. log—0.096;. -°<—-h-.._ ‘ - .-. me ‘SOCIQ-ROLITICALZ EACKGROUND or JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS: THE TWENTY-FOURTH DIET Thesis faith. Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY . Tadao KobayaShi 1956 THESIS :11 ' _. :""‘~I , ' .' I ' ‘- ' ‘ 'IIT,‘ lulu uvaV—fubll‘ivng DnVlLU$1V\JL\J) vl‘ Jnl ruling.) U.._‘.J.L| l'ml‘wunoz T42) Jjal .1“ .L1 iI-l‘lvcpliin V blur I. y '71: . r'7 r; T h r;‘*rr (1‘1" . lmgvuo .LLO "v41 aDl-l 1m fwdl'findl‘ submitted to the College of business and Iublic gervice of hichigan etate Lniversity of agriculture and Applied pcience in partial fulfillment of the requirements for fine degree of . - 11:! ,' '1 3 “\ 1““, 1.1-9.) lgix VJ? :1.th Department of :eliticel dCiSJCG 1356 ./" -} . / 7\‘ [C I" \ C _‘ Approv’e ‘3. t7 /‘,.’.»( £' \5L ’Lfifggfé j) [1" [Ii-’7 2 x v ——y THEszss ls‘i ' l T . 1 . iadao nobayasni pince the allied Lccupgtion, tfie Japanese Diet has been placed in tLe position wnsre it could rise all the important politic; decisions of tbe country. The pn1p03e of this paper has been to describe what types of individuals the Japanese voters chos as tneir lculbudq+eolVCo in this body. BPe 462 Llemb ers of tne lOwel house of the Diet in Dec e‘1ber 1949 were selected for induiry, 31d tneir official biographies have been *sed as a basis for descriting their socio—political back— 'rounds. occie l b clqiodrd LIclUdes such variables as tbe Diet ne"be1c' ages, educatiOns, occupational eXperiences, the regions of birth and election, tle types of conmnnities in which they were born, and t 'eir positions of leadersliip in private organizations. -olitic l ticl Jound includes their sta+ nses in party or; aniz ations, previous eXperiences in appointive and elective offices on the national, prefectnral, and local levels of governm_nt, and positions of leaders hip held in the Diet. Ehese dat' liave been analyrs ed in terls of the Diet as a whole, and also bgr pa artv affiliation. rhis study de onstrates that members of the 1949 Diet were largely recruited from the tOp status groups in Japan- ese society. fhey were ;enerally persons likely to be label- ed "successful" in any modern society, i.e., tke OCCUpants of hi on status positions in private industry, in the profes- A sions, or in pnblic affairs. 1 large number of them were 1K4 " o Ledao nobayasni it)“ eads or directors 0: manu acturin‘ and 00‘16rCiEl firms; many were foruer govern01s, nayors, and bureau chiefs in national and prefecturel governrents. nrriculture was a very under— represented occupation in the Diet, and even 920“: tnose rer— bers claiming to be aériculturists, feJ were identifiable as "dirt farmers.” nlnost all Diet cenbers, i unists, were therefore from the w ite collar class. Their succ s U) (1) iii private life guy be partly attributed b0 tr -eir ori in s, tneir naturity, and their educational attain- ments. Typic 1 members were lar5ely born around the turn of the century in small towns, and as of 1949 tney were, thus, more urban in origin than tneir age group in tne total popu- lation. They were very well ed uc; ed as compared with the electorate in l949——nost of then had received university education in the large fokyo institutions. Eneir fields of study were practical ones, such as law, commerce, and economics, and almost none of them received what amounts to liberal educa— tion in the American sense. Politically, the members were extremely ineXperienced on the national level--9O percent of them had never been elect— ed to the Diet before 1946. Diet officers such as the speak— ers, committee chairmen, and caucus cnairuen were almost as inerperienced. many of tne members had, however, prior legis— lative eXperience in tIIe prefectur and municipal assemblies. Lost members were office's of nationsl party 01.: a.1u1t13ns, or were heads of prefectural or local organizations. - . 1:: '5 r wrr~ ‘1 '- Tauao hOb$;aSfll finally, it was found that the nemhers of the 1349 Diet were largely 1:.aisen—r‘:~"<1:‘i1«fin, the political "5;..rvenus since the war defeat." It is unlilely that .:-::;-;.ny of then could have risen to political power without t‘..e purwing of the old-ti“ politicians under the Allied ocsu etion. 1"“e extent to which they represent a new ty‘ke of political decision—1.1ane‘" is dif- ficult to ascertain in tie absence of studies siniilar to this of Lists prior to 134$. TRUE SOCIO—POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE DIET MEJEERS: THE TWENTY—FOURTH DIE by Tadao Kobayashi A THESIS Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Political Science 1956 ACKNOWLEDGHENTS I am grateful to the members of my guidance com— Imittee, Professors Wesley R. Fishel, Bruce L. Smith, and John.Useem, who read the manuscript and offered many sug- gestions for improving the style and content of this paper. I am especially indebted to Dr. Fishel for placing at my disposal his collection of Japanese documentary ma- terials which are probably unobtainable elsewhere at this time. During the course of my summer employment in 1954 which took me to various parts of the country, I have been fortunate in being able to use materials in the libraries of the University of Washington and the cities of Seattle, New York, and Los Angeles. To the reference librarians of these institutions, I am also indebted. Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my wife, who, like wives of graduate students everywhere, shared the trials and tribulations of thesis research and writing. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Research technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 CHAPTER I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Prewar developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . l9 Postwar parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 General election of 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . 4O Post-election develOpments . . . . . . . . . . 50 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 II. BIRTHPLAOE AND AGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Basis for representation . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Regional origin and representation . . . . . . 61 Prefectural origin and representation . . . . 66 Type of birthplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Age in 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 III. EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Educational levels of Diet members . . . . . . 85 University education . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Foreign aduCation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Foreign travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 iv CHAPTER PAGE Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 ILV. OCCUPATIONS AND LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSO~ CIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . 116 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Occupations by work groupings . . . . . . . 122 Occupations by status groups . . . . . . . . 127 Professional services . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Leadership in private associations . . . . . 156 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 V. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Civil Service Examinations . . . . . . . . . 147 Experience in the national government . . . 152 Experience in prefectural governments . . . 157 Experience in municipal governments . . . . 162 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 VI. POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND DIET LEADERSHIP . . . 168 Previous Diet experience . . . . . . . . . . 169 Previous experience in local assemblies . . 175 Highest positions held in political par- ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Diet leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 CHAPTER PAGE VII). SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A 195 Introduction . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . 195 Birthplace and age . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Occupation and leadership in private as- sociations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 Government experience . . . . . . . . . . 204 Political experience and Diet leader- ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20? Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 TABLE 1. 5. 6. 10. ll. 12. LIST OF TABLES Elections of 1947 and 1949-—Votes and Seats Won, by Party . . . . . . . . . . Candidates-~Number Running, Number and Per- centage Elected: 1949 . . . . . . . . . . Reported Election Expenditures of Major Par- ties: 1949 . . . . . Comparison of Party Strength: January and December 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage Elected in Each Region, by Party . Representatives Elected in Prefectures Not of Birth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of Population by Size of Com- munity, 1898 and 1950, and the Birthplaces of Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . Age of Representatives—-by Age Group and by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Age of Representatives Compared with Age of Population in 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . Age of Representatives in Selected Diets, by Age Group . . . . . . . . . . . Age of Members of Lower Houses in Japan, U. S. and U. K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educational Level by Party . . . . . . . 46 48 49 52 64 67 71 75 79 79 81 90 vii TABLE PAGE 15. Educational Level by Age Groups . . . . . . . . 91 14. Years of Schooling Completed--Comparison between Diet Members and Non-Student POpulation, 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 15. Educational Level of Members of the Lower House—-Japan, U. S., U. K. . . . . . . . . . 94 16. Universities Attended, by Party . . . . . . . . 99 17. Universities Most Frequently Attended . . . . . 102 18. Major in Both Colleges and Universities, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 19. Major in Universities, by Institutions . . . . 109 20. Foreign Education, by Party . . . . . . . . . . 111 21. Travel Abroad, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 22. Published Works, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . 115 25. Occupational Distribution by Status and Work Groupings . . . . . . . . . . . C . . . . . . 121 24. Occupational Distribution by Work Groupings-- Comparison of Diet Members and Labor Force in 1950, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 25. Selected Occupations Represented in Past Diets, by Work Groupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 26. Highest Occupational Status--Comparison of Die Members and Labor Force in 1950, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 viii TABLE PAGE 27. Professional Services, by Party . . . . . . . . 155 28. Professionals in the Diet and U. S. Congress. . 154 29. Leadership in Private Associations by Type of Association and Party . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 50. Leadership in Private Associations, by Level of Leadership and Scope of Association . . . 158 51. Civil Service Examinations Passed, by Uni- versity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 52. Highest Offices Held in National Government, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 55. Highest Offices Held in Prefectural Govern— ment, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 54. Highest Office Held in Municipal Government by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 55. Government Experience of U. S. and Japanese Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 56. Number of Times Elected to the Diet, by Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 57. Members Elected for the First Time . . . . . . 171 58. Postwar, War, Prewar Diet Experience . . . . . 172 59. Experience in Prefectural Assemblies . . . . . 177 40. Experience in City, Town, and Village Assem- blies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 41. Highest Position Held in National, Prefectural, and Local Party Organizations, by Party . . . 185 ix TABLE PAGE 42. Highest Postition Held in National, Prefectural, and Local Party Organizations, by Educational Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 45. Diet Leaders-~Age in 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . 189 44. Diet Leaders--Number of Times Elected . . . .*. 190 45. Diet Leaders—-Educationa1 Level . . . . . . . . 191 46. Diet Leaders-~Occupationa1 Status . . . . . . . 195 INTRODUCTION A. The Problem This study is largely the outgrowth of the author's feeling that, from an American democratic point of view, something is amiss with parliamentary government in Japan, before as well as after the Allied Occupation, and that available literature fails to explain this persistent short— coming adequately. Some other approach to the study of the Japanese Diet is needed which will supplement and make more meaningful the traditional, institutional studies that have been accomplished thus far. {uch of the literature available in English on Japa- nese government and politics which are cited in the follow- ing chapter, take the descriptive approach, historical or journalistic. Many of the writers, particularly on postwar developments, betray an American, ethnocentric viewpoint with regard to Japanese politics; they fail to give suffi- cient attention to those aspects of Japanese culture and society which condition political behavior. Some intriguing political studies at the "rice-roots" level have been re- ported by the Center of Japanese Studies of the University of Michigan,1 and some important ethnOgraphic2 and community 3 studies indirectly bearing upon political studies are wide- 2 1y available. However, empirical studies on government at the national level are rarely seen.AL Besides being untested, the statements contained in the historical and journalistic works are largely qualita- tive, and they therefore lack the precision of studies em- ploying quantitative methods. It is not enough to be able to say, for example, that in the Diet "age and seniority were observed as rigidly as in the bureaucracy," as one of the books put it.5 To the political scientist, it would be far more useful to know to what degree seniority as charac— terized by age, by length of service in the Diet, by number of times elected, or by some other criteria, is evident in the selection of speakers and committee chairmen. Further- more, a pOpular although extreme notion might be that "some Diet members are such uneducated bumpkins that they say 'oika—yosan' instead of 'tsuika—yosan' (i.e., a mistaken reading of the two ideographs for 'supplementary' in the term, 'supplementary budget')," as expressed to the author by an Okinawan legislator. Again, it would be far more pre- cise to be able to state what percentage of Diet members re- ceived what levels of education in what fields. One should not be overly critical of American writers for neglecting to use sociological methods, in view of the fact that the Japanese political scientists themselves have not exploited this approach. This much is admitted by one of their leaders, Dr. Masamichi Royama, a former member of 5 the Law Faculty of Tokyo University. Himself a pioneer in empirical studies,6 he writes that "Japanese political sci— ence has failed to conduct historical (i.e., critical) re- search and social investigations into political institu- tions and their functions," and that it has failed to coor- dinate its research with the other branches of the social sciences, i.e., anthropolbgy, cultural history, psychology, and sociology:7 A cursory examination of publishers' lists since the end of the war indicates that Japanese political scientists have been preoccupied with research in constitu- tional and legal problems and in diplomatic history and in- ternational relations. So much for the shortcomings of existing literature. The purpose of this study is not to duplicate these de- scriptive analyses, but to supplement them with information largely neglected by political scientists. Instead of fo- cusing upon "the Diet" as an abstract, reified institution, it will concentrate upon the individuals who compose the Diet, and seek to answer the question: what are the mem- bers of the Diet like--what are their political and social antecedents? Sociological theory holds that the group in human relations is never the sum of its parts, and therefore, the National Diet can never be equated merely with the 466 mem- bers of the House of Representatives and the 250 members of the House of Councillors who together make up the national 4 body. A better understanding of the Diet can come with the study of the web of interaction between individuals and groups within the Diet (e.g., caucuses, committees, and in- formal groups), interaction among these groups, and inter- action between these individuals or groups and extra-Diet individuals or groups, such as governmental ministries, pressure groups, political parties, journalists, prefectu-d ral and local governments, and constituents. All this in- teraction should be explained in terms of the cultural and situational context of Japan. This much is granted, but this study presupposes that as a starting point for the study of relationships, it is fruitful to examine the individuals themselves, the po- litical elites composing the Diet, and see what generaliza- tions can be made about the social and political composi- tion of the Diet. For our purpose, "social background" in- cludes variables such as regions and types of communities in which Diet members were born, age, education, foreign contacts, and occupational experiences. "Political back- ground" includes variables like party affiliation, status in party organizations, previous Diet experience, age at which first elected to the Diet, status in the Diet, previ- ous experience in other elective offices on the prefectural and municipal levels, and previous experience in executive and judicial offices on the national, prefectural, and mu- nicipal levels. This type of information is indeed prelim- inary to any sociological examination of the organization and behavior of the legislative body, just as census data are the preliminary requisite to the construction of survey design. A careful study of political elites as individuals is especially important with regard to Japan if it is true, as almost all western writers assert, that the Japanese tend to vote more on the basis of personalities than on party affiliations and political views of candidates. Be- fore the war, a political scientist wrote:8 Personal prestige appears to be the essential quali- ty in a candidate. A connection with a formerly power- ful clan, relationship to a locally respected family, reputation for cleverness as a journalist or speaker-- these attributes are highly regarded by the voters. Party platforms are too indefinite and the speeches of politicians too vague to afford even the well-educated voter a hold on reality. Another prewar scholar attributes this phenomenon to Confu- cian concepts which hold that ethics govern the political relationships between two distinct classes, the governors and the governed, and that the former, being superior in o virtue, make the laws and are themselves above the laws:’ Thus the Japanese have laid great stress on personal- ities in government and have paid less attention to form, theory, and law. It is the officials themselves that make a government either just or tyrannical. It is not the organization of the state, but the governing class; not the political theory, but the men who put that theory into practice; not the laws, but the offi- cials who create and enforce them that are important. These observations have been borne out in voting be- havior after World War 11, according to a report issued by the Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SOAP),lO as well as by a former member of the Allied Occupation who hypothesizes:ll . . . the Japanese voter is more likely than the Amer— ican voter to vote for persons with prestige and status and less likely to vote for candidates because of the principles for which they stand. Since the very begin- nings of Japanese constitutional government in the late nineteenth century, politics has typically been conduct- ed on the basis of personal loyalty resembling somewhat the loyalty of the retainer to his feudal lord. These statements appear to be untested ideas of the authors, but they also seem to be confirmed by a sociologi- cal study of voting behavior in the General Election of 1949, to the extent that personality characteristics still dominate although the traditional prestige types appear to be less important than new, emerging types:l2 One must be cognizant of the fact that throughout thg city and farm village, personality characteristics /of candidate§7 had a powerful effect on voting. In other words,/Zvoters chos§7 candidates who endeared. themselves to the electorate through imaginative cam- paigning and personalities who serve as symbols of ideological groups. In these turbulent times, these are the persons who strongly appeal to all classes as well as to specific individuals and classes. Therefore it is probably clear that the old political symbols are universally disappearing at least from the political awareness of the voters. A study of individuals in the Diet may yield, in ad- dition to data on the socio-political make-up of the mem- bers, generalizations concerning those types of legislators most favored by the Japanese electorate. B. Research Techniques An ideal study of the individuals who make up a part of the pmlitical elite of Japanese government, the members of the Diet, would include in its universe all members of both houses, since the inception of the Diet in 1890, How- ever, the present paper will examine intensively only mem— bers of the House of Representatives of the Twenty-Fourth Diet who held office from January 1949 to October 1952. No pretension is made that conclusions reached on the basis of this one body can be generalized for members of the other twenty-six Diets which have convened since 1890. However, data for these other Diets will be introduced when avail- able and applicable for comparative purposes. The lower house was chosen as the area of inquiry be- cause, figgt, it is the more powerful of the two bodies to- day. According to the Constitution of 1947, when a bill passed by the lower house is changed, defeated or not taken up within sixty days by the upper house, the lower house may overrule this action by a two-thirds majority (Article 59). In case of budget bills or treaties (Articles 60, 61), a simple instead of a two-thirds majority suffices. In case of disagreement over the choice of the Prime Minister, the choice of the lower house applies (Article 69). Second, the lower house reflects party alignments to a greater de- gree than the House of Councillors. For example, in 1949, 8 only one member out of 466 in the House of Representatives claimed to be an independent, whereas94 out of 253 claimed to be either members of somewhat non-party groups such as the Green Breeze Society (Ryokufu Kai) and the lndependents' Discussion Society (Hushozoku Kondan Kai), or outright in- 13 dependents. Third, electorally speaking, lower house members are homogeneous and easier to treat as units, i.e., each member was elected from one of 117 multi-member con— stituencies and all were elected for concurrent terms, whereas in the House of Councillors, 100 are chosen from the nation at large and 150 from prefectures,14 and one- half of the body stand for election every three years. The Twenty-Fourth Diet was chosen because of the sig— nificant period in which it was active and because of its political alignments. It lasted longer than any other post- war Diet, actually twice as long as its nearest rival, the Twenty-Sixth Diet. It continued throughout most of the im- portant second phase of the American Occupation when empha— sis was shifted from punishment to recovery and from reform to consolidation, and it remained in power through the first five months of independence. Its members were the first chosen under the new Constitution and under the 1947 election laws, which called for governmental supervision and sponsorship of electioneering. Most significantly, it reflected for the first time a polarization of political sentiment toward the extreme right and left. The Democratic- 9 Liberual IParty became the first postwar party to command an absolnltee majority, although the purge which originally thirudeél its ranks was still in effect. The Communist Party ‘was ruaver-stronger than in the first year of the Twenty- Fourth Diet. The principal source of authoritative biographical imnfoznnation was the Hanual _£ the House 9f Representatives, Voldnne II (Shugiin Yoran, Otsu), published in 1949 by the Geruaral Affairs Office, House of Representatives (Shugiin Jinnfkyoku), primarily for the use of legislators. This hamnlbook, upon which most of the statistical data of this study'is based, contains the names, photographs and bio- graphical sketches of each of the 462 representatives (four less than the total number of seats in the lower house) in office when the book was issued on December 25, 1949. Sup- plementary information, such as education below the high school level, was obtained from Japan's Who's Who, 1950~ 1951.l5 The Asahi Yearbook, 1950 (Asahi Nenkan, Showa l6 Nijugonen Ban) and various reports issued for the General Election of 1949 by the National Election Administration Commission (Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai) were also found useful—-for example, in yielding information on current oc- cupational status. The following outline contains the types of informa- tion found in the biographies; these are listed as numbered items. Other items of information which were derived from 10 thenl agapear after the lower case letters under the appro- pri at e numbers . 1. Name a. Sex Party Prefecture and electoral district from which elected a. Region from which elected (Since it would be too unwieldy to deal with 46 prefectures, they have been grouped into seven traditionally recognized regions.) Place of birth a. Region of birth b. Type of community in which born c. Prefecture from which elected compared with pre- fecture of birth Date of Birth a. Age in 1949 Service in previous Diets a. lumber of times elected b. Postwar, war and prewar experience in the Diet c. Number of years of previous Diet experience d. Age at first election Education a. Educational level b. National universities attended 0. Private universities attended d. Major field of study e. Foreign education ll 8. Travel abroad 9. Publications 10. Occupational history. a. Government examinations passed b. Occupations classified according to industry 0. Professional services (Detailed breakdown of "b") d. Highest previous governmental and political of- fices held in national, prefectural and local governments (l) Diplomatic experience (2) Police experience e. Highest occupational level held in career govern- mental positions and in private industry 11. Party experience a. Highest positions held in party organizations b. Highest positions held in the Diet 12. Participation in private organizations-~e.g., Cham— bers of Commerce. Each of these socio-political variables was coded and punched on IBM cards, one card for each representative. No sampling was involved. Except for Chapters 1 and 7, the study is organized around groupings of these variables. The first chapter is designed primarily to orient the reader to the data; it dis- cusses the develOpment of parliamentary representation—-or more precisely, its failure to develOp in the western sense between the Meiji Restoration and the regaining of independ- ence in 1952. Also, it deals with the election of the . . o :— ~. 12 Twenty-Fourth Diet, the party alignment which emerged from the election, and the various reshufflings of factions which took place in the Diet during the first year. The following five chapters are concerned with the birthplaces and ages of representatives; education, foreign travel and publications; occupations and offices in private organiza-7 tions; experience in appointive governmental positions in national, prefectural, and local governments; and finally, past and present political experience, i.e., elective posi- tions held in the Diet, prefectural assemblies, and munici- pal councils, and offices held in party organizations. The last chapter summarizes the results obtained and sets forth some conclusions. Two social variables, ethnic origin and religion, which are very important in the study of United States Con— gressmen, are not mentioned in the biographies and are omitted from this study because of their political unimpor— tance. In the 1949 Diet, only three members were born out- side Japan Proper, and only one of them, a Korean, is non- Japanese. Religion, too, is insignificant in Japan. Shinto and Buddhism are the predominant faiths, but the Japanese seem to be so religiously accommodating that many embrace both faiths. This fact is borne out by the statistics of the Ministry of Education which indicate that the total number of religious adherents is about 25 per cent larger than the total population.17 15 The universe of the study was divided for analysis in three ways: fgpgt, data have been tabulated for the Diet as a whole so that generalizations can be made con- cerning the socio-political backgrounds of all members. Second, variables (e.g., age, education, occupational and governmental experience, etc.) have been tabulated accord- ing to party affiliation. This, p33 g3, may not be as sig- nificant in Japan as in western countries as noted previ- 18 A SOAP study, moreover, attributed this insignif- ously. icance to: (l) the multiplicity of parties and the constant realignment among them, (2) party organization emphasizing personalities instead of principles, and (5) ambiguous party platforms little understood by either voters or politicians}9 However, party membership of representatives has been treat- ed as an independent variable to test this notion, i.e., to see if important differences can be found in their socio- political backgrounds when they are grouped according to the major parties. Thigd, variables have been analyzed not only from the standpoint of function but from the often neglect- ed dimension of status as well in dealing with the experi- ence of representatives in the following: Legislative bodies (Diet, prefectural assemblies, mu— nicipal councils) Political party organizations Executive bodies on the national, prefectural, and lo- cal levels of government 14 Schools and other public organizations Private firms Private organizations These are established social organizations in which there are divisions of labor, i.e., functional specializations, and structures of authority, i.e., status systems. As a sociologist put it:20 . . . Status is an important kind of cement that binds an organization together. When authority becomes rela— tively stable, and when functional specialization is established, the development of status symbols for each position in the organization serves to institutionalize and regularize the structure. Status is therefore defined as:21 . . . a set of visible, external markings that system- atically ranks individuals and groups in relation to each other, and that includes all the members of the organization some place in the scheme of rankings. For our purpose, the'job titles," such as "committee chair- man," "mayor," "director," or "president," which representa- tives ascribe to themselves in their official biographies are the only status symbols available. Job titles and de- scriptions often have little resemblance to actual authority exercised and duties performed, but since there is no way of verifying the claims of representatives save through ex- tensive and difficult field investigation, the titles are used in this study as indicators of status with this limita- tion in mind.‘ Finally, it is conceivable that statistical informa- tion concerning the backgrounds of Diet members is readily .v u , < -_h III 15 Tflle universe of the study was divided for analysis in tlrresa'ways: first, data have been tabulated for the Diet; as; a whole so that generalizations can be made con- cernddig the socio-political backgrounds of all members. Secornl, variables (e.g., age, education, occupational and govexnnnental experience, etc.) have been tabulated accord- film; to party affiliation. This, per gg, may not be as sig— :nificant in.Japan as in western countries as noted previ- ously.18 A SOAP study, moreover, attributed this insignif- icance to: (l) the multiplicity of parties and the constant realignment among them, (2) party organization emphasizing personalities instead of principles, and (5) ambiguous party platforms little understood by either voters or politicians.l9 However, party membership of representatives has been treat- ed as an independent variable to test this notion, i.e., to see if important differences can be found in their socio- political backgrounds when they are grouped according to the major parties. Third, variables have been analyzed not only from the standpoint of function but from the often neglect- ed dimension of status as well in dealing with the experi- ence of representatives in the following: Legislative bodies (Diet, prefectural assemblies, mu- nicipal councils) Political party organizations Executive bodies on the national, prefectural, and lo- cal levels of government l4 ESCIuools and other public organizations Private firms Private organi zations Thesma are established social organizations in which there are (Livisions of labor, i.e., functional specializations, and.satructures of authority, i.e., status systems. As a sociologist put it:20 . . . Status is an important kind of cement that binds an organization together. When authority becomes rela- tively stable, and when functional specialization is established, the develOpment of status symbols for each position in the organization serves to institutionalize and regularize the structure. Status is therefore defined as:21 . . . a set of visible, external markings that system- atically ranks individuals and groups in relation to each other, and that includes all the members of the organization some place in the scheme of rankings. For our purpose, the'job titles," such as "committee chair- man," "mayor," "director," or "president," which representa- tives ascribe to themselves in their official biographies are the only status symbols available. Job titles and de- scriptions often have little resemblance to actual authority exercised and duties performed, but since there is no way of verifying the claims of representatives save through ex- tensive and difficult field investigation, the titles are used in this study as indicators of status with this limita- tion in mind. Finally, it is conceivable that statistical informa- tion concerning the backgrounds of Diet members is readily 15 availjiblxa in a variety of forms, and that there is no need for'clulfilicating such tedious work. For example, among postwar sources in Japanese may be mentioned the important Japaruese newspapers which carry statistical items after each.(}eneral Election, and yearbooks like the Asahi Nenkan. Reldxible election summaries are contained in the numerous repmnrts issued by the National Election Administration Com- Imission (Zenk ku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai), and in the excellent General Survey 9: the Election 9: members _f the New Nation— ‘gl Parliament for 1949 (Shin Kokkai Senkyo Taikan).22 Among English sources of statistical information (which, however, are secondary in nature) may be mentioned Japanese Government and Politics, by Harold S. Quigley;25 Party Gov- ernment in ggpgg, by Robert E. Ward;24 and Political Reori— entation g: Jgpgg, compiled by Government Section, SOAP.25 In rebuttal, the following points may be raised. First, all these sources have been used in this study when- ever they supplemented statistics obtained from the biog- raphies. None of the references above in English deal with the Twenty-Fourth Diet, and most American political scien- tists cannot use the Japanese sources, unless they are in translated form. More seriously, the statistics in these references are not refined enough to be of much value to political science. For example, education of representa- tives may be given, but no breakdown is available according to universities and major fields of study. Occupational . . . ..¢ .. o u . .1. e - n~h . o «L. l6 infcxrnuation.is particularly misleading in that many individ- ualjs wfldo, for example, classify themselves as farmers are, upon examination of their biographies, actually officers of agriculltural associations and c00peratives and are there- forxa likely to be far removed from the soil. Representa— tiAnas may be classified as "business firm employees," kaisha—in, with no indication as to the type of business involved.(manufacturing, banking, commerce, etc.) or the status held within such firms (director, clerk, etc.). This study emphasizes status as well as function in all or- ganizations, a line of inquiry which has not been treated in the sources above. Finally, statistical data are mean- ingful to political scientists only when they are organized into sociologically significant relationships within a con— ceptual scheme, and when they are supplemented by background information. When discussing educational statistics, for instance, one must bear in mind the significance of educa- tion at the Tokyo Imperial University for entrée into the civil service. 17 NOTES--Introduction l. E. g., see selections by Robert E. Ward, "Patterns of Stability and Chang e," Occasional Papers No. 1, Center of Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor. University of Lichigan Press, 1951), p. 11; Paul S. Dull, "The 'Senkyoya' System in Rural Japanese Communities," ibid. No. 4 (1955), p. 29; Joseph L. Sutton, "Rural Politics in Japan," ibid., p. 40. 2. E.g., Ruth Benedict, Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946). 5. E. g., John F. Embree, Suye Lura A Japanese Vil— lave (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959). 4. A very useful work is John F. Embree, The Mp a- nese Nation, A Social Survey (New York: Farrar and Rims- hart, 1945). 5. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948), p. 214. 6. Masamichi Royama, Sei i Ishiki No Kaibo / An Anal- ysis of Political Awareness7ZTokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949), a study of voting behavior in the 1949 General Elec— tion in a sample city district, a town and a farm village. 7. Masamichi Royama, "Political Science in Japan," selection in Contemporary Political Science (Paris: UNESCO, 1950) , p0 5200 8. Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Poli- tics (New York: Century, 1952), p. 264. 9. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan, Government-Politics (New York: Nelson, 1959), pp. 51, 52. 10. Government Section, SOAP, Political Reorienta- tion of Japan, Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Of- fice. 19491. p- 352 11. Robert B. Textor, Failure in Japan (New York: John Day, 1951), p. 115. l2. Masamichi Royama, Seiji Ishiki Np Kaibo, pp. cit., p. 228. Translation mine. 18 15. Statistics from Asahi Nenkan / Asahi Yearbook, 19507 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha,1949), pp. 287, 291. Of the 94 independents in the Hous of Councillors, 75 were in theGreen Breeze Society, 16 in the Independents' Discussion Society, and 5 were independents. 14. See Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai /-Nationa1 Elec- tion Administration Commission7, Senkyo Se1do Shiryo, Dai §EE E2 / Liaterials on the Election System, Part 5 _7, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), pp. 28, 54. Of the 117 districts for the elec— tion of the House of Representatives, 40 were three-member, 59 were four-member, and 58 were five-member constituencies. In the House of Councillors elections, prefectures were represented by 2 to 8 persons depending upon pOpulation. 15. (Tokyo: Tokyo News Service, April 1950). 16. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949). 17. Iichi Oguchi, "Religions of Japan," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 195, No. 1 (Jan. 55), pp. 122, 125. 19. Political Reorientation pg Japan, Vol. I, pp.545, 20. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration (New York: Prentice-Ha11,1951), p. 254. 21. 391g. 22. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1947 and 1949). 25. 9p. £23., pp. 168-170. 24. Full title: Party Government in £2282: A Pre- liminar Surve of Its Development and Electoral Record, 2-157.Un175blished Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1948.) 25 92- c1t., V01- 19 Section X--"Popu1ar Elections," PP- 514, 557- 18 15. Statistics from Asahi Nenkan /-Asahi Yearbook, 19597 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 19495,_pp. 287, 291. Of the 94 independents in the House of Councillors, 75 were in theGreen Breeze Society, 16 in the Independents' Discussion Society, and 5 were independents. 14. See Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai /—National Elec— tion Administration Commission7, Senkyo Seido Shir o, Dai San Eu /-Materials on the EleE ion System, Part 5 , (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), pp. 28, 54. Of the 117 districts for the elec- tion of the House of Representatives, 40 were three—member, 59 were four-member, and 58 were five-member constituencies. In the House of Councillors elections, prefectures were represented by 2 to 8 persons depending upon population. 15. (Tokyo: Tokyo News Service, April 1950). 16. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949). 17. Iichi Oguchi, "Religions of Japan," Atlantic- Monthly, Vol. 195, No. 1 (Jan. 55), pp. 122, 12S. 18. See pp. 5-7, supra. 19. Political Reorientation pi Japan, Vol. I, pp.545, 20. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration (New York: Prentice—Hall, 1951), p. 254. 21. Ipid. 22. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1947 and 1949). 25. 9p. git., pp. 168-170. 24. Full title: Party Government ip gapag: A Egg- 1iminar Surve of Its DevelOpment and Electoral Record, 1 8-1 52. Unpfifblished Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1948.) 25. 9p. cit., Vol. I, Section X--"Popular Elections," pp. 514, 557. 18 15. Statistics from Asahi Nenkan /-Asahi Yearbook, 19507 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 19497,‘pp. 287, 291. or the-94 independents in the House of Councillors, 75 were in theGreen Breeze Society, 16 in the Independents' Discussion Society, and 5 were independents. 14. See Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai /—Nationa1 Elec— tion Administration Commission7, Senkyo Seido Shiryo, Dai Sap pp /_Materials on the EleE ion System, Part 5 7, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), pp. 28, 54. Of the 117 districts re; the elec— tion of the House of Representatives, 40 were three-member, 59 were four-member, and 58 were five-member constituencies. In the House of Councillors elections, prefectures were represented by 2 to 8 persons dependinq upon pOpulation. 15. (Tokyo: Tokyo News Service, April 1950). 16. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949). 17. Iichi Oguchi, "Religions of Japan," Atlantic- Monthly, Vol. 195, No. 1 (Jan. 55), pp. 122, 125. 18. See pp. 5-7, supra. 19. Political Reorientation pf Japan, Vol. I, pp.545, 20. Robert Dubin, Human Relations ip Administration (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 254. 21. Ibid. 22. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1947 and 1949). 25. 9p. cit., pp. 168-170. 24. Full title: Party Government ip Japan: A 232- liminar Surve of Its Development and Electoral Record, 1 8-1 57. Unpfifblished Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1948.) 25. 9p. cit., Vol. I, Section X--"Popular Elections," pp. 514. 557. CHAPTER I BACKGROUND INFORMATION Learn from the evergreen pine tree: In a lonely garden In winter decay It changes not its color. Emperor Hirohitol 1949 A. Prewar Developments The artistic sensitivity of the Japanese peOple is, perhaps, no better exemplified than in the annual poetry contest held throughout the nation under the auspiCes of the emperor. Each year, he himself writes a pglkp, an epi- grammatic poem expressed in five—seven-five syllables. In- nocuous as they may seem to the occidental, they neverthe- less take on political significance in that they are close— ly scrutinized by the Japanese public for possible clues to the emperor's thoughts. Like all pithy sayings, these poems can be interpreted in as many ways as there are interpret- ers. The one above which appeared in January 1949 may be interpreted as an exhortation from the emperor to the peOple to be as purely Japanese as before--whatever that may be--in a period of alien rule, inflation, physical hardship and social disorganization. 2O ' On the other hand, should one prefer to analogize the pine tree to the Japanese state, or "national polity" to employ a much used and ill-understood term,of prewar militarists, he may say that Emperor Hirohito wants the prewar pattern of political powers to be maintained in spite of the structural and institutional changes in gov— ernment made under the allied occupation. What was in the emperor's mind when he penned it, only he can explain, but the poem helps to dramatize what is undoubtedly the most discussed question concerning the government of postwar Japan. Is the Japanese state un— changing like the presumably metaphoric pine tree in spite of winter decay? Regardless of the many institutional changes introduced into the social, economic, and political relationships of the Japanese under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SOAP), can we say, as some writers have, that the underlying cultural bases of Japanese society are such that the power structure of pre- war government remains insignificantly modified? Social scientists seem to agree that the scope and direction of power allocated to governments are dependent upon the cultural and social situation.2 Thus the pgal as distinguished from the formal or legal organization and ”4.”- function of a government are basei: (1) on the "national 5 character" or "ethos" or "cultural pattern" of the nation , and (2) on the primary social institutions (e.g., the fami- 21 ly and church) and the groups (e.g., parties and pressure groups) which appear to be dominant in their ceaseless ri- valry among themselves for political priority.4 The form of government as neatly portrayed in organizational charts may be quite different from the actual structure and func- tions of authority, just as the "law" may be quite differ— ent from the "spirit" in which it is interpreted and ap- plied. This should be particularly apparent in a country like Japan, which skipped centuries of the evolutionary change that took place in western civilization and adOpted many of its contemporary features during the Meiji Restora— tion. Granted that government, in practice, could not be established by fiat alone unless it finds expression in pre— vailing conventions and the wishes of dominant social in- stitutions and power groupings, then the somewhat startling democratic innovations contained in the Meiji Constitution of 1889 could not have drastically altered centuries-old governmental institutions and practices. Perhaps the most significant innovation contained in the Constitution of 1889 was the recognition of parliamen- tary representation in one of the two houses of the Imperial Diet. Probably nothing could be more alien to Japanese ex- perience than the notion that the peOple could choose legis- lators, since the prevailing customs and mores echoed the 22 Confucian dictum that rulers should command and the ruled should obey. Yet limited male suffrage was granted in 1889 so that 450,000 (out of a total pOpulation of 40 million) were eligible to vote in 1890 for members of the House of Representatives.5 Property qualifications were gradually reduced so that by 1925, universal male suffrage (12,495,000 voters out of a pOpulation of 59 million) was an accom- plished fact. This revolutionary idea of holding popular elections is not so startling when one asks what it was meant to ac- complish. The Satsuma—Choshu oligarchs then in power faced serious Opposition from rival clans which sought to pene- trate the closed circle of administrators surrounding the throne. To placate their desires as well as to establish a symbol of westernization to gain the respect of the Great Powers, Hirobumi Ito, one of the leading oligarchs, devised a nationally elected lower house under the Meiji Constitu- tion which was shorn of final law-making power. Powers generally exercized by the national assembly in western countries were retained by the Emperor. He could determine the organization of the government and armed forces, declare war, make peace and conclude treaties, and issue ordinances for implementing laws and for maintaining public peace and order. Significantly, he could even issue ordinances in place of laws when the Diet was not in session. Since in 23 practice the emperor seldom acted on his own initiative, his nominal authority was exercised by the oligarchs sur— rounding him. As if this were not enough to stifle democratic rule, the budgetary powers of the Diet were almost nulli- fied by provisions which forbade the rejection of "fixed expenditures," which permitted the government to legislate financial measures when the Diet was not in session, and which authorized the government to'barry out the budget of the preceding year" if the Diet failed to enact one. Ito made clear his intention of maintaining the Diet as a mere discussion chamber and of centering authority in the Emperor in the true Confucian tradition when he wrote: From the nature of the original polity of this country, it follows that there ought to be one and only one source of the sovereign power of the State . . . The use of the Diet is to enable the head of the State to perform his function and to keep the State in a well- disciplined, strong and healthy condition. The legis- lative power is ultimately under the control of the Em- peror, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. Thus between the Emperor and the Diet, a dis- tinction is to be sprictly maintained as to their re- spective positions. Except for a brief interval of responsible govern— ment based on party alignments from 1924 to 1952, this was essentially the pattern of government which prevailed until l945--the maintenance of an intentionally weak but pOpular- ly elected lower house, sharing with a largely appointed upper house the privilege of sanctioning decisions made elsewhere. 24 Unlike the subordinate role of the Teikoku Gikai (the Imperial Diet) under the Neiji Constitution, the new Kokkai (the National Diet) is constitutionally omnipotent today. It is "the highest organ of state power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State."7 The emperor himself echoed these thoughts when he said, "The foundation for the develOpment of future Japan lies solely in the right man- agement of the Diet."8 Are these views justifiably in view of the preceding tradition and experience? Is responsible parliamentary government still so dimly understood and little accepted by the Japanese that it may not endure for long in practice although its form may be retained? Since all writers seem to agree that the postwar constitution is largely the result of American direction, one may well ask whether the preeminent role of the Diet in it is built upon assumptions prevailing in American society which perhaps have little applicability in Japan. General Douglas MacArthur acknowledged the presence of these doubts and answered them as follows:9 . . . In the inception of Japan's reformation, many voices were raised against the planned implantation here of ideals and principles and standards underlying American democracy, for it was contended that Japanese tradition, Japanese culture, and Japanese experience would not permit their assimilation in Japan's rede- signed social system. Never was statement more errone- ous and unrealistic. For those very things which have supported Japan's past are responsible for the tragedy of Japan's present, and those very things which have supported America's past are no less responsible for the strength of Americals present. . . . Once the 25 process of assimilation has been completed, the Japa- nese may be expected to adherein, cherish and preserve this new way of life. General MacArthur's Optimistic statement is predicated upon completion of the "process of assimilation," but can the new position of the Diet be assimilated? In form, the National Diet is a far different par- liament from its predecessor. In consonance with its role as "the sole law—making organ of the State," all extra- legal councils surrounding the throne were abolished. An elected House of Councillors replaced the House of Peers and was made somewhat subordinate to the House of Represen- tatives. Since the Prime Minister, the highest executive officer, is chosen by and from among members of the Diet and members of the cabinet are made collectively responsible to it, the Diet today is a more powerful legislature than the United States Congress. Its control over the public purse is now complete, for money cannot be spent or bor- rowed without its consent, nor can taxes be levied or modi- fied without its approval. Almost as important as the constitution in giving it a preeminent place in government was the new Diet Law which even preceded the implementation of the constitution. Drafted largely by the lower house and enacted in the last few days of the Imperial Diet, the law discarded many re- strictive provisions of Ito's Law of the Houses, such as 26 the division of the houses into sections, imperial appoint— ment of the Speaker, the Vice-Speaker, and the Secretariat, time limit for deliberation by budget committees, and pro- hibition of Diet contacts with government offices and local assemblies except through a minister of state.10 More important were the revisions made in the old law, such as the lengthening of the ordinary session from three to five months, and apprOpriation of the budget for each house separately from the government budget, thus freeing it from the control of the Finance Minister. Whereas the mediocre prestige of the representative was ev— ident in his rank and pay before the war (equivalent to the pppip, a secondary rank in the bureaucracy with half the pay of the highest civil servant, the vice-minister), he was now elevated to status equal to that of the vice- minister. Furthermore, the Diet Law provided new aids for mak- ing it an effective law-making body, many of which were freely borrowed from the United States Congress. The franking privilege was provided to encourage legislators to keep in touch with their constituents; office space and help were made available; a Diet library and a legislative reference service were established. Most important, stand- ing committees for eighteen substantive fields plus steer- ing, library, and disciplinary committees were set up with the assurance that each member could be appointed to at 27 least one of them for his full term. Committees were now able to conduct investigations with the power to subpoena witnesses, to engage expert staff assistance, and to hold Open hearings. These, then, are the tools now at the command of the National Diet. Whether it uses them and thereby transforms itself into the strong instrumentality for democratic rule in Japan which it was meant to be, or whether it falls into its effete prewar pattern of subordination to the executive organs lies in the hands of Diet members and the peOple who choose them. Much has been written concerning the effectiveness of the Diet in the immediate postwar years. Few of the analyses are Optimistic. Since legislation was monitored and often suggested by SCAP, studies made under SCAP aus— pices are of necessity laudatory and point out as examples of real progress the assertion of Diet powers restricting the old bureaucratic practice of legislating substantive laws through Cabinet Orders,11 and the exposure of a major scandal involving a number of prominent persons by the Spe- cial Committee for Investigation of Concealed and Hoarded Goods and the Illegal ProPerty Transactions Investigation 12 Burks says that aside from Committee in 1947 and 1948. the major gain of cabinet responsibility, the fact that the Diet challenged the Katayama Cabinet‘s right to appoint 28 members as parliamentary vice-ministers and councillors in the administration, and that it asserted its powers over the budget, formerly the Finance Minister's private pre- serve, bespeak, among other things, its new role in postwar government.13 Justin Williams, the chief SCAP official concerned with Diet affairs, feels that on the positive side, the Diet did demonstrate its willingness to use the new aids and devices provided by the Diet Law, and to uphold its dignity vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and the cabinet. Govern- ment parties have COOperated with their cabinets in imple- menting policies, and many members have shown some concern over public Opinion in their constituencies.l4 0n the other hand, much of the literature on postwar Japan is highly critical of the Diet. In the middle of 1946, a Japanese newspaper editorialized: . . . The new Diet is not much different from the old one and we will even go so far as to say that we have killed the tiger at the front door in the form of the old militaristic Diet, but a wolf, which is the new disposition of the Diet, is waiting for us at the back door.15 To the consternation of the reading public, ingaidan, or so-called lobbyistsyabrashly intervened, especially during the coal nationalization debate in 1947, and some of the Diet sessions were a national disgrace. "Diet or Zoo?" ed- 17 and "Violence and Swearing l8 itorialized one newspaper, Mark Three Days of Diet Brawls" headlined another. "Final discussions on the coal bill produced fist fights on the floor of the House of Representatives. A number of drunken legislators, gurgling with the wine industrialist lobbyists had fed them wandered about the chamber " wrote Russell , 3 . l9 . . M . , ,. . . Brines. Just as discouraging to him was the Diet in its staid moments: The men and women in the Diet were distinctly unimpres- sive. They spent most of their time in political quar- rels and personal fence-mending. The institution was bogged down by every conceivable tradition, except leadership for the people. Patriarchs were supreme, and age and seniority were observed as rigidly as in the bureaucracy . . . . In each of its sessions during the occupation, the Diet sat for weeks without a single accomplishment . . . . The legislators still had not caught the idea of introducing legislation themselves butéoas before, awaited cabinet bills for action . . The editor of the Institute of World Economy made the fol- . . . . . l loWing generalizations concerning the Diet:2 a. Since nearly all who held seats before and during the war were purged by the Public Office Purge Ordi- nance, most of the postwar members were inexperienced. b. Therefore Diet deliberations were not smooth. c. Although research facilities are available, the standing committees do not prepare or submit inde— pendent bills but merely conduct deliberations on bills drafted by government ministries and submitted by the cabinet for Diet action. Usually only small revisions are made. d. Although the Diet has authority to prOpose bills and any member can Sponsor them, almost all major bills are those prOposed by the cabinet except minor bills for bicycle racing, horse racing, etc. e. Debates are of low caliber. 50 f. Each house meets once every three weeks to give mem— bers opportunity for free debate, but this provision is little used. g. Attendance at plenary and committee sessions has been poor. According to the editor, this dismal showing can be explained as follows: (1) SOAP maintained a strict sur- veillance over all prOposed legislation and screened it carefully before submission, so bills before the Diet need- ed only to be approved; (2) members engaged in debate not to determine the facts but to attack political rivals. Some of these views were also expressed by Justin Williams:22 Diet plenary sessions have never been, and are not now, occasions for forensic clashes between the orators of the Opposing parties, nor for reshaping legislative bills reported out of committee, nor for speeches mere- ly for the record. Plenary sessions are held for three general reasons: first, to give perfunctory approval to matters previously decided in committees; second, to afford spokesmen of the several parties a chance pub- licly to interrogate and embarrass cabinet ministers; and third, to conclude filibusters in an atmosphere of turbulence. During slack periods, when the cabinet falls behind in submitting bills to the Diet, members become bored and recess for periods up to 10 days at a time. In addition to this unfortunate develOpment in plenary ses- sions, Williams felt that democratic government was jeOpar- dized by hooliganism, instances of which have just been de- scribed, and the influence of lobbyists, which is closely related to political fund-raising, corruption, and bribery. However, even more serious is the instability of postwar 51 governments, at least up to the Twenty-Fourth Diet, which is due in large measure to the nature and multiplicity of Japanese parties. B. Postwar Parties Undoubtedly, of all political phenomena in postwar Japan, the most difficult to understand are the political parties, particularly during the period preceding the Gen- eral Election of 1949. The parties defy description because of their complexity, their transitory nature, and their neb— ulous principles. Yet, some comprehension of the major parties which gained representation in the Diet is neces— sary in order to see the significance (or insignificance) of party affiliation as an independent variable in the sociO-political background of Diet members. Most of the generalizations to follow are based on the observations of competent writers as well as the author's limited experi- ences in Tokyo.25 An important feature of Japanese politics from 1946 to 1948 is this paradox: a multiplicity of legally recog- nized parties coupled with the very limited number of par- ties in the western sense. A political party is viewed in the United States as a group of voters organized on a rela- tively permanent baSis around a core of common interests. Its chief aim is to place its candidates in public office 52 through the electoral process. 333% then, a going concern, not an 3; hoc body like many pressure groups. However, in the 1949 election, we find the following situation in Japan:24 N umber Parties registered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,400 " nominating candidates . . . . . . . . 129 " successful in electing candidates . . 55 Major parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Parties with important Diet representation . . 5 A sort of filtering process from 1,400 parties down to three seems to be involved. Actually, the numbers are mis- leading in that the figure 1,400 indicates not excessive splintering of factions but faulty registration procedure. For example, rules permitted anyone to get a handful of peOple together and register as a party. Even though most of the 1,400 disappeared before or soon after the election, there was no way of indicating this in the records. Another aspect of the same problem is the instabil- ity of party affiliation in the Diet. Only two months after the 1947 elections, only three out of 158 independents re- tained their independent status; the others joined with ex- isting parties. This means that those persons who were able to run and be elected without the financial support of party organizations shopped around in the Diet gfppp elec- tion for parties to join. 0f some 50 minor parties repre- 53 sented in the past at election time, only one retained its identity, and the rest simply disappeared.25 In one post- war Diet session, more than half of the representatives shifted their allegiance, according to one writer.26 Even more serious than the ephemeral nature of the parties are their universally undemocratic structure and Operation. The Japanese party is not an organization with mass support at the rice-roots level in which municipal and prefectural representatives convene on occasions to hammer out nation-wide policies and choose national officers. It is a relatively exclusive group, entrance into which re- quires the Sponsorship of the candidate by a member who would be willing to vouch for his character.27 Party mem- bers are usually Diet members, local leaders, or heavy con- tributors. The party organization and decision-making process are both hierarchical and centralized. All major decisions of a party are made in Tokyo by a small group of men who may be the nominal leaders (e.g., members of the Central Executive Committee) or behind-the-scenes wire-pullers, the kuromaku, like Ichiro Hatoyama of the Liberal Party. Auton- omy is not granted to the local branches in the prefectures and municipalities; these branches must implement policies formulated in Tokyo headquarters or face either dictatorial direction or expulsion. Forced contributions and imposi- 54 tion of candidates upon the local organizations are pos- sible, and actions of these bodies are subject to review by party headquarters. In short, voters at the rice-roots have no voice in policy formulation or nomination of candi- dates. As may be expected, party discipline is strict. Diet members must accept party decisions, such as the fre- quent amalgamation moves with other factions, or accept ex- pulsion. To escape this, representatives often switch par— ties, and because of the number of parties in the Diet, they do not face serious consequences as do renegades in two-party parliaments like that of Great Britain. The oyabun-kobun or boss-henchmen relationship traceable to early Tokugawa times and widely practiced among building contractors (kppi), gambling syndicates, and racketeers, is also found in political groups. It is dif— ficult to ascertain to what degree these groups influence government policy, but they are unlikely to be syndicated into a nation-wide, conspiratorial organization extending from the farm village to the cabinet as claimed at one time by Colonel Charles E. Kades, Assistant Chief of the Govern- 28 When SCAP ordered the police to crack down ment Section. on these groups in the latter half of 1947, an interesting develOpment was the Opposition of both conservatives and Communists, the former, because many important politicians 55 owed their positions to ovabun, and the latter, because of some oyabun—kobun characteristics of the Communist Youth Action Corps. Because victory at the polls is often dependent upon the ability to finance vote-catching campaigns, political leaders are often skillful fund-raisers or persons most able to tap resources. This is particularly true today be— cause patronage plums are not available as they were in the days of the Home Ministry and other service ministries. Shigeru Yoshida, head of the Democratic-Liberal Party, is said to have the support of big business through Tanzan Ishibashi of the Bridgestone Tire Company, and bankers, and contractors. Kijuro Shidehara of the Democratic Party is related through marriage to the Iwasaki family which con- trols the Mitsubishi interests. New sources of political funds are the reconstruc— tion and industrial funds which finance loans made to in- dustrial firms, and the cost-plus contracts to build Occu- pational facilities. The most flagrant scandal involving the Democrats of the Ashida faction was the Showa Denko case which broke in January 1948. Implicated were Takeo Kurusu, Director of the Economic Stabilization Board, and Suehiro Nishio, former Deputy Prime Minister, who were ac- cused of extending an excessive 1.2 billion yen loan to the Showa Denko Company from which they received a kickback of 24 million yen for the Democratic war-chest. Although not 56 directly implicated in this case, Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida was arrested in December 1948 for receiving bribes for facilitating loans to building contractors, although he was acquitted soon thereafter. These, then, are the salient characteristics of po- litical parties from 1945 to the end of l948--the transi— tory nature of the large number of so-called parties, the unstable affiliation of members in the major parties, their undemocratic organization and operation, and evidence of corruption. Another feature commented upon by many writers is the nebulous and almost uniform party platforms which characterize all except the Communist Party.29 Since this study is concerned with the party affilia- tion of members of the House of Representatives, we shall deal primarily with the three parties having the largest representation: the Democratic—Liberals (Minshu-Jiyuto), the Democrats (Minshuto), and the Socialists (Nippon Shakaito, often translated as the Social Democrats). We shall also examine the one on the extreme left, the Commu- nist Party (Nippon Kyosanto), which, although weak during the period under consideration, gained tremendously in the 1949 election. Although the National Cooperatives (Kokumin Kyodoto, also translated as the PeOples' Cooperatives) were fairly strong before 1948, they have grown progressively weaker since; so they have been grouped with the rest of the small parties under the category of minor parties. 57 All four of the major parties were organized within two months after SCAP removed restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties (SCAPIN 95) on October 4, 1945. The first major party to be organized was the So- cialist Party with the joining of 17 Representatives under the presidency of Komakichi Matsuoka. The first conserva- tive party, the Liberal, was formed on November 9 under Ichiro Hatoyama with 50 members in the lower house. The almost equally conservative Progressive Party, organized at the same time, garnered the largest support, ultimately 274 Representatives. The Communists began forming, informally at first, after prominent members like Kyiuchi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga were released from jail on October 10. On January 4, 1946, the first of a series of purge directives was issued by SCAP which ultimately disrupted not only the elites in the two conservative parties, the Liberals and the Progressives, but the Socialists as well. Removed from public office and also excluded from partici- pation in the General Election of April 1946 were govern- ment officials, all Diet members recommended by Tojo in the election of 1942, and professional military men associated with ultranationalistic activities. 0f the members in the lower house, at least 247 of the 274 Progressives, 20 of the So Liberals, and 10 of the 17 Socialists were banned.30 When the Cabinet announced its "Opinion" on February 15, 58 1947, that party position was to be interpreted as public office in the meaning of the purge directive, none of the remaining Progressives except Takao Saito kept their seats. This party later came to be known as the Democratic Party. The Liberals, too, lost men like Ichiro Hatoyama, who was forced to relinquish his leadership to Shigeru Yoshida. The Socialists had to drop some of their founders, such men as Jotaro Kawakami, Soichi Kawamata, and Shoichi Niyake, which immediately strengthened the hand of the leftist fac- tion and the leadership of Tetsu Katayama. The first postwar election on April 10, 1946, was inconclusive. No party emerged with a majority, and the weak government formed by the Liberals under Shigeru Yoshida was incapable of stemming popular discontent, particularly with regard to the mounting inflation. A nation-wide gen- eral strike in February 1947 was barely averted by General 51 MacArthur when he "suggested" that instead of strike ace tion by the unions, a new election should be called to let the voters decide who was to solve the economic crisis and how. The second postwar election ensued on April 25, 1947. The Progressives, the heaviest losers in the 1946 election, rose in strength from 95 seats in that election to 126 in 1947. The greatest gainers in 1947 were the Socialists who captured 145 seats, making it the largest party in the Diet but far below the majority. The Liberals lost a handful of 59 the 159 seats they controlled in 1946. The Communists and the minor parties were able to hang on in 1947 to the very small beachhead which they established in the first postwar election. Besides the tremendous gains of the Socialists, the outstanding develOpment of the second election was the drOp in the number of independents from 85 in 1946 to 12. In the upper chamber, on the other hand, 110 out of 250 Councillors remained nominal independents. We need not discuss in detail the extremely complex maneuvers which occurred in the House of Representatives from April 1947 to January 1949. Because of Socialist plu— rality in the lower house, Tetsu Katayama, the party leader, was designated prime minister with the agreement of the Dem- ocrats under Ashida and the National Cooperatives, and lack of Opposition from the Liberals. This coalition government did not last long because of the ineffectual leadership of Katayama. Moreover, his party was split into left, central, and right wings, and the left wing refused to accept the three-party agreement upon which the coalition was built, on the ground that it watered down Socialist principles. Meanwhile, the Liberals were able to join with the Demo- cratic faction led by Shidehara in forming the Democratic- Liberal Party. Katayama's downfall came in February 1948 as a consequence of left-wing Socialist and Democratic- Liberal Opposition to his supplementary budget calling for a 100% increase in postal and railroad rates. 4O Intricate maneuvering again characterized the selec- tion of the new Prime Kinister. The Liberals tried to form a coalition but were rebuffed; the Socialist factions recon- ciled their differences and asked Katayama to succeed him- self, but he refused. Finally, they joined the Democrats in successfully electing Ashida to the post, although the House of Councillors favored Yoshida. This government was in worse shape than its predecessor and lasted only seven months. Members of Ashida's cabinet were immediately in— volved in the notorious Showa Denko scandal, and he himself was implicated on bribery charges. His downfall came in October 1948 when the Socialists withdrew from the cabinet in protest against the government's support of the SCAP recommendation calling for denial of the right to strike to all public service employees. On November 18, 1948, Yoshida took over the caretaker government which was designed to adept the anti-strike provision, approve a supplemental budget, and call the new elections which materialized in January 1949. C. General Election of 1949 The General Election held on January 25, 1949, was the third one held after the end of the war and under the Allied Occupation, the third since women's suffrage, and the first under the new constitution and the new election 41 law of December 7, 1947. As far as the election of repre- sentatives was concerned, the new constitution imposed no new changes. Legally speaking, the novel feature was the election law which for the first time imposed stringent re- strictions on campaign methods. The new regulations limited campaign expenditures for each candidate to ¥50,000, of which ¥30,000 had to be deposited with election officials to cover the cost of the following expenses incurred by the state: 1 newspaper announcement 5 speeches over the radio 1,000 postcards mailed free Door-to—door canvassing was forbidden, and individual speechmaking and debates with opposing candidates were spon— sored by the government. Election posters were allowed only at campaign headquarters and on campaign trucks. The purpose of these regulations was to lessen the financial burden of candidates and to minimize corruption in government which arises from the need for campaign funds. Also, "it was hOped that the attention of the peOple would be directed toward the character, political views, and ex- perience of the candidates, and the voters would be able to cast their ballots after careful consideration," according to the National Election Administration Commission (NEAC).53 The liberal interpretation of the law by NEA somewhat de- 42 feated its main purpose, because the most active campaign— ers, political parties, labor unions, and other organized groups, were able to campaign without restriction so long as they espoused principles instead of specific candi- dates.54 In spite of its dramatic outcome, this election is probably the least reported, in the English language, of the postwar General Elections.55 A compelling reason is that internationally, other momentous events competed for public attention both in Japan and abroad. Truman was in- augurated, for example, for his second term on January 19, just four days before election, and the Chinese Red Forces engulfed the northern half of China with the "retirement" of Chiang Kai-Shek from Nanking on January 21. . - Domestically, NEAC conceded that year—end and New Year festivities dampened campaign ardor in the beginning. Then, too, there was so little partisan activity throughout the campaign that Newsweek magazine characterized it as the 56 "election without issues." Except for the Communists, the major parties were contented to use their customary pious 57 and platitudinous platforms: Democratic Liberal: l. Sincerely observe the Potsdam Declaration, and build a new Japan based on international justice. 2. Based on the new constitution, establish respon~ sible government and reform all government on the basis of social justice. 5. Raise national virtue, thus providing respect for liberty and self-realization of responsibilities. 45 4. Respect labor, promote free enterprise, and re— habilitate productive economy. 5. Promote science and education, enrich the lives Of peOple, and improve national culture. Democratic: 1. We will pursue progressive policies by defending the spirit of the constitution, by building a democrat- ic political organization, and by establishing a peace- ful state. 2. We will democratize industry based on master eco- nomic plans, and stabilize the livelihood Of the masses. 3. We will plan for rehabilitating education which will perfect individualism, endeavor to raise morality Of the masses through cultivating religious sentiments, and contribute to world enlightenment. 4. We will endeavor to restore world confidence and cooperate toward the establishment Of world peace. Socialist: 1. Our party unites the working classes and protects the political freedoms Of the peOple, and thus build a democratic system. 2. Our party endeavors to ban capitalism, pursue so- cialism, and thus stabilize and raise the livelihood Of the people. 5. Our party Opposes all militaristic ideology and actions and endeavors tO realize permanent world peace through cooperation with the peoples Of the world. Communist: l. Overthrow the emperor system; establish a peOple's republic. 2. Strict realization Of the Potsdam Declaration; support Of peaceful policies Of democratic nations; com- plete independence for Korea; international OOOperation Of labor unions. 5. Dissolution Of all anti-democratic organizations; eradication Of subversive underground organizations and terroristic plans; severe punishment Of all war crimi- nals and Oppressors Of human rights; destruction Of parties serving the emperor who is the enemy Of democra- cy. 4. Abolishment Of the constitution which was handed down frOm above and establishment Of a democratic con- stitution by the peOple; abolishment Of the Privy Coun- cil, House Of Peers, House of Representatives, and es- 44 tablishment Of a democratic unicameral body; eradica- tion Of all quasi-feudal systems for the privileged, like the Imperial Household. (These are the first four Of 25 tersely worded planks. ILater ones have economic appeals like the following:) 11. Kinimum working hours (generally less than 7 hours, maximum limit to be 8 hours; 44 hours per week.) 13. Ban on labor Of children below 14, a vacation day per week; 2 weeks' vacation per annum at full pay.) 15. Social security including national unemployment insurance, health insurance, pensions, paid by the cap- italists. 16. Confiscation Of all absentee-owned land without compensation, and distribution without repayment tO peasants. 17. Control Of key industries by laborers. 25. Guarantee Of housing to all workers lacking it; Opening Of all mansions and recreational pavilions. It may seem strange to some western Observers that political campaigns can be conducted on such platitudinous generalities. Granted that Japanese voters tend tO elect candidates because Of their fame and prestige more than be- cause Of their platforms, the latter cannot be ignored. At 58 least one Observer ignores personalities and states that (irrespective Of platforms), the campaign revolved around the following issues: a. Middle-Of-the-road policies Of the Socialist and Dam- ocratic coalitions Of the TwentyfThird Diet. b. Scandals affecting primarily the Democrats. 0. The anti-strike order. Despite the spiritless campaign, voter turnout ex- Ceeded expectations, somewhat aided by the fine weather 45 prevailing throughout the nation on election day. Out Of 42.1 million eligible voters, 51.1 million voted, a 74.0 percent turnout (male--80.7%; female—-67.9%). In the 1947 election, 67.9 percent voted (male--74.9%; female--6l.6% ; so there was a six percent increase in 1949. Apathy was reflected by a smaller number Of candi- dacies in 1949 than in the previous election. In 1947, 1,567 candidates contested for the 466 seats, whereas only 1,564 ran this time. This comes to 5.5 candidates for each seat in 1947 and 2.9 in 1949. This small number Of contend- ers in recent elections was deplored by at least one writer,59 but actually there were only three elections out Of 25 held prior to 1949 in which more than 2.9 candidates ran for each seat. The low point was reached in the four elections held from 1905 tO 1912 during which only 1.5 to 1.4 candidates sought electionflrO The outcome Of the election was predictable to most Observers, since it was evident that the middle-Of-the-road groups represented by the Katayama and Ashida cabinets had been discredited. What was startling, however, is the de- gree tO which the electorate favored the parties at the ex- treme right and left, the Democratic-Liberals and the Com- munists. TABLE 1 46 ELECTIONS OF 1947 AND 1949-—VOTES AND SEATS WON, BY PARTY (Percentages) 1947 1949 1947 1949 Democratic-Liberal 26.9 45.8 28.5 56.6 Democratic 25.1 15.7 27.0 14.8 Socialist 26.2 15.5 50.7 10.5 Communist 5.6 9.7 .9 7.5 Minor Parties 12.4 10.7 10.5 7.5 Independents 5.8 6.6 2.6 5.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 27.5 50.5 466 466 million million Source: 1. Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1951, pp. 560, 561. 2. NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan 1950, p. 124. The Democratic-Liberals were the greatest gainers, having almost doubled the number Of votes received and hav- ing exactly doubled their seats in the lower house since the previous election. With 264 seats or 56.6 percent of the lower house under its wings, it became the first party after the war to command an absolute majority and the mandate to establish a one—party cabinet. The Communists almost tripled the votes received since 1947, and they increased their strength in the lower house almost nine times. Although still comprising only 7.5 percent Of the representatives, 47 they now gained stature as leaders among the Opposition. The Socialists were the heaviest losers, having dropped from 145 seats in the previous election to 48, a reduction to one-third their former strength. The Democrats, too, lost heavily as did the National COOperatives among the mi- nor parties. Even important Socialist Diet members like former Premier Katayama, Kanju KatO and Suehiro Nishio and Democrats like Wataru Narahashi failed tO get themselves re- elected. An interesting sidelight is the degree to which par- ties have been successful in having their endorsed candi- dates elected (see Table 2). The nominating procedures Of all major parties were essentially the same. Minor varia— tions occurred; for example, the Socialists claimed that they considered the nominees' views and their relations with labor unions, and the Communists claimed that nominees were first chosen by prefectural conventions called by "prefec- tural committees." However, they all gave preference to incumbents and to persons most likely to be successful who were recommended by the local branches. All parties ex- tended Official recognition only to those approved by a 41 Of all candidates body in central party headquarters. reported to NEAC, 54.2 percent were elected, but the Demo- cratic—Liberals were outstandingly successful since three- fifths Of their candidates were elected. In contrast, the 48 other three major parties placed only one-third to one- fourth Of their nominees. The importance Of organization is evident in the very poor showing made by the minor par— ties and independents. CANDIDATES-~NUMBER RUNNING, RTMBER AND PERCENTAGE E ECTED: 1949 Part Candidatesl Number 0 Y Elected2 A Elected Democratic—Liberal 420 264 62.8 Democratic 208 69 55.4 Socialist 187 48 26.6 Communist 115 55 50.4 Minor 225 54 15.2 Independent 211 16 7.6 All Candidates 1,564 466 54.2 lSOurce: NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan 1950, pp. 116, 117. 2Source: Ibid., p. 124. ' Doubts have been expressed concerning the reliabil- ity Of campaign costs reported to NEAC by the political parties, and the exact costs may never be known. However, for what they may be worth, those figures show that all parties except the Communists reported surpluses at the end Of the campaign (Table 5). In terms Of expenditures per successful candidate the-Democratic-Liberals spent the most, followed by the Socialists, Democrats, and Communists. The last seem tO have got a bargain if they actually spent 49 only ¥5,857 (about sixteen dollars) for each elected candi- date. TABLE 5 REPORTED ELECTION E”PEYDITURES OF MAJOR PARTIES: 1949 Expenditure per Party Income Outgo Successful Candidate Democratic-Liberal ¥9,099,208 ¥8,079,865 ¥50,605 ($85.01) Democratic 795,000 620,248 8,989 ( 24.96) Socialist 915,700 912,844 19,017 ( 52.82) Communist 22,540 205,000 5,857 ( 16.26) Source: NEAC, Senkyg Nenkan, p. 108. Reasons for the poor showing Of the Socialists and Democrats are not hard to find. Observers are all agreed that the peOple were disillusioned with these middle-Of-the- road parties which bungled the mandate handed them in 1947. The Katayama cabinet was beset by schism among the Social- ist factions, incompetence, and vacillation, and the Ashida cabinet was tainted with corruption. 0n the other hand, the Democratic-Liberals were largely able, as the leading Opposition party, to escape public Opprobrium, and the effective way in which the care— taker government Of Yoshida went about its business during its brief tenure may have appealed to conservative business- men and farmers. According to a commentatorf‘u+ these voters sought the same leadership "to take the nation out Of the economic morass." 50 The Communists also profited by being an "out" party. Said the Nippon Times:45 "the surprisingly large Communist vote was largely a protest vote." Many non-Communists who were disappointed with the middle-of-the-roaders and who disliked the Democratic-Liberals voted Communist "to give vent to their dissatisfaction with the powers that be." Because Of General MacArthur's known antipathy towards the Communists, many government workers may have protested his anti-strike directive by voting for leading labor leaders like Katsumi Kikunami and Kazuyoshi DObashi running on the Communist ticket. Other reasons may be suggested for the Communist victory, such as their skillful campaign, which soft-pedaled the question Of the Emperor, built fears Of inflation, and made enticing economic promises, knowing well that they would not become a majority group that would be entrusted with responsibility. The spectacular victories on the China mainland and "the favorable conditions for Com— munism all over the world" as claimed by Kentaro Yamabe, a Communist spokesman, probably won more votes for the party. D. Post-Election Developments From election day on January 25 to December 25, 1949, when the Manual 9f the House 9f Representatives (upon which this study is based) was published, there were few important changes in the numbers Of representatives Of each major party. 51 Table 4 indicates that there were practically nO' shifts in the party affiliation of representatives among the major parties. A notable exception is shift made by Takehide Yamaguchi from the Socialist tO the Communist Par— ty, thus raising the latter's strength to 56. The greatest change indicated is the shift made by all except one inde- pendent toward party affiliation. Also, among the minor parties, three disappeared and three new ones appeared dur- ing the eleven months. One Of them, the New Political Council, Shin Seiji Kyogikai, claims 22 members and is a coalition Of former members Of the National COOperative, Social Renovationist, Kosei Club, and the New Farmer par- ties. Established in May 1949, it soon went out Of exist— ence when it merged in April 1950 with the Democrats to form the National Democratic Party. On the surface, the major parties appeared to be stable and united, but within them were clusters Of person- al followings which fragmented the Democrats in 1949 and the other parties in the following years. Within the dominant Democratic-Liberal Party were the former Democratic faction led by Shidehara, the Hatoyama clique clustered around Ono, and the "younger" group led by Yoshida. As expected, Yoshida was designated tO form a cabinet, but what came as a surprise, especially to the Shidehara and Ono factions, was his desire to form a coali- 52 TABLE 4 COMPARISON OF PARTY STREJoTH: January and December 1949 Party Januaryl December2 Democratic—Liberal . . . . . . 264 266 Democrats . . . . . . . . . . 69 70 Opposition - 57 Coalition - 55 Socialist . . . . . . . . . . 48 46 Communist . . . . . . . . . . 55 56 Minor Parties . . . . . . . . 54 45 Social Renovationist 5 5 Labor-Farmer 7 6 National COOperative 14 New Farmer 6 New Liberal 2 New Political Council 22 Kosei Club 5 Agricultural COOperative 7 Independents . . . . . . . . . 16 l Vacancies . . . . . . . . . . 0 4 Total 466 466 1Source: Senkyo, Japan Yearbook 1949-52, p. 87. 2n n n , Source: Manual Of the House Of Representatives, 1949. 55 tion government with the Democrats. This move was Opposed 'by the Council Of Elders (ChorO Kaigi) and the Officers' Association (Yakuinkai) within his party, but Yoshida re- mained undaunted. In trying to reach a rapprochement with the Democrats, he was attempting to build a two-party sys- tem with the conservative bloc Of Democratic-Liberals and Democrats Opposed totfluaSocialists, and the elimination Of the Communists and the minor parties. In currying the favor Of Inukai, he was merely carrying out a pro—election prom- ise. When he made a formal prOposal to Inukai and his fol- lowers On January 26, Democrats Heitaro Inezaki, Kozaemon Kimura and IwaO Yamazaki agreed to serve in his cabinet. Had it not been for the personal enmity Of Shidehara and OnO toward Inukai, he and his followers would have joined the Democratic-Liberal Party in 1949 as they ultimately did in February 1950 (except for Inukai who was barred). The Democrats were divided into two factions, as can be inferred above. The group favoring coalition numbered 55 in December 1949 and was led by Inukai. Those Opposing coalition numbered 57 and were led by Hitoshi Ashida, and Suehiro Nishio. The latter group was successful in expelling both Inukai and Hori,whO were the tOp leaders Of the party, and the three men who joined Yoshida's cabinet. A formal break between the coalition and Opposition groups came on March 8 when they separately called party conventions and 54 established independent organizations. The Opposition Dem- ocrats then sought to build a "Social Democratic Front" with the right—wing Socialists and the recently formed New Political Council. This move was unsuccessful as Of Decem- ber 1949 but was partially fulfilled on April 1950 with the establishment of the National Democratic Party. The Socialists, too, suffered from disunity through- out 1949 between the right-wing under Katayama and Jiro Asanuma and the left-wing under Mosaburo Suzuki. Although the former were elected in greater numbers in the 1949 elec- tion and were able to select Katayama as president at the party convention held in April, the leftists came to dom- inate party Operations. Not only was this due to Suzuki's election to the key post of general secretary, but to the great numbers of labor union members who joined to set up the Socialists as the workers' party as Opposed to the Com- munist Party. Another significant develOpment of the April convention was the ideological difference which became ap— parent between the two wings. Whereas previous differences were largely based on personality conflicts, the leftewing "Suzuki PrOposal" submitted to the convention for ratifica— tion showed strong Marxist tendencies, whereas the right- wing "Asanuma Proposals" showed revisionist sentiments, ac- cording to the Asahi Nenkan.46 During the last half of 1949, the Socialists alternately fought the government re- 55 trenchment program of the Conservatives which resulted in a large number of dismissals from the public payroll and the excesses of violence committed by the Communists. The highwater mark of Communist prestige was reached during the first half of 1949 when they seemed to be taking leadership away from the discredited Socialists. On the surface, the party seemed monolithic, and yet it was split between its two leaders, the internationalist and revolu- tionary Tokuda and the moderate and "gradualist" Nozaka. During the first few months, the Communists attempted to form a common front with the left-wing Socialists and the Labor-Farmer Party against the impending conservative bloc. The Socialists refused to join them, but the Labor—Farmers collaborated, although they refused to merge completely with the Communists. During the summer of 1949, the party began an "Offensive" (kosei) consisting of sabotage, mob violence, strikes, and assassination against the dismissal of govern- ment employees. This culminated in the murder and mutila- tion of the elderly president of the National Railway. This, plus the insolence of Communist-indoctrinated repatriates from Siberia led to public revulsion against Communist tac- tics and Russian domination. A rapid decline in Communist prestige began. The Japanese public was able to see to what extent the Communist Party was subordinated to moscow when, on January 6, 1950, the Cominform criticized the moderate 56 tactics advocated by Nozaka and he recanted. Moderate labor leaders and groups like the Democratization Leagues, Mindo, lithin the labor movement withdrew from Communist- led unions and established the Rational Federation of In- dustrial Unions. 57 JCT ES --Chapter I 1. As quoted in Arthur Tiedemann, Iiodern Japan (Princeton: Van Nostrand, l955),p . 186. 2. For a useful compendium of sociolorical writings concerning political theory, see selections Of R. LT. Mac- Iver, Harold Laski, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Charles E. Merriam in Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wil- son, Roots of Political Behavior (New York: American Com- pany, 1949), Chaps. 2 and 5. 3. Ibid., p. 174 ff. 4. Ibid., p. 164 ff. Election statistics here are from Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai / National Election Control Commission, here- after abbreviated as lTEAC _7, Senkyo Seido Shiryo / Materi- als on the Electoral System_ 77(Tokyo: NEAC, 19507, p. 151. 6. Hirobumi Ito, Commentary on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Miyoji Ito, tr., 5rd ed., Tokyo, 1951), pp. 9, 10, as quoted in Political Reorientation 9; Japan, Vol. I, p. 150. 7. Art. 41 of the postwar constitution. 8. Official figzette, Extra NO. 6 (June 24, 1947), 9. Political Reorientation pf Japan, Vol. II, p. 772. 10. For full text of the Diet Law, see ibid., pp. 968- 11. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 175. 12. Ibid., pp. 179, 180. 15. Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath Burks, Far Eastern Government and Politics (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954}, pp. 508, 509. 14. Justin Williams, "Party Politics in the New Japa- nese Diet," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Dec. 1948), p. 1179. 58 15. Tokyo Shinbun, June 20, 1946, as quoted ibid. 16. See Justin Williams, pp. cit., p. 1171, for "bully-boy" characteristics of lobbyists. 17. Nippon Times, Nov. 25, 1947. 18. Mainishi, Nov. 25, 1947. 19. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948), pp. 214, 215. 20. Ibid., p. 214. 21. Institute for World Economy, The Japan Annual, 1954 (Tokyo: Japan Annual Publications, 1954), pp. 40-42. 22. Justin Williams, pp. pip., pp. 1167, 1168. 25. The principal sources of information are Harry Emerson Wildes, "Underground Politics in Post-War Japan," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Dec. 1948), pp. 1149-1162; Political Reorientation pg Japan Vol. I, pp. 542-562; Asahi Nenkan / Asahi Annual 1550 7, pp. 295-505; Kermit G. Stewart, "Japanese Politics: 1947- 1948," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 15 (July 7, 1948), pp. 152-155. The author was in Tokyo in 1946 and part of 1947, 1948 and 1950, and was able to interview Diet members like Takizo Matsumura and Kijuro Shidehara. 24. Statistics taken from Political Reorientation pp Ja an, Vol. I, p. 559. 25. Ibid. 26. Harr Emerson Wildes, Typhoon 1p Tokyo (New York: MacMillan, 1954 , p. 104. 27. Harry Emerson Wildes, "Underground Politics in Post—War Japan," pp. cit., p. 1149. 28. Ibid., p. 1159. 29. See the following section on the 1949 election. 50. Political Reorientation pg Japan, Vol. I, pp. 25- 27. 51. The author acted as interpreter in the eleventh hour conference held between General Marquat, Chief of Eco- 59 nomic and Scientific Section, SCAP, and the union leaders, and it seemed to him that the reason the latter acceded to MacArthur's suc'estlon was the possibility of new elections in the immediate future. 52. Political Reorientation pp Japan, Vol. I, p. 555. 55. PEAC , Shugiin Giin Sosenkyo (Dai Nijuyor kai) 0yobi Saiko Saibansho Saibankan Kokumin Shinsa Kekka Shirabe / Study of the Results of the General Election (24th) of the members of the House of Representatives an1 National Review of Justices of the Supreme Court 7 (Tokyo: NEAC,1949), foreword. - 54. NEAC, Senkyo 1en“an /Election Annual _7, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950),p . 107. 55. The first two elections were fully covered in published SCAP report s like Political Reorientation of Japan and the I.Ionthly Summation of Non—Iilitary Activities which dealt with events up to the end of 194S. The 1949 election is hardly mentioned in scholarly periodicals like Far Eastern Quarterly and Pacific Affairs. 564 prsweek, Vol. 55, No. 5 (Jan. 51, 1949), p. 25. 57. Asahi Shimbunsha, Asahi Nenkan 1950 [-Asahi Yearbook_7, pp. 298-502, translation mine. 58. E.g., Lafe Franklin Allen, "Japanese Election," Commonweal, Vol. 50, No. 5 (May 15, 1949), pp. 116-118. 59. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon 3p Tokyp, p. 150. 40. Data computed from statistics in NEAC, Senkyo Seido Chosa Teishu tsu Shi yo, Sambu / Liaterials Submitted for Election System WIe earch 7, (Tokyo: NE EAC, 1950), p. 15. 41. Party recognition of candidates was given by the Election Policy Committee (Democratic—Liberal), Election Policy Headquarters (Democratic), Central Executive Commit- tee (Socialist), and Political Bureau (Communist). See NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan, op. cit., pp. 107, 108. 42. Lafe Franklin Allen, "Japanese Election," pp. cit. . . 45. As quoted ibid. 44. Asahi Nenkan 1950, pp. ci . CHAPTER II BIRTHPLACE AND AGE A. Basis for Representation As a result of the postwar Election Law (Law No. 42, December 1945, as amended by Law No. 45, 1947), the minimum age of members of the House of Representatives has been lowered from 50 to 25, the same minimum age which applies to representatives in the United States Congress. Repre- sentatives are now chosen by all Japanese nationals over 20 years of age, irrespective of sex or prOperty ownership. Although the nation is divided into 46 prefectures which form one of the two bases for representation in the upper house, the 466 representatives are elected not from prefec- tures but from multi—member electoral districts. For the 1949 election, there were 117 districts, 40 of which elect- ed three members, 59 elected four members, and 58 elected five members, according to population and as apportioned by the Election Law Amendment of 1947. This is commonly called the "medium district system" by the Japanese in con- trast to the "large district system" of 54 districts, each electing two to fourteen members, which was used in 1946. Because of the steady increase in population, the emancipation of women, and the lowering of the voting age, each Diet member in 1949 represented more eligible voters 61 and peOple in general than at any time in Japanese history, as can be seen below:1 Number of .‘. Population Diet El1g1b1e Voters per member per member * , (1000's) (1000 s) lst (1890) 1.5 155 10th (1908) 4.2 126 20th (1957) 50.9 152 24th (1949) 90.5 172 Furthermore, the Japanese member of the lower house represents more peOple than does his counterpart in any other country except the United States. Some of the com- parative figures published by NEAC are as follows:2 POpulation per member Country (1000's) Japan 172 United States 521 Great Britain 76 France 65 Philippines 159 B. Regional Origin and Representation Narrowly speaking, each member of the lower house represents the people in his electoral district and not his prefecture, just as the U. S. Congressman is commonly thought to represent his district and not his state, except 62 for representatives-at—large. However, purely for the sake of convenience, electoral district and prefectural lines will be set aside in this section, and the representatives will be considered in terms of the regions in which they were born and those from which they were elected. For our purpose, Japan is subdivided into seven re- gions. Although the regional boundaries are arbitrary from the cultural standpoint, they are the ones used in Japanese geography textbooks, except that we will combine Hokkaido and the Tohoku region of northern Honshu as a unit instead of treating them separately. Because this regional demarca- tion is largely based on terrain, climate, and land use, it is most useful to physical and economic geographers, but the subdivisions are also similar to those adopted by military planners during World War II to consolidate all local gov- ernments into nine administrative regions for efficiency and tighter control from Tokyo. Running from the northeast to the southwest, the sev- en regions and the prefectures in them are as follows: Tohoku Region Akita, Aomori, Fukushima, Hokkaido, Iwate, Miyago, Yamagata Kanto Region Chiba, Gumma, Ibaragi, Kanagawa, Saitama, Tochigi, Tokyo Chubu Region Aichi, Fukui, Gifu, Ishikawa, Nagano, Niigata, Shizuoka, Toyama, Yamanashi 65 Kinki Region Hyogo, Kyoto, hie, Nara, Osaka, Shiga, Wakayama Chugoku Region Hiroshima, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, Yamaguchi Shikoku Region Ehime, Kagawa, Kochi, Tokushima Kyushu Region Fukuoka, Kagoshima, Numamoto, Miyazaki, Nagasaki, Oita, Saga The Tohoku region is by far the least populated for its immense area, which comprises 40% of the national ter- ritory, but it is the rural part of Japan which has re- ceived the greatest number of migrants from other parts of the country in recent time, amounting to 25 to 54 percent of its pOpulation between 1920 and 1940. Only the metropoli- tan areas of Tokyo-Yokohama in the Kanto region, Nagoya in the Chubu region, Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto in the Kinki region, and the heavy—industrial belt in northern Kyushu have seen a comparable or greater pOpulation growth, due to in-migration from rural areas. The Kanto Plain is by far the most dense- ly pOpulated region, followed by the Kinki and Kyushu re— gions. The remaining three areas are almost equal in den- sity to the nation as a Whole. Examining the strength of the various parties by percentage of party members in each region (Table 5), the 64 TABLE 5 PERCENTAGE ELECTED IN EACH REGION, BY PARTY (Percentages) Regions All Mems. D-L Dem. Soc. Com. Othersl Tohoku 17.5% 18.4% 18.6% 15.0% 2.8% 25.07 Kanto 21.2 21.8 14.5 25.9 58.9 11.5 Chubu 19.0 18.8 22.8 15.2 16.6 20.5 Kinki 15.4 15.2 11.4 19.6 27.8 20.5 Chugoku 8.5 7.5 5.7 15.2 11.1 9.1 Shikoku 5. 5.5 8.6 4.4 O 6.8 Kyushu 13.2 15.0 18.6 8.7 2.8 6.8 Total 100.0 100.0 130.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N2 462 266 70 46 56 44 l"Others" refers to members in the 8 minor parties and 1 Independent (see Table 4). 2 . .. In subsequent tables 1n wn1ch percentages and broken down by party, derstood unless otherwise stated. data are presented in this "N" is to be un— Democratic-Liberals most resemble the distribution of strength of all members, which is, in turn, almost identi- cal with the distribution of the total population among the since this party com- regions. This is to be expected, prises more than one-half of the representatives. In the Tohoku, the leftist parties, particularly the Communists, are under-represented, while the region seems to be the stronghold of the minor parties. In the vital and densely populated Kanto region, the Democrats and the minor parties are particularly weak, whereas the Communists are almost doubly represented. The Chubu region claims few leftist party members, which is somewhat of an anomaly because the 65 heavily industrialized city of Nagoya is located in it, while the Democrats are well represented there. The re- maining southern parts of Honshu, Kinki and Chugoku, are similar to Kanto in that the leftists are strong while the conservatives are under-represented there. Unlike the Kanto, however, the minor parties more than hold their own in these areas. DeSpite heavy industrialization in its northern fringe, Kyushu claims comparatively few Socialists and Communists. The regions in which representatives were born were cross-tabulated with data contained in Table 5. This showed that the areas receiving the greatest number of im- migrants from other regions, Tohoku in the north and the Kanto and the Kinki regions with the growing industrial metropoles, are the places most represented by non-natives. Some exceptions can be noted among the parties, however. The Democrats and the Communists have more native than non- native representatives in the Kanto and Tohoku regions re- spectively, and these are their weakest areas in relation to the other parties. The Communists, however, have an un— usually large percentage of non—natives in the Kanto region. In the other four regions of Japan Proper, the na— tives exceed the non-natives. These are the areas which 66 lost pOpulations as well as persons of parliamentary cali- ber to the aforementioned areas. In addition, three repre- sentatives were born in places outside the four main islands of Japan presently under foreign domination. A Democrat, Takeshi Hara, was born in Formosa, and two Commu- nists, Kyuichi Tokuda and Kenichi Ito, were born in Okinawa and Korea respectively. C. Prefectural Origin and Representation While discussion thus far dealt with non—native representation in terms of regions, let us narrow our unit of inquiry to the prefectural level. Whether a candidate is or is not a native of the area he hOpeS to represent is of utmost importance in Japan. As was pointed out earlier,5 personal prestige of candidates through connection with a powerful clan of relationship to a locally prominent family is highly regarded by voters. Moreover, personal political machines known in Japan by the euphemistic term, legp or earth foundations, are so entrenched in some areas that votes can be delivered to a politician throughout his life- time, and can even be guaranteed to his son, as in the case of the elder and younger Inukai in Okayama.4 Presumably, these traditional symbols of prestige are either inherited or acquired through long association with the community ‘within which they are meaningful. Likewise, machines are not build overnight by newcomers, but are cultivated over long periods of time by men who do favors for others and thus establish a matrix of oyabun-kobun relationships. In a tradition-oriented country like Japan, the possessors of prestige symbols and political machines are, therefore, most likely to be natives of their area of influence. To carry this line of logic a step farther, we may hypothesize that the conservative parties are more likely to have native-sons as members than the leftist parties. When we array the percentages by party of representatives who were not born in the prefectures they represent, this hypothesis seems to be substantiated€Table 6): TABLE 6 REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED IN PREFECTUlES NOT OF BIRTH (Percentages) Representatives Percentage All Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.6_. Democratic-Liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.6 Democratic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.8 Socialist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.1 Communist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.2 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.0 Almost one-fourth of the representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet are not natives of the prefecture from which they were elected (Table 6). Interestingly enough, 68 exactly twice that percentage or almost one half of the Com- munists are non-natives, whereas at the other end of the political continuum, only 17.6 percent of the Democratic Liberals are non-natives. The Democrats and the Socialists lie between these extremes. The essentially conservative nature of most minor party members, especially those of the New Political Council, is borne out by their percentage of non-natives. It seems that the "radicalness" of Japanese parties is in direct relationship with the percentage of their representatives who are non-natives. D. Type of Birthplace Another way in which the origins of representatives can be studied is by the type of community in which they were born. The ideal method of classifying birthplaces is admittedly by the size of their pOpulation. However, since most of the representatives were born around the turn of the century, and since scientifically valid national cen- suses were not taken before 1923, only estimates of pOpula- tion during that period can be used, and these are unavail- able for each city, town, and village. Consequently birth- places were classified according to their names. Conveniently enough, all place-names in Japan bear the suffixes of sh; (city), ghg (town), or E22 (village). For example, places are not officially designated simply as 69 Hiroshima, Funai, or Oishi; they are always known as Hiro- shima Shi, Funai Cho, or Oishi Son. In the United States, this practice is uniformly followed only in the designation of counties, e.g., Ingham County. The Japanese suffixes are generally determined on the basis of the population and importance of the place at the time they are officially recognized by a higher government, the Home Ministry before the war, and prefectural governments today. However, since many localities cling to their old suffixes because of sen- timent or local pride, they are only rough indices of popu- lation and density today.5 Sh; or cities are, by legal definition, "areas with at least 50,000 inhabitants with the shigaichi Z-corporate part:7 consisting of at least 603percentcdfthe house- holds."6 Cities are recognized by the prefectural govern- ments (Home Ministry before the war) when towns and villages reach the minimum pOpulation requirement and petition for a change in status.7 In 1950, there were 280 communities of over 30,000 persons, comprising 59 percent of the total pOp- ulation, while in 1898 (two years earlier than 1900, the year in which the average representative was born), there were only 48 cities, estimated to comprise just 11 percent of the nation's population.8 There is no legal distinction between town and vil— lage, although towns are generally larger and more urban- 7O ized. In 1948, there were 1833 towns with pOpulations ranging from 4,000 to 73,000; most of them ranged between 5,000 and 30,000. As a cultural anthropologist described them:9 Characteristically, a ghg is a center with several thousand inhabitants with shops, inns and geisha houses, a post office, a railroad and bus station, and possibly a high school. It is the education, transportation, communication, and economic center for the surrounding hamlets. In the biographies of representatives, those born in these semi-rural ghg can be distinguished from those born in ghg which are subdivisions of cities by the fact that county names precede the former and city names precede the latter. The rest of the country is made up of villages, which constitute the main unit of government in rural Japan. Although commonly translated as "villages," ggg are not single clusters of houses in the American sense, but are more akin to townships. They cover a rural area with a scattering of hamlets of about fifteen houses each, called kg or buraku. These hamlets have no separate legal status, but they retain traditional names and choose informal head— men who often perform indispensable functions like the dis- tribution of food rations. In general, villages have less peOple and are less urbanized than towns. In 1898, there were 13,557 villages,10 but they diminished to 8,420 by 1948 through consolidation with neighboring villages and growth into towns and cities. Host villages have a village 71 office, a primary school and a local fishery, forestry or farm association. Population estimates for 1898 are available, so that the pOpulation distribution by size of communities for that year can be compared with that of 1950 based on census data. If, for present purposes, we assume that communities with populations less than 4,999 are villages, 5,000 to 29,000 are towns, and over 30,000 are cities, we find the percent- ages of the pOpulation living in each of the three types of community in 1898 and 1950, in Table 7 (two left columns). The columns to the right compare the population figures with the percentages of representatives born in each of the three types of communities as determined by the suffixes of place—names: TABLE 7 DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY SIZE OF CONHUNITY, 1898 AND 1950, AND THE BIRTHPLACES OF REPRESENTATIVES (Percentages) POpulation Representatives 18983” 1950b réi: D-L Dem Soc Com Other _— Village 67.2 24.8 46.8 44.4 52.9 45.7 44.4 54.6 Town 21.3 36.2 27.5 30.8 21.4 23.9 25.0 22.7 City 11.5 39.1 25.7 24.8 25.7 30.4 30.6 22.7 0 TotallO0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 100.0 100.0 —¥ aSource: Japan Yearbook 1938-59, P. 49. bComputed from Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, pp. 16, 17. 72 Considering first the representatives as a whole, the greatest difference between the legislators and the population about the time they were born, 1898, was in the percentage of persons with village origins. While over two—thirds of the pOpulation lived in villages, less than one-half of the representatives were born in them. Their percentage born in towns exceeded that of the town popula- tion by 6 percent. Furthermore, over twice as many legis— lators, proportionately, were born in cities than the pro— portion of city—dwellers in 1898. Combining this informa- tion withtfluapercentage of people living in cities, towns, and villages in 1950 (Table 7), we may conclude that the representatives are more urban in origin than the pOpula- tion distribution at the time of birth, but much more rural in origin than the pOpulation distribution at the time of election. Differences among the parties are less apparent, al- though a number of generalizations can be abstracted. A greater prOportion of the Democrats and the minor party members have rural origins than members of the three re— maining parties, and among them, there is little difference in the prOportion with rural births. On the other hand, the Democratic-Liberals tend to dominate among those born in towns, followed by the Communists. Among the city-born, the leftist party members dominate. To summarize, the 75 Democratic-Liberals are closest to the birthplace distribu- tion of representatives as a whole, again due to their large number. The Democrats and the minor party members are the most rural, and the Socialists and Communists are the most urban in origin. E. Age in 1949 In many countries, age has long been an important criterion for choosing persons to positions of public authority. Advanced age seems to be particularly signifi- cant in Far Eastern countries like Japan where Confucian traditions are still dominant. One of the most important concepts in private social relations is that "the patriarch and the elders of the family council are acknowledged as superiors in virtue and experience to the rank and file of the clan."11 So, too, in public affairs, respect and def- erence to age have been evident in Japan's past. In the government of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the council of state was composed of five men called the Go-tairo or Five Great Aged.l2 The heads of administration under the Tokugawa Shoguns were called Go-tairo, Honorable Aged One, or 92332, Founding Elder. During the Meiji Era, the Genroin, the Council of Elders, was established in 1875, and from the turn of the century to World War I, a group of extremely influential Genro, Elders, ruled as the real power behind 74 the throne. Even before the ggppg became extinct with the death of its last member in 1940, another body, the Jushin or Senior Statesmen, succeeded to power. As will be demonstrated later, a very noticeable trend in the House of Representatives under the Meiji Con— stitution was increasing age of its members. Presumably, one important effect of the purge directives early in the Occupation (which disqualified from postwar offices those who held power in the old regime), and of the lowering of the minimum age of representatives, would be the entrance of new and younger men in the Diet. The focal point of this section will be whether younger men did enter the House of Representatives in 1949, and if so, how their ages compare with members of previous Diets and with members of lower houses of other national parliaments. A note of caution concerning the use of ready—made age data in Japan must be mentioned. The computation of age is unduly complicated because until very recent times the kazoe—doshi form of reckoning was used. Under this system, a child is considered to be one year old on the day of birth and two years old on the following New Year's Day. To carry this to absurd extremes, a child born on the night of December 31 would be two years old after that midnight. Statistics of age computed in this manner were included in statistical abstracts as late as 1950 and were sometimes 75 labeled as "Age—Japanese style." To eliminate this diffi— culty in this study, ages were computed by subtracting from 1949 the year of birth mentioned in the biographies. No attempt has been made to correct their ages to the nearest month. The ages of representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet range from 28 to 91, the youngest member being the Democratic- Liberal from Tokyo, Kimiyoshi Amano, and the oldest being the well-known parliamentarian, Yukio Ozaki, a member of the Kosei Club (a minor party), who served in every Diet in Jap- anese history. Taking the representatives as a whole, the mean age is 48.6, the modal age is 47.3, and the median age is 46.5. All of these averages lie in the 45-49 class in— terval, which itself claims one-fourth of the members (Table 8). TABLE 8 AGE OF REPRESENTATIVES--BY AGE GROUP AND BY PARTY (Percentages) Age Group All Mems. D—L Dem Soc Com Other . 25-29 .6 .8 0.0 00 00 203 30-54 505 2.6 208 201 2.8 1103 40-44 17.1 15.4 17.1 15.2 33.3 15.9 45-49 24.2 25.2 24.2 28.3 22.2 15.9 50-54 16.5 19.5 10.0 17.4 8.3 13.6 55—59 14.7 15.0 20.0 10.9 5.6 15.9 60-64 7.4 8.3 7.1 6.5 5.6 4.6 65-69 202 2.5 1.4 CO 208 [+06 70¢ 1.9 2.6 1.4 .0 .0 2.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Mean Age 48.6 49.7 48.2 45.9 45.3 47.1 76 Taking the mean age, we may then sketch the life and experiences of our model representative. He is a person born in 1900 who entered school just a year or two after the Russo-Japanese War. He remembers something about the Meiji Era since it ended when he was in the fourth grade. His college years coincided with the First World War, and he began to carve himself a career during the time of the Versailles and the Washington Naval Disarmament conferences. Several of his young adult years were spent during the so- called golden years of liberal government and parliamentary rule in Japan which lasted from the early Twenties to the Manchurian Incident in the early Thirties. From about ages 30 to 45, the militarists took control of the Japanese gov- ernment and plunged the country into a series of wars on the Asiatic continent, which eventually led to World War II and defeat in 1945. Thus, most representatives know what conditions were like before, during, and after military control of the government. By party affiliation (Table 8), the mean age of the Democratic-Liberals is above that of members as a whole. Leftist party members have the lowest mean ages, while the Democratic and minor party members lie between these ex- tremes. Once again the commonsensical notion is confirmed that the younger the mean age of its members, the farther to the left is the party in the Twenty-Fourth Diet, although ’77 age differences among the parties are relatively insignifi- cant. This picture gained from central tendencies of par- ties fails, however, to show which parties have the young- est members. While the conservatives have more peOple in the older age groups than the leftists, they nevertheless have more prOportionately in the lowest age group. 0f the 3 members below age 29, 2 are Democratic-Liberals and l‘is a member of the conservative minor party, the New Political Council. The ages of minor party members are, incidental- ly, more evenly dispersed than those of other parties. Age sixty is the traditional time for retirement in Japan, although many men keep on working through economic necessity. Nevertheless, this age is rich in folk—lore and symbolic meaning. Men reaching their sixtieth birthday are usually feted by their families and made to wear red in- fant's clothing, thus symbolizing the fact that the wearer has just ended his allotted time and is entering upon a second life. Such a man is traditionally allowed some lat- itude in his behavior because he is said to be enjoying his second childhood, and he often relinquishes his preroga- tives and responsibilities as head of the household to his eldest son. In the Twenty-Fourth Diet, 53 representatives or 11.5 percent of the body were past this symbolic age of re- tirement. PrOportionately, the Democratic-Liberals had 78 more members in this group (13.2%) than any other party. They are followed by the minor parties (11.5%), Democrats (9.9%), Communists (8.4%) and finally the Socialists (6.5%). The last-named have no representative over age 65. Comparing the age distribution of the representa- tives with that of the adult population over 25, we find that the latter group comprises 37.5 million peOple or 45 percent of the total Japanese pOpulation of 83 million in 1950 (Table 9). As in any parliament, the members do not constitute a fair sample of the pOpulation or of the voters, age-wise. While the pOpulation decreases gradually from the youngest to the oldest age groups, the number and pro— portion of representatives increase from the 25-29 age group to the modal 45-49 group, then decrease. This means that the portion of the pOpulation in the most influential and productive years, from ages 40 to 64, are overrepre- sented, while the pOpulation below 39 and over 65 are under- represented. The mean age of the pOpulation over 25 (39.7) is almost ten years below that of the representatives (48.6). Comparing the ages of representatives in the Twenty- Fourth Diet with past Diets (Table 10), we have already noted the striking trend toward the election of older mem- bers in the prewar period. Although it is not known wheth- er the ages of Diet members other than in the Twenty-Fourth have been computed on the basis of kazoe—doshi or by years 79 TABLE 9 AGE CF RJPRES EIETAT IVES CC PA? ‘D WITH AGE OF POPULATION IN 1950 (Percentages) J .Age Group Representatives POpulation* 30-34 5.5 13.9 55-39 11.9 13.5 45-49 24.2 10-7 50-54 1605 901 55-59 14.7 7.5 60-64 7.4 6.1 65-69 2.2 4.7 70+ 1.9 6.2 Total 100.0 100.0 N 462 37,476,000 *Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p. 22. \ TABLE 10 AGE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN SQLECTED DI TS, BY AGE RCUP (Percentages) Dietsa Age . Group 1st 5th 10th 14th 17th 20th 24th (1890) (1898) (1908) (1920). (1950) (1957) (1949) 50-39 51.5 55.0 16.1 12.9 4.5 5.2 16.0b 40-49 35.0 47.0 46.4 32.3 34.6 ' 29.4 41.3 50-59 10.0 15.0 34.0 41.2 36.3 41.2 31.2 60+ 3.7 3.0 3.4 13.6 24.0 24.2 11.5 Mean . - Age 40.6 42.5 ..46.4 49.5 51.7 52.4 47.8 aSources: 1st‘to 17th, Japan Yearbook 1930, as quot— ed in Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, pp. 168,169; 20th, Teikoku Toke1 11 enkan 1937, p. 409, as quoted in Robert E. Ward, Party Government in Japan, p. 564; 24th,hianua1 of the House of Representatives. bIncludes 3 representatives in new 25- 29 age group. 80 after birth, the trend toward the increasing age of members in prewar Diets is clearly indicated in Table 10. The mean age increased twelve years from 1890 to 1937. Whereas one— half of the members in the First Diet were in their thir- ties, the age group with the largest number of representa- tives advanced into the forties in 1898 and 1908, and thereafter into the fifties. The mean age of the Twenty- Fourth Diet is lower than at any time since 1920, but it is not as low as those prevailing prior to 1908. Interesting- ly enough, only 3.0 to 3.7 percent of the members prior to 1908 were above the retirement age of sixty, but this group grew to almost one-fourth of the body in the 1930's, then decreased to 11.5 percent in the Twenty-Fourth Diet. It is interesting to compare the age distribution of the Japanese representatives with that of lower house mem- bers of other countries, although data are not readily available for the same period (Table 11). While the repre- sentatives in Japan averaged 48.6 years of age in 1949, 15 studies reveal that his American counterpart averaged 52 in 1941, and his British counterpart averaged 50 for the period between the two World Wars. Members of the British House of Commons averaged from 48 years of age in 1931 to 51 in 1935. As far as average age is concerned, therefore, Japanese representatives today are a few years younger than their American and British counterparts before the war, but 81 there is little difference between Japanese representatives in the 1930's (Table 10) and prewar American and British representatives. Table 11 shows, however, that the latter are more evenly distributed among the age groups than the Japanese. No single age group in the American and British lower houses for the periods covered comprised more than 34 percent of the body, while every Japanese Diet in Table 10 except the Seventeenth has an age group with more than 40 percent of the membership. TABLE 11 AGE OF MELBERS CF LOWER HOUSES IN JAPAN, U.S. AND U.K. (Percentages) l 2 3 7 Japan U.S. U.K. 0 Abe Group (1949) (1941) (1918-1955) Abe GrouP 25-29 .6 l 4.7 21-50 40-49 41.3 34 29.7 41-50 50-59 31.2 28 31.8 51-60 60-69 9.6 19 15.0 61-70 70+ 1.9 5 2.2 71+ Total 100.0 99 100.0 Mean Age 48.6 52 50 l . 24th Diet. 2 H. R. 77th Congress. Data from Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the 77th Congress," APSE, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 52), p. 68. 5House of Commons, 1918-1935 averages. Data from J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944}, p. 27. 82 TTA 1v vau--vhapter II 1. NEAC, Senkyo Seido Shiryo, Dai Sambu / l.uaterials on the Electoral System, Part 3 _7 (Tokyo: NEAC,1950), pp. 30- 31. 2. Ibid., pp. 52, 33. 3. See p. 6. 4. See Paul S. Dull, "The Senkyoya System in Rural Japanese Communities," Occasional Papers Ho. 4(1953), (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press), pp. 29ff. 5. For breakdown of cities, towns and villages ac- cording to population groups, see NEAC, Senkyoku, Yukensha, Jinko To Ni Kansuru Shirabe / Study Relatin to Election Districts, Registrants, Population, etc._7 Tokyo: NEAC, 1949), pp. 23. 24. 6. Hikosaburo Sugimura, Chiho Jichisei koyo /-Ele— ments of the Local Autonomy System:7 (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1955), P- 59- 7. NEAC, Senkyoku Yukens ha Jinko To Ni Kansuru Shirabe / Study Relating to Election Districts, Registrants, POpulation, etc. _7 (Tokyo: NEAC,1949), p. 8. In 1949, however, there were 36'towns" and 2 "villages" with pOpula- tions over 30, 000. 8. Computed from data in the Japan Statistical Year- book 1951, pp. 16, 17, and Japan Yearbook 1938-1939, p. 50. 9. John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, p. 82. 10. Japan Yearbook 1938-1939, p. 50. 11. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan, Government-Politics, P- 35- 12. Edward Norbeck, "Age Grading in Japan," American Anthropologist, Vol. 55( Aug. 53), pp. 373- 384. 13. See sources of Table 12 for references. CHAPTER III EDUCATION A. Educational Levels of Diet Members This chapter on the educational backgrounds of rep- resentatives is based on three assumptions which seem to be valid but which cannot be absolutely demonstrated by avail- able evidence. The first is that all members in the Twenty- Fourth Diet received some kind of formal education. From Representatives, supplemented by materials from the Japan's Egg g Egg, 1950-1951, the educational backgrounds of93 perh cent of the members are known. The assumption is made, therefore, that the remaining 7 percent received some form of primary or secondary education; All representatives whose educational information was omitted in the Manual but found in the flthg Egg had received no more than middle school education. This may mean that the 7 percent whose education is not listed in the Manual or the Ehglg Egg may have hesi- tated to make known their modest educational backgrounds. Another assumption is that they ‘11 received their education before the end of the Second World War. Although the years in which members completed their educations are not given in the biographies, we have already judged from their ages in 1949 that most of them received their primary 84 and secondary schooling before the First World War, and their university educations during and immediately after that war. Even the youngest member would have graduated from middle school in 1936 and from the university in 1941, if his education were not interrupted. The last assumption is that the amount of formal ed- ucation received by an individual, be he a Diet member or one of his constituents, is an important determinant of his frame of reference toward political affairs. It is signifi- cant to note that the education of all Diet members came be- tween 1880 and 1945 when the entire school system, public and private, was supervised by the Ministry of Education. During this period of centralized control, primary and sec- ondary schools had almost uniform curricula throughout the nation. They became the chief organs for indoctrinating students with the principles of the sacrosanct Imperial Re- script of Education (1890), which stressed filial piety, virtue and loyalty for advancement of the commonkgood, and service to the state. Beyond the secondary level, educa- tion took on a heavy professional and vocational emphasis. The favored few receiving this preparation were not only able to fill jobs with more pay and prestige but were also able to increase their facility in using the very difficult language.1 Before language reform in 1946, the intelli- gentsia prided itself in the use of esoteric Chinese char- 85 acters, foreign phrases, and the classical epistolary style. The level of spoken and written Japanese used by an individual became one of the best indicators of his educa- tional attainment and social status. For our purpose, the extremely complex organization of the educational system in Japan prior to the Second World War will be grouped into three divisions: Primagy Education-~first six years of schooling Secondary Education--schooling from the seventh to the eleventh years Higher Education College--schooling from the eleventh or twelfth to the thirteenth years University--education beyond the fourteenth year. Because of the large proportion of Diet members with uni- versity education, this level of education will be treated in greater detail in the next section. Throughout this study no distinction is made between those who merely at- tended and those who were graduated from schools at the various levels. 2 Jinjo Sho Gakko, is the core of Primary education, the educational system before and after the Allied Occupa- tion. Attendance from age six has been compulsory since 1907, and all normal children are enrolled (99.9% in 1950). The curriculum is largely devoted to the three R's, but 86 other subjects like sports, music, art, and ethics, shushin, are also taught. Thirty-three representatives (7.1%) of the lower house received only this form of education. If we assume, however, that the 33 members whose educational back- ground is unknown also received no more than primary school education, then this group would include 14 percent of the body. Most schools also have a higher primary division, [£232 §h2,§§kkg, consisting of two years beyond the first six grades. This is a non—compulsory and terminal program, but there is no indication that any Diet member ended his education with this form of schooling. Beyond the first six grades, the school system be- comes extremely complicated. In addition to this Egggl§hg ggkkg program, there are two different terminal programs which are designed to prepare boys for different levels of occupational skills and responsibilities.3 After primary school, students could attend vocational schools, Jitsugyo figkkg, on the secondary school level for five years, and then go on to semi-skilled jobs. Only a select few gradu- ates of primary schools (6% in 1945) are able to enter boys' middle school, Chg ngkg, which serves as terminal education for most graduates (72% in 1945), who then go into clerical or semi-professional jobs. The small minority go on to colleges and universities. Because these various terminal programs were thought to be undemocratic, they 87 'were all revamped into the 6-3-3—4 pattern of American schools after the spring of 1947.4 The majority of the Diet members with more than pri- mary education (85%) attended middle schools, then colleges or universities; so we need not be concerned with the voca- tional school program. Middle school education is for the select few; only one-tenth of the graduating class of pri- mary schools usually applies for admission, of which little more than one-half are accepted. Deepite the large prOpor- tion of middle school students who terminate after complet- ing the five-year program (72%), the curriculum still em- phasizes college preparation. Advanced work on the three R's is given in the first two years, followed by three years of mathematics, civics, foreign languages, and science. Thirty-nine members or 8.5 percent of the Diet terminated with this form of education. In addition, 6 representatives or 1.3 percent of the House of Representatives attended normal schools, Shihan ,nggg. The ordinary normal school has a five-year program on the secondary school level which is entered after pri- mary school. This type of school trains the bulk of pri- mary school teachers. Those intending to teach in secondary school go on to higher normal schools for men and for women, £933 Shihan ngkg and Koto Joshi Shihan Gakko, which offer four-year courses on the collegiate level. In 1937 there 88 ‘were only four of these, enrolling only 2,692 students, 'while ordinary normal schools enrolled almost 33,000 stu- dents. Most of the six Diet members received normal school training of the lower type. Those seeking higher education, that is, schooling beyond the eleventh year in school, go either to high schools and college preparatory divisions of universities, then into universities, or they go directly to colleges, which the Japanese call "specialty schools”--Semmon.§gkkg. Colleges are three-to five-year schools beyond the secondary level but not quite equivalent to the prewar uni- versity level. College standards are higher than those for normal schools and high schools, and most of them have been elevated to university status since 1946. Except for women's colleges and certain private institutes like the well-known Aoyama Gakuin, they offer intensive programs in technical fields like agriculture, fishery, forestry, busi- ness, engineering, pharmacy, and even medicine and dentistry. Others include specialized curricula in theology, interna- tional affairs, and the fine arts. Forty-nine (more than one-tenth) of the representatives received this level of education. High schools, Eggg,§§kkg, offer two—or three-year programs for university preparation. They are difficult to enter since less than 8 percent of those finishing middle 89 school are admitted, but high school graduates are virtual- ly assured entrance into universities. Some universities maintain preparatory divisions, 39kg, which correspond to these high schools and to junior colleges in the United States. Only 4 Diet members, or less than 1 percent of them, entered this level of schools and did not go on to universities. University education will be treated in greater de- tail in the following section, but we may note here that almost two out of three representatives received some form of it. The highest schools attended by representatives ac- cording to party affiliation are shown in Table 12. Both the Socialists and minor party members have the largest percentages with unknown educational background. The con- servatives are generally better educated than the leftists; both the Democratic-Liberals and the Democrats have smaller percentages with primary education and larger percentages with higher education than the leftist parties. Although in the generally conservative minor parties the prOportion with higher education is above average and second only to that of the Democratic-Liberals, they have a large group whose educational background is unknown. The Communists are not far behind the Democrats in educational attainment. Only the Socialists have more than one-fourth of their mem- 9O bers with only primary education and less than two-thirds with higher education. We may generalize therefore that the Democratic-Liberals are by far the best educated, and the Socialists are the least educated. The Democrats and Communists have about the same levels of education prOpor- tionately and lie between these extremes together with the minor parties which have high prOportions of both highly and poorly educated members. TABLE 12 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY PARTY (Percentages) Edugggignal All Mems D-L Dem _Soc Com Others Primary . . 7.1 6.0 8.6 10.9 11.1 4.6 Secondary . 9.9 8.6 12.9 10.9 13.9 4.6 Middle 8.5 7.5 11.5 8.7 13.9 4.6 Normal 1.3 1.1 1.4 2.2 0 0 Higher . . 76.0 80.1 72.8 63.0 69.5 77.2 College 10.6 10.9 10.0 8.7 2.8 2.2 High .9 .8 1.4 o 2.8 18.2 Univ. . 64.5 68.4 61.4 54.3 63.9 56.8 Unknown . . 7.0 5.3 5.7 15.2 5.5 13.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 *2 ‘ — -_ t r 1 .7 In terms of age, one would naturally guess that the younger members are better educated than the older because of the steady expansion of educational Opportunities in Japan throughout the first half of the twentieth century. This hypothesis is generally demonstrated in Table 13, al- 91 “though a number of points need to be mentioned. Members in their twenties are all university-educated, but they are 'too few in number to be significant. Those above the re- tirement age of sixty have the largest preportion of mem- 'bers with primary education, but even in this group more than one-half has university background and almost two- thirds has some kind of higher education. An interesting phenomenon is the smaller percentage of members in their thirties with university education than members in their forties and fifties. This may be partly due to the fact that the former group was of university age from 1929 to 1942, and therefore had less opportunity to go to universi- ties because of poor economic conditions and military con- scription than the latter groups which reached university age in more stable and prosperous times. TABLE 13 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY AGE GROUPS (Percentages) Educational Level 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Primary 0 4.2 5.8 6.9 17.0 Secondary 0 16.9 7.8 11.8 9.4 College 0 16.9 11.5 6.3 11.; University 100.0 59.2 69.1 63.2 52.9 Unknown 0 2.8 5.8 11.8 9.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 3 71 191 144 53 92 In the previous chapter, we noted that the lower Ihouse of the Diet is by no means representative of the adult jpopulation in terms of age. This situation also holds with .regard to educational background (Table 14). Estimates of 'the schooling of persons above age 25 indicate that about 8 percent have some form of higher education, while more than three-fourths of the Diet members have similar education. The proportions of representatives with primary and with secondary education are one—fifth the prOportions of the adult population with such education. TABLE 14 YEARS OF SCHOCLING COMPLETED-~COMPARISON BETWEEN DIET MEMBERS AND NON-STUDENT POPULATION, 1950 (q _- I All Population' Years Completed Members 25+ years 0 0 7.2 1-6 701 5506 7—11 10.8 48.9 12+ 76.0 8.2 Not reported 7.1 .1 Total 100.0 100.0 N 462 57,444,000 ‘Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p. 386. Unfortunately, the educational background of past Diets has not been studied systematically so that it is dif- ficult to compare the distribution of members at every edu- cational level for two or more Diets. For what they may be 95 for the House of Representa- 5 worth, newspaper statistics tives after the 1930 election indicate that there were 288 "college graduates" in the body then, while our figures re- veal 298 members with "some form of university education" in 1949. Whereas 107 representatives in 1930 had "less than middle school education," only 72 in 1949 had "educa- tion up to graduation from middle school," but if we‘include the 33 with unknown background in this category, the total would be 105. If we assume therefore that these classifica- tions of educational levels in the 1930 and 1949 Diets cor- respond to each other, then the educational distribution of representatives remained almost constant for the Diets which are two decades apart. Again, there is limited opportunity for comparing the educational background of different parliamentary bodies 6 and since little research in this field has been done, even they relate to Parliaments in different periods. Dis- regarding the variation in time, it is interesting to note that both the American and the Japanese Houses of Represen- tatives have the same prOportion of university-educated persons (64%), while the British House of Commons has an average of 42 percent for the interwar period, or only two- thirds the prOportion in the former two bodies (Table 15). However, during this interwar period, the percentage of university-educated Members of Parliament ranged from 37 . .. ... ... ... ... _ ... ... ... . . . .. ... ... n :. . e. w. .. . . ... ... .. .. o n .... q. t .. .. z .. .. .. .. .. ... e .. .. .. I .. .. .. I .. .... Z .. .. ... . . ... . ... ... .. ... .. . I _. .. L ... z 1 ... ... z . . ... ... . ... ... . ... ... . .. : ... _ ... . . . .. ... v. .. .. I q T ... ... _ : .. . .. .c x . .. ... .. ... . ... -. ... ... ... . . w. ... .. ... . ... .._ ... .. ... ... ... .fi . . ... .. ... ...- _.: ... _v ... L . . .. .N. _. .. : ... ... ... .. ... .. ... .... ... 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T. ... .x .. .. . .. ... ... .. .. ... .. ... .. .. .. . .. .. ... ._ ... ... ... .... .. ... ... .. .. ... ... .. ... ... ... .. I .. .. .. . . .... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... .. . . s. I .. . ... I ... . I .. 2 .. ... .. .. .. ._ e. _ ... ... .. .. . .. . .. . ... ... x ; I. ... ... .. 2. ... .. ... ... ... : .. .. .. .. ... .. ... .. ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... .. .. ... ... . ... . .. ... .. .. ... ... ... ._ ... ... . .. ... ... 1 .. . .. ... ... .. . _ . .. .. : ... .. .. _ ... .e. ... L. ... . . ... .... .. . ... ... ... 1 . .. .. I 2 v. .. ... T 5.. .. .. ... I .. ... I t w .. ... 2 ... .. 2. ; ... ... ... . o. v. .. ... .. ... .. ... .. .. ... _ ... ... .. ; ... ... . ... I ... ... .. ... . . ... .... ... .. ... ... T .. ... . . . Z . . s I ... Z L .. ... ... .. Y .. 3 a“ : ... ... 5. .. ... .. L ... ... a. ... y. a. ... ... .. . ... 2. . . o. 2 o 2. w. ... Z L .. ... ... .. ... ... . .. .. ... .. ... .. ... ... ... ... ... a ... .. e. v. E ... .. . . ... Z ... . . ... ... .. .... e .. Z Z .7 y. . , 3 . . 2 a 7 . . . .. . . V s. .. . w. z. ... Z . Z ... . . E . . E .. . : . 5. S ... ... T . . .. .. .. ... ... I 2 s. .. . . . ... ... t .. .... a. . . ... ... I ... .. .... .. C .. ... ... ... ... u. s. ... v. I .. .. ... . . ... ... . . . . v . . : . ... ... 5. 5. w .1 I 5. ,4 .5 ... ... ... .. ... ... ... _._. .. ... c. ... .. . . ... .. T 3. v! o a. an, I. . .. .. _ .. ... .. Z ... . ... .. ... ... ... .. E .. 9 . L .. :. . . z . .. . ... ... . . . 3 ... .... : . 2 1 . . ... ... . I 5. . .. . s . .. 3. w. .. ... .. I .. 6. .. . .5 —_ .a 5. ... a. .y. .7 .1... .n v! w. 9. _. r . ... t ... .. .. ... .. ... ... ... .. I .. .. .. .. .1. . ‘ ... ... I s . . .. . . a. . . z. ... 5. . . . . .s f, I . 5. ... . 7o ... .. .. .. _ . .. .. ... .... ... .. ... 7; ... ... r 2 .. .. Z .. ... .... . ... ... ... 2 1. .. ... ... ._ .. .. 9 ... 2 .... ... .7 .. ... ... Z ... ... 3 .. . . ... .. 2 3 E ... .. E s ... 3. . .. z I .. E I .... .. .. ... ... .. 7: 3 ... I ... ... . . . , 2’ ... ._ 2 ... .. ... ... .. ... .. s. .... .. ... . ... .. . .. . .. .. . x .. 2 e. E .. ... .... .. I ... 7 v. .I . . 3 z . . ... .. . . .. . : ... ... . _ ... .... z. .. .. ... .. 1 .. .. ... 3 ... ... ... ... ... .. .. . ... ... Q ~.. .. . ... ... ... E ... .a .. 2 v t .. r Y ... .. . .. .- .. .1. .. . .. E e r t .. I. a t ... . 94 percent in 1923 to 51 percent in 1931. While 90 percent of Congressmen have some form of post-secondary education, only 75 percent of Japanese representatives make similar claims. Based upon this limited sample, the United States Congressmen are generally better educated than Japanese representatives, but both are far superior in university education to British members of parliament. TABLE 15 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MELBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE-- JAPAN, U. SO, U. K. (Percentages) . Japan U. s.a U. K.d Educational Level (1949) (1941) (E918-35) Primary 7.1 .2 ~- Secondary 10.7 8.3 —- College 10.6 25.8b -- University 64.5 64.8c 42.0 Unknown 7 e 1 e 9 "'- N 462 435 1823 aData of the House of Representatives, 77th Congress, from Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy- seventh Congress," APSR,-Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 1942), p. 70. bIncludes business college. 0Classified as "professional school" in source. dJ. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation, p. 57. Average of 7 parliaments during 1918-35. Other comparable figures not available. 95 B. University Education The university, Daigaku, is the highest educational level in Japan. The student finally reaches it after a rigorous weeding out process in six years of primary, four or five years of middle, and two or three years of high school. He is therefore about nineteen years of age and has already gone through thirteen years of schooling before he begins his three years of undergraduate work at the uni— versity. In other words, in both age and education, he be- gins at about the sophomore level in American universities, but graduates at the same age and after the same number of total school years as his American brethren. Upon complet— ing his three-year program, the Japanese university student is awarded the Gakushi-Go, which is comparable to the bach- elor's degree today, although it was translated as the mas- ter's degree in prewar catalogs of the Tokyo Imperial Uni- versity. The student may then matriculate in the graduate division, Daigakuin, and work up to four years on his doc- torate, Hakushi-Go, which is awarded after submission of a dissertation and ordinarily without the requirement of com- pleting a schedule of course work. University education in Japan probably contributes more toward the social mobility of individuals than in the United States. The importance of facility with the diffi- cult language in order to obtain social recognition has al- 96 ready been mentioned, and education at this highest level certainly contributes toward this mastery. Moreover, when all factors remain equal, the prestige jobs in the profes- sions, business firms, and government are obtainable pri- marily on the basis of training and personal "connections." Toward both these ends, university education has much to offer. The importance of going to the "right" universities for certain types of preferred employment has been recog- nized for some time. Gakubatsu or school cliques are some- times regarded in the same vein as the other immense "batsu's" or cliques--e.g., Gumbatsu (military) and Zai- batsu (Financial)--and the nearest western equivalents are the "old school tie" loyalty which prevails in Great Brit- ain. Embree writes:7 A degree from one of the Imperial Universities is al- most a necessity for a government career, and a degree from certain universities such as the Imperial Universi- ty of Tokyo is almost a sure passport into the civil service . . . . Graduates from private universities such as Keio and Waseda are more likely to become busi- nessmen, writers, or newspapermen. Mitsui draws many of its bright young men from Keio and Mitsubishi from Waseda. In all fairness, it is probably true that graduates of universities favored in select fields may be chosen and advanced to higher positions not merely because of alumni "pull" but also because institutions they attended equip them best for professional competence. In examining the 97 university background of Diet members, it would be inter- esting therefore to consider (1) the types of universities attended, (2) the specific schools attended, and (5) the field of education in which representatives majored in the more important institutions. Toward the end of the prewar period, there were 45 institutions registered as universities8 in Japan PrOper with the Ministry of Education, and they have generally been classified as government, public and private universi- ties. Government universities are those maintained and fi- nanced by the national government, and they consisted of 6 Imperial Universities and 12 universities with single faculties of medicine, commerce, engineering, and litera- ture and science. There are only two public universities, i.e., the medical and commercial institutions supported by the municipal governments of Kyoto and Osaka respectively. Because of their small total enrollment (1,448 in 1937), this classification of universities will not be treated separately in this discussion. The remaining 25 institus tions are private universities, the most important of which are all located in the Tokyo area. Except for the source of financial support and religious instruction in some pri- vate institutions, there are no essential differences be- tween government and private universities according to the findings of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan.9 How- 98 ever, it is pOpularly conceded that the gvvorrment univer- sities in general, and the Tokyo Imperial University in par- ticular, enjoy greater prestige than private institutions. This is partly revealed in the percentage of student ap- plicants accepted by the two types of universities. In 1948, only 30 percent of the 32 thousand applicants to gov- ernment universities were enrolled, while 40 percent of the 64 thousand applicants were accepted by the private insti- tutions.10 Table 16 shows the distribution of university-educated representatives between the government and the private uni- versities with a breakdown among the largest institutions. The most interesting fact emerging from these statistics is that 4 out of every 10 representatives attended government universities, and that this proportion holds for all par- ties except the Socialists. A slightly smaller percentage (34.6%) of its members attended government universities. Of the 6 Imperial Universities, only 2, Tokyo and Kyoto, claim sizable groups of representatives. Two others, Kyushu and Tohoku, claim very few--on1y about 1 out of every 100 university-educated legislators. The remaining 2 Imperial Universities, Osaka and Hokkaido, are completely unrepresented. It is interesting to note that the number of Diet members from the various Imperial Universities conforms in general to their order of prestige as pOpularly conceived --Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Osaka.11 99 TABLE 16 .UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED, BY PARTY (Percentages) . All Universities N D-L Dem Soc Com Others lemSo Government Tokyo 28.5 27.7 36.4 19.2 26.0 32.0 Kyoto 8.5 9.0 4.5 11.5 8.7 8.0 Kyushu 1.0 1.1 O 3.9 O O Tohoku 1.; 1.; O O 4.; O 51.1th1331 5 e 5 e E60 ; 53.6 e 1:506 Private ase a 15.3 16.4 11.4 19.2 8.7 16.0 Nippon 12.2 13.6 4.5 15.4 13.1 12.0 Meiji 8.5 9.0 9.1 O 8.7 12.0 Chuo 8.1 6.2 13.6 11.5 8.7 8.0 Keio 3.7 3.4 2.3 3.9 8.7 4.0 Hosei 3.1 4.0 2.3 O 0 4.0 Others .8 . l .9 1 .4 l .1 4.0 Subtotal 68.7 6%.; 59.1 65.4 . '6676 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 295 177 44 26 23 25 Tokyo Imperial University, the oldest, the second largest, and particularly largest alumni in the lower house (28.5%). the most esteemed institution in the country, for training government personnel, has the By party affil- iation, however, this proportion varies from 1 out of 3 among the Democrats to 1 out of 5 among the Socialists. While the Democrats and the minor parties have no one from Kyushu and Tohoku universities, a Socialist attended the former and.a Communist, the latter institution. The Commu- nist member is the only representative of that party from 100 the Hokkaido-Tohoku region. Incidentally, students of the Tohoku Imperial University, his alma mater, are reputed to be relatively unresponsive to political movements and dem- onstrations because of their preoccupation with studies in the natural sciences.12 Education in private universities is claimed by 6 out of 10 university-educated representatives in all par— ties, again, except the Socialist. There seems to be little correlation between the particular private university at- tended by representatives and their party affiliation. Democratic-Liberals and minor party members are, however, more apt to be the products of the large Tokyo universities, while Democrats, Communists, and Socialists include larger prOportions of members eeducated at less prominent schools largely located in the outlying areas. Waseda, the private university with the largest num- ber of Diet members (15.3%) has traditionally emphasized politics, law, and economics, and trained men for govern- ment, journalism, and letters.13 While both the Socialists and the Communists are leftist parties Springing from the same "proletarian movement" in prewar Japan, 19:2 percent of the former but only 8.7 percent of the latter came from Waseda. One out of 7 attended Nippon University in all par— ties except the Democrats. Chuo University,which was first established as the English Law School (Igirisu Horitsu 101 ‘ngkgx,is sometimes thought to be a hotbed of leftist move- ments, but this hypothesis is not borne out by the number of its alumni representing leftist parties. A relatively large although still insignificant proportion of Communists are from Keio University, the oldest school of higher learning in the country. Hosei University founded in 1879 as the French Law School has no leftist Diet member among its alumni. In Table 17, the eight largest universities (two government and six private which we will call the HBig Eight") are listed, and their enrollment in 1936 is compared with the number of their alumni in the lower house, this time without regard to party affiliation. While Waseda is the largest school in the nation, it has less than one half of the number of representatives as the second largest school, Tokyo Imperial University. Although ranking fifth in student enrollment, Nippon University has the third largest contingent in the lower house. In terms of the 1936 enrollment, the first four schools--Waseda, Tokyo Im- perial, Nippon, and Kyoto Imperial--are overrepresented, while the rest of the 41 universities are underrepresented. Although the 37 less prominent universities (classified as "other" in this table) claim 46 percent of all university students, only 12 percent of university-educated members came from these institutions. The most underrepresented 102 school among the Big Eight is Keio, which, while third in student enrollment, is seventh in size of alumni in the lower house. This poor showing certainly is in keeping with the teachings of its founder, Yukichi Fukuzawa, who encouraged his students to go into teaching or business in- stead of government. TABLE 17 UNIVERSITIES MOST FREQUENTLY ATTENDED % Student Universities Number Cgit POpglation bgaggze 36 1. Tokyo Imperial 84 28.5 11 2 2. Waseda 45 15.3 11 l 3. Nippon 36 12.2 5 5 4. Kyoto Imperial 25 8.5 8 4 5. Meiji 25 8.5 4 6 6.0mm 24 8J. 3 7 7. Keio 11 3.7 9 3 8. Hosei 9 3.0 3 8 Others _36 12.2 46 Total 295 100.0% 100% ’Source: Japan Year Book 1938-39, pp. 706, 707. Geographically, only Kyoto Imperial University among the Big Eight and most of the "other" universities, i.e., private and single-faculty universities, are located out- side the Tokyo area. These schools with more than one half of the university enrollment educated only 20.7 percent of the representatives. Ominously, 8 out of 10 legislators at the very least spent their university years in the capital. 103 Unfortunately, few studies have been made of the university education of members in previous Diets so that meaningful comparisons can be accomplished. The only one available to the writer is a newspaper report in 1930 which gave the number of Diet members then in office from the 14 four largest universities. These figures compared with those for the 1949 session are as follows: 1930 1949 Tokyo Imperial 83 84 Kyoto " 15 25 Waseda - 65 45 Keio 18 11 In these Diets two decades apart, the large number of mem- bers from Tokyo Imperial University remained almost con- stant. A 66 percent gain was made by the Kyoto Imperial University, while the number from both Waseda and Keio fell about one-third. In addition to the particular institutions attended by the legislators, an equally important question is the field of study-~or in Japanese parlance, the faculty (gakubu) in which they majored. An important characteristic of the . prewar curriculum of the Japanese university is its empha- sis on "training" at the expense of "education" in the broad American sense. In the words Of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan:15 In the curriculum of Japanese institutions of higher learning . . . there is too little Opportunity for gen- eral education, too early and too narrow a specializa- 104 tion, and too great a vocational or professional em- phasis. The members of this mission may have noted but failed to make clear in their report that Japanese universities do not have professional schools beyond the bachelor's degree as in the United States. Here, the prospective physician or lawyer spends four years of undergraduate work in pre- medical or pre-legal studies which allows a modicum of work in the liberal arts before he enters professional school. His Japanese counterpart, on the other hand, receives all his professional training on the undergraduate level. Nat- urally his program precludes liberal arts courses or even electives, except, possibly the choice of a modern European language from several at his disposal to meet his language requirement. Perhaps, in a relatively poor country like Japan, this type of abbreviated and narrowly specialized education is unavoidable. For students who must enter an extremely competitive and economically stringent world after graduation, it is to be expected that they should prefer "training" in utilitarian fields which would prepare them for the preferred jobs as doctors, lawyers, business administrators and government officials. While most universities are single-faculty institu- tions, such as the Osaka Commercial University, all impor- tant universities consist of several faculties. The Tokyo Imperial University, for example, has seven--Law, Medicine, 105 Engineering, Literature, Science, Agriculture, and Econom- ics--plus numerous research institutes. The other type Of post-secondary school, the Semmon—Gakko (translated as "college" but which literally means "specialty school"), is a single faculty institution Offering professional training in the same fields as universities but at a lower standard. The fields of study of both college and university- educated legislators are tabulated in Table 18, as well as that of all college and university students in 1936 in the extreme right column. On the university level, only the Literature Faculty, and on the collegiate level, only the Literature, Fine Arts, and Music specialties (grouped in the "other" category in the table) may be classified as liberal arts. It is therefore likely that no more than 15 percent of the students in 1936 received this form of high- er education so esteemed by American educators. Of even greater significance to this study, only about 3 out of every 100 representatives with higher education majored in Literature. The Socialists lead in this regard, while the Democrats are distinguished by having no one trained in the liberal arts. Of the remaining 97 percent receiving the profession- al and vocational form of education, the greatest portion (41.6%) Prepared for the law, whereas about one-fourth of the students as a whole did in 1936. If the "Political 106 TABLE 18 MAJOR IN BOTH COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, BY PARTY (Percentages) . College.& Major Méii D-L Dem Soc Com Other Ugtzggitzy 1936‘ Law 41.6 41.2 47.8 37.9 40.9 38.7 24 Political ' ' course 801 808 605 609 901 605 "’ Economics 17.1 15.5 21.7 17.2 27.3 12.9 5 Commerce 12.1 13.4 10.9 10.4 0 16.1 17 Agriculture/ Fishery 6.2 5.1 4.4 3.4 4.5 19.4 2 Literature 3.1 3.1 O 6.9 4.5 3.2 11 Medicine/ Dentistry 1.9 2.1 O 6.9 O O 16 Other 9.9 10.8 8.7 10.4 13.7 3.2 25 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 322 194 46 29 22 31 108,793 *Source: Japan Year Book, 1938-39, pp. 707, 711. 107 Course" offered at the Tokyo Imperial University16 is re- garded as a law program since it is almost entirely devoted to legal studies, one-half of the representatives with higher education may be said to have majored in law, over twice the prOportion of law students among students at large in 1936. More Democrats are trained in the law than any other party, while the Socialists are the least trained. The Communists have about the same prOportion of legally trained as the Democratic-Liberals. Percentage- wise, the Communists are most educated in political studies, although as will be noted later, only one of them became a bureaucrat, but in a prefectural office. The next important categories are the closely relat- ed ones of economics and commerce. A greater percentage of representatives majored in economics than students as a whole, but a greater portion of students majored in com- merce than did representatives. Of those specializing in economics, the Communists lead by far, while the minor par- ties are last. The Opposite holds true for the proportions majoring in commerce. As may be expected, no Communist specialized in the bourgeohsstudy of business administra- tion, but the minor party members lead in this regard. Three times as many representatives studied agricul- ture as compared to students at large, although this group is still small (6.2%) as compared with the number in other 108 faculties. The minor party members are particularly well- educated in this field. Only 2 out of 100 representatives with college and university education took up medicine and dentistry, although eight times as many students did. None of the representatives received medical and dental educa- tion in the Big Eight universities, and most of them are Socialists. About 1 out of 10 representatives was educated in the ”other" faculties, and most of them studied engineer- ing. Only one university-trained representative majored in education. Setting aside those educated in colleges, to what universities did legislators go for education in the vari- ous fields? Table 19 shows the distribution of the universityeeducated ppppp majors ppp kpppp. While 40 per- cent of the representatives went to the Imperial Universi- ties, Over two thirds of those majoring in literature, agriculture and fishery, and the political course attended these institutions. While 60 percent went to private uni- versities. 75 Percent of those majoring in economics and 100 percent in commerce attended them. No representative went to the Imperial Universities for commerce, and the six largest private universities for agriculture and fishery and literature. Only two attended universities for medi- cine or dentistry, but not at any of the Big Eight schools. Only a slightly larger portion (44.4%) went to the Imperial 109 Universities for law education than might have been expect- ed (40.6%). TABLE 19 MAJOR IN UNIVERSITIES, BY INSTITUTIONS (Percentages) . .. . All Pol. Come Agric. . Med. Ikr1vers1t1esMa$x€ Law Course Econ. mercem Fish. L t. D nt. Other Government ' Tokyo :30.1 30.1 68.0 19.2 0 44.5 77.8 0 27.8 Kyoto 9.1 12.8 0 3.9. O 33.3 11.1 0 11.1 Others 1.4 1.5 O 1.9 O 0 O O 5.5 Subtotal 40.6 44.4 68.0 25.0 0 77.8 88.9 0 44.4 Private ' ' . Waseda 15.2 4.5 8.0 44.2 28.6 0 O O 16.7 Nippon 11.6 16.6 16.0 3.8 3.6 O 0 O 11.1 Meiji 8.3 10.5 0 .8 21.4 0 O O O Chuo 8.3 15.9 0 5.8 O O O O O Keio 2.9 O 8.0 11.5 0 O O O O Hosei 3.3 4.5 O 1.9 7.1 O O O 0 Others 9.8 4.5 O 0 39.3 22.2 11.1 100.0 27.8 Subtotal 59.4 55.6 32.0 75.0 100.0 22.2 11.1 100.0 55.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N 276 133 25 52 28 9 9 2 18 Among the outstanding schools in each field of study, Tokyo Imperial University is most highly esteemed in law and the political course. The prOportion of members studying in the legal division of the Law Faculty there, though larger than in any other university, is only equal to the prOportion which attended that school in all faculties. Also outstanding in law are Nippon and Chuo universities. wasedaimssurprising- 1y weak. On the other hand, Waseda is outstanding in economics, with Tokyo Imperial University a poor second. Important, 110 too, is Keio which was attended by 11.5 percent of those majoring in economics although less than 3 percent attended the school for all majors. None of the economics majors attended the "other" private universities. In commerce, these small private institutions are outstanding, followed by Waseda and Meiji. Keio produced no commerce major in the lower house, although its bright~ est graduates are said to go into business, particularly in the Mitsui interests. In agriculture and fishery, Tokyo Imperial Universi- ty is outstanding, followed by its sister school in Kyoto and the smaller private institutions. Similarly, these are the places attended by the nine literature majors. C. Foreign Education Of 462 representatives, 25 or 5.4 percent received some kind of education abroad, i.e., in the United States and European countries, principally the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (Table 20). Eighty percent of them studied in the United States. None of the representatives was educated in any Asian country outside of Japanese juris- diction or in any country in the western hemisphere besides the United States. All went abroad for university educa— tion, usually after spending some time in universities at home. A number of individuals like Etsujiro Uyehara re- ceived the doctorate abroad. 111 TABLE 20 FOREIGN EDUCATIOI, BY PARTY an: Area Megtirs D—L Dem Soc Com Others United States l7(20)* 10(12) 4 0(1) 0 3 Europe 5(8) 5(5) 0 0(1) O 2 U. S. & Europe 3 2 O O 0 Total 25 15 4 0 5 % of Party with Foreign Education 5.4% 5.6 5.7 2.2 0 11.4 % of Party with U. S. Education 4.3 4.5 5.7 2.2 0 6.8 *Figures in parentheses include those who went to both areas. The minor parties have the largest proportion of the foreign-educated (11.4%), followed by the conservatives. No Communist claims foreign education although the tOp leaders have all been abroad for other reasons. While 20 members in this Diet claimed American educa- tions, an almost equal number (19) in the 1930 Diet did like— wise.17 D. Foreign Travel In prewar Diets, the government encouraged foreign travel of senior legislators by Sponsoring their trips. These individuals still in the Diet in 1949, plus those go- 'ing abroad for education and private purposes, and on diplo- matic and military missions comprise the 102 or 22.7 percent of the representatives who have been outside Japan PrOper (Table 21). 112 TABLE 21 TRAVEL ABROAD, BY PARTY Area Megtirs D-L Dem Soc Com Others U. S. 12(47)‘ 9(33) 2(6) 0(5) O 1 5) EurOpe 17(47) 8(29) 5(6) 1(4) 5(4) 2 4) Asia 56(56) 25(57) 6(9) 2 2(59 5 5) Other Area 1 O O l O O U. S. & Europe 16 10 l 3 O 2 U. S. & Asia 6 3 1 O O 2 EurOpe & Asia 1 O O O l O U. 5., Europe, Asia 13 11 2 O O 0 Total 102 64 15 7 6 10 % of Party Which Traveled Abroad 22.7% 24.4 21.4 13.0 16.7 22.7 1Figures in parentheses include those who have been to more than one area. Sixty—six have been to only one continent, and 36 have been to two or more. The most frequently traveled con- tinent is Asia, particularly areas like Manchuria and north- ern China which were under Japanese control. Forty-seven have been to the United States and to Europe. Only 1, a Socialist, has been to Latin America. As in the case of foreign education, the conserva- tives are more traveled than the leftists. Almost one- fodrth of the Democratic-Liberals have been abroad, some of them like Shigeru Yoshida and Kijuro Shidehara as noted diplomats. They are followed by the minor party members who have, as we noted, the greatest prOportion of the 113 foreign—educated. The Communists have 6 with travel ex- perience, but none in the United States. Those among them who went to Europe saw little more than the Soviet Union. The Socialists are the least traveled of the legislators. E. Publications A commonsensical hypothesis might be that the most educated party would have the greatest percentage of mem- bers with publications to their credit. Such is not the case, and actually there is an inverse relationship (Table 22). The most highly educated party, the Democratic- Liberal, has close to the smallest percentage of members with publications, while the least educated party, the So- cialist, has the greatest percentage--more than 1 out of 3. In general, there is twice the proportion of authors among the leftists as among the conservatives. TABLE 22 PUBLISHED WORKS, BY PARTY Dem Soc Com Others All N9; of Pub. Works Mems. D—L One 32 17 6 4 2 3 Two 27 16 2 6 2 1 Three 13 6 2 3 2 0 Four or more 15 3 2 3 5 2 Total 87 42 12 , 16 ll 6 % of Party with Published Works 18.8% 15.8 17.1 34.8 30.5 13.6 114 Although no analysis has been made of the nature or subject of the books written by the representatives, since this would be difficult to determine merely from the titles listed in the biographies, most of them appear to bear upon items of current interest, such as the problems of democra- cy and international relations. Many authors with foreign education did translations of foreign works, but these have not been included in this tabulation. Since SCAP was still in full control in 1949, none of these works were critical of the Occupation like the rash of Now-It-Can-Be-Told books which appeared immediately after the granting of independ- ence in May 1952. Each author has been credited with his minimum num- ber of publications, since only those books with titles listed in the biographies have been counted in the tabula- tion above. Many of them mentioned that they had written several other books, the titles of which could not be list- ed through lack of space. The Communists seem to have the most prolific writers. 115 NOTES--Chapter III 1. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report (Tokyo: SCAP,,1946), p. 51. 2. This discussion of school organization in prewar Japan is based on SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, Education in the New Ja an, Vol. II (Tokyo: SCAP, 1948) mimeographed;-ROBE?t-K1ng a l,-Education for 3 New Ja an (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 240: ; Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook, Ja an, Section.l9: Education (Washington: GPO, 1944), pp. I-l8. 3. SCAP, CIE Sec., Education ip'the New Japan, Vol. II, p. 383. 4. Ibid., p. 405. 5. Japan Advertiser, Feb. 26, 1930, as quoted in Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, p. 170. 6. See source citation under Table E for references to studies used. 7. John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, p. 135. 8. Japan Year Book, 1938-1939, pp. 706-707. 9. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report, p. 54. 10. See statistics in Prime Minister's Office, Statis- tics Section, Statistical Abstract, 1920, p. 157. 11. Robert King Hall, Education for E New Japan, pp. 246-247. 12. Nippon Times, Oct. 30, 1948. 13. Chitoshi Yanaga, Ja an Since Perry (New York: Columbia, 1949), pp. 103-10 . 14. Japan Advertiser, pp. cit. 15. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report, p. 57. 16. This is the famous "prep course" for aspiring bureaucrats (see Ch. V, Sec. B . . 17. Japan Advertiser, pp. cit. CHAPTER IV OCCUPATIONS AND LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS A. Introduction Occupation is probably the most important variable in the socio-political background of Diet members. In the first place, most of the members spent from twenty to thir- ty years of their adult life pursuing their occupations be- fore coming to the Diet. Even while serving in the Diet, all except a handful of fulltime Diet officers like the Speaker and Standing Committee Chairmen continue their pri- vate work in some capacity. Ninety-seven percent of the members with higher education prepared themselves for spe- cific occupations by choosing heavily vocation-oriented programs. Occupation is an important determinant of status and prestige. This is becoming increasingly apparent with the develOpment of complex, modern, urban societies. Although earlier or rural societies tend to attribute status on the basis of family lineage, religious Office, and personal character, modern societies everywhere seem to supplant these status-fixing factors with occupational identifica- tion.1 Urban dwellers in particular define their relations with others in terms of occupation because other means of 117 identification are either less important economically, or more diffuse due to the anoruymity ani impersonality of ur- ban life. Occupation is important as "a fair index of intelli- gence, ability, character, and personal acceptability."2 Many studies like that of Alba Edwards, the Army Alphaand AGCT tests, and research into social prestige and stratifi- cation in the United States demonstrate varying degrees of correlation between occupation and these variables. Similarly, a study of social stratification in the six largest cities of Japan in 19525 revealed a close rela- tionship between occupation and status, as seen in the fol- lowing excerpts from the study:4 In considering the nomination of candidates, polit- ical parties are interested in prestige, which usually is related to occupation, social status and individual personality. . . . there exists a close correlation between all of these factors that were considered rele- vant to social status, on the one hand, and occupation, on the other. This is here taken to be evidence that occupation occupies the position of an all-inclusive factor in determining social status. 1 Italics mine._7 . . . the ten experts had discerned a high correla- tion between their ranking of respondents' social sta- tuses and their ranking by prestige of occupation, amount of education and of income--in that order. Seemingly contradictory results were reported in a study of Japanese patriotic organizations by the U. S. Stra- tegic Bombing Survey in 1948.5 It concluded that "PeOple today still tend to think of persons in terms of the status which they hold deriving from precedent rather than from 118 one's present occupation, training, or ability." However, in discussing how leaders were selected for these organiza- tions in World War II, the study showed that "In charge of these status organizations were placed not local experts in any special function, but leading landowners were put in charge of Patriotic Agricultural Associations, and wives of mayors in charge of municipal women's clubs." If "land- owners" and "mayors" are seen not as traditional status po- sitions but as occupational positions commonly held by pres- tigeful individuals, it would seem that no contradiction is involved. Granted that occupation is a good index of social status, prestige, and a number of other variables like in- come, we can proceed to use it as a tool for analyzing the strata of society from which Diet members are recruited, even though information on status and income are totally lacking in their biographies. Existing studies of the occupations of Japanese Diet 6 and incidentally of American and British legis- memters, lators as well,7 were examined to see if they offer good research models for classifying occupations. All of them, however, have weaknesses. For example, these studies are based on the occupations reported by the legislators them- selves when they filed their candidacy. They merely list the occupational titles of legislators such as farmer and 119 government worker without taking into consideration the range of statuses which are implicit in each of these broad categories (one may well wonder whether a Diet member clas- sified as a farmer is a tiller of the paddies or president of an important agricultural COOperative). Most seriously, these studies fail to rank occupations systematically, al- though occupations are more meaningful politically if they are related to stratification theory. To improve upon these studies, an attempt has been made to avoid these pitfalls in this chapter. Instead of using the self-declared occupations of Diet members, it was felt that it would be more useful to use as the unit of analysis the highest ocOupational positions held by the mem- berseflzany time prior to election as determined by objective standards. This is particularly important in this study, since the Twenty-Fourth Diet was elected under unstable postwar conditions, and the occupations held by many mem- bers at election time may not reflect their true social statuses held throughout much of their adult lives. Then, too, the analysis of the highest occupational positions a1- 1ows the study of the background of retired and unemployed members. In order to scale occupations in line with stratifi- cation theory, one cannot merely reshuffle a random listing of occupational titles such as farmer, lawyer, and govern- 120 ment worker. This is an impossible task, as pointed out by Hatt.8 In every occupational position held by a Diet mem- ber, two quite distinct variables are involved: functional specialization or industry, and status. Hatt suggests that occupations can be scaled by the use of a two-dimensional scheme of classification--the horizontal which he called the "situs" dimension and the vertical or status dimension;9 In Other words, it is impossible to scale reliably all occupations, but it is possible if occupations are broken down into families (e.g., professional, business, agricultural, etc.), and each of them are scaled in turn. I.e-, status judgements within business or agri- cultural occupations are valid but not comparisons be- tween them. Such a two-dimensional scheme has been followed in this chapter, but modified to meet our needs. In Table 23 the occupations of Diet members have been classified hori- zontally by function, i.e., work groupings, and vertically by status. Horizontally, those work groupings (or, as they are termed by Hatt, "situses") are listed in which the greatest number of Diet members are found. Vertically, the higher status groups are broken down in detail because most of the members are found in them rather than in the lower groups. l‘Tote thatthe professionals are classified in both dimensions--horizontally as Professional Services, and ver- tically in terms of the Independent Professionals at the tOp and all the dependent professionals below it--i.e., those in bureaucratic contexts such as teachers in schools and physi- cians on hospital staffs. 121 HH sH mm mmH am ms smH mm Nos 2 HH 0 H m o H 4 mm ms seconds H o o o o o H m msosoHeH .soampmsao o H m m m NH o om masoHo o 6 mm H m m m os swarm m . mm am a m 0H m we anemones H o a m 0H am 0 mm maosoosHH mH mm mH mH mm mm mH mnH msaoaneam pH on mm mm os moH Hm mmm anHonHo .msom Imqux .wnopmflnmonm I I I mm I I .I I am mamdoammomonm.goedH .fihom .mdddH sacsxsb mnospo .pbom .mmsmna .8800 .MHHE .Oflnm4 mspmpm donm HH< meHmbomw mmoB Q24 mbedam Wm ZOHBDmHmBmHQ 9420H8o dam 8H0 mammm #H mnomnmm UthHQSMm as on we on mom mos ooo.mnm.mm z phppH phppH . phpr . Imhonl m.mm ©.mH .m m.w H. N.o nBonde o m.m o a. as. em.¢m mnmnopmq .nmampemno m.© u.um o m.H om.¢ m.m mxmoao H.m m.ma m.w o.oH m.u u.m mmepm w.mH u.m N.mH m.dH m.®a m.#H mammmdmfi 0.3 m.m H.mH m.NH M.HH m.HH whopomafln m.mm m.mH u.Hm s.m¢ e.¢a m.mm mpqmeamopm m.om m.mm o.mm m.mm 5.05 ¢.ms o.m mamaoaeuo .mpmm Incas .maopmfiamoafl ®.ma m.mm mfia m.m wt: m.mH not: mamsoammomohm .QquH mama moaom mnmflpo 800 com 80m Him HH4 mnonwfl mfipMpm Amommpamoammv mmflmfiflg Mamas em .omoH 2H memos somaq new ON M9m¢8 BEHQ mo ZomHm¢m%OOIlmDB¢Bm Q¢ZOHPdflbooo BummOHm 132 conservatives than leftists in the P-M—O class, particular- ly in the President-Proprietor subclass. As noted above, only two out the 462 members (a Democratic-Liberal and a Communist) are in the Craftsman-Laborer class, although it comprises the vast bulk of the work force. The Communists stand out as members of the most atypical party. Compared with the Diet members as a whole, they have, prOportionately, twice as many Independent Pro- fessionals, half as many P-K—O, one—third as many President- PrOprietors, one-fifth as many Managers, but more than six times as many Clerks. If the handful of Communists serving as fulletime managers of party organs (e.g., the newspaper) were omitted, their proportion in the P-M-O class would be‘ diminished. Despite this, the Communist Party is emphat- ically not a party represented in the Diet by proletarians. D. Professional Services To review what has thus far been shown about the Professional Services, 133 members (28.4% of the Diet) be— long to this group, the largest work grouping in the legis- lature. Fifty-nine of them belong in the status class of Independent Professional, and 69 of the remaining 74 Depend- ent Professionals belong in the P-M-O class. Proportionate- ly, the leftist parties have more members in the Professional Services (av. 41%) than the conservative parties (av. 23%). 133 Table 27 shows the breakdown of members in Profes— sional Services according to substantive fields.- As ex- pected, the largest group is that of lawyers (8. % of the Diet), closely followed by the journalists. While the edu- cators comprise the third large group, writers, physicians, and dentists are less important. In the "other" category are 5 accountants, 4 priests, and 1 artist. TABLE 27 PBOFESSIOXAL SERVICES, BY PARTY (Percentage of Party Members) Paéties D-L Dem Soc Com Others .:.Ho Ififi% It: Lawyer 40 8.6 7.8 5.7 15.2 13.9 6.9 Journalist 38 8.2 9.0 5.7 6.5 13.9 4.5 Educator 29 6.2 4.4 4.2 13.1 5.5 13.6 Writer 11 2.3 1.4 1.4 2.2 8.4 4.5 Physician,Dentist 5 1.0 1.1 O 4.3 0 O Other 10 2.1 2.6 2%;8 O O 2. 1;; QSOi 26.; 0 ii.; iIO: 1. In the Communist Party, there is a disproportionate— ly large group of the "practitioners of persuasion"--i.e., lawyers, journalists, and writers. There are above average proportions of lawyers and physicians among the Socialists, and educators among the Socialists and minor parties. The conservatives are average or below in almost every field. The tremendous difference in the occupational back- ground of Japanese Diet members in contrast to United 134 States Congressmen is highlighted in Table 28. No more than 3 out of 10 representatives in Japan belong to the professions, but almost 9 out of 10 in the United States do. TABLE 28 PROFESSIONALS IN THE DIET AED U. S. GONG ES (Percentage of Total Members) W m Japan U. 5.3 Lawyer . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 (29.o)° 57.9b Journalist . . . . . . . . . 8.2 10.8 Educator . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 16.3 Writer . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 1.3 Physician, Dentist . . . . . 1.0 2.0 other C O O O O O O O C O O 2.1 0.0 28.4 88.3 8U. S. House of Representatives, 1942. Source: Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Cong." pp. cit., p. 72. b Includes publishers. 0Those with legal training. The greatest difference is seen in the very large prOportion of lawyers in the American body as opposed to the Japanese. Various factors account for this showing in the United States,17 some of which lie in the very nature of the legal profession. For example, this profession enjoys high prestige in our culture; there is a close relationship be- tween legislative duties an1 law training and practice; lawyers are able to ocrtinue their practice on a part—time 135 basis or to leave it temporarily and resume it without too much inconvenience or loss of skill, unlike some other pro- fessionals such as physicians. However, these factors have similar application in Japan. The difference seems to lie in tradition and the lack of prestigeful groups competing for legislative office in the United States. Since colonial and revolutionary times, Americans have looked to lawyers for political leadership, and their position has not been challenged by other groups, such as the landed aristocracy, as in other countries. Japan lacks a similar tradition, and, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, the cream of law students enter government service, either as admin- istrators or as judicial officials, instead of private prac- tice and then into elective office. Although 29 percent of the Japanese legislators had law training, only 8.6 percent of them entered national politics through private practice. In the Japanese Diet, the dominant, single occupational group appears to be heads of private firms, and particular- ly those in manufacturing (Table 23). The second difference lies in the proportion of mem- bers with teaching background. Despite the high prestige of teachers in Japan, their proportion in the Diet is about one-third that in the United States Congress. |There are small differences between the two bodies with respect to the other professions. 136 E. Leadership in Private Associations Political scientists in the United States devote considerable attention to the roles of private associa- tions, such as the American Legion, CIO, Farm Bureau, and NAACP, in the legislative process. Students of Japanese politics, too, deal with the activities of the Zaibatsu business interests and the militaristic secret societies in the prewar Diet, but little is reported about the political activity of the bulk of present-day organizations. Business interests do try to influence legislation in the postwar Diet, often through questionable means, as we have seen in Chapter I (e.g., involvement of the coal mine interests in 1947 and the electric power interests in 1948). However, little is known concerning the role of the countless other private associations existing today. Whether they consti- tute important pressure groups in the Diet can be deter- mined only through field observation; but even in the ab— sence of such study, their potentialities for develOping into powerful groups as in the United States cannot be de- nied. Interestingly enough, one-half of the Diet members hold or have held office in the national, prefectural, or local organizations of a variety of private associations. In Table 29 are listed seven categories of associations: (1) Professional Associations (e.g., Highway Engineering 137 Association), (2) Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Shoko Kaigisho), (3) Labor Unions, (4) Agricultural Associations (e.g., Federations of Agricultural Cooperatives), (5) "Other Economic" Associations (e.g., Restaurant Kanagers' Associa- tion, Tourist Buleau), (6) Charity Organizations, and (7) Others (e.g., Japan Auto Association, sports groups). TABLE 29 LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS, BY TYPE CF ASSOCIATION AHD PARTY (Percentage of Party Members) -_ Association PagtTes D-L Dem Soc Com Other Professional 4.9 4.5 4.2 10.8 2.7 4.5 Chamber of Commerce 5.8 6.7 9.9 O 0 4.5 Labor 6.2 .7 0 32.6 24.9 6.8 Agric. 10.6 9.3 7.1 10.8 8.3 24.9 Other Econ. 15.8 19.1 17.1 6.5 11.1 6.8 Charity 4.5 4.1 7.1 0 2.7 9.0 Other 2.3 3.2 1.4 0 0 0 Total 50.1 48.1 46.8 60.7 49.7 56.5 N 233 129 33 28 18 25 Differences among the parties in the leadership of these organizations are not surprising. A disproportion- ately large share of the leftists lead the labor unions, but they are absent in the Chambers of Commerce and "other" associations. Their almost total absenceilithe charity as; sociations, however, is difficult to explain. In the pro- fessional organizations, the Socialists are well represent- ed, but the Communists are not. 138 The conservatives, on the other hand, are dominant as leaders in the Chambers of Commerce and the "other eco— nomic" associations. The latter represent some entrepre- neurial interests. Many agricultural leaders are found in the minor parties. While it is debatable whether these Diet members serve as spokesmen for these organizations in the Diet, at the very least, they may be assumed to take an active part in any issue affecting their organizational interests. This is particularly so since many of them are very impor- tant leaders (Table 30). The positions of leadership they occupy in private associations are classified as Head, Di- rector (i.e., members of boards of directors, trustees, ad- visors, consultants and kindred non—executive positions), and Officer (i.e., all important executives below the head). TABLE 30 LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS, BY LEVEL OF LEADEhSHIP AND SCOPE OF ASSOCIATION All Parties Iat.'- Pref. Loc. %' Head 102 (22.0) 15 36 51 Director 91 (19.6) 38 27 26 Officer 40 (8.5) 16 11 13 N 255 (50.1) 69 74 9O ‘Of all Diet members, 22 percent are heads of nation- al, prefectural, and local organizations, and 15 (3%) of 139 them are all-important national heads. Almost 20 percent are directors and 8.5 percent are officers; in both these categories the leaders of national associations outnumber those of prefectural and local chapters. 140 NOTES—-Chapter IV 1. Theodore Caplow, The Sociology pf Work (Kinne- polis: U. of Minn. Press, 1954), p. 30. 2. See ibid., Ch. 2, for detailed discussion on this point and for references. 3. Japan Sociological Society, The Political Signif— icance of Social Stratification and Mobilit in Japan's Six Largest-Cities (Tokyo: U. of Tokyo, 19525, mIEeo. This study was conducted by 50 social scientists and 170 univer- sity students from 18 institutions in the cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Osaka, and involved a sample of 899 male respondents from ages 20 to 68. 4. Ibid., pp. 5,6. 5. Frederick S. Hulse, "Status and Function as Fac- tors in the Structure of Organizations Among the Japanese," American Anthrgpologist, Vol; 49, No. 1 (Jan. 49), pp. 154» 157. 6. E.g. NEAC Shuliin Giin Sosenkyo 24 . . . Kekka Shirabe (Tokyo; ’REEC7‘19E97, pp. 30, ; SCAP, Polit- ical Reorientation.g£ Ja an, Vol. 1, ppl 322, 335; HaroId S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, p. 169. 7. E.g., J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation, Chs. 7, 8; Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the Seventy- seventh Congress," APSR (Feb. 42), p. 72. 8. Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratifica- tion," American Journal 2: Sociology, Vol. 55 (May 50), pp. 533-543- 9. Ibid., p. 555. 10. Office of the Prime Kinister, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, pp. 38-41. 11. The number of professional military officers in the Diet was negligible, i.e., less than 1 percent, from 1928-37. Robert E. Ward, Part Government ip Japan (Un- publ. Ph.D. thesis, U. of a1. , p. 565. None in the 1949 Diet are military officers; the only members with military experience are the small number of career bureaucrats who went overseas in World War II as army and navy military gov- ernment officers. 141 12. ibid. for statistics from 1928 to 1937. 13. 92. gi£., Ch. 2. 14. Japan Sociological Society, 9p. gi§., p. 6. 15. Alba H. Edwards, Comparative Occupational Statis- tics for the United States 1870-1940 (Washington, D. 0.} CovernnentPrinting Office, 1943), p. 179. 16. The Japanese employ a large variety of titles for positions with similar functions. Examples of these are enclosed in parentheses. 17. Donald R. Matthews, Social Background of Political Decision—Makers (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday,-l954), pp. 30-32 0 18. TNEC Monograph 26 found in Richard C. Snyder and H. Herbert Wilson, Boots 2; Political Behavior (N. Y.: American Book Co., 19495, pp. 241-248. CHAPTER V GCVERNHENT EXPERIENCE A. Introduction Prior to the election of 1949, 16 members or 3.4 percent of the lower house declared themselves as career government officials to the National Election Administra- tion Board. Actually, three times this number reached their highest occupational statuses and spent a greater part of their adult years in government service. In this chapter, we will examine the background of these career men as well as other Diet members who served at any time in appointive positions in the national, pre- fectural and local governments. They include persons who held medium and lower positions in the classified Civil Service obtained through examinations, as well as those in the highest administrative offices gained through political appointment. Since the average Diet member finished his university education in the early 1920's, it seems likely that most of the Civil Service personnel in the former cat- egory were in government service prior to the Allied Occu— pation, and specifically from 1920 to 1945. Host of the political appointees, on the other hand, appear to have held office since the end of the war and the implementation of the purge directives. 145 The unique importance of government offices in Japan makes it worthwhile to study present and former public of- ficials serving in the Diet. Bureaucrats (i.e., public of- ficials as used by Max Weber) held considerable power in prewar Japan. On the national and prefectural levels, they not only performed the routine tasks of administration, but formulated policy and executive ordinances as well which were implemented through a highly centralized administra- tive system. Among the bureaucrats were officials charged with administrative affairs common to the executive branch of the United States Government such as taxation, commerce, and agriculture. In addition, however, there were bureau- crats who supervised the nation-wide education system, and in the Home Kinistry, those who served as prefectural gov- ernors, prefectural department heads, and police officials. In the Foreign Kinistry, they served as diplomats and con- suls. Judges and public prosecutors of all courts were of- ficials of the Justice Ministry. Although bureaucrats in a general sense, those within the sacrosanct Imperial House- hold Ministry were outside the classified civil service sys- tem. Moreover, the bureaucrats form an extremely close- knit group with considerable esprit d3 cor s, so much so that they are still referred to as the Kambatsu, or offi- cial clique. This solidarity is maintained primarily through the extremely rigorous recruitment process. In or- 144 der to pass the prewar civil service examinations, candi- dates were virtually required to complete the specialized legal program given by the most highly esteemed university in the country. Solidarity, too, is reinforced by the common enjoy- ment of high social status, despite the comparatively low salary scale of government workers. Although prestige dif- fers with the rank and function of officials, as well as with the ministry with which they are identified (e.g., the Imperial Household Ministry and the Foreign Ministry were the most prestigeful agencies before the war), Japanese bu- reaucrats in general enjoy higher prestige than comparable officials in private industry, and are held in higher es- teem than bureaucrats in the United States. Quigley and others have suggested1 that public respect felt for high officials contributes toward their success as candidates to public office. Finally, the prewar bureaucracy is generally regard- ed as one of the most undemocratic and conservative groups in the government. Identifying themselves with the ruling class of Japan with its long tradition of special status and power, they felt responsible only to the throne and the authorities who appoint them, the top level being commis- sioned by the Emperor. Their loyalty was to the Emperor and to themselves as a class,2 not to the popular branch of 145 the Diet which they considered inferior to them,3 and cer- tainly not to the peOple whom they often treated with con- tempt and regarded "as troublesome and unworthy recipients of guidance."4 The bureaucrats had no understanding of public relations,5 and found no need for it. In the tradi- tion of old Japan, the public was expected to please the officials and not vice versa. On occasion, they even an- tagonized other powerful groups like the party politicians, private businessmen and the Army. The conservative attitude of bureaucrats everywhere is patent and has been described in detail by men like Karl Mannheim6 and Robert K. ILerton.’7 Since bureaucracies Oper— ate within the framework of detailed, preexisting rules, bu- reaucrats when faced with a new situation either seek au- thorization in the rules or do nothing. When carried to the extreme, the means prescribed for effectuating a pro- gram override the objectives of the program themselves. In the Japanese bureaucracy, this legalistic tendency was fos- tered from the very beginning when it was established on the Prussian model. All courses of action were anticipated and minutely prescribed, and changing conditions made amendments and amendments of amendments necessary. Only those highly trained in administrative law could interpret these rules, hence the heavy emphasis on legalism in the training and examination of bureaucrats. In addition, 146 their conservative attitudes were reinforced by the con- sciousness of their prestige in Japanese government and so- ciety, and their desire for maintaining their status. Be- cause of their exclusiveness and homogeneity, all bureau- crats who have risen through the ranks to the highest posi- tions in the career civil service may be regarded as indi- viduals possessing these attitudes and norms. The generalizations thus far pertain to all members of the classified civil service, but in normal years prior to World War II, they comprised only one-fourth to one- third of all government employees. Until 1949 when the system was modified, all classified officials were divided into three groups: in descending order, chokunin, Eggig, and hannin. Chokunin and pgpip together comprised the kotokan or higher officials. These are the men with whom we are primarily concerned in this chapter, the individuals who held the responsible positions and who were accepted only after undergoing rigorous legal studies on the univer- sity level and passing the Higher Civil Service Examina— tions. In 1940, ghokunin comprised only 0.8 percent, and ggpip, little more than 10 percent of all classified work— ers. The remainder of the classified service (88%) was made up of hannin who filled the minor positions in govern— ment, and who obtained appointments by passing the Ordinary Civil Service Examination which did not require university 147 preparation. In addition, there was a large unclassified service composed of minor clerks, custodians, and agents. The great importance of the kotokan class of bureaucrats becomes obvious when one realizes that it comprised only 3.3 percent of all government employees in 1940, both clas- sified and unclassified. B. Civil Service Examinations Before discussing the Diet members who actually served in the government, the nature of the High Civil Serv- ice Examinations, the Diet members who passed these exam- inations, the universities in which they were trained, and the type of education emphasized in the leading "prep school” for bureaucrats will be reviewed. Except for those appointed by the Foreign Ministry, those who passed the ex— aminations were not necessarily placed in government jobs and many were merely placed on the civil service register. However, the passing of the Higher Civil Service Examina- tions (Bunkan Koto Shiken) was in itself a matter of con- siderable pride, and this fact is given prominent mention in the biographies of Diet members. The examinations consisting of both written and oral tests were given in three divisions: administrative (£233 Shiken Gyosei g3), diplomatic (Koto Shiken Gaikokan 5g), and judicial (Koto Shiken Shiho fig). The diplomatic division 148 led to appointments in the diplomatic and consular service, and the judicial division led to positions as judges and procurators in the Justice Ministry. The administrative division tested the broadest category of bureaucrats since it led to appointment in any of the remaining ministries and agencies in the government regardless of the substan— tive background of candidates. In each of the three divisions, there were four to five compulsory subjects for testing, and three Optional subjects to be selected by the candidate out of a list of fifteen to twenty. All three divisions emphasized law with the administrative division giving more weight to adminis- trative law, the diplomatic to international law, and the judicial to criminal and civil law. From one-fourth to one— third of the Optional subjects were also related to law, with the remainder devoted to philosophy, history, econom— ics, and the social sciences. Those successful in the written examinations were then tested orally, this time in a compulsory law field and two optional subjects. A grade of 60 percent was passing, and candidates in the administrative and judicial divisions were then appointed by the ministries or placed on the register. In the diplomatic division, only those required to fill vacancies were declared successful. In the 1949 Diet, 73 members (15% of the body) claim to have passed the Higher Civil Service Examinations, a ma- 149 jority of them in the administrative division (Table 31). Only 7 took their examinations in the diplomatic field, but 3 of them--Hitoshi Ashida, Shigeru Yoshida, and Kijuro Shidehara—-are tOp-ranking party leaders in the Diet. TA IE 31 CIVIL SERVICE EKAZINATICIS PASSED, BY UHIVERSITY Officer Examinations University Administrative Judicial Diplomatic Tokyo Impl. 30 5 4 Kyoto Impl. 5 3 O Other Govt. U. O O l Waseda l l O Chuo O 6 1 Nippon O 6 O Meiji O 3 O Other Pvt. U. _4 _g l N 40 26 7 In terms of university education of the examinees, it is interesting to note the preponderance of Imperial University graduates in the administrative and diplomatic fields, but their relative weakness in the judicial field. As a whole, they constitute 65 percent of the Diet members passing the examinations, but this is about 10 percent low- er than the usual ratio of Imperial University graduates over private university graduates who enter the higher civil service each year.11 150 Despite their enormous student enrollments, the large private universities in Japan are noteworthy for their failure to produce civil servants. This fact is reflected in the Diet by the small prOportions of their alumni who have taken the examinations. Waseda, the largest universi- ty in the country, produced only two members. In keeping with the admonition of its founder, Keio, the third largest university, has not only few members in the Diet, but none of these members claim to have taken or passed the civil service examinations. Nippon and Chuo, however, contributed more than their share of judicial candidates although they likewise have almost none in the administrative and diplo- matic divisions. The small, private universities do have more civil service candidates in the Diet than might be ex- pected. ' It is the Law Faculty of the Tokyo Imperial Univer- sity, however, which is pOpularly thought to be the out- standing training ground for future bureaucrats, and our figures for Diet members passing the examinations who are products of the faculty confirm this general observation. Kyoto Imperial contributed 8 candidates, and all the other Imperial Universities contributed but 1, while Tokyo Im- perial boasts 39,