VALUES, VALUE SYSTEMS, AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STRUCTURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY DAVID DANIEL MCLELLAN 1970 THESIS



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#### ABSTRACT

## VALUES, VALUE SYSTEMS, AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STRUCTURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

By

### David Daniel McLellan

Rokeach (1968) suggests that everyone who has undergone the process of socialization has acquired a set of beliefs about end-states of existence and modes of behavior which they consider personally and socially preferable to alternative end-states of existence or modes of behavior. The preferential end-states (terminal values) and preferential modes of behavior (instrumental values) are hierarchically organized into value systems. These values transcendentally guide behavior and judgments across specific objects and situations. Rokeach, however, does not directly consider the process of the <u>development</u> of values and value systems.

Kohlberg (1964) has identified six distinguishable stages in the development of moral reasoning where this development is based on natural transformations of moral thought which reflect underlying cognitive processes. The stages, which reflect the formal, structural characteristics of the judgmental process, are:

- 1. The punishment and obedience orientation
- 2. The instrumental relativist orientation
- 3. The interpersonal concordance orientation
- 4. The rigid rule orientation
- 5. The social-contract legalistic orientation
- 6. The universal ethical principle orientation.

It was hypothesized that specific value (as conceptualized by Rokeach) differences, for individuals within a given culture, correspond to differences in their developmental levels of moral reasoning (as conceptualized by Kohlberg). To test whether the value concept as operationalized in the Rokeach Value Survey actually is sensitive to developmental structural differences, 78 male <u>S</u>s from three grade levels (7th, 9th, & 11th) in a small suburban-rural public school were administered portions of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview individually and were twice administered the Value Survey in groups. The test-retest interval for the Value Survey was three weeks.

The major findings of this research were: (a) the stability of terminal and instrumental value systems increased with age rather than with developmental level of moral reasoning; (b) Rokeach's "moral values" (a subset of instrumental values) were not found to differentiate better among <u>Ss</u> at different moral levels than the non-moral instrumental values; (c) an overall measure of value system similarity did not reflect the moral development pattern; and (d) for specific individual values, there was a predictable pattern across stages of moral development.

Two values, <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u>, were found to discriminate strongly among moral stage-groups and to be predictable across moral stages within age levels. These two values were considered as values defining the structural variation in the development of moral reasoning and a single score utilizing both value ranks is discussed. Value differences related to the age dimension were also discussed.

It was concluded that the Value Survey is sensitive to the structural differences in moral reasoning across the Kohlberg stages. However, it

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was suggested that the current Value Survey terms are best suited for adult <u>S</u>s and that different value terms be developed for use with school age <u>S</u>s.

Approved: Mitton Cokeach Date: May 23, 1970

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### A THESIS

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### INTRODUCTION

Values and morality have long received the attention of philosophers, theologians, and social scholars of various persuasions. As Kohlberg (1964) notes, morality was, for many generations, the central category for defining social relationships and development, and the social sciences were termed "the moral sciences." Morality and moral values have received only sporadic attention by the behavioral sciences in more recent years but current trends would indicate that the pendulum is on an upward course. Rokeach (1968), for example, argues that values should replace attitudes as the central concern of social psychology. In the area of morality, Kohlberg has identified developmental stages in the structure of children's moral reasoning which have strong implications for the educational process.

The importance of values, moral and otherwise, is twofold: for the individual and for the society. The sociologist, as Inkeles (1968) points out, in stating what it is that any society must have in order to survive is, in effect, specifying adult characteristics which must presumably be acquired by a significant portion of the population. Reviewing Marion Levy's "functional requisites of any society," Inkeles argues that they are more a statement of the properties or qualities which individual members of a society must have if the society is to survive. Among these societal requisites are (a) a shared set of articulated goals, (b) regulation of choice of means, and (c) effective

control of disruptive forms of behavior. Inkeles translates these societal requisites into elements of the personal system as  $(a_1)$  values,  $(b_1)$  values plus conscious functions of ego or "social self," and  $(c_1)$ modes of moral functioning.

That these elements are imperatives for any system of child socialization makes them of great interest not only to the psychologist but to all members of society in that the relatively enduring patterns of adult values and moral functioning are of considerable significance as inputs into the social process. This concern for the development of values increases if the commonly-held notion that values of the young are more malleable than those of adults is correct. The establishment of valid and reliable methods of assessing development in these areas is useful for establishing norms, for identifying adaptive and meladaptive shifts early in development, and for assessing the effects of experimental treatments or socialization efforts.

It is toward this general goal which this paper is aimed; specifically, a preliminary assessment of the validity and reliability of the Rokeach Value Survey as a measure of value and value system development.

#### The Literature

Research and theory in the area of moral and non-moral values have taken a number of distinctive paths. Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966) have reviewed much of the literature on these efforts to assess values and have considered these efforts within the context of behavioral considerations. They see the history of these attempts to assess values as having three distinct eras since 1900, with each era characterized by a particular type of instrument.

The first era was seen by Pittel and Mendelsohn as being characterized by paper-and-pencil tests which sought to differentiate normal children from deviant children. Among such efforts, the work of Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) stands out. Hartshorne and his collaborators developed a number of instruments designed to tap a child's moral knowledge.

These Tests of Moral Knowledge, for example, asked children to pick one of four solutions to a social situation. Others used by Hartshorne, et al. attempted to measure vocabulary of moral words or attitudes towards various acts of misconduct. These tests were of little use in discriminating among children who exhibited differential resistance to temptation. The tests did, however, correlate highly with intelligence.

The second era was characterized by a growth of theoretical orientations and the consideration of moral values within these orientations. Pittel and Mendelsohn saw two major trends within the second era: (1) development of interview techniques for assessing the formal structure of moral reasoning within a developmental cognitive framework; and (2) integration of the consideration of values within omnibus investigations of personality based primarily on psychoanalytic and behavioristic models.

The first trend was begun by Piaget (1932), about whom I shall have more to say later. The second trend is exemplified by Murray (1938) and by Havighurst and Taba (1949). Murray designed items to tap what were called Superego Integration, Superego Conflict, and Sentiments of the Superego in his efforts to study the normal personality. Havighurst and Taba's work on the adolescent character and personality included scoring essays on such topics as "Where Do I Get My Ideals?" and questionnaires designed to tap such traits as "Honesty" and "Moral Courage." Here, too,

there was found little correlation between "values" and "behavior."<sup>1</sup>

The third, and current, era in the study of values makes particular use of projective techniques which "all seem to deal with the superego in operational terms which place emphasis on the tendency of subjects to take a moralistic stance in the consideration of violations of conventional prohibitions, to project guilt feelings onto characters who violate these standards, and to indicate by their responses that they characteristically deny or suppress impulses which lead to socially unacceptable behavior (Pittel and Mendelsohn, 1966, p. 32)."

Another overview of value studies by MacCurdy (1950) lists four general value measuring techniques:

- 1. self report (paper-and-pencil tests),
- 2. intensity of emotional reaction,
- 3. variations in observed moral judgment,

and 4. choice of "fealty" (i.e., behavior choice).

Homant (1967) points out that the last three techniques all require observation of a subject's behavior, thus they are all based on the notion of behavior reflecting implicit values. The self-report technique is the only one which lends itself to tapping explicit value orientations. These techniques have been summarized in Homant (1967) and Hollen (1967). Robinson and Shaver (1969) present brief treatments of a number of the current instruments.

### Value Definition

The consideration of values and value orientations and efforts to measure them depend, to a large extent, on the researcher's conceptualization of what a value or value orientation is. Dukes (1955), in

reviewing value studies in psychology, admits that philosophical considerations, such as defining means and ends, are inextricably intertwined in most conceptions of values. The various definitions and conceptualizations used and instruments used are selectively summarized in Homant (1967) and Hollen (1967). These two theses, while summarizing value research, also offer extensive discourses on the Rokeach Value Survey which has been used in this study.

One of the most extensive treatments of the problem of the definition aspects of values has been given by Kluckhohn (1959).

> Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse, literature on the subject of the various fields of learning, one finds values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals, groups, objects, events. The only general agreement is that values somehow have to do with normative as opposed to existential propositions. (Kluckhohn, p. 390).

Kluckhohn does, however, offer his definition and elaborate on it. For him, a value is an implicit or explicit conception (for an individual or group) of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.

The union of the cognitive (conception) and the affective (desirable) dimensions is necessary in his definitions of value for "if the rational... is omitted, we are left with something not very different from...'sentiment.' When the affective aspect is omitted, we have something resembling 'ethics plus aesthetic and other taste canons.' The elements of 'wish' and 'appraisal' are inextricably united in 'value' (Kluckhohn, p. 400)."

A different treatment of the definition of value by Barton (1962) is a consideration of the different object frameworks in which value

has been treated. In his discussion, he points to four major classifications of the use of "value." These classifications are combinations of explicit-implicit and preferential-normative dimensions.

Here, the explicit-implicit dimension refers to the inference of value from behavior, on the one hand, and the verbalization of values, on the other. The preferential-normative separation is somewhat more ambiguous. Preferential values are individual goals while normative values are qualities used for judging others or oneself. It is not difficult to see that a normative value used by an individual to judge others may become a preferred goal for himself, thus blurring the distinction between the two.

Rokeach (1968) has also addressed himself to the area of values. Rokeach assumes that everyone who has undergone the process of socialization has learned a set of beliefs<sup>2</sup> about modes of behavior and about end-states of existence which they consider to be personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of behavior or end-states of existence. As noted above, Rokeach argues these values should become the major focus of psychological research, replacing attitudes, because values occupy a more central and dynamic role within the individual's cognitive-affective system.

A value, for Rokeach, is differentiated from an attitude<sup>3</sup> in a number of respects:

While an attitude represents several beliefs focused on a specific object or situation, a value is a single belief that transcendentally guides actions and judgments across specific objects and situations, and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate end-states of existence. Moreover, a value, unlike an attitude, is an imperative to action, not only a belief about the preferable but also a preference for the preferable (Lovejoy, 1950). Finally, a value,

unlike an attitude, is a standard or yardstick to guide actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations, and justifications of self and others. (1968, p. 160).

These preferential end-states of existence (terminal values) and preferential modes of behavior (instrumental values) are conceptualized by Rokeach to exist in a hierarchical organization within each individual's belief system. That is, each individual is posited to have two distinct value systems, terminal and instrumental, each with a hierarchy of values. These value systems are considered to be functionally and cognitively connected with each other and with specific attitudes.

While Rokeach does theoretically consider value change and concomitant attitude and behavioral change, he does not directly consider the <u>development</u> of values and value systems. The socialization process which has resulted in the acquisition of terminal and instrumental values has not been specified nor have the resulting emergent value patterns for varying socialization processes.

### Value Development

I have, to a limited degree, already touched upon psychological explorations dealing with the area of the development of values and value orientations during childhood and a more extensive examination will reveal that the conceptual definitional problems noted in the preceding section are enlarged somewhat by the addition of a developmental dimension.

The preceding section dealing with value definition left us with a generalized notion of a value being a cognitive conception of the desirable means and ends of action and the conceptualization of Rokeach was specifically elaborated. It is explicit in this orientation that the value is "internalized;" that is, the value is an integral aspect of

the functional cognitive structure of the adult individual.

A shift in focus from the adult value and value system to a developmental dimension has meant, for most psychological conceptualizations of this century, a major concern with the increasing internalization of values. That is, if adult values have been considered internalized preferences of means and ends, then how and why this internalization occurs has been the primary concern of the developmentalist. In reviews of the theories of the development of value orientations, both Kohlberg (1963a, 1964) and Maccoby (1968) have noted that the most prevalent conceptualization of moral development has been that of increasing internalization of basic cultural rules of social action. They also note that three different aspects of this internalization which have been stressed in the theoretical literature and research. These aspects are (a) moral behavior, (b) moral affect, and (c) moral judgment.

The previously-cited Hartshorne and May (1928-1930) studies exemplify research in the moral behavior area. Here, internalization was considered to be intrinsically motivated conformity or resistance to temptation. Hartshorne and May defined moral character as a set of culturally defined virtues (honesty, service, self-control) which they felt would be translated into measurable traits through the use of temptation situations. As noted above, their Tests of Moral Knowledge correlated little with moral behavior. They also found there was little consistency of moral behavior from one situation to another.

The affective criterion of the existence of internalized standards is that of guilt. Both learning theories and psychoanalytically-oriented theories focus on guilt or anxiety as a basic moral motive and focus on

inhibition as the basic expression of morality.

Rokeach (1969) also makes room for this notion in his conceptualization of values:

> To my mind, the <u>general</u> concept of value is considerably broader than the concept of moral value. For one thing, moral values refer only to modes of behavior, instrumental values, and not to end-states of existence, terminal values. For another, moral values refer mainly to those modes of behavior which, when violated, arouse pangs of conscience or feelings of guilt or wrong doing; they have an <u>interpersonal</u> focus (p. 6).

In other words, Rokeach sees moral values as a sub-set of instrumental values which have specific functions and are specifically related to the affective dimension.

Finally, the judgmental or cognitive aspect of internalization suggests an understanding of a standard and a positive valuing of it. For Kohlberg (1964), "the internalization of a standard implies a capacity to make judgments in terms of that standard and to justify maintaining the standard to oneself and to others (p. 384)."<sup>4-</sup>

However, Kohlberg (1960) notes elsewhere the developmental position on this internalization:

> The basic assumption of most...is that moral development is a matter of <u>internalizing</u> external cultural standards through reinforcement or identification. The developmentalist would say in opposition that there are basic attributes of adult morality which represents the outcome of developmental transformations of earlier motives and conceptions. Moral development is not a simple stamping in of external prohibitions and rules, on a childish tabula rasa mentality.

It is morality in this more positive and developmental sense which was seen as the key problem of socialization by the founders of social psychology; McDougall, Dewey, Mead, and Baldwin (p. 1). <u>Piaget</u>

This cognitive aspect of internalization received its modern pioneering work from Piaget (1932). It is important to note that the subject matter of this work is not separated in any important manner from Piaget's general cognitive theme at that time. Piaget's efforts in the moral judgment area can only be fully understood within the larger context within which he worked, i.e., the context of a more comprehensive effort to describe cognitive and logical development.

Flavell (1963) notes that the important theoretical tie between Piaget's <u>The Moral Judgment of the Child</u> and his preceding works lies in understanding that the mechanism Piaget considers responsible for the development of rational morality is the same as for rationality in general. In addition to the developmental parallelism, Piaget saw an even deeper intrinsic connection between thought and morality: "Logic is the morality of thought just as morality is the logic of action (1932, p. 398)."

Thus, to understand fully what Piaget is saying about moral development, we must first understand the larger, more inclusive concerns of his general theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide comprehensive coverage of Piaget's general theory; therefore, I will not attempt to review Piaget's general theoretical foundations. Flavell (1963) details much of Piaget's work and summarizes his theory and Furth (1969) presents a reasonably concise summary of Piaget's theoretical foundations, emphasizing the biological and epistemological dimensions.

Piaget's general approach to moral development is essentially a "stage" theory approach. That is, a child growing up in an environment

and interacting with the environment undergoes identifiable changes in his cognitive structure and functioning. These changes take place in a predetermined sequence in all children, yet not necessarily at the same time or at the same rate of change. Indeed, Piaget suggests that in certain environments development may stop at some particular stage. Use of the word "stage" is only a convenient method of condensing at certain points the characteristics of the changes which are taking place.

> Though we could not point to any stages properly so called, which followed one another in a necessary order, we were able to define processes whose final terms were quite distinct from one another. These processes might mingle and overlap more or less in the life of each child, but they marked nevertheless the broad divisions of moral development (Piaget, 1932, p. 175).

The final result of Piaget's considerations of the child's moral reasoning is to identify two stages, or ideal types, in the early development of the child. The earlier of the two stages reflects the morality of <u>constraint</u> (the heteronomous stage) and the later stage reflects the morality of <u>cooperation</u> (the autonomous stage).

As the developmental process is essentially concerned with the internalization of basic cultural rules of social action, the stages represent increasing internalization of rules by the child. Prior to the heteronomous stage, the child has not internalized rules at all; they are entirely external to himself. The heteronomous stage represents a <u>partial</u> internalization of rules where the child feels an obligation to conform even though he considers the sources of the rules to be external. The autonomous stage reflects the full internalization of the rules with the child feeling some control over them. In the sample of children Piaget talked with, most children reached the autonomous stage by eleven years of age. That is, few children eleven years old or older made moral judgments using the immature aspects of the heteronomous stage. Children below seven years of age seldom characterized their moral judgments with aspects indicative of the higher autonomous stage.

Kohlberg (1963a), in reviewing the research in the area of moral development, concluded that Piaget's <u>generalized</u> developmental view of moral judgment has received clear support in that there was crosscultural evidence of age trends along several dimensions. However, many of the specifics of Piaget's theory, such as the two stages of development, have not been supported by research evidence.

At the time The Moral Judgment of the Child was published in 1932, Piaget had restricted himself primarily to verbal methods and it was not until some years later that he reached the perspective that the central mechanism of intelligence is found in the construction of operations which derive from the general coordinations of actions. Instead of "overcoming" egocentrism and realism, Piaget now writes of the development of the ability to carry out concrete operations. In his theory of cognitive development as currently viewed, the child moves from the sensori-motor stage, through the preoperational stage, to the stage of concrete operations and, finally, to the stage of formal operations. During the preoperational stage (roughly from 2 to 6 years of age) the child acquires the use of symbols but confuses means and ends. As the child moves into the stage of concrete operations, he begins to differentiate means and ends and begins to view means as instruments. This

stage of concrete operations, beginning about the seventh year and lasting until about the eleventh or twelth, roughly encompasses Piaget's autonomous stage of the development of moral judgment. Just as few children below seven years showed any use of the autonomous aspects of moral judgment, so do few children of that age show operational thinking.

The strong emphasis of Piaget on the parallelism between general cognitive development and the development of moral judgment still holds, suggesting that the heteronomous and autonomous stages of moral development could be reformulated to fit into the contemporary theoretical structure.

Piaget does allude to the continuing parallelism of cognitive and moral development in <u>The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to</u> <u>Adolescence</u>. In <u>The Moral Judgment of the Child</u>, adolescents were not considered and thus, development into the age range of formal operational thought was not then considered. In their book on adolescent thinking, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) were

> struck by the fact that feelings about ideals are practically nonexistent in the child. A study of the concept of nationality and the associated social attitudes ... has shown us that the child is sensitive to his family, to his place of residence, to his native language, to certain customs, etc., but that he preserves both an astonishing degree of ignorance and a striking insensitivity not only to his own designation or that of his associates as Swiss, French, etc., but toward his own country as a collective reality. This is to be expected, since, in the 7-11-year-old child, logic is applied only to concrete or manipulable objects. ... The notions of humanity, social justice (in contrast to interindividual justice which is deeply experienced at the concrete level), freedom of conscience, civic or intellectual courage, and so forth, like the idea of nationality, are ideals which profoundly influence the adolescent's affective life; but with the child's mentality, except for certain individual glimpses, they can neither be understood nor felt.

In other words, the child does not experience as social feelings anything more than interindividual affects. Even moral sentiments are felt only as a function of unilateral respect (authority) or mutual respect. But, beginning at 13-15 years, feelings about ideals or ideas are added to the earlier ones, although, of course, they too subsist in the adolescent as well as the adult. Of course, an ideal always exists in a person and it does not stop being an important interindividual element in the new class of feelings. The problem is to find out whether the idea is an object of affectivity because of the person or the person because of the idea. But whereas the child never gets out of this circle because his only ideals are people who are actually part of his surroundings, during adolescence the circle is broken because ideals become autonomous (pp. 348-349).

Thus, moral development is not complete at the autonomous stage outlined in <u>The Moral Judgment of the Child</u>. It is the development of formal operational thought during adolescence which is necessary for the formation of social ideals and principles.

### Kohlberg

The most extensive and significant reformulation of Piaget's theory of the development of moral judgment has been done by Kohlberg (1958 +). Essentially Kohlberg takes a quantitative approach to the general qualitative material of Piaget. While Kohlberg (1963a) suggests that his work provides clear support for the general developmental view, it does not support Piaget specifically:

> As opposed to Piaget's view, the data suggest that the "natural" aspects of moral development are continuous and a reaction to the whole social world rather than a product of a certain stage, a certain concept (reciprocity), or a certain type of social relations (peer relations). (pp. 322-323).

Kohlberg's conceptualization of moral judgment suggests, as does Piaget's, that morality develops within a framework of general cognitive growth which imposes restrictions on the judgmental abilities of the child. Within this generalized framework of developing cognitive abilities, Kohlberg has identified six distinct stages in the development of moral reasoning. These six stages (or ideal-types) which are thought to form an invariant, culturally-universal sequence are:

I. Preconventional Level

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.

- II. Conventional Level
  - <u>Stage 3</u>: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation.

Stage 4: The rigid rule ("law and order") orientation.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

<u>Stage 5</u>: The social-contract, legalistic orientation.

<u>Stage 6</u>: The universal ethical principle orientation. (See Appendix A for elaboration of stages)

The research evidence to date indicates that the following four conditions, which Kohlberg considers necessary for validating the presence of true "stages", do hold for his typology:

- a. Regular age-related changes with lower stage judgments decreasing and higher stage judgments increasing.
- b. Considerable generality across situations.
- c. Higher correlation of frequency of judgments in adjacent stages than with more distant stages.
- d. It should be easier to move a child up one stage in judgment than to produce any other change (summarized from Maccoby, 1968).

Kohlberg (1958, 1963a, 1963b, 1964) has presented evidence to support his typology in both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. Turiel (1965) demonstrated the invariance of the sequential progression and integration of lower stages into higher stages. Kramer (1968) investigated the Kohlberg stages longitudinally and found support for earlier findings. Kohlberg (1968) also presents data supporting the cultural universality of his stages of moral development.

Returning to the concept of internalization, Kohlberg concludes that moral internalization relates closely to the cognitive development of moral concepts. At the first two stages (stages summarized in Appendix A) standards of judgments and motivations are external to the child. The motivations are essentially external rewards and punishments. At the middle two stages, the standards the child uses are for the most part, external. However, he has internalized much of his motivation to conform where he feels it necessary to maintain the expectations of the family, group, or nation. At the highest stages, the motivations and standards have become internal to the individual. It is at these stages that the individual becomes truly "moral" for Kohlberg.

Each of these stages, for Kohlberg (1969), is a normative ethical theory. To define these stages, he has listed all the concerns on which a normative ethical theory must potentially take a stand in any given moral situation. These concerns, called Aspects or Categories (see Appendix B), are the basic units of moral judgments. At present, Kohlberg lists thirty Aspects which, in effect, each define a question, "What stand does your theory take on this area of concern?" The Aspects of Kohlberg's system are exhaustive but not necessarily mutually exclusive,

as one statement might bear on a number of Aspects at once.

These areas of concern which the Aspects define must be culturally universal and universal across situations. That is, every culture or elaborated moral theory must focus to an extent on the Aspect. Also, it must be always logically possible to raise a question on any aspect in any moral situation.

The structure of Kohlberg's typology is a 6 x 30 matrix: Stage x Aspect. Thus, for each Aspect or area of concern, there is a stagetypical orientation reflecting the developmental scheme. Each person, in making a moral judgment, logically can be called upon to take a stand on each one of the thirty Aspects at one of the six stages. Any given individual may be at different stages for different Aspects on a particular moral situation. At the lower stages, some of the Aspects will not be differentiated from one another.

The thirty Aspects are separated into three groupings: (a) the basic <u>modes</u> of normative moral judgment, (b) the basic <u>principles</u> of normative moral judgment, and (c) the basic moral <u>values</u> (see Appendix C). These groupings are subdivided into capital-letter modes and principles, each of which includes several Categories or Aspects.

The Aspects which fall under (a) above may be seen as the different kinds of answers to questions as to <u>what</u> is right or wrong, good or bad, Aspects under (b) are different kinds of moral reasons of answers to the question "Why is it right?" or "Why should someone do what you say is right?" The Aspects under (c) include such recurrent themes as Life, Property, Liberty or Autonomy, etc. Basically, the Aspects (c) are just applications of the other aspects to particular content areas.

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Kohlberg's approach to moral development is essentially a descriptive one. He has identified stages in the development of moral judgment and provided some evidence to support the existence of the stages. However, he has yet to clearly confront the processes by which individuals progress through the stages. He has cited evidence (Kohlberg, 1963) supporting, to an extent, a theory of developmental identification. It is through role-playing and identification at various levels that the individual develops and internalizes values. But, the variables and the mixture which facilitate moral development for Kohlberg are still not elaborated.

In answering his own question about the interpretation and definition of level of maturity of moral judgment, Kohlberg suggests:

> One general answer is that a more mature judgment is a more <u>moral</u> judgment. This does not mean that a child who utters mature judgments is a more moral person, as judged by the standards of the community. It means that his judgments more closely correspond to genuine moral judgments as these have been defined by philosophers. While philosophers have been unable to agree upon any ultimate principle of the good which would define "correct" moral judgments, most philosophers agree upon the characteristics which make a judgment a genuine moral judgment... Unlike judgments of prudence or esthetics, moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds (1964, p. 405).

Thus, the "goal" toward which moral development is continually striving may be structurally delineated and the progress of any child may be viewed relative to this goal.

This goal, as represented by Kohlberg's postconventional stages, is represented best as a concept of justice. And, as Kohlberg (1968) notes, "The man who understands justice is more likely to practice it (p. 30)." This is not to suggest that there has been demonstrated a
one-to-one relationship between moral judgment and behavior. Kohlberg (1963a, 1964) considers at length the findings dealing with the correspondence between moral judgment and behavior. The findings suggest moderate correlations between stage of moral thinking and such behavioral measures as resistance to temptation.<sup>5</sup>

Basically, Kohlberg has found "that youths who understand justice act more justly, and the man who understands justice helps create a moral climate which goes far beyond his immediate and personal acts. The universal society is the beneficiary (1968, p. 30)."

### Values and moral reasoning

The research focus of this paper is the relationship between value survey responses, age, and developmental level of moral reasoning. Kohlberg has identified distinguishable stages in the development of moral reasoning where this development is based on natural transformations of moral thought which reflect underlying cognitive processes. Kohlberg is concerned with the formal, structural characteristics of the judgmental process. That is, what are the formal criteria for action? This contrasts the formal structure of a judgment of right or wrong with the growth of moral knowledge or increased behavioral or verbal conformity to societal norms.

This concept of the development of moral reasoning implies that, within a given cultural context, certain preferences about what are and are not desirable modes of behavior and end-states of existence will be shared by individuals at the same level of reasoning. Kohlberg has, in fact, built into his elaborated typology the generalized correspondence of the modes and principles of moral reasoning with specific

content areas such as <u>Human Life and Liberty</u> or <u>Autonomy</u> (see Appendix B for these basic values). Thus, for Kohlberg, values are an integral component of the developmental schema.

For example, contract, promise, and non-deception (a specific content area) may be followed across the stages (structure). At stage 1, there are no reasons for maintaining trust; at stage 2, the reason for maintaining trust is self-interest; at stage 3, trust is maintained to avoid disappointing others; at stage 4, there is a categorical attitude about "keeping your word" with a sense of disappointment if you don't; at stage 5, there is a contractual conception of expectations somewhat more impersonal than 3 or 4 with an emphasis on the freedom not to enter into a contract when considering blame for violation of the contract; at stage 6, mutual trust is universalistic but more personal than at stage 5 as it is an act of faith going beyond simple contract--trust is also seen as a condition for the ideal society at this stage. In terms of a value hierarchy, contract, promise and non-deception as a value may be seen as becoming increasingly important within the individual's belief system as he progresses through the six stages of moral development. For the two highest stages, maintenance of trust and honesty become preferred modes of behavior for ethical and moral reasons which transcent specific situational or societal variables. It will be noticed, that, in terms of a value hierarchy, cultural influences may reduce or increase the relative value distances among stages, thus making stage-related differences more or less measurable. In a society such as ours which places heavy emphasis on honesty, we would expect that even stage-1 individuals would rank honesty highly but that the increasing internalization

of the value which occurs with the development of moral reasoning would cause <u>honesty</u> to be valued still higher by the later stages.

Thus, within a given cultural context, we would hypothesize that the increasing internalization of specific moral content which accompanies the development of moral reasoning in the Kohlberg schema and increasing ranking of that moral content (i.e., value) within the individual's value hierarchy as conceptualized by Rokeach are functionally equivalent.

For Rokeach, the judgment of right or wrong is based on the value hierarchy within an individual's belief system. That is, a moral judgment (i.e., a judgment of action based on a set of factual and evaluative beliefs about a particular set of situations and individuals) will reflect the terminal and instrumental values of an individual. The particular set of values (value system) a person holds become "a standard or criterion for guiding action,...for morally judging self and others (Rokeach, 1968, p. 160)." These values, these preferential end-states and modes of behavior, are not situationally-bound but rather transcendentally guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations.

It is possible, then, for two individuals to value, as an end-state of existence, <u>equality</u> more highly than all other alternative end-states. However, the <u>reasons</u> why they value equality so highly may be different. Person Y may value <u>equality</u> because of his universal ethical principle orientation (Kohlberg's stage 6) which is based on the principles of the reciprocity and equality of human rights. The other individual, person Z, may value <u>equality</u> highly because of a rigid rule-orientation (stage 4) which recognizes that the official doctrine of the society is to value

<u>equality</u> highly and maintenance of the social order demands it. It is apparent, however, that Y's value of <u>equality</u> has validity and application apart from any societal norms while Z's high value on <u>equality</u> depends on the perceived social and legal norms.

Likewise, let us compare three persons who all value <u>honest</u> most highly as a mode of behavior. Person A, when asked why he values <u>honest</u>, might say that it is because his mother and father will spank him and send him to bed without supper if he is not honest (stage 1). Person B might say he values <u>honest</u> because his family and friends value <u>honest</u> highly and he wouldn't want to disappoint them (stage 3). Person C might say he values <u>honest</u> highly because of the need for maintenance of trust which is the foundation of extra-legal moral relations within the society (stage 6).

We can see that a particular value may be held for and mean different things to different people. However, within a given cultural milieu, we anticipate certain value differences among individuals who utilize differential reasoning for maintaining their values. For example, with the two individuals, Y and Z, who both valued <u>equality</u> highly, we would anticipate that Y actually values <u>equality</u> more highly than Z because Y's reasoning represents self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency while Z considers <u>equality</u> valuable because of his identification with the social authority. To say that one "actually values" <u>equality</u> more highly is to say that the value is internalized for Y, suggesting little cross-situation variability and a more consistent high ranking of the value when compared with conflicting values. Thus, if the social

authority were to de-emphasize <u>equality</u> in order, say, to placate segments of an electorate, Z would be considered to have a higher probability of changing his value of <u>equality</u> downward than would Y whose values are not based on identification with the social system.

Likewise, A, B, and C's high value of <u>honest</u> carry different implications for comparison with conflicting values and for the correlation with honesty-related behavior. Just as with earlier research on moral behavior, simple knowledge of the value of <u>honest</u> by adults or peers for those at moral stages 1 through 4, does not necessarily mean they will <u>act</u> honestly suggesting that other values such as <u>success</u> or <u>social</u> <u>recognition</u> actually take precedence in real-life situations. However, those who have achieved moral stage 5 or 6 and who value honest highly would be expected to be paying more than lip service to the value.

These hypothesized relationships between an individual's developmental stage of moral reasoning and his values are not thought just to evidence themselves in value rank-differences but in the stability of his value system as well. Where values are external to an individual, as they are at stage 1, his value system is more susceptible to external influences than is the value system of the individual whose values are rooted in self-chosen ethical principles of Kohlberg's stage 6. Thus, we would hypothesize that the higher an individual's development stage of moral reasoning, the more stabile will be his value system over time.

A seemingly obvious point of contact for the value concept of Rokeach with the developmental dimension of moral judgment is Rokeach's concept of <u>moral value</u>, which was discussed earlier in the context of moral affect. However, when the concepts of moral value and moral

judgment are considered beyond their nominal similarity, this point of contact becomes less obvious.

As has been noted, Rokeach (1969) defines moral values as a subset<sup>6</sup> of instrumental values which have an interpersonal focus and violation of which results in affective arousal (e.g., guilt). The judgmental aspect of morality considers the ability to make judgments in terms of a standard and to justify maintaining that standard. The concept of "moral" in moral value is not isomorphic to "moral" in moral judgment. For Rokeach, a value is intrinsically moral in that its referent is a mode of behavior which has an interpersonal focus. This use of moral value suggests a rule--deontological theory which holds that rules such as "honest" or "obedient" are valid standards of right and wrong apart from any consideration of the specific situation or the consequences of acting in accord with the moral value. This is contrasted with a teleological theory which is ultimately concerned with the comparative balance of good and evil which results from acting (Frankena, 1963, chapter 3 deals with these topics in some detail). The concept of moral value may also be contrasted, in a somewhat separate way, with the position of Fotion (1968) on "what makes a moral situation moral?"<sup>7</sup>

The use of the standard in Kohlberg's concept of moral judgment encompasses not only the rules for behavior (moral values) but also the terminal values which are used for such purposes as justifying a particular mode of behavior in a given situation. Especially at the post conventional level of Kohlberg's typology, all three levels of reasoning in dealing with a moral situation suggested by Fotion (1968) are found. These levels are: the descriptive or factual level, the

rule level (where rules are equivalent to Rokeach's instrumental values), and the value level (equivalent to Rokeach's terminal values). Fotion sees that the basic factual elements of a moral situation lead to a consideration of what rules for behavior are relevant in that situation which lead, in turn, to a consideration of principles or judgments of individual or societal goals which are relevant. In a somewhat different context, Frankena also acknowledges a similar sentiment:

> I propose therefore that we regard the morality of principles and the morality of traits of character, or doing and being, not as rival kinds of morality between which we must choose, but as two complimentary aspects of the same morality (p. 53).

The use of both terminal and instrumental values as defined by Rokeach would thus be anticipated in making moral judgments. Thereby, developmental differences in the structure of moral reasoning could result in both terminal and instrumental value differences, rather than in just moral value differences as might be suggested by equating the concept "moral" in moral values and moral reasoning.

My value data will give us the opportunity to determine the relationship of the moral and nonmoral instrumental values to the moral judgmental dimension in order to test whether the moral values differentiate among individuals at different stages of moral reasoning better than the nonmoral values. The overall relationship between the terminal values and the developmental dimension of moral reasoning will also become more clear.

Finally, based on the Kohlberg typology, there are specific values which are conceptually linked to the moral development dimension and these specific relationships will be detailed in the following section.

#### Hypotheses

We have already (p. 21) stated the general hypothesis which we wish to test: specific value (as conceptualized by Rokeach) differences for a given cultural context, correspond to differences in the developmental level of an individual's moral reasoning ability (as conceptualized by Kohlberg).

In the preceding section, the stability of value systems was hypothesized to be related to stage of moral development. Specifically, the hypothesis to test is:

> H1: The stability of terminal and instrumental value systems will increase as <u>stage</u> of development of moral reasoning increases, with age held constant.

Within a given culture, specific value <u>content</u>, as measured by the Value Survey, is thought to correspond to the developmental <u>structure</u> of moral reasoning. This general hypothesis may be operationally tested both by a global measure of value similarity and by specific value differences predicted from the developmental stages of moral reasoning.

The global value similarity notion yields this hypothesis:

H4.1: Holding age constant, <u>Ss</u> at a given <u>stage</u> of moral development will show more value system similarity when compared to one another than when compared to <u>Ss</u> at different stages; this pattern of value system similarity among the developmental stages will reflect the developmental pattern.

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If our hypothesis that the ethical theories which the Kohlberg stages represent have something to say about values is correct, we have only to select those values from the Value Survey with which the moral judgmental dimension deals directly, predict value differences consistent with the developmental structural differences, and, finally, assess the accuracy of our predictions. The nature of the Value Survey, however. limits the type of value differences which can reasonably be predicted. The relative ranking procedure makes any absolute value rank prediction or absolute rank differences prediction futile. The best that we can say is that when a stage-typical ethical theory emphasizes a value more than the other stage-typical theories, that value should, on the average, be ranked higher by Ss at that stage of reasoning than by Ss at the other stages. Thus, our next hypothesis will be in the form of a list of values which will be ranked highest on the average ("peak"<sup>8</sup>) by Ss at one or two specified stages of moral development, if the values are related to the moral dimension. These predictions are not thought to be related to age differences, so all 78 Ss may be considered as one group. However, since age and stage of moral development are correlated, each value prediction will also be expected to hold within each grade level separately. Where there are too few Ss at the moral level where a value is predicted to peak, that prediction is altered to conform to the stages available within the grade level. This somewhat lengthy hypothesis is:

H4.2: The following values will be ranked highest on the average ("peak") by Ss at the indicated stage(s) of moral reasoning.

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- I. Terminal values
  - A comfortable life will peak at stage 2. The stage 2 instrumental hedonists of the Kohlberg typology are preoccupied with a concern for their own comfort and well-being rather than for others. It would be at this stage where <u>a comfortable life</u> would most be utilized in making moral judgments.
  - 2. Equality will peak at stage 6. It is at this stage where equality becomes a defining element of the moral reasoning. Lacking any stage-6 Ss in our sample, however, equality will peak at stage 5, where equality and brotherhood are also among the defining elements of moral thought. In each grade separately, equality will peak at the highest stage present.
  - 3. <u>Family security</u> will peak at stage 1 and at stage 3. The stage-1 moralist defers unquestionly to the prevailing power which, for our <u>Ss</u>, is primarily found in the family. This deference to the parental authority reflects a high regard for the family structure. In a much different sense, the stage-3 moralist also has a high regard for the family structure, but this regard is reflecting an identification with the family rather than the simple deference to it as with the stage-1 moralists.

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- 4. <u>Freedom</u> will peak at stage 2 and stage 5. The hedonistic relativists at stage 2 feel that anyone may do what they wish with their own lives or property, reflecting a concern for their own <u>freedom</u>. The stage-5 moralists share this concern for individual freedom with the stage-2 moralists in that the concept of social-contract emphasizes free agreement outside the legal realm.
- 5. <u>National security</u> will peak at stage 4. The stage-4 moralists consider the honor and welfare of the state as an ultimate concern; something which should be defended at all cost.
- 6. <u>Pleasure</u> will peak at stage 2. The hedonistic overtones of the stage-2 morality reflect a prime concern with the self and the tendency is to make judgments on the basis of what <u>pleasure</u> or good an act brings to the self.
- 7. <u>Salvation</u> will peak at stage 1 and at stage 4. The moralities at these two stages represent the most socially conserving moralities and the most absolutist positions in terms of religious imperatives. As Rokeach (1969) has shown, <u>salvation</u> is highly correlated with religiousness and social conservatism.

- II. Instrumental values
  - 8. <u>Broadminded</u> will peak at stage 5 and stage 6. It is at these stages of moral reasoning that <u>broad-</u><u>minded</u>ness is strongly implied in that openmindedness and flexibility are prerequisites for making moral judgments.
  - 9. Forgiving will peak at stage 6. It is in the stage-6 morality where the moral principles of justice are principles of obligation and not principles requiring blame or justifying blame of others on self. In our sample, stage-5 Ss will share this outlook most. Where no stage-5 Ss are present in a particular grade, the morality of stage-3, with its concern with being nice and maintaining pleasant relationships, would lead to higher ranking of this value.
  - 10. <u>Helpful</u> will peak at stage 3 and at stage 5. The good, for the stage-3 moralist, is often defined as helping others. For stage-5 moralists, the welfare of the community is an ultimate criteria of the consequences of action so that behavior which leads to this is highly valued.
  - 11. Loving will peak at stage 3. The stage-3 moralist, in defining the good, often refers to this value.
  - 12. Obedient will peak at stage 1 and at stage 4. At stage 1, respect is defined as obedience to the superior power. At stage 4, right behavior consists, in part, of obedience to and respect for the social authority.
  - 13. <u>Responsible</u> will peak at stage 5 and stage 6. The moralists at these stages consider themselves responsible for all consequences of their own action or inaction to which moral principles apply (this is true more so for the stage-6 moralists).
  - 14. <u>Self-controlled</u> will peak at stage 4 and stage 5. The stage-4 moralist is concerned with rigid maintenance of rules in order to avoid guilt. The stage-5 moralist, with a greater awareness of his own responsibility, demands a greater measure of self-discipline.

These value peak predictions for the entire sample are summarized in Table 1. The predictions within each grade level are summarized in Table 2. To specifically deal with the issue of moral values which was dealt with in the preceding section, we will make two additional hypotheses

Table 1. Predicted Value Peaks<sup>\*</sup> Across Stages of Moral Development for Entire Sample (N=78).



\*A peak is defined as the highest median rank order among the groups for each value.

Table 2. Predicted Value Peaks<sup>\*</sup> Across Stages Of Moral Development for Each Grade Level.



\*A peak is defined as the highest median rank order among the stage-level groups within each grade level for each value.

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based on the Rokeach conception of moral values. These hypotheses are designed to test whether the moral values as defined by Rokeach are operationally related to the moral judgmental dimension to a greater extent than are the terminal values or the non-moral instrumental values.

Under Hl, we hypothesized both terminal and instrumental value system reliabilities would correlate with stage of development. If the moral values are more intrinsically related to the moral judgmental dimension, then the instrumental value system stabilities should show a stronger correlation with that dimension than will the terminal stabilities. Formally stated, this hypothesis is:

> H2: Instrumental value system stability will correlate more highly with <u>stage</u> of moral development than will terminal value system stability.

The related hypothesis is:

H3: The "moral values" will differentiate among <u>S</u>s at different moral <u>stages</u> more than will the nonmoral instrumental values.

METHOD

Research designs in developmental areas, according to Kessen (1960), are of two generalized types: longitudinal and cross-sectional. The longitudinal designs make use of repeated measures of the same subjects at different points along the time scale. The cross-sectional designs utilize single measures of individuals who are, at that moment, at different points along the time scale. There are benefits to be derived from each approach: the repeated measures design gives more sensitive estimates of small, reliable changes which occur while the crosssectional approach must rely primarily on group means and the like for analysis. Also the cross-sectional design fails to handle cultural variance at the different ages as does the longitudinal design. However, the cross-sectional design has the undeniable virtue of being quicker and cheaper.

For this study, a cross-sectional design was chosen. Economic concerns were primarily responsible but it was also felt that the results from a cross-sectional analysis would, in the event hypotheses were confirmed, make results much more compelling. This is because larger value differences between groups would have to occur in order for significant results to be found.

As Rokeach and Parker (1970) note, "we would expect value differences to be associated with differences in subcultural membership, sex, religion, age, race, ethnic identification, life style, socio-economic

status, child-rearing practices, intelligence, authoritarianism, etc." Since our interest here is to determine what, if any, value differences are related to structural differences in moral judgment, we wish to eliminate all extraneous variables (other than age) when selecting our sample so that developmental difference is, to what extent possible, the single independent variable.

To achieve this end of selecting a homogeneous sample, we drew our subjects from the public school system of a small suburban-rural community a few miles from Lansing, Michigan. The school and community are virtually one-hundred per cent white, predominately middle to lowermiddle class.

## The Sample

So (N=78) were white males from the seventh, ninth, and eleventh grades. At the request of the school administration, positive parental approval for each potential subject had to be acquired (Appendix D contains a sample parental request form). This procedure reduced the available pool from which to draw  $\underline{Ss}$ .<sup>9</sup> Table 3 indicates the varying return rates. The procedure also resulted in a somewhat biased sample, as Table 4 indicates. In all three grades, the mean scholastic achievement scores for  $\underline{Ss}$  and non-subjects were compared. In all cases, the mean scores were higher for the  $\underline{Ss}$  than for other male students in the same grade who were not  $\underline{Ss}$  in this study. In grades seven and nine, the differences are quite marked. Thus, the required procedure resulted in a more scholastically advanced sample than we would have anticipated had we drawn our  $\underline{Ss}$  at random from each grade rather than from those students for whom we had parental permission.

			Gra	de				
		7		9		11	To	otal
	n	7	n	7,	n	7	N	7
Number of Male Students	79		68		55		202	
Affirmative Parental Responses	39	(49)	38	(56)	32	(58 <u>)</u>	109	(54)
Negative Parental Responses	11	(14)	7	(10)	5	(9)	23	(11)
Total Parental Responses	50	(63)	45	(66)	37	(67)	132	(65)

Table 3. Number and Percent of Parental Permission Slips Returned by Male Students in Each Grade.

Table 4. <u>t</u> tests for Mean Differences in Scholastic Achievement Scores<sup>a</sup> for <u>Ss</u> <u>vs.</u> All Other Males in Each Grade.

		X	б <sup>2</sup>	n	df	t	р
Grade 7	<u>S</u> s Other Males	<b>59.</b> 6 45.3	615.8 782.7	22 48	68	2.033	<.05
Grade 9	<u>S</u> s Other Males	93.8 84.4	283.3 229.0	21 37	56	1.977	<.10
Grade 11	<u>S</u> s Other Males	52.4 50.8	287.8 216.5	25 32	55	0.388	>.50

<sup>a</sup>Scores not available for all students. The following test results from pupil files were used for this analysis:

Grade 7 - Composite percentile score on Iowa Test of Basic Skills

Grade 9 - Composite G.E. on Iowa Test of Basic Skills

Grade 11 - Verbal Reasoning raw score + Numerical Ability raw score on Differential Appitude Test.

### Testing Procedures

Each  $\underline{S}$  was first met by  $\underline{E}$  in an individual 50-minute session in the school. At this session,  $\underline{S}$  and  $\underline{E}$  chatted for a few minutes to get at ease and then  $\underline{E}$  explained the general purpose and nature of the testing to  $\underline{S}$ .  $\underline{E}$  assured  $\underline{S}$  that the procedure would be harmless and that  $\underline{S}$ 's responses would be confidential.  $\underline{S}$  was assured that no one other than  $\underline{E}$  would see his responses in any but anonymous form.  $\underline{E}$  also reiterated that he was not connected with the school, that the school had only allowed him to use its facilities.  $\underline{S}$  was then asked if he wanted to participate. He was assured that he was free to return to class and not participate for any reason. No student chose not to participate.

The testing began with asking age, parental occupation and education, and family size. S was then given the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) (Dunn, 1965) to quickly assess MA and IQ. The PPVT was given prior to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview because the game-like quality of the PPVT is useful for establishing rapport with S and getting him to respond freely. The mean C.A., PPVT raw score, and IQ for each grade are presented in Table 5.

The mean IQ's for  $\underline{S}s$  at each grade level are reasonably equivalent in that an ANOVA yielded a non-significant  $\underline{F}$ . The bias effect of the sampling procedure noted in Table 4 has resulted in higher mean IQs for the seventh and ninth grade, but not significantly higher. The increasing mean PPVT scores, which are equivalent to MA, show the predictable increase with grade.

<u>S</u> was then read four hypothetical moral dilemmas from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (KMJI) and was asked to answer questions about

Table 5. Mean C.A., PPVT Raw Score, and I.Q. for Ss in Each Grade

		Grade	
	7	9	11
C.A.	12.9	15.0	16.8
PPVT raw score	102.6	112.1	116.9
I.Q.	115.3	116.7	112.2

the stories (see Appendix E for the four stories and questions). S's responses were tape-recorded and later typed up for scoring purposes.

After all <u>S</u>s had completed this initial individual testing, they were twice brought together in groups to complete the Rokeach Value Survey--Form D (see Appendix F). The test-retest interval for all <u>S</u>s was three weeks.<sup>10</sup>

# Scoring the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (KMJI)

The global rating method (Kohlberg, 1958 & 1969) was used in scoring the S's responses on the KMJI. (See Appendix G for a sample Global-Rating Guide). Each situation is scored separately for all Ss. With the Global-Rating Guide, each S's responses are given a major code indicating the predominant stage of moral reasoning used by the subject in making judgments about the situation. If one stage is not clearly predominant, the scorer may also assign a minor code indicating a secondary stage of reasoning used by S. This major code alone or major and minor code is the global score for that S for that situation. When all protocols have been scored, each S has four global scores indicating the stage of moral reasoning used in making judgments about each situation. The scorer then, on the basis of the four global scores, assigns each subject to one of the six stages of moral reasoning which best typifies that S's level of moral reasoning. This assignation to one of the idealtype stages is the  $\underline{S}$ 's global-global (GG) score and is said to represent that S's developmental stage of moral reasoning.

Although the Global Rating method is somewhat less precise than the detailed scoring method first elaborated by Kohlberg (1958) or his newest, not-yet-completed, Aspect Scoring Method (1969), it has the benefit of

being much faster. However, despite the method used to score each situation, there has, as of yet, never been developed a clearly defined method for "averaging" the global scores in order to arrive at the global-global score or "pure" stage-type. Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) used the following method for assigning college students to a final "pure" type: Each global score was given a weight of 3 (major code only=3; if major and minor, major code weight=2, minor code weight=1) and the weights at each stage were summed across all situations. If, for two judges, the summed weight of the highest weighted stage was at least twice the summed weight of any other stage, the subject was assigned to that stage. This is a fairly rigorous method, as Haan, et. al. point out even when the detailed scoring method is used.

In this study, assignment of  $\underline{S}s$  to a final "pure" type was also based on the global scores, but every  $\underline{S}$  was required to be assigned so any method which eliminated  $\underline{S}s$  for failure to meet a criterion was not useful. It was thus decided to sum the weighted global scores and the largest sum would determine the global-global score for that  $\underline{S}$ . For example, subject 30 had the following global scores on the situations and was determined to be a "stage 2" moralist on the basis of the weighting:

Situatio	n:	III	IV	I	VII	Σ
Global Scor	e:	2(4)	1(3)	2	2(3)	
1 9 3 4 5 5 6		2 1	2 1	3	2 1	2 (7) 2 1 0 0

Where ties occurred, the scorer re-evaluated  $\underline{S}$ 's protocol to make a judgment as to which stage best represented the reasoning of  $\underline{S}$ .

## Reliability of Scoring

The outlined procedure for assigning  $\underline{S}s$  to "pure" types requires considerable training and practice to achieve reliable results. Two coders were trained in scoring the KMJI and the protocols fo 31  $\underline{S}s$  were randomly selected for scoring by both (the remainder were scored only by one coder, the experimenter) coders.

For reliability purposes, global scores of the two coders were considered to "agree" if any of the following three conditions were met:

a) both major and minor codes were identical,

b) major and minor code were just reversed (e.g., 4(3) and 3(4)).

or c) major codes were identical regardless of any minor codes

(e.g., 4(2) and 4(3)).

For global-global scores, agreement is only when "pure" type scores are identical as there are no minor codes. The percent agreement between the two coders on global scores for each situation and grade are shown in Table 6 and the agreement on global-global designations, in Table 7.

An additional measure of reliability is the correlation between the moral maturity (MM) scores given by each coder.<sup>11</sup> Table 8 shows these correlations.

These tables indicate fairly good agreement between the two coders. One additional reliability measure is the percent agreement of the two coders with a set of test protocols used by Kohlberg in training. Of 10 situations, Coder A's (experimenter) global scores agreed 100%, Coder B's agreed 90%.

Table 6. Percent Agreement Between Coders on Global Scores for 31 Ss.

				KMJI Sit	uation		
			111	IV	I	VII	Total
Grade	7	(n=10)	50 <b>%</b>	807	80 <b>%</b>	60 <b>%</b>	68 <b>7.</b>
Grade	9	(n=11)	100%	73 <b>%</b>	91 <b>%</b>	37%	80%
Grade	11	(n=10)	80%	100%	80%	80%	85%
	Tota	11	77%	84%	<b>84%</b>	58%	-

•

Table 7. Percent Agreement<sup>a</sup> Between Coders on Global-Global Scores for 31 <u>S</u>s.

		Grade	
	7	9	11
Percent Agreement	90%	82%	80%

<sup>a</sup>Where agreement was not reached, the global-global scores given by the two coders were always in adjacent stages.

Table 8. Correlations Between Moral Maturity Score Distributions of Two Coders

		Grade		1
	7	9	11	Combined
	(n=10)	(n=11)	(n=10)	(n=31)
r =	.932	.867	. 908	.903

.

RESULTS

The distribution of moral types within and between grades reflects the development dimension in that the lower stages tend to become less frequent and the higher stages more frequent as age increases (see Figure 1). For example, 23% of the seventh graders are at stage 1 while there are no eleventh graders at that stage. The mean global-global scores show an increasing trend as age increases. When weighted global scores for each situation are used as the unit of analysis, the pattern is essentially the same. An analysis of these means (Table 9) indicates that the distributions of global scores are significantly different for the three age groups, as would be expected.

The distribution of moral types is somewhat more positively skewed than we had anticipated, especially in the eleventh grade sample. Kohlberg's (1964) chart of the age trends across the six stages is in Figure 2a. Note that use of stage-1 and stage-2 reasoning decreases with age, use of stage-3 and stage-4 reasoning increases until age 13 and then stabilizes, and the use of the highest two stages increases from age 13 to 16. Figure 2b shows that percentages of global scores for our ages show roughly a similar pattern but, in the later stages, the absolute percentages of our sample lags behind that of the Kohlberg sample. For example our thirteen-year-olds exhibit a pattern close to the pattern of ten-year-olds in the Kohlberg sample. At seventeen, in our sample, stage-2 reasoning has not declined nearly to the extent it has in the

Table 9. <u>t</u> tests for Mean Differences in (Weighted) Global Scores for Each Grade.

	X	σ²	n <sup>a</sup>	df	t	р
Grade 7	2.31	1.09	104	206	9 69	< 01
Grade 9	2.68	0.94	104	200	2.03	<.01 
Grade 11	3.02	1.43	104	200	2.23	<.05

<sup>a</sup>104 equals number of <u>Ss</u> (26) times number of KMJI situations used (4).



Figure 1. Distributions of <u>S</u>s by Stage of Moral Development (Global-Global Score) Within Each Grade Level.



Figure 2a. Mean Percent of Total Moral Statements of each of 6 Moral Judgment Types at Three Ages. (From Kohlberg, 1964, p. 403)

Percent of Weighted Global Scores 40 2 30-3 1 Q 3 D 4 20-10 <u>ہ م</u> 4 ) 1 5 6 6 13 15 17 Age

Figure 2b. Percent of Global Scores for <u>S</u>s at Three Ages in This Study.

Kohlberg sample at age sixteen. This suggests that either the measurements differ or the samples differ, or both. Although the percentages referred to in Figures 2a and 2b are not precisely equivalent, they substantially represent the same thing: percent of stagetypical moral reasoning at a given age for a given sample. If we assume that the differences between the two samples are actual developmental differences and not measurement error, It is apparent that our sample is somewhat slow to develop in the moral aphere.

## Moral development, cognitive development and socio-economic level.

The question of the relationship between cognitive development and moral development is answered by Kohlberg in his suggestion that level of cognitive development is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for attainment of moral stages. That is, a given level of cognitive ability is required for reasoning at a particular moral level but the ability to reason at that given level of abstraction does not automatically mean that the individual will attain the moral level: other social-situational factors are required. In our sample, the correlation between level of cognitive development (as measured by the raw PPVT score which is roughly equivalent to M.A.) and level of moral development (Moral Maturity score) is .58. This general size of correlation is found within each grade level as well. The correlations between cognitive levels and moral levels for the 7th, 9th, and 11th grade  $\underline{Ss}$ are .58, .49, and .66, respectively, thus confirming a moderate trend for attainment of higher moral levels with higher cognitive levels.

However, as Maccoby (1968) notes, certain social-structural variables are also related to progression through the stages of moral

development. The suggestion in Kohlberg's theory of identification is that the major difference between children from different social classes is not that they acquire different values but that the rate of progress through the stages differs. Kramer (1968) found this to be the case in his study of adolescents and young adults. When <u>S</u>s in our sample are dichotomized in High and Low groups based on parents' jobs and educational levels (socio-economic level<sup>12</sup>), a two-way ANOVA on Moral Maturity scores (Table 10) confirms main effects for both grade (age) and socio-economic level without any significant interaction. In all cases, the mean Moral Maturity score for the High socio-economic <u>S</u>s is higher than that for the Low socio-economic <u>S</u>s.

## Value system stability

The Rokeach Value Survey was administered twice to each  $\underline{S}$  at a three week interval to ascertain the stability of each  $\underline{S}$ 's value rankings. For both the terminal and instrumental values, Spearman rho correlations were computed between the time-one and time-two rankings. For the entire sample (N=78), the median stability coefficients (rho) are .712 for terminal value systems and .673 for the instrumentals.<sup>13</sup> The correlation (r) between terminal and instrumental value system stability is .477.

As with Moral Maturity scores, mean value system stability coefficients were compared across grade levels and socio-economic levels. These ANOVA's are summarized in Table 11 (terminal stabilities) and Table 12 (instrumental stabilities), indicating that grade level (age) has a significant effect on both terminal and instrumental value system stability. The mean stability coefficients for both terminal and instrumental value

Table 10. Analysis of Variance on Moral Maturity Scores for EntireSample by Grade and Socio-economic Level.

Source	df	MS	F	Р
Socio-economic				
level (A)	1	1030.4	11.88	<.005
Grade (B)	2	500.9	5.78	<.005
АХВ	2	136.6	1.57	n.s.
Within cell	72	86.7	-	-
Table 11. Analysis of Variance on Terminal Value System Stability Coefficients (rho) for Entire Sample by Grade and Socioeconomic Level.

Source	df	MS	F	Р
Socio-economic				
Level (A)	1	.0025	.06	n.s.
Grade (B)	2	.1341	3.31	<.05
АХВ	2	.1109	2.73	n.s.
Within cell	72	.0405	-	-

Fable 12.	Analysis of Variance on Instrumental Value System Stability
	Coefficients (rho) for Entire Sample by Grade and Socio-
	economic Level.

Source	df	MS	F	P
Socio-economic				
le <b>ve</b> l (A)	1	.056	1.29	n.s.
Grade (B)	2	.192	4.46	<.05
AXB	2	.001	0.02	n.s.
Within cell	72	.043	-	-

1-4 systems show consistent increases as grade level increases (Figure 3). The main effect of socio-economic level and the interaction effect were nonsignificant for both terminal and instrumental stabilities. (Tables 1.H & 2.H in Appendix H list mean stability coefficients for all cells in a Stage X Grade table).

In Hl. I predicted that value system stabilities would increase with increasing moral development. Figure 3 indicates stability increases with age. Figure 4 indicates a similar pattern of increasing stability over stages of moral development. The general trend is for higher value system stability to be related to higher stages of moral reasoning. However, since the higher moral stages occur more frequently at the higher grade levels, a two-way ANOVA was run to determine the main effects of stage and grade and interaction effects, if any. For these analyses, only Ss at stages 2, 3 and 4 were retained in order to eliminate empty cells (there are no stage-1 Ss in the eleventh grade and no stage-5 Ss in the ninth grade). Tables 13 and 14 summarize the ANOVA's for the terminal and instrumental stabilities. As may be seen with this restricted sample, the main effect of grade on the terminal stabilities is no longer significant (as it was in Table 11 which utilized all 78 Sa). More importantly for H1, the main effect of stage of development is nonsignificant for both terminal and instrumental value systems. This tends to disconfirm H1 and to rather suggest that value system stability is most strongly related to differences in chronological age which, in turn, suggests that such factors as reading ability, vocabulary size, familiarity with value terms, and the like may be influencing the stability of the value rankings rather than any underlying intrinsic value instability



Figure 3. Mean Value System Stability Coefficients (rho) by Grade Level.

,



Figure 4. Mean Value System Stability Coefficients (rho) by Stage of Moral Development.

Table 13. Analysis of Variance on Terminal Value System Reliabilities by Stage (2, 3, & 4) and Grade.

Source	df	MS	F	P
Stage (A)	2	.068	1.86	n.s.
Grade (B)	2	.063	1.73	n.s.
AXB	4	.019	0.52	n.s.
Within cell	55	.036	-	-

Source	df	MS	F	р
 Stage (A)	2	.051	1.41	<b>D.8</b> .
Grade (B)	2	.123	3.37	<.05
AXB	4	.014	0.38	n.s.
Within cell	55	.036	-	-

Table 14. Analysis of Variance on Instrumental Value System Reliabilities by Stage (2, 3, &4) and Grade.

specifically related to developmental stage of moral reasoning.

Likewise, H2 is disconfirmed in that the relationship between stage of moral development and value system stability is not stronger for the instrumental value system with its moral values than for the terminal value system. This suggests that the moral values of the Value Survey are not being differentially responded to at the different stages of moral development.

In H3, it was predicted that these moral values would differentiate among individuals at the different moral stages more strongly than would the non-moral instrumental values. As a measure of a value's ability to differentiate among various stage groups, the Kruskal-Wallis H statistic was used as a descriptive index of the degree to which the moral groups differentially ranked the value. The more stage-groups differed in their rankings, the larger  $\underline{H}$  becomes. If these H's for each instrumental value are then rank ordered from largest to smallest, a Mann-Whitney U statistic may be derived to test the null hypothesis that the rank sums of the moral and non-moral value Hs do not differ. If the moral values are differentially ranked by the stage-groups more so than the non-moral values, the  $\underline{H}$ 's for the moral values should be consistently larger, resulting in a significant U. For the entire sample and for each grade individually a  $\underline{U}$ was derived. In none of these four tests was the U significant (the U for the largest difference in the predicted direction was 25, which is not significant at the .05 level) and the rank sum differences were in the predicted direction only in two of the four cases. Thus H3 was not confirmed.

## Value Structure and Value Content

The structure of an individual's level of moral reasoning has implications for the content of the individual's values. Thus, we predicted that the content of our culturally homogeneous sample would be related to stage of moral reasoning and that, in some cases, value peaks could be predicted. The more general relationship between structure and content is predicted in H4.1, which suggests that for individuals who share a common culture, there will be more value similarity within moral development stages than between stages and that the pattern of value similarity will reflect the moral development sequence. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to determine the extent of value similarity between each and every S and then to determine the average value similarity among Ss within each stage and between stages. If rho correlations are used as indices of terminal and instrumental value system similarity between Ss, we would expect highest correlations between Ss at the same stage of development and increasingly lower correlations between Ss at increasingly distant stages. Thus, a matrix of the average value system (either terminal or instrumental) correlations (rho) between and among Ss at various stages of development should show decreasing correlations as we move away from the diagonal. Since our interest is in stage-related value similarity as opposed to ageor grade-related similarity, we will test H4.1 at each of the three grade levels independently.

The first question to answer is whether the <u>S</u>s at each moral stage are ranking the values independently or whether they are using similar standards to rank the values. A Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W)

was computed as a measure of both terminal and instrumental value system similarity for each moral stage group at each grade level. Each <u>W</u> was tested under the null hypothesis that the <u>n</u> sets of value rankings were independent. A significant <u>W</u> indicates that the <u>S</u>s are, to an extent, using the same standard in ranking the 18 values. Table 15 summarizes this analysis.

Tables 16, 17, and 18 contain the matrices of average terminal value system correlations between and among <u>Ss</u> at the various stages of moral development for each of the three grade levels. Likewise, Tables 19, 20, and 21 show average instrumental value system correlations.

The significance tests in Table 15 indicate that  $\underline{S}s$  at each stage (exceptions in eleventh grade sample noted) are applying similar standards in the ranking of the terminal and instrumental values. However, our specific hypothesis related to the matrix patterns is strongly disconfirmed. Not only are the values of  $\underline{S}s$  at a given stage often more similar to the values of  $\underline{S}s$  at different stages than to the values of same-stage fellows, but also this similarity often <u>increases</u> as the distance between stages increases. The hypothesized pattern is evident only for the instrumental values among the seventh grade  $\underline{S}s$ , (Table 19) with only one cell not in the predicted direction. However, we must conclude that the developmental dimension of moral reasoning is not evident in the global measure of value system content similarity derived from the Value Survey. That is to say that  $\underline{S}s$  in our sample do not show a reliable indication of value similarity based on stage of moral development.

Table 15. Kendall Coefficient of Concordance,  $\underline{W}_{,}^{a}$  for Each Moralstage group at Each Grade Level at time-1.

				Stage			
			1	2	3	4	5
1	1	Terminal Instrumental	-	.24 <b>**</b> .23 <b>*</b>	.37 <b>***</b> .24 <b>**</b>	.23 .28	.40 <b>**</b> .24
Grade	9	Terminal Instrumental	-	.32 <b>***</b> .19 <b>**</b>	.30 <b>*</b> .32 <b>**</b>	.34 <b>**</b> .33 <b>**</b>	
	7	Terminal Instrumental	.34 <b>**</b> .33 <b>**</b>	.30*** .27***	.27 <b>*</b> .47 <b>***</b>	-	-

 $a_{\underline{W}}$  is a linear function of the average rho correlation among each set of rankings.

\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Table 16. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Terminal Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 1, 2, and 3 in Grade 7.

			Stage	
		1	2	3
n==		6	10	6
	1	.21		
tage	2	.24	.22	
0	3	.22	.18	.13

Table 17. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Terminal Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 2, 3, and 4 in Grade 9.

		Stage						
		2	3	4				
n=		12	6	6				
	2	.26						
tage	3	.15	.16					
Ñ	4	.07	.24	.21				

Table 18. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Terminal Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Grade 11.

	Stage								
		2	3	4	5				
n=		8	8	5	5				
	2	.13							
0 10 10	3	.17	.28						
Sto	4	.14	.08	.04					
	5	.20	.24	.07	.25				

Table 19. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Instrumental Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 1, 2, and 3 in Grade 7.

	Stage						
			1	2	3		
			6	10	6		
	•	1	.20				
	tage	tage	2	.11	.19		
	•.	3	.06	.25	.36		

Table 20. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Instrumental Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 2, 3, and 4 in Grade 9.

				Stage	
			2	3	4
	n=		12	6	6
	പ പ	2	.12		
	S La g	3	.19	.18	
-		4	.13	.22	.20

Table 21. Average Correlations (rho) of Time-1 Instrumental Value Systems Between and Among <u>S</u>s at Stages 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Grade 11.

	Stage							
		2	3	4	5			
<b>n=</b>		8	8	5	5			
	2	.12						
e e	3	.17	.13					
Sta	4	.14	.16	.10				
	5	.14	.18	.22	.08			

This failure of H4.1 to be confirmed may be attributable to a number of possible factors. One possibility is that the Ss are responding to the Value Survey not according to their own value preferences but rather according to what they think they ought to value. That is, the values may be being perceived by the Ss as cultural norms or imperatives and they are ranking them in order of perceived social desirability. Then, to the extent the Ss perceive the same cultural value norms, they will tend to rank the value labels in the same way. Another possibility is that the structural aspects of moral reasoning are not, contrary to Kohlberg's implication, strongly related to specific value content even in a homogeneous group. A third possibility is found in Rokeach's notion that values related to morality are but a subset of the instrumental values and thus similarity in value content among the stages is related only to this subset. In this case, the global measure of value system similarity used in the preceding analysis may be "washing out" moral value similarity with the inclusion of the additional, unrelated values. We found previously that the moral values specified by Rokeach do not, in fact, seem to be discriminating among the stages better than the non-moral values, suggesting that an analysis of the moral values alone would not result in a different conclusion. However, value predictions under H4.2 include seven terminal and seven instrumental out of the 36 values, suggesting a subset of morally related values but a subset different from those suggested by Rokeach.

If the notion that the stage-typical ethical theories of the Kohlberg typology speak only to a subset of the values in the Value Survey, then the ineffectiveness of the global similarity measure is not inconsistent. However, the specific predictions of H4.2 must be

demonstrably accurate if we are to conclude that value content is, indeed, predictable from the underlying structural variation.

In H4.2, I specifically predicted at what stage or stages a particular value would be most highly ranked. Only fourteen values (7 terminal and 7 instrumental) from the Value Survey were directly related to the moral judgment concept of Kohlberg.

Table 18 and Table 19 contain the value peak predictions (originally given in Table 1 and Table 2) as well as the actual value peaks as they occurred in my sample. The correctness of each value peak prediction is contained in Tables 22 and 23. The more general question which needs answering is that of the overall success of my predictions. If we assume that each prediction is independent of the others and that there is an equal probability associated with guessing a peak correctly by chance, we may determine the probability associated with making as many or more correct predictions by chance.<sup>14</sup> If this probability is small, we may reject the null hypothesis that chance alone is working and feel reasonably confident that, given knowledge of moral stages, our ability to predict value peaks is enhanced.

For purposes of getting the best estimate of value medians for the entire sample, time-1 and time-2 value rankings were combined and grand median ranks computed for each value for each stage-typical group. Table 24 presents the data on correct peak predictions and the probabilities associated with getting as many or more correct by chance if p(correct) = .2. These probabilities indicate that we may reject the hypothesis that p(correct) = .2 in favor of the alternative, p(correct) > .2. That is, our ability to predict value peaks given stage of moral development is considerably better than chance.

Table 22. Predicted Value Peaks and Actual Value Peaks (time-1 & time-2 combined) Across Stages of Moral Development for Entire Sample (N=78).



\* = predicted value peak(s).

O = actual value peak(s).

Table 23. Predicted Value Peaks and Actual Value Peaks (time-1 only) Across Stages of Moral Development for EAch Grade Level.



\* = predicted value peak(s).
() = actual value peak(s).

Table 24. Number of Correct Value Peak Predictions in Table 22 and the Associated Binomial Probability Where the Probability of a correct prediction is 1/5.

Prediction	Number of Predictions	Number Correct	р
Terminal	7	4	<.05
Instrumental	7	4	<.05
Combined	14	8	<.003

Here, as before, an age factor is correlated with stage of development so that our stage predictions are, to a degree, age predictions. For this reason, peaks were predicted within each grade level separately in Table 2. Table 25 summarizes the probabilities associated with the correct predictions in Table 23. When age is controlled, it is apparent that our predictive ability is somewhat diminished. The major predictions hold up well for the ninth grade Ss, somewhat less well for the seventh grade  $\underline{S}s$ , and almost not at all for the eleventh grade Ss. However, H4.2 is generally supported by the data. The failure of our predictions to hold up strongly in the eleventh grade sample may be partly explained in Tables 18 and 21. Note that the three concordance coefficients which failed to achieve significance are in the eleventh grade sample (stage 4 terminal and instrumental and stage 5 instrumental). These low average intercorrelations were not sufficiently large enough to allow us to reject the hypothesis of independent value ranking for the Ss at these stages. Obviously, as group value similarity decreases, it becomes more difficult to predict accurately. In a similar vein, the partial failure of our predictions in the seventh grade instrumental values may well be the result of the fact that five of the seven major peak predictions are for the highest stage (3). It should be apparent that the ranking procedure used in the Value Survey does not allow for measures of absolute value but rather for relative rank order. Thus, if some values are to be ranked higher, other values must assume the lower ranks. So, perhaps it would be unlikely that stage 3 Ss would rank all the predicted values higher than the other stages.

Table 25.Number of Correct Value Peak Predictions within Each Grade<br/>(Table 23) and the Associated Binomial Probabilities.

				Grade	e		
		7		9		11	
	p(correct) =	1/3		1/3		1/4	
Prediction	Number of Predictions	Number Correct	: P	Numbe Corre	er ect P	Numbe Corre	r ct <sup>p</sup>
Terminal	7	5	<.05	6	<.05	3	n.s.
Instrumental	7	3	n.s.	5	<.05	2	n.s.
Combined	14	8	<.06	11	<.001	5	n.s.

The support received for H4.2 suggests that the Value Survey is, in fact, tapping value content differences related to the underlying structure of an individual's development stage of moral reasoning. This support of H4.2, while H4.1 was not supported, lends credence to the idea that moral judgments are related to a particular subset of values. However, as has already been noted, it is not just the moral instrumental values (which Rokeach cites) which are strongly related to moral judgmental dimensions.

To further pursue this question of the moral values and to gain more insights into the relationship between values and moral development, additional analysis of the value data was carried out. This further analysis relates to the ability of the Value Survey to discriminate among individuals at the various stages of moral development. We have seen that relative value peaks can be predicted among the stages, but this says nothing about the absolute value differences between individuals at the various stages. Given the relatively small sample and the cultural homogenity of the sample, we would anticipate a high degree of value similarity. However, the individual differences implied by the moral judgmental differences require the Value Survey be able to discriminate among the various stages if it is, in fact, tapping structural developmental differences and not just knowledge of cultural value labels.

At this point, it is important to recall the general exploratory nature of this work so that our following analysis of the Value Survey responses are not misinterpreted. As Bakan (1966) relates, Berkson suggested that, given a sufficiently large <u>N</u>, almost any division of

subjects will result in chi-squares sufficiently large so that the probability will be small beyond any usual limit of significance. Thus, in this work, given enough subjects, we would find that each and every value discriminates among <u>Ss</u> at different stages or grades at a statistically significant level. For this reason, my intent is not to "prove" or "disprove" that the Value Survey discriminates among the <u>Ss</u> but rather my purpose is to determine how well the Value Survey discriminates among various age and developmental levels.

The specific generalizability of the finding in this study is limited by the restricted nature of the sample. However, this restriction also has the effect of minimizing value differences among the  $\underline{S}s$ , thereby making the Value Survey's task more difficult. Thus, the significant findings are indicating robust relationships within our sample which would be magnified by a more heterogeneous sample. Also age-related differences which are found would be more readily interpretable as age-related in that cultural and intellectual variation is well matched among the three age groups.

To measure the ability of the Value Survey to discriminate among the age and stage groups, the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (Siegal, 1956) was used to indicate what values were being ranked in systematically different ways across ages and stages. It is my intent to use the <u>H</u> statistic and its associated probability as a descriptive statistic since as the rank order differences between groups become larger, the <u>H</u> increases and <u>p</u> decreases. Although a strict usage of the probability level would allow only the making of inferences to the populations from which our samples are drawn, the relationship between

the probability and sample differences makes it a useful descriptive statistic. Thus, a smaller  $\underline{p}$  for value X than for value Y indicates a greater amount of systematic rank order differences among the groups for value X than for value Y.

For descriptive purposes, it was decided that a p < .10 indicated a difference in rank order of sufficient size to suggest that strong group differences in value rank actually existed in our sample.

To evaluate value differences among the three age levels, it was decided that there were systematic value rank differences in our sample if the Kruskal-Wallis <u>H</u> for any value had a p < .10 for <u>both</u> time 1 <u>and</u> time 2 <u>or</u> a combined analysis resulted in p < .05. A difference which occurred once might or might not be due to chance, so the retest with the Value Survey allowed us to check if time 1 differences were replicable. Thus, large differences (p < .10) which occurred at both time 1 and time 2 are less likely to be random sample differences. Also a reliable difference in value rankings might, by chance, fail to meet our criterion of p < .10 at one of the administrations. So that a value was not overlooked for such a reason, a probability less than .05 associated with value differences in a combined analysis was taken to indicate non-random robust value differences.

If the combined analysis resulted in p <.01, this large group difference was considered at least as strong a discrimination as the criterion of p <.10 over both administrations. Given the nonindependence of the two administrations, this criterion actually is more stringent. Table 26 indicates those terminal and instrumental values which best differentiate among the <u>S</u>s in the three grades.

erminal erminal RAMLY SECURITY SOCIAL RECOGNITION         Main.         Rnk.         Rnk	FAMILY SECURITY <sup>b</sup> 4.0 3 SOCIAL RECOGNITION 12.2 15	Grade 9	Grø	lde 11	
Erminal         FMHLX SECURITY         4.0         3         7.0         4           FAMILY SECURITY         4.0         3         7.0         4           SOCIAL RECOGNITION         12.2         15         14.6         15         7.0         4           Nature Love         12.3         16         10.5         11         15         17         16         9.0         8           A Sense of Accomplishment         11.1         11         11         12.2         11.1         11.0         12.8         16         9.0         8           A Sense of Accomplishment         11.1         11.1         11.0         12         11.0         12         11.0         12         11.0         12         11.0         12         11.0         12 <th colspa="&lt;/th"><th>FAMILY SECURITY<sup>b</sup> 4.0 3 SOCIAL RECOGNITION 12.2 15</th><th>Mdn. Ri</th><th>nk. Mdn</th><th>Rnk.</th></th>	<th>FAMILY SECURITY<sup>b</sup> 4.0 3 SOCIAL RECOGNITION 12.2 15</th> <th>Mdn. Ri</th> <th>nk. Mdn</th> <th>Rnk.</th>	FAMILY SECURITY <sup>b</sup> 4.0 3 SOCIAL RECOGNITION 12.2 15	Mdn. Ri	nk. Mdn	Rnk.
Social RECOGNITION       12.2       15       14.8       18       15.8       18         Salvation <sup>C</sup> 10.5       8       10.5       11       15.3       17         Mature Love       12.3       16       10.2       10       9.0       8         Instrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         Intrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       7.3       4         Intrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       7.3       4         Internation       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4       7.7       5       4.7       7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       6	SOCIAL RECOGNITION 12.2 15	7_8	2 <sup>°</sup> C	4	
Salvation <sup>c</sup> 10.5       8       10.5       11       15.3       17         Mature Love       12.3       16       10.2       10       9.0       8         Mature Love       12.3       16       10.2       10       9.0       8         A Sense of Accomplishment       11.1       11       11       8.5       8       11.0       12         Interval       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16       9.5       9         Indertal       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13.0       18       9.5       9       9       5       9       9       5       9       16       7.3       4       7       2       4/7       2       8       6       7.7       2       4/7       2       4/7       7       3       11       10.7       11       7.3       4       7       7       3       11.3       13       13       11       7       3       11.3       13       11       3       11       3       11       3       11       3       11       3       11       3       11       3       3       3       3		14.8	18 15.8	18	
Mature Love       12.3       16       10.2       10       9.0       8         Intumental       11.1       11       11       8.5       8       11.0       12         Intrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         Internal       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       5         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       15       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       11.8       16       9.1       9.1       9.1	Salvation <sup>c</sup> 10.5 8	10.5	11 15.3	17	
A Sense of Accomplishment       11.1       11       11       8.5       8       11.0       12         istrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         INDEPENDENT       12.5       17       13.0       18       9.5       9         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11	Mature Love 12.3 16	10.2	10 9.0	8	
istrumental       CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         LOGICAL       14.3       17       13.0       18       9.5       9         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14,4       11.5       15       8.2       6       7.1       3       13         Forgiving       6.5       6       7.1       3       11.3       13       13       13       13       13       13       14       11.5       15       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       5       6       7.7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7       7 <t< td=""><td>nse of Accomplishment 11.1 11</td><td>8.5</td><td>8 11.(</td><td>0 12</td></t<>	nse of Accomplishment 11.1 11	8.5	8 11.(	0 12	
CLEAN       6.2       2       11.5       13       12.8       16         IOGICAL       14.3       17       13.0       18       9.5       9         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6       7.7       5         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11       8       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       13       11.8       16       9.1       8       9.1       8       9.1	ntal				
IOGICAL       14.3       17       13.0       18       9.5       9         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       11.8       16       9.1       8       9.1       8	CLEAN 6.2 2	11.5	13 12.6	3 16	
INDEPENDENT       12.5       15       10.7       11       7.3       4         Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Responsible       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       13       13       9.1       8.1       6       11.8       16       9.1       8	LOGICAL 14.3 17	13.0	18 9.5	6 9	
Responsible       8.2       8       6.3       2       4.7       2         Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Loving       6.5       6       7.1       3       11.3       13         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       13       11.8       16       9.1       8	INDEPENDENT 12.5 15	10.7	11 7.5	3 4	
Self-controlled       10.8       10       8.7       6       7.7       5         Loving       6.5       6       7.1       3       11.3       11.8       10.7       11       8.2       6       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11       8       10.7       11       8       10.7       11       8       9.1       8       10.7       11       8 <td>Responsible 8.2 8</td> <td>6.3</td> <td>2 4.7</td> <td>1 2</td>	Responsible 8.2 8	6.3	2 4.7	1 2	
Loving       6.5       6       7.1       3       11.3       13         Broadminded       12.1       14       11.5       15       8.2       6         Forgiving       7.7       7       9.3       8       10.7       11         Capable       11.3       13       13       11.8       16       9.1       8	Self-controlled 10.8 10	8.7	6 7.7	5	
Broadminded 12.1 14 11.5 15 8.2 6 Forgiving 7.7 7 9.3 8 10.7 11 Capable 11.3 13 11.8 16 9.1 8	Loving 6.5 6	7.1	3 11.5	3 13	
Forgiving 7.7 7 9.3 8 10.7 11 Capable 11.3 13 11.8 16 9.1 8	Broadminded 12.1 14	11.5	15 8.2	9	
Capable 11.3 13 11.8 16 9.1 8	Forgiving 7.7 7	9.3	8 10.7	7 11	
	Capable 11.3 13	11.8	16 9.1	8	
Polite 8.7 9 9.5 9 11.9 15	Polite 8.7 9	9.5	9 11.6	15	

<sup>c</sup> Lower case values: for Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA, p < .05 at combined analysis.

For our sample, <u>family security</u> and <u>social recognition</u> are the two terminal values which differentiate among age levels best. While <u>family security</u> remains fairly highly valued over all ages, there is a decided drop between seventh and ninth grades. <u>Social recognition</u>, although relatively low in the seventh grade, continues to drop off in later grades.

Of the instrumental values, <u>clean</u>, <u>logical</u>, and <u>independent</u> seem to reflect age differences best. <u>Clean</u> shows a sharp decline as age increases, dropping from second for seventh graders to sixteenth for eleventh graders. <u>Logical</u> shows a sharp rise, from 18th to 9th, from the ninth to eleventh grade. <u>Independent</u> shows a steady increase across the three age groups, going from 15th to 11th to 4th in importance as age increases.

Less strongly, age-related increases occur with <u>mature love</u>, <u>responsible</u>, <u>self-controlled</u>, <u>broadminded</u>, and <u>capable</u>; age-related decreases occur with <u>salvation</u>, <u>forgiving</u>, <u>loving</u>, and <u>polite</u>. The strongest curvilinear trend occurs with <u>a sense of accomplishment</u>, which rises from 11th to 8th in the ninth grade and drops off to 12th in the eleventh grade.

The value rankings of the <u>S</u>s were then analyzed by means of the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance technique according to their stage of moral development. The same criteria for determining reliable value differences between groups were maintained: a strong, reliable difference was to be inferred if p < .10 for <u>both</u> time 1 and time 2 value rankings or p < .01 for the combined analysis; a somewhat less strong and reliable difference was inferred if p < .05 for the combined analysis.

Table 27 summarizes these findings.

Where linear trends for median or rank differences seemed to be the rule across ages (Table 26), the pattern across stages has become somewhat more complex. As our specific value peak predictions in Table 1 and Table 2 made clear, simple linear increases or decreases in value rankings across the stages of moral reasoning were not anticipated. <u>Freedom</u>, for example, is ranked 1st by the first two stages, drops off somewhat at stages 3 and 4, then returns to 1st rank at stage 5.

Looking at Table 27 in context of our previous findings, one terminal value, freedom, and one instrumental value, obedient, stand out. Not only do these two values discriminate best among the Ss at different stages of development, they discriminate in a way consistent with the moral development typology. In Table 22, the combined time 1 time 2 value data, freedom was correctly predicted to peak at stages 2 and 5 and <u>obedient</u> was correctly predicted to peak at stages 1 and 4.<sup>15</sup> When the value data for each grade level and each time is separately considered, there are six opportunities to predict peaks (one peak prediction for Ss at each of the three grade levels for both time 1 and time 2) for each value. Table 23 shows the within-grade peak predictions for <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> were correct at two of the three grade levels at time 1. Time 2 data (not shown) indicates that the predictions for freedom and obedient were correct at all three levels. Thus, freedom and obedient not only strongly differentiate among Ss at the various stages of moral development, they differentiate in a consistent, reliable manner over all Ss or for Ss within each grade. These two values will be considered in more detail later in this section.

ies Which Differentiate Best Among Ss at	
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		8	3	0	2	0	1	4		6
	Mdn.	Rank								
<u>[erminal</u> b							1			
FREEDOM	3.2	-1	3.0	1	5.2	2	5.7	m	2.0	-1
INNER HARMONY	12.8	13	13.5	17	10.8	10	9.2	10	11.5	12
Salvation <sup>c</sup>	7.5	2	13.2	16	11.5	13	6.5	4	17.6	18
National Security	8.5	7	10.9	10	11.5	12	14.5	18	5.5	S
Self-respect	11.0	11	13.1	15	11.8	14	11.7	15	8.0	80
A World of Beauty	9.5	6	8.8	80	13.5	17	0.0	6	13.5	14
[nstrumental										
OBEDIENT	10.0	10	13.1	16	12.8	16	8.8	9	16.5	18
Ambitious	10.0	11	7.5	Ś	4.5	2	8.5	Ś	9.9	6
Forgiving	6.5	4	9.3	10	7.5	4	11.5	13	10.0	11

 $\frac{Or}{C} \quad p < .01 \quad for \quad combined \ analysis.$ 

## Age-related and Stage-related Value Differences

Table 26 and Table 27 present an interesting picture when considered together. Only two values, <u>salvation</u> and <u>forgiving</u>, appear on both lists as values which discriminate well among both age-groups and moral stagegroups. The remaining values differentiate among <u>Ss</u> strongly on only one of the variables. This implies that even though there is a strong correlation between age and developmental level of moral reasoning, the values which define age and stage differences do so independently. Obviously, such a statement requires statistical support which, unfortunately, is not forthcoming.<sup>16</sup>

The age-related value differences also give rise to speculation that there is a developmental pattern of value change related to interpersonal behavior which is distinct from the moral judgmental dimension of Kohlberg. Note in Table 26 that five of the seven instrumental values which (in Table 1) were thought to be related to the moral dimension (responsible, self-controlled, loving, broadminded, and forgiving) discriminate well among different age <u>Ss</u>. Only one, <u>forgiving</u>, also discriminates well among stage-groups. The other four values are among the least-best stage-group discriminators of the instrumental values.

These findings generally suggest that values are more a product of the sub-culture of age group than of the underlying structural variation which the Kohlberg typology is so intimately related. Thus, Kohlberg's own suggestion that the value content for individuals below his post-convention stages is largely culture-bound is given some support. However, as Tables 22 and 23 indicated, predictable value variation occurs across the stages of moral development when the cultural variation is at

a minimum. In another culture, predictable value variation should also be found, but the specific values involved might or might not be the same as we found. Additionally, we would predict that <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> would consistently vary with stage of moral development across cultures although their relative overall ranks would vary from culture to culture.

A word must be said about <u>salvation</u> and <u>forgiving</u>, which are the two values which are ranked discriminably different by both stage and age groups. Considering that Rokeach (1969) found <u>salvation</u> and <u>forgiving</u> to be the most distinctively Christian values in a representative sample of adult Americans, it is not surprising that children growing up in the culture would show difference on these values as they develop. Neither is it surprising that the moral dimension would also show distinctions on these values. It is here that the interaction between stage and age might be most revealing. It should be noted that the hypothesized relationship between stage of moral reasoning and value ranking was as reliable for <u>salvation</u> (see Table 22 and Table 23) as any value. The predicted peaks for <u>salvation</u> were correct for the combined analysis and for the time-1 within-grade analyses.

We should also note in Table 27 that <u>inner harmony</u> discriminates strongly among <u>S</u>s on the moral development dimension. Initially, there seemed to be little to suggest that <u>inner harmony</u> was a value which would reflect the structural variation found in Kohlberg's schema. However, following the median ranks across the stages of moral development, it appears that the pattern for <u>inner harmony</u> is much like that for <u>obedient</u>. Also for both the time 1 and time 2 data, there is a

significant (p <.05 one-tailed) correlation between <u>inner harmony</u> and <u>obedient</u>. These correlations are not large  $(r_1=.2051; r_2=.2226)$  but support the suggestion that <u>obedient</u> and <u>inner harmony</u> tend to be related to the moral judgmental dimension in a similar manner. <u>Inner</u> <u>harmony</u>, while showing a general pattern across the stages similar to <u>obedient</u>, does not show the extreme variation of <u>obedient</u>. <u>Inner harmony</u> also tends to be more highly ranked by the conventional stages, 3 and 4, but without the severe drop at stage 5. The interpretation of <u>inner</u> <u>harmony</u> as a value reflecting some underlying structural variation is confounded by the lack of any consistency in the within-grade analyses. For grades seven, nine, and eleven, <u>inner harmony</u> peaks at stages 1, 4, and 2 respectively. This inconsistent pattern suggests that there may be some strong interaction between moral stage and age for these <u>Ss</u>.

## FREEDOM and OBEDIENT as Defining Moral Values

It was noted in the last section that <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> were not only the strongest, most reliable values for discriminating among <u>Ss</u> at the various stages of moral development, but these values also were the most predictable and consistent values related to the moral development typology. This suggests that, within the <u>Ss'</u> culture, the structural differences encountered in the development of moral reasoning are, to significant extent, reflecting an individual's value of <u>freedom</u> as a desirable end-state of existence and his valuing of <u>obedient</u> as a desirable mode of behavior.

It might be suspected that <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> are value-opposites and are tapping the two directions of a value continuum. Were this the

case, we would expect a significant negative correlation between <u>Ss'</u> ranking of <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u>. While the correlations between <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> for both time 1 and time 2 are negative, neither is sufficiently large to reject the hypothesis that the population correlation is zero.<sup>17</sup>

The median ranks for <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> across the stages of moral development (for the combined time 1-time 2 analysis) are given in Figure 5. For <u>freedom</u>, the grand median is 4.0 and for <u>obedient</u>, 12.0.

Recalling the stage-typical descriptions of Kohlberg's moral stages, it seems that <u>S</u>s at stage 1 would be the most likely to be responding to the values on the Value Survey as merely cultural labels and rules rather than as personal preferences. This is a result of the relative undifferentiated, unintegrated structure which, in moral matters, defers to the superior power. It is most difficult at this stage to say that an individual "has a value" in that value preferences are inextricably tied to the authority present in the situation. Since the value rankings took place within the school before an adult observer and the S identified himself on the Value Survey, we may assume that effects of acquiesence will be maximum at stage 1. The approval motive may be strong at stage 3 as well, thus further confounding the responses. However, it is assumed that these  $\underline{S}$ s will be ranking the values in a socially acceptable way to some degree. To the degree that socially desirable responses are given, the cultural homogeneity of the Ss will reduce stage-related response differences making the Value Survey's task that much more demanding. We have already seen valid stagerelated value differences occurring, assuring us that these children



Figure 5. Median Ranks for <u>Freedom</u> and <u>Obedient</u> by Stage of Moral Development (combined time-1 - time-2 analysis).
are not responding to the Value Survey with socially desirable responses only.

The high value of <u>freedom</u> at stage 1 is partly a response to a label highly valued by the culture and may be considered as a good estimate of the socially desirable response. Thus, deviations from this point may be thought to represent stage-typical value differences. <u>Obedient</u>, however, was predicted to peak at stage 1 (and at stage 4) not because the culture values <u>obedient</u> but because the stage-1 <u>S</u>'s morality is one of obedience to the power and authority.

Moving to stage 2, we find that one of <u>freedom</u>'s peaks was predicted for stage 2 due to the hedonistic orientation of the <u>S</u>s at this stage. The increase in median over stage 1 is very slight but it is nonetheless higher. Obviously, since <u>freedom</u> is already high at stage 1, there is little room to move upward and the median differences could not become too large in any event. However, while the median difference is slight, the percent of stage-2 <u>S</u>s ranking <u>freedom</u> first is twice that of stage-1 <u>S</u>s who rank <u>freedom</u> first (23% for stage 2; 12% for stage 1).

The higher ranking of <u>freedom</u> at stage 2 is coupled by a sharp drop in the median rank for <u>obedient</u>. Not only do the stage-2 hedonists value <u>freedom</u> more highly, their instrumental relativistic orientation reflects a relaxation over concerns with the consequences of rigid deference to authority found at stage 1.

At stage 3, this valuing of <u>obedient</u> is little changed from stage 2. However, <u>freedom</u> has taken a (relatively) sharp drop, falling over two full ranks. Given the strong cultural emphasis on <u>freedom</u> and the emphasis at this stage for being "nice" and maintaining approval by

showing loyalty and conformity to the established order, this drop in the median rank of <u>freedom</u> is an even more compelling indication that the label "freedom" is not being responded to in simply a sociallydesirable manner, but is being responded to, at least in part, as a personal standard reflecting the morality of this stage which, in stressing conformity and approval, de-emphasizes personal freedom.

The failure of <u>obedient</u> to rise much from the stage-2 level reflects this stage's concern with maintaining a friendly, flexible interpersonal concordance in moral matters rather than a rigid, strict rule orientation such as found at stage 4.

This stage-4 rigid rule orientation emphasizing doing one's duty and respect for and obedience to authority was predicted to reflect a high value for <u>obedient</u>. The data in Figure 5 confirms this. Of all the stages, <u>obedient</u> is ranked highest at stage 4. <u>Freedom</u> drops slightly as might be expected. The slightness of the drop may be due to the strong cultural influence which, in this sample, keeps <u>freedom</u> relatively high for all <u>Ss</u>.

The development of the child's morality from the conventional stage-4 morality to the autonomous principled level of stage-5 morality finally has polarization effect on these two values: <u>freedom</u> rises to its highest and <u>obedient</u> falls to its lowest. In fact, <u>freedom</u> now has the highest median rank (supplanting <u>a world at peace</u>) and <u>obedient</u>'s median is eighteenth in order (down from sixth in order at stage 4). These values are reflected in the stage-5 moral concern with individual rights and responsibility and an awareness that personal obligation, outside the legal sphere, is a result of freely entered agreement. The

emphasis is on democratic agreement in the legal sphere and on the individual's personal standard evaluated within a social-contract orientation. Thus, <u>freedom</u> for self and others is a primary prerequisite while the notion of unquestioned duty and respect for authority within the value <u>obedient</u> has become outmoded and useless.

Once again, with five of the six stage-5 <u>S</u>s in the eleventh grade, a strict stage-interpretation unconfounded with age is difficult. Sufficient numbers of stage-5 moralists at all grade levels would aid in our interpretation. However, the fact that our value peak predictions held up fairly well in the eleventh grade even without considering the stage-5 moralists suggests that stage of moral development is more strongly related to these value differences than age, although some interaction between stage and age would not be unlikely.

## Rank-difference Score

As Figure 5 indicates and the discussion above endeavored to point out, neither <u>freedom</u> nor <u>obedient</u> alone are as indicative of stage of moral development as when they are considered together. A simple measure which utilizes both value ranks was later devised to further simplify the analysis. The Rank-difference Score is a single number indicative of the distance between the ranks of <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u>.<sup>18</sup> Table 28 summarizes the mean Rank-difference Scores for the five stages and Table 29 summarizes an ANOVA on the Rank-difference Scores by stage and grade level. Only the main effect of stage of moral development is significant in this analysis.

The absence of any strong age-related effect on the Rank-difference Scores and the absence of any strong interaction effects gives further

Table 28. Means and Standard Deviations of Rank-Difference<sup>4</sup> Scores by Stage of Moral Development.

٦			
5	3	4	5
20	20	14	6
5.20	5.20	2.36	8.83
	6.25	6.52	7.84
		6.25	6.25 6.52

<sup>a</sup> Rank-Difference score = (rank of <u>obedient</u>) - (rank of <u>freedom</u>).

Table 29. Analysis of Variance on Rank-Difference<sup>a</sup> Scores by Stage<sup>b</sup> of Moral Development and Grade Level

Source	df	MS	F	P
Grade (A)	2	25.3	0.65	n.s.
Stage (B)	2	142.2	3.64	<.05
АХВ	4	25.5	0.65	n <b>.s</b> .
Within cell	55	39.1	-	•

<sup>a</sup> Rank-Difference score = (rank of <u>obedient</u>) - (rank of <u>freedom</u>).

<sup>b</sup> Ss at stages 2, 3, & 4 only included in this analysis.

support to the notion that <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> are values related to the moral development dimension. Even when all <u>Ss</u> are used in an analysis, the mean Rank-difference score for the ninth grade <u>Ss</u> (5.5) is well below that for both the seventh grade (6.5) and eleventh grade (6.9) <u>Ss</u>. Thus, there is not even a hint of any linear relationship between age and Rank-difference Score as might be anticipated.

From Table 28, we see that, in terms of Rank-difference Scores, stage 1 and stage 3 are similar and stage 2 and stage 5 are similar while stage 4 is quite unique. However, the similarity in Rank-difference Scores for stages 1 and 3 does not reveal the tendency for both <u>freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u> to be ranked lower at stage 3. Likewise, the Rank-difference similarity between stages 2 and 5 does not reveal the more extreme median positions of the two values at stage 5.

There are, then, both quantitative and qualitative differences among the stages of moral development for these two values. It undoubtedly would be possible to derive more elaborate and sophisticated methods for scoring value patterns which reflect and identify value aspects of such phenomena as structure of moral development. This, in fact, will be encouraged in the final section of this paper. However, it is sufficient for our purposes here to have explicated reliable and valid value components related to the underlying structure of moral reasoning. These more sophisticated and refined techniques will require samples more nearly suited to the purpose and considerably more subjects with which to work.

#### Summary of Hypotheses

Before moving to a final discussion, let us review the conclusions

related to the specific hypotheses.

- H1. Value system stability, contrary to this hypothesis, did not appear to show a strong linear increase with higher moral development. However, there was a strong indication that value system stability increases with age. A  $f_{\rm e}$  C  $_{\rm e}$   $F_{\rm e}$
- H2. Instrumental value system stability, contrary to this hypothesis, related less to stage of moral development than did terminal value system stability.
- H3. The moral values, identified by Rokeach as a subset of the instrumental values, did not, contrary to this hypothesis, differentiate better among Ss at different stages of moral development than did the non-moral instrumental values. La contract of the stages of the sta
- H4.1 Contrary to this hypothesis, a global measure of value system similarity did not reflect the pattern of moral development.
- H4.2 This hypothesis that the content of values may be predicted from the structural component within a given cultural context was strongly supported. Value peaks were predictable from stage of moral development and a number of values discriminated reliably among Ss at different stages. <u>Freedom</u> and <u>obedient</u>, especially, were related to moral development.

### DISCUSSION

Kohlberg (1968) makes the point that moral content or value for individuals at the preconventional or conventional levels (stages 1 through 4) is largely accidental or culture-bound. However, in the higher stages, "Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau and Martin Luther King tend to speak without confusion of tongues, as it were. This is because the ideal principles of any social structure are basically alike, if only because there simply aren't that many principles which are articulate, comprehensive and integrated enough to be satisfying to the human intellect (p. 30)."

Rokeach (1968), in his conceptualization of adult values, also suggests that there are only a limited number of means and ends which the individual holds and applies universally and consistently. In his definition of terminal and instrumental values, Rokeach makes clear that a "value" has application across situations, across individuals, across social systems, across objects. Thus, the values of Rokeach and the universal, comprehensive, consistent abstract principles which guide moral judgments at the post-conventional level (stages 5 and 6) of Kohlberg's typology function in remarkably similar ways. But, as Kohlberg implies in the quote at the beginning of this section, only a handful of men achieve the highest stages.

Rokeach's value definition does not deal with those individuals who are unable to say that they believe a particular mode of conduct is

universally preferable. With the Value Survey, the individual who, in one sense, has no values as defined by Rokeach is operationally forced to generate a value system of value terms which may be meaningless for him. The Kohlberg typology, with its structural dimension, readily identifies those individuals for whom such a concept as justice is not universally conceived nor applied. Thus, in populations of individuals who are at the Kohlberg's stage 5 or 6, the Value Survey would seem to be most valid for indicating differences in values which have universal application. For individuals at lower stages of development, the Value Survey might be seen as forcing them to order some value terms which, in fact, may not reflect consistent, universal, and comprehensive preferences within the individual's belief systems. These lower-stage individuals might be seen as responding to the value terms merely as cliches' and perceived social norms which have little personal reference or utility.

Given the conceptualization and operationalization of the value concept by Rokeach, the preceding argument against the validity of the Value Survey for those whose developmental stage of moral reasoning has not reached stages 5 or 6 is not untenable. The purpose of the research reported in this paper was to ascertain whether or not that argument was supported in practice.

I have concluded that the arguments above are not supported in practice. The Value Survey does tap developmental structural differences in moral reasoning across <u>all</u> the stages of the Kohlberg typology.

The nature of the value-ranking procedure, in that it generates a value system for an individual whether or not one actually exists,

obviously makes it impossible to determine where one group would systematically rank all or most of the values higher than another group. Such an occurrence is suggested in comparing value responses of stage-6 individuals to those of stage-2 individuals. The absolute degree of internalization of all the values theoretically could not be tapped by the ranking procedure (unless stability of rankings was related to degree of internalization as suggested in H1.).

The results of this work indicate, however, that even where we have apparently maximized the opportunities for minimal value differences, reliable value differences consistent with the complex underlying structural variation <u>do</u> occur. This indication of the validity (concurrent) of the Value Survey may not be interpreted to mean that the value differences found "explain" all or even much of the moral judgmental differences. The interpretation which is consistent with the findings is that certain values on the Value Survey validly reflect the structural dimension in the development of moral reasoning where other contaminating variables are reasonably controlled. Had our sample of 78 <u>Ss</u> been drawn from a large, urban, socially and ethnically mixed school system, the value variations related to other socio-cultural variables might be expected to "wash-out" the relatively small stage-related value variation.

Even though valid and reliable value differences have been found, the failure of some of our predictions raises further questions which this data does confront. For example, the failure of <u>equality</u> to peak for stage-5 <u>S</u>s in the eleventh grade and its failure to discriminate well among the various stage <u>S</u>s cannot be dismissed without concern for

the implications these failures may carry. Equality clearly is related to the moral development concept in theory and the discrepancies noted in this data should be further pursued in other studies in order to determine the age-stage interactions and the relationship of the value equality to the moral dimension both in children and adults in this and other cultures.

The generalization we make from the data is that the structural differences in moral reasoning existing in adults and children are identifiable in value terms. That is, judgments made by individuals in moral situations do refer to both terminal and instrumental values which the individual holds. In moral dilemmas, an individual makes a judgment about the good and the right of action based not only on his preferences about those specific modes of behavior but also on his preferences for desirable end-states of existence which may be affected by the action in question.

There is some factual as well as theoretical support for the suggestion the value concept as currently operationalized may not be maximally powerful for the younger adolescents or for groups with large numbers of preconventional moralists. While the Value Survey was tapping reliable and valid differences at these levels, they were not as overwhelming as the interview data would suggest they might be. A modification of the value terms specifically for use with these younger and less developed individuals might well result in more compelling and powerful results which cannot be obtained with the current set of "adult" values. The value ranking format, however, seems entirely adequate if large amounts of data are being sought. Complication of

the current format might not give additional results worth the additional time and cost involved in administering and scoring. As an example, Penner, Homant, and Rokeach (1968) found that the rankorder procedure compares favorably with the more laborious pairedcomparison method.

Although the moral judgmental dimension and the value dimension as currently operationalized cannot be viewed as isomorphic, there is reason to believe that the more complex, tedious, and expensive interview techniques required for assessing level of moral development might be supplanted, in some cases, by a value-ranking procedure. In adults, the Value Survey would appear to be already taking the structural variation into account. In children and adolescents, the particular value terms now in use may not be ideal for this purpose, but, as we have seen, are not insensitive to it.

Specific value differences found in our data may or may not be generalizable to the other sex, to other communities, to other races, or to other time periods.<sup>19</sup> The age-related value patterns (as opposed to the stage-related patterns) are particularly interesting and they may have implications for our educational and socialization practices. Further research to consider these aspects is encouraged.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1. The "behavior" in Havighurst and Taba (1949) is based on adult and peer ratings of  $\underline{S}$ 's character reputation rather than any observed behavioral criterion.
- 2. "A belief is any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase 'I believe that...'" (Rokeach, 1968, p. 113). A belief system, for Rokeach "represents the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the self. (123)"
- 3. An attitude, for Rokeach, is defined as "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner (1968, p. 112)."
- 4. Cf. Rokeach, 1968: "A value...is a standard or yardstick to guide actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations and justifications of self and others (p. 160)."
- 5. Maccoby (1968), in discussing Kohlberg's theory:

"If values are being internalized...should it not be true that they guide behavior? Should we not require that measures of moral judgment predict actual overt conformity, as a test of the validity of the moral-judgments analysis? Kohlberg recognizes the importance of the issues involved in the mesh between moral values and moral behavior. He does insist that moral judgments are of importance in their own right--that society cares not only about what an individual does but cares also about the nature of the moral judgments an individual is able to make concerning his own behavior and that of others. He points out that law requires that the individual shall be able to distinguish 'right from wrong' before he may be punished for a deviant act and that, furthermore, the law judges behavior in terms of the intent as well as the consequences of an individual's actions. Therefore, it is important to understand the development both of concepts of right and wrong and of the ability to judge on the basis of intentionality, even if these aspects of moral development are unrelated to overt deviant or conforming behavior in specific situations. For Kohlberg, morality itself is defined more by the cognitive contents of moral judgments than by individual items of behavior.

"Nevertheless, Kohlberg does concern himself with the correspondence between the two classes of phenomena...He cites evidence to show that there are low, but positive, correlations between the maturity of moral judgments and resistance to cheating, teachers' ratings of conscience, and teachers' ratings of fairness with peers. He notes, further, that maturity of moral judgments is associated with a child's ability to resist external pressure to commit an "immoral" action. Kohlberg's interest in conceptual development stems in part from his assumption that thought and action are not really separable, and hence he is impelled to search for instances in which one can be predicted from the other and to suspect that in cases of lack of correspondence the wrong thing has been measured (pp. 239-240)."

- 6. The "moral values" specified by Rokeach (1969) are: <u>clean</u>, <u>forgiving</u>, <u>helpful</u>, <u>honest</u>, <u>loving</u>, <u>obedient</u>, <u>polite</u>, <u>responsible</u>, and <u>self</u>-<u>controlled</u>. The remaining instrumental values are competence values except <u>courageous</u> and <u>cheerful</u>, which are indeterminate.
- 7. "One wants to say that what makes a moral situation moral must be some element in the situation, whatever it might be, which itself is uniquely moral. Like a human who is said by some to be human because he possesses a unique human soul, so a situation is supposed to be moral because it has some unique moral component (e.g., some quality, relation, rule) in it. But when we look for the alleged moral component and fail to find its "moral-ness" we are puzzled. We think perhaps we ought to look harder. And perhaps we should. We also perhaps ought to look at the model we are using to answer the question "What makes a moral situation moral?" A moral situation may be less like a human with a soul and more like, say, a lion. A lion is not normally thought of as a lion because it has lion parts, but the other way around; the parts are labelled lion parts because they are parts of a lion. Similarly it may be that a moral situation is not moral because of any one of its parts (e.g., rules) but because of the way the parts are put together as a whole. Thus the rule (or value judgment) cited in a moral situation may not be what makes the situation a moral one. Rather, the rule (or value judgment) cited may be treated as a moral rule (or value judgment) because it is cited in a moral situation. If the situation makes the rules and other parts of a situation moral and not the other way around, the task of the philosopher is not to look for the one moral "quality" or whatever, but rather to characterize those combinations of circumstances or aspects which make a situation a moral one. And this is just what this study is about. Just as the lion is composed of a series of parts no one of which is labelled "lion," so moral situations may best be thought of as having such "parts" as agents, actions, rules, patients, conditions, and value judgments -- no one of which can be labelled intrinsically moral (Fotion, 1968, pp. 47-48)."
- 8. In a cross-sectional developmental study, the passage of individuals through the stages of development over time is represented by the responses of different individuals at different stages at one time. The resulting responses are thought to represent the pattern of

movement that the construct being measured shows if the same individuals were measured at these various intervals. Thus, when "movement" of values in the hierarchy across ages or stages is alluded to, it should be recalled that this is an inference about a longitudinal pattern from the cross-sectional data.

With this in mind, value "peaks" refer to the developmental group in which a value reaches its highest average rank when compared to other groups. Thus, when <u>relative</u> to <u>Ss</u> at other stages of development, <u>Ss</u> at a given stage will be predicted to rank a value highest on the average, the value is said to "peak" at this given stage.

- 9. Each male student in the three grades was given a copy of the letter with parental request form to take home and was asked to return it the following day whether or not approval was given. One week later a second copy of the form with an additional cover letter was mailed to the parents of each child who had not returned the form asking them to sign it and have their son return it.
- 10. A few Ss were absent on one or the other test days. They were administered the Value Survey on the first day they returned to school. The longest test-retest interval for any S was three weeks, four days.
- Moral maturity (MM) scores are the sum of weighted situation score weights. As an example, the MM score for subject #30 = 26.

Situation Global Score	: III : 2(4)	IV 1(3)	I 2	VII 2(3)	Σ	Weighted ∑
1 2 3 5 6 6	2 1	2 1	3	2 1	2 7 2 1 -	2 14 6 4 -
-					•	∑=26=MM score

12. Socio-economic level was determined from Ss' reports of parental occupations and educational achievement. <u>High</u> socio-economic level (roughly "middle-class" and up) was inferred from such occupations as: professional or semi-professional; teacher; engineer; shop foreman; small business, sales, or skilled trades with some college education. Low socio-economic level (roughly "lower middle-class" and below) was inferred from such occupations as: small business, sales, or skilled trades with no college education; electrician; semi-skilled factor work; unskilled labor.

13. Rokeach reports the following test-retest median stability coefficients for samples of college students:

N=117; at 3 weeks: terminal = .78; instrumental = .72 N=100; at 7 weeks: terminal = .78; instrumental = .71.

- 14. These value peak predictions may be classed as a binomial experiment as there are <u>n</u> independent trials (predictions) with only two possible outcomes, 'correct' and 'incorrect' and we are interested in the number 'correct' in the <u>n</u> trials. However, p(correct) is not identical for each of the <u>n</u> trials because in some cases the <u>two</u> highest medians have been predicted and in the others, only the single highest median. Where (in Table 18) only one peak has been predicted, the chance p(correct)=1/5=.2. Where two peaks are predicted, p(both correct)=(2/5) (1/4)=.1. Thus, if for simplicity, we count each two-peak prediction as correct <u>only</u> if <u>both</u> peaks are correct, and consider this equivalent to a one-peak prediction with p(correct)=.2, we would actually overestimate the chance probability, making our statistical decision more conservative.
- 15. The chance probability of guessing correctly both peaks for either value is .10. The probability of getting all four correct by chance is .01. Even if the two stages at which one value peaks can be eliminated from consideration in predicting the peaks of the other value, the chances of guessing all four peaks correctly is only one out of thirty.
- 16. A non-parametric two-way ANOVA technique such as that outlined by Wilson (1956) would be useful for analyzing stage by age interaction. However, the cell n's in such an analysis would be of such a small order that any interpretation of the results would be dubious.
- 17. The correlations (r) between rank of <u>freedom</u> and rank of <u>obedient</u> are, for time 1: -.1749; for time 2: -.0252. The hypothesis  $p \ge 0$ may be tested with the <u>t</u> ratio:

t= 
$$\frac{r\sqrt{n-2}}{\sqrt{1-r^2}}$$
 with N-2 df (Mays, 1963).

For N=78,  $\propto$  =.05 (1-tailed), the critical value of <u>t</u>=1.67. The value of <u>t</u> associated with r= -.1749 is 1.55. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.

- 18. The Rank-difference Score is derived by subtracting the <u>S</u>'s rank for <u>freedom</u> on the terminal scale from his rank for <u>obedient</u> on the instrumental scale. Thus, Rank-difference Scores may range from +17 (<u>freedom</u> ranked 1 and <u>obedient</u> ranked 18) to -17 (<u>freedom</u> ranked 18 and <u>obedient</u> ranked 1).
- 19. An eyeball comparison of the value medians of my <u>S</u>s with the value means of 564 New York City Public School children at the same grade

levels (i.e., 7th, 9th, and 11th grades) reveals some interesting pattern similarities and differences. For example, <u>salvation</u>, in the Michigan sample (boys only) stays above rank 10 for 7th and 9th grades before dropping 17th, where it stayed consistently in the New York sample. The most striking comparison, however, seems to be general <u>similarity</u> in the developmental patterns of the New York City and Michigan samples. (The unpublished New York value data is the work of R. P. Beech and Aileen Schoeppe of New York University).

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#### APPENDIX A

## Definition of Kohlberg's Moral Stages

### I. Preconventional Level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural roles and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: <u>The punishment and obedience orientation</u>. Orientation toward punishment and unquestioning deference to superior power. The physical consequences of action regardless of their human meaning or value determine its goodness or badness.

Stage 2: <u>The instrumental relativist orientation</u>. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way.

### II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: <u>The interpersonal concordance or "good boy - nice girl"</u> <u>orientation</u>. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps other and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One seeks approval by being "nice."

# APPENDIX A - continued

Stage 4: <u>The "law and order" orientation</u>. Orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation. Generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement, and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and Constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen <u>ethical principles</u> appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical, (The Golden Rule, the categorical imperative) they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the <u>reciprocity</u> and <u>equality</u> of the human <u>rights</u>, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as <u>individual persons</u>.

Note: from Kohlberg, 1969.

## APPENDIX B

#### ASPECT LIST

Grouping I. The Categories

#### A. Prima-Facie Obligations

Aspect 1: <u>Extra-Legal or Moral Norms</u>. Ways of invoking and conceiving of rules, norms, and role-stereotypes. Aspect 1M: Metaethical issues about relativity of moral norms

and rules. Aspect 2: <u>Legal Norms</u>. Ways of invoking and defining legal norms.

- (Either explicitly or if norms about stealing, etc., are talked about in ways implying crime, police, etc.)
  - Aspect 2M: Metaethical issues about relation of morality to law. Issues of legitimacy of civil disobedience. (Aspect 22<sub>II</sub>: General reasons for making and keeping laws is listed under Grouping III as a value.)
    - B. Conceptions of Prima-Facie Rights

(These are all defined under Grouping III where each value aspect has a rights subaspect and a value subaspect.)

C. Conceptions of Dutiful Choice

- Aspect 3:Concept of "should" or "ought" for an actor in a choice<br/>situation involving a conflict between rules or<br/>between rules and the interest of self or of others.Aspect 3R:Obligation when have right not to fulfill obligations-<br/>the relation between rights and obligations.Aspect 3M:Metaethical issues about relativity of obligations.
  - D. Taking Responsibility

Aspect 4:	Limiting consequences and persons actor is responsible for.
Aspect 5:	Limiting autonomous choice by reliance on advice or compromise
	with others.
Aspect 6:	Accountability. Limiting accountability for (not) performing
-	an act because of ignorance, lack of self control, etc.

E. <u>Praising and Blaming-the Worth of Persons and</u> <u>Personal Actions</u>

## APPENDIX B - continued

Aspect 7: <u>Culpability or Blame</u>. Judgments of whether to blame someone as a person when he has violated a norm or obligation. (Aspect 8: Praise and Admiration.)

F. Meting Out punishment and Reward

Aspect 9: <u>Rules for Punishing</u>. When, how, how much to punish. (Aspect 23<sub>II</sub>: the general purpose of punishment, its basic functions as explative and preventive--is listed under Grouping III as a value.)

Aspect 10: <u>Rules for Rewarding</u>. When, how to reward. (Aspect 24<sub>II</sub>: purpose or function of reward--is listed under Grouping III as a value.)

Grouping II. The Principles

G. Considerations of Prudence

Aspect 11: Fear of Punishment and anticipation of guilt (or shame) as reasons for following norms. (Aspect 12: Anticipation of Reward or of pride or self-esteem as reasons for following norms.) Aspect 13: Anticipation of pain to the self, of injury or failure as reasons for following norms. (Differs from Aspect 11 in that these bad consequences are not punishment--they may be interpersonal, however. The harm to the self coming from disruption of desired relations is Aspect 13, altruistic relations are Aspect 15.) (Aspect 14: Anticipation of pleasure to self (outside a defined reward system) as a reason for following norms.) H. Consideration of Welfare of Others (Note where the welfare is a matter of definite values of Aspect 22<sub>TT</sub>, Maintenance of Law; of Aspect 26, Life; of Aspect 27, Property; of Aspect 28, Liberty; of Aspect 29, Love and Fraternity--it is scored under Grouping III values.) Aspect 15: Welfare of other individuals (Love and friendship as altruistic motives or reasons for helping others or conforming come here, the reasons for entering into and maintaining love or friendship relations are scored Aspect 29, Love.) Aspect 16: Welfare of group, institutions, and societies, as a reason.

# APPENDIX B - continued

# I. Considerations of Respect

Aspect 17: <u>Respect for persons</u> and personal authority as a reason. Aspect 18: <u>Respect for the group</u>, for group consensus, and for social order as a reason.

J. Considerations of Justice

Aspect 19:	Maintaining positive reciprocity and trust.
Aspect	19RX: Defining or justifying obligations by stating
	actor should exchange places with the victim- Golden Rule.
Aspect 20:	Maintaining negative reciprocity by vengeance or by refusal
	to honor non-reciprocal demands.
Aspect 21:	Distributive Equality Maintaining equality or equity (equality relative to need) as a reason.

Grouping III. The Basic Values and Rights

Aspect 22:	Security	y of Law and Legal Order as a Value.
Aspect	22 <sub>T</sub> :	(not used as comes under Aspect 2)
Aspect	22 <sub>11</sub> :	Reasons why laws and their enforcement are necessary
		or desirable.
Aspect 23:	Punishme	ent as a Value
Aspect	23 <sub>1</sub> :	(not used as comes under Aspect 9)
Aspect	23 <sub>11</sub> :	Reasons, purposes of punishment, its basic
		functions as explative and preventive.
(Aspect 24:	Reward a	as a Value.)
Aspect	24 <sub>T</sub> :	(not used as comes under Aspect 10)
Aspect	24 <sub>11</sub> :	Reasons, purposes of reward.
Aspect 25:	Contract	t, Promise and Non-Deception as Values.
Aspect	25 <sub>1</sub> :	Definition and Use of Contract and Promise-
	-	Keeping Concepts.
Aspect	25 <sub>TT</sub> :	Reasons for Maintaining Contract and Promise
Aspect	25 <b>M</b> :	The Social Contractthe contract of the individual
		with abstract institutions or with society.
Aspect	25T:	Truth values.
Aspect 26:	Life as	<u>a Value</u> .
Aspect	26 <sub>1</sub> :	Definition of the nature of Life's Value, of the
	-	Right to Life, e.g. of what lives are valuable
		under what conditions.
Aspect	2611:	The reasons why life is morally valuable.
Aspect 27:	Property	y as a Value.
Aspect	27 <sub>1</sub> :	Definition of Property Rights and Values.
Aspect	27 <sub>11</sub> :	Reasons for maintaining property rights.
Aspect 28:	Liberty	<u>or Autonomy as a Value</u> .
Aspect	28 <sub>1</sub> :	Definitions of rights and values of freedom
	-	from coercion.

## APPENDIX B - concluded

Aspect 28<sub>II</sub>: Reasons for valuing freedom, for having rights of liberty. Aspect 29: Love and Fraternity as Values. Aspect 29I: Definition of the obligations and nature of a good relationship or of a good love motive. Aspect 29<sub>II</sub>: Reasons for love and friendship being valued. Aspect 30: <u>Sexual Values</u> Aspect 30<sub>I</sub>: Definition of appropriate sexual relations. Aspect 30<sub>II</sub>: Reasons for valuing appropriate sexual relations.

Note: from Kohlberg, 1969.

APPENDIX C

		STAGES IN THE MAJOR MODES	OF JUDGMENT	
STAGE	Obligation (Aspects 1-3)	Responsibility (Aspects 4-6)	Blame and Approbation (Aspects 7-8)	Punishment (Aspects 9, 10, 23)
	absolutistic, external, coercive	limited by powerless- ness of actor	based on physical con- sequences, damage and "goodness" of the devi- ance of the act	unquestioned, fixed, retaliative
2.	relativistic, instru- mental to wish, hypothe- tical (ifthen)	bounded by the skin	blame-oriented to the stupid or foolish vs. the sensible	lenient, preventive of repetition or restitutive to the victim
°.	steretotypical, what most people, good people would do	limited by the existence of benevolent power auth- orities who take care of things	blame-oriented to not having good prosocial conforming motives	expression of disapproval and a restitution to the victimtakes account of motives
. 4	categorical, rule-deter- mined right and wrong	limited to following the rules and fulfilling as- signed responsibilities	categorical wrongness takes priority over personal (approval) disapproval	expiative (i.e. one must pay for one's sins) and law-maintaining
ŝ	determined by legal-con- tractual rules or by rational choice within a personal hierarchy of values	limited to respecting rights of others and fulfilling contractual committments	blame judged by im- partial spectator who is a member of society	utilitarian-psychological view of punishment in con- text of legal consistency
	determined by universal moral principles of decision	responsible for all con- sequences of own action or inaction to which moral principles apply	morality not based on praise or blame, other- wise as Stage 5	no duty to punish-punish- ment otherwise as for Stage 5, except for obli- gation not to punish a man who has acted justly, re- gardless of utilitarian- legalistic considerations

APPENDIX C - continued

PRINCIPLES OF JUDGMENT

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STAGE	rrugence	Wellare of Ulners	Kespect	Justice-Commutative. Reci- procity and distributive
	(Aspects 11-14)	(Aspects 15, 16)	(Aspects 17, 18)	equality (Aspects 19-21)
1.	Orientation to fear of punishment and danger	doesn't define the good in terms of human welfare- consequences	respect is obediente to superior power	accepts non-reciprocal, un- equal relations between power-figures and subordinates
5	the good or right is that which serves indi- vidual concrete need	the good is also what is instrumental to the need of the other (if self and others' need not in con- flict	lacks conventional re- spect for authority, does not attribute special worth to authority	uses reciprocity as tit for tat exchange. Uses distribu- tive or absolute equality- everyone should get the same- no privilege
	good is maintaining good relations and approval of others	the good is helping others, being unselfish and loving	respect for authority faced with an affec- tional relation	reciprocity is grateful re- turn of past favors-used to rationalize conventional re- lations. Equality is consi- dering both sides.
4	the right maintains one's honor and avoids feelings of guilt over violating the rules and hurting others	the maintenance of social order, the honor and sur- vival of the larger or in- stitutional group are the ultimate welfare	internal respect for authority a necessary or important part of morality. Authorities respected because they express and symbolize the rules.	reciprocity is the return of rewards for merit and work, the payment of debts. Ob- jectionable inequalities are those where some have to conform or work and others don't.
	oriented to rational max- imizing of own welfare and to retaining community's respect	community welfare, the greatest good of the greatest number of mem- bers of society is an ul- timate criteria of the consequences of action	rights and functions of authority recognized but separated from his personality. Concern for mutual respect.	reciprocity defined by con- tract, equality is equality of opportunity and of funda- mental human-civil rights.
9	Prudence (the self's wel- fare) enters into moral judgment only in the same way as the welfare of others	where justice does not have prior claims, welfare is the ultimate criterion	universal respect for human personality	reciprocity is the maintenance of trust. Equality is treat every man's claims equally-a fundamental principle of all morality.

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THE BASIC VALUES AND RIGHTS (SELECTED ASPECTS)

TAGE	Contract and Promise (Aspect 25)	Life (Aspect 26)	Property (Aspect 27)
1.	promises are made by the more powerful to the less and are not binding	human life's value not clearly distinguished from value of physical objects or from prestige of its possessor	property rights and power rights con- fused. Accepts notion that people can be the property of others, e.g. child- ren the property of parents, slaves of owners
5.	promises and agreements seen in a context of bargaining and exchange.	life's value reduced to its instrumentality to the hedon- istic wants of its possessor	"absolute" property rights based on ownership of self and of thingsevery- one can do what they want with their property (and lives)
°°°	agreements and promises are kept to avoid disappointing others and so you will be trusted	human life's value based on the affection and empathy of others toward it	property rights subordinated to role norms, to what a good property-owner would do.
4	A categorical orientation to keep- ing your word with a sense of dis- honor if you don't and the need for reliability in social relations	life is the ultimately important because the core of the social- religious order is the protection of life.	property rights are absolute, based on the fact that hard work and the reward for it are the foundations of the social order.
ŝ	Free contract or agreement is the foundation of obligation, commit- ment and of social order	life is the basic universal, natural right and basic object of rational value	property rights can be natural human rights, part of the social contract. However, detailed definitions are ar- bitrary in terms of varying definitions in capitalistic, socialistic systems.
۰ ب	Beyond contract, the maintenance of mutual trust is the foundation of moral relations in society, es- pecially of moral relations which go beyond maintenance of legal order	equal respect for all human life is the core of a moral orienta- tion	property rights have the force of law and respect for them is necessary for social trust. But property rights are not themselves absolute or natural moral rights

Note: from Kohlberg, 1969

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY • east lansing

department of psychology . olds hall

March 1969

Dear Parent:

During the next few weeks, I will be undertaking some graduate research in the Haslett Junior and Senior High Schools. This study has been approved by the Haslett Board of Education, administration, and counselors; and I am seeking your permission to interview your son.

This study seeks a better understanding of what values students of differing ages have and on what basis they make moral judgments. The procedures will involve 3 standard tests (1 value survey, 1 listening test, and an interview in which the student examines hypothetical dilemmas), and they should afford both an interesting and valuable experience. Although no highly personal questions will be asked, all responses will be kept strictly confidential between myself and the student. No one else will see any student's responses except in anonymous form.

This testing, of course, will take place in the school building during school hours at a time which is minimally disruptive. Students to be interviewed will be selected at random from those students for whom we have parental permission. Thus, we are asking you to indicate on the attached form whether or not you have any objections to your son participating. In either event, it is essential that we have a returned form for each student. Your cooperation in taking just a few seconds to complete the form will be greatly appreciated. Please have your son return it as indicated no later than Friday of this week.

Thank you for your assistance.

D. Daniel McLellan

STUDENT: PLEASE HAVE A PARENT COMPLETE THIS FORM AND RETURN IT BY THIS FRIDAY TO YOUR HOMEROOM TEACHER.

Mr. McLellan: I do (CIRCLE ONE) give my permission for you do not

to interview my son\_\_\_\_\_

name

in the course of this study.

date

signature of parent or guardian

#### APPENDIX E

Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview

#### SITUATION VII

There were two grown up brothers who had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Alex, the older one, broke into a store and stole \$500. Joe, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he was very sick and he needed \$500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the money back. Although the man didn't know Joe very well, he loaned him the money. So Joe and Alex skipped town, each with \$500.

- 19. If you had to say who did worse, would you say Al did worse to break in the store and steal the \$500 or Joe did worse to borrow the \$500 with no intention of paying it back? Why?
- 20. Would you feel like a worse person stealing like Al or cheating like Joe?
- 21. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store anyhow?
- 22. Who would feel worse, the storeowner who was robbed or the man who was cheated out of the loan? Why?
- 23. Which should the law be more harsh or strong against, stealing like Al or cheating like Joe? Why?

APPENDIX E - continued

## SITUATION I

Joe is a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the \$40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before campe was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

- 14. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?
- 15. Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
- 16. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?
- 17. Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father?
- 18. Why should a promise be kept?

#### APPENDIX E - continued

## SITUATION III

In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

- 1. Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually right or wrong? Why?
- 2. Is it the husband's duty to steal the drug for his wife if he can get it in no other way? Would a good husband do it?
- 3. Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why?

The next two questions apply only if the subject thinks Heinz SHOULD steal the drug:

- 4-a. If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he still steal the drug?
- 4-b. Suppose it wasn't Heinz's wife who was dying of cancer, but it was Heinz's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and there was no one in his family willing to steal the drug. Should Heinz steal the drug in that case? Why?

The next two questions apply only if the subject thinks Heinz should NOT steal the drug:

- 5-a. Would you steal the drug to save your wife's life?
- 5-b. If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you steal the drug to save your own life?

The next question applies to everyone:

6. Heinz broke in the store and stole the drug and gave it to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. Should the judge send Heinz to jail for stealing, or should he let him go free? Why?
### APPENDIX E - concluded

#### SITUATION IV

The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she could not stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

- 7. Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that will make her die? Why?
- 8. When a pet animal is badly wounded and will die, it is killed to put it out of its pain. Does the same thing apply here? Why?

The next three questions apply only if the subject thinks the doctor should NOT give her the drug:

- 9-a. Would you blame the doctor for giving her the drug?
- 9-b. What would have been best for the woman herself, to have had her live for six months more in great pain or have died sooner? Why?
- 9-c. Some countries have a law that doctors could put away a suffering person who will die anyway. Should the doctor do it in that case?

#### The following questions apply to everyone:

- 10. The doctor finally decided to kill the woman to put her out of her pain, so he did it without consulting the law. The police found out and the doctor was brought up on the charge of murder. The jury decided he had done it, so they found him guilty of murder even though they knew the woman had asked him. What punishment should the judge give the doctor? Why?
- 11. Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence?
- 12. Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in some cases? Why?
- 13. The law prescribes the death penalty for treason against the country. Do you think the death sentence should be given for treason? Why?

# VALUE SURVEY

CITY and STATE OF BIRTH\_

NAME (FILL IN ONLY IF REQUESTED)\_

# **INSTRUCTIONS**

On the next page are 18 values listed in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life. Each value is printed on a gummed label which can be easily peeled off and pasted in the boxes on the left-hand side of the page.

Study the list carefully and pick out the one value which is the most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 1 on the left.

Then pick out the value which is second most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 2. Then do the same for each of the remaining values. The value which is least important goes in Box 18.

Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your mind, feel free to change your answers. The labels peel off easily and can be moved from place to place. The end result should truly show how you really feel.

### APPENDIX F - continued

1	A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
2	AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
3	A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
4	A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
5	A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
6	EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
7	 FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
8	FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
9	 HAPPINESS (contentedness)
10	 INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
11	MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
12	 NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
13	PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
14	SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
15	SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
16	SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
17	 TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
18	 WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED, GO TO THE NEXT PAGE.

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Below is another list of 18 values. Arrange them in order of importance, the same as before,



#### APPENDIX G

Global Rating Guide for Situation III of Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview

Stage 1. Oriented to fearful avoidance of stealing and without a) awareness of any moral responsibility for wife's life b) a clear awareness of the druggist's deviance in the situation and c) without awareness of the hierarchical importance of human life as compared to property.

<u>Choice</u>. Should not steal. Only stage which says self would not do it in the husband's place.

1. Stealing rule. Stealing is a bad act because it is a crime, breaking the law, is punishable (rather than Stage 4 because it destroys the social order and because it is a key rule in a system of internally respected rules). A major reason for not stealing is likely to be fear of punishment. If punishment is the salient factor in choice, this is almost automatically a Stage 1 response. In addition a focus on the badness of stealing because of the value of the drug is distinctively Stage 1. 2. Druggist's rights. Has no clear sense of property rights beyond physical ownership, but thinks druggist has a right to charge that much because the drug is valuable, etc. If questions druggist, it is solely because he is "charging too much" on some absolute quantitative scale. In this case insists druggist will be punished or is violating the law, in spite of the text. In any case, does not see druggist's withholding as in any way justifying the husband's theft not because disclaims its relevance as "2 wrongs don't make a right" (Stage 4) but because doesn't perceive it as relevant. 3. Husband's and friends' role-obligations. No or very little sense of husband's responsibility to save wife in this situation. Insofar as there is any responsibility at all it derives from husband's job to be an economic provider, to buy food and drugs. No responsibility at all for a friend. 4. Value of human life. Has no clear idea of the priority of live over property, law or other concrete factors in the situation, not even in the sense (Stage 2) that the husband himself sees the wife's life as far more important than all other considerations in choice. May assess wife's life as a value on the same scale as the value of the drug or of property rather than as qualitatively higher. Has no clear awareness that the woman's life should be a matter of moral concern to other people.

#### APPENDIX G - continued

 <u>Responsibility for action</u>. Does not see husband as required to act here, because it is out of his hands because one is never obligated to engage in deviant action, etc.
<u>Should husband be punished</u>? Thinks husband would or should be punished. Does not see any clear reason why punishment should be minimized or dispensed with in this situation. (As opposed to Stage 4 who sees the reasons for not punishing but takes a firm rule-maintaining stand.)

- <u>Stage 2</u>. Oriented to the instrumental necessity of stealing because of husband's more or less selfish need for his wife. Aware that a human life is worth more than property (on an hedonisticpragmatic scale) and aware that druggist is being unreasonable as a partial justification.
  - Choice. Steal. Little conflict or indecision.

1. <u>Stealing rule</u>. Little concern for stealing rule in this context. Sees punishment as avoidable by escape or repayment, or as worth it to the husband. Sees stealing as necessary and prudent, rather than as virtuous or obligatory or as an act of desperation.

2. <u>Druggist's rights</u>. Usually thinks druggist had a right to hold out, it's his invention. But may feel it is stupid to charge that much for the druggist's own financial interest and that ignores the needs of the non-wealthy. While not indignant at druggist, doesn't really think druggist has any beef if it is stolen. May finally accept that stealing is alright as retaliation.

3. <u>Husband's role</u>. Usually accepts one needs one's wife and that a wife is an extension of oneself and one's interests. Aware also of reciprocity or exchange in service to wife. Same may or may not hold for a friend. In any case saving wife is not a fixed obligation or duty to be performed if one doesn't love his wife, etc.

4. <u>Value of human life</u>. Sees a human life as worth more than property since anyone prefers survival to property. This value, however, is not a shared moral value, it is only the person himself or people who need him who should or would make great sacrifices to preserve a life.

5. <u>Responsibility</u>. No effort to avoid responsibility, see other solution.

6. <u>Should husband be punished</u>? Says let him go free or minimal sentence if takes judge's role at all, though may simply predict what a law-bound or unsympathetic judge might do. No reason to punish because husband had to do it, anyone would, etc.

<u>Stage 3.</u> Oriented to being a good family person in context where stealing would not be too disapproved. Recognizes little

#### APPENDIX G - continued

disapproval because it's natural, a loving husband would, and because provoked by the man druggist.

<u>Choice</u>. Basically thinks he should steal though may be indecisive, look for other outs and hedge as to whether it is actually right to steal.

Stealing rule. Usually some sense that stealing is still somewhat wrong in this situation, that it is extreme behavior but one which the husband would be "desperate" enough to do. Tends to consider punishment and disapproval and say act would not be really disapproved by the judge, the jury, other people. Stealing is a matter of just this once in an extreme situation.
<u>Druggist's rights</u>. While druggist has to care for his family, he is being selfish in this situation so his rights are minimized.

3. <u>Husband's role</u>. An orientation to the husband's affection for his wife as motivating stealing. If asked, "if husband didn't love wife?" may revert to a Stage 2 position or may shift to "He promised to love and care for her." Basically thinks any husband would love his wife enough for that. Orients to friend on same dimensions, whether one stole for a friend depends upon how good a friend, how S feels about his best friends, etc.

4. <u>Value of life</u>. Life is more valuable than property because it is the object of much greater empathy and affection.

5. <u>Responsibility</u>. Tends to insist druggist, other people, society will be beneficial and solve the problem without requiring stealing.

6. <u>Punishment</u>. Believes judge should release husband or give him the minimal possible sentence because would understand what he did, the motives behind it.

Stage 4. Stage 4 is seldom seen in pure type on this story because of the difficulty of maintaining a pure rule-oriented orientation and the conflict within Stage 4 between life and property rules. Accordingly, it is more likely to appear in a 4(2), 4(3), 4(5) or 4(6) form. Each of these accepts some moral and rational legitimacy for stealing. The 4(2) and 4(6) forms are described, the others are understandable as simple mixtures of the guide-description. A "pure" Stage 4 is oriented first and foremost to a rigid categorical maintenance of the stealing rule, but is aware of life's value as compared to property, of husband's duties.

<u>Choice</u>. It is wrong for husband to steal though it may be natural for anyone to do it. Says no at first but may waiver and decide husband should steal.

#### APPENDIX G - continued

1. <u>Stealing rule</u>. A categorical orientation that stealing is always wrong, one can't make exceptions to rules, even though recognizes the urgency of this situation. Believes if one starts making exceptions, waiving rules, society will break down, etc.

2. <u>Druggist's rights</u>. Sees druggist as being unsympathetic, selfish but feels he still has his property rights since he worked to invent the drug, even if he is wrong. In any case, two wrongs don't make a right.

3. <u>Husband's role</u>. A sense of categorical obligation of the husband to make sacrifices to save his wife (though not necessarily an obligation to steal or violate moral rules), regardless of degree of love for her. Differentiates husband from friend role in obligation since more than affection and reciprocity are involved in husband's obligations. If says friend should steal, it is on sheer "life" grounds. But recognizes a responsibility for the safety or welfare of the other contained in the family role and not in the friend role.

4. <u>Value of human life</u>. Value of human life is based primarily on the rule "Thou shalt not kill", i.e. primarily on a negative rule rather than a positive one (save life) and on a rule rather than the value of a life. Within this sphere, recognizes the value of life as categorical and that everyone must avoid unnecessary death. This does not take clear priority over all other moral obligations, however.

5. <u>Responsibility</u>. Some sense that one must still rely on higher authorities rather than taking law into one's own hands. Nevertheless perceives the husband as responsible to act in situation.

6. <u>Punishment</u>. Husband must be punished to maintain the law, even though he had some justification.

Stage 4(2). While more or less aware of Stage 4 obligations to rules, roles, and life, has a more pragmatic orientation to the obvious necessity of stealing in this case based on the obvious greater importance of life than property. The orientation is neither a purely selfish determination of the decision to steal to save a life (Stage 2) nor an abstract universal principled obligation to save life as the core of morality. Stealing the drug is more than selfishly rational, it is a regard for a shared act of obvious community value. The value of life, however, is essentially utilitarian, its value to the community and to the possessor.

#### APPENDIX G - concluded

- Stage 4(6) or 6(4). A choice that it is right to steal because there is a categorical obligation to save human life, that this obligation derives from a "higher law" than stealing laws and the act of stealing is an act of conscience. Unlike Stage 4, the value of life is not "rule bound" but is considered to be an intrinsic quality of life. The sacredness of life derives from the fact that it is not man-made, that it is something wonderful and higher. Its value then derives from the value of God or of the universe, respect for a human life derives from respect for God or for Life as a whole. The sense of conscience compelling stealing is either a direct intuition of the value or a respect for theological law.
- <u>Stage 5</u>. Orients to the situation as involving a legal judgment of wrong within a contractual commitment to be bound by law and a view that only the socially agreed upon is nonrelative and non-personal or arbitrary. At the same time recognizes that any rational individual weighing both prudential and social values would or should do it. Says one would steal, but there is still a conflict between obligations behind the choice.

<u>Choice</u>. Says it is reasonable to steal though it is still legally wrong.

1. <u>Stealing rule</u>. Orientation to the wrongness of stealing is based solely on the fact that it is still legally wrong, and that as a member of society one must accept the obligation to live by the laws. In other words there is no real of stealing in terms of the sacred stealing rule, but there is a sense of being bound to live within the laws which are generally accepted. Recognizes that the legal system would be compelled to judge the husband as wrong because it is bound to consistency. From the point of view of rational prudence, it is worth going to jail. May say acceptance of the possibility.

2. <u>Druggist's rights</u>. The druggist still has his legal rights despite his inhumaneness, i.e. he still has a claim to have his property rights respected. Basically the druggist's unfairness is not a major consideration in the legal or moral decision, though it is perceived.

3. <u>Husband's role</u>. Does not have a strong orientation to husband role-obligations or duties. The respondent or a rational husband would prefer to steal. If he does not from his value perspective he does not have a firm duty to steal. Essentially husband and friend roles are matters of greater psychological concern, the moral obligation issues are based on the life involved.

-								
			1	2	Stage 3	4	5	Grade Totals
	11	n X	-	<b>8</b> .74	8 .74	5 .74	5 .75	26 .74
rade	9	n X	2 .20	12 .64	6 .63	6 .77	- -	26 .63
G	7	n T	6 .67	10 .59	6 .53	3 .74	1 (.71)	26 .62
Sta Tot	ge als	n x	8 .55	30 .65	20 .64	14 .75	6 .74	78 .66

Table 1.H. Mean Terminal Value System Stability Coefficients (rho) by Stage of Moral Development and Grade Level.

APPENDIX H

					Stage			
			1	2	3	4	5	Grade Totals
	11	n x	-	8 .69	8 .70	5 .70	5 .76	26 .71
Grade	9	n x	2 .14	12 .58	6 .72	6 .73	-	26 .61
	7	n x	6 .57	10 .47	6 .62	3 .54	1 (.20)	26 53
Sta; Tota	ge als	n x	8 .46	30 .57	20 .68	14 .68	6 .67	78 .62

Table 2.H. Mean Instrumental Value System Stability Coefficients (rho) by Stage of Moral Development and Grade Level.

		Grae	de 7	Gra	de 9	Gre	lde 11		
8 2			52		52		52		ILLIS ANOVA
	4	fdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	H	đ
A Comfortable Life		2.0	13	11.8	14	12.8	15	0.07	.967
An Exciting Life	-	12.5	17	11.8	13	10.5	11	2.44	.296
A Sense of Accomplishment	-	1.1	11	8.5	œ	11.0	12	6.15	.046
A World at Peace		3.3	2	2.7	1	3.5	-1	0.84	.659
A World of Beauty	-	11.0	10	10.2	6	11.7	14	0.28	.871
Equality		5.3	4	6.5	e	6.2	ę	1.65	.439
Family Security		4.0	ę	7.8	\$	7.0	4	17.93	000.
Freedom		3.1	-1	4.9	7	3,8	2	4.88	.087
Happiness		8.7	7	8.0	9	8.5	7	1.24	.538
Inner Harmony	-	12.0	12	11.5	12	11.0	13	3.53	.171
Mature Love		12.3	16	10.1	10	0.6	80	6.72	.035
National Security	-	10.7	6	12.5	15	9.8	6	1.06	.589
Pleasure	-	3.4	18	13.6	17	13.3	16	2.61	.271
Salvation	-	10.5	80	10.5	11	15.3	17	8.54	.014
Self-respect		12.1	14	12.8	16	10.3	10	5.24	.073
Social Recognition	-	12.2	15	14.9	18	15.8	18	10.57	.005
True Friendship		7.2	ŝ	7.3	4	8.0	9	0.31	.856
Wisdom		R.2	9	R . 3	7	7.1	ſ	2 86	239

Terminal Value Medians and Composite Rank Orders for <u>S</u>s at Each Grade Level (time-1 & time-2 Value Survey data combined). Table 3.H.

<sup>a</sup> Each of the 26 Ss in each grade responded twice to the Value Survey.

## APPENDIX H (con't)

		Gra	de 7	Gra	de 9	Gr	ll abi		
	п <sup>в</sup> п		52		52		52	Kruskal-Wa	ANOVA ALLIA
		Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Rnk.	Rank	Н	đ
Ambitious		6.3	4	7.8	2	6.5	e	3.27	.195
<b>Broadminded</b>		12.1	14	11.5	15	8.2	9	7.47	.024
Capable		11.3	13	11.8	16	9.1	8	6.30	.043
Cheerful		11.1	11	8.8	7	11.9	14	2.84	.241
Clean		6.2	2	11.5	13	12.8	16	20.92	.000
Courageous		6.3	ო	7.2	4	8.8	7	3.68	.159
Forgiving		7.7	7	9.3	œ	10.7	11	7.42	.025
Helpful		6.3	Ś	9.7	10	11.0	12	5.18	.075
Honest		2.8	1	3.4	1	3.5	1	0.84	.656
Imaginative		15.3	18	12.8	17	14.7	18	1.45	.485
Independent		12.5	15	10.8	11	7.3	4	10.79	.005
Intellectual		13.3	16	11.5	14	10.0	10	3.76	.153
Logical		14.3	17	13.0	18	9.5	6	13.98	.001
Loving		6.5	9	7.1	რ	11.3	13	7.67	.022
Obedient		11.3	12	11.3	12	13.9	17	5.64	.060
Polite		8.7	6	9.5	6	11.9	15	6.23	.044
Responsible		8.2	œ	6.3	2	4.7	2	8.86	.012
Self-controlled		10.8	10	8.7	9	7.7	Ś	8.52	.014

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Instrumental Value Medians and Composite Rank Orders for Ss at Each Grade Level (time-1 & time-2 Value Survey data combined). Table 4.H.

<sup>a</sup> Each of the 26 <u>S</u>s in each grade responded twice to the Value Survey.

•	Stag	je 1	Stag	çe 2	Stage	3	Stage	4	Stage	5 c			
	1	6	Ð	0	40		28		11	~	Kruska l-Wa	IIIS ANOVA	
	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	Mdn.	Rank	H	đ	
A Comfortable Life	13.0	14	11.5	13	12.8	15	11.0	13	14.5	15	1.45	.835	
An Exciting Life	13.8	18	11.0	11	11.5	11	11.7	14	9.5	6	3.33	.505	
A Sense of Accomp.	11.8	12	10.0	6	10.5	9	10.5	12	10.0	10	2.04	.729	
A World at Peace	3.5	7	3.1	7	3.5	-	2.5	1	3.0	7	0.57	.966	
A World of Beauty	9.5	9	8.8	œ	13.5	17	0.0	9	13.5	14	11.47	.022	
Equality	6.0	4	6.5	ო	5.8	ო	5.0	7	5.0	Ś	0.48	.976	
Family Security	4.5	ო	6.8	4	6.0	4	8.2	7	5.3	4	9.62	.047	
Freedom	3.2	1	3.0	1	5.2	7	5.7	ო	2.0	1	25.24	000.	
Happiness	8.8	œ	8.5	7	8.8	80	7.1	9	10.5	11	4.1	.387	
Inner Harmony	12.8	13	13.5	17	10.8	10	9.2	10	11.5	12	17.67	.001	
Mature Love	13.0	16	11.1	12	8.3	7	9.8	11	11.5	13	7.89	.096	
National Security	8.5	7	10.9	10	11.5	12	14.5	18	5.5	Ś	12.23	.016	
Pleasure	13.0	15	12.7	14	14.3	18	13.6	17	15.2	17	3.42	.490	
Salvation	7.5	Ś	13.2	16	11.5	13	6.5	4	17.6	18	12.39	.015	
Self-respect	11.0	11	13.1	15	11.8	14	11.7	15	8.0	œ	11.892	.018	
Social Recognition	13.2	17	15.5	18	13.0	16	13.5	16	15.0	9 <b>t</b>	4.32	.364	
True Friendship	7.8	9	7.8	Ś	7.3	9	6.7	Ś	7.8	7	2.20	.699	
Wisdom	10.0	10	7.9	9	6.7	ŝ	0.0	œ	7.3	9	6.05	.195	

Table 5.H.. Terminal Value Medians and Composite Rank Orders for Ss at Each Stage of Moral Development (time-1 & time-2 Value Survey data combined).

<sup>a</sup> The n's are inflated because each <u>S</u> responded twice to the Value Survey.

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	Stai	ge 1	Stag	ie 2	Stag	e 3	Stag	e 4	Stag	je 5			
		16	9	Q	4	0	2	8	I	5	Kruskal-Wa]	LIIS ANOVA	
	Mdn.	Rank	H	P									
Ambitious	10.0	11	7.5	S	4.5	2	8.5	S	9.0	6	11.053	.026	
Broadminded	12.0	13	11.0	13	11.0	14	10.5	6	7.5	4	0.657	.956	
Capable	13.5	15	11.3	14	9.5	10	10.8	11	8.0	7	4.033	.402	
Cheerful	12.0	14	10.0	11	11.0	13	10.5	10	12.0	14	0.115	.998	
Clean	10.0	12	8.5	7	8.5	9	12.5	17	14.8	17	960.9	.192	
Courageous	7.5	7	7.1	4	8.2	Ś	6.8	ო	8.0	9	0.939	.919	
Forgiving	6.5	4	9.3	10	7.5	4	11.5	13	10.0	11	10.992	.027	
Helpful	6.2	ო	8.8	œ	0.0	ø	10.2	œ	11.2	12	2.273	.686	
Honest	2.3	1	4.1	-	3.8	-1	2.7	-1	2.5	7	4.149	.368	
<b>Imaginative</b>	15.5	18	13.5	18	15.5	18	14.5	18	14.5	16	4.677	.322	
Independent	7.5	9	10.5	12	10.9	12	12.3	14	7.5	Ś	8.096	.088	
Intellectual	13.8	16	12.5	15	11.8	15	12.5	16	7.0	e	6.447	.168	
Logical	15.5	17	13.5	17	12.8	17	12.5	15	0.6	10	8.558	.073	
Loving	7.5	Ś	7.1	ę	9.5	6	0.0	7	12.5	15	4.618	.329	
Obedient	10.0	10	13.1	16	12.8	16	8.8	9	16.5	18	15.875	.003	
Polite	10.0	6	7.8	9	10.5	11	11.5	12	11.5	13	3.581	.466	
Responsible	5.3	7	7.0	7	6.2	e	5.9	7	3.0	7	4,639	.326	
Self-controlled	10.0	œ	9.3	6	0.0	7	7.5	4	8.5	80	4.718	.318	

Instrumental Value Medians and Composite Rank Orders for <u>S</u>s at Each Stage of Moral Development (time-1 & time-2 Value Survey data combined). Table 6.H.

The n's are inflated because each S responded twice to the Value Survey. Ø

## APPENDIX H (concluded)

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