THE ANGLO'AMERICAN CONT-ROVERSY
OVER THE ALASKAN BDUNDARY‘AND
ITS SETTLEMENT, 1903

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A,
Hilding C Olson
1933

 

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Submitted
for the degree
Michigan State

Hilding C. Olson

finrm...

~1933-

in p rtial fulfillment of the requirements
of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of
Colle5e of A5riculture and Applied Science.

 

32L

THKSL‘?

Approved for the Department of

History and Political Science

 

 

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2-3.7)

12933-2

Acknowledgment

The writer of this essay wishes to eXpress
his appreciation for the helpful guidance and
many constructive criticisms given during the

writing of this essay by Professor E. B. Lyon..

Outline

I. Introduction
A. International rivalry along the northwest coast
of North America I
)1. Character and importance of the diSputed area
2. The rival powers: their claims and advances
£3. Importance of the trade in the area to 1821
a. Russian fur trade
b. Trade of the other powers
B. The Russian Ukase of 1821
l: Circumstances giving cause for its promulgation
2. Purpose and content of the Ukase
5. Its effect
a. On Great Britain
b. On United States
C. Early Ventures in Diplomacy between United States,
Great Britain, and Russia: Adjustments of 1824
and 1825
1. Nature of early procedures and negotiations
a. Individual action of Great Britain and
United States, 1821-1823
b. Joint action of Great Britain and United

States, 1823-1824

N)
0

Effect of Monroe's Message to Congress: new
viewpoint taken by Secretary of State John

Quincy Adams

3. Russo-American Treaty of 1824
a. Diplomatic negotiations and correspondence
b. The Convention: its provisions
c. Meaning and effect of the Convention to:
(1) Russia
(2) United States
(3) Great Britain
4. Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825
a. Anglo-Russian diplomacy of 1824-1825
b. The Convention: its provisions
c. Significance of the Treaty to:
(1) Russia
(2) Great Britain
(3) United States
D. Russian occupation, 1825-1867
1. Jealous regard of territorial rights in
North America
2. Russoquerican negotiations, 1835-1845
a. Circumstances prompting them
b. Results
II. Beginning of the Controversy
J A. The Purchase of Alaska by the United states, 186?
1. Russo-American relations, 1861-1867
2. The Treaty of 1867
a. Russo-American negotiations of Seward
and Stoeckl

b. Provisions

5. Effects and significance of the Purchase of
1867
B. Difficulties arising between United States, Great
Britain, and Canada over the Alaskan Boundaries,
1867-1878
1. Incorporation of British Columbia into the
Dominion of Canada, 1872: effect on the
question a issue.
2. Relations between United States and Great
Britain, 1867-1878
a. The first request for a boundary adjustment
b. President Grant's Message of 1872
0. Great Britain's desire for an early settle-
ment: the numerous requests.
(1) Survey of major General Cameron
(2) Survey of Joseph Hunter
C. The Modus Vivendi of 1878
1. Arrival at an agreement
2. Basis and nature of it
3. Duration of the agreement
III. The Ball-Dawson Conferences of 1887-1888
B .a. Anglo-American diplomatic correSpondence and nego-
tiations previous to the Fisheries Conference of
1887-1888
1. Introduction of a new phase to the controversy
by United States: vieWpoint of Secretary of

State Bayard

2. The Bayard-Phelps, Salisbury-Roseberry Nego-
tiations up to 1888
B. Informal conferences on the Alaskan boundary made
possible by the Fisheries Conference of 1887-1888
1. The viewpoints of Dell and Dawson
2. Results of he Ball-Dawson conferences
IV. The Anglo-American Convention of 1892
A. Nature and extent of the negotiations from 1889
to 1892
B. Conference of 1892
1. Original purpose of the conference
2. Introduction of th Alaskan Boundary Question
3. Provisions of the Convention of 1892
C. Work of the Commissions
1. Purpose
2. Organization: Convention of 1894
3. Reports of the surveys
V. Organization and Work of the Joint High Commission of 1898
A. Events and circumstances preceding its meetings
1. The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty of 1897
3 2. The discovery of gold on the Yukon: Klondike
Gold Rush
5. Conferences preliminary to the Joint High Con-
mission of 1898
B. The Joint High Commission
1. Membership and organization
2. Its agenda: questions to be settled

3. Failure of the Commission: causes and effects

C. The Modus Vivendi of 1899
1. Provisions
2. Duration
VI. The Alaskan Boundary Tribunal of 1905
A. Anglo-American Convention of January 24, 1905
1. Preliminary negotiations
2. John Hay's desire for a treaty
3. The Convention of 1905: its provisions
B. Composition of the Tribunal
1. American choice of judges
a. President Roosevelt's selections
b. Protest of the Canadian Government
0. Criticism of the American choices by the
Canadian press
d. Attitude of the American press
e. The defense of Roosevelt
2. Canadian choice of judges
a. Canada's selections
b. Attitude of Canada and its press
c. Sentiment of the British press toward
Alverstone
5. Other principals
C. Proceedings of the Tribunal
1. Problems to be solved.
2. Points at dispute
3. Presentation of evidence by United States and

Great Britain

a. Cases, countercases, and argumentation
4. Possible decisions.
D. Decision of the Tribunal
1. The seven important decisions of the Tribunal
2. Opinions of the Tribunal Judges on each of
these
E. Attitude toward the Decision
1. Canadian View of the award
2. American eXpression
a. Voiced by President Roosevelt
b. The American press
VII. The Final Chapter of the Controversy
A. Anglo-American Notes of 1905
1. Desire for a boundary delimitation
2. Report of King and Tittmann
5. Exchange of Notes
3. Alaskan Boundary Convention, 1906
1. Purpose
2. Provisions

VIII.Conclusions

 

 

The Anglo-American Boundary DiSpute arose in a pecu-
liar geographical area. The northwest coast of North Amp
erica, extending from the Strait of Juan de Fuca northward
to the 60th parallel of north latitude, was the last sea-
board of the continent to be occupied by Americans and
Europeans. Its remoteness from the Atlantic seaports and
the difficulty of access to it by land made this region but
little known to the world before the close of the eighteenth
centur'. The extreme rugged formation of the country ren-
dered intercommunication difficult. Its rivers were navi-
gable only by steamers having light draught, while the
climate was such that neither cereals nor fruits could be
successfully cultivated.l

The importance of the area centered around its rivers
and inlets. Lynn Canal formed a natural gateway to the
Klondike and the Yukon. It penetrated the mountains border-
ing the west coast and ran eighty miles into the interior.
Sixty miles from the ocean it bifurcated forming two inlets,
the Chilkat and Chilkoot, each receiving rivers at its head.

The rivers lead to the passes that Opened into the British

hinterland.2

A AAA—A AA
A ..A‘ A‘

1. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess., No.
162, Vol. 15, Part II, Case of the United States. p. 4.
2. Edinborough Review, Vol. 191, p. 280,

The Russians were the most energetic of the alien
groups who explored the northwest coast of North America.
Russia based her claims upon the voyages and discoveries
of Vitus Bering3 and his lieutenant, Chirikoff.4 Russia's
right was further fortified by the occupation of COpper and
Bering Islands and a considerable part of the mainland which
was good for hunting purposes. Shortly afterwards govern-
ment occupation was proclaimed.

England, Spain, and Portugal had seamen exploring and
claiming this area. The consensus of Opinion, however, was
that Russia was the rightful owner. Sir George Simpson, a
welloknown eighteenth century authority, has stated:

The discovery and possession of Alaska went hand and
hand. The Kodyak settlement was formed four years before
John Hears, flying Portuguese colors, erected his shed at
Nootka Sound, and Sitka was formed ten years before Astoria.‘

Alexander George Findlay in his "Directory of the North
Pacific“ published in 1870, remarked: "In justice to Rus-
sia it must be Said that no country had a better title to
the territory."6

Hence it seemed to be agreed upon early in Alaskan his-
tory that the northwest coast of North America belonged to
Russia. The various treaties with Spain, Great Britain,

and United States substantiated this claim.'

The value of the district rested solely upon the fur

 

3. Senate Executive Documents, 58th Cong., 2nd. Sess., No.
162, Vol. 15, Part II, p. 5.

4. Henry W. Clark, ”History of Alaska", 9. 56.

5. George Davidson, "The Alaskan Boundary", p. 38.

6. Ibid., p. 580

trade. United States, through independent traders, Great
Britain through the Hudson Bay Company, and Russia through
the Russian-American Company competed for the native fur
supply. The Russian efforts were predominant and preceded
those of the other nations. The develOpment of the fur
trade by Russia is an interesting history.

In 1781 Gregory Shelikof and other Siberian merchants
formed a trading association, and in 1790 the Shelikof Com-
pany was reorganized and named the "Irutsk Company." In
the meanwhile Russian and American independent traders had
extended their Operations on the mainland. The "Irutsk
Company" absorbed some Of the independents, but in spite of'
this competition continued to increase. Finally in 1799
the company secured a monopoly of the trade and the occupa-
tion of the territory lying north of the 550th parallel
north latitude. Thus a Russian colonial system similar to
that of the Hudson Bay Company was established.7

The Russian Ukase of 1799 was ineffectual in keeping
the American trading vessels from frequenting the islands
along the coast. The Americans carried their cargoes to
Canton where they disposed of them at large profits. Many
more Americans became interested in the profitable fur
trade. These independent traders secured a considerable
proportion of the native trade and impaired the value of

the Russian-American Company's monOpoly. Furthermore the

A *— A. A; AA

7. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess., No.
162, Vol. 15, Part II, Case of the United States, p. 6.

Russians were forbidden the use of Canton, while the Amer-
icans, through the use of the Chinese city, developed a
trade which made the Russian-American Company desperate.
About the same time the Operations of the hudson Bay Com-
pany were beginning to reach their peak.

The Imperial Ukase of September 4, 1821 was the out-
growth Of these conditions. Previous to 1821 the Russians
had on seVeral occasions requested the United States to
issue rigid orders against hunting in Russian territor*.g
Count Rezanoff, Russian Minister of Foreign affairs, had
broken Off negotiations with John Quincy Adams in 1810 when
they differed over the question of territorial limits.lo
BaranOff, director of the Russian-American Company, then
made an agreement with the enterprising American, John Jacob
Astor.ll In 1821 the company was reorganized and royalty
became a stockholder with the result that more governmental

. 12
protection was assured the company.

The purpose of the Ukase Of 1821 is well stated in the
foreward signed by Count D. Guruff, Russian Minister of
Finance:

Observing from reports submitted to us, that the trade
of our subjects on the Aleutian Islands and on the north-
west coast of North American, appertaining to Russia, because
of certain illicit traffic, to Oppression and impediments,
and finding that the principle cause of these difficulties
is the want of rules establishing the boundaries for

 

8. Ibid., p. 7.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Ibid., p. 8.
11. Ibid., pp. 4, 8.
2. Ibid., p. 9.

navi5ation alon5 these coasts, and the order of naVal com-
munication as well in these places as on the whole of the
eastern coast of biber ia and tie Kurile Islands, we have
deemed it necessary to determine these concunicutions by
specific regulati one, \hich are hereto attacr ed.

The Ukase of 1821 provided for the capture and confis-
cation of foreign vessels landing on or approaching within
one hundred Italian miles of the coast eo1.andel v Russia;
for the permissable landin5 of sriips along the northwest

coast of North American; for the prohibition of carryin5 on
trade with the natives e cent bv those an horized by the
Tsar; and for the prevention of Comp a1y officials visiting
on forei n vessels or doing business with the same.

Count Iesselrcde, Russian hinister of Forei5n Affairs,
in a letter to a fellow cabinet member explained tl1e Ukase
of deptember 4, 1821. He stated that the new regulation
:ould not prevent forei5n vessels from sailing thrcu5h the
restricted area, mainly because Russia did not h ave the
naval power to prevent the same, but it could close the whole
sea if it so desired.

To both the United States and Great Eritain it meant
a restriction of their fishing, trading, and hunting activi-
ties. The one-hundred mile limitation set by the Ukase of
1821 was especially irritating. As a result diplomatic ne-

gotiations were begun with Russia by both of the English

spe akin5 nations.

13. Ibid., p. 9.
14. Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
15. George Davidson, op. cit., p. 45.

Henry Yiddleton, the nmeriC1n Sinister at St. Peters-
burg, and air Charles Ba5ot, Eritish Linist er to Russia, on
the same day informs d their resoective Dove1nmentc of the
Ukase. f1e R1ss ian Ukase was off101ally communicated in
Lo idon by the Russian Hinister, Faron de :icolay, on Octo-
ber 21, 1891 in a letter to the British Forei5n Zinister,
fhe Marquis of Londonderry. Similar action was taken in
Wasnin5ton by I. de Politica in a letter to the AmeriCan
secretary of state, John ;uincy adams.16

ins unusual assertion of sovereignty ove waters with-
in one hundred miles of the Russian coast was repu5n1nt to
the British side 01 international ri5ht and subversion of
the commercial interests of British suoje cts. TheL -Lw Of-

ficers of the Crown declared "The extent of territory so

assumed is much greater than is ordinarily recognised by
...17

A.

the principles of tne law of nations
On January 18, 1322 the British Iinister of Forei5n
Affairs protested. One month later, John ;uincy adage,
followin5 an intervi eu witi stratf01d Cannin5, Rritish Xin—
ister at Jashin5ton, addressed a note to the Russian Iinis-

ter at Hashin5ton arotesting the maritime and territorial
3

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#111,. . . .1 -3 1 .. . . ,1 1 '-— - ,- : .. ,. 7‘ ,
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A AA -_‘___‘ L-..-

16. senate Executive Documents, 58th. Con5., 2nd. bfiSm., Ho.
_62, ,01, 15, Case of United States, p. 2.

17. Ibid., appendix, p. 102

13. Ib11., Part II, p. 1c.

or subjects on tln northvest Coaft of Y-rt; nieric .. Tohn
;uine” don's 11 1ent8’wers ldVfiH“€d for the curnose of
esuiblishing tte ri5ht of she -ndeanuenu “hericmn fur
mn~de“ to tixair11~str11ted.iirtercourss,1fizich he F'r1_pre-
'vicus15rezyya,ed v-11. the ruinives. LO nai:M1Lu1 this Inrsition.
it rigs n--e essziry IQ“ him to deny the rig?" of Russia Liver
these re5i1ns, Since the niiitine jur sdic ion f Qussin

was oised on her territorial domin tin;
In In; I. de Politieu, 7Hssie: :inieter to Iashin can

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on retn 1

tions. On July 57th Liddleton

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tnc poser UU Cirrr 3n ne5otia

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t1": three mtlnng were ll’lV 31303 Cl‘e‘lt :31. t .in 3.31-1 um we“?

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On July 12, 1823 Cann-n5,

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info3nc0 Eesaeerue uLdL TnlJed ct3ues 3m“ Uerb br3t31n

were going to act jointly. The jOlfit gctlon program dld not

 

o 17

21. Sen3te yuec3n3 e Docamcuts vflth. 0033., Pad. 9953., 30.
a 'V I T r)
22. Ib:a. ’ Plrt II' J). {4

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._'

pared "to assert e uel pretensione with Great
Russia to the whole coast as fur north as the Glut} prl‘illel
of north latitude and the r151t_tu be e purty to anJ par—

4.

_. . __,_.. . --, A. t .229 v, ‘. ,
'tltion.ol tn33t e3eu'. ulTlSt be Ivn:auoe ed.3nnic the

‘ ~ - .— ‘- 4-3 ‘130 , 1 "A rm 3. 1 -
L're;0fl COUJIul‘U-f between ’35; 51.1%.; 3-0 '3g' 113131.; 3 lat].

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by United otutes and Great Fritdin from 1318

:1.
CH.
O
HI
:1;
( f‘
f‘J
‘1

161

to l--

(I)
,.
o

This posit ion CLLn ed the attitude of United Stites and
Great ltitiin torard elch other. Begot broke off ne J<tia-
tions and Iiddlcton followed suit until he found out what
England's intentions were to be. Exact failed to receive
the expected ilistructions in December 01 T25, 30 id dle ton

ecided to act alone. He presenter a mehoriul to 383381-
rode, the chief claim of which was to establisn the superi-
ority of the territorial righ s of United Stutes over Russia
between the Slost and 6lost parallels of north latitude,
and that the right of the former to navigate along the coast
at such places as had not been actually settled and occu-

94 . . .. .
pied by the Bus sians.“ Count Lieven, Ruseiun flinister at
London, informed the Duke of Wellington of the Americnn
clAims and advised lwiz, that if Great Britain had any claim
to the territory, they should bring it forward so as not to

2-
be shut out bJ e1y Russo-A111e1 10 n abreencnt On February

25. Ibid., Part II, p. 97.
24. Ibid., Pert II- pp. 33-4
25. Ibid., Aopeno ix, p. 64.

*4
O

l, 132 4 Qush inforne Iiddleton that Great Britain had de-
clined to act jointly. This change of attitude was blamed,
first, on the territorial claims of the United States; and
secondly, on the Presidential Hessuge of 325 which put

forth the famous Ionroe Doctrine.“”

The famous Cocument together with the letters of secre-

tary of State, John Quincy Adams express d the new "Ameri-

rt

e

.‘J

can Policy." It is now generally agreed that ti ear of
Russian a “res ion convinced Adams and Ionroe of the neces-
sity of enunciuting the policy which was soon afterwards
.- c, -'3 rr' 27 ‘ 4-

procla1ned oy President Aonroe. One of tne best state-
ments of he avowel AmericAJn policy 0 me fro 2.1 a letter of
Adams to Rush in which the AmeriCAn Secretary of state wrote:

It was not imaginable that, in the present condition of
the world, any EuroPean nation should entertain the project
of settling a c0101y on the northwest co: st of North America;
that the United States should forne e sM olioimonov there, with
the View of absolute territorial ribht and inland communica-
tion, is not only to be expected, but is pointed out by the
finger of nature.23

This statement of the attitude of United States toward
future colonization by EurOpean nations and of the exPected
extension of finerican settlements is peculiarly important in
determining the actual position of United States in regard
to Russia's title to her AmeriCAn possessions. As a rttsult

Great Britain deemed it wise to break off joint action and

decided to settle on an n¢10*qUSLAdl agreement.

 

vvv’l—v— —.— w—v rvw'-m~~——r

26. Ibid., Part II, p. 34.
27. Hugh L. Keenleyside, "Canada and the United Stu to s, "p.211.
28. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. bes s. No.

1'.

162, Vol. lo, Appendix, p. 61.

11

Early in 1824 Hiddleton resumed negotiations for a
treaty tith Ru sia. In the first conference I. de Poli-
tica was told that any attempt to negotiate on the terri-
torial question without consulting the United States would
bring a protest in the strongest possible terms. at the
second conference the Russian and American diplomats ex-
changed treaty drafts. The Russians proposed a line drawn
along the 54° 40', by which Americnns were excluded north

of ha line except at flew Ar nargel, and the Russians

0

south of it. Iiddletcn remarked that the Qusuian proposal
was "entirely inadmisuable", and tha he must obtain acdui-
escence on two points, before he would conclude a treaty

. . _ ‘ 09
which would limit tne boundary to 55° north latitude.“

«4

Politica replied by sayina that he would never sign any

instrument allowing AmeriCan ships free admission to Rus-

. 30
Sign coasts.

At the third meeting several counterdrafts were dis-
cussed. On April 30, 1824 de Politica left a new Russian
dra’t with Hiddleton which included anong the contraband

articles, spirits and liquors. Two days later a convention

“I
o 7 o w -3 a _ U
was signed by United states and Russ1a.

The convention contained the following provisions:

’5

1. In any part of the Pacific Ocean the citizens 0“ either

i ‘1'

29. Two points: first, revocation of the maritime claim of
the Ukase, second, a trade privilege clause as was in
the Anglo-American Treaty of 1818.

Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Con5., 2nd bess., No.
162, Vol. 15, Part II, p. 3".

bid,,Part II, p. 38.

()3
O
0

()3
H
o

19
I»;

nation "shall be neither restrained nor disturbed either in
navigation, or in fishing, or in the power of resorting to
the coast upon points which may not have been already occu-
pied, for the purpose of trading with the natives."

2. A person of either country must get permission of the

governor to resort to the other country's establishments.

. United states was not to erect any posts or settlements

()1

north of 54° 40', nor Russia to the south of it.

4. Reciprocation for ten years along the coast for fishing

and trading purposes with the natives in the disputed area

was provided.

5. ”All spiritous liquors, firearms, other arms, powder

and ammunition were no longer to be accepted as trading ar-

ticles, but no boarding or searching of vessels for the a-

. . 32

bove mentioned should be permitted".
The meaning of the fooument to the principals involved

.can be briefly stated. The United States signed for fear

that Russia and Great Britain would conclude the territor-

ial question before and without the United States. In Ar-

ticle III the United states recognized the sovereignty of

Russia over the northwest coast of Horth.America.extending

from the Polar Sea (Arctic Ocean) to 54° 40' north latitude.

Russia signed because of this concession. The United States

also secured fishing and trading privileges for ten years,

a.point for which the Americans had continually negotiated.

 

32. Senate Executive Documents, 50th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
Vol. 4, No. 146.

H
()1

Great Britain was thoroughly dissatisfied vith the 54° 40'

0'"

P',
‘\
Ll

arrangement.

Great Britain likewise made an arrangement with Russia.
On January 5th Bagot received new instructions and was able
to meet on the 16th with Politica and Nesselrode, the two
Russian representatives. Bagot at the conference proposed
a line to be drawn through Chatham Straits to the head of

Lynn Canal north to the 140° west longitude, thence north-

7I
u
2

ward to the Polar Sea. 4 Russia did not accept this line
nor did she accept another preposed by Bagot. .This line
was to run in such a manner that Great Britain would con-
trol the whole Alexander Archipelago; the line then would
be drawn to the head of Lynn Canal and thence northward to
the Artie Sea. Sir Charles Bagot made a last preposal for
a boundary line and then agreed to leave the drawing of a
boundary to the Russian officials.55 After numerous pro-
posals by both parties Bagot suspended negotiations. In
the meantime, Canning wrote to Lieven stating that Bagot
would be able to admit with some qualifications the last
terms proposed by Russia. Bagot, however, had rejected the
Russian draft convention, and he knew nothing of the Canning-

Lieven correspondence. At this paint Bagot was replaced by

__ .7 v—

35. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 15, Part II, p. 40.

54, Ibid., Vol. 16, Case of Great Britain, Vol. 3, Part I,
p. 23.

35. George L. Davidson, op. cit., p. 69.

l4

stratford Canning, who on December 8, 1834 received permis-
sion to reOpen negotiations. On March 1, 1825 Stratford
wrote that he had signed the conventions”:6

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1825 contained a re-
nunciation of the Ukase of 1321; a statement of the bound-
ary line (which will be stated in full later in the paper
"and in an appendix together with the translations of the
disputed phrases); and a ten year reciprocal trade privi-
lege.37

This treaty was very important because all later dis-
putes grew out of it. The greater part of the Spoils went
to Russia. ‘Uhile Great Britain had by the treaty prevented
the extension of Russian domination to the Rocky Mountains,
yet Russia by the treaty obtained; (1) the protective bar-
rier of land which she sought; (2) the exclusion of foreign
trading posts from her area; (5) and the formal recognition
of her rights of possession and of the sovereignty she ex-
ercised over her American possessions.58 The United States
had somewhat checked the Anglo-Russian negotiations and in
the future would have to be considered in all of the Alaskan
territorial discussions.

By the Treaties of 1824 and 1825 Russia had gained

complete sovereignty over the area extending from the Polar

V— vv

36. Ibid., pp. 79-84.

37. Senate ExecutiVe Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. bess.,
Vol. 15, Appendix, p. 75.

38. Ibid., Part II, Vol. 1, p. 69.

15

Sea to 540 40’ - sometimes stated as being the southernmost
point on Prince of Wales Island. Russia vas very jealous
of her territorial rights in North American. she erected
forts at the mouths of all the important rivers running
through the disputed area into the British hinterland. she
absolutely refused to tolerate even the smallest intrusion
by any rival power. This jealousy was reflected in the
Russo-American negotiations of 1834-1845 through which the
United States attempted to secure a renewal of the trade
. . . . ' 39
priv1lege clause of the Russo-american Treaty of 1824.
When this ten year trade privilege had ended on April
5, 1834, Baron Wrangell, Governor of Russian-America, hand-
ed to the AmeriCan ships at Sitka a circular saying that
their trading privileves north of 54° 40' had ceased. In
February of 1835 Baron Krudener, Russian dinister at Wash-
ington, told Secretary of State Forsyth of Baron Wrangell's
actions and requested that the State Department print a
public notice announcing the expiration of the trade privi-
lege clause. In February of 1835 the British trade privi-
lege clause also expired. Forsyth declared that he hoped
the trade privilege clause might be renewed. After a second
Russian request an informal notice was printed in the public
journals of the United States. In July Wilkins, American
.Minister at St. Petersburg, was directed to renew negotia-

tions for trading privileges. Nesselrode told Wilkins that

39. Ibid., Part II, p. 70.

16

before he could give a definite answer he must first consult
the directors of the RuSsian-American Company. Finally Nes-
selrode informed him that if Great Britain requested a re-
newal of her trade privilege clause and it was granted,
then the clause with the United States would be immediately
renewed. Great Britain never asked for a renewal. The Hud-
son Bay Company had involved Russia in a quarrel which re-
sulted in the granting of a lease of the disputed area to
the Hudson Bay Company.40

In April of 1837 the United States sought to recover
damages for the ship, "Leriot", which had been confiscated
in 1836. The next year, Russia in a terse answer refused
to extend the trade privilege clause or pay the "Leriot"
claim. Seven years later on September 26, 1845 the United
States published an official notice announcing the expira-
tion of the trade privilege clause and recognizing the
sovereignty of Russia over the northwest coast of North
American north of 54° 40' north latitude.41

Great Britain had outdone the United States, in as much
as she had gained a perpetual trade privilege clause, while
the United States had been left to shift for itself. From
1845 until the purchase of Alaska by the United States Rus-

sia did as she pleased, at times much to the discomfort of

Great Britain and the United States.

40. Ibid., Part II, p. 70.
41. Ibid., Part II, p. 71.

-{I
' J
L“
l 1

II

A few years after the trade privilege clause had been
refused, the first suggestions of the sale of Alaska to the
United States were heard. The Purchase of Alaska was partly
the result of the amicable relations existing between the
United States and Russia, and partly due to the failure of
the Russian-Emerican Company and the inability of the colony
of Alaska.to continue as a paying investment.

Russia during the Civil War manifested her friendship
toward the United States in many ways. She vetoed Napoleon
the Third's plan of intervention Just as we Opposed concert-
ed intervention in Russia, when the Polish question had a-
roused the Opposition of all Europe to her. Besides Russia
sent two fleets to the United States in 1865 and we consider-
ed this a powerful moral demonstration in favor of the North
at a critical stage in the Civil War. This idea, however,
according to F. A. Golder, an.American authority, was an ?
erroneous one; Russia actually sent her fleet to the United
States so that it would be free to act in case England or
France went to war withRussia.42 On the whole the relations
between the two countries were very friendly and the public
of United States was satisfied that we owed Russia a good
turn. 1

Moreover, Russia was having difficulties in Alaska. In

1849 whaling in the Arctic Ocean was for the first time

42. F. A. Golder, "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War,"
American Historical Review, Vol. XX, pp. 801-812.

18

successfully attempted. As the whaling Operations moved
farther north, so did the trade with the whaling vessels
move northward along the coast which in time resultei in
repeated violations of the Treaties Of 1824 and 1825. From
the inland side the Hudson Bay Company had advanced far
into Russian territory and as early as 1851 English Mis-
sionaries were working among the natives of Alaska.43
Russia had considered the colony an investment which was
centered in the Russian-American Company. Russia being
obliged to ship her furs through Siberia, finally realized
that foreign traders were able to outbid her for the Indian
trade. Moreover, the company had scarcely attempted to pro-
mote the moral, social, and political development of Alaska.
The Company's stock which in 1854 stood at 500 rubles per
share had declined to 75 rubles in 1865. Russia was ex-
panding southward into Asia and at this period was anxious
to diSpose of her less profitable.American possessions.44
It was Stoeckl who carried on the Russian negotiations
for the sale of Alaska to the United States. The chief ad-
vocate for the disposal of Alaska was Duke Constantine, a
brother Of the Czar, Alexander II, and a bitter Opponent
of the Russian-American Company. The Russian Foreign Min-
ister, Gorchakoff, was hostile to the sale Of Alaska. When

in 1859 Senator Gwinn Offered Stoekl $5,000,000.00 for

Alaska, the Russian Government studied the offer seriously

7—7

43. Henry Clark, "History of Alaska", pp. 62-64.
44. Ibid., pp. 64-68.

r 19

and was about ready to sell when the Presidential election
of 1860 and the Civil War prevented the culmination of the
transaction. Again in 1866 Constantine's influence over
the Czar resulted in a return of Stoeckl to Washington
for the purpose of disposing of the Alaskan Territory for
not less than five million dollars. A California organiza-
tion had previously offered to lease the Russian-american
and Hudson Bay Companies' right-51.;5 President Johnson's
Secretary of State, William Seward, now offered tO purchase
Alaska. He proposed $5,000,000.00 but Russia held out for
$10,000,000.00. At the outset President Johnson was rather
indifferent to the idea, but in the meanwhile Seward had
won over the Cabinet. On the night of March 29, 1867
Stoeckl called at Seward's home to report that Russia was
willing to settle at $7,200,000.00. Before Stoeckl returned
to his residence a convention had been drawn up and signed,
The Senate ratified it by a vote of 37-256
The Treaty of march 30, 1867 between the United States
and Russia provided for the payment of $7,200,000.00 by
the United States whereby Russia ceded to the United States
all the Alaskan Territory comprising the mainland and the
adjacent islands. The disputed eastern boundary decided
upon was the line drawn by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825.
There were certain minor provisions such as, the withdrawal

Of Russian troops; the permission to Russians in Alaska to

 

45. Ibid., pp. 70-71.
46. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

20

return home within three years; and the statement that all

franchises and monopolies granted by Russia were nullified.47
This was a new departure in American policy. For the

first time territory which was not contiguous to the Union

48 With the Purchase of Alaska the United

was acquired.
States inherited the troublesome boundary quarrel. The An-
glo-Russian negotiations from 1867 to 1906 became Anglo-
American. To Great Britain it meant the termination of the
Hudson Bay Company’s lease and a loss of a considerable por-
tion of the coastal fur trade.

Shortly the discussion involving the eastern and south-
ern boundaries of Alaska assumed international importance.
In 1871 the territory of British Columbia was incorporated
into the Dominion of Canada. Less than a year later the
lieutenant-governor of the new province requested the Domin-
ion authorities to take steps for bringing about a "final
and definitive elucidation and settlement of the territorial
rights in NorthAmerica".49 During July of 1872 the Domin-
ion officials reported the request of British Columbia to
the British Foreign Office as well as to the Dominion Office.
Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister to Washington,
consulted the State Department with the result that President

Grant decided to accede to Great Britain's request. The

47. William M. Malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United
States and Other Powers". Vol. 2, p.1,521.

48. Henry W. Clark, Op. cit., p. 80.

49. Hugh L. Kennleyside, 0p. cit., p. 214.

21

President in his Annual Message to Congress, December 2,
1872, recommended a joint commission be authorized to make
a study of the point at issue, and suggest a suitable
boundary to Canada and the United States. Two weeks later
a bill to hat effect failed in Congress.50.

The new Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, on Febru-
ary 12, 1875 responded to the second Ottawa appeal by re-
marking that any survey would cover a period of nine years
with an approximate expenditure of $1,500,000.00. He con-
cluded by stating the uncertainty, if not the impossibility,
of such a large appropriation by the United States Congress.
After a few weeks the Dominion Government agreed to bear
one-half the cost of marking a boundary; again the United
States failed to act. From that moment on the trouble over
the boundary increased. When the United States officials
in Alaska on May 23, 1873 denied British subjects the privi-
lege of free navigation on the Stikine and Yukon Rivers,
which had been guaranteed by the Anglo-Russian Treaty of
1825 and the Washington Treaty of 1871, Canada.made a
vigorous but inconsequential protest. When Fish remarked
that a survey would cost too much, the Governor-General of
Canada requested Major Cameron, Her Majesty's Boundary Com-
missioner, to furnish an approximate estimate of the cost
and of the time required for carrying out the objects of

r
any commission that might be appointed.°l

L. _‘ 4 4“ W

50. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
Vol. 16, p. 51.
51. Ibid., Part I, p. 33.

22

With reference to the scepe of the survey Cameron made
the following statement:

While the United States have indicated a definite plan ‘
of proceedure, and named the points of the boundary which
they consider it essential should be marked, the Government
of Canada makes no reference to such details, and therefore,
leave it to be assumed that they expect the terms of-the
Treaty of 1825 to be fully and strictly carried out. The
cost of marking the boundary will be seriously affected b
the view which may prevail on this subject. ' 52

Cameron estimated the cost not less than $425,000.00
nor more than $2,250,000.00, and the time required for its
completion varying from two to seven years. He also designa-
ted the points which should be surveyed. ho action was taken

7
on Fish's suggestion or on Cameron's report.50

The State Department seemed willing enough to act but
it lacked the support of Congress. The urgency arose when
a group of British settlers laid out a town, on territory
claimed by both Great Britain and the United States. While
discussing this matter with Secretary of State Fish, the
Canadian Minister remarked that the affair should have been
settled two years previous. Fish was still apprehensive as
he doubted the possibility of securing the necessary funds.
Thornton and Fish again in 1875 discussed the situation a-
rising over the new town on the Btikine River. The next
move came in March of 1877 when the Canadian Government sent
Joseph Hunter to make a study of the boundary along the

A
Stikine River.51

52. Ibid., Part I, p. 53.
55. Ibid., Part I, p. 55.
54. Ibid., Part I, p. 35.

 

fA'L

 

23

Hunter was instructed to lay down the line on the
river along the line connecting the two highest mountain
peaks parallel to the coast, and "to lay off or estimate
the ten marine leagues on a course at right angles thereto".
In his report Hunter state‘.that the crossing of the river
by a line following the summit of the mountains parallel
to the coast was situated at 19. 15 miles from the coast.55
During the previous year of 1876 Canada had bitterly
remarked to Great Britain that the United States although
feigning disinterestedness had stood in the way of a bound-
ary adjustment unless its demands were met. In answer to
numerous requests for action by Thornton, Fish announced

that Congress had adjourned thus making further action im-

possible.56

The Hayes.Administration came into office in March of
1877. For the time being Mr. Plunket, Charge d'Affairs at
Washington, represented Great Britain. Mr. Plunket wrote
to Mr. Evarts, the new Secretary of State, on October 1,

1877 requesting action on the boundary question. Evarts

1 . 57
reassured Plunket, but was unaole to act.

By this time Joseph Hunter's report was available.
The modusgvivendi of 1878 was a result of this report. On
January 19, 1878 Thornton, who again was in active charge

of the British interests in the controvers1, sent Evarts

55. Ibid., Part I, p. 54. . . .
56. Ibid., Part 1, Case of Great Britain, p. 65.

57. Ibid., Part II, pp. 56-57.

58.

24

a copy of Hunter's report. Would the United States tempor-
arily accept the line as drawn by Hunter? Evarts accepted
this temporary arrangement on February the 19th, stipula-
ting that the line so drawn was not to run contrary to any
of the treaty rights of the two countries. The arrangement
so made was not binding due to the fact that the United
States Senate never ratified the preposal. It lasted until
58

the modLsgvivggd; of 1899 was agreed upon.

0
".-

Ibid., Part II, pp. 36-37..Appendix.a, No. l.

 

 

 

«“0

01

III

The medus Vivendi having been arranged this controversy

 

did not reach another peak until the infolmal Ball-Dawson
conferences at the Fisheries Conference of 1887-1888. By
1884 the boundzrry question entered into a ew phase of its
history. Mr. Dell, then of the United 8tates Geological

survey, advanced the theory that the boundary according to

the treaty was impose iole. Ba; ard, who became 8ecretary of

h 1885 endorsed this viewnoint.39 In a letter to
’ .L

{.1.

tate

Cf.

Lord 8alisbury , British Foreign Beeretary, Bay a1d remarked
that the Treaty of 1825 really gave no boundary at all. He
claimed that th's statement was completely and obviously
true.60 He further stated that Captain George'Vancouver
was a poor tepogragher; henceforth Bavarl declared the line

should go down the middle of Portland Canal until it reached

the 560th parallel of north latitude.61

By this time the Secretary of 8tate was taking an

r ,

active inter est in the question. Ehree other men were par-

ticipants in the discussions which led to the conferences of
1887-1888, namely: sir Lionel 8.el <ville-"est, British Min-
ister to the United 8tates; hr. Phelps, nmerican minister

at London; and Robert Cecil, Iarduis of salisbury, The For-

eign 8ecretary for Great Britain. Fr on the outset a commis-

es

Sion was thought highly desirable as a means to a solution.

u ve JJCIHLMUS, 58th. Cong., 2nd. bess., No.

162, Vol. 16, p. 37.

60. Hugh L. Kee 1e siie, 0p. cit., p. 816.

61. senate Exscutive Documents, 49th. Cong., 1st. bee“., No.
143, pp. 8-6.

62, Ibid., p. 12.

’4

‘O
0)

hr. Phelps in an interview on February 12, 1886 broach-

ed the subject of eom1i ss ion to Lord 8alisbuly who inclin-

'3.
*U

ed favorably to the suggestion, but said he desired to con-

. .. r3
sult and secure the oomlnlon Government's assent.3' A
change of English C binet occurred .nd Payard urged Phelps

to renew inquiries and 1e otiltions with the new Administra-
tion. 8ee retlry of state, Bayard, received the follOuing

Q

resyonse in Iareh, 1888:

11th reference to the previous correspondence on the
the subject, I Save tne honor to inform you that I am au-
thorized by his jxczllcnc , the Karquis of Landsdowqe, to
state that he ha: co1nunicated to Fer majesty's Governlent
the agreement of the Government of Canada in principle to
u preliminlrv survey of the Alaska boundlry by a commission .64

It bore the signature of E. O. Eelyar, Canadian hinis-
ter to the Ijnitel 8t; te,. secretary Fayard the n notified
Phelps of he_yar's letter and instructed him to proceed
with the negotiations at once. his inst
or a preliminary sur-

linit the formulation of an agreement

vey of the Alaskan boundary to be used as a basis for a fu-

r w 1 55

ture -ornal conve.ntion.
The British minister, 8ir Lionel 8a nVllle-uest, on

ngril 3, 1888 stated that Great. srit Lin agreed in ri 1ei11e

to the preliminary exudination, "but that the a;reeuent must

not be undelstood neces sirily to imply the up pointleut o: a

. . 66
301 nt CO1mnlsslon".

A4 -.._.

63. Ibid., p. 14, Part I.
81. Ibid., p. 15.
65. Ibid., p. 17.
66. Ibid., p. 17.

IO
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Taku, ugi @hilficot Inlctc,

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sheriffs be allowed to tuxe criiinalm from the interiur to
r)

tug Cqut g“; dawn .o Britii“ Colurbia :or trial.‘1

The discussions weve :gicihly “irri'd on. It Wis .grcefi
iuymi that 9.<nniventicnrfiL liA‘ vj izt we “ioptzd, ‘uiitu whila

nearly m;reeinb with that of th Tre :y of 1;?5, wauld prove
were convenient an; 193, costly to ~urvey The fulloving
conventional 11nd; were su¢;erttd E; 3:11 and Dawson: (1)
Points on Fortland Suaunel, uniting and Taku Inlet“, an;
keg; Of Lynn Ciual should Le dvvidgi in Bone manner. ”hese
points shou.i be cannected by a series of Straight liLDS
running gypruximatelj puiillel to the CQaSt ind being p03-
tiSflb of arés of gran circles. (?) A line starting From
his above *‘rzeutio‘ncd poiits shad C; b u. fl‘ofi. 3; i213: t3
guint. The tarrionid draiwcn by StTJ'mb iehochiAQ to tnc
eegwird should balonb to tge United Stites, and that drained
hy streafo debsuuhinb on the inland side of tLe ixcd Unints
WA“ to belong to Canaiu. One Specification W18 maie, namely:
that -gz'zcricml territory ‘..10‘1; rivers-z was to e-;te‘3:1t1 inn arr“:
not beyond :1 certain dist ‘.ice tan; 1.1;.‘OTTI Touring :‘r::-12.;i.¢-:J. tgqt

 

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“o r “‘ Z. n" '1 . r" tr ~ ‘ ‘ ~r 'l 1 . . . '5' y“ .‘ ’ ‘V'J.’
Final Juu clriied dir -actly Hettuiic until lb met the at.
'1 ' ,. ,i _ 4.x: ._.,., ' .t l , 4w ,. ° L
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0 '7'?
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--’ CL... 9.) VL .. .LLAA 4, ,7. 7‘; ‘_‘_

~ienccs by remirnins

31.8

(I) The parties were cniefly concerned nitn a matter
of principle ritner tnm with the ac.iieiti n of 3 little
more 01 less te iritcr; union sue regained b; all as prac-

ticelly aorthlese except for i

(2) That in the ielimitnt
frua the fire and to the last
latitude rti'nei' t;;a.n cf encn e.

C
an area of the continent.

No concrete

v—

questicn was ired,

4

LI C‘

d D

upon. I did, however, ervc

sion.

gains Cine out of t

23.8

fur trade;

:3
of
:1 ‘L BSJtiOg-l
group oi

I _)

Bl

1..
I

LG

5

dw

(D

it
\-

the ter

and

ritOl‘fj it Wits
1 1m Alel of
studs and. each

I \
Ca.

74

The
Wee decided

‘ SOLIS-

"Q
I“
‘.r. 1

IV

p - ,M, ' r- ,a ,. ~‘1 1‘ ~-~ f‘. . .1 u. .. .a‘ f‘ ,- - ”‘..“1 .- ' .‘ ‘ . .‘.
IHlOfmitlUn reigned the olnadian UOVQPMmeut in June of

(D

1888 to the effect thdt certain persons were about to receiv
a charter from the alashen officials duthorizina the construc-
tion of a. triil from Lynn Canal by new? of '.fllite Pass to the
interior of nlaehe. oir Jon: Idcjonnld, Deputy Iinister of

Interior of Candda, declare. such a charter was an encroach-

75

went on Cdnddian territory.
The attention oi Lord Salis‘ury was at once called to
the gutter, and Her Hejesty's Iinister at Fashindton was in-
structed to inform the United states Government that this
report had reached the Fritish Foreign Office by whom it was
presumed to be unfounded "as the territory in question is

a part of Her deesty's dominions".76 Si“ Lionel odckville-
West in his reluest failef to state the exact ocation of

the trail and Bayard in axsner stated that neither the

J

Interior nor the otnte Degdr meat had any report of the a-
77

forenentioned Charter. The hatter was then drapped.

In April of 1391 th} attention of the Canadian Govern-

r' ; :.

ment was drawn to a report of tFe United states Codst and
Geodetic survey in which it was stited that a survey was
about to he made under the authority of Congress which would

head of Portland

(D

involve the marking of a line through th

 

v v-v“. ~—

VS. senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
Ho. 16?, Vol. 16, p. 4

76. Ibid., p. ‘10.

7?. Ibid., p. 40.

Ccndl to the SCUth of north latitude, thence northwesterly

on, .-' c r. , , ,, m: .- _ - . - - ., -
lollononQ as neirlj.is 1-ULt be ordeticmblc tte ;enerii

"" a ‘ ' " r J' g' ' o “ 1 ' ‘ | ‘c‘ r‘. ‘ a ‘ . - '- v
trend OJ. the codst at J. distince oi wbelt thirty-five Miles

from it to the ldloth of west longitude, thence due north
to the Arctic Ocean.78 Upon learning of his intention

bir Julian Pduncefote was instructed to remind the United
states Government thdt the boundary at this point momentar-
ily was ,he suoiect of 80710 difference of Opinion, and the.
the actual line could only be determined by an international
commission. This viewpoint was communicated on June 5, 1891
to the American decretary of otdte, JmmCS G. Elaine. Action

then lapsed until February of 1892, when a conference took

place between delegates of the Canadian Government and the

.

F

lecretery of otite, relating primarily to the extension and

I

United states.

(.1:
CD
0)

velOpmcnt of trade between cinadn and th
‘t t‘"--- f‘ p Np (A 1 -‘ "t ' ‘ 1 3d per“; t. g: tl"
A nis Con_ercncc in ALFGGMEu was redole r ~poo in“ re
Alaskan boundary which was embodied in a convention signed
U. 1. A no 0 79

a wasninbton on July an, l8o2.

Bv this convention the two countries a reed "a 'oint

:J L2

survey should be made of the territory adjacent to that part
of the boundary line of the United States and the Dominion
0’ Canada dividine the territory of Alaska from the Province

of British Columbia and the Northwest Territory of Canada

from the latitude of 54° 40' to the point where the said

~~~-.-*—

 

'78. Ibid., p. 40.
79. Ibid., p. 41.

C r]
(N

7‘

boundary line encounters the 1410 0* west longitude .....
with a view to ascertain tLe facts and data neceSSury to a
permanent delimitation of the said boundary line in accord-
unce with the spirit and intent of the existing treaties
in regard to it between Great Britain and Russia, and be-

80

tween the United Stutes and Russia". The two countries

also agreed to begin within two months a report to be made
T". 4'7" . 2' 17', - -\ . (- ~~1 " ~r-. . 'v- ° . + v 81
“1 min txo Jedi-i, and tne e.«.pense to be boxne Jelntly.

They desired to remove all possible cuuses for difference
' .-.. 4. 1,. _ - ° ' .p v. .= i 1, w .-., .. . .. 82
in resyect b0 tne dcllmltwtlon oi tne alusnan soundiiy.

Ir. J. King was appointed as Her Majesty's Comuission—
er and the United States appointed Dr. T. C. Mendenhsll,

#-
v-J

afterwards succeeded by General Jillian Herd Duffield. T 8
period for making the report was lenythened to December 31,
1895 by a supplementary convention signed in February of
1394,83

It is important to note at this time that the Conven-
tion of 1892 referred to an existing boundary line. The
facts and data concerning the boundary were to be obtained
by a joint survey. Previous cartography or acts of settle-
ment were not embodied in the work authorised by tte con-

v ntion, nor did the commissioners report on such cartography

80. Willism K. Halloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International
nCtS, Protocols and Agreements between the United States
and Other Powers", p. 764, Vol. I.

81. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 764.

82. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 763.

83. Ibid., p. 765.

or —cts of settlement if such existed. a restatement Of

go

this was mufle later by Canada during the Tribunal proceed-

ings. The Commissioners presented their joint report on

December El, 1895, followed by a descriptive report in

., ~ ,-84 . . . . 1
Larcn of lByo. Jo definite uctlon was tuxe

*<

1 concerning

he reports until the modusmzivendi of 1899.

N!

84. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Con5., 2na. bess.,
No. 162, Vol. 16, p. 42.

Cd
()1

v

The control of the Dominion Government in 1896 was won
over by the Liberal party. The Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred
Laurier, was most anxious to try for a system of reciprocity
with the United States and President Cleveland was definite-
ly committed to the idea. The possibility of an agreement
on this question led to a discussion of other matters. Other
events hurried on a meeting concerning the boundary.85

On January 11, 1897 an arbitration treaty was signed by
the United States and Great Britmin and it was ratified in
May by the United States Senate. Sir Julian Pauncefote was
the most active diplomat in bringing about the arrangement.
The Arbitration Treaty of 1897 provided that:

1. All questions unable to be settled by diplomatic
negotiations were to be subjected to arbitration.

l. The tribunal was to consist of six members - ‘1ree

from each nation.

3. The vote should be at least five to one.86

Then too, during the years c§r1896 and 1897 gold in
large amounts was discovered in the Klondike area. This
precipitated the famous "Klondike Gold Rush" which brought
many peeple into the territory and raised grave questions
of jurisdiction where the boundary line had never been

drawn. The only access to the gold fields was through Lynn

85. William.a. Dunning, "The British Empire and the United
States," p. 324.

86. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., Ed. Sess.,
EC. 161, Vol. 4, pp. 4-6.

Canal; the importance of the boundary question increased
considerably. Canadian pressure increased and more and
more were heard demands for adjudication of the boundary
question.87 i

In the meanwhile the seal quarrel had come up again.
John Hay preposed a meeting of the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, and Japan to be held in Washington. The
scheme broke down owing to the reluctance of Canada who

88 Nothing resulted

wanted an Anglo-American conference.
until 1898 when discussions concerning some sort of a com-
mission were begun by the Convention of January 50, 1897
which provided for a partial survey of the Alaskan boun-
dary.89

The discussions, preliminary to the appointment of a
Joint High Commission, were carried on by Sir Julian Paunce-
fete, British Minister at Washington, Sir Louis Davies,
Canadian Minister of Marines and Fisheries, John W. Foster,
a former Secretary of State, and John W. Kasson, special
American commissioner. After several meetings the princi-
pals came to an underStanding. They decided upon the prob~
lems that should come up for amicable settlement; the number
of persons to represent each country was fixed; the powers

of the commissioners were defined; and tie proceedure to be

90
followed was stated.

 

87. William A. Dunning, op. cit., p. 325.

88. R. B. Mowat, op. cit., p. 276.

89. Ibid., p. 277.

90. W. h. malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts
Protocols, and Agreements bet een United States and
Other Powers, 1776-1909", pp. 770-772.

37

The Joint High Commission met in Quebec and Uashington
from august, 898 to February, 1899. The policy of leaving
Canadian foreign affairs chiefly to the Canadians was again
demonstrated. Canada was represented by Lord Herschell,

Sir Wilfred Laurier, Sir. R. J. Cartwright, Sir L. H. Davies,
Sir J. T. Winter, and John Charlton; the men to represent
the United States were; Senator C. W. Fairbanks, Senator

~r

George Gray, ar. Dingley, John H. Foster, J. A. Kasson, and

l

'.O

T. A. Cooledge.
Twelve prepositions presented to the Joint High Commis-
sion for settlement were: (1) fur seals, (2) Atlantic and
Pacific coast fisheries, (3) th Alaskan boundary, (4) tran-
sit of merchandise "across intermediate territory of the
other", (5) "Transit of merchandise from one country to be
delivered at points in the other country beyond the fron-
tier", (6) alien labor laws, (7) mining rights, (8) reci-
procal eustons concessions, (9) Lake Agreement of 1817,
(10) the marking of the frontier, (ll) conveyance of prison-
ers "in the lawful custoiy of the officers of one country
through the territory of the other", and (12) any other
difference not included in the foregoing specifications".92
On August 23, 1898 the Commission organized for business
in Quebec. For a time the Commission proceeded without dif-
ficulty, but with the assumption of the boundary question

. R. Thayer, "The Life and Letters of John Hay," p.205.
B. LIOWSLt, Op. Cit. , p. 278.

38

proceedure was more troublesome. In fact so deSpairing
was Secretary of state John Hay, that in a letter to Henry
White, American ambassador at London, he stated:

I hear from no less than three members of our Cana-
dian commission that by far the worst member of the com-
mission to deal with is Lord Herschell, who is more cantan-
kerous than any of the Canadians, raises more petty points,
and is harder than any of the Canadians to get along with.
In fact he is the principle obstacle to a favorable arrange-
ment. If you could in any discreet way, in conversation
with Balfour or Villiers, or even Lord Salisbury, should
occasion offer, intimate this state of things, so that they
might Speak a word which would moderate his lawyer-like
zeal to make a case, it would be a good thing.‘ 93

The Commissioners could not agree upon the text of the
Convention of 1825. When this disagreement became fixed the
Canadians coolly prOposed that the United States should cede
or grant in perpetuity Pyramid Harbor on Lynn Canal, which
was the only safe deep water harbor in the region, and one
and two-third miles south of the deep water head of Chilkat

4 This necessitated the cession of a strip of terri-

9
Inlet.
tory directly through the lisiere'. It was the best route
of travel into Canada; so remarkable was itthat in the
Opinion of the Alaska Packers Association Canada had nothing

’ 1 9 5 0 u I" - 0
equal to offer in excnange. For military reasons the United
States Government could not possibly cede the strip of land

which would divide Alaska. The United States refused to

act.96

 

~93. W. R. Thayer, Op. Citop p0 204.
94. George L. Davidson, op. cit., p. 201.
95. Ibid., p. 201.

»96. Hugh L. Keenleyside, 0p. cit., p. 216.

59

Arbitration in agreement with the Venezuela affair
was then offered by the British Commissioners. Arbitra-
tion was not favorably accepted by the United States, who
wanted an umpire, if they had to have one, from the Amer-
ican continent. John Hay writing to Whitelaw Reid stated:

The position in regard to arbitration is not altogether

free from awkwardness. After we had put forth our entire
force and compelled, there is no other word, England to
accept arbitration in the Venezuela matter, we cannot feel
entirely easy refusing on arbitration in this, and yet if
we went into arbitration on the matter, although our claim
is as clear as the sun in Heaven, we know enough of arbi-
tration, to foresee the fatal tendency of all arbitrators
to compromise. 97

Canada did not wish to resort to arbitration if it
seemed likely that it would end in a deadlock. Thus after
several months of discussion the Joint High Commission per-
manently adjourned on February 20, 1899.98

The one positive result of the Joint High Commission

was the modus Vivendi of 1899. The boundary line by this

 

arrangement was to begin at the peak west of Porcupine
Creek running to the Klehine River which it followed for
ten miles to the Junction with the Chilkat River, thence

southwesterly six miles to the peak east of the Chilkat

River. On the Dyea and Skagway trails the summits of the
Chilkoot and White Passes were the fixed points. Some ar-’

rangement was also made concerning the heads of Chilkat,

97. W. R. Thayer, 0p. cit., p. 207.
98. Hugh L. Keenleyside, op. cit., p. 231.

40

Chikoot, and Taiya Inlets. It was agreed that the full
rights, privileges, and claims of both countries pending
a settlement were to be protected.99
By accepting the modus Vivendi the United States gave
an extensive region of placer gold diggings over to the
control of Canada. Davidson, a geographer for the Alaska
Packers Association, in speaking of the arrangement stated:
"In consideration of the strained relations between the
citizens of Canada and the United States on these routes, or
.for some inscrutable reason, it may have seemed polite to
the American members of the Joint High Commission to yield

this temporary arrangement for the period during which nego-

tiations toward a settlement are pending.100

The modus Vivendi of 1899 although never ratified by
the United States Senate lasted until the Tribunal decision
of 1903. Speaking of the modus vivendi the editor of the
"Canadian Magazine“ stated:

One does not care to speak reservedly on this point
since it seems increditable that British diplomacy should
once again, after so many fatal blunders, make another con-
‘cession to deprive us of territory that is ours. The re-
mark of Sir John MacDonald in 1871 recurs to the mind with
unpleasant significance: It stated that'if protection was
denied us by England, we might as well go while we had some
property left us with what we could make an arrangement
with the United States'. The affection of Canada is more
deeper and sincere than it was thirty years ago, to trifle
with it, however, is hazardous in the extreme. 101

99. William M. Malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States
and Other Powers, 1776-1909”, Vol. I. p. 777.Appendix.A,ho.2.

100. George L. Davidson, 0p. cit., p. 197.
101. Canadian Magazine, Vol. 20, Nov. 1902, p. 62.

41
VI

The commission to finally settle the boundary dispute
to the governmental satisfaction of both countries was the
Boundary Tribunal of 1903. The convention signed on Janu-
ary 20, 1905 was an outgrowth of the very friendly relations
between the United States and Great Britain. Neither Cana-
da nor the United States was satisfied with the modus vi-
‘Eggg; of 1899.

Secretary of State John Hay was very anxious to secure
a treaty. In the new alignment of world politics, which
was measured by continents, Hay deemed it of utmost impor-
tance that friendship should be cemented between the United
States and nations of western EurOpe. His first object was
to make for closer bonds with Great Britain, in order that
these two nations should be strengthened against possible
conflict with other rivals.1°2

Working through Pauncefote and his successor, Sir Mi-
chael Herbert, Hay was able to bring about the arrangement.
The Convention of 1903 provided for the organization of the
Tribunal; the proceedure to be followed; the treaties to be
considered in the Tribunal meetings; the questions to be
settled; the places and numbers of meetings; the decision
to be made; and the provisions for ratification by the prin-
cipals involved. The purpose of the convention was well

stated in the preamble:

102. W. R. Thayer, op. cit., p. 202.

42

The United States and His majesty, Edward VII, equal-
ly desirous for the friendly and final adjustment of the
boundary differences which exist between them in respect to
the meaning and application of certain clauses of the con-
vention between Great Britain and Russia signed under the
date of February 28, 1825, which clauses related to the de-
limitation of the boundary line between the Territory of
.Alaska, now in the possession of the United States, and the
British possessions in North.America, have resolved for the .
submission of the questions as hereinafter stated to a
tribunal‘. 103

The first meeting of the Tribunal was held September
5, 1905 in the rooms of the British Foreign Office. Previ-
ous to the meetings cases, counter-cases, and printed ar-
guments were exchanged by the two parties. The Tribunal was
to consist of six impartial jurists, whose decision was to

be a majority vote of the judges. Each country was to se-

4
lect three of the judges.10

To represent the United States President Roosevelt
chose Elihu Root, Secretary of War; Henry Cabot Lodge, United

States Senator from.Massachusetts; and George Turner, United

105

States Senator from the State of Washington. When these

selections became known a storm of protest swept over Cana-

da, and the Dominion Government took the unusual step of

formally objecting to the choice of the two Senators.106

Roosevelt, however, made no changes and Canada was unable to

do anything except to protest through the press.

__ A

w Ag 4 ##‘AA—A “‘ A AAA A A“‘ _—_———‘

—

103. William.M. malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States
and Other Powers, 1776-1909”, Vol. I, p. 787.

104. Ibid., p. 788.

105. Senate Executive Documents, 58th Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 15, p. 15.

106. Hugh L. Keenleyside, 0p. cit., p. 218.

43

A Canadian authority writing recently on the matter

has remarked:

Elihu Root had then, as now, the confidence and respect
of the whole English-speaking world. He was, and is, a man
of the most scrupulous honesty; honorable, able, and consci-
entious. Senator Turner was little known even in his own
country but was a politican from Washington, the state most
vitally interested in the retention of Alaska. The politi-
cal career of Henry Cabot Lodge, on the other hand, had been
characterized by an excessive devotion to partisan and na-
tionalistic ends. It is not too much to say that for a
quarter of a century he had been recognized as a mischevious
force in international relations and that in relation to
things British in particular he had displayed a complete lack
of objectivity. He had been the incarnation of bigoted na-
tionalism and jingoistic imperialism and his nomination as
an "impartial jurist of repute” was bitterly resented in
Canada. 107

"If Lodge and Turner are to represent the United States,"
declared the Toronto Globe, "it makes little difference how
ably the Canadian case is presented.” The Montrea;;§§§ette
agreed that "the representatives of the United States were
hardly Open to conviction," while the Toronto News summed
it up thus: "Hr. Root is a lawyer of real eminence; Senator
Lodge is a well known jingo; and Senator Turner comes from
the ”State” in which Seattle is situated."108

Speaking of the two American judges, Lodge and Turner,
the figgitgbapggge Press on February 24, 1905, declared:
”Whatever may be said of the final decisions of the Tribunal

it must be agreed that in making these selections the United

m--—‘ - v A W

107. Ibid., p. 218.
108. Ibid., p. 219.

44

states Government dishonored its own treaty." The Ottawa
Citizen stated: "Neither of them is an impartial jurist
in any sense of the word. Both of them are extreme parti-
sans....... Senator Lodge, a fiery jingo, has delivered
characteristic intemperate sgeecnes on this very subject
which he is now supposed to view with objective eyes;
speeches in which he assailed Great Britain and sneered at
Canada..... Turner represents the state in which are center-
ed the interests which will derive most benefit from a
settlement in harmony with the American contentions."log
Speaking of the breach of the treaty by the United
States, F. C. Wade, one of the counsel for Great Britain
stated: "I have no comment to make on this except the ob-
vious one that a more gross breach of faith on the part of
any nation, great or small, could not be imagined, and that
we seem to have traveled a long way since the days of Wash-
ington and Lincoln."110

In the United States a leading liberal newspaper,

SpringfielgwRepublican concurred with the Opinion of the

 

Canadian press when it remarked:

“If the President of the United States were to seek the
country over for men who were entirely without the judicial
quality on this question, he could not find persons whose

109. Ibid., p. 218. n
110. Canadian magazine, Vol. 22, February, 1904, p. 5c6.

 

 

45

minds are more set than Messrs. Lodge, Turner, and Root.
Their selection cannot be interpreted in any other way than
that the President intends to block the slightest chance of
a decision in the least favorable to Canada";111 while on
the other hand the Seattle Post declared, "that there was
nothing to arbitrate and was proud of the fact that none of
the American Commissioners would yield on a single point.'112
In an attempt to defend himself against this tirade of
criticism Roosevelt in a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes,
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
aplained his choice in ”that no three men fit for the posi-
tion could not be found in all the United States who had not
already come to some conclusion", and the American dele-
gates were "anxious to do justice to the British claim on
all points". 113
Thus from the outset the United States Government arous-
ed Canadian ill-feeling. Roosevelt, of course, in his own
mind was satisfied that he had made the best possible se-
lection. It was generally agreed in Canada and Great Bri-
tain that the men chosen to represent them were "impartial
jurists of repute.". They chose Sir Louise Jette of luebec
Province, Mr. Allen B. Aylesworth of the city of Toronto,

and Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England.114

111. Hugh L. Keenleyside, 0p. cit., p. 219.

112. Ibid., p. 219.

115. Ibid., p. 220.

1114. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 15, p. 15.

46

The Canadian press leaned favorably toward Jette and
Aylesworth, but not so toward Alverstone. The Victoria
Colonist on February 24, 1905 printed the”tone of the Bri-
tish press toward the Boundary Commission foreshadows a
surrender to the United States", while in EngLind the L22;
don SaturdaILBeview emphatically reiterated that "the di-
rectors of our foreign policy are throwing our premier col-
ony to the able diplomacy of the United States as a pledge
of determination to be friends at all hazards“.115 On the
whole the Canadians were dubious as to the attitude of Al-
verstone. It was almost certain that the two Canadians
would vote for Canada's claims. Hence it may be concluded
that the only impartial member of the Tribunal was Lord
Alverstone.116

There were a number of other persons involved inthe
proceedings. John W. Foster, former Secretary of State, was
designated as the Agent of the United States, while Clif-
ford Sifton served in the same capacity for Great Britain.
Mr. Reginald Tower, British Ambassador at Munich and‘Stutt-
gart, was designated as the Tribunal's Secretary, and with
Mr. J. B. Carter, Second Secretary of the.American Embassy
and Mr. Joseph POpe, Under-Secretary of Canada, as Assist-
ant Secretaries. Jacob H. Dickinson, David T. Watson,

Chandler P. Anderson, and H. Taylor were chosen as counsels

115. Hugh L. Keenleyside, 0p. cit., p. 224.
116. Ibid., p. 224.

47

for the United States, while Sir Robert Findlay, Sir Ed-
ward Carson, Mr. ChristOpher Robinson, Mr. F. C. Wade, Mr.
L. P. Duff, and H. Geoffrion of the Canadian bar, and S.
A. Rowett, and J. A, Simon of the English bar, acted as
counsels for Great Britain and Canada.117
Seven problems in the form of questions were placed
before the Tribunal. These questions were:
1. What is the intended point of commencement of the
line?
2. What channel is Portland Channel?
3. What should be the course from the point of com»
mencement to the entrance of Portland Channel?
4. To what point of the 560th parallel should the
line be drawn?
0. Was Russia to remain in the exclusive possession
of a continuous strip of territory separating
English land from ocean waters?
6. From.what coast or line should the width of the
lisiere be measured?
7. What if any, are the mountains referred to as situ-
ated parallel to the coast?118
The points at dispute rested in the meaning and in-

terpretation of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825, which

 

v '— vv—‘—

11?. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
H0. 162, Vol. 15, pp. 15-16.

118. William.M. Malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, Internation-
al Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United
States and Other Powers, 1776-1909", Vol. I, pp.790-791.

48

involved a discovery of the intentions, knowledge, claims,
attitudes, and devices of the plenipotentiaries to the con-
ference that framed the treaty. In an appendix to this
essay will be found the various translations together with
the original French wording of Articles III, IV, and V of
the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825.119

Before going into a discussion of the contentions of
the two countries it may be stated that both parties, but
especially the United States, introduced the contentions by
basing their claims on and using as a basis of proceedure
the ”Rules of Interpreting a Treaty" by William Hall,
taken from Wattel's "Law of Nations", Book II, pp. 268-286
wherein he stated: (1) When a treaty yielded a plain and
reasonable sense it should be interpreted accordingly; (2)
if there was no plain sense then the general sense of the
treaty should be discovered. In interpreting a treaty a
person should: (1) Discover the dominant intention of the
treaty; (2) consider the subsequent acts of the parties to
the treaty; (5) consider the situation and circumstances
in which the treaty was made; (4) interpret obscurities ac-
cording to the probable thoughts of the negotiators; and
(5) discover the true motive which led to the drawing up

of the treaty.120

__—
'—
_.___

119. Appendix B. _
120. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,

N0. 162, V01. 18’ Pp. 8'10.

 

 

 

49

It was generally conceded that the United States pre-
sented a much stronger case. Both Great Britain and the
United States presented a history of the controversy such
as had been attempted in the preceeding pages and concluded
by requests for certain decisions. The counter-cases added
evidence and refuted the claims of the other party to the
dispute. The minds of the American judges had by this time
been made up as was shown by a letter of Lodge to Roosevelt
on July 50, 1905 when he stated:

The British counter-case is extremely weak. I have
read that and our own since I wrote you and our own is very
strong. At the same time I have not much hope of reaching
an agreement for I do not think they will have the courage
to decide against the Canadians, and the Canadians are so
perfectly stupid about it that they utterly fail to see
that a disagreement deprives them of their only chance to
get out of the matter creditably and leave the land in our
possessions. - 121

It must be remembered the only maps available in 1825
were those of Vancouver. In the course of the preparation
of the cases the American counsel noticed discrepencies be-
tween Vancouver's narrative and his maps. It was agreed in
principle that in these cases the maps were to be consulted.
The British contended that the only maps worthy and neces-
sary including Vancouver's were the maps prepared by the
Joint Commission authorized by the Convention of 1892.

121. §elections_frommthe_gorre5pondence of Theodore Roose:
231} and Henrywcabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Vol. 2, p. 41.

50

America wanted to bring additional recent maps into the
Tribunal discussions.122
The United States attempted to show that Canada until

1889 did not object to the arrangement of 1825. The Ameri-

can case established these facts: (1) that Great Britain

during the thirty years after the Purchase of Alaska in 1867

had never given notice to the United States that she was

claiming any part of the territory ceded by Russia; (2) that

the United States hrad entered into possession of, and had

occupied the lisiere, had exercised sovereign rights therein,

and treated the same at all times as a part of its national

domain; and to such occupation and exercise of governmental

authority Great Britain had entered no protest or objection.l‘?':5
On the other hand Canada attempted to prove that from

the incorporation of British Columbia into the Dominion of

Canada in 1871, she had continually requested the settlement

of the boundary question.124
There was no great difference of Opinion over the first

question. The United States contended that the point of

commencement was Cape Muzon which at the time of the nego-

tiations of 1824 and 1825 was believed to be the southern-

most point of Prince of Wales Island.125 It was proved by

‘— ~—

122. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 15, Part II, p. 95. Appendix, A, Ho. 5,

125. Ibid., p. 102.

124. Ibid., Vol. 16, Case of Great Britain, p. 42.

1.25. Ibid., V01. 15, Part II, p. 1030

51

the maps of the Joint Commission of 1892 that Cape Muzon
was the southernmost point of Dall Island and that Chacon
was the true southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island.
Hence the British contended for Chacon Point, but said that
they would be satisfied with Cape Muzon.126
The second question presented a greater difficulty.
This involved an interpretation of Vancouver's charts.
There were several openings into the ocean from Portland
Canal and it was doubtful as to which one Vancouver had in-
tended to be the true Portland Channel. The British claim-
ed that the channel passed between Tongass and Kannaghunut
Islands, so that Wales, Sitklan, Pearse, and Kannaghunut
Islands belonged to Canada. The United States insisted
that Portland Channel did not follow a.straight line but
angled between Pearse Island and Ramsdem Point; this gave
the United States the four islands. The United States sup-
ported this claim by insisting that the line follow the
parallel of 54° 40' a contention based on the fact that
this line was mentioned in the negotiations of 1825 in re-
gard to the point of commencement. Canada, in reSpect to
the claim of 54° 40', replied that in the negotiations
Russia had taken a stand upon the charter of Tsar Paul and
had claimed down to 55° north latitude. Since the parallel
of 55° cut Wales Island near its southern extremity Politica

126. Ibid., Vol. 16, Case of Great Britain, p. 48,

52

prOposed that the rest of the island go to Russia -- as a
result the starting point accidently was 54° 40'.127

The United States endeavored to show the channel they
chose was the most navigable and that according to inter-

national law this was proof enough that the claimed channel,

Observatory Inlet, was the true Portland Channel.128

The United States and Great Britain respectively con-

cluded their arguments with the following claims:

The United States requests the Tribunal to answer and
decide that Portland Channel is the same body of water now
commonly known and described as Portland Canal, which, pass-
ing from the north between Ramsdem Point on the mainland
and.Pearse Island, and thence southward of the sane island
and Wales Island to enter Dixon Entrance between the island
last mentioned and Compton Island. 1

Great Britain contends that Portland Channel means the
passage Vancouver called Portland Canal and which enters the
ocean between Tongass Island and Kannaghunut Island leaving
Sitklan, Wales, and Pearse Islands on the south and east.
The canal is not to be departed from and if done so is not
the entrance of Observatory Inlet. 13°

The solution to the third proposition was dependent
upon the answer given in the second problem. Great Britain

claimed that the line ran from Cape Muzon or Chacon to the

center of the channel between Tongass and Kannaghunut Islands;151

while the United States wanted the line to run from Cape

12?. Ibid., p. 63.

128. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 18, p. 52.

129. Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 43.

130. Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 65.

131. Ibid., Vol. 16, Part I, p. 65.

53

Muzon in an easterly direction until it intersected the
center of Portland Channel at its opening into Dixon En-
trance.152

The fourth proposition presented a more difficult prob-
lem. In the first place they didn't know to what point on
the 56° parallel the line should be drawn to, and secondly
they didn't know what course the line should follow. Great
Britain declared that the point to which the line should be
drawn was the point from which it was possible to continue
the line along the crest of the mountains situated parallel
to the coast.153

The United States emphatically stated that the British
claim was contrary to the Treaty of 1825 since the line re-
commended by them out oflepoint of Bell Island and part of
‘the mainland from the American possessions since there was
no possible construction of the treaty that enabled Great

154

Britain to claim any part of the mainland. Therefore,

the United States requested the Tribunal to draw the line
along Portland Channel to its head and continue it until it
intersected the 56° parallel north latitude.135

Bitter words were exchanged when the fifth problem was

taken up and as a result long arguments were forthcoming.

132. Ibid., Vol. 15, Part II, p. 107.
155. Ibid., Vol. 16, pp. 71-72, Part I.
134. Ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 60-61.

135. Ibid., Vol. 15, Part II, p. 104.

54

The Canadians stated that it was not the intention of the
Treaty of 1825 to exclude them from the inlets, bays, and
havens along the coast. The United States asserted that
Russia under the Treaty was left in control of a continu-

h.156

ous strip of land not to exceed ten marine leagues in widt

Any answer that might be given was dependent upon the mean-

'.

ing attached to the French word.ggtg. To the Americans
the word meant continuous land with all the sinuosities and
indentations so that the boundary would never come within
thirty miles of the tidewater. Canada had a different in-
terpretation; to them it meant a line that applied to the
coast outside the narrow inlets, to general trend, and that
did not penetrate farther in than a.boundany line drawn from
headland to headland.157

The United States attempted to prove the efficacy of
its claims by referring to international law which stated
that there were two coast lines, an inner and an outer one.
In measuring boundaries the inner coast line was used -
Canada agreeing that was the proper course to pursue along
the Alaskan coast, but the two parties would not agree to
the use of the physical coast line which up to that time
had been used by all nations in drawing boundaries. By

using the physical coast line the United States would pre-

vent the drawing of a line following the general trend of

136. Ibid., Vol. 16, pp. 71-72.
157. Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 65.

55

the coast which in turn would have permited Canada to have

access to the ocean}:58

The Canadian claim insured Canada an arm of the ocean
that afforded the most practical access to the Klondike
gold fields which were mostly on Canadian soil, while the

American claim shut Canada from the ocean north of Cape

mnzon.159 Thus the United States requested the Tribunal to

answer and decide in the affirmative140 while Great Britain

demanded a negative answer.141

The sixth question dealing with the manner in which
the width of the lisiere was to be measured depended upon
the answer given in the fifth instance. If the fifth ques-
tion was answered in the affirmative there was no need for
an answer in the sixth. But if the fifth was answered in

the negative the United States requested that the line be

drawn from the heads of all the inlets along the lisiere}42

Great Britain requested that ”the width of the lisiere be

measured along a line perpendicular to the general direction,

locally, of the mainland coast of the ocean”.143

The seventh and last question created considerable dis-
cussion. The United States contended that the mountains

referred to in the Treaty of 1825 really did not exist. They

A A __- A _.__- _ __‘ “

““ -a~“_‘a§4 ‘4

158. Ibid., PD. 15, 18.

139. W. A. Dunning, 0p. cit., p. 522.

140. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
No. 162, Vol. 15, Part II, p. 105.

141. Ibid., Vol. 16, pp. 72-73.

142. Ibid., Vol. 15, Part II, p. 105.

143. Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 78.

 

56

went on to state that Vancouver was a very poor tOpographer
and had misrepresented the mountains. Mr. Dall had made an
extensive survey of the area during the last decade of the
nineteenth century and had been unable to find the mountains
referred to by Vancouver. Therefore, the United States re-
quested the Tribunal to decide that "such mountains do not

144

exist within ten marine leagues of the coast". Great

Britain contended that ”there are such mountains and that
they are to be found fronting the general coast of the main-
land along the whole coast from 56° north latitude north-
ward".145

There was some doubt as to possibility of an agreement
between the Judges of the Tribunal.‘ An editorial appearing
on September 12, 1903 in Harper's Weekly stated:

It is expected that the consideration of the case will
be complete within two months, but whether any award is
rendered depends upon the question whether the American
Commissioners can succeed in convincing their British Col-
leagues that their claim is well founded. Otherwise the
Commission will he divided and no decision will be rend-
ered. 146

Any decision that might be made depended upon the atti-
tude of Lord Alverstone. Lodge in writing to Roosevelt on
September 12, 1903 stated that Alverstone was at that time

somewhat contrary to the American view and that if he

A - ‘_‘ A

wm“ ~AAA A — ‘u

144. Ibid., V01. 15, Part II, p. 106.
145. Ibid., Vol. 16, Part I, p. 78.
146. Harper's Weekly, Vol. 47, September 12, 1903, p. 1468.

 

57

persisted in remaining such the American Commissioners would
cause a split and the lisierg would be taken over by the
troops which Roosevelt had stationed in Alaska for that very

147 Ho

purpose. wever, Alverstone did weaken and in accord-

ance with the Convention of January 24, 1903 a written de-
cision was submitted to the Tribunal by the six Judges.148

The Tribunal Judges decided that: (1) the point of
commencement was Cape Muzon; (2) Portland Channel was the
channel which passed north of Pearse and Wales Islands, and
which after passing north of Wales Island passed between
Wales and Sitklan Islands into and through a channel called
Tongass Channel; (3) the line was to run from points "B" to
"C” aszmarked upon the map; (4) the line was to be drawn to
the point on the 56° parallel marked "D“ on the map with the
boundary line to be drawn from "C" to ND"; (5) the fifth
question was answered in the affirmative; (6) no answer was
necessary for the sixth; and (7) there were such mountains
parallel to the coast but their exact location would have to
be determined before a definite line could be drawn.149

The draft was signed by Lord Alverstone, Elihu Root,
Henry Cabot Lodge, and George Turner. Jette' and Aylesworth

refused to sign the document.150

Following the Tribunal'a decision the Judges submitted

A _. ..L AJ-MA_~—-_ A A AAA 4. AA _ A A 14_——

147. Selectionsgfrom theJCgrrespendence of Thegrdore;figgse-
velt andAgenry Cabot Lodge, Vol. 2, p. 57.
148. Senate Executive Documents, 58th. Cong., 2nd. Sess.,
' No. 162, Vol. 15, p. 32.
149. Ibid., p. 32. .Appendix.d, No. 4.
150. Ibid., p. 52.

58

written Opinions on the most troublesome of the questions.
The second question was the first to be contended. Mr.

Aylesworth stated:

The course for the boundary is directly Opposite to
the distinct findings made, and the whole line of reasoning
adOpted by the President in his memorandum of reasons for
the decision. It was a line of boundary which was never so a
much as suggested in the written case of the United States 3
or by counsel before us. No intelligent reason for select- M
ing it has been given in my hearing. 151

Jette said Canada had been compromised and the unheard
of had been done when the line was so drawn contrary to all
previous and logical understanding.152

Alverstone defended his position concerning the sharp
turn in the boundary by saying that "the reference to Ton-
gass Island in 1855 as being on the frontier of the Russian
Straits, and in 1863 as being on the north side of Portland
Canal, and in 1867 as to Tongass being on the boundary line
between Canada and Alaska, are strongly confirmative of the
view arrived at".153

The fifth question aroused severe comment. Aylesworth
contended that the width of the lisiere should be measured
from the outer coast and that when the Treaty Spoke of ocean
154

line it did not refer to the coast line along Lynn Canal.

Jette' ridiculed the decision which deprived Great Britain

- m- #‘M

151. Ibid., p. 84.
152. Ibid., p. 70.
155. Ibid., p. 56.
154. Ibid., pp. 88-91.

59

Of any access to the sea along the Wh018.ll§l§£§-155 The
American Judges stated that the ordinary meaning Of the
Treaty called for the exclusion of Canada from the ocean
and that all the official maps for a period of sixty years

156 Alverstone based his

had drawn the line accordingly.
construction upon the ambiguities Of the Treaty Of 1825.
He was Of the firm conviction that the line was to be drawn
around the bays, havens, and inlets.157
Canada was very critical Of the outcome Of the award.
This criticism was directed not so much against the details
Of the award itself as against the methods employed in reach-
ing the decision. Two main lines Of criticism as presented
in the national press were; first, the betrayal Of Canada's
interests by the mother country for political reasons; and
second, the American disregard Of the convention stipulation
in the selection of jurists.158
Regarding the first point the Vancouver,Provingg_on
October 21, 1903 stated: "It showed that we cannot depend
upon the mother country to protect our interests; it shows
that we cannot depend on her to see common justice done us,
when, by sacrificing us, she has an Opportunity of catering

to a sentiment which does her much less credit than She

imagines". The Victoria Colonist summarized the Canadian

 

__‘ 44“

155. Ibid., p. 79.

156. Ibid., 9?. 46-48.

15?. Ibid., pp. 37-58.

158. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Op. cit., p. 227.

60

feeling as follows: "About the decision we do not care.
Our main consideration is the means by which it was arrived
at. The prevailing tone of the British press has not been
the necessity of maintaining imperial rights, but the ne-
cessity of cultivating the friendship with United States."

The Rossland Miner on October 22, 1903 declared in a bitter g

 

mood: "Perhaps we should be thankful that there is no terri- 1
tory left which prospering America can reach for, and com-
placent British Commissioners give away". The Toronto
‘flgglg on October 19, 1905 printed: "This is not the first
time British diplomacy has proven costly to Canada. Canada,
however, accepted a “loaded" Tribunal as a means Of effect-
ing settlement. The negotiations have gone against us. It
is our duty to submit ....... What Canada should do to pro-
tect herself in the future is a question which deserves and
will undoubtedly receive deep consideration."159

R. E. Gosnell, Victoria Provincial Librarian, in cri-
ticizing England's early foreign policy asserted: "If some
years ago the imperial authorities had understood the advan-
tage of possessing Alaska, Great Britain, today, would be
troubled with one less Of those boundary disputes in which
they are so extensively involved, and there would be to us
the supreme satisfaction of seeing the Dominion of Canada ‘
absolute possessor Of all the territory between the 49th

parallel and the Artic Ocean."160

159. Ibid., p. 228.
160. Canadiag4Magazine, Vol. 6, January, 1896, p. 248.

 

 

 

61

Not only was Canada disgusted with Great Britain but
also with the "impartial jurists", especially those of the
United States. Perhaps the best summary of the Canadian
viewpoint is to be found in an editorial of the Manitoba
Free Presg, October 19, 1905 from which the following is

quoted:

We recognize that the Canadian case may have been the
weaker Of the two. If this were the case it undoubtedly is
unfortunate that the decision should have been reached by
means that have left one Of the parties to the dispute con-
vinced that it has not been justly dealt with. The merits
Of the case, to the satisfaction of one Of the parties can
never be decided now. If Canada was the right the decision
was lamentable; if she was wrong it is calamitous that an
impartial Tribunal could not have made this clear, as it is,
the damage is irreparable. Canadians, with very few excep-
tions, will accept without question the statements Of their
representatives that their interests were sacrificed and the
resulting resentment is certain to affect the attitude of
Canada toward the United States, and in a still greater de-
gree, towadd the Motherland. 161

The Le Jgurnal, an important French Montreal daily,

stated: "We find ourselves contemplating, not the decisions

Of an arbitration Commission, but a diplomatic arrangement."162

John A. Cooper in the_§anadian Magazine stated that
Canada's rights were sacrificed for imperial gain and "if
the Canadian Government had thought for a moment that in this
case the decision would have been diplomatic and not judicial

it is-safe to say that they would never have agreed to this

reference to six jurists.”163

#A A A A A

—'.

161. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Op. cit., p. 228.
162. Ibid., p. 227.
163. Canadian Magazine, Vol. 22; November, 1905, p. 93.

62

United States was elated.and satisfied. Everything
had gone her way and even the concession she did make seem-
ed to favor her. President Roosevelt was certain that the
United States had attained her just rights, and that Canada
was not actually losing territory. Roosevelt, of course,

had exercised much influence over the Tribunal and perhaps

A —-‘0

this partly accounted for the decision. Likewise, the Am-

- rl—a'

erican press lauded the decision and criticized the Cana-
dian attitude.
Commenting on Lord Alverstone Harperis Weekly of Cote-

ber 51, 1905 declared:

By the decision rendered in the Alaskan controversy
he has convinced the American peOple that a British jurist
can be trusted to act on an international tribunal without
any prOper bias in favor of his native land. He has gone
far to convince us, for the first time, not only that it
might be at once safe and wise to refer to arbitration all
future disputes between Great Britain and the United States,
but that the arbitration might well be of a unique and im- 164
posing kind, reflecting equal honor on both parties thereto.

The Living Age sympathized with Canada: "We sympathize
with the Canadians in their disappointment, and we fully.
understand their soreness in view of the, to say the least,
of the non-judicial quality of the American side of the
Tribunal."165

,flarperts Weekly severely criticized and rebuked Canada
for her unfriendly protest: "Evidently the Canadians are

poor losers.......We prefer to believe that they have been
164. Harper's_Weekly, Vol. 49; October 31, 1903, p. 1728.
165. Living Age, Vol. 239; November 21, 1905, p. 505.

 

carried away by irritation, and by their keen disappoint-
ment are disabled for evincing the equanimity, the resig-
nation, the cheerful acceptance of accomplished facts which
were exhibited by the American members of the board to which
the Bering Sea controversy was submitted."166
The United States felt that it had achieved a diplo-
matic triumph and had at the same time secured a more friend-
ly understanding with England. Most of the American peOple
were convinced the Tribunal's decision was a right and just

one.

A A“ A LA“; ‘_ A..—

166. Harpegis weekly, Vol. 47; p. 1?7?.

64

VII

In 1905 and 1906 the final chapter of the Alaskan
boundary dispute was written. Canada alone could not re-
pudiate the decision of the Tribunal. The United States
and Great Britain were anxious to conclude the settlement
and to smoothen out the difficulty concerning the seventh
question which judges of the Tribunal had encountered.

On January 24, 1904 Mr. Loomis, Acting Secretary of
State, received a note from Sir Mortimer Durand, British
Ambassador at Washington, informing him that the Canadian
Government was ready to enter into arrangements for the
delimitation of the boundary between British Columbia and
Alaska, and they prOposed to appoint Mr. King as their mem-
ber of the Delimitations Commission. Mr. Loomis informed
Durand on February 5, 1904 that Mr. O. H. Tittman, Super-
intendent of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, had been ap-
pointed as the United States' member on the commission for
drawing the boundary in conformity with the Tribunal award.
He also advised that "owing to the brief season in which
work can be done to advantage I venture to suggest to your
Excellency the expedience of an early conference between
Messrs. Tittman and King in order that work may be begun

without undue delay.”l67

Sir Mortimer Durand on October 1, 1904 told Loomis that

Tittman and King had completed their work and that Canada

167. House Documents, 58th. Cong., 3d. Sess., Vol. 1,
p. 324.

 

'2;

 

65

was satisfied with the proposed line and "they have express-
ed the wish that the United States should be approached with
a view to obtain their formal agreement to that line as an
international boundary".168 A copy of the report of the
Delimitations Commission was enclosed in the letter.

John Hay on December 2, 1904 after studying the report
of Tittman and King announced to Durand: "In reply I have
the honor to state that the Government of the United States
is likewise ready to accept the preposed line as satisfac-
tory, and considers that it will be sufficient for the two
governments to accept formally the recommendations of the
commissioners by an exchange of notes."169

Thus on March 25, 1905 notes were exchanged by the
reSpective governments. Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of
State, in a note to the British Ambassador, H. M. Durand,
accepted the line drawn between points "P" and "T" as drawn
by Tittman and King. Durand gave to the Secretary of State
a similar note empressing Great Britain's acquiescence.170

The following year Roosevelt was able to secure with
Great Britain an agreement for the surveying of the l4l°st
meridian west longitude as a'boundary between Alaska and the

Dominion of Canada.171

The.Alaskan Boundary Convention of 1906 provided for

AAuA

168. Ibid., p. 325.

169. Ibid., p. 525.

170. House Dbcuments, 59th Cong., 1st. Sess., Vol. 1,
DP 0 478-480 0

171. House Documents, 59th. Cong., 2nd. Sess., Vol. 1,
pp.801, Part I.

 

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66

the appointment of one commissioner by each country for the
purpose of making a survey. A starting point on the 141°st
meridian west longitude was to be determined and then to
trace "as much of the north and south line passing through
the said point as is necessary to be defined to determine
the exact boundary as established by the Treaty of 1825."172
So ended the difficult boundary contention ”at had
tried the tempers of the English-speaking peOples continu-
ally since the beginning of their new history as neighbors.
Until some new and unforeseen acquisitions of territory by
one or the other of the nations shall take place, no further
difference of this sort seems possible. Every yard of the
4,000 mile line along which the British and American do-
mains are contiguous, from the Bay of Fundy to the point
where the l4l°st meridian intersects the shore of the Arctic
Ocean is now fixed and most of them by the most precise

methods known to modern 's.c:i.el’lce.l7:5

AA

AA _‘ ‘

172. William M. Malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States
and Other Powers, 1776-1909", Vol. 2, p. 803.

.173. R. B. Mowat, 0p. cit., p. 353.

VIII

The award made by the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal of

w

seen a just and right one.m1 United

’I‘

1903 appears to have
States had exercised com lete sovereL Qnty over the disputed
area since the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867.

Cana d2 at no time had attem)ted to control the area or any

.5
L

O
.4.

ts bays and inlets. Until the discovery of gold in tne

I“

Klondike area Canada had not placed any pressure upon urea

cf

Britain for an immediate settlement. After 1897 the need
for a waterway into the British hinterland became neces-
sary. All things considers d it now appears that Canada had
the weaker claim.

In order to understand why the Alaskan boundary dis-
pute was settled by the United States and Great Britain in
the manner previously narrate d, it is necessary to realise
the status of Great Britain internationally during the early
years of the twentieth centurV. The adjudication and settle-
ment of the bound. iry Hue tion was not a matte r of a few
seuare miles to England; it was the absolute need of a po-
werful ally to stand with her against certain EurOpean po-
wers. German industrialism was at the point where enpan-
sion was necessary if its industries were to survive; con-
sequently she was looking for colonies which might furnish
new markets and raw materials. Kaiser Wilhelm had attempted

to increase th efriendly feeling betreen Gr eat Brita in and

O)
(I)

Germany by visiting England in 1905, but the trip failed
miserably. France, fearing Austria and Italy, could not
reciprocate too Openly as a friend of Great Britain. France
was having trouble in Morocco due to German intervention.
Czar Nicholas II was a cousin of Kaiser Wilhelm.and was
most anxious to remain friendly toward Germany. The only
powerful unallied nation was the United States, and in view
of the enormous military strength of Gemnany, it was both
wise and necessary to befriend the United States who could
furnish material and manpower in case of war.

Great Britain relative to the Alaskan boundary had no
choice to make even though She had become exasperated with
Roosevelt's aggregiveness. The Dominion interests had to
be sacrificed for a larger and more necessary gain. The
combined efforts of Great Britain and the United States led
by President Roosevelt did result in the submission of the
Moroccan question to a meeting of powers which group decided
against Gerrs y. Roosevelt seemed to have influence over
the Kaiser and this was helpful to Great Britain. United
States and Great Britain had been on friendly terms for many
years and had been able to adjust their difficulties auica-
bly by some form.of arbitration. Therefore, rather than
break off this friendly relationship with the United States
and endanger her position in Europe, England sacrificed the

smaller material gain on the Horth American Continent.

69

An anti-American feeling had been slowly develoyin3
in Canada and nwtuiull the sentiment increased followin3
the decision of the Tribunal of 1903. The Canadian press
lambasted Rooseve t continually with.sarcustic inferences
respectin3 the avarice end 3reed of the American peeple.

:hether or not this feelin3 hdd somethin3 to do with
the failure of the reci11rocity treaty between Ceneda and
the United States durin3 the Te 1ft administration is herd to
conclude. Undoubtedly the economic interests of Canada had
more to do with the seeping and defeatin3 of the recipro-
city treaty then any other sin3le influence or factor. From
a political viewpoint it may be possible that Clifford Sif-
ton, Agent for Gregt Britain at the Tribunal of 1903 and
later leuder of the Conservatives, was effectei by the de-
cision to the extent thut his anti-Americanism became far
more intense and he was very ee3er to defeat Laurier and the
Liberal Party. Henry Ceoot Lod3f e earlier had remarked that
Leurier feared Sir Charles Tupper, then lead,r of the oppo-
sition part3, more than he fee red Salisbury 1nd McKinley
combined. 174T} 1ere is the oossibility t1 rat the Liberals fear-
ed a settlement in fuvor of the United btete s because the
Conservatives were likely to make a political issue out of
the outcome at home. It mey be that tlm Liber ls brought
about a stron3er expression of unti—lnerloen1sn anon the

‘vfj

ConserVeti‘es with the result that this same seirit has

 

W

 

 

_'- .rvv-rv—wv-un'--—-—vv—v-—— ' '-~A‘ v 'v—vv—vv'-w

174.U.R. Theyer, "Life and Letters of John Huy", Vol. 2,

70

again disylayed durin3 the reciprocity negotiations of
1910-1912. On the whole, however, economic considerations
and not patriotic sentiment seem to have been responsible
for the defeat of reciprocity.

Canadian public Opinion after the decision was both
favorable and unfavorable. The national press was very
severe in its criticism of Lord Alverstone. In Canada two
groups had arisen over the issue as to whether Canada ou3ht
'or ou3ht not belon3 to th= jritish dominions. The exPres-
sion of these two attitudes was evinced earlier when Laur-
ier during the Boer War sent 7,000 Canadians to Africa.

The French Canadians were not pleased with the action and
became bitter Opponents of the Liberal Party. Laurier lean-
ed toward imperialism until his defeat in the election of
1910. It appears that the outcome 0f the diSpute did not
shake the Liberal Party's confidence in the ritish Govern-
ment althou3h an unfavorable press and public Opinion had
arisen. The anti-imperialists desiring to sever relations
England
withadeemed the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal to be one of those
British mistakes which were beginning to prove so costly to
Canada. Laurier, of course, found that he had not only the
Conservatives, but also the anti-innerialists to Oppose. It
appears that the decision of the Alaskan boundary disnute

added to the lon3 list of peoole who wanted to break away

from the mother country.

71

Canadaleven though She miaht have had a strong case,
was not in a position to dictate to Great Britain who was
in need of a very powerful ally to aid her in keeping the
European situation in check. Hence Canada's interests
were sacrificed but it seems to have been a wise step on
the part of Great Britain.

The man who carried the greatest determining influ-
ence over the Tribunal was Theordore Roosevelt, President
of the United states. Why did Great Britain fear Roose-
velt? Roosevelt was convinced that the United states owned
without question the disouted area and was determined to
secure the finality of such a viewpoint even at the point
of a bayonet. Again his policy in the Alaskan dispute was
the "big stick policy". No obstacle was going to hinder him»
every inch of the disouted area was and always would be the
prOperty of the United States if Roosevelt had his wa‘.
Hhat he could not accomglish by permitting matters to run
their course he achieved by threats. As early as march,
1902 he had ordered Secretary of War Root to place trOOps
at all strategic points along the disnuted area with a view
of exerting force, if necessary, to defend the American
claims. Four months later he remarked to Hay_that the Cana-
dian claim was "an outrage, punaand simple".175 do certain
was Roosevelt of his ground, and because he personally ex-

pected Great Britain to interfere, that he invited a war

M * mm“ *- -.-M. W ——

175. H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt", p. 291.

72

with Canada which according to the President would be
futile for the Ce.n.ac"-.i.ans.1"76
Jhen it became apparent that Great Britain was going
to interfere in the diSpute between Canada and the United
States, Roosevelt sent Oliver Wendell Holmg to the British
Premier and Foreign Secretary with a letter, which stated
that there would be no arbitration of the matter, out that
in a message to Congress he would make it necessary for
Congress to break off negotiations and draw a line suitable
to the President. 177
Such an outspoken viewpoint could not be disregarded,
because Great ritain had too much at stake and dared not
Oppose the dynamic and poyular Roosevelt. Accordingly Lord
Alverstone was chosen as England's jurist on the Tribunal.
'Even Roosevelt admitted that the three American judges were
committed to a.decision before the cases were exchanged, and
that they considered the American claim to be very strong.
The two Canadian judges were chosen as being impartial jur-
ists of repute, but most historians agree that Aylesworth
and Jette' were prepared to think well of Canada's claim.
The Tribunal, in short, was a polite way of letting
Great Britain out with dignity. Before the first session of
the Tribunal the decision had been made. Actually there was

no arbitration. The decision was not a judicial one; it was

~_ *‘_— w

m-“”‘—---' -- - — v - -_—— - - V—

176Ibido, p. 291.
1773. B. Liowat, op. cit., p. 289

 

75

after all a diplomatic compromise. United States undoubted-
ly had the stronger case, but the comiromising features would
not have been so noticeable had Roosevelt made a wiser selec-
tion of jurists. Supreme Court Justices would have been
preferred to politically-biased United States senators.

Once convinced of the correctness of the United States'
position Roosevelt was not going to deviate from.the chosen
course. He was Opposed to long-drawn out negotiations and
preferred short-cut methods. When John Hay's procedure did
not satisfy himland after Hay became too ill to take an ac-
tive part in the affairs of btate,Roosevelt became his own
Secretary of fitate. Although Roosevelt was clunsy in his
methods and undiplonetic he achieved the desired objective.

It must be admitted that Roosevelt did not promote
necessary and highly desirably friendship with Canada; nor
did he secure the honest friendly feeling of Great Britain;
besides he did not conduct h'mself in accordance with the
Anglo-American traditions, {Olicies, and diplomatic proce-
dures of the past.

The Anglo-American dispute over the boundary between
Alaska and British Columbia was the last of the boundary
settlements on the North American continent between British
and American territories. Aetsual the fine friendly feeling
was displayed by Great Britain and the United States in the

settlement of their difficulties. It does not seem pOSsible

74

that Canada and the United States will clash over boun-
daries again and that in suite of this incident fir more
desirable and necessary relationships have been left open

to both the Canadians and the Americans.

APPEXDIX.A

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ALASKAN BOUNDARY TRIBUNAL

AWARD OF 1 903

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B

Translations and original text
of the Disputed Clauses of the

Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825

French Text of Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825
Article III

"La ligne de demarcation entre les Possessions des
Hautes Parties Contractontes sur la Cate du Continent et
les alles de l'Amerique Nerd-Quest, sera tracee ainse
qu'il suit."

"A parter du Point le plus meridional de l'lle dite
Prince of Wales, lequel Point se trouve sans la par allele
du 54 me degre 40 minutes de latitude Nord, et entre 1e
131 me st 135 me degree de longitude Ouest. (Heridien de
Greenwich), la dite ligne remontera qu Nord 1e long dela
passe dite Portland Channel; jusqu' au auit de la terra ferme
ou elle atteint 1e 56 me degne latitude More; de ce dernier
point la ligne de demarcation siuvra la crete des montagues,
situees parallelement a la Cote. jusqu'au point d'intensec-
tion du 141 me degre de longitude Ouest, (meme Meridien);
et finalement du dit point d'intersection, la meme ligne
meridienne du 141 me degre farmera, dans son prolongement
jusqu'a la Mer Glaciale, La limite entre les Passessions
Russes et Britaniques sur le continent de l'Amerique Nerd

Quest.”
Article IV

All est entendu, par rapport a la ligne de demarca-

tion determines dans l'Article precedent;

"1. Que 1'ilse dite Prince of Wales apprentienda
tante entiere a la Russia.

2. Que partoute au' La crete des montagnes qui s'
etendent dans une direction par allele a La Cote depuis
1e 56 me degre de latitude Nerd au point d'entersection
du 141 me degree de longitude Guest, se trouverait a la
distance de plus de dix lieues marines de 1'Ocean, 1a
limite entre les Possessions Britanniques et la lisiere de
Cote mentionnee oi dessus comme devant appartenir a la
Russia. sera formee par une ligne parallels aux sinnosites
de la Cote, et qui ne pauma jamais en etre eloiqnee que de

dix lieues marines."
Article‘V

"All est convenu en outre, que nul Etalelessement ne
sera forme par l'une de deux Parties dans les limites que
les deux Articles precedens assignent aux Possessions de
l‘Autre. En consequence, les Sujets Britanniques ne for-
meront aucun. Etablessement sait sur La Cote, sait sur la
lisiere de terre ferme comprise dans les limites des Poses-
sions Russes, telles qu'elles sont designees dans les deux.
Articles precedens; et, de meme, nul Etablessement ne sera

forme par des Sujets Russes au dela des dites limites."

Literal T anslation of Articles III and IV of
the Russian Text of the Treaty Between Great Britain
and Russia of February 28, 1825, As Certified by the

Russian Foreign Office.1

ArtiClQ III

"The line of limit-separation between the possessions
of the High negotiating sides upon the shore of solid land
and upon the islands of north west America shall be drawn
out in the following manner:

Beginning from the very southern point called the
Prince of Wales, which point finds itself under 54° 40'
north latitude and between 131 and 133° of west longitude
(counting from Greenwich meridian) the above mentioned line
stretches itself through the north lengthwise by the inlet,
called Portland Channel up to that point of solid land
where she (the line, not the inlet) touches the 5600f north
latitude. Thence the line of limit separation shall follow
the backbone of the mountains Spread out in a parallel di-
rection with the shore up to the point of cutting across
upon the 141 degree of nest longitude (from the same meridi-
an) and, finally from this point of cutting across the same
meridinal line of 1410 composes in its continuation up to
the Frozen Sea, the boundary between the Russian and the

‘—

British Possession on the solid land of north West America.

 

 

--—-.——”-" ’- 7m~ ‘.II‘I .- - ' »mm-M_—WM -—'.---' *~.- 7 ‘—

 

1. Senate Executive Document, 58th. Cong., 2nd. 5888..

Article IV

In relation to the line of limit separation defined
in the preceeding article, it is understood: (1) That the
island named Prince of Wales, shall belong to Russia en-
tire without exception.

(2) That everywhere, where the backbone of the moun-
tains stretches out in a parallel direction with the shore
from 56° north latitude up to the point of cutting across
under 1410 of west longitude, Shall stand away farther than
ten marine miles from the Ocean, the boundary between the
Great Britain Possessions and the above designated shore
as being necessary to belong to Russia, shall be drawn out
by a parallel line with the crookedness of the shore and

cannot go farther than ten naval miles from it."

the British possessions and the line of coast which is
to belong to Russia as above mentioned (that is to say,
the limit to the possessions ceded by this convention)
shall be formed by a line parallel to the winding of the
coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of ten

marine leagues, therefrom."

PRILLiRYpsOU

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