-‘ vw— .. ."" .i‘ *5? THE $25!? AM) FALL OF THE FEDERATION 0F RI-EGDESEA AND RYASALANB {953-1963 Thesis fez: fiche fleet“ cvf M. A. MECHiGM STAY? UfiNERSETY James D“ .Makawa 1965‘ “—_-__ W”,- J ' L LxmARY $ 1 3 Mi ganState 3 U iversity amass ~‘-m .— _.._.____,_ _,_. mm [1133 AND FALL OF Tm: mammrlozx OF dHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1953-1963 Thesis for the Degree of M.A. Michigan State University James D. Makawa 1965 ”HE RISE AJD FALL OF TLE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AJD NYASALAND 1953-1963 BY James D. makawa A rhesis Submitted to Hichigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts .Department of History 1965 [[l‘f’llfl lili‘l.[llllll> { Il‘fl’lallulllfl‘ [I‘I[( 1"!" I!!!“ Preface Sir Roy Welensky has told the painful story of the life and death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from his own point of View. In his book, ihe Life and Death of the Federation of hhodesia and Nyasaland, he writes like a disillusioned man: The federation was destroyed, not by our avowed enemies but by those who called themselves our friends and said they believed in what they had built. They killed it slowly, in the dark and by stealth; and they wept hypocrytical tears as they finished the deed. It is my purpose to write a thesis on British Central Africa, to tell the story of the union of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and to examine and explain the causes which led to the downfall of the Federation. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was one of the great political concepts of our time. Federalism is a sophisticated form of government which presupposes a great deal of political consensus. It is the purpose of this thesis to find out whether the Federation had any political consensus at all. In.&frica it represented a unique and challenging proposition for it was intended to demonstrate that, contrary to sad experience in the south, it was possible for different races to work together in mutual respect and harmony. lSir Boy Welensky, Quoted in.&frican world, July (196%), p. 10. l! I Ill 1' [I l I Illllll‘l [II]: [Ill [‘1‘ ’ll‘ If it had succeeded, as it had been founded on Partnership and not apartheid, its influence on the entire continent and the rest of the world would have been far-reaching. Unfortunately, one short decade saw the dream dissolved, partnership completely shattered and Federation ruined. In order to understand the history of th Federation, a brief history of the events since the period of colonization is necessary. This is the object of Chapter One. The main emphasis will be on Southern Rhodesia and how it came to be united with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.. Chapter One deals with Eritish settlement in Central Africa towards the end of the nineteenth century. The story of Nyasaland, the first of the three colonies to attract European missionaries, goes back to the exploration of David Livingstone in the 1850's and that of the two Rhodesias goes back to the coming of Cecil John Rhodes in 1890. From the time of responsible government in Southern Phodesia, political parties were formed, but their real development in the other three territories came when they were united in 1953. Since then there has been a rising tide of African Kationalism which has encountered a stiffening resistance in Rhodesia where the struggle continues for political power, liberty, and economic and social equality. The white men who dominated the Federation for a decade thought that Federation was going to continue under European domination. But they found their hOpes and aspirations doomed in December, 1963 when the Federation was dissolved. To their chagrin, the Europeans saw the Africans in the two northern territories gain their independence in less than a year. The future of Southern Rhodesia under Kr. Ian Smith, a st unch supporter of European or white supremacy, is still very uncertain. But the future of Northern Rhodesia and Hyasaland, new independent states of Zambia and Falawi respectively, is very promising and the destiny of these two new.lfrican states lies in the hands of the Africans themselves. TABLE OF CONTENTS rage Preface . ........... ............................. iii Chapter I. British Settlement in South Central Africa ... 1 II. Chief Developments Before Federation ......... 12 III. The Birth of a Federation A. The Fight for Amalgamation ............. 33 B. The dettina up of the Federation ....... 45 C. Opposition to the Federal Proposals . 1951-1953 ............... ..... ......... 56 IV. Federation in Operation: Progress and Disillusionment A. The Federal Legislature and the Franchise 63 B. Racial Discrimination and Partnership 70 C. Economic Progress and Problems ...... 75 V. The Breakup of the Federation ............. 84 Conclusion .............. ...... .................... 106 Illustrations ..................................... 116 Map 1. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ... ..... .................. 116A Map 2. Southern Rhodesia, the Three Velds 116 B. Map 3. S. Rhod. Provisional map of Soils 116 C Illustrations Continued ........................ .... 116 map 4. S. Rhod. Land Apportionment 1958 ... 116 D Map 5. Federation, Land Distribution and Railways .......... . ........ ... 116 E Table 1. S.R. Land Apportionment, 1930 .... 116 F C.) Table 2. 8.3. Land Apportionment, 1952 .... 116 {11 Table 3. S.R. Land Apportionment, 1958 .... 116 Table 4. Fed. Europeans in Employment, Wages and Salaries . .............. 116 I Table 5. Fed. Asians and Coloureds in Employment, sages and Salaries ... 116 I Table 6. Fed. Africans in Employment, wages and Salaries ............... 116 J Pictures Lord Malvern and Doctor Kamuzu Banda ....... 116 K Sir Roy Welensky and Kenneth Kaunda ........ 116 L .Nkumbula, Kaunda, Banda, and Nkomo ......... 116 M Statutory Bodies and Commissions ..... ...... 116 N Bibliographical Essay .. ...... .............. 117 Bibliography . ........ . ....... . ..... ...........l22 Chapter I British Settlement in South Central Africa Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, which comprised the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are situated in South Central Africa. The three territories cover just under half a million square miles or about ten times the size of England and Wales. They have boundaries with the depublic of South Africa in the south, Mozambique in the east, Angola and Bechuanaland in the west, and Tanganyika and the Congo Republic in the north. The countries have no sea coast of their own. Only a hundred years ago, this area and much of the rest of the interior of Africa south of the Sahara was for the greater part unknown to the outside world. However, about four hundred years ago, a few Portuguese explorers had gone into the interior briefly and often fatally, and the Arabs had pursued their abominable slave trade through it.1 Southern Rhodesia was the first of the three countries to be settled by the British with the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Before 1890, the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo Rivers, covering an area of about one-hundred and fifty thousand square miles, was occupied by the peaceful Mashona in the north east and _ ... .r -_-- .-.-.1.“ - --_...._.. 1: _.._...- 4..- _ ...—.- - ...fl.—--———-——-—— -- -—— —< ... —— ..- m . . ". lW.T. Blake, antralhAfriQan_SurY§y= Facts and Fleuras_o£ Fbodesia.and grassland (London: Alvin Redman Ltd., 1961), pp. 7-12. -0... (— by the warlike Natabele in the south west. The former were ruled by several chiefs scattered about Nashonaland while the latter were ruled by King Lobengula who was most concerned with the settlement of Southern Rhodesia by the British. The High Veld of Southern Rhodesia is over four' thousand feet above sea level, has rich soil for agriculture, a beautiful climate, adequate rainfall in the summer, and a variety of minerals such as gold, copper, and chrome iron ore. Coal is largely found in the low veld. All these factors combine to concentrate population on the High Veld which has been the scene of all competition for the country's wealth. Here, in the centre of the African continent lay in the nine- teenth century a great area believed to be rich in gold, not yet occupied by Europeans, but the subject of shadowy claims from Portugual, eyed speculatively by the German Chancellor Bismark, by the South African Premier Paul Kruger, and by the British financier and imperialist Cecil John Rhodes. Lobengula had sovereignty over Natabeleland and claimed the overlordship of Nashonaland. Immediately the British took steps to prevent other nations from entering the much coveted area.2 On 11 February, 1887, Lobengula signed what came to be known as the Moffat Treaty, which in the first article provided for peace and friendship between the British and the khtabele, and in the second that Lobengula would not enter into any 2phiiip Mason, rye Birth of a Dilemma (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 117. -3- agreement with a foreign country without the consent of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.3 This treaty was significant because it was a prelude to the Rudd Concession to be discussed shortly and other powers were kept out of Zambezia, now Southern Rhodesia. It is here that Cecil John Rhodes comes into the picture. Because of poor health, Rhodes left England in 1870 at the age of seventeen for South Africa, where he made a vast fortune in diamonds and gold at Kimberley and the Witwaters- rand respectively. For many years he had a dream to secure for the British flag the enormous tract of land north of the Transvaal. In fact, his primary aim was to establish a British Sphere of influence from Cape to Cairo. Having failed to persuade both the Imperial Government and the Cape Government to acquire Zambezia, Rhodes in 1888 conceived the idea of floating a private enterprise to undertake what had been neglected by the two governments.)+ The colonization of Zambezia was based on the Rudd ConceSsion. In 1888, Rhodes sent Nessrs Rudd, Naguire, and Thompson to negotiate a mining concession with Lobengula, then already besieged by many applications by other concession seekers representing different countries and different interests. The task before Rudd and his companions was therefore difficult and it entailed much patience, 3The Moffat Treaty. Quoted in Mason, p. 121. hP.F. Hone, Southern Rhodesia (London: C. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1912), p. 9. -h- persuasion, and perseverence. The concession was eventually drafted, explained in detail to Lobengula and finally signed by Lobengula whose signature was in the form of an "X," by C. D. Ruud, Bochfort Maguire, and F. R. Thompson with Rev. Helm and J.D. Dreyer as witnesses. It is highly probable that the Chief agreed to Sign the treaty "mainly in the mistaken belief, encouraged by deliberate deception on the part of Rudd and his colleagues, that it would lessen the external pressure."5 The concession provided for the payment to Lobengula and his heirs and successors of one hundred pounds a month for an unspecified period, one hundred breach loading rifles, and an armed steam boat on the Zambezi in exchange for exclusive mining rights only. Here is part of the concession which Lotengula signed: I Lobengula, King of Matabeleland and Moshonaland and other adjoining territories in the exercise of my Sovereign Power and in the presence and with the consent of my Council of Indunas do hereby grant and assign...complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my Kingdoms, Principalities, and Dominions, together with full power, to do all things they may deem necessary to win and procure the same...and whereas I have been much molested of late by divers persons seeking to obtain grants and concessions of land and mining rights... I do hereby authorize the grantees... to take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my Kingdoms...all persons seeking land metals and minerals...and I undertake to grant no concession of lan or mining rights...without their concurrence... From the outset, Nashonaland had been the main 5Richard Brown, "The Scramble and African Politics in Natabeleland," The History of Central African Peopleg, Openheimer Series (Lusaka: The Rhodes Livingstone Inst., 1963), p. 2. 6Quoted in mason. pp. 124-26. -5- attraction, and, although Matabeleland was thought to be rich in gold, Mashonaland was even thought to be richer. Therefore, Rhodes lost no time in obtaining a royal charter to enable him to carry out the terms of the Rudd Concession. The first step Rhodes took was the formation of the Chartered Company. On October 15, 1889, the Royal Charter was granted and by virtue of its provisions the British South Africa Company was established. The Company was given power to make treaties, announce laws, maintain a police force, construct roads, railways and other public works, to engage in industry, make land grants, conduct lawful commerce, trade and business; and it was to operate in the area north of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, and west of the Portuguese territories in East Africa.7 On June 27, 1890, a group of 184 British and South African settlers, called the "Pioneer Column,‘ plus five hundred strong B.S.A. Company's police escort, set out from Macloutsie in Bechuanaland to what is now Salisbury, arriving there on September 12. At Fort Salisbury, the Union Jack was hoisted, a salute fired, and possession taken of Mashona- land in the name of the Queen.8 The Rudd Concession granted no rights of settlement or administration, but by taking a strong military force into Mashonaland where the African population was sparce and _.__. -.. u_,+'-v _,._,_._~,__.-___. ._ —._ .. ___ ...» _ _. ___r._.._..__ 7Charter of the British South Africa Company, 29 October, 1889. C8773. Quoted in Colin Leys, European Politicgmin_Southern Bhgdepia (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959). p. 5. 8Mason, p. 142. -5- Lobengula's authority periodic, the Company succeeded in establishing the first European settlement at Salisbury in 1890, and appointed a Mr. Colquhoun the first Administrator of I-Iashonaland.9 The years before 1900 were completely unprofitable because there were no Spectacular gold-fields. European farming was also disappointing due to crop and cattle diseases and drought. The situation was made worse by the abortive Jameson Raid on the Transvaal hepublic in 1895, and by the Matabele and Mashona Rebellions of 1896. It was after the suppression of the two rebellions that Rhodes acquired what is now Southern Rhodesia for the British Queen by right of conquest.10 By the Order in Council of 1898, Nashonaland and Natabeleland were united to form Southern Rhodesia. The name was given in honor of Cecil John Rhodes. By this time the settlers had switched their attention to agriculture and the Company was promoting European settlement on the land, because the hopes placed in gold had been greatly exaggerated. The land policy of the Company was limited by the Southern Rhodesia Order In Council of 1898 which provided the country with the first constitution. The Company was required to provide the.AfricanS with sufficient land for occupation and "suitable for their agriculture and pastoral recuirements." The result was the creation of a series of Native Reserves, 9Leys, p.5. loHarry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock (London: George Unwin, Ltd., 1963), p. 17. -7- which were set aside for exclusive use by the Africans. ln- Spite of this Special arrangement, the settlers gobled up most or the rich land on the High Veld, eSpecially the land rich in minerals. The country was put under Company rule which terminated in 1923 when Southern Rhodesia obtained responsible government. There were four main divisions of service (the Administrator's, the Treasurer's, the.Attorney- General's, and the Division of the Secretary of Mines and works) which covered a comprehensive range of governmental activities. The Native Department in the Division of the Administrator had on its staff Native Commissioners who had wide powers for administering the Africans. The Native.Affairs Department today resembles the old Native Department in all essentials.ll Rhodes's men, pushing into what is now Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), obtained for the British South Africa Company concesSionS which were regarded as treaties in return for the Queen's protection, first from Lewanika Paramount Chief of the Barotse, and then from other chiefs. Lewanika was advised by Chief Khama of the Bamangwato and Francois Coillard the French Missionary to apply to Queen Victoria for protection against his enemies, the Boers, the Portuguese, and the Matabele. At first the Colonial Office hesitated to accept further colonial reSponSibility, but Rhodes offered to bear the llLeys, pp. 9-10. -8- expenses of administration out of the B.S.A. Company's funds. He had already bought a concession which a Kimberleyfirm had obtained from Lewanika. Then Rhodes sent Mr. Frank Lochner to negotiate a treaty with the Chief who asked for two thousand pounds a year as subsidy for a concession of mineral and commercial rights over the whole of his dominion. The Concession was signed on June 27, 1890. By its terms Lewanika accepted the Queen's protection to be offered by the Company. In 1891, Lewanika was informed that the protection of Her . Majesty's Government had been extended to his country as he had requested that it Should be. Sir Harry Johnston was named the Queen's representative in the country. Reantime, the Crown entrusted the administration of the protectorate to the Chartered Company as Johnston had suggested that the administration Should be from the south instead.l2 Before 1899 the whole Northern Rhodesian Territory had been vaguely included in the Charter granted to the British South Africa Company,but in that year the Barotseland-North- Western Rhodesia Order In Council placed the Company's administra- tion of the western portion of the country on a firm basis. It was closely followed by the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1900 which had a Similar effect. The two territories were amalgamated in 1911 under the designation of Northern Rhodesia, and the administration of the Company, subject 12Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa (London: Holder & Stoughton, 1902 , pp. 3 5- 37. -9- to the exercise of certain powers of control by the Crown, continued until 1924. In that year, the administration of the territory was assumed by the Crown in terms of a settlement arrived at between the Crown and the Company, and the first Governor to represent the Queen was appointed on April 1.13 In the years that followed came the development of Northern Rhodesia's great copper industry. The territory's four big mines at Luansha, Nkana, Jufulira, and Nchanga came into production shortly after Bwana Hkubwa Copper Mine had collapsed in 1950. These four mines have altered the entire economic outlook of the country. In a few years Northern Rhodesia was netting more than ten million pounds annually, and building up reserve funds of several million pounds. It is largely upon copper that the new schools, hospitals, roads, and other recent witnesses to increasing prosperity are found.14 Nyasaland, a former British Protectorate, lies directly north of the Zambezi River and east of Zambia. Its colonial history begins with David Livingstone's discovery of Lake Nyasa on 16 September, 1859. In the early 1860's the path he had opened of teaching Christianity and fighting against slavery was followed under his guidance, by the pioneers of the University's Mission to Central Africa. ---...m- ...- ' _—- .- _-—- _—_.—_—— ... —-———- .-.—P _—-— _—— _. - _-_ ... ...—... .... . —-..—‘. .... 3Report, Great Britain Colonial Office, "Northern Rhodesia," Vol. XAKIII (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1957), pp. 86-7. 14 lbid. -10- In the short time between these expeditions, the country had been re aged by tribal wars and Slave raids in a way which made a harrowing contrast to the Shiling land and people seen earlier by Livingstone. The missionaries retired in the face of disease and death, after suffering heavy and tragic losses, and the University's Fission did not return until 1881.15 After Livingstone's death, and inspired by it, the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland established missions in 1874-5 as memorials to Livingstone at Blantyre and Livingstonia. A number of business men, mainly from Glasgow, who were interested in Livingstonia, formed in 1878 the African Lakes Company as a tranSport and trading concern to work in close co-operation with mission activities. Other European missionaries, traders, hunters, and coffee planters followed the pioneers. The missionaries asked the British government to intervene and suppress the Slave trade in Nyasaland. But not until 1883 did a representative of the British Government appear in the Shape of a consul, Captain Foot. 0n the north end of the country open warfare broke out in 1888 between the_Arab Slave traders and the African Lakes Company. The B.S.A. Company helped the Lakes Company to fight the Arabs.16 About this time too there was a certain amount of friction with the Portuguese who were interested in the 15Great Britain Colonial Office, "Nyasaland Protectorate," Report (London: Her hajesty's Stationary Office, 1956), p. 121. 16Harry Johnston, Britain Across the Seas, Africa (London: Spottiswood Company, Ltd., ), pp. 20%- . -11- country. However, in 1891 an Anglo—Portuguese Convention ratified the work of Sir Harry Johnston, Sir Alfred Sharpe, and others who had concluded treaties with various native chiefs. The territories of British Central.&frica were defined as "British Sphere of Influence" by the Convention concluded with Germany and Portugal. Johnston's immediate aim was to negotiate a peace between the African Lakes Company and the Arabs, who were still enganged in open hostilities. A treaty of peace was signed with the Arabs on October 22, 1889. In the spring of 1891, a British Protectorate was formally declared over Nyasaland and the Shire district. Sir Barry Johnston was appointed as Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General to administer the newly acquired territories, while the remainder of the "British Sphere of Influence" was placed under the Control of the Chartered Company, and was divided into Northwest Rhodesia and Northeast Rhodesia. In 1898 the name of the territory was changed to British Central African Protectorate, but in 1907, a further Order in Council revived the old name of Nyasaland Protectorate. Nyasaland did not fall under British influence by conquest like Southern Rhodesia, it was led under the protection of the Crown by the British missionaries and traders with, as first the proclamation put it, "the consent and desire of the chiefs and people."17 l7Nyasaland Report, p. 123. Chapter 11 Chief Developments Before Federation The purpose of this chapter is to show the major differences in native policy between the three territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the major social, political, and economic developments before federation and their significance on the fight for closer association of the states. Until 1953, there were two methods of dealing with.fifricans and two sets of aims in the three British territories. The Colonial Office in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was determined to preserve and develop native methods of administration. They adopted the system of indirect rule through the chiefs. It was a conservative loose form of administration which was not likely to encourage rapid change. The scene was quite different in Southern Rhodesia where government was from the start firmly paternal. It was in the early days largely concerned with the provision of labour for the European farms and mines. The African chief lost much of his power and influence because the Native Commissioner was appointed to protect the African against exploitation, to collect taxes, and to issue licences, passes, and lands. As far as aims were concerned, the Colonial Office was determined that the protectorates should develop into autonomous African -13- states. In Southern Rhodesia, however, the aim was to make the country the white man's land and the idea of African majority rule in future was completely foreign to the thought of the white settler. Because of diverse native policies adopted in the three territories, the issue of amalgamation became a burning question. The year 1923 was a turning point in the history of Central Africa, for the year saw the passing of Company rule in the two Rhodesias and the establishment of responsible government in Southern Rhodesia. In 1915 the Company's Charter, which had been granted for twenty— five years, expired and was replaced by a supplementary charter in which a new clause was written providing the granting of a responsible type of government by the Crown whenever the settlers showed a desire and readiness for such a government any time after October 29, 1915. Two years later a ReSponsible Government.Association was formed under the leadership of Sir Charles Coghlan, a Salisbury barrister and dough y fighter, which quickly adopted the character of a political party. .Among the European population there was a strong feeling that Company's rule should be replaced by responsible govern- ment. Meanwhile General Smuts, who was then Prime Minister of South Africa, tried to persuadeSouthern Rhodesia to join the Union as a fifth province. In favour of this plan were the Unionist Party of Southern Rhodesia -14- who found Strong support among the British Conservatives, the members of the Chartered Company, local mining interests, and senior civil servants. The ReSponsible Government party also enjoyed support from Indian and Colonial people, the missionaries, Liberals and left- wingers in Britain. They preferred the creation of a British colony based on British ideas to Afrikaner Nationalism. After a long and bitter political struggle the matter was put to the Southern Rhodesia electorate in a referendum on October 27, 1923 and the count revealed 8,774 votes for reSponsible government against 5,99 for union with the south.1 The margin in favour of reaponsible government was therefore emphatic. Although the Unionists had money and political ability, they lacked sufficient popular appeal and an outstanding leader. On September 12, 1923, the thirty-third anniversary of the occupation of Mashonaland by the Pioneer Column, the Company's rule came to an end and Southern Rhodesia was granted her reSponsible government. Sir John Chancellor became the first governor of the Colony as the King's representative and Charles Coghlan formed a ministry which took office on October 1.2 The Constitution of 1923 gave Southern Rhodesia responsible government and at the same time the country tA.J. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 196E7, pp. 21+2.I+6 0 2"Southern Rhodesia," Round Table, XIV (Dec., 1924), pp. 185-86. -15- was formally annexed to the British Crown by Order in Council. Since then it has become an established agreement for the British Parliament "not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia in matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia Government."3 The constitution provided for a governor to represent the King in Southern Rhodesia, and for a house of parliament to consist of thirty members. The franchise was open to British subjects of any race having an annual income of over one hundred and fifty pounds. This automatically excluded the Africans, who did not have the financial and educational qualifications required of a voter. Elections were to be held at least every five years, and the Prime Minister, chosen from the strongest party returned at the polls, was to govern with the aid of six cabinet ministers. Parliament had control over all the territory's affairs except those concerning mining royalties, and laws affecting Africans. Differential legislation "whereby natives may be subjected to disabilities to which persons of European descent are not also subjected" required the assent of the Secretary of State before it could become law.)+ The authority of the Imperial Government was 'preserved because the grant to a European community of 3See the introduction to the Southern Rhodesia Constitution, Cmnd. 1400, p. 3. a C. Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, P- 39. -16- less than 35,COO of entirely unfettered jurisdiction over a large native population of over a million without electoral representation, would have aroused sharp criticism in the Imperial Parliament and elsewhere. The constitution contains certain other provisions safeguarding the African. The new government found itself in possession of unalienated Crown lands amounting to hh,OO0,000 acres and a revenue of about 1,326,000 pounds. On the whole the financial position of the new government was favourable, the land revenue with the surplus left by the Chartered Company, being sufficient to provide for interest and sinking fund on the loan.5 Meanwhile the small European population in Northern Rhodesia had obtained a different character and outlook from that of Southern Rhodesia by 192%. ReSponsible government was not considered for such a small white population of 3,000 in 1921 as compared with an African population close to a million. Most of the Europeans were settled along the railway strip, apart from 250 at Fort Jameson and a handful at Abercorn and a few scattered missionaries and administrative officers. Economically the country lagged behind Southern Rhodesia. Thus, most settlers, aware of the impossibility of self-rule at this ¥ SRound Table, XVI (Dec. 1925-Sept. 1926), pp. 757-58. -17- stage from all points of View, were content with Crown Colony status. But they pressed hard for settler representation on the legislature. However, native interests were considered to be paramount by the British Government. It was agreed that on 10th April, 1924, the Imperial Government would take over its administration, as well as "full and entire control of the lands throughout Northwestern and North Eastern Rhodesia, to be administered as it thinks best in the interest of the native population and in the public interest generally."6 The B.S.A. Company was to retain mineral rights, and freehold estates in Northern Rhodesia. There was to be special protection of the railway companies since there was heavy investment in them. A new constitution was brought into force by the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1924. It provided for a governor and an executive council nominated by the Crown. There was to be, for the first time, a legislative council, set up by separate Order, composed of nine nominated and five elected members under the Chairmanship of the Governor. Discrimination on grounds of race, apart from laws relating to arms, amunition and liquor, was forbidden.7 But the natives of Northern Rhodesia were excluded from the franchise, as they were “protected persons" not subjects. k‘-m~fl'—c--— .‘_' ... ”I... 6Quoted in Wills, p. 249. 7 Ilid., p. 250. .— -18- Nyasaland was the most backward of the three territories economically, so she could not attract a large European population. Nyasaland had been proclaimed a British Protectorate in 1891 and governed by the Commissioner and Consul-General, but in 1907 a Governor was appointed, who would be assisted by a Deputy Governor, a Treasurer, an Attorney-General, and three appointed officials. The Africans were to be represented indirectly by a missionary, because of the Church of Scotland's influence probably. As in Northern Rhodesia, and for the same reason, the Africans were excluded from the franchise. During the thirties, the economy of Southern Rhodesia still rested almost entirely on primary products for export, and the chief economic activity still consisted of mining, agricultural and railway operations. Chrome, zinc, and asbestos production was still mounting but gold mining had almost reached its maximum level. Gradually the agricultural front was broadening in tobacco, maize, cotton, wheat, and fruit and vegetable production. But tobacco has become the main cash crop in the colony. The railways still employed the largest number of ten, black and white, of any single industry. Beyond the Zambezi, Northern Rhodesia was concentrating on copper mining which has remained the back-bone of the country's economy, while Nyasaland resorted to tea-growing and the raising of a few minor farm products. Comparatively, the two Rhodesias were developing economically much faster. However, Nyasaland had a surplus in cheap labour. In 1935, when Nyasaland -19- was still struggling in the trough of depression, Southern Rhodesia was making a gradual recovery, while Northern Rhodesia's prospects were beginning to rise.8 Divergent native policies were adopted for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. In his October 1926 address, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia stated the aim of Europeans in Africa thus: We are in.African colonies the trustees of the backward and primitive races, and that it is our solemn duty to do all we can 50 promote their moral and matelial welfare. Ne contended that some measure of segregation of the natives was necessary for the comfort and happiness of Europeans and.Africans alike, and for the maintenance of good will between the two races which "I am glad to think," said the governor, "thanks largely to the splendid officers of our Native Department, prevails at the present time in Southern Rhodesia."10 This was the beginning of segregation based on race. But most Europeans would not accept trusteeship and any suggestion that Southern Rhodesia was to be an African inheritance.11 The governor found it desirable that the native population should have assigned to them for their use and enjoyment land in sufficiently large areas to enable them to live their own lives and develop local self-government on lines congenial to their 8Ibid., pp. 257-58. 9Sir John Chancellor, "Southern Rhodesia and its Problems," Journal of the.African Society, Vol. XXVI No. CI (October, 1926), p. 2. 10 Ibid., p. 3. ,v 11J.R. Rocker, "The African Worker in Southern hrlodesia," Race Vol. VI, No. 2., p. 142. -20- traditions and customs. But the land assigned to Africans was too small. as shall be seen later. Following the Governor's speech, Sir Charles Coghlan, the Prime Minister declared: Our desire is that every member of our empire, irrespective of race, creed or color, should be equal before the law, though I feel that in matters of governing, the untutored native is a child and has to be tigated as such for his own sake and all sakes. What an ambivilance and paternalistic attitude! Sir Herbert Stanley, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, proposed a gradual, rather than a rapid Euronean settlement in Northern Rhodesia, and spoke in favour of African advancement and against forced labour which the settlers had adopted in order to obtain cheap labour.13 One of the earliest exponents of the essential "master and servant" relationship of white and black respectively, Sir Harry Johnston, said: "Africa South of the Zambezi and North of the Atlas... must be settled by the white and whitish races and that Africa which is well within the tropics must be ruled by whites, developed by 14 Indians, and worked by blacks." Thus, south of the Zambezi "the weakest must go to the wall." In Southern Rhodesia social and economic discrimination was to follow 12Journgl.offlthg_African Society, Vol. XXVI., p. 3. 13 Ihigo ’ pp. 213-14. 4 ,, 1 Sir Harry Johnston. Quoted in Philip mason, The-Blinth-_9§-.e..,flil§mma. pp. 241-15. -Ql- racialist lines. Sir Harry Johnston had no idea of promoting settlers' domination North of the Zambezi; on the cont ra:;y he foresaw the same future in African develo; :ment towards Mel -government as later took place in West Africa, as well as East Africa. "I entertain great hopes," he wrote in 1896, "of the intellectual development of the Negro of Central Africa... Our mission here is to raise the Negro of Can al Africa into a civilized nati nality, for we can never hope to colonize this country wl ith the white race."15 Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have never had self—government under European domination. This means that the Africans there were generally protected from the grosser forms of settlers' colour prej Ldice found in Southern Rhodesia. The separation of races was recommended as early as 1925. Those Europeans who were regarded as representing African interests, and particularly the missiona ies, advanced the View tha t territorial segregation was necessary in order to protect the African from the demoralizing and disintegratin effect of contact with the European society. Accordingly, the horris Carter Commission of 1925 reported: However desirable it may be that memters of the two races should live together side by side with equal rights as the holding of land, we are convinced that in pr ctice, probably for geienatlor to come, such a policy is not practice le r in the lSQuotedin Kenneth Kaunda, Dominion Status for Centra 1.Africa? (London: Movement for Colonial Freedom, 19); I, p0 20 -22- best interest of the two races, and that until the native has advanced very much further on paths of civilization it is better that points of contact in this respect between the two races should be reduced. 0 In order that the desired separation of races should be achieved the Commission recommended a partitioning of land between the two races. The Act which legalized this division of land in 1930 came to be known as the Land Apportionment Act. It was recommended by the Commission that all the land outside the Reserves be divided into African, European, and unassigned areas. Special African areas were established as hative Purchase areas and in them Africans could acouire by purchase, limited individual property rights as distinct from the communal rights of the traditional system which was to continue 17 in the Reserves. The Commissioners recommended that 6,851,876 acres be set aside as Native Purchase Areas. Together with the Reserves and 406,200 acres of Mission land, this was to make up the African share of the country's land which amounted in all to 28,933,362 acres out of the total of 96,226,560 acres. The recommended European share amounted to 48,605,898 acres. All towns fell into the European areas. These recommendations, with some sliaht changes, were accepted by the government and embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.18 W 5'4 -" —— ~—- -- --- - -—--- 16Report of the Carter Commission, Salisbury, 1925, para. 63. 17 Leys, pp. 9-10. 8 See Table I. The Land Apportionment, p. 116 F. -23- Most of the Native area is poor soil, usually the poorer types of granite-sand known technically as class IlI land while the European area contains nearly all the areas of fertile soil in the colony.19 The change in soil type coincided exactly with the boundary line and is startlingly obvious when one passes through an European area into a Native area such as on the Salisbury to Shamva road, passing into Chinamhora Reserve and on the Salisbury to htoko road, passing into Chikwaka, Mangwende, Uzumta, and Mtoko Reserves. While most of the European areas are adjacent to a main road, a railway or both, most Native areas are located far away from existing main-roads and railways, making transportation to markets a difficult problem for the African farmer. For example, one can travel the main north road from Salisbury to Chirundu, or from Salisbury to Odzi, or from Salisbury to Bulawayo, all by road or rail, without passing through any native area.20 It is thus easy to see the unfairness and injustice of the Act. Iore than half the colony has been allocated to the Europeans who comprise only about one-fifteenth of the total population; and this contains nearly all the fertile soil, is close to markets, and is 19See Provisional maps on Land Apportionment 1920 and 1958, Illustrations, p. 116 0. 20Ken Brown, Land in Southern Rhodesia (London: The Africa Bureau, 1959), p. 5. well served by roads and railways. Forty-one percent is allocated to almost four million_Africans, and most of it is poor, infertile, remote from main roads, and markets. Besides, about eighty per cent of the Europeans live in the cities while over ninety per cent of the Africans earn their livelihood from farming an average of eight acres per family. This rigid territorial segregation forms the basis for the entire social and political system of the country and is undoubtedly "the root cause of a deep- seated sense of injustice among Africans."21 The.colour bar on the land—~cripp1ing, discriminating, and irrational in the eyes of the Africans, is one of the major political issues in the contemporary life of this disturbed country. The Act on the whole justifies Professor Richardson‘s comment that: The on the-spot attitudes of settler conflicted with his own heritage of Christianity and democratic ideals. A tension was set up within the European mind in Central Africa which has not yet been resolved. The pattern of race relations set during those years indicate clearly that fear of the surrounding Africans and the desire to wrest a living from the country dominated the conduct of the European. Christianity and the liberal English political heritage took second place to the needs of the time and place in .Africa. 2 The land situation was quite different in the North. .According to the Devonshire agreement, the Crown 21C. Leys and C. Pratt (eds.), A New Deal in Central Africa (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960), p. 176. 22Richardson, "The Future of a Dilemma " Africa Today .Eflgnphlets (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1959), p. 3. -25- recognized all alienations of land to Europeans made by the Company during its rule, though reserving the right to set apart a Native Reserve in the North Charterland Concession Company's area. The land was divided first into Native heserves vested in the Secretary of State and set aside for the use and occupation of the native tribes of Northern Rhodesia. The natives in the reserves must hold their land on assignment from the chief under the tribal law. Secondly, native trust land was to be leased by the governor to non-Africans for the benefit of Africans. Third, Earotse_land was to be administered by the paramount chief under tribal law.23 0f the total land area of Nyasaland, about 86.7 per cent was set aside as African Trust Land, for the use and occupation by Africans according to their laws and customs. Without any minerals, the country concentrated on Agriculture, raising such crops as tea, cotton, and tobacco. Many Africans who could not find employment in the protectorate migrated to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, an appreciable number of them were recruited in the King's African Rifles, an opportunity which helped them to go overseas to fight in both World Wars. As Nyasas from different tribes fought side by side in foreign lands, a national spirit grew among 23T.M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Strgggle for Powergin Rhodesia and N asaland (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 77-8. ' -26- them and this was to help in future for the Nyasaland Africans to fight for independence as ne nation not as different tribes. Unlike Southern and Northern Rhodesia where whites dominated the railways, the Nyasaland railways were operated 2% by Africans and lndians. Southern hhodesia's Land .Apportionment Act had no counterpart in the north. In .African administration, while Southern Rhodesia remained a "direct rule territory," Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland proceeded to an "indirect rule" policy. This difference in policy was to play a major role in the federation controversy from 1951 to 1963. In the absence of self—government, politics in Northern Rhodesia took on a different character from those of Southern Rhodesia. There was friction as well as co—operation between Unofficials, that is settlers elected to the legislative council, and Colonial Administration. Both settlers and Officials (Colonial Office Civil Servants) appeared to have been interested in the economic development of the territory but were not agreed on the future of European settlers. The Labour Secretary of State for Dominion ALfairs, Lord Passfield, published a memorandum defining the Eritish Native Policy in Last Africa, also adopted for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was a restatement 2H A.J. Hannah, The Story of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London: Faber and Faber, 196057pp. 214-16. -27- of Lord Devonshire's pronouncement. The memorandum stated that the interests of Africans in these territories must be paramount, "and if those interests and the interests of immigrant peoples should conflict, the former shoul prevail." Governors were given overriding powers "in case they should find it necessary to differ from their councils."25 The white settlers disliked the determination of the British Government to protect and advance the native races. However, Lord Passfield later backed down. This theory of the paramountcy of native interests became significant during the federation. The architect of modern Rhodesia was Sir Godfrey Huggins, now Lord halvern. He was born in England, where he studied medicine, and came to Southern Rhodesia in 1911 to practice his profession. His great assets were sympathy with his patients and confidence in himself, and he carried these assets into politics. Indeed, he thought himself as a doctor well qualified to prescribe for the body politic. He adopted the attitude of a benevolent autocrat for he was a product of the Victorian England which was far from egalitarian. The Victorian public schools were designed to produce benevolent leaders with a high sense of responsibility. A subtle and persuasive politician of the old fashioned paternalistic kind, Huggins was Prime __ 25Quoted in Wills, p. 259. -28- Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953 and of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1956 for longer than any Prime Minister in British history, including Sir Robert Halpole of England.26 In 1932, Dr. Huggins became leader of Opposition, the Reform Party which promised a number of economic reforms: to treat unemployment as a national issue, to look after white workers by putting new industrial legislation on the Statute Book, "gradual differential development of the European and the Native races upon a territorial basis," to remove.African voters from the common roll, and to develop Native Councils.27 The Reform Party became an effective political force and their electoral campaign gained considerable strength. In the general election of 1933 the Reform Party came into power with Huggins as the leader. On September 6, 1933, he took the Oath of Office and shortly afterwards formed a ministry. .A fresh railways bill which aroused sharp criticism brought about the break Up of the Reform Party. Parliament was dissolved and Huggins formed a new United Party which soon became very powerful. The election following the inevitable dissolution in November 1934 gave the United Party an overwhelming victory with ‘ 6Philip mason, "Two Sets of Values," Race Vol. VI No. 2 (October, 196%), pp. 152-54. 27L.H. Gann and r. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia (Ifiumdon: .Allen and Unwin Ltd., 196%), p. 92. -29- twenty-four seats out of thirty in the legislature.28 Under the United Party Government, recovery from the trade depression occurred in the tobacco industry, motor traffic was increasing, roads and bridges were built, and the Rhodesia Aviation was formed. The Prime Minister launched a campaign to intensify white immigration, widen the sector of secondary industry, and to acquire as much independence as possible short of a dominion status.29 The foundation of the United Party's power in the colony was the policy of the "double pyramid" or parallel development for the European and African races. The principle was that each race should develop in its own sphere. It differed from the South African Nationalist "apartheid" in that ultimately the two pyramids should meet at the top; that is, at the level of national government. Such a time was generally supposed to be generations ahead when the Africans would have become civilized. The two races were not allowed to mingle, except in a master- servant relationship. Huggins envisaged Africans and Europeans developing on their own lines in their own sections of the country, Africans reaching the highest positions in the African Areas, that is the Reserves and Native Purchase Areas. However, he abandoned this complete territorial segregation at a fairly early E 28 C. Leys, pp. 135-38. 29w1113, p. 252. -30- stage in his career for he realized that the urban and rural areas could not be separated in this way; the economy of the country was one and the cities needed 30 African labour. He saw also that it was impractical and inhuman to set up society so that African urban.workers must spend long periods at work away from their families. Besides, the African could only be a contented and valuable worker if he had his family with him and lived the whole life of a man. It became necessary in 1941 to amend the Land.Apportionment Act in order to allow Africans to live in Urban areas in special locations near their work. The Prime Minister's general plan aimed at securing decent living conditions for the increasing numbers of natives, particularly married men. He warned the European community that: We have to realize that a permanent urban class is arising and is bound to grow in the future unless the people in the EurOpean towns can manage without any native assistance and the time has passed when that might have Seen possible-so we must face facts of tne case. He contended that in the white areas the African should be welcomed, but on the understanding that he merely assists and does not compete with the white man. The African was to be an efficient worker but worth a 32 quarter of the wages European should be worth. 3OMason, "Two Sets of Values," Race, p. 153. »_ 31Godfrey Huggins, "Native Problem in Southern RhOClesia," The Rhodesia Herald, November 24, l9hh, pp. 8-9. 32Ibid., October 6, l9kh, p. 11. -31- The "two pyramid policy" found expression in the twin pillars of legislation, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. The latter provided for the regulation and regstration of trade unions and set up an Industrial Conciliation Board for the settlement of disputes. African workers were entirely denied the benefits of the Act. It was clearly stated that Africans could not be employed at the wage rates other than those specified in agreement under the Act. For instance in construction work semi- skilled Africans earned fifteen shillings a week while Europeans with the same qualification earned over four shillings per hour, that is about eight pounds per week.33 The clauses were repeated in the 1945 Amendment, preventing the Africans from forming legal Trade Unions till 1959. Thus, Africans were effectively excluded from competing with the Europeans in white areas of employment. Until very recently, the Africans have enjoyed no direct representation in government except through Europeans elected by the white voters. They have even been unable to play any significant part in local government or in the conduct of their own affairs. The Native Councils, created by Huggins. have always been dominated by Native Commissioners appointed by the Government , ._ _ ..-—on“ —— ...—m _ —v -.. --p.-—-———~ -- ‘—.' -' 1944, p. 9. -32- and illiterate African chiefs who receive government subsidies. The policy of "indirect rule," the adaptation of traditional authority to modern administrative convenience, was never tried in Southern Rhodesia. From the earliest days of Company rule, African affairs were handled "direct" through the omnipotent Native Commissioner. Southern Rhodesian Africans have always had things done for them and to them, but have had very little chance to do anything for themselves. In the cities the rigid colour bar, supported by legislation, made it impossible for an African to enjoy the amenities of the European city and forced him to fall back on the inadequate facilities of the native locations. In Spite of the Prime kinister's appeal to municipal authorities to improve African housing, large numoers of Africans still lived in "overcrowded, miserable hovels."31+ Because of very low wages and the rising cost of living, conditions for the urban African became more intolerable. The future of the African was clearly not to be as the Carter Commission had predicted for the Africans "mainly agricultural and pastoral." The effect of the Land.Apportionment Act in both urban and rural areas became more and more unjust as it grew less and less relevant.35 3hIbid., November 3, 194%, p. 9. 35Terence Ranger, "Crisis in Southern Rhodesia," Africa Today Pamphlets, Research Series No. 217 (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960), p. 12. Chapter III The Birth of a Federation The problem of Central Africa really begins with the Europeans. Isolated and weak in numbers, they felt caught between the devil and the deep. They wondered whether they should remain within the British colonial orbit and adapt themselves to such doctrines as the "paramountcy of native interests" or self-government on the basis of "one man one vote?" Or should they federate with the Union of South Africa, the big and rich neighbour to the south. Of course they wanted neither; what they wanted was power in their own hands and to advance their interests as they thought best in Central Africa. They regarded themselves as a bastion of white civilization threatened on one side by an obstinate Afrikaner illiberalism, and hemmed in all round by the rising tide of.African Nationalism. Therefore, they decided to deal with these threats by means of unity and independence of the three British territories. Lord halvern and Sir Roy Helensky, imbued with a restless desire to unite the territories by hook or by crook, came to the fore. Their dream was the establishment of an independent unit within the Commonwealth and the casting off of the old colonial shackles. The Fight For Amalgamation The proposal for amalgamation of the two Rhodesias -34- was first made in 1915 by the Directors of the British South Africa Company. They contended that amalgamation would mean cheaper administration, the avoidance of a duplication of services, the facilitation of a common native policy, and a step towards constitutional.advancement by adding several more European members to the Legislative Council. The argument that the Southern Rhodesian whites would be swamped by taking in a vast number of Afcicans was said to be unsound. They would have to learn to live with the indigenous people and to adjust their native policy to the realities of the situation. Otherwise the alternative would be for Northern Rhodesia to join the territories to the north of it, leaving Southern Rhodesia a wedge between a Northern Federation and a Southern Federation.l However, the scheme did not gain the settler's support and the Colonial Office vetoed the scheme for amalga- mation so that the two Rhodesias remained separate. It was after Southern Rhodesia gained her reSponsible government that a strong feeling for amalgamation with the north developed among the settlers. The first action by the Imperial Government regarding closer association in Central Africa was taken in November 1927. The Colonial Secretary appointed a commission headed by Sir E. Hilton Young in order to "make recommendations as to whether, either by federation or some other form of lGann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, p. #8. -35- closer union, more effective co-operation between the different governments in Central Africa may be secured."2 Hilton Young disagreed with his colleagues on the future of the Central African territories and submitted a separate report in which he recommended the division of Northern Rhodesia into three areas. The central area was to be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, thereby becoming "Greater Rhodesia", while North-Eastern Rhodesia was to be amalgamated with Nyasaland, and the third area, Barotseland, was to be a native state. On the other hand the rest of the commission recommended maintenance of the status quo, which was accepted by the Imperial Government because at this time there were still so many people antagonistic to the idea of amalgamation.3 Led by the Prime Minister, Dr. Godfrey Huggins, the protagonists for a closer union put forward a strong economic case. They argued that only by the unification of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland would the problem of finding sufficient markets for Southern Rhodesia's manufactured goods be solved. It would cheapen administration, improve communications, provide Southern Rhodesia with cheap labour from the north, facilitate railway control, and Norther Rhodesia's copper would be carried to the sea via Beira on the east coast, thereby giving employment to Rhodesian railway men. Political advantages 2Quoted by A. Taylor and E. Dvorin in gage, Vol. I 3S.H. Veats, "The jhodesias and Amalgamation," The Nineteenth Century, Vol. CXXIV, 1938, pp. 3117-18. were also outlined. In 193+, when Huggins was still thinking in rigidly segregationist terms, he ug ested a project U) for amalgamatian similar to the Young Plan. Both the Imperial Government and the Legislative CounCLl of northern Rhodesia rejected the scheme which recommended the splitting of the country into two.4 The Northern Shodesia settlers, angered by the Imperial statement which advocated the paramountcy of native interests in british Colonial africa, later solidly stood for a closer association with the south and managed to put up a strong case. The Colonial Office in 1930 had published a memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, which stressed the paramountcy of Native interests. Self- government would be given to dependencies only when the Africans were sufficiently advanced to participate in government. The st tenant Caused the horthern nhodesian Unofficials to give up former hopes of Europea self- government and turn to the idea of amalgamation with outhern Rhodesia to ensure the continuation of Northern U) ihodesi: as a WfllLe men's country, contrary to the Colonial Office prlicy. Joint representations were made to the 1 V Ir Dominions Secretary, ;3. J. h. Thomas, who replied negatively that: u / Gann and Gelfand, pp. llS-lo. -37- His Kajesty's government in the United Kingdom are not prepared to agree to amalgamation at the preSent time...On the other hand;...while considering that amalgamation is not practicable now or in the near future do not wish to reject the idea in principle...Without going into details of these contingencies, it is sufficient that it should be indicated that the territory to be amalgamated with Southern Ehodesia would not necessarily have boundaries coterminoug with the present boundaries of Northern Rhodesia. From now on serious proposals for closer association included Nyasaland. By 1935 general dissatisfaction with Colonial Office rule in Horthern Rhodesia had gained momentum and united the elected memners in favour of amalgamation. They held a conference at the Victoria Falls in January, 1936. Although no member of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature was present, all political parties were represented. The Conference adopted the resolution "that the early amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a constitution conferring the right of complete self-government is in the interest of both countries." Delegations were again sent to London and in October, 1936 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, then Dominions Secretary, announced that the Crown would not reconsider the earlier decision to leave the colonies separate because there had been no change in Southern Rhodesia's Native policy and more over "the unanimity reached at the Sihe Nineteenth Century, p. 320. -38- Victoria Falls was obtained largely on the basis of conferring the right of complete self—government,..."6 .A Royal warrant announced the appointment of a Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe, "to enquire and report whether any, and if so what, form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible..."7 The terms of reference stressed the special responsibility of the British Government for the interests of the.Africans. When the Commissioners arrived in Central.&frica in 1938, they found the Europeans on the whole in favour of closer union. Most African witnesses on the other hand, opposed the project, and never relented in their hostility. African teachers, court interpreters, and ordinary drivers gave evidence before the Bledisloe Commission, and most of them spoke vehemently against amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia the.Africans expressed the fear that EurOpeans would take over tribal lands and put an end to "indirect rule" by the chiefs. They disliked the Southern Rhodesia land and tax policies, pass laws, and the lowly status of Southern Rhodesian tribal chiefs. In Southern Rhodesia the Africans opposed amalgamation on the grounds that it would encourage more northern migrants to come south where their unwelcome 61bid. 7Taylor and Dvorin, pp. 70-1. -39- presence kept wages low, and would retard the progress of African education there. The missionaries did not support amalgamation either. European racists like Alderman Charles Olley of Salisbury argued against amalgamation because they feared a change in native policy as well as African domination. In their report, the Commissioners expressed that the disparity between the territories constituted a fundamental objection to any scheme of closer association. In principle the Commission favoured amalgamation although this was not considered to be immediately desirable owing to the divergence in native policies. Therefore they concluded that there should be a further testing period during which the territories would evolve more acceptable and like-minded native policies. In the meantime an Inter-Territorial Council should be created to co-ordinate administrative services. The British Government insisted that the Copperbelt should not be regarded as a purely white area, and that Africans should be allowed to rise to the highest position even in European portions of the country.8 Huggins was not satisfied with the recommendations of the Imperial Government for the whites in Rhodesia would not accept the idea of Africans competing with Europeans in white areas. The war came in 1939 and the whole issue was shelved. 8Gann and Gelfand, pp. 120-21. -40- When the war ended in 19H5, the amalgamationists resumed their fight once more. At general elections held in 19H8 the United Party led by Dr. Huggins had been returned to power with amalgamation as the first point in its policy. In Northern Rhodesia Unofficial members under Mr. Roy Welensky were also returned to the Legislative Council with a majority in favour of amalgamation. From now on Huggins and Welensky were to co-operate in a vigorous fight for a strong united Central Africa. Roy Welensky was born in Salisbury of a Lithuanian-Jew and an Afrikaner girl. He grew up in bitter poverty but later became a professional boxer and one-time heavy weight champion of Rhodesia, subsequently getting a job on the railways. He became a successful trade-union organizer who put his trust in negotiation and determined that white men such as himself should not allow lower-paid.dfrican workers to under-cut them in the labour market. Like Huggins, Boy Welensky was a convinced imperialist and deeply loyal to the lritish Crown in Spite of his Jewish origin. During his lifetime as a politician in Northern Rhodesia from 1938 to 1953 and in the Federation of Rhodesia and Hyasaland from 1953 to 1963, Helensky fought with much tenacity and energy to win a greater measure of control from the Colonial Office eSpecially in Northern Rhodesia. Welensky is huge, -41- burly, pugnacious and e>cellent in public speech though C ‘ . O - he h‘d the sh etchiest o: schooling.’ ie is now retired. Having realized h't neither the British Conservatives nor the labourites would consent to amalgamation, Welens“y ”:1 Sir uodfrej Hug; ins rou-nd r. _ _'_ . into a federal solution.l‘ hr. Creech Jones, then Colonial Secretary, preferred a federal sc1eme safeguarding native rights and local autonomy of the associated territories. The Colonial office did not trink in economic and imperial terms only, but also anticipated that a link with the two Northern territories would liberalize Hhodesia's much hated policy and assimilate the colony towards 1e lorthern p_.ttern, a prediction later to some extent fulfilled. Towards the end of 1948 Huggins announced a plan for the three Central African territories to work out a federal scheme, and Eur ropean settlers wl 0 had been determined to get dominion status for Southern Ehodesia first, at last foresaw the tirth of a Britisn dominion in Central Africa.11 Helene y's decision to support federation did change the course of ten ral Af-ican history, at least for a decade. Ho 51 men went back to Rhodesia to make preparations for a conference to be held early in l9e9 to consider the 9 This biographical sketch of Sir Roy helens ky is taken from Don Taylor, The chodesian: The Life of Sir Hay helensky. London: Iuseum Iress, 1955. loItid., pp. lC6-7. 71” - 1 , * eann and Celfina, p. 21 O\ -42- question of federation. The federation issue, as shall be seen in the next chapter, became a burning question. Stockil, with his dominion status first programme, still wielded much influence in Southern Rhodesia, while Huggins, to th dismay of Imperial Officials, still stuck to his idea of excluding.Africans from the voter's roll. The federalist movement nevertheless slowly gathered momentum and early in 1949, an Unofficial Conference met at the Victoria Falls, attended by various Rhodesian hinisters and members of political parties, as well as elected members from the Northern protectorates. Sir Codfrey Huggins, aided by Roy Welensky, played the cnief role, and largely under the Prime Hinister's influence the conference produced a constitution federal in frame, but amalgamationist in nature. The central legislature would contain a senate, but all power rested with a House of fiepresentatives from which Huggins still wished to exclude the Africans. The draft parallelled in some ways Huggin's earlier designs for an altered Southern Rhodesian Constitution. The result of this conference was to frighten politically conscious Africans in the Northern territories, who were not directly represented, and "federation" became a dirty word at African Welfgre Society heetings, just as amalgamation had been earlier on. In London, Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Hyasaland expatriate, and a medical -n3- practioner, issued a joint stat ment with Harry hkumbula, a Northern Rhodesia school teacher who was studying economics at the London School 0 Economics. Their document described the Victoria Falls Conference as a plot to extend settler rule beyond the Zambe l, and N anticipated that Southern Hhodesian donination would clamp a colour bar on to the Northern territories and put an end to all African political and economic progress in Spite of constitutional guarantees that had been promised. African speakers in the north warned their people that federation would cause a great influx of white settlers who would chase them out of their lands, deprive chiefs of their power and prevent Africans from getting good jobs. Powerful pressure groups such as the Fabians and the Aborigine's Protection Society supported the African case against federation; so did many leading British academics and clergymen, as well as prestige- worthy journals like the New Statesman and Nation. The British labour Government did not, however, reject closer association outright, and Southern Rhodesia pressure continued.12 With the fall of Creech Jones from the Labour Government, Huggins swung back from federation to amalgamation. At the end of 19H9 while in London, he lZIbid., p. 217. -hh- told Patrick Gordon walker, who was how in charge of Commonwealth relations, that federation was 'out' tecause of the expenses involved in supporting an extra legislature, and because the powers of Southern Rhodesia‘s own Parliament might be impaired. it a meeting in april he once nore demanded an amalgamationist solution. He argued the European settlement must be made secure; white settlers would not live in a black republic and.Africa could not develop without European skill. Inconsistency was one of Huggin's weaknesses (or strengths, politically). Of course the Prime Minister was :eeting strong opposition from men like hr. 3. a. W. Stumbles and Mr. L. h. Cullinan both members of parliament in the Southern rhodesia Legislature, who were demanding dominion status before federation or amalgamation with the north. I believe we have a far better chance of getting Dominion Status if we stand apart from Eorthern Rhodesia, because I believe with their native policy there would Ce considerable difficulty in ccming to an agreement. Arguing against amalgamation, Mr. Stumbles said, "To ask for amalgamation now will impede our progress to the higher constitutional status we are now seeking. Dealing with Northern Rhodesia their system of government must be brought to the level of ours. To imagine that you can talk of amalgamation unless their system 1 . q . .__ + is brought to our level 15 ridiculous."l 13Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, XEVIII (June, 19%8), p. 1376. lhlbid., p. 1352. -45- Such serious disputes continued until Huggins suggested a conference of Officials should sit in London in 1951 to consider means of overcoming the obstacles to federation. James Griffiths, then Colonial Secretary, and Gordon Walker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations at that time, agreed to have the conference held in London in 1951. Iuggins had made his deci ive breakthrough, and a Central .African Federation of some sort at last moved from political theory into the realm of raet.15 The Setting up of the Federation The first serious move towards federation was taken in 1951 when the Conference of Officials from Britain and the three Central african states reported in 16 1t advanced the usual economic favour of closer union. arguments for federation such as the advantages of economic planning over a large area, the co-ordination of the puulic services, and the greater attraction of overseas investment which a large market offered. The political arguments were given as the superior capacity of a federation of territories to resist outside pressures, and to protect "British traditio- nal principles from influences from outside" the borders of British Central Africa. The report also recognized that the lSSir Boy Welensky, Welensgy's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia2ghd Nyasaland (London: Collins, 196%), pp. 36-37- 16 8233: 1951- Report of Conference on Closer Association, Cmd. -46- crucial problem in Central Africa was the relations ip between the races. All previous moves towards a closer association between the Rhodesias and hyasaland had failed on this particular problem. To meet this problem, the principle of "economic and political partnership was laid down." This, the report said, "was the only policy which can succeed in the conditions of Central Africa."17 The political structure that was proposed was a curious compromise in that it transferred important powers to the European community and at the same time it suggested a number of safeguards for the.Africans, the chief of which was the retention of certain key powers, as far as the two protectorates were concerned, in the hands of the Crown. From then on increasing powers were claimed by, and given to, the local European community and the safeguards for the Africans were at the same time weakened.18 .According to the 1951 Officials' Scheme, the Europeans were to have twenty-six representatives out of thirty-five and would also be in control of a responsible Cabinet. Southern Rhodesia was to have seventeen members, a high proportion not justified by any objective criterion. .A strict division of functions was laid down between the Federal and separate territories under the Colonial Office. The Federal Government would not be allowed to control the 17Ibid. 18The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma in Central Africa (London: T13 Africa lureau, 1960), p. 3. -47- more intimate domestic policies of the protectorates, and to interfere with the political status and the control of the land in these two countries, which would remain Britain's special responsibility. arious constitutional safeguards for the Africans were introduced. One was the inclusion of a special "Hinister for African Interests" in the Federal Government, who was to be independently appointed by the Governor-General, and with power to veto any proposed executive action of the government for prior approval by the Secretary of State in Britain. The second was the African affairs Board which was to be a committee of the Legislature consisting of the Minister for African Interests, the Secretaries for Native Affairs from each of the three territories, three elected members and three Africans. The function of this Board was to examine before publication all proposed Federal legislation. If they thought it detrimental to African interests and the Legislature never- theless passed it, the Governor-General would be required to refer it to the Secretary of State in London, and the final decision rested with the British Government.19 The Cfficials' report provoked at once African as well as European opposition in Central Africa and Lritain. There were doubts as to whether the constitutional safeguards would work. The world had just seen South Africa destroy 19The Federal Scheme, ‘md. 8233, 1951. -lp8_ the safeguards which had been entrenched into her constitution. Southern Rhodesia herself had had constitutional safeguards enabling Britain not to allow discriminatory legislation there but no government had ever paid them any attention. There was nothing in the record of the European leaders to inSpire the slightest confidence that they would really play the game of "partnership," and set their faces against racial discrimination. No one believed that the whites could be kept in order by Eriiain, the policeman six thousand miles away from Centre Africa. In September 1951, a conference was held at Victoria Falls to discuss federation. Present were two Labour Ministers, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth Relations. Southern Rhodesia sent no Africans in her delegation. Only the greatest persuasion induced the.Africans from the protectorates to attend. The conference broke up in disagreement. However, its communique stated: It is becoming evident that further discussion with each territory and exchanges of views between the four governments will be necessary...it is hoped that the position can be sufficiently clarified to enable the Conference to reassemble in London about the middle of nex year.20 The Conference, with the exception of the African delegates, showed itself favourable to the principle of federation and agreed that the protectorates must retain their existing 2Ofihodesia Herald, September 22, 1951, p. 1. —49- political status, and that economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans was the only policy under which federation could be established. The Africans from Forthern Rhodesia expressed their willingness to consider federation "after the policy of partnership in Northern Rhodesia had been defined, and as so defined, put into progressive operation."21 The two British hinisters had hardly returned to London when a general election was held and a Conservative Government returned to office. The discussions about partnership unfortunately did not take place and the date for the next conference was pushed forward to April, 1952. This time no Africans at all from the northern territories attended but the conference was held without them. Two Africans from Southern Rhodesia attended. During 1952 and 1953 the original proposals were translated into a Draft 22 the Draft Federal Scheme into a Federal Federal Scheme Scheme,23 the Federal Scheme into an Order in Council 24 the Order in Council into law, and the Central African Federation into fact. These developments occurred very rapidly and the original proposals which the Officials' Conference had drafted were transformed to the detriment of the Africans. These changes may briefly be summarized under four headings. 2lIbid. 22 The Federal Scheme, Cmd. 8573, 1952. 23The Federal Scheme, Cmd. 875%, 1953. 24 Order in Council no 1199, 1953. -50- First, Britain's special reSponsibilities for the protectorates "for so long as their reapective peoples so desired" were relegated to a Preamble in the Constitution and doubts were soon expressed as to the validity of this Preamble. 1n the Preamble itself, a new clause had appeared which had not been the e in earlier drafts and was not in the Officials' Scheme: The association of the three territories...in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when the inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards thg attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.‘ This clause seemed to indicate that federation was a stepping- stone towards independence. Admittedly there was the saving clause "when the inhabitants of the territories so desire." But what did "inhabitants” mean? James Griffiths, former Secretary of State for the Colonies explained that "Inhabi— tants means inhabitants without any qualification of colour, race or creed." Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then Secretary of State for the Colonies in agreement with Griffiths said: By the majority of the people I agree with the Rt. Hon. Gentleman that we mean the inhabitants which he said are the inhabitants... Nothing short of that will enable any government to approve of a scheme of amalga- mation or of a status which will end in dominion status without the agreement of the majorlty of the inhabitants. I give a categorical assurance about that.26 This sounded very well to the.Africans and liberals but Mr. 25The Federal Scheme, Clause (e), Cmd. 875%, 1953. 26Quoted in Hansard, July 24, 1953. Col. 1969. -51.. Roy Welensky had a different view. He contended that "the pledge that independence could not be granted before a majority of the inhabitants wanted it did not mean that the natives had the right to veto anything which would be in the best interests of the Federation."27 Another European member in the Federal Assembly said that what was meant by the "majority of the inhabitants" was really the "majority of the voters," who were of course the Europeans. On the Preamble itself Sir Godfrey Huggins said, "Let us, for the sake of Federation, wiich was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble, Lave patience." q Secondly, the composition of the Federal Assembly was altered to the detriment of the.&fricans. The Minister for African Interests, whom the Rhodesian whites called "the cuckoo in the nest," was drOpped. In the Officials' original scheme the Europeans would have controlled twenty-six seats in the assembly; in the final scheme the; controlled twenty- nine, that is three-quarters of the total. Third, the African Affairs Board was reduced to a standing committee of the Federal Assembly. Its membership was reduced from nine to six, the three Secretaries for Native Affairs were dropped; one of these six was to be appointed chairman by the Governor-General. The functions and the powers of the Board were diminished. hr. G. A. Davenport, 27The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 5. 28Reported in Rhodesia Herald, July 31, 199+. -52- Southern Rhodesia Minister of Education said something that showed the weak position of the Board: The African Affairs Board would probably be necessary, if only to reassure the Natives. If the people in the African Affairs made a farce of it they could be replaced, and if the same thing happened a second time, the Board would have to go.2 Finally, the division of powers between the Federal and territorial governments was further weighted in favour of the Federal Government which was given control of foreign affairs, of the armed forces, of the economy, of communications, of some key develOpment services and the major sources of revenue. 1n the final scheme the following additional items were re oved from the list of territorial functions proposed by the Officials' conference. Some were transferred to the Federal Government, others went into a concurrent list in which both governments had power, but with federal law prevailing: "Income tax; European agriculture in Southern Rhodesia; veterinary service in Southern Rhodesia; co-operatives, except where the majority were Africans; marketing; health; town planning; European police forces; prisons; roads."30 The Federal Parliament was given the vital power to fix the first federal franchise. Bills affecting the electoral law and all constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds majority of the Federal Assembly, 29Ibid., June 25, 1952. 30The Africa Bureau, Iritain's Dilemma, p. 6. -53- that is, they would be in control of the European representatives. There was no doubt in any one's mind what this Federal Constitution meant, even in its earliest stage. At a meating of civil servants in Salisbury on October 23, 1952, the Southern Rhodesia Minister of Justice explained, "to tne extent that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have given up powers to the Federal Government, to that extent they have escaped from the domination of the Colonial Office..."31 On July 16, 1951, Sir Godfrey Huggins told his party that "Once the Imperial Government have granted this constitution they have lost all control- don't forget that."32 The Federation proposals were fought step by step in the British Parliament in the three years before they came into law 1953. The Labourites had begun by considering the_Officials' Scheme "a constructive proposal." But as they watched the treatment which African views were accorded in Central Africa, and observed the watering down of the scheme to the detriment of the Africans, they put up strong opposition. They withdrew all support for the proposals, and on several occasions divided the House. The Conservatives defended the scheme on the grounds that "it is a thoroughly comprehensive and liberal document and that, as far as human foresight *- _. ,7 7......__ ..—-_ .- -... —— - ._ .. -_ _.—_. ._ fl..- _i H ”H— , if - . - ”-— H — BlIbid. , p. 7. 321pig, -54- can see, it provides a means by which partnership between the races can be established."33 The Federal Scheme was approved by the House of Commons on harch 24, 1953, by forty-four Voters with the whips on the Labour and Liberal.parties voting against it. It was then referred to a referendum in Southern Rhodesia, which was held April 10, 1953. Out of a total of about three million Africans and 150,000 Europeans, there were h6,355 voters of whom only 380 were Africans. Eighty per cent votes were cast with 25,570 in favour and 1H,OOO against. In the legislature of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the African members were joined in opposition by the Europeans nominated to represent African interests, and in Nyasaland by the one Indian member of the Council. The Officials were instructed to vote with the Europeans.3H Then, by Act of Parliament on August 1, 1953, the British Government created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and by an Order in Council, the Federation was brought into being on September 3, 1953. The Federation was to be headed by a Governor-General appointed by the Queen to represent her. Lord Llewellin was made the first Governor- General with Sir Godfrey Huggins the First Prime Minister. 33Hansard, March 24, 1953, Col. 671. 3”The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 8. -55- Opposition to the Federal Proposals 1951-1953 Strong opposition was expressed by nearly all_Africans and by a few Europeans to the Federal proposals in Central Africa. To a minority of whites federation seemed a bad idea because the; disliked the combination of British liberalism and black nationalism, which they feared would "swamp" them. White supremacists like 3. A. Stockil, Smit, and Olley opposed federation because they abhorred the idea of Europeans sitting in the same parliament with.Africans, the idea of partnership with the blacks,and they feared that they might lose an opportunity to achieve dominion status if Southern Rhodesia‘ federated with the north. Charles Olley maintained that partnership was a departure from the Southern Rhodesia policy of segregation. The Land Apportionment Act, the Native Urban Areas Accomodation and Registration Act and the several pass laws for him remained the authorities of Southern Rhodesia in governing the black proletariat and must therefore not be changed. To anti-federalists, partnership meant equality with white men and an increasing number of Africans on the voter's roll, which must ultimately oust white power in parliament. It meant equality of opportunity in commerce and industry contrary to the terms of the Industrial Concilliation Act of 1934, and here again it must undermine white progress and finally it meant integration of races, miscegenation and -56.. the mongrelization of the white species.3S Charles Olley was expressing the Opinions of many Europeans in ihodesia. Among the majority of Africans in Central Africa there was a very strong feeling against any form of closer union. The memoranda and submissions of 1951 to 1953 prepared by the Protectorate Councils, hational Congresses and other bodies deal directly with the proposals for a particular form of federation contained in the Government White Papers Cmd. 8233 and Cmd. 874. The Nyasaland.African National Congress Memorandum36 on closer association in Central Africa addressed to the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. James Griffiths rejected federation for several reasons. They feared that the acceptance of partnership would have meant the recognition of Europeans and other aliens as co-owners of the land. Nyasaland was a protectorate and wished to remain so, under federation she might lose this political status. Nyasaland was anxious to gain her independence as India had done. .After examining the report of the 1951 Conference held at the Victoria Falls the memorandum stated: "We can go on showing that federation for the Africans is a dangerous thing to plunge into- chiefs, peasants, artisans, teachers, in fact all sorts of Africans are unanimous on this total rejection of federation." On April 6, 1953, the 35Rhodesia Herald, January 5, 1952, p. 5. See also Boris Gussman, Out in the Mid-day Sun (London: George Allen a Unwin Ltd., 1962), p.‘h1. 36The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 1%. -57- Nyasaland.African National Congress issued a statement on Non-Violent Movement Against Federation. It was resolved "that a Supreme Council of action consisting of representative Chiefs, members of the Legislative Council, Congress and people from various organizations be set up immediately which Council shall consider and direct the resistance movement." Even the .African delegates to the 1951 Conference had gone there with an avowed intent to oppose federation.37 A delegation of chiefs from Nyasaland arrived in London in January, 1953 and met the Secretary of State on February #. They expressed their bitter disappointment at being refused access to the Queen whom they wished to present their petition against federation. Nevertheless, the fight continued. In Northern Rhodesia Africans were almost unanimous in their opposition to federation. Only a few expressed the desire to consider federation after a clear definition of partnership. On August 24, 1951, Government Officials reported that hundreds of thousands of.Africans had rejected the idea of federation at meetings held throughout the country. Only the Native authority tribal councils in Ft. Jameson, which represented 140,000 Africans seemed to have acqiesced.38 Some of the reasons for the dislike of closer union were the lack of power given to African chiefs in Southern 37Rhodesia Herald, October 5, 1951, p. 9. 38M', 'AugUSt 24, 1951, p0 lo ~58- nhodesia, limitation of employment in public service, European Trade Union's policy of restricting the scope of the African in skilled and semi-skilled trades and they feared to lose their status as a pr0tectorate. In 1952, two delegations of Northern Rhodesia Africans visited Britain to inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Lritish of their people‘s unanimous opposition to the Federal Scheme. .African members of the.&frican National Congress addressed a petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations. They also petitioned the speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor: We appeal to Her Najesty's House of Commons/ House of Lords to grant us hearing...and we respectfully request you Sir/ Your Lordship, to allow this to be done before any legislation is brought before Parliament to enable federation to be imposed Upon us against our will. We believe that the grounds of our appeal are those of right and justice, and the principles cherished and taught by Britain of government by consent of the governed. african opposition in Southern Rhodesia as expressed by chiefs and various African organizations was based on three main points. They feared that there would be no direct representation of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Parliament; that Southern Rhodesia policy "repressive and discriminatory," would tend to spread to the other two territories under federation; and that if african development in Southern Rhodesia were 39Africa Bureau, p. 18. -59- not to be held back, Central africa would have to be stronger economically before federation took place. The safeguards for African interests were not sound and partnership had never been practiced in Southern Rhodesia although Huggins claimed it had been.1+0 The Fabians in Zritain were convinced that the major obstacle to federation was that Africans were not convinced of the urgent need for it; it had never been explained to them in terms they could appreciate and the official report failed to convince them. No African would believe that better economic planning and better control of immigration could be achieved only by political federation. The.&fricans were opposed to a strong central government that would delegate much of the power formerly held by the United Kingdom to the local European community. The veto power that was to be given to the Minister for African Interests would never be effective for in Southern Rhodesia Britain had never used it against laws that discriminate against Africans. Horse still the special minister was drOpped in the final scheme. The wider power given to the European community would nullify the protection Britain had guaranteed to the.africans in the north by treaty and 1+1 by statement of policy. In Scotland Dr. Kamuzu Banda gave several addresses opposing federation and he sent MORhodesia Herald,.&ugust 22, 1951, p. l. Lt11bid., August 2, 1951, p. 3. -60- out thousands of pamphlets urging.&fricans to oppose any form of closer association with the Bhodesias.42 European politicians themselves did much to increase AfriCan suspicion of federation by the careless speeches and remarks which they made concerning Africans and the Special safeguards for African interests. Mr. Patrick Fletcher, then Minister for Native Affairs in Southern Rhodesia said in derision, "After all african opinion did not count."1+3 Of course it did count in London. Here is an example of reckless extravagant and unjustifiable statements made by some Europeans of the White Rhodesia Council, which SprinC from fear, sus;icion, and hate: If you believe in white supremacy, if you believe in keeping the flack man out of White Parliament, if you believe that white men and white women should be the artisans, typists, and clerks, if you believe that the natives ought to be retained as the peasants to grow food for the rest, if you believe in keeping hordes of natives out of white towns and stopping them from overwhelming the Europeans, then suppgrt the policy of the W ite Rhodesia Council.r This white supremacy chain letter was circulated to whites in Centra Africa and was read to hr. Griffiths by Africans at a time when he was persuading Africans to accept the principle of federation. Nothing could have hurt the federalists more than such a letter. M2Philip Nason, The Year of Decision (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 22. 1+3ibid., p. 26. Lfibfihodesia herald, August 30, 1951, p. l. -61- Huggin's reassurances to Euro,eans of continued European domination increased African suSpicion of federation. There is no need to fear a black parliament, he said to the United Central.éfrican Association, "the whole thing is fantastic; it would not happen in fifty or sixty years" for Europeans could make laws to ensure their survival; if too many.&fricans registered as voters, the qualifications could always be raised.1+5 During the 1951 Victoria Falls Conference the debate on federation degenerated to nothing Lore than an attack on the Colonial Secretary and a display of contemptuous superiority towards African leaders. Huggins himself made. some thoughtless remarks which were unstatesmanlike and caused much illfeeling. Roy Welensky was no exception.1+6 The EurOpeans wanted independence for themselves. It is their doctrine of white domination that Africans detested. The Africans hated to be reduced to a permanent position of subjugation and inferiority. The crucial point about federation had never been mentioned: that it was a means of transferring the substance of power from London to a European-controlled Central African Government. This, above all, was what the Europeans wanted, and this above all, was what the Africans feared. This time the Europeans were victorious. The Federation of Central Africa came into being in l953 “5, rason, The Year of Decision, p. 43. ”égpodesia Herald, December 3, 1951, p. 1, and December 21, 1951, p. l. -62- against the will, clearly and passionately expressed, of 7" the African people. wy tLis act, the seeds of future trouble were irrevocably sown. Chapter IV Federation in Operation: Progress and Disillusionment The Federal Act of 1953 combined together three diverse territories: Southern Rhodesia, the most highly developed, with a fully developed system of separation between the races in land, industry, and agriculture; Northern Rhodesia, with its one great asset of the Copperbelt and its undeveloped hinterland, possessing a small and privileged white community in a country controlled by the Colonial Office in the interests of the Africans; and Nyasaland, poor, almost entirely African, living primarily on agricultural products' and the export of its abundant cheap labour, and confidently expecting an African government. The Federal Legislature and the Franchise The first Federal Assembly, which was constituted in December, 1953, consisted of thirty-five members. Of these, three were Europeans to represent african interests, and six were African members, two being elected from each territory under special arrangements. The remaining twenty-six members were all Europeans elected on qualitative franchises differing from territory to territory. Although these seats were open to all races, due to the nature of the franchise no 1 Africans could be elected. The Federal executive consisted lCmnd. 1148, p. 35. -64- of a Governor General who represented the Crown and appointed the Prime Minister and other ministers. There was also a Federal Supreme Court with jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the handling of any dispute between a territorial government and the Federal Government, and appelate jurisdiction from the territorial courts. The court was made up of a Chief Justice appointed by the Federal Government, the Chief Justices of the three territories, and not less than two nor more than six other justices appointed by the Federal Government.2 By the Constitution Amendment Act of 1957, the Federal Assembly was enlarged to fifty-nine members. The three European members charged with special responsibilities for African interests remained; four.African members, two each from the Northern Territories, were specially elected by Africans; eight African members were elected on a special Federal franchise, of whom four were from Southern Rhodesia and two from each of the Northern Territories. Forty-four members were all Europeans elected on a higher Federal franchise, twenty-two from Southern Rhodesia, fourteen from Northern Rhodesia and six from Nyasaland.3 In 1957, the first federal franchise was introduced. It was based on a system of two rolls, a special roll and a general roll. Both were open to all races, but the high 2C. Leys, pp. H8-9. 31b1d., p. M3. -65- economic and educational qualifications for the general roll in practice restricted it to Europeans. The special roll was powerless and was designed mainly to enable more .Africans to register as voters. These voters were eligible to vote only for the eight elected members and for the Southern Rhodesia European member wit special responsibilities for African interests. For the forty-four elected members, only general voters could vote. There were less than 2,0CC Africans on the general roll while other races on this roll numbered approximately C0,0CC. The African vote therefore could not exercise any significant influence in the election of three- quarters of the Federal assembly. .All this created the feeling that the Federal Parliament was dominated by Europeans. COKEOSITIfN OF TEE FEDEZAL PAYLIAIE T, 1957L+ S. Rhodesia N. Rhodesia Nyasaland Total Kembers elected by voters on General Roll (flace not specified) 24 l’+ 6 an electorate mainly European African hembers 4 2 2 elected by voters elected by elected by on General Roll .African African and Special Roll Electoral Electoral voting together Colleges Colleges 2 2 l2 elected as in S. Rhodesia European Kembers Representing.African Interests l l l 3 elected as above appointed by the Governors 29 19 11 .59 n lbid., p. 235. ...(Qé- m r- a e ' m ‘ ,., fl " To be legistered as a general voter, a person was required to have one of the following qualifications: (i) Income of 720 pounds per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at 1,500 (ii) Income of #80 pounds per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at l,OCO plus the completion of a primary course of education (iii) income of three hundred pounos per annum or owne'ship of five hundred pounds plus the completion of a four-year course of secondary education (iv) Being a recognized minister of religion (v) Feing a chief capable of satisfying ‘he literacy The qualifications for a special roll were litsracy and: (i) 240 pounds a year or (ii) 120 pounds a year plus two years completed secondary education. All voters on both rolls were to be at least twenty-one years of age, citizens or kritish protected persons, able to speak, read, write %n and understan English and complete the prescribed voting form. The Federal franchise violated the common roll principle by dividing the electorate into two separate classes, rdinary and special voters. The distinction between them was based on property and education, not race. but it so happened that almost every European in the Federation was an ordinary voter, while very few Africans could be, and almost all Special voters were Africans. Since the special vote was weak and the SIbid., p. 236. -67.. ordinary vote powerful, this worked out as "discriminatory representation masquerading as ideal common roll democracy."6 It gave the substance of power to Europeans. The ordinary roll, in practice, was a European roll and the forty-four members elected by it were European representatives of a European minority. A5 general voters were allowed to vote for the special African representatives, all members of parliament were elected by a European majority. It is quite obvious that the intention behind the franchise was to keep decisive political power in European hands for as long as possible. Africans could not qualify as general voters because of limited educational and economic attainment. Secondary education is completely out of the reach of the majority of the Africans. For example, the number of Africans who reached School Certificate level (Form IV) in Southern Rhodesia in 1955 was seventy; the number reaching Standard Six in 195% was H,429. These figures were much lower in the Northern Territories. The educational system does not offer a wide avenue of advance to.&fricans who are unable to satisfy the highest, or even the middle, means of qualification. The highest income qualification was well below the average of European income, which was approximately 1,10C pounds in 1956. The average income of Africans in employment in 1956 was approximately 6T. R. M. Creighton The Anatomy of Partnership (Faber and Faber, 1960), p. é -68.. seventy pounds per annum. The average income of all.africans in the Federation was, however, far lower than this.7 These principal provisions of the Federal franchise were not part of the Constitution. The Constitution empowered the Federal Parliament to pass its own electoral laws by a simple two-thirds majority, subject to the theoretical veto of Her kajesty's Government. The Southern Rhodesia franchise after 1957 was almost identical with the Federal franchise. .although there is no discrimination in terms of race in the Electoral Amendment of 1957, the roll has remained, in practice, predominantly European. There is also a provision for a lower roll but when the number of voters with lower qualifications amounts to twenty per cent of the number of the other voters, no more will be enrolled without full qualification. The legislative assembly consisted of thirty members. There were no Africans then sitting in parliament. The ministers are chosen from the majority party, as at Westminister. The Nyasaland Executive Council was appointed by the Governor. The legislative council consisted of twelve civil servants, ex officio, six representatives of the non~éfrican community elected on a non—African roll by constituencies, and some African members. Up to 1959, there were five African legislators to eighteen others in a pepulation of three million 7Leys, pp. 239-40. -69.. .Africans and about 10,000 other races. The.&fricans felt they were not adequately represented in government. The system of government by appointment did not work well in Nyasaland for the Governor was inclined to appoint those Africans who supported his policies. If the majority were against his policy, the Governor's nominees could not have represented African wishes. They did not enjoy African confidence.8 Nyasaland participated in the federal franchise under the arrangements described above. Northern Rhodesia was ruled by Governors appointed in the same way as Hyasaland until 1958 when a new constitution was introduced by the Colonial Secretary. The franchise was similar to the Federal one and suffered from the same defects. The major difference between the two is that the former was a compromise between rule by governor's appointment and rule by an electorate, the federal was almost completely elective. But there were only six nominated officials, and two other Governor's nominees, to twenty-two elected members in a House of thirty. However, the largest single block in Northern Rhodesia legislature, and the executive council, was nominated by the Governor. Two of the elected members were to be Africans and two were to be Europeans under the constitution. All other seats were open to any race. This attempt to reduce the racial element in politics would have been praiseworthy 8Creighton, pp. 82-3. -70- if it were accompanied by an extension of the franchise. In the territorial elections of 1959, there were nine.Africans including two nominated by the Governor to represent three million and thirteen Europeans to represent 80,000.9 i The Executive Council of Ministers was composed of four civil servants, and six unofficial members, of whom two were Africans. All were appointed by the Governor, but he was obliged to nominate the Africans from the party with the majority of elected members. Under the new Constitution, the territorial branch of the Federal Government Party, Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party, held much power. But the majority of the.Africans did not support the Federal Party,lC perhaps because of its policies which resembled those of «x 1% Ab Southern hodesia. Racial Discrimination and Partnership Racial discrimination was one of the forces working against Federation. The reference to "partnership" in the Preamble to the 1953 Constitution led many Africans to believe that discrimination would quickly be eliminated. But discrimination did not disappear and partnership remained undefined. The result was a growing suspicion and disillusionment with federation among the.Africans. Discrimination remained rigid and entrenched by law in Southern Rhodesia. The maintenance 9Ibid., p. 8%. lOIhid. -71- of colour bar in Southern Rhodesia turned the.Africans of the Northern Territories, and many of those within Southern Rhodesia itself, against the Europeans who control it.11 The concept of partnership originated in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920's to enable a small white minority to live in a country where the Colonial Office held African interests paramount. The lritish Government and the Colonial Office viewed partnership as a partnership of individuals in a single society, while the hhodesian whites thought of a partnership between separate racial groups of quite unequal size. The Federal Government adopted the Southern Rhodesian interpretation of partnership as its racial policy. It I regarded European interests as paramount and partnership as a means to accommodate a bit of African development at a very slow pace. This interpretation "is the original conception of partnership turned upside down."12 The Europeans refused to extend the franchise, to carry out land reforms or economic integration or even social integration between the races. .Africans desired a general partnership of all individual members of society irrespective of colour, a partnership in which men have the same economic and political rights. Partnership was not an integral part of the Federal Constitution, tte only reference to it is in the Preamble which stated that: llCmnd. 1148, p. 75. 12Creighton, p. 10%. -72- The association of the colony of Southern Rhodesia and the territories in a federation would conduce to the security, advancement and welfare of all, their inhabitants and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants.l Lord Hailey remarked that partnership has "a moral rather than a political connotation," and that it is "rather an inspiration "14 It seems then that the word was just a vague than a policy. expression of goodwill as it was not binding as were the provisions in the Constitution. Southern Rhodesia accepted partnership for the sake of economic advance, not from enthsiasm for it as a positive ideal, for Lord halvern said, "Let us for the sake of federation, which was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble which was forced upon us, have patience."15 While hr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies then, talked exaltedly a out partnership and the Preamble, Mr. Julian Greenfield, Hinister of Law for Southern Rhodesia, talked in quite a different way: "One of the principal reasons for having this federation at all is to get as much power as possible out of the hands of the people far away in London."16 When Mr. Dauti Yamba, an African representative in the Federal Assembly, asked for equal treatment for all races in the Federation, Sir Godfrey Huggins said: "There is going to be inequality and differentiation. To pretend there is not l3Ibid., p. 101. lhlbid. 15 Rhodesia Herald., July 31, 195%. 6Quoted in Ha sard, March 2%, 1953, Col. 679. -73- is to deceive everybody." There was not much done to produce a stable interracial society. Sir Roy Welensky envisaged partnership at best "not one between the races, but between the Europeans as a whole and certain selected Africans,"17 and at worst as "the Partnership between horse and rider."18 The Federal Congress defined it in 1952 as "the gradual xtensicn of political rights and privileges to civilized standards of behavior and culture." But any system of partnership which does not carry with it the implications of at least equality of political representation between the groups concerned today is the partnership of "horse and rider." In Southern Rhodesia there is a limited form of home- ownership in urban areas; few hotels have applied for registration as multiracial hotels, the Land Apportionment .dct continues to operate; pass laws require every black man to carry a piece of paper to identify himself and he is arrested if he is found without one; social contact between the races is impossible; and the African vote does not count at all.19 Mr. R. s. 0. Todd, ex-Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, pointed out in 1958 that: "After five years of so called partnership, an African citizen clean, well-dressed, educated and ambitious...remains a second class citizen unable to enter a cinema or become a fireman on the Government-owned railways."20 17Quoted in Creighton, p. 102. 18 - a T 1 r Attributed to hora halvern 19See T. N. Franck, Pace and Nationalism, pp. 22h—35. 20 . . , Quoted in Creighton, D. 103. -7h_ The Federal Government, however, did succeed in desegregating Post Offices. In 1959, the Federal Government finally announced that it would no longer maintain racially segregated Post Offices in Southern Rhodesia. his policy had already been accepted in Northern Rhodesia and Ryasaland before Federation. But in many other instances, the Federal Government missed several chances to make friends with the africans. Another area of partial success was at the university level. In 1957, the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was opened. The college tried to do something that had never been done before, to create a genuinely interracial university. But many whites protested having their children live in the same dormitories or eating in the same dining-halls with the Africans. After Eritain insisted that students live together, the whites agreed provided the students slept in different rooms according to race. However, there is no segregation in teaching, sports or any other official activity. The major criticism of the university is its high entrance qualifications. The best way of ensuring a white majority at the colleg (9 without openly admitting any racial distiiction was to put the entrance qualifications and academic standards ‘beyond the reach of most Africans. The minimum requirement is a good Higher Certificate (Form V1) for entrance to the college. There are many other restrictions which make it difficult for the college to function as a truly interracial institution. Economic Progress and Problems The advocates for the Central African Federation harped primarily on the economic advantages that could be reaped from closer co-operation between the three territories. This argument was accepted as valid in many quarters of Britain and Central Africa. Yet a strict analysis of the economic situation revealed some startling results especially among t.e African people. in uncritical respect for statistics often led to an exaggeration of the economic achievements of Federation. Host observers accepted the crude figures without asking who benefited from the growth that took place. The money economy, which is European dominated, is wrongly equated with the whole economy. The underlying truth is that over ninety per cent of the Africans live a subsistence life. Very often economists in Central Africa want to make comparisons between the money economy of the Federation and that of the other countries, as though the subsistence economy did not exist. The Federation‘s economy was a stratified one with wide gaps between the strata.21 That economic expansion, as measured by conventional indicators, took place during the federation cannot be doubted. But to say these gains were brought about by federation is a fallacy that ought to be disxissed. Economic 218hirley Williams, Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality (London: Fabian Commonwealth Euroau, 1960), p. l. -76- relations between the three territories were not hostile before federation. Changes in the political and administrative machinery in themselves had little impact on the size of the market area. Also it was not the case that as a result of federation the produce of each territory would be more widely used in the other territories. In itself federation did not affect the use of Southern Rhodesian coal and tobacco in Northern Bhodesia, or Northern Rhodesia copper in Southern Rhodesia, or of Nyasaland tea in the Rhodesias. The achievements of the Central African Economy can largely be explained by the action of normal economic forces which had been little affected by the changed governmental structure of the area. For instance, in Nyasaland there was a dynamic economic growt. between 1947 and 1953 when Nyasaland's revenue increased from just over one nillion pounds to four million pounds. Yet between 1953 and 1957 there was only 1,000,0CO pounds rise in the economy. Between 1948 and 1953 there was a tremendous increase in European crops, tea and tobacco, and in.african-grown crops.22 The course of econ mic policy set during federation might have worked, in the long term, to the 9-4 economic disadvantage of the Africans.23 In iis Dawn in gyasa and, Guy Clutton Brock concludes that: 22 23William F. Barber, in C. Leys and C. Pratt (eds.), a New Deal in Central.dfrica (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1960), pp. 59—81. Economists at the College of Rhodesia and Kyasaland discussed this matter, as well as members of the Chamber of Commerce. The Jack heport on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958/195 , is very enlightening. ‘he Report Stresses the econoric advantage of federation. The Central african Examiner, Feb. 13, 1960, p. 24. The overall umbrella of Federation wi h its increasing political restrictions tends to arrest the real development of Nyasa and. It is a stumbling block to economic progress. The country has surrendered its economic and political independence and thus lost its mainN incentive to develop its once viable economy.“+ With the arrival of Sir Geoffrey Colby as Governor in 19MB, a man whose dynamic economic policy helped to increase Nyasaland's revenue, the rate of economic development increased tremendously. The next question to ask is, what effects had federation on the distribution of gains from economic growth both on the individual territories and on the different racial groups in Central Africa? The following table is revealing: Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits: Ordinary Receipts, Territorial 2: and Federal Governments in CO0,0CO'S pounds: / Year 3. Fhod. N. Fhod. Nyas. Fed. Total 1951 21.2 17.8 3.1 ---- 42.1 1952 28.5 32.2 3.2 ~--- 63.9 1953 22.3 39.9 u.5 -——- 66.7 1956-57 17.1 19.3 6.3 53.0 95.7 1957-56 19.7 19.0 5.5 56.4 100.6 This table rev als a dramatic drop in receipts by the Northern Rhodesian Government after Federation. In the last pre- federation year, Northern Rhodesia collected about sixty per cent of Central african public revenue; by 1957-58, its share had fallen to less than twenty per cent. It is clear that its revenues would have been much higher if it had not shared taxes on the COpper industry with other 2“The Central african Examiner, op. cit. A C,“ ' l 1 ‘Jrarber, in C. Leys and C. Pratt, p. 83. ~78- governments. The Coppertelt was definitely the financial backbone of the federal fiscal structure for it made th major financial contribution to Federation in taxes. Southern Rhodesia benefited enormously by being relieved of expensive responsibilities which she passed to Federal jurisdiction. The major expenditure items transferred to the Federal Government were those which provided services primarily for Europeans such as agriculture and non-African education. The comparisons of territorial revenues before and after 1953 indicate that Nyasaland had larger sums at its disposal after federation, but it was scarcely touched by these major changes in th Federation owing to its small European pOpulation. European agriculture remained a territorial hatter in Nyasaland while European agriculture in the Rhodesias became a Federal reSponsibility. The Federal Government assumed primary responsibility for road, railway and air transport, for posts and telegraphs, and for the development of power. Territorial governments were thus relieved of expenditures which they would otherwise have been called upon to finance. Once again, Southern Rhodesia benefited most from these changes as most of the developments took place in that territory. Hyasaland received benefits from the Federation in one category of services. Expenditure on public health, which was then a Federal responsibility, increased in Hyasaland during Federation. In 1958 recurrent expenditure on health -79- services amounted to one million pounds compared with less than 300,000 pounds before Federation.26 Development expenditures were overwhelmingly allocated to the Rhodesias. Out of an expenditure of 63.3 million pounds projected by the Federal Government for the 1955-5,, the largest single share was claimed by the Rhodesia iailways, roads and bridges for th Rhodesias, and a tele-communications system. In th e five financial years 195%- 19C,, lyasaland' 3 share of a total 140 million pounds was only 6.2 million pounds. It has been shown by students of the Central African economy that Eyasaland lid not benefit from the Federal Government's borrowings. Loans xmlich she got from the Colonial Development Corporation and the Rhodesian Selection Trust, and the grants from the Colonial Development and welfare Funds, benefited her bore than the Federal loans.27 The costs and benefits of government to the different t al U} o be cc nside red. Europeans were eligible for U) races nu many costly services which were either denied to Africans or availatle only to a few of them, such as #Le Land and Agricul- tural Bank, industrial loan boards, cheap labour recruited by the government, public funds, and government assistance for the aged or unemployed. The allocation of expenditures on education for Europeans and for Africans was unfair as the following table shows 26barber, in C. Leys and Pratt, p. 87. .... 271 id., r. 89. See also rontl 1y :igpst of Statistics, harch, 1959. 1'1 - 1‘ “—11 - ° * 28 Expenditure from nevenue Votes on Education in 000's Pounds: Year Euro ean -african 1950 16 1 11%3 1951 1925 1338 1952 2285 1498 1956-57 H66h 381% 1957-58 5533 4557 By 1958 EurOpean population in the Federation was less than 300,000 while African population amounted to more than seven million. This is its most obvious, most basic, and yet most neglected statistic. African education expenditures were borne by the territories, while European education was a Federal responsibility. .Africans always pointed out that only the Europeans were benefitting, since they had more money to spend on their children's education. Agriculture for the Africans lagged behind too. The following table is revealing: Expenditures from Revenue Votes on Agricultural Services in O the Biodesia's in 000's pounds:2’ Year European .African 1956-57 5074 1877 1957-58 6128 1672 Thus a discrepancy between the allocations received by the racial groups is observable in expenditures on agriculture. Federation segregated agricultural services for Europeans and Africans in Northern Rhodesia; formerly, this had been the case only in Southern Rhodesia. The European farmers drew far more heavily on public funds than the African farmers. 28Ibid., p. 90. 291bid., p. 91. -81— Wages had risen in Central Africa since the war for all races. The total wages for Africans in the Federation rose about 56.5 per cent between 195% and 1958. However, per capita wages rose less-~about thirty-one per cent, since the labour force itself increased by 163,00C during these four years. But when a comparison of wages between Europeans and Africans is made, the increases for the Africans fall into perspective: A n. ‘1 Comparison, Per Capita, of Average European and of average African Earnings Per Annum in the Federation: Territory European .1frican 30 S. Rhodesia 995 pounds 80 pounds N. Rhodesia 1273 pounds 99 pounds Nyasaland 889 pounds 46 pounds The best working conditions for Africans are found in the Northern Rhodesian COpperLelt. Even there the gap between the races during Federation was enormous. The average wage paid European employees in the year ending in June, 1956, was 2,390 pounds, in addition to 177 pounds housing, water, and electricity subsidies. The average wage including bonuses and benefits paid to Africans was eight shillings per shift or on the basis of 308 shifts, 123 pounds per year. African wages rose slightly during 1955-56, but their average remained at about one-twentieth that of the whites. There is a wide gap in pension schemes, life assurance, subsidized 30Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Economic Report, 1959. -82- cost-of-living allowance, and leave pay between the races.31 The Federal Government and territorial governments collected taxes from companies, personal income tax, poll tax, and indirect taxes on goods and services. Both racial groups contributed to the creation of profits because the success of tax-paying enterprise depends jointly on the capital, skill, and labour provided by Europeans and on the labour supplied by.Africans. Both racial groups pay direct taxes. The basic direct tax Africans are subject to is the poll tax. In 1957 approximately two million was collected in this way. Europeans feel direct taxation through income tax. Personal income tax payments to the Federal Government came to about 6,850,000 in 1957. In view of the differentials in average income between the groups, direct income pinched more sharply on the African than on the European. .all adult male Africans who were judged to be able bodied had to pay direct taxes, regardless of the size of their income. 0n the other hand, under the Federal income tax structure, a married European with three children could enjoy a tax-free income up to 1,733 pounds per annum if he paid 100 pounds to a nedical aid society and if he saved 100 pounds per year in a pension fund.32 The Federal Government was successful in pursuing an impressive development plan of building the Kariba Dam 31Franck, pp. 277-78. I) 3‘Barter, p. 93. -83- and of nod rnizing the Rhodesia Railways. Vast Quantities of electricity are now generated from the dam to the Copper- belt and to the main industrial centres of Southern Rhodesia. Both schemes have brought indirect benefits to all the aces in the form of new opportunities for work and the possibilities of better wages, out the sch mes were intended to enhance still further the wealth of the European-dominated sector of the econo y. The railway serves the European towns, the Cepperbelt, and European farms. But th re is still a serious problem of transportation in the rural districts where the peasants depend on agriculture. Although the Federal Public Service was created under a constitutional guarantee that all races would receive equal treatment, very few Africans were appointed under this provi- sion to high positions. One was a doctor, the late Dr. danuel Farirenyatwa, and another was Lawrence Vambe, a journalist who was posted to the information staff of Rhodesia House in London. Both were employed under conditions identical to those of Europeans occupying similar posts. Beyond that, there was little evidence of African advancement and equality in the Federal Service. There were many areas of civil service where here was disparity in wages. The Federal Government practiced discrimination in the army, on railroads, in immigration policy, in the enactment of the Federal franchise, in housing, education, and welfare services in areas of federal employment. Chapter V The Ereakup of the Federation “...it was generally acknowledged that opposition to Federation was there, that it was deeply rooted and almost universally held." The visiting Government Ministers and European spokesmen from Central Africa often denied the unanimity of opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Eyasaland. They contended that opposition was confined only to a few ambitious leaders, that the majority of the Africans did not understand the issues, and that the African National Congress in the territories did not represent the people. These people were blind to the truth; there is enough evidence to show the constancy of African opposition. The strongest African organization against Federation was the African National Congress within the Federation. The Southern Rhodesia Congress was led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, originally one of Lord halvern's proteges. Congress there concentrated its efforts against the Land Husbandry.Act of 1951. The Act enables the Government to work towards a complete system of individual land tenure in the Native Areas, so that Africans who wish to own land must live on it and farm it; and to create a stable community of urban Africans by providing family accomodation in the towns which, in some municipalities, 1Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (The Devlin Commission), Para. R3. Quoted in Leys and Pratt, p. Xi. -85— it is now possible for Africans to buy lease-hold on very long leases.2 The Nationalist leaders attacked the scheme because it did not provide adequate land for Africans in the rural areas and did not provide old-age pensions, social security, and closer integration of.Africans into the industrial economy for urban Africans. They also demanded universal suffrage. In Northern Rhodesia, the Zambia National Congress was led by Fr. Kenneth Kaunda, new President of the Republic of Zambia. In July 1958, Dr. Tastings Banda arrived in Eyasaland to assume leadership of the Nyasaland .African Fational Congress. He demanded universal suffrage and an.African majority in the Legislative Council. Supported by schoolmasters, social welfare officers, clerks, and other white collar workers,.African Nationalism became an effective political force in Central Africa.3 By the end of 1958, the United Federal Party, which dominated the Federal Government, was talking of some form of Dominion status within three years. In fact, Lord Nalvern had asked the British Government in 1956 for a Constitutional advance for the Federation to Dominion status. But the Colonial Office replied that it could not change the Constitution in u the way Lord halvern had asked it should be. The National Congress reacted sharply against constitutional proposals that denied any prospect of equality. In 1959, the Africans (Leys, pp. 29-300 3Gann and Gelfand, p. 263. Movement for Colonial Freedom, handbook for Federal Politicians, London, August, 195a, p. 11. -€6— struck, especially in Nyasaland where there was violence. The political explosions of February and Earch, 1959, shook the foundations of life in the Federation. There were three immediate causes of the Emergency of 1959. The first was the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland after many years of study in America and Scotland and medical practice in England and Ghana. He at once took command of the Congress and demanded that the Protectorate secede from the Federation. In five months eighty-three branches of the Congress increased to two hundred. For the first time the Europeans were confronted with an African political leader with the skill to rally the masses be ind him. However, the Federal Government in Salisbury waited with anxiety to "teach the natives a lesson" by nipping African power in the bud. The second event was the holding in Accra, Ghana, in ) December 1953, of the first pan-African Conference. Dr. Dand~ and Lessrs Kaunda and Ekumbula from Northern RLodesia, are alleged to have signed a declaration pledging them to break up the Federation and to drive the Europeans out of Africa.5 The third factor was another allegation based upon informers. It as charged that 150 African leaders in Kyasaland held a meeting on January 25, 1959, during w ich a plot was made to massacre Eyasaland's 8,000 Europeans, its Asian population, and those Africans too friendly to European Smelensky, p. 113. -87- Government. Dr. Landa himself was not present at the meeting. Later, Alan Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary in London, stated that "massacre”, widespread violence, and murder were being planned. Tensions continued to grow in Nyasaland until, by the 20th of Pebrua y, Open defiance of District Commissioners, stoning of police cars, and riots had become frequent. The Governor, Sir hobert Armitage, asked for Federal troops to maintain order, and these were dispatched from Southern Rhodesia. Sir Edgar hhitehead, the Prime Ninister of Southern Rhodesia then, was the first to take action against the Nationalist leaders and their followers. On February 26 he declared a state of emergency and "potential trouble makers" were rounded up. The Southern Rhodesia African National Congress and three other congresses with branches in the colony were banned. 475 members were arrested in pre-dawn raids and jailed. No riots had occurred in the country but the Prime Iinister explained that the action was precautionary. 1n Fyasaland an emergency was declared on larch 3 and Dr. Banda and 13286 of his leaders and followers were arrested. He and a few aides were deported to a prison in dwelo, Southern Rhodesia. Some of these arrests were Lollowed by violence, notably at Jkata lay where twenty Africans were killed by 60. Richardson, The Future of a Z;lcmna, p. 7. -88- troops. In Northern Rhodesia the Zambia National Congress was declared illegal and Fr. Iaunda and his chief aides were rusticated to a remote part of the territory. No general emergency was proclaimed in Northern Rhodesia. In the two Forthern Territories fifty-four Africans were killed by Federal troops. In hyasaland Africans were brutally treated, houses were burned and heavy collective fines were exacted for damages done. Yo Europeans were killed during the riots; a few were injured. .All these events rake one general Emergency, which is still fresh in the minds of many Africans. The action taken by the Federal and territorial governments intensified African hatred of Federation and confirmed the fear among the.Africans in the north of being dominated by the n Southern Rhodesian whites.’ Emergency legislation8 passed in the three territories, especially in Southern hhodesia, was broad and harsh. Sir Edgar's government introduced six Bills, notably tne Unlawful Organizations act which empow:red th- Governor to declare any organization unlawful if it appeared to him dangerous for public safety, and the Preventive Detention Act which enabled the Governor to make an order for the detention of persons involved in any of the activities which led to the state of emergency or any activity which might lead to another. These laws were to last for a period of five years. The use of 7Ibid. 8 hason, The Year of Decision, pp. 218-225. -89- boycotts and intimidation were proscribed. However, by mid-October, most of the Nyasa detainees had been released. .At the insistence of hr. Ian Kacleod, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dr. Danda was released. Even Kenneth Kaunda was allowed freedom of movement in Northern Rhodesia. Most of the Southern Rhodesian detainees remained in jail. The Lritish Press and Labour Members in the House of Commons bitterly criticized Sir Boy for the massive arrests and brutal treatment of the Nationalists. They charged that it was a brutal and barbaric diSplay of military streng h’by the Federal Government, and that it was an effort to terrorize the Africans into abject submission. Sir Boy was denounced as the embodiment of brutal imperialism.9 A Committee of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin, was appointed to investigate and report upon the Nyasaland disturbances and the events which led up to them. Their most controversial report was published on July 23, 1959. It condemned the policies of the British and Nyasaland Govern- ments and questioned the conception on which Federation was being constructed. It confirmed that rejection of Federation was general, almost universal and sincere, among the rich and the poor, the educated and the illiterate, and that the advantages and disadvantages of Federation were correctly interpreted and understood by most.&fricans. The report also maintained that 9Welensky, p. 122. -90- the government's refusal to heed the protests of Africans, or of any other critics of Federation, sustained as they were for over a period of six years, was resyonsible for the Emergency. The Comnission did not accept the Government's contention that Congress was a small gang of unprincipled agitators intimidating their fellow Africans into opposing a paternal government wLich they otherwise would have accepted with gratitude and devotion. They considered the Congress to be widely representative of African opinion as a whole. Nyasaland was described as "a police state," in which "it is not saie to eXpress approval of the policies of the Congress Party...and unwise to express any but the most restrained criticism of government policy."10 The report made it clear that government without consent becomes tyranny, and leads to violence and disturbances which are harder to condemn than the tyranny which causes them. Sir Roy Welensky did not agree with many of the Commission's conclusions. The events of February and Karch had profound effects. On the African side, policies of disorganized violence were discredited and non-violent propaganda techniques were adopted. New parties came into being: he halawi Congress in Nyasaland, the National Democratic Party in Southern Rhodesia, and the United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia. he NDP becare a more militant organization in the eyes of the 10Quoted in Creighton, p. 230. -91- government. Outbreaks of violence in Salisbury and Bulawayo resulted in some deaths of African rioters, and the colony had to drop its proud claim that no bloodshed had occurred since 1896. Leaders of the party were arrested and the party banned. The African parties in the north continued their fight against Federation and for national liberation and independence. heanwhile the hopes of independence for the Federation in 1960 were vanishing into thin air and faith in Federation was dwindling among the Europeans, especially followers of the Dominion Party, a segregationist party. The Federal Government in the coming negotiations was inevitably thrown on the defensive. Powerful disintegrating forces were at work. Besides the irreconcilable African parties of the north, the liberal Central Africa Party was calling for a modification of at least the Federal Structure in order to allow more to participate in government. The Dominion Party in Southern Rhodesia was loudly demanding secession and independence for the colony. .gainst these novements, the powerful but battered United Federal Party, stood for the continuation of Federation under European control. The party failed to attract African membership.ll Significant changes took place in 1959. In Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Todd, who had startled the public by calling for British troops to protect Airicans during the emergency, llWills, p. 3‘43. -92- demanded a massive and immediate end to colour bar. Not much was done but his successor, Sir Edgar Whitehead,l2 plunged into a fresh programme designed to improve the social position of the African. A new Education Act planned to bring every A-rican child into elementary school by 1964. The Trade Disputes Act, passed at length in 1959, was to allow multiracial trade unions by 1960. Post Cffices were desegregated, discrimination in the betting and lottery laws was removed, and the urban housing programme was accelerated. A proposal to abolish the Land Apportionment Act was defeated. In Northern Rhodesia public places were desegregated. Lhile strengthening her police forces, Nyasaland also increased African representation in the Legislature, providing an African majority on the official side for the first time, and introducing two Africans to the Executive Council. Article 99 of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasal nd provided that "not less than seven nor more than nine years from the date of the coming into force of this Constituti2n, there shall be convened a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three Territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective governments, for the purpose of reviewing this Constitution." In a joint declaration made by the United Kingdom and Federal Governments on 27th April, 1957, however, 12rason, The Year of Decision, pp. 226-27. -93- those governments announced their intention that the Conference should be held in 1960.13 Sefore the Conference was convened, a Royal Commission, headed by Viscount Honchton of Brenchley, was appointed to scudy the situation in the Federation and make recommendations for the forthcoming Conference to review the Federal Constitution. Its terms of reference for weeks had been the subject of controversy. The main issue was whether the right of secession should be a subject for consideration. On his tour of Africa, Prime minister garold Macmillan had assured Jelensky that the Commission would not be authorized to discuss the possible breakup of the Federation. Kevertheless, the Commission's report, when finally published in October after months of careful preparation, made it plain that its task had been impossible without recognizing secession as a political possibility.l4 All the Comnissioners, except two Africans from the Rorth, signed the report. nr. Habanyama from Northern Rhodesia and Er. Wellington Chirwa from Nyasaland, signed a dissenting report, saying that the continuance of a Federation not based on consent was unacceptable. Both of tnem favoured secession.15 The Commission recognized that the dissolution of the Federation was undesirable on economic grounds, but it stated clearly that if the association of the states were to continue, frican hostility must be overcome. There was therefore a need —~—-———~ ———-—. 15Cmnd. 1148, The henchtgnjgpmmissionfs Report, p. 6. 14Cmnd. 1148, p. 98. 15, nelensky, p. 269. -94- for drastic and fundamental changes in the structure of the Federation and in the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. he main recommendations were first, the Africans should have a higher proportion of seats in the Federal Assembly and that the franchise should be extended in order to make the assembly representative of "the broad mass of both African and European oyinion." Second, that the structure of the Federation should be altered by devolving powers on the territorial governments, leaving the Federal Government with reSponsibility only for external affairs, defence, and control of the economy. Third, that "unfairly discriminatory legislation should be removed in all territories," the Southern Rhodesia Pass Laws and the Land Apportionment Act being particularly mentioned. Such equitability of laws should be guaranteed by a Bill of hights to be entrenched into the constitutions of the Federal and member states, and by the establishment of Councils of State which would replace the African.Affairs Board in which the people had lost confidence. Lastly, the Commission advised that a "declaration of the intention of Her Lajesty's Government to permit secession by any of the territories, if so requested after a stated time or at a particular stage of constitutional development would have a very favourable effect, and might be decisive in securing a trial for a new A association." 16Cmnd. llhB. -95- This last recommendation provoked indignant protest among the Europeans in Central Africa, articularly the Federal Government. Welenshy, complaining that the British Prime Kinister had broken faith, declared bluntly that the preposal to permit secession by an individual territory would sound the death knell of the Federation. On the other hand, the defenders of the report in the House of Commons, pointed out that Lord Fonckton had honoured his terms of reference by recommending that Federation should continue, and that a secession clause in the Constitution would be a measure most likely to make its continuation possible. Herein lay the core of the difference between the points of View of the Federal and Imperial Governments. While the former considered that the Federation, whose survival was regarded as essential to the preservation of European civilization in Central Africa, was the product of European leadership and could only be maintained through such leadership, the British Government, observing the "wind of change" in Africa, recognized that the initiative was passing to the African people. To deny this initiative, its expression, was to court disaster.17 A possible solution to the Central African problem clearly outlined by the Menckton Conmissien was for the Europeans to abandon white supremacy and negotiate with the British Government for a new constitution giving political l7Wills, pp. 345-46. -96- representation to africans in some relation to their num ber and leading quickly to universal suffrage. let the Lur01e1ns refused to he nd over political power to the Afri cans or even to share it with them. They chose to "shelter behind their whiteness", a path which led to disaster. Lritain was left with one alternative, to abrogate the Federal '-OflStitUtiOl, revoke the Order in Council which created the Federation, and resume full res onsibility for Northern Rhodesia and LQasa land, . . . . . 18 . intr ob uCing genuinely liberal Constitutions that would give the majority political power. This is what the :ritish Government finally decided to do when they be are convinced hat Federation could not continue in the form it was. This action was not taken until after the geview Conference. The Conference Yet in London in Lecem er, 1 6C, with 0. Prime Yinister ' c illan in the clair an‘ laser 3 Sandys and Lacleod as alternative vie e cnair en. Those representiig the Federation were confronted with an array of nfrican Kationalists from the Horthern le’ritories, almost all of them bitter enemies of the federation. ene ver 3outhern hhodesian delegates spoke, Dr. lands and Er. Iaundn alhed out of the Confer ence. All the three airican lea3ers were al% agreed that Federation sheild be disso ved since the three territorial governzent s and the Federal Government were not r1 fully regresented. They expressed tteir keenness for continued -97- British Protection, but vehemently attacked the use of emergency powers, the inadequacy of African educational facilities, and the slowness of African emancipation from political domination by Europeans.19 No definite conclusions were arrived at and the Conference was to be resumed after the holidays. hr. Sandys enumerated the subjects to be discussed on the resumption of the Conference thus: the composition of the legislature, the franchise, the division of functions, safeguards against racial discrimination, and secession. It was announced too that constitutional talks for the Rhodesias should be completed, and in the light of their decisions reconvene the main Federal 20 Sir Toy was not pleased with the arrangement Conference. for he feared that Northern Rhodesia might get a constitution that would favour the Africans who were determined to destroy Federation. On January 30, 1961, the Northern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference began. The proposed scheme was: a legislative council of thirty members, either fifteen Africans and fifteen Europeans or sixteen Africans and fourteen Europeans; six nominated officials and two or three nominated unofficials (one an Asian) with some representative, but perhaps non-voting, chiefs; an executive council of four officials, three African and three European unofficials, assisted perhaps by the Parliamentary Secretaries, race unspecified, who would be 19Welensky, p. 286. 2olbid., p. 289. members of the gove nnent though not of the executive council itself; and a franchise which, by altering th qualifications for both upper and lower rolls, would produce an African “1 electorate of about 100,000.‘ 1 Again Sir Boy was indignant about the scheme for he wanted Northern Fhodesia to adopt the Fede al franchise. He denounced the schene as a sell-out of the Europeans in the territory and a clever plan to kill Federation. H warned Kacrillan that the scheme would drive douthorn Rhodesia out of the Federation. Sir Edgar Whitehead had threatened that if power was to be exercised by Africans Southern Rhodesia would not want to stay in the Federation with the two Northern Territories. Whitehead wanted no further revision of the Constitution, he wanted security and no further upset in t r) balance of pox-fer.“2 Worse still for Welenshy, Lacleod announced new electoral regulations for Eyasaland, which would enfranchise a considerable number of.ifricans. In Southern Rhodesia, on February 7, hr. Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Edgar Whitehead signed their agreed proposals for a new constitution for the colony. They recommended an assembly of 65, of whom 50 would be q l ordinary and 15 special members, elected on a complicated dual-roll franchise. This scheme, unlike the Northern Rhodesian one, ensured continued European control of government 211bid., p. 291. hason, Birth of a Dilcmga, p. 238. -99- and a step towards full independence for the Southern Rhodesian whites. Fro-n now on events moved at an amazing rapidity to the disadvantage of the protagonists of Federation. In Hyasaland, new elections were held on August 15 under the new constitution which ”ranto. the vote to the ma ority of the Q‘ Africans. The Fa la\.'i Congress Party won 2? out of the 28 elected seats in the legislative council and received 94 per cent of the total votes cast. This was an overwhelming and decisive victory for Dr. Ban a who took office at once virtually as Chief iristc The secessionist movement gathered momentum. B rly in July, the Chief Iinister went to London to demaid irrediate secession for Fyasaland. Keantine, Ir. Butler, first Secretary of State, iuolis ed two Orders in Council, the first on the delineation of constituencies in Northern Fhodesia the second, on the tring in of the long g debated constitution into being. aigain Sir Roy felt sta bed in the back for the Constitution a peared to h'i m to favour hr. Kaunda and CHIP to the detriment of the Europeans. he had hoped the Fritish Government would consider his objections to a constitution that rut the reins of government into the hands of what he called "uncivilized beings." Sir Roy Welenshy had ignored that Fr. hacnillan on several occasions rade it crystal clear that Eritain would not relinguish her obligation to protect the Northern Territories, native interests were p re ount there. After the October elections of Northern -lOC— Rhodesia, hr. Kaunda and hr. Kkumbula formed a coalition f‘ I overnment with the aim of breakine awar from the Federation.‘ \) DJ Thus, black governments were formed in the north to the hagrin of Sir Re; and his followers. The Federal Prime Iinister had serious disagreements with the British Prime fiinister over the proposed constitution for Northern Rhodesia. He pleaded in vain with the British Government to have the franchise qualifications kept high in Northern Rhodesia. Uelensky decided to have the last desperate fight to save the Federation by dissolving parliament to seek a mandate from the Federal electorate. He was now flogging a dead horse because the leaders of the territorial governnents were all decided on pulling away from the Federation. All the African parties, in all the three territories boycotted the elections, saying that they were totally opposed to the Federation and would take part only in elections based on the principle of "one man one vote." The European opposition party also refused to take part in the elections. Out of 59 seats, the Federal Party controlled 5%. Sir Roy’s victory was short lived. On Fovemher 5, Lord Alport, Tritish High Commissioner, delivered very disturbing news to the Federal Prime Iinister. The news was that the British Government had accepted the principle of the withdrawal of fyasaland from the Federation. Another 23Welensky, p. 3%8. -lOl- shock came from Southern Rhodesia. Sir ddgar Whitehead was defeated in the general elections by Fr. Winston Field who, Upon learning the results of the elections, declared "Federation is dead!" These events were interpreted as a prelude to the “1‘ .. - . 2H . . break-up of the Federation. ine Victorious panda also [7} demanded secession, "now, now, how." ihe new Southern Rhodesian Government also was opjosed to the continuance of Federation due to the creation of black governments in the north. The final blow came at the end of harch, 1963, when the British Government announced that "no territory can be kept in the Federation against its will, and it follows from this that any territory must be allowed to secede if it so wishes."25 Sir Roy responded by accusing the British Prise Finister of betraying the Federation. Since the Northern Rh desian Legislature had already passed a motion demanding secession, Federation was doomed. Both Dr. Banda and Er. Kaunda formally announced their intentions to secede from the Federation. Their request was granted Ly the British Government. A conference to dissolve the Central African Federation was held at Victoria Falls from June 28 to July 3, 1963. All three territorial governments were represented. Kyasaland was only represented by a delegation 2% D Ibido pp. 3LT/-54+o 2SAnnouncement by Harold hacnillan, Quoted in Helensky, p. 3590 -lO2- of three official observers. Dr. .anda did not attend. The Conference decided to set up a committee for dissolving the Federation and another for considering interterritorial questions, including economic links. The dissolving committee worked out detailed arrangements for reversion of federal functions to territorial rosyonsibility. It consisted of officials representi g the Governments of Fritain and the Rhodesias under a Critish chairman. In particular, it Iealt with the Federal public service and means of dealing with federal assets and liabilities, including the public debt. Later, a special committee was appointed to apportion the public debt between the governments. The interterritorial committee was fiade up of officials from Britain, the two Rhodesias, and the Federation. The administrative, judicial, fiscal and financial structure of the Federation was di mantled. The defence forces and big public undertakings like the Federal Broadcasting Corporation and the Central African Airways were split up. An agreement was reached to keep the giant Kariba project in operation, and to preserve the Rhodesia Railways as' an entity.26 The 80 million pounds Kariba hydroelectric power scheme on the Zambezi River will continue to be operated as a single entity under the joint ownership and control of the Governments of Rhodesia and Zambia. The Central African / 26 Africa Digest Vol. XI No. 1, August, 1963, pp. 6-8. -103- Power Corporation succeeded th Federal Power foard. It is controlled by two Kinisters, one each from Fhodesia and Zambia. Each government appoints three members to the Board by consulting with the other government and the chairman who is appointed by q, the two governments. .a1i the assets and liabilities were transferred to the new corporation on December 31, 1963.27 The Kariba project, opened by Queen Elizabeth the Queen hother in 1960, has cost nearly 80 million pounds so far. The World Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, Anglo-American and the Rhodesian Selection Trust, the British South.&frica U) Company and tandard and Earclays banks, helped to finance the project. One power station producing 600 megawatts has been completed and the second one when built will produce 900 megawatts. This will raise the cost of the scheme to more than 28 100 million pounds. a Central African Common Market had been set up but Forthern Rhodesia decided to end the Common Market and impose tariffs against Southern Rhodesia. The three territories would also each establish their own currencies. The decisions were blows to hopes that after the territories were separated politically, they would retain the benefit of economic and -r- financial co-operation. Southern Nhodesia suffered heavily because she sent about a quarter ci‘her products to Northern q fihodesia and had almost a monopoly in consumer goods and 7ib1d, p. 68. —1cu- secondary industries. The hinister of Finance for Northern Rhodesia explained that the Government had decided to end the Common Market because it had worked against the interests of Nortrern Rhodesia. However, Northern Rhodesia was prepared to negotiate trade agreements with Nyasaland and Southern hhodesia. It would give them preferential treatment while they remained no . . - . . dependencies." The Rhoae51a dailways, tne Central & British 7.", African Airways, and the nariba Hydroelectric power still serve Central Africa in much the same way as they have done before. The ast Federal Parliament met on December 11. air 7 Roy belensky made his final speech to the Assembly. He said: The epilogue to the federal story is all but written. At this stage 1 have no bitterness and no complaint. I fought and I lost because I did not know I was taking part in a game of chance. I believed that the Eritish Governrent would behave in accordance with th Spirit and intention of the agreement reached and the pledges given prior to the establishment of the Federation. I never imagined the Government would take refuge in legalistic jargon or resort to practices which might euphemistioa%%y be described as less than honest. I was wrong. Officially the Federation ended at tidnight on December 31. It was brought to an end when the British Order in Council dissolving the Federal Constitution came into force. All Federal laws became null and void, the various Ministries and Departments came to an end, and the three territories brok their association.31 O 2’lbid., p. HM. Definite trade agreements were finally made by the two Rhodesias. 30 Roy Welensky, quoted in Africa Digpst, Feb., 1964, 3lIbid., p. 97. -105- In less the a year the Protectorates of Horthern Rhodesia azd Nyasaland had achieved their independence. On July 5, 19C%, Hyasaland became the independent state of Malawi within the British Commonwealth with Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Eanda as its first Prime hinister. Falawi is to remain monarchical with a Governor—General to represent the Queen, who stays as titular head of state. Korthern Rhodesia, under the new name of Zambia rained its independence on October 24, 1964. It was the first Eritish dependency to becore a republic immediately on achieving independence. Hr. Kenneth Kaunda became its first President. The Government of Zambia indicated that they would apply for membership to the Commonwealth. Conclusion There is a divergence of opinion as to the real object of the Federation of Rhodesia and Hyasaland. The preamble to the Federal Constitution said that the object of the whole operation was to promote racial partnership. In other words it was intended to demonstrate that different races could work together in mutual respect and understanding. On the other hand Federation appears to have been a package deal intended to harmonize conveniently a great many separate interests and policy objectives. One of these objectives was to draw Southern Rhodesia away from South African influence and link her together with her British neighbours in the north politically and economically. Another reason was to prevent Northern Rhodesia from becoming "another Gold Coast," that is, from becoming a black state. For ten years, Rhodesia, the independent state of Falawi, and the Republic of Zambia were linked together as the Federation of Rhodesia and Iyasaland. These three states could not go for more than a decade as a federation. But why did the :rand design fail? ('10 Sir Roy helensky, one of the founders of the Federation, tells us that: The Federation was destroyed, not by our avowed enemies but by those who called themselves our friends and said they believed in what they had built. They killed it slowly, in the dark and stealth; and theyl wept hypocritical tears as they finished the deed. l‘w’elensky, Quoted in Afghan world, July (1961+), p- 10- -107- Sir Roy Welenshy has hard things to say about British Officials at Lusaka. He bitterly criticized Sir .Arthur Benson, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, for a secret dispatch he wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1956 which was a bitter indictment of the Federal Government and its policies.2 He also blames the British Prime Finister, Mr. Harold Iacwdllan, and the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, particularly hr. Nacleod whom he found subtle, secretive, and calculating.3 So this is how Sir Roy Welensky tells the painful story from his own point of view. There are many reasons that can be attributed to the failure of the Central African Federation. The Africa Correspondent of the Lpndon Times on December 30 wrote of the Federation: Probably the idea was doomed to failure from the start. Certainly the imposition of federation by the British Government against the expressed wishes of articulate African opinion poisoned it at birth. In the intervening years the failure of the Federal Government to take convincing action in support of its professions of partnership hastened tne end.1+ The Federation attempted to combine two different conceptions of colonial rule within one political systeu. The Colonial Office Policy had been the paramountcy of African interests. But Southern Rhodesia's aspiration has been parallel develOpment of both races under European control. The theory of partnership did not prove strong enough to bridge 2Welensky, p. 70. 3Ibid., p. 187. Refrica Digest, p. 98. ~108- the gap between the two concepts. The Federal link, instead of improving race relations, tended to extend the policies of Southern ihodesia to th Northern Territories. Partnership was watered down by the Europeans and so the Africans rejected it. The Europeans did not offer enough partnership to show the Africans that Federation was good for them. .Africans persistently emphasized their desire to work together with Europeans on the basis of freedom and equality. They could not collaborate with the Federal Government because it offered nothing but subordination and African under-representation. It was a sheer illusion on the part of the Europeans to conclude that an extension of the franchise would bring barbaric and irreSponsible black chauvinist power. The suggestion which Sir Roy Welensky was so fond of making that to give political power to Africans would mean a return "to the dark tribal past" was both false and unstatesmanlike. African leaders in Central Africa are most anxious to carry their peOple forward, but the conservatives were preventing them and insisted on saying "don't advance the African too fast." Kr. Garfield Todd was thrown out of Government as Prime Iinister in Southern Rhodesia because he appeared to be doing this. Until the end of 1959 the British Government treated the Federation almost as an independent Dominion. It supported the Federal Government instead of using its powers to safeguard African interests. The African Affairs Board which had been -109- set up as a safeguard to African interests was ireffective. By accepting the Federal Constitutional.imendment Bill and the Federal Electoral Bill, the British Government connived in the entrenchrent of the Federal Government, with its political principle of "white supremacy for the foreseeable future."5 The spirit of African Nationalism that has grown throughout Africa, has been directing its force against white supremacy. The Africans opposed Federation because they believed it was used to bolster European domination. In Central Africa, every political aspiration was met by increased repression arising from European insecurity. The Federal and Territorial Governments, responsible to an overwhelmingly European electorate, refused to recognize the strength and depth of African political feelings, whether ex_ressed by peaceful demonstrations or by boycotts and disturbance. It was the Hyasaland emergency of 1959 that brought things to a head. The Devlin Commission which inquired into the tensions and riots in Nyasaland drove a nail in the Federation's coffin. After the Ionkton Report was published, the British Government realized that Federation could not be continued in the form it was. They realised that the Federal arrangements were disruptive of peace and good government in Central Africa and that the Federal Government did not rule with the consent of the majority of the governed. It is SFaith Raven, Central Africa: Eackgreund to Argument (London: The Africa Putlications Trust, 1900), p. R3. -llO- quite clear that Government without consent is unjust, expensive, and detrimental to economic develOptent. ,At the Federal Review Conference of 1960-1961, the British Governhent exerted its influence and refused to give independence to the federation. It finally accepted the principle of an African majority in Nyasal nd and reformed the Northern Rhodesian Constitution to allow the Africans a larger voice in government. When the Africans got the hajority in government, Federation was finished. 1t was inevitable for the Africans in the Forth to demand secession from the federation. The Federal Constitution failed to provide for the expression of African opinion. Guy Clutton-Erock describes the failure of the Federation very clearly when he says after the 1959 crisis: The Federal Government hastily opened to all races the public counters in the Post Office. It appointed an African as a Parliamentary Secretary to the Tinistry of Home Affairs. It promised the removal of 'pinprick .' 1t gave to indication that it would seek to eas the real causes of deep disquiet but stated rather hat its synpathies lie with the policy of the Southern Thodesian Government. At a moment when Federal Statesmanship could have achieved a major advance in territories, it backed a policy of repression throughout the Federation. Why did it do this? Secause it is a white colonist's government and the ideas of the majority of colonist's throughoug the Federation were those of Southern Rhodesia. Professor Creighton rightly concludes that the Federal Government was sailing "complacently towards self-destruction 6 1 . w Guy Clutto-brock, Dawn in Nyasaland (London: hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 158. -111- in rapids more precipitous and turbulent than the Victoria 7 Falls" for it insisted on using the policy of Southern Rhodesia of white supremacy and racial discrimination. It is on the "native policy" that Federation broke down. It is the heart of the patter. 311 Africans in Central Africa hate the policy of parallel development ‘ which the white dhodesians have always adiered to in Spite of opposition from the Africans and criticism from outside. The Land Apportionment Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Native Registration Act, the iative Pass Act,zand many other discriminatory laws made it impossible for the Federation to function as a truly rultiracial society in which every citizen would enjoy the rights of citizenship. Far too late to save the Federation a serious effort was made by Sir Edgar Whitehead, toward the end of his term of office as Irime Finister, to turn his political party into a genuinel; multiracial team. he could not win African support because he still insisted on a constitution that favoured the European community. One remarkable feature of the ten-year experiment in interracial co-operation was that Rhodesia is not now a wholly segregated state. It was contaminated by Northern liberalism. The main hotels, movie theaters, park benches, and some public facilities are now desegregated. 7 Creighton, p. 231. -112- The breakup of the Federation had serious consequences for Southern ihodesia. By the end of 1963 there were already signs of advancing economic deterioration. It began in 196C, with the first evidence of the Federation's approaching collapse. The flow of foreign capital dad dried up; fifteen per cent of dalisbury office space was vacant; une ployment was up to ten per cent and getting chronic; local industries - textiles, jeep asse bly plants - were planning new branches in the north rather than expanding on the spot; and the government's finances were so bad that a {lo-million British loan for '| .African housing nad to go to meet the civil-service payroll instead. There is still serious racial antagonism in fihodesia today. The Front Government is committed to keeping the Southern Rhodesian Government "permanently in reaponsible hands," ensuring that there will be "no dominance of the .African over the Burepean," preserving the Land Apportionment .Act, and restoring full racial segregation in the cities as well as on the land. The Republic of Zambia is governed by one of the lOSt dedicated Pan-African leaders, hr. Kenneth Kaunda. He is cultivated, temperate, patient, and remarkably free of racial Y. ‘ animosity. be aappens to be on excellent terms with the big copper companies, Anglo-American and the hhodesian Selection 8 Claire Sterling, "The End of a Dream in Southern Rhodesia," The Reporter, Tay 9, 1963, pp. 29-32. -113- Trust, w ich are rost anxious to keep on good terms with him. There are good prospects for textile industries to develop in Zambia and development capital to stay there. By 1963, the nining companies had both decided to rove their offices to the country's capital, Lusaka.9 Zambia will need R odesia 's co-operation in transporting her copper over Rhodesia's part of the railway system to Beira, La :ambique. If the price of the copper should fall, then Zambia could be in serious trouble. The level of the lublic Debt in Zambia will not present any particular trot ler and increased finance will almost certainly be available for such purposes as health, education, and the development of econ mic services. . alawi is almost exclusively a black man's country. It will continue to need some Europeans as administrators, professional men and technicians. Development aid to Kalawi from other countries than Britain in money or services has been prorised from the United States, figeria, Denmark, Australia, and New Sealand. France expressed a desire to help too. Dy August of 1963, halawi had be een promised 250,000 pounds from the U ited States agency for International Development. The money is to meet the cost of the new .Agricultural College at Dunda, near Lilongwe, and he expansion '7“ -i of Bulawayo Polytechnic. he halawi Government itself11as plans to undertake the development of the hkula Falls o ,q i 1 ’Ibid. see raunda 's Profile in The Bx:m1iner, 1'36 MFG A, 1900., p0 lLI'o -ll#- hydroelectrical scheme. The scheme will be financed by f- contributions 01 one rillion pounds from the Colonial Development Corforation and 500,000 from other sources.10 Dr. Danda has briefly outlined his policy on economic development. He said that he was going to protect industries and would give preferential tre t eat to industries that proved efficient and productive. Te pointed out that it was imgortant to :chieve political independence first, because without it economic freedom could not be secured. Lalawi's budgetary positionzzt the close of 1964 showed a deficit of 5% rillion pounds which is one million pounds less than was forecast for 1965. however, britain had given the country a "breathing space by making a grant of up to 2% million pounds from august 1963 to January l§6h.l2 In conclusion, the Tederati~n of Rhodesia and Uyasaland was a notle concept which could have succeeded if both races had been willing to compromise. If it had succeeded, it could have provided a significant example to the world of how people of different races and different origins could live and work together for their mutual advantage loarrica Digest, Yol.Xl, p. 8. 11 I 1,3: iii 0 12 lbid., Vol. 12, p. 119. John Deary.&nalyzes the Phoenix Group's latest publication on sore economic consequences for the Rhodesia's and Iyasaland. They suggest that the economic case for Federation is not convincing and that the real case for the Federation in Central Africa had always been political, not economic (The_Central African Examiner, July, 1063, pp. 15—18). ~115- and betterment. Federation failed because it had no political consensus at all. It is hoped that the people of Central Africa will continue to co-operate in matters of common interests. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that both black and white need each other in Africa as co-workers. The black needs the technical skill of the white man and the white man needs the co-operation of the black to build and maintain a harmonious multiracial society. All the people of Central Africa must face the winds of change and be ready to have their fears, ignorance, and prejudices blown away. Map 1. i o ICC 200 300 MILES / g / ’Mwini ungo Elisabe ville v ForEf""Roseb¢py 1 K , / .ndl/ 1 A N G O L A /g \//.////,/f-’-’-”[%Z:}/ / ”7/2 /Bo|ovo|e UNION OF \~ . 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Native Purchase Area, Southern Rhodesia Crown Land, Northern Rhodesia Public Land , Nyasaland European Area, Southern Rhodesia. [ (Also includes Unassigned Area. part of which w may be allocated to Native Area) C3%%% Table 1. Land Ayportionment in Southern Rhodesia, 1930. CATEGORIE§ European Areas Native Reserves Native Areas Ln:ssigned areas tndetermined Area Forest Areas G\\n 4:1» to l—-‘ O TCTAL 116 F SQfARE TILES 76,796 33,011 11,663 7,802 107 acres 49,149,17u 21,127,0uo 7,464,566 17,793,300 88, Sho 590 L500 96 . 1181 27;?) % OF 1 C OUNTFY 51.0 0 C>0w4\noms 13 Trade Commission IQMH (dalisbury, 19M5), p. 11. outhern Rhodesia, Report of Native Production and 2 w . . w . The native areas were later re-naned native Purchase Areas. \JONH¥IURH4 116 G Table 2. CATEGORIE S European_Areas Native Reserves Special Iative lative Purchase Unassigned area s Undeterminec Area 5 Forest Areas TlfaL lareaSQ Areas SQUARE NILES .8 RE 7h,075 H7, #07, 792 32’32? 28,391”? 838-35 536513325 26 728 17,105 918 7 00 a 563 133}; 387,755 150,333, 06,213,120 Lane apportionment in South ern Rhodesia, 3'5 1952.1 OF COUNTRY ;' \O O O H 00 00 HoooONJ-‘l—J <3\nf3CHD\n ...: O O O Number Three, 11 1 . _ oouthern Rhode31a, The African in Southern Rhod031a: 2 1 o o ~' 0 '\ auditions to Native Ease Agriculture (5a liisbury, 1092), p. 2. Native Areas and European Areas. rves, acquired from Old 116 H Table 3. land apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, 1955. carat IIES 398213 IILEs aCRES flier COUNTRY 1. Europew nAreasl 81,230 51, 987, 000 53.5 2. Na.tive -eserves 32, 84% 21 ,020, COO 21.5 3. SIecial Native areas 522‘ 20,122 W8 ,OCO 13.0 4. Iative Eurc“ase greas3 12,5L018,052,COO 8.0 5. 1110 eterzijxxi Areas LI c8 57 (3.; 6. Forest Areas . 0Q; 3,130£CCO _ 3.; CTaL 161,8E9 37,118,000 113:2: l-.— '9 a L w“ v 1nc1uoe 4,00C,CCC acres of GaIe Reserves and National Parks . dlend added to th Native Teserves in 1950- L» areas where lfricans may acquire land on an individual basis, as dis inct from tribal tenure in the Lative Reserves. 1L w ~--. 0 1 fl ' 0 ‘Land owned by huropeans whlcn ray be solo to afr1cans if the owners so desire. 1Hn1ng and quarrying 9,575 1,605 15,365 10,538 2,115 22,606 10,821 1,871 20,216 10,151 1,716 17,731 10,517 1,933 20,386 10,792 flanufacturIng 11,994 993 11,914 13,503 1,094 14,775 15,988 1,150 Building and construction 11,774 971 11,435 13,809 1,121 2,021 18,381 19,019 1,131 '21,601 18,837 1,165 21,952 .19,037 1,205 15,177 15,221 1,191 18,133 15,513 1,213 18,855 3 miss a §§a§_§§$§§3 §ss gm 533;); G$Oda; “mm A w “mm 119' if ‘61‘7;58.:66088ER 0F EUROPEANS 1N EMPLOYMENT, NAGES AND SALARIES 9110 1ND AVERAGE EARNINGS BY INDUSTRY. as , 1954 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 gAverage ihverage ! Average Average Average Ayerage -mfl_m.__finfl.-_._. Numbgr ‘Earnings Earnings Number EarningsLEarnfngs Number Earnings Earn1ngstumber Earnings Earnings Number Earnings Earnings Number Earnin i E £1000 £ 1 £1000 E ' £1000 _ £ ' £1000 E'OOO 5 , ifigriculture 1,750 876 1,160 5,155 1,016 5,392 5,317 1,087 5,777 5,311 1,118 5,970 - 5,197 1,171 6,151 5,198 1,230 1 11,286 1,205 17,218 13,015 1,233 1,816 1,193 ' 2,203 1,921 1,272 5 21,011 2 906 19,036 21,262 921 .W_“.r—o_. Etectricity and water 1,355 1,058 1,133 1,178 1,131 1,676 1,686; 1,111 1,9251 1,797 1,193 2,111 1 55' 11,051 19,1933 833 Distribution 16,517 648 10,707 18,618 7 15,9901 20,691 892 18 452 :Banking and insurance 3,812 ' 815 1 3,132 1 1,918 849‘ 1 1,201 6,5021 902 Transport and 1 1 1 1 1 _ . n . , 1 5,8663 7,311 1,001 7,372 1 7,802 1,032 8,055 --7,986 -13053_* . ; , , _ ‘ , ,. L 1 L ' ~.1 communications 9,366 1,108 1 10,377 , 10,961 1,181 1 12,981? 11,568, 1,231 1 11,2771 11,923 1,287 15,311 , 11,827 1 ,355 L 16,031, 11,885 1,362 . i 1 i 1 ' ‘ 1 1 .eovernment administration , 8,280 913 1 7,806 1 9,7781 1,021 1 10,008, 10,570; 1,111 1 12 ,062, 12 ,061' 1,155 1 13,929 , 12 ,9321 1,172 1 15,1651 13,723. 1,251 1 E 1 , L i, .1 gEducation ., 3,622 816 1 2,956 1 1,1001 931 3,8191 4,7671 1,029 1 1,903} 5,337, 1,023 1 5,158 15,9131 1,020 , - 6,0621 6,162! 1,066 1 1 1 1 " 1 i 1 1 , 1 . 1Heatth 2,629 801 1 2,106 1 2,893; 931 2,693; 3,2011 1,005 ; 3,2215 3,438, 926 , 3,181 1 3,6681 938 1 3,139 3,733, 993 . 1 ’ 2 1 1 1 1 1 - irrivate domestic services 140 506 L 82 1 1671 665 1121 177i 684 1 1211 190; 700 1 133 L 192 693 1 133 194‘ 701 1 1 I ’ 1 ' 1 1 ‘ , $01her services __6+989 746 g 5,214 3 7,713! 851, _.*,62563‘ 8 270: 898 ‘ 7 4251 9 1751 902 3 8 279 L 9 333‘ 904 1 8,440 9,356, 932 ' 1 t 1 : . s --191312_ '9Q,85§ 1 951 ; 86,687 1103,6641 1,103 111, 357 113 290 1 133 ‘ M327 122 013 1,131 138 152 123 7211 1,169 1 111,571 121,8911 1,209 IEBEE,§£,;111138ER 0F 8111NS AND COLOUREDS 1N ENPLOYNENL,NAGES AND SNLARlES P810 AND AVERAGE EARNINGS. Euwwu_,__w, 2-_ ___. -2-__.EEE 1 h _ - “”1956~ .22_.2. 7 1956 1957 - 1958 1959 1960 Average"T_ 1 Average 1 . Average 3 ,Nverage 1i'Average'7‘ éverggf 2-__-w-~32_3_Eflum__hu_,,,uo_Nu1:1_.3E 1E33 rn1nJS1E8£n1ngs W ber.,E1rnjngs 1Earn_1flgs Nun1bg_r Earn1ngs E8£n1ng§ Number 1Earn1ngs Earnings Number 1Earn1ngs;Earnfngs Number .Vgrn1n 1 E 1 E1000 , 8 , £1000 , g 8 1 E 000 , . E 5 3 £ 000 , 1 £ £ 000 ‘ : 1 g i 1 j 1 ' I 1 A -219131 _ _-, -32 2-2-“. 5,681 1 133_ E 2170 6 131 1 1823 1 3,101 1 6,913 ' 511 1 31547 1 7,285 1 511 - 32260 r 71568 1 563 . 41317 f 7.991 57§_ _\\wu.hq . -w “u. . qurmrms.u zczwmz om >mx_obzm _z mzwrommm >zc m>r>x_mm w>_c >2: >mm mpxz_zom m4 _=c:qu<. pmub #emm domu domm .mmo .mmo 333% . ,. .. . U 3838 .. _ 32.3w .. q . . 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