THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF JAPANESE DIET MEMBERS: THE TWENTY-FOURTH DIET

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by

Tadao Kobayashi

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Since the Allied Occupation, the Japanese Diet has been placed in the position where it could make all the important political decisions of the country. The purpose of this paper has been to describe what types of individuals the Japanese voters chose as their representatives in this body. The 462 members of the lower house of the Diet in December 1949 were selected for inquiry, and their official biographies have been used as a basis for describing their socio-political backgrounds. Social background includes such variables as the Diet members' ages, educations, occupational experiences, the regions of birth and election, the types of communities in which they were born, and their positions of leadership in private organizations. Political background includes their statuses in party organizations, previous experiences in appointive and elective offices on the national, prefectural, and local levels of government, and positions of leadership held in the Diet. These data have been analyzed in terms of the Diet as a whole, and also by party affiliation.

This study demonstrates that members of the 1949 Diet were largely recruited from the top status groups in Japanese society. They were generally persons likely to be labeled "successful" in any modern society, i.e., the occupants of high status positions in private industry, in the professions, or in public affairs. A large number of them were

heads or directors of manufacturing and commercial firms; many were former governors, mayors, and bureau chiefs in national and prefectural governments. Agriculture was a very underrepresented occupation in the Diet, and even among those members claiming to be agriculturists, few were identifiable as "dirt farmers." Almost all Diet members, including the Communists, were therefore from the white collar class.

Their success in private life may be partly attributed to their origins, their maturity, and their educational attainments. Typical members were largely born around the turn of the century in small towns, and as of 1949 they were, thus, more urban in origin than their age group in the total population. They were very well educated as compared with the electorate in 1949--most of them had received university education in the large Tokyo institutions. Their fields of study were practical ones, such as law, commerce, and economics, and almost none of them received what amounts to liberal education in the American sense.

Politically, the members were extremely inexperienced on the national level--90 percent of them had never been elected to the Diet before 1946. Diet officers such as the speakers, committee chairmen, and caucus chairmen were almost as inexperienced. Many of the members had, however, prior legislative experience in the prefectural and municipal assemblies. Most members were officers of national party organizations, or were heads of prefectural or local organizations.

Finally, it was found that the members of the 1949 Diet were largely _haisen-nenrikin_, the political "parvenus since the war defeat." It is unlikely that many of them could have risen to political power without the purging of the old-time politicians under the Allied Occupation. The extent to which they represent a new type of political decision-maker is difficult to ascertain in the absence of studies similar to this of Diets prior to 1946.

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I am especially indebted to Dr. Fishel for placing at my disposal his collection of Japanese documentary materials which are probably unobtainable elsewhere at this time. During the course of my summer employment in 1954 which took me to various parts of the country, I have been fortunate in being able to use materials in the libraries of the University of Washington and the cities of Seattle, New York, and Los Angeles. To the reference librarians of these institutions, I am also indebted.

Finally, my heartfelt thanks go to my wife, who, like wives of graduate students everywhere, shared the trials and tribulations of thesis research and writing.

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INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem

This study is largely the outgrowth of the author's feeling that, from an American democratic point of view, something is amiss with parliamentary government in Japan, before as well as after the Allied Occupation, and that available literature fails to explain this persistent shortcoming adequately. Some other approach to the study of the Japanese Diet is needed which will supplement and make more meaningful the traditional, institutional studies that have been accomplished thus far.

Much of the literature available in English on Japanese government and politics which are cited in the following chapter, take the descriptive approach, historical or journalistic. Many of the writers, particularly on postwar developments, betray an American, ethnocentric viewpoint with regard to Japanese politics; they fail to give sufficient attention to those aspects of Japanese culture and society which condition political behavior. Some intriguing political studies at the "rice-roots" level have been reported by the Center of Japanese Studies of the University of Michigan,[1] and some important ethnographic[2] and community studies[3] indirectly bearing upon political studies are wide-

ly available. However, empirical studies on government at the national level are rarely seen.[4]

Besides being untested, the statements contained in the historical and journalistic works are largely qualitative, and they therefore lack the precision of studies employing quantitative methods. It is not enough to be able to say, for example, that in the Diet "age and seniority were observed as rigidly as in the bureaucracy," as one of the books put it.[5] To the political scientist, it would be far more useful to know to what degree seniority as characterized by age, by length of service in the Diet, by number of times elected, or by some other criteria, is evident in the selection of speakers and committee chairmen. Furthermore, a popular although extreme notion might be that "some Diet members are such uneducated bumpkins that they say 'oika-yosan' instead of 'tsuika-yosan' (i.e., a mistaken reading of the two ideographs for 'supplementary' in the term, 'supplementary budget')," as expressed to the author by an Okinawan legislator. Again, it would be far more precise to be able to state what percentage of Diet members received what levels of education in what fields.

One should not be overly critical of American writers for neglecting to use sociological methods, in view of the fact that the Japanese political scientists themselves have not exploited this approach. This much is admitted by one of their leaders, Dr. Masamichi Royama, a former member of

the Law Faculty of Tokyo University. Himself a pioneer in empirical studies,[6] he writes that "Japanese political science has failed to conduct historical (i.e., critical) research and social investigations into political institutions and their functions," and that it has failed to coordinate its research with the other branches of the social sciences, i.e., anthropology, cultural history, psychology, and sociology.[7] A cursory examination of publishers' lists since the end of the war indicates that Japanese political scientists have been preoccupied with research in constitutional and legal problems and in diplomatic history and international relations.

So much for the shortcomings of existing literature. The purpose of this study is not to duplicate these descriptive analyses, but to supplement them with information largely neglected by political scientists. Instead of focusing upon "the Diet" as an abstract, reified institution, it will concentrate upon the individuals who compose the Diet, and seek to answer the question: what are the members of the Diet like--what are their political and social antecedents?

Sociological theory holds that the group in human relations is never the sum of its parts, and therefore, the National Diet can never be equated merely with the 466 members of the House of Representatives and the 250 members of the House of Councillors who together make up the national

body. A better understanding of the Diet can come with the study of the web of interaction between individuals and groups within the Diet (e.g., caucuses, committees, and informal groups), interaction among these groups, and interaction between these individuals or groups and extra-Diet individuals or groups, such as governmental ministries, pressure groups, political parties, journalists, prefectural and local governments, and constituents. All this interaction should be explained in terms of the cultural and situational context of Japan.

This much is granted, but this study presupposes that as a starting point for the study of relationships, it is fruitful to examine the individuals themselves, the political elites composing the Diet, and see what generalizations can be made about the social and political composition of the Diet. For our purpose, "social background" includes variables such as regions and types of communities in which Diet members were born, age, education, foreign contacts, and occupational experiences. "Political background" includes variables like party affiliation, status in party organizations, previous Diet experience, age at which first elected to the Diet, status in the Diet, previous experience in other elective offices on the prefectural and municipal levels, and previous experience in executive and judicial offices on the national, prefectural, and municipal levels. This type of information is indeed prelim-

inary to any sociological examination of the organization and behavior of the legislative body, just as census data are the preliminary requisite to the construction of survey design.

A careful study of political elites as individuals is especially important with regard to Japan if it is true, as almost all western writers assert, that the Japanese tend to vote more on the basis of personalities than on party affiliations and political views of candidates. Before the war, a political scientist wrote:[8]

> Personal prestige appears to be the essential quality in a candidate. A connection with a formerly powerful clan, relationship to a locally respected family, reputation for cleverness as a journalist or speaker--these attributes are highly regarded by the voters. Party platforms are too indefinite and the speeches of politicians too vague to afford even the well-educated voter a hold on reality.

Another prewar scholar attributes this phenomenon to Confucian concepts which hold that ethics govern the political relationships between two distinct classes, the governors and the governed, and that the former, being superior in virtue, make the laws and are themselves above the laws:[9]

> Thus the Japanese have laid great stress on personalities in government and have paid less attention to form, theory, and law. It is the officials themselves that make a government either just or tyrannical. It is not the organization of the state, but the governing class; not the political theory, but the men who put that theory into practice; not the laws, but the officials who create and enforce them that are important.

These observations have been borne out in voting behavior after World War II, according to a report issued by

the Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),[10] as well as by a former member of the Allied Occupation who hypothesizes:[11]

> . . . the Japanese voter is more likely than the American voter to vote for persons with prestige and status and less likely to vote for candidates because of the principles for which they stand. Since the very beginnings of Japanese constitutional government in the late nineteenth century, politics has typically been conducted on the basis of personal loyalty resembling somewhat the loyalty of the retainer to his feudal lord.

These statements appear to be untested ideas of the authors, but they also seem to be confirmed by a sociological study of voting behavior in the General Election of 1949, to the extent that personality characteristics still dominate although the traditional prestige types appear to be less important than new, emerging types:[12]

> One must be cognizant of the fact that throughout the city and farm village, personality characteristics /of candidates/ had a powerful effect on voting. In other words, /voters chose/ candidates who endeared themselves to the electorate through imaginative campaigning and personalities who serve as symbols of ideological groups. In these turbulent times, these are the persons who strongly appeal to all classes as well as to specific individuals and classes. Therefore it is probably clear that the old political symbols are universally disappearing at least from the political awareness of the voters.

A study of individuals in the Diet may yield, in addition to data on the socio-political make-up of the members, generalizations concerning those types of legislators most favored by the Japanese electorate.

B. Research Techniques

An ideal study of the individuals who make up a part of the political elite of Japanese government, the members of the Diet, would include in its universe all members of both houses, since the inception of the Diet in 1890. However, the present paper will examine intensively only members of the House of Representatives of the Twenty-Fourth Diet who held office from January 1949 to October 1952. No pretension is made that conclusions reached on the basis of this one body can be generalized for members of the other twenty-six Diets which have convened since 1890. However, data for these other Diets will be introduced when available and applicable for comparative purposes.

The lower house was chosen as the area of inquiry because, first, it is the more powerful of the two bodies today. According to the Constitution of 1947, when a bill passed by the lower house is changed, defeated or not taken up within sixty days by the upper house, the lower house may overrule this action by a two-thirds majority (Article 59). In case of budget bills or treaties (Articles 60, 61), a simple instead of a two-thirds majority suffices. In case of disagreement over the choice of the Prime Minister, the choice of the lower house applies (Article 69). Second, the lower house reflects party alignments to a greater degree than the House of Councillors. For example, in 1949,

only one member out of 466 in the House of Representatives claimed to be an independent, whereas 94 out of 250 claimed to be either members of somewhat non-party groups such as the Green Breeze Society (Ryokufu Kai) and the Independents' Discussion Society (Mushozoku Kondan Kai), or outright independents.[13] Third, electorally speaking, lower house members are homogeneous and easier to treat as units, i.e., each member was elected from one of 117 multi-member constituencies and all were elected for concurrent terms, whereas in the House of Councillors, 100 are chosen from the nation at large and 150 from prefectures,[14] and one-half of the body stand for election every three years.

The Twenty-Fourth Diet was chosen because of the significant period in which it was active and because of its political alignments. It lasted longer than any other post-war Diet, actually twice as long as its nearest rival, the Twenty-Sixth Diet. It continued throughout most of the important second phase of the American Occupation when emphasis was shifted from punishment to recovery and from reform to consolidation, and it remained in power through the first five months of independence. Its members were the first chosen under the new Constitution and under the 1947 election laws, which called for governmental supervision and sponsorship of electioneering. Most significantly, it reflected for the first time a polarization of political sentiment toward the extreme right and left. The Democratic-

Liberal Party became the first postwar party to command an absolute majority, although the purge which originally thinned its ranks was still in effect. The Communist Party was never stronger than in the first year of the Twenty-Fourth Diet.

The principal source of authoritative biographical information was the Manual of the House of Representatives, Volume II (Shugiin Yoran, Otsu), published in 1949 by the General Affairs Office, House of Representatives (Shugiin Jimukyoku), primarily for the use of legislators. This handbook, upon which most of the statistical data of this study is based, contains the names, photographs and biographical sketches of each of the 462 representatives (four less than the total number of seats in the lower house) in office when the book was issued on December 25, 1949. Supplementary information, such as education below the high school level, was obtained from Japan's Who's Who, 1950-1951.[15] The Asahi Yearbook, 1950 (Asahi Nenkan, Showa Nijugonen Ban)[16] and various reports issued for the General Election of 1949 by the National Election Administration Commission (Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai) were also found useful--for example, in yielding information on current occupational status.

The following outline contains the types of information found in the biographies; these are listed as numbered items. Other items of information which were derived from

them appear after the lower case letters under the appropriate numbers.

1. Name
    a. Sex
2. Party
3. Prefecture and electoral district from which elected
    a. Region from which elected
    (Since it would be too unwieldy to deal with 46 prefectures, they have been grouped into seven traditionally recognized regions.)
4. Place of birth
    a. Region of birth
    b. Type of community in which born
    c. Prefecture from which elected compared with prefecture of birth
5. Date of Birth
    a. Age in 1949
6. Service in previous Diets
    a. Number of times elected
    b. Postwar, war and prewar experience in the Diet
    c. Number of years of previous Diet experience
    d. Age at first election
7. Education
    a. Educational level
    b. National universities attended
    c. Private universities attended
    d. Major field of study
    e. Foreign education

8. Travel abroad

9. Publications

10. Occupational history

    a. Government examinations passed

    b. Occupations classified according to industry

    c. Professional services (Detailed breakdown of "b")

    d. Highest previous governmental and political offices held in national, prefectural and local governments

        (1) Diplomatic experience

        (2) Police experience

    e. Highest occupational level held in career governmental positions and in private industry

11. Party experience

    a. Highest positions held in party organizations

    b. Highest positions held in the Diet

12. Participation in private organizations--e.g., Chambers of Commerce.

Each of these socio-political variables was coded and punched on IBM cards, one card for each representative. No sampling was involved.

Except for Chapters 1 and 7, the study is organized around groupings of these variables. The first chapter is designed primarily to orient the reader to the data; it discusses the development of parliamentary representation--or more precisely, its failure to develop in the western sense between the Meiji Restoration and the regaining of independence in 1952. Also, it deals with the election of the

Twenty-Fourth Diet, the party alignment which emerged from the election, and the various reshufflings of factions which took place in the Diet during the first year. The following five chapters are concerned with the birthplaces and ages of representatives; education, foreign travel and publications; occupations and offices in private organizations; experience in appointive governmental positions in national, prefectural, and local governments; and finally, past and present political experience, i.e., elective positions held in the Diet, prefectural assemblies, and municipal councils, and offices held in party organizations. The last chapter summarizes the results obtained and sets forth some conclusions.

Two social variables, ethnic origin and religion, which are very important in the study of United States Congressmen, are not mentioned in the biographies and are omitted from this study because of their political unimportance. In the 1949 Diet, only three members were born outside Japan Proper, and only one of them, a Korean, is non-Japanese. Religion, too, is insignificant in Japan. Shinto and Buddhism are the predominant faiths, but the Japanese seem to be so religiously accommodating that many embrace both faiths. This fact is borne out by the statistics of the Ministry of Education which indicate that the total number of religious adherents is about 25 per cent larger than the total population.[17]

The universe of the study was divided for analysis in three ways: first, data have been tabulated for the Diet as a whole so that generalizations can be made concerning the socio-political backgrounds of all members. Second, variables (e.g., age, education, occupational and governmental experience, etc.) have been tabulated according to party affiliation. This, per se, may not be as significant in Japan as in western countries as noted previously.[18] A SCAP study, moreover, attributed this insignificance to: (1) the multiplicity of parties and the constant realignment among them, (2) party organization emphasizing personalities instead of principles, and (3) ambiguous party platforms little understood by either voters or politicians.[19] However, party membership of representatives has been treated as an independent variable to test this notion, i.e., to see if important differences can be found in their socio-political backgrounds when they are grouped according to the major parties. Third, variables have been analyzed not only from the standpoint of function but from the often neglected dimension of status as well in dealing with the experience of representatives in the following:

Legislative bodies (Diet, prefectural assemblies, municipal councils)

Political party organizations

Executive bodies on the national, prefectural, and local levels of government

Schools and other public organizations

Private firms

Private organizations

These are established social organizations in which there are divisions of labor, i.e., functional specializations, and structures of authority, i.e., status systems. As a sociologist put it:[20]

> . . . Status is an important kind of cement that binds an organization together. When authority becomes relatively stable, and when functional specialization is established, the development of status symbols for each position in the organization serves to institutionalize and regularize the structure.

Status is therefore defined as:[21]

> . . . a set of visible, external markings that systematically ranks individuals and groups in relation to each other, and that includes all the members of the organization some place in the scheme of rankings.

For our purpose, the "job titles," such as "committee chairman," "mayor," "director," or "president," which representatives ascribe to themselves in their official biographies are the only status symbols available. Job titles and descriptions often have little resemblance to actual authority exercised and duties performed, but since there is no way of verifying the claims of representatives save through extensive and difficult field investigation, the titles are used in this study as indicators of status with this limitation in mind.

Finally, it is conceivable that statistical information concerning the backgrounds of Diet members is readily

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Finally, it is conceivable that statistical information concerning the backgrounds of Diet members is readily

available in a variety of forms, and that there is no need for duplicating such tedious work. For example, among postwar sources in Japanese may be mentioned the important Japanese newspapers which carry statistical items after each General Election, and yearbooks like the Asahi Nenkan. Reliable election summaries are contained in the numerous reports issued by the National Election Administration Commission (Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai), and in the excellent General Survey of the Election of Members of the New National Parliament for 1949 (Shin Kokkai Senkyo Taikan).[22] Among English sources of statistical information (which, however, are secondary in nature) may be mentioned Japanese Government and Politics, by Harold S. Quigley;[23] Party Government in Japan, by Robert E. Ward;[24] and Political Reorientation of Japan, compiled by Government Section, SCAP.[25]

In rebuttal, the following points may be raised. First, all these sources have been used in this study whenever they supplemented statistics obtained from the biographies. None of the references above in English deal with the Twenty-Fourth Diet, and most American political scientists cannot use the Japanese sources, unless they are in translated form. More seriously, the statistics in these references are not refined enough to be of much value to political science. For example, education of representatives may be given, but no breakdown is available according to universities and major fields of study. Occupational

information is particularly misleading in that many individuals who, for example, classify themselves as farmers are, upon examination of their biographies, actually officers of agricultural associations and cooperatives and are therefore likely to be far removed from the soil. Representatives may be classified as "business firm employees," **kaisha-in**, with no indication as to the type of business involved (manufacturing, banking, commerce, etc.) or the status held within such firms (director, clerk, etc.). This study emphasizes status as well as function in all organizations, a line of inquiry which has not been treated in the sources above. Finally, statistical data are meaningful to political scientists only when they are organized into sociologically significant relationships within a conceptual scheme, and when they are supplemented by background information. When discussing educational statistics, for instance, one must bear in mind the significance of education at the Tokyo Imperial University for entrée into the civil service.

NOTES--Introduction

1. E.g., see selections by Robert E. Ward, "Patterns of Stability and Change," Occasional Papers No. 1, Center of Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1951), p. 11; Paul S. Dull, "The 'Senkyoya' System in Rural Japanese Communities," ibid. No. 4 (1953), p. 29; Joseph L. Sutton, "Rural Politics in Japan," ibid., p. 40.

2. E.g., Ruth Benedict, Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

3. E.g., John F. Embree, Suye Mura: A Japanese Village (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

4. A very useful work is John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, A Social Survey (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945).

5. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948), p. 214.

6. Masamichi Royama, Seiji Ishiki No Kaibo /An Analysis of Political Awareness/(Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949), a study of voting behavior in the 1949 General Election in a sample city district, a town and a farm village.

7. Masamichi Royama, "Political Science in Japan," selection in Contemporary Political Science (Paris: UNESCO, 1950), p. 320.

8. Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics (New York: Century, 1932), p. 264.

9. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan, Government-Politics (New York: Nelson, 1939), pp. 31, 32.

10. Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 332.

11. Robert B. Textor, Failure in Japan (New York: John Day, 1951), p. 113.

12. Masamichi Royama, Seiji Ishiki No Kaibo, op. cit., p. 228. Translation mine.

13. Statistics from Asahi Nenkan /Asahi Yearbook, 1950/ (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949), pp. 287, 291. Of the 94 independents in the House of Councillors, 75 were in theGreen Breeze Society, 16 in the Independents' Discussion Society, and 3 were independents.

14. See Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai /National Election Administration Commission/, Senkyo Seido Shiryo, Dai San Bu /Materials on the Election System, Part 3/, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), pp. 28, 34. Of the 117 districts for the election of the House of Representatives, 40 were three-member, 39 were four-member, and 38 were five-member constituencies. In the House of Councillors elections, prefectures were represented by 2 to 8 persons depending upon population.

15. (Tokyo: Tokyo News Service, April 1950).

16. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1949).

17. Iichi Oguchi, "Religions of Japan," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 195, No. 1 (Jan. 55), pp. 122, 125.

18. See pp. 5-7, supra.

19. Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, pp.345,

20. Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 254.

21. Ibid.

22. (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1947 and 1949).

23. Op. cit., pp. 168-170.

24. Full title: Party Government in Japan: A Preliminary Survey of Its Development and Electoral Record, 1928-1937. (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1948.)

25. Op. cit., Vol. I, Section X--"Popular Elections," pp. 314, 337.

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25. Op. cit., Vol. I, Section X--"Popular Elections," pp. 314, 337.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Learn from the evergreen pine tree:
In a lonely garden
In winter decay
It changes not its color.

Emperor Hirohito[1]
1949

A. Prewar Developments

The artistic sensitivity of the Japanese people is, perhaps, no better exemplified than in the annual poetry contest held throughout the nation under the auspices of the emperor. Each year, he himself writes a haiku, an epigrammatic poem expressed in five-seven-five syllables. Innocuous as they may seem to the occidental, they nevertheless take on political significance in that they are closely scrutinized by the Japanese public for possible clues to the emperor's thoughts. Like all pithy sayings, these poems can be interpreted in as many ways as there are interpreters. The one above which appeared in January 1949 may be interpreted as an exhortation from the emperor to the people to be as purely Japanese as before--whatever that may be--in a period of alien rule, inflation, physical hardship and social disorganization.

On the other hand, should one prefer to analogize the pine tree to the Japanese state, or "national polity" to employ a much used and ill-understood term, of prewar militarists, he may say that Emperor Hirohito wants the prewar pattern of political powers to be maintained in spite of the structural and institutional changes in government made under the allied occupation.

What was in the emperor's mind when he penned it, only he can explain, but the poem helps to dramatize what is undoubtedly the most discussed question concerning the government of postwar Japan. Is the Japanese state unchanging like the presumably metaphoric pine tree in spite of winter decay? Regardless of the many institutional changes introduced into the social, economic, and political relationships of the Japanese under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), can we say, as some writers have, that the underlying cultural bases of Japanese society are such that the power structure of prewar government remains insignificantly modified?

Social scientists seem to agree that the scope and direction of power allocated to governments are dependent upon the cultural and social situation.[2] Thus the <u>real</u> as distinguished from the <u>formal</u> or <u>legal</u> organization and function of a government are based: (1) on the "national character" or "ethos" or "cultural pattern" of the nation[3], and (2) on the primary social institutions (e.g., the fami-

ly and church) and the groups (e.g., parties and pressure groups) which appear to be dominant in their ceaseless rivalry among themselves for political priority.[4] The form of government as neatly portrayed in organizational charts may be quite different from the actual structure and functions of authority, just as the "law" may be quite different from the "spirit" in which it is interpreted and applied.

This should be particularly apparent in a country like Japan, which skipped centuries of the evolutionary change that took place in western civilization and adopted many of its contemporary features during the Meiji Restoration. Granted that government, in practice, could not be established by fiat alone unless it finds expression in prevailing conventions and the wishes of dominant social institutions and power groupings, then the somewhat startling democratic innovations contained in the Meiji Constitution of 1889 could not have drastically altered centuries-old governmental institutions and practices.

Perhaps the most significant innovation contained in the Constitution of 1889 was the recognition of parliamentary representation in one of the two houses of the Imperial Diet. Probably nothing could be more alien to Japanese experience than the notion that the people could choose legislators, since the prevailing customs and mores echoed the

Confucian dictum that rulers should command and the ruled should obey. Yet limited male suffrage was granted in 1889 so that 450,000 (out of a total population of 40 million) were eligible to vote in 1890 for members of the House of Representatives.[5] Property qualifications were gradually reduced so that by 1925, universal male suffrage (12,495,000 voters out of a population of 59 million) was an accomplished fact.

This revolutionary idea of holding popular elections is not so startling when one asks what it was meant to accomplish. The Satsuma-Choshu oligarchs then in power faced serious opposition from rival clans which sought to penetrate the closed circle of administrators surrounding the throne. To placate their desires as well as to establish a symbol of westernization to gain the respect of the Great Powers, Hirobumi Ito, one of the leading oligarchs, devised a nationally elected lower house under the Meiji Constitution which was shorn of final law-making power. Powers generally exercized by the national assembly in western countries were retained by the Emperor. He could determine the organization of the government and armed forces, declare war, make peace and conclude treaties, and issue ordinances for implementing laws and for maintaining public peace and order. Significantly, he could even issue ordinances in place of laws when the Diet was not in session. Since in

practice the emperor seldom acted on his own initiative, his nominal authority was exercised by the oligarchs surrounding him.

As if this were not enough to stifle democratic rule, the budgetary powers of the Diet were almost nullified by provisions which forbade the rejection of "fixed expenditures," which permitted the government to legislate financial measures when the Diet was not in session, and which authorized the government to "carry out the budget of the preceding year" if the Diet failed to enact one.

Ito made clear his intention of maintaining the Diet as a mere discussion chamber and of centering authority in the Emperor in the true Confucian tradition when he wrote:

> From the nature of the original polity of this country, it follows that there ought to be one and only one source of the sovereign power of the State . . . . The use of the Diet is to enable the head of the State to perform his function and to keep the State in a well-disciplined, strong and healthy condition. The legislative power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent. Thus between the Emperor and the Diet, a distinction is to be strictly maintained as to their respective positions.[6]

Except for a brief interval of responsible government based on party alignments from 1924 to 1932, this was essentially the pattern of government which prevailed until 1945--the maintenance of an intentionally weak but popularly elected lower house, sharing with a largely appointed upper house the privilege of sanctioning decisions made elsewhere.

Unlike the subordinate role of the Teikoku Gikai (the Imperial Diet) under the Meiji Constitution, the new Kokkai (the National Diet) is constitutionally omnipotent today. It is "the highest organ of state power" and "the sole law-making organ of the State."[7] The emperor himself echoed these thoughts when he said, "The foundation for the development of future Japan lies solely in the right management of the Diet."[8] Are these views justifiably in view of the preceding tradition and experience? Is responsible parliamentary government still so dimly understood and little accepted by the Japanese that it may not endure for long in practice although its form may be retained?

Since all writers seem to agree that the postwar constitution is largely the result of American direction, one may well ask whether the preeminent role of the Diet in it is built upon assumptions prevailing in American society which perhaps have little applicability in Japan. General Douglas MacArthur acknowledged the presence of these doubts and answered them as follows:[9]

> . . . In the inception of Japan's reformation, many voices were raised against the planned implantation here of ideals and principles and standards underlying American democracy, for it was contended that Japanese tradition, Japanese culture, and Japanese experience would not permit their assimilation in Japan's redesigned social system. Never was statement more erroneous and unrealistic. For those very things which have supported Japan's past are responsible for the tragedy of Japan's present, and those very things which have supported America's past are no less responsible for the strength of America's present. . . . Once the

> process of assimilation has been completed, the Japanese may be expected to adhere to, cherish and preserve this new way of life.

General MacArthur's optimistic statement is predicated upon completion of the "process of assimilation," but can the new position of the Diet be assimilated?

In form, the National Diet is a far different parliament from its predecessor. In consonance with its role as "the sole law-making organ of the State," all extra-legal councils surrounding the throne were abolished. An elected House of Councillors replaced the House of Peers and was made somewhat subordinate to the House of Representatives. Since the Prime Minister, the highest executive officer, is chosen by and from among members of the Diet and members of the cabinet are made collectively responsible to it, the Diet today is a more powerful legislature than the United States Congress. Its control over the public purse is now complete, for money cannot be spent or borrowed without its consent, nor can taxes be levied or modified without its approval.

Almost as important as the constitution in giving it a preeminent place in government was the new Diet Law which even preceded the implementation of the constitution. Drafted largely by the lower house and enacted in the last few days of the Imperial Diet, the law discarded many restrictive provisions of Ito's Law of the Houses, such as

the division of the houses into sections, imperial appointment of the Speaker, the Vice-Speaker, and the Secretariat, time limit for deliberation by budget committees, and prohibition of Diet contacts with government offices and local assemblies except through a minister of state.[10]

More important were the revisions made in the old law, such as the lengthening of the ordinary session from three to five months, and appropriation of the budget for each house separately from the government budget, thus freeing it from the control of the Finance Minister. Whereas the mediocre prestige of the representative was evident in his rank and pay before the war (equivalent to the sonin, a secondary rank in the bureaucracy with half the pay of the highest civil servant, the vice-minister), he was now elevated to status equal to that of the vice-minister.

Furthermore, the Diet Law provided new aids for making it an effective law-making body, many of which were freely borrowed from the United States Congress. The franking privilege was provided to encourage legislators to keep in touch with their constituents; office space and help were made available; a Diet library and a legislative reference service were established. Most important, standing committees for eighteen substantive fields plus steering, library, and disciplinary committees were set up with the assurance that each member could be appointed to at

least one of them for his full term. Committees were now able to conduct investigations with the power to subpoena witnesses, to engage expert staff assistance, and to hold open hearings.

These, then, are the tools now at the command of the National Diet. Whether it uses them and thereby transforms itself into the strong instrumentality for democratic rule in Japan which it was meant to be, or whether it falls into its effete prewar pattern of subordination to the executive organs lies in the hands of Diet members and the people who choose them.

Much has been written concerning the effectiveness of the Diet in the immediate postwar years. Few of the analyses are optimistic. Since legislation was monitored and often suggested by SCAP, studies made under SCAP auspices are of necessity laudatory and point out as examples of real progress the assertion of Diet powers restricting the old bureaucratic practice of legislating substantive laws through Cabinet Orders,[11] and the exposure of a major scandal involving a number of prominent persons by the Special Committee for Investigation of Concealed and Hoarded Goods and the Illegal Property Transactions Investigation Committee in 1947 and 1948.[12] Burks says that aside from the major gain of cabinet responsibility, the fact that the Diet challenged the Katayama Cabinet's right to appoint

members as parliamentary vice-ministers and councillors in the administration, and that it asserted its powers over the budget, formerly the Finance Minister's private preserve, bespeak, among other things, its new role in postwar government.[13]

Justin Williams, the chief SCAP official concerned with Diet affairs, feels that on the positive side, the Diet did demonstrate its willingness to use the new aids and devices provided by the Diet Law, and to uphold its dignity vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and the cabinet. Government parties have cooperated with their cabinets in implementing policies, and many members have shown some concern over public opinion in their constituencies.[14]

On the other hand, much of the literature on postwar Japan is highly critical of the Diet. In the middle of 1946, a Japanese newspaper editorialized:

> . . . The new Diet is not much different from the old one and we will even go so far as to say that we have killed the tiger at the front door in the form of the old militaristic Diet, but a wolf, which is the new disposition of the Diet, is waiting for us at the back door.[15]

To the consternation of the reading public, ingaidan, or so-called lobbyists,[16] brashly intervened, especially during the coal nationalization debate in 1947, and some of the Diet sessions were a national disgrace. "Diet or Zoo?" editorialized one newspaper,[17] and "Violence and Swearing Mark Three Days of Diet Brawls" headlined another.[18] "Final

discussions on the coal bill produced fist fights on the floor of the House of Representatives. A number of drunken legislators, gurgling with the wine industrialist lobbyists had fed them, wandered about the chamber," wrote Russell Brines.[19] Just as discouraging to him was the Diet in its staid moments:

> The men and women in the Diet were distinctly unimpressive. They spent most of their time in political quarrels and personal fence-mending. The institution was bogged down by every conceivable tradition, except leadership for the people. Patriarchs were supreme, and age and seniority were observed as rigidly as in the bureaucracy . . . . In each of its sessions during the occupation, the Diet sat for weeks without a single accomplishment . . . . The legislators still had not caught the idea of introducing legislation themselves but, as before, awaited cabinet bills for action . . . .[20]

The editor of the Institute of World Economy made the following generalizations concerning the Diet:[21]

a. Since nearly all who held seats before and during the war were purged by the Public Office Purge Ordinance, most of the postwar members were inexperienced.

b. Therefore Diet deliberations were not smooth.

c. Although research facilities are available, the standing committees do not prepare or submit independent bills but merely conduct deliberations on bills drafted by government ministries and submitted by the cabinet for Diet action. Usually only small revisions are made.

d. Although the Diet has authority to propose bills and any member can sponsor them, almost all major bills are those proposed by the cabinet except minor bills for bicycle racing, horse racing, etc.

e. Debates are of low caliber.

f. Each house meets once every three weeks to give members opportunity for free debate, but this provision is little used.

g. Attendance at plenary and committee sessions has been poor.

According to the editor, this dismal showing can be explained as follows: (1) SCAP maintained a strict surveillance over all proposed legislation and screened it carefully before submission, so bills before the Diet needed only to be approved; (2) members engaged in debate not to determine the facts but to attack political rivals.

Some of these views were also expressed by Justin Williams:[22]

> Diet plenary sessions have never been, and are not now, occasions for forensic clashes between the orators of the opposing parties, nor for reshaping legislative bills reported out of committee, nor for speeches merely for the record. Plenary sessions are held for three general reasons: first, to give perfunctory approval to matters previously decided in committees; second, to afford spokesmen of the several parties a chance publicly to interrogate and embarrass cabinet ministers; and third, to conclude filibusters in an atmosphere of turbulence. During slack periods, when the cabinet falls behind in submitting bills to the Diet, members become bored and recess for periods up to 10 days at a time.

In addition to this unfortunate development in plenary sessions, Williams felt that democratic government was jeopardized by hooliganism, instances of which have just been described, and the influence of lobbyists, which is closely related to political fund-raising, corruption, and bribery. However, even more serious is the instability of postwar

governments, at least up to the Twenty-Fourth Diet, which is due in large measure to the nature and multiplicity of Japanese parties.

B. Postwar Parties

Undoubtedly, of all political phenomena in postwar Japan, the most difficult to understand are the political parties, particularly during the period preceding the General Election of 1949. The parties defy description because of their complexity, their transitory nature, and their nebulous principles. Yet, some comprehension of the major parties which gained representation in the Diet is necessary in order to see the significance (or insignificance) of party affiliation as an independent variable in the socio-political background of Diet members. Most of the generalizations to follow are based on the observations of competent writers as well as the author's limited experiences in Tokyo.[23]

An important feature of Japanese politics from 1946 to 1948 is this paradox: a multiplicity of legally recognized parties coupled with the very limited number of parties in the western sense. A political party is viewed in the United States as a group of voters organized on a relatively permanent basis around a core of common interests. Its chief aim is to place its candidates in public office

through the electoral process. It is, then, a going concern, not an *ad hoc* body like many pressure groups. However, in the 1949 election, we find the following situation in Japan:[24]

	Number
Parties registered	1,400
" nominating candidates	129
" successful in electing candidates . .	35
Major parties	5
Parties with important Diet representation . .	3

A sort of filtering process from 1,400 parties down to three seems to be involved. Actually, the numbers are misleading in that the figure 1,400 indicates not excessive splintering of factions but faulty registration procedure. For example, rules permitted anyone to get a handful of people together and register as a party. Even though most of the 1,400 disappeared before or soon after the election, there was no way of indicating this in the records.

Another aspect of the same problem is the instability of party affiliation in the Diet. Only two months after the 1947 elections, only three out of 138 independents retained their independent status; the others joined with existing parties. This means that those persons who were able to run and be elected without the financial support of party organizations shopped around in the Diet *after* election for parties to join. Of some 30 minor parties repre-

sented in the past at election time, only one retained its identity, and the rest simply disappeared.[25] In one post-war Diet session, more than half of the representatives shifted their allegiance, according to one writer.[26]

Even more serious than the ephemeral nature of the parties are their universally undemocratic structure and operation. The Japanese party is not an organization with mass support at the rice-roots level in which municipal and prefectural representatives convene on occasions to hammer out nation-wide policies and choose national officers. It is a relatively exclusive group, entrance into which requires the sponsorship of the candidate by a member who would be willing to vouch for his character.[27] Party members are usually Diet members, local leaders, or heavy contributors.

The party organization and decision-making process are both hierarchical and centralized. All major decisions of a party are made in Tokyo by a small group of men who may be the nominal leaders (e.g., members of the Central Executive Committee) or behind-the-scenes wire-pullers, the kuromaku, like Ichiro Hatoyama of the Liberal Party. Autonomy is not granted to the local branches in the prefectures and municipalities; these branches must implement policies formulated in Tokyo headquarters or face either dictatorial direction or expulsion. Forced contributions and imposi-

tion of candidates upon the local organizations are possible, and actions of these bodies are subject to review by party headquarters. In short, voters at the rice-roots have no voice in policy formulation or nomination of candidates.

As may be expected, party discipline is strict. Diet members must accept party decisions, such as the frequent amalgamation moves with other factions, or accept expulsion. To escape this, representatives often switch parties, and because of the number of parties in the Diet, they do not face serious consequences as do renegades in two-party parliaments like that of Great Britain.

The oyabun-kobun or boss-henchmen relationship traceable to early Tokugawa times and widely practiced among building contractors (kumi), gambling syndicates, and racketeers, is also found in political groups. It is difficult to ascertain to what degree these groups influence government policy, but they are unlikely to be syndicated into a nation-wide, conspiratorial organization extending from the farm village to the cabinet as claimed at one time by Colonel Charles E. Kades, Assistant Chief of the Government Section.[28] When SCAP ordered the police to crack down on these groups in the latter half of 1947, an interesting development was the opposition of both conservatives and Communists, the former, because many important politicians

owed their positions to oyabun, and the latter, because of some oyabun-kobun characteristics of the Communist Youth Action Corps.

Because victory at the polls is often dependent upon the ability to finance vote-catching campaigns, political leaders are often skillful fund-raisers or persons most able to tap resources. This is particularly true today because patronage plums are not available as they were in the days of the Home Ministry and other service ministries. Shigeru Yoshida, head of the Democratic-Liberal Party, is said to have the support of big business through Tanzan Ishibashi of the Bridgestone Tire Company, and bankers, and contractors. Kijuro Shidehara of the Democratic Party is related through marriage to the Iwasaki family which controls the Mitsubishi interests.

New sources of political funds are the reconstruction and industrial funds which finance loans made to industrial firms, and the cost-plus contracts to build Occupational facilities. The most flagrant scandal involving the Democrats of the Ashida faction was the Showa Denko case which broke in January 1948. Implicated were Takeo Kurusu, Director of the Economic Stabilization Board, and Suehiro Nishio, former Deputy Prime Minister, who were accused of extending an excessive 1.2 billion yen loan to the Showa Denko Company from which they received a kickback of 24 million yen for the Democratic war-chest. Although not

directly implicated in this case, Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida was arrested in December 1948 for receiving bribes for facilitating loans to building contractors, although he was acquitted soon thereafter.

These, then, are the salient characteristics of political parties from 1945 to the end of 1948--the transitory nature of the large number of so-called parties, the unstable affiliation of members in the major parties, their undemocratic organization and operation, and evidence of corruption. Another feature commented upon by many writers is the nebulous and almost uniform party platforms which characterize all except the Communist Party.[29]

Since this study is concerned with the party affiliation of members of the House of Representatives, we shall deal primarily with the three parties having the largest representation: the Democratic-Liberals (Minshu-Jiyuto), the Democrats (Minshuto), and the Socialists (Nippon Shakaito, often translated as the Social Democrats). We shall also examine the one on the extreme left, the Communist Party (Nippon Kyosanto), which, although weak during the period under consideration, gained tremendously in the 1949 election. Although the National Cooperatives (Kokumin Kyodoto, also translated as the Peoples' Cooperatives) were fairly strong before 1948, they have grown progressively weaker since; so they have been grouped with the rest of the small parties under the category of minor parties.

All four of the major parties were organized within two months after SCAP removed restrictions on political, civil, and religious liberties (SCAPIN 93) on October 4, 1945. The first major party to be organized was the Socialist Party with the joining of 17 Representatives under the presidency of Komakichi Matsuoka. The first conservative party, the Liberal, was formed on November 9 under Ichiro Hatoyama with 50 members in the lower house. The almost equally conservative Progressive Party, organized at the same time, garnered the largest support, ultimately 274 Representatives. The Communists began forming, informally at first, after prominent members like Kyiuchi Tokuda and Yoshio Shiga were released from jail on October 10.

On January 4, 1946, the first of a series of purge directives was issued by SCAP which ultimately disrupted not only the elites in the two conservative parties, the Liberals and the Progressives, but the Socialists as well. Removed from public office and also excluded from participation in the General Election of April 1946 were government officials, all Diet members recommended by Tojo in the election of 1942, and professional military men associated with ultranationalistic activities. Of the members in the lower house, at least 247 of the 274 Progressives, 20 of the 50 Liberals, and 10 of the 17 Socialists were banned.[30] When the Cabinet announced its "opinion" on February 15,

1947, that party position was to be interpreted as public office in the meaning of the purge directive, none of the remaining Progressives except Takao Saito kept their seats. This party later came to be known as the Democratic Party. The Liberals, too, lost men like Ichiro Hatoyama, who was forced to relinquish his leadership to Shigeru Yoshida. The Socialists had to drop some of their founders, such men as Jotaro Kawakami, Soichi Kawamata, and Shoichi Miyake, which immediately strengthened the hand of the leftist faction and the leadership of Tetsu Katayama.

The first postwar election on April 10, 1946, was inconclusive. No party emerged with a majority, and the weak government formed by the Liberals under Shigeru Yoshida was incapable of stemming popular discontent, particularly with regard to the mounting inflation. A nation-wide general strike in February 1947 was barely averted by General MacArthur[31] when he "suggested" that instead of strike action by the unions, a new election should be called to let the voters decide who was to solve the economic crisis and how. The second postwar election ensued on April 25, 1947. The Progressives, the heaviest losers in the 1946 election, rose in strength from 93 seats in that election to 126 in 1947. The greatest gainers in 1947 were the Socialists who captured 143 seats, making it the largest party in the Diet but far below the majority. The Liberals lost a handful of

the 139 seats they controlled in 1946. The Communists and the minor parties were able to hang on in 1947 to the very small beachhead which they established in the first postwar election. Besides the tremendous gains of the Socialists, the outstanding development of the second election was the drop in the number of independents from 83 in 1946 to 12. In the upper chamber, on the other hand, 110 out of 250 Councillors remained nominal independents.

We need not discuss in detail the extremely complex maneuvers which occurred in the House of Representatives from April 1947 to January 1949. Because of Socialist plurality in the lower house, Tetsu Katayama, the party leader, was designated prime minister with the agreement of the Democrats under Ashida and the National Cooperatives, and lack of opposition from the Liberals. This coalition government did not last long because of the ineffectual leadership of Katayama. Moreover, his party was split into left, central, and right wings, and the left wing refused to accept the three-party agreement upon which the coalition was built, on the ground that it watered down Socialist principles. Meanwhile, the Liberals were able to join with the Democratic faction led by Shidehara in forming the Democratic-Liberal Party. Katayama's downfall came in February 1948 as a consequence of left-wing Socialist and Democratic-Liberal opposition to his supplementary budget calling for a 100% increase in postal and railroad rates.

Intricate maneuvering again characterized the selection of the new Prime Minister. The Liberals tried to form a coalition but were rebuffed; the Socialist factions reconciled their differences and asked Katayama to succeed himself, but he refused. Finally, they joined the Democrats in successfully electing Ashida to the post, although the House of Councillors favored Yoshida. This government was in worse shape than its predecessor and lasted only seven months. Members of Ashida's cabinet were immediately involved in the notorious Showa Denko scandal, and he himself was implicated on bribery charges. His downfall came in October 1948 when the Socialists withdrew from the cabinet in protest against the government's support of the SCAP recommendation calling for denial of the right to strike to all public service employees. On November 18, 1948, Yoshida took over the caretaker government which was designed to adopt the anti-strike provision, approve a supplemental budget, and call the new elections which materialized in January 1949.

C. General Election of 1949

The General Election held on January 23, 1949, was the third one held after the end of the war and under the Allied Occupation, the third since women's suffrage, and the first under the new constitution and the new election

law of December 7, 1947. As far as the election of representatives was concerned, the new constitution imposed no new changes. Legally speaking, the novel feature was the election law which for the first time imposed stringent restrictions on campaign methods.

The new regulations limited campaign expenditures for each candidate to ¥50,000, of which ¥30,000 had to be deposited with election officials to cover the cost of the following expenses incurred by the state:

1 newspaper announcement

3 speeches over the radio

1,000 postcards mailed free

Door-to-door canvassing was forbidden, and individual speechmaking and debates with opposing candidates were sponsored by the government. Election posters were allowed only at campaign headquarters and on campaign trucks.

The purpose of these regulations was to lessen the financial burden of candidates and to minimize corruption in government which arises from the need for campaign funds. Also, "it was hoped that the attention of the people would be directed toward the character, political views, and experience of the candidates, and the voters would be able to cast their ballots after careful consideration," according to the National Election Administration Commission (NEAC).[33] The liberal interpretation of the law by NEAC somewhat de-

feated its main purpose, because the most active campaigners, political parties, labor unions, and other organized groups, were able to campaign without restriction so long as they espoused principles instead of specific candidates.[34]

In spite of its dramatic outcome, this election is probably the least reported, in the English language, of the postwar General Elections.[35] A compelling reason is that internationally, other momentous events competed for public attention both in Japan and abroad. Truman was inaugurated, for example, for his second term on January 19, just four days before election, and the Chinese Red Forces engulfed the northern half of China with the "retirement" of Chiang Kai-Shek from Nanking on January 21.

Domestically, NEAC conceded that year-end and New Year festivities dampened campaign ardor in the beginning. Then, too, there was so little partisan activity throughout the campaign that Newsweek magazine characterized it as the "election without issues."[36] Except for the Communists, the major parties were contented to use their customary pious and platitudinous platforms:[37]

Democratic Liberal:

1. Sincerely observe the Potsdam Declaration, and build a new Japan based on international justice.
2. Based on the new constitution, establish responsible government and reform all government on the basis of social justice.
3. Raise national virtue, thus providing respect for liberty and self-realization of responsibilities.

4. Respect labor, promote free enterprise, and rehabilitate productive economy.
5. Promote science and education, enrich the lives of people, and improve national culture.

Democratic:

1. We will pursue progressive policies by defending the spirit of the constitution, by building a democratic political organization, and by establishing a peaceful state.
2. We will democratize industry based on master economic plans, and stabilize the livelihood of the masses.
3. We will plan for rehabilitating education which will perfect individualism, endeavor to raise morality of the masses through cultivating religious sentiments, and contribute to world enlightenment.
4. We will endeavor to restore world confidence and cooperate toward the establishment of world peace.

Socialist:

1. Our party unites the working classes and protects the political freedoms of the people, and thus build a democratic system.
2. Our party endeavors to ban capitalism, pursue socialism, and thus stabilize and raise the livelihood of the people.
3. Our party opposes all militaristic ideology and actions and endeavors to realize permanent world peace through cooperation with the peoples of the world.

Communist:

1. Overthrow the emperor system; establish a people's republic.
2. Strict realization of the Potsdam Declaration; support of peaceful policies of democratic nations; complete independence for Korea; international cooperation of labor unions.
3. Dissolution of all anti-democratic organizations; eradication of subversive underground organizations and terroristic plans; severe punishment of all war criminals and oppressors of human rights; destruction of parties serving the emperor who is the enemy of democracy.
4. Abolishment of the constitution which was handed down from above and establishment of a democratic constitution by the people; abolishment of the Privy Council, House of Peers, House of Representatives, and es-

tablishment of a democratic unicameral body; eradication of all quasi-feudal systems for the privileged, like the Imperial Household.

(These are the first four of 25 tersely worded planks. Later ones have economic appeals like the following:)

11. Minimum working hours (generally less than 7 hours, maximum limit to be 8 hours; 44 hours per week.)
13. Ban on labor of children below 14, a vacation day per week; 2 weeks' vacation per annum at full pay.)
15. Social security including national unemployment insurance, health insurance, pensions, paid by the capitalists.
16. Confiscation of all absentee-owned land without compensation, and distribution without repayment to peasants.
17. Control of key industries by laborers.
25. Guarantee of housing to all workers lacking it; opening of all mansions and recreational pavilions.

It may seem strange to some western observers that political campaigns can be conducted on such platitudinous generalities. Granted that Japanese voters tend to elect candidates because of their fame and prestige more than because of their platforms, the latter cannot be ignored. At least one observer[38] ignores personalities and states that (irrespective of platforms), the campaign revolved around the following issues:

a. Middle-of-the-road policies of the Socialist and Democratic coalitions of the Twenty-Third Diet.

b. Scandals affecting primarily the Democrats.

c. The anti-strike order.

Despite the spiritless campaign, voter turnout exceeded expectations, somewhat aided by the fine weather

prevailing throughout the nation on election day. Out of 42.1 million eligible voters, 31.1 million voted, a 74.0 percent turnout (male--80.7%; female--67.9%). In the 1947 election, 67.9 percent voted (male--74.9%; female--61.6%); so there was a six percent increase in 1949.

Apathy was reflected by a smaller number of candidacies in 1949 than in the previous election. In 1947, 1,567 candidates contested for the 466 seats, whereas only 1,364 ran this time. This comes to 3.3 candidates for each seat in 1947 and 2.9 in 1949. This small number of contenders in recent elections was deplored by at least one writer,[39] but actually there were only three elections out of 23 held prior to 1949 in which more than 2.9 candidates ran for each seat. The low point was reached in the four elections held from 1903 to 1912 during which only 1.3 to 1.4 candidates sought election.[40]

The outcome of the election was predictable to most observers, since it was evident that the middle-of-the-road groups represented by the Katayama and Ashida cabinets had been discredited. What was startling, however, is the degree to which the electorate favored the parties at the extreme right and left, the Democratic-Liberals and the Communists.

TABLE 1

ELECTIONS OF 1947 AND 1949--VOTES AND SEATS WON, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

	Votes		Seats	
	1947	1949	1947	1949
Democratic-Liberal	26.9	43.8	28.3	56.6
Democratic	25.1	15.7	27.0	14.8
Socialist	26.2	13.5	30.7	10.3
Communist	3.6	9.7	.9	7.5
Minor Parties	12.4	10.7	10.5	7.3
Independents	5.8	6.6	2.6	3.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	27.3 million	30.5 million	466	466

Source: 1. Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1951, pp. 360, 361.
2. NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan 1950, p. 124.

The Democratic-Liberals were the greatest gainers, having almost doubled the number of votes received and having exactly doubled their seats in the lower house since the previous election. With 264 seats or 56.6 percent of the lower house under its wings, it became the first party after the war to command an absolute majority and the mandate to establish a one-party cabinet. The Communists almost tripled the votes received since 1947, and they increased their strength in the lower house almost nine times. Although still comprising only 7.5 percent of the representatives,

they now gained stature as leaders among the opposition. The Socialists were the heaviest losers, having dropped from 143 seats in the previous election to 48, a reduction to one-third their former strength. The Democrats, too, lost heavily as did the National Cooperatives among the minor parties. Even important Socialist Diet members like former Premier Katayama, Kanju Kato and Suehiro Nishio and Democrats like Wataru Narahashi failed to get themselves re-elected.

An interesting sidelight is the degree to which parties have been successful in having their endorsed candidates elected (see Table 2). The nominating procedures of all major parties were essentially the same. Minor variations occurred; for example, the Socialists claimed that they considered the nominees' views and their relations with labor unions, and the Communists claimed that nominees were first chosen by prefectural conventions called by "prefectural committees." However, they all gave preference to incumbents and to persons most likely to be successful who were recommended by the local branches. All parties extended official recognition only to those approved by a body in central party headquarters.[41] Of all candidates reported to NEAC, 34.2 percent were elected, but the Democratic-Liberals were outstandingly successful since three-fifths of their candidates were elected. In contrast, the

other three major parties placed only one-third to one-fourth of their nominees. The importance of organization is evident in the very poor showing made by the minor parties and independents.

TABLE 2

CANDIDATES--NUMBER RUNNING, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE ELECTED: 1949

Party	Candidates[1]	Number Elected[2]	% Elected
Democratic-Liberal	420	264	62.8
Democratic	208	69	33.4
Socialist	187	48	26.6
Communist	115	35	30.4
Minor	223	34	15.2
Independent	211	16	7.6
All Candidates	1,364	466	34.2

[1]Source: NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan 1950, pp. 116, 117.

[2]Source: Ibid., p. 124.

Doubts have been expressed concerning the reliability of campaign costs reported to NEAC by the political parties, and the exact costs may never be known. However, for what they may be worth, those figures show that all parties except the Communists reported surpluses at the end of the campaign (Table 3). In terms of expenditures per successful candidate the Democratic-Liberals spent the most, followed by the Socialists, Democrats, and Communists. The last seem to have got a bargain if they actually spent

only ¥5,857 (about sixteen dollars) for each elected candidate.

TABLE 3

REPORTED ELECTION EXPENDITURES OF MAJOR PARTIES: 1949

Party	Income	Outgo	Expenditure per Successful Candidate	
Democratic-Liberal	¥9,099,208	¥8,079,865	¥30,605	($85.01)
Democratic	795,000	620,248	8,989	(24.96)
Socialist	913,700	912,844	19,017	(52.82)
Communist	22,340	205,000	5,857	(16.26)

Source: NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan, p. 108.

Reasons for the poor showing of the Socialists and Democrats are not hard to find. Observers are all agreed that the people were disillusioned with these middle-of-the-road parties which bungled the mandate handed them in 1947. The Katayama cabinet was beset by schism among the Socialist factions, incompetence, and vacillation, and the Ashida cabinet was tainted with corruption.

On the other hand, the Democratic-Liberals were largely able, as the leading opposition party, to escape public opprobrium, and the effective way in which the caretaker government of Yoshida went about its business during its brief tenure may have appealed to conservative businessmen and farmers. According to a commentator,[44] these voters sought the same leadership "to take the nation out of the economic morass."

The Communists also profited by being an "out" party. Said the Nippon Times:[45] "the surprisingly large Communist vote was largely a protest vote." Many non-Communists who were disappointed with the middle-of-the-roaders and who disliked the Democratic-Liberals voted Communist "to give vent to their dissatisfaction with the powers that be." Because of General MacArthur's known antipathy towards the Communists, many government workers may have protested his anti-strike directive by voting for leading labor leaders like Katsumi Kikunami and Kazuyoshi Dobashi running on the Communist ticket. Other reasons may be suggested for the Communist victory, such as their skillful campaign, which soft-pedaled the question of the Emperor, built fears of inflation, and made enticing economic promises, knowing well that they would not become a majority group that would be entrusted with responsibility. The spectacular victories on the China mainland and "the favorable conditions for Communism all over the world" as claimed by Kentaro Yamabe, a Communist spokesman, probably won more votes for the party.

D. Post-Election Developments

From election day on January 23 to December 25, 1949, when the Manual of the House of Representatives (upon which this study is based) was published, there were few important changes in the numbers of representatives of each major party.

Table 4 indicates that there were practically no shifts in the party affiliation of representatives among the major parties. A notable exception is shift made by Takehide Yamaguchi from the Socialist to the Communist Party, thus raising the latter's strength to 36. The greatest change indicated is the shift made by all except one independent toward party affiliation. Also, among the minor parties, three disappeared and three new ones appeared during the eleven months. One of them, the New Political Council, Shin Seiji Kyogikai, claims 22 members and is a coalition of former members of the National Cooperative, Social Renovationist, Kosei Club, and the New Farmer parties. Established in May 1949, it soon went out of existence when it merged in April 1950 with the Democrats to form the National Democratic Party.

On the surface, the major parties appeared to be stable and united, but within them were clusters of personal followings which fragmented the Democrats in 1949 and the other parties in the following years.

Within the dominant Democratic-Liberal Party were the former Democratic faction led by Shidehara, the Hatoyama clique clustered around Ono, and the "younger" group led by Yoshida. As expected, Yoshida was designated to form a cabinet, but what came as a surprise, especially to the Shidehara and Ono factions, was his desire to form a coali-

TABLE 4

COMPARISON OF PARTY STRENGTH:
January and December 1949

Party	January[1]		December[2]	
Democratic-Liberal	264		266	
Democrats	69		70	
Opposition		-		37
Coalition		-		33
Socialist	48		46	
Communist	35		36	
Minor Parties	34		43	
Social Renovationist		5		5
Labor-Farmer		7		6
National Cooperative		14		
New Farmer		6		
New Liberal		2		
New Political Council				22
Kosei Club				3
Agricultural Cooperative				7
Independents	16		1	
Vacancies	0		4	
Total	466		466	

[1]Source: Senkyo, Japan Yearbook 1949-52, p. 87.

[2]Source: Manual of the House of Representatives, 1949.

tion government with the Democrats. This move was opposed by the Council of Elders (Choro Kaigi) and the Officers' Association (Yakuinkai) within his party, but Yoshida remained undaunted. In trying to reach a rapprochement with the Democrats, he was attempting to build a two-party system with the conservative bloc of Democratic-Liberals and Democrats opposed to the Socialists, and the elimination of the Communists and the minor parties. In currying the favor of Inukai, he was merely carrying out a pre-election promise. When he made a formal proposal to Inukai and his followers on January 26, Democrats Heitaro Inezaki, Kozaemon Kimura and Iwao Yamazaki agreed to serve in his cabinet. Had it not been for the personal enmity of Shidehara and Ono toward Inukai, he and his followers would have joined the Democratic-Liberal Party in 1949 as they ultimately did in February 1950 (except for Inukai who was barred).

The Democrats were divided into two factions, as can be inferred above. The group favoring coalition numbered 33 in December 1949 and was led by Inukai. Those opposing coalition numbered 37 and were led by Hitoshi Ashida, and Suehiro Nishio. The latter group was successful in expelling both Inukai and Hori, who were the top leaders of the party, and the three men who joined Yoshida's cabinet. A formal break between the coalition and opposition groups came on March 8 when they separately called party conventions and

established independent organizations. The opposition Democrats then sought to build a "Social Democratic Front" with the right-wing Socialists and the recently formed New Political Council. This move was unsuccessful as of December 1949 but was partially fulfilled on April 1950 with the establishment of the National Democratic Party.

The Socialists, too, suffered from disunity throughout 1949 between the right-wing under Katayama and Jiro Asanuma and the left-wing under Mosaburo Suzuki. Although the former were elected in greater numbers in the 1949 election and were able to select Katayama as president at the party convention held in April, the leftists came to dominate party operations. Not only was this due to Suzuki's election to the key post of general secretary, but to the great numbers of labor union members who joined to set up the Socialists as the workers' party as opposed to the Communist Party. Another significant development of the April convention was the ideological difference which became apparent between the two wings. Whereas previous differences were largely based on personality conflicts, the left-wing "Suzuki Proposal" submitted to the convention for ratification showed strong Marxist tendencies, whereas the right-wing "Asanuma Proposals" showed revisionist sentiments, according to the Asahi Nenkan.[46] During the last half of 1949, the Socialists alternately fought the government re-

trenchment program of the Conservatives which resulted in a large number of dismissals from the public payroll and the excesses of violence committed by the Communists.

The highwater mark of Communist prestige was reached during the first half of 1949 when they seemed to be taking leadership away from the discredited Socialists. On the surface, the party seemed monolithic, and yet it was split between its two leaders, the internationalist and revolutionary Tokuda and the moderate and "gradualist" Nozaka. During the first few months, the Communists attempted to form a common front with the left-wing Socialists and the Labor-Farmer Party against the impending conservative bloc. The Socialists refused to join them, but the Labor-Farmers collaborated, although they refused to merge completely with the Communists. During the summer of 1949, the party began an "offensive" (kosei) consisting of sabotage, mob violence, strikes, and assassination against the dismissal of government employees. This culminated in the murder and mutilation of the elderly president of the National Railway. This, plus the insolence of Communist-indoctrinated repatriates from Siberia led to public revulsion against Communist tactics and Russian domination. A rapid decline in Communist prestige began. The Japanese public was able to see to what extent the Communist Party was subordinated to Moscow when, on January 6, 1950, the Cominform criticized the moderate

tactics advocated by Nozaka and he recanted. Moderate labor leaders and groups like the Democratization Leagues, Mindo, within the labor movement withdrew from Communist-led unions and established the National Federation of Industrial Unions.

NOTES--Chapter I

1. As quoted in Arthur Tiedemann, Modern Japan (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 186.

2. For a useful compendium of sociological writings concerning political theory, see selections of R. M. MacIver, Harold Laski, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Charles E. Merriam in Richard C. Snyder and H. Hubert Wilson, Roots of Political Behavior (New York: American Company, 1949), Chaps. 2 and 3.

3. Ibid., p. 174 ff.

4. Ibid., p. 164 ff.

5. Election statistics here are from Zenkoku Senkyo Kanri Iinkai [National Election Control Commission, hereafter abbreviated as NEAC], Senkyo Seido Shiryo [Materials on the Electoral System] (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), p. 131.

6. Hirobumi Ito, Commentary on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (Miyoji Ito, tr., 3rd ed., Tokyo, 1931), pp. 9, 10, as quoted in Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 150.

7. Art. 41 of the postwar constitution.

8. Official Gazette, Extra No. 6 (June 24, 1947), p. 1.

9. Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. II, p. 772.

10. For full text of the Diet Law, see ibid., pp. 968-976.

11. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 175.

12. Ibid., pp. 179, 180.

13. Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath Burks, Far Eastern Government and Politics (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954), pp. 508, 509.

14. Justin Williams, "Party Politics in the New Japanese Diet," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Dec. 1948), p. 1179.

15. Tokyo Shimbun, June 20, 1946, as quoted ibid.

16. See Justin Williams, op. cit., p. 1171, for "bully-boy" characteristics of lobbyists.

17. Nippon Times, Nov. 25, 1947.

18. Mainishi, Nov. 23, 1947.

19. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1948), pp. 214, 215.

20. Ibid., p. 214.

21. Institute for World Economy, The Japan Annual, 1954 (Tokyo: Japan Annual Publications, 1954), pp. 40-42.

22. Justin Williams, op. cit., pp. 1167, 1168.

23. The principal sources of information are Harry Emerson Wildes, "Underground Politics in Post-War Japan," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Dec. 1948), pp. 1149-1162; Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, pp. 342-362; Asahi Nenkan / Asahi Annual 1950 /, pp. 295-303; Kermit G. Stewart, "Japanese Politics: 1947-1948," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 13 (July 7, 1948), pp. 152-155. The author was in Tokyo in 1946 and part of 1947, 1948 and 1950, and was able to interview Diet members like Takizo Matsumura and Kijuro Shidehara.

24. Statistics taken from Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 359.

25. Ibid.

26. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo (New York: MacMillan, 1954), p. 104.

27. Harry Emerson Wildes, "Underground Politics in Post-War Japan," op. cit., p. 1149.

28. Ibid., p. 1159.

29. See the following section on the 1949 election.

30. Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, pp. 25-27.

31. The author acted as interpreter in the eleventh hour conference held between General Marquat, Chief of Eco-

nomic and Scientific Section, SCAP, and the union leaders, and it seemed to him that the reason the latter acceded to MacArthur's suggestion was the possibility of new elections in the immediate future.

32. Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 355.

33. NEAC, Shugiin Giin Sosenkyo (Dai Nijuyonkai) Oyobi Saiko Saibansho Saibankan Kokumin Shinsa Kekka Shirabe / Study of the Results of the General Election (24th) of the Members of the House of Representatives and National Review of Justices of the Supreme Court_7 (Tokyo: NEAC, 1949), foreword.

34. NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan /Election Annual_7, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), p. 107.

35. The first two elections were fully covered in published SCAP reports like Political Reorientation of Japan and the Monthly Summation of Non-Military Activities which dealt with events up to the end of 1948. The 1949 election is hardly mentioned in scholarly periodicals like Far Eastern Quarterly and Pacific Affairs.

36. Newsweek, Vol. 33, No. 5 (Jan. 31, 1949), p. 23.

37. Asahi Shimbunsha, Asahi Nenkan 1950 /Asahi Yearbook_7, pp. 298-302, translation mine.

38. E.g., Lafe Franklin Allen, "Japanese Election," Commonweal, Vol. 50, No. 5 (May 13, 1949), pp. 116-118.

39. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, p. 130.

40. Data computed from statistics in NEAC, Senkyo Seido Chosa Teishutsu Shiryo, Sambu /Materials Submitted for Election System Research_7, (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), p. 13.

41. Party recognition of candidates was given by the Election Policy Committee (Democratic-Liberal), Election Policy Headquarters (Democratic), Central Executive Committee (Socialist), and Political Bureau (Communist). See NEAC, Senkyo Nenkan, op. cit., pp. 107, 108.

42. Lafe Franklin Allen, "Japanese Election," op. cit.

43. As quoted ibid.

44. Asahi Nenkan 1950, op. cit.

CHAPTER II

BIRTHPLACE AND AGE

A. Basis for Representation

As a result of the postwar Election Law (Law No. 42, December 1945, as amended by Law No. 43, 1947), the minimum age of members of the House of Representatives has been lowered from 30 to 25, the same minimum age which applies to representatives in the United States Congress. Representatives are now chosen by all Japanese nationals over 20 years of age, irrespective of sex or property ownership. Although the nation is divided into 46 prefectures which form one of the two bases for representation in the upper house, the 466 representatives are elected not from prefectures but from multi-member electoral districts. For the 1949 election, there were 117 districts, 40 of which elected three members, 39 elected four members, and 38 elected five members, according to population and as apportioned by the Election Law Amendment of 1947. This is commonly called the "medium district system" by the Japanese in contrast to the "large district system" of 54 districts, each electing two to fourteen members, which was used in 1946.

Because of the steady increase in population, the emancipation of women, and the lowering of the voting age, each Diet member in 1949 represented more eligible voters

and people in general than at any time in Japanese history, as can be seen below:[1]

Diet	Number of Eligible Voters per member (1000's)	Population per member (1000's)
1st (1890)	1.5	135
10th (1908)	4.2	126
20th (1937)	30.9	152
24th (1949)	90.3	172

Furthermore, the Japanese member of the lower house represents more people than does his counterpart in any other country except the United States. Some of the comparative figures published by NEAC are as follows:[2]

Country	Population per member (1000's)
Japan	172
United States	321
Great Britain	76
France	65
Philippines	159

B. Regional Origin and Representation

Narrowly speaking, each member of the lower house represents the people in his electoral district and not his prefecture, just as the U. S. Congressman is commonly thought to represent his district and not his state, except

for representatives-at-large. However, purely for the sake of convenience, electoral district and prefectural lines will be set aside in this section, and the representatives will be considered in terms of the regions in which they were born and those from which they were elected.

For our purpose, Japan is subdivided into seven regions. Although the regional boundaries are arbitrary from the cultural standpoint, they are the ones used in Japanese geography textbooks, except that we will combine Hokkaido and the Tohoku region of northern Honshu as a unit instead of treating them separately. Because this regional demarcation is largely based on terrain, climate, and land use, it is most useful to physical and economic geographers, but the subdivisions are also similar to those adopted by military planners during World War II to consolidate all local governments into nine administrative regions for efficiency and tighter control from Tokyo.

Running from the northeast to the southwest, the seven regions and the prefectures in them are as follows:

Tohoku Region

Akita, Aomori, Fukushima, Hokkaido, Iwate, Miyago, Yamagata

Kanto Region

Chiba, Gumma, Ibaragi, Kanagawa, Saitama, Tochigi, Tokyo

Chubu Region

Aichi, Fukui, Gifu, Ishikawa, Nagano, Niigata, Shizuoka, Toyama, Yamanashi

Kinki Region

Hyogo, Kyoto, Mie, Nara, Osaka, Shiga, Wakayama

Chugoku Region

Hiroshima, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, Yamaguchi

Shikoku Region

Ehime, Kagawa, Kochi, Tokushima

Kyushu Region

Fukuoka, Kagoshima, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, Nagasaki, Oita, Saga

The Tohoku region is by far the least populated for its immense area, which comprises 40% of the national territory, but it is the rural part of Japan which has received the greatest number of migrants from other parts of the country in recent time, amounting to 25 to 34 percent of its population between 1920 and 1940. Only the metropolitan areas of Tokyo-Yokohama in the Kanto region, Nagoya in the Chubu region, Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto in the Kinki region, and the heavy-industrial belt in northern Kyushu have seen a comparable or greater population growth, due to in-migration from rural areas. The Kanto Plain is by far the most densely populated region, followed by the Kinki and Kyushu regions. The remaining three areas are almost equal in density to the nation as a whole.

Examining the strength of the various parties by percentage of party members in each region (Table 5), the

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE ELECTED IN EACH REGION, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Regions	All Mems.	D-L	Dem.	Soc.	Com.	Others[1]
Tohoku	17.3%	18.4%	18.6%	13.0%	2.8%	25.0%
Kanto	21.2	21.8	14.3	23.9	38.9	11.3
Chubu	19.0	18.8	22.8	15.2	16.6	20.5
Kinki	15.4	13.2	11.4	19.6	27.8	20.5
Chugoku	8.5	7.5	5.7	15.2	11.1	9.1
Shikoku	5.4	5.3	8.6	4.4	0	6.8
Kyushu	13.2	15.0	18.6	8.7	2.8	6.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N[2]	462	266	70	46	36	44

[1]"Others" refers to members in the 8 minor parties and 1 Independent (see Table 4).

[2]In subsequent tables in which data are presented in percentages and broken down by party, this "N" is to be understood unless otherwise stated.

Democratic-Liberals most resemble the distribution of strength of all members, which is, in turn, almost identical with the distribution of the total population among the regions. This is to be expected, since this party comprises more than one-half of the representatives. In the Tohoku, the leftist parties, particularly the Communists, are under-represented, while the region seems to be the stronghold of the minor parties. In the vital and densely populated Kanto region, the Democrats and the minor parties are particularly weak, whereas the Communists are almost doubly represented. The Chubu region claims few leftist party members, which is somewhat of an anomaly because the

heavily industrialized city of Nagoya is located in it, while the Democrats are well represented there. The remaining southern parts of Honshu, Kinki and Chugoku, are similar to Kanto in that the leftists are strong while the conservatives are under-represented there. Unlike the Kanto, however, the minor parties more than hold their own in these areas. Despite heavy industrialization in its northern fringe, Kyushu claims comparatively few Socialists and Communists.

The regions in which representatives were born were cross-tabulated with data contained in Table 5. This showed that the areas receiving the greatest number of immigrants from other regions, Tohoku in the north and the Kanto and the Kinki regions with the growing industrial metropoles, are the places most represented by non-natives. Some exceptions can be noted among the parties, however. The Democrats and the Communists have more native than non-native representatives in the Kanto and Tohoku regions respectively, and these are their weakest areas in relation to the other parties. The Communists, however, have an unusually large percentage of non-natives in the Kanto region.

In the other four regions of Japan Proper, the natives exceed the non-natives. These are the areas which

lost populations as well as persons of parliamentary caliber to the aforementioned areas. In addition, three representatives were born in places outside the four main islands of Japan presently under foreign domination. A Democrat, Takeshi Hara, was born in Formosa, and two Communists, Kyuichi Tokuda and Kenichi Ito, were born in Okinawa and Korea respectively.

C. Prefectural Origin and Representation

While discussion thus far dealt with non-native representation in terms of regions, let us narrow our unit of inquiry to the prefectural level. Whether a candidate is or is not a native of the area he hopes to represent is of utmost importance in Japan. As was pointed out earlier,[3] personal prestige of candidates through connection with a powerful clan of relationship to a locally prominent family is highly regarded by voters. Moreover, personal political machines known in Japan by the euphemistic term, jiban or earth foundations, are so entrenched in some areas that votes can be delivered to a politician throughout his lifetime, and can even be guaranteed to his son, as in the case of the elder and younger Inukai in Okayama.[4] Presumably, these traditional symbols of prestige are either inherited

or acquired through long association with the community within which they are meaningful. Likewise, machines are not build overnight by newcomers, but are cultivated over long periods of time by men who do favors for others and thus establish a matrix of oyabun-kobun relationships. In a tradition-oriented country like Japan, the possessors of prestige symbols and political machines are, therefore, most likely to be natives of their area of influence. To carry this line of logic a step farther, we may hypothesize that the conservative parties are more likely to have native-sons as members than the leftist parties. When we array the percentages by party of representatives who were not born in the prefectures they represent, this hypothesis seems to be substantiated (Table 6):

TABLE 6

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED IN PREFECTURES NOT OF BIRTH
(Percentages)

Representatives	Percentage
All Representatives	23.6
Democratic-Liberal	17.6
Democratic	22.8
Socialist	39.1
Communist	47.2
Others	25.0

Almost one-fourth of the representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet are not natives of the prefecture from which they were elected (Table 6). Interestingly enough,

exactly twice that percentage or almost one half of the Communists are non-natives, whereas at the other end of the political continuum, only 17.6 percent of the Democratic Liberals are non-natives. The Democrats and the Socialists lie between these extremes. The essentially conservative nature of most minor party members, especially those of the New Political Council, is borne out by their percentage of non-natives. It seems that the "radicalness" of Japanese parties is in direct relationship with the percentage of their representatives who are non-natives.

D. Type of Birthplace

Another way in which the origins of representatives can be studied is by the type of community in which they were born. The ideal method of classifying birthplaces is admittedly by the size of their population. However, since most of the representatives were born around the turn of the century, and since scientifically valid national censuses were not taken before 1920, only estimates of population during that period can be used, and these are unavailable for each city, town, and village. Consequently birthplaces were classified according to their names.

Conveniently enough, all place-names in Japan bear the suffixes of shi (city), cho (town), or son (village). For example, places are not officially designated simply as

Hiroshima, Funai, or Oishi; they are always known as Hiroshima.Shi, Funai Cho, or Oishi Son. In the United States, this practice is uniformly followed only in the designation of counties, e.g., Ingham County. The Japanese suffixes are generally determined on the basis of the population and importance of the place at the time they are officially recognized by a higher government, the Home Ministry before the war, and prefectural governments today. However, since many localities cling to their old suffixes because of sentiment or local pride, they are only rough indices of population and density today.[5]

Shi or cities are, by legal definition, "areas with at least 30,000 inhabitants with the shigaichi [corporate part] consisting of at least 60 per cent of the households."[6] Cities are recognized by the prefectural governments (Home Ministry before the war) when towns and villages reach the minimum population requirement and petition for a change in status.[7] In 1950, there were 280 communities of over 30,000 persons, comprising 39 percent of the total population, while in 1898 (two years earlier than 1900, the year in which the average representative was born), there were only 48 cities, estimated to comprise just 11 percent of the nation's population.[8]

There is no legal distinction between town and village, although towns are generally larger and more urban-

ized. In 1948, there were 1833 towns with populations ranging from 4,000 to 73,000; most of them ranged between 5,000 and 30,000. As a cultural anthropologist described them:[9]

> Characteristically, a cho is a center with several thousand inhabitants with shops, inns and geisha houses, a post office, a railroad and bus station, and possibly a high school. It is the education, transportation, communication, and economic center for the surrounding hamlets.

In the biographies of representatives, those born in these semi-rural cho can be distinguished from those born in cho which are subdivisions of cities by the fact that county names precede the former and city names precede the latter.

The rest of the country is made up of villages, which constitute the main unit of government in rural Japan. Although commonly translated as "villages," son are not single clusters of houses in the American sense, but are more akin to townships. They cover a rural area with a scattering of hamlets of about fifteen houses each, called ku or buraku. These hamlets have no separate legal status, but they retain traditional names and choose informal headmen who often perform indispensable functions like the distribution of food rations. In general, villages have less people and are less urbanized than towns. In 1898, there were 13,557 villages,[10] but they diminished to 8,420 by 1948 through consolidation with neighboring villages and growth into towns and cities. Most villages have a village

office, a primary school and a local fishery, forestry or farm association.

Population estimates for 1898 are available, so that the population distribution by size of communities for that year can be compared with that of 1950 based on census data. If, for present purposes, we assume that communities with populations less than 4,999 are villages, 5,000 to 29,000 are towns, and over 30,000 are cities, we find the percentages of the population living in each of the three types of community in 1898 and 1950, in Table 7 (two left columns). The columns to the right compare the population figures with the percentages of representatives born in each of the three types of communities as determined by the suffixes of place-names:

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY, 1898 AND 1950, AND THE BIRTHPLACES OF REPRESENTATIVES (Percentages)

	Population		Representatives					
	1898[a]	1950[b]	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Other
Village	67.2	24.8	46.8	44.4	52.9	45.7	44.4	54.6
Town	21.3	36.2	27.5	30.8	21.4	23.9	25.0	22.7
City	11.5	39.1	25.7	24.8	25.7	30.4	30.6	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a]Source: Japan Yearbook 1938-39, p. 49.

[b]Computed from Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, pp. 16, 17.

Considering first the representatives as a whole, the greatest difference between the legislators and the population about the time they were born, 1898, was in the percentage of persons with village origins. While over two-thirds of the population lived in villages, less than one-half of the representatives were born in them. Their percentage born in towns exceeded that of the town population by 6 percent. Furthermore, over twice as many legislators, proportionately, were born in cities than the proportion of city-dwellers in 1898. Combining this information with the percentage of people living in cities, towns, and villages in 1950 (Table 7), we may conclude that the representatives are more urban in origin than the population distribution at the time of birth, but much more rural in origin than the population distribution at the time of election.

Differences among the parties are less apparent, although a number of generalizations can be abstracted. A greater proportion of the Democrats and the minor party members have rural origins than members of the three remaining parties, and among them, there is little difference in the proportion with rural births. On the other hand, the Democratic-Liberals tend to dominate among those born in towns, followed by the Communists. Among the city-born, the leftist party members dominate. To summarize, the

Democratic-Liberals are closest to the birthplace distribution of representatives as a whole, again due to their large number. The Democrats and the minor party members are the most rural, and the Socialists and Communists are the most urban in origin.

E. Age in 1949

In many countries, age has long been an important criterion for choosing persons to positions of public authority. Advanced age seems to be particularly significant in Far Eastern countries like Japan where Confucian traditions are still dominant. One of the most important concepts in private social relations is that "the patriarch and the elders of the family council are acknowledged as superiors in virtue and experience to the rank and file of the clan."[11] So, too, in public affairs, respect and deference to age have been evident in Japan's past. In the government of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the council of state was composed of five men called the Go-tairo or Five Great Aged.[12] The heads of administration under the Tokugawa Shoguns were called Go-tairo, Honorable Aged One, or Genro, Founding Elder. During the Meiji Era, the Genroin, the Council of Elders, was established in 1875, and from the turn of the century to World War I, a group of extremely influential Genro, Elders, ruled as the real power behind

the throne. Even before the Genro became extinct with the death of its last member in 1940, another body, the Jushin or Senior Statesmen, succeeded to power.

As will be demonstrated later, a very noticeable trend in the House of Representatives under the Meiji Constitution was increasing age of its members. Presumably, one important effect of the purge directives early in the Occupation (which disqualified from postwar offices those who held power in the old regime), and of the lowering of the minimum age of representatives, would be the entrance of new and younger men in the Diet. The focal point of this section will be whether younger men did enter the House of Representatives in 1949, and if so, how their ages compare with members of previous Diets and with members of lower houses of other national parliaments.

A note of caution concerning the use of ready-made age data in Japan must be mentioned. The computation of age is unduly complicated because until very recent times the kazoe-doshi form of reckoning was used. Under this system, a child is considered to be one year old on the day of birth and two years old on the following New Year's Day. To carry this to absurd extremes, a child born on the night of December 31 would be two years old after that midnight. Statistics of age computed in this manner were included in statistical abstracts as late as 1950 and were sometimes

labeled as "Age-Japanese style." To eliminate this difficulty in this study, ages were computed by subtracting from 1949 the year of birth mentioned in the biographies. No attempt has been made to correct their ages to the nearest month.

The ages of representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet range from 28 to 91, the youngest member being the Democratic-Liberal from Tokyo, Kimiyoshi Amano, and the oldest being the well-known parliamentarian, Yukio Ozaki, a member of the Kosei Club (a minor party), who served in every Diet in Japanese history. Taking the representatives as a whole, the mean age is 48.6, the modal age is 47.3, and the median age is 46.5. All of these averages lie in the 45-49 class interval, which itself claims one-fourth of the members (Table 8).

TABLE 8

AGE OF REPRESENTATIVES--BY AGE GROUP AND BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Age Group	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Other
25-29	.6	.8	0.0	.0	.0	2.3
30-34	3.5	2.6	2.8	2.1	2.8	11.3
35-39	11.9	8.3	15.7	19.6	19.4	13.6
40-44	17.1	15.4	17.1	15.2	33.3	15.9
45-49	24.2	25.2	24.2	28.3	22.2	15.9
50-54	16.5	19.5	10.0	17.4	8.3	13.6
55-59	14.7	15.0	20.0	10.9	5.6	15.9
60-64	7.4	8.3	7.1	6.5	5.6	4.6
65-69	2.2	2.3	1.4	.0	2.8	4.6
70+	1.9	2.6	1.4	.0	.0	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Age	48.6	49.7	48.2	45.9	45.3	47.1

Taking the mean age, we may then sketch the life and experiences of our model representative. He is a person born in 1900 who entered school just a year or two after the Russo-Japanese War. He remembers something about the Meiji Era since it ended when he was in the fourth grade. His college years coincided with the First World War, and he began to carve himself a career during the time of the Versailles and the Washington Naval Disarmament conferences. Several of his young adult years were spent during the so-called golden years of liberal government and parliamentary rule in Japan which lasted from the early Twenties to the Manchurian Incident in the early Thirties. From about ages 30 to 45, the militarists took control of the Japanese government and plunged the country into a series of wars on the Asiatic continent, which eventually led to World War II and defeat in 1945. Thus, most representatives know what conditions were like before, during, and after military control of the government.

By party affiliation (Table 8), the mean age of the Democratic-Liberals is above that of members as a whole. Leftist party members have the lowest mean ages, while the Democratic and minor party members lie between these extremes. Once again the commonsensical notion is confirmed that the younger the mean age of its members, the farther to the left is the party in the Twenty-Fourth Diet, although

age differences among the parties are relatively insignificant.

This picture gained from central tendencies of parties fails, however, to show which parties have the youngest members. While the conservatives have more people in the older age groups than the leftists, they nevertheless have more proportionately in the lowest age group. Of the 3 members below age 29, 2 are Democratic-Liberals and 1 is a member of the conservative minor party, the New Political Council. The ages of minor party members are, incidentally, more evenly dispersed than those of other parties.

Age sixty is the traditional time for retirement in Japan, although many men keep on working through economic necessity. Nevertheless, this age is rich in folk-lore and symbolic meaning. Men reaching their sixtieth birthday are usually feted by their families and made to wear red infant's clothing, thus symbolizing the fact that the wearer has just ended his allotted time and is entering upon a second life. Such a man is traditionally allowed some latitude in his behavior because he is said to be enjoying his second childhood, and he often relinquishes his prerogatives and responsibilities as head of the household to his eldest son.

In the Twenty-Fourth Diet, 53 representatives or 11.5 percent of the body were past this symbolic age of retirement. Proportionately, the Democratic-Liberals had

more members in this group (13.2%) than any other party. They are followed by the minor parties (11.5%), Democrats (9.9%), Communists (8.4%) and finally the Socialists (6.5%). The last-named have no representative over age 65.

Comparing the age distribution of the representatives with that of the adult population over 25, we find that the latter group comprises 37.5 million people or 45 percent of the total Japanese population of 83 million in 1950 (Table 9). As in any parliament, the members do not constitute a fair sample of the population or of the voters, age-wise. While the population decreases gradually from the youngest to the oldest age groups, the number and proportion of representatives increase from the 25-29 age group to the modal 45-49 group, then decrease. This means that the portion of the population in the most influential and productive years, from ages 40 to 64, are overrepresented, while the population below 39 and over 65 are underrepresented. The mean age of the population over 25 (39.7) is almost ten years below that of the representatives (48.6).

Comparing the ages of representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet with past Diets (Table 10), we have already noted the striking trend toward the election of older members in the prewar period. Although it is not known whether the ages of Diet members other than in the Twenty-Fourth have been computed on the basis of kazoe-doshi or by years

TABLE 9

AGE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMPARED WITH AGE OF POPULATION IN 1950
(Percentages)

Age Group	Representatives	Population*
25-29	.6	16.5
30-34	3.5	13.9
35-39	11.9	13.5
40-44	17.1	12.0
45-49	24.2	10.7
50-54	16.5	9.1
55-59	14.7	7.3
60-64	7.4	6.1
65-69	2.2	4.7
70+	1.9	6.2
Total	100.0	100.0
N	462	37,476,000

*Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p. 22.

TABLE 10

AGE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN SELECTED DIETS, BY AGE GROUP
(Percentages)

Age Group	Diets[a]						
	1st (1890)	5th (1898)	10th (1908)	14th (1920)	17th (1930)	20th (1937)	24th (1949)
30-39	51.3	35.0	16.1	12.9	4.5	5.2	16.0[b]
40-49	35.0	47.0	46.4	32.3	34.6	29.4	41.3
50-59	10.0	15.0	34.0	41.2	36.3	41.2	31.2
60+	3.7	3.0	3.4	13.6	24.0	24.2	11.5
Mean Age	40.6	42.5	46.4	49.5	51.7	52.4	47.8

[a]Sources: 1st to 17th, Japan Yearbook 1930, as quoted in Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, pp. 168, 169; 20th, Teikoku Tokei Nenkan 1937, p. 409, as quoted in Robert E. Ward, Party Government in Japan, p. 564; 24th, Manual of the House of Representatives.

[b]Includes 3 representatives in new 25-29 age group.

after birth, the trend toward the increasing age of members in prewar Diets is clearly indicated in Table 10. The mean age increased twelve years from 1890 to 1937. Whereas one-half of the members in the First Diet were in their thirties, the age group with the largest number of representatives advanced into the forties in 1898 and 1908, and thereafter into the fifties. The mean age of the Twenty-Fourth Diet is lower than at any time since 1920, but it is not as low as those prevailing prior to 1908. Interestingly enough, only 3.0 to 3.7 percent of the members prior to 1908 were above the retirement age of sixty, but this group grew to almost one-fourth of the body in the 1930's, then decreased to 11.5 percent in the Twenty-Fourth Diet.

It is interesting to compare the age distribution of the Japanese representatives with that of lower house members of other countries, although data are not readily available for the same period (Table 11). While the representatives in Japan averaged 48.6 years of age in 1949, studies [13] reveal that his American counterpart averaged 52 in 1941, and his British counterpart averaged 50 for the period between the two World Wars. Members of the British House of Commons averaged from 48 years of age in 1931 to 51 in 1935. As far as average age is concerned, therefore, Japanese representatives today are a few years younger than their American and British counterparts before the war, but

there is little difference between Japanese representatives in the 1930's (Table 10) and prewar American and British representatives. Table 11 shows, however, that the latter are more evenly distributed among the age groups than the Japanese. No single age group in the American and British lower houses for the periods covered comprised more than 34 percent of the body, while every Japanese Diet in Table 10 except the Seventeenth has an age group with more than 40 percent of the membership.

TABLE 11

AGE OF MEMBERS OF LOWER HOUSES IN JAPAN, U.S. AND U.K.
(Percentages)

Age Group	Japan[1] (1949)	U.S.[2] (1941)	U.K.[3] (1918-1935)	Age Group
25-29	.6	1	4.7	21-30
30-39	15.4	12	16.6	31-40
40-49	41.3	34	29.7	41-50
50-59	31.2	28	31.8	51-60
60-69	9.6	19	15.0	61-70
70+	1.9	5	2.2	71+
Total	100.0	99	100.0	
Mean Age	48.6	52	50	

[1]24th Diet.

[2]H. R. 77th Congress. Data from Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the 77th Congress," APSR, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 52), p. 68.

[3]House of Commons, 1918-1935 averages. Data from J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 27.

NOTES--Chapter II

1. NEAC, Senkyo Seido Shiryo, Dai Sambu /Materials on the Electoral System, Part 3/ (Tokyo: NEAC, 1950), pp. 30-31.

2. Ibid., pp. 32, 33.

3. See p. 6.

4. See Paul S. Dull, "The Senkyoya System in Rural Japanese Communities," Occasional Papers No. 4 (1953), (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press), pp. 29ff.

5. For breakdown of cities, towns and villages according to population groups, see NEAC, Senkyoku, Yukensha, Jinko To Ni Kansuru Shirabe /Study Relating to Election Districts, Registrants, Population, etc./ (Tokyo: NEAC, 1949), pp. 23, 24.

6. Hikosaburo Sugimura, Chiho Jichisei koyo /Elements of the Local Autonomy System/ (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1953), p. 59.

7. NEAC, Senkyoku Yukensha Jinko To Ni Kansuru Shirabe /Study Relating to Election Districts, Registrants, Population, etc./ (Tokyo: NEAC, 1949), p. 8. In 1949, however, there were 36 "towns" and 2 "villages" with populations over 30,000.

8. Computed from data in the Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, pp. 16, 17, and Japan Yearbook 1938-1939, p. 50.

9. John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, p. 82.

10. Japan Yearbook 1938-1939, p. 50.

11. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan, Government-Politics, p. 33.

12. Edward Norbeck, "Age Grading in Japan," American Anthropologist, Vol. 55(Aug. 53), pp. 373-384.

13. See sources of Table 12 for references.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION

A. Educational Levels of Diet Members

This chapter on the educational backgrounds of representatives is based on three assumptions which seem to be valid but which cannot be absolutely demonstrated by available evidence. The first is that all members in the Twenty-Fourth Diet received some kind of formal education. From the biographical sketches in the Manual of the House Of Representatives, supplemented by materials from the Japan's Who's Who, 1950-1951, the educational backgrounds of 93 percent of the members are known. The assumption is made, therefore, that the remaining 7 percent received some form of primary or secondary education. All representatives whose educational information was omitted in the Manual but found in the Who's Who had received no more than middle school education. This may mean that the 7 percent whose education is not listed in the Manual or the Who's Who may have hesitated to make known their modest educational backgrounds.

Another assumption is that they all received their education before the end of the Second World War. Although the years in which members completed their educations are not given in the biographies, we have already judged from their ages in 1949 that most of them received their primary

and secondary schooling before the First World War, and their university educations during and immediately after that war. Even the youngest member would have graduated from middle school in 1936 and from the university in 1941, if his education were not interrupted.

The last assumption is that the amount of formal education received by an individual, be he a Diet member or one of his constituents, is an important determinant of his frame of reference toward political affairs. It is significant to note that the education of all Diet members came between 1880 and 1945 when the entire school system, public and private, was supervised by the Ministry of Education. During this period of centralized control, primary and secondary schools had almost uniform curricula throughout the nation. They became the chief organs for indoctrinating students with the principles of the sacrosanct Imperial Rescript of Education (1890), which stressed filial piety, virtue and loyalty for advancement of the common good, and service to the state. Beyond the secondary level, education took on a heavy professional and vocational emphasis. The favored few receiving this preparation were not only able to fill jobs with more pay and prestige but were also able to increase their facility in using the very difficult language.[1] Before language reform in 1946, the intelligentsia prided itself in the use of esoteric Chinese char-

acters, foreign phrases, and the classical epistolary style. The level of spoken and written Japanese used by an individual became one of the best indicators of his educational attainment and social status.

For our purpose, the extremely complex organization of the educational system in Japan prior to the Second World War will be grouped into three divisions:

Primary Education--first six years of schooling

Secondary Education--schooling from the seventh to the eleventh years

Higher Education

College--schooling from the eleventh or twelfth to the thirteenth years

University--education beyond the fourteenth year.

Because of the large proportion of Diet members with university education, this level of education will be treated in greater detail in the next section. Throughout this study no distinction is made between those who merely attended and those who were graduated from schools at the various levels.

Primary education,[2] Jinjo Sho Gakko, is the core of the educational system before and after the Allied Occupation. Attendance from age six has been compulsory since 1907, and all normal children are enrolled (99.9% in 1950). The curriculum is largely devoted to the three R's, but

other subjects like sports, music, art, and ethics, shushin, are also taught. Thirty-three representatives (7.1%) of the lower house received only this form of education. If we assume, however, that the 33 members whose educational background is unknown also received no more than primary school education, then this group would include 14 percent of the body. Most schools also have a higher primary division, Koto Sho Gakko, consisting of two years beyond the first six grades. This is a non-compulsory and terminal program, but there is no indication that any Diet member ended his education with this form of schooling.

Beyond the first six grades, the school system becomes extremely complicated. In addition to this Koto Sho Gakko program, there are two different terminal programs which are designed to prepare boys for different levels of occupational skills and responsibilities.[3] After primary school, students could attend vocational schools, Jitsugyo Gakko, on the secondary school level for five years, and then go on to semi-skilled jobs. Only a select few graduates of primary schools (6% in 1945) are able to enter boys' middle school, Chu Gakko, which serves as terminal education for most graduates (72% in 1945), who then go into clerical or semi-professional jobs. The small minority go on to colleges and universities. Because these various terminal programs were thought to be undemocratic, they

were all revamped into the 6-3-3-4 pattern of American schools after the spring of 1947.[4]

The majority of the Diet members with more than primary education (85%) attended middle schools, then colleges or universities; so we need not be concerned with the vocational school program. Middle school education is for the select few; only one-tenth of the graduating class of primary schools usually applies for admission, of which little more than one-half are accepted. Despite the large proportion of middle school students who terminate after completing the five-year program (72%), the curriculum still emphasizes college preparation. Advanced work on the three R's is given in the first two years, followed by three years of mathematics, civics, foreign languages, and science. Thirty-nine members or 8.5 percent of the Diet terminated with this form of education.

In addition, 6 representatives or 1.3 percent of the House of Representatives attended normal schools, Shihan Gakko. The ordinary normal school has a five-year program on the secondary school level which is entered after primary school. This type of school trains the bulk of primary school teachers. Those intending to teach in secondary school go on to higher normal schools for men and for women, Koto Shihan Gakko and Koto Joshi Shihan Gakko, which offer four-year courses on the collegiate level. In 1937 there

were only four of these, enrolling only 2,692 students, while ordinary normal schools enrolled almost 33,000 students. Most of the six Diet members received normal school training of the lower type.

Those seeking higher education, that is, schooling beyond the eleventh year in school, go either to high schools and college preparatory divisions of universities, then into universities, or they go directly to colleges, which the Japanese call "specialty schools"--Semmon Gakko.

Colleges are three-to five-year schools beyond the secondary level but not quite equivalent to the prewar university level. College standards are higher than those for normal schools and high schools, and most of them have been elevated to university status since 1946. Except for women's colleges and certain private institutes like the well-known Aoyama Gakuin, they offer intensive programs in technical fields like agriculture, fishery, forestry, business, engineering, pharmacy, and even medicine and dentistry. Others include specialized curricula in theology, international affairs, and the fine arts. Forty-nine (more than one-tenth) of the representatives received this level of education.

High schools, Koto Gakko, offer two-or three-year programs for university preparation. They are difficult to enter since less than 8 percent of those finishing middle

school are admitted, but high school graduates are virtually assured entrance into universities. Some universities maintain preparatory divisions, Yoka, which correspond to these high schools and to junior colleges in the United States. Only 4 Diet members, or less than 1 percent of them, entered this level of schools and did not go on to universities.

University education will be treated in greater detail in the following section, but we may note here that almost two out of three representatives received some form of it.

The highest schools attended by representatives according to party affiliation are shown in Table 12. Both the Socialists and minor party members have the largest percentages with unknown educational background. The conservatives are generally better educated than the leftists; both the Democratic-Liberals and the Democrats have smaller percentages with primary education and larger percentages with higher education than the leftist parties. Although in the generally conservative minor parties the proportion with higher education is above average and second only to that of the Democratic-Liberals, they have a large group whose educational background is unknown. The Communists are not far behind the Democrats in educational attainment. Only the Socialists have more than one-fourth of their mem-

bers with only primary education and less than two-thirds with higher education. We may generalize therefore that the Democratic-Liberals are by far the best educated, and the Socialists are the least educated. The Democrats and Communists have about the same levels of education proportionately and lie between these extremes together with the minor parties which have high proportions of both highly and poorly educated members.

TABLE 12

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Educational Level	All Mems	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Primary . .	7.1	6.0	8.6	10.9	11.1	4.6
Secondary .	9.9	8.6	12.9	10.9	13.9	4.6
Middle	8.5	7.5	11.5	8.7	13.9	4.6
Normal	1.3	1.1	1.4	2.2	0	0
Higher . .	76.0	80.1	72.8	63.0	69.5	77.2
College	10.6	10.9	10.0	8.7	2.8	2.2
High	.9	.8	1.4	0	2.8	18.2
Univ. .	64.5	68.4	61.4	54.3	63.9	56.8
Unknown . .	7.0	5.3	5.7	15.2	5.5	13.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In terms of age, one would naturally guess that the younger members are better educated than the older because of the steady expansion of educational opportunities in Japan throughout the first half of the twentieth century. This hypothesis is generally demonstrated in Table 13, al-

though a number of points need to be mentioned. Members in their twenties are all university-educated, but they are too few in number to be significant. Those above the retirement age of sixty have the largest proportion of members with primary education, but even in this group more than one-half has university background and almost two-thirds has some kind of higher education. An interesting phenomenon is the smaller percentage of members in their thirties with university education than members in their forties and fifties. This may be partly due to the fact that the former group was of university age from 1929 to 1942, and therefore had less opportunity to go to universities because of poor economic conditions and military conscription than the latter groups which reached university age in more stable and prosperous times.

TABLE 13

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL BY AGE GROUPS
(Percentages)

Educational Level	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Primary	0	4.2	5.8	6.9	17.0
Secondary	0	16.9	7.8	11.8	9.4
College	0	16.9	11.5	6.3	11.3
University	100.0	59.2	69.1	63.2	52.9
Unknown	0	2.8	5.8	11.8	9.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	3	71	191	144	53

In the previous chapter, we noted that the lower house of the Diet is by no means representative of the adult population in terms of age. This situation also holds with regard to educational background (Table 14). Estimates of the schooling of persons above age 25 indicate that about 8 percent have some form of higher education, while more than three-fourths of the Diet members have similar education. The proportions of representatives with primary and with secondary education are one-fifth the proportions of the adult population with such education.

TABLE 14

YEARS OF SCHOOLING COMPLETED--COMPARISON BETWEEN DIET MEMBERS AND NON-STUDENT POPULATION, 1950

Years Completed	All Members	Population* 25+ years
0	0	7.2
1-6	7.1	35.6
7-11	10.8	48.9
12+	76.0	8.2
Not reported	7.1	.1
Total	100.0	100.0
N	462	37,444,000

*Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p. 386.

Unfortunately, the educational background of past Diets has not been studied systematically so that it is difficult to compare the distribution of members at every educational level for two or more Diets. For what they may be

worth, newspaper statistics[5] for the House of Representatives after the 1930 election indicate that there were 288 "college graduates" in the body then, while our figures reveal 298 members with "some form of university education" in 1949. Whereas 107 representatives in 1930 had "less than middle school education," only 72 in 1949 had "education up to graduation from middle school," but if we include the 33 with unknown background in this category, the total would be 105. If we assume therefore that these classifications of educational levels in the 1930 and 1949 Diets correspond to each other, then the educational distribution of representatives remained almost constant for the Diets which are two decades apart.

Again, there is limited opportunity for comparing the educational background of different parliamentary bodies since little research in this field has been done,[6] and even they relate to Parliaments in different periods. Disregarding the variation in time, it is interesting to note that both the American and the Japanese Houses of Representatives have the same proportion of university-educated persons (64%), while the British House of Commons has an average of 42 percent for the interwar period, or only two-thirds the proportion in the former two bodies (Table 15). However, during this interwar period, the percentage of university-educated Members of Parliament ranged from 37

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percent in 1923 to 51 percent in 1931. While 90 percent of Congressmen have some form of post-secondary education, only 75 percent of Japanese representatives make similar claims. Based upon this limited sample, the United States Congressmen are generally better educated than Japanese representatives, but both are far superior in university education to British members of parliament.

TABLE 15

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE--
JAPAN, U. S., U. K.
(Percentages)

Educational Level	Japan (1949)	U. S.[a] (1941)	U. K.[d] (1918-35)
Primary	7.1	.2	--
Secondary	10.7	8.3	--
College	10.6	25.8[b]	--
University	64.5	64.8[c]	42.0
Unknown	7.1	.9	--
N	462	435	1823

[a]Data of the House of Representatives, 77th Congress, from Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Congress," APSR, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 1942), p. 70.

[b]Includes business college.

[c]Classified as "professional school" in source.

[d]J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation, p. 57. Average of 7 parliaments during 1918-35. Other comparable figures not available.

B. University Education

The university, Daigaku, is the highest educational level in Japan. The student finally reaches it after a rigorous weeding out process in six years of primary, four or five years of middle, and two or three years of high school. He is therefore about nineteen years of age and has already gone through thirteen years of schooling before he begins his three years of undergraduate work at the university. In other words, in both age and education, he begins at about the sophomore level in American universities, but graduates at the same age and after the same number of total school years as his American brethren. Upon completing his three-year program, the Japanese university student is awarded the Gakushi-Go, which is comparable to the bachelor's degree today, although it was translated as the master's degree in prewar catalogs of the Tokyo Imperial University. The student may then matriculate in the graduate division, Daigakuin, and work up to four years on his doctorate, Hakushi-Go, which is awarded after submission of a dissertation and ordinarily without the requirement of completing a schedule of course work.

University education in Japan probably contributes more toward the social mobility of individuals than in the United States. The importance of facility with the difficult language in order to obtain social recognition has al-

ready been mentioned, and education at this highest level certainly contributes toward this mastery. Moreover, when all factors remain equal, the prestige jobs in the professions, business firms, and government are obtainable primarily on the basis of training and personal "connections." Toward both these ends, university education has much to offer.

The importance of going to the "right" universities for certain types of preferred employment has been recognized for some time. Gakubatsu or school cliques are sometimes regarded in the same vein as the other immense "batsu's" or cliques--e.g., Gumbatsu (military) and Zaibatsu (Financial)--and the nearest western equivalents are the "old school tie" loyalty which prevails in Great Britain. Embree writes:[7]

> A degree from one of the Imperial Universities is almost a necessity for a government career, and a degree from certain universities such as the Imperial University of Tokyo is almost a sure passport into the civil service . . . . Graduates from private universities such as Keio and Waseda are more likely to become businessmen, writers, or newspapermen. Mitsui draws many of its bright young men from Keio and Mitsubishi from Waseda.

In all fairness, it is probably true that graduates of universities favored in select fields may be chosen and advanced to higher positions not merely because of alumni "pull" but also because institutions they attended equip them best for professional competence. In examining the

university background of Diet members, it would be interesting therefore to consider (1) the types of universities attended, (2) the specific schools attended, and (3) the field of education in which representatives majored in the more important institutions.

Toward the end of the prewar period, there were 45 institutions registered as universities[8] in Japan Proper with the Ministry of Education, and they have generally been classified as government, public and private universities. Government universities are those maintained and financed by the national government, and they consisted of 6 Imperial Universities and 12 universities with single faculties of medicine, commerce, engineering, and literature and science. There are only two public universities, i.e., the medical and commercial institutions supported by the municipal governments of Kyoto and Osaka respectively. Because of their small total enrollment (1,448 in 1937), this classification of universities will not be treated separately in this discussion. The remaining 25 institutions are private universities, the most important of which are all located in the Tokyo area. Except for the source of financial support and religious instruction in some private institutions, there are no essential differences between government and private universities according to the findings of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan.[9] How-

ever, it is popularly conceded that the government universities in general, and the Tokyo Imperial University in particular, enjoy greater prestige than private institutions. This is partly revealed in the percentage of student applicants accepted by the two types of universities. In 1948, only 30 percent of the 32 thousand applicants to government universities were enrolled, while 40 percent of the 64 thousand applicants were accepted by the private institutions.[10]

Table 16 shows the distribution of university-educated representatives between the government and the private universities with a breakdown among the largest institutions. The most interesting fact emerging from these statistics is that 4 out of every 10 representatives attended government universities, and that this proportion holds for all parties except the Socialists. A slightly smaller percentage (34.6%) of its members attended government universities.

Of the 6 Imperial Universities, only 2, Tokyo and Kyoto, claim sizable groups of representatives. Two others, Kyushu and Tohoku, claim very few--only about 1 out of every 100 university-educated legislators. The remaining 2 Imperial Universities, Osaka and Hokkaido, are completely unrepresented. It is interesting to note that the number of Diet members from the various Imperial Universities conforms in general to their order of prestige as popularly conceived --Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Osaka.[11]

TABLE 16

UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Universities	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Government						
Tokyo	28.5	27.7	36.4	19.2	26.0	32.0
Kyoto	8.5	9.0	4.5	11.5	8.7	8.0
Kyushu	1.0	1.1	0	3.9	0	0
Tohoku	1.3	1.7	0	0	4.3	0
Subtotal	39.3	39.5	40.9	34.6	39.0	40.0
Private						
Waseda	15.3	16.4	11.4	19.2	8.7	16.0
Nippon	12.2	13.6	4.5	15.4	13.1	12.0
Meiji	8.5	9.0	9.1	0	8.7	12.0
Chuo	8.1	6.2	13.6	11.5	8.7	8.0
Keio	3.7	3.4	2.3	3.9	8.7	4.0
Hosei	3.1	4.0	2.3	0	0	4.0
Others	9.8	7.9	15.9	15.4	13.1	4.0
Subtotal	60.7	60.5	59.1	65.4	61.0	60.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	295	177	44	26	23	25

Tokyo Imperial University, the oldest, the second largest, and the most esteemed institution in the country, particularly for training government personnel, has the largest alumni in the lower house (28.5%). By party affiliation, however, this proportion varies from 1 out of 3 among the Democrats to 1 out of 5 among the Socialists. While the Democrats and the minor parties have no one from Kyushu and Tohoku universities, a Socialist attended the former and a Communist, the latter institution. The Communist member is the only representative of that party from

the Hokkaido-Tohoku region. Incidentally, students of the Tohoku Imperial University, his alma mater, are reputed to be relatively unresponsive to political movements and demonstrations because of their preoccupation with studies in the natural sciences.[12]

Education in private universities is claimed by 6 out of 10 university-educated representatives in all parties, again, except the Socialist. There seems to be little correlation between the particular private university attended by representatives and their party affiliation. Democratic-Liberals and minor party members are, however, more apt to be the products of the large Tokyo universities, while Democrats, Communists, and Socialists include larger proportions of members educated at less prominent schools largely located in the outlying areas.

Waseda, the private university with the largest number of Diet members (15.3%) has traditionally emphasized politics, law, and economics, and trained men for government, journalism, and letters.[13] While both the Socialists and the Communists are leftist parties springing from the same "proletarian movement" in prewar Japan, 19.2 percent of the former but only 8.7 percent of the latter came from Waseda.

One out of 7 attended Nippon University in all parties except the Democrats. Chuo University, which was first established as the English Law School (Igirisu Horitsu

Gakko), is sometimes thought to be a hotbed of leftist movements, but this hypothesis is not borne out by the number of its alumni representing leftist parties. A relatively large although still insignificant proportion of Communists are from Keio University, the oldest school of higher learning in the country. Hosei University founded in 1879 as the French Law School has no leftist Diet member among its alumni.

In Table 17, the eight largest universities (two government and six private which we will call the "Big Eight") are listed, and their enrollment in 1936 is compared with the number of their alumni in the lower house, this time without regard to party affiliation. While Waseda is the largest school in the nation, it has less than one half of the number of representatives as the second largest school, Tokyo Imperial University. Although ranking fifth in student enrollment, Nippon University has the third largest contingent in the lower house. In terms of the 1936 enrollment, the first four schools--Waseda, Tokyo Imperial, Nippon, and Kyoto Imperial--are overrepresented, while the rest of the 41 universities are underrepresented. Although the 37 less prominent universities (classified as "other" in this table) claim 46 percent of all university students, only 12 percent of university-educated members came from these institutions. The most underrepresented

school among the Big Eight is Keio, which, while third in student enrollment, is seventh in size of alumni in the lower house. This poor showing certainly is in keeping with the teachings of its founder, Yukichi Fukuzawa, who encouraged his students to go into teaching or business instead of government.

TABLE 17

UNIVERSITIES MOST FREQUENTLY ATTENDED

Universities	Number	Per Cent	% Student Population 1936*	Rank by Size
1. Tokyo Imperial	84	28.5	11	2
2. Waseda	45	15.3	11	1
3. Nippon	36	12.2	5	5
4. Kyoto Imperial	25	8.5	8	4
5. Meiji	25	8.5	4	6
6. Chuo	24	8.1	3	7
7. Keio	11	3.7	9	3
8. Hosei	9	3.0	3	8
Others	36	12.2	46	
Total	295	100.0%	100%	

*Source: Japan Year Book 1938-39, pp. 706, 707.

Geographically, only Kyoto Imperial University among the Big Eight and most of the "other" universities, i.e., private and single-faculty universities, are located outside the Tokyo area. These schools with more than one half of the university enrollment educated only 20.7 percent of the representatives. Ominously, 8 out of 10 legislators at the very least spent their university years in the capital.

Unfortunately, few studies have been made of the university education of members in previous Diets so that meaningful comparisons can be accomplished. The only one available to the writer is a newspaper report in 1930 which gave the number of Diet members then in office from the four largest universities.[14] These figures compared with those for the 1949 session are as follows:

	1930	1949
Tokyo Imperial	83	84
Kyoto "	15	25
Waseda	65	45
Keio	18	11

In these Diets two decades apart, the large number of members from Tokyo Imperial University remained almost constant. A 66 percent gain was made by the Kyoto Imperial University, while the number from both Waseda and Keio fell about one-third.

In addition to the particular institutions attended by the legislators, an equally important question is the field of study--or in Japanese parlance, the faculty (gakubu) in which they majored. An important characteristic of the prewar curriculum of the Japanese university is its emphasis on "training" at the expense of "education" in the broad American sense. In the words of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan:[15]

> In the curriculum of Japanese institutions of higher learning . . . there is too little opportunity for general education, too early and too narrow a specializa-

> tion, and too great a vocational or professional emphasis.

The members of this mission may have noted but failed to make clear in their report that Japanese universities do not have professional schools beyond the bachelor's degree as in the United States. Here, the prospective physician or lawyer spends four years of undergraduate work in premedical or pre-legal studies which allows a modicum of work in the liberal arts before he enters professional school. His Japanese counterpart, on the other hand, receives all his professional training on the undergraduate level. Naturally his program precludes liberal arts courses or even electives, except, possibly the choice of a modern European language from several at his disposal to meet his language requirement. Perhaps, in a relatively poor country like Japan, this type of abbreviated and narrowly specialized education is unavoidable. For students who must enter an extremely competitive and economically stringent world after graduation, it is to be expected that they should prefer "training" in utilitarian fields which would prepare them for the preferred jobs as doctors, lawyers, business administrators and government officials.

While most universities are single-faculty institutions, such as the Osaka Commercial University, all important universities consist of several faculties. The Tokyo Imperial University, for example, has seven--Law, Medicine,

Engineering, Literature, Science, Agriculture, and Economics--plus numerous research institutes. The other type of post-secondary school, the Semmon-Gakko (translated as "college" but which literally means "specialty school"), is a single faculty institution offering professional training in the same fields as universities but at a lower standard.

The fields of study of both college and university-educated legislators are tabulated in Table 18, as well as that of all college and university students in 1936 in the extreme right column. On the university level, only the Literature Faculty, and on the collegiate level, only the Literature, Fine Arts, and Music specialties (grouped in the "other" category in the table) may be classified as liberal arts. It is therefore likely that no more than 15 percent of the students in 1936 received this form of higher education so esteemed by American educators. Of even greater significance to this study, only about 3 out of every 100 representatives with higher education majored in Literature. The Socialists lead in this regard, while the Democrats are distinguished by having no one trained in the liberal arts.

Of the remaining 97 percent receiving the professional and vocational form of education, the greatest portion (41.6%) prepared for the law, whereas about one-fourth of the students as a whole did in 1936. If the "Political

TABLE 18

MAJOR IN BOTH COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Major	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Other	College & University Students, 1936*
Law	41.6	41.2	47.8	37.9	40.9	38.7	24
Political Course	8.1	8.8	6.5	6.9	9.1	6.5	-
Economics	17.1	15.5	21.7	17.2	27.3	12.9	5
Commerce	12.1	13.4	10.9	10.4	0	16.1	17
Agriculture/ Fishery	6.2	5.1	4.4	3.4	4.5	19.4	2
Literature	3.1	3.1	0	6.9	4.5	3.2	11
Medicine/ Dentistry	1.9	2.1	0	6.9	0	0	16
Other	9.9	10.8	8.7	10.4	13.7	3.2	25
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	322	194	46	29	22	31	108,793

*Source: Japan Year Book, 1938-39, pp. 707, 711.

Course" offered at the Tokyo Imperial University[16] is regarded as a law program since it is almost entirely devoted to legal studies, one-half of the representatives with higher education may be said to have majored in law, over twice the proportion of law students among students at large in 1936. More Democrats are trained in the law than any other party, while the Socialists are the least trained. The Communists have about the same proportion of legally trained as the Democratic-Liberals. Percentage-wise, the Communists are most educated in political studies, although as will be noted later, only one of them became a bureaucrat, but in a prefectural office.

The next important categories are the closely related ones of economics and commerce. A greater percentage of representatives majored in economics than students as a whole, but a greater portion of students majored in commerce than did representatives. Of those specializing in economics, the Communists lead by far, while the minor parties are last. The opposite holds true for the proportions majoring in commerce. As may be expected, no Communist specialized in the bourgeois study of business administration, but the minor party members lead in this regard.

Three times as many representatives studied agriculture as compared to students at large, although this group is still small (6.2%) as compared with the number in other

faculties. The minor party members are particularly well-educated in this field. Only 2 out of 100 representatives with college and university education took up medicine and dentistry, although eight times as many students did. None of the representatives received medical and dental education in the Big Eight universities, and most of them are Socialists. About 1 out of 10 representatives was educated in the "other" faculties, and most of them studied engineering. Only one university-trained representative majored in education.

Setting aside those educated in colleges, to what universities did legislators go for education in the various fields? Table 19 shows the distribution of the university-educated whose majors are known. While 40 percent of the representatives went to the Imperial Universities, over two thirds of those majoring in literature, agriculture and fishery, and the political course attended these institutions. While 60 percent went to private universities, 75 percent of those majoring in economics and 100 percent in commerce attended them. No representative went to the Imperial Universities for commerce, and the six largest private universities for agriculture and fishery and literature. Only two attended universities for medicine or dentistry, but not at any of the Big Eight schools. Only a slightly larger portion (44.4%) went to the Imperial

Universities for law education than might have been expected (40.6%).

TABLE 19

MAJOR IN UNIVERSITIES, BY INSTITUTIONS
(Percentages)

Universities	All Majors	Law	Pol. Course	Econ.	Commerce	Agric. Fish.	Lit.	Med. Dent.	Other
Government									
Tokyo	30.1	30.1	68.0	19.2	0	44.5	77.8	0	27.8
Kyoto	9.1	12.8	0	3.9	0	33.3	11.1	0	11.1
Others	1.4	1.5	0	1.9	0	0	0	0	5.5
Subtotal	40.6	44.4	68.0	25.0	0	77.8	88.9	0	44.4
Private									
Waseda	15.2	4.5	8.0	44.2	28.6	0	0	0	16.7
Nippon	11.6	16.6	16.0	5.8	3.6	0	0	0	11.1
Meiji	8.3	10.5	0	5.8	21.4	0	0	0	0
Chuo	8.3	15.0	0	5.8	0	0	0	0	0
Keio	2.9	0	8.0	11.5	0	0	0	0	0
Hosei	3.3	4.5	0	1.9	7.1	0	0	0	0
Others	9.8	4.5	0	0	39.3	22.2	11.1	100.0	27.8
Subtotal	59.4	55.6	32.0	75.0	100.0	22.2	11.1	100.0	55.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	276	133	25	52	28	9	9	2	18

Among the outstanding schools in each field of study, Tokyo Imperial University is most highly esteemed in law and the political course. The proportion of members studying in the legal division of the Law Faculty there, though larger than in any other university, is only equal to the proportion which attended that school in all faculties. Also outstanding in law are Nippon and Chuo universities. Waseda is surprisingly weak.

On the other hand, Waseda is outstanding in economics, with Tokyo Imperial University a poor second. Important,

too, is Keio which was attended by 11.5 percent of those majoring in economics although less than 3 percent attended the school for all majors. None of the economics majors attended the "other" private universities.

In commerce, these small private institutions are outstanding, followed by Waseda and Meiji. Keio produced no commerce major in the lower house, although its brightest graduates are said to go into business, particularly in the Mitsui interests.

In agriculture and fishery, Tokyo Imperial University is outstanding, followed by its sister school in Kyoto and the smaller private institutions. Similarly, these are the places attended by the nine literature majors.

C. Foreign Education

Of 462 representatives, 25 or 5.4 percent received some kind of education abroad, i.e., in the United States and European countries, principally the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (Table 20). Eighty percent of them studied in the United States. None of the representatives was educated in any Asian country outside of Japanese jurisdiction or in any country in the western hemisphere besides the United States. All went abroad for university education, usually after spending some time in universities at home. A number of individuals like Etsujiro Uyehara received the doctorate abroad.

TABLE 20

FOREIGN EDUCATION, BY PARTY

Area	All Members	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
United States	17(20)*	10(12)	4	0(1)	0	3
Europe	5(8)	3(5)	0	0(1)	0	2
U. S. & Europe	3	2	0	1	0	0
Total	25	15	4	1	0	5
% of Party with Foreign Education	5.4%	5.6	5.7	2.2	0	11.4
% of Party with U. S. Education	4.3	4.5	5.7	2.2	0	6.8

*Figures in parentheses include those who went to both areas.

The minor parties have the largest proportion of the foreign-educated (11.4%), followed by the conservatives. No Communist claims foreign education although the top leaders have all been abroad for other reasons.

While 20 members in this Diet claimed American educations, an almost equal number (19) in the 1930 Diet did likewise.[17]

D. Foreign Travel

In prewar Diets, the government encouraged foreign travel of senior legislators by sponsoring their trips. These individuals still in the Diet in 1949, plus those going abroad for education and private purposes, and on diplomatic and military missions comprise the 102 or 22.7 percent of the representatives who have been outside Japan Proper (Table 21).

TABLE 21

TRAVEL ABROAD, BY PARTY

Area	All Members	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
U. S.	12(47)*	9(33)	2(6)	0(3)	0	1(5)
Europe	17(47)	8(29)	3(6)	1(4)	3(4)	2(4)
Asia	36(56)	23(37)	6(9)	2	2(3)	3(5)
Other Area	1	0	0	1	0	0
U. S. & Europe	16	10	1	3	0	2
U. S. & Asia	6	3	1	0	0	2
Europe & Asia	1	0	0	0	1	0
U. S., Europe, Asia	13	11	2	0	0	0
Total	102	64	15	7	6	10
% of Party Which Traveled Abroad	22.7%	24.4	21.4	13.0	16.7	22.7

*Figures in parentheses include those who have been to more than one area.

Sixty-six have been to only one continent, and 36 have been to two or more. The most frequently traveled continent is Asia, particularly areas like Manchuria and northern China which were under Japanese control. Forty-seven have been to the United States and to Europe. Only 1, a Socialist, has been to Latin America.

As in the case of foreign education, the conservatives are more traveled than the leftists. Almost one-fourth of the Democratic-Liberals have been abroad, some of them like Shigeru Yoshida and Kijuro Shidehara as noted diplomats. They are followed by the minor party members who have, as we noted, the greatest proportion of the

foreign-educated. The Communists have 6 with travel experience, but none in the United States. Those among them who went to Europe saw little more than the Soviet Union. The Socialists are the least traveled of the legislators.

E. Publications

A commonsensical hypothesis might be that the most educated party would have the greatest percentage of members with publications to their credit. Such is not the case, and actually there is an inverse relationship (Table 22). The most highly educated party, the Democratic-Liberal, has close to the smallest percentage of members with publications, while the least educated party, the Socialist, has the greatest percentage--more than 1 out of 3. In general, there is twice the proportion of authors among the leftists as among the conservatives.

TABLE 22

PUBLISHED WORKS, BY PARTY

No. of Pub. Works	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
One	32	17	6	4	2	3
Two	27	16	2	6	2	1
Three	13	6	2	3	2	0
Four or more	15	3	2	3	5	2
Total	87	42	12	16	11	6
% of Party with Published Works	18.8%	15.8	17.1	34.8	30.5	13.6

Although no analysis has been made of the nature or subject of the books written by the representatives, since this would be difficult to determine merely from the titles listed in the biographies, most of them appear to bear upon items of current interest, such as the problems of democracy and international relations. Many authors with foreign education did translations of foreign works, but these have not been included in this tabulation. Since SCAP was still in full control in 1949, none of these works were critical of the Occupation like the rash of Now-It-Can-Be-Told books which appeared immediately after the granting of independence in May 1952.

Each author has been credited with his minimum number of publications, since only those books with titles listed in the biographies have been counted in the tabulation above. Many of them mentioned that they had written several other books, the titles of which could not be listed through lack of space. The Communists seem to have the most prolific writers.

NOTES--Chapter III

1. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report (Tokyo: SCAP, 1946), p. 51.

2. This discussion of school organization in prewar Japan is based on SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section, Education in the New Japan, Vol. II (Tokyo: SCAP, 1948) mimeographed; Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 240-247; Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 15: Education (Washington: GPO, 1944), pp. 1-18.

3. SCAP, CIE Sec., Education in the New Japan, Vol. II, p. 383.

4. Ibid., p. 405.

5. Japan Advertiser, Feb. 26, 1930, as quoted in Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, p. 170.

6. See source citation under Table E for references to studies used.

7. John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation, p. 135.

8. Japan Year Book, 1938-1939, pp. 706-707.

9. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report, p. 54.

10. See statistics in Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Section, Statistical Abstract, 1950, p. 157.

11. Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, pp. 246-247.

12. Nippon Times, Oct. 30, 1948.

13. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York: Columbia, 1949), pp. 103-104.

14. Japan Advertiser, op. cit.

15. U. S. Education Mission to Japan, Report, p. 57.

16. This is the famous "prep course" for aspiring bureaucrats (see Ch. V, Sec. B).

17. Japan Advertiser, op. cit.

CHAPTER IV

OCCUPATIONS AND LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS

A. Introduction

Occupation is probably the most important variable in the socio-political background of Diet members. In the first place, most of the members spent from twenty to thirty years of their adult life pursuing their occupations before coming to the Diet. Even while serving in the Diet, all except a handful of fulltime Diet officers like the Speaker and Standing Committee Chairmen continue their private work in some capacity. Ninety-seven percent of the members with higher education prepared themselves for specific occupations by choosing heavily vocation-oriented programs.

Occupation is an important determinant of status and prestige. This is becoming increasingly apparent with the development of complex, modern, urban societies. Although earlier or rural societies tend to attribute status on the basis of family lineage, religious office, and personal character, modern societies everywhere seem to supplant these status-fixing factors with occupational identification.[1] Urban dwellers in particular define their relations with others in terms of occupation because other means of

identification are either less important economically, or more diffuse due to the anonymity and impersonality of urban life.

Occupation is important as "a fair index of intelligence, ability, character, and personal acceptability."[2] Many studies like that of Alba Edwards, the Army Alpha and AGCT tests, and research into social prestige and stratification in the United States demonstrate varying degrees of correlation between occupation and these variables.

Similarly, a study of social stratification in the six largest cities of Japan in 1952[3] revealed a close relationship between occupation and status, as seen in the following excerpts from the study:[4]

> In considering the nomination of candidates, political parties are interested in prestige, which usually is related to occupation, social status and individual personality. . . . there exists a close correlation between all of these factors that were considered relevant to social status, on the one hand, and occupation, on the other. This is here taken to be evidence that occupation occupies the position of an all-inclusive factor in determining social status. [Italics mine.]

> . . . the ten experts had discerned a high correlation between their ranking of respondents' social statuses and their ranking by prestige of occupation, amount of education and of income--in that order.

Seemingly contradictory results were reported in a study of Japanese patriotic organizations by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in 1948.[5] It concluded that "People today still tend to think of persons in terms of the status which they hold deriving from precedent rather than from

one's present occupation, training, or ability." However, in discussing how leaders were selected for these organizations in World War II, the study showed that "In charge of these status organizations were placed not local experts in any special function, but leading landowners were put in charge of Patriotic Agricultural Associations, and wives of mayors in charge of municipal women's clubs." If "landowners" and "mayors" are seen not as traditional status positions but as occupational positions commonly held by prestigeful individuals, it would seem that no contradiction is involved.

Granted that occupation is a good index of social status, prestige, and a number of other variables like income, we can proceed to use it as a tool for analyzing the strata of society from which Diet members are recruited, even though information on status and income are totally lacking in their biographies.

Existing studies of the occupations of Japanese Diet members,[6] and incidentally of American and British legislators as well,[7] were examined to see if they offer good research models for classifying occupations. All of them, however, have weaknesses. For example, these studies are based on the occupations reported by the legislators themselves when they filed their candidacy. They merely list the occupational titles of legislators such as farmer and

government worker without taking into consideration the range of statuses which are implicit in each of these broad categories (one may well wonder whether a Diet member classified as a farmer is a tiller of the paddies or president of an important agricultural cooperative). Most seriously, these studies fail to rank occupations systematically, although occupations are more meaningful politically if they are related to stratification theory.

To improve upon these studies, an attempt has been made to avoid these pitfalls in this chapter. Instead of using the self-declared occupations of Diet members, it was felt that it would be more useful to use as the unit of analysis the highest occupational positions held by the members at any time prior to election as determined by objective standards. This is particularly important in this study, since the Twenty-Fourth Diet was elected under unstable postwar conditions, and the occupations held by many members at election time may not reflect their true social statuses held throughout much of their adult lives. Then, too, the analysis of the highest occupational positions allows the study of the background of retired and unemployed members.

In order to scale occupations in line with stratification theory, one cannot merely reshuffle a random listing of occupational titles such as farmer, lawyer, and govern-

ment worker. This is an impossible task, as pointed out by Hatt.[8] In every occupational position held by a Diet member, two quite distinct variables are involved: functional specialization or industry, and status. Hatt suggests that occupations can be scaled by the use of a two-dimensional scheme of classification--the horizontal which he called the "situs" dimension and the vertical or status dimension:[9]

> In other words, it is impossible to scale reliably all occupations, but it is possible if occupations are broken down into families (e.g., professional, business, agricultural, etc.), and each of them are scaled in turn. I.e., status judgements within business or agricultural occupations are valid but not comparisons between them.

Such a two-dimensional scheme has been followed in this chapter, but modified to meet our needs. In Table 23 the occupations of Diet members have been classified horizontally by function, i.e., work groupings, and vertically by status. Horizontally, those work groupings (or, as they are termed by Hatt, "situses") are listed in which the greatest number of Diet members are found. Vertically, the higher status groups are broken down in detail because most of the members are found in them rather than in the lower groups. Note thatthe professionals are classified in both dimensions--horizontally as Professional Services, and vertically in terms of the Independent Professionals at the top and all the dependent professionals below it--i.e., those in bureaucratic contexts such as teachers in schools and physicians on hospital staffs.

TABLE 23

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY STATUS AND WORK GROUPINGS

Status	All Indus.	Agric.	Mfrg.	Comm.	Transp.	Prof. Serv.	Govt.	Others	Unknown
Indep. Professionals	59	-	-	-	-	59	-	-	-
Proprietors, Managers, Officials	339	31	108	40	25	69	50	16	
Presidents	178	16	68	26	18	16	22	12	
Directors	53	9	27	10	2	4	0	1	
Managers	68	3	10	2	4	24	22	3	
Staff	40	3	3	2	1	25	6	0	
Clerks	20	0	12	2	2	3	1	0	
Craftsmen, Laborers	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
Unknown	42	23	4	1	0	2	1	0	11
N	462	55	124	43	27	133	52	17	11

As might be expected, although not to the degree revealed in Table 23, a striking proportion of the members is located in the high status group of Proprietors, Managers, Officials in all work groupings except Agriculture and the Professional Services. In Agriculture, the status of 42 percent of the members is unknown, but a large number in this class are believed to consist of independent farmers although not of the "dirt farmer" variety. In the Professional Services, 44 percent consist of Independent Professionals. More will be said about them in a separate section.

While Table 23 merely records the number of members in each cell, the following two sections discuss each of the two dimensions in terms of party affiliation. To emphasize party differences, percentages have been used.

B. Occupations by Work Groupings

All occupations can be analyzed horizontally in terms of work groupings. For our discussion of Diet members, it was found that the 85 work "families" into which the Japanese labor force is divided in the 1950 National Census can be conveniently grouped into seven broad categories as follows:

1. Agriculture--also forestry and fishery
2. Manufacturing--also mining, construction, food processing, repairing

3. Commerce--wholesale, retail, banking, insurance, brokerage

4. Transportation--also communication, other public utilities

5. Professional Services--medicine, dentistry, education, law, newspaper work, religion, writing, fine arts

6. Government--all career government employment

7. Others--includes Personal Services (restaurant management, amusement and recreation, domestic servants), philanthropic foundations, research centers, etc.

A somewhat large proportion of the Diet members worked in two or more work groupings in the past. They have been classified under those work groupings in which they attained the highest statuses. Members attaining the same status in two or more work groupings were classified in the grouping in which they last worked.

Roughly speaking, the Professional Services and Manufacturing each claims over 1 out of 4 Diet members, and Government, Agriculture and Commerce each claims about 1 out of 10 (Table 24). The remainder is made up of members in Transportation, the "Other" work groupings and those whose biographies give little indication of their work affiliations.

In comparing the occupational distribution of the national labor force with that of the Diet members, it is interesting to note that Agriculture, which claims one half of all workers, is grossly underrepresented in the Diet

TABLE 24

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY WORK GROUPINGS--COMPARISON OF DIET MEMBERS AND LABOR FORCE IN 1950, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Work Groupings	Labor Force[a]	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Other
Agriculture	48.3	11.8	9.0	18.6	6.5	5.6	29.6
Manufacturing	21.4	27.0	29.7	21.4	30.4	22.2	20.5
Commerce	11.8	9.2	9.4	17.2	6.5	2.7	4.5
Transportation	5.1	5.7	5.6	7.1	2.2	11.1	4.5
Professional Serv.	4.6[b]	28.4	26.3	20.0	41.3	41.7	31.8
Government	4.2	12.2	15.1	14.3	0	2.7	2.3
Others	4.4[c]	3.5	3.0	1.4	8.7	5.6	4.5
Unknown	0.2	2.2	1.9	0	4.4	8.4	2.3
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	35,575,000	462	266	70	46	36	44

[a]Employed persons 14 years old and over. Based on 10% sample of 1950 Census. Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1951, pp. 44, 45.

[b]Includes all workers in medical, legal, educational, and religious services, and "miscellaneous professional services," ibid., pp. 40, 41.

[c]Non-professional service industries.

(11.8%). To a lesser degree, Commerce and the "Other" work groupings are also underrepresented. On the other hand, there are six times as many Professionals in all statuses serving in the Diet, proportionately, as in the national population, and three times as many government officials, proportionately, as there are in the nation. To a lesser extent, Manufacturing and Transportation are also overrepresented.

No clear pattern of correlations between work and party affiliation is discernible. As might be expected because of its large size, the distribution of members of the Democratic-Liberal party most closely approximates that of the lower house. In general, the leftist party members are more homogeneous than the conservative party members. They have smaller proportions in Agriculture, Government, and Commerce (as expected) than the conservatives, but very much larger proportions in the professions, and to a lesser extent, in the "Other" work groupings. However, the Socialists and Communists are at opposite poles as regards Transportation. Contrary to normal expectations, the percentage of Communists in Manufacturing is small compared with the other parties, but this becomes less surprising when one notes that a large portion of all Diet members in Manufacturing belong to the proprietorial, directorial and managerial status groups.

On the conservative side, the Democratic-Liberals and Democrats are highly represented in government. However, the Democrats have double the Democratic-Liberal proportion in Agriculture and Commerce, but smaller proportions in Manufacturing and the Professional Services. The minor parties are outstanding in having three times as many members in Agriculture proportionately as the house as a whole.

Since we do not know how the occupational statistics of past Diets have been derived, it is difficult to ascertain to what degree they are comparable with ours. Given this caveat, however, a number of broad trends can be discerned in Diet membership. The growing importance of commerce and industry in Japan from 1890 to 1928 and the concomitant decline in the importance of agriculture are dramatically portrayed in the figures on Diet composition (Table 25). Members with military and government background fell from the initial showing of 20 percent to less than 1 percent two decades later, then rose to 10 percent in 1928.[11] Since there are only minor changes in these three key work groupings between the Diets of 1928 and 1949, these as well as other data[12] show that the occupational distribution in the Diet has become relatively stable in recent times.

TABLE 25

SELECTED OCCUPATIONS REPRESENTED IN PAST DIETS, BY WORK GROUPINGS

	1st* (1890)	10th* (1908)	16th* (1928)	24th (1949)
Agriculture	48.0	27.4	9.5	11.8
Commerce/Mfrg.	12.0	19.3	39.7	36.2
Government/Military	20.2	0.7	10.2	12.2

*Source: Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, p. 169.

C. Occupations by Status Groups

Implicit in the correlation between occupation and social status which was discussed earlier is the notion that occupations themselves are stratified. They can be ranked, according to Caplow,[13] by taking into account the following variables: responsibility, nature of work, formal education and/or training required, authority, class attributes, and income.

In the Japanese sociological study previously cited,[14] ten experts ranked ten broad classes of occupations by using three variables: "social status, amount of education, and income." The occupational classes were then ranked by 899 respondents who also took these three variables into consideration, plus ten others such as "social importance, special talent required, responsibility, security, etc." Both the experts and the lay respondents

agreed on the rank order of the top three occupational classes:

1. Professional and technical
2. Managers and Officials
3. Clerical

There was also general agreement although some variation in the order in which the seven remaining classes were ranked below them: Craft and Industrial Producers, Transportation Workers, Merchandisers, Mining and Quarry Workers, Agrarian Workers, Service Employees, and General Laborers.

In the light of these findings, a scale was constructed as described below to classify the occupational backgrounds of Japanese Diet members. The six-fold classification devised by Alba Edwards served as a useful guide. He asserted, it must be remembered, that his classification grouped the U. S. work force not merely occupationally but by "somewhat distinct standards of life, economically, and to a considerable extent, intellectually and socially,"[15] and it may be assumed that the classification has similar implications when applied to the Japanese situation.

1. Independent Professionals--e.g., physicians and lawyers in private practice
2. Proprietors, Managers, Officials[16]
   a. Presidents--also proprietors (e.g., Shacho, Torishimariyaku Shacho, Todori, Shimbun Shuhitsu)

b. Directors--members of board of directors, advisors, consultants, and trustees (e.g., Juyaku, Torishimariyaku, Shuji, Shokutaku, Rijikan, Sodanyaku, Hyogiin)

c. Managers--also department and section chiefs (e.g., Semmu Torishimariyaku, Kanji, Bucho)

d. Staff--e.g., engineers, technicians, non-supervisory officials, faculty members, accountants, etc.

3. Clerks--also lower staff members (e.g., bookkeepers)

4. Craftsmen, Laborers--skilled, semi-skilled, manual workers, farmers, servants

Since the great majority of Diet members held the upper status occupations, the class of Proprietors, Managers, Officials(P-M-O) was broken down into four sub-groups according to the degree of prestige allocated to them by subordinates and clients, and not along functional lines as in the Edwards classification. In some cases, it was difficult to ascertain whether lower-status subjects were clerks or craftsmen-laborers; the only indication was the type of firm they worked for. When members simply indicated that they were "company employees" (kaishain) or that they worked for a certain firm (--kimmu shita), they were classified in these lower two groups, the assumption being that had they held more prestigeful positions, they would have mentioned them in the biographies.

The highest occupational statuses of Diet members and the status structure of the labor force in 1950 are com-

pared in the two left columns of Table 26. In the preceding section, we have just seen the great difference between the distributions of the Diet members and of the labor force among the various work groupings. Even more disparate are the distributions of these two groups according to occupational status. While only 2 percent of the labor force is in the P-M-O class, exclusive of independent farmers, that class claims almost three-fourths of the Diet members. Assuming that the Diet percentages for the two lower classes are correct, 85 percent of the work force is composed of craftsmen and laborers (i.e., those primarily concerned with the manipulation of tools and materials) and sales employees, but only two legislators (0.4%) are in the group. Proportionately, there are more than twice as many Independent Professionals in the Diet as there are "Professional and Technical Workers" in the work force, and one-half as many clerical workers as in the work force (excluding sales people).

Differences according to party affiliation in the Diet are also given in Table 26, but in interpreting these data the relatively large proportion of "Unknown" status in the leftist and minor parties should be borne in mind. Generally, however, there are far more Independent Professionals proportionately among the leftists than there are among the conservatives. As might be expected, there are far more

TABLE 26

HIGHEST OCCUPATIONAL STATUS--COMPARISON OF DIET MEMBERS AND LABOR FORCE IN 1950, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Status	Labor Force[a]	All Mems	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Indep. Professionals	4.6[b]	12.8	11.6	8.5	17.3	22.2	13.6
Proprietors, Managers, Officials	2.0	73.4	79.7	82.8	58.6	38.8	56.8
Presidents		38.5	44.4	45.7	21.7	13.9	29.5
Directors		11.5	11.3	12.8	13.1	8.3	4.6
Managers		14.7	16.5	14.3	15.2	2.7	13.6
Staff		8.7	7.5	10.0	8.6	13.9	9.1
Clerks	8.5[d]	4.3[c]	1.5	0	6.5	27.7	6.8
Craftsmen, Laborers	84.5	.4[c]	.4	0	0	2.7	0
Unknown	0.2	9.1	6.8	8.7	17.6	18.6	22.8
	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	35,575,000	462	266	70	46	36	44

[a]Employed persons 14 years old and over. Based on 10% sample of 1950 Census. Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1951, pp. 46, 47.

[b]"Professional and Technical Workers."

[c]Biographies do not make clear distinction.

[d]Includes sales clerks.

conservatives than leftists in the P-M-O class, particularly in the President-Proprietor subclass. As noted above, only two out the 462 members (a Democratic-Liberal and a Communist) are in the Craftsman-Laborer class, although it comprises the vast bulk of the work force.

The Communists stand out as members of the most atypical party. Compared with the Diet members as a whole, they have, proportionately, twice as many Independent Professionals, half as many P-M-O, one-third as many President-Proprietors, one-fifth as many Managers, but more than six times as many Clerks. If the handful of Communists serving as full-time managers of party organs (e.g., the newspaper) were omitted, their proportion in the P-M-O class would be diminished. Despite this, the Communist Party is emphatically not a party represented in the Diet by proletarians.

D. Professional Services

To review what has thus far been shown about the Professional Services, 133 members (28.4% of the Diet) belong to this group, the largest work grouping in the legislature. Fifty-nine of them belong in the status class of Independent Professional, and 69 of the remaining 74 Dependent Professionals belong in the P-M-O class. Proportionately, the leftist parties have more members in the Professional Services (av. 41%) than the conservative parties (av. 23%).

Table 27 shows the breakdown of members in Professional Services according to substantive fields. As expected, the largest group is that of lawyers (8.6% of the Diet), closely followed by the journalists. While the educators comprise the third large group, writers, physicians, and dentists are less important. In the "other" category are 5 accountants, 4 priests, and 1 artist.

TABLE 27

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, BY PARTY
(Percentage of Party Members)

	All Parties		D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
	No.	%					
Lawyer	40	8.6	7.8	5.7	15.2	13.9	6.9
Journalist	38	8.2	9.0	5.7	6.5	13.9	4.5
Educator	29	6.2	4.4	4.2	13.1	5.5	13.6
Writer	11	2.3	1.4	1.4	2.2	8.4	4.5
Physician, Dentist	5	1.0	1.1	0	4.3	0	0
Other	10	2.1	2.6	3.0	0	0	2.3
	133	28.4	26.3	20.0	41.3	41.7	31.8

In the Communist Party, there is a disproportionately large group of the "practitioners of persuasion"--i.e., lawyers, journalists, and writers. There are above average proportions of lawyers and physicians among the Socialists, and educators among the Socialists and minor parties. The conservatives are average or below in almost every field.

The tremendous difference in the occupational background of Japanese Diet members in contrast to United

States Congressmen is highlighted in Table 28. No more than 3 out of 10 representatives in Japan belong to the professions, but almost 9 out of 10 in the United States do.

TABLE 28

PROFESSIONALS IN THE DIET AND U. S. CONGRESS
(Percentage of Total Members)

	Japan	U. S.[a]
Lawyer	8.6 (29.0)[c]	57.9
Journalist	8.2	10.8[b]
Educator	6.2	16.3
Writer	2.3	1.3
Physician, Dentist	1.0	2.0
Other	2.1	0.0
	28.4	88.3

[a]U. S. House of Representatives, 1942. Source: Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Cong." op. cit., p. 72.

[b]Includes publishers.

[c]Those with legal training.

The greatest difference is seen in the very large proportion of lawyers in the American body as opposed to the Japanese. Various factors account for this showing in the United States,[17] some of which lie in the very nature of the legal profession. For example, this profession enjoys high prestige in our culture; there is a close relationship between legislative duties and law training and practice; lawyers are able to continue their practice on a part-time

basis or to leave it temporarily and resume it without too much inconvenience or loss of skill, unlike some other professionals such as physicians. However, these factors have similar application in Japan. The difference seems to lie in tradition and the lack of prestigeful groups competing for legislative office in the United States. Since colonial and revolutionary times, Americans have looked to lawyers for political leadership, and their position has not been challenged by other groups, such as the landed aristocracy, as in other countries. Japan lacks a similar tradition, and, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, the cream of law students enter government service, either as administrators or as judicial officials, instead of private practice and then into elective office. Although 29 percent of the Japanese legislators had law training, only 8.6 percent of them entered national politics through private practice. In the Japanese Diet, the dominant, single occupational group appears to be heads of private firms, and particularly those in manufacturing (Table 23).

The second difference lies in the proportion of members with teaching background. Despite the high prestige of teachers in Japan, their proportion in the Diet is about one-third that in the United States Congress. There are small differences between the two bodies with respect to the other professions.

E. Leadership in Private Associations

Political scientists in the United States devote considerable attention to the roles of private associations, such as the American Legion, CIO, Farm Bureau, and NAACP, in the legislative process. Students of Japanese politics, too, deal with the activities of the Zaibatsu business interests and the militaristic secret societies in the prewar Diet, but little is reported about the political activity of the bulk of present-day organizations. Business interests do try to influence legislation in the postwar Diet, often through questionable means, as we have seen in Chapter I (e.g., involvement of the coal mine interests in 1947 and the electric power interests in 1948). However, little is known concerning the role of the countless other private associations existing today. Whether they constitute important pressure groups in the Diet can be determined only through field observation; but even in the absence of such study, their potentialities for developing into powerful groups as in the United States cannot be denied.

Interestingly enough, one-half of the Diet members hold or have held office in the national, prefectural, or local organizations of a variety of private associations. In Table 29 are listed seven categories of associations: (1) Professional Associations (e.g., Highway Engineering

Association), (2) Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Shoko Kaigisho), (3) Labor Unions, (4) Agricultural Associations (e.g., Federations of Agricultural Cooperatives), (5) "Other Economic" Associations (e.g., Restaurant Managers' Association, Tourist Bureau), (6) Charity Organizations, and (7) Others (e.g., Japan Auto Association, sports groups).

TABLE 29

LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS, BY TYPE OF ASSOCIATION AND PARTY
(Percentage of Party Members)

Association	All Parties	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Other
Professional	4.9	4.5	4.2	10.8	2.7	4.5
Chamber of Commerce	5.8	6.7	9.9	0	0	4.5
Labor	6.2	.7	0	32.6	24.9	6.8
Agric.	10.6	9.3	7.1	10.8	8.3	24.9
Other Econ.	15.8	19.1	17.1	6.5	11.1	6.8
Charity	4.5	4.1	7.1	0	2.7	9.0
Other	2.3	3.7	1.4	0	0	0
Total	50.1	48.1	46.8	60.7	49.7	56.5
N	233	129	33	28	18	25

Differences among the parties in the leadership of these organizations are not surprising. A disproportionately large share of the leftists lead the labor unions, but they are absent in the Chambers of Commerce and "other" associations. Their almost total absence in the charity associations, however, is difficult to explain. In the professional organizations, the Socialists are well represented, but the Communists are not.

The conservatives, on the other hand, are dominant as leaders in the Chambers of Commerce and the "other economic" associations. The latter represent some entrepreneurial interests. Many agricultural leaders are found in the minor parties.

While it is debatable whether these Diet members serve as spokesmen for these organizations in the Diet, at the very least, they may be assumed to take an active part in any issue affecting their organizational interests. This is particularly so since many of them are very important leaders (Table 30). The positions of leadership they occupy in private associations are classified as Head, Director (i.e., members of boards of directors, trustees, advisors, consultants and kindred non-executive positions), and Officer (i.e., all important executives below the head).

TABLE 30

LEADERSHIP IN PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS, BY LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP AND SCOPE OF ASSOCIATION

	All Parties		Nat.	Pref.	Loc.
		%			
Head	102	(22.0)	15	36	51
Director	91	(19.6)	38	27	26
Officer	40	(8.5)	16	11	13
N	233	(50.1)	69	74	90

Of all Diet members, 22 percent are heads of national, prefectural, and local organizations, and 15 (3%) of

them are all-important national heads. Almost 20 percent are directors and 8.5 percent are officers; in both these categories the leaders of national associations outnumber those of prefectural and local chapters.

NOTES--Chapter IV

1. Theodore Caplow, The Sociology of Work (Minneapolis: U. of Minn. Press, 1954), p. 30.

2. See ibid., Ch. 2, for detailed discussion on this point and for references.

3. Japan Sociological Society, The Political Significance of Social Stratification and Mobility in Japan's Six Largest Cities (Tokyo: U. of Tokyo, 1952), mimeo. This study was conducted by 50 social scientists and 170 university students from 18 institutions in the cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Osaka, and involved a sample of 899 male respondents from ages 20 to 68.

4. Ibid., pp. 5,6.

5. Frederick S. Hulse, "Status and Function as Factors in the Structure of Organizations Among the Japanese," American Anthropologist, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Jan. 49), pp. 154-157.

6. E.g., NEAC, Shugiin Giin Sosenkyo (24) . . . Kekka Shirabe (Tokyo: NEAC, 1949), pp. 30, 31; SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. 1, pp. 322, 335; Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, p. 169.

7. E.g., J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation, Chs. 7, 8; Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Congress," APSR (Feb. 42), p. 72.

8. Paul K. Hatt, "Occupation and Social Stratification," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55 (May 50), pp. 533-543.

9. Ibid., p. 533.

10. Office of the Prime Minister, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, pp. 38-41.

11. The number of professional military officers in the Diet was negligible, i.e., less than 1 percent, from 1928-37. Robert E. Ward, Party Government in Japan (Unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, U. of Cal.), p. 565. None in the 1949 Diet are military officers; the only members with military experience are the small number of career bureaucrats who went overseas in World War II as army and navy military government officers.

12. Ibid. for statistics from 1928 to 1937.

13. Op. cit., Ch. 2.

14. Japan Sociological Society, op. cit., p. 6.

15. Alba M. Edwards, Comparative Occupational Statistics for the United States 1870-1940 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 179.

16. The Japanese employ a large variety of titles for positions with similar functions. Examples of these are enclosed in parentheses.

17. Donald R. Matthews, Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 30-32.

18. TNEC Monograph 26 found in Richard C. Snyder and H. Herbert Wilson, Roots of Political Behavior (N. Y.: American Book Co., 1949), pp. 241-248.

CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE

A. Introduction

Prior to the election of 1949, 16 members or 3.4 percent of the lower house declared themselves as career government officials to the National Election Administration Board. Actually, three times this number reached their highest occupational statuses and spent a greater part of their adult years in government service.

In this chapter, we will examine the background of these career men as well as other Diet members who served at any time in appointive positions in the national, prefectural and local governments. They include persons who held medium and lower positions in the classified Civil Service obtained through examinations, as well as those in the highest administrative offices gained through political appointment. Since the average Diet member finished his university education in the early 1920's, it seems likely that most of the Civil Service personnel in the former category were in government service prior to the Allied Occupation, and specifically from 1920 to 1945. Most of the political appointees, on the other hand, appear to have held office since the end of the war and the implementation of the purge directives.

The unique importance of government offices in Japan makes it worthwhile to study present and former public officials serving in the Diet. Bureaucrats (i.e., public officials as used by Max Weber) held considerable power in prewar Japan. On the national and prefectural levels, they not only performed the routine tasks of administration, but formulated policy and executive ordinances as well which were implemented through a highly centralized administrative system. Among the bureaucrats were officials charged with administrative affairs common to the executive branch of the United States Government such as taxation, commerce, and agriculture. In addition, however, there were bureaucrats who supervised the nation-wide education system, and in the Home Ministry, those who served as prefectural governors, prefectural department heads, and police officials. In the Foreign Ministry, they served as diplomats and consuls. Judges and public prosecutors of all courts were officials of the Justice Ministry. Although bureaucrats in a general sense, those within the sacrosanct Imperial Household Ministry were outside the classified civil service system.

Moreover, the bureaucrats form an extremely close-knit group with considerable <u>esprit de corps</u>, so much so that they are still referred to as the <u>Kambatsu</u>, or official clique. This solidarity is maintained primarily through the extremely rigorous recruitment process. In or-

der to pass the prewar civil service examinations, candidates were virtually required to complete the specialized legal program given by the most highly esteemed university in the country.

Solidarity, too, is reinforced by the common enjoyment of high social status, despite the comparatively low salary scale of government workers. Although prestige differs with the rank and function of officials, as well as with the ministry with which they are identified (e.g., the Imperial Household Ministry and the Foreign Ministry were the most prestigeful agencies before the war), Japanese bureaucrats in general enjoy higher prestige than comparable officials in private industry, and are held in higher esteem than bureaucrats in the United States. Quigley and others have suggested[1] that public respect felt for high officials contributes toward their success as candidates to public office.

Finally, the prewar bureaucracy is generally regarded as one of the most undemocratic and conservative groups in the government. Identifying themselves with the ruling class of Japan with its long tradition of special status and power, they felt responsible only to the throne and the authorities who appoint them, the top level being commissioned by the Emperor. Their loyalty was to the Emperor and to themselves as a class,[2] not to the popular branch of

the Diet which they considered inferior to them,[3] and certainly not to the people whom they often treated with contempt and regarded "as troublesome and unworthy recipients of guidance."[4] The bureaucrats had no understanding of public relations,[5] and found no need for it. In the tradition of old Japan, the public was expected to please the officials and not vice versa. On occasion, they even antagonized other powerful groups like the party politicians, private businessmen and the Army.

The conservative attitude of bureaucrats everywhere is patent and has been described in detail by men like Karl Mannheim[6] and Robert K. Merton.[7] Since bureaucracies operate within the framework of detailed, preexisting rules, bureaucrats when faced with a new situation either seek authorization in the rules or do nothing. When carried to the extreme, the means prescribed for effectuating a program override the objectives of the program themselves. In the Japanese bureaucracy, this legalistic tendency was fostered from the very beginning when it was established on the Prussian model. All courses of action were anticipated and minutely prescribed, and changing conditions made amendments and amendments of amendments necessary. Only those highly trained in administrative law could interpret these rules, hence the heavy emphasis on legalism in the training and examination of bureaucrats. In addition,

their conservative attitudes were reinforced by the consciousness of their prestige in Japanese government and society, and their desire for maintaining their status. Because of their exclusiveness and homogeneity, all bureaucrats who have risen through the ranks to the highest positions in the career civil service may be regarded as individuals possessing these attitudes and norms.

The generalizations thus far pertain to all members of the classified civil service, but in normal years prior to World War II, they comprised only one-fourth to one-third of all government employees. Until 1949 when the system was modified, all classified officials were divided into three groups: in descending order, chokunin, sonin, and hannin. Chokunin and sonin together comprised the kotokan or higher officials. These are the men with whom we are primarily concerned in this chapter, the individuals who held the responsible positions and who were accepted only after undergoing rigorous legal studies on the university level and passing the Higher Civil Service Examinations. In 1940, chokunin comprised only 0.8 percent, and sonin, little more than 10 percent of all classified workers. The remainder of the classified service (88%) was made up of hannin who filled the minor positions in government, and who obtained appointments by passing the Ordinary Civil Service Examination which did not require university

preparation. In addition, there was a large unclassified service composed of minor clerks, custodians, and agents. The great importance of the kotokan class of bureaucrats becomes obvious when one realizes that it comprised only 3.3 percent of all government employees in 1940, both classified and unclassified.

B. Civil Service Examinations

Before discussing the Diet members who actually served in the government, the nature of the High Civil Service Examinations, the Diet members who passed these examinations, the universities in which they were trained, and the type of education emphasized in the leading "prep school" for bureaucrats will be reviewed. Except for those appointed by the Foreign Ministry, those who passed the examinations were not necessarily placed in government jobs and many were merely placed on the civil service register. However, the passing of the Higher Civil Service Examinations (Bunkan Koto Shiken) was in itself a matter of considerable pride, and this fact is given prominent mention in the biographies of Diet members.

The examinations consisting of both written and oral tests were given in three divisions: administrative (Koto Shiken Gyosei Ka), diplomatic (Koto Shiken Gaikokan Ka), and judicial (Koto Shiken Shiho Ka). The diplomatic division

led to appointments in the diplomatic and consular service, and the judicial division led to positions as judges and procurators in the Justice Ministry. The administrative division tested the broadest category of bureaucrats since it led to appointment in any of the remaining ministries and agencies in the government regardless of the substantive background of candidates.

In each of the three divisions, there were four to five compulsory subjects for testing, and three optional subjects to be selected by the candidate out of a list of fifteen to twenty. All three divisions emphasized law with the administrative division giving more weight to administrative law, the diplomatic to international law, and the judicial to criminal and civil law. From one-fourth to one-third of the optional subjects were also related to law, with the remainder devoted to philosophy, history, economics, and the social sciences.

Those successful in the written examinations were then tested orally, this time in a compulsory law field and two optional subjects. A grade of 60 percent was passing, and candidates in the administrative and judicial divisions were then appointed by the ministries or placed on the register. In the diplomatic division, only those required to fill vacancies were declared successful.

In the 1949 Diet, 73 members (15% of the body) claim to have passed the Higher Civil Service Examinations, a ma-

jority of them in the administrative division (Table 31). Only 7 took their examinations in the diplomatic field, but 3 of them--Hitoshi Ashida, Shigeru Yoshida, and Kijuro Shidehara--are top-ranking party leaders in the Diet.

TABLE 31

CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS PASSED, BY UNIVERSITY

University	Officer Examinations		
	Administrative	Judicial	Diplomatic
Tokyo Impl.	30	5	4
Kyoto Impl.	5	3	0
Other Govt. U.	0	0	1
Waseda	1	1	0
Chuo	0	6	1
Nippon	0	6	0
Meiji	0	3	0
Other Pvt. U.	4	2	1
N	40	26	7

In terms of university education of the examinees, it is interesting to note the preponderance of Imperial University graduates in the administrative and diplomatic fields, but their relative weakness in the judicial field. As a whole, they constitute 65 percent of the Diet members passing the examinations, but this is about 10 percent lower than the usual ratio of Imperial University graduates over private university graduates who enter the higher civil service each year.[11]

Despite their enormous student enrollments, the large private universities in Japan are noteworthy for their failure to produce civil servants. This fact is reflected in the Diet by the small proportions of their alumni who have taken the examinations. Waseda, the largest university in the country, produced only two members. In keeping with the admonition of its founder, Keio, the third largest university, has not only few members in the Diet, but none of these members claim to have taken or passed the civil service examinations. Nippon and Chuo, however, contributed more than their share of judicial candidates although they likewise have almost none in the administrative and diplomatic divisions. The small, private universities do have more civil service candidates in the Diet than might be expected.

It is the Law Faculty of the Tokyo Imperial University, however, which is popularly thought to be the outstanding training ground for future bureaucrats, and our figures for Diet members passing the examinations who are products of the faculty confirm this general observation. Kyoto Imperial contributed 8 candidates, and all the other Imperial Universities contributed but 1, while Tokyo Imperial boasts 39, or more than one-half of all examinees in the Diet. Of these, 37 are products of the Law Faculty, which is divided into the Law and Political Course Divisions. Those aspiring to careers as judges and procurators

ordinarily enroll in the Law Division which offers a strictly legal education, and indeed all 5 Tokyo Imperial graduates who passed the judicial examinations are products of this faculty. On the other hand, those hopeful of passing the administrative and diplomatic civil service examinations usually enroll in the Political Course which enjoys unparalleled prestige as the gateway to the civil service. It, too, is heavily law-oriented, thus making it suspect as the breeding ground of legalism in the Japanese bureaucracy.[12] Of the fourteen compulsory courses in the three-year program, nine are legal in nature, and similarly, one-half of the ten elective courses are legal. Of the remainder, three are in the field of economics, two in world and diplomatic history for preparing aspiring diplomats, one in European political theory, two in social science, and significantly, only one in the science of administration. Its outstanding record for placing its graduates in the bureaucracy is largely explained by its extremely high standards of entrance and retention, the fact that many of its professors serve on the Higher Civil Service Examination Committee,[13] and that the oral examinations which look into such qualities as personality, background, and character are largely administered by its alumni.[14]

Contrary to expectations, however, its graduates in the Diet who passed the administrative civil service exam-

ination are not many. Of the 30 Tokyo Imperial graduates passing this examination, only 11 majored in the Political Course, and of the remainder, 17 majored in the Law Division and 2 in the Economics Faculty.

C. Experience in the National Government

Prior to 1947, the National Civil Service System covered all classified positions on the national and prefectural levels of government. Although part of one system, we will first discuss those Diet members who served in national offices, then those in prefectural governments. The former includes all administrative officers of the ministries and national agencies, judicial officers of courts throughout the country, and members of the diplomatic and consular corps. The latter includes the Home Ministry personnel assigned to prefectural governments, which are, in effect, field agencies of the ministry.

The government service of Diet members will also be analyzed in terms of those who occupied those higher positions in the bureaucracy normally held by political appointees, and those in the less important offices normally held by career civil servants. Diet members in the former positions have been in office after 1945 since the purge directives disqualified many prewar incumbents of the highest offices from the 1949 Diet. Those in the latter positions,

however, held them prior to 1945 based upon their occupational histories. In any event, no distinction will be made between prewar and postwar government service of Diet members since there has been little change in the organization of personnel within each ministry.[15]

The political appointees are those serving as Prime Ministers (Naikaku Sori Daijin), Permanent Vice-Ministers (Jikan), Parliamentary Vice-Ministers (Seimu Jikan), and as persons in various parttime advisory capacities such as Advisors (Fomon), consultants (Shokutaku), and members of boards, councils, and committees (Iinkai Iin). All of these office holders are of chokunin rank. Ministers normally serve for one cabinet term, but some have held office through several consecutive cabinets. The Permanent Vice-Minister is presumed to be the highest office attainable by a career civil servant, and as the name implies, the incumbent is intended to lend continuity to the operation of the ministry despite cabinet changes. In actuality, however, his tenure is as impermanent as the Minister's in some ministries.[16] The office of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister was established in 1924 ostensibly to bring closer relations between the ministries and the Diet, and often the incumbents do appear before Diet committees as spokesmen of the ministries. However, this position is often looked upon as sinecures for deserving party politicians.

Today, they are exclusively held by Diet members, although many non-Diet members held them prior to 1945. The remaining group of political appointees, the Advisors, serve as supplementary officials to the regular administrative personnel. Although all the foregoing positions are usually filled by "political appointees," they are not likely to be professional politicians or those with a complete lack of civil service experience as in the United States. To a large degree, the appointees are career men who have been "adopted" by the political parties and who are being rewarded for their support.[17]

Below these officials with ministry-wide responsibilities are those in charge of bureaus (Kyokucho) who are chokunin rank, and section chiefs (Kacho), private secretaries (Hisho), chief secretaries (Kambocho), specialists, and lesser administrative officers, all of sonin rank. These officers up to and including bureau chiefs are all career men who are appointed only after passing the Higher Civil Service Examinations. The remainder of the classified civil service in administrative positions is composed of clerks (Shoki) of hannin rank.

In addition, the classified civil service is made up of judicial officers, i.e., judges and procurators, who are appointed by the Minister of Justice in the name of the Emperor. Both types of officials enjoy lifetime tenure, and

most of them are of chokunin rank. Judges sit in four levels of courts: local, district, appellate, and Supreme. Public Procurators are attached to each court, and their duties are similar to that of district attorneys in the United States except that they have, in addition, some judicial responsibilities.

In the 1949 Diet, a very large proportion of the members, more than 1 out of 3, or 165 persons, served in government positions on the national level in all capacities: career, parttime, and temporary (Table 32). As might be expected, an overwhelming majority of them held the highest chokunin offices. About two-thirds served as Prime Ministers, Ministers, Vice-Ministers, and Advisors. Of these, about one-half served as Parliamentary Vice-Ministers. Naturally, most of these individuals were appointed to office after becoming Diet members.

TABLE 32

HIGHEST OFFICES HELD IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, BY PARTY

National Offices	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Political Appointees						
Ministers, V-Min.	37	23	5	4	0	5
Parl. V-Min.	53	33	12	4	0	4
Advisors	18	10	5	1	0	1
Examinees						
Bureau, Section Chiefs	22	17	4	0	0	1
Staff	19	13	3	1	0	2
Clerks	7	4	1	0	1	1
Judicial Off.	9	8	1	0	0	0
N	165	108	31	10	1	14
% of Party	35.7	40.6	44.2	21.7	2.7	31.8

Probably of greater significance to our study is the one-third of the 165 members who served as career officers. While 47 Diet members claimed to have passed the administrative and diplomatic divisions of the Higher Civil Service Examinations, we find that 41 actually served as higher officials (Kotokan). Of these, more than one-half reached the high bureaucratic positions of bureau and section chiefs. Only 7 members claim to have served in clerical positions filled by hannin officials. While 26 Diet members passed the judicial division of the civil service examinations, only 9 of them were appointed as judges and procurators.

In terms of party affiliation, it is interesting although not surprising to note that the proportion of party members serving in government diminishes as we go from the right parties to the left. More than 40 percent of the conservative party members served in both "political" and career offices, while 31.8 percent of the minor party members, 21.7 percent of the Socialists, and only 2.7 percent of the Communists did. Party differences are even more striking when we examine only those in career positions, i.e., bureau chief and below. The parties then rank as follows: Democratic-Liberal (15.7%), Democratic (12.8%), minor parties (9.0%), Communist (2.7%) and Socialist (2.1%). Of the 36 Communists in the Diet, only 1 held a government posi-

tion, and this was on the clerical level. None of the former judges and procurators are in the leftist and minor parties.

The claim has often been made that since the ministry with the greatest prestige after the Imperial Household Ministry is the Foreign Ministry, its diplomatic and consular corps receive the cream of the bureaucratic hopefuls.[18] Out of the 165 Diet members with government background, only 11 were in the foreign service, and of these, 1 served in the consular service and 10 in the diplomatic corps. Three of the latter, all Democratic-Liberals, became ambassadors. Moreover, out of the 11, 9 are Democratic-Liberals and 2 are Democrats; none of the minor party members, Socialists, and Communists were in the foreign service.

D. Experience in Prefectural Governments

From the latter part of the 19th century until 1947, the prefectures served as the administrative subdivisions of the national government, and prefectural administrative officials were part of the national civil service system. More specifically, prefectural governments were regarded as the field agencies of the Home Ministry, and all prefectural officials of the chokunin and sonin ranks were appointed by the Home Minister. Only the hannin officials and unclassified workers in each prefecture were appointed and controlled

by the Governor. Since all Diet members who held important prefectural posts were in office during this period of Home Ministry control, the governmental structure prevailing prior to the home-rule reforms of 1947 will be described.

Clearly, the most important prefectural official was the Governor, a chokunin official in the national bureaucracy. He ranked below the Vice-Minister but above the Bureau Chiefs in the ministry, and therefore enjoyed considerable social prestige in addition to his political powers, which were practically supreme within the prefecture. He could assign sonnin officials to posts in the various departments, select and promote hannin officials, and name a slate of three candidates for mayor of municipalities in the prefecture from which the local assemblies made the final selection. With the concurrence of the Home Minister, he could dismiss these mayors and even dissolve local assemblies. Also, the Governor convened and dissolved the prefectural assemblies, and he could override all their actions. Budgets of both the prefecture and municipalities were subject to his review. Because of his focal position, he was largely selected on political grounds when the party system was strong in Japan, and he was expected to swing his prefecture in favor of the party in power in national elections.[19]

Within each prefectural government, there was a Governor's Secretariat (Chiji Kambo) and three administrative

departments: Police, Economics, and General Affairs. Larger prefectures had, in addition, a Public Works Department (Komubu), and the administrative district of Hokkaido had a Development Department (Takushokubu). These were generally headed by chokunin officials in the larger prefectures and sonin officials in the smaller ones. Sections within each department were headed by sonin and hannin. Even in the large prefectures, however, there were seldom more than four chokunin bureaucrats including the Governor. In addition to these career officials, there were various Advisors, Consultants, and members of councils, committees, and boards in each government, but it is difficult to ascertain whether they held formal civil service ranks.

About 10 percent of the Diet members served in prefectural governments in career and non-career capacities (Table 33). Leaving aside the 15 Advisors in the latter category, 33 (7.4%) in the lower house served as career bureaucrats ranging from Governor to staff, i.e., officials below section chief. Although there are 7 former clerks of the national government in the Diet, there are none in a similar capacity on the prefectural level. Similar to the ranking on the national level, there are more conservatives serving as former prefectural officials than leftists and minor party members, both in absolute numbers and percentages. The dominance of the conservatives is especially vis-

ible if the Advisors are excluded from the totals. While the Democratic-Liberals and Democrats have 25 and 6 career men respectively, the Socialists and Communists have only 1 each and the minor parties have none. The high offices are almost the exclusive preserve of the conservatives, the leftists having none who served as Governor.

TABLE 33

HIGHEST OFFICES HELD IN PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT, BY PARTY

Prefectural Offices	All Members	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Governor	13	9	4	0	0	0
Dept., Sec. Chief	16	14	1	0	1	0
Staff	4	2	1	1	0	0
Clerks	0	0	0	0	0	0
Advisors	15	9	1	4	0	1
N	48	34	7	5	1	1
% of Party	10.3	12.7	10.0	10.8	2.7	2.7

Since high prefectural office has tremendous prestige value, one would expect most of these officials to capitalize upon this asset and run for election in the prefectures where they held office. Except for the Advisors, this does not appear to be the case. Eighty percent of the Advisors represent the prefectures in which they functioned as officials, but in contrast to this, only 15 percent of the Governors, 37 percent of the Department and Section Chiefs, and 25 percent of the Staff do. In other words,

while they undoubtedly benefited from their high governmental status in their election campaigning, such benefits were not exploited by a large majority of them in the areas where they are presumably best known.

One of the most important functions of the prefectural government before 1947 was its control of the police. Japanese police engages in many activities other than the apprehension of criminals and the supervision of traffic usually assigned to the police in the United States. For example, they also engaged in public health activities, ran the fire-fighting units, enforced economic regulations including those pertaining to labor relations, directed civilian defense in wartime, and most significantly, enforced the notorious Peace Preservation Laws. The last-named function included the supervision of political activities, censorship of publications and communication, and surveillance over foreign nationals. While the Governor held final authority, the key police official of the prefecture was the bureaucrat in charge of the Police Department, one of the three departments in the government. The Police Department Chief (Keisatsu Bucho) was usually a sonin official, and under him were Superintendents (Keishi), and also a sonin, who was in charge of one of the sections within the department or head of a large police station. Below them were the Inspectors, Assistant Inspectors, and Policemen of va-

rious grades. In the 1949 Diet, 13 members were either Department Chiefs or Superintendents of sonin rank. Ten of them are Democratic-Liberals, 2 are Democrats, and 1 is a minor party member. None of the Socialists and Communists are former police officials.

E. Experience in Municipal Governments

Unlike the national and prefectural bureaucratic positions, the offices of cities, towns, and villages have never been part of the National Civil Service. As a consequence, these muncipal positions were considerably lower in social prestige and authority except for certain high offices in the very large cities. None of the municipalities had the merit system, none of the positions required the passing of examinations, and in general, most municipal employees were underpaid and overworked.[20] As expressed by an American specialist in public administration:[21]

> Their ranks are generally filled by unsuccessful candidates in the higher civil service examination and by college graduates in political science and economics who prefer not to compete in the examination. Local officials are looked upon by national officials as socially and intellectually inferior.

Within each city, town, and village, however, the mayor enjoyed high status, generally above that of his counterpart in the United States. He was appointed to four-year terms by the assembly from a slate of three candidates approved by the Governor. All city mayors were

full-time salaried officials, but a majority of the mayors of towns and villages received no pay or only small allowances. Village mayors therefore were usually members of the landed gentry with independent means.[22] In order to improve morale, mayors of the thirteen largest cities were given chokunin rank, and those of other cities, sonin rank, in 1944. Depending upon the size of the municipality, they were assisted by one or more Deputy Mayors (Joyaku), a Treasurer, section chiefs, and under them, the administrative staff.

A slightly larger proportion of the Diet members, 11.2 percent, served in municipal administrations than in prefectural governments (Table 34). As might be expected from the foregoing discussion concerning the comparatively low status of municipal employees, a large majority of the Diet members (90%) is found in the highest municipal office, that of mayor, and only 3 at the section chief level, and 1, a Communist, at the clerical level. More so than among Diet members serving in the national and prefectural governments, these former municipal officials are overwhelmingly members of the conservative parties.

In comparison to U. S. Congressmen, Japanese representatives are far more experienced as heads and deputy heads of executive departments in the national government, and as chief executives of prefectures (states) and municipalities (Table 35). On the other hand, a far greater pro-

TABLE 34

HIGHEST OFFICE HELD IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT BY PARTY

Municipal Offices	All Mems	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Mayor	45	30	11	0	0	4
Sec. Chiefs	3	2	0	0	0	1
Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clerks	1	0	0	0	1	0
Advisors	3	3	0	0	0	0
N	52	35	11	0	1	5
% of Party	11.2	13.2	15.7	0.0	2.7	11.3

TABLE 35

GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE OF U. S. AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES

	U. S.[1]	Japan[2]
Ministerial Level	0	37
Governor	2	13
Mayor	14	45
Judge, Prosecuting Attys	127	9
Total Members	435	462

[1]House of Representatives, 77 Cong. (1942).

[2]House of Representatives, 24 Diet (1949).

portion of U. S. representatives has experience as judges and prosecuting attorneys. This means, significantly, that these court positions are more political in nature in the United States, since they are elective in most states, and they are better springboards to higher legislative office than in Japan.

NOTES--Chapter V

1. Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, pp. 264, 265.

2. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan Government-Politics, p. 86.

3. For indications of this sentiment in postwar Japan, see SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, pp. 173-175.

4. Milton J. Esman, "Japanese Administration, A Comparative View," Public Administration Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1947), p. 105.

5. Ibid.

6. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936), pp. 105-106.

7. Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Social Forces, Vol. 17 (1940), pp. 560-568.

8. Milton J. Esman, op. cit., p. 101.

9. 1940 statistics for this rank and those to follow obtained from Office of the Prime Minister, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1951, p. 350.

10. Harold S. Quigley, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

11. Milton J. Esman, op. cit., p. 101.

12. Ibid., pp. 102, 103, and Linebarger et al., Far Eastern Governments and Politics, pp. 391, 392.

13. Ibid., p. 103.

14. Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Executive Power in Japanese Prefectural Government," Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3 (May 1950), p. 232.

15. In 1949, the three rank designations of chokunin, sonin, and hannin have been replaced by an American-type classification system of Grades 1 to 15. The old three-fold system is used in this study, however, since all Diet members who held career government positions operated under it.

16. Army Service Forces, Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Section 2: Government and Administration (Washington, GPO, 1945), p. 105.

17. Harold S. Quigley, op. cit., p. 151.

18. Linebarger et al., op. cit., p. 395.

19. Harold S. Quigley, op. cit., p. 294; and Army Service Forces, op. cit., Section 2B, p. 11.

20. SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, pp. 265, 266.

21. Milton J. Esman, op. cit., p. 104.

22. Army Service Forces, op. cit., p. 34.

23. Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-seventh Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 1942), p. 71.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AND DIET LEADERSHIP

Thus far in this paper, the social variables of regional background, birthplace, age in 1949, education, experience abroad, and occupation, as well as the political variable of experience in appointive governmental positions have been discussed. In this final chapter, the second and possibly more significant political variable of experience in elective governmental positions will be described. By elective positions are meant seats in representative bodies on the national, prefectural, and local levels which are filled through popular, direct elections. These are the House of Representatives of the Diet, the prefectural assemblies, and city, town and village assemblies respectively. Next, positions of responsibility occupied by Diet members in political parties, again, on the national, prefectural, and local levels, will be taken up. Finally, attention will be focused upon the group of members in the House of Representatives who occupy positions of leadership in the body, and generalizations will be made concerning their socio-political background in contrast to the members as a whole.

A. Previous Diet Experience

Immediately after the Second World War, newspapers expressed the fear that the Diet will continue to be dominated by the Old Guard politicians, and that changes in the Diet structure would be like "pouring old wine into new bottles." However, toward the end of 1948, the relative inexperience and irresponsibility of Japanese Diet members became noticeable and this is partly the result of the SCAP purge directives in 1946 and 1947 which barred well-known politicians from the Diet, and which facilitated the election of many "new faces" in 1947. To what extent do we have "new faces" in the 1949 Diet? Is the Diet under consideration made up largely of men inexperienced in politics? How do they compare with prewar Diets and with members in other national assemblies? These are the questions which concern us in this section.

Experience in the Diet can best be described in terms of the number of times representatives have been elected to the body. It is interesting to note (in Table 36) that more than 40 percent of the 1949 Diet has been elected for the first time, and has therefore no previous legislative experience on the national level. Those members elected two and three times together comprise one-half of the body. Less than 8 percent has been elected four or more times.

TABLE 36

NUMBER OF TIMES ELECTED TO THE DIET, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

No. of Times Elected	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
One	41.6	47.4	32.9	13.1	77.8	20.4
Two	26.2	25.9	25.7	34.8	16.7	27.3
Three	24.4	18.8	34.3	41.3	5.5	40.9
Four	2.2	2.3	1.4	6.5	0	0
Five or more	5.6	5.6	5.7	4.3	0	11.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Because of the bipolar election returns, it is not surprising to note that those parties which were the heaviest gainers in 1949 have the greatest proportions of freshmen. Three-fourths of the Communists and almost one-half of the Democratic-Liberals are newcomers. However, while 8 percent of the Democratic-Liberals were elected four or more times, none of the Communists are similarly experienced. The heaviest losers in the election, the Socialists, minor party members, and Democrats, have the smallest proportions of new members. In general, the ranking of parties according to previous Diet experience is as follows: Socialist, minor, Democratic, Democratic-Liberal, and Communist.

The greatest turnover in Diet personnel came in the first postwar election of 1946 when 80 percent of the body was elected for the first time. This is twice the propor-

tion of freshmen in the 1949 Diet, and yet the latter figure (41.6%) is very large when compared with those of prewar Diets (Table 37). The last time before World War II when newcomers made up more than one-third of the body was in the significant 1928 election in which millions of men were enfranchised and universal male suffrage became a reality. In the 1930's there was a steady decline in the percentage of newcomers from about 1 out of 4 to 1 out of 6 representatives.

TABLE 37

MEMBERS ELECTED FOR THE FIRST TIME

Legislature	No.	%
24th Diet (1949)	192	41.6
16th " (1928)[a]	173	37.0
18th " (1932)[a]	122	26.0
20th " (1937)[a]	80	17.0
22nd " (1946)[b]	375	80.4
77th Congress (1942)[c]	16	3.6
British House of Commons (average: 1918-1935)[d]	175	29.2

[a]Robert E. Ward, Party Government in Japan, p. 569.

[b]SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, p. 321.

[c]Madge M. McKinney, "Personnel of the 77th Congress," APSR, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 42), p. 70.

[d]J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation, p. 36.

When compared with the turnover in other national assemblies, the figure for the Twenty-Fourth Diet is still remarkably great. For example, only 3.6 percent of the Seventy-Seventh U. S. Congress, and an average of 30 percent of the British House of Commons during the interwar period was made up of freshman legislators.

Experience can also be analyzed in terms of postwar, war, and/or prewar Diet service (Table 38). Postwar Diet service includes experience in any of the three Diets (22nd, 23rd, and 24th) elected since 1946. By service in a War Diet is meant experience in the Twenty-First Diet elected in April 1942 and which remained in office until 1946. Prewar Diet experience includes service in any of the twenty Diets which met prior to 1942.

TABLE 38

POSTWAR, WAR, PREWAR DIET EXPERIENCE
(Percentages)

Diet Experience	All Mems.	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Postwar	91.1	91.7	89.0	87.0	100.0	90.0
Postwar & War	1.5	1.5	4.6	0	0	0
Postwar & Prewar	5.4	5.7	4.6	8.7	0	7.0
Postwar,War,Prewar	2.0	1.1	1.8	4.3	0	3.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This scheme of analysis is used because of the peculiar circumstances under which the wartime Diet was elected

in 1942. Although Japan was actually at war from July 1937 on, it was not until the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai) by Prince Fumimaro Konoye in 1940 that Japanese politics took on a totalitarian form. In this organization, all political parties and factions were merged into a national front, although without the omnipotent character of the Nazi Party in Germany. The parliamentary arm of the IRAA, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, was organized by the Tojo regime prior to the 1942 election as the "political party to assist in the accomplishment of the Great East Asia War."[1] In this wartime election, the Political Society "recommended" 466 candidates, one for every seat in the lower house. Of these, 382 were elected, as compared with the seating of only 84 non-recommended candidates. Prior to the first postwar election in 1946, all 382 recommended legislators were purged by SCAP, and so the 113 members of the group who filed as candidates in that election were barred.

The ideological acceptability of all members in 1949 is clear. Since the purge was still in effect in 1949, all of those in the Twenty-Fourth Diet with wartime legislative experience are either those elected in 1942 without the backing of the Tojo regime like the veteran liberal, Yukio Ozaki, or those who were subsequently "depurged" after review of their records like Ken Inukai, head of one of the

two factions of the Democratic Party. Only 16 members or 3.5 percent of the lower house in 1949 are in both these categories. The parties with the largest proportion of members with wartime experience are the Democrats (6.4%) and the Socialists (4.3%), followed by the minor party members (3.0%) and the Democratic-Liberals (2.7%). None of the Communists have any war or prewar experience.

The extreme inexperience of the Twenty-Fourth Diet is again demonstrated. While our previous analysis revealed that 92.2 percent of the legislators have been elected no more than three times, almost the same percentage (91.1%) has had service solely in postwar Diets. This proportion generally holds for all parties except the Communists, the members of which are all postwar novitiates.

Prewar experience, that is, service in the Twentieth Diet (which was elected three months before July 1937) and before, is claimed by 7.4 percent, twice the proportion with wartime experience. Although the Democrats ranked first in the proportion with wartime experience, they rank third with prewar experience; otherwise the ranking of parties proportionate to members with prewar experience is the same as with war experience.

Only 9 members (2.0%) have had service in all three types of Diets. Among them, of course, is Yukio Ozaki who served in all twenty-four Diets in Japanese history.

Two other methods of analyzing previous Diet experience were attempted--number of years of Diet service, and age at first election. However, the results only repeat data already presented, because of the inexperience of members in general. The proportion of members with no more than three years of Diet service is, for example, almost identical to the proportions with only postwar experience, or with one to three election successes. The mean age of members at first election is 46.1 years, only 2.5 years less than the mean age in 1949, with little variation among the parties.

B. Previous Experience in Local Assemblies

Most Diet members are relatively inexperienced as national legislators, but in coming to Tokyo, do most bring with them a wealth of experience as legislators in prefectural and municipal bodies? Do these assemblies serve as stepping stones to the Diet?

Again, as in the case of education and governmental experience, the assumption is made that most of the political experience of Diet members on the prefectural and municipal levels was obtained during the pre-Occupation period. Then, too, we are concerned only with service in prefectural and municipal assemblies in which members are chosen by direct, popular election. Prior to 1947, all pre-

fectures and large cities had councils in addition to assemblies, but experience as council members is not included in this study because they are appointed by the assembly rather than elected at large.

Prefectural assemblies are made up of 20 to 40 members who are elected to four-year terms. Members serve without salary and usually meet each year toward the end of November for one month. The assemblies elect their own speakers and vice-speakers. They deliberate on a limited number of topics like the budget, accounts, prefectural taxes, and public works, but they are not empowered to enact regulations. The prefectural governor appointed by the Home Ministry may veto any action of the assembly, promulgate ordinances in the absence of action, and even dissolve the body with the concurrence of the Home Minister.

Ninety-four or about 1 out of 5 representatives served in these deliberative bodies prior to becoming Diet members, of which 9 members served as speaker (Table 39). About one-fourth of the Democrats, one-fifth of the Democratic-Liberals and Socialists, and one-eighth of the minor party members are former assemblymen. None of the Communists are in this category. The Democratic-Liberals have the largest number of members (8) who are former speakers. Only 3 out of the total (94) were elected to assemblies of prefectures in which they were not born, and none of them became speakers.

TABLE 39

EXPERIENCE IN PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLIES

	All Mems		D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Speaker	9	(9.6)	8	1	0	0	0
Assemblyman	85	(90.4)	52	17	10	0	6
	94	(100%)	60	18	10	0	6
% of Party	20.3		22.5	25.7	21.7	0	13.6

Unlike prefectures which are administrative divisions of the national government before 1947, municipalities are corporations which can own property and control affairs within prescribed boundaries to a fairly large extent. Municipal assemblies therefore have greater powers within their jurisdictions than prefectural bodies, but legislation must be limited to items like the budget, revision of ordinances, taxes, and selection of mayors, which are authorized by national laws. Municipal assemblies vary in size proportionate to the population from 30 to 150 among city assemblies, 12 to 30 among town assemblies, and 12 in village assemblies. Although they do not concern us here, very small villages often have town meetings instead of representative assemblies in which all voters are able to participate. All assemblymen are elected at large to four-year terms (except in the three largest cities having wards as subdivisions). They elect assembly chairmen from among them. Although not regulated by law, assemblies are usual-

ly convened once a month by the mayor. Like prefectural assemblymen, members receive no salaries, and so assembly service is only a parttime activity.

A slightly smaller proportion (18.2%) of the 1949 Diet has experience on these municipal bodies than in prefectural assemblies (Table 40). More than one-third of the Socialists have municipal political experience, although none of them became chairmen. Proportionately, the Democrats and the Democratic-Liberals follow with 18 percent, then the minor party members with 9 percent. Again as in the prefectural assemblies, the Communists are the least experienced in municipal legislatures.

TABLE 40

EXPERIENCE IN CITY, TOWN, AND VILLAGE ASSEMBLIES

	All Mems		D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
Chairman	12	(14%)	9	2	0	1	0
Assemblyman	72	(86%)	39	11	17	1	4
	84	(100%)	48	13	17	2	4
% of Party	18.2		18.0	18.5	37.0	2.8	9.0

Comparing somewhat parallel experience among U. S. representatives, again of the Seventy-Seventh Congress,[2] we find that 123 of them (28%) served previously in state legislatures (Diet - 20%), and only 21 (5%) served in city or town councils (Diet - 18%). Figures for U. S. congress-

men who are former speakers or chairmen of state and municipal bodies are not available. On the basis of this limited information, we may conclude that in Japan elective experience on the municipal level is a far better stepping-stone to the national body than in the United States, but less so on the prefectural (state) level.

C. Highest Positions Held in Political Parties

Although an informal adjunct of government, political parties play an important part in policy formulation in Japan despite their many limitations observed earlier in this paper (e.g., their transitory character, shifting allegiances of members, vacuous platforms, and the tendency of Japanese voters to elect representatives on the basis of personality instead of party affiliation and principles). Be that as it may, the description of the political experience of Diet members would be far from complete if their background in party activities is ignored.

Since political parties like all social organizations are structured, their members are organized into different levels of power, i.e., influence and authority. Our aim is to determine how many Diet members occupy what positions of power within party organizations at the national, prefectural, and local levels. Influence within organizations is difficult to determine except through controlled

field studies, but authority and/or prestige are largely determinable by the party titles borne by Diet members.

The problem of ranking these titles in a hierarchy of authority and prestige is a difficult one. The author is not aware of any study of Japanese parties which sheds light on this question; consequently, an almanac[3] and a Cabinet Ordinance implementing a SCAP purge directive have been consulted for clues. The former lists all officers of political parties in 1949, and the latter, all positions in political parties before 1945 which were affected by the purge. These have been analyzed on the assumption that the positions are listed in the order of importance. Party titles, thus, have been grouped into the three-fold classification of (1) Party Head, (2) Director/Manager, and (3) Officer.

"Party Heads" are obviously easy to determine although the titles ascribed to them vary among the parties. The Democratic-Liberals as well as the Democrats are headed by Presidents (Sosai), and the Socialists and most of the minor parties, by Chairmen of the Central Executive Committees (Chuo Shiko Iincho). The head of the Communist Party is the Chairman of the Central Committee (Chuo Iincho), Kyuichi Tokuda, who also heads the Politburo (Seiji Kyokucho). However, the General Secretary (Shokicho), Sanzo Nozaka, seems to be equally as important as Tokuda, and he

too has been classified as a party head for the purpose of our analysis.

"Director/Manager" is used here to mean those party officials who are immediately below the head in importance. These include not only members of bodies comparable to the board of directors in business organizations, but heads of bureaus, sections, committees, and other important officials as well. Among the titles included in this classification which also vary among the parties are Supreme Advisors (Saiko Komon), members of Supreme Committees (Saiko Iin), Central Executive Committees (Chuo Shiko Iin), and Central Committees (Chuo Iin), Chief Secretaries (Kanjicho), and Chief of Executive Members (Somu Kaicho). Also included are heads of Political Investigation Committees (Seimu Chosa Kai), and Ideological Policy Committees (Shiso Chosa Kai). The Communists have a relatively large number of these staff bodies, such as the Diet Policy Bureau (Kokkai Taisaku Bu), Orgburo (Soshiki Kyoku), Youth Department (Seinen Bu), Women's Department (Fujin Bu), and Propaganda Department (Joho Senden Bu), but surprisingly few Communist Diet members head them.

"Officer" refers to the lesser officials of party organizations, such as Managers (Kanji), Executive Members (Somu), and members of the various bureaus, departments, sections, and committees mentioned above.

Since many party members worked their way up from local and prefectural to national party offices, they listed more than 1 party position in their biographies. In each of these instances, that position thought to be the highest in authority and importance was chosen for consideration according to the following order of precedence:

1. National Head
2. Prefectural Head
3. National Director/Manager
4. Local Head
5. National Officer
6. Prefectural Director/Manager
7. Prefectural Officer
8. Local Director/Manager
9. Local Officer

The party positions of 22 percent of the representatives are unknown, but many of these are likely to be rank-and-file party members. This unknown percentage ranges from as high as 41.6 percent for the Communists to as low as 4.4 percent for the Democrats. This large proportion of Communists may be partly due to their intentional withholding of information from the biographies (they have the shortest biographical sketches of all party members).

Of the 78 percent of Diet members who claim party positions (Table 41), 66 percent held their highest offices at the national level of party organizations. Only 9 percent held them at the prefectural and 3 percent at the local levels. The majority of members of all parties except the Communist held offices at the national level, ranging

from 63 percent among the Socialists to 87 percent for the Democrats. Only the Communists have a relatively small proportion (16%) at this level, but they have by far the largest group of officials at the prefectural level in the Diet (40%).

TABLE 41

HIGHEST POSITION HELD IN NATIONAL, PREFECTURAL, AND LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, BY PARTY
(Percentages)

Party Position	All Mems	D-L	Dem	Soc	Com	Others
National						
Head	2.4	.7	2.9	2.2	2.8	9.1
Dir./Man.	33.0	27.1	40.0	52.2	13.9	54.5
Officer	30.8	39.8	44.2	8.7	0	2.3
Prefectural						
Head	3.6	1.5	4.2	10.9	11.1	2.3
Dir./Man.	3.4	1.5	1.4	4.3	25.8	0
Officer	1.9	2.6	0	0	2.8	0
Local						
Head	2.4	2.6	2.9	4.3	0	0
Dir./Man.	.4	0	0	2.2	2.8	0
Officer	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	22.1	24.2	4.4	15.2	41.6	31.8
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The proportion of members who have been or who are at present heads of national organizations is understandably small except in the category of minor parties since it is composed of eight different parties. An unusually large proportion of leftist members (1 out of 10) are heads

of prefectural organizations as compared to the conservative members.

To summarize, there is an unusually great percentage of Democratic-Liberals who are National Officers, Democrats who are National Director/Managers and National Officers, Socialists who are National Director/Managers and Prefectural Heads, Communists who are Prefectural Heads and Director/Managers, and minor party members who are National Director/Managers. Only 1 Socialist and 1 Communist are Local Director/Managers; none of the Diet members of any party listed themselves as Local Officers.

From the standpoint of educational background, national party officials are very well educated as might be expected, but not so among prefectural and local officials except Prefectural Officers (Table 42). Previously, we have noted that 64.5 percent of all members are university educated. National Heads and Director/Managers are well above this Diet average and National Officers are almost equal to it. Prefectural Officers, too, are above average, but Prefectural Heads and Director/Managers are far below. The poor educational attainments of Local officials are particularly noticeable. Only 13 Local Heads and Director/Managers are Diet members, but it is interesting to see that only 3 of them had university education, and none of the rest went beyond the secondary level. Bearing in mind

the high regard for education felt by the Japanese populace and the relatively low educational attainments of these prefectural and local party leaders, it is not surprising that many of them are regarded as "bosu", or political bosses, with all the opprobrium attached to that label in western countries.

TABLE 42

HIGHEST POSITION HELD IN NATIONAL, PREFECTURAL, AND LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Party Position	Educational Level					
	Total	Primary	Secondary	College	University	
National						%
Head	11	0	0	1	10	90.9
Dir./Man.	152	7	10	17	105	69.0
Officer	142	12	17	14	90	63.3
Prefectural						
Head	17	0	2	3	8	47.0
Dir./Man.	16	5	2	2	6	37.5
Officer	9	1	0	1	7	77.7
Local						
Head	11	4	4	0	3	27.2
Dir./Man.	2	0	2	0	0	0
Officer	0	0	0	0	0	0

D. Diet Leaders

Since the underlying assumption of this paper is that all Diet members are part of the decision-making elite of Japanese government, and since Diet leaders are among the most powerful members of the body, it follows that they are

the elite among the elite. While an examination of the socio-political background of all Diet members is important, it is even more crucial to focus our attention upon their leaders to see if their backgrounds are any different from that of the rest.

For our analysis, Diet leaders are defined as those representatives who have occupied or who at present occupy one of the following Diet offices:

(1) Speaker	(Gicho)
(2) Vice-Speaker	(Fuku Gicho)
(3) Standing Committee Chairman	(Jonin Iincho)
(4) Caucus Chairman of Both Houses	(--To Ryoin Giin Sokai Kaicho)
(5) Caucus Vice-Chairman of Both Houses	
(6) Lower House Caucus Chairman	(--To Daigishi Kai Kaicho)
(7) " " " Vice-Chairman	

The Diet Law of 1947 as amended in 1948[5] includes (1), (2), and (3) above in its definition of Diet Officers (Kaku Giin No Yakuin), and omits (4) to (7), but these four officers of each party have been included here despite this lack of formal recognition because of their importance in policy formulation. The Diet Law, in addition, recognizes a Speaker Pro Tempore (Kari Gicho) and a Secretary General (Jimu Socho) as Diet officers, but they will not be considered in this paper, because the former is either elected by the lower house or designated by the Speaker only when both the Speaker and the Vice-Speaker are incapacitated or ab-

sent, and the latter is required by law to be a non-Diet member.

The Speaker is elected by the House of Representatives to "maintain order in the House, adjust its proceedings, supervise its business, and represent it."[6] In actuality, his important managerial functions, as distinct from his presiding duties in plenary sessions, are exercized by the Interparty Negotiating Conference,[7] the extra-legal body over which he presides. It is composed of representatives from all the important parties. The Vice-Speaker performs the duties of the Speaker during his absence. Both their terms of office coincide with their terms as representatives. Usually the Speaker and Vice-Speaker are chosen from the largest and second largest parties respectively,[8] but both these offices are filled by Democratic-Liberals in the 1949 Diet.

Chairmen of Standing Committees are elected from among the pro-Government party members of the respective committees at the beginning of each Diet. Their terms of office likewise coincide with their terms as Diet members. Standing Committees organized by substantive areas are among the outstanding changes brought about by the postwar Constitution. There are twenty of them in the House of Representatives, five of which are concerned with administrative affairs (Budget, Audit, Steering, Discipline, Li-

brary Management), and fifteen of which deal with affairs in substantive fields (Civil Service, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Commerce and Industry, Labor, etc.). Each representative is entitled to serve on one of the latter committees, and a chosen few are also able to serve on one of the former. Since Standing Committee Chairmen have few precedents to guide them, they are not always subservient to the wishes of their parties or committee members, and some have taken unilateral and unauthorized action.[9]

Little has been written concerning the role of the Chairmen of Party Caucuses of both houses as well as the House of Representatives. They are chosen by the respective bodies of Diet members in each party, and they are important leaders of national party organizations as well as of the Diet. In the lower house, they make up the bulk of the powerful Interparty Negotiating Conference which decides on all Diet business entrusted by law to the Speaker. Although they usually consult the individual party caucuses on important matters, they sometimes act as party plenipotentiaries. Party caucuses in turn allow free debate among the members, but once decisions are made, members must accept them on pain of expulsion.[10]

In the 1949 Diet, there are 88 representatives who have held or who presently hold one of these seven positions of leadership. This means that 1 out of 5 members is in this group of powerful legislators.

Age-wise (Table 43), the 88 leaders are younger than might be expected in a country like Japan where age is an important factor in the selection of leaders. Their average age is 53, only 4.4 years above the mean age of Japanese Diet members, and 1 year above that of U. S. Congressmen in 1942.[11] The relative unimportance of age in the selection of members in this Diet would be even more apparent if their ages could be tabulated as of the year they first assumed leadership, but this was not possible because of lack of information. If it were possible, the resulting mean age would probably lie between 51 and 52.

TABLE 43

DIET LEADERS--AGE IN 1949

Age	Speaker, V-Speaker	Committee Chairman	Caucus		Total
			Chairman	V-Chairman	
25-29	0	0	0	0	0
30-39	0	3	0	1	4
40-49	0	18	5	6	29
50-59	2	18	7	9	36
60-69	5	6	2	1	14
70+	2	3	0	0	5
N	9	48	14	17	88
Mean Age	64.6	53.0	53.1	50.9	53.0

The Speakers are understandably the oldest of the four groups, and they average in the mid-sixties. Two of them are septuagenarians. The other three groups of lead-

ers are not much older than the average representative--Committee Chairmen are 4.4 years older, Caucus Chairmen, 4.5 years older, and Caucus Vice-Chairmen, only 2.3 years older.

If age is not an important factor in the selection of leaders, one would think that seniority in the Diet would be. Such is not the case (Table 44), partly because of the inexperience of representatives as a whole. While 92.2 percent of the Diet members have been elected no more than three times, we find that 80 percent of their leaders are similarly inexperienced. Sixty-six percent of the Speakers, 76 percent of the Committee Chairmen, 85 percent of the Caucus Chairmen, and 94 percent of the Caucus Vice-Chairmen are in this category. This last group of leaders, then, have even less seniority in the Diet proportionately than members as a whole.

TABLE 44

DIET LEADERS--NUMBER OF TIMES ELECTED

No. Times Elected	Speaker, V-Speaker	Committee Chairman	Caucus		Total
			Chairman	V-Chairman	
One	2	1	0	2	5
Two	1	7	1	11	20
Three	3	29	11	3	46
Four	0	5	0	0	5
Five	0	2	2	1	5
Six	0	1	0	0	1
Seven	1	1	0	0	2
Eight or more	2	2	0	0	4
N	9	48	14	17	88

The educational level of Diet leaders is not outstanding, and actually, they appear to constitute a representative sample of the lower house (Table 45). While 64.5 percent of the members in general are university educated, the proportion among the leaders is 63.6 percent. Proportionately, the Committee Chairmen are slightly above the Speakers in university background, possibly because of the specialized and technical demands of their duties. Caucus Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen are, however, about 14 percent below these preceding leaders in university attendance, and are, indeed, substantially below the Diet average.

TABLE 45

DIET LEADERS--EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Educational Level	Speaker, V-Speaker	Committee Chairmen	Caucus		Total
			Chairman	V-Chairman	
Primary	1	1	1	1	4
Secondary	0	4	1	2	7
College	1	4	2	3	10
University	6(66.6%)	33(68.7%)	8(57.1%)	9(52.9%)	56(63.6%)
Unknown	1	6	2	2	11
N	9	48	14	17	88

The distribution of Diet leaders attending the various universities is surprisingly similar to that of the entire body. Even the ratio of leaders attending government and private universities is almost the same as in the lower

house. Those institutions in which there is a slight over-representation of leaders in contrast to all members (ranging from 2.2 to 4.4%) are Waseda, Kyoto Imperial, and the small universities, and those with a slight underrepresentation (1.7 to 2.7%) are Chuo and Tokyo Imperial.

While the Diet leaders are not very different from the other members in terms of age, seniority, or education, a greater proportion of them do occupy the most prestigeful civilian occupations (Table 46). While seventy percent of the Diet members hold positions as Independent Professionals, Presidents, Directors, and Managers (excluding the "staff" category discussed in Chapter IV), 7 percent more of the leaders occupy these positions. Despite their relative youth and lack of seniority and education as compared with the rest of the leaders, the Caucus Vice-Chairmen have the greatest proportion in these preferred occupational statuses (94%), followed by the Speakers (77%), Committee Chairmen (75%) and Caucus Chairmen (64%). Only 7 percent of the leaders are in the staff category as we have defined it in Chapter IV, and none are in the Clerical level.

The occupational structure of the leaders is somewhat complicated by the fact that 15 percent failed to give occupational information in their biographies. The bulk of this group appears to consist of professional politicians.

TABLE 46

DIET LEADERS--OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

Occupational Status	Speaker, V-Speaker	Committee Chairman	Caucus		Total
			Chairman	V-Chairman	
Professionals, Independent	1	4	2	2	9
Presidents	4	18	4	9	35
Directors	2	6	1	2	11
Managers	0	8	2	3	13
Staff	0	3	2	1	6
Clerks	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	2	9	3	0	14
N	9	48	14	17	88

NOTES--Chapter VI

1. SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, Vol. I, p. 19.

2. Madge M. McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-Seventh Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Feb. 1942), p. 71.

3. Asahi Nenkan 1950, pp. 298, 303.

4. Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1, Jan. 4, 1947, translated in SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, op. cit., pp. 513, 537.

5. Art. 16, The Diet Law of 19 Mar. 1947, as amended 5 July 1948, translated ibid., p. 969. "Gicho" is translated as President in the Diet Law instead of Speaker as used here because the term refers to the presiding officer of both houses.

6. Art. 19, ibid.

7. Justin Williams, "Party Politics in the New Japanese Diet," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Dec. 1948), p. 1164.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 1166.

10. Ibid., p. 1165.

11. Madge M. McKinney, op. cit., p. 67.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary

Introduction

The aim of this paper has been to help fill a gap in the study of Japanese government and politics, namely, information concerning the social and political backgrounds of Japanese Diet members. Studies of political elites in Japan should be particularly fruitful because of the relative importance of personalities in comparison with political ideologies or programs in Japanese politics. To limit this vast field to manageable proportions without resorting to sampling, the House of Representatives of the Twenty-Fourth Diet was chosen as the population of the study.

The social variables chosen were birthplace, age, education, foreign contacts, and occupational experience, and the political variables selected were previous experience in elective and appointive public offices on the national, prefectural, and local levels, and experience in party organizations. These were analyzed in terms of the Diet as a whole, and in terms of party affiliation. Experiences involving participation in social organizations, private and public, were analyzed by functional specialization as well as status.

Before examining the background of Diet members, the history of parliamentary government in Japan from the Meiji Period to the 1949 Diet was described. We have seen that the idea of popular representation on the national level is a novel concept in Japanese tradition. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Diet had the semblance but not the substance of power commonly ascribed to western national assemblies. The Constitution of 1947 gave it recognition and the Diet appropriated for itself all the basic tools for parliamentary rule belonging to the United States Congress. In addition, the Diet retains the formal power over the executive which comes with ministerial responsibility to the legislature. However, indications up to the beginning of 1949 are that the Diet has contributed little despite its formal potentialities. Much publicity has been given to its spectacular instances of raucousness and corruption. One reason for this, besides the lack of a democratic tradition, is that under the Allied Occupation, the Diet could act only as the ratifiers of SCAP policies.

These are not the only reasons. To some extent, the quality of the Diet hinges upon the quality of political parties. In order to broaden participation in government, SCAP released all political prisoners early in the Occupation period, permitted the formation of parties, and banned from postwar politics all government leaders and politicians

who were active during the war. The new parties, however, proved to be unstable, lacking in mass support, undemocratic in operation, and, in certain instances, corrupt. What is even more significant, parties seem to represent clusters of personal loyalties around leaders more than party principles. Nevertheless, a continuum of principles ranging from the vague to the specific can be traced, and the major parties--Democratic-Liberal, Democratic, Socialist, and Communist--occupy positions on that continuum in that order.

The first election in 1946 was inconclusive and was followed by a second one in which the moderates emerged as the most powerful but by no means decisive group. The Socialist and Democratic coalitions, however, bungled their opportunity through indecision, disunity, and corruption. The third election, in 1949, with which we are directly concerned, resulted in defeat for the moderates and strengthening of the extreme right and left. Few changes in party alignment occurred during the rest of 1949, except for the independents who soon joined one of the old parties or created new ones. Within each major party, there were factions largely based on personal loyalties which fragmented the parties in the ensuing years.

Finally, the quality of the Diet is dependent upon the individuals who comprise it. The remainder of the

study described the social and political background of these members in the 1949 Diet.

Birthplace and Age

With the lowering of the voting age and the enfranchisement of women since 1945, individual members of the lower house have come to represent more voters and more people than at any time in Japanese history. Today, they represent more people permember than any other lower house in the world except the United States House of Representatives.

Birthplace of representatives has been studied in terms of regions, prefectures, and types of communities in which they were born and elected. Regionally speaking, the Democratic-Liberals are the most evenly represented throughout the country. The Communists are extremely weak in the northern and southern extremes of the country, but very strong in the population centers of Tokyo and Osaka. The opposite situation holds for the Democrats and the minor party members. The Socialists are well represented in the Tokyo and Osaka areas, but are proportionately strongest in southern Honshu. The areas receiving the largest number of migrants from other parts of the country--Tohoku and the industrial centers--are the areas most represented by nonnatives.

Almost one-fourth of the representatives were not born in the prefectures they represent. The leftist parties have the most non-natives proportionately, while the conservative parties have the least.

At the turn of the century when the average representative was born, a greater percentage of representatives was born in urban areas than the portion of the population living there. However, a greater proportion of representatives came from rural areas than the portion of the rural population at the time of election. In general, the conservatives are more rural in origin than the leftists.

The mean age of representatives in 1949 is 48.6. Although there is little difference among the parties, the conservatives are apt to be older than the leftists. In general, the members of the Twenty-Fourth Diet are slightly younger than those of the interwar period, but older than those prior to that time. Japanese representatives today are younger than their counterparts in the United States and Great Britain before 1942, but the differences are not great. They all cluster around age 50.

Education

All representatives in the Twenty-Fourth Diet apparently received some kind of formal education before the beginning of World War II, and their political frame of reference reflects in varying degrees this prewar education.

In general, the representatives are very well educated, with 3 out of every 4 having some form of higher education. The Democratic-Liberals are by far the most educated and the Socialists are the least educated. The Democrats and Communists have about the same levels of education between these two extremes.

Educationally, the Diet members are not representative of their constituents, since only 8 percent of the population above age 25 received some kind of post-secondary education. A comparison of the 1930 and 1949 Diets shows that the levels of education of the Diets two decades apart are almost alike. Members of the Twenty-Fourth Diet appear to be less educated than U. S. Congressmen in 1941 but far more so than members of the British House of Commons between the World Wars.

University education was given detailed consideration because a large portion of the Diet (64.5%) received this level of schooling, and because it contributes toward the occupational and social mobility of its recipients. Except for the Socialists, there is almost no difference in the ratios of members of the various parties attending government and private universities. Tokyo Imperial University, although it ranks second in the nation in student enrollment, has the greatest alumni group in the lower house, twice as large as the second group, from Waseda, the nation's

largest university. The third university from the standpoint of student enrollment, Keio, is very poorly represented in the Diet, as are the 37 smaller universities. About 8 out of 10 legislators with university education attended institutions located in Tokyo.

University and college education in Japan is extremely specialized, and is professionally and vocationally oriented. Only 3 percent of the representatives with higher education majored in literature, which is the nearest equivalent to the liberal arts in the United States. Of the remaining 97 percent with professional and vocational training, one-half took up law and its closely related program, the political course, and 30 percent took up economics and commerce. The remaining 20 percent of the representatives majored in fields like agriculture, literature, medicine, and engineering. Except for the unusually large percentages of Democrats majoring in law, Communists in economics, and minor party members in agriculture and fishery, there is general similarity in the distributions of members, regardless of party, among the fields of education. A disproportionately large number of representatives majored in the political course, literature, and agriculture at Tokyo Imperial, agriculture at Kyoto Imperial, economics at Waseda, and commerce and medicine at the smaller universities.

Only 5.4 percent of the representatives received foreign education, but 22.7 percent traveled abroad. The minor parties have the greatest percentage of members with foreign education. In general, a far greater proportion of the conservatives studied or traveled abroad than the leftists. Eighty percent of those studying abroad did so in the United States. Asia is the area most frequently traveled, followed closely by the United States and Europe.

While the Socialists are the least educated of the parties, they had the greatest percentage (34%) of members credited with publications. The Communists, however, are the most prolific writers. Twice as great a proportion of leftists as of conservatives has written books.

Occupation and Leadership in Private Associations

Occupation is probably the most important social variable in the background of Diet members. It is closely correlated with social status, amount of education, income and other variables. Almost all members with higher education pursued vocation-oriented programs, and most members spent 20 to 30 years in their occupations prior to election.

Occupations have been analyzed in terms of status and work groupings. In terms of work groupings, the two largest, each claiming about 25 percent of the Diet, are the Professional Services and Manufacturing. Only 12 percent of the members are engaged in Agriculture, although it claims one-

half of the Japanese labor force. As compared with the conservatives, the leftists have very large proportions in the Professional Services and "Other" work groupings, but much smaller proportions in Agriculture, Commerce, and Government.

Information on the occupational backgrounds of past Diets is incomplete, but those up to 1928 indicate important changes in the Diet paralleling the rapid industrialization and the decline in the relative importance of agriculture in the national economy. During the last two decades, the occupational composition within the Diet appears to have become stabilized.

In terms of occupational status, about three-fourths of the Diet members occupy the high status class of Proprietors-Managers-Officials in which only 2 percent of the work force exclusive of farmers is placed. Less than 1 percent of the Diet members are Craftsmen or Laborers, although 85 percent of the labor force is located in this category. The Communists stand out as the most atypical group because of their disproportionately large representation in the Independent Professional and Clerical groups, and small representation in the Proprietor-Manager-Official group.

Differences in the occupational backgrounds of Japanese and American representatives are great: only three-tenths of the former, but as many as nine-tenths of the

latter are found in the professions. Only 8.6 percent of the Diet is composed of lawyers, but 57 percent of Congress is--seven times the Japanese proportion. There is also a far larger proportion of former teachers among American representatives than there are among the Japanese. Differences among the other professions are minor.

Analysis of the leadership roles of Diet members in private associations revealed that 22 percent of them are leaders or officers of national, prefectural, or local organizations. There is a disproportionately large number of leftists serving as leaders of labor unions, and of conservatives as leaders of Chambers of Commerce and "miscellaneous" associations. In addition, many Socialists are leaders in professional societies and minor party members in agricultural associations. It can be assumed that these Diet members look after the interests of the groups which they head.

Government Experience

The prewar, and to a lesser extent, the postwar bureaucracy of Japan possesses the following characteristics:

a. High social prestige and status.

b. Great political power in wide areas of administrative activity.

c. Great esprit de corps.

d. Legalistic training and outlook.

All these characteristics help to explain their extremely

conservative behavior in carrying out their duties and in their relations with the public. This research into the governmental experience of Diet members is justified by the hypothesis that those members who rose to high career positions and, to some extent, those who were politically appointed to high bureaucratic positions share these norms and attitudes.

In the 1949 Diet, 15 percent of the members had passed the prerequisite Higher Civil Service Examinations. One-half of the members are graduates of the Tokyo Imperial University, and more specifically, of the famous Law Faculty of that institution. This proportion is, however, smaller than the proportion (75%) of Imperial University graduates passing the examinations annually. Members graduating from the large private universities are very poorly represented except in the judicial division of the examinations.

One out of 3 Diet members served in various capacities on the national level of government, mostly in the high positions commonly occupied by political appointees. However, 1 out of 8 members was a career bureaucrat, and a majority of these individuals reached the high post of bureau and section chief.

One out of 10 representatives served in prefectural governments, mostly as Governors and departmental chiefs. Most of them are not elected from the prefectures in which

they held office. Thirteen Diet members previously held important posts in the oppressive prefectural police departments.

Municipal officials are not part of the National Civil Service, and they enjoy far less prestige than the national and prefectural bureaucrats. However, the office of city, town, and village mayor is highly regarded within the respective jurisdictions, and this fact is clearly demonstrated in the Diet. Forty-five of the 52 members with municipal experience are former mayors.

Party-wise, the conservative members predominate in all three levels of government; they nearly monopolize all the top executive offices. The Socialist and Communist parties have very few former bureaucrats among their members, and none of them held high positions in the career civil service. None of them are former judges, procurators, prefectural police officials, governors, or mayors. If it were not for the participation of Socialists in the Katayama and Ashida cabinets, it is doubtful whether any of them would be represented in the high national offices given to political appointees.

Compared with U. S. Congressmen, Japanese representatives are far more experienced as top executives in national, prefectural (state) and municipal governments, but far less experienced as judges and procurators (public prosecutors).

Political Experience and Diet Leadership

One of the reasons commonly given for the "unsatisfactory" behavior of postwar Diet members and their "lack of accomplishment" has been their political inexperience. This is found to be true, particularly on the national level. Nine out of ten members had been elected to the National Diet no more than three times, and a similar proportion had never served before 1946. Four out of 10 members were freshmen in 1949, a proportion exceeded in recent decades only in the 1946 election, which came in the midst of the purge program. In comparison, only 3.6 percent of U. S. Congressmen and only 30 percent of British Members of Parliament are newcomers, according to our limited study. Those parties making the greatest gains in 1949 have the greatest proportions of newcomers. All parties are alike, however, in having very few members with wartime or prewar Diet experience, or with service in four or more Diets.

One out of five representatives served in prefectural assemblies. Minor party members and Communists are particularly inexperienced in these bodies. A slightly smaller proportion of representatives claim experience in municipal assemblies. The Socialists are especially well represented at this level, and the Communists are again the least represented. Before becoming national legislators, U. S. Congressmen have far more experience in state assemblies than have Japanese representatives in comparable legislatures.

In analyzing the positions of leadership held by the Diet members in political parties, it was found that almost 4 out of 5 members served as a Party Head, Director, of Officer, predominantly at the national level of party organization. Only the Communists had a large proportion of members who held prefectural party offices. Party officials of national organizations are very well educated, but those of prefectural or local organizations are far below the Diet average.

One out of 5 members served as Diet leaders (a term which includes all present and former Speakers, Vice-Speakers, Committee Chairmen, and Caucus Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen). In general, these men are not much older, and have only as much education as, and little more seniority in the Diet than, the average member. Caucus Vice-Chairmen have even less seniority and education than the average member. The only significant variable which differentiates the leaders from the members as a whole is that of occupation--a much larger proportion of the leaders hold the prestigeful private occupations.

B. Conclusions

Only 1 out of 20,000 Japanese born each generation has a chance of being elected to the Diet, even if we assume that no one is reelected. The Diet is therefore an

extremely select group. It is not "an average sample of ordinary men." It is not a cross-section of the population, or even of the voters.

In comparison to the Japanese people, the Diet is composed of men who are:

More urban in birth than the population around the turn of the century, but much more rural in birth than the population at the time of election.

Much older, clustering around age 50.

Far better educated.

In the professional occupations and in governmental positions to a greater degree, and in agriculture to a far lesser degree.

Occupying the top level positions in their occupations to a much greater extent.

What, then, are the Japanese Diet members like? What are their social and political backgrounds? Out of the mass of statistical data presented in this paper, a generalized profile of the legislators in the Twenty-Fourth Diet can be sketched. They are men who were:

Not active participants in the war effort from 1932 to 1945.

Born in small towns,
about the turn of the century,
in the prefecture in which they ran for office.

Educated in large Tokyo universities (largely Tokyo Imperial and Waseda)
in profession-oriented curricula (largely law, commerce, and economics).

They are:

"Successful," i.e., occupants of high status positions
in private industry (heads of manufacturing and commercial firms),
in the professions, and
in public affairs (bureau chiefs, governors, mayors).

Somewhat experienced in prefectural and municipal assemblies,
but very inexperienced in the Diet.

Party officers at the national level or heads of party organizations at the prefectural or local levels.

Somewhat acquainted with foreign cultures through travel or study abroad.

In short, Diet members are largely recruited from among the mature but not oldest members of each district, mainly from the top status group, the group with the most and best education, who occupy high status positions in government, private industry, and the professions.

When compared with United States Congressmen (House of Representatives, 1942), the Japanese Diet members are:

Slightly younger.

Less well educated.

More experienced in the highest executive positions in the national, prefectural (state), and local governments.

Much less experienced as judges and prosecutors.

Much less experienced in the national assembly.

Less experienced in prefectural (state) assemblies.

More experienced in municipal assemblies.

Much less apt to be in the professions, particularly in law and education.

Of all these differences, the Japanese members' lack of Diet experience and legal education appear to be most significant.

The foregoing should not be taken to mean that the Diet is homogeneous. Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate the heterogeneity of members within the body is to contrast the backgrounds of members at the extremes, the Democratic-Liberals and the Communists. In comparison to the Democratic-Liberals, the Communists are:

Elected from the metropolitan areas of Osaka and Tokyo and rarely from the extreme north and south of the country. The Democratic-Liberals are elected evenly throughout the country.

More likely to be non-natives of the places they represent.

Slightly more urban in origin.

Slightly younger.

Less likely to have representatives above age 60.

Less educated.

More likely to have majored in economics in college, while the Democratic-Liberals are more likely to have majored in commerce.

Unlikely to have foreign education. None of the Communists had traveled in the United States, while the Democratic-Liberals had many with foreign education and travel experience, relative to the other parties.

More likely to be in the professions, especially as lawyers, journalists, and writers.

Less likely to be found in the high status proprietor-manager-official group.

More likely to head labor unions, while the Democratic-Liberals head Chambers of Commerce and entrepreneurial organizations.

Almost unlikely to be found in administrative positions in the national, prefectural, and local governments. None of them are former judges, procurators, diplomats or police officials. On the other hand, many Democratic-Liberals held top level positions in all three levels of government, and many of them held the offices mentioned above.

Unlikely to have experience as prefectural or municipal assemblymen.

Less likely to be national party officers, but more likely to be prefectural party officers.

The opposite holds true for the Democratic-Liberals vis-a-vis the Communists. Members of the two parties are alike only in two respects. They have had little experience in the Diet, and the university-educated members of both parties are, in general, alumni of the same schools in the same proportions.

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