GROVER CLEVELAND'S FOREIGN POLICY RELATIVE TO CUBA DURING THE INSURRECTION OF 1895-1896

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Cuba was discovered by Columbus on his first voyage, October 28, 1492. The "Pearl of the Antilles", as Cuba has aptly been named, lies at the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico and is about ninety miles south of Key West, Florida. Possessing a warm climate, rich soil, and an abundant rainfall, the island can grow a large variety of products. Articles of economic value include tobacco, coffee, cacao, sugar-cane, as well as most of the tropical fruits. Due to its proximity to the United States and its position relative to the South American trade routes, the strategic importance of Cuba can not be overestimated. Moreover, the island is fortunate in that it has an abundance of excellent natural harbors.

The language of Cuba is Spanish. The long occupation of the island by the Spaniards started with its actual occupation by Diego Velasquez in 1511. Gradually the native element lost its identity by intermarriage with the Spaniards, and, at a later time, with the negroes. Slavery in Cuba early proved itself to be a profitable labor system, so that by 1817 out of a total of 688,000 inhabitants on the island, there were over 365,000 negroes of whom 250,000 were slaves.[1]

Spain's rule over Cuba lasted about four hundred years. These four centuries of Spanish control from 1492 to 1898 can be characterized by one work, Absolutism. Economically Spain regarded Cuba as a source of revenue for the home country. Spain determined the economic

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1. Charles E. Chapman, "A History of the Cuban Republic", p. 31.

policies of Cuba by prescribing what crops the Cubans might grow, and by compelling the exportation of these crops to Spain alone. Demands for revenues in Cuba were very burdensome, both in the amount and variety of taxable objects. Besides agricultural and commercial restrictions were imposed on the Cuban interests so as to work advantages to the wheat-growers and manufacturers of Spain.[2]

Politically, the Spanish rule of Cuba was comparable to the colonial administration that characterized most of Spain's colonial possessions in America. The ruler of the island was a royal appointee called the Captain-General. His control was practically absolute, being limited only by the audiencia, an advisory body always constituted of persons of Spanish birth. The right to suffrage was practically unknown to the native Cuban. Spaniards with meagre salaries were sent out from Spain to fill all the colonial positions and it was expected they would reap the rewards such positions entailed.[3] Even as late as the latter half of the nineteenth century it could be observed that

> . . . in Cuba, progress toward self government was slow. Spaniards continued to hold all the offices. Newcomers were favored in taxation and in the administration of justice. Both of these functions of government were hopelessly corrupt. Cuba remained in the hands of lower and middle-class adventurers from Spain backed by the entire authority of the home government.[4]

Very early in the history of the United States keen interest in the commercial and trade possibilities with Cuba developed. It was, therefore, desirous to cultivate a friendship with Cuba. The strained

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2. Walter Millis, "The Martial Spirit", p. 11.
3. J. H. Latané, "United States and Latin America", pp. 4-6.
4. L. H. Jenks, "Our Cuban Colony", p. 16.

relations between the United States and Spain, which had developed over the Florida boundaries from 1783 to 1795 and the navigation of the Mississippi River were finally adjusted on October 27, 1795 by the Treaty of San Lorenzo el Real.[5] With the obstacles of the boundary disputes and rights to the Mississippi River amicably settled, the United states hoped to enter into a closer relationship with Spain's colony to the south. The events in Europe, however, soon caused the United States to fear the designs of France in Cuba. In 1808 when Napoleon invaded Spain the possible complications of the invasion on Spanish possessions in Spanish America caused no little anxiety in America. Previously the Purchase of Louisiana in 1803 had given us title to the territory which would be seriously menaced if France were to gain Cuba. Thomas Jefferson who had manipulated the purchase of the Louisiana territory firmly believed in the American annexation of Cuba. In commenting on the Spanish-American policy of Napoleon in a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson stated:

> That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column in the southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a *ne plus ultra* as to us in that direction.[6]

President Madison realized well the significance of the geographic position of Cuba. In a letter to William Pinkney dated on October 30,

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5. H. S. Commager, "Documents of American History", pp. 168-169.
6. H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson", Vol. 5, p. 443.

1810, he remarked:

> The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States.[7]

Madison expressed for the first time the essence of a Cuban policy, which was to be adhered to by the United States until after the Mexican War, 1846-1848.

Meanwhile, England had kept close watch on the development of the Cuban question. As early as 1817 the American public was troubled over newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed to Spain a cession of the island of Cuba. The Purchase of Florida by the United States in 1819 again brought the Cuban question sharply into prominence. The British press became more insistant that England should have Cuba in order to offset the preponderance of American influence in the West Indies resulting from its possession of Florida.[8] The British government, however, disclaimed any designs on Cuba whatsoever. The United States was not entirely reassured of the British official position in Cuba so that in 1823 John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, in his instructions to our new Spanish Minister took pains to add:

> In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.[9]

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7. "Madison's Works", Vol. 2, p. 488.
8. R. Fitzgibbon, "Cuba and the U.S.", P. 6.
9. House Executive Document, No. 121, 32nd. Cong., 1st. Sess.

During the same year, 1828, President Monroe after consulting Jefferson on the possibilities of European entanglements in South American affairs received Jefferson's most significant reply of June 11, 1823 which stated in part:

> Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guarantseing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.[10]

Nor was France lacking in appreciation of the value of possessing Cuba at this time. In 1825, without any explanation she sent a large squadron which visited the West Indies and for weeks hovered about the coasts of Cuba. Both England and the United States were alarmed and both nations vigorously protested. Henry Clay was quite emphatic when he stated "that we could not consent to the occupation of these islands (Cuba and West Indies) by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever".[11] England felt as the United States did about the occupation of Cuba by any European power, except Spain, and in 1825 George Canning attempted to get the three countries, England, France, and the United States, to sign a tripartite agreement to refrain from any occupation of Cuba. The United States considered the proposal carefully, but when France declined to participate, the project was dropped.[12]

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10. H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson", Vol. 7, p. 288
11. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. 5, p. 855.
12. Harry F. Guggenheim, "The United States and Cuba", p. 6.

During the following year of 1826, it was proposed that the United States send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American republics assembled at Panama. The American Congress debated earnestly on this proposal, but the opposition of the Southern members was too strong. They were opposed to the Congress because the South American republics had adopted the principle of slave-emancipation. Southern Congressmen and Senators feared their influence would jeopardize the institution of slavery in the United States.[13]

Henry Clay's declaration against the interference of France and England in the affairs of Cuba was consistently followed by the administrations of both Jackson and Van Buren. In 1838-1839 England sent commissioners to Cuba and Porto Rico to report on the condition of the slave trade with those islands. Reports were at once circulated that Great Britain contemplated occupation of Cuba. The United States promptly told Spain that we would not consent to any British control over the island. Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary of State, wrote to our representative at Madrid, Mr. Vail, on July 15, 1840 to the effect:

> You are authorized to assure the Spanish government, that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[14]

Our position was reaffirmed later during January of 1843, by Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, when he wrote to Mr. Campbell,

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13. F. E. Chadwick, "The Relations of the United States and Spain", pp. 211-213.
14. T. H. Benton, "Abridgment of the Debates of Congress", Vol. 8, pp. 427-428, Vol. 9, pp. 90-218.

our consul, at Havana:

> The Spanish government has long been in possession of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to Cuba, which have never changed, and has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents, or forces upon any pretext whatever; and that in the event of any attempt to wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole naval and military resources of this country to aid her in preserving or recovering it.[15]

As a result of our war with Mexico, 1846 to 1848, our foreign policy became more aggressive. Americans now came to think of Cuba in terms of eventual annexation. Up to this period the United States had primarily been interested in preventing the acquisition of the island by other powers. The acceptance of the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny was the basis during the next fifteen years for all kinds of schemes promoting territorial extension --- Cuba included.[16] During the administration of President Polk in June of 1848, Secretary of State Buchanan instructed the American minister at Madrid to open negotiations with the Spanish government for the purchase of Cuba. After offering the maximum price of $100,000,000 for its purchase, the American minister added, that "desirable, however, as this island may be to the United States, we would not acquire it except by the free will of Spain. Any acquisition not sanctioned by justice and honor would be too dearly purchased".[17] In as much as the Spanish government refused to consider this proposal, there was no further effort to

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15. Francis Wharton, "Digest of the International Law of the United States", Section 60.
16. J. H. Latané, op. cit., p. 91.
17. House Executive Document, No. 121, 32nd Cong., 1st. Sess., Mr. Buchanan to Mr. Saunders.

purchase Cuba during the Whig administration of Taylor and Fillmore, 1849-1853. It was during this period that the ill-advised attempts of Narciso Lopez, a Cuban patriot, to invade Cuba occurred. His exploits not being sanctioned by the Administration caused Taylor on August 11, 1849 to warn all United States citizens from participation in such ventures. Taylor further added that "no such persons must expect the interference of this government in any form on their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in consequence of their conduct."[18] Prominent veterans of the Mexican War, especially Southerners, volunteered to assist, but the three expeditions of Lopez failed miserably and he subsequently was executed.[19] President Franklin Pierce, a Democrat coming into office in 1853, thought entirely contrary to his predecessors, Taylor and Fillmore on the Cuban issue. In his inaugural address he stated that the policy of the administration would "not be controlled by any timid foreboding of evil from expansion" and that the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdiction was "eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world".[20] Unfortunately, his selection of Pierre Soulé as our Minister to Spain was a bad choice. Soulé's instructions were to negotiate a commercial treaty with Spain which would be favorable to our trade development with Cuba. Mr. Soulé was indiscreet in his conduct and consequently our relations with Spain were strained.[21] Meanwhile, the seizure of the American steamer, Black

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18. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 5, p. 7.
19. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., pp. 35-39.
20. J. D. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
21. A. E. Ettinger, "The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soulé 1853-1855," p.310.

Warrior, by Spanish officials at Havana for violation of custom-house regulations, only increased the mutual misunderstandings between Spain and the United States.[22] Soule was instructed to demand an indemnity of $300,000 and a prompt disavowal of the act by the Spanish authorities. Spain was incensed at the preemptory tenor of the demand and was slow in answering the note. The affair was eventually adjusted by a private agreement between the Havana officials and the owners of the Black Warrior.[23] Shortly afterwards there was a change of ministry in the Spanish government with resulting internal disorders. Mr. Soulé was next instructed to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba. It was proposed that Soulé consult the United States minister to England, James Buchanan, and the American minister to France, John Mason, in order to arrange a conference at Ostend, Belgium for the purpose of overcoming any opposition which England or France might make to the proposed purchase.[24] The conference was held in October of 1854 and resulted in the issuing of the so-called Ostend Manifesto.[25] This Manifesto dealt mainly with an enumeration of the advantages that would accrue if the United States were to acquire Cuba. The only specific recommendation in the document was the suggestion that the United States should attempt, through the proper channels of diplomacy to purchase Cuba at a price not exceeding $120,000,000.[26] However, the report had some features that were most objectionable to Spain. It proposed

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22. A. E. Ettinger, ibid., pp. 252-253.
23. A. E. Ettinger, ibid., p. 254.
24. A. E. Ettinger, ibid., pp. 341-342
25. H. S. Commager, op. cit., pp. 333-335.
26. A. E. Ettinger, op. cit., p. 247.

in substance, that if Spain refused to sell the island, then the United States would be justified in taking Cuba by force.[27] The Pierce Administration repudiated the Ostend Manifesto by pigeon-holing it. It never became an executive pronouncement.[28] Pierre Soulé promptly resigned and with his return to this country our relations with Spain considerably improved.[29]

Previous to Buchanan's Administration, all negotiations for the purchase of Cuba had been initiated by the authority of the President alone. President Buchanan coming into office in 1857 tried to get both House and Senate of Congress to concur in an appropriation for Cuba's purchase.[30] His appeals met with little encouragement. In 1859 the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Slidell, reported a bill carrying $30,000,000 as a preliminary sum for the purchase of Cuba, but the bill was subsequently withdrawn because of the violent opposition of Southerners who feared the possible effect on slavery.[31]

Two years after Slidell's report the United States was in the throes of the Civil War and Cuban annexation dropped out of sight because of more pressing domestic affairs.

After 1865 our policy relative to Cuba was not one for acquiring the island for ourselves, but rather of urging Spain to abolish slavery on the island, to establish a more liberal form of government for the Cubans, as well as to promote a more untrammelled commercial

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27. H. S. Commager, op. cit., p. 334.
28. J. H. Latané, op. cit., p. 105.
29. A. E. Ettinger, op. cit., pp. 381-382.
30. J. W. Foster, "A Century of American Diplomacy", p. 350.
31. Senate Report, No. 351, 35th Cong., 2nd. Sess., p. 1.

intercourse between Cuba and the United States.

In the years immediately following the American Civil War the economic, social and political conditions in Cuba tended to promote greater unrest among the native population. Slavery was the cause of two distinct parties on the island. There came into existence a strong Spanish party which stood for the perpetuation of slavery and Spanish domination over Cuba. This political group came to be opposed by a second faction the Creoles or native Cubans, whose slogan was "Cuba for the Cubans".[32] In September of 1868 the Creole party rose against the Spanish authorities for the control of Cuba. The Cuban Revolt of 1868 soon spread throughout the island with disastrous effects.

In 1869 President U. S. Grant was most fortunate in having as his Secretary of State a man as able as Hamilton Fish. The Grant-Fish Cuban Policy was one of non-intervention, yet at the same time it sought to afford protection to American citizens and safeguard their rights in Cuba.[33] Hamilton Fish, alert to the situation, tried to prevent the shipment of munitions, men, and supplies from the United States to Cuban insurgents. Nevertheless, some ships managed to elude the American patrols, with the result that American relations with Spain again became tense.[34] On October 31, 1873 an incident occurred that very nearly precipitated a war between the two powers. On that day the steamer Virginius, flying the American colors and carrying a United States registry, was captured on the high seas by a Spanish

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32. J. H. Latané, op. cit., p. 107.
33. Allan Nevins, "Hamilton Fish", pp. 121-129
34. Ibid., pp. 185-189.

war vessel. While the Virginius had men and supplies on board destined for the Cuban insurgents, her seizure was a flagrant violation of international law. After summary trials, fifty-three of the crew and passengers of the ship were executed by the Spanish officials.[35] Excitement in this country was intense and the Grant Administration was urged to declare war at once.[36] It was later revealed that the vessel had illegally carried the American colors and registry.[37] A settlement was made finally in which Spain agreed to surrender the survivors of the crew, the vessel itself, and to disclaim any intention of indignity to the American flag.[38] In the meantime, the Grant Administration was anxious to bring about a settlement between Spain and Cuba in as much as the revolt was directly affecting American economic interests on the island.[39] On November 5, 1875, the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, addressed a letter of instruction to Caleb Cushing, our minister to Spain, in which he reviewed the course of the insurrection and the results on American interests in Cuba. Mr. Fish stated in his note that if the Spanish government couldn't effect a settlement with the insurgents, then the United States would feel it incumbent to intervene for the purpose of restoring order on the island.[40] Copies of this note were sent to our ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, and other European centers.[41] The answers received from these foreign

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35. Ibid., pp. 667-670.
36. Ibid., p. 672.
37. Ibid., pp. 679-681.
38. Ibid., pp. 688-689, and Senate Doc., 54th Cong., 1st. Sess., No. 165, pp. 1-118.
39. Allan Nevins, "Hamilton Fish", pp. 701-704.
40. Ibid., pp. 876-879.
41. Ibid., p. 879.

powers were either unsatisfactory or evasive. While Spain sympathized with the American wishes, yet its government stated emphatically that no outside intervention would be countenanced.[42] Although the insurrection dragged on for over two years after the issuing of the Circular Notes of Fish, finally the revolt was terminated in 1878.[43] The terms that Spain held out to the Cubans were: first, a partial representation in the Spanish Cortes and, secondly, the promise that slavery would be gradually abolished.[44] The non-intervention policy of the Grant-Fish Administration toward Cuba was significant, both from the fact that a Spanish-American War was averted between 1868-1878, and because the precedent set by Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, in preserving peace with Spain and also firmly insisting on American rights, were later followed by the Cleveland-Olney Administration.

The economic losses to Cuba as a result of the Ten Years' War were great. Cuba itself was nearly ruined. Her plantations, industries, and farms had been pillaged and destroyed. The debt of the War itself was forced on Cuba. Taxation was excessive, but even the money thus raised was not used for internal improvements.[45] In addition to shouldering the debt of the Ten Years' War, Cuba also had to bear the debt of the war with Peru, and the cost of maintaining the Spanish legation and consulate in the United States. At the time of the Insurrection of 1895 the taxes were especially grevious. The average revenue for the years 1893-1898 was $25,000,000. Of this amount, $10,500,000 was used in paying interest on the Cuban debt,

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42. Ibid., pp. 880-881.
43. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., p. 42.
44. Ibid., p. 69.
45. Ibid., p. 70.

which in 1897 was $400,000,000.[46]

After the termination of the Ten Years' War there was a great increase in the volume and the value of American-Cuban trade. The United States soon became the main buyer of Cuban products. "In sixteen years, 1876-1891 inclusive, the United States bought Cuban products to the extent of some $924,000,000 worth ....."[47] In his fourth annual message to Congress on December 7, 1896, President Grover Cleveland sketched the growth of American investments in Cuba. He said in part:

> It is reasonably estimated that at least from $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are invested in plantations and in railroad, mining, and other business enterprises on the island. The volume of trade between the United States and Cuba, which in 1889 amounted to about $64,000,000, rose in 1893 to about $103,000,000 ....[48]

In his annual report of December 7, 1896, Secretary of State, Richard Olney estimated the total value of American investments in Cuba as follows:

Cienfuegos district	$12,000,000
Mantanzas	9,000,000
Sagua district	9,229,000
Santiago mines	15,000,000 [49]

Cuba was the leading producer of cane sugar in the world during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. During the fiscal year of 1893-1894 an official report indicated that the five leading producers of cane sugar of the world were namely:

Cuba	900,000 tons
Java	480,000 "

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46. Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899, p. 38.
47. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., p. 70.
48. J. D. Richardson, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 718.
49. L. H. Jenks, "Our Cuban Colony", pp. 36-37.

Louisiana (U.S.)	265,000 tons
Phillipines	250,000 "
Brazil	225,000 " [50]

The significance of these statistics shows that of the world sugar cane crop for the year of 1893-1894 amounting to 2,960,000 tons, Cuba produced nearly one third of it.[51] The United States was one of the leading consumers of sugar during this period. United States consumption of sugar for the year 1890-1893 inclusive was as follows:

YEAR	TONS CONSUMED
1890	1,522,000
1891	1,872,000
1892	1,853,000
1893	1,891,911 [52]

The United States had a monopoly of all Cuban exports during this period. For the fiscal year of 1894 to 1895 the major Cuban exports of sugar and tobacco were as follows:

	SUGAR (Tons)	TOBACCO (Bales)
United States	680,642	153,642
All other countries	135,252	74,223
Total	815,894	227,865 [53]

However, the United States had other interests in Cuba to consider besides sugar and tobacco. Cuba being rich in iron, manganese, and nickel ores caused the Pennsylvania Steel Company and the Bethlehem Iron Works to purchase large ore deposits near Santiago in the year 1893.[54] American interests by the last decade of the nineteenth

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50. Senate Doc., 54th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 193, pp. 70-71.
51. Ibid., p. 71.
52. Ibid., p. 70
53. Commercial Rel. of U. S. with For. Countries, 1896, Vol. 1, p. 122.
54. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, "The United States since 1865", p. 331.

century had a decided monopoly of iron-ore investments in Cuba, with the result that by 1898 "Cuban shipments of iron-ore to this country reached the amount of 400,000 tons."[55]

It was during this same period that the obstacles to free trade between Cuba and the United States were removed by the McKinley Tariff Bill of 1890. Largely through the efforts of Secretary of State, James G. Blaine that a system of reciprocity with South American countries was adopted. Raw sugar was placed on the "free list" which resulted in an increased volume of trade with Cuba.[56] In 1890 the American trade with Cuba which was valued at $67,000,000, had increased in 1893 to $103,000,000.[57] Spain's opposition to the reciprocity features of the McKinley Tariff Bill was withdrawn in 1890, but in 1894 she again increased her rigid tariff laws.[58]

The filibustering activities of Cuban patriots in the United States to outfit expeditions for Cuban liberation never ceased. The agitator of these Cubans was José Martí, who, having escaped from a Spanish prison, came to the United States.[59] He was aided by other exiles and these men founded junta clubs in several of the leading American cities. By the year 1895 there were "about one hundred and forty patriotic clubs in the United States, Mexico, Central and South America, and the West Indies".[60] These men organized, financed, and

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55. Ibid., p. 331.
56. W. P. Mead, "The Development of the United States since 1865", p. 160
57. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 331.
58. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 71.
59. Ibid., p. 75.
60. E. J. Benton, "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War", p. 25.

outfitted filibustering expeditions during the year 1894, but in spite of the seizure of their vessels, their efforts were not entirely wasted, as was attested by the fact that in the following year the insurrection was to be formally launched which they had done so much to organize.[61]

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61. Charles Chapman, op. cit., pp. 75-77.

II

The Peace of Zanjón which ended the Ten Years War left many problems unsolved in Spain's relationship with Cuba. The promises which Spain hade made to her colony were not fulfilled. In a letter describing the general conditions in Cuba, Señor T. Estrada Palma stated to the American Secretary of State, Richard Olney that:

> The representation which was to be given the Cubans has proved to be absolutely without character; taxes have been levied anew on everything conceivable; the officers in the island have increased, but the officers are all Spaniards; the native Cubans have been left with no public duties whatsoever to perform, except the payment of taxes to the government and blackmail to the officials, without privilege even to move from place to place in the island except on the permission of governmental authority.
>
> Spain has framed laws so that the natives have substantially been deprived of the right of suffrage .... the Cubans have no security of person or property. The judiciary are instruments of the military authorities. Trial by military tribunals can be ordered at any time at the will of the captain-general.[62]

The dissatisfaction with these conditions resulted in opposition to the Spanish administration which lead to the development of political parties on the island. The Cuban resentment to Spanish rule was indicated in various ways, but the central theme of all their protests to the home government expressed the desire for autonomy. This desire was voiced by all the classes of Cubans. "Possibly the

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62. Senate Doc., 54th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 166, pp. 1-2

majority among the educated classes of Cubans would have been satisfied with autonomy for the island, though there were widely differing views as to the form it should take".[63] The authorities in Spain realized the need for improving the political status of the natives.

> The Peace of Zanjón forced upon the Spanish governors an effective change of policy .... the natural and wise thing to do would have been to found an autonomous regime .... the desire for autonomy grew even stronger, and in the Cortes this was pointed out by the colonial deputies, without their gaining a hearing, or even having justice done to their intentions .... In 1895 hopes were revived by a plan for political and administrative reforms of an autonomist nature .... but it was rejected and the very inadequate law which was substituted for it in 1895 was hardly put into force.[64]

The Cubans never lost sight of the motives which had inspired them to revolt in 1868, and after 1878 they continued to maintain organizations in both Cuba and the United States for the cherishing of their ideal. The Cuban leaders realized that to insure the success of their cause they must organize both for civil and military administration. The Cuban Revolutionary Party was founded with this end in view. Its main objects were to promote the sympathy of other countries, collect funds, and gather all the munitions of war.[65] Out of this situation were formed the junta clubs which were found in Cuba and neighboring countries. The United States in the course of time became a haven for Cuban patriots, who having been forced to leave their homes because of their political opposition to Spanish

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63. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 74.
64. Rafeal Altamira, "A History of Spanish Civilization", p. 202.
65. Senate Doc., 54th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 166., p. 2.

authority, fled to the United States. The American sentiment generally was quite sympathetic for the Cuban cause. The friendly attitude for the Cuban patriots persisted even after the inception of the insurrection of 1895 and the degree to which it found expression may be appreciated in that

> Soon after the outbreak of the Cuban insurrection, mass meetings were held in many of the larger cities to aid the cause of the rebels and as news reports of "opression" increased, these gatherings were held more frequently .... at one mass meeting held in Philadelphia $577 was collected for the Cubans and subscriptions to the amount of $3,000 were received.... An organization known as the "American Friends of Cuba" was formed in New York in 1896 to aid the Cubans.... Three weeks after its organization some 300,000 signatures to petitions had been reported.[66]

This external assistance was invaluable to the cause of the Cuban insurrectionists. "Whatever strength the insurrection has shown has been derived more than anything else from external aid, assisted by the involved financial situation of the country at present. But for these causes the movement would have ended almost as soon as it began". [67]

However, the friendly sentiment felt by the mass of Americans for the Cubans in their struggle for independence was not shared by particular individuals in the United States who had capital investments in Cuba. "American economic interests in Cuba in the seventies, eighties, and nineties made our concern over political stability of greater moment than the matter of sovereignty."[68]

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66. M. M. Wilkerson, "Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War," p. 58.
67. North American Review, Vol. 161, pp. 362-365
68. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 329.

Such vested interests of American business men in Cuba were directly affected by the political situation there. American capital was largely invested in the sugar industry, therefore it was this particular interest that especially felt the effects of Cuba's political instability.[69]

The American economic depression which came in 1893 during Cleveland's second administration aggravated the economic unsoundness of the Cuban situation. This business crisis came largely as the result of a combination of adverse conditions caused by inordinate speculation especially in railroads, over-production of silver enhanced by the Sherman Act of 1890, a large deficit in the national treasury resulting from a policy of inordinate spending, and agricultural conditions due to crop failures.[70] The economic and social distress caused by the Panic of 1893 was unequaled by any previous business depression in the United States. It came with

> Failures of well-known concerns (which) had already shaken public confidence in the business structure, and the decline of the reserve set in motion a period of liquidation the most severe yet experienced. During 1893 over 600 banking institutions failed, while during the summer 74 railroad corporations owning 30,000 miles of road passed into the hands of receivers ..... More than 15,000 commercial failures involving liabilities of $346,000,000 were recorded for 1893. The production of iron and coal declined, and to add to the general distress there was a poor corn crop in 1894 and a decreased demand on the part of Europe for wheat. Unemployment, strikes, discontent, and much actual suffering characterized the winters of 1893 and 1894, a period which encompassed the Pullman strike in Chicago and the marching of "Coxey's army."[71]

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69. J. W. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898", p. 248.
70. H. V. Faulkner, "American Economic History", p. 502.
71. Ibid., p. 504.

Such a crisis in the United States naturally had repercussions elsewhere. In reference to Cuba the magnitude and extent of the Depression of 1893 directly affected its economic status in as much as the United States was the main importer of Cuban goods. Moreover, any fluctuations in American business conditions were bound to influence Cuban business interests directly. The Panic of 1893 was so widespread that recovery was slow. "Since the panic of 1893 American business had been in the doldrums. Tendencies toward industrial revival had been checked, first by the Venezuela war scare in December, 1895, and again by the free silver menace in 1896".[72] American investors promptly cut down on expanding their holdings in Cuba. By the early months of 1895 the historical maxim that economic insecurity breeds political unrest was illustrated in Cuban society when the revolutionary parties again sought to realize their long-cherished objective of political autonomy if not complete independence. "The real substance of Cuban dissatisfaction in 1895, however, was basically economic".[73] Nearly 80% of Cuban wealth was invested in sugar. This product was the most important single item of Cuban trade with the United States. "Among further economic causes for the outbreak of 1895 may be cited the fact that loans contracted by Cuban sugar planters on the basis of a rapidly expanding industry became extremely burdensome under conditions as they existed following the repeal of the reciprocity arrangement."[74]

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72. Hispanic-American Review, Vol. 14, p. 166
73. R. Fitzgibbon, "Cuba and the U. S.", p. 14.
74. Ibid., p. 15.

The McKinley Tariff of 1890 went into effect at a time when the United States was in a sound financial condition. In framing a new tariff in that year the Republican Congress cut heavily at the sources of revenue and by so doing placed all sugar on the free list.[75] Meanwhile Spain's unwelcome restrictions on Cuban exports were still in force but shortly the policy was modified by the Foster-Canovas Treaty of 1891 which had the effect of encouraging an unprecedented expansion of Cuban raw sugar manufacture.[76] The hard times with the accompanying loss of revenue in the United States, however, caused the Democratic Congress to pass the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 which placed a 40% ad valorem duty on raw sugar automatically abolishing the trade reciprocity between Cuba and the United States.[77] "The Cuban revolution drew strength from the economic catastrophe of the Wilson tariff."[78] The result was that many of the native Cubans were deprived of means of employment. When the revolt came in 1895 these men, excited by the urgings to insurrection by their leaders, joined eagerly the ranks of the insurgents.[79] L. H. Jenks, an authority on Cuban economic conditions, has summarized the statistical effect of the Wilson-Gorman Act on Cuban sugar production as follows:

YEAR	PRODUCTION (Long Tons)	VALUATION
1885-1889 (Average)	630,000	$44,500,000
1890	632,000	43,300,000
1891	819,000	57,400,000

75. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., p. 38.
76. Ibid., p. 39.
77. Ibid., p. 39.
78. E. F. Atkins, "Sixty Years in Cuba", pp. 143-145.
79. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 407.

YEAR	PRODUCTION (Long Tons)	VALUATION
1892	976,000	69,300,000
1893	815,000	64,300,000
1894	1,054,000	62,100,000
1895	1,004,000	45,400,000
1896	225,000	13,000,000

[80]

The spirit of discontent among the natives of Cuba finally found its expression in the grito de Baire, or the battle-cry of the Cuban insurrectionists. The Cuban uprising of 1895 was carefully planned, and on the twenty-fourth day of February the revolt was formally launched. "The time for the revolution was well chosen, because the depression of 1893 had crushed Cuba as general depressions always do and as only a one-crop country can be crushed."[81]

Spain early realized the seriousness of the insurrection and dispatched large numbers of Spanish regular troops to assist the insufficient soldiery already in Cuba. Within a short time the Spanish troops in Cuba numbered approximately two hundred thousand men comprised mostly of infantry, though the cavalry would have been much more efficient in coping with the guerilla warfare of the insurrectionists.[82] Moreover, the military forces sent over from Spain were composed of mere boys and totally unfit for fighting against the hardy natives.[83] Within less than two months after the outbreak of the insurrection the Spanish government dispatched to Cuba its most able military leader, General Martínez Campos, who was well acquainted with Cuban conditions because of his service during the Ten Years' War. Although possessed of unquestionable ability, Campos was unable to gain substantial

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80. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., p. 40.
81. H. F. Guggenheim, op. cit., p. 30.
82. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., p. 78.
83. E. P. Oberholtzer, "A History of the United States since the Civil War", Vol. 5, p. 48.

victories and therefore he was recalled to Spain early in 1896.[84]

As a successor to Campos the Spanish government selected General Valeriano Weyler who had gained a reputation for cruelty during the Ten Years War. Weyler at once inaugurated a policy of concentration of non-combatants within restricted areas known as the reconcentrado camps. "He built a series of blockhouses, joined together by wire entanglements, across the island in the hope of corralling the insurgent forces in a gradually restricted area; and he took measures to stop the rebels from living off the countryside by ordering the concentration of the island's population into camps under the surveillance of troops."[85] Within a short time these reconcentrado camps became centers of disease and pestilence. The American Consul General at Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, reported to Washington "that of the 101,000 reconcentrados in Havana alone, more than 52,000 had died."[86]

The insurgents in the meanwhile were following a program of property destruction to gain their ends. They moved about the country "attacking and burning plantations and pueblos, and even occasionally falling upon a special garrison in a small town, but fighting only when they outnumber the Spaniards or surprise them in a disadvantageous position."[87] The Cubans were excellent in this type of guerilla warfare. The Spanish answered these challenges to an ever increasing warfare of ferocity and revenge. "Revolutionists who were captured were shot or sent to prisons in Africa.....Estates were ravished, isolated garrisons captured, railroads destroyed, towns burned and the

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84. Charles E. Chapman, op. cit., p. 80.
85. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 333.
86. D. T. Lynch, "Grover Cleveland", p. 498.
87. Cosmopolitan Magazine, No. 19, pp. 608-618.

larger cities threatened."[88] The Cubans were lacking greatly in the munitions of war and were extremely handicapped in fighting the Spanish regular troops who were adequately equipped. The insurgents in 1895 claimed to possess a military force of about sixty thousand men. One-third of these was well armed, one-third moderately well equipped, but the remainder was very poorly provided.[89]

The revolt was at first confined to the province of Santiago. It then spread to Puerto Principe, next to the province of Santa Clara, and finally to Mantanzas province, so that by the end of 1895 the entire island was in a state of revolt against Spain.[90]

The crisis in Cuba was a direct challenge to the Cleveland Administration. Whatever his personal opinions might have been relative to the legitimacy of the Cuban cause for freedom, President Cleveland placed his duty to his country in defining what the United States foreign policy should be as of greater importance than the satisfying of his private convictions. "He (Cleveland) was far from being a pacifist, but he was a firm believer in the doctrine that nations should mind their own business, and he did not consider the Cuban situation our affair."[91] However, the immediate problem was not one of merely ignoring the existence of Cuba. "The outbreak of a fresh insurrection in Cuba increased greatly the perplexities of the administration. The outspoken sympathy with the insurgents.....expressed itself.....in heated denunciation of the President for his strict observance of a friendly attitude toward Spain, and for the steps which

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88. E. P. Oberholtzer, op. cit., p. 49.
89. American Review of Reviews, Vol. 13, p. 420.
90. North American Review, Vol. 166, pp. 560-569.
91. Robert McElroy, "Grover Cleveland", p. 272.

he took to prevent filibustering and other violations of the neutrality laws."[92] Fortunately President Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney viewed eye to eye the Cuban situation, and anxiously watched the development month by month on the island. A few months after the outbreak of hostilities in February Mr. Olney in a letter to President Cleveland expressed his views on the Cuban situation by remarking in part:

> The Spanish side is naturally the side of which I have heard, and do hear, the most. It is, in substance, that the insurgents.....are the ignorant and vicious and desperate classes marshalled under the leadership of a few adventurers, and would be incapable of founding or maintaining a decent government if their revolution against Spain were to be successful..... There are, however, grounds for questioning the correctness of this view.....The Cuban insurgents are not to be regarded as the scum of the earth.....In sympathy and feeling nine-tenths of the Cuban population are with them.[93]

Olney believed in strict impartiality, however, and was both zealous and efficient in carrying out the policy of the Administration respecting Spain's requests for American non-assistance to the insurgents. He decided that the involved situation in Cuba warranted an impartial investigation by the United States.[94] However, the economic losses sustained by American investors in Cuba as a result of the wholesale property destruction were fully realized by President Cleveland and his Secretary of State and were a matter of genuine concern to them.[95] The Administration was faced at once with the problem of determining the

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92. Edward Stanwood, "History of the Presidency", p. 520.
93. Robert McElroy, op. cit., p. 245.
94. Allan Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland", p. 410.
95. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 718.

status of Cuba. There were many who considered the status of the insurgents[96] to be that of belligerents. However, President Cleveland and Secretary of State Olney considered the island to be in a state of insurgency. Cleveland personally stated that in regard to the question he was utterly opposed to the recognition of belligerency. "Indeed, so very unmistakable were my views (he stated at a later date) on the subject that I was time and again threatened by frenzied men and women with dire calamities to be visited upon myself and children because of what they saw fit to assert was my enmity to the Cuban cause."[97] Cleveland was justified in his refusal to recognize the belligerency of Cuba. "The only kind of war that justifies the recognition of insurgents as belligerents is what is called 'public war'; and before civil war can be said to possess that character the insurgents must present the aspect of a political community or de facto power, having a certain coherence, and a certain independence of position, in respect of territorial limits, of population, of interests and of destiny ..... It is evident that a war is in progress in Cuba; but it is equally evident that it presents the features of guerilla rather than of regular warfare....."[98] Therefore in June 12, 1895 President Cleveland issued

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96. C. H. Stockton, "Outlines of International Law", p. 78. In the United States Supreme Court decision of The Three Friends, rendered in 1897, Chief Justice Fuller distinguished between a state of insurgency and a state of belligerency as follows: "The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition of political revolt, between recognition of the existence of war in the material sense and of war in a legal sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the political department has not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent engaged in hostility with Spain but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary warfare prevailing before, at the time, and since this forfeiture is alleged to have occurred."
97. Allan Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland", p. 492.
98. Forum, Vol. 21, pp. 288-300.

a proclamation recognizing a state of insurgency in Cuba and warning American citizens against violating United States neutrality laws. The Proclamation stated in part:

> Whereas the island of Cuba is now the seat of serious civil disturbances, accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the established Government of Spain, a power with which the United States are and desire to remain on terms of peace and amity; and whereas the laws of the United States prohibit their citizens, as well as all others being within and subject to their jurisdiction, from taking part in such distrubances adversely to such established Government, by accepting or exercising commissions for war-like service against it, by enlistment or procuring others to enlist for such service, by fitting out or arming or procuring to be fitted out and armed ships of war for such service, by augmenting the force of any ship of war engaged in such service and arriving in a port of the United States, and by setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for military enterprises to be carried on from the United States against the territory of such government ..... I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of America, do hereby admonish all citizens and other persons to abstain from every violation of the laws herein-before referred to, and do hereby warn them that all violations of such laws will be vigorously prosecuted .....[99]

The Proclamation recognized a definite distinction between insurgency and belligerency. It merely put into effect municipal statutes and did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality that come under international law.[100] The refusal of President Cleveland to recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerent, however, was unfortunate in certain respects. It provoked an advocacy of the Cuban cause both by Congress and the American people. In the course of time this sympathy for the insurgents grew so strong that in time it came to

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99. J. D. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 591-592.
100. J. B. Moore, "Digest of International Law", Vol. 1, pp. 242-243.

be felt, both in the United States and Spain, "that a recognition of belligerency would be introductory to a recognition of independence .....and would undoubtedly constitute a casus belli".[101]

Despite the Proclamation, with its definite warning to refrain from aiding the Cubans in their warfare with Spain, the Cleveland Administration was faced with much opposition in maintaining strict neutrality. American public opinion was aroused because of the Spanish program of cruelty instituted and carried on by Weyler. The business men of the United States were hostile to Cleveland because his program of non-recognition and non-assistance was causing the ruin of their investments on the island. The press was especially denunciatory of the Administration. Throughout the period of the Insurrection there was much rivalry between the leading newspapers of the United States. "Especially was the contest bitter between the World and Journal, which had developed into a fight for supremacy in the field of New York journalism, conducted by Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Pulitzer bought the World in 1883 and by launching an aggressive editorial policy and adding typographical invocations to his paper had built a small, insignificant publication into one of the most influential papers in New York. Beginning with a circulation of some 15,000 the World, under Pulitzer, had reached by April, 1896, a circulation of 742,673 a day."[102] These papers never ceased in their appeal to the American public on behalf of the Cuban cause. They sent their correspondents to Cuba to get "atrocity" stories. This type of "yellow

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101. North American Review, Vol. 162, pp. 406-413.
102. M. M. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 7.

journalism" did a great deal in keeping the public aroused to the nature of the Spanish mode of warfare in Cuba. An example will illustrate the emotional appeal of these articles:

> Meanwhile a cowardly American president and a cold-blooded American secretary of state sit calmly by and declare there is not a state of war in that unfortunate island which has been harried and devastated by war nearly two years. It is not only war, but uncivilized, barbarous, bloody war. It must stop. If the present administration will not stop it the next administration will take the responsibility of stopping it and will thereby earn the plaudits of all humane, civilized, patriotic, liberty-loving Americans.[103]

The juntas maintained their organizations in various cities in the United States and many Cubans, including some who were still Spanish subjects, established themselves in American ports and furnished the insurgents with arms and supplies. Illegal expeditions were continually being fitted out in the United States, and while the great majority of them were stopped by port officials or intercepted by the navy, some of them succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba.[104]

Secretary of State Olney cooperated with the Spanish ministry by preventing the departure of vessels for Cuba that were suspected of bearing men or munitions for the insurgents. His efforts were greatly appreciated by the Spanish Government and did much to maintain amicable relations between the two powers.[105] It was exceedingly difficult, however, to get unbiased reports on the situation in Cuba. In his

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103. Ibid., p. 49, (Quoting the Chicago Tribune, December 3, 1896).
104. J. H. Latane, "History of American Foreign Policy", p. 502.
105. For. Rel. of U. S., 54th Cong., 1st. Sess., No. 1, pp. 1163-1231.

report to the President on September 25, 1895 Secretary Olney wrote in part:

> If the insurgents are revolting against intolerable political conditions we should certainly be justified in remonstrating..... against the resort, by either party, to cruel and inhuman modes of warfare.....we should also put ourselves in a position to intelligently consider and pass upon the questions of according to the insurgents belligerent rights, or of recognizing their independence.....For these reasons and because it seems to me the Executive may well consider it his duty to see that want of proper information does not lead Congress astray upon any matters involving our foreign relations -- I take the liberty of suggesting that an agent be sent to Cuba, not with any diplomatic title nor vested with any diplomatic functions, but simply empowered to investigate and report all the features of the present Cuban situation so far as America's interests can be affected by them.....[106]

Cleveland did not follow the suggestion of his secretary of state at this time, however, and, when later he did decide to send a mission of the type suggested by Olney it was too late.[107]

Shortly after this report of Olney's an incident occurred which proved to be a "test case" for the Neutrality Proclamation of June 12, 1895. The vessel Horsa, sailing under the Danish flag with Danish officers had been engaged over a period of time in the fruit business of an American firm. On November 9, 1895 the vessel cleared Philadelphia for Port Antonio, Jamaica. Just before departure the captain received a message instructing him to proceed north and anchor off the New Jersey coast at Barnegat Light. When the vessel reached the designated place it was joined by the steam-lighter J. S. T. Stranahan which had sailed down from Brooklyn, New York, to meet the Horsa.

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106. Allan Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland", p. 410.
107. Ibid., p. 469.

Some forty Cubans were also placed on board the vessel. When the vessel came near Cuba on its Jamaica itinerary, the Horsa dispatched to the island two small boats with the cargo of munitions as well as the forty Cubans. On its return the filibustering vessel with its captain and two mates was seized by the United States authorities for violation of the American Neutrality laws. The trial took place in the Eastern Federal District Court of Pennsylvania. The court claimed a violation of Section 5286 of the Revised Statutes of 1794 which in part contained that:

> Every person who, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begins or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.[108]

The case presented two primary questions. First, was such a military expedition organized in the United States and, secondly, did the defendants render such material assistance with full knowledge of the facts? In construing the law the court defined a military expedition as a combination of men organized in the United States with the purpose of aiding the Cuban insurrectionists in their resistance to the de jure government by providing them with arms and ammunitions, while at the same time the United States officially was maintaining a policy of strict neutrality. The second question arising from the case was whether or not the officers had knowledge of the actual facts. The court again decided that the officers and crew of the Horsa had full

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108. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 412.

knowledge of their operations.[109] The filibusterers next made an appeal to the United States Supreme Court which was unwilling to reverse the decision of the lower court.[110] The court decisions in the Horsa case proved most helpful to the Cleveland Administration in its endeavor of maintaining a condition of strict neutrality. The unfavorable positions taken by the United States Supreme Court in its unwillingness to reverse a lower court's decision had a discouraging effect on further filibustering operations from the United States. Nevertheless, from time to time some attempts were made to disregard the American neutrality laws with the result that on July 27, 1896, President Cleveland issued his second proclamation of neutrality. He restated the desire of the United States to remain at peace with Spain and again warned all citizens of the United States, including any others within its jurisdiction, from any violations of the laws of American neutrality.[111] The effect of this second proclamation was to diminish most appreciably the number of filibustering expeditions.

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109. House Executive Document, No. 326, 55th Cong., 2nd. Sess.
110. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 414.
111. J. D. Richardson, op. cit. pp. 694-695.

III

President Grover Cleveland was opposed in his Cuban non-intervention policy by members of both houses of Congress. The propaganda that emanated from the juntas in the United States and the "yellow journalism" of such men as Pulitzer and Hearst combined to develop a sympathetic attitude among members of the House and Senate favorable to Cuba. Members of the Cuban juntas visited the congressmen and senators individually and did their utmost to win sympathy for the cause of the insurrectionists.[112] The "atrocity stories" aroused not only the emotions of the American public but also gained the sympathy of many members of Congress. The following excerpt taken from the New York World for May 17, 1896 illustrates the kind of sensational writing which was spread before the gullible American public:

> This year (1896) alone the war will strike $68,000,000 from the commerce of the U. S. ..... Wounded soldiers can be found begging in the streets of Havana.....Cuba will soon be a wilderness of blackened ruins. This year there is little to live upon. Next year there will be nothing. The horrors of a barbarous struggle for the extermination of the native population is witnessed in all parts of the country. Blood on the roadsides, blood in the fields, blood on the doorsteps, blood, blood, blood!"[113]

Such accounts came to have a large reading public throughout the United States and in time were eagerly seized upon by certain members of both

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112. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., p. 334.
113. New York World, May 17, 1896, as quoted by M. M. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 32.

houses of Congress who desired American intervention in Cuba.[114] The leader of this faction in the Senate was Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts who voiced the sentiment of his element when he remarked that "this is a world of comparative progress, and freedom from Spain would be to Cuba a long step in advance on the high-road of advancing civilization. The interests of humanity are the controlling reasons which demand the beneficent interposition of the United States to bring to an end this savage war and give to the island peace and independence. No great nation can escape its responsibilities ..... We have a responsibility with regard to Cuba."[115] These "youthful war-hawks.....were declaring that God would curse the American people if they waited for Cuban independence until the island should be desolated by fire and sword."[116] The United States Senate in 1896 was about evenly divided in membership in respect to party affiliations. There were ninety senators in the 54th Congress at the opening of its first session among which were forty-four Republicans, forty-three Democrats, and three Populists. On the other hand, in the House of Representatives the Republicans had an impressive majority of two hundred and forty-seven out of a total membership of two hundred and sixty-seven.[117]

The lack of cooperation between President Cleveland and the House of Representatives was partly due to the fact that he was a Democrat while the House majority was overwhelmingly Republican, but mostly because the majority of Congressmen favored Cuban intervention.[118] The 54th Con-

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114. Walter Millis, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
115. Forum, Vol. 21, pp. 278-287.
116. Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 48.
117. Senate Doc., 54th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 15-141.
118. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., pp. 332-334.

gress had no sooner opened its session before the Cuban question became an object of spirited debate. On December 3, 1895, Senator Wilkinson Call of Florida offered a joint resolution to recognize the independence of Cuba.[119] Call was probably influenced to some extent by the many Cuban-Americans who lived in his constituency. On December 21, 1895 Call's resolution was followed by one from Senator Hill of New York who offered a similar resolution declaring "that a state of public war exists in Cuba, and that the parties thereto are entitled to and hereby are accorded belligerent rights".[120] Senator Call's resolution was also followed closely by that of the Populist senator, William V. Allen of Nebraska, who offered a resolution which provided for the independence and annexation of Cuba, the purchase of all the islands in the neighborhood of the United States, the prompt and effective observation of the Monroe Doctrine in "its purity and primary intentions", and a firmer protection of the rights of American citizens abroad.[121] These resolutions were referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with the purpose of investigating the true conditions which had prompted these propositions for intervention. On January 29, 1896 the Committee rendered its report which made mention of the damages to American interests and stated that the United States had met the difficult task of maintaining a program of neutrality "with vigor, impartiality, and justice".[122] After asserting that chaotic conditions existed in Cuba it further declared that it was Spain's duty to recognize a state of war on the island.[123] The

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119. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 39.
120. Ibid., p. 365.
121. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 205.
122. Senate Reports, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 141, p. 1.
123. Ibid., p. 2.

Committee's report submitted the proposed resolution with the contention that it was "the duty of Congress to define the final attitude of the government of the United States toward Spain.....

> Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), that the present deplorable war in the island of Cuba has reached a magnitude that concerns all civilized nations to the extent that it should be conducted, if unhappily it is longer to continue, on those principles and laws of warfare that are acknowledged to be obligatory upon civilized nations when engaged in open hostilities, including the treatment of captives who are enlisted in either army; due respect to cartels for exchange of prisoners, and for other military purposes; truces and flags of truce; the provision of proper hospitals, and hospital supplies and services to the sick and wounded of either army.
>
> Resolved further, that the representation of the views and opinions of Congress be sent to the President; and if he concurs therein that he will, in a friendly spirit, use the good offices of this government to the end that Spain shall be requested to accord to the armies with which it is engaged in war the rights of belligerents, as the same are recognized under the law of nations.[124]

The Committee's report in itself was vague in as much as it had little more than described the conditions in Cuba. However, it did reflect the effectiveness of the "atrocity stories" in influencing Congress. Nor did the report show at all clearly how the recognition of belligerency would end the savage nature of the insurrection.[125] There could be, nevertheless, no doubt as to the barbarity of the struggle. It revealed how under the orders of General Valeriano Weyler the Spanish soldiers had gathered the Cuban civilian population in the towns. It showed how the refusal to comply with this decree of

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124. Ibid., p. 4.
125. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 433-435.

reconcentrado resulted in the recalcitrants' being treated as rebels. It also indicated that the majority of those who obeyed the orders were women and children with a resulting high mortality because of their being sequestered in crowded villages with miserable sanitary facilities as well as being provided with inadequate food supplies.[126] As a retaliatory program the insurgents followed a policy of destroying property and became so efficient at this that even American investments received slight respect. Within a period of less than three years the American claims on file in the American State Department against Spain for property losses sustained in Cuba amounted to sixteen million dollars.[127] Moreover, public opinion in the United States was stirred because of the treatment of American citizens by the Spanish authorities in Cuba. Throughout the entire Second Administration of Grover Cleveland, 1893-1897, this problem became the occasion for much adverse comment in reference to the policy formulated by the President.[128] During Cleveland's Administration there was a total of seventy-four arrests made of persons who claimed to be bona fide American citizens.[129] The Spanish authorities unhesitatingly cast these individuals in prison, and in some cases administered harsh treatment. Fully three-fourths of these persons were either Cubans or of Cuban parentage who had become naturalized American citizens. In the course of time several were released while others were expelled from Cuba. However, a considerable number of the group who were given

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126. Senate Doc., 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 25, p. 125.
127. Senate Committee on For. Rel., Compilation of Reports, Vol. 7. p.339.
128. M. M. Wilkerson., op. cit., p. 48.
129. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1896, pp. 747-750.

long terms of imprisonment and in some instances even death sentences were ultimately released as a concession to the United States when Weyler was recalled.[130]

The continual refusal of President Cleveland to recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerents resulted in Congress' attempt to force the President's hand. This action took the form of a concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress which urged the President to offer Spain the good offices of the United States for a peace providing for Cuban independence.[131] On February 28, 1896 this resolution was passed by the Senate with a vote of sixty-four ayes to six nays.[132] The resolution set off much acrimonious debate in the House of Representatives whose members had been for over a year subjected to the propaganda of "yellow journalism" which favored the Cuban demand for independence.[133] Representative William Arnold of Pennsylvania was outstanding in his demands that the United States recognize the Cubans as belligerents. In fact he maintained that "Cuba should be and will be free.....Let us now, in Congress assembled, show to the Cuban patriots and to the world that we still worship at the shrine of liberty and that freedom will not call on us in vain."[134] Regardless of a few isolated opponents the resolution was passed on April 6, 1896 by a vote of two hundred and forty-six as to twenty-seven against.[135]

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130. Senate Doc., 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 25, 581-585.
131. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, p. 2256.
132. Ibid., pp. 3075-3551.
133. Hacker and Kendrick, op. cit., p. 333.
134. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 28, Part 7, pp. 258-259.
135. Ibid., p. 2629.

Despite the outstanding majority that the resolution received in both houses of Congress, it was ignored by President Cleveland who was not bound to act on a resolution of Congress which merely expressed an opinion.[136] The appreciation of the Spanish government for Cleveland's attitude was shortly reflected in a note of the Spanish minister to the United States which remarked in part:

> When one considers the numerous resolutions of the two houses of Congress, the popular agitation, the tide of public opinion, superficial but widespread, which has been inspired against Spain by our enemies, the attitude of the press and what it has been asking and is asking even today -- nay, more, what has been demanded even now of the President of the republic -- we can do no less than admire the high qualities of rectitude and honor, the fearlessness and the respect toward the legitimate rights of Spain shown in this note addressed by this government through me to the government of his majesty.[137]

Two days before the vote of the House of Representatives had been taken on the resolution of April 6th the American Secretary of State Richard Olney offered the good offices of the United States to Spain for the purpose of mediation. Olney's note of the fourth of April sketched the economic losses caused by the insurrection. He maintained further "that the United States cannot contemplate with complacency another ten years of Cuban insurrection". Olney then stated that his object in addressing this note to Spain was "to suggest whether a solution of present troubles cannot be found which will prevent all thought of intervention by rendering it unnecessary." The Secretary of State then summed up the American offer for mediation with the statement:

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136. J. H. Latané, "United States and Latin America", p. 127.
137. Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, April 10, 1896, p. 4.

> What the United States desires to do, if the way can be pointed out, is to cooperate with Spain in the immediate pacification of the island on such a plan as leaving Spain her rights of sovereignty, shall yet secure to the people of the island all such rights and powers of local self-government as they can reasonably ask.[138]

Although friendly in tone, Olney's objective in this note was to impress Spain with the necessity of a speedy solution. He closed this communication by remarking that "the United States has no designs upon Cuba and no designs against the sovereignty of Spain. Neither is it actuated by any spirit of meddlesomeness nor by any desire to force its will upon any other nation. Its geographical proximity and all the considerations above detailed compel it to be interested in the solution of the Cuban problem whether it will or no. Its only anxiety is that the solution should be speedy, and, by being founded on truth and justice, should also be permanent."[139] The note closed with the suggestion that if Spain had relied less on the sword and more on adequate governmental means for the consideration of political, economic, and social reforms, it was quite possible the insurrection would have been quickly terminated.[140] For some weeks the Spanish Government paid little attention to Olney's friendly counsel. "Instead of reforming the administration of its sole remaining American colony, it took the course of greatly augmenting its military forces on the Island, in preparation for a powerful offensive."[141] Cánovas

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139. Quoted in S. F. Bemis, "The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy", Vol. 8, p. 288.
140. Ibid., p. 8.
141. Orestes Ferrara, "The Last Spanish War", p. 15.

was the unchallenged director of Spain's imperial policies at this time and his statement that he "would fight in Cuba until the last dollar" was the typical attitude taken by the majority of Spain's public men and it even came to be echoed by the leader of the opposition, Don Praxedes Mateo Sagasta.[142]

It was not until the twenty-second of May that Olney's note was answered by the Spanish Government. Although De Lome's reply was very courteous in its tenor, yet at the same time it was a rejection of the American offer for mediation and claimed that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most liberal political systems in the world". The letter concluded with the suggestion that the United States would contribute greatly to the pacification of the island by prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the past."[143] The effect of this courteous refusal by Spain to accept the United States' offer of mediation for Cuba's pacification resulted in dampening Olney's enthusiasm for treating with the Spanish Foreign Office. "The American note was, indeed, the turning point of the affairs with Spain. Its rejection meant, could only mean as a finality, the forcible intervention by the United States, and war."[144] The Cleveland-Olney Administration, despite the rejection of the proposal for mediation, insisted on the strict observance of American neutrality laws and non-intervention. The Spanish government and people, however, read out of the American overture for mediation the veiled desire of the

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142. Ibid., p. 16.
143. Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900, No. 13.
144. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 465.

United States government to acquire the island for itself.[145] The Spanish press was equally as critical. At one time a suggestion was made by a Spanish editor advocating an expeditionary force of twelve thousand men for the purpose of attacking the United States.[146] American newspaper correspondents in Madrid likewise reported that preparations for war with the United States were under way as a result of the resolutions passed by Congress recognizing a state of belligerency in Cuba, and that hostilities would be started if Cleveland followed the dictates of Congress.[147] Spain's warlike attitude toward the United States was shortly reflected in the Barcelona incident.[148] The highly critical remarks reflecting on Spain's attitude made by certain members in both the Senate and House as well as by leading American publicists were printed in nearly all the leading Spanish newspapers.[149] The growing antagonism toward the United States developed to a dangerous point when a group of Spaniards, largely composed of university students, decided to stone the American consulate at Barcelona.[150] Having worked themselves up to highly emotional state the rioters approached the consulate hissing and shouting. "Abajo los tocineros Americanos", (down with the American pig-killers), and at the same time let loose stones and potatoes, which broke many windows of the consulate residence. They next proceeded to the prefecture and the residence of the captain-general where they expressed their impatience for the Spanish official

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145. New York World, March 5, 1896, quoted by M. M. Wilkerson, "Public Opinion and the Spanish American War", p. 72.
146. M. M. Wilkerson, op. cit., p. 65.
147. Ibid.
148. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., pp. 437-438.
149. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3075-3551.
150. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., 438.

policy by tearing up a Spanish flag. Returning once again to the consulate with a body of at least fifteen thousand strong, they offered a very lively struggle with the municipal police and definitely indicated their extreme displeasure by tearing to shreds an American flag.[151] This incident was immediately disclaimed by the Spanish government, which in addition to an offer of complete reparation, presented formal regrets for the occurrence and assured the United States that steps had been promptly taken to prevent a repetition of such an affair.[152]

The extent and nature of the American newspaper accounts of Cuban conditions that were forced upon a more or less gullible public had so prejudicial an effect on the majority of Americans, that the Spanish minister to the United States decided the need of presenting to the American public a statement expressing the Spanish point of view relative to the Cuban situation.[153] In carrying out this purpose Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, submitted on February 23, 1896 an article to the New York Herald in which he endeavored to neutralize the Cuban propaganda in the United States. De Lome stated at the outset that he considered the Cuban insurrection as an importation. His article read in part that:

> All the representative leaders were and have been abroad and have obeyed the junta which has been established in New York and which had more than one hundred and fifty revolutionary clubs, the greater part of them being in the United States. The revolution is not a popular uprising of a discontented nation. It is a filibustering movement, principally of demagogues without standing in the island, who have nothing

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151. F. E. Chadwick., op. cit., p. 438, quoting the Marquis de Olivart, Revue General de Droit International Public, Vol. 8, p. 1900.
152. Ibid., p. 439.
153. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 440.

to lose and are trying their chances.[154]

He then went on in his article to elaborate the fundamental cause of unrest as being of an economic origin. He explained how the abolition of the Cuban-American reciprocity treaty of 1890, with a consequent increased duty on sugar, had the effect of depressing Cuban industry and of throwing laborers on the plantations out of work.[155] De Lome continued with the accusation of the unpunished violations by American filibusters of American neutrality and concluded with the following statement: "I will only ask impartial persons to compare Cuba with many other countries from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn, and see if there is more liberty, order, and good government, and if Spanish Cuba is not more free and happy than many other nations which are independent."[156] The De Lome presentation was widely read but had little actual influence on American opinion for two reasons, namely: in the first place, it was an unofficial statement and so merely represented an individual's viewpoint, and in the second place, the effect of the "yellow journalism" of Hearst and Pulitzer had produced too great a credence in the minds of the American public as to the authenticity of De Lome's contentions. De Lome tried again in the same month to refute the Cuban claims of Spanish atrocity but had little success with the American public.[157]

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154. New York Herald, February 23, 1896, quoted by Chadwick, op. cit., p. 440.
155. Ibid.
156. F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 442.
157. Cong. Record, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2591.

IV

The pressure on the Cleveland-Olney Administration to intervene in Cuba grew greater as the weeks went by. Back of the desire the motivating groups in the United States had definite objectives to realize. In the first place there were those business groups with investments on the Island who insisted from the outset of the insurrection that the United States Government should prevent the destruction of American property in Cuba. The loss of wealth belonging to American vested interests in Cuba was rapidly assuming dangerous proportions. By the end of the year of 1896 our commerce with Cuba had been nearly wiped out. At the beginning of the Cuban Insurrection this amounted to a hundred million dollars annually.[158] The largest loss sustained by American investors was in the sugar industry. In as much as the programs of both factions in Cuba called for a wholesale destruction of sugar cane plantations, the result was a marked decline in sugar production from one million tons in 1894 to twenty-five thousand tons in 1898.[159] American investments in Cuba reached a total of fifty million dollars by the end of 1896.[160] However, the United States did not "own" Cuba in any sense of the word. The railroads were controlled by British capital; banking facilities were largely in the possession of British, German and French nationals.[161]

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158. North American Review, No. 165, pp. 610-635.
159. E. J. Benton, "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War", p. 37.
160. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
161. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 332.

Many other undertakings were Spanish and there was not a single American bank in Cuba.[162]

Those investors of American capital, however, saw their interests practically ruined by the Insurrection. In the one fiscal year of 1895 to 1896 imports from Cuba dropped from $52,871,259 to $40,017,730 while American export trade to Cuba suffered a loss of over five million dollars during the same period.[163] The United States' economic losses were not confined to the Cuban sugar imports alone. Even though sugar was Cuba's most significant product, there were also valuable ore deposits on the island in which American investors had the controlling shares. There were three American iron and manganese enterprises in the single province of Santiago claimed to have an investment of some $6,000,000 of American capital, a large proportion of which was in property which easily could be destroyed.[164] Naturally, the complete destruction of these interests, or in some cases the appropriation of them by both factions for military purposes tended to completely ruin the Cuban-American trade relations.[165]

The Spanish, moreover, regarded the American investors in Cuba as outsiders with no particular right to exploit Cuba's resources, and they were firmly of the opinion that the chief cause for American sympathy towards the insurrection was due solely to the extensive American investments in Cuba.[166] The press of Spain was increasing in its denunciation of the American attitude toward the Cuban Insurrection,

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162. L. H. Jenks, op. cit., p. 37.
163. Commercial Rel. of U. S. with For. Countries, 1896, Vol. 1, p. 122.
164. Julius W. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898", pp. 250-251.
165. J. H. Latané, "A History of American Foreign Policy", p. 502.
166. Orestes Ferrara, op. cit., p. 15

and like the Spanish Government it could not comprehend the need for the colonial reforms which were being urged by the United States. Furthermore, Spanish opinion, supported and directed by the newspapers, which, almost without exception, wishes war and promised the chastisement of the rebels and of their protectors, did not demand the reforms, which they considered as a humiliating and useless remedy.[167]

The result of this indifference toward a program of political and economic changes by the Spanish Government in Cuba tended to foster a strong anti-Spanish sentiment in the United States. Within a short time it was noticed that "public opinion in the United States was thoroughly aroused by the execution of policies which not only excited sympathy for the unfortunate inhabitants of Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of the island and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned at least fifty millions of property on the island, and American commerce at the beginning of the insurrection amounted to one hundred millions annually".[168] This American attitude was being fed constantly by the "yellow journalism" of such propagandists as William Randolph Hearst with such effect that it has been stated that "Hearst probably did more than any single private citizen to bring on the Spanish American War".[169] This strong feeling rose to such a pitch in the United States that the "Spanish retention of the island became as unacceptable to the vast body of the American people as to the Cubans themselves".[170] It is not hard to realize why a large part of the American public informed as they were by such biased newspaper

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167. Señor de Olivart in La Revue Générale de Droit International, as quoted by F. E. Chadwick, op. cit., p. 480.
168. J. H. Latané, op. cit., p. 502.
169. John K. Winkler, "W. R. Hearst, an American Phenomenon", p. 6.
170. Charles Chapman, op. cit., p. 82.

accounts came to disregard all but the technical obligations which the United States owed Spain in preserving a strictly neutral position. The prevailing mental attitude of most Americans was well expressed in an article appearing in the Forum entitled "Shall Cuba be Free", in which the author presented an American Cuban policy that would ultimately lead to its liberation. An excerpt from the article ran as follows:

> To secure victory for Cuba it is necessary for us, in my opinion, to take but a single step; that is, to recognize here belligerency: she will do all the rest.....Our record toward Spain is clear.....Our obligations to her are measured by an easily terminable treaty, which, however, while in force, in no way prevents us from recognizing Cuba's belligerency. Is it difficult for us to decide between free Cuba and tyrant Spain? Why not fling overboard Spain and give Cuba the aid which she needs, and which our treaty with Spain cannot prevent? Which cause is morally right?—which is manly?—which is American?[171]

The numerous arrests of American citizens in Cuba added to the strong anti-Spanish sentiment in America, and although the majority of these arrests were made on genuine grounds for suspicion yet they in time assumed a significant part in the Spanish-American controversy.[172]

The American Cuban policy was to a large degree shaped upon the advice of Americans in Cuba. Among these "the most important was..... Edwin F. Atkins, who had the ear of Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of State".[173] Atkins owned a sugar plantation at Soledad, Cuba in which he had a capital investment of $1,400,000.[174] In as much as he was one of the leading investors in Cuba, he naturally assumed the leadership in influencing the Cleveland-Olney Administration in its refusal

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171. Forum, Vol. 20, pp. 50-65.
172. House Executive Document, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 1, pp. 751-820.
173. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, op. cit., p. 332.
174. Hispanic-American Historical Review, Vol. 14, p. 176.

to recognize the insurrectionists as belligerents.[175] Secretary of State Olney and Mr. Atkins were in constant correspondence over the losses suffered by American investors in Cuba during 1895 to 1897. The following item taken from their correspondence dated March 9, 1896 indicates the nature of the complaints sent to the American Secretary of State as well as his reaction to them.

Boston, Mass., March 9, 1896

Dear Sir:

The mail received today from Cienfuegos, dated February 26, brings advices of the further burning by insurgents, on or about the 20th, of something over 500 acres of cane on our property Soledad. Owing to the difficulty of the manager getting about throughout the territory, a detailed estimate of cane lost by these fires was not then made up.

At the date of the above-mentioned mail fires were again general, and we hear of two other American properties having suffered severely in the Cienfuegos district.

Very respectfully yours,

E. Atkins and Company[176]

On receipt of this letter Mr. Olney immediately dispatched a copy of it to Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister.[177] The influence of Atkins on the Administration was aided by "all of Olney's Boston sugar friends who wanted, not Cuban freedom, but the immediate suppression of the revolution".[178]

Even with the aroused public sentiment for American intervention

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175. J. E. Wisan, "The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898)", p. 455.
176. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1896, p. 676.
177. Ibid., p. 676.
178. Carleton Beals, "The Crime of Cuba", p. 115.

in Cuba, President Cleveland showed that he was unwilling to alter his policy in as much as he had been insisting on recognizing the rights of Spain as well as maintaining a course of American neutrality.[179] However, public opinion toward the Cuban issue found definite statement in the Presidential Election of 1896.[180] The Cuban question found expression in the platforms of the major as well as some of the minor parties. The events of 1895 had completely destroyed President Cleveland's leadership and his party was hopelessly divided.[181] This was reflected at the Democratic convention which met in Chicago on the seventh of July and refused to indorse the Cleveland Administration by a vote of 564-357.[182] The delegates were composed largely of "free silver" men and nominated as their candidate William Jennings Bryan.[183]

The Republicans chose as their candidate William McKinley of Ohio, who was groomed by Mark Hanna, a representative of "big business".[184] The Republicans had the most expansive plank in their platform on the Cuban question. It read as follows:

> We reassert the Monroe Doctrine in its full extent, and we reaffirm the rights of the United States to give the Doctrine effect by responding to the appeal of any American state for friendly intervention in case of European encroachment... ..We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battles of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty. The government of Spain, having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its Treaty obliga-

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179. J. D. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 591-592.
180. Kirk Porter, "National Party Platforms", pp. 186-205.
181. J. F. Rhodes, "The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations", pp. 17-18.
182. Ibid., p. 18.
183. Ibid., pp. 19-22.
184. Ibid., pp. 23-27.

> tions, we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island.[185]

The Democrats, on the other hand, in stating their Cuban plank were less verbose but were equally as insistent on expressing their decided sympathy for the Cuban insurrectionists. Their plank elicited deep sympathy for the Cubans and read as follows:

> The Monroe Doctrine as originally declared, and as interpreted by succeeding Presidents, is a permanent part of the foreign policy of the United States and must at all times be maintained. We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence.[186]

In addition to the two major parties which participated in this election there were six additional political groups of lesser importance including the Populist, National, National Democratic, National Silver, Prohibition, and Socialist Labor parties.[187] Only one of these, the Populist Party, made any mention of the Cuban issue in its platform. This party like the Democratic organization voiced its deepest sympathy and concern for the Cuban cause in the following words:

> We tender to the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest sympathy for their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence, and we believe the time has come when the United States, the great Republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is, and of right ought to be, a free and independent state.[188]

The fact that the three leading political parties in the United States should embody the Cuban question in their platforms indicates the importance of the issue in the American political thinking of that

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185. Kirk Porter, op. cit., pp. 204-205.
186. Ibid., p. 186.
187. Ibid., pp. 186-205.
188. Ibid., p. 199.

year. It must be distinctly understood that the Election of 1896 was contested not primarily on the question of the recognition of Cuban independence but on a variety of important domestic issues, among which were the questions of free silver, protectionism, and the improvement of American social and economic conditions.[189] Because of the great unpopularity resulting from the espousal of his non-intervention policy in Cuba President Cleveland had definitely determined as well as hindered his political fortunes both within and without his party. There were, however, a few unprejudiced men who did realize the contribution he was trying to make toward maintaining peace between the United States and Spain. From this group there was Woodrow Wilson who at a later period in American history was to encounter somewhat the same problems. Wilson in an article written at a somewhat later date for the Atlantic Monthly, summed up Cleveland's contribution to peace in these words:

> He has satisfied neither the Democrats nor the Republicans, because neither cared to observe the restraints of international law or set themselves any bounds of prudence; but he has made Spain feel the pressure of our opinion and of our material interest in the Cuban struggle none the less, and by his very self-restraint has brought the sad business sensibly nearer to its end.[190]

The editor of The Nation, E. L. Godkin, also supported the President in his action in protecting American citizens in Cuba when he remarked there was not "a scintilla of evidence that the President has not acted in their behalf with prompt energy".[191] The Election of 1896 revealed that the vast majority of Americans had not been satisfied,

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189. J. F. Rhodes, op. cit., pp. 13-29.
190. Atlantic Monthly, No. 79, p. 300.
191. Nation, Vol. 62, No. 1615, p. 446.

with the major policies of the Democratic Party under Cleveland. In the votes cast William McKinley, "the advance agent of prosperity", received two hundred and seventy-one electoral votes to Bryan's one hundred and seventy-six, while his popular vote swelled to a six hundred thousand majority.[192]

Meanwhile the American public as well as both Houses of Congress were awaiting with keen interest the post election pronouncements of Cleveland on the Cuban issue which would be forthcoming in his annual message to Congress in December. A recent historian sensed this air of expectancy when he wrote that "the nation was in an expectant mood.....there was war talk in the air".[193] On the seventh of December Cleveland delivered his message to Congress in which, after reviewing the destruction of American investments on the island and after attacking the illegitimate activities of the Cuban juntas in the United States, he went on to remark that -

> These inevitable entanglements of the United States with the rebellion in Cuba, the large American property interests affected, and considerations of philanthrophy and humanity in general have led to a vehement demand in various quarters for some sort of positive intervention on the part of the United States. It was at first proposed that belligerent rights should be accorded to the insurgents - a proposition no longer urged because untimely and in practical operation clearly perilous and injurious to our own interests. It has since been and is now sometimes contended that the independence of the insurgents should be recognized; but imperfect and restricted as the Spanish government of the island may be, no other exists there.....It is urged finally that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine strife in Cuba should be terminated by our intervention, even at the cost of a war between the United States and Spain.....The

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192. J. F. Rhodes, op. cit., p. 29.
193. Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 61.

> United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct.[194]

The President expressed his belief that if Spain should extend to Cuba genuine autonomy then the main reason for the insurrection would be satisfied. "Such a result", he stated, "would appear to be in the true interest of all concerned".[195] Cleveland closed his comment on the Cuban situation with a warning to Spain which he frankly declared:

> It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. While we are anxious to accord all due respect to the sovereignty of Spain, we can not view the pending conflict in all its features and properly apprehend our inevitably close relations to it, and its possible results without considering that by the course of events we may be drawn into such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the contest either alone and in her own way or with our friendly cooperation.....But I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens, joined by considerations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile country intimately related to us saved from complete devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its inhabitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.[196]

Congress "listened to Mr. Cleveland's message with an apathy broken only during the reading of the Cuban passages. Though cold, as ever to the aspirations of Cuba Libre, Mr. Cleveland went further in the

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194. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 718.
195. Ibid., p. 719.
196. Ibid., p. 722.

direction of intervention than he had ever gone before".[197] The American public was disappointed with the Message and characterized it as "a makeshift and a time-server".[198]

The reaction in Congress was indicative of the jingoistic leanings of many of its members. The result was the introduction in the Senate of a series of resolutions by Senators Mills of Texas, Call of Florida, and Cullom of Illinois for the purpose of recognizing the Cubans as belligerents.[199] Senators Roger Q. Mills and Wilkinson Call, veterans of the Confederate Army, still advocated the ante bellum policy of Cuban annexation which had been so forcefully developed by the pro-Southern Democratic administrations from 1845 to 1861 on the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny.[200] The New York Journal in quoting Mills stated that he hoped his resolution would bring about a war between the United States and Spain.[201] Senator Call's resolution probably reflected the political influence centered in Florida which was a Cuban junta stronghold.[202] However, a resolution by Senator James D. Cameron of Pennsylvania received more consideration than the others because of his membership on the Committee for Foreign Relations.[203] Cameron's resolution provided for Cuban independence and contained the suggestion that the "United States should use its friendly offices with the government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and

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197. Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 61.
198. Chicago Tribune, December 8, 1896, as quoted by Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 67.
199. Cong. Record, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 39.
200. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, 1st Sess., No.14, pp. 27-125.
201. J. E. Wisan, op. cit., p. 251.
202. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, 1st Session, No. 14, p. 27.
203. Ibid., p. 108.

Cuba".[204] The American press became jubilant over these resolutions and applauded this "Cuban field day in the Senate".[205] President Cleveland was disappointed with the effect of his Message on Congress in which he had voiced a plea against unwise action by that body.[206] He, nevertheless, firmly refused to yield in his policy of non-recognition of the insurrectionists.[207] He was supported in this policy by the Republican majority of the House which was opposed to the Cameron resolution mainly because of the strong influence of the Republican Speaker Reed who "detested jingoism and all forms of national aggression".[208] Although defeated in their attempts to pass the Cameron resolution in the House of Representatives the leading jingoists of the Senate went as a delegation to Cleveland with the hope of forcing him to abandon his policy of non-intervention in Cuba.[209] The Senatorial delegation told Cleveland that they had decided to declare war against Spain because of the intolerable conditions on the island.[210] "Mr. Cleveland drew himself up and said: 'There will be no war with Spain over Cuba while I am President.' One of the members flushed up and said angrily: 'Mr. President, you seem to forget that the Constitution of the United States gives Congress the right to declare war'. He answered: 'Yes, but it also makes me Commander-in-Chief, and I will not mobilize the army.....It would be an outrage to declare war".[211]

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204. Senate Doc., 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 231, part 7, p. 64.
205. J. E. Wisan, op. cit., p. 251.
206. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 717.
207. Ibid., p. 718.
208. W. A. Robinson, "Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian", p. 356.
209. Allan Nevins, op. cit., pp. 718-719.
210. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906", p. 65.
211. Walter Millis, op. cit., p. 65.

The resolutions introduced by the several members of the Senate for the recognition of Cuban independence were referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which rendered its report on December the 21st.[212] The Committee recommended the adoption of a joint resolution declaring "that the independence of the Republic of Cuba be, and the same is hereby, acknowledged by the United States of America".[213] But the State Department not wishing to embarass the incoming Administration gave notice through Olney that recognition was a matter for the Executive to determine.[214] On the same day Senator Augustus Bacon of Georgia proposed the following concurrent resolution which read as follows:

> The question of the recognition by this Government of any people as a free and independent nation is one exclusively for the determination of Congress in its capacity as the law-making power; this prerogative of sovereign power does not appertain to the Executive department of the Government except in so far as the President is, under the Constitution, by the exercise of the veto, made a part of the law-making power of the Government.[215]

The statement of Olney's that recognition was a matter for the Executive authority was ultimately substantiated by the results of a thorough investigation by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations relative to precedents involving the power of recognition.[216] The report of the Committee published on January 11, 1897 showed that recognition is distinctly an executive function and that Congress has merely an indirect influence stating that "in the department of inter-

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212. Senate Doc., 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 231, part 7, p. 64.
213. Ibid., p. 64.
214. W. A. Robinson, op. cit., p. 355.
215. Cong. Record, 54th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 29, p. 357.
216. Senate Doc., 54th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 56, p. 18.

national law.....a Congressional recognition of belligerency or independence would be a nullity".[217] This statement of the Committee received the sanction of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Neely v. Henkel in 1901 when the Court rendered its opinion in the following statement:

> The contention that the United States recognized the existence of an established government known as the Republic of Cuba..... is without merit. The declaration by Congress that the people of Cuba were and of right ought to be free and independent was not intended as the recognition of the existence of an organized government instituted by the people of that Island in hostility to the government maintained by Spain.....Both the legislative and executive branches of the government concurred in not recognizing the existence of any such government as the Republic of Cuba.[218]

President Cleveland made one more attempt to solve the Cuban problem before his Republican successor, William McKinley, took office as President. Cleveland had in his possession a letter from a London banking firm which led him to believe that Spain would sell Cuba for a sum of one hundred million dollars.[219] The letter read to the effect that in 1892 a group of London bankers had raised the sum of twenty million pounds sterling for the purpose of purchasing Cuba.[220] A change in the Spanish Cabinet had rendered abortive the scheme at that time but Cleveland was still hopeful that the Spanish Government might again consider the sale of Cuba.[221] Cleveland selected as his emissary the international lawyer, Frederic René

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217. Ibid., p. 19.
218. J. M. Mathews, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
219. R. M. McElroy, "Grover Cleveland", Vol. 2, p. 250.
220. Ibid., p. 251.
221. Allan Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland", p. 469.

Coudert, who had previously served the Cleveland Administration as a member of the Commission to investigate the Venezuelan boundary dispute.[222] Coudert was an American of French parentage, who had been graduated with honors from Columbia University in 1850. Furthermore, he had served as counselor-at-law in the United States to the French, Italian, and Spanish governments.[223] Cleveland hoped that with Coudert's knowledge of the Spanish language and an understanding of Latin peoples a satisfactory settlement with Spain might be made.[224] With this objective in view he addressed a note dated on the twenty-eighth of February to Mr. Coudert requesting his presence at the White House.[225] Mr. Coudert's interview with the President developed into a lengthy discussion in which the President informed Coudert that he feared a war with Spain was imminent and asked him to accept the mission to the Spanish authorities in Havana. Coudert was astonished at Cleveland's request and declined to fulfill it.[226] He offered as excuses personal ill health as well as the forthcoming change in the national administration.[227]

Notwithstanding the failure of the proposed mission to the Spanish authorities in Cuba the Cleveland-Olney Administration continued to adhere to the policy of non-intervention and non-recognition up to March 4, 1897 when the McKinley Administration assumed office.[228]

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222. A. Johnson, "Dict. of Am. Biog.", Vol. 4, p. 464.
223. Ibid., p. 465.
224. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 719.
225. R. M. McElroy, op. cit., p. 252.
226. Bemis, S. F. (Editor), "American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, p. 289.
227. R. M. McElroy, op. cit., p. 252.
228. J. F. Rhodes, op. cit., p. 41.

The remaining days after the Coudert conference of February 28th were occupied with correspondence between Secretary of State Olney and the Spanish Minister Señor Dupuy de Lome concerning the protection of American citizens in Cuba.[229]

The inability of the Cleveland-Olney Administration to make an adjustment with Spain over the Cuban problem was especially disappointing to DeLome who appears to have hoped that an understanding could have been arrived at despite the opposition of an over-aggressive Congress.[230] The Spanish Minister fully appreciated the fact that Cleveland and Olney would still have welcomed a peaceful solution but by the end of February he had to report to the Spanish Government that he noted "a certain tendency to inaction on the part of the Secretary of State during the little time that remains to him in the discharge of his office."[231]

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229. For. Rel. of the U. S., 1897, pp. 483-485.
230. Henry James, "Richard Olney and His Public Service", p. 155.
231. Ibid., p. 167.

V

The expansionist urge of the Democratic Administrations from Polk to Buchanan had as its objective the ultimate incorporation of Cuba as an integral part of the United States. However, after the diplomatic adjustments, which had marked the American Civil War, there was a rapid subsidence of the Doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and the attention of the American people tended to turn to the large economic and political activities related to the settlement of the Far West. Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis of Yale University has stated it well in the following sentences:

> The American people.....became engrossed with the building of the transcontinental railroads, with the exploitation of the natural resources of the newly won continental domain, with the development of mighty industrial functions summoned to life to supply the vast home market, free from tariff barriers, which was now the good fortune of citizens of the United States. A satiated nation, with a territory sufficient to occupy its activities for a century to come, provided it were prudently tilled by proper national policy; a people without a dangerous frontier; such a nation of happy beings seemed to have little concern for foreign affairs.[232]

However, one chronic problem of American diplomacy, which had subsided for a time by 1878, was the Cuban Question. In meeting this problem after the Period of the Ten Years' War, 1868-1878, the Grant-

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232. S. F. Bemis, "A Diplomatic History of the United States", p. 432.

Fish Administration came to formulate a policy radically different from the programs of the earlier Administrations. The Cuban insurrection of 1868-1878 came at a time in American history when the people as a whole opposed further territorial annexation, and likewise at a period in our national life when isolation came to be the accepted doctrine. In the development of American policy Secretary of State Hamilton Fish prevented Grant from being unwisely led by a Congress which was only too anxious to recognize Cuba as being in a _status of belligerency_. Not only did Fish definitely assert the right of recognition as the Chief Executive's prerogative--a function early assumed by George Washington and consistently followed by his successors, but he also withheld a certain moral encouragement to the Cuban rebels which actually strengthened his subsequent dealings with Spain on the question of Cuban reforms. Grant and Fish by declaring Cuba as being in a _state of insurgency_ rather than in a _state of belligerency_ had defined a policy for the United States which the Cleveland-Olney Administration found applicable in the troublesome years of 1895-1897.

Thus in the recrudescence of the Cuban insurrection in 1895 the Cleveland Government had to meet a similarity of conditions somewhat more complicated with which the Grant-Fish Administration had previously been confronted. Cleveland and Olney seemed to have determined rather early in the period of the insurrection of 1895 that the only correct policy to follow was one that invited co-operation with Spain to bring about peace to Cuba on the basis of home rule. Cleveland followed logically the only course open to him--that Cuba was in a _state of insurgency_ for under international law she could not meet the conditions determining a _state of belligerency_. In attempting to define a Cuban policy at all times consistent with the best interests of Cuba, Spain, and the United States,

the American State Department was met by an antagonistic and ever alert Congress, as well as by a strongly prejudiced American public. The policy of non-intervention in Cuba which had been so firmly adhered to by the Grant-Fish Government during the Ten Years' War was a precedent which Cleveland and Olney were desirous of continuing.

In attempting to evaluate the strength of the influence of American capital in Cuba on the formulation of a Cuban policy during the years of 1895 to 1897 the conclusion drawn must be largely negative. While it is true that appreciable amounts of American wealth had gone into Cuban enterprises--notably in sugar and tobacco plantations--after the Period of the Ten Years' War, yet it was considerably less than the capital investments of England, France, Germany, and of course Spain. Likewise, the Spanish policy of restricting Cuban exports and imports to and from other nations by means of tariff walls was vexatious to other nations and particularly to the United States. With the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 better commercial relations seemed imminent when raw sugar was placed on the American free-list, and a reciprocity treaty promised the island a more profitable trade with the United States. The reciprocity efforts of Secretary of State Blaine, however, were of short duration for with the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, which was prompted by the need of revenue resulting from the Panic of 1893, the Government again put up a tariff wall against Cuban sugar and thereby greatly deranged the whole economic life of Cuba and also hurt American capital investments.

With the outbreak of the insurrection in the following year American capital invested in Cuba was bound to suffer. It would be natural to conclude that certain Americans with heavy investments in

Cuba would attempt to influence the Administration for the acceptance of a Cuban policy more likely to meet their immediate economic interests. Edwin Atkins of Boston was representative of such a group, and while he had entrée to official circles because of his personal friendship with Secretary of State Olney, yet there is no shred of evidence discernible which would indicate that the Administration was moved to act out of consideration for such a pressure group. In fact the researches of recent writers such as Millis, Hacker and Bemis indicate that the American sugar planters in Cuba as well as the Sugar Trust were opposed to a policy which would bring the United States into a war with Spain. The claims resulting from lives lost and the property destroyed during the insurrection because of the Spanish policy were not adjusted until after Cleveland left office when spoilation claims could be presented by our government. It is a matter of record that few bona-fide American citizens were imprisoned and sentenced by the Spanish authorities.

In proclaiming a course of American neutrality President Cleveland like every other President of the United States under similar circumstances was confronted with the grave problem of maintaining it. The so-called juntas of the Cubans became a force to reckon with as the insurrection spread. In this group Cleveland found an element which had accumulated strength in the United States through propaganda before the revolt had broken, and which resorted to every artifice in rendering aid to the Cubans by furnishing arms and munitions accumulated in the United States. Sometimes under the camouflage of American naturalization this group had long been planning a program and shaping a policy for the United States to pursue. It is at least interesting on noting that those Senators who introduced resolutions for recognition of a status

of belligerency as well as the ultimate status of freedom for Cuba came from states wherein the Cuban juntas were most active. The researches on which this essay has been based have not revealed any direct contacts between junta leaders and the Cleveland Administration. Cleveland's early neutrality proclamation and his grave warnings to Americans regarding its observance did much in stopping filibustering operations from the United States to Cuba, while the decisions of the United States Circuit Courts and the United States Supreme Court in the case of the Horsa probably achieved the desired effect.

The press of a democratic nation like the United States can at times become the formulator of public opinion which may not always be in keeping with the best interests of all the people. At the time of the Cuban Crisis of 1895 the American public was coming under the insidious spell of that species of the press known as "yellow journalism". It was the day of such journalistic rivals as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. Cuban copy made newspapers sell, and in the Cuban situation a "humanitarian appeal" could easily stimulate a naturally sympathetic American people to cry for a more drastic foreign policy in helping the "under-dog." The clear-thinking and independence of President Cleveland in spite of the insistence of the Hearst papers for a more "vigorous policy" kept him from deviating from his set policy. While a gullible American public was accepting as truth the drawings of Frederick Remington's "Cuban Atrocities", Cleveland and Olney were keeping to the course they had pointed to.

The independence of his convictions and the courage in carrying them out were distinguishing traits of Grover Cleveland. There was little in the way of valuable constructive advice from the Senate's

Committee on Foreign Affairs, nor was there much support from the Senate as a body. One could hardly accuse Cleveland of developing his Cuban position with the "advice and consent of the Senate". How different was Cleveland's relation with the Senate from that of William McKinley's! The presence of a conspicuous group of "war-hawks" in the Senate in 1895 did not augur well for so conciliatory a policy as the one advanced by Cleveland and Olney. The Administration found plenty of opposition from the bellicose Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and his coterie who never were without a press organ for the creation of an administration opposition. The resolutions of the several Senators likewise indicated a decided stand against Cleveland's position, but here again it is difficult to discern just how far this opposition was created by the Cuban issue, by a personal dislike for Cleveland, or because of a general opposition to Cleveland's stand on other major issues before Congress.

Tying up very closely with some of the opposition Senators were a group who had imperialistic leanings. While the strength of this group was not greatly realized until the Spanish-American War got under way, yet its thinking did permeate the public mind, to some extent, and naturally became a handicap to the preservation of peace with Spain.

To maintain a policy of non-intervention and non-recognition in opposition to the above-mentioned forces at work is indicative of Cleveland's solidness of character and the independence of his action as President. From 1895 to 1897 the Cleveland-Olney Administration firmly upheld the treaty obligations between the United States and Spain in spite of the annoying Cuban situation, and it effectively protected the rights of American investments as well as citizens in Cuba. However,

within the course of a year after Cleveland left office these achievements were nullified by the declaration of war--a war which Cleveland could only postpone but not avert.

In as much as the Cuban Crisis occurred about the time of a Presidential Election it is logical to inquire as to the possible influence of political parties and party platforms in shaping the administrative policy after November of 1896. The Cuban issue although written into the party platforms of the three major parties can scarcely be emphasized as a deciding factor in the election outcome. In 1896 "free-silver" was the all absorbing topic and if there ever was an election in American history which was decided on one issue it surely was the Election of 1896. It is sane to conclude that the Cuban planks of all the party platforms were negligible in determining the vote of the electorate.

The firm, if not bellicose attitude, taken by Cleveland in his treatment of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute in 1895 led many Americans to believe that the President would enter upon as forceful a procedure in handling the Cuban problem. To many, therefore, it was disappointing to observe that Cleveland adopted a milder course in dealing with Spain than he had taken in meeting Lord Salisbury and the British Government. The deep honesty, which characterized Cleveland's actions both in private and public life, was again revealed by his insistence that the right of Spain as a sovereign state must not be disregarded. Cleveland saw all angles of the issue and he saw them all at the same time.

In the light of historical perspective, which comes only with the flight of time, it seems when all factors are considered that the

policy of Cleveland in refusing to recognize an insurgency movement in Cuba as one of belligerency was undoubtedly correct. The wisdom of not recognizing the Cubans in their struggle for the realization of their ideals may be open to question, but on the other hand the course pursued by the Cleveland-Olney Administration in dealing with an extremely complicated international problem in the light of existing international law and accepted precedents in the conduct of foreign relations did keep the United States at peace with Spain. Had the successor of President Cleveland been as sincere in his attitude towards Spain it is quite possible that the United States would never have gone to war in the year 1898. While Cleveland's Cuban policy was very unpopular at the time of its employment, yet today it withstands the full flood light of scrutiny as the fairer means of conducting international relations.

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