THS GR OVER CLEVELAND'S FOREIGN ‘r‘C'LiCY RELATIVE TO CUBA DURING THE INSURRECTEON 0'? 1895-1896 Thesis for the Degree. Cf M. A. MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE Francis: A. Lord 1938.. rho o" .uv 4. . . w . .s. .3 a- mi... 0‘ hfohw. .l * .J VVQ . w oaovm‘: CLEVELAND'S FOREIGN POLICY { RELATIVE TO CUBA DURING THE INSURRECTION OF 1895-1896 Francis A. Lord 01938- Submittod in partial fulfillment of tho roquirementu for the degrco of floater of Arts in the Graduate School of Kiohigan State Collage of Agriculture and Applied Science. Approved for the Department of History and Political Science 1159.330 Acknowledgment The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation for the kind assistance given him throughout this essay by Professor E. B. Lyon whose constructive criticisms have made this thesis possible. OUTLINE I. Introduction A. Cuba as a Spanish colony 1. Its economic importance 2. Its strategic importance 5. Its racial elements 4. Character of the Spanish rule, 1511-1898 B. The character of American diplomacy relative to Cuba, 1795-1895 1. The period of 1795-1848: the development of the Doctrine of Paramount Interest in reference to Cuba a. United States' desire for the friend- ship and commerce of Cuba, 1795-1807 b. The Jefferson and Madison Adminis- trations' proposals for Cuban annex- ation , 1807-1810 c. The American Purchase of Florida, 1819, and its effect an the English and French Cuban policies: the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 d. The American fear of and probable pre- vention of Cuban independence, 1826- 1845 2. The period of 1848-1861: the development of a more aggressive policy toward Cuba with the purpose of annexation b. Ce d. Effects of the Mexican war, 1846-1848, on American foreign policy - the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny: the proposed Cuban Purchase of President Polk in 1848 Attitude of the Whig Administration of Taylor and Fillmore, 1849-1855: the Lopez Expedition The extreme character of Franklin Pierce's policy, 1855-1857::the Soule Mission and the Ostend Manifesto, 1854 The expansionist views of President James Buchanan toward Cuba, 1857-1861 5. The period of the Ten Years' War, 1868-1878,snd its effect on the diplomacy of the United States a. Effect of the American Civil lar, 1861- 1865, on the Cuban question The Ten Iears"lar, 1868-1878, and President Grant's Policy: the Grant- Fish.Policy of non-intervention 4. The period of American capital investment and commercial growth in Cuba, 1878-1895 8. b. Cuban economic conditions at the end of the Ten Years' war Increase of the commerce between the United States and Cuba c. The nature and extent of American capital investments in Cuba d. The American tariff issue and Cuba: the Convention of 1884 for tariff ad- Justments, and the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 with its reciprocity features e. Political instability in Cuba from 1884-1895 II. The Cuban Insurrection of 1895 and the question of American Policy A. The outbreak of the insurrection, February 24, 1895 1. The remote causes 2. The immediate causes B. The insurrection 1. Character and extent: program and leadership 2. The Spanish program I a. The military program b. Administration of’lartinez Campos as Governor-General c. Administration of'Valeriano Weyler as Governor-General: the reconcentrado camps C. Cleveland's problem of formulating a Cuban Policy in 1895 l. The Cuban crisis as a challenge to the Adminis- tration a. Cleveland's personal views b. Early views of his Cabinet 2. 5. 5. Cleveland's choice of recognizing Cuba as being in a state 2; insurgency or in a state of belligerencz a. b. The problem of determining Cuba's status in the light of international law Cleveland's Proclamation of June 12, 1895 recognizing a state 2: insurgency in Cuba Cleveland's difficulties in maintaining a strict neutrality 8.. b. C. The effect of his Proclamation in preserving neutrality The force of American pulbic opinion due to humanitarian and economic reasons The influence of "yellow Journalism" Activities of the Cuban‘iggtg in the United States The Report of Richard Olney, Secretary of State, on the Cuban conditions, September 25, 1895 as b. Sources of his information Nature of the report: Olney's recom- mendation The incident of the "Horsa", November 9, 1895, as a factor in determining the Administration's policy a. b. c. Nature of the incident Violation of American neutrality Decision of the United States Supreme Court, May of 1896: significance 6. Cleveland's Second Proclamation of Neutrality, July 27, 1896 a. Its purpose and content b. Its effect III. The formulation of Cleveland's non-intervention policy A. The Fifty-fourth Congress, 1895-1896 1. Composition a. House b. Senate 2. Congressional Resolutions for intervention a. Senator Call's resolution, December 5, 1895 b. Senator Allen's resolution 5. Congressional Investigation and Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 29, 1896 a. Purpose b. Content of the report c. Effect 4. Joint Resolution of Congress a. Reason for it b. Its content c. Its passage by Congress (1) Senate, February 28, 1896 (2) House of Representatives, April 6, 1896 d. Cleveland's rejection of it: reasons B. Secretary of State Olney's offer of mediation, April 4, 1896 1. His note to Sendr Don Enrique Dupny de Ldme Spanish Minister a. Content b. Spain's reply on lay 22, 1896 2. Effect of the rejection on the State Department C. Hostility of the Spanish Government toward the proposed Congressional policy of American intervention in Cuba 1. Growth of Spain's hostile attitude as reflected in a. Spanish press b. Attack on American Consulate in Barcelona 2. Spain's official statement as expressed by De La’me in the m 33;; Herald, February 25, 1896 IV. The attitude of the Cleveland Administration toward the recognition of Cuban independence A. The question of American intervention in behalf of Cuba as a Spanish colony, or the recognition of its indepen- dence as a solution to the economic insecurity of American interests 1. Extent of American investments in Cuba, 1895-1896 2. Condition of Cuban-American Commerce, 1895-1896 5. Attitude of the Spanish government toward foreign governments attempting to safeguard the interests of their nationals in Cuba 4. 5. Growth of a strong anti-Spanish sentiment in the United States The influence of E. P. Atkins on the Cleveland- Olney Administration B. The Cuban issue in the American Presidential Election of 1896 '1. 2. 5. 4. Party platfonms and the Cuban issue a. b. c. d. 6. f. g. h. Republican Party Democratic Party Populist Party National Party National Democratic Party National Silver Party Prohibition Party Socialist Labor Party The Cuban issue in the Campaign speeches and literature of the several parties Comparative importance of the Cuban issue with other national issues Result of the election. C. Cleveland's last annual lessage to Congress, December 2, 1896 1. The Message as b. C. His review of the Cuban situation His position stated Public opinion toward his message as revealed in the press 2. Its reception by Congress a. Cameron's Resolution in the Senate, December 9, 1896 (1) Its content (2) Its failure b. The Congressional delegation and its reception by Cleveland D. The Senate's failure to carry through Cleveland's recommendations 1. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign. Relations, December 21, 1896 a. Recommendation of the Committee b. Senator Bacon's concurrent resolution of December 21, 1896 2. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 11, 1897 a. The purpose of the investigations b. Nature of the report c. Effect E. Cleveland's proposed mission of Frederic R. Coudert to Cuba, February 28, 1897 1. Its purpose 2. Its failure F. Cleveland's adherence to a policy of non-intervention and non-recognition up to larch 4, 1897 V. Conclusion Cuba was discovered by Columbus on his first voyage, October 28, 1882. The ‘Pearl of the Antilles', as Cuba has aptly been named, lies am the entrance to the Gulf of flexico and is about ninety miles south of Key East, Florida. Possessing a sarmdclimate, rich soil, and an abundant rainfall, the island can grow a large variety of products. Articles of economic value include tobacco, coffee, cacao, sugar-cene, as cell as most of the tropical fruits. Due to its proximity to the United Statca.and its position.relative to the South American trade routes, the strategic importance of Cuba can not be overestimated. lbrecser, the island is fortunate in that it has an abundance of ex- cellent natural harbors. The language of Cuba is Spanish. The long occupation of the island by the Spaniards started.with its actual occupation by Diego Tel-sauce in 1511. Gradually the native element lost its identity by intermarriage with the Spaniards, and, at a later time, with the negross. Ilassry in Cubs early proved itself to be a profitable labor system, so that by 1817 out of a.total of 688,000 inhabitants on the island, there were over 385,000 negroes of whom 250,000 were slaves.1_ Spainis rule over Cuba lasted about four hundred years. These four centuries of Spanish control from 1492 to 1898 can be character- ised by one work, Absglutiem. Economically Spain regarded Cuba as a source of revenue for the home country. Spain determined the economic 1. Charles E. Chapman, I'AJiistory of the Cuban Republic”, p. 31. policies of Cuba by prescribing what crops the Cubans might grow, and by compelling the exportation of these crOps to Spain alone. Demands for revenues in Cuba were very burdensome, both in the amount and variety of taxable objects. Besides agricultural and commercial re- strictions were imposed on the Cuban interests so as to work advan- tages to the wheat-growers and manufacturers of Spain.2 Politically, the Spanish rule of Cuba was comparable to the colonial administration that characterized most of Spain's colonial possessions in America. The ruler of the island was a royal appointee called the Captain-General. His control was practically absolute, being limited only by the audiencia, an advisory body always con- stituted of persons of Spanish birth. The right to suffrage was practically unknown to the native Cuban. Spaniards with meagre salaries‘ were sent out from Spain to fill all the colonial positions and it was expected they would reap the rewards such positions entailed.3 Even as late as the latter half of the nineteenth century it could be observed that . . . in Cuba, progress toward self govern- ment was slow. Spaniards continued to hold all the offices. Newcomers were favored in taxation and in the administration of Justice. Both of those functions of government were hopelessly corrupt. Cubs remained in the hands of lower and middle-class adventurers from Spain backed by the entire authority of the home government. Very early in the history of the United States keen interest in the commercial and trade possibilities with Cuba developed. It was, therefore, desirous to cultivate a friendship with Cuba. The strained 8. Walter Billie, "The flartial Spirit“, p. 11. 3. J. H. Latandz I'United States and Latin America“, pp. 4-6. ‘s lie 3. J0“.. “Our Cuban COIOM'. Po 16s relations between the united States and Spain, which had developed over the florida.boundaries from 1783 to 1795 and the navigation of the Iississippi liver were finally adjusted on October 21, 1195 by the frosty of San Lorenzo e1 Real. ‘lith the obstacles of the boundary disputes end rights to the Mississippi River amicably settled, the Uhited states hoped to enter into a closer relationship with Spain's colony to the south. The events in Europe, however, soon caused the united States to fear the designs of France in Cuba. In 1808 when Hopeless invaded Spain the possible complications of the invasion on Spanish possessions in Spanish lmerica.caused no little anxiety in Imerisa. Previously the Purchase of Louisiana in 1803 had given us title to the territory which would be seriously menaced if France were to gain Cuba. Thomas:Jefferson who had manipulated the purchase of the Louisiana.tsrritory firmly believed in the American annexation of Cuba. In commenting on the Spanish-American policy of Napoleon in a letter to President Madison in 1808, Jefferson statedr_ a.-- N”“"\o‘~ e That he would give up the Floridas to with- hold intercourse with the residue of those cclo onies cannot be doubted. But that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; and until sewer they are of no par- ticular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column in the south- ernpmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a pg plgg_ultga as to us in that direction.6 President Iadison realised well the significance of the geographic position of Cuba. In a letter to lillism.Pinkney dated on October 30, f 5. H. 8. Commsgsr, 'Documents of American History“, pp. 168-169. C. H. l. fishington, I"Iritings of Thomas Jefferson", Vol. 5, p. 443.9 1810, he remarked: The position of Cuba gives the United States so—deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum.of that position against the com- mercs and security of the United States.7 lldisen expressed for the first time the essence of a Cuban policy, which was to be adhered to by the United States until after the lexicon Isr, 1848-1848. lean-bile, England had kept close watch on the development of the Cuban question. is early as 181? the American public was troubled over newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed to Spain a session of the island of Cuba. The Purchase of Florida by the United States in 1819 again.brought the Cuban question.sharp1y into prominence. The British press became more insistent that England should have Cuba in order to offset the preponderance of Emerican in» fluence in the lost Indies resulting from its possession of Florida.8 The British government, however, disclaimed any designs on Cuba whatsoever. The United States was not entirely reassured of the British official position in Cuba so that in 1823 John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, in his instructions to our new Spanish Minister toek pains to add: In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century. it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Re- public will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the [mien itself.“ 'l. 'hdisen's lorks', Vol. 2, p. 488. 8. Rs Fituibm. 'Cubt m the U.S.'. Po 6. 8. 3935;,igecutige Qogumsnt, No. 181, 32nd. Cong., 1st. Sass. During the same year, 1828, President Monroe after consulting Jefferson on the possibilities of European entanglements in South American affairs received Jefferson's most significant reply of June 11, 1825 which stated in part: Cuba alone seems at present to hold up s.speok of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain.wculd indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her/to Join us in guaramtpeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I.wou1d not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do «.10 nor was France lacking in appreciation of the value of possess- ing Cuba at this time. In 1825, without any explanation she sent a lsrge squadron which visited the Iest Indies and for weeks hovered about the coasts of Cuba. Both England and the United States were else-stand both nations vigorously protested. Henry Clay was quite emphatic when he stated ”that we could not consent to the occupation of these islands (Cuba and lest Indies) by any other European power 11 than Spain under any contingency whatever“. England felt as the United States did about the occupation of Cuba by any European power, except Spain, and in 1825 George Canning attempted to get the three countries, England, France, and the United States, to sign a tripartite agreement te refrain from any occupation of Cuba. The United States considered the proposal carefully, but when France declined to 2 partieipats, the project was dropped.1 10. H. A. Itebington, “Critings of Thomas Jefferson“, V28. 1, p. 288 11. lmsrican State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 5, p. 855. 12. Harry F. Guggenheim, 'The United States and Cuba“, p. 8. During the following year of 1828, it was preposed that the united States send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American re- publics sssscbled at Panama. The American Congress debated earnestly on this proposal, but the opposition of the Southern members was too strong. They were opposed to the Congress because the South American republics had adopted the principle of slave-emancipation. Southern congressmen and Senators feared their influence would Jeopardise the institution of slavery in the United States.13 chry Clay's declaration against the interference of France and England in the affairs of Cuba was consistently followed by the ad, ministrations of both Jackson and‘Van Buren. In 1838-1839 England ,smnt commissioners to Cuba_and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade with these islands. Reports were at once cir- culated that Great Britain contemplated occupation of Cuba. The united States promptly told Spain that we would not consent to any British control over the island. Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, write to our representative at Madrid, Mr. Vail, on July 15, 1840 to the effect: You are authorised to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, fro- whatever quarter, to wrest from.her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the united States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.14 Our position was reaffirmed later during January of 1843, by ' Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, when he wrote to Ir. Campbell, 13. P. E. Chadwick, I"The Relations of the united States and Spain', PPe 211-213. 1‘. T. H. Benton, “Abridgment of the Debates of Congress', Vol. 8, pp. 4216428,‘Vol. 9. PP. 90-218. «our consul, at Havana: The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents, or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserv- ing or recovering it.15 As a result of our war with lexico, 1846 to 1848, our foreign policy became more aggressive. Americans now came to think of Cuba in terms of eventual annexation. Up to this period the United States had primarily been interested in preventing the acquisition of the island by other powers. The acceptance of the Doctgige 2g_ m m was the basis during the next fifteen years for all kinds of schemes promoting territorial extension o-é Cobaincluded.16 During the administration of President Polk in June of 1848, Secretary of State Buchanan instructed the American minister at Iadrid to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. After offering the memimum price of $100,000,000 for its purchase, the American minister added, that 'desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by Justice and honor would be too dearly purchased'.17 In as such as the Spanish govern- ment refused to consider this proposal, there was no further effort to 15. Irancie'Uharton, “Digest of the International Law of the United States“, Section 60. 1‘. Is He Intand', 0p. Cite. D. 91s 1?. House Executive Document, No. 121, 32nd Cong., 1st. Sess.. fie Buchanan t0 llr. Saunders. purchase Cuba.during the Hhig administration of Taylor and Fillmore, lddlbllbs. It was during this period that the ill-advised attempts of larciso Lopes, a.Cuban patriot, to invade Cuba occurred. His exploits not being sanctioned by the Administration caused Taylor on August 11, 1848 to were all United States citisens from participation in such ventures. Taylor further added that "no such persons must expect the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their ccnduet."18 Prominent veterans of the Mexican.Iar, especially South- erners, volunteered to assist, but the three expeditions of Lopes failed miserably and he subsequently was executed.19 President iranklin Pierce, a Democrat coming into office in 1855, thought entirely contrary to his predecessors, Taylor and Fillmore on the Cuban‘issue. In his inaugural address he stated that the policy of the administration.would “not be controlled by any timid foreboding of evil frn expansion' and that the acquisition of certain possessions not within our Jurisdiction was 'eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world'.20 Unfortunately, his selection of Pierre Sou1"as our linister to Spain.was a bad choice. Soule‘s inp structions were to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain which would be fevcrable to our trade development with Cuba. Ir. Soule was in- discreet in his conduct and consequently our relations with Spain were strained.21 leanwhile, the seiaure of the imerican.steamer, filack w. __ 18. J. D. Richardson, 'flessages and Papers of the Presidents“, Vol. 5, Do we 13. Charles I. Chapman, op. cit., pp. 35-39. 20. Is De Richardson, Op. Cite. PD. 198-199e 81. l. I. lttinger, ”The Mission to Spain of Pierre Souls 1853-1855;-p.310. m by Spanish officials at Havana for violation of custu-house regulations, only increased the mutual misunderstandings between Spain and the name sun-.23 Souls was instructed to denend an indemnity of £300,000 and a prompt disavowal of the act by the Spanish authorities. Spain no incensed at the preemptory tenor of the demand and was slow . in enacting the note. The affair was eventually adjusted by a pri- vate agreement between the Ravens. officials and the owners of the my, “195.23 Shortly afterwards there was a change of ministry in the Spanish government with resulting internal disorders. Ir. SoulsI was next instructed to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba. It was pro- posed that Scule’ consuh the United States minister to England, James Buchanan, and the American minister to France, John Biases, in order to arrange a conference at Ostend, Belgium for the purpose of cwercaing any opposition which Sngland or France might make to the proposed ”as...“ m. conference was held in October of 1854 and resulted inthe issuing of the so-called 923921 W35 This mifesto dealt mainly with an enmeration of the advantages that would accrue if the United States were to acquire Cuba. The only specific rec.- .ndatiu ia the document was the suggestion that the United States ehnld‘ attempt, through the proper channels of diplomacy to purchase Cuba at a price not exceeding $180,000,000.“ However, the report had some features that were most objectionable to Spain. It proposed 2‘. ‘0 I}. KttWCr. ibid., pp. 252.353a 33. l. I. Ittinger, ibid., p. 254. “a ‘e to Dttingcr, “ids. DP. 3410343 35. H. S. Cos-agar, op. cit., pp. 333-335. 28. l. I. Dttinger, op. cit., p. 24?. 10 in substance, that if Spain refused to sell the island, then the United States would be Justified in taking Cuba.by force.27 The Pierce id- ministratiat repudiated the 951m Manifesto by pigeon-holing it. It never become an executive pronouncement.28 Pierre Souls, promptly resigned and with his return to this country our relations with Spain considerably improved.29 Previous to Buchanan's Administration, all negotiations for the purchase of Cuba had been initiated by the authority of the President alone. President Buchanan coming into office in 1851’ tried to get both House and Senate of Congress to concur in an appropriation for Cuba's par-chant,"3 Elie appeals met with little encouragement. In 1869 the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,. John Slidell, reported a bill carrying 830,000,000 as a preliminary ’sum for the purchase of Cuba, but the bill was subsequently withdrawn because of the violent opposition of Southerners who feared the possible effect on. slavery}1 Two years after Slidell's report the United States was in the throes of the Civil War and Cuban annexation dropped out of sight because of more pressing domestic affairs. A nfter 1865 our policy relative to Cuba was not one for aoquir~ ing the island for ourselves, but rather of urging Spain to abolish slavery on the island, to establish a more liberal form of government for the Cubans, as well as to promote a more untrammelled comercial 23. H. S. Commager, op. cit., p. 334. ”a Is He utm‘. 0p. Cite. p. 105. 89. ‘e E. “timer. Op. 31‘.. PP. 581-3820 30. J. V. Poster, 'i Century of American Diplomacy', p. 350. 31. Quote Rgport, No. 351, 35th Cong., 2nd. Sess., p. l. 11 intercourse between Cuba and the United States. In the years immediately following the American Civil War the Mo, social and political conditions in Cuba tended to promote greater unrest among the native population. Slavery was the cause of tin distinct parties on the island. There came into existence a strong Spanish party which stood for the perpetuation of slavery and Spanish dosination over Cuba. This political group came to be opposed by a.eecond faction the Creoles or native Cubans, whose slogan was "Cuba.for the Cubans'.32 In September of 1868 the Creole party rose against the Spanish authorities for the control of Cuba. The Cuban Revolt of 1868 soon spread throughout the island with disastrous effects. In 1859 President U. S. Grant was most fortunate in having as his Secretary of State a man as able as Hamilton Fish. The Grant- !ish Cuban Policy was one of nonbintervention, yet at the same time it sought to afford protection to American oitisens and safeguard their 33 Hamilton Fish, alert to the situatien, tried to rights in.Cuba. prevent the shipment of munitions, sen, and supplies from the United States to Cuban insurgents. Nevertheless, some ships managed to elude the American patrols, with the result that American relations with Spain.again became tense.3‘ On October 31, 1873 an incident occurred that very nearly precipitated a war between the two powers. On that day the steamer giggigigg, flying the American colors and carrying a Uhitsd States registry, was captured on the high seas by a Spanish as. J. a. Latane’, op. cit., p. 107. 335 Allan levins, 'Hamilton Fish', pp. 121-129 us WOO PP. 135.189. \ 0‘ q. a ‘es :’ “2 i ‘ . l 12 wer'vesssl. Ihile the Xi;gigigg_had men and supplies on board destined for the Cuban insurgents, her seizure was a flagrant violation of inter- national 1-.§ After summary trials, fifty-three of the crew and 'pssssngers of the ship were executed by the Spanish officials.35 Incite-est in this country was intense and the Grant Administration was urged to declare war at once.36 . It was later revealed that the vessel bad illegally carried the American colors and registry.37 A settle- asst was wads finally in which Spain agreed to surrender the survivors of the crew, the vessel itself, and to disclaim any intention of in- dignity to the American use.” In the meantime, the Grant Adminis- tratiosuwss:ansious to bring about a settlement between Spain and Cuba in as such as the revolt was directly affecting American.economic 39 interests on the island. On November 5, 1875, the Secretary of State, Basilica Fish, addressed a letter of instruction to Caleb Cushing, our sinister to Spain, in.which he reviewed the course of the insurrection and the results on American interests in Cuba. Er. Fish stated in his acts that if the Spanish government couldn't effect a settlement with the insurgents, then the United States would feel it incumbent to intervene for the purpose of restoring order on the island.40 Copies of this note were sent to our ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, and other European centers.‘1’ The answers received from these foreign A A 35. Ibid., pp. 661-670. “0 “ids. ’0 6'3. 37. Ibid” pp. 579-681. a. 15“.. pp. 688.689. and $0551.! 09.. 54th Cong., l‘ta 80.8.. No. 165. pp. 1.118. 30. Allan.Nevins, 'Hhmilton Fish', pp. 101e104. 40. Ride. We 876.8790 I 41. IBM» P. 379. 13 gases were either unsatisfactory or evasive. \Ihile Spain sympathised with the American wishes, yet its government stated emphatically that no outside intervention would be countenanced.“ Although the in- surrectin dragged on for over two years after the issuing of the m gm of Fish, finally the revolt was terminated in 1876.“5 The terms that Spain held out to the Cubans were: first, a partial repruentation in the Spanish Cortes and, secondly, the promise that 44 The non-intervention policy slavery would u. gradually abolished. of the Grant-Fish Administration toward Cuba was significant, both from the fact that a Spanish-American War was averted between 1868- 1878, and because the precedent set by Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, in preserving peace with Spain and also firmly insisting on herican rights, were later followed by the Cleveland-Olney Ad- ministration. The economic losses to Cuba as a result of the Ten Years' liar were great. Cuba itself was nearly ruined. Her plantations, in- dustries, and farms had been pillaged and destroyed. The debt of the lar itself was forced on Cuba. Taxation was excessive, but even the money thus raised was not used for internal improvements.” In addition to shouldering the debt of the Ten Yeare' Iar, Cuba also use to bear the debt of the war with Peru, and the cost of maintain- ing the Spanish legation and consulate in the United States. At the time of the Insurrection of 1895 the taxes were especially grevious. The average revenue for the years 1895-1898 was $25,000,000. Of this anoint, 810,500,000 was used in paying interest on the Cuban debt, as Dildos PPe 380-881e 43. W]... to Chapman, op. Cite. Po 420 “a Dido. Pe 59s as hide. Pa 70e 14 which in 1397 was $400,000,000.“3 after the termination of the Ten Years' lar there was a great increase in the'volume and the value of American-Cuban trade. The united States soon became the main buyer of Cuban products. “In sixteen years, 1076-1891 inclusive, the United States bought Cuban 4? products ‘0 th. extent or some ‘924,000,000 'Ol'th aeeoe. In hifl fourth.annual.nssaage to Congress on December 7, 1896, President Grover Cleveland sketched the growth of American investments in cuba. He said in part: It is reasonably estimated that at least fras $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are invested in plantations and in railroad, lining, and other business enterprises on the island. The volume of trade between the united States and Cuba, which in 1889 amounted to about 364,000,000, '0‘. 1. 1893 to CbOU‘ $103.000.000 a...‘8 In his annual report of December 7, 1896, Secretary of State, Richard Clnsy estimated the total value of American investments in Cuba as follows: Cienfuegos district 812,000,000 Ilntanzss 9,000,000 Segue district 9.229.000 Santiago mines 15,000,000 ‘9 cub-uses the leading producer of cane sugar in the vorld during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. During the fiscal year of lfltaelflfid an official report indicated that the five leading pro» ducers of cane anger of the world.were namely: Cuba 900,000 tons Java 480,000 - 45. Mathewsim. p.33. 41. Charlesri. Chapman, op. cit., p. . 48. I. D. Richflrd‘on. Ops cits. Vol. 9’ Do 7180 4!. L. H. Jenks, 'Our Cuban Colony“, pp. 36-37. O. sees 15 Louisiana (0.3.) 265,000 tons Phillipines 250,000 50 Brazil 225,000 a The significance of these statistics shoes that of the vorld sugar cane crap for the year of 1893-1894 amounting to 2,960,000 tons, Cuba produced nearly one third of it.51 The united States was one of the leading consumers of sugar during this period. united States con- sumption of sugar for the year 1890-1893 inclusive was as follows: Inns ' gang cgusuumg 1890 1,522,000 1391 1,872,000 1892 1,853,000 as 1893 _ . 1,891,911 The united States had a monopoly of all Cuban exports during this period. For the fiscal year of 1894 to 1895 the major Cuban exports of sugar and tobacco were as failure: SUGAR (roan) TOBACCO (Bales) united States 680,642 153,542 ‘11 other countries 5 '52 __1§,gg§‘ 53 Total 315,894 227,865 Homeeer, the United States had other interests in Cuba to consider besides sugar and tobacco. Cuba.being rich in iron, manganese, and nickel ores caused the Pennsylvania Steel Company and the Bethlehem Iron Ibrks to purchase large ore deposits near-Santiago in the year 1893.54 immarican interests by the last decade of the nineteenth m. “212%., 54th 30113.. 1“ We, .00 193. PPe 70.710 519 Dido. Po no 53. Ibid., p. 70 5'50 WM» 212- ioflihl'flbfiemlfiiéshl. l. P- 122- 5‘. .L. I. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, “The United States since 1865', Pa 331s 16 century had a decided monopoly of iron-ore investments in Cuba, with the result that by 1898 ‘Cuban shipments of iron-ore to this country reached the amount of 400,000 tons.‘55 It was during this same period that the obstacles to free trade between Cuba and the United States were removed by the flexinlgy 1g;1£§fl§111,ef 1890. Largely through the efforts of Secretary of State, James 0. Blaine that a system of reciprocity with South Amer- iemn.countries was adopted. Raw sugar was placed on the "free list' munuwnuiamimuuuramautmarnnmufi‘Inmw the Imerican trade with Cuba which was valued at $61,000,000, had 57 increased in 1893 to $103,000,000. Spain's opposition to the reciprocity features of the KcKigley Tariff[flill,wasnwithdrawn in 1:90, but in 1894 she again increased her rigid tariff lara.5° The filibustering activities of Cuban patriots in the United States to outfit expeditions for Cuban liberation never ceased. The agitator of these Cubans was Jos‘ larti, who, having escaped from a Spanish prison, came to the United States.59 He was aided by other smiles and these men founded junta clubs in several of the leading lmsriean cities. By the year 1895 there were ‘about one hundred and forty patriotic clubs in the united States, lesion, Central and South lmerioa, and the West lndies‘.60 These'msn organised, financed, and 35. Ibid., p. 331. 56. ‘l. P. lead, 'Tho Development of the United States since 1865', ’e 150 "a is. .0 Back” .34 Ba Ba ROWICK. Q. 01‘.. Pa 331. 38. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 11. 5’. Ibid.’ P. 15. 00. l. 3. Benton, “International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish herican '83-. Pa 250 0.. 17 outfitted filibustering expeditions during the year 1894, but in spite of the seizure of their vessels, their efforts were not entirely wasted, as was attested by the fact that in the following year the insurrection was to be formally launched which they had done so much to organize.61 51. Charles Chapman, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 18 II The Peace of Zanjdn which ended the Ten Years War left many problems unsolved in Spain's relationship with Cuba. The promises which Spain hade made to her colony were not fulfilled. In a letter describing the general conditions in Cuba, Senor T. Estrada Palma stated to the American Secretary of State, Richard Olney that: The representation which was to be given the Cubans has proved to be absolutely without character; taxes have been levied anew on everything conceivable; the officers in the island have increased, but the officers are all Spaniards: the native Cubans have been left sith no public duties.whatsoever to perform, except the payment of taxes to the government and blackmail to the officials, without privb ilege even to move from place to place in the island except on the permission of govern- mental authority. Spain has framed laws so that the natives have substantially been deprived of the right of suffrage .... the Cubans have no security of person or property. The Judiciary are in- struments of the military authorities. Trial by military tribunals can be ordered at any time at the will of the captain-general.62 The dissatisfaction with these conditions resulted in Opposition to the Spanish administration which lead to the development of political parties on the island. The Cuban resentment to Spanish rule was in- diceted in various ways, but the central theme of all their protests to the heme government expressed the desire for autonomy. This desire was voiced by all the classes of Cubans. 'Possibly the 62. §gggtg_ggg,, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 166, pp. 1-2 19 majority among the educated classes of Cubans would have been eat- ilfisd.with antonomy for the island, though there were widely differ. in. views as to the form it should take".63 The authorities in Spain realised the need for improving the political status of the natives. I The Peace of ZanJon forced upon the Spanish governors an effective change of policy s... the natural and wise thing to do would have been to found an autonomous regime s... the desire for autonomy grew even stronger, and in the Cortes this was pointed out by the colonial deputies, without their gaining a hear- ing, or even having Justice done to their inp tentions .... In 1895 hopes were revived by a plan for political and administrative reforms of an autonomist nature .... but it was re- Jected and the very inadequate law which was substituted for it in 1895 was hardly put into force.“ The Cubans never lost sight of the motives which had inspired them to revolt in 1868, and after 1878 they continued to maintain or- ganisations in both Cuba and the United States for the cherishing of their ideal. The Cuban leaders realised that to insure the success of their cause they must organise both for civil and military edlinistretion. The Cuban Revolutionary Party was founded.with this end in.visw. Its Iain obJects were to promote the sympathy of other countries, collect funds, and gather all the munitions of war.65 an of this situation were formed the m clubs which were found in Cubs and neighboring countries. The United States in the course of time became a haven for Cuban patriots, who having been forced to leave their homes because of their political opposition to Spanish 63. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 74. Cd. lafeal Altamira, ”A History of Spanish Civilisation“, p. 202. 65. ‘ggngtguflgg., 54th Cong., let Sess., No. 168., p. 2. C . . ' I... Owes 2O authority, fled to the United States. The lmerican sentiment generally was quite sympathetic for the Cuban cause. The friendly attitude for the Cuban patriots persisted even after the inception of the insurrection of 1898 end the degree to which it found expression may be appreciated in thst Soon after the outbreak of the Cuban in- surrection, mass meetings were held in many of the larger cities to aid the cause of the rebels and as news reports of 'opression‘ increased, ' these gatherings were held more frequently .... at one mass meeting held in Philadelphia 8577 was collected for the Cubans and subscriptions to the amount of 83,000 were received.... in organisation known as the “American Friends of Cuba“ was formed in New York in 1898 to aid the Cubans.... Three weeks after its organisation some 300,000 signatures to petitions had been reported.56 This external assistance was invaluable to the cause of the Cuban in- ssrreetionists. “whatever strength the insurrection has shown has been derived more than anything else from external aid, assisted by the involved financial situation of the country at present. But for these causes the movement would have ended almost as soon as it begsn‘. ‘7 However, the friendly sentiment felt by the mass of Americans for the Cubans in their struggle for independence was not shared by particular individuals in the United States who had capital invest- ments in Cuba. I'lmerican economic interests in Cuba in the seventies, eighties, and nineties made our concern over political stability of greater moment than the matter of sovereignty."68 es. I. I. Wilkerson, ”Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War,“ Pa 58c 67. lcrth American Review, Vol. 161, pp. 362-365 68. L. l. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 329. e f P Gees \ eves ( lees Q C Q s e “ I 21 Such.vestsd interests of American business men in Cuba.were directly affected by the political situation there. American capital was largely invested in the sugar industry, therefore it was this partic- ular interest that especially felt the effects of Cuba's political instability.‘9 The Emerican economic depression which came in 1893 during Cleveland's second administration aggravated the economic unsoundness of the Cuban situation. This business crisis came largely as the result of a.coebination of adverse conditions caused by inordinate speculation especially in.railroads, over-production of silver en- hanced by the Sherman Act of 1890, a large deficit in the national treasury resulting from a policy of inordinate spending, and agricultural conditions due to crop failures."0 The economic and social distress caused by the Panic of 1893 was unequaled by any pre- vious business depression in the United States. It came with Failures of well-known concerns (which) had already shaken public confidence in the business structure, and the decline of the reserve set in motion a period of liquidation the most severe yet experienced. During 1893 over 800 banking institutions failed, while during the summer 74 railroad corporations owning 30,000 miles of road passed into the hands of receivers ...... lore than 15,000 commercial failures involving liabilities of $346,000,000 were recorded for 1893. The production of iron and coal declined, and to add to the general distress there was a poor corn crop in 1894 and a decreased demand on the part of Europe for wheat. Unemployment, strikes, discontent, and such actual sufferb ing characterised the winters of 1893 and 1894, a period which encompassed the Pullman strike in Chicago and the marching of 'Coxey's army.’71 ‘9. I. W. Pratt. 'kpansionlfll Of 1898'. P. 2480 TO. H. Y. Faulkner, ”American Economic History', p. 502. 71. Ibid.’ p. 504. Q P'OCI 22 Such.a crisis in the United States naturally had repercussions else- where. In reference to Cuba the magnitude and extent of the De- pression of 1893 directly affected its economic status in as much as the United States was the main importer of Cuban goods. Moreover, any fluctuations in American business conditions were bound to in- fluence Cuban business interests directly. The Panic of 1893 was so widespread that recovery was slow. “Since the panic of 1893 American business had been in the doldrums. Tendencies toward industrial revival had been checked, first by the.Venesuela war scare in December, 1895, and again by the free silver menace in 1896'.72 American in- vestors promptly cut down on expanding their holdings in Cuba. By the early months of 1895 the historical maxim that economic in- security breeds political unrest was illustrated in Cuban society when the revolutionary parties again sought to realize their long-cherished objective of political autonomy if not complete independence. “The real substance of Cuban dissatisfaction in 1895, however, was basically economic'.73 nearly 801 of Cuban wealth was invested in sugar. This product was the most important single item of Cuban trade with the United States. 'flmong further economic causes for the outbreak of 1895 may be cited.the fast that loans contracted by Cuban sugar planters on the basis of’a rapidly expanding industry became extremely burdensome under conditions-as they existed following the repeal of the reciprocity arrangement."74 72. Wm RBV:CW' Vol. 1‘. p. 165 13. R. Fitsgibbon, "Cuba and the U. S.'. p. 14. 7‘. hide. ’0 15. 23 The chinley Tariff of 1890 went into effect at a time when the United States was in a sound financial condition. In framing a new tariff is that year the Republican Congress out heavily at the sources of'ssvsnue and by so doing placed all sugar on the free list.75 Isanwhile Spain's unwelcome restrictions on Cuban exports were still in force but shortly the policy was modified by the Foster-Canovas Treaty of 1891.which had the effect of encouraging an unprecedented exp passion of Cuban raw sugar manufacture.76 The hard times with the accompanying loss of revenue in the United States, however, caused the Elaboratic Congress to pass the Wilson-German Tariff of 1894 which placed.an402'gg;1§10ran duty on raw sugar automatically abolishing the trade reciprocity between Cuba and the United States.17 ”The Cuban resolution.drws strength from the economic catastrophe of the Wilson tariff.“78 The result was that many of the native Cubans were deprived of Issue of employment. When the revolt all in 1895 these men, excited by the urgings to insurrection by their leaders, Joined eagerly the ranks of the insurgents.79 L. H. Jenks, an authority on Cuban economic conditions, has summarised the statistical effect of the Wilson-German Est on Cuban sugar production as follows: PRODUCTION YEA; ' (Long Tons! VALUATLQQ 188 5.1389 (Average) 630 , 000 844, 500,000 1890' 552,000 43,300,000 1891 819,000 57,400,000 ”a B. H; leaks. op. cits. P. 380 76. Ibid.. pa 39. 17. lbid., p. 39. . 18. I. F. Atkins, "Sixty Years in Cubs”, PP. 143-145. 19. I. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 407. PRODUCTION YEAR (Long Tons} VALUATIQU 1892 975,000 69,300,000 1893 815,000 84,300,000 1894 1,054,000 52,100,000 1895 1,004,000 45,400,000 1896 225,000 1;,000,000 3° The spirit of discontent among the natives of Cuba finally found its expression in the gaitg,gg,§gigg, or the battle-cry of the Cuban in- surrectionists. The Cuban uprising of 1895 was carefully planned, and on the twenty-fourth day of February the revolt was formally launched. 'The time for the revolution was well chosen, because the depression of 1893 had crushed Cuba as general depressions always do and as only a one-crop country can be crushed."81 Spain early realised the seriousness of the insurrection and dispatched large numbers of Spanish regular troops to assist the in~ sufficient soldiery already in Cuba. Within a short time the Spanish troops in Cuba numbered approximately two hundred thousand men comprised mostly of infantry, though the cavalry would have been much more effio slant in coping with the guerilla warfare of the insurrectionists.82 Inrecver, the military forces sent over from Spain were composed of mere boys and totally unfit for fighting against the hardy natives.83 With- ia.lsaa than two months after the outbreak of the insurrection the Spanish government dispatched to Cuba its most able military leader, General Martinez Campos, who was well acquainted with Cuban conditions because of his service during the Ten Years' war. Although possessed of unquestionable ability, Campos was unable to gain substantial 80. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., p. 40. ‘1. H. to Guggenheim, Op. Cite. Do 30. 82. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., p. 78. 83. I. P. Oberholtser, 'A.History of the United States since the Civil "31". Vol. 5. 9. 48s 25 victories and therefore he was recalled to Spain early in 1896.84 is a successor to Campos the Spanish government selected General Usleriano Weyler who had gained a reputation for cruelty during the Ten Years lar. leyler at once inaugurated a policy of concentration of non-combatants within restricted areas known as the recgncggtggdo camps. “He built a series of blockhouses, Joined together by wire en. tangioments, across the island in the hope of corralling the insurgent forces in a.gradually restricted area; and he took measures to stop the rebels from living off the countryside by ordering the concentration of the island‘s population into camps under the surveillance of troops."85 Iithin.a.short time these reconcentrggg camps became centers of disease and pestilence. The American Consul General at.Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, reported to Washington "that of the 101,000 recon entr es in Havana alone, more than 52,000 had died."86 The insurgents in the meanwhile were following a program of property destruction to gain their ends. They moved about the country 'attacking and burning plantations and pueblos, and even occasionally falling upon a special garrison in a small town, but fighting only when they outnumber the Spaniards or surprise them in a disadvantageous pcaition.'87 The Cubans were excellent in this type of guerilla war- fare. The Spanish answered these challenges to an ever increasing warfare of ferocity and revenge. 'Revolutionists who were captured were shot or sent to prisons in Africa.....Estates were ravished, isolated garrisons captured, railroads destroyed, towns burned and the “a Ghulc. E. Chapman, Op. Cite. Pa 800 85. L. I. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p, 333. 86. n. T. Lynch, “Grover Cleveland“, p. 498. or. Melissa Maine. No. 19. pp. 606-618. 26 larger cities threatened."88 The Cubans were lacking greatly in the munitions of war and were extremely handicapped in fighting the Spanish regular troops who were adequately equipped. The insurgents in 1885 claimed to possess a.military force of about sixty thousand men. (he-third of these was well armed, one-third moderately well equipped, but the remainder was very poorly provided.89 The revolt was at first confined to the province of Santiago. It then spread to Puerto Principe, next to the province of Santa Clara, and finally to Iantansas province, so that by the end of 1895 the entire island was in a state of revolt against Spain.90 The crisis in Cuba was a direct challenge to the Cleveland Ad- ministration. Whatever his personal opinions might have been relative to the legitimacy of the Cuban cause for freedom, President Cleveland placed his duty to his country in defining what the United States foreign policy should be as of greater importance than the satisfying of his private convictions. “He (Cleveland) was far from being a pacifist, but he was a firm believer in the doctrine that nations should mind their own business, and he did not consider the Cuban sit- uatiaa.our affair.'91' However, the immediate problem was not one of merely ignoring the existence of Cuba. “The outbreak of a fresh in- surrection in Cuba increased greatly the perplexitiss of the adminis- trstica. The outspoken sympathy with the insurgents.....expressed itself.....in heated denunciation of the President for his strict ob- servance of a friendly attitude toward Spain, and for the steps which 33. I. P. Obem°1tmg Op. cit., p. 49. 89. gaggiggg Review g£_Reviews, Vol. 13, p. 420. 90. lggth.Ameri§ag Review, Vol. 166, pp. 560-569. 91. Robert Kcnlroy, “Grover Cleveland“, p. 272. 27 he took to prevent filibustering and other violations of the neutrality laws.'92 Fortunately President Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney viewed eye to eye the Cuban situation, and anxiously‘ watched the development month by month on the island. A few months after the outbreak of hostilities in February ur. Olney in a letter to President Cleveland expressed his views on the Cuban situation by re- washing in part: The Spanish side is naturally the side of which I have heard, and do hear, the most. It is, in substance, that the insurgents.....are the ignorant and vicious and desperate classes marb shelled under the leadership of a few adven- turers, and would be incapable of founding or maintaining a decent government if their rev- olution against Spain were to be successful..... There are, however,grounds for questioning the correctness of this view.....The Cuban in- surgents are not to be regarded as the scan of the earth.....ln sympathy and feeling nine. 93 tenths of the Cuban population are with than. Cissy believed in strict.impartiality, however, and was both sealcue and efficient in.carrying out the policy of the Administration respect- ing:Spain!s requests for Imerican nonoassistance to the insurgents. He decided that.the involved situation in Cuba warranted an impartial incestigation by the U’nited’States.94 However, the economic losses sustained by American investors in Cuba as a result of the wholesale property destruction were fully realised by President Cleveland and his Secretary of State and were a matter of genuine concern to then.95 The administration was faced at once with the problearcf determining the 92. Idward Stanwood, “History of the Presidency', p. 520. 93. Robert lcllrcy, op. cit., p. 245. 84. Allan Nevins, 'Lstters of Grover Cleveland“, p. 410. 95. I. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers:of the Presidents”, Vol. 9, Pa 718. OOIO. O A 0 § 5 28 status of Cuba. There were many who considered the gtptgg,g£_thg, inggzggggg?6 to be that of belligerents. However, President Cleveland and Secretary of State Clney considered the island to be in a £353; 9; Lpgnzggggz. Cleveland personally stated that in regard to the question he was utterly opposed to the recognition of belligerency. “Indeed, so very unmistakable were my views (he stated at a later date) on the lubdect that I was time and again threatened by frenzied men and women with dire calamities to be visited upon myself and children because of what they saw fit to assert was my enmity to the Cuban cause.'97 Cleveland was Justified.in his refusal to recognise the belligerency of Cuba. ”The only kind of war that Justifies the recognition of in- surgents as belligerents is what is called 'public var'; and before civil.war can be said to possess that character the insurgents must present the aspect of a political community or dg,f§gtg poser, having a certain coherence, and a certain independence of position, in respect of territorial limits, of population, of interests and of destiny ..... It is evident that a war is in progress in Cuba; but it is equally evident that it presents the features of guerilla rather than of regular 9 werfere.....' 8 Therefore in June 12, 1895 President Cleveland issued 96. C. H. Stockton, "Outlines of International Law“, p. 18. In the United States Supreme Court decision of ghg_Three Friends, ren- dered in 1891, Chief Justice Fuller distinguished between a state of insurgency and a state 2; belligerency as follows: “The die- tinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of the exist- ence of war in the material sense and of ear in a legal sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the political department has not recognised the existence of a de facto bel- ligerent engaged in hostility with Spain but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing before, at the time, and since this forfeiture is alleged to have occurred.“ 97. Allen Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland”, p. 492. 98. 22!, V01. 21' pp. 288-300e .— C v e “' s I I c ( eaves Y ( ( eeeee s e t V ‘ ~ I Q - ' f c Q ' ( D 4 y ( 29 a proclamation recognizing a state 9; insurgency in Cuba and warning Ilerican citizens against violating United States neutrality laws. The Proclamation stated in part: lhereas the island of Cuba is now the seat of serious civil disturbances, accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the established Government of Spain, a power with which the United States are and desire to remain on terms of peace and amity; and whereas the laws of the United States prohibit their citizens, as well as all others be- ing within and subject to their Jurisdiction, from taking part in such distrubances adversely to such established Government, by accepting or exercising commissions for var-like service against it, by enlistment or procuring others to enlist for such service, by fitting cut or arming or procuring to be fitted out and armed ships of war for such service, by augmenting the force of any ship of war engaged in such service and arriving in a port of the United States, and by setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for military en- terprises to be carried on from the United States against the territory of such government ..... I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, do hereby admonish all citizens and other persons to abstain from every violation of the laws herein-before referred to, and do hereby warn them that all violations of such laws will be vigorously prosecuted .....99 The Proclamation recognized a definite distinction between insurgency and hglliggggggz. It merely put into effect municipal statutes and did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality that same under international law.100 The refusal of President Cleveland to recognise the Cuban insurgents as belligerent, however, was un- fortunate in certain respects. It provoked an advocacy of the Cuban cause both by Congress and the American people. In the course of time this sympathy for the insurgents grew so strong that in time it came to 99. J. D. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 591-592. 100. J. B. floors, I'Digeet of International Law“, Vol. 1, pp. 242-243. ates 30 be felt, both in the United States and Spain, ”that a recognition of belligerency would be introductory to a recognition of independence .....end would undoubtedly constitute a gaggg,§g;l13}01 Despite the Proclamation, with its definite warning to refrain from aiding the Cubans in their warfare with Spain, the Cleveland Ad- ministration was faced with.much opposition in maintaining strict neutrality. American public opinion was aroused because of the ‘Spanish program of cruelty instituted and carried on by Weyler. The business men of the United Stateswere hostile to Cleveland because his program of non-recognition and non-assistance was causing the ruin of their investments on the island. The press was especially denun- cietory of the Administration. Throughout the period of the Insurrection there was much rivalry between the leading newspapers of the United States. I'I:specially was the contest bitter between the flggld_and Journal, which had developed into a fight for supremacy in the field of New York Journalism, conducted by Joseph Pulitser and William Randolph Hearst. Pulitser bought the Egglg_in 1883 and by launching an aggressive editorial policy and adding typographical invocations to his paper had built a small, insignificant publication into one of the most influential papers in New York. Beginning with a circulation of some 15,000 the Eggld, under Pulitser, had reached by April, 1896, a.circulation of T42,673 a day.'102 These papers never ceased in their appeal to the Imericen public on.behalf of the Cuban cause. They sent their cor- respondents to Cuba to get ”atrocity“ stories. This type of I'yellow 101. 52;13,5gggiggg Review, Vol. 162. PP. 406-413. 102. l. I. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 7. 7 .‘57 4" 31 JournaliemP did a great deal in keeping the public aroused to the nature of the Spanish mode of warfare in Cuba. An example will illustrate the emotional appeal of these articles: Heanwhile a cowardly American president and a cold-blooded American secretary of state sit calmly by and declare there is not a state of war in that unfortunate island which has been harried and devastated by war nearly two years. It is not only war, but uncivilised, barbarous, bloody war. It must stop. If the present administration will not stop it the next administration will take the responsibil- ity of stopping it and will thereby earn the plaudits of all humane, civilised, patriotic, liberty-loving Americans.10 The jgpggg,maintained their organisations in various cities in the Uhited States and many Cubans, including some who were still Spanish subjects, established themselves in American ports and furnished the insurgents with arms and supplies. Illegal expeditions were con- tinually being fitted out in the United States, and while the great majorityzof them were stOpped by port officials or intercepted by the navy, some of them succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba.10‘ Secretary of State Olney cooperated with the Spanish ministry by preventing the departure of vessels for Cuba that were suspected of bearing men or munitions for the insurgents. His efforts were greatly appreciated by the Spanish Government and did much to maintain amicable 105 relations between the two powers. It was exceedingly difficult, however, to get unbiased reports on the situation in Cuba. In his 103. Ibid., p. 4%, (Quoting the Chicago Tribune, December 3, 1896). 104. I. H. Latane, 'History of American Foreign Policy', p. 502. 105. m. 122;. g; 9. §_., 54th Cong., 1st. Sess., No. 1, pp. 1163-1231. 1M .F ‘1‘ . .ihnl !‘ 32 report to the President on September 25, 1895 Secretary Olney wrote in part: If the insurgents are revolting against intolerable political conditions we should certainly be Justified in remonstrating..... against the resort, by either party, to cruel and inhuman modes of warfare.....we should also put ourselves in a position to intelligently consider and pass upon the questions of accord- ing to the insurgents belligerent rights, or of recognizing their independence.....For these reasons and because it seems to me the Executive may well consider it his duty to see that want of proper information does not lead Congress astray upon any matters involving our foreign relations - I take the liberty of suggesting that an agent be sent to Cuba, not with any diplomatic title nor vested with any diplomatic functions, but simply empowered to investigate and report all the features of the present Cuban situation so far as America's interests can be affected by them..... Cleveland did not follow the suggestion of his secretary of state at this time, however, and, when later he did decide to send a mission of the type suggested by Olney it was too late.107 Shortly after this report of Olney's an incident occurred which proved to be a "test case“ for the Neutrality Proclamation of June 12, 1895. The vessel.fig§g§, sailing under the Danish flag with Danish officers had been engaged over a period of time in the fruit business of an American firm. On November 9, 1895 the vessel cleared Phil- adelphie for Port Antonio, Jamaica. Just before departure the captain received a message instructing him to proceed north and anchor off the New Jersey coast at Barnegat Light. When the vessel reached the designated place it was Joined by the steemplighter 1, §, 15 Strgnahap which had sailed down from Brooklyn, New York, to meet the Horse. 106. Allen Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland”, p. 410. 107. I‘ide’ P. 469. 1.9.. 0‘49. '9‘. 33 Some forty Cubans were also placed on board the vessel. When the vessel same near Cuba on its Jamaica itinerary, the Horsa dispatched to the island two small boats with the cargo of munitions as well as the forty Cubans. On its return the filibustering vessel with its captain and two sates was seized by the United States authorities for violation of the'American Neutrality laws. The trial took place in the Eastern Federal District Court of Pennsylvania. The court claimed a violation of Section 5286 of the Revised Statutes of 1794 which in part contained that: Every person who, within the territory or Jurisdiction of the United States, begins or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise to be car- ried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.108 -The case presented two primary questions. First, was such a military expedition organised in the United States and, secondly, did the de- fendents render such material assistance with full knowledge of the waste! In construing the law the court defined a military exp pedition as a combination of men organised in the United States with the purpose of aiding the Cuban insurrectionists in their resistance to the g; Jure government by providing them with arms and ammunitions, while at the same time the United States officially was maintaining a policy of strict neutrality. The second question arising from the case was.whether or not the officers had knowledge of the actual facts. The court again decided that the officers and crew of the Horse had full 1080 Fe Es CthWIOk. op. Gite. p. 412. ._.r?r .- 4 34 knowledge of their operations.109 The filibusterers next made an appeal to the United States Supreme Court which was unwilling to reverse the decision of the lower court.“’0 The court decisions in the Horse case proved most helpful to the Cleveland Administration in its endeavor of maintaining a condition of strict neutrality. The unfavorable positions taken by the United States Supreme Court in its unwillingness to re- verse a lower court‘s decision had a discouraging effect on further fili- bustering operations from the United States. Nevertheless, from time to time some attempts were made to disregard the American neutrality laws with the result that on July 27, 1896, President Cleveland issued his second proclamation of neutrality. He restated the desire of the United States to remain at peace with Spain and again warned all citizens of the United States, including any others within_its Jurisdiction, from any violations of the laws of American neutrality.111 The effect of this second proclamation was to diminish most appreci- ably the number of filibustering expeditions. 109. 8033! lxgcgtivg Document, No. 326, 55th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 110. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 414. 1110 J. De Richardson, Op. Cit. PP. 694.6950 I‘D». If .ea u 9 35 III President Grover Cleveland was opposed in his Cuban non- intervention policy by members of both houses of Congress. The prop- sgsnda that emanated from the juntas in the United States and the "yellow Journalism' of such men as Pulitzer and Hearst combined to de- velop a sympathetic attitude among members of the House and Senate favorable to cube. Members of the Cuban Juntas visited the congress- men and senators individually and did their utmost to win sympathy for the cause of the insurrectionists.112 The 'atrocity stories" aroused not only the emotions of the American public but also gained the sulpathy of many members of Congress. The following excerpt taken from the flew Zork World for May 17, 1896 illustrates the kind of sensational writing which was spread before the gullible American public: This year (1896) alone the war will strike $68,000,000 from the commerce of the U. S. ..... Wounded soldiers can be found begging in the streets of Havana.....Cuba.will soon be a wil- derness of blackened ruins. This year there is little to live upon. Next year there will be nothing. The horrors of a barbarous struggle for the extermination of the native population is witnessed in all parts of the country. Blood on the roadsides, blood in.the fields, blood on the doorsteps, blood, blood, blooei'113 Such accounts came to have a large reading public throughout the United States and in time were eagerly seized upon by certain members of both 112. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., p. 334. 113- New York World, May 17, 1896, as quoted by M. M. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 32. 36 114 houses of Congress who desired American intervention in Cuba. The leader of this faction in the Senate was Henry Cabot Lodge of Massa- chusetts who voiced the sentiment of his element when he remarked that 'this is a world of comparative progress, and freedom from Spain would be to Cuba a long step in advance on the high-road of advancing civilisation. The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and in- dependence. No great nation can escape its responsibilities ..... we have a responsibility with regard to Cuba."115 These 'youthful warbhewks.....were declaring that God would curse the American people if they waited for Cuban independence until the island should be desolated by fire and sword."116 The United States Senate in 1896 was about evenly divided in membership in respect to party affili- ations. There were ninety senators in the 54th Congress at the opening of its first session among which were forty-four Republicans, forty- three Democrats, and three Populists. 0n the other hand, in the House of Representatives the Republicans had an impressive majority of two hundred and forty-seven out of a total membership of two hundred and eixty-seven.117 The lack of cooperation between President Cleveland and the House of Representatives was partly due to the fast that he was a Democrat while the House majority was overwhelmingly Republican, but mostly because the majority of Congressmen favored Cuban intervention.118 The 54th Con- lld. Halter Hillis, op. cit., pp. 47.48. m. m. v01. 21’ pp. 278.287. 116. "1t9r "5.111., 0pc citag pa 48s 11?. §g§§tgpggg., 54th Cong., let Sess., pp. 15-141. 118. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., PP. 332-334. 1L 0.. 37 grass had no sooner opened its session before the Cuban question he- came an object of spirited debate. On December 3, 1895, Senator Iilkinson Call of Florida offered a Joint resolution to recognise the independence of Cuba.119 Call was probably influenced to some extent by the many Cuban-Americans who lived in his constituency. On Decem- her 21, 1895 Call's resolution was followed by one from Senator Hill of New York who offered a similar resolution declaring ”that a state of public war exists in Cuba, and that the parties thereto are en- titled to and hereby are accorded belligerent rights“.120 Senator cell's resolution was also followed closely by that of the Populist senator, William V. Allen of Nebraska, who offered a resolution which provided for the independence and annexation of Cuba, the pur- chase of all the islands in the neighborhood of the United States, the prompt and effective observation of the Eggggg Doctrine in "its purity and primary intentions', and a firmer protection of the rights of American citizens abroad.121 These resolutions were referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with the purpose of investigat- ing the true conditions which had prompted these propositions for in- tervention. On January 29, 1896 the Committee rendered its report which made mention of the damages to American interests and stated that the United States had met the difficult task of maintaining a program of neutrality ”with vigor, impartiality, and Justice'.122 After assert- ing that chaotic conditions existed in Cuba it further declared that it was Spain's duty to recognize a state of war on the island.123 The 119. Cong. Rggord, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 39. 120. Ibide. Po 555e 1210 C095. Record, 54th Cong., lat 8383., P. 2050 122. Senate Reports, 54th Cong., lst Sess., No. 141, p. l. 123. Ibide. De 2. 'E‘n‘ . 38 Committee's report submitted the proposed resolution with the con- , tention that it was 'the duty of Congress to define the final attitude of the government of the United States toward Spain..... Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that the present deplorable war in the island of Cuba has reached a magnitude that concerns all civi- lised nations to the extent that it should be conducted, if unhappily it is longer to con- tinue, on those principles and laws of war- fare that are acknowledged to be obligatory upon civilised nations when engaged in open hostilities, including the treatment of captives who are enlisted in either army; due respect to cartels for exchange of prisoners, and for other military purposes; truces and flags of truce; the provision of proper hospitals, and hospital supplies and serVices to the sick and wounded of either army. Resolved further, that the represent- stion of the views and opinions of Congress be sent to the President; and if he concurs therein that he will, in a friendly spirit, use the good offices of this government to the end that Spain shall be requested to accord to the armies with which it is engaged in war the rights of belligerents, as the same are recognised under the law of nations.1 The Committee's report in itself was vague in as much as it had little more than described the conditions in Cuba. However, it did reflect the effectiveness of the “atrocity stories“ in influencing Congress. Nor did the report show at all clearly how the recognition of bel- ligsrency would end the savage nature of the insurrection.125 There could be, nevertheless, no doubt as to the barbarity of the struggle. It revealed how under the orders of General Valeriano Weyler the Spanish soldiers had gathered the Cuban civilian population in the towns. It showed how the refusal to comply with this decree of 124. Ibidop p. 40 125. F. E. Che-dW1Ck' Op. Cite. pp. 453-435. s1 59 Egggggggtgadg resulted in the recalcitrants' being treated as rebels. It also indicated that the majority of those who obeyed the orders were women and children with a resulting high mortality because of their being sequestered in crowded villages with miserable sanitary facil- 126 As itiss as well as being provided with inadequate food supplies. a retaliatory program the insurgents followed a policy of destroying property and became so efficient at this that even American invest- ments received slight respect. Within a.period of less than three years the American claims on file in the American State Department against Spain for property losses sustained in Cuba amounted to six- teen million dollars.127 Moreover, public opinion in the United States was stirred because of the treatment of American citizens by the Spanish authorities in Cuba. Throughout the entire Second Adminis- tration of Grover Cleveland, 1893-1897, this problem became the occasion for much adverse comment in reference to the policy formu- lated by the President.128 During Cleveland's Administration there was a total of seventy-four arrests made of persons who claimed to be bona.fide American citizens.1‘?'9 The Spanish authorities unhesitan tingly cast these individuals in prison, and in some cases administered harsh treatment. Fully threeofourths of these persons were either Cubans or of Cuban parentage who had become naturalized American citisens. In the course of time several were released while others were expelled frIILCuba. However, a considerable number of the group who were given 126. §gn§tg,§oc., 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 25, p. 125. 127. §enate Committee 2g 29;. Rel., Compilation of Reports, Vol. 7. p.339. 128. N. M. Wilkerson., op. cit., p. 48. 129. as. m. 2: $1.12 2. a. 1896. pp. 747-750. 40 long terms of imprisonment and in some instances even death sentences were ultimately released as a concession to the United States when leyler was recalled}:50 The continual refusal of President Cleveland to recognise the Cuban insurgents as belligerents resulted in Congress' attempt to force the President's hand. This action took the form of a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress which urged the President to offer Spain the good offices of the United States for a peace providing for Cuban independence}:51 On February 28, 1896 this resolution was passed by the Senate with a vote of sixtyofour ayes to six nays.132 The resolution set off much acrimonious debate in the House of Rep. resentatives whose members had been for over a year subjected to the propaganda of "yellow journalism“ which favored the Cuban demand for 133 independence. Representative Iilliam Arnold of Pennsylvania was outstanding in his demands that the United States recognize the Cubans as belligeregts. In fact he maintained that ”Cuba should be and will be free.....Let us now, in Congress assembled, show to the Cuban patriots and to the world that we still worship at the shrine of lib- 134 erty and that freedom will not call on us in vain.” Regardless of a few isolated opponents the resolution was passed on April 6, 1896 ' 35 by a vote of two hundred and fortybsix as to twenty-seven against.1 130. Senatg Qgg., 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 25, 581-585. 131. ang. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, p. 2256. 1320 Ibida' DP. 30.75-3551. 133. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., p. 333. 134. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., lst Sess., Vol. 28, Part 7, pp. 258-259. 135. Ibid., p. 2629. this! I . .IL —_!4I ‘ O O Y 1 41 Despite the outstanding majority that the resolution received in both houses of Congress, it was ignored by President Cleveland who was not bound to act on a resolution of Congress which merely expressed an opinion.136 The appreciation of the Spanish government for Cleveland’s attitude was shortly reflected in a note of the Spanish minister to the United States which remarked in part: When one considers the numerous.resolutions of the two houses of Congress, the popular agi- tation, the tide of public opinion, superficial but widespread, which has been inspired against Spain by our enemies, the attitude of the press and what it has been asking and is asking even today .. nay, more, what has been demanded even now of the President of the republic -- we can do no less than admire the high qualities of rectitude and honor, the fearlessness and the respect toward the legitimate rights of Spain shown in this note addressed by this govern- ment through me to the government of his majesty.137 The days before the vote of the House of Representatives had been taken on the resolution of April 6th the American Secretary of State Richard Olney offered the good offices of the United States to Spain for the purpose of mediation. Olney's note of the fourth of April sketched the economic losses caused by the insurrection. He mainp tained further 'that the United States cannot contemplate with com- placency another ten years of Cuban ineurrection'. Olney then stated that his object in.addressing this note to Spain was “to suggest whether a solution of present troubles cannot be found which will pre- went all thought of intervention by rendering it unnecessary.“ The Secretary of State then summed up the American offer for mediation with the statement: 13‘. J. H. Latang; "United States and Latin America”, p. 127. 13?. Snenisn Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, April 10, 1896’ p. 4. 42 What the United States desires to do, if the way can be pointed out, is to cooperate with Spain in the immediate pacification of the island on such a plan as leaving Spain her rights of sovereignty, shall.yet secure to the people of the island all such rights and powers of local self-government as they can reasonably &8ka138 Although friendly in tone, Olnsy's objective in this note was to im- press Spain with the necessity of a speedy solution. He closed this communication by remarking that "the United States has no designs upon Cuba and no designs against the sovereignty of Spain. Neither is it actuated by any spirit of meddlesomeness nor by any desire to force its will upon any other nation. Its geographical proximity ' and all the considerations above detailed compel it to be interested in the solution of the Cuban problem whether it will or no. Its only anxiety is that the solution should be speedy, and, by being founded on.truth and Justice, should also be permanent.‘139 The note closed with the suggestion that if Spain had relied less on the sword and more on adequate governmental means for the consideration of political, economic, and social reforms, it was quite possible the insurrection 140 would have been quickly terminated. for some weeks the Spanish Government paid little attention to Olney's friendly counsel. ‘In- stead of reforming the administration of its sole remaining American colony, it took the course of greatly augmenting its military forces on the Island, in preparation for a powerful offensive.'141 Canovas 139. Quoted in S. F. Bemis, ”The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy‘, Vol. 8, p. 288. I‘Oe Ibida' Po 8. 141. Creates Ferrara, 'The Last Spanish War", p. 15. 43 was the unchallenged director of Spain's imperial policies at this time and his statement that he “would fight in Cuba until the last dollar"was the typical attitude taken by the majority of Spain's public sea and it even came to be echoed by the leader of the opposition, Don Pissedes Mateo Sagasta.142 It was not until the twenty-second of May that Olney's note was answered by the Spanish Government. Although De Lome's reply was very courteous in its tenor, yet at the same time it was a rejection of the American offer for mediation and claimed that Cuba already enjoyed ‘one of the most liberal political systems in the world". The letter concluded with the suggestion that the United States would contribute greatly to the pacification cf the island by prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the past.'143 The effect of this courteous refusal by Spain to accept the united States‘ offer of mediation for Cuba's pacification resulted in dampening Olney's enthusiasm for treating with the Spanish Foreign Office. ‘The American note was, indeed, the turning point of the affairs with Spain. Its rejection meant, could only mean as a finality, 144 The Cleve» the forcible intervention by the United States, and war.‘ land-Olney Administration, despite the rejection of the proposal for mediation, insisted on the strict observance of American neutrality laws and non-intervention. The Spanish government and people, however, read out of the American overture for mediation the veiled desire of the 1% Ride, Po lac 143. Snnnnsh Dinlomatic Correspondence and Documents, 896-;900, No. 13. I“. F. E. ChadW1ck, Op. Cit.. p. 465. 44 United States government to acquire the island for itself.145 The Spanish press was equally as critical. At one time a suggestion was made by a Spanish editor advocating an expeditionary force of twelve 146 Amer- thousand men for the purpose of attacking the United States. ican newspaper correspondents in Madrid likewise reported that prepara- tions for war with the United States were under way as a result of the resolutions passed by Congress recognizing a slate of belligerenc; in Cuba, and that hostilities would be started if Cleveland followed the dictates of Congress.147 Spain's warlike attitude toward the United States was shortly reflected in the Barcelona incident.148 The highly critical remarks reflecting on Spain's attitude made by certain members in both the Senate and abuse as well as by leading American publicists were printed in nearly all the leading Spanish newspapers.149 The growing antagonism toward the United States developed to a dangerous point when a group of Spaniards, largely composed of university students, decided to stone the American consulate at Barcelona.150 Having worked themselves up to highly emotional state the rioters approached the con- . sulate hissing and shouting. 'Abajo loe tocineros Americanos', (down with the American pigbkillers), and at the same time let loose stones and potatoes, which broke many windows of the consulate residence. They next proceeded to the prefecture and the residence of the captain— general where they expressed their impatience for the Spanish official 145. g!!;York'Wor1g, March 5, 1896, quoted by M. M. Wilkerson, 'Public Opinion and the Spanish American War“, p. 72. 146. H. H. lilkerson, op. cit., p. 65. 1‘1. Ibid. 148. F. E. ChadW1ck' Op. cit., pp. 437.08. 149. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3075-3551. 150. F. E. ChadW16k. Op. Cit.. 438. 45 policy by tearing up a Spanish flag. Returning once again to the con- sulate with a body of at least fifteen thousand strong, they offered a very lively struggle with the municipal police and definitely indicated their extreme displeasure by tearing to shreds an American flag.151 This incident was immediately disclaimed by the Spanish government, which in.addition to an offer of complete reparation, presented formal regrets for the occurrence and assured the United States that steps had been promptly taken to prevent a repetition of such an affair.152 The extent and nature of the American newspaper accounts of Cuban conditions that were forced upon a more or less gullible public had so prejudicial an effect on the majority of Americans, that the Spanish minister to the United States decided the need of presenting to the American public a statement expressing the Spanish point of view 153 relative to the Cuban situation. In carrying out this purpose seas: Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, submitted on February 23, 1896 an article to the ngn;Yorn herein in which he endeavored to neutralize the Cuban propaganda in the United States. De Lcme stated at the outset that he considered the Cuban insurrection as an importation. His article read in.part that: All the representative leaders were and have been abroad and have obeyed the junta which has been established in New York and which had more than one hundred and fifty revolution- ary clubs, the greater part of them being in the United States. The revolution is not a popular uprising of a discontented nation. It is a filia bustering movement, principally of demagogues without standing in the island, who have nothing 151. P. E. Chadwick., op. cit., p. 438, quoting the Marquis de Olivart, Revue General gg_Droit International_Public, Vol. 8, p. 1900. 152. Ibid., p. 439. - 153. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 440. 46 to lose and are trying their chances.154 He then went on in his article to elaborate the fundamental cause of unrest as being of an economic origin. He explained how the abolition of the Cuban-American reciprocity treaty of 1890, with a consequent increased duty on sugar, had the effect of depressing Cuban industry and of throwing laborers on the plantations out of work.155 De Lame continued with the accusation of the unpunished violations by American filibusters of American neutrality and concluded with the following statement: I'I will only ask impartial persons to compare Cuba with many other countries from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. and see if there is more liberty, order, and good government, and if Spanish Cuba is not more free and happy than many other nations which are independ- ant."156 The De Lome presentation was widely read but had little actual influence on American opinion for two reasons, namely: in the first place, it was an unofficial statement and so merely represented an individual's viewpoint, and in the second place, the effect of the 'yellow journalism" of Hearst and Pulitzer had produced too great a credence in the minds of the American public as to the authenticity of De Lama's contentions. De Lome tried again in the same month to refute the Cuban claims of Spanish atrocity but had little success with the American public.157 154. 5:2;Yog; Herald, February 23, 1896, quoted by Chadwick, op. cit., Pa ‘40. 155. Ibid. 156. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 442. 157. anggigcord, 54th Cong., lst Sess., p. 2591. ‘1 It .1 47 " IV The pressure on the Cleveland-Olney Administration to inter- vene in Cuba grew greater as the weeks went by. Back of the desire the motivating groups in the United States had definite objectives to realize. In the first place there were those business groups with investments on the Island who insisted from the outset of the insur- rection that the United States Government should prevent the des- truction of American property in Cuba. The loss of wealth belonging to American vested interests in Cuba was rapidly assuming dangerous proportions. By the end of the year of 1896 our commerce with Cuba had been nearly wiped out. At the beginning of the Cuban Insurrection this amounted to a hundred million dollars annually.158 The largest loss sustained by American investors was in the sugar industry. In as much as the programs of both factions in Cuba called for a whole- sals destruction of sugar cane plantations, the result was a marked decline in sugar production from one million tons in 1894 to twenty- five thousand tons in 1898.159 American investments in Cuba reached a total of fifty million dollars by the end of 1896.160 However, the United States did not "own" Cuba in any sense of the word. The rail- roads were controlled by British capital; banking facilities were largely in the possession of British, German and French nationals.161 158. North Aggrican Revigg, No. 165, pp. 610.635. 159. E. J. Benton, "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War", p. 57. 160. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., pp. 56-37. 161. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 332. 48 Many other undertakings were Spanish and there was not a single American bank in Cuba.162 Those investors of American capital, however, saw their interests practically ruined by the Insurrection. In the one fiscal year of 1895 to 1896 imports from Cuba dropped from $52,871,259 to $40,017,750 while American export trade to Cuba suffered a loss of over five million dollars during the same period.163 The United States' economic losses were not confined to the Cuban sugar imports alone. Even though sugar was Cuba's most significant product, there were also valuable ore deposits on the island in which American investors had the controlling shares. There were three American iron and manganese enterprises in the single province of Santiago claimed to have an investment of some $6,000,000 of American capital, a large proportion of which was in ‘ property which easily could be destroyed.164 Naturally, the complete destruction of these interests, or in some cases the appropriation of them by both factions for military purposes tended to completely ruin the Cuban-American trade relations.165 The Spanish, moreover, regarded the American investors in Cuba as outsiders with no particular right to exploit Cuba's resources, and they were firmly of the opinion that the chief cause for American sympathy towards the insurrection was due solely to the extensive American investments in Cuba.166 The press of Spain was increasing in its denunciation of the American attitude toward the Cuban Insurrection, 162. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., p. 57. 165. Commercial Rel. of U. S. with For. Countries, 1896, Vol. 1, p. 122. 164. Julius W. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898", pp. 250-251. 165. J. H. Latané, "A History of American Foreign Policy", p. 502. 166. Orestes Ferrara, op. cit., p. 15 49 and like the Spanish Government it could not comprehend the need for the colonial reforms which were being urged by the United States. Further- more, Spanish Opinion, supported and directed by the newspapers, which, almost without exception, wishes war and promised the chastisement of the rebels and of their protectors, did not demand the reforms, which they considered as a humiliating and useless remedy.167 The result of this indifference toward a program of political and economic changes by the Spanish Government in Cuba tended to foster a strong anti—Spanish sentiment in the United States. Within a short time it was noticed that "public opinion in the United States was thoroughly aroused by the execution of policies which not only excited sympathy for the unfortunate inhabitants of Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of the island and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned at least fifty'nillions of property on the island, and American commerce at the beginning of the insurrection amounted to one hundred millions annually".168 This American attitude was being fed constantly by the "yellow journalism" of such propagandists as lilliam Randolph Hearst with such effect that it has been stated that "Hearst probably did more than any single private citizen to bring on the Spanish American War".169 This strong feeling rose to such a pitch in the United States that the ”Spanish retention of the island became as unacceptable to the vast body of the American people as to the 170 Cubans themselves". It is not hard to realize why a large part of the American public informed as they were by such biased newspaper 167. séfibr de Olivart in La Revue céhéEale‘gg Droit International, as quoted by’F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 480. 168. J. H. Latane, op. cit., p. 502. 169. John K. Winkler, "W. R. Hearst, an American Phenomenon", p. 6. 170. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 82. 50 accounts came to disregard all but the technical obligations which the United States owed Spain in preserving a strictly neutral position. The prevailing mental attitude of most Americans was well expressed in an article appearing in the Egggg entitled "Shall Cuba be Free", in which the author presented an American Cuban policy that would ultimate— ly lead to its liberation. An excerpt from the article ran as follows: To secure victory for Cuba it is necessary for us, in my Opinion, to take but a single step; that is, to recognize here belligerency: she will do all the rest.....0ur record toward Spain is clear.....0ur obligations to her are measured by an easily terminable treaty, which, however, while in force, in no way prevents us from recognizing Cuba's belligerency. Is it difficult for us to decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling overboard Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs, and which our treaty with Spain cannot prevent? Which cause is morally right7—which is manly‘L—which is American?171 The numerous arrests of American citizens in Cuba added to the strong anti—Spanish sentiment in America, and although the majority of these arrests were made on genuine grounds for suspicion yet they in time assumed a significant part in the Spanish-American controversy.172 The American Cuban policy was to a large degree shaped upon the advice of Americans in Cuba. Among these "the most important was..... Edwin F. Atkins, who had the ear of Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of 175 State”. Atkins owned a sugar plantation at Soledad, Cuba in which he had a capital investment of $1,400,000.174 In as much as he was one of the leading investors in Cuba, he naturally assumed the leader- ship in influencing the Cleveland-Olney Administration in its refusal 171. Forum, Vol. 20, pp. 50-65. 172- 52233.HEEEQDI1EB.Dnnnmsnt, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 1, pp. 751-820. 175. L. M. Backer and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 552. 174. Hispanic-American Historical Review, Vol. 14, p. 176. 51 to recognize the insurrectionists as belligerent .175 Secretary of State Olney and Ir. Atkins were in constant correspondence over the losses suffered by American investors in Cuba during 1895 to 1897. The following item taken from their correspondence dated March 9, 1896 indicates the nature of the complaints sent to the American Secretary of State as well as his reaction to them. Boston, Mass., March 9, 1896 Dear Sir: The mail received today from Cienfuegos, dated February 26, brings advices of the further burning by insurgents, on or about the 20th, of something over 500 acres of cane on our property Soledad. Owing to the difficulty of the manager getting about throughout the territory, a detailed estimate of cans lost by these fires was not then made up. At the date of the above-mentioned mail fires were again general, and we hear of two other American properties having suffered severely in the Cienfuegos district. Very respectfully yours, E. Atkins and Company176 On receipt of this letter Ir. Olney immediately dispatched a copy of 177 it to 36605 Dupuy de Lame, the Spanish Minister. The influence of Atkins on the Administration was aided by ”all of Olney's Boston sugar friends who wanted, not Cuban freedom, but the immediate suppression of the POVOIutianu,173 Even with the aroused public sentiment for American intervention 175. J. E. Nisan, "The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New fork Press (1895-1898)", p. 455. 176. Egg. 3.1:- pf Lh_e_ Q. §., 1896, p. 676. 177. Ibid., p. 676. 178. Carleton Beals, uThe Crime of Cuba", p. 115. 52 in Cuba, President Cleveland showed that he was unwilling to alter his policy in as much as he had been insisting on recognizing the Orights of Spain as well as maintaining a course of American neutrality.179 However, public Opinion toward the Cuban issue found definite statement 180 in the Presidential Election Of 1896. The Cuban question found ex- pression in the platforms Of the major as well as some of the minor parties. The events Of 1895 had completely destroyed President Cleveland's leadership and his party was hopelessly divided.181 This was reflected at the Democratic convention which met in Chicago on the seventh Of July and refused to indorse the Cleveland Administration 182 The delegates were composed largely of “free 185 by a vote of 564-557. silver" men and nominated as their candidate‘lilliam Jennings Bryan. The Republicans chose as their candidate William McKinley of Ohio, who was groomed by Mark Hanna, a representative of "big business".184 The Republicans had the most expensive plank in their platform on the Cuban question. It read as follows: we reassert the [cares Doctrine in its full extent, and we reaffirm the rights of the United States to give the Doctrine effect by responding to the appeal of any American state for friendly intervention in case of European encroachment... ..we watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battles Of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and Oppression, and best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty. The government Of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its Treaty obliga- ——'— vv—f v v—v— V‘ 179. J. D. Richardson, Op. cit., pp. 591-592. 180. Kirk Porter, "National Party Platforms", pp. 186-205. 181. J. F. Rhodes, "The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations", pp. 17-18. . 182. Ibid., p. 18. 185. Ibid., pp. 19-22. 184. Ibid., pp. 25-27. 55 tions, we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good Offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island.1 5 The Democrats, on the other hand, in stating their Cuban plank were less verbose but were equally as insistent on expressing their decided sympathy for the Cuban insurrectionists. Their plank elicited deep sympathy for the Cubans and read as follows: The Monroe Doctrine as originally declared, and as interpreted by succeeding Presidents, is a permanent part of the foreign policy of the United States and must at all times be main- tained. We extend our sympathy to the people Of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence. In addition to the two major parties which participated in this election there were six additional political groups of lesser impor- tance including the Populist, National, National Democratic, National Silver, Prohibition, and Socialist Labor partiea.137 Only one of these, the POpulist Party, made any mention of the Cuban issue in its platform. This party like the Democratic organization voiced its deepest sympathy and concern for the Cuban cause in the following words: We tender to the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest sympathy for their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence, and we believe the time has come when the United States, the great Republic Of the world, should recognize that Cuba is, and Of ri ht ought to be, a free and independent state. 83 The fact that the three leading political parties in the United States should embody the Cuban question in their plathrms indicates the importance of the issue in the American political thinking of that 185. Kirk Porter, Op. cit., pp. 204-205. 186. Ibid., p. 186. 187. Ibid., pp. 186-205. 188. Ibid., p. 199. 54 year. It must be distinctly understood that the Election of 1896 was contested not primarily on the question Of the recognition Of Cuban independence but on a variety of important domestic issues, among which were the questions Of free silver, protectionism, and the 189 Because of improvement Of American social and economic conditions. the great unpopularity resulting from the sepousal Of his non- intervention policy in Cuba President Cleveland had definitely deter- mined as well as hindered his political fortunes both within and without his party. There were, however, a few unprejudiced men who did realize the contribution he was trying to make toward maintaining peace between the United States and Spain. From this group there was Woodrow Wilson who at a later period in American history was to encounter somewhat the same problems. Wilson in an article written at a somewhat later date for the Atlantic Monthly, summed up Cleve- land's contribution to peace in these words: He has satisfied neither the Democrats nor the Republicans, because neither cared to Observe the restraints Of international law or set them- selves any bounds of prudence; but he has made Spain feel the pressure Of our Opinion and of our material interest in the Cuban struggle none the less, and by his very self-restraint has brought the sad business sensibly nearer to its end. 90 The editor of The Nation, E. L. Godkin, also supported the President in his action in protecting American citizens in Cuba when he remarked there was not "a scintilla Of evidence that the President has not acted in their behalf with prompt energy".191 The Election Of 1896 revealed that the vast majority of Americans had not been satisfied, 189. J. F. Rhodes, Op. cit., pp. 15-29. 190. Atlantic Monthl , NO. 79, p. 500. 191. Nation, Vol. 62, No. 1615,-p~ 446. 55 with the major policies Of the Democratic Party under Cleveland. In the votes cast William McKinley, "the advance agent Of prosperity", received two hundred and seventy-one electoral votes to Bryan's one hundred and seventy-six, while his popular vote swelled to a six hundred thousand majority.192 Meanwhile the American public as well as both Houses of Congress were awaiting with keen interest the post election pronouncements Of Cleveland on the Cuban issue which would be forthcoming in his annual message to Congress in December. A recent historian sensed this air Of expectgncy when he wrote that "the nation was in an expectant 195 mood.....there was war talk in the air". 0n the seventh of December Cleveland delivered his message to Congress in which, after reviewing the destruction Of American investments on the island and after attack- ing the illegitimate activities of the Cuban Jppggg in the United States, he went on to remark that - These inevitable entanglements Of the United States with the rebellion in Cuba, the large American property interests affected, and considerations of philanthrophy and humanity in general have led to a vehement demand in various quarters for some sort of positive intervention on the part Of the United States. It was at first proposed that belligerent rights should be accorded to the insurgents - a proposition no longer urged because untimely and in practical Operation clearly perilous and injurious to our own interests. It has since been and is now sometimes contended that the independence Of the insurgents should be recognized; but imperfect and restricted as the Spanish government Of the island may be, no other exists there.....It is urged finally that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine strife in Cuba should be ter- minated by our intervention, even at the cost Of a war between the United States and Spain.....The 192. JO Fe RhOdeS, Op. Cite, pe 29a 195. Walter Millis, Op. cit., p. 61. 56 United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which plainly dictates that right an? not might should be the rule Of its conduct. 94 The President expressed his belief that if Spain should extend to Cuba genuine autonomy then the main reason for the insurrection would be satisfied. "Such a result", he stated, "would appear to be in the true interest of all concerned".195 Cleveland closed his comment on the Cuban situation with a warning to Spain which he frankly declared: It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. While we are anxious to accord all due respect to the sovereignty Of Spain, we can not view the pending conflict in all its features and properly apprehend our inevitably close re- lations to it, and its possible results without considering that by the course Of events we may be drawn into such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the contest either alone and in her own way or with our friendly cooperation.....But I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests Of other nations and their citizens, joined by consider- ations Of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile country intimately related to us saved from complete devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its inhabitaptg an Opportunity to enjoy the blessings Of peace. 9 Congress "listened to Mr. Cleveland's message with an apathy broken only during the reading of the Cuban passages. Though cold, as ever to the aspirations Of Cuba Libre, Mr. Cleveland went further in the 194. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers Of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 718. 195. Ibid., p. 719. 196. Ibid., p. 722. 57 direction Of intervention than he had ever gone before".197 The American public was disappointed with the Message and characterized it as "a makeshift and a time-server".198 The reaction in Congress was indicative of the jingoistic leanings of many of its members. The result was the introduction in the Senate Of a series of resolutions by Senators Mills Of Texas, Call Of Florida, and Cullom Of Illinois for the purpose of recognizing the Cubans as belligerents}99 Senators Roger Q. Hills and Wilkinson Call, veterans Of the Confederate Army, still advocated the gntgflbgllpm_ policy of Cuban annexation which had been so forcefully developed by the pro-Southern Democratic administrations from 1845 to 1861 on the Doctrine 2f Manifest Destig;.200 The Egg lggk Journal in quoting Mills stated that he hoped his resolution would bring about a war between the United States and Spain.201 Senator Call's resolution probably reflect- ed the political influence centered in Florida which was a Cuban‘jggtg stronghold.202 However, a resolution by Senator James D. Cameron Of Pennsylvania received more consideration than the others because of his membership on the Committee for Foreign Relations.205 Cameron's resol- ution provided for Cuban independence and contained the suggestion that the "United States should use its friendly Offices with the government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and 197. Welter Millie, Op. cit., p. 61. 198. ghggago Tribune, December 8, 1896, as quoted by Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 67. 199. Con . Record, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 59. 200. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, lst Sess., No.14, pp. 27-125. 201. J. E. Wisan, op. cit., p. 251. 202. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, lst Session, NO. 14, p. 27. 205. Ibid., p. 108. 58 0 . Cuba".2 4 The American press became jubilant over these resolutions 205 and applauded this "Cuban field day in the Senate". President Cleveland was disappointed with the effect Of his Message on Congress in which he had voiced a plea against unwise action by that body.206 He, nevertheless, firmly refused to yield in his policy Of non- recognition of the insurrectionistsfiO7 He was supported in this policy by the Republican majority Of the House which was Opposed to the Cameron resolution mainly because Of the strong influence Of the Republican Speaker Reed who "detested jingoism and all forms of national aggression".208 Although defeated in their attempts to pass the Cameron resolution in the House Of Representatives the leading jingoists Of the Senate went as a delegation to Cleveland with the hope Of forcing him tO abandon his policy of non-intervention in Cuba.209 The Senatorial delegation told Cleveland that they had decided to declare war against Spain because Of the intolerable conditions on the island.210 ”Mr. Cleveland drew himself up and said: 'There will be no war with Spain over Cuba while I am President.‘ One of the members flushed up and said angrily: 'Mr. President, you seem to forget that the Constitution Of the United States gives Congress the right to declare war'.‘ He answered: 'Yes, but it also makes me Commander-in-Chief, and I will not mobilize the army.....It would be an outrage to declare war".211 204. Sgnate Doc., 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 251, part 7, p. 64. 205. J. E. Wisan, Op. cit., p. 251. 206. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 717. 207. Ibid., p. 718. 208. W. A. Robinson, "Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian", p. 556. 209. Allan Nevins, op. cit., pp. 718-719. 210. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906", p. 65. 211. Walter Millis, Op. cit., p. 65. 59 The resolutions introduced by the several members Of the Senate for the recognition Of Cuban independence were referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which rendered its report On December 212 the 2lst. The Committee recommended the adoption Of a joint re- solution declaring "that the independence of the Republic Of Cuba be, and the same is hereby, acknowledged by the United States of America".213 But the State Department not wishing to embarass the incoming Administration gave notice through Olney that recognition was a matter for the Executive to deter;nine.214 0n the same day Senator Augustus Bacon Of Georgia proposed the following concurrent resolution which read as follows: The question Of the recognition by this Government of any people as a free and independent nation is one exclusively for the determination Of Congress in its capacity as the law-making power; this prerogative Of sovereign power does not appertain to the Executive department Of the Government except in so far as the President is, under the Constitution, by the exercise Of the veto, made a part Of the law-making power of the Government.21 Q The statement of Olney's that recognition was a matter for the Executive authority was ultimately substantiated by the results Of a thorough investigation by the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- lations relative to precedents involving the power Of recognition.216 The report of the Committee published on January 11, 1897 showed that recognition is distinctly an executive function and that Congress has merely an indirect influence stating that "in the department Of inter- 212. Senate Doc., 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 251, part 7, p. 64. 215. Ibid., p. 64. 214. W. A. Robinson, Op. cit., p. 555. 215. Cong. Record, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 29, p. 557. 216. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 56, p. 18. 60 national law.....a Congressional recognition Of belligerency or in- dependence would be a nullity".217 This statement of the Committee received the sanction of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Neely v. Henkel in 1901 when the Court rendered its opinion in the following statement: The contention that the United States recognized the existence Of an established government known as the Republic Of Cuba..... is without merit. The declaration by Congress that the people Of Cuba were and Of right ought to be free and independent was not intended as the recognition of the existence of an organ- ized government instituted by the peOple Of that Island in hostility to the government maintained by Spain.....Both the legislative and executive branches Of the government concurred in not recognizing the existence Of any such government as the Republic of Cuba. 18 President Cleveland made one more attempt to solve the Cuban problem before his Republican successor, William McKinley, took Office as President. Cleveland had in his possession a letter from a London banking firm which led him to believe that Spain would sell Cuba for a sum Of one hundred million dollars.219 The letter read to the effect that in 1892 a group Of London bankers had raised the sum Of twenty million pounds sterling for the purpose Of pur- 220 chasing Cuba. A change in the Spanish Cabinet had rendered abor- tive the scheme at that time but Cleveland was still hopeful that the 221 Spanish Government might again consider the sale Of Cuba. Cleve- land selected as his emissary the international lawyer, Frederic Rene, 217. Ibid., p. 19. 218. J. M. Mathews, Op. cit., pp. 122-125. 219. R. M. McElroy, "Grover Cleveland", Vol. 2, p. 250. 220. Ibid., p. 251. 221. Allan Nevins, "Letters Of Grover Cleveland", p. 469. 61 Coudert, who had previously served the Cleveland Administration as a member of the Commission to investigate the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute.222 Coudert was an American of French parentage, who had been graduated with honors from Columbia University in 1850. Furthermore, he had served as counselor-at-law in the United States to the French, Italian, and Spanish governments.225 Cleveland hoped that with Coudert's knowledge Of the Spanish language and an understanding of Latin peoples a satisfactory settlement with Spain might be made.224 With this Objective in view he addressed a note dated on the twenty- eighth Of February to Mr. Coudert requesting his presence at the White House.225 Mr. Coudert's interview with the President developed into a lengthy discussion in which the President informed Coudert that he feared a war with Spain was imminent and asked him to accept the mission to the Spanish authorities in Havana. Coudert was aston- 226 ished at Cleveland's request and declined to fulfill it. He Offered as excuses personal ill health as well as the forthcoming change in the national administration.227 Notwithstanding the failure Of the proposed mission tO the Spanish authorities in Cuba the Cleveland—Olney Administration con- tinued to adhere to the policy of non-intervention and non-recognition Up to March 4, 1897 when the McKinley Administration assumed Office.228 222. A. Johnson, "Diet. Of Am. Biog.", Vol. 4, p. 464. 225. Ibid., p. 465. 224. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 719. 225. R. M. McElroy, Op. cit., p. 252. 226. Bemis, S. F. (Editor), "American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, p. 289. 227. R. M. McElroy, op. cit., p. 252. 228. J. F. Rhodes, op. cit., p. 41. 62 The remaining days after the Coudert conference of February 28th were occupied with correspondence between Secretary of State Olney and the Spanish Minister Sehor Dupuy de Lome concerning the protection of American citizens in Cuba.229 The inability of the Cleveland-Olney Administration to make an adjustment with Spain over the Cuban problem was eSpecially disappointing to DeLome who appears to have hoped that an understanding could have been arrived at despite the Opposition of an over-aggressive Congress.250 The Spanish Minister fully appreciated the fact that Cleveland and Olney would still have welcomed a peaceful solution but by the end Of February he had to report to the Spanish Government that he noted "a certain tendency to inaction on the part Of the Secretary of State during the little time that remains to him in the discharge of his Office."251 229. For. R91. 2; £139.11. _S_., 1897, pp.'485-485. 250. Henry James, "Richard Olney and His Public Service", p. 155. 251. Ibid., p. 167. 63 The expansionist urge of the Democratic Administrations from Polk to Buchanan had as its objective the ultimate incorporation of Cuba as an integral part of the United States. However, after the diplomatic adjustments, which had marked the American Civil War, there was a rapid subsidence of the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the attention of the American people tended to turn to the large economic and political activities related to the settlement of the Far West. Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis of Yale University has stated it well in the following sentences: The American people.....became engrossed with the building of the transcontinental rail- roads, with the exploitation of the natural re- sources of the newly won continental domain, with the development of mighty industrial func- tions summoned to life to supply the vast home market, free from tariff barriers, which was now the good fortune of citizens of the United States. A satiated nation, with a territory sufficient to occupy its activities for a cen- tury to come, provided it were prudently tilled by proper national policy; a people without a dangerous frontier; such a nation of happy beings seemed to gave little concern for foreign affairs.2 2 However, one chronic problem of American diplomacy, which had subsided for a time by 1878, was the Cuban Question. In meeting this problem after the Period of the Ten Years' War, 1868-1878, the Grant- 252. S. F. Bemis, "A Diplomatic History of the United States", p. 452. 64 Fish Administration came to formulate a policy radically different from the programs of the earlier Administrations. The Cuban insurrection of 1868-1878 came at a time in American history when the people as a whole opposed further territorial annexation, and likewise at a period in our national life when isolation came to be the accepted doctrine. In the development of American policy Secretary of State Hamilton Fish pre- vented Grant from being unwisely led by a Congress which was only too anxious to recognize Cuba as being in a §£E£E§.2£ belligerency. Not only did Fish definitely assert the right of recognition as the Chief Executive's prerogative—-a function early assumed by George washington and consistently followed by his successors, but he also withheld a certain moral encouragement to the Cuban rebels which actually strength- ened his subsequent dealings with Spain on the question of Cuban reforms. Grant and Fish by declaring Cuba as being in a state gf insurgency rather than in a.§tgtg_g§_belligerency had defined a policy for the United States which the Cleveland-Olney Administration found applicable in the troublesome years of 1895-1897. Thus in the recrudescence of the Cuban insurrection in 1895 the Cleveland Government had to meet a similarity of conditions somewhat more complicated with which the Grant-Fish Administration had previously been confronted. Cleveland and Olney seemed to have determined rather early in the period of the insurrection of 1895 that the only correct policy to follow was one that invited co—operation with Spain to bring about peace to Cuba on the basis of home rule. Cleveland followed logically the only course open to him-that Cuba was in a'gtatg‘gf insurgency for under international law she could not meet the conditions determining a state ‘2; belligerency. In attempting to define a Cuban policy at all times consistent with'the best interests of Cuba, Spain, and the United States, 65 the American State Department was met by an antagonistic and ever alert Congress, as well as by a strongly prejudiced American public. The policy of non-intervention in Cuba which had been so firmly adhered to by the Grant-Fish Government during the Ten Years' War was a precedent which Cleveland and Olney were desirous of continuing. In attempting to evaluate the strength of the influence of American capital in Cuba on the formulation of a Cuban policy during the years of 1895 to 1897 the conclusion drawn must be largely negative. While it is true that appreciable amounts of American wealth had gone into Cuban enterprises-notably in sugar and tobacco plantations- after the Period of the Ten Years‘ War, yet it was considerably less than the capital investments of England, France, Germany, and of course Spain. Likewise, the Spanish policy of restricting Cuban exports and imports to and from other nations by means of tariff walls was vexatious to other nations and particularly to the United States. With the pas- sage of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 better commercial relations seemed imminent when raw sugar was placed on the American free-list, and a reciprocity treaty promised the island a more profitable trade with the United States. The reciprocity efforts of Secretary of State Blaine, however, were of short duration for with the passage of the Wilson- Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, which was prompted by the need of revenue re- sulting from the Panic of 1895, the Government again put up a tariff wall against Cuban sugar and thereby greatly deranged the whole economic life of Cuba and also hurt American capital investments. With the outbreak of the insurrection in the following year American capital invested in Cuba was bound to suffer. It would be natural to conclude that certain Americans with heavy investments in 66 Cuba would attempt to influence the Administration for the acceptance of a Cuban policy more likely to meet their immediate economic interests. Edwin Atkins of Boston was representative of such a group, and while he had entree to official circles because of his personal friendship with Secretary of State Olney, yet there is no shred of evidence discernible which would indicate that the Administration was moved to act out of i consideration for such a pressure group. In fact the researches of recent writers such as Millie, Hacker and Bemis indicate that the American sugar planters in Cuba as well as the Sugar Trust were opposed to a Y www.~¢1_;-...’\~_.r-‘ ’.-. _- '1. policy which would bring the United States into a war with Spain. The claims resulting from lives lost and the property destroyed during the insurrection because of the Spanish policy were not adjusted until after Cleveland left office when spoilation claims could be presented by our government. It is a matter of record that few bona-fide American citizens were imprisoned and sentenced by the Spanish authorities. In proclaiming a course of American neutrality President Cleve- land like every other President of the United States under similar cir- cumstances was confronted with the grave problem of maintaining it. The so—calledljgntag of the Cubans became a force to reckon with as the insurrection spread. In this group Cleveland found an element which had accumulated strength in the United States through propaganda before the revolt had broken, and which resorted to every artifice in rendering aid to the Cubans by furnishing arms and munitions accumulated in the United States. Sometimes under the camouflage of American naturalization this group had long been planning a program and shaping a policy for the United States to pursue. It is at least interesting on noting that those Senators who introduced resolutions for recognition of a status ILA" 67 .2£ belligerency as well as the ultimate status of freedom for Cuba came from states wherein the Cuban Apntgg were most active. The re- searches on which this essay has been based have not revealed any direct contacts between jpntg leaders and the Cleveland Administration. Cleveland's early neutrality proclamation and his grave warnings to Americans regarding its observance did much in stopping filibustering E operations from the United States to Cuba, while the decisions of the t United States Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court in the case of the Horse probably achieved the desired effect. 1 q—awgfi'fmv i - - . . The press of a democratic nation like the United States can at times become the formulator of public opinion which may not always be in keeping with the best interests of all the people. At the time of the Cuban Crisis of 1895 the American public was coming under the in- sidious spell of that Species of the press known as "yellow journalism". It was the day of such journalistic rivals as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Cuban copy made newspapers sell, and in the Cuban situation a "humanitarian appeal" could easily stimulate a naturally sympathetic American people to cry for a more drastic foreign policy in helping the "under-dog." The clear-thinking and independence of President Cleveland in spite of the insistence of the Hearst papers for a more "vigorous policy" kept him from deviating from his set policy. While a gullible American public was accepting as truth the drawings of Frederick Remington's "Cuban Atrocities", Cleveland and Olney were keeping to the course they had pointed to. The independence of his convictions and the courage in carrying them out were distinguishing traits of Grover Cleveland. There was little in the way of valuable constructive advice from the Senate's 68 Committee on Foreign Affairs, nor was there much support from the Senate as a body. One could hardly accuse Cleveland of deveIOping his Cuban position with the “advice and consent of the Senate". How different was Cleveland's relation with the Senate from that of William McKinley's! The presence of a conspicuous group of "war-hawks" in the Senate in 1895 did not augur well for so conciliatory a policy as the one advanced by Cleveland and Olney. The Administration found plenty of opposition from the bellicose Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and his coterie who never were without a press organ for the creation of an administration op- position. The resolutions of the several Senators likewise indicated a decided stand against Cleveland's position, but here again it is difficult to discern just how far this opposition was created by the Cuban issue, by a personal dislike for Cleveland, or because of a general opposition to Cleveland's stand on other major issues before Congress. ' Tying up very closely with some of the opposition Senators were a group who had imperialistic leanings. While the strength of this group was not greatly realized until the Spanish-American War got under way, yet its thinking did permeate the public mind, to some extent, and naturally became a handicap to the preservation of peace with Spain. To maintain a policy of non-intervention and non-recognition in opposition to the above—mentioned forces at work is indicative of Cleve- land's solidness of character and the independence of his action as President. From 1895 to 1897 the Cleveland-Olney Administration firmly upheld the treaty obligations between the United states and Spain in spite of the annoying Cuban situation, and it effectively protected the rights of American investments as well as citizens in Cuba. However, 69 within the course of a year after Cleveland left office these achievements were nullified by the declaration of war-a war which Cleveland could only postpone but not avert. In as much as the Cuban Crisis occurred about the time of a Presidential Election it is logical to inquire as to the possible influence of political parties and party platforms in shaping the administrative policy after November of 1896. The Cuban issue although written into the party platforms of the three major parties can scarcely be emphasized as a deciding factor in the election outcome. In 1896 "free-silver" was the all absorbing topic and if there ever was an election in American history which was decided on one issue it surely was the Election of 1896. It is sane to conclude that the Cuban planks of all the party platforms were negligible in determining the vote of the electorate. The firm, if not bellicose attitude, taken by Cleveland in his treatment of the Venezuelan Boundary DiSpute in 1895 led many Americans to believe that the President would enter upon as forceful a procedure in handling the Cuban problem. To many, therefore, it was disappoint- ing to observe that Cleveland adopted a milder course in dealing with Spain than he had taken in meeting Lord Salisbury and the British Government. The deep honesty, which characterized Cleveland's actions both in private and public life, was again revealed by his insistence that the right of Spain as a sovereign state must not be disregarded. Cleveland saw all angles of the issue and he saw them all at the same time. In the light of historical perspective, which comes only with the flight of time, it seems when all factors are considered that the 70 policy of Cleveland in refusing to recognize an insurgengy movement in Cuba as one of belligerency was undoubtedly correct. The wisdom of not recognizing the Cubans in their struggle for the realization of their ideals may be open to question, but on the other hand the course pursued by the Cleveland—Olney Administration in dealing with an extremely complicated international problem in the light of existing international law and accepted precedents in the conduct of foreign relations did keep the United States at peace with Spain. 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