


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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FEDERATION
OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1953-1963

Thesis for the Degree of M.A.

Michigan State University

James D. Mikawa

1965

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FEDERATION
OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1953-1963

By

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Preface

Sir Roy Welensky has told the painful story of the life and death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from his own point of view. In his book, The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, he writes like a disillusioned man:

The federation was destroyed, not by our avowed enemies but by those who called themselves our friends and said they believed in what they had built. They killed it slowly, in the dark and by stealth; and they wept hypocritical tears as they finished the deed.¹

It is my purpose to write a thesis on British Central Africa, to tell the story of the union of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and to examine and explain the causes which led to the downfall of the Federation. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was one of the great political concepts of our time. Federalism is a sophisticated form of government which presupposes a great deal of political consensus. It is the purpose of this thesis to find out whether the Federation had any political consensus at all. In Africa it represented a unique and challenging proposition for it was intended to demonstrate that, contrary to sad experience in the south, it was possible for different races to work together in mutual respect and harmony.

¹Sir Roy Welensky, Quoted in African World, July (1964), p. 10.

If it had succeeded, as it had been founded on Partnership and not Apartheid, its influence on the entire continent and the rest of the world would have been far-reaching. Unfortunately, one short decade saw the dream dissolved, partnership completely shattered and Federation ruined.

In order to understand the history of the Federation, a brief history of the events since the period of colonization is necessary. This is the object of Chapter One. The main emphasis will be on Southern Rhodesia and how it came to be united with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Chapter One deals with British settlement in Central Africa towards the end of the nineteenth century. The story of Nyasaland, the first of the three colonies to attract European missionaries, goes back to the exploration of David Livingstone in the 1850's and that of the two Rhodesias goes back to the coming of Cecil John Rhodes in 1890.

From the time of responsible government in Southern Rhodesia, political parties were formed, but their real development in the other three territories came when they were united in 1953. Since then there has been a rising tide of African Nationalism which has encountered a stiffening resistance in Rhodesia where the struggle continues for political power, liberty, and economic and social equality. The white men who dominated the Federation for a decade thought that Federation was going to continue under European domination.

But they found their hopes and aspirations doomed in December, 1963 when the Federation was dissolved. To their chagrin, the Europeans saw the Africans in the two northern territories gain their independence in less than a year. The future of Southern Rhodesia under Mr. Ian Smith, a staunch supporter of European or white supremacy, is still very uncertain. But the future of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, now independent states of Zambia and Malawi respectively, is very promising and the destiny of these two new African states lies in the hands of the Africans themselves.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	iii
Chapter	
I. British Settlement in South Central Africa ...	1
II. Chief Developments Before Federation	12
III. The Birth of a Federation	
A. The Fight for Amalgamation	33
B. The Setting up of the Federation	45
C. Opposition to the Federal Proposals	
1951-1953	55
IV. Federation in Operation: Progress and	
Disillusionment	
A. The Federal Legislature and the Franchise	63
B. Racial Discrimination and Partnership	70
C. Economic Progress and Problems	75
V. The Breakup of the Federation	84
Conclusion	106
Illustrations	116
Map 1. The Federation of Rhodesia and	
Nyasaland	116A
Map 2. Southern Rhodesia, the Three Velds	116 B
Map 3. S. Rhod. Provisional Map of Soils	116 C

Illustrations Continued	116
Map 4. S. Rhod. Land Apportionment 1958 ...	116 D
Map 5. Federation, Land Distribution and Railways	116 E
Table 1. S.R. Land Apportionment, 1930	116 F
Table 2. S.R. Land Apportionment, 1952	116 G
Table 3. S.R. Land Apportionment, 1958	116 H
Table 4. Fed. Europeans in Employment, Wages and Salaries	116 I
Table 5. Fed. Asians and Coloureds in Employment, Wages and Salaries ...	116 I
Table 6. Fed. Africans in Employment, Wages and Salaries	116 J
Pictures	
Lord Malvern and Doctor Kamuzu Banda	116 K
Sir Roy Welensky and Kenneth Kaunda	116 L
Nkumbula, Kaunda, Banda, and Nkomo	116 M
Statutory Bodies and Commissions	116 N
Bibliographical Essay	117
Bibliography	122

Chapter I

British Settlement in South Central Africa

Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, which comprised the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are situated in South Central Africa. The three territories cover just under half a million square miles or about ten times the size of England and Wales. They have boundaries with the Republic of South Africa in the south, Mozambique in the east, Angola and Bechuanaland in the west, and Tanganyika and the Congo Republic in the north. The countries have no sea coast of their own.

Only a hundred years ago, this area and much of the rest of the interior of Africa south of the Sahara was for the greater part unknown to the outside world. However, about four hundred years ago, a few Portuguese explorers had gone into the interior briefly and often fatally, and the Arabs had pursued their abominable slave trade through it.¹

Southern Rhodesia was the first of the three countries to be settled by the British with the approval of Her Majesty's Government. Before 1890, the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo Rivers, covering an area of about one-hundred and fifty thousand square miles, was occupied by the peaceful Mashona in the north east and

¹W.T. Blake, Central African Survey: Facts and Figures of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London: Alvin Redman Ltd., 1961), pp. 7-12.

by the warlike Matabele in the south west. The former were ruled by several chiefs scattered about Mashonaland while the latter were ruled by King Lobengula who was most concerned with the settlement of Southern Rhodesia by the British.

The High Veld of Southern Rhodesia is over four thousand feet above sea level, has rich soil for agriculture, a beautiful climate, adequate rainfall in the summer, and a variety of minerals such as gold, copper, and chrome iron ore. Coal is largely found in the low veld. All these factors combine to concentrate population on the High Veld which has been the scene of all competition for the country's wealth. Here, in the centre of the African continent lay in the nineteenth century a great area believed to be rich in gold, not yet occupied by Europeans, but the subject of shadowy claims from Portugal, eyed speculatively by the German Chancellor Bismark, by the South African Premier Paul Kruger, and by the British financier and imperialist Cecil John Rhodes. Lobengula had sovereignty over Matabeleland and claimed the overlordship of Mashonaland. Immediately the British took steps to prevent other nations from entering the much coveted area.² On 11 February, 1887, Lobengula signed what came to be known as the Moffat Treaty, which in the first article provided for peace and friendship between the British and the Matabele, and in the second that Lobengula would not enter into any

²Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 117.

agreement with a foreign country without the consent of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa.³ This treaty was significant because it was a prelude to the Rudd Concession to be discussed shortly and other powers were kept out of Zambezia, now Southern Rhodesia.

It is here that Cecil John Rhodes comes into the picture. Because of poor health, Rhodes left England in 1870 at the age of seventeen for South Africa, where he made a vast fortune in diamonds and gold at Kimberley and the Witwatersrand respectively. For many years he had a dream to secure for the British flag the enormous tract of land north of the Transvaal. In fact, his primary aim was to establish a British sphere of influence from Cape to Cairo. Having failed to persuade both the Imperial Government and the Cape Government to acquire Zambezia, Rhodes in 1888 conceived the idea of floating a private enterprise to undertake what had been neglected by the two governments.⁴

The colonization of Zambezia was based on the Rudd Concession. In 1888, Rhodes sent Messrs Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson to negotiate a mining concession with Lobengula, then already besieged by many applications by other concession seekers representing different countries and different interests. The task before Rudd and his companions was therefore difficult and it entailed much patience,

³The Moffat Treaty. Quoted in Mason, p. 121.

⁴P.F. Hone, Southern Rhodesia (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1912), p. 99.

persuasion, and perseverance. The concession was eventually drafted, explained in detail to Lobengula and finally signed by Lobengula whose signature was in the form of an "X," by C. D. Rudd, Rochfort Maguire, and F. R. Thompson with Rev. Helm and J.D. Dreyer as witnesses. It is highly probable that the Chief agreed to sign the treaty "mainly in the mistaken belief, encouraged by deliberate deception on the part of Rudd and his colleagues, that it would lessen the external pressure."⁵ The concession provided for the payment to Lobengula and his heirs and successors of one hundred pounds a month for an unspecified period, one hundred breach loading rifles, and an armed steam boat on the Zambezi in exchange for exclusive mining rights only. Here is part of the concession which Lobengula signed:

I Lobengula, King of Matabeleland and Moshonaland and other adjoining territories in the exercise of my Sovereign Power and in the presence and with the consent of my Council of Indunas do hereby grant and assign...complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my Kingdoms, Principalities, and Dominions, together with full power, to do all things they may deem necessary to win and procure the same...and whereas I have been much molested of late by divers persons seeking to obtain grants and concessions of land and mining rights... I do hereby authorize the grantees... to take all necessary and lawful steps to exclude from my Kingdoms...all persons seeking land metals and minerals...and I undertake to grant no concession of land or mining rights...without their concurrence...⁹

From the outset, Mashonaland had been the main

⁵Richard Brown, "The Scramble and African Politics in Matabeleland," The History of Central African Peoples, Openheimer Series (Lusaka: The Rhodes Livingstone Inst., 1963), p. 2.

⁶Quoted in Mason, pp. 124-25.

attraction, and, although Matabeleland was thought to be rich in gold, Mashonaland was even thought to be richer. Therefore, Rhodes lost no time in obtaining a royal charter to enable him to carry out the terms of the Rudd Concession. The first step Rhodes took was the formation of the Chartered Company. On October 15, 1889, the Royal Charter was granted and by virtue of its provisions the British South Africa Company was established. The Company was given power to make treaties, announce laws, maintain a police force, construct roads, railways and other public works, to engage in industry, make land grants, conduct lawful commerce, trade and business; and it was to operate in the area north of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, and west of the Portuguese territories in East Africa.⁷

On June 27, 1890, a group of 184 British and South African settlers, called the "Pioneer Column," plus five hundred strong B.S.A. Company's police escort, set out from Macloutsie in Bechuanaland to what is now Salisbury, arriving there on September 12. At Fort Salisbury, the Union Jack was hoisted, a salute fired, and possession taken of Mashonaland in the name of the Queen.⁸

The Rudd Concession granted no rights of settlement or administration, but by taking a strong military force into Mashonaland where the African population was sparse and

⁷Charter of the British South Africa Company, 29 October, 1889. C8773. Quoted in Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 5.

⁸Mason, p. 142.

Lobengula's authority periodic, the Company succeeded in establishing the first European settlement at Salisbury in 1890, and appointed a Mr. Colquhoun the first Administrator of Mashonaland.⁹

The years before 1900 were completely unprofitable because there were no spectacular gold-fields. European farming was also disappointing due to crop and cattle diseases and drought. The situation was made worse by the abortive Jameson Raid on the Transvaal Republic in 1895, and by the Matabele and Mashona rebellions of 1896. It was after the suppression of the two rebellions that Rhodes acquired what is now Southern Rhodesia for the British Queen by right of conquest.¹⁰ By the Order in Council of 1898, Mashonaland and Matabeleland were united to form Southern Rhodesia. The name was given in honor of Cecil John Rhodes. By this time the settlers had switched their attention to agriculture and the Company was promoting European settlement on the land, because the hopes placed in gold had been greatly exaggerated. The land policy of the Company was limited by the Southern Rhodesia Order In Council of 1898 which provided the country with the first constitution. The Company was required to provide the Africans with sufficient land for occupation and "suitable for their agriculture and pastoral requirements." The result was the creation of a series of Native Reserves,

⁹Leys, p.5.

¹⁰Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock (London: George Unwin, Ltd., 1963), p. 17.

which were set aside for exclusive use by the Africans. In spite of this special arrangement, the settlers gobbled up most of the rich land on the High Veld, especially the land rich in minerals. The country was put under Company rule which terminated in 1923 when Southern Rhodesia obtained responsible government. There were four main divisions of service (the Administrator's, the Treasurer's, the Attorney-General's, and the Division of the Secretary of Mines and Works) which covered a comprehensive range of governmental activities. The Native Department in the Division of the Administrator had on its staff Native Commissioners who had wide powers for administering the Africans. The Native Affairs Department today resembles the old Native Department in all essentials.¹¹

Rhodes's men, pushing into what is now Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), obtained for the British South Africa Company concessions which were regarded as treaties in return for the Queen's protection, first from Lewanika Paramount Chief of the Barotse, and then from other chiefs. Lewanika was advised by Chief Khama of the Bamangwato and Francois Coillard the French Missionary to apply to Queen Victoria for protection against his enemies, the Boers, the Portuguese, and the Matabele. At first the Colonial Office hesitated to accept further colonial responsibility, but Rhodes offered to bear the

¹¹Leys, pp. 9-10.

expenses of administration out of the B.S.A. Company's funds. He had already bought a concession which a Kimberley firm had obtained from Lewanika. Then Rhodes sent Mr. Frank Lochner to negotiate a treaty with the Chief who asked for two thousand pounds a year as subsidy for a concession of mineral and commercial rights over the whole of his dominion. The Concession was signed on June 27, 1890. By its terms Lewanika accepted the Queen's protection to be offered by the Company. In 1891, Lewanika was informed that the protection of Her Majesty's Government had been extended to his country as he had requested that it should be. Sir Harry Johnston was named the Queen's representative in the country. Meantime, the Crown entrusted the administration of the protectorate to the Chartered Company as Johnston had suggested that the administration should be from the south instead.¹²

Before 1899 the whole Northern Rhodesian Territory had been vaguely included in the Charter granted to the British South Africa Company, but in that year the Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia Order In Council placed the Company's administration of the western portion of the country on a firm basis. It was closely followed by the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1900 which had a similar effect. The two territories were amalgamated in 1911 under the designation of Northern Rhodesia, and the administration of the Company, subject

¹²Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa (London: Holder & Stoughton, 1902), pp. 385-437.

to the exercise of certain powers of control by the Crown, continued until 1924. In that year, the administration of the territory was assumed by the Crown in terms of a settlement arrived at between the Crown and the Company, and the first Governor to represent the Queen was appointed on April 1.¹³

In the years that followed came the development of Northern Rhodesia's great copper industry. The territory's four big mines at Luansha, Nkana, Mufulira, and Nchanga came into production shortly after Bwana Mkubwa Copper Mine had collapsed in 1930. These four mines have altered the entire economic outlook of the country. In a few years Northern Rhodesia was netting more than ten million pounds annually, and building up reserve funds of several million pounds. It is largely upon copper that the new schools, hospitals, roads, and other recent witnesses to increasing prosperity are found.¹⁴

Nyasaland, a former British Protectorate, lies directly north of the Zambezi River and east of Zambia. Its colonial history begins with David Livingstone's discovery of Lake Nyasa on 16 September, 1859. In the early 1860's the path he had opened of teaching Christianity and fighting against slavery was followed under his guidance, by the pioneers of the University's Mission to Central Africa.

¹³ Report, Great Britain Colonial Office, "Northern Rhodesia," Vol. XXXIII (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1957), pp. 86-7.

¹⁴ Ibid.

In the short time between these expeditions, the country had been ravaged by tribal wars and slave raids in a way which made a harrowing contrast to the smiling land and people seen earlier by Livingstone. The missionaries retired in the face of disease and death, after suffering heavy and tragic losses, and the University's Mission did not return until 1881.¹⁵ After Livingstone's death, and inspired by it, the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland established missions in 1874-5 as memorials to Livingstone at Blantyre and Livingstonia. A number of business men, mainly from Glasgow, who were interested in Livingstonia, formed in 1878 the African Lakes Company as a transport and trading concern to work in close co-operation with mission activities. Other European missionaries, traders, hunters, and coffee planters followed the pioneers. The missionaries asked the British government to intervene and suppress the slave trade in Nyasaland. But not until 1883 did a representative of the British Government appear in the shape of a consul, Captain Foot. On the north end of the country open warfare broke out in 1888 between the Arab slave traders and the African Lakes Company. The B.S.A. Company helped the Lakes Company to fight the Arabs.¹⁶

About this time too there was a certain amount of friction with the Portuguese who were interested in the

¹⁵Great Britain Colonial Office, "Nyasaland Protectorate," Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), p. 121.

¹⁶Harry Johnston, Britain Across the Seas, Africa (London: Spottiswood Company, Ltd.,), pp. 204-6.

country. However, in 1891 an Anglo-Portuguese Convention ratified the work of Sir Harry Johnston, Sir Alfred Sharpe, and others who had concluded treaties with various native chiefs. The territories of British Central Africa were defined as "British Sphere of Influence" by the Convention concluded with Germany and Portugal. Johnston's immediate aim was to negotiate a peace between the African Lakes Company and the Arabs, who were still engaged in open hostilities. A treaty of peace was signed with the Arabs on October 22, 1889. In the spring of 1891, a British Protectorate was formally declared over Nyasaland and the Shire district. Sir Harry Johnston was appointed as Her Majesty's Commissioner and Consul-General to administer the newly acquired territories, while the remainder of the "British Sphere of Influence" was placed under the Control of the Chartered Company, and was divided into Northwest Rhodesia and Northeast Rhodesia. In 1898 the name of the territory was changed to British Central African Protectorate, but in 1907, a further Order in Council revived the old name of Nyasaland Protectorate. Nyasaland did not fall under British influence by conquest like Southern Rhodesia, it was led under the protection of the Crown by the British missionaries and traders with, as first the proclamation put it, "the consent and desire of the chiefs and people."¹⁷

¹⁷Nyasaland Report, p. 123.

Chapter II

Chief Developments Before Federation

The purpose of this chapter is to show the major differences in native policy between the three territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the major social, political, and economic developments before federation and their significance on the fight for closer association of the states.

Until 1953, there were two methods of dealing with Africans and two sets of aims in the three British territories. The Colonial Office in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was determined to preserve and develop native methods of administration. They adopted the system of indirect rule through the chiefs. It was a conservative loose form of administration which was not likely to encourage rapid change. The scene was quite different in Southern Rhodesia where government was from the start firmly paternal. It was in the early days largely concerned with the provision of labour for the European farms and mines. The African chief lost much of his power and influence because the Native Commissioner was appointed to protect the African against exploitation, to collect taxes, and to issue licences, passes, and lands. As far as aims were concerned, the Colonial Office was determined that the protectorates should develop into autonomous African

states. In Southern Rhodesia, however, the aim was to make the country the white man's land and the idea of African majority rule in future was completely foreign to the thought of the white settler. Because of diverse native policies adopted in the three territories, the issue of amalgamation became a burning question.

The year 1923 was a turning point in the history of Central Africa, for the year saw the passing of Company rule in the two Rhodesias and the establishment of responsible government in Southern Rhodesia. In 1915 the Company's Charter, which had been granted for twenty-five years, expired and was replaced by a supplementary charter in which a new clause was written providing the granting of a responsible type of government by the Crown whenever the settlers showed a desire and readiness for such a government any time after October 29, 1915. Two years later a Responsible Government Association was formed under the leadership of Sir Charles Coghlan, a Salisbury barrister and doughty fighter, which quickly adopted the character of a political party. Among the European population there was a strong feeling that Company's rule should be replaced by responsible government. Meanwhile General Smuts, who was then Prime Minister of South Africa, tried to persuade Southern Rhodesia to join the Union as a fifth province. In favour of this plan were the Unionist Party of Southern Rhodesia

who found strong support among the British Conservatives, the members of the Chartered Company, local mining interests, and senior civil servants. The Responsible Government party also enjoyed support from Indian and Colonial people, the missionaries, Liberals and left-wingers in Britain. They preferred the creation of a British colony based on British ideas to Afrikaner Nationalism. After a long and bitter political struggle the matter was put to the Southern Rhodesia electorate in a referendum on October 27, 1923 and the count revealed 8,774 votes for responsible government against 5,999 for union with the south.¹ The margin in favour of responsible government was therefore emphatic. Although the Unionists had money and political ability, they lacked sufficient popular appeal and an outstanding leader.

On September 12, 1923, the thirty-third anniversary of the occupation of Mashonaland by the Pioneer Column, the Company's rule came to an end and Southern Rhodesia was granted her responsible government. Sir John Chancellor became the first governor of the Colony as the King's representative and Charles Coghlan formed a ministry which took office on October 1.²

The Constitution of 1923 gave Southern Rhodesia responsible government and at the same time the country

¹A.J. Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 242-46.

²"Southern Rhodesia," Round Table, XIV (Dec., 1924), pp. 185-86.

was formally annexed to the British Crown by Order in Council. Since then it has become an established agreement for the British Parliament "not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia in matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, except with the agreement of the Southern Rhodesia Government."³ The constitution provided for a governor to represent the King in Southern Rhodesia, and for a house of parliament to consist of thirty members. The franchise was open to British subjects of any race having an annual income of over one hundred and fifty pounds. This automatically excluded the Africans, who did not have the financial and educational qualifications required of a voter. Elections were to be held at least every five years, and the Prime Minister, chosen from the strongest party returned at the polls, was to govern with the aid of six cabinet ministers. Parliament had control over all the territory's affairs except those concerning mining royalties, and laws affecting Africans. Differential legislation "whereby natives may be subjected to disabilities to which persons of European descent are not also subjected" required the assent of the Secretary of State before it could become law.⁴ The authority of the Imperial Government was preserved because the grant to a European community of

³See the introduction to the Southern Rhodesia Constitution, Cmnd. 1400, p. 3.

⁴C. Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, p. 39.

less than 35,000 of entirely unfettered jurisdiction over a large native population of over a million without electoral representation, would have aroused sharp criticism in the Imperial Parliament and elsewhere. The constitution contains certain other provisions safeguarding the African.

The new government found itself in possession of unalienated Crown lands amounting to 44,000,000 acres and a revenue of about 1,326,000 pounds. On the whole the financial position of the new government was favourable, the land revenue with the surplus left by the Chartered Company, being sufficient to provide for interest and sinking fund on the loan.⁵

Meanwhile the small European population in Northern Rhodesia had obtained a different character and outlook from that of Southern Rhodesia by 1924. Responsible government was not considered for such a small white population of 3,000 in 1921 as compared with an African population close to a million. Most of the Europeans were settled along the railway strip, apart from 250 at Fort Jameson and a handful at Abercorn and a few scattered missionaries and administrative officers. Economically the country lagged behind Southern Rhodesia. Thus, most settlers, aware of the impossibility of self-rule at this

⁵Round Table, XVI (Dec. 1925-Sept. 1926), pp. 757-58.

stage from all points of view, were content with Crown Colony status. But they pressed hard for settler representation on the legislature. However, native interests were considered to be paramount by the British Government. It was agreed that on 10th April, 1924, the Imperial Government would take over its administration, as well as "full and entire control of the lands throughout Northwestern and North Eastern Rhodesia, to be administered as it thinks best in the interest of the native population and in the public interest generally."⁶ The B.S.A. Company was to retain mineral rights, and freehold estates in Northern Rhodesia. There was to be special protection of the railway companies since there was heavy investment in them. A new constitution was brought into force by the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1924. It provided for a governor and an executive council nominated by the Crown. There was to be, for the first time, a legislative council, set up by separate Order, composed of nine nominated and five elected members under the Chairmanship of the Governor. Discrimination on grounds of race, apart from laws relating to arms, ammunition and liquor, was forbidden.⁷ But the natives of Northern Rhodesia were excluded from the franchise, as they were "protected persons" not subjects.

⁶Quoted in Wills, p. 249.

⁷
Ibid., p. 250.

Nyasaland was the most backward of the three territories economically, so she could not attract a large European population. Nyasaland had been proclaimed a British Protectorate in 1891 and governed by the Commissioner and Consul-General, but in 1907 a Governor was appointed, who would be assisted by a Deputy Governor, a Treasurer, an Attorney-General, and three appointed officials. The Africans were to be represented indirectly by a missionary, because of the Church of Scotland's influence probably. As in Northern Rhodesia, and for the same reason, the Africans were excluded from the franchise.

During the thirties, the economy of Southern Rhodesia still rested almost entirely on primary products for export, and the chief economic activity still consisted of mining, agricultural and railway operations. Chrome, zinc, and asbestos production was still mounting but gold mining had almost reached its maximum level. Gradually the agricultural front was broadening in tobacco, maize, cotton, wheat, and fruit and vegetable production. But tobacco has become the main cash crop in the colony. The railways still employed the largest number of men, black and white, of any single industry. Beyond the Zambezi, Northern Rhodesia was concentrating on copper mining which has remained the back-bone of the country's economy, while Nyasaland resorted to tea-growing and the raising of a few minor farm products. Comparatively, the two Rhodesias were developing economically much faster. However, Nyasaland had a surplus in cheap labour. In 1935, when Nyasaland

was still struggling in the trough of depression, Southern Rhodesia was making a gradual recovery, while Northern Rhodesia's prospects were beginning to rise.⁸

Divergent native policies were adopted for the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. In his October 1926 address, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia stated the aim of Europeans in Africa thus:

We are in African colonies the trustees of the backward and primitive races, and that it is our solemn duty to do all we can to promote their moral and material welfare.⁹

He contended that some measure of segregation of the natives was necessary for the comfort and happiness of Europeans and Africans alike, and for the maintenance of good will between the two races which "I am glad to think," said the governor, "thanks largely to the splendid officers of our Native Department, prevails at the present time in Southern Rhodesia."¹⁰ This was the beginning of segregation based on race. But most Europeans would not accept trusteeship and any suggestion that Southern Rhodesia was to be an African inheritance.¹¹ The governor found it desirable that the native population should have assigned to them for their use and enjoyment land in sufficiently large areas to enable them to live their own lives and develop local self-government on lines congenial to their

⁸Ibid., pp. 257-58.

⁹Sir John Chancellor, "Southern Rhodesia and its Problems," Journal of the African Society, Vol. XXVI No. CI (October, 1926), p. 2.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹J.R. Hooker, "The African Worker in Southern Rhodesia," Race Vol. VI, No. 2., p. 142.

traditions and customs. But the land assigned to Africans was too small, as shall be seen later.

Following the Governor's speech, Sir Charles Coghlan, the Prime Minister declared:

Our desire is that every member of our empire, irrespective of race, creed or color, should be equal before the law, though I feel that in matters of governing, the untutored native is a child and has to be treated as such for his own sake and all sakes.¹²

What an ambivalence and paternalistic attitude!

Sir Herbert Stanley, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, proposed a gradual, rather than a rapid European settlement in Northern Rhodesia, and spoke in favour of African advancement and against forced labour which the settlers had adopted in order to obtain cheap labour.¹³

One of the earliest exponents of the essential "master and servant" relationship of white and black respectively, Sir Harry Johnston, said: "Africa South of the Zambezi and North of the Atlas... must be settled by the white and whitish races and that Africa which is well within the tropics must be ruled by whites, developed by Indians, and worked by blacks."¹⁴ Thus, south of the Zambezi "the weakest must go to the wall." In Southern Rhodesia social and economic discrimination was to follow

¹² Journal of the African Society, Vol. XXVI., p. 3.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 213-14.

¹⁴ Sir Harry Johnston. Quoted in Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma, pp. 241-15.

racialist lines. Sir Harry Johnston had no idea of promoting settlers' domination North of the Zambezi; on the contrary he foresaw the same future in African development towards self-government as later took place in West Africa, as well as East Africa. "I entertain great hopes," he wrote in 1896, "of the intellectual development of the Negro of Central Africa... Our mission here is to raise the Negro of Central Africa into a civilized nationality, for we can never hope to colonize this country with the white race."¹⁵ Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have never had self-government under European domination. This means that the Africans there were generally protected from the grosser forms of settlers' colour prejudice found in Southern Rhodesia.

The separation of races was recommended as early as 1925. Those Europeans who were regarded as representing African interests, and particularly the missionaries, advanced the view that territorial segregation was necessary in order to protect the African from the demoralizing and disintegrating effect of contact with the European society. Accordingly, the Morris Carter Commission of 1925 reported:

However desirable it may be that members of the two races should live together side by side with equal rights as the holding of land, we are convinced that in practice, probably for generations to come, such a policy is not practicable or in the

¹⁵Quoted in Kenneth Kaunda, Dominion Status for Central Africa? (London: Movement for Colonial Freedom, 1958), p. 2.

best interest of the two races, and that until the native has advanced very much further on paths of civilization it is better that points of contact in this respect between the two races should be reduced.¹⁶

In order that the desired separation of races should be achieved the Commission recommended a partitioning of land between the two races. The Act which legalized this division of land in 1930 came to be known as the Land Apportionment Act. It was recommended by the Commission that all the land outside the Reserves be divided into African, European, and unassigned areas. Special African areas were established as Native Purchase areas and in them Africans could acquire by purchase, limited individual property rights as distinct from the communal rights of the traditional system which was to continue in the Reserves.¹⁷ The Commissioners recommended that 6,851,876 acres be set aside as Native Purchase Areas. Together with the Reserves and 406,200 acres of Mission land, this was to make up the African share of the country's land which amounted in all to 28,933,362 acres out of the total of 96,226,560 acres. The recommended European share amounted to 48,605,898 acres. All towns fell into the European areas. These recommendations, with some slight changes, were accepted by the government and embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.¹⁸

¹⁶Report of the Carter Commission, Salisbury, 1925, para. 63.

¹⁷Leys, pp. 9-10.

¹⁸See Table I. The Land Apportionment, p. 116 F.

Most of the Native area is poor soil, usually the poorer types of granite-sand known technically as class III land while the European area contains nearly all the areas of fertile soil in the colony.¹⁹ The change in soil type coincided exactly with the boundary line and is startlingly obvious when one passes through an European area into a Native area such as on the Salisbury to Shamva road, passing into Chinamhora Reserve and on the Salisbury to Mtoko road, passing into Chikwaka, Mangwende, Uzumba, and Mtoko Reserves. While most of the European areas are adjacent to a main road, a railway or both, most Native areas are located far away from existing main-roads and railways, making transportation to markets a difficult problem for the African farmer. For example, one can travel the main north road from Salisbury to Chirundu, or from Salisbury to Odzi, or from Salisbury to Bulawayo, all by road or rail, without passing through any native area.²⁰

It is thus easy to see the unfairness and injustice of the Act. More than half the colony has been allocated to the Europeans who comprise only about one-fifteenth of the total population; and this contains nearly all the fertile soil, is close to markets, and is

¹⁹See Provisional maps on Land Apportionment 1920 and 1958, Illustrations, p. 116 C.

²⁰Ken Brown, Land in Southern Rhodesia (London: The Africa Bureau, 1959), p. 5.

well served by roads and railways. Forty-one percent is allocated to almost four million Africans, and most of it is poor, infertile, remote from main roads, and markets. Besides, about eighty per cent of the Europeans live in the cities while over ninety per cent of the Africans earn their livelihood from farming an average of eight acres per family.

This rigid territorial segregation forms the basis for the entire social and political system of the country and is undoubtedly "the root cause of a deep-seated sense of injustice among Africans."²¹ The colour bar on the land—crippling, discriminating, and irrational in the eyes of the Africans, is one of the major political issues in the contemporary life of this disturbed country. The Act on the whole justifies Professor Richardson's comment that:

The on the-spot attitudes of settler conflicted with his own heritage of Christianity and democratic ideals. A tension was set up within the European mind in Central Africa which has not yet been resolved. The pattern of race relations set during those years indicate clearly that fear of the surrounding Africans and the desire to wrest a living from the country dominated the conduct of the European. Christianity and the liberal English political heritage took second place to the needs of the time and place in Africa.²²

The land situation was quite different in the North. According to the Devonshire agreement, the Crown

²¹C. Leys and C. Pratt (eds.), *A New Deal in Central Africa* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960), p. 176.

²²Richardson, "The Future of a Dilemma," *Africa Today Pamphlets* (New York: American Committee on Africa, 1959), p. 3.

recognized all alienations of land to Europeans made by the Company during its rule, though reserving the right to set apart a Native Reserve in the North Charterland Concession Company's area. The land was divided first into Native Reserves vested in the Secretary of State and set aside for the use and occupation of the native tribes of Northern Rhodesia. The natives in the reserves must hold their land on assignment from the chief under the tribal law. Secondly, native trust land was to be leased by the governor to non-Africans for the benefit of Africans. Third, Barotseland was to be administered by the paramount chief under tribal law.²³

Of the total land area of Nyasaland, about 86.7 per cent was set aside as African Trust Land, for the use and occupation by Africans according to their laws and customs. Without any minerals, the country concentrated on Agriculture, raising such crops as tea, cotton, and tobacco. Many Africans who could not find employment in the protectorate migrated to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. However, an appreciable number of them were recruited in the King's African Rifles, an opportunity which helped them to go overseas to fight in both World Wars. As Nyasas from different tribes fought side by side in foreign lands, a national spirit grew among

²³T.M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia and Nyasaland (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 77-8.

them and this was to help in future for the Nyasaland Africans to fight for independence as one nation not as different tribes. Unlike Southern and Northern Rhodesia where whites dominated the railways, the Nyasaland railways were operated by Africans and Indians.²⁴ Southern Rhodesia's Land Apportionment Act had no counterpart in the north. In African administration, while Southern Rhodesia remained a "direct rule territory," Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland proceeded to an "indirect rule" policy. This difference in policy was to play a major role in the federation controversy from 1951 to 1963.

In the absence of self-government, politics in Northern Rhodesia took on a different character from those of Southern Rhodesia. There was friction as well as co-operation between Unofficials, that is settlers elected to the legislative council, and Colonial Administration. Both settlers and Officials (Colonial Office Civil Servants) appeared to have been interested in the economic development of the territory but were not agreed on the future of European settlers. The Labour Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Lord Passfield, published a memorandum defining the British Native Policy in East Africa, also adopted for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This was a restatement

²⁴A.J. Hannah, The Story of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), pp. 214-16.

of Lord Devonshire's pronouncement. The memorandum stated that the interests of Africans in these territories must be paramount, "and if those interests and the interests of immigrant peoples should conflict, the former should prevail." Governors were given overriding powers "in case they should find it necessary to differ from their councils."²⁵ The white settlers disliked the determination of the British Government to protect and advance the native races. However, Lord Passfield later backed down. This theory of the paramountcy of native interests became significant during the federation.

The architect of modern Rhodesia was Sir Godfrey Huggins, now Lord Malvern. He was born in England, where he studied medicine, and came to Southern Rhodesia in 1911 to practice his profession. His great assets were sympathy with his patients and confidence in himself, and he carried these assets into politics. Indeed, he thought himself as a doctor well qualified to prescribe for the body politic. He adopted the attitude of a benevolent autocrat for he was a product of the Victorian England which was far from egalitarian. The Victorian public schools were designed to produce benevolent leaders with a high sense of responsibility. A subtle and persuasive politician of the old fashioned paternalistic kind, Huggins was Prime

²⁵Quoted in Wills, p. 259.

Minister of Southern Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953 and of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1956 for longer than any Prime Minister in British history, including Sir Robert Walpole of England.²⁶

In 1932, Dr. Huggins became leader of Opposition, the Reform Party which promised a number of economic reforms: to treat unemployment as a national issue, to look after white workers by putting new industrial legislation on the Statute Book, "gradual differential development of the European and the Native races upon a territorial basis," to remove African voters from the common roll, and to develop Native Councils.²⁷ The Reform Party became an effective political force and their electoral campaign gained considerable strength. In the general election of 1933 the Reform Party came into power with Huggins as the leader. On September 6, 1933, he took the Oath of Office and shortly afterwards formed a ministry. A fresh railways bill which aroused sharp criticism brought about the break up of the Reform Party. Parliament was dissolved and Huggins formed a new United Party which soon became very powerful. The election following the inevitable dissolution in November 1934 gave the United Party an overwhelming victory with

²⁶Philip Mason, "Two Sets of Values," Race Vol. VI No. 2 (October, 1964), pp. 152-54.

²⁷L.H. Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1964), p. 92.

twenty-four seats out of thirty in the legislature.²⁸

Under the United Party Government, recovery from the trade depression occurred in the tobacco industry, motor traffic was increasing, roads and bridges were built, and the Rhodesia Aviation was formed. The Prime Minister launched a campaign to intensify white immigration, widen the sector of secondary industry, and to acquire as much independence as possible short of a dominion status.²⁹

The foundation of the United Party's power in the colony was the policy of the "double pyramid" or parallel development for the European and African races. The principle was that each race should develop in its own sphere. It differed from the South African Nationalist "apartheid" in that ultimately the two pyramids should meet at the top; that is, at the level of national government. Such a time was generally supposed to be generations ahead when the Africans would have become civilized. The two races were not allowed to mingle, except in a master-servant relationship. Huggins envisaged Africans and Europeans developing on their own lines in their own sections of the country, Africans reaching the highest positions in the African Areas, that is the Reserves and Native Purchase Areas. However, he abandoned this complete territorial segregation at a fairly early

²⁸C. Leys, pp. 135-38.

²⁹Wills, p. 252.

stage in his career for he realized that the urban and rural areas could not be separated in this way; the economy of the country was one and the cities needed African labour.³⁰ He saw also that it was impractical and inhuman to set up society so that African urban workers must spend long periods at work away from their families. Besides, the African could only be a contented and valuable worker if he had his family with him and lived the whole life of a man. It became necessary in 1941 to amend the Land Apportionment Act in order to allow Africans to live in Urban areas in special locations near their work. The Prime Minister's general plan aimed at securing decent living conditions for the increasing numbers of natives, particularly married men. He warned the European community that:

We have to realize that a permanent urban class is arising and is bound to grow in the future unless the people in the European towns can manage without any native assistance and the time has passed when that might have been possible-so we must face facts of the case.³¹

He contended that in the white areas the African should be welcomed, but on the understanding that he merely assists and does not compete with the white man. The African was to be an efficient worker but worth a quarter of the wages European should be worth.³²

³⁰Mason, "Two Sets of Values," Race, p. 153.

³¹Godfrey Huggins, "Native Problem in Southern Rhodesia," The Rhodesia Herald, November 24, 1944, pp. 8-9.

³²Ibid., October 6, 1944, p. 11.

The "two pyramid policy" found expression in the twin pillars of legislation, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. The latter provided for the regulation and registration of trade unions and set up an Industrial Conciliation Board for the settlement of disputes. African workers were entirely denied the benefits of the Act. It was clearly stated that Africans could not be employed at the wage rates other than those specified in agreement under the Act. For instance in construction work semi-skilled Africans earned fifteen shillings a week while Europeans with the same qualification earned over four shillings per hour, that is about eight pounds per week.³³ The clauses were repeated in the 1945 Amendment, preventing the Africans from forming legal Trade Unions till 1959. Thus, Africans were effectively excluded from competing with the Europeans in white areas of employment.

Until very recently, the Africans have enjoyed no direct representation in government except through Europeans elected by the white voters. They have even been unable to play any significant part in local government or in the conduct of their own affairs. The Native Councils, created by Huggins, have always been dominated by Native Commissioners appointed by the Government

³³"Labour Policy," Rhodesia Herald, October 27, 1944, p. 9.

and illiterate African chiefs who receive government subsidies. The policy of "indirect rule," the adaptation of traditional authority to modern administrative convenience, was never tried in Southern Rhodesia. From the earliest days of Company rule, African affairs were handled "direct" through the omnipotent Native Commissioner. Southern Rhodesian Africans have always had things done for them and to them, but have had very little chance to do anything for themselves.

In the cities the rigid colour bar, supported by legislation, made it impossible for an African to enjoy the amenities of the European city and forced him to fall back on the inadequate facilities of the native locations. In spite of the Prime Minister's appeal to municipal authorities to improve African housing, large numbers of Africans still lived in "overcrowded, miserable hovels."³⁴ Because of very low wages and the rising cost of living, conditions for the urban African became more intolerable. The future of the African was clearly not to be as the Carter Commission had predicted for the Africans "mainly agricultural and pastoral." The effect of the Land Apportionment Act in both urban and rural areas became more and more unjust as it grew less and less relevant.³⁵

³⁴Ibid., November 3, 1944, p. 9.

³⁵Terence Ranger, "Crisis in Southern Rhodesia," Africa Today Pamphlets, Research Series No. 217 (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960), p. 12.

Chapter III

The Birth of a Federation

The problem of Central Africa really begins with the Europeans. Isolated and weak in numbers, they felt caught between the devil and the deep. They wondered whether they should remain within the British colonial orbit and adapt themselves to such doctrines as the "paramountcy of native interests" or self-government on the basis of "one man one vote?" Or should they federate with the Union of South Africa, the big and rich neighbour to the south. Of course they wanted neither; what they wanted was power in their own hands and to advance their interests as they thought best in Central Africa. They regarded themselves as a bastion of white civilization threatened on one side by an obstinate Afrikaner illiberalism, and hemmed in all round by the rising tide of African Nationalism. Therefore, they decided to deal with these threats by means of unity and independence of the three British territories. Lord Malvern and Sir Roy Welensky, imbued with a restless desire to unite the territories by hook or by crook, came to the fore. Their dream was the establishment of an independent unit within the Commonwealth and the casting off of the old colonial shackles.

The Fight For Amalgamation

The proposal for amalgamation of the two Rhodesias

was first made in 1915 by the Directors of the British South Africa Company. They contended that amalgamation would mean cheaper administration, the avoidance of a duplication of services, the facilitation of a common native policy, and a step towards constitutional advancement by adding several more European members to the Legislative Council. The argument that the Southern Rhodesian whites would be swamped by taking in a vast number of Africans was said to be unsound. They would have to learn to live with the indigenous people and to adjust their native policy to the realities of the situation. Otherwise the alternative would be for Northern Rhodesia to join the territories to the north of it, leaving Southern Rhodesia a wedge between a Northern Federation and a Southern Federation.¹ However, the scheme did not gain the settler's support and the Colonial Office vetoed the scheme for amalgamation so that the two Rhodesias remained separate. It was after Southern Rhodesia gained her responsible government that a strong feeling for amalgamation with the north developed among the settlers.

The first action by the Imperial Government regarding closer association in Central Africa was taken in November 1927. The Colonial Secretary appointed a commission headed by Sir E. Hilton Young in order to "make recommendations as to whether, either by federation or some other form of

¹Gann and Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia, p. 48.

closer union, more effective co-operation between the different governments in Central Africa may be secured."² Hilton Young disagreed with his colleagues on the future of the Central African territories and submitted a separate report in which he recommended the division of Northern Rhodesia into three areas. The central area was to be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, thereby becoming "Greater Rhodesia", while North-Eastern Rhodesia was to be amalgamated with Nyasaland, and the third area, Barotseland, was to be a native state. On the other hand the rest of the commission recommended maintenance of the status quo, which was accepted by the Imperial Government because at this time there were still so many people antagonistic to the idea of amalgamation.³

Led by the Prime Minister, Dr. Godfrey Huggins, the protagonists for a closer union put forward a strong economic case. They argued that only by the unification of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland would the problem of finding sufficient markets for Southern Rhodesia's manufactured goods be solved. It would cheapen administration, improve communications, provide Southern Rhodesia with cheap labour from the north, facilitate railway control, and Northern Rhodesia's copper would be carried to the sea via Beira on the east coast, thereby giving employment to Rhodesian railway men. Political advantages

²Quoted by A. Taylor and E. Dvorin in Race, Vol. I No. 1, 1959, pp. 68-69.

³S.H. Veats, "The Rhodesias and Amalgamation," The Nineteenth Century, Vol. CXXIV, 1938, pp. 3117-18.

were also outlined. In 1934, when Huggins was still thinking in rigidly segregationist terms, he suggested a project for amalgamation similar to the Young Plan. Both the Imperial Government and the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia rejected the scheme which recommended the splitting of the country into two.⁴

The Northern Rhodesia settlers, angered by the Imperial statement which advocated the paramountcy of native interests in British Colonial Africa, later solidly stood for a closer association with the south and managed to put up a strong case. The Colonial Office in 1930 had published a memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, which stressed the paramountcy of Native interests. Self-government would be given to dependencies only when the Africans were sufficiently advanced to participate in government. The statement caused the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials to give up former hopes of European self-government and turn to the idea of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia to ensure the continuation of Northern Rhodesia as a white men's country, contrary to the Colonial Office policy. Joint representations were made to the Dominions Secretary, Mr. J. H. Thomas, who replied negatively that:

⁴Gann and Gelfand, pp. 115-16.

His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom are not prepared to agree to amalgamation at the present time...On the other hand;...while considering that amalgamation is not practicable now or in the near future do not wish to reject the idea in principle...Without going into details of these contingencies, it is sufficient that it should be indicated that the territory to be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia would not necessarily have boundaries coterminous with the present boundaries of Northern Rhodesia.⁵

From now on serious proposals for closer association included Nyasaland.

By 1935 general dissatisfaction with Colonial Office rule in Northern Rhodesia had gained momentum and united the elected members in favour of amalgamation. They held a conference at the Victoria Falls in January, 1936. Although no member of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature was present, all political parties were represented. The Conference adopted the resolution "that the early amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a constitution conferring the right of complete self-government is in the interest of both countries." Delegations were again sent to London and in October, 1936 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, then Dominions Secretary, announced that the Crown would not reconsider the earlier decision to leave the colonies separate because there had been no change in Southern Rhodesia's Native policy and more over "the unanimity reached at the

⁵The Nineteenth Century, p. 320.

Victoria Falls was obtained largely on the basis of conferring the right of complete self-government,..."⁶ A Royal Warrant announced the appointment of a Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe, "to enquire and report whether any, and if so what, form of closer co-operation or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible..."⁷ The terms of reference stressed the special responsibility of the British Government for the interests of the Africans. When the Commissioners arrived in Central Africa in 1938, they found the Europeans on the whole in favour of closer union. Most African witnesses on the other hand, opposed the project, and never relented in their hostility. African teachers, court interpreters, and ordinary drivers gave evidence before the Bledisloe Commission, and most of them spoke vehemently against amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. In Northern Rhodesia the Africans expressed the fear that Europeans would take over tribal lands and put an end to "indirect rule" by the chiefs. They disliked the Southern Rhodesia land and tax policies, pass laws, and the lowly status of Southern Rhodesian tribal chiefs. In Southern Rhodesia the Africans opposed amalgamation on the grounds that it would encourage more northern migrants to come south where their unwelcome

⁶Ibid.

⁷Taylor and Dvorin, pp. 70-1.

presence kept wages low, and would retard the progress of African education there. The missionaries did not support amalgamation either. European racists like Alderman Charles Olley of Salisbury argued against amalgamation because they feared a change in native policy as well as African domination.

In their report, the Commissioners expressed that the disparity between the territories constituted a fundamental objection to any scheme of closer association. In principle the Commission favoured amalgamation although this was not considered to be immediately desirable owing to the divergence in native policies. Therefore they concluded that there should be a further testing period during which the territories would evolve more acceptable and like-minded native policies. In the meantime an Inter-Territorial Council should be created to co-ordinate administrative services. The British Government insisted that the Copperbelt should not be regarded as a purely white area, and that Africans should be allowed to rise to the highest position even in European portions of the country.⁸ Huggins was not satisfied with the recommendations of the Imperial Government for the whites in Rhodesia would not accept the idea of Africans competing with Europeans in white areas. The war came in 1939 and the whole issue was shelved.

⁸Gann and Gelfand, pp. 120-21.

When the war ended in 1945, the amalgamationists resumed their fight once more. At general elections held in 1948 the United Party led by Dr. Huggins had been returned to power with amalgamation as the first point in its policy. In Northern Rhodesia Unofficial members under Mr. Roy Welensky were also returned to the Legislative Council with a majority in favour of amalgamation. From now on Huggins and Welensky were to co-operate in a vigorous fight for a strong united Central Africa.

Roy Welensky was born in Salisbury of a Lithuanian-Jew and an Afrikaner girl. He grew up in bitter poverty but later became a professional boxer and one-time heavy weight champion of Rhodesia, subsequently getting a job on the railways. He became a successful trade-union organizer who put his trust in negotiation and determined that white men such as himself should not allow lower-paid African workers to under-cut them in the labour market. Like Huggins, Roy Welensky was a convinced imperialist and deeply loyal to the British Crown in spite of his Jewish origin. During his lifetime as a politician in Northern Rhodesia from 1938 to 1953 and in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1963, Welensky fought with much tenacity and energy to win a greater measure of control from the Colonial Office especially in Northern Rhodesia. Welensky is huge,

burly, pugnacious and excellent in public speech though he had the sketchiest of schooling.⁹ He is now retired.

Having realized that neither the British Conservatives nor the Labourites would consent to amalgamation, Welensky talked Sir Godfrey Huggins round into a federal solution.¹⁰ Mr. Creech Jones, then Colonial Secretary, preferred a federal scheme safeguarding native rights and local autonomy of the associated territories. The Colonial office did not think in economic and imperial terms only, but also anticipated that a link with the two Northern territories would liberalize Rhodesia's much hated policy and assimilate the colony towards the Northern pattern, a prediction later to some extent fulfilled. Towards the end of 1948 Huggins announced a plan for the three Central African territories to work out a federal scheme, and European settlers who had been determined to get dominion status for Southern Rhodesia first, at last foresaw the birth of a British dominion in Central Africa.¹¹ Welensky's decision to support federation did change the course of Central African history, at least for a decade. Both men went back to Rhodesia to make preparations for a conference to be held early in 1949 to consider the

⁹This biographical sketch of Sir Roy Welensky is taken from Don Taylor, The Rhodesian: The Life of Sir Roy Welensky. London: Museum Press, 1955.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 106-7.

¹¹Gann and Gelfand, p. 216.

question of federation.

The federation issue, as shall be seen in the next chapter, became a burning question. Stockil, with his dominion status first programme, still wielded much influence in Southern Rhodesia, while Huggins, to the dismay of Imperial Officials, still stuck to his idea of excluding Africans from the voter's roll. The federalist movement nevertheless slowly gathered momentum and early in 1949, an Unofficial Conference met at the Victoria Falls, attended by various Rhodesian Ministers and members of political parties, as well as elected members from the Northern protectorates. Sir Godfrey Huggins, aided by Roy Welensky, played the chief role, and largely under the Prime Minister's influence the conference produced a constitution federal in frame, but amalgamationist in nature. The central legislature would contain a senate, but all power rested with a House of Representatives from which Huggins still wished to exclude the Africans. The draft paralleled in some ways Huggin's earlier designs for an altered Southern Rhodesian Constitution. The result of this conference was to frighten politically conscious Africans in the Northern territories, who were not directly represented, and "federation" became a dirty word at African Welfare Society Meetings, just as amalgamation had been earlier on. In London, Dr. Kamuzu Banda, Nyasaland expatriate, and a medical

practitioner, issued a joint statement with Harry Mkumbula, a Northern Rhodesia school teacher who was studying economics at the London School of Economics. Their document described the Victoria Falls Conference as a plot to extend settler rule beyond the Zambezi, and anticipated that Southern Rhodesian domination would clamp a colour bar on to the Northern territories and put an end to all African political and economic progress in spite of constitutional guarantees that had been promised. African speakers in the north warned their people that federation would cause a great influx of white settlers who would chase them out of their lands, deprive chiefs of their power and prevent Africans from getting good jobs. Powerful pressure groups such as the Fabians and the Aborigine's Protection Society supported the African case against federation; so did many leading British academics and clergymen, as well as prestige-worthy journals like the New Statesman and Nation. The British Labour Government did not, however, reject closer association outright, and Southern Rhodesia pressure continued.¹²

With the fall of Creech Jones from the Labour Government, Huggins swung back from federation to amalgamation. At the end of 1949 while in London, he

¹²Ibid., p. 217.

told Patrick Gordon Walker, who was now in charge of Commonwealth relations, that federation was 'out' because of the expenses involved in supporting an extra legislature, and because the powers of Southern Rhodesia's own Parliament might be impaired. At a meeting in April he once more demanded an amalgamationist solution. He argued that European settlement must be made secure; white settlers would not live in a black republic and Africa could not develop without European skill. Inconsistency was one of Huggin's weaknesses (or strengths, politically). Of course the Prime Minister was meeting strong opposition from men like Mr. A. A. W. Stumbles and Mr. L. M. Cullinan both members of parliament in the Southern Rhodesia Legislature, who were demanding dominion status before federation or amalgamation with the north.

I believe we have a far better chance of getting Dominion Status if we stand apart from Northern Rhodesia, because I believe with their native policy there would be considerable difficulty in coming to an agreement.¹³

Arguing against amalgamation, Mr. Stumbles said, "To ask for amalgamation now will impede our progress to the higher constitutional status we are now seeking. Dealing with Northern Rhodesia their system of government must be brought to the level of ours. To imagine that you can talk of amalgamation unless their system is brought to our level is ridiculous."¹⁴

¹³Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, XXVIII (June, 1948), p. 1376.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1352.

Such serious disputes continued until Huggins suggested a conference of Officials should sit in London in 1951 to consider means of overcoming the obstacles to federation. James Griffiths, then Colonial Secretary, and Gordon Walker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations at that time, agreed to have the conference held in London in 1951. Huggins had made his decisive breakthrough, and a Central African Federation of some sort at last moved from political theory into the realm of fact.¹⁵

The Setting up of the Federation

The first serious move towards federation was taken in 1951 when the Conference of Officials from Britain and the three Central African states reported in favour of closer union.¹⁶ It advanced the usual economic arguments for federation such as the advantages of economic planning over a large area, the co-ordination of the public services, and the greater attraction of overseas investment which a large market offered. The political arguments were given as the superior capacity of a federation of territories to resist outside pressures, and to protect "British traditional principles from influences from outside" the borders of British Central Africa. The report also recognized that the

¹⁵Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London: Collins, 1964), pp. 36-37.

¹⁶Report of Conference on Closer Association, Cmd. 8233, 1951.

crucial problem in Central Africa was the relationship between the races. All previous moves towards a closer association between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland had failed on this particular problem. To meet this problem, the principle of "economic and political partnership was laid down." This, the report said, "was the only policy which can succeed in the conditions of Central Africa."¹⁷

The political structure that was proposed was a curious compromise in that it transferred important powers to the European community and at the same time it suggested a number of safeguards for the Africans, the chief of which was the retention of certain key powers, as far as the two protectorates were concerned, in the hands of the Crown. From then on increasing powers were claimed by, and given to, the local European community and the safeguards for the Africans were at the same time weakened.¹⁸

According to the 1951 Officials' Scheme, the Europeans were to have twenty-six representatives out of thirty-five and would also be in control of a responsible Cabinet. Southern Rhodesia was to have seventeen members, a high proportion not justified by any objective criterion. A strict division of functions was laid down between the Federal and separate territories under the Colonial Office. The Federal Government would not be allowed to control the

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma in Central Africa (London: The Africa Bureau, 1960), p. 3.

more intimate domestic policies of the protectorates, and to interfere with the political status and the control of the land in these two countries, which would remain Britain's special responsibility. Various constitutional safeguards for the Africans were introduced. One was the inclusion of a special "Minister for African Interests" in the Federal Government, who was to be independently appointed by the Governor-General, and with power to veto any proposed executive action of the government for prior approval by the Secretary of State in Britain. The second was the African Affairs Board which was to be a committee of the Legislature consisting of the Minister for African Interests, the Secretaries for Native Affairs from each of the three territories, three elected members and three Africans. The function of this Board was to examine before publication all proposed Federal legislation. If they thought it detrimental to African interests and the Legislature nevertheless passed it, the Governor-General would be required to refer it to the Secretary of State in London, and the final decision rested with the British Government.¹⁹

The Officials' report provoked at once African as well as European opposition in Central Africa and Britain. There were doubts as to whether the constitutional safeguards would work. The world had just seen South Africa destroy

¹⁹The Federal Scheme, Cmd. 8233, 1951.

the safeguards which had been entrenched into her constitution. Southern Rhodesia herself had had constitutional safeguards enabling Britain not to allow discriminatory legislation there but no government had ever paid them any attention. There was nothing in the record of the European leaders to inspire the slightest confidence that they would really play the game of "partnership," and set their faces against racial discrimination. No one believed that the whites could be kept in order by Britain, the policeman six thousand miles away from Central Africa.

In September 1951, a conference was held at Victoria Falls to discuss federation. Present were two Labour Ministers, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth Relations. Southern Rhodesia sent no Africans in her delegation. Only the greatest persuasion induced the Africans from the protectorates to attend. The conference broke up in disagreement. However, its communique stated:

It is becoming evident that further discussion with each territory and exchanges of views between the four governments will be necessary...it is hoped that the position can be sufficiently clarified to enable the Conference to reassemble in London about the middle of next year.²⁰

The Conference, with the exception of the African delegates, showed itself favourable to the principle of federation and agreed that the protectorates must retain their existing

²⁰Rhodesia Herald, September 22, 1951, p. 1.

political status, and that economic and political partnership between Europeans and Africans was the only policy under which federation could be established. The Africans from Northern Rhodesia expressed their willingness to consider federation "after the policy of partnership in Northern Rhodesia had been defined, and as so defined, put into progressive operation."²¹

The two British Ministers had hardly returned to London when a general election was held and a Conservative Government returned to office. The discussions about partnership unfortunately did not take place and the date for the next conference was pushed forward to April, 1952. This time no Africans at all from the northern territories attended but the conference was held without them. Two Africans from Southern Rhodesia attended. During 1952 and 1953 the original proposals were translated into a Draft Federal Scheme²² the Draft Federal Scheme into a Federal Scheme,²³ the Federal Scheme into an Order in Council ²⁴ the Order in Council into law, and the Central African Federation into fact. These developments occurred very rapidly and the original proposals which the Officials' Conference had drafted were transformed to the detriment of the Africans. These changes may briefly be summarized under four headings.

²¹Ibid.

²²The Federal Scheme, Cmd. 8573, 1952.

²³The Federal Scheme, Cmd. 8754, 1953.

²⁴Order in Council no 1199, 1953.

First, Britain's special responsibilities for the protectorates "for so long as their respective peoples so desired" were relegated to a Preamble in the Constitution and doubts were soon expressed as to the validity of this Preamble. In the Preamble itself, a new clause had appeared which had not been there in earlier drafts and was not in the Officials' Scheme:

The association of the three territories...in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when the inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.²⁵

This clause seemed to indicate that federation was a stepping-stone towards independence. Admittedly there was the saving clause "when the inhabitants of the territories so desire." But what did "inhabitants" mean? James Griffiths, former Secretary of State for the Colonies explained that "Inhabitants means inhabitants without any qualification of colour, race or creed." Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then Secretary of State for the Colonies in agreement with Griffiths said:

By the majority of the people I agree with the Rt. Hon. Gentleman that we mean the inhabitants which he said are the inhabitants... Nothing short of that will enable any government to approve of a scheme of amalgamation or of a status which will end in dominion status without the agreement of the majority of the inhabitants. I give a categorical assurance about that.²⁶

This sounded very well to the Africans and liberals but Mr.

²⁵The Federal Scheme, Clause (e), Cmd. 8754, 1953.

²⁶Quoted in Hansard, July 24, 1953. Col. 1969.

Roy Welensky had a different view. He contended that "the pledge that independence could not be granted before a majority of the inhabitants wanted it did not mean that the natives had the right to veto anything which would be in the best interests of the Federation."²⁷ Another European member in the Federal Assembly said that what was meant by the "majority of the inhabitants" was really the "majority of the voters," who were of course the Europeans. On the Preamble itself Sir Godfrey Huggins said, "Let us, for the sake of Federation, which was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble, have patience."²⁸

Secondly, the composition of the Federal Assembly was altered to the detriment of the Africans. The Minister for African Interests, whom the Rhodesian whites called "the cuckoo in the nest," was dropped. In the Officials' original scheme the Europeans would have controlled twenty-six seats in the assembly; in the final scheme they controlled twenty-nine, that is three-quarters of the total.

Third, the African Affairs Board was reduced to a standing committee of the Federal Assembly. Its membership was reduced from nine to six, the three Secretaries for Native Affairs were dropped; one of these six was to be appointed chairman by the Governor-General. The functions and the powers of the Board were diminished. Mr. G. A. Davenport,

²⁷The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 5.

²⁸Reported in Rhodesia Herald, July 31, 1954.

Southern Rhodesia Minister of Education said something that showed the weak position of the Board:

The African Affairs Board would probably be necessary, if only to reassure the Natives. If the people in the African Affairs made a farce of it they could be replaced, and if the same thing happened a second time, the Board would have to go.²⁹

Finally, the division of powers between the Federal and territorial governments was further weighted in favour of the Federal Government which was given control of foreign affairs, of the armed forces, of the economy, of communications, of some key development services and the major sources of revenue. In the final scheme the following additional items were removed from the list of territorial functions proposed by the Officials' conference. Some were transferred to the Federal Government, others went into a concurrent list in which both governments had power, but with federal law prevailing: "Income tax; European agriculture in Southern Rhodesia; veterinary service in Southern Rhodesia; co-operatives, except where the majority were Africans; marketing; health; town planning; European police forces; prisons; roads."³⁰

The Federal Parliament was given the vital power to fix the first federal franchise. Bills affecting the electoral law and all constitutional amendments would require a two-thirds majority of the Federal Assembly,

²⁹Ibid., June 25, 1952.

³⁰The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 6.

that is, they would be in control of the European representatives.

There was no doubt in any one's mind what this Federal Constitution meant, even in its earliest stage. At a meeting of civil servants in Salisbury on October 23, 1952, the Southern Rhodesia Minister of Justice explained, "to the extent that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have given up powers to the Federal Government, to that extent they have escaped from the domination of the Colonial Office..."³¹ On July 16, 1951, Sir Godfrey Huggins told his party that "Once the Imperial Government have granted this constitution they have lost all control- don't forget that."³²

The Federation proposals were fought step by step in the British Parliament in the three years before they came into law 1953. The Labourites had begun by considering the Officials' Scheme "a constructive proposal." But as they watched the treatment which African views were accorded in Central Africa, and observed the watering down of the scheme to the detriment of the Africans, they put up strong opposition. They withdrew all support for the proposals, and on several occasions divided the House. The Conservatives defended the scheme on the grounds that "it is a thoroughly comprehensive and liberal document and that, as far as human foresight

³¹Ibid., p. 7.

³²Ibid.

can see, it provides a means by which partnership between the races can be established."³³

The Federal Scheme was approved by the House of Commons on March 24, 1953, by forty-four voters with the whips on the Labour and Liberal parties voting against it. It was then referred to a referendum in Southern Rhodesia, which was held April 10, 1953. Out of a total of about three million Africans and 150,000 Europeans, there were 46,355 voters of whom only 380 were Africans. Eighty per cent votes were cast with 25,570 in favour and 14,000 against. In the legislature of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the African members were joined in opposition by the Europeans nominated to represent African interests, and in Nyasaland by the one Indian member of the Council. The Officials were instructed to vote with the Europeans.³⁴ Then, by Act of Parliament on August 1, 1953, the British Government created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and by an Order in Council, the Federation was brought into being on September 3, 1953. The Federation was to be headed by a Governor-General appointed by the Queen to represent her. Lord Llewellyn was made the first Governor-General with Sir Godfrey Huggins the First Prime Minister.

³³Hansard, March 24, 1953, Col. 671.

³⁴The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 8.

Opposition to the Federal Proposals 1951-1953

Strong opposition was expressed by nearly all Africans and by a few Europeans to the Federal proposals in Central Africa. To a minority of whites federation seemed a bad idea because they disliked the combination of British liberalism and black nationalism, which they feared would "swamp" them. White supremacists like R. A. Stockil, Smit, and Olley opposed federation because they abhorred the idea of Europeans sitting in the same parliament with Africans, the idea of partnership with the blacks, and they feared that they might lose an opportunity to achieve dominion status if Southern Rhodesia federated with the north. Charles Olley maintained that partnership was a departure from the Southern Rhodesia policy of segregation. The Land Apportionment Act, the Native Urban Areas Accommodation and Registration Act and the several pass laws for him remained the authorities of Southern Rhodesia in governing the black proletariat and must therefore not be changed. To anti-federalists, partnership meant equality with white men and an increasing number of Africans on the voter's roll, which must ultimately oust white power in parliament. It meant equality of opportunity in commerce and industry contrary to the terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, and here again it must undermine white progress and finally it meant integration of races, miscegenation and

the mongrelization of the white species.³⁵ Charles Olley was expressing the opinions of many Europeans in Rhodesia.

Among the majority of Africans in Central Africa there was a very strong feeling against any form of closer union. The memoranda and submissions of 1951 to 1953 prepared by the Protectorate Councils, National Congresses and other bodies deal directly with the proposals for a particular form of federation contained in the Government White Papers Cmd. 8233 and Cmd. 874. The Nyasaland African National Congress Memorandum³⁶ on closer association in Central Africa addressed to the Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. James Griffiths rejected federation for several reasons. They feared that the acceptance of partnership would have meant the recognition of Europeans and other aliens as co-owners of the land. Nyasaland was a protectorate and wished to remain so, under federation she might lose this political status. Nyasaland was anxious to gain her independence as India had done.

After examining the report of the 1951 Conference held at the Victoria Falls the memorandum stated: "We can go on showing that federation for the Africans is a dangerous thing to plunge into- chiefs, peasants, artisans, teachers, in fact all sorts of Africans are unanimous on this total rejection of federation." On April 6, 1953, the

³⁵Rhodesia Herald, January 5, 1952, p. 5. See also Boris Gussman, Out in the Mid-day Sun (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 41.

³⁶The Africa Bureau, Britain's Dilemma, p. 14.

Nyasaland African National Congress issued a statement on Non-Violent Movement Against Federation. It was resolved "that a Supreme Council of action consisting of representative Chiefs, members of the Legislative Council, Congress and people from various organizations be set up immediately which Council shall consider and direct the resistance movement." Even the African delegates to the 1951 Conference had gone there with an avowed intent to oppose federation.³⁷ A delegation of chiefs from Nyasaland arrived in London in January, 1953 and met the Secretary of State on February 4. They expressed their bitter disappointment at being refused access to the Queen whom they wished to present their petition against federation. Nevertheless, the fight continued.

In Northern Rhodesia Africans were almost unanimous in their opposition to federation. Only a few expressed the desire to consider federation after a clear definition of partnership. On August 24, 1951, Government Officials reported that hundreds of thousands of Africans had rejected the idea of federation at meetings held throughout the country. Only the Native authority tribal councils in Ft. Jameson, which represented 140,000 Africans seemed to have acquiesced.³⁸ Some of the reasons for the dislike of closer union were the lack of power given to African chiefs in Southern

³⁷Rhodesia Herald, October 5, 1951, p. 9.

³⁸Ibid., August 24, 1951, p. 1.

Rhodesia, limitation of employment in public service, European Trade Union's policy of restricting the scope of the African in skilled and semi-skilled trades and they feared to lose their status as a protectorate. In 1952, two delegations of Northern Rhodesia Africans visited Britain to inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British of their people's unanimous opposition to the Federal Scheme. African members of the African National Congress addressed a petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations. They also petitioned the speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor:

We appeal to Her Majesty's House of Commons/
House of Lords to grant us hearing...and we respectfully request you Sir/ Your Lordship, to allow this to be done before any legislation is brought before Parliament to enable federation to be imposed upon us against our will. We believe that the grounds of our appeal are those of right and justice, and the principles cherished and taught by Britain of government by consent of the governed.³⁹

African opposition in Southern Rhodesia as expressed by chiefs and various African organizations was based on three main points. They feared that there would be no direct representation of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Parliament; that Southern Rhodesia policy "repressive and discriminatory," would tend to spread to the other two territories under federation; and that if African development in Southern Rhodesia were

³⁹Africa Bureau, p. 18.

not to be held back, Central Africa would have to be stronger economically before federation took place. The safeguards for African interests were not sound and partnership had never been practiced in Southern Rhodesia although Muggins claimed it had been.⁴⁰

The Fabians in Britain were convinced that the major obstacle to federation was that Africans were not convinced of the urgent need for it; it had never been explained to them in terms they could appreciate and the official report failed to convince them. No African would believe that better economic planning and better control of immigration could be achieved only by political federation. The Africans were opposed to a strong central government that would delegate much of the power formerly held by the United Kingdom to the local European community. The veto power that was to be given to the Minister for African Interests would never be effective for in Southern Rhodesia Britain had never used it against laws that discriminate against Africans. Worse still the special minister was dropped in the final scheme. The wider power given to the European community would nullify the protection Britain had guaranteed to the Africans in the north by treaty and by statement of policy.⁴¹ In Scotland Dr. Kamuzu Banda gave several addresses opposing federation and he sent

⁴⁰Rhodesia Herald, August 22, 1951, p. 1.

⁴¹Ibid., August 2, 1951, p. 3.

out thousands of pamphlets urging Africans to oppose any form of closer association with the Rhodesias.⁴²

European politicians themselves did much to increase African suspicion of federation by the careless speeches and remarks which they made concerning Africans and the special safeguards for African interests. Mr. Patrick Fletcher, then Minister for Native Affairs in Southern Rhodesia said in derision, "After all African opinion did not count."⁴³ Of course it did count in London. Here is an example of reckless extravagant and unjustifiable statements made by some Europeans of the White Rhodesia Council, which spring from fear, suspicion, and hate:

If you believe in white supremacy, if you believe in keeping the Black man out of White Parliament, if you believe that white men and white women should be the artisans, typists, and clerks, if you believe that the natives ought to be retained as the peasants to grow food for the rest, if you believe in keeping hordes of natives out of white towns and stopping them from overwhelming the Europeans, then support the policy of the White Rhodesia Council.⁴⁴

This white supremacy chain letter was circulated to whites in Central Africa and was read to Mr. Griffiths by Africans at a time when he was persuading Africans to accept the principle of federation. Nothing could have hurt the federalists more than such a letter.

⁴²Philip Mason, The Year of Decision (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 22.

⁴³Ibid., p. 26.

⁴⁴Rhodesia Herald, August 30, 1951, p. 1.

Huggin's reassurances to Europeans of continued European domination increased African suspicion of federation. There is no need to fear a black parliament, he said to the United Central African Association, "the whole thing is fantastic; it would not happen in fifty or sixty years" for Europeans could make laws to ensure their survival; if too many Africans registered as voters, the qualifications could always be raised.⁴⁵

During the 1951 Victoria Falls Conference the debate on federation degenerated to nothing more than an attack on the Colonial Secretary and a display of contemptuous superiority towards African leaders. Huggins himself made some thoughtless remarks which were unstatesmanlike and caused much illfeeling. Roy Welensky was no exception.⁴⁶

The Europeans wanted independence for themselves. It is their doctrine of white domination that Africans detested. The Africans hated to be reduced to a permanent position of subjugation and inferiority. The crucial point about federation had never been mentioned: that it was a means of transferring the substance of power from London to a European-controlled Central African Government. This, above all, was what the Europeans wanted, and this above all, was what the Africans feared. This time the Europeans were victorious. The Federation of Central Africa came into being in 1953

⁴⁵Mason, The Year of Decision, p. 43.

⁴⁶Rhodesia Herald, December 3, 1951, p. 1, and December 21, 1951, p. 1.

against the will, clearly and passionately expressed, of the African people. By this act, the seeds of future trouble were irrevocably sown.

Chapter IV

Federation in Operation: Progress and Disillusionment

The Federal Act of 1953 combined together three diverse territories: Southern Rhodesia, the most highly developed, with a fully developed system of separation between the races in land, industry, and agriculture; Northern Rhodesia, with its one great asset of the Copperbelt and its undeveloped hinterland, possessing a small and privileged white community in a country controlled by the Colonial Office in the interests of the Africans; and Nyasaland, poor, almost entirely African, living primarily on agricultural products and the export of its abundant cheap labour, and confidently expecting an African government.

The Federal Legislature and the Franchise

The first Federal Assembly, which was constituted in December, 1953, consisted of thirty-five members. Of these, three were Europeans to represent African interests, and six were African members, two being elected from each territory under special arrangements. The remaining twenty-six members were all Europeans elected on qualitative franchises differing from territory to territory. Although these seats were open to all races, due to the nature of the franchise no Africans could be elected.¹ The Federal executive consisted

¹Cmd. 1148, p. 35.

of a Governor General who represented the Crown and appointed the Prime Minister and other ministers. There was also a Federal Supreme Court with jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the handling of any dispute between a territorial government and the Federal Government, and appellate jurisdiction from the territorial courts. The court was made up of a Chief Justice appointed by the Federal Government, the Chief Justices of the three territories, and not less than two nor more than six other justices appointed by the Federal Government.²

By the Constitution Amendment Act of 1957, the Federal Assembly was enlarged to fifty-nine members. The three European members charged with special responsibilities for African interests remained; four African members, two each from the Northern Territories, were specially elected by Africans; eight African members were elected on a special Federal franchise, of whom four were from Southern Rhodesia and two from each of the Northern Territories. Forty-four members were all Europeans elected on a higher Federal franchise, twenty-two from Southern Rhodesia, fourteen from Northern Rhodesia and six from Nyasaland.³

In 1957, the first federal franchise was introduced. It was based on a system of two rolls, a special roll and a general roll. Both were open to all races, but the high

²C. Leys, pp. 48-9.

³Ibid., p. 43.

economic and educational qualifications for the general roll in practice restricted it to Europeans. The special roll was powerless and was designed mainly to enable more Africans to register as voters. These voters were eligible to vote only for the eight elected members and for the Southern Rhodesia European member with special responsibilities for African interests. For the forty-four elected members, only general voters could vote. There were less than 2,000 Africans on the general roll while other races on this roll numbered approximately 90,000. The African vote therefore could not exercise any significant influence in the election of three-quarters of the Federal Assembly. All this created the feeling that the Federal Parliament was dominated by Europeans.

COMPOSITION OF THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT, 1957⁴

S. Rhodesia	N. Rhodesia	Nyasaland	Total
Members elected by voters on General Roll (Race not specified)			
24	14	6	44
electorate mainly European			
African Members			
4	2	2	
elected by voters on General Roll and Special Roll voting together	elected by African Electoral Colleges	elected by African Electoral Colleges	
	2	2	12
elected as in S. Rhodesia			
European Members Representing African Interests			
1	1	1	3
elected as above	appointed by the Governors		
29	19	11	59

⁴ibid., p. 235.

To be registered as a general voter, a person was required to have one of the following qualifications:

- (i) Income of 720 pounds per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at 1,500
- (ii) Income of 480 pounds per annum or ownership of immovable property valued at 1,000 plus the completion of a primary course of education
- (iii) Income of three hundred pounds per annum or ownership of five hundred pounds plus the completion of a four-year course of secondary education
- (iv) Being a recognized minister of religion
- (v) Being a chief capable of satisfying the literacy

The qualifications for a special roll were literacy and:

- (i) 240 pounds a year

or

- (ii) 120 pounds a year plus two years completed secondary education.

All voters on both rolls were to be at least twenty-one years of age, citizens or British protected persons, able to speak, read, write in and understand English and complete the prescribed voting form.⁵

The Federal franchise violated the common roll principle by dividing the electorate into two separate classes, ordinary and special voters. The distinction between them was based on property and education, not race. But it so happened that almost every European in the Federation was an ordinary voter, while very few Africans could be, and almost all special voters were Africans. Since the special vote was weak and the

⁵Ibid., p. 236.

ordinary vote powerful, this worked out as "discriminatory representation masquerading as ideal common roll democracy."⁶ It gave the substance of power to Europeans. The ordinary roll, in practice, was a European roll and the forty-four members elected by it were European representatives of a European minority. As general voters were allowed to vote for the special African representatives, all members of parliament were elected by a European majority.

It is quite obvious that the intention behind the franchise was to keep decisive political power in European hands for as long as possible. Africans could not qualify as general voters because of limited educational and economic attainment. Secondary education is completely out of the reach of the majority of the Africans. For example, the number of Africans who reached School Certificate level (Form IV) in Southern Rhodesia in 1955 was seventy; the number reaching Standard Six in 1954 was 4,429. These figures were much lower in the Northern Territories. The educational system does not offer a wide avenue of advance to Africans who are unable to satisfy the highest, or even the middle, means of qualification. The highest income qualification was well below the average of European income, which was approximately 1,100 pounds in 1956. The average income of Africans in employment in 1956 was approximately

⁶T. R. M. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership (Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 88.

seventy pounds per annum. The average income of all Africans in the Federation was, however, far lower than this.⁷

These principal provisions of the Federal franchise were not part of the Constitution. The Constitution empowered the Federal Parliament to pass its own electoral laws by a simple two-thirds majority, subject to the theoretical veto of Her Majesty's Government.

The Southern Rhodesia franchise after 1957 was almost identical with the Federal franchise. Although there is no discrimination in terms of race in the Electoral Amendment of 1957, the roll has remained, in practice, predominantly European. There is also a provision for a lower roll but when the number of voters with lower qualifications amounts to twenty per cent of the number of the other voters, no more will be enrolled without full qualification. The legislative assembly consisted of thirty members. There were no Africans then sitting in parliament. The ministers are chosen from the majority party, as at Westminster.

The Nyasaland Executive Council was appointed by the Governor. The legislative council consisted of twelve civil servants, ex officio, six representatives of the non-African community elected on a non-African roll by constituencies, and some African members. Up to 1959, there were five African legislators to eighteen others in a population of three million

⁷Leys, pp. 239-40.

Africans and about 10,000 other races. The Africans felt they were not adequately represented in government. The system of government by appointment did not work well in Nyasaland for the Governor was inclined to appoint those Africans who supported his policies. If the majority were against his policy, the Governor's nominees could not have represented African wishes. They did not enjoy African confidence.⁸ Nyasaland participated in the federal franchise under the arrangements described above.

Northern Rhodesia was ruled by Governors appointed in the same way as Nyasaland until 1958 when a new constitution was introduced by the Colonial Secretary. The franchise was similar to the Federal one and suffered from the same defects. The major difference between the two is that the former was a compromise between rule by governor's appointment and rule by an electorate, the federal was almost completely elective. But there were only six nominated officials, and two other Governor's nominees, to twenty-two elected members in a House of thirty. However, the largest single block in Northern Rhodesia legislature, and the executive council, was nominated by the Governor. Two of the elected members were to be Africans and two were to be Europeans under the constitution. All other seats were open to any race. This attempt to reduce the racial element in politics would have been praiseworthy

⁸Creighton, pp. 82-3.

if it were accompanied by an extension of the franchise. In the territorial elections of 1959, there were nine Africans including two nominated by the Governor to represent three million and thirteen Europeans to represent 80,000.⁹

The Executive Council of Ministers was composed of four civil servants, and six unofficial members, of whom two were Africans. All were appointed by the Governor, but he was obliged to nominate the Africans from the party with the majority of elected members. Under the new Constitution, the territorial branch of the Federal Government Party, Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party, held much power. But the majority of the Africans did not support the Federal Party,¹⁰ perhaps because of its policies which resembled those of Southern Rhodesia.

Racial Discrimination and Partnership

Racial discrimination was one of the forces working against Federation. The reference to "partnership" in the Preamble to the 1953 Constitution led many Africans to believe that discrimination would quickly be eliminated. But discrimination did not disappear and partnership remained undefined. The result was a growing suspicion and disillusionment with federation among the Africans. Discrimination remained rigid and entrenched by law in Southern Rhodesia. The maintenance

⁹Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰Ibid.

of colour bar in Southern Rhodesia turned the Africans of the Northern Territories, and many of those within Southern Rhodesia itself, against the Europeans who control it.¹¹

The concept of partnership originated in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920's to enable a small white minority to live in a country where the Colonial Office held African interests paramount. The British Government and the Colonial Office viewed partnership as a partnership of individuals in a single society, while the Rhodesian whites thought of a partnership between separate racial groups of quite unequal size. The Federal Government adopted the Southern Rhodesian interpretation of partnership as its racial policy. It regarded European interests as paramount and partnership as a means to accommodate a bit of African development at a very slow pace. This interpretation "is the original conception of partnership turned upside down."¹² The Europeans refused to extend the franchise, to carry out land reforms or economic integration or even social integration between the races. Africans desired a general partnership of all individual members of society irrespective of colour, a partnership in which men have the same economic and political rights.

Partnership was not an integral part of the Federal Constitution, the only reference to it is in the Preamble which stated that:

¹¹Cmd. 1148, p. 75.

¹²Creighton, p. 104.

The association of the colony of Southern Rhodesia and the territories in a federation would conduce to the security, advancement and welfare of all, their inhabitants and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants.¹³

Lord Hailey remarked that partnership has "a moral rather than a political connotation," and that it is "rather an inspiration than a policy."¹⁴ It seems then that the word was just a vague expression of goodwill as it was not binding as were the provisions in the Constitution.

Southern Rhodesia accepted partnership for the sake of economic advance, not from enthusiasm for it as a positive ideal, for Lord Malvern said, "Let us for the sake of federation, which was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble which was forced upon us, have patience."¹⁵ While Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies then, talked exaltedly about partnership and the Preamble, Mr. Julian Greenfield, Minister of Law for Southern Rhodesia, talked in quite a different way: "One of the principal reasons for having this federation at all is to get as much power as possible out of the hands of the people far away in London."¹⁶ When Mr. Dauti Yamba, an African representative in the Federal Assembly, asked for equal treatment for all races in the Federation, Sir Godfrey Huggins said: "There is going to be inequality and differentiation. To pretend there is not

¹³Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Rhodesia Herald., July 31, 1954.

¹⁶Quoted in Hansard, March 24, 1953, Col. 679.

is to deceive everybody." There was not much done to produce a stable interracial society. Sir Roy Welensky envisaged partnership at best "not one between the races, but between the Europeans as a whole and certain selected Africans,"¹⁷ and at worst as "the Partnership between horse and rider."¹⁸ The Federal Congress defined it in 1952 as "the gradual extension of political rights and privileges to civilized standards of behavior and culture." But any system of partnership which does not carry with it the implications of at least equality of political representation between the groups concerned today is the partnership of "horse and rider."

In Southern Rhodesia there is a limited form of home-ownership in urban areas; few hotels have applied for registration as multiracial hotels, the Land Apportionment Act continues to operate; pass laws require every black man to carry a piece of paper to identify himself and he is arrested if he is found without one; social contact between the races is impossible; and the African vote does not count at all.¹⁹ Mr. R. S. G. Todd, ex-Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, pointed out in 1958 that: "After five years of so called partnership, an African citizen clean, well-dressed, educated and ambitious...remains a second class citizen unable to enter a cinema or become a fireman on the Government-owned railways."²⁰

¹⁷Quoted in Creighton, p. 102.

¹⁸Attributed to Lord Malvern

¹⁹See T. M. Franck, Race and Nationalism, pp. 224-35.

²⁰Quoted in Creighton, p. 103.

The Federal Government, however, did succeed in desegregating Post Offices. In 1959, the Federal Government finally announced that it would no longer maintain racially segregated Post Offices in Southern Rhodesia. This policy had already been accepted in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland before Federation. But in many other instances, the Federal Government missed several chances to make friends with the Africans.

Another area of partial success was at the university level. In 1957, the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was opened. The college tried to do something that had never been done before, to create a genuinely interracial university. But many whites protested having their children live in the same dormitories or eating in the same dining-halls with the Africans. After Britain insisted that students live together, the whites agreed provided the students slept in different rooms according to race. However, there is no segregation in teaching, sports or any other official activity. The major criticism of the university is its high entrance qualifications. The best way of ensuring a white majority at the college without openly admitting any racial distinction was to put the entrance qualifications and academic standards beyond the reach of most Africans. The minimum requirement is a good Higher Certificate (Form VI) for entrance to the college. There are many other restrictions which make it difficult for the college to function as a truly interracial institution.

Economic Progress and Problems

The advocates for the Central African Federation harped primarily on the economic advantages that could be reaped from closer co-operation between the three territories. This argument was accepted as valid in many quarters of Britain and Central Africa. Yet a strict analysis of the economic situation revealed some startling results especially among the African people. An uncritical respect for statistics often led to an exaggeration of the economic achievements of Federation. Most observers accepted the crude figures without asking who benefited from the growth that took place. The money economy, which is European dominated, is wrongly equated with the whole economy. The underlying truth is that over ninety per cent of the Africans live a subsistence life. Very often economists in Central Africa want to make comparisons between the money economy of the Federation and that of the other countries, as though the subsistence economy did not exist. The Federation's economy was a stratified one with wide gaps between the strata.²¹

That economic expansion, as measured by conventional indicators, took place during the federation cannot be doubted. But to say these gains were brought about by federation is a fallacy that ought to be dismissed. Economic

²¹Shirley Williams, Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality (London: Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, 1960), p. 1.

relations between the three territories were not hostile before federation. Changes in the political and administrative machinery in themselves had little impact on the size of the market area. Also it was not the case that as a result of federation the produce of each territory would be more widely used in the other territories. In itself federation did not affect the use of Southern Rhodesian coal and tobacco in Northern Rhodesia, or Northern Rhodesia copper in Southern Rhodesia, or of Nyasaland tea in the Rhodesias. The achievements of the Central African Economy can largely be explained by the action of normal economic forces which had been little affected by the changed governmental structure of the area. For instance, in Nyasaland there was a dynamic economic growth between 1947 and 1953 when Nyasaland's revenue increased from just over one million pounds to four million pounds. Yet between 1953 and 1957 there was only 1,000,000 pounds rise in the economy. Between 1948 and 1953 there was a tremendous increase in European crops, tea and tobacco, and in African-grown crops.²² The course of economic policy set during federation might have worked, in the long term, to the economic disadvantage of the Africans.²³ In his Dawn in Nyasaland, Guy Clutton Brock concludes that:

²²The Central African Examiner, Feb. 13, 1960, p. 24.

²³William F. Barber, in C. Leys and C. Pratt (eds.), A New Deal in Central Africa (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1960), pp. 59-81. Economists at the College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland discussed this matter, as well as members of the Chamber of Commerce. The Jack Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958/1959, is very enlightening. The Report stresses the economic advantage of federation.

The overall umbrella of Federation with its increasing political restrictions tends to arrest the real development of Nyasaland. It is a stumbling block to economic progress. The country has surrendered its economic and political independence and thus lost its main incentive to develop its once viable economy.²⁴

With the arrival of Sir Geoffrey Colby as Governor in 1948, a man whose dynamic economic policy helped to increase Nyasaland's revenue, the rate of economic development increased tremendously.

The next question to ask is, what effects had federation on the distribution of gains from economic growth both on the individual territories and on the different racial groups in Central Africa? The following table is revealing:

Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits: Ordinary Receipts, Territorial and Federal Governments in 000,000's pounds:²⁵

Year	S. Rhod.	N. Rhod.	Nyas.	Fed.	Total
1951	21.2	17.8	3.1	----	42.1
1952	28.5	32.2	3.2	----	63.9
1953	22.3	39.9	4.5	----	66.7
1956-57	17.1	19.3	6.3	53.0	95.7
1957-58	19.7	19.0	5.5	56.4	100.6

This table reveals a dramatic drop in receipts by the Northern Rhodesian Government after Federation. In the last pre-federation year, Northern Rhodesia collected about sixty per cent of Central African public revenue; by 1957-58, its share had fallen to less than twenty per cent. It is clear that its revenues would have been much higher if it had not shared taxes on the copper industry with other

²⁴The Central African Examiner, op. cit.

²⁵Farber, in C. Leys and C. Pratt, p. 83.

governments. The Copperbelt was definitely the financial backbone of the federal fiscal structure for it made the major financial contribution to Federation in taxes.

Southern Rhodesia benefited enormously by being relieved of expensive responsibilities which she passed to Federal jurisdiction. The major expenditure items transferred to the Federal Government were those which provided services primarily for Europeans such as agriculture and non-African education. The comparisons of territorial revenues before and after 1953 indicate that Nyasaland had larger sums at its disposal after federation, but it was scarcely touched by these major changes in the Federation owing to its small European population. European agriculture remained a territorial matter in Nyasaland while European agriculture in the Rhodesias became a Federal responsibility.

The Federal Government assumed primary responsibility for road, railway and air transport, for posts and telegraphs, and for the development of power. Territorial governments were thus relieved of expenditures which they would otherwise have been called upon to finance. Once again, Southern Rhodesia benefited most from these changes as most of the developments took place in that territory.

Nyasaland received benefits from the Federation in one category of services. Expenditure on public health, which was then a Federal responsibility, increased in Nyasaland during Federation. In 1958 recurrent expenditure on health

services amounted to one million pounds compared with less than 300,000 pounds before Federation.²⁶

Development expenditures were overwhelmingly allocated to the Rhodesias. Out of an expenditure of 63.3 million pounds projected by the Federal Government for the years 1955-59, the largest single share was claimed by the Rhodesia Railways, roads and bridges for the Rhodesias, and a tele-communications system. In the five financial years 1954-1959, Nyasaland's share of a total 140 million pounds was only 6.2 million pounds. It has been shown by students of the Central African economy that Nyasaland did not benefit from the Federal Government's borrowings. Loans which she got from the Colonial Development Corporation and the Rhodesian Selection Trust, and the grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Funds, benefited her more than the Federal loans.²⁷

The costs and benefits of government to the different races must also be considered. Europeans were eligible for many costly services which were either denied to Africans or available only to a few of them, such as the Land and Agricultural Bank, industrial loan boards, cheap labour recruited by the government, public funds, and government assistance for the aged or unemployed.

The allocation of expenditures on education for Europeans and for Africans was unfair as the following table shows:

²⁶Barber, in C. Leys and Pratt, p. 87.

²⁷Ibid., p. 89. See also Monthly Digest of Statistics, March, 1959.

Expenditure from Revenue Votes on Education in 000's Pounds:²⁸

Year	European	African
1950	1641	1143
1951	1925	1338
1952	2285	1498
1956-57	4664	3814
1957-58	5533	4557

By 1958 European population in the Federation was less than 300,000 while African population amounted to more than seven million. This is its most obvious, most basic, and yet most neglected statistic. African education expenditures were borne by the territories, while European education was a Federal responsibility. Africans always pointed out that only the Europeans were benefitting, since they had more money to spend on their children's education. Agriculture for the Africans lagged behind too. The following table is revealing:

Expenditures from Revenue Votes on Agricultural Services in the Rhodesia's in 000's pounds:²⁹

Year	European	African
1956-57	5074	1877
1957-58	6128	1672

Thus a discrepancy between the allocations received by the racial groups is observable in expenditures on agriculture. Federation segregated agricultural services for Europeans and Africans in Northern Rhodesia; formerly, this had been the case only in Southern Rhodesia. The European farmers drew far more heavily on public funds than the African farmers.

²⁸Ibid., p. 90.

²⁹Ibid., p. 91.

Wages had risen in Central Africa since the war for all races. The total wages for Africans in the Federation rose about 56.5 per cent between 1954 and 1958. However, per capita wages rose less--about thirty-one per cent, since the labour force itself increased by 163,000 during these four years. But when a comparison of wages between Europeans and Africans is made, the increases for the Africans fall into perspective:

A Comparison, Per Capita, of Average European and of Average African Earnings Per Annum in the Federation:

Territory	European	African	30
S. Rhodesia	995 pounds	80 pounds	
N. Rhodesia	1273 pounds	99 pounds	
Nyasaland	889 pounds	46 pounds	

The best working conditions for Africans are found in the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. Even there the gap between the races during Federation was enormous. The average wage paid European employees in the year ending in June, 1956, was 2,390 pounds, in addition to 177 pounds housing, water, and electricity subsidies. The average wage including bonuses and benefits paid to Africans was eight shillings per shift or on the basis of 308 shifts, 123 pounds per year. African Wages rose slightly during 1955-56, but their average remained at about one-twentieth that of the whites. There is a wide gap in pension schemes, life assurance, subsidized

³⁰Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Economic Report, 1959.

cost-of-living allowance, and leave pay between the races.³¹

The Federal Government and territorial governments collected taxes from companies, personal income tax, poll tax, and indirect taxes on goods and services. Both racial groups contributed to the creation of profits because the success of tax-paying enterprise depends jointly on the capital, skill, and labour provided by Europeans and on the labour supplied by Africans. Both racial groups pay direct taxes. The basic direct tax Africans are subject to is the poll tax. In 1957 approximately two million was collected in this way. Europeans feel direct taxation through income tax. Personal income tax payments to the Federal Government came to about 6,850,000 in 1957.

In view of the differentials in average income between the groups, direct income pinched more sharply on the African than on the European. All adult male Africans who were judged to be able bodied had to pay direct taxes, regardless of the size of their income. On the other hand, under the Federal income tax structure, a married European with three children could enjoy a tax-free income up to 1,733 pounds per annum if he paid 100 pounds to a medical aid society and if he saved 100 pounds per year in a pension fund.³²

The Federal Government was successful in pursuing an impressive development plan of building the Kariba Dam

³¹Franck, pp. 277-78.

³²Barber, p. 93.

and of modernizing the Rhodesia Railways. Vast quantities of electricity are now generated from the dam to the Copperbelt and to the main industrial centres of Southern Rhodesia. Both schemes have brought indirect benefits to all the races in the form of new opportunities for work and the possibilities of better wages, but the schemes were intended to enhance still further the wealth of the European-dominated sector of the economy. The railway serves the European towns, the Copperbelt, and European farms. But there is still a serious problem of transportation in the rural districts where the peasants depend on agriculture.

Although the Federal Public Service was created under a constitutional guarantee that all races would receive equal treatment, very few Africans were appointed under this provision to high positions. One was a doctor, the late Dr. Samuel Farirenyatwa, and another was Lawrence Vambe, a journalist who was posted to the information staff of Rhodesia House in London. Both were employed under conditions identical to those of Europeans occupying similar posts. Beyond that, there was little evidence of African advancement and equality in the Federal Service. There were many areas of civil service where there was disparity in wages. The Federal Government practiced discrimination in the army, on railroads, in immigration policy, in the enactment of the Federal franchise, in housing, education, and welfare services in areas of federal employment.

Chapter V

The Breakup of the Federation

"...it was generally acknowledged that opposition to Federation was there, that it was deeply rooted and almost universally held."¹

The visiting Government Ministers and European spokesmen from Central Africa often denied the unanimity of opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They contended that opposition was confined only to a few ambitious leaders, that the majority of the Africans did not understand the issues, and that the African National Congress in the territories did not represent the people. These people were blind to the truth; there is enough evidence to show the constancy of African opposition.

The strongest African organization against Federation was the African National Congress within the Federation. The Southern Rhodesia Congress was led by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, originally one of Lord Malvern's proteges. Congress there concentrated its efforts against the Land Husbandry Act of 1951. The Act enables the Government to work towards a complete system of individual land tenure in the Native Areas, so that Africans who wish to own land must live on it and farm it; and to create a stable community of urban Africans by providing family accommodation in the towns which, in some municipalities,

¹Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (The Devlin Commission), Para. 43. Quoted in Leys and Pratt, p. xi.

it is now possible for Africans to buy lease-hold on very long leases.² The Nationalist leaders attacked the scheme because it did not provide adequate land for Africans in the rural areas and did not provide old-age pensions, social security, and closer integration of Africans into the industrial economy for urban Africans. They also demanded universal suffrage. In Northern Rhodesia, the Zambia National Congress was led by Mr. Kenneth Kaunda, now President of the Republic of Zambia. In July 1958, Dr. Hastings Banda arrived in Nyasaland to assume leadership of the Nyasaland African National Congress. He demanded universal suffrage and an African majority in the Legislative Council. Supported by schoolmasters, social welfare officers, clerks, and other white collar workers, African Nationalism became an effective political force in Central Africa.³

By the end of 1958, the United Federal Party, which dominated the Federal Government, was talking of some form of Dominion status within three years. In fact, Lord Malvern had asked the British Government in 1956 for a Constitutional advance for the Federation to Dominion status. But the Colonial Office replied that it could not change the Constitution in the way Lord Malvern had asked it should be.⁴ The National Congress reacted sharply against constitutional proposals that denied any prospect of equality. In 1959, the Africans

²Leys, pp. 29-30.

³Gann and Gelfand, p. 263.

⁴Movement for Colonial Freedom, Handbook for Federal Politicians, London, August, 1956, p. II.

struck, especially in Nyasaland where there was violence. The political explosions of February and March, 1959, shook the foundations of life in the Federation. There were three immediate causes of the Emergency of 1959.

The first was the return of Dr. Banda to Nyasaland after many years of study in America and Scotland and medical practice in England and Ghana. He at once took command of the Congress and demanded that the Protectorate secede from the Federation. In five months eighty-three branches of the Congress increased to two hundred. For the first time the Europeans were confronted with an African political leader with the skill to rally the masses behind him. However, the Federal Government in Salisbury waited with anxiety to "teach the natives a lesson" by nipping African power in the bud.

The second event was the holding in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958, of the first pan-African Conference. Dr. Banda and Messrs Kaunda and Ikumbula from Northern Rhodesia, are alleged to have signed a declaration pledging them to break up the Federation and to drive the Europeans out of Africa.⁵

The third factor was another allegation based upon informers. It was charged that 150 African leaders in Nyasaland held a meeting on January 25, 1959, during which a plot was made to massacre Nyasaland's 8,000 Europeans, its Asian population, and those Africans too friendly to European

⁵Welensky, p. 113.

Government. Dr. Banda himself was not present at the meeting. Later, Alan Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary in London, stated that "massacre", widespread violence, and murder were being planned.

Tensions continued to grow in Nyasaland until, by the 20th of February, open defiance of District Commissioners, stoning of police cars, and riots had become frequent. The Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, asked for Federal troops to maintain order, and these were dispatched from Southern Rhodesia.

Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia then, was the first to take action against the Nationalist leaders and their followers. On February 26 he declared a state of emergency and "potential trouble makers" were rounded up. The Southern Rhodesia African National Congress and three other congresses with branches in the colony were banned. 475 members were arrested in pre-dawn raids and jailed. No riots had occurred in the country but the Prime Minister explained that the action was precautionary. In Nyasaland an emergency was declared on March 3 and Dr. Banda and 1328⁶ of his leaders and followers were arrested. He and a few aides were deported to a prison in Gwelo, Southern Rhodesia. Some of these arrests were followed by violence, notably at Ikata Bay where twenty Africans were killed by

⁶C. Richardson, The Future of a Dilemma, p. 7.

troops. In Northern Rhodesia the Zambia National Congress was declared illegal and Mr. Kaunda and his chief aides were rusticated to a remote part of the territory. No general emergency was proclaimed in Northern Rhodesia. In the two Northern Territories fifty-four Africans were killed by Federal troops. In Nyasaland Africans were brutally treated, houses were burned and heavy collective fines were exacted for damages done. No Europeans were killed during the riots; a few were injured. All these events make one general Emergency, which is still fresh in the minds of many Africans. The action taken by the Federal and territorial governments intensified African hatred of Federation and confirmed the fear among the Africans in the north of being dominated by the Southern Rhodesian whites.⁷

Emergency legislation⁸ passed in the three territories, especially in Southern Rhodesia, was broad and harsh. Sir Edgar's government introduced six Bills, notably the Unlawful Organizations Act which empowered the Governor to declare any organization unlawful if it appeared to him dangerous for public safety, and the Preventive Detention Act which enabled the Governor to make an order for the detention of persons involved in any of the activities which led to the state of emergency or any activity which might lead to another. These laws were to last for a period of five years. The use of

⁷Ibid.

⁸Mason, The Year of Decision, pp. 218-225.

boycotts and intimidation were proscribed. However, by mid-October, most of the Nyasa detainees had been released. At the insistence of Mr. Ian Macleod, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Dr. Banda was released. Even Kenneth Kaunda was allowed freedom of movement in Northern Rhodesia. Most of the Southern Rhodesian detainees remained in jail.

The British Press and Labour Members in the House of Commons bitterly criticized Sir Roy for the massive arrests and brutal treatment of the Nationalists. They charged that it was a brutal and barbaric display of military strength by the Federal Government, and that it was an effort to terrorize the Africans into abject submission. Sir Roy was denounced as the embodiment of brutal imperialism.⁹

A Committee of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin, was appointed to investigate and report upon the Nyasaland disturbances and the events which led up to them. Their most controversial report was published on July 23, 1959. It condemned the policies of the British and Nyasaland Governments and questioned the conception on which Federation was being constructed. It confirmed that rejection of Federation was general, almost universal and sincere, among the rich and the poor, the educated and the illiterate, and that the advantages and disadvantages of Federation were correctly interpreted and understood by most Africans. The report also maintained that

⁹Welensky, p. 122.

the government's refusal to heed the protests of Africans, or of any other critics of Federation, sustained as they were for over a period of six years, was responsible for the Emergency. The Commission did not accept the Government's contention that Congress was a small gang of unprincipled agitators intimidating their fellow Africans into opposing a paternal government which they otherwise would have accepted with gratitude and devotion. They considered the Congress to be widely representative of African opinion as a whole. Nyasaland was described as "a police state," in which "it is not safe to express approval of the policies of the Congress Party...and unwise to express any but the most restrained criticism of government policy."¹⁰ The report made it clear that government without consent becomes tyranny, and leads to violence and disturbances which are harder to condemn than the tyranny which causes them. Sir Roy Welensky did not agree with many of the Commission's conclusions.

The events of February and March had profound effects. On the African side, policies of disorganized violence were discredited and non-violent propaganda techniques were adopted. New parties came into being: the Malawi Congress in Nyasaland, the National Democratic Party in Southern Rhodesia, and the United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia. The NDP became a more militant organization in the eyes of the

¹⁰Quoted in Creighton, p. 230.

government. Outbreaks of violence in Salisbury and Bulawayo resulted in some deaths of African rioters, and the colony had to drop its proud claim that no bloodshed had occurred since 1896. Leaders of the party were arrested and the party banned. The African parties in the north continued their fight against Federation and for national liberation and independence.

Meanwhile the hopes of independence for the Federation in 1960 were vanishing into thin air and faith in Federation was dwindling among the Europeans, especially followers of the Dominion Party, a segregationist party. The Federal Government in the coming negotiations was inevitably thrown on the defensive. Powerful disintegrating forces were at work. Besides the irreconcilable African parties of the north, the liberal Central Africa Party was calling for a modification of at least the Federal structure in order to allow more to participate in government. The Dominion Party in Southern Rhodesia was loudly demanding secession and independence for the colony. Against these movements, the powerful but battered United Federal Party, stood for the continuation of Federation under European control. The party failed to attract African membership.¹¹

Significant changes took place in 1959. In Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Todd, who had startled the public by calling for British troops to protect Africans during the emergency,

¹¹Wills, p. 343.

demanded a massive and immediate end to colour bar. Not much was done but his successor, Sir Edgar Whitehead,¹² plunged into a fresh programme designed to improve the social position of the African. A new Education Act planned to bring every African child into elementary school by 1964. The Trade Disputes Act, passed at length in 1959, was to allow multiracial trade unions by 1960. Post Offices were desegregated, discrimination in the betting and lottery laws was removed, and the urban housing programme was accelerated. A proposal to abolish the Land Apportionment Act was defeated. In Northern Rhodesia public places were desegregated. While strengthening her police forces, Nyasaland also increased African representation in the Legislature, providing an African majority on the official side for the first time, and introducing two Africans to the Executive Council.

Article 99 of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided that "not less than seven nor more than nine years from the date of the coming into force of this Constitution, there shall be convened a conference consisting of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three Territories and from the United Kingdom, chosen by their respective governments, for the purpose of reviewing this Constitution." In a joint declaration made by the United Kingdom and Federal Governments on 27th April, 1957, however,

¹²Wason, The Year of Decision, pp. 226-27.

those governments announced their intention that the Conference should be held in 1960.¹³ Before the Conference was convened, a Royal Commission, headed by Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, was appointed to study the situation in the Federation and make recommendations for the forthcoming Conference to review the Federal Constitution. Its terms of reference for weeks had been the subject of controversy. The main issue was whether the right of secession should be a subject for consideration. On his tour of Africa, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had assured Welensky that the Commission would not be authorized to discuss the possible breakup of the Federation. Nevertheless, the Commission's report, when finally published in October after months of careful preparation, made it plain that its task had been impossible without recognizing secession as a political possibility.¹⁴

All the Commissioners, except two Africans from the North, signed the report. Mr. Habanyama from Northern Rhodesia and Mr. Wellington Chirwa from Nyasaland, signed a dissenting report, saying that the continuance of a Federation not based on consent was unacceptable. Both of them favoured secession.¹⁵ The Commission recognized that the dissolution of the Federation was undesirable on economic grounds, but it stated clearly that if the association of the states were to continue, African hostility must be overcome. There was therefore a need

¹³ Cmnd. 1148, The Monckton Commission's Report, p. 6.

¹⁴ Cmnd. 1148, p. 98.

¹⁵ Welensky, p. 269.

for drastic and fundamental changes in the structure of the Federation and in the racial policies of Southern Rhodesia. The main recommendations were first, the Africans should have a higher proportion of seats in the Federal Assembly and that the franchise should be extended in order to make the Assembly representative of "the broad mass of both African and European opinion." Second, that the structure of the Federation should be altered by devolving powers on the territorial governments, leaving the Federal Government with responsibility only for external affairs, defence, and control of the economy. Third, that "unfairly discriminatory legislation should be removed in all territories," the Southern Rhodesia Pass Laws and the Land Apportionment Act being particularly mentioned. Such equitability of laws should be guaranteed by a Bill of Rights to be entrenched into the constitutions of the Federal and member states, and by the establishment of Councils of State which would replace the African Affairs Board in which the people had lost confidence. Lastly, the Commission advised that a "declaration of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to permit secession by any of the territories, if so requested after a stated time or at a particular stage of constitutional development would have a very favourable effect, and might be decisive in securing a trial for a new association."¹⁶

¹⁶ Cmnd. 1143.

This last recommendation provoked indignant protest among the Europeans in Central Africa, particularly the Federal Government. Welensky, complaining that the British Prime Minister had broken faith, declared bluntly that the proposal to permit secession by an individual territory would sound the death knell of the Federation. On the other hand, the defenders of the report in the House of Commons, pointed out that Lord Monckton had honoured his terms of reference by recommending that Federation should continue, and that a secession clause in the Constitution would be a measure most likely to make its continuation possible. Herein lay the core of the difference between the points of view of the Federal and Imperial Governments. While the former considered that the Federation, whose survival was regarded as essential to the preservation of European civilization in Central Africa, was the product of European leadership and could only be maintained through such leadership, the British Government, observing the "wind of change" in Africa, recognized that the initiative was passing to the African people. To deny this initiative, its expression, was to court disaster.¹⁷

A possible solution to the Central African problem clearly outlined by the Monckton Commission was for the Europeans to abandon white supremacy and negotiate with the British Government for a new constitution giving political

¹⁷Wills, pp. 345-46.

representation to Africans in some relation to their numbers and leading quickly to universal suffrage. But the Europeans refused to hand over political power to the Africans or even to share it with them. They chose to "shelter behind their whiteness", a path which led to disaster. Britain was left with one alternative, to abrogate the Federal Constitution, revoke the Order in Council which created the Federation, and resume full responsibility for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, introducing genuinely liberal Constitutions¹⁸ that would give the majority political power. This is what the British Government finally decided to do when they became convinced that Federation could not continue in the form it was. This action was not taken until after the Review Conference.

The Conference met in London in December, 1960, with Prime Minister Macmillan in the chair and Messrs Sandys and Macleod as alternative vice chairmen. Those representing the Federation were confronted with an array of African Nationalists from the Northern Territories, almost all of them bitter enemies of the Federation. Whenever Southern Rhodesian delegates spoke, Dr. Banda and Mr. Kaunda walked out of the Conference. All the three African leaders were ~~all~~ agreed that Federation should be dissolved since the three territorial governments and the Federal Government were not fully represented. They expressed their keenness for continued

¹⁸Creighton, p. 212.

British Protection, but vehemently attacked the use of emergency powers, the inadequacy of African educational facilities, and the slowness of African emancipation from political domination by Europeans.¹⁹ No definite conclusions were arrived at and the Conference was to be resumed after the holidays. Mr. Sandys enumerated the subjects to be discussed on the resumption of the Conference thus: the composition of the legislature, the franchise, the division of functions, safeguards against racial discrimination, and secession. It was announced too that constitutional talks for the Rhodesias should be completed, and in the light of their decisions reconvene the main Federal Conference.²⁰ Sir Roy was not pleased with the arrangement for he feared that Northern Rhodesia might get a constitution that would favour the Africans who were determined to destroy Federation.

On January 30, 1961, the Northern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference began. The proposed scheme was: a legislative council of thirty members, either fifteen Africans and fifteen Europeans or sixteen Africans and fourteen Europeans; six nominated officials and two or three nominated unofficials (one an Asian) with some representative, but perhaps non-voting, chiefs; an executive council of four officials, three African and three European unofficials, assisted perhaps by the Parliamentary Secretaries, race unspecified, who would be

¹⁹Welensky, p. 286.

²⁰Ibid., p. 289.

members of the government though not of the executive council itself; and a franchise which, by altering the qualifications for both upper and lower rolls, would produce an African electorate of about 100,000.²¹

Again Sir Roy was indignant about the scheme for he wanted Northern Rhodesia to adopt the Federal franchise. He denounced the scheme as a sell-out of the Europeans in the territory and a clever plan to kill Federation. He warned Macmillan that the scheme would drive Southern Rhodesia out of the Federation. Sir Edgar Whitehead had threatened that if power was to be exercised by Africans Southern Rhodesia would not want to stay in the Federation with the two Northern Territories. Whitehead wanted no further revision of the Constitution, he wanted security and no further upset in the balance of power.²² Worse still for Welensky, Macleod announced new electoral regulations for Nyasaland, which would enfranchise a considerable number of Africans.

In Southern Rhodesia, on February 7, Mr. Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth Secretary, and Sir Edgar Whitehead signed their agreed proposals for a new constitution for the colony. They recommended an assembly of 65, of whom 50 would be ordinary and 15 special members, elected on a complicated dual-roll franchise. This scheme, unlike the Northern Rhodesian one, ensured continued European control of government

²¹Ibid., p. 291.

²²Mason, Birth of a Dilemma, p. 238.

and a step towards full independence for the Southern Rhodesian whites.

From now on events moved at an amazing rapidity to the disadvantage of the protagonists of Federation. In Nyasaland, new elections were held on August 15 under the new constitution which granted the vote to the majority of the Africans. The Malawi Congress Party won 28 out of the 28 elected seats in the legislative council and received 94 per cent of the total votes cast. This was an overwhelming and decisive victory for Dr. Banda who took office at once virtually as Chief Minister. The secessionist movement gathered momentum. Early in July, the Chief Minister went to London to demand immediate secession for Nyasaland. Meantime, Mr. Butler, first Secretary of State, published two Orders in Council, the first on the delineation of constituencies in Northern Rhodesia, the second, on the bringing of the long debated constitution into being. Again Sir Roy felt stabbed in the back for the Constitution appeared to him to favour Mr. Kaunda and UNIP to the detriment of the Europeans. He had hoped the British Government would consider his objections to a constitution that put the reins of government into the hands of what he called "uncivilized beings." Sir Roy Welensky had ignored that Mr. Macmillan on several occasions made it crystal clear that Britain would not relinquish her obligation to protect the Northern Territories, native interests were paramount there. After the October elections of Northern

Rhodesia, Mr. Kaunda and Mr. Nkumbula formed a coalition government with the aim of breaking away from the Federation.²³ Thus, black governments were formed in the north to the chagrin of Sir Roy and his followers.

The Federal Prime Minister had serious disagreements with the British Prime Minister over the proposed constitution for Northern Rhodesia. He pleaded in vain with the British Government to have the franchise qualifications kept high in Northern Rhodesia. Welensky decided to have the last desperate fight to save the Federation by dissolving parliament to seek a mandate from the Federal electorate. He was now flogging a dead horse because the leaders of the territorial governments were all decided on pulling away from the Federation. All the African parties, in all the three territories boycotted the elections, saying that they were totally opposed to the Federation and would take part only in elections based on the principle of "one man one vote." The European opposition party also refused to take part in the elections. Out of 59 seats, the Federal Party controlled 54. Sir Roy's victory was short lived.

On November 5, Lord Alport, British High Commissioner, delivered very disturbing news to the Federal Prime Minister. The news was that the British Government had accepted the principle of the withdrawal of Nyasaland from the Federation. Another

²³Welensky, p. 348.

shock came from Southern Rhodesia. Sir Edgar Whitehead was defeated in the general elections by Mr. Winston Field who, upon learning the results of the elections, declared "Federation is dead!" These events were interpreted as a prelude to the break-up of the Federation.²⁴ The victorious Banda also demanded secession, "now, now, now." The new Southern Rhodesian Government also was opposed to the continuance of Federation due to the creation of black governments in the north.

The final blow came at the end of March, 1963, when the British Government announced that "no territory can be kept in the Federation against its will, and it follows from this that any territory must be allowed to secede if it so wishes."²⁵ Sir Roy responded by accusing the British Prime Minister of betraying the Federation. Since the Northern Rhodesian Legislature had already passed a motion demanding secession, Federation was doomed. Both Dr. Banda and Mr. Kaunda formally announced their intentions to secede from the Federation. Their request was granted by the British Government.

A conference to dissolve the Central African Federation was held at Victoria Falls from June 28 to July 3, 1963. All three territorial governments were represented. Nyasaland was only represented by a delegation

²⁴Ibid. pp. 349-54.

²⁵Announcement by Harold Macmillan, Quoted in Welensky, p. 359.

of three official observers. Dr. Banda did not attend. The Conference decided to set up a committee for dissolving the Federation and another for considering interterritorial questions, including economic links. The dissolving committee worked out detailed arrangements for reversion of federal functions to territorial responsibility. It consisted of officials representing the Governments of Britain and the Rhodesias under a British chairman. In particular, it dealt with the Federal public service and means of dealing with federal assets and liabilities, including the public debt. Later, a special committee was appointed to apportion the public debt between the governments. The interterritorial committee was made up of officials from Britain, the two Rhodesias, and the Federation. The administrative, judicial, fiscal and financial structure of the Federation was dismantled. The defence forces and big public undertakings like the Federal Broadcasting Corporation and the Central African Airways were split up. An agreement was reached to keep the giant Kariba project in operation, and to preserve the Rhodesia Railways as an entity.²⁶

The 80 million pounds Kariba hydroelectric power scheme on the Zambezi River will continue to be operated as a single entity under the joint ownership and control of the Governments of Rhodesia and Zambia. The Central African

²⁶Africa Digest Vol. XI No. 1, August, 1963, pp. 6-8.

Power Corporation succeeded the Federal Power Board. It is controlled by two Ministers, one each from Rhodesia and Zambia. Each government appoints three members to the Board by consulting with the other government and the chairman who is appointed by the two governments. All the assets and liabilities were transferred to the new corporation on December 31, 1963.²⁷

The Kariba project, opened by Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother in 1960, has cost nearly 80 million pounds so far. The World Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, Anglo-American and the Rhodesian Selection Trust, the British South Africa Company and Standard and Farclays Banks, helped to finance the project. One power station producing 600 megawatts has been completed and the second one when built will produce 900 megawatts. This will raise the cost of the scheme to more than 100 million pounds.²⁸

A Central African Common Market had been set up but Northern Rhodesia decided to end the Common Market and impose tariffs against Southern Rhodesia. The three territories would also each establish their own currencies. The decisions were blows to hopes that after the territories were separated politically, they would retain the benefit of economic and financial co-operation. Southern Rhodesia suffered heavily because she sent about a quarter of her products to Northern Rhodesia and had almost a monopoly in consumer goods and

²⁷Ibid, p. 68.

²⁸Ibid.

secondary industries. The Minister of Finance for Northern Rhodesia explained that the Government had decided to end the Common Market because it had worked against the interests of Northern Rhodesia. However, Northern Rhodesia was prepared to negotiate trade agreements with Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. It would give them preferential treatment while they remained British Dependencies.²⁹ The Rhodesia Railways, the Central African Airways, and the Kariba Hydroelectric power still serve Central Africa in much the same way as they have done before.

The last Federal Parliament met on December 11. Sir Roy Welensky made his final speech to the Assembly. He said:

The epilogue to the federal story is all but written. At this stage I have no bitterness and no complaint. I fought and I lost because I did not know I was taking part in a game of chance. I believed that the British Government would behave in accordance with the spirit and intention of the agreement reached and the pledges given prior to the establishment of the Federation. I never imagined the Government would take refuge in legalistic jargon or resort to practices which might euphemistically be described as less than honest. I was wrong.³⁰

Officially the Federation ended at midnight on December 31. It was brought to an end when the British Order in Council dissolving the Federal Constitution came into force. All Federal laws became null and void, the various Ministries and Departments came to an end, and the three territories broke their association.³¹

²⁹Ibid., p. 44. Definite trade agreements were finally made by the two Rhodesias.

³⁰Roy Welensky, quoted in Africa Digest, Feb., 1964, p. 98.

³¹Ibid., p. 97.

In less than a year the Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had achieved their independence. On July 5, 1964, Nyasaland became the independent state of Malawi within the British Commonwealth with Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda as its first Prime Minister. Malawi is to remain monarchical with a Governor-General to represent the Queen, who stays as titular head of state. Northern Rhodesia, under the new name of Zambia gained its independence on October 24, 1964. It was the first British dependency to become a republic immediately on achieving independence. Mr. Kenneth Kaunda became its first President. The Government of Zambia indicated that they would apply for membership to the Commonwealth.

Conclusion

There is a divergence of opinion as to the real object of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The preamble to the Federal Constitution said that the object of the whole operation was to promote racial partnership. In other words it was intended to demonstrate that different races could work together in mutual respect and understanding. On the other hand Federation appears to have been a package deal intended to harmonize conveniently a great many separate interests and policy objectives. One of these objectives was to draw Southern Rhodesia away from South African influence and link her together with her British neighbours in the north politically and economically. Another reason was to prevent Northern Rhodesia from becoming "another Gold Coast," that is, from becoming a black state. For ten years, Rhodesia, the independent state of Malawi, and the Republic of Zambia were linked together as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These three states could not go for more than a decade as a federation. But why did the grand design fail?

Sir Roy Welensky, one of the founders of the Federation, tells us that:

The Federation was destroyed, not by our avowed enemies but by those who called themselves our friends and said they believed in what they had built. They killed it slowly, in the dark and stealth; and they¹ wept hypocritical tears as they finished the deed.

¹Welensky, Quoted in African World, July (1964), p. 10.

Sir Roy Welensky has hard things to say about British Officials at Lusaka. He bitterly criticized Sir Arthur Benson, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, for a secret dispatch he wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1956 which was a bitter indictment of the Federal Government and its policies.² He also blames the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, and the Secretaries of State for the Colonies, particularly Mr. Macleod whom he found subtle, secretive, and calculating.³ So this is how Sir Roy Welensky tells the painful story from his own point of view.

There are many reasons that can be attributed to the failure of the Central African Federation. The Africa Correspondent of the London Times on December 30 wrote of the Federation:

Probably the idea was doomed to failure from the start. Certainly the imposition of federation by the British Government against the expressed wishes of articulate African opinion poisoned it at birth. In the intervening years the failure of the Federal Government to take convincing action in support of its professions of partnership hastened the end.⁴

The Federation attempted to combine two different conceptions of colonial rule within one political system. The Colonial Office Policy had been the paramountcy of African interests. But Southern Rhodesia's aspiration has been parallel development of both races under European control. The theory of partnership did not prove strong enough to bridge

²Welensky, p. 70.

³Ibid., p. 187.

⁴Africa Digest, p. 98.

the gap between the two concepts. The Federal link, instead of improving race relations, tended to extend the policies of Southern Rhodesia to the Northern Territories. Partnership was watered down by the Europeans and so the Africans rejected it. The Europeans did not offer enough partnership to show the Africans that Federation was good for them. Africans persistently emphasized their desire to work together with Europeans on the basis of freedom and equality. They could not collaborate with the Federal Government because it offered nothing but subordination and African under-representation. It was a sheer illusion on the part of the Europeans to conclude that an extension of the franchise would bring barbaric and irresponsible black chauvinist power. The suggestion which Sir Roy Welensky was so fond of making that to give political power to Africans would mean a return "to the dark tribal past" was both false and unstatesmanlike. African leaders in Central Africa are most anxious to carry their people forward, but the conservatives were preventing them and insisted on saying "don't advance the African too fast." Mr. Garfield Todd was thrown out of Government as Prime Minister in Southern Rhodesia because he appeared to be doing this.

Until the end of 1959 the British Government treated the Federation almost as an independent Dominion. It supported the Federal Government instead of using its powers to safeguard African interests. The African Affairs Board which had been

set up as a safeguard to African interests was ineffective. By accepting the Federal Constitutional Amendment Bill and the Federal Electoral Bill, the British Government connived in the entrenchment of the Federal Government, with its political principle of "white supremacy for the foreseeable future."⁵

The spirit of African Nationalism that has grown throughout Africa, has been directing its force against white supremacy. The Africans opposed Federation because they believed it was used to bolster European domination. In Central Africa, every political aspiration was met by increased repression arising from European insecurity. The Federal and Territorial Governments, responsible to an overwhelmingly European electorate, refused to recognize the strength and depth of African political feelings, whether expressed by peaceful demonstrations or by boycotts and disturbance.

It was the Nyasaland emergency of 1959 that brought things to a head. The Devlin Commission which inquired into the tensions and riots in Nyasaland drove a nail in the Federation's coffin. After the Monkton Report was published, the British Government realized that Federation could not be continued in the form it was. They realized that the Federal arrangements were disruptive of peace and good government in Central Africa and that the Federal Government did not rule with the consent of the majority of the governed. It is

⁵Faith Raven, Central Africa: Background to Argument (London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1960), p. 43.

quite clear that Government without consent is unjust, expensive, and detrimental to economic development. At the Federal Review Conference of 1960-1961, the British Government exerted its influence and refused to give independence to the Federation. It finally accepted the principle of an African majority in Nyasaland and reformed the Northern Rhodesian Constitution to allow the Africans a larger voice in government. When the Africans got the majority in government, Federation was finished. It was inevitable for the Africans in the North to demand secession from the Federation. The Federal Constitution failed to provide for the expression of African opinion.

Guy Clutton-Brock describes the failure of the Federation very clearly when he says after the 1959 crisis:

The Federal Government hastily opened to all races the public counters in the Post Office. It appointed an African as a Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs. It promised the removal of 'pinpricks.' It gave no indication that it would seek to ease the real causes of deep disquiet but stated rather that its sympathies lie with the policy of the Southern Rhodesian Government. At a moment when Federal Statesmanship could have achieved a major advance in territories, it backed a policy of repression throughout the Federation. Why did it do this? Because it is a white colonist's government and the ideas of the majority of colonist's throughout the Federation were those of Southern Rhodesia.⁶

Professor Creighton rightly concludes that the Federal Government was sailing "complacently towards self-destruction

⁶ Guy Clutton-Brock, Dawn in Nyasaland (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 158.

in rapids more precipitous and turbulent than the Victoria Falls"⁷ for it insisted on using the policy of Southern Rhodesia of white supremacy and racial discrimination.

It is on the "native policy" that Federation broke down. It is the heart of the matter. All Africans in Central Africa hate the policy of parallel development which the white Rhodesians have always adhered to in spite of opposition from the Africans and criticism from outside. The Land Apportionment Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Native Registration Act, the Native Pass Act, and many other discriminatory laws made it impossible for the Federation to function as a truly multiracial society in which every citizen would enjoy the rights of citizenship.

Far too late to save the Federation a serious effort was made by Sir Edgar Whitehead, toward the end of his term of office as Prime Minister, to turn his political party into a genuinely multiracial team. He could not win African support because he still insisted on a constitution that favoured the European community.

One remarkable feature of the ten-year experiment in interracial co-operation was that Rhodesia is not now a wholly segregated state. It was contaminated by Northern liberalism. The main hotels, movie theaters, park benches, and some public facilities are now desegregated.

⁷Creighton, p. 231.

The breakup of the Federation had serious consequences for Southern Rhodesia. By the end of 1963 there were already signs of advancing economic deterioration. It began in 1960, with the first evidence of the Federation's approaching collapse. The flow of foreign capital had dried up; fifteen per cent of Salisbury office space was vacant; unemployment was up to ten per cent and getting chronic; local industries - textiles, jeep assembly plants - were planning new branches in the north rather than expanding on the spot; and the government's finances were so bad that a \$10-million British loan for African housing had to go to meet the civil-service payroll instead.⁸

There is still serious racial antagonism in Rhodesia today. The Front Government is committed to keeping the Southern Rhodesian Government "permanently in responsible hands," ensuring that there will be "no dominance of the African over the European," preserving the Land Apportionment Act, and restoring full racial segregation in the cities as well as on the land.

The Republic of Zambia is governed by one of the most dedicated Pan-African leaders, Mr. Kenneth Kaunda. He is cultivated, temperate, patient, and remarkably free of racial animosity. He happens to be on excellent terms with the big copper companies, Anglo-American and the Rhodesian Selection

⁸Claire Sterling, "The End of a Dream in Southern Rhodesia," The Reporter, May 9, 1963, pp. 29-32.

Trust, which are most anxious to keep on good terms with him. There are good prospects for textile industries to develop in Zambia and development capital to stay there. By 1963, the mining companies had both decided to move their offices to the country's capital, Lusaka.⁹ Zambia will need Rhodesia's co-operation in transporting her copper over Rhodesia's part of the railway system to Beira, Mozambique. If the price of the copper should fall, then Zambia could be in serious trouble. The level of the Public Debt in Zambia will not present any particular problem and increased finance will almost certainly be available for such purposes as health, education, and the development of economic services.

Malawi is almost exclusively a black man's country. It will continue to need some Europeans as administrators, professional men and technicians. Development aid to Malawi from other countries than Britain in money or services has been promised from the United States, Nigeria, Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand. France expressed a desire to help too. By August of 1963, Malawi had been promised 250,000 pounds from the United States Agency for International Development. The money is to meet the cost of the new Agricultural College at Bunda, near Lilongwe, and the expansion of Bulawayo Polytechnic. The Malawi Government itself has plans to undertake the development of the Mkula Falls

⁹Ibid. See Kaunda's Profile in The Examiner, March, 1960., p. 14.

hydroelectrical scheme. The scheme will be financed by contributions of one million pounds from the Colonial Development Corporation and 500,000 from other sources.¹⁰

Dr. Banda has briefly outlined his policy on economic development. He said that he was going to protect industries and would give preferential treatment to industries that proved efficient and productive. He pointed out that it was important to achieve political independence first, because without it economic freedom could not be secured.¹¹

Malawi's budgetary position at the close of 1964 showed a deficit of 5½ million pounds which is one million pounds less than was forecast for 1965. However, Britain had given the country a "breathing space by making a grant of up to 2½ million pounds from August 1963 to January 1964."¹²

In conclusion, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a noble concept which could have succeeded if both races had been willing to compromise. If it had succeeded, it could have provided a significant example to the world of how people of different races and different origins could live and work together for their mutual advantage

¹⁰Africa Digest, Vol.XI, p. 8.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 119. John Deary Analyzes the Phoenix Group's latest publication on some economic consequences for the Rhodesia's and Nyasaland. They suggest that the economic case for Federation is not convincing and that the real case for the Federation in Central Africa had always been political, not economic (The Central African Examiner, July, 1963, pp. 15-18).

and betterment. Federation failed because it had no political consensus at all. It is hoped that the people of Central Africa will continue to co-operate in matters of common interests. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that both black and white need each other in Africa as co-workers. The black needs the technical skill of the white man and the white man needs the co-operation of the black to build and maintain a harmonious multiracial society. All the people of Central Africa must face the winds of change and be ready to have their fears, ignorance, and prejudices blown away.

Map 1.










THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND


SOUTHERN RHODESIA

MAP 2

THE THREE VELDS

LEGEND

-  LOW VELD, BELOW 3000'
-  MIDDLE VELD, 3000'-4000'
-  HIGH VELD, ABOVE 4000'
-  E. HIGHLANDS, ABOVE 6000'
-  RAILROADS
-  MAIN ROADS
-  PRINCIPAL TOWNS



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SOUTHERN RHODESIA

MAP 5

PROVISIONAL MAP OF SOILS








SOUTHERN RHODESIA

MAP 1


LAND APPORTIONMENT 1958

LEGEND


-  NATIVE RESERVES
-  SPECIAL NATIVE AREAS
-  NATIVE PURCHASE AREAS
-  CROWN LAND (ALIENATED & UNALIENATED), ALSO FOREST AREAS



Land Distribution and Railways



Native Reserves



Railways



**Native Trust Land, Northern Rhodesia
African Trust Land, Nyasaland**



Native Purchase Area, Southern Rhodesia



**Crown Land, Northern Rhodesia
Public Land, Nyasaland
European Area, Southern Rhodesia.**

(Also includes Unassigned Area, part of which
may be allocated to Native Area)

Table 1. Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, 1930.¹

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	<u>SQUARE MILES</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>% OF COUNTRY</u>
1. European Areas	76,796	49,149,174	51.0
2. Native Reserves	33,011	21,127,040	22.0
3. Native Areas	11,663	7,464,566	7.8
4. Unassigned Areas	27,802	17,793,300	18.5
5. Undetermined Area	107	88,540	0.1
6. Forest Areas	923	590,500	0.6
TOTAL	<u>150,302</u>	<u>96,143,280</u>	<u>100.0</u>

¹Southern Rhodesia, Report of Native Production and Trade Commission 1944 (Salisbury, 1945), p. 11.

²The Native Areas were later re-named Native Purchase Areas.

116 G

Table 2. Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, 1952.¹

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	<u>SQUARE MILES</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>% OF COUNTRY</u>
1. European Areas	74,075	47,407,792	49.0
2. Native Reserves	32,593	20,859,350	21.5
3. Special Native Areas ²	6,461	4,135,427	4.0
4. Native Purchase Areas	8,835	5,654,325	6.0
5. Unassigned Areas	26,728	17,105,918	18.0
6. Undetermined Areas	98	62,563	0.5
7. Forest Areas	1,543	987,745	1.0
TOTAL	<u>150,333</u>	<u>96,213,120</u>	<u>100.0</u>

¹ Southern Rhodesia, The African in Southern Rhodesia: Number Three, Agriculture (Salisbury, 1952), p. 2.

² Additions to Native Reserves, acquired from Old Native Areas and European Areas.

Table 3. Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia, 1958.

<u>CATEGORIES</u>	<u>SQUARE MILES</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>% OF COUNTRY</u>
1. European Areas ¹	81,230	51,987,000	53.5
2. Native Reserves	32,844	21,020,000	21.5
3. Special Native Areas ²	20,122	12,878,000	13.0
4. Native Purchase Areas ³	12,580	8,052,000	8.0
5. Undetermined Areas ⁴	89	57	0.5
6. Forest Areas	4,984	3,190,000	3.5
TOTAL	<u>151,849</u>	<u>97,104,000</u>	<u>100.0</u>

¹Include 4,000,000 acres of Game Reserves and National Parks.

²Land added to the Native Reserves in 1950.

³Areas where Africans may acquire land on an individual basis, as distinct from tribal tenure in the Native Reserves.

⁴Land owned by Europeans which may be sold to Africans if the owners so desire.

TABLE 4.- NUMBER OF EUROPEANS IN EMPLOYMENT, WAGES AND SALARIES PAID AND AVERAGE EARNINGS BY INDUSTRY.

	1954			1956			1957			1958			1959			1960	
	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings
		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£
Agriculture	4,750	876	4,160	5,155	1,046	5,392	5,317	1,087	5,777	5,341	1,118	5,970	5,497	1,174	6,451	5,498	1,230
Mining and quarrying	9,575	1,605	15,365	10,538	2,145	22,606	10,824	1,871	20,246	10,154	1,746	17,731	10,547	1,933	20,386	10,792	2,021
Manufacturing	11,994	993	11,914	13,503	1,094	14,775	15,988	1,150	18,381	19,049	1,134	21,604	18,837	1,165	21,952	19,037	1,205
Building and construction	11,774	971	11,435	13,809	1,121	15,477	15,224	1,191	18,133	15,543	1,213	18,855	14,286	1,205	17,218	13,045	1,233
Electricity and water	1,355	1,058	1,433	1,478	1,134	1,676	1,686	1,141	1,925	1,797	1,193	2,144	1,846	1,193	2,203	1,921	1,272
Distribution	16,517	648	10,707	18,618	755	14,054	19,193	833	15,990	20,691	892	18,452	21,011	906	19,036	21,262	924
Banking and insurance	3,842	815	3,132	4,948	849	4,201	6,502	902	5,866	7,344	1,004	7,372	7,802	1,032	8,055	7,986	1,058
Transport and communications	9,366	1,108	10,377	10,964	1,184	12,981	11,568	1,234	14,277	11,923	1,287	15,341	11,827	1,355	16,031	11,885	1,362
Government administration	8,280	943	7,806	9,778	1,024	10,008	10,570	1,141	12,062	12,061	1,155	13,929	12,932	1,172	15,165	13,723	1,254
Education	3,622	816	2,956	4,100	931	3,819	4,767	1,029	4,903	5,337	1,023	5,458	5,943	1,020	6,062	6,462	1,066
Health	2,629	801	2,106	2,893	931	2,693	3,204	1,005	3,221	3,438	926	3,184	3,668	938	3,439	3,733	993
Private domestic services	140	586	82	167	665	112	177	684	121	190	700	133	192	693	133	194	701
Other services	6,989	746	5,214	7,713	851	6,563	8,270	898	7,425	9,175	902	8,279	9,333	904	8,440	9,356	932
Total	90,833	954	86,687	103,664	1,103	114,357	113,290	1,133	128,327	122,043	1,134	138,452	123,721	1,169	144,571	124,894	1,209

TABLE 5.- NUMBER OF ASIANS AND COLOURED IN EMPLOYMENT, WAGES AND SALARIES PAID AND AVERAGE EARNINGS.

	1954			1955			1956			1957			1958			1959			1960	
	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings	Number	Average Earnings	Earnings		
		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		£	£'000		
Total	5,684	435	2,470	6,434	482	3,101	6,943	511	3,547	7,285	544	3,960	7,668	563	4,317	7,991	576			

TABLE 6.- NUMBER OF AFRICANS IN EMPLOYMENT, WAGES AND SALARIES PAID AND AVERAGE EARNINGS BY INDUSTRY.

1954			1956			1957			1958			1959			1960		
Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000	Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000	Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000	Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000	Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000	Number	Average Earnings £	Earnings £1000
332,497	37	12,264	355,541	41	14,727	352,033	43	15,309	349,373	46	16,182	366,009	49	17,949	375,005	49	18,508
102,133	95	9,667	98,277	117	11,454	101,156	132	13,375	92,703	128	11,882	89,706	154	13,789	93,638	165	15,469
96,824	60	5,776	114,967	74	8,548	120,591	86	10,400	120,231	96	11,544	122,050	103	12,538	124,936	112	13,940
123,907	56	6,909	146,007	72	10,449	163,694	76	12,517	154,506	84	13,051	133,532	94	94	122,845	90	11,018
7,724	67	518	8,072	74	595	8,499	84	713	8,985	90	809	9,327	105	983	19,846	109	1,069
47,860	68	3,260	55,304	79	4,349	57,174	81	4,633	56,636	91	5,154	57,444	96	5,531	56,158	102	5,702
1,068	80	85	1,385	88	122	1,912	95	181	1,908	110	209	2,310	115	266	2,404	124	298
21,164	86	1,813	24,598	105	2,583	26,517	118	3,119	26,852	126	3,371	26,697	137	3,662	27,148	144	3,906
34,428	74	2,551	38,994	87	3,408	43,142	98	4,220	46,135	108	4,992	48,218	114	5,509	51,473	118	6,068
21,013	88	1,843	24,421	97	2,372	25,689	105	2,705	26,581	118	3,143	27,821	116	3,237	28,234	121	3,414
9,378	75	703	10,990	96	1,051	11,703	106	1,235	12,106	111	1,346	12,448	114	1,413	12,910	116	1,500
114,300	54	6,175	128,143	59	7,557	138,150	62	8,622	145,700	65	9,478	150,050	69	10,350	154,600	74	11,398
29,171	63	1,825	33,248	68	2,265	34,652	79	2,723	36,199	82	2,975	37,579	88	3,318	37,324	92	3,417
941,467	57	53,389	1,040,047	67	69,480	1,084,912	74	79,758	1,077,915	78	84,136	1,083,191	84	91,075	1,096,521	87	95,707



5. LORD MALVERN, first Prime Minister of the Federation.
Photo Federal Information Department



DR HASTINGS KAMUZU BANDA, first Prime Minister of
Nyasaland. Photo Central Office of Information

116 L



SIR ROY WELENSKY



KENNETH KAUNDA


*Cyril Bernard**Hulton Press**Jane Bown**Africa Special Report*

PLATE III *Top Left* Mr H. Nkumbula, President of the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress
top right Mr K. Kaunda, President of the Zambia African National Congress, Northern
Rhodesia *lower left* Dr H. K. Banda, President of the Nyasaland African Congress *lower right*
Mr J. Nkomo, President of Southern Rhodesian African National Congress.

STATUTORY BODIES AND COMMISSIONS (Public Corporations).

Federal :

Central African Airways
Federal Power Board
Grain Marketing Board
Rhodesia Railways
Federal Broadcasting Corporation
Rhodes National Gallery
Cold Storage Commission
Dairy Marketing Board
National Archives Building
Federal Pension Fund Board
South Western Tobacco Marketing Board
Tobacco Research Board of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Tobacco Export and Promotion Council of Rhodesia
Pig Industry Board
Agriculture Marketing Council Corporation

Southern Rhodesia :

Electricity Supply Commission
Forestry Commission
The Land and Agricultural Bank of Southern Rhodesia
Land Settlement Board
Rhodesia Iron and Steel Commission
Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission
The Roasting Plant
Sugar Industry Board
Southern Rhodesia State Lotteries
Southern Rhodesia National Museum

Northern Rhodesia :

African Housing Board
The Land and Agricultural Bank of Northern Rhodesia
Central Electricity Corporation Limited
Northern Rhodesia Industrial Development Corporation
Victoria Falls Electricity Board
Zambesi River Transport Board
Northern Electricity Supply Corporation (Pvt.) Limited

Nyasaland :

Agricultural Produce and Marketing Board
Electricity Supply Commission
Mudi River Water Board

Bibliographical Essay

Since the end of World War II, the former territories of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland have been the setting, not only for increasingly complex problems of race relations, but also for a spate of scholarly historical research, much of which has become readily available in the form of books, articles, and published conference proceedings. A dozen or more books came out in 1960. However, much still remains to be done.

The main sources used for this thesis are shown in the footnotes and bibliography. A short list of important constitutional and political documents proved very useful. Some material can be obtained from the British Information Services, 475 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, New York.

Alan R. Taylor and Eugene P. Dvorin have provided students of Central African History with a list of the literature and background materials for the "Political Development in British Central Africa, 1890-1956." Their article appears in Race, Vol. I, No. 1, November 1959, pp. 61-78. They selected official and unofficial publications, essays, political tracts, and materials felt to be of particular significance in Central Africa's political evolution.

Dr. A. J. Wills attempted to make out of all the material available a handy, single volume, Introduction

to Central African History (1964). The book is inadequate on the dissolution of the Federation. Nevertheless, it is a good reference book.

Three biographies were used for this study.

Gertrude Millin's Cecil Rhodes (1933) describes the life story of Rhodes and his work as a capitalist, and politician in South Africa, and as the founder of Rhodesia. Don Taylor's The Rhodesian (1955) deals with the life story of Sir Roy Welensky and his career as an ex-engine driver, ex-heavy weight boxer, ex-agitator for trade union rights, and as a politician. The book describes his work up to 1955 and shows the part played by Sir Roy Welensky in the long series of negotiations that led up to the creation of the Central African Federation. Dr. L. H. Cann and Dr. H. Gelfand have written a very useful biography, Huggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His Country (1964). The book presents a useful picture of Huggins as both a medical man and politician. It tells how Huggins led Southern Rhodesia for twenty years as Prime Minister from 1933 to 1953 and also how he helped founding the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, of which he was Prime Minister from 1953 to 1956. The authors present effectively many of the factors in white Rhodesia itself, but Dr. Cann is much of an apologist for one side of the Rhodesian controversy. For example he speaks more favourably for the Southern Rhodesian point of view of administering "native affairs" than the Colonial Office Administration. The authors did not realize that it was on the "native policy"

that the Federation broke down.

The Birth of a Dilemma (1959), by Philip Mason, is an excellent account of the Territories before the white man went to Central Africa to seek converts, gold and ivory, and of the conquest and settlement of the Rhodesias. The book deals a deadly blow to many of the European comfortable notions. Colin Leys's European Politics in Southern Rhodesia is the best political history of the country. The author ably analyzes the structure of Southern Rhodesian politics, racial segregation and colour bar. He points out that throughout the years covered by his book "control of government was, in effect, in the hands of only one party, closely interlocked with the major European interest organizations, and reflecting in its organization and policies the social and economic solidarity of the European electorate." The book also deals with Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation.

Events in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, culminating in the 1960 Constitutional Review in London, resulted in a focus of world-wide interest on the affairs of the Federation. More than a dozen books on the Federation came out in 1960 some of which are: T.R.M. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership, C. Leys and C. Pratt (ed.), A New Deal in Central Africa (contains a variety of articles by different authors), A. J. Hanna, The Story of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, E. Clegg, Race and Politics, R. Gray, The Two Nations, T. M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle

for Power in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and P. Mason, Year of Decision. Most of these authors agree that Northern Rhodesia was the key to the Federation. Professor Creighton's book is concerned with a detailed expose of disabilities - economic, social and political - to which Africans as a race, have been subjected. Mr. Mason's book, which follows on from his earlier work, The Birth of a Dilemma, is virtually a history of the Federation since 1951. He reviewed the course of the Federation with a candid eye on the Federal Review Conference. He discusses clearly African unrest, the halting advances toward partnership, the Todd crisis in Southern Rhodesia, and future policy. He warned that Southern Rhodesia would be hit hard if Federation broke down.

Sir Roy Welensky's book, Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1964), tells the painful story of the demise of the Federation from his own point of view. It contains valuable information. The same story is told from another point of view by Harry Franklin, Director of the Northern Rhodesia Government Information and Broadcasting Services, in his book Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation (1963). The book is full of direct quotations.

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