FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY or THE FEDERATIONS or NIGERIA,
AND THE WEST moms

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHleAN STATE UNIVERSITY

. ~‘CHUKWUEME-KA ONWUBU
1970 ’

 

 

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Michigan State
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ABSTRACT

FEDERALISM AND SCCIAL CONVLTCT: A CPVPARATIVE
STUDY CF 'JE FCDWRATTCHS CF NIGYRIA,
RED THE WGWT TNDTVS

By Chukzmereka Cntmbu

Federalism is treated as a socio-political organisation. Cbnsequently,
an analysis of a federal system calls for the examination of the actual and
potential issues of social conflict, normally associated with social processes.
The three sections of the study are constituted as follows:
Part I: This consists solely of Chapter 1, being the introductory chapter.
The notion or concept of Federalism is considered, and an operational concept-
ualisation of a federation deveIOped. The choice of the examples of Nigeria
and the west Indies for study is rationalised, and the assumption of 'disin—
tegration' of these two systems is justified on the basis of the conceptual
framework. The comceptual framework, together with the consideration of the
other historical Cases of Federal experience, leads to the formulation of the
central problem of the study: the question of the conditions for the constition
of human societies into viable federal associations, in the face of both
conflicting and overlapping interests of these societies. The chapter concludes
with an overview of the two cases selected for investigation--Ffigeria, and

the west Indies.

Part II: Background to Federation

This consists of Chapters 2 and 3, and forms what is considered as'back-

Ho

ii
ground' to the process of federalism in both societies chosen for study. As
elaborated later in the last chapter (5), the claim is made that social con-
flicts within a social system such as a federation, arise from two sources,
in general--internal and external. It is therefore presumed that a real
comprehension of the nature of social conflicts can only be acquired by con-
sidering both the internal and external aspects. In the particular cases
being considered, it is suggested that the internal aspects of social con-
flict should be considered by examining the structural set-up of the units
constituting the systems, prior to any ”external influences“, while the locus
of the 'externals' should consist in the colonial and imperial intrusions.

Consequently, Chapter Two is devoted to the treatment of the peoples
and cultures of the three major ethnic groups (in the case of Nigeria), and
the three major racial communities (in the case of the West Indies), select-
ed. Chapter Three deals with the economic and political devel0pments in the
context of the evolutionary processes within these two federal systems. Also
dealt with in this chapter, is the process through which the internal and the
external forces converge. Chapters Two and Three, taken together, then con-
stitute the background over which the conflict issues raised in the subsequent
chapter Foufl should be perceived.

PART III

This consists of Chapters 4 and 5, which, together constitute what could
be considered as sources of social conflict, and the implications for social
change.

Chapter A deals exclusively with what may be described as 'general con-
flict issues' and 'specific conflict issues'. The former consist in those is-
sues of conflict whose origin may not be said to be localised within the given
society; while the latter consist of those conflict issues unique to particular

social systems. Thus, the fact of I'imposed federalism”, ”anomalies of the federal

iii
structuring", and "intensity of Nationalism", could be regarded as general
conflict issues; whereas, "The Chaguararas Affair" (Jest Indies), or "The
Census Crisis" (Nigeria), for example,could be appropriately regarded as issues
unique to the respective federal systems. While the general issues could be
accounted for by considering external or colonial forces, the specific issues,
may, to a great extent, be attributed to unique local factors, although,
having indirect colonial, nee-colonial, or imperialistic implications.

Chapter 5 presents a theoretical perspective of the substantive consi-
derations dealt with in the earlier chapters. In particular, it deals with a
social system, by considering the dynamics of system change, and conflict.
Moreover, it offers an evaluative schemata for the substantive analysis, as
well as predictively-though in a limited sense—-suggesting possible trends
and tendencies.

In conclusion, it is proposed that the analytical efforts of the present
study, can account, fairly adequately, for the federal experiences of both
Nigeria and the west Indies; it is further preposed that this study has
contributed--if in a modest way—-to the general understanding of the mechanics

of federalism and its institutions.

FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE FEDERATIONS OF NIGERIA,
AND THE WEST INDIES

by

CHUKWUEMEKA ONWUBU

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

1970

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TO BIAFRA

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ACKNOWLEDGEYENTS

This writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Ruth Hamilton, his
committee chairman, and major Professor,'without whose careful guidance,
scrutiny, advice and encouragement, this work would not have come to fruition.
Ifis acknowledgement also goes to the other members of the committee, Irofessor
Grafton Trout (Department of Sociology), Professor John Useem (Department of
Sociology); and also to Professor James Hecker, of the Department of History,
M.S.U.

Acknowledgements are also due to ur. Akalazu NWachukwu, a Biafran
graduate student in the Department of History, a close companion of the writer's,
whose fellowship has done much to sustain the writer's morale, throughout the
period during which the rather arduous process of this investigation was
being executed. In particular, the writer owes a great deal to Dr. and Mrs.
Sonde N. NWankpa, for the vital role——even if indirect-~they played in the
execution of this study. Without their interest, encouragement, advice, and,
in fact, equal commitrent, the interest of this writer in the field of
sociology, perhaps, could not have been sustained, at the initial stage when
the cemmitment to this field was made. Dr. Nwankpa, a Biafran mathematician,
is now Assistant Professor Of Nhthematics at Tuskegee Institute in Alabama,
where his family and he are presently residing.

The writer also wishes to express appreciation to Mr. and Hrs. Rex C.
Odokara, for the contributions they made—~if indirectly--to the sucess of this
undertaking.

Finally acknowledgements go to Kiss Irene MbDowell, and Miss Florence

Eve, both students at Michigan State University, for their much-valued help

vii

in preparing and typing the drafts of this thesis.

Once again, the writer wishes to say "Thank you" to all these people.

'Ekneka Onwubu ,

December, 1970

TABLE OF CONTENT

“MOT. C C O O O O O O O O O O O o O O O O O O O O O O O O O

ABS?”

TITLE

0 O C O O O O O O O O I 0 O O O O O C O O O O O C O 0 O

DEDICA. TIOI‘I. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o O

ACKI‘IOYHJEDIGEI:3 NTS O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O

TABIE OF CONTE FITS . O O O 0 0 O O O O O O I C C O O O O I C C 0

LI q'1‘ OF TABTR go 0 O O o o O o o o o o o o 0 o o o o 0 O o 0 O O

PAALTS

 

1.

II.

III .

NOT

II‘ITRODUCTION

Chapterl: ........................
Conceptual Framework, Overview, and the
Statement of Problem

NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: BACKGROUND TO FEDERATION

Cl’la-IDt’eI‘ 2: O o o o o o o o o O o o o o 0
Nigeria and the West Indies: The Peoples, Their

Culture

Chapter3: 00000900000000.000000000
Nigeria and the West Indies: Political and Economic

Development

SOURCES OF SOCIAL CC'EFLICI AND THE IT-CPLICATIONS FOR
SOC IAL CH A ETGE O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O C O C C O .

Ch'ipter 1.1:. o o o o o o o o o o o 0 o o o o o o o o o o
Fedexations of Nigeria and the Vest Indies:
Sources of Social Conflict

mapter S: O O O O o O O O O 0 0 O O O 9 O 0 O O O O O 9 0
Implications of Conflict for Social Change:
Some Theoretical Considerations

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

TABLE OF CCMTENTS

\Cont inued)

. 122

. 125

TABLE

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LIST OF TABLES

Federation of Nigeria: Distribution of Land-area and
Population by Regions . . . . . . .

The West Indies Federation: Distribution of Land-area
and Population by island territories.

The West Indies Federation: Racial distribution of Population
by territorities.

Northern Nigeria: Ethnic Composition of Population.

The West Indies Federation: Power Distribution and
Revenue Association .

Nigeria Federation: POpular Votes and Federal Seats by
Parties--Pre-independence election Results, 1959. .

Nigeria Federation: Projected Allotment of Seats on a
National Basis--Pre-indepencence election, 1959 .

The West Indies Federation: Blue-Print for the Distribu-
tion of Federal ReSponsibility as prOposed in the “Eco-
nomics of Nationhood” .

Nigeria Federation: Distribution of POpulation by Regions -
1952 Census Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nigerie Federation: Distribution of Population by Regions -
I963 Census Report.

Nigeria Federation: Growth Rate of Population, as impli-
cated in tables 4-5, and 4-6.

PAGE

20

21

52

53

5h

62

66

67

67

PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Federalism, as a political concept, is by no means of recent making.
The incidence of political federations has almost kept pace with the or-
ganisation of human societies. The Lycian federation of Asia Minor, the
Theasalian or Aetolian Unions of Greece, were cases in ancient history.

The federation of Swiss Cantons constitutes a case in point at a later
period in European history. The United States of America, the Dominion
of Canada, are examples of federal unions in modern times.

Within the last quarter century, there have been several experiments
in political federation. India, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria),
Rhodesia and Nyasaland,1 the projected East African Federation,2 the Federa-
tion of Malasia, Nigeria, and the West Indies Federation, fall into this
category. Except for India, these federations have all disintegrated; and
except for Egypt, they were all former British colonies.

In all these instances, both ancient and modern, the federal unions have
varied in structure and in fUnction. Each case could be said to reflect
both the political and social exPeriences of the time and place. Two of
these federal systems, Nigeria, and the West Indies, will constitute. the
focus of the present study. Before proceeding further, it is imperative to
address the question: 'What ia'a federation?‘

A federation has been defined as:

"a form of government consisting of a group of units or states which‘

retain specific powers for themselves absolutely, while at the same

time transferring other powers to a central government, which is not
subordinate. A federation is characterized by the supremacy, not of

the legislature or legislatures, but of the law as interpreted by a

federal supreme court, in that a law duly passed by a federal or by a
unit of legislature may be declared unconsitutional by the court."3

The major point of emphasis here is the equity in the allocation or
distribution of power, between the federal entity, pn'the one hand, and the
component units of the federal system, on the other. The primacy given to
the supremacy of the "Federal Supreme Court" carries the obvious implication
of the strategy of cooperation that should mark the relationships among’the
various units of the system. The Supreme Court, although a federal struc-
ture, is symbolic of power delegation from the member units to the central
body. Bearing this in mind, one may also consider another view.

According to Georg Simmel, ”That which characterizes a federation of
states is its unit as a war-conducting power. (For), in all other respects,
the individual states may preserve their autonomies." He further suggests
that "The perfect federation of states (is) one which in its relation to
other states-forms an absolute unit while in their relations to one another,
its members possess absolute independence."4 One is impressed by the two
main points of relevance from this concept of federation:

1) Relationships of the units of the federation among themselves.
2) Relationships of the federal entity with an outside body.

In the latter case, there is implicit emphasis on the commonality of purpose;
in the former, what is stressed is the autonomy of the units, vis-a-vis, one
another, as well as the central body.

In summary, it is possible to conceptualise a Federation as a form of
government in which two or more states come together under one central body
to which authority is delegated by the unit states for the purpose of collec-
tively executing certain functions relating to some tasks common to all the
federating units. Federalism as a concept, as well as the notion of delega-

tion of authority to the central body, presupposes the existenceI a priori,
9f twg 2; more autgnomgus territorial units, whose interests may overlap in~

some cases, and conflict in others. In dealing with federalism, there is a
concern not only with matters of concurrent interests of the units, but also
witht the issue of conflicting interests. The presumption of autonomy of
ugiggldemands that, in an ideal situation, at least, the willingness of these
member units be one of the pre-conditions for any embarkment.on federalism.
In the language of Rousseau it may be suggested that federalism is a form
of social contract in which the contractual parties are autonomous states
rather than individuals. Furthermore, one of the major goals of a federa-
tion should be the preservation of the federal units. In other words, a
major preoccupation of a federal government should be the well-being of all
the constituent states of the federation.

Needless to say, the correspondence and conflict of interests of the
federating members creates problems, the resolution of which constitutes,
at least in part, the task of the federal unit. The 'social contract' im-
plicated in the system of federalism is based On the.principle employing
collective effort in solving group tasks. It would seem that the degree
to which this collective effort can be harnessed effectively, would depend
on the extent to which interests overlap among the constituent units of the
federal system.

___tatement of the Prom:

This study focusses on the defunct5 federations of Nigeria, and the
West Indies. In view of the foregoing considerations, the central problem
of the present investigation is posed in the following question:

Under what conditions can human societies constitute themselves

into viable6 federal associations in the face of conflicting and

overlapping interests of the constituent federating societies?

The attempt to provide some answers to this question constitutes the major

task of the present study. And, in doing this, the primary concern is to un-
derstand the nature of social conflict. as considered from the standpoint of
the defunct federations of Nigeria and the West Indies.

Nigeria and the West Indies are only two examples of federations that
did not succeed.7 When on 13 April, 1968, the Government of Tanzania accorded
diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Biafra, its (Tanzanian) spokesman’
neted. that "the purposes of society, and of all political organisation, is
the service of man."8 But if federalism is a practical socio-political
philosophy, a federal government is certainly a bold experiment in the organ-
isation of human societies.

As it; quite often the case in every practical experiment, success cannot
always be taken as a matter of course. And, as in every case of an experi-
ment, practical procedures follow some underlying principles. But it is not
always the case that principles in themselves are practically-—if at all-im-
mune from errors of misconception. Consequently, the failure to attain suc-
case in any such undertaking could be attributed to either procedural errors
in its execution, or to some errors or inadequacies in the conceptual appa-
ratus.

But, in the event success is not attained in a particular trial, the
question might arise as to 'why?’ To demand an answer to the question is to
call for a diagnosis, without which the detection of the fault or identifica-
tion of the problem would hardly be conceivable. Besides, it would appear
quite irrational to proceed to the next issue (or problem) without first as-
certaining the causes for the failure of the former. Consequently, in choosing
for the present study, two defunct federations—- Nigeria, and the West Indies-

the primary goal is to diagnose in order to ascertain what went wrong in the

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processes of political experimentation. One would like to understand-and
therefore better appreciate-ethe problems, in order that one may better as-
certain the basis upon which the operation of such systems of government could
proceed so as to ensure "success". In the meantime, it would be worthwhile
to record some empirical facts about these two defunct federal systems.
N' ri the Wes dies: Some figgic Facts;

The defupnct federations of Nigeria and the West Indies were former co-
lonial territories of BritainF-part of the one-time vast and extensive British
Empire. At the time the British relinquished their colonial administration

9 states or regions,

of Nigeria in 1960, the latter was made up of three
namely, Eastern Region (Eastern.Nigeria), Northern Region (Northern Nigeria),
and Western Region (Western Nigeria). The West Indies Federation,.on the
other hand, was constituted by ten of the British Caribbean territories.
These were constituted into four groups of islands, namely:

1) The Leeward Islands (Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Trinidad—and—
Tobago ; .

2) The Windward group (Dominica, Greneda, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent);
3) .Jamaica; and 4) Barbados.

As constituted before the break-up, the Federation of Nigeria encompassed
a total area of about 360,000 square miles; whereas, all the land area of all
the West Indian units added up to a mere 7,663 square miles.10 But where
Nigeria was made up of relatively contiguous units, the component island
units of the West Indies, scattered’over a vast expanse of the Atlantic waters,
constituted a highly discontiguous ecology. For, although the Leeward and
Windward groups of islands are relatively close to one another, Jamaica is

located some 800 miles from the nearest of the Eastern group of islands.

-¢“ .

Besides, Kingston, Jamaica, is 1000 miles away from Port—of—Spain, in Trini-
dad. In Nigeria, the boundary separating Northern Nigeria from the rest of
the Federation was not marked by any physical barrier, although, the West11
and the East were separated by the River Niger, only a mile or two across

IBoth Nigeria and the island units of the West Indies fall within the
tropical belt. Whereas most of the West Indian islands are mountainous-—
with the notable exceptions like Barbados-—in Nigeria, mountain ranges of
any significance are found only in the Northern Region of the Federation.
In the West Indies:

"many of the islands are of volcanic origin including the western

members of the Leeward group...and the Windwards. (Dominica,

St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Greneda). Antigua, and...a small

portion of Barbados, Tobago, and northern Trinidad are of lime-

stone formation. Host of Barbados and Southern Trinidad are coral
covered with a thin layer of earth... Most have ample rainfall

which falls much more heavily on the windward (Atlantic) side."12
In Nigeria, the Southern Region (East and west) falls within the equatorial
rainbelt; the intensity of rainfall diminishes from the coastal South, thin-
ning down to almost complete year-round drought in some northerly remote
parts of the Nerthern Region.

The vegetation in Nigeria varies from the equatorial rain-forest in the
South to the tropical grassland in the Northern portion. In the West Indian
case, with the notable exception of Trinidad (which has the flora and fauna
of the mainland continent) few of the plants are indigenous. Bananas, and
cane-sugar were introduced by the early settlers. In Nigeria, the major plants
of economic interest were palm trees, coconuts (mainly found in the East and
(some parts of the Nest), cocoa, and rubber (in the West), and rice, and cot-
ton (in the North). The.major mineral resources in the West Indies were oil

(in Trinidad and to some extent, Jamaica), bauxite (in Jamaica). In Nigeria

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the leading'minerals were tin, copper (in the North), coal, iron-nand later,_.
oil-«(in the East).

In both federations the constituent units were not evenly structured, both
in size and in population. In Nigeria, the Northern Region was the largest
state with a land area of about 281,000 square miles. It constituted about
three-quarters of the total land mass of the Federation, whereas with an
estimated13 population of nearly 30 million, it was greater than the rest of
the Nigerian population Put;tog€ther. The tables below give the distribution

of land and population in both areas.

TABLE 1-1
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND POPULATION: NIGERIAN FEDERATION

Land Area 9% of Total 9% of Total

Region (SQ, His) Agga Populatign Population
Eastern Region 29,484 8.0 12,388,646 21.8
14Western Region 44,022 12.2 12,811,837 21.9
N0rthern Region 281,152 78.0 29,777,986 52.7

Lagos (Fed. Capi— .

tal) 5.747 1.4 675.352 1.0
Total 360,405 100.0 55,653,821 100.0

Source: The population figures were from the preliminary figures of the
1963 National Population Census, released by the Census Board. (Quoted in

Arthur A. Nwankwo, and Samuel U. Ifejika, The Mgkigg of g Nation ; Biafra,
C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969. pt. 49.

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TABLE 1-2
DISTRIBUTION OF L532 AND POPULATION: THE WEST INDIAN FEDERATION
Area 3% of Total 96 of Total

Islands 1§Qa mis.) Area Population Populgtion
Jamaica 4,411 57.8 1 1,615,148 51.70
Trinidad
and Tobago 1,980 25.80 825,957 26.50
Barbados 166 2.20 232,085 7.40
Grenada 153 1.70 88,677 2.80
St. Vincent 150.3 2.00 80,042 2.60
St. Lucia 238 3.10 94.718 3.00
Dominica 289.5 5.80 59,124 1.90
Antigua ' 108 1.40 54.354 1.70
St. Kitts-chis 155 2.00 56,644 . 1.80
Mentscrrat 52.5 0.03 12,157 0.40

Total 7,663.3 99.63* 3,115,906 99.80

* The Jamaican dependencies are excluded.

Source: Statesman's Year Book, 1962—1963. Quoted in Amitai Etzioni,
‘ "ificotio , (Holt, Rinehart, and winston, Inc, 1965), p' . 150.

    

The failure of federations primarily created by the British is not unusual.
Malaya and Singapore, the Central African Federation, or the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland are additional reminders. In each case, federation
developed out of former colonial territiories. In each case, the federal
structure would up in disintegration. As Richard West keenly observed,

"When these federations dissolved, the British Government shrugged so to

speak and merely said, 'what a pity'. (But) when Nigeria, the largest, least
homogenous (and) the most calamitous federation failed, the British Government

15 The question then arises as to why the col-

paid for a war to restore it."
lapse of the other federation, like the West Indies, was taken as a matter of

course, but that of Nigeria,greeted with arruthless hostility that was'remia-i

cent of the medieval 'Holy Crusades'. One of the tasks of the present study
is to find some adequate explanation to this question. What strikes attention-
and therefore, what provokes a spirit of inquiry-18 not so much a situation
in.which things happen as expected, as it is situations in which there are
marked departures from.expectations.

It may be the case, as Bertrand Russell suggests, that "the fundamental
concept in social science;is power, in the same sense in which energy is the
fundamental concept in physics.“16 He delineates various forms of societal
differentiation corresponding to different forms of power and their reSpective
utilities or applications:

"There are many ways in which different societies differcin.relationu

to power. They differ , to tegin with, in the degree of power possessed

by individuals or organisations; it is obvious, for example, that,

owing to increase of organisation, the state has more power now

than in former times. They differ, again, as regards the kind of

organisation that is most influential: a military despotism,

a theocracy, a plutocracy, are very dissimilar types. They differ,

thirdly, through diversity in the ways of acquiring power: hered-

itary kingship produced one kind of eminent man, the qualities

required of a great ecclesiastic produce another kind, democracy

produces a third kind, and'war a fourth."17

But the primary teak of the present study is not so much the analysis
of power per so, than it is the exploration of these social settings in which
the possession or use of power becomes manifest-if implicit-—in human activ-
ities. The role of power, will be especially evident from the political and
economic aspects of the subsequent analysis. That the notion of power does
not constitute the central theme in the analysis, should not therefore be
construed as a denial of the contention that Russell makes, and which he
elegantly elaborates in subsequent arguments. For, otherwise, one could

also argue, using Russell's logic, that in Newtonian mechanics, the fact that

10

it is "mass"-—and not "energy"-—that plays a prominent role in the theory of
kinematics, would constitute a violation of the axiom that energy is the fun—
damental concept in physics. But on reflection, one finds that no violation
is committed.' For modern physics-—thanks to Einstein's1§ formulations on
mass-energy equivalence-—has shown that "mass" and "energy", are,in fact, dif-
ferent manifestations of the same physical phenomenon.

At this juncture, an attempt should be made at the clarification of cerh
tain concepts used in this study, viz., race and ethnicity. In view of the
fact that these concepts have generated controversies-as yet unresolved-
among scholars, there will be no commitment here, to the search for the
ultimate and "true" meanings of race and ethnicity. A good many of these con-
troversieareSPecially as regards "race"-have been politically inspired, as
was evident in the evolution of "anti-semitism" around the Nazi movement; or
the concept of "negro" within the American social structure. The primary
endeavourihere would be to formulate an.operational definition or conceptual
scheme, which would facilitate the analytical task.

As defined hanreer, "Ethnicity refers to the differentiation of the pop-
ulation ly racial and cultural backgrounds."19 But, unfortunately, one is
left in the dark as to what is meant by "racial". Consequently, in so far
as the term "race" is regarded as problematic, the above definition of
"ethnicity" does not lend itself adequately to conceptual clarity. One is
therefore compelled to search elsewhere for a much clearer conceptualisation.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
gives the following definition of "ethnic":

”foreign, gentile, national; relating to community of physical and mental

11

traits possessed by the members of a group as a product of their common

heredity and cultural tradition; having or originat' from racial,

linguistic, and cultural ties with a specific group."
It also difines "race" as:

"generation, family; the descendants of a common ancestor; a

family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock; a class

or kind of individuals with common characteristics, interests,

appearance, or habits, as if derived from a common ancestor; a group

of human beings recognising*a common history, and a common culture."21
Although an improvement on Green's concept, Webster's definitions of ethnic-
ity as well as race, show some elements of circularity and redundance£~L"Ethaic-
ity" is defined in terms of race, whereas, race is conceived in terms of
"nation" or “trips", for instance. But it is also true that Webster gives
one definition.0f "nationality" as " a group of people having a common and
distinguishing racial and cultural background...an Wupo”22 Tribe is

also defined in terms of "a natigngl gggup"?3

In other words, we are baCk

to where we started from. One wonders then, whether it is possible to make 2
some sense out of this rather confounding mesh of conceptual circularities.

The problem.may not yield a unique solution, but certainly, some suggestions'
can be entertained as to how some forms of resolution may be effected.

_ One way of tackling this problem is via the "empiricist" approach. Empir-

icismqis used here, in Hodgkin's sense that a technique "is normally devel-
oped piecemeal, in relation to specific situations, or 83's means of solving

Specific problems."24

In this sense, the approach being adopted here is
pragmatic. Consequently, we shall mean by "ethnicity", cultural-lin 'stic
ggppp_or community. This would allow for the requisite of a cultural tra-
dition as suggested in the earlier definitions; but it is also stipulated
that language be one of the crucial elements characteristic of this tradi-
tion. It is therefore suggested that, the linguistic element here be indigb

enous. Thus, in the case of Nigeria, for example, although it may be argued

12

that English language isLthe lingua-fanca, it should be pointed out however,
that English is indigenous to no given group or community. In this sense,
then, we may consider the Igbo, the Yoruba, the Hausa-Fulani, as distinct
ethnic communities. As will be shoun in the next chapter, not only has each
group a common culture rooted in historical tradition, but it is also a fact
that the language of a given group is an essential part of this cultural tra-
dition.

It is perhaps more difficult to be.i'precise in the conceptualisation of
"race" as in the case of "ethnicity". But it may prove fruitful in this case,
to incorporate part of Webster's notions:"A group of human beings recognising
a.common history, and a common culture, yearning’ for a common destiny, as».
‘suming common habits."25 It would seem, from Webster's definitions, that
"race" and "ethnicity" are hardly distinguishable from each other. But then,
in the West Indies, for instance, one would not consider, say, the black
population, as constituting an "ethnic" community, in the same sense that
the YOruba of Nigeria would be regarded. It is true that they may be COD!
sidered as sharing a common;language-English, if of a peculiar dialect-,
but then, English could not be considered as indigenous to them in the sense
that Yoruba language is indigenous to the Yoruba people of Nigeria. As will
be seen shortly, not only have they virtually lost the traditions indigenous
to their African.heritage, but it is also the case, that English language is
indigenous to a Specific European culture. The same argument could be applied
to the Indian community who originally came from India. But in the sense of
the Nigerian “ethnic” communities, only the white population could be regarded

as an ethnic group in the West Indies, for, as will be evident later, most of

13

the members of the white-European population, in fact, are descendants of
EngliSh migrants. In Webster's sense, there is a recognition of a common
history among the white Europeans, among the Blacks, and among the Indian
community; and it is in the sense of this conceptualisation that the Indians
the English, and the blacks, may be regarded as different "raCial" groups.

As conceived here, "ethnicity" and trace" differ, only in the linguistic
element stipulated in the former, which may not be crucial for the latter.
One obvious consequence of this conceptualisation is that whereas the members
of an ethnic group must of necessity be of the same race, the converse need
not be true. In other words, if one assumes the validity of common reference
to bladk peoples as belonging to one "race", then, the Igbo, the Yoruba, and
the Hausa-Fulani may be regarded as of the same race, in this sense; but it
need not be the case, however, that all balck peoples constitute an ethnic
community.

In considering the two cases of Nigeria and the West Indies, the pro-
position is that the subsequent rupture of the federation derived from causes
rooted in social conflicts. These conflicts are linked to the cultural, po-
litical, and economic history of the federations. It is further suggested '
that-these Boeial conflicts have both internal and external aspects. It is
with a View of obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of these con-
flicts, that the following organisation of material is presented. Ascor-

taining the nature and sources of the conflicts constitutes the major task‘

of the next part of this study. Attention will focus on the cultural
background of the peoples of the former federations of Nigeria and the West

Indies, as well as on the political and economic history of the constituent

14

societies. While Chapter 2 deals with the peoples and their respective cul-
tures, Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with an analysis of the political
issues. By implication, questions pertaining to foreign domination in the

former federations are also entertained.

PART II
NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: BACKGROUND T0 FEDERATION.

CHAPTER 2

NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION: THE PEOPLES, THEIR CULTURES

Although, in the former Nigerian Federation, several ethnic-linguis-
tic groups could be distinguished, only three major ethnic groups are con-
sidered as representative of the peoples of the former federation. These
are, the Igbo of Eastern Nigerta the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria, and
the Yoruba of Western Nigeria. Not only does each of these ethnic units
constitute a dominant population in each of the three Regions; the three
together constituted between eighty and ninety per cent of the entire
federal population. Consequently, when reference is subsequently made to
the Igbo, the Hausa, or the Yoruba, it should be understood that they are
taken to represent the respective Regions that constituted the units of the
Federation.

Similar simplifications are adopted in the case of the West Indies
Federation. Accordingly, Jamaica, Trinidad—Tobago, and Barbados, are taken
as representative of the island units that constituted the West Indies Fed-
eration. In contrast with Nigeria, the rationale for the West Indian choice
is not ethnic distribution. These three island units constituted the predom-
inant population of the Federation (see table 1-2). In addition, these
three island units also contain among themselves, a vast majority of the
three main“raciaI'groups; the blacks of African heritage, the white Euro-
pean descendants, and the people of Indian origin (gang, pp. 18—19 ).

In Nigeria, three ethnic groups, the Igbo, (E. Nigeria), the Hausa-
Fulani (N. Nigeria), and the Yoruba (w. Nigeria) are discussed. In the
West Indian case, partly for reasons already stated, and partly for reasons
that will be apparent shortly, the focus will be on the three predominant

racial groups, (the people of European origin, the people of African origin,

15

16

and those of Indian1 origin), distributed over three major island units,
Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barbados. To facilitate the task, it might be
necessary to deal with the two groups separately.
The West Indies
Available historical records indicate that the indigenous inhabitants
of the West Indian territories were the Arawak and the Carib Indians who were
almost completely wiped out2 by the first European settlers. The present pop-
ulation of the West Indies are descendants of African, European, and to some
extent, Asian peoples. As Gordon Merril points out, "within the federation of
the West Indies there is great cultural diversity. Englishmen, Sephardic
Jews, Africans, Portuguese, East Indians, Chinese, Syrians, and other peoples
have contributed to island population and ways of; life.“3 The Jews are: the
descendants of the Sephardic Jews of Eortugal, migrating with the early Por-
tuguese explorers and adventurers, and whose influence on the West Indian life
must have been quite significant in the seventeenth century.4 The Chinese and
Syrians probably arrived in the West Indies much later, for commericial reasons.
At any rate, the main focus here is on the Blacks of African descent, the
White Europeans, and the East Indian descendants.
The Black people of the West Indies were the descendants of the survi-
vors of the historic slave phenomenon that lasted for over three centuries.
A great majority of these enslaved men were exported from West Africa.5
"The eighteenth century historian, Bryan Edwards, estimates that more
than.600,000 Africans were introduced as slaves into Jamaica
'alone between 1700 and 1786-(And) in the days of the slave trade,
Africans were identified by tribe or region as Carromantes, Ibboes
(Igbos), Whydahs, and Congo and Angola Negroes (sic). In the Lee-
ward Islands, the West African Negroes known as Carromantes were
held in high esteem as slaves-the Ibboes were considered timid and
prone to suicide-The Whydahs, or Papaws...were thought more trac-

table...the Congo and,Angola natives were more fit for domestic ser-
vice than for field lahour."6

17

The Black population was predominant in virtually all the West Indian
islands except in Trinidad, where the East Indian population was less than
that of the Black by a small margin. Culturally, the surviving African heri-

tags is practically nil. As Ayearst7

points out; "There would seem to be a
few remnants, what might be termed faint memories of West African culture
among Negroes. Before emancipation the slave-owners were almost completely
successful in stamping out the use of African languages and the traditional
institutions of African tribal society. Having been de-culturised, the Ne-
groes assimilated the only available one, that of the Europeans." He notes
that "African tribal culture was bound to disintegrate under the conditions
of slavery", admitting, however, of possible exceptions "in the fields of re-
ligion, music, and dance?.

This phenomenon of cultural emasculation is seen in a better perspective
when one realises that the slave-owners, that is, the slave masters, were us-
ually outnumbered numerically by the African slaves in their possession. What
the slave-master, the White—European plantation owner, least desired, was any-
thing’that would help to give the slaves an opportunity for collective action.
It became imperative, therefore, to put them in groups or communities in
which communication and normal social and cultural interaction were virtually
impossible. One of the strategies for accomplishing this was to prevent a
significant number of slaves sharing a common African language from residing
in the.same slave community. The late Malcolm.X aptly described this emas-
culation as "slave—making".8

The members of the white community of the West Indies were descendants of
European settlers. Although one could find evidence of significant French,
Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch influences, by far the overwhelming.majority of

the white West Indians were the descendants of the peoples of English origin.

18

As Merrill points out;

"the white folk who established the West Indian economy and whose

descendants dominated it for centuries, arrived during the first

fifty years of settlement. The identity of the English settlers

is revealed in the sailing lists of vessels bound for the Indies

in the seventeenth century. The names of many of them have survived

as family estate names in the West Indies down to the present day-

(And) most of these folk came from Southern England-(from) the

counties of Cornwall, Somerset-Suffolk, Essex, Hertford, and Oxford-

shirea—Over the centuries the white folk of English origin have

maintained close ties with the mother country."9

People of European origin were in relative numerical minority in most
of the West Indian islands, although, they have, in almost all cases, domi-
nated the West Indian economy. In Jamaica they constituted about one and a
half per cent; in Trinidad, three percent; in Barbados, five percent; in
St. Vincent, three percent; and they form less than two percent of the total
population of the other units. That the whites dominated the economy of the
West for centuries follows logically from the fact that they arrived in the
West Indies in the first place as masters. Since they started in a position’
of dominance, one cannot but agree with Ayearst that, "The only significant
culture in the West Indies is European".1O With the predominance of English
life styles, including'English as the official11 language, one can understand
why a West Indian would identify with England as the "mother country", or why
there has been reference to West Indians as being “more English than the Queen".
C.L.R. James of Trinidad makes a good point when he asserts that "...the
languages, the pattern of life are English.“12

The third major group constituting the West Indian population was the
East Indians. These were the descendants of the indentured workers brought
over to the plantations from India, in the period between the time of emanci-

pation of the slaves and the First World War. Forming about twelve percent of

19

the federal population, the East Indians constitute the largest minority in 3
the West Indies. within the federation, the largest13 group of East Indians
are to be found in Trinidad where they number up to 330,000.14 Jamaica has
about 20,000 East Indians, and there are hardly any to be found in both Bar-
bados15 and the leeward Islands.

Unlike in the case of the African descendants, the East Indians were not
much interfered with, culturally, so that, a great deal of their Indian
heritage has survived, and is being perpetuated. Although, as Lowenthal
suggests,16 "the East Indians in Trinidad became 'Creolized' and their mode
of life is much like'thatioffother Trinidadiams",uthe‘fuhttstilirremains'that the
East Indians were a distinct cultural entity. They still identify with the
cultural heritage of mother India as exemplified by their Tunisian desire
to preserve the Hindu religion. On the other hand, they have assimilated
much of Western culture as conveyed through Western education.

Taking the Federation as a whole, Lowenthal concludes that the "West
Indians are-—in good part bilingual". Although "standard English is required
in school and standard EngliSh alone is legitimate,-—a more or less educated

17 As one writer observed, the language

Creole is heard in most homes."
and social structure is English in Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Is-
lands; whereas, in Trinidad, it is Spanish in origin, French in tradition,
although having’East Indian and Chinese elements. In summary, then, it can

be said that the West Indies Federation reflected significant social differen-
tiation. On the other hand, English cultural tradition and life style are

dominant.

20

TABLE 2-1

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POEQLATION IN WEST INDIAN TERRITORIES

Territo Total African E. Indian European Mixed Others

 

(thousands)
Barbados 192.8 148.9 .1 9.8 33.8 0.1
Jamaica 2,249.9 971.4 21.4 16.0 232.2 8.8
Antigua 41.8 35.4 .____~. 0.7 5.4 0.2
Montserrat 14.3 13.3 __ 0.1 0.9 __
St. Christopher 46.2 40.0 0.1 0.9 .5.1 0.1
Trinidad-Tobago 558.0 261.5 195.7 15.3 78.8 6.7
Dominica 47.6 11.9 0.1 35.5 0.1
Greneda 72.4 53.3 3.5 0.6 14.8 0.2
St. Lucia 70.1 40.6 2.6 0.3 26.3 0.2
St. Vincent 61.6 45.0 1.8 1.9 12.6 0.3

Source: Morley Ayearst, The Brit'sh West Indies The Search for Self-
GovernmentI (New York University Press, 19605, p. 64.

Niggrig

.As indicated earlier, three18 major ethnic groups, the Igbo, the Hausa-
Fulani, and the Yoruba constitute the major focus of the present study. As
in the case of the West Indies these three groups are considered to be large-
ly representative of the peoples constituting the population of the defunct
Nigerian Federation. Whereas in Nigeria the three groups were concentrated
in three geographical regions, (the East, the North,,and the West) that con-
stituted the major states of the Former Federation; in the West Indies, the
three major ethnic groups were distributed over three main islands, Jamaica,
Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados.

There have been several and varied attempts to account for the origin of

the peoples of Nigeria. But, not infrequently, some of the accounts-both

21

historically and archeologicallyh-seem to contradict one another, and there-
fore, to add to the already existing confusion. The treatment of the social
and cultural life of the peoples has been no less wanting. What is subse-

quently presented here is therefore, no more the "true account" than it con-

stitutes another dimension to the already existing complexity.

The Hausa-Fulani
19

The Hausa-Fulani constituted the predominant group in Northern Nigeria.
According to the 1952 National Census report, the population of the region

was distributed as follows:

Hausa 5,488,446
Fulani 3,022,581
Kanuri 1,298,306
Yoruba 536,109
Nupe 348.979
Tiv 772,771
Others 5,051,380

Total 16,518,572

It is apparent, then, that the Hausa-Fulani constituted over half the total
population of over 16,000,000. Although the hegemony20 was Fulani in char-
acter, the language commonly spoken.was Hausa, the predominant population
deriving from this ethnic origin. Most of the people were Moslems by religh

ious inclination, although there were minor variations of other faiths.
According to some historians, the earliest states in Northern Nigeria .

were founded by some black migrants from the Northeastern part of Africa,

possibly assoc1ated with the black kingdoms of Meroe and Kush, located by

the Nile River, in what is now, the Republic of Sudan. Other accounts suggest

that the Fulani migrated from the area of Senegal, and became mixed with

the Hausa through intermarriage, after settling in Hausaland. The major

wave of Fulani migration seems to have occurred early in the 19th century

22

following the Fulani conquest of Northern Nigeria under Sheik Othman dan Fodio.
But Islamic influence appears to have been felt in this area as early as the
12th and 13th centuries. Sklar suggests that, "the original Habe states,
seven in number, appear to have been established in the territory of modern
Hausaland about the 10th century. (And) during the 12th and 13th centuries,
they were at least partially within the sphere of influence of the Islamised
kingdoms of Kanem—Bornu, unquestionably the dominant state in the central
Sudan."21 But according to the Willink Minorities Commission report:22

Most of the main tribal groups (of Northern Nigeria) came into the

country from the northeast; in the Middle Ages the centre of the

northern part of the territory of the Region was held by a loose
confederac of Hausa City States occasionally at war with each

other (sic but usually linked in an intermittent alliance. There

were seven Hausa states known as the Hausa Bakwai, or The Seven

Hausa States, and seven associated states known as the Banza

Bakwai, a somewhat derogatory term which means 'the seven states

which are only imperfectly Hausa'. Islam had come into this area

towards the end of the 14th century and there were many Muslims

among the Hausa States, but there was no uniformity; not all

professed Islam and many of those who did were lax in.their ob-

servances.

Among the Hausa-Fulani, women were considered the social inferiors of
men, to whom only, the prerogative of full citizenship was accorded. Mar-
riage among the people was influenced by religious ethics, which allowed
for limited polygamy. Under Moslem code, a man may have up to four wives.
As will be seen later, this varied slightly with the traditional practice of
the Igbo society of Eastern Nigeria, where polygamy was not only admissiole,
but where also, the limitation was imposed mainly by the economic and social

exigencies existing in each case.

The Yoruba
The Yoruba people constituted the dominant population of Western Nigeria.

From.the official report of the 1952 Nigerian Census, the Yoruba: constituted

23

about 4,302,000 of the Region's population of six million.23 The origin of
the Yoruba, not unlike that of the other peoples of Nigeria, has been much
obscured by the myths and legendry, that are very often associated with oral
traditions.

According to one of these traditions, the Yoruba are descendants of the
legendary Oduduwa, a pseudo-deity believed to have resided at Ile—Ife, and
whose six children, the legend goes on, established the six major'states 6f
the early Yoruba country} namely: Ila, Ketu, Cyo, Owu, Popo, and Sabe. But
the most popular and common tradition indicates that the Yoruba people mi-
grated to their present place of abode from the Nertheastern24 part of Af—
rica about the 8th Century A.D. There is also the further suggestion that
they might have had some connection with Gogobiri-the Hausa State of Cobir.
.9...the Hausa traditions recognise 'Yoruba' as one of the seven 'illegit-
imate' (or bastard) states of Hausaland".25 Some Yoruba scholars have even
theoriscd on the possibility of the Yoruba coming originally from Egypt.

As suggested by 8.0. Biobaku, a Yoruba scholar, the origin of the peo-
ple could be traced to the ancient kingdom of Meroe, which was located in
what is now the Republic of Sudan. If this be the case, then there is the
logical conclusion that the Yoruba of the Western Region of Nigeria, and the
Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region, if not of the same stock, at least mi-
grated from the same area.26 In this context, it is interesting to note that
chieftaincy systems, or kingdom states attained parallel stages of develop-
ment among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria, and the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern
Region.

The Yoruba and the HausaéFulani were also culturally similar in some

other aSpects. For example, "the flowing robes of the Yoruba resemble those

24

of the Hausa, and are usually brightly coloured...By tradition the
buildings are grouped around a compound in which the family group lives...
The customary law of the Yoruba allows a man to have more than one wife.27
Family ties are very strong,28 and the group feels responsible for the wel-
fare of all its members, whether they are close relatives or more distant
ones."29

Hodgkin contends that the Yoruba make excellent traders and are spec-
ulative. Moreover, the men are believed to be generally hard and strong,
though cunning in their dealings with one another. Implicit obedience is
known to be a characteristic mark of their life, and their sense of confi-
dence in the advice and orders of elderly men is rather remarkable. It has
been suggested that the Yeruba are generally passive and supine, inaccessible
to curiosity, not easily moved by political vissitudes and, "as a rule

30

parsimonious in the extreme."

The Igbo People

The second31

largest group of people in the former federation, and the
predominant32 ethnic community in the Eastern Region was the Igbo. It is
perhaps true that among all the peoples of the former Nigerian Federation, 1
the Igbo have attracted the greatest publicity. Perhaps, more has been
written and said about them than about any other group. This is particular-
ly evident because of the Nigeria—Biafra war. Yet, the Igbo, paradoxically,
appear to be the least understood.of all the peoples, constituting the former
Nigerian Federation.

As with the case of other ethnic groups, the origin of the Igbo people
is also highly Speculative. Onwuka Dike, an eminent Igbo historian, suggests

that:

25

"throughout the 19th century the great majority of the Ibos claimed
Nri town in Awka district as their ancestral home, and it has been

(stated) that around Nri town, is to be found the heart of the Ibo

temtoryon33

Flint offers a more elaborate theory:

"Along the lower Niger, however, and in the area east of that river,
there is no evidence of either kingship, or even chieftaincy before
the late seventeenth century....For the historian this raises acute
problems of interpretation...The absence of kingship is even more
puzzling...in view of the extraordinary cultural, linguistic, and
social uniformity of the people...The problem would be simpler if '
the Ibo were a Stone Age people; it could then be argued that the
strength of their Northern neighbours, and perhaps the rise of the
Jukun Empire in the sixteenth century, had shielded the Ibo from
immigrant conquerors bringing iron weapons. However, the Ibo were
as skilled34 in iron technology as any of their neighbours. The
only hl thesis, therefore, and it is go more than a hypothesis,

is that the Ibo migrated into the area en masse, bringing their
iron technology with them, and either completely expelled or des-
troyed the aborigipg; inhabitants. To date, such a movement is
impossible, although it may be argued that Ibo dialects differ
sufficiently for us to conclude that they must have been evol-
ving in separate areas for perhaps a thousand years."

And taking other things into consideration, Flint has come to the conclu—

sion that:

"Whatever the explanation, the I99 gpe distinct from.the other majop
peoples of Niggrig in having evolved no centralised state or states,

in the European sense of the term. (For), kingship and chieftaincy
were unknown to them, even on the village 1evel...The Ibo culture,
nevertheless, survived with remarkable uniformity, and the absense
of a 'state' in no way inhibited the economic or cultural achieve—
ments of the people. Ibo agriculture, indeed, was perhaps the

most efficient in Africa, and Ibo population developed a density...
only matched in Africa by that of the Nile Valley. Though the Ibo

village remained a govereigp law unto itself, the Ibo presented a

remarkable unity and conformity of customary law and practice, so
't even without a centralised state, they retained the social

unity of a national group."35

While it is possible to agree that there were indeed some "aborigi-
nal inhabitants" of this land now occupied by the Igbo people, it has not'
been absolutely proved that the Igbo themselves were not the aboriginal
inhabitants and that they have not always lived in what is now known as
Igboland. The great population density previously alluded to, could logi-

cally have resulted in an outward movement, giving rise to what Diamond

26

has described as "an Ibo diSpora".36 Moreover, the substantial number of
Igbo-Speaking’people on the Western bank of the Niger River seems to indi-
cate that migration, if it did take place, must have been across the Niger
from the East to the West Bank of the river at a remote period in history.

The following comments give some insight regarding the cultural life
of the Igbo.

"The dispersed power of the Igbo is characterised by a high degree of
popular participation in the making of decisions. Ibo culture magni-
fies the value of individual achievement. Yet, Ibo people are‘known
forttheir enthusiasm for community development and by the multitude
of voluntary improvement associations. The Ibo people are famous
for their exceptional receptivity to change.37

From all I could gather by observation, the Iboes are very emulative.
As in other things, so it will be in book Iearning.38

Place them where you will, or introduce them to any manners and cus-
toms, you will find that they very easily adapt themselves to them...
They always possess a desire for superiority, and make attempts to
attain it, or excel in what is praiseworthy, without a desire for
depressing others,...Place Ighoe (sic) man in a comfortable position
and he will never rest satisfied until he sees others occupying* '
the same or similar position. The Ibos cannot be drawn to act;

they are most stubborn and bull-headed; but with kindness they

could be made to do anything, even to deny themselves of comforts.
They would not, as a rule, allow anyone to act the superior over

them nor sway their conscience by coercion to the performance of any
act whether good or bad when they have not the inclination to do so...

In fact, evepyppe likes t9 be his own.master."39

The Igho are traditionally animists by religious inclination, and
pantheisth: in the practice of their religion. The many sub-deities,
"Chi's", are designated with Specific functions. The supreme deity, "Chukwu",

oversees the activities of the "Chi's"

under him. There are, among others,
"Chi-neke", the deity reSponsible for creation; "Chi-nedu", the deity

who guides and leads; and "Chi—nenye", the deity who allocates amenities
to humans. .According to one Igbo anthropologist:

"The world as a natural order which inexorably goes on its ordained
way according to a 'master plan' is foreign to Igho conceptions.

Rather their world is a dynamic one-—a world of moving equilibrium.

It is an equilibrium that is constantly threatened, and sometimes

actually disturbed by natural and social calamities. The events

which upset it include natural disasters like long continuous

droughts, long periods of famine, epidemic diseaSes, as well as

sorcery and other antisocial forces; litigation, homicide, viola-

tion of taboo, and other incidents."

In summary, the Nigerian peoples were culturally heterogenous and indigb
enous to the consideration that "the Yoruba, Hausa, or Ibo people,...each
numbering several million...could be equally described as nations."41 In
contrast, the West Indies situation was quite different. The scene was
succintly characterised by C.L.R. James:

"The whole population is expatriate. Slaves, freed slaves, former

non-slaves, immigrants from India, economic masters, none is

native...(And) the languages, the pattern of life are European."42

One indirect relationship between the peoples of Nigeria and the
West Indies, would be between the black (and perhaps 'coloured') descendants
of slaves brought from Africa, and the Nigerian peoples, who also happen to
be dark-complexioned. Of the three Nigerian ethnic groups, only one, the

43

Igbo, was positively identified as represented among the West Indian Blacks.

But then, the cultural gap has been all but complete.44
Thus in Nigeria, there was a mere aggregation of diverse cultures,
linked only by their common allegiance to a foreign power—-Britain. In the
West Indies, the human diversity was merely covered by the facade of a com-
mon aspiration to acquire the English life style and culture. In the for-
mer case, the illusion of "oneness" or commonality was created by the sup-

pression of the indigenous cultures by the imperial Power; in the latter,
it was facilitated by the vacuum created by cultural emasculation. The im—
plications of this state of affairs will be elaborated in the next chapter

which will focus on the political and economic history of the former

Federations, of Nigeria and the West Indies.

CHAPTER 3

NIGERIA QED THE WEST INDIES: POLITIC.L ND ECONONI DEVELOPMENT

   

On February 23, 1956, the agreement to federate the ten island units
that constitued the West Indies was signed. On January 3, 1958, the West
Indies Federal Constitution came into effect with the arrival of Lord Hailes
to assume duties as the first Governorbceneral of the Federation, the first
Federal Parliament being convened in April of the same year. On September 19,
1961, in a public referendum, the people of Jamaica decided to opt out of the
Federation. On May 31, 1962, the constitution of the West Indies Federation
was legally terminated. On August 6, 1962, the Federation of West Indies
collapsed as Jamaica went on alone to independence. It was the end of a four—
year period of political experimentation.

In 1914, the Southern (west and East) and the Northern regions of Nigeria

were amalgamated. In 1946, the Richards1

Constitution brought the (South and
North) regions under one administrative authority, although, paradoxically,
still retaining different administrative systems. The McPherson's Constitu-
tion2 in 1951, instituted a federal system, thus establishing three separate
administrative units in the three reSpective Regions and the Federal territory
of Lagos3 constituting a coordinating point. October 1, 1960 was the date the
Federation of Nigeria attained independence from Britain. On May 30, 1967,
Eastern Nigeria opted out of the Federation proclaiming the Republic of BIAFRA.

Thus ended4

some 53 years of federal experimentation.

In the Nigerian case profound disintegration occurred some six and a,
half years after self-government was attained. In the case of the West Indies,
self-government was never achieved as a group before the life of the federas

tion came to an end. It is in the hope of ascertaining and charting the cau-

ses of the conflicts leading to these disruptions that the present study is

28

undertaken.

To facilitate this end, the colonial history of the two federal sys-
tems is being treated. Within the confines of this study, colonialism
has to do with the economic and political implications of the relationships
of these societies with the colonial-or former colonial--power.5
The West Indies Federation

The political development of the West Indies is closely related to the
historical development of the West Indian economy. It is a history of slave
. trade and slave economy. It is in this respect, perhaps, that the closest
link between the West Indies and the Nest Africa-particularly Nigeria-—can
be drawn. It was the so-called "discovery" of the 'new world' which opened
new frontiers of economic enterprise. The subsequent trans~At1antic traffic
in slaves that lasted over three centuries, initially was calculated to ex-
ploit these vast economic potentialities at minimum cost to the white Euro-
pean entrepreneurs; but before long, the trade had become an end in itself.
As noted by one humanitarian, "the treatment of Africa by Christian Europe
in the period of the slave trade constituted the greatest crime in history."7

The British and the French were known to have established their first
successful tropical colony in the same year (1623), and on the same island—-
St. Christopher. By the year 1655, these early colonialists had extended
their settlement up to Jamaica, where, as noted previously, the aboriginal
Arawak Indians were all but exterminated in less than forty years. By the
year 1655, also, the British had captured Jamaica from Spain. Subsequently,
following Cromwell's proclamation, British immigrants were encouraged with
offers of land grants, "and other enticements which drew settlers there."8
By 1713, the British through the Treaty of Ultrecht, had taken over from

France the contract to distribute African slaves to Spanish colonies, and

Jamaica became the base for this operation.

30

Before the time of the emanipation, the political life was dominated
by the white European settlers, the slave population enjoying no rights of
citizenship. As noted earlier, the East Indian presence followed the demand
for indentured labour, after many freed slaves had left the plantation to be
on their own. The demand was more serious in islands like Trinidad and
Jamaica but less so in Barbados. The government in most of the islands was
"The Old Representative System", based on the proposition that "the colonies
were and would remain areas of European settlement whose inhabitants would be
familiar with representative institutions and would form a fairly homogenous
society."9

The struggle: for political power was a struggle for the control of the
economy of the West Indies. The West Indian society was one based upon a-
single—crop economy, the chief crop being sugar. Sugar, played a role in
both agriculture and industry. Most of the plantation owners had returned
to England leaving their estates to the custody of agents in the islands. And
the political involvement of these absentee landlords in the British govern-
ment contributed a great deal in determining the political and economic re-
lationship of the British colonial government, vis-a—vis, the West Indies.
"Forty or more members of Parliament...were the owners of West Indian plan-
tations...and sugar was so profitable and fitted so well into the mercantil-
ist economy."10 But the events follwing the First and Second World Wars con-
tributed immensely in creating the present political and economic phase of the
West Indies.

Just as in Nigeria, in the West Indies, the British had recruited troops
to fight in the two wars-—to safeguard the freedom of the British people.
With the notions and ideals of freedom acquired during the years still fresh
in their memory, the experience, no doubt, was frustrating for the troops

coming back to the colonies, only to relapse into colonial bondage. To make

31

matters worse, "the continuance of economic distress over so many years
became increasingly intolerable. (And) suddenly, the islands were swept
by a series of bloody disturbances, out of which organized trade unionism
was born."11 These trade unions constituted the beach-head of the political
movement. From that time on, as Mordecai clearly points out, "the flavor of
west Indian politics ceased to be 'Liberal' (in the British party-sense), and
became ‘Labour'."12 A brief sketch of these disturbances is imperative.

The year 1935, could appropriately be regarded as a turning point in
the political and economic development of the West Indies. This was the year
the social disturbances began, with the eruption of the Sugar Strike in
St. Kitts in January. A month later, in February, there was an oil strike
in Trinidad accompanied by a hunger march led by Uriah Butler. September
came with a Sugar strike in the British Guiana,13 and in October of the same
year, there was a tax increase demonstration in St. Vincent. A coal strike
took place in November in St. Lucia. In the words of Merdecai, "1935 was a

year of great tension".14

These social unrests, no doubt, did a great deal
to generate a new type of political awareness among the people.

Consequently, following a relatively peaceful interlude in 1936, the
confrontation between rulers and the ruled resumed in June 1937 with attempts
to apprehend Butler, following the strike in Trinidad. The incident escala-
ted to such a grave social upheaval, that it needed the aid of a warship from
Bermuda, to bring it under control. Then, the social outbursts shifted over
to Barbados, where fourteen people lost their lives. Eventually, the social
unrests Spread over to Jamaica, with the strikes that erupted in January 1938,
and lingering through May of the same year. It was at this stage that polit-
ical and labour movements started to take shape and the future leaders of the

Federation were emerging with the movements. The course of the West Indian

32

political drama therefore started to take a dramatic turn.

These social movements brought men like Alexander Bustamante, Norman
hanley,15 Grantley Adams (later Sir Grantley), and later, Eric williams, to
the political limelight of the West Indies. In Jamaica, the labour movement

was spearheaded by Bustamante, the founder of the subsequent Bustamante In-

).16

dustrial Trade Union (BITU Manley came into the show when he institu.

ted legal proceedings for the release of the arrested labour leaders, among
whom was Bustamante. The founding’of the BITU was shortly followed by the
inauguration of the People's National Party (PNP), by Manley, in September
of the same year. (See note #16). Although working cooperatively with Manley,
up to this point, Bustamante's political split with his cousin began with

the founding of his Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), in 1943, presumably master-

minded by the British colonial representative, Governor.Arthur Richards.17

Morley Ayearst presents an interesting argument in this context:

"There is an interesting example of the Governor in politics alleged to
have taken place in Jamaica during the governorship of Arthur Richards...
It is impossible to find proof for the widely held belief that the
Governor, who had been holding.Alexander Bustamante in detention under
the Emergency Regulations, released him on the understanding that

he would at once form a new political party in opposition to Manley's
Peoples's National Party, despite the fact that hitherto Manley and
Bustamante had been.working together. (But) it is conceivable that
the Governor took this step, if he did, because he was convinced that
Bustamanteis radicalism was confined to trades union objectives
whereas he feared the extremist nationalism and avowed socialism of
the PNP and thought a political sweep by this party might be disas-
trous to the British connection and the colony's economy."18

At any rate, the fact still remained that the two political forces had thence
identified themselves in Manley and Bustamante. But the political conse-
quences of the labour movements were not confined to Jamaica.

"In Barbados, Mr. Grantley Adams;..attained prominence after the
riots of 1937, as legal counsel for some of the men arrested. He
founded his 'Barbados Progressive League' (BPL) in August 1938, and
after differences with more radical elements in 1939, converted it
into the Barbados Labour Party (BLP)...(And) in Trinidad, Mr. Albert
Gomes, who was to play a leading part in federal discussion in the

33

first half of the fifties, was just becoming known as a popular

political speaker."19

But Eric Williams, who was to become the leading political figure in Trin-
idad, entered the West Indian political drama in 1956, under a federal banner.
As the leader of the newly formed People's National Movement, (PNM), he had
joined the ranks of the federalists with fresh zeal; and he had "thought it
worthwhile to justify the federal case by argument."20

One major consequence of the waves of social disturbances resulting in
the emergence of the political and labour movements, was the initiative tap
ken by the British government to institute social reform. Thus, a Royal
Commission was appointed in August 1938, with Lord Moyne as the chairman.
The social unrests also started an era of fresh political awareness and gen-
erated some feelings of oneness among the various peoples of the West Indies.
According to the report of the Commission:

Although the question of closer union has remained officially in a-

beyance since (1933), there is evidence that a lively and growing

interest has continued to be taken in it in many political circles in

the West Indies, some of which now advocate, as part of their pro-

grammes, wide measures of federation to cover all the British colo-

nies in the Caribbean area...0ur general impression, from the evi-

dence which we heard, is that which local opinion has made a consid-

erable advance in the direction of political unity since 1932, it is

doubtful whether the time is yet ripe for the introduction of any

large scheme of federation.21

At any rate, by 1938, the Jamaican Legislative Council made proposals
for constitutional reforms that took effect in 1944. Ironically, over 93%
of the island population did not go to the polls at this time, more because
of the literacy and property requirememts, although in the same year, Jamaica
had gained universal adult suffrage. The first major step towards constitu—
tional advance to federalism was perhaps taken in 1945 when the British gov-
ernment, acting through the Colonial Secretary, issued a directive encouraging

"federation" as a statu§_to be favoured by the British Government.

34

The Secretary's directive resulted in the calling, in February 1947, of
the Montego-Bay Conference that met in September of the same year "to discuss
the establishment of federation".22 The conference was preceded by the
Caribbean Labour Congress Conference held in.Kingston, Jamaica, days earh
lier; and the sole theme of the Kingston Conference was federation. Among

23 was the establishment

the decisions reached at the Montego Bay Conference,
of a Standing Closer.Association Committee (SCAC) which was to draft a fed-
eral constitution. ‘In turn, the SCAG made a number of recommendations for
the projected federation.

Among other things, it recommended that the federal legislature should
be of a bicameral nature, the House of Assembly being based on Universal
adult suffrage, while the Senate was to be appointed by the Governor-'Gen—
eral at his discretion. This was, to some degree, a model of the British
Parliamentary system, with relatively minor variations. Thus, seeing it as.
"the weakest federal systems ever to come into existence", Anglin contended
that "the political institutions of the West Indies are, in the main, almost
slavishly patterned on the British Parliamentary system."24

The SCAC recommendations were adopted with substantial modifications
in the course of the two subsequent Constitutional Conferences held in
London in 1953, and 1956. Following the 1953 conference, adult suffrage
was introduced all over the Federation. But the Federation itself was not
formally constituted after adoption in 1956, until 1958. By 1957, the
British had instituted an Order—in—Council which gave it legal tender. The
Federal constitution was formally put into operation in January 1958, and
from then to the subsequent disintegration in.August 1962, the task of na—

tion—building'became a rather arduous one.

35

The causes of the federal breakup will constitute part of the con-
siderations in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention at this stage,
however, Etzioni's suggestion that the west Indies Federal "system of ad-
ministration did not tend toward unification...Each island was administered
as a separate unit directly tied to the Colonial Office in London, and British

aid...was as a rule given to each island individually."25

Federation 9: Eiggrig

.A prominent political figure in the former Federation of Nigeria had,
at one point concluded that: \

"Nigeria is not a nation. (Rather) it is a mere geographical ex-

pression. (For) there are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as

there are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is

merely a distinct appellation to distinguish those who live within

the boundaries of the (geographical entity) from those who do not."26

Most historians are of the opinion that the political history of what
came to be the Federation of Nigeria dates back to the year 1851, when
Kosoko, the then King of Lagos, was involved in a conflict with the British,
over his refusal, supposedly, to sign a treaty abolishing all traffic in
slaves. According*to the "official" British report, King’Kosoko was evenp
tually deposed with the 'cooperation' of his uncle, Akitoye, whom the Brit—
ish.installed as King of Lagos in 1852, upon his signing the treaty in dis-
pute. Included in the treaty were such clauses as provided fpgedom of trade
for British merchants Egg protection 9f Europgan missiogggies, granting them,
as well, the right to build schools and churches. It seems obvious then,
that the prime motive of the British in attacking and deposing'King*Kosoko,
was not to bring peace and tranquility to the people of Lagos. and the
neighbouring territories. For, much as they always appeared in the wings
of angels, they (the British) also had daggers, sheathed in their feathers.

At any rate, the real objective of the British people was soon to become ap-

parent.

36

In 1853, Akitoye had died, to be succeded by his son, Dosunmu, who could
not succeed in rallying the support of all the local chiefs. In 1861, Dosunmu
was forced to surrender the sovereignty of Lagos to the British in exchange
for an annual pension of one-thousand-and—two—hundred pounds 061,200)-the
equivalent of about three thousand dollars (33,000). But it is highly
doubtful whether the Brithish.would have gone to such a length with their
"peace" crusade in a remote part of the world from where they would get
nothing'in return.

It was not until the proceedings of the notorious "Berlin Slaughter

27

House" of 1884—85, that the British design in the area crystallised in
their claim to the territory along the coast and around the River Niger.
This territory-then,known as Oila§,Rivers Protectorate-—which came to be
known as the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, was gradually extended by means
of ”treaties" and "peace agreements". And by the year 1893, the British area
of economic influence had been built up into what was referred to as “the
Niger Coast Protectorate"-later to become the Southern Region of Nigeria.
Commenting on these "treaties", a Biafran.historian noted that they "were
initiated by Britians—and invariably embodied coercive clauses designed to
bring other nations into line with her policy of suppression.“29
From the coast, the territorial expansion took a northward trend. The
Royal Niger Company, to which the administrative charter of those territories
had been granted, pursued this "peace—treaty" policy northwards, and where
"peace" was not assured by treaty, it was imposed by force of arms. By
1897, the Emirates of Ilorin and Bida had been brought under the British con-
trol and the "recalcitrant" emirs replaced with more compliant ones. In 1900,

the Charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked when direct British rule

was introduced with the appointment of Frederick Lugard as the first

37

governor (of the Northern Provinces). The Southern Provinces were placed

under the authority of a consul resident in Lagos.

Missionary activities operated pari—passu with colonial expansion.30

But while they operated with relative ease and freedom in the South, they
ran into serious problems in the Northern Provinces, for the following
reasons, inter alia:

(1) Conditions of physical hardship involved in the long and rather

' treacherous trek from the coast up the interior. Transportation
facilities inland were practically non—existent.

(2) Moslem resistance against the intrusion of other faiths. Long

before this time, the Fulani conquerors of the North had, with
the aid of Arabic influences, established a strong Noslem tra-
dition among the people.

(3) The local establishment (the emirates) were highly suspicious of
the missionaries as constituting potential threats to their aup
thority, in view of their association with colonial politics.

This fear was not completely unfounded, for

"the climatic point of missionary endeavors coincided with the dra-

matic expansion of industralization and the need for new economic

outlets, and thus with the climatic stage of European.imperialism.

(And) the initial effect of missionary wort all over Africa was to

make the African people more submissive to the inroads of the

Europeans."31

It was not until the year 1914, that both the Northern and the Southern

Provinces were welded into a single political entity. Prior to 1914, Lugard
had utilised the lecal rulers for administering the Northern provinces. This
administrative tactic which came to be known as 'indirect rule',32 held a
great deal of economic and other advantages, but its applicability could

not be easily extended to all societies. As Lugard himself discovered, the
principle could not be applied to the Southern Provinces without incurring
uglyaconsequences. Thus3when "applied to the South, it has disastrous

among the Ibos,33 whose5loosespolitiCal structure did not suit such slayer

tem."34 Following a 1922 constitution, a legislative body was constituted in 1923,

.38

with specific mandate to legislate only for the Southern provinces; while
the Nerth continued to operate under the indirect rule. It becomes evi-
dent then, that the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Regions of
Nigeria had hitherto been nominal.y The first attempts at the institution of
a common administrative system came with the advent of the controversial

Richard's3S

Constitution.

But just as in the case of the West Indies, the emergence of political
movements in Nigeria came in the wake of social and economic inequities; and
the emergent political parties constituted an outlet through which the pic-
neer nationalists expressed their indignation against colonial injustices.
As in the West Indies also, troops from Nigeria had been required to fight
in the two Werld Wars. Moreover, Nigerians had travelled to other parts of
the world especially to Europe and America in other capacities.36 As was
seen in the case of the West Indies, the ideas, and ideals, which these ‘
Nigerians brought back with them, were instrumental in nurturing political
awareness among the peoples of Nigeria. This fanned the flame of dissent
against colonial malpractices within the colony. The provenance of what
came to be the leading political mevement in the Nigerian Federation, followed
the aftermath of these out-bursts of nationalistic indignations.

In 1944, towards the end of the Second Werld War, the students of King's
College?? Lagos, had called a strike to protest against what they had re-
garded as an unwarranted use of the college facilities for the service of the
soldiers. The authorities reSponded by expelling seventy-five of the stri-
king students, and eight of them-presumed to be the leaders-swere drafted
into the army. It was in the wake of this incident that the indignant Ni-

38

gerian intellectuals assembled in a meeting organised by the Nigerian Union

of Students. One major outcome of this assembly was the inauguration of the

39

Nigerian National Council (NNC), later to be known as the National Council of

Nigeria and the Cameroons?9 (NCNC). Herbert Macaulay, a Yoruba40

by ethnic
heritage, was elected President, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, the General
Secretary. Though inaugurated at the spur of a provocation consequent
upon a Specific act of social injustice by the colonial administration the
major objective of the new organisation was to liberate the country from the
bondage of colonial imperialism.

Thus, in 1946, a team of the NCNC had embarked on a nation-wide political
tour of the country to acquaint the people with.what they regarded as the

41 It was

gross inequities of the newly introduced Richard's Constitution.
during this tour that Macaulay passed away, and the leadership of the Party
subsequently reverted to Azikiwe—-a position he held until 1960, the year of

42 to accept the appointment as

the Country's independence, when he resigned
the nation's first indigenous Governor-General. The NCNC dominated the Ni-
gerian political scene until the emergence of the Action Group (AG) in 1951.

The emergence of the AG as another major political movement was one of
the epoch—making dramas of the Nigerian political history. While a law

3

student in London, in 1945,4 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yeruba, who was to

become one of Nigeria's leading political figures, had organised the Egbe Omo

44 regarded then as a purely cultural association, the aim of which

Oduduwa,
was to preserve and perpetuate the cultural heritage of the Yoruba people.
But in 1951, Chief Awolowo dramatically proclaimed the birth of a new polit-
ical partyh—the Action Group.

The AG contrasted with the NCNC in the strict discipline and seemingly
impermeable secrecy that tended to characterise its operations. It would
appear that its primary goal was to establish political power in the Western

Region, particularly, among the Yoruba population, in Spite of its professed

40

national interest. Some critics had suggested45

that, prior to its official
inauguration, the AG had operated in secrecy for the duration of almost one-
year, within the NCNC, which, incidentally was the party in power in the
Western Regional Government at the time. It had also been suggested that
the AC was an offspring of the Oduduwa cult-in fact, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in
disguise.46

The third of the major political movements-the Nerthern People's Cone
gress (NPC)-came to be regarded as an anathema among Nigerian nationalists.
It was originally organised in December 1949, by R.A.B. Dikko,47 a Fulani
scholar. As the name suggests, the organisation was originally formed to im-
prove the culture and welfare of the people of Nerthern Nigeria. And its sub—
sequent conversion to a political movement later in the 'fifties, was a mat—
ter of expediency rather than principles. For, with the NCNC and the AG re-
presenting'respectively the interests of the East and the West, as it were,
Ithe Northern leaders had felt called upon by duty to procure for the Norh
therners, their own slice of the national cake. But a political party was 1
the prescribed means throughvflnkitthis politically defined goal was to be
attained. Thus, the Ind} the cultural association, became suddenly trans-
formed into the NPC. the political organisation.

But it is also true that some of the pioneer'members of the NPC, when
it was a purely cultural institution, had founded a political party under
the leadership of Mallam.48 Amino Kano-the Northern Elements Progressive
Union (NEPU). Amino Kano, for instance, held simultaneous membership in
both organisations until the NPC was converted into a political party that

came to be regarded by many as ultra-conservative.49

Having thus followed the evolutionary paths of the major political

movements, further consideration of the political developments seems

41

appropriate. The Richard's Constitution of 1946, attempted, for the first‘
time, to bring the entire country under the administrative authority of

one legislative council (vide supra, p. 28). It also marked the beginning of
regionalism in Nigerian politics; for it was then that the country was ad-
ministratively partitioned into three states or regions, (East, West, and
North). These were later to constitute the intitial three units of the
Nigerian Federation. But the Federal constitution was not to be instituted
until the McPherson's50 Constitution was introduced to rectify the ills of
his predecessor's administration.

The dissatisfactions, objections, and dissent which greeted the Richards'
Constitution, precipitated a major political crisis that required a consti-
tutional conference for its resolution. The constitutional conference of
1947, had, as its major outcome, the McPhersonis Constitution which took ef-
fect in 1951. This marked the beginning of federalism in Nigerian politics.
But the McPherson‘s (federal) Constitution, though an improvement on the
preceding one, did not, by any means,resolve all the political problems of

Nigeria. It created some more problems of its own. Nigeria was at the brink
of another political crisis as federalism intensified regionalism. Regionalism
in turn fostered the growth of 'opportunistic ethnicity'.51

Another constitutional conference seemed inevitable. In 1953, the con-
ference on the Nigerian Constitution met in London. It was to meet again
in 1956 and finally in 1959. The conference of the 'fifties were to resolve
political issues with deep economic roots. Federalism and the attendant re-
gionalism, had intensified ethnic loyalties. This seemed to create a cen-
trifugal force among the three major Regions, the federal assets, consti-
tuting, as it were, the central hub. This was the trend prior to the last

constitutional conference in 1959, which was to grant Nigeria self-government.

42

It was the expectation of "Independence" that slightly eased the seal
for regionalism and induced the three Regional political parties into com-
promising some of their Regional commitments for the national interest.

Prior to this, the parties were ethnically polarised. The NCNC, under

Dr. Ngamdi Azikiwt; had its major base in the Eastern Region, especially
among'the Igbo; the NPC, under.Ahumadu Bello, the Northern Premier, was
based on, and almost confined completely to, the Hausa-Fulani of the North.
The Action Group, under its leader, Chief Awolowo, the Premier of the West,
had its base among the Yoruba people of the Region.

In.the 'fifties, the great demand for cocoa in the world market had renp
dered cocoa business a very lucrative enterprise at the time. This had made
the Western52 Region, where cocoa was mainly produced, the richest, and there -
fore, the most economically viable Region of the Federation. It also left
Eastern Nigeria the poorest of the three Regions, its economy based primar-
ily on palm produce. The Nerthern Region, was better off than the East, be-
cause of its cotton, tin and copper. To make matters worse for the East, the
Nigerian Railway Corporation had changed to diesel, thus rendering the coal
industry of the East virtually inoperative, thereby suffocating ”further the
economy of that Region.

In this state of economic set-up, the regionalism which deeply perme—
ated Nigerian politics with the institution of Federal constitution in 1951,
did more to protract the economic warfare, which, if not clearly manifest,
was latent in the inter—regional political struggles. Thus, the Yoruba-
based Action Group Party, and the Government of the West which it controlled,
‘were advocating revenue allocation op the gggis of derivation.53 But with
the eventual slump54 in the cocoa market, and the almost simultaneous dis-

covery and production of oil in the Eastern.Region, the scale of Nigeria's

43

economy Suddenly tilted, making the Eastern Region the richest Region of the
Federation, and the West, the worse55 off. ’The sudden switch of the Western
Regionpbased Action Group in advocating for revenue. allocation on the basis
of need, was a clear case of "opportunistic ethnicity" that had characterised
the Nigerian political life. To fully appreciate the role of regionalism and
ethnicity in Nigerian politics, it should be remembered that, prior to the
intrusion of the European imperialist-and the British colonialists in par-
ticularh-the three major ethnic groups had developed their distinct, and in
most cases conflicting, political institutions.

In the NOrth , for example, the influence of the Arabic and Fulani in-
vaders had resulted in the establishment of a strong’Moslem tradition among
the Hausa—Fulani people. A form of feudal aristocracy had therefore marked
the political life of the people. The situation, while appearing to be sim-
ilar, was fundamentally different among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria.

The political system,of the Yoruba was traditionally, one of consti-
tutional monarchy. But the monarchical system was anything but absolute.

The Yoruba.King was responsible to a council or body of Kingymakers, who,

in turn, held a mandate from the people. The colonial policy which subsequently
conferred on the Yoruba Kings the absolute mandate that they had tradition-
ally lacked,tpas essentially a conceptual parallax deriving from the situ-
ation existing among the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of the North. For, when

the British colonial administratbrs found a monarchial.set—up in the Western
Region, they pictured a pyramid-like structure in which authority flowed in

a unidirectional pattern from top to base. Thus, the Yoruba leaderr, Chief
Awolowo was to conclude that:

"There is no doubt that in iteroriginal treatment of Paramount Chiefs,
the British government mistook a part for the whole. It invested the

44

part with the powers, the exercise of which properly belonged to the
whole...The dibtatorial powers which some Yoruba Chiefs are wielding
today are the making of the British government, who agsthe beginning
misconcelved the true nature of the Yoruba monarchy."
Nevertheless, the Ybruba of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the North had
at least one thing in common in the set-up of their political lives, viz.,
the institution of the chieftaincy system. But among the Igbo of the Eastern
Region, the story was quite different.

For the British colonial administrator, the conspicuous absence of chief-
taincy system among the Igbo created a problem unique in itself. This had
constituted an effective hindrance to the extension of the indirect—rule
which, though partially successful among the Yoruba of the West, was a
major triumph in the administration of Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. In es-
sence, "the Ibo-speaking peoples were traditionally and politically decen-
tralized, egalitarian, and individualistic",57 and "along'smallness in scale
58

went an essentially democratic
making".59
had reported that:

or consultative method of political decision-

Moreover, an eminent British anthropologist, Professor, G.I. Jones,

"The usual pattern here (in Igboland) is for public matters to be
discussed at a general meeting at which every able-bodied male who.

is a full—blooded member of the community had a right to attend and

to Speak if he wished. After a general discussion the elders retire
to consult and when they return a Spokesman announces their decision
to the full meeting who either accept by general acclamation or refuse
it. The community...is not prepared to surrender its legislative aup
thority to any chiefs, elders, or other traditional office—holders."60

In view of the foregoing, an Igbo educator, B.O. Ukeje, had come to the

conclusion that:

"The different political systems developed by the different elements
(prior to the colonial era), possibly influenced the general charac-
ter of the people; with autocracy and Mohammedanism in the North,
there is apparent conservatism; with constitutional monarchy in
Yoruba-land, there is apparent shrewdness and subtlety; and with
republéfanism in Iboland, there is apparent individualism and dyna-
mism."

45

Thus these ethnic characteristics, to a great extent, influenced the
political life of Nigeria, being'mainly responsible for the regional polar-
isation evidenced in the struggle among the leading political parties. But
this ethnic polarisation in.Nigeria, has a counter-part in the West Indian
political drama. Just as in Nigeria, the political parties had regional
bases, in the West Indies, the political movement had insular orientation.
In both cases, although the major political parties had nominal national
(Federal) commitments, a great deal of their activities and operations de-
pended on the localised support they received from their reSpective regional
bases.

In the West Indies, Manley‘s PNP, and Bustamante's JLP, both thrived on
the island politics of'Jamaica. Eric Williams' PNM was the major political
movement in Trinidad, the rival political movement being the Democratic
Labour Party headed by Albert Comes. But just as in Nigeria where the Parties
were associated with different ethnic groups, in Trinidad, Williams' PNM
was regarded as a Black Party, and the Democratic Labour Party of Gomes
considered an Indian Party. Thus ethnic politics in Nigeria in a way had
a correspondence to the racial and the insular character of West Indian po-
litical life.‘ Even so, in Nigeria, the operation of the political parties
on the Federal level was as nominal as the interhisland bonds holding the
Federal Parties were artificial. What came to be known as the Adams-
Manlethilliams political axis, as manifested in the West Indian Federal
Labour Party (FLP) inaugurated in 1956, was no more than a token of polit-
ical affiliation of Manley's PNP (Jamaica), Williams' PNM (Trinidad), and
Grantley Adam’s Barbados Labour Party, BLP (Barbados). But then, the Dem-
ocratic Labour Party (DLP), whose principal affiliates were Bustamante's

Jamaica Labour Party, (Jamaica), and Gomes' Democratic Labour Party (Trinidad),

46

constituted no more than a mere countervailing force against the Manley-
Williams-Adams axis already alluded to. As Angiin aptly points out:

"If the Federal Labour Party stands for independence, federation,

and socialism, the Democratic Labour Party,...tends to be less

militant in its nationalism, lukewarm towards federation and...

socially more conservative."

This chapter has focussed mainly on the political and the economic
transformations in the two defunct Federations. The attempt has been to
highlight the significant landmarks along’this process, with emphasis on
certain aspects of their cultural history, which formed a sequel to subse-
quent developments. In the Nigerian case, the discourse has been carried -
up to the time just before independence; and in the case of the West Indies,
it has been brought up to the eve of the Federation. The two Federations
eventually collapsed; the one, after some six years of self-government, the
other, before it was to have attained independence. The theme of the
subsequent considerations will be the identification of the factors
generating, directly or indirectly, the series of social conflicts, as well
as those factors accentuating the existing conflicts. It is the cumulative
effect of these, which conspired in the disruption of the reapective federal

systems. This will then constitute the major task of the following section.

PART III

SOURCES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL CHINGE.

47

In part two, an attempt has been made to explore the cultural and socio-
political background on which the dramas of federalism were staged in both
the West Indies and Nigeria. Chapter 2 dealt with the internal aSpects of
the background to the drama, with an effort to delineate the initial condi-
tions existing in the component units of the federation. At this stage, the
emphasis was on the potential nature of the forces of social conflict. Chap—
ter 3 focussed on the processes which brought these internal forces together,
as well as the way in which they were brought into collision with the exter-
nal forces.

The third part of the study places emphasis on the specific causes and
sources of social conflict and the possible consequences for'social change.
Selected sources of tension among the various social groups, that eventually
exploded into conflict, are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the pri-
mary concern is to determine or show how these cases of conflict conspired
to effect the eventual disruption of the two federations.

Although this work is not a treatise on conflict resolution, some
thoughts are entertained on how related conflict situations could be pre-
vented from culminating in eventual social disruption apart from suggesting
ways of avoiding the manifestations of such conflict situations in the first
place. In view of the problem posed at the intial stage of this study, the
main objective here is not so much to determine the sufficient conditions
under which a federation operates, as it is to discern the conditions that are
necessary and fundamental to social groupings of this type. In other words,
the contention is not that the satisfaction of these conditions would guaran-
tee the eventual coming into being of these social groupings. Rather, what
is suggested is that where such groupings fail to occur, or where their oo-

curance fails to persist, then this failure could be accounted for, at least

48

in part, by the non-existence of these conditions in one form or the other.

CHAPTER 4

FEDERATIONS OF NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: §QHRCES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

"Territories jointly administered by colonial powers, tend to form

a single state, while those administered separately tend to main-

tain their distinct structures after independence."1

That the above proposition is plausible, is evident from the experiences
of the Nigerian and the West Indian Federations. But one of the major reasons
for ascertaining the causes and sources of social conflict, as undertaken in
the present ;chapter, consiSts in providing an explication or rationale that
would account for this trend or tendency. Following, are then some of the
overriding issues. They typify, rather than exhaust, the totality of prob-
lems which conspired to bring about the collapse of the Federations. In
other words, they merely highlight the disintegrative forces which militated
against federalism.

Imposed Federation '

In the cases of both Nigeria and the West Indies, the contention here is
that the principle of federalism was negated when, from the on-set, the deci-
sion to federate was virtually imposed from the outside by the colonial powerh—
Britain. In case of the West Indies, Etzioni maintains that:

"The Federation...was initiated and supported by a country that never

became or intended to become a memberh—the United Kingdom...(And) most

of the west Indians who supported it did so for exterior and transient

3798301130 3!

He goes further to suggest that:

"The.idea was largely British, it was promoted by the Colonial Office

and was 'sold' to a thin layer of West Indians...The Federation...

followed the pattern Britain believed best; it was net the kind

of federation that might have evolved in the region without out—

side interference."2

In the Nigerian case, the situation was not much different; for, "Nigeria

50

3

and the concept of a Nigerian nation were an entirely British creation."
Bretton points out.that:
"The Nigerian Federation was imposed upon the area by the colonial
Power-Great Britain—~largely for reasons related to colonial
interests."4
And just as in the case of the West Indies where Bustamante of Jamaica was to
condemn the union as "a federation of paupers being foisted by Britain to es-
" 5

cape her ancient resonsibility", Chief Awolowo had argued in the Nigerian case:

"Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There

is no 'Nigerian' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh',

or 'French'. The word 'Nigeria' is merely a distictive appellation

to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from

those who do not."6

One major consequence of the fact that federalism was externally im-
posed on the constituent units, is the implication it had for the structuring
of the federations. This constitutes the topic for the subsequent consideration.
Ano ies f the Fede c

The island units-in the case of the West Indies-had reacted to the Bri-
tish.proposa1 for federation with some measure of skepticism. This suspicion
of the British design was not, in fact, unfounded. The British-engineered
federation failedv..;in part because the governmental structure established
by the federal constitution was not congruent with the actual power relations
‘ 7

among'the member units." The inter-island suspicions were based on certain
concerns and fears. The smaller units, such as the Windward group, had
feared a union in which they would be dominated by the larger, more populous
partners, like Jamaica and Trinidad. The bigger units, in turn, expressed
concern over a union, the major goal of which would be to place on their
shoulders, the burden of sustaining'the smaller, and poorer units. Thus, the
Barbadians feared:

"that a union with the poorer Windwards would increase their economic

51

burdens and would lead to a 1038 of autonomy by the imposition of

a nonpself-governing Crown Colony system. Barbados had a fully

elected representative assembly, but under federation this would

have been abolished."8
And when at the London Conference of 1956, Britain ruled out Dominion status
for any 'single territory', it was quite apparent that the threat was direc-
ted mainly toward Jamaica, which felt itself capable of going on its own,
both economically and politically. As Etzioni points out, this 'victimi—
sationfl motive manifested in the gerrymandering of the Federal Constitution
by the British was responsible,“not only for the slanting of the federal
structure in favour of the smaller islands, but also in terms of the so-
called 'Colonial limitations' the residue of British control left in the

West Indian Constitution."9

This slanting of the constitution was respon-
sible for the fact that the distribution of power among the units was not
in keeping*with the structure of the Federation. The incongruity was re-
flected in the allocation of federal seats, compared with the unit sizes
and contribution to the Federal revenue, as illustrated in table 4—1, pre-

sented below.

 

 

TABLE ~4~1

‘MECWEH INSTITUTION AND REVENUE ALLOCATION FOR

[Area
(sq.mis.)

Eh of To-
tal Area

Population
(in mills.)

WEST INDIES FEDERATION

7' .9
$.01 Total

Population

iliaaatice as
4; ~a'.."A .. ..

as. at. ".1 Un"

Federal Seats

Contribution
to National In-

come 1%Q_

Proposed Allocan
tion of Colonial
Dev. Funds

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jessie- 4,411 57.60 1.613 51.70 17 37.9 54.5 250.000
Trinidad-

Tobago 1,980 26.80 0.825 26.50 10 22.2 31.3 100.000
;::;.:::a_.all.__ll€66 2.20 o. 7: I 7.40 éfi - 11.1 6.6 500,000
2: , W 133 1.70 (Jo—8‘9 2.80 2- 4.4 540,000
2;. EZITYaI” a....;5003 2.00 0.08? t” a.e3 “‘2 -.. -. 4.4 5.3 I_- 5402000

‘m" of"? *4'3-‘3- m v.>v.l~.-mumwm-

v
~q

.,. .
‘ . - .4 . .. 1,
we __ i .-I ",
nun-r tater-Hows '- W‘r¢~;' "mu... 1‘“

t v
DC’Y. 3 In”! T117).

“mum ~‘e' .9 nth ix: ‘0‘ «- :E-wnnveoz
O
y '2 (av; s ,~
g -1 r q a

m"fi’m"u.’"t_ .7... .- .

QJ. " .'

u be VJ fits-

NICVI I;

mw'm'rw nmraurwaw -
Montserrat

—-
~ vrlvs. '1 -.

T>TLT

‘wl

(Source:

 

289.5

,-
0.09s
I

0.060

'r' .‘\II-hl“

 

”..v

108

7,663.3

2.00

0.03

99.63

0.054

sum "

0.057

0.01?

3.11.7

 

3.00

1.90

1.70

1.80

0.40

100.0

 

- ‘_ l - w.‘ u. Nut-w: 'I

.—--—--;: ”.ivlvsiflhi not ,2 '1“

900,000

 

1 million

 

 

1.1

680,000'

 

0.2

200,000

 

100

.Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, Holt, Einehart, and Winston, pp. 150-151, 173).

100 3,240,000

 

53

As the above table indicates, it is difficult to rationalise the struc-
turing of the Federation, and the attendant distribution of responsibilities
and amenities on the basis of any simple mathematical or logical formula. One
cannot help but wonder if the primary rationale was not in large part, the whim
or caprice of the British colonial administration.

What has been said of the West Indies, was also true of Nigeria. As
Bretton points out, the British purposely arranged the constitutional struc-
ture "so as to favour the less progressive, or less developed Northern Re-
gion", condemning it "as a giant gerrymander".1O This, no doubt, had serious
implications for the manner in which power was distributed among the various
units of the Federation. And, just as in the case of the West Indies, this
was reflected on the allocation of seats to the regions, in the Federal legb
islature. For purposes of illustration, we may consider the distribution of
the popular vote and federal seats by political parties, following the pre-

independence federal elections in 1959.
TABLE 4-2

POPULAR VOTES AND FEDERAL SEATS BY PARTIES IN THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION

 

 

NPC Action GrOUD NCNC-NEPU
Popular Votes 1,992,179 1,992,364 2,594,577
Seats 134 73 89

(Source: Stanley Diamond, N' ria- Model of a Colonial Failure, American
Committee on Africa, 1967, p. 365.

From the above, it becomes evident then, that, although the Northern
People's Congress (NPC) was the most unpopular political party, in terms of
numerical votes, it nevertheless won an overwhelming'majority of the seats

in the Federal legislature. But, as Diamond accurately points out,

54

"if the allotment of seats were made on a national, rather than a
regional basis, the NPC would have been deadlocked with the AG, while
losing national primacy".11

TABLE 4-3

PROJECTED ALLQTMENT QF SEATS ON A NATIONAL BASIS

 

 

NPC Action Group NCNC-NEPU
Federal Seats 86 86 112

(Source: See Table 4—2).

This arrangement would defintely have put the control of political power,on
the national level, in the hands of the Southern Nigerian Parties, and in
particular, Eastern Nigeria. But, as may already have been apparent—and as
would be further appreciated subsequentlyh-Southern Nigeria in general, and
the Igbo, in particular, had constituted the greatest single obstacle to the
operation of the British colonial administration in the Federation. Such po-
litical arrangement that would have given political power to the Eastern Ni-
gerian people (the Igbo in particular) would not have been in the best in-
terest of the British government. But this did not happen. Nigeria attained
independence with the 'preferred' group (the Northern Region, in this case),
in control of the game. It is pointed out, however, that:

"In a colonial situation it is not normally possible to resolve the

struggle for power between political groups. Even if it happens

that...the parties wbrk out the constitution, they do so under

the supervision of an autocratic colonial referee who inevitably

modifies the forces of conflict. Hence, the pre-independence ar-

rangements that become effective with independence seldom repre-

sent a real and natural division of power between the various groups...
(BUI) this referee is in itself, an interest group,«12 .

Intensity 9f Nationalism
Another major potential source of social conflict in both Nigeria and

the West Indies was perhaps, nationalism that was low in intensity. This

55

Was reflected in the conspicuous absence of what Etzioni has described as
"identitive Power".13 The logic of this is very simple. In the West Indies,
the intensification of inter-island differences was a major consequence of
ecological insularity. To the separate island nationists struggling for
emancipation from colonial rule and imperial exploitation, Britain repre-
sented the oppressor.r Moreover, there had been.more interaction between
Britain and the separate island units, and very little or no interaction
among the units themselves. The proposal by Britain for the federation of'
the units, therefbre, not only strengthened the skepticism about the British
design, but also intensified inter-island suspicion. The identitive feeling
was therefore lacking'among the West Indians. ThuS:

"Where befbre federation, there had developed some sense of West Indian

identity, its strength was not sufficient to establish its priority

over island loyalties. Each island continued to be conscious of its

uniqueness and individuality...(And) the West Indian nation exists only

when the West Indian team plays cricket against an outside team."14

Also the Moyne Commission had reported that time was not "yet ripe for
the introduction of any large scheme of federation". Pointing to local ’
pride as a major hindrance to federation, the commission noted that:

"efforts to secure co-operation for the common good from all the

West Indian colonies are still...frustrated by insularity...

(there being some doubt about) the readiness of West Indian

opinion to accept federation in principle."15
Furthermore, Etzioni suggests that:

"The development of a West Indian nationalism was (limited by)

strong ethnic differentiations and identifications. These were

esPecially important in accounting for the separatist feelingg

and secession of Trinidad. Relations between the East Indians

and Negroes in Trinidad are tense and the former greatly fear

a federation dominated by the latter. The East Indians who

form...the second largest group in Trinidad view federation with

suspicion...They see the possibility of being swamped in

a predominantly African domination."1

But the West Indies Federation collapsed not so much because of the weak

nationalism of its human diversity, but more because of the cultural poverty

56

that constituted the content of this diverse humanity. As Ayearst points out;

"The colonies and expcolonies in.Africa...present the familiar picture

of native peoples ruled...by European powers and, as they acquire self-

government, reviving or developing'a local nationalism based upon

their own historic culture. In contrast...those of the West Indies

contain no 'natives'. Instead, their populations constitute an

amalgam of non-indigenous peoples."17

But if the absence of indigenous peoples constituted a hindrance to the
working of a West Indies Federation, the presence of indigenous cultures by
itself, did not prove to be a Special asset in the case of Nigeria. The cul-
tural incompatibility of these indigenous cultures militated against the
principles of federalism. The major weakness of Nigerian nationalism consis-
ted in the fact that commitment to national interest was neither extensive
nor profound enough as to constitute an adequate countervailing force to
ethnic loyalties. Bretton points out that, "what is significant about the
ethnic composition of this nation of Nigeria is that its composition actually
includes different: races."18 But the major issue was not the mere fact of
ethnic differentiation. His contention was that the peoples of Nigeria and
their cultures, were, in fact

"so different...that in every respect they do not warrant being

given the same national designationsr.A person living in S.E.

Nigeria-a member of the Ibo tribe-is more different from a

fellow Nigerian in the N.W. corner than can be said of a Greek

peasant and a British Lord."19

As a matter of fact, Nallam.Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the man who later
came to be the Prime Minister of the Federation, had earlier contended:

"Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in

1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is

still far from being united...Nigerian unity is only a British

intention for the country."20
In these circumstances, then, the cultivation of identitive sentiments by

the peoples of the federation, vis-advis, one another, could not be taken

as a matter of course. Hence, one is reminded that:

57

"The naked letters of the constitution, however strongly worked,
can never preserve the unity of the Federation unless the various
ethnic groups are in their heart of hearts determined to live
together as one."21

But in such a heterogenously constituted system, common sense would
dictate that, for a smooth operation, the relationships among the constituent

units of the Federation be based on some kind of equitable exchange. As
22

Ahmadu Bello ‘himself admitted, "the political future (of the Nigerian_peo-
I plea) must rest on an aggeeable give and take between the parties".23 But

whether he believed in the actual practice of this reciprocity principle, was
another matter. For, while struggling to grab their own share of the Nigerian
cake, as it were, the Northern leaders were, at the same breath, engaged in

a systematic process of absolving the North from any kind of obligations or
responsibilities to the Federation. Thus, Bello was to state categorically

24 was not of great consequence

at a latter time; "what happened in Lagos
here in the North."25
It would seem that in Nigeria cultural diversity fanned the flame of
ethnic animosity, thereby intensifying inter-regional antagonism, just as
in the case of the West Indies, ecological insularity had accentuated inter-
island suSpicion. This was in spite of Ayearst's suggestion that whereas
the ex-colonies in Africa:
"are vividly conscious of their nationalism as they emerge from co-
lonial status...in the West Indies the new nationalism is conditioned
and somewhat blurred by the mixture of races in the population, the ab-
sence of any truly local culture."26
Having thus dealt with the general aspects of the issues of social con-
flict, attention will now be turned to the Specific sources of social con—

flict, or conflict issues arising from unique local factors. To facilitate

the task, it seems necessary to consider the two federal systems separately.

58

THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION: Source of Conflict
The Chaguaramas Affaig

Perhaps one of the factors that contributed most to the ultimate
disintegration of the West Indies Federation was the conflict that de-
veloped around the issue of Chaguaramas, where the United States had a
huge military base. It is here perhaps that the collision of imperial and
colonial forces, with those deriving from internal tension, is brought to
a better perspective.

Back in 1940, during the Second World War, the naval harassment of the
Atlantic shippings, by the German U-boats,had rendered American military
shipments to Britain almost inoperative. The British evacuation at Dunkirk,
and the almost simultaneous capitulation of France and her navy, had caused
great consternations among Anglo—American policy makers. It was as part of
the grand strategy to counter the German menace that Britain leased the
Chaguaramas base in Trinidad, for ninety-nine years to the United States.
Furthermore, part of the agreement was that, in time of emergency, the U.S.
was to exercise absolute authority, not only over the base, but also through-
out the island Territory of Trinidad. Here then was an example of a terri-
tory made a pawn between imperial powers-an incident that is very reminis-
cent of the historic "Berlin Slaughter House".

But how does this relate to the present issue under consideration?
Back in 1957, the Standing Federation Committee (SFC) had chosen Trinidad
for the site of the Federal capital, following which a site committee
(S.C.) had been constituted to find and recommend a suitable site in Trini-
dad. The S-C. consequently put Chaguaramas at the top of their list of pri-
orities, using the criteria laid down by the SFC. This then was the begin-
ning of the tension that was to pull the Jamaican, the Trinidadian, and

the Barbadian statesmen further apart.

59

When the SFC reconvened to consider the recommendations of the S.C.,
Manley of Jamaica and Grantley of Barbados pressed for the release of the
base by the U.S., whereas Williams of Trinidad found himself in a dilemma.

On the one hand, Williams, a federalist in every reapect, could not very well
oppose the release of the base, for this would have exposed him to ridicule,
and earned him the label of an "imperial stooge". On the other hand, the
Party he led (PNM) had, in its federal manifesto promised "a clear, dis-
tinct, and unequivocal guarantee before our election that we would honour

all international obliggtions including the U.S. Bases Agggement. The
Chaguaramas base was vital for the defense of Trinidad and its oil-an imp

 

portant basis of Federal revenue. If Trinidad supported the resolution, she
would be exposed to the charge of using SFC to break international commit-
ments. If Trinidad opposed it, she would be suspected of trying to foist
some other site upon her federal partners."27 At any rate, the delegates
finally agreed to the intiating of a joint negotiation with the British
government and the United States, that was convened in London.

Ironically, it was at the London meeting that Williams, who formerly
advocated the path of caution, dramatically became the uncompromising
federal proponent for the unconditional release of the base by the United
States. It was perhaps this unexpected change of stance by Williams that
tempered the unyielding position of both Washington and London into re-
ferring the issue to a Joint Commission. The report of the Commission was
not released until after the Federal inauguration. But not surprisingly,
it came out in favour of the American interest. A footnote to this, was
the British-American offer of a ten year "amnesty", when the Base-Agreement
shoud be brought under review.

But what alienated the authorities in Trinidad more from their col-

leagues in Jamaica and Barbados, was not the fact that Williams came later

60

to champion the cause already supported by Manley and Adams. What drove the
wedge deeper into the already shaky Adams-ManleyéWilliams axis was the reali-
sation later, by Williams, that his federal compatriots were reluctant to
carry on to its logical conclusion, the struggle they had set out to win.
Mordecai thus argues:
"It was clearly by omission, that Sir Grantley did not intend to follow
any cause which implied unit direction, but was intent upon keeping
Chaguaramas as an issue of Federal direction...He and his government
stood by holding such conference without being committed to pushing
for a surrender."28
Manley, who was party to the initiation of the fight, was later to desert
his comrade on the battlefield with a retreating apologia that the Chaguaramas

29

issue "was not a Federal responisibility". The Chaguaramas case was later

to be complicated by the oil refinery issue.
The Oil Refigegy Issue.

By mid-1958, the Jamaican government had entered into negotiations with
the American oil company, ESSO, for the construction of an oil refinery.
Mordecai auggusts that the Jamaican government proposal for the refinery was
in flat contradiction of internal free trade.

"This was a proposal to protect oil refining in Jamaica by

levying a consumption tax which would be refunded to Jamaican

refiners. Its purpose was to afford protection to (the)

refinery...at the expense of excluding imports from the

refiners in Trinidad."30

As one would expect, this move by Jamaica was received in Trinidad with
grave concern. It drew a strong protest, to ,both Jamaican and Federal
authorities2from.Williams who saw the economy of Trinidad, and therefore,
that of the Federation, seriously threatened. -The unconciliatory and re-
calcitrant responses which greeted his protests only served to accelerate

the pace of the centrifugal forces already set in motion by the Chaguaramas

Affair. To Williams‘ ultimatum that, "The Trinidad Government would be no

61

party to freedom of movement of people as soon as possible, and to freedom of

31

movement offigoods as late as possible," the Jamaican authorities responded
with a threat of secession:
"The Constitution must be rewritten so that theFederala Government

would have no right whatsoever to impose any kind of taxation upon

Jamaica, without Jamaica's prior agreement. Representation...

must be based on population...Any Customs Union must be such as not

to hurt our workers or our economy."32
The Jamaican authorities warned that:

"If these things are not met, Jamaica must withdraw (from the Federation)."33
It would appear that the major battle within the Federation from now on had
been drawn maninly between Jamaica and Trinidad. The former was heading for
an association with as weak a bond as possible; the latter could not buy
anything less than a tight union. The oil refinery issue wound up, neverb
theless, with Jamaica having her way. But this, by itself, did not mitigate
the interbisland conflict.

The highlight of the Jamaican ultimatum of May 27, 1959 was the Gov-
ernment Ministry Paper No. 18 (M.P. #18) which "identified the wide ecologb
ical gap between Jamaica and Trinidad, with Jamaica determined to denude the
Federal Government of vital powers, present and prospective,”34 Trinidad's
response to this was Eric Williams' 'Economics of Nationhood', which was
a blueprint of what the federation ought to be. In the 'Economics of Na-
tionhood' , Williams had proposed that the Federal Government should control,
among other things: defenSe, external affairs, immigration, and emigration}
Freedom of Movement of persons "to be entrenched in the constitution";
Exchange control and Currency, customs, and the right to impose any kind
of tax, subject to a Financial Agreement. It further suggested that the
distribution of the financial responsibility be according to the following

format:

62

TABLE 4-4

BLUE PRINT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY AS
EROEQSED IN THE 'ECQNOMICS 0F NATIONHOOQ'

B.W.I. 8 million B.W.I. 3 million
Trinidad + 22.8 Antigua - 0.66
’ Jamaica + 13.5 St. Vincent - 0.77
Barbados ' 3.7 Greneda - 0.14
St. Kitts 0.23 Montserrat - 0.18
Dominica 0.80 I St. Lucia - 0.21

(Source: John Mordecai, The West Ind'es‘ Federal Ne tiations, (George
Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 19685, p. 1645.

This would have meant the major burden of the federation being borne
by the three biggest units, with five of the smaller units having a net
gain from thefederal coffer. But this proposal was not expected to be
taken seriously by Jamaica whose mind, it seems, had already been made up,
against the Federation.

From the foregoing, it would have been surprising if the union had lasted
much longer than it did. The Trinidadian authorities, it appears, had appre—
ciated Jamaica's concerns. They had noted the fact that Jamaica contribu—
ted about forty percent of the Federal revenue while getting'much less than
that,in return from,the Federation. But then, Williams had contended that

"Jamaica had conspicuously underestimated the advantage it would

derive from the Federation...(And) he did not agree with.Jamaican

fears with respect to Federal control of industry, (because) Trinidad-

and-Tobago had similar problems...but was yet prepared to submit to

Federal control."

He further maintained that

"Trinidad-and-Tobago alone could not take over the responsibilities
involved in a Federation without Jamaica."35

In any case, the interhisland tension, rather than cooling off, intensified,

63

and the internal conflict escalated. The result of the 1961 referendum
which urged Jamaica out of the Federation did not, in fact, come as a
surprise. The Federation had been dealt a fatal blow, and its complete
suffocation required a formal ritual the following year when Jamaica fi-

nally took leave, to be followed shortly by Trinidad.

The Fedegation of Niggria

The Westegn Niggrig Crisis: Phase 1
Perhaps, the wave of social crises which marked, and eventually culmi-

nated in the break-up of,post-independence Nigeria originated from the po-
litical upheaval which erupted in the Western Region in 1962. During the
early period of the Action Group history, the primary concern of its Yoruba

36 37 which was the

leadership had been the consolidation of Regional power,
only way-—at least, so it seemed to these leaders-the Yoruba could have a
voice in the policyemaking procesSes of the Federation. And in adopting

this policy, the AG leadership had received solid support from the masses

of the Yoruba people.

In the early days of independence, Chief Awolowo had come to grips with
the reality of the limited prospects in regionalism as a basis for political
operation on a national scale. Moreover, with the setback in cocoa market
which had once made Western Nigeria the richest Region in the Federation,
the lucrative oil enterprise which had subsequently conferred on the Eastern
Region the status of the richest-—and therefore, the most economically viable-
unit, and with the Northern Region emerging as the dominant political force,
in virtue of its numerical majority, Chief Awolowo saw only one channel open.
for the AG)as well as the Western Region,to assert its right in the federal
enterprise. The expansion of the political base, and the national scope of

the AG seemed to be imperative. There was one more encouraging note. The

64

substantial in-roads which his party (AG) had made in the Northern Region

during the 1959 elections had demonstrated that Northern Nigeria was not,

after all, impenetrable, and neither was the NPC invulnerable, as had been
the common belief.

But there were some dissenting opinions within the ranks of the Action
Group leadership, vehemently opposed to the idea of 'over—extending‘ the
operational scope of the party politics, to the detriment, as it were, of
power—consolidation within the Region, especially Yorubaland. The leading
exponent of Regionalism in this sense, was Chief Akintola, Awolowo's deputy.

Awolowo's neo—nationalism, so to Speak, had been most articulated in
his urge for the creation of more states-—having in mind the Northern Re-
gion.which the AG had sought to break up into segments compatible with the
size of the Southern Regions. It is to be expected that the Northern leader-
ship would not particularly be inclined to fraternise with Awolowo and his
supporters in view of this avowed policy to 'disintegrate' the Northern
Region. But if 'devils' ever have attributes of virtue or goodness, and if
the Southern politicans were radical political Scoundrels, via—advis, the
Northern statesmen, then, given a choice between Awolowo and his deputy,
the Northerners would certainly take "the better of two evils"; and Chief
Akintola was their candidate.

In the middle of 1961, the Northern legislature had been dissolved and
reconstituted by a subsequent election in which the NPC was returned to power
by an overwhélming'majority. But the electoral processes were carried out
in a manner that the AG and its leadership had regarded as clandestine.

This had led Chief Awolowb to charge the NPC with irregularities in the con-
duct of the election. But meanwhile, the division .within the AG itself had

been growing wider.

65

This internal conflict in the AG came to a head during the Party's
Annual Conference in Northern Nigeria in the middle of 1962, when the Party's
deputy Chief, (and Western Region Premier), Chief Akintola, left the Confer-
ence against the will of his party, for home, to play host to the Northern
Premier whose visit to the Western Region had, incidentally, coincided with
the AG Conference in the North. This by no means portrayed a good and exem-
plary image of Chief Akintola to the Yoruba citizenry still loyal to Chief
Awolowo. Thus, alarmed, at the 'audacious' incursions of the Hausa-Fulani
oligarchy into their domain, the Yorubas had to act quickly in the face of
this hmmenent 'invasion' from the North.

Consequently, sixty-‘158 members of the Western Legislature submitted a
memorandum to the Regional Governor, in which they had disavowed confidence
in the Premier, Chief Akintola. And, following consultations with the Re—
gion's attorney-general, the governor had dismissed the Premier, replacing
him with another Yoruba appointee. But the Governor's action was subse—
quently challenged by Chief Akintola in a law suit, in which he had contens
ded that the Governor exceeded his constitutional powers in removing him from
office without the benefit of a hearing by the House. The Action Group
countered the legal move by formally terminating?9 Chief Akintola's mem—
bership 0f the Party. Akintola was later to form his own party. Nevertheless,
Chief Akintola's case was upheld; and with his subsequent reinstatement by
the nation's court, a state of political schism thus prevailed within the
Western Region. Its repercussions were to be felt all over the federation.
This schism generated enormous forces of social conflict. It was the escala-
tion of this conflict into violent actions, that brought the Federal inter-
vention which placed the Region under emergency rule for the subsequent six
months. But the Western Nigeria crisis was rooted in a more fundamental prob-

lem that had plagued the Federation right from its inception: 'How many Nigerians?'

66

The Census Qgisis

The first population census ever to take place in post—independence
Nigeria was organised in 1962. This was about the time the Federal Consti—
tution was introduced in Nigeria. It was also the time that "opportunistic
ethnicity" was injected into Nigerian political system, with the dramatic
inauguration of the Yoruba-based Action Group party. .According to the 1952

Census count,- the Federal population was distributed as follows:

TABLE 4-5

NIGERIA; QISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY REGIONSI 1952

 

Regions Po tion
Eastern Region 7,497,000
N0rthern Region 17,573,000
Western Region 6,408,000
Federal Territory of

Lagos 4272.000
TOTAL ' 31 .750,000

(Source: 1952 Census Report).

The following remark seems perinent in this context:
"The political significance of the (1952) Census was that it assured
the dominance of the North in the Federal Government since seats
in the Federal House of Parliament were then allocated on a popula-

tion basis. Out of the 312 seats in the Federal House, the North
received 174 seats, thus placing it in an absolute majority."40

But Professor s.a. Alulco,41

has demonstrated that prior to independence,
there had been no serious effort to ascertain the actual figure of Nigerian
population, and that the figures officially used were based on careless es-
timates, and as such, quite, unreliable.

The Census of May 1962, was therefore, the first serious attempt to de-
termine the real population of Nigeria, but as it turned out, it proved a

failure, because of the manipulation of the figures to achieve regionalistic

67

political ends. Consequently, the report of the census was never pulicised.
And with the rejection of the 1962 count, a second census trial was set for
the follOwing*year. When the report of the second count was released early

in 1964, the Federal population was distributed as follows:

TABLE 4-6

NIGERIA; DISTRIBUTION OF EEQLATION Bx REGIONS, 1962

 

Eastern Region 12,388,646
*Mid-Western Region 2 .533, 337
Northern Region 29 .777,985
Western Region 10,278,500
Lagos 675.32;
TOTAL - 55,653,821

* The Midwest was carved out of the former Western Region in 1963 .

Source: 1963 Census Report, as quoted in Arthur A. Nwankwo et.al.,
The flggigg of g Nation; Biafga, (C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969), p.49.

Comparison of tables 4—5 and 4—6 would seem to indicate that the population
of Nigeria increased by about eighty percent in one decade; Eastern Region
by forty percent; Western Region (including the Midwest) by 100%; Northern
Region by eighty percent; and Lagos by 100%. This would suggest an annual

population increase of the form indicated below
*TABLE 447

I-IIGERIA: GROWTH RATE OF POPULATION

 

 

 

Federal Units 76 Population Increase over 195; Percentag Annual Growth
Eastern Region 4% 4%
N0rthern Region 80% 8%
Western Region 100%’(includes the Midwest) 10%
Lagos 100% 10%.
TOTAL 80% 8%

*(Derived from Tables 4—5 and 4-6).

68

As some observers accurately pointed out, "the United Nations demographers

42 but it is

regarded a two percent increase per annum.as normal in.Africa",
only the growth rate of the Eastern Region (four percent) that comes closest
to the UN figure. Table 4—7 would also suggesttthat the East had the least
growth rate of all the units of the Federation. But this would be in flat
contradiction of what was said in the second chapter, regarding the high pop—
ulation density and high growth rate of the Igbo, who constituted the pre—
dominant population of that Region. As one observer noted, "The East, which
many had thought to be the fastest growing region was... shown to have lost

ground compared with the other regions."43 44

But in spite of the protests
from many concerned quarters of the Federation, the NPcfigontrolled government
decided to accept the report as official and final. This decision further
intensified the ihterethnic differences, and the inter—Regional conflicts,
and crises followed, one after another. The inter-ethnic animosity was re-

flected in the Northernisation Policy.46

The Federal Election Crisis, 1264

The Census crisis was at the root of the subsequent Federal election
crisis, which followed shortly after. As will be recalled, in the Western’
Region, Chief Akintola had been reinstated following'the Federal interven-
tion in that Region, and his chief political adversary, Chief Awolowo, sub-
sequently convicted of treason;47 but that Region was anything but peaceful.
(Following'the Census, a federal election had been scheduled for December 1964.
The social atmosphere all over the Federation was tense with interhethnic
distrust. Some NCNC adherents of Yoruba heritage had resigned from the Party
to join forces with Akintola's group to fight "Igbo domination"; and Akin-
tola's newlyhformed Party, United People's Party (UPP) had adopted a new
nomenclature-the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)-—to accommodate

the 'new comers'.

69

Meanwhile, three members of the Federal Electoral Commission had re-
signed in protest against what they regarded as unfair: holding an election
in an.atmosphere of tension. But this did not move the NPC-controlled
Federal leadership who insisted that the elections be held on schedule; and
this was what happened.

Power realignmentin political alliances were a reflection of the polit-
ical and social forces at work at the eve of the federal elections. Thus,
the Northernsbased NPC and Akintola's NNDP joined forces as the Nigerian

National Alliance (NNA); the NCNC and the AG,48

the NEPU, and the United
Middle Belt congress (UMBC) all came together to constitute the United Pro—
gressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The campaigns were marked by open hostili-
ties between the supporters of opposing groups. And campaign rallies and
49

Speeches became a rather precarious enterprise.in areas where members of a
particular alliance did not enjoy popular support.

But the election which was initially boycotted by the Eastern Region
and the UPGA supporters in parts of the Western Region, did not ease the
tension; it rather intensified the inter—ethnic antagonism. And the 'vic-
tory' of the NPC-NNDP alliance only aggravated the apprehension of the
Southerners, of Northern domination. What, to the Yoruba in particular,
had appeared to be the use of Akintola's NNDP lackey as an instrument of
the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, had generated sentiment against Chief Akintola
and his supporters while cultivating sympathy for the Action Group loyal-
ists whose hero, Chief Awolowo, was still in jail. The election crisis
brought the Prime Minister, Mr Bellewa (a N0rthsrner) and the nation's
President, Dr. Azikiwe (an Easterner) almost into head-on collision;50
and the Federation would have exploded at this stage, had not the Presi-
dent given in, to the Prime Minister, at the last moment. But behind the

facade of the NCNC-AG Alliance was the still unabated anti—Igbo sentiment

70

which was yet to be manifested in another incident.

The UniverSity of nggs Crisis

In the spring of 1965, the IgboS1

vice—Chancellor of the University of
Lagos (a Federal institution), Dr. Eni Njoku, was replaced with a Yoruba

scholar, Saburi Biobaku.52

This change was carried out by the predominantly
Yoruba Provisional Council of the University, against the recommendations

of the University senate. One of the consequences was the resignation of
several members of the senior faculty of the University, who saw this as a
flagrant violation of, and an infringement on, the academic freedom of the
University. This triggered demonstrations and protests both within and out-
side the University community, by indignant students and faculty, who saw
Dr. Njoku as an innoncent victim of social injustice, political vindictive-

ness, and opportunistic ethnicity. The confrontation53

between the Univer-
sity community and the essentially Yoruba authorities, was such that the
University was temporarily closed. The chain of crises continued, neverthe-
less, and it was in this atmosphere of interhethnic tension that an election
' was scheduled in the Western Region for October 1965.
western Ni ' Crisis- Phase

The unpopularity of the NNDP government of the Western Region, as re-
flected in the growing public sentiment, was such as would indicate that the
Premier, Chief Akintola and his supporters, had all but lost ground in that
Region. There was relatively high public expectation in the anticipated
victory of the Action Group Partyh-which fact would warrant the release of
the AG leader, Chief Awolowo from prison. But Akintola and his NNDP sup-
porters, determined to stay in power. at all cost, were known to have

54 the election. At this point the general public of Western

blatantly rigged
Nigeria felt driven to the limit of endurance. For, whereas Chief Akintola

had the right to want to impose his leadership on the people, the pe0ple

71

also had even greater right to reject any form of leadership that did not
meet their approval. This then, was the beginning of the last phase of the
crisis in the Region, which subsequently threatened the very life of the
Federation. It was a showadown between the ruler and the ruled.

Loss of human lives and damage of property, followed in the wake of the
violent social upheaval which subsequently engulfed the entire Region. This
violent confusion and utter chaos persistedp-ironically, at the connivance of
the Federal Government which, earlier in 1962, did not hesitate to declare a
state of emergency in that same Region. Puzzled by the apparent indifference
of the Federal authorities, some observers have asked:

”If the Federal Government could declare a state of emergency in

1962, following the internal crisis in the Action Group, why did

the same Federal Government refuse to take a similar line of action

in 1965, when wholesale arson, looting, and murder were taking

place in Western Nigeria following the fraudulent Western election

of October that year? It was the same Federal Government under

the same...Belewa."55
Perhaps the right answer to this question will ever remain a mystery. At
any rate, the Federal action was never to come; the conflict escalated; the
situation degenerated. The aimless drift continued until the situation was

arrested by the January Revolution of 1966.56

The January Revolution57

The Army coup d'etat of'January 15, 1966 should be considered in a
perspective in which the foregoing sequence of crises forms a broad back-
ground. It was in the midst of’murders, arson, and other aspects of the
social turmoil threatening to destroy the nation that the Prime Minister of
Nigeria undertook,on his own initiative, to play host to a Conference of
Commonwealth58 Prime Ministers in order to resolve the issues of the Rhodesian
crisissg. The Prime Minister, Balewa, had himself opened the Conference on
60 1

January 4, 1966, in Lagos, in the vicinity of which his own people were

killing themselves in large numbers.

72

But however good his intentions, vis-a—vis, the oppressed people of
Rhodesia, the Army did not allow them to obstruct what it considered its
duty to the Nigerian people-the protection of the people from both.external
and internal danger. Certainly the peoples of Nigeria were in danger. This
then was the ba0kground to the January Revolution61 that was to last but
briefly. I
The Jul Counter—Con and its Tra 'c termath

The January revolution inaugurated the first military regime in the
country‘s history under an Igbo army officer, General Ironsi.62 The Army
considered the problem of ethnicity as constituting the root of Nigeria's
social crises; and this consequently prompted the promulgation of the his-
toric Degree No. 34 which sought to abolish regionalism thereby giving legal
tender to a programme of a united Nigeria. Subsequently, this was inter—
preted in some quarters to be a prelude to the "Igbo domination" of the
country. As a result of the schemings and intrigues of international
opportunists-mainly the British-—the Northern Nigerians were impressed with
the idea that the Decree No. 34, was an Igbo design to control the whole
country. As noted by some observers of the Nigerian scene,

"the expatriates (mainly British) resident in Northern Nigeria, who

can rightly be called the largest contributors of the break-up of

the Federation...(the) great beneficiaries of the Northernisation’

policy...saw in the military take-over an end to their long years of

paternalism in that region...(and)saw in Decree No.34 a document

which gave constitutional permanence to their diSplacement from.their

priveleged positions as 'expert' advisers to the Northern Nigeria 3
Government and substitution by qualified Nigerians from the South."

 

The consequence of this international collaboration was a series of rioting,

killings, of the Easterners in a number of Northern cities, the looting and

destruction of their property. West Africa commenting on the riots noted:
"The riots in Northern Nigeria...are generally thought to have been

the responsiblility of politicians disappointed in their expectation
that they would soon be returned to the fruits of office...It is

73

clear that the demonstrations were essentially tribalistic, anti-Ibo,
in nature, and should not be elevated into serious expressions of
pglitical thinking about the constitution."
The May riots were only a prelude to the major catastrophe which began on
July 16, 1966 with the counter military coup and the subsequent pogrom that
ensued. The victims were Eastern Army officers and civilians (especially
those of Igbo heritage).
"The aim of the July 29 (coup) was two-fold: (i) to Split the country
and effect the secession of the North from the rest of Nigeria;
(ii) in the alternative, to re-establish the hegemony and domination ’
of the North in the Federation."65
But without going into the details of the ensuing pogrom, a few comments
on the highlights would be in order.
Writing in the New Leader, George T.0rick had the following comment on
the events of post—July 1966 Nigeria:
"Gowon, (the self-proclaimed head of the present Nigerian military
government), has become little more than a mouthpiece for the Hausa-
Fulani leaders, who...Speak of national unity yet say, and not al-
ways privately, that unity (Meaning Northern domination) is not
possible unless the Ibos are either killed or contained in their
home land."
On the actual killings, he states:
"Then in September 1966, the Moslem Hausa got down to the serious
business of exterminating Ibos. In less than 10 days they
slaughtered upwards of 50,000 Ibo men, women, and children who
had been living and working in Northern cities...The Army units
in the North already purged of Ibos in July an% August, instead
of stopping the slaughter participated in it." 6
Stephen Lewis reminds Skeptics, and apologists of "one Nigeria" not to
ignore the fact "that 30,000 Biafrans died in the pogroms of 1966", noting
that "the world press had reported the sheer madness of that episode and of
the subsequent harassment and ferocity which forced two million Ibos to flee
for home."67 Frederick Forsyth.68 has documented the account of the 1966
atrocity against the Easterners in general and the Igbo, in particular.

Below are some excerpts from the account of foreign eyewitnesses of the pogrom.

74

(i) From the correspondence of Time Magazine, October 7:

The massacre began at the airport near the Fifth Battalion's
home city of Kano...From the airport the troops fanned out
through downtown Kano hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels, and on
the streets. One contingent drove their Landrovers to the
railroad station.where more than 100 Ibos were waiting for a

'train,cut them down with automatic weapon fire...Somehow several
thousand Ibos survived the orgy, and all had the same thought:
to get out of the North.

(ii) From the Correspondence of the Daily Ezpress, London, October 6:

I do not know if there are any Ibos left in the town in the
Nerthern Region...I saw vultures and dogs tearing at Ibo corpses,
and women and bhildren wieldingrmachetes and clubs and guns...
the Airline Charter pilots who flew hundreds of Ibos to safety
last week...said 'the death toll must be far in excess of
30,000...The Hausa were carting“wounded Ibos off to hospital

1:0 fill them there. a o o In Zaria. 0 ca saffron-mm Hausa. o o t01d

me: 'We killed about 250 here. Perhaps Allah willed it.‘

One European saw a womaxaand her daughter slaughtered in his
front garden after he had been forced to turn them away.

(iii) From Colin Legum of the Observer, London, 16 October, 1966:

While the Hausa in each town and village in the North know
what happened in their own localities, only the Ibos know

the whole terrible story from the 600,000 or so regugees who
have fled to the safety of the Eastern Region-hacked, slashed,
mangled, stripped naked and robbed of their possessions; the
orphans, the widows, the traumatised...After a fortnight the
scene in the Eastern Region continues to be; reminiscent of
the gathering of exiles into Israel after the end of the last
war. The parallel is not fanciful.69

Conspicuous absence of the Prospects for Peace

In light of the foregoing accounts, the subsequent polarisation of the
Nigerian society into two antagonistic camps becomes logical. It was
Eastern Nigeria versus the rest of the Federation. Perhaps the end of these

frustrations could have come about at the Aburi7O

Meetings of the leaders
of all the conflicting'groups. Following, are the highlights of the Agree-
ment reached during those meetings that lasted from January 4 through

January 5, 1967.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

75

All the military leaders solemnly declared that they renounced
the use of force as a means of settling the problems...and re-
affirmed their faith in discussion and negotiations as the only
way of resolving the Nigerian crisis.

A Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions
should meet to exchange information on the quantity of arms and
ammunitions held in each.unit of the army in all parts of the
country. Unallocated stores of arms and ammunition held in the
country should be shared out equitably between the various com-
mands in the Federation.

The Army itself should be reorganised in order to restore disci-
pline and confidence. Specifically the Army should be governed
by the Supreme Military Council under a Chairman to be known as‘
CommanderhinFChief-of-thqurmed Forces, and Head of the Military
Government. Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and
under Area Commanders should be created. During the period, of
the Military Government, Military Governors should have control
over Area Commands for internal security.

...Army personnel of Northern Nigeria should return to the North
from the West.

All matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to
Commissions or senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police
should be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

The legislative and executive authority of the lederal Military
Government should be vested in the Supreme Military Council.
Displaced civil servants and Corporation Staff (including'

daily paid employees) should continue to be paid their full
salaries until 31 March 1967, provided they have not secured
alternative employment. The Military Governors of the East,
West, and MidAWest should send representatives (Police Com-
missioners) to meet and discuss the problems of recovery of
property left behind by displaced persons.71

It would be futile to argue on the merits and shortcomings of these Agree-

ments in the absence of any real efforts on the part of the Nigerian au-

thorities, which would have facilitated their implementation. But it is in

76

the light of the internal and external pressures which precluded their im-
plementation, that the following observation seems pertinent, even.more so in
view of the subsequent British hostility, vis-a—vis, Biafra:

Never...has a confidential 'top-level' meeting been so fully

published as was the Aburi encounter. But it is probable that

only one or two members of the British Government and three or

four journalists have ever taken the trouble of listening to the

complete recording of the two-day session. Yet what was said at

Aburi is of vital significance to the subsequent and prior behav-

iour of the protagonists in the drama.72

With this background the secession of the Eastern Region, and the si-
multaneous proclamation of the Republic of Biafra_ is considered.
The Birth of Biafra: The Termination of the Nigerian Federation

Following the failure of the Aburi episode, the gulf that divided the
East from the rest of the Federation continued to widen and the crisis es-
calated in proportion. The Lagos Government increased its measures to suf-
focate the East, while the East, in turn, took counter measures to ensure
self- preservation. On May 26, the Eastern Nigerian Consultative Assembly
convened in a meeting in which they mandated the military governor, Lt. Col.
C.O. Ojukwu, to proclaim the Region, at the earliest time possible, an in-
dependent, sovereign, Republic of Biafra. A few hours later, the Lagos
regime countered this move by issuing a decree by means of which the Fed—
eration .asn'arbitrarily'splitinto 12 states; " But the East had already'been
pushed beyond the point of no return. Consequently, on May 30, 1967, the
formal ritual of the Federal disintegration was performed with the Procla-
mation of the Republic of Biafra.

"Thus Nigeria, a federation created and destrpyed by Britain, has

unhappily taken a well-deserved seat among the federations that

collapsed. Out of its decadence has emerged a young,'virile,

and amazingly promising'African nations-the Republic of Biafra."73

The conflict issues so far delineated were just the highlights of the‘

disintegrating forces that overwhelmed the Federation of Nigeria almost from

77

its very 'beginning. But were these by themselves sufficient to disrupt

the federal set-up? one might ask. Are ethnic differences an insurmountable
obstacle to federalism? Does a simple change of government warrant the dis-
ruption of a national structure? Perhaps, correct answers do not exist for
these questions. Ethnicity per se, need not necessarily constitute a hinder-
ance to federalism. However, it is never the case that problems can be re-
solved by merely ignoring them, or wishing that they did not exist. The

July military coup d'etat, if it meant a mere change of military leadership,
would probably not have occaseioned any alarm. But the concurrent execution
of some two hundred Igbo-speaking Army officers, the simultaneous and rather
remorseless massacre of several thousand civilians of EaStern Nigeria origin,
both in the Northern tomsand the federal city of Lagos, constituted a national
upheaval with no parallel in the history of federations. Even Lt. Col. Yakubu
Gowon, who assumed federal leadership following the July coup admitted in his
first broadcast to the nation on 1 August 1966: "Putting all considerations
to the best test-political, economic, as well as social-the base of unity

is not there, or it is badly rocked."74

The Military Governor of the Eastern
Region, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, echoed the same opinion when in a counter broad—
cast, the same day he concluded: "The brutal and planned annihilation of

officers of Eastern Nigeria origin has cast serious doubts as to whether

the peoples of Nigeria can ever sincerely live together as members of the
75

same nation."
In the opinion of this writer, therefore, the very essence of federalism
has been negated. And, as has been accurately noted:

"When the state ceases to stand for the honour, protection, and
well-being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instru-
ment of those it has rejected. In such a case, the people have
the right to create another instrument for their protection...
in other words, to create another state."76

78

This was certainly what happened when the East opted out of the Federation.
Niggria and the West Indies: The Process of Disintegggtion

In this Chapter, the path of disintegration of the two former Federations-
Nigeria and the West Indies-had been followed. The focus has been on the
major issues of social conflict which conspired to bring about the collapse
of the two federations. These could be viewed as constituting the rationale
for Etzioni's proposition?7 relating to the functioning of former colonial
territories after independence. The implications of this have been reflected
in the various problemsconsidered: the initial difficulty in both cases
arising from the fact the very principle of Federalism was introduced from
the outside rather than originating from within the system; the problems of
discontiguous ecology, human diversity and racial disparity in the case of ‘
the West Indies on one hand, and the problems of cultural incompatibility
fostering opportunistic ethnicity in the case of Nigeria on the other hand;
the problems of constitutional inequities reflected in the federal structuring
by the Colonial Government, in both cases, and the socio-economic complica-
tions introduced from foreign, imperial interests, constituting what this
writer alludes to, as international opportunism.

Thus, in the West Indies, the absence of indigenous political and cul-
tural heritage, consequent upon cultural emasculation due to slavery and in-
dentured labour, constituted in part a source of stress that developed into
disruptive tension. In Nigeria, the fixaad.amalgamation of feudal autocracy
of the North, constitutional monarchy of the west, and participatory democracy
of the East, resulted in a system with great explosive potentials. And the
superimposition of Britain's "Parliamentary democracy" could only have

hastened to trigger the explosion.

CHAPTER 5

IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

 

It is, perhaps, true in most cases that social change is an outcome
(of social conflict. In this sense, one may take as a given, the fact that
social conflict leads to social change. But social changes occur in on-
going social phenomena; and certainly, federalism may be conceived as an
on-going social process. For the student of social change, or, in partic—
ular, for the sociologist, the study of federalism as a social process is
relevant in so far as it provides him.with an opportunity for identifying
the sources of strain or tension which may in turn result in social con-
flict. The sources of this social Strain or tension could be internal and/
or external. But a good deal of the studies and analyses of social systems
tend to place major emphasis on the external sources of social conflict,
while ignoring the internal aspects. This theoretical orientation, of
course, stems mainly from the funtionalist notionr-perhaps, misconceived-—
of the 'boundaryzmaintenance', 'self—sustaining‘, and 'integrative' attri-
butes of the so—called social system, as exemplified in the works of the
Parsonian school. This notion is based on the assumption-perhaps an er-
roneous one—-that the so-called social systems are 'complete' wholes or
entities with perfect mechanismS. Thus, just as in the Newtonian mechanics
of uniform, rectilinear motion of a particle,1 where the particle does not
deviate from its path unless interfered with by externally impressed forces;
so, too, does the functionalist assume that social conflict occurs in a social
system only through the agency of external forces.

But Wilbert Moore,2 for example, representing a different school of

thought, deplores this customary practice of social scientists in general,

79

,’m ‘
1 .9
:- -.—~ w fig 5'2 9'5!!!

 

80

and sociologists in particular, in concerning themselves mainly with the
external sources of social change while paying little or no attention to

the internal determinants. He suggests therefore, that more emphasis be
placed on the internal forces without minimising the import of the external
aspects, in order to achieve a theoretical balance. In stressing the need to
identify the sources of social change, Moore views with disfavour, the search
for the so—called "single cause of social change", which he regards as "un-
realistic", in spite of the simplicity implicated in this kind of theoret-
ical enterprise. Perhaps Durkheim had anticipated Moore's theoretical ori-
entation in affirming that social life3 is a correspondence between thg_
internal and the external milieu.

In the present work, therefore, it is suggested that, only in the ex-
ploration of both the external and the internal sources can the real nature
of social conflict be grasped and better appreciated. It is further proposed
that the circumstances surrounding the genesis of a social system should be
taken into account in any meaningful attempt to ascertain the nature and
sources of social conflict that may subsequentIy ensue. Federations are
social systems, or socio-political organisations. Potential sources of
conflict therefore exist in one form or another; and the two cases chosen
for the present study-Nigeria and the West Indies-do not constitute an
exception. What may be regarded as the internal sources of conflict here,
derive primarily from the ethnic differentiations and cultural disparities
of the peoples constituting the reSpective units of the two Federations;
whereas the external sources stem principally from the intrusion of.colon-
ial imperialism.

At this point then, one may entertain the question as to how, in a

federation, such as here considered, the potential sources of tension could

81

be prevented from developing into manifest coflict; or, are conflicts, in

fact, necessary for social systems,such as federations, to operate? Is it
possible that certain conflict issues strengthen the bonds which link the
constituent units of a federation, while other forces of social conflict
militate against the principles of federalism? Is federalism, in fact, a
desireable form of political organisation? Or, could it be that some societies
can adapt to federal system of political life much better than others? Per-
haps no readyhmade answers exist, to these questions. But much as one may

not have the answers, one would like to search or probe for any realities
which might be embodied in the problems.

A real understanding of some potential sources of conflict in a federa-
tion, however, would compel one to entertain some thoughts about those con-
ditions which seem most favourable to the establishment and operation of fed-
aration. In this context, H.W. Springer's idea seems to be very relevant.

He distinguishes between what he calls "predisposing conditions", and "in-
ducements", to the establishment of federations. According to Springer:

"Previous political association, geographical neighbourhood, and

similarity of political institutions may be described as predis-

posing conditions; while the sense of need for common defense,

the desire for independence, and the hope of economic advantage

are clearly in the class of inducements...(and) it is the induce-

ments that are the deciding factors. (For), it seems unlikely

that countries will desire union unless at least one of the in-

ducements is present, and present in sufficient strength to over-

come the natural reluctance on the part of communities...accustomed

to leading a separate existence and making decisions independently

of their neighbours to relinquish to a central authority, any part’

of their freedom of decision."

But, although Springer may be correct in suggesting that "at least one
of these inducements" must be present, it is doubtful, however, that "induce-
ments"per se, are, in fact, "decisive", if by this it is understood that fed-
erations could be successfully established on the sole basis of "inducements".

Thus, it is difficult to imagine that any two or more communities would, in

fact, proceed to federate if all the inducement conditions are satisfied, and

82

if these communities are highly dispersed ecologically, and/or if a high
degree of cultural disparity exists amongst them. One can only make a mod-
est claim, at this level of analysis, to the effect that the conditions for
federating are slightly weighted on the side of inducements. Also, implicit
in Springer's paradigm of "predisposing conditions" and "inducements" to fed-
eralism, is the presupposition that the federating communities must have a
"dependent" status to begin with, as suggested in the phrase: "desire for

5

independence". Although this assumption holds true for the two federations
considered in the present study, it should not necessarily be the case in
general. In other words, the colonial experience by the federating commun-
ities shOuld not necessarily constitute a precondition for federalism.

It is possible, however, to make some modifications of the paradigm with-
out altering the basic format. Consequently, the following reformulation
is suggested:
I The Predisposing,Conditigg§_

(1) Ecological Contiguity;

(2). Cultural compatibility;
(3) Actual and potential degree of inter—societal interaction.

II The Induc‘ Conditio
1 The need and desire for a federation.
$2; The expectation of greater rewards.

It is evident that this reformulation subsumes the set of criteria suggested
by Springer, apart from taking into consideration, those aspects of the prob-
lem which his paradigm seems to ignore. For example, under "predisposing
conditions" it can be seen that mere "similarity of political institutions"
precludes the potentials for conflict, which derive from other dimensions

of the cultural category. Moreover, "previous political association"
(eSpecially in the case of former colonial territories) need not constitute

a warrant for continued political association (after independence), nor

should its absence necessarily create an absolute impediment to federalism

83

where the other conditions are satisfied. Nevertheless, the paradigm as
modified, lends itself-—as an adequate framework-—not only to the inte-
gration of the content of the issues raised in the first, second, and
third chapters of this work, but also to the placing into clearer per-
Spective, the problems considered in the fourth chapter. It may therefore
be fruitful to recast the problems of this study in this framework.
I. Predisposing Conditions

(1) Ecological Contiggity. Ecological discontiguity constituted a dis-
tinct feature of the West Indian communities. Springer, in considering the
West Indian case, notes that "three million people on eight thousand square
miles of land is not a very big country".6 But, the crucial problem was not
just the simple fact of "three million people on eight thousand square miles".
What constituted a real obstacle to federalism was the manner in which the
fragmented pieces ofland constituting the eight thousand square miles were
scattered over a relatively vast area of the Atlantic waters. Jamaica, for
example, is separated from the Eastern group of islands by some one thousand
miles of ocean water. But then, it has been argued that:

"had it not been for separation by sea, it is unlikely that the '

communities could have separate personalities to the degree that

would have made federal solution the appropriate one."7’

In Nigeria, the ecology was relatively compact on account of the fairly
close contiguity of the component units that constituted the Federation.
This was, in spite of the fact that the River Niger—~the major body of water—-
together with its two tributaries, constituted a kind of natural demarcation,
separating8 the three major ethnic communities, one from another. But many
of the other inter—spaced and relatively minor ethnic groups further insula-
ted the three major ones from one another.

One major consequence of ecological problems was the problem of commun-

ication, although, physically, this problem was less pronounced in Nigeria

84

than in the West Indies. Hence, although the ecological considerations, per
se, would have constituted no major hinderance to federalism in Nigeria, the
same could not, realistically, be said of the West Indian communities. As
Lowenthal points out "physical insularity not only aggrawtes inter—island
differences, it also intensifies a sense of belonging within each island,
whatever its size."9

(2) Cultural Compatibility: The African, the European, and the Indian
descendants constituted the three major West Indian communities considered.
The phenomenon of slavery and 'slave-making', the fact of indentured labour,
and the domineering role of the European plantation economy, conspired to
uproot the African cultural heritage, and a great deal of the Indian cultural
tradition, thus leaving the Europeaan (English) life style as the sole cultural
survivor. In the case of the peoples of African descent the cultural emas-
culation consequent upon slavery could be seen as creating a cultural vacuum;
in the Indian case, their potential for increasingbadaption to European ways,
may be considered as lending itself to progressive acculturation, thus crea-
ting a culturally partial vacuum that increases with the degree of accul-
turation. This vacuum consequently becomes filled with European culture
which becomes systematically accentuated. The West Indian communities,
in this sense, could be seen as constituting a human diversity within a
cultural homogeneity.

But in Nigeria, what existed was a mere agggregation of cultural diver-
sities within an artificial10 nationality. The distinct cultural traits of
the Igbo, the Hausa-Fulani, and the Yoruba, were reflected in the dispari-
ty and incompatibility that marked their respective political and cultural
institutions.11

It may then be said that, while the 'cultural uniformity'12 of the West

Indian peoples was to some extent compatible to federalism, the

85

incompatibility of the cultural institutions of the Nigerian communities
militated against the forces of federalism and integration. Some quali-
fication of the West Indian 'cultural uniformity' here seems appropriate. It
would be a gross oversimplification to simply assert that the cultural life
was uniform. It is a fact that English life—style dominated the West Indian
culture. But it is also true that this dominant culture was not uniformly13
assimilated by the various social groups, to the extent that would have
given West Indian identity priority over island loyalty; This,therefore,
constituted a source of cleavage not compatible with the forces of integration.

(3) Actual and Potep tial Degrpe of Interaction. The problem of inter-
group activities or associations is closely tied to that of ecology. The
problems of communication arising from ecological discontiguity, and the con-
sequent intensification of inter-island differences, made this problem a park
ticularly acute one in the West Indies. Prior to the advent of the aircraft,
the principal mode of inter—island communication among the islands was the
ocean-going vessels; the special difficulties and problems involved in sea
travel were not comparable to the relative ease of overland transportation,
as was primarily the case with the Nigerian peoples. Moreover, the cost of
air-travel, not being within the normal means of the average person in both
Federations, and in view of the fact that over-land travel was much easier
in Nigeria than in the West Indies, the oridinary man-in-the-street in the
West Indies was left withless options for communications with other island
groups, than was his counterpart in NigeriaIwith the different ethnic com-
munities.

But this seemingly relative ease of mobility was all but superficial.

The so-called Igbo "diaspora",14

for example, did not at all generate
interhethnic interaction to the extent that would have entailed cultural

diffusion among the various ethnic communities. The institution of

86

"Sabon-Gari" (Strangers' quarter) in the Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern
Nigeria would serve to diapel this illusion. Moreover, this arrangement
appears to have been reinforced by the natural tendency of the Igbo to stay
together, in a foreign land. This fact made it particularly easy for the
effectiveness of their victimisation in the Northern Region in the pogroms
unleased against them in 1966. Thus, "shortly after the start of the dem-
onstration in Kano hundreds of armed thugs swept across the space between
the city walls and the Sabon Qiris where the Eagterners lived,...and started
burning, raping, looting and killing as many men, women, and children from the
§p§p_as they could lay hands on."15 It may be said then, that, the degree of
interaction among the different ethnic groups in Nigeria, and among, the is-
land territories, in the West Indies, was not high enough to override ethnic
loyalty, and island solidarity in the respective Federations. This, there-
fore, did not foster the cause of federalism.
II The Inducement Conditions

(1) The Need and Desire for Federation. It is evident from the con-
siderations in Chapter 4, that in either case of the two federations, being
considered, federalism was initiated and imposed by an external colonial
powerh—Britain. It could be argued in both cases, that the different fede-
rating units had a common need.for collaborating in the struggle against
colonialism. But this argument loses itsgforee when it is recalled that
the initiative for the 'collaboration in this struggle' came, not from the
struggling groups themselves, but rather, from the party against whom the
struggle was to be directed. This would lead one to question the genuineness
of the parties concerned, in the "agreement" to unite in a federation. In
the case of Nigeria, James O'Connell presents a rather interesting argument

which clearly illustrates this point:

87

"In a state composed of many nations the political class must lead the
way in forging links between the communities and in founding or deep-
ening a sense of state...The Nigerian ethnic communities, went on
living with one another within one state in the kind of international
relationship that they had lived traditionally with 'stranger' commun-
ities. But in living within the one state they no longer possessed

the safeguards of a genuine international situation; there were con-
stant possibilities for uneasiness and tension between the communities."

16

As was conceptualised in Chapter 1, the 'autonomy' of the units at the
initial stage of a federation was a major presupposition of Federalism in the
present study (vide supra, pp. 1-3). In both Nigeria and the West Indies,
fthis situation did not exist when initiatives towards federation were taken.
Certainly, if the need existed among the different communities, for coming
together in the respective federations, the principal motor that sustained
this desire was their aSpiration towards ultimate freedom from colonial rule.
Thus, it could not be said that the need and desire for federation existed to
a reasonably sufficient degree to warrant the different communities of both
Nigeria and the west Indies, to federate as they did.

(2) The Egpgctation for Greater Rewards: If one accepts the concept of
man as a rational being, then, a person is considered to be "irrational" if
he knowingly engages in an undertaking from which, it is obvious, he cannot
expect any dividends. In other words, individuals or groups do not, normally,
invest in a business where they know in advance that the out-come or divi-
dends would not be such that would,at least, just compensate for the capital
invested. There does not seem to be any reason for expecting that an enter-
prise in federalism.should constitute an exception to this rule. Conse-
quently, one of the primary inducements which prompt human societies to come
together in a federal union is the expectation for, inter alia, greater ec-
onomic dividends than each of the constituent units would expect as a sepa-
rate entity. It is, in fact, this expectation that accentuatexsthe need and

desire for the units to seek a federal arrangement.

88

If this be the case, the degree of expectation for greater rewards
would be reflected in the nature of the initiatives taken by the different
units separately, and collectively, in constituting a federal system. But,
as has already been demonstrated, neither in the case of Nigeria nor in that
of the West Indies, were the initiatives primarily undertaken by the units
of the system themselves. On the contrary, the instigation came mainly
from the outside, from a party that did not intend to be, and was never, part
of the system. This logically leads one.to wonder whether the advantages of
federalism would accrue more to the colonial powerh-Britain—-or to the members
of the federation in either case. No answer to this queStion is suggested at
this stage; tut, some may emerge in the course of the remaining part of
this discourse.

The gypgmics 9f System Chapgp and Conflict

The foregoing considerations would lead one;to wonder whether federations
can be established under any kinds of conditions. But the experiences of
Nigeria and the West Indies, inter alia, seem to be in support of Etzioni's
contention that:

"territories jointly administered by colonial powers tend to form

a single state, while those administered separately tend to main-

tain their distinct structures after independence."17
Etzioni maintains that "the West Indies conforms to this pattern”,18 further
arguing that "The British...system of administration did notttend toward
unification".19 That Nigeria also conformed to the pattern is best attested
to, by the pronouncement of the very person who was to become Nigeria's
first Prime Minister, Balewa:

I "Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914,
Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far
from being'united...Nigerian unity is only a British intention for

the country."20

In view of this then, certain questions may be entertained at this juncture:

89

Is federalism a desireable form of political organisation, and for

what kinds of social groupings? In the particular cases of Nigeria

and the West Indies, what was the rationale for the insistence on

federalism as a prerequisite for independence?

It is not claimed that appropriate answers to these and related questions are
provided here; but some suggestions are advanced.

It would be futile of course to argue on the relative merits of fedee.
ralism without some means of guaging the degree of success of a given fed-
eration. But it is not usually fruitful to talk of 'success" in an on—going
process, since, there is an implicit assumption of a "terminal point" in the
process. Moreover, any measure; or calculation of "success" has to be under—
taken in terms of the extent of accomplishment of objectives. But it is
characteristic of on—going processes that the so—called 'objectives' or
'goals' cannot always be delineated at the initial stage, but are, in most
cases, incidental to the process. It may therefore, be more meaningful and
fruitful, analytically, to adopt the notion of 'viability' as a more adequate
theoretical orientation. Consequently, 'viability' may be considered in terms
of the conditions or circumstances under which a federation is established.

It is perhaps not very easy to provide adequate criteria for determining
a 'viable' federal system. In view of this, attention may be focussed, pri-
marily, on the circumstances surrounding the establishment, or constituting
of a federation. Mainly. for analytical ease, one may contrast the institu-
tion of the American Federation with the situations which gave rise to the
establishment of the Nigerian and the West Indian Federations.

What brought the original former British colonies in America together
into a federation was the need for a collective defense against the common
threat posed by an external enemy-British colonialism. But it was the sub-
sequent victory of these colonies over the common foe, and the continued

need for coping with similar potential threats, which further cemented the

Union. It is true that, as British colonies, these states were administered
separately. But, in what would have appeared to be a violation of Etzioni's
proposition,21 these states decided to come together after they had won their
independence. On the other hand, this was in keeping with the earlier conten-
tion that previous political association need not be a guarantee for continp
ued political association after independence; nor should the absence of
previous association preclude its possibility after freedom has been won.

But, rather,the conditions for' federating, in the case of the American
states, were weighted on the side of inducements-as suggested earlier in

the paradigm.

One may, of course, attempt to draw a parallel between the Biafra~
Nigerian War and the American Civil War, for instance. Both wars occurred at
periods when the“ respective federations had been established . It is true
that, in both.cases, the Northern States of America and the Nigerian regime,
were, supposedly, fighting to "preserve" the respective federations. But
Simmcl contended that; "The economic superiority (because of their slave
economy) of the Southern States before the Civil War, over the Northern states,

22 But the international character of the

was the reason for that war."
Biafra-Nigerian War would make one feel quite uncomfortable in likening

it to the American Civil War. It was demonstrated in the first chapter,
for instance, that Britain23 shouldered the major burden of the War on the
Nigerian side, against Biafra. While the Biafrans, at least from.their own
stand point, were fighting for their survival, the same could not have been
said of the Southern states of the United States, in the sense that they ate
tempted to opt out of the federation becauseutheir very lives were

threatened”. Besides, as C.L.R. James aptly noted, at the end of the

American Civil War; "The Sputhern States were offered the choice of military

91

government or universal manhood suffrage without regard to colour, race, or
24

previous condition of servitude." By contrast, the victorious Nigerian
government offered the Biafrans no alternative to an imposed military regime.
C.L.R. James, further recalls that, "in a few years the Southern states were
restored to Southern control";25 this writer would certainly wish to see,
the Nigerian government and their international collaborators relinquish to
the Biafrans, the control of their own affairs. In view of the foregoing,
one could say, with some measure of confidence, that the establishment of the
American Federation satisfied, to a reasonable degree, the conditions stip-
ulated in Springer's paradigm of "prediSposing and inducement conditions."

But in either case of Nigeria or the West Indies, one could not be per-
suaded by earlier considerations in the present study, that the conditions
prevailing at the inception of federalism were conducive to the establish-
ment of the federation. And, as O'Connell points out:

"the nationalist leaders add to the artificiality of independence

settlement by being more bent on hastening independence than on

definitely settling the location of power."2
But this problem cannot be ignored after independence had been won; it is
bound to come up as a major factor in setteing the tone of the dialectics and
dynamiCs of a social system. At this point then, a simple argument may be
suggested.

Generally, in the struggle for independence or freedom, two kinds of
Commitment may be distinguished:

(1) Total commitment, which seeks complete disengagement from the
existing system;
(2) Partial or limited commitment, which compromises certain aspects of

the existing system.
In the first case, the demands tend to be unconditional, and to eschew any
kind of compromise with the elements of the existing system. The struggle

tends to be violent and the actions ruthless. This kind of commitment is

92

very likely to culminate in warfare. The struggle tends to permeate every
facet of the society. In a situation of war, for instance, the burden of the
struggle is fairly evenly distributed among the population constituting the
social system, either by actual participation in the fight, or indirectly

in the economic and other repercussions of the destructions entailed. Con-
sequently, the sense of commitment is profound, and there is a commonly
shared expectation of better prOSpects for all, in the event of victory.

The commitment here may therefore be said to be total. The mood of the
struggle is intrasigence.

In the second case, the struggle is often motivated by transient, rather
than strong inducements. The exchange here seems to be on the verbal level;
or euphemiStically'the struggle is confined to the category of 'diplomacy'.
The mood is accented by compromise, rather than intrasigenee. Since the
‘elite class’ invariably constitutes a minority of the populace, the sense
of commitment is usually not widely shared; and since the gravity of the
struggle is usually mild in intensity, this sense of commitment is never
profound. where it does exist. Consequently, for all the members of the
community engaged in the struggle, the overriding goal is simply "freedom
from domination". It may be said then that, what is achieved at the end of
the struggle is 'common freedom without communal prospects'. Thus Azikiwe

was to declare at the occasion of Nigeria's independence in 196027

"I am...satisfied with the present agzangements...My stiffest

earthly assignment is ended and my major life's work is done.
My countrygis free...What more could one desire?"

But the trouble with this kind of reasoning is that it presupposed that
independence was an end in itself. But whereas the leaders of the former
colonial territories (in the second category) had accepted federation as a
means towards achieving independence (as in the cases of both Nigeria and

the West Indies), the Colonial Power (Britain in this case), has granted

93

independence as a guarantee that federalism would be maintained. O'Connell,
argues in the case of Nigeria, for example that:

"The first effect of settlement that owed much to...the exercise

of colonial influence was a situation that is an anathema to

federal theorists; a federation in which one unit predominates

even when the others combine."28
In contrast to Azikiwe's declaration in 1960 at the occasion of Nigeria's
nominal29 independence, a Biafran was quoted during the struggle with Ni-
geria as saying:

"We in Biafra are_overthrowing the mantle of colonialism left by

the British. We are arran ' our borders the African wa , not

the British way. If we succeed here, we will point to the way

that other African nations must follow eventually, as they shed

the trappings of colonialism."3O
To the extent that the American states, Nigeria, and the West Indies, were
former colonies of Britain, and that the attainment of independence from
the colonial power involved some form of struggle in each case, then the fol-
lowing simple argument may be advance. The ciroumstances surrounding the es-
tablishment of the American Federation, may then be said to have involved
commitments of the first kind. Although unsuccessful, the Biafran struggle
could be characterised by this kind of commitment. 0n the other hand, the
struggles related to the establishment, and the independence of the Nigerian
and the West Indies Federations, could be said to have involved commitments
of the second kind. In the first case (total), there is usually a consid-
erable investment of common effort and energy, and enormous sacrifice is
very often involved; so that, the post-struggle communality is further
strengihened by the shared expectation of dividends well-earned by all.
In the other case (partial), the superficial nature of the commitment re-
sults in the minimal investment of collective energy and effort; so that the

sense of communality, after the struggle, is rendered vacuous by the relative
want of common expectations.)1

94

If the break—up of Nigerian and West Indian Federations conformed to

32

the pattern suggested by Etzioni, why then was the case of the West Indies

taken as a matter of course, while the option of the Eastern Region of Nigeria
from the Nigerian Federation resulted in one of the most violent conflicts

of this century? We may not know the 'true' answer, but certainly, we can
entertain some suggestions. Regarding the West Indies, C.B.R. James argues:

"This is how the British West Indies Federation collapsed. The
old colonial system consiSted of insular economies, each with its
financial and economic capital in London. .A federation meant that
the economic line of direction should no longer be from island to ’
London, but from island to island. But that involved the break-up
of the old-colonial system...This (federal break-up)...is the
direct continuation of the old colonial system."33

And it is what the Colonial Powers wanted.
In the Nigerian Case, Diamond presents some interesting arguments:

"In a very real sense, judgment of the British Raj, the perspective
in which the British were to view their own history in so large a
part a history of colonial formation and dissolution, centered on the
denounenmnfli of the Nigerian drama. Nigeria was a symbol of the in-
vestment of British energy and pride in Africa, and more than a sym-
bol...The federation was imagined to be a colonial success, an exe
ample of how well-intentioned powers, sober and lofty design, can
create a nation and move people, with minimum displacement, from

a position of tutelage to one of 'independence', through which the
best interests of rulers and ruled are harmoniously united."34

Elsewhere, Diamond argues that:

"it was and is vital to Englans's idea of itself that the ultimate
brutality and greed of Empire be rationalised to more humane and
altruistic ends...But thegprimitive democracies which criss—cross

the primarily Ibo—speaking East resisted domination...Nevertheless,
they (the Igbo) were the primary architects of Nigerian freedom, in-'
evitably, their conception was that of an independent, democratic,
economically sovereign unitary state...(But) the Biafrans finally
opted out of the Nigerian Federation when it became clear that the
British role was evolving from outright colonialism to neo-colonialism,
and that the cultural differences between Eastern and Northern Ni-
ggrians, in particular, were too great to overcome...England (then)
stared across the barricades at its old antagonists in a new guise. '
The former colonial power could not afford an independent Biafra,
hostile to the trading and investment interests which Nigeria had
accommodated, to the profit of both the local business and political
elites, and the colonial companies...The British were still buying
cheap in Nigeria and selling dear.- Biafra intended to trade as

95

equals and with whomever it pleased. Moreover, the political
example of Biafra could well have broken up the oil and banking
connections which helped to feed the British economy...Biafra, then,

was an economic threat to England,papd the final embarrassment to
Epgdand's imagg of itself."

Finally Conor Cruise O'Brien contends that:

 

"The reason why the Federation of Nigeria, has such a powerful

appeal to certain minds is that it was, and is, a device for ‘

kggping the educatechfrican in his place. under the control

of the dignified rulers of the North"???

Nigeria and the West Indies: Problems and Prospects

It is not proposed here, that an adequate and most comprehensive ans-
wer has been provided to the questions posed and the issues raised in the
first chapter of this study. However, given the facts presented in the
second and third chapters, the analytical endeavors of the fourth.and
fifth chapters, it would have been difficult to imagine that the two fed-
eral systems under consideration would have proceeded in a manner different
from the way they did-the path of disintegration. This is not to suggest,
however, that a different form of associational arrangement could not have
been effected with success. Rather, the contention is that, given the set
of predisposing conditions, and the potential inducements as explicated
in the earlier part of the present chapter, a working and effective fed-
eral system of distinct, autonomous37 units could not be constituted without
due consideration of the crucial factor of 'functional autonomy' of the
constituent units. But how have the units of the two systems fared since
the collapse of the federations?

Jamaica, and Trinidad-and-Tobago attained independence in 1962; and
Barbados followed a few years later. Their relationship, vis-a-vis, one
another, if they have not improved significantly, at least, they have not
grown worse than they were during the period of federation. If the smaller
units have not yet achieved self-government at least they have benefitted

from'the subsequent reorganisations and associations based on the commonality

96

of needs for one another. Foremost among these Posthederation associa-
tions, is the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), instituted in
May 1968. The membership of CARIFTA includes not only the members of the
former West Indies Federation, but also Guyana, South America, which was
not part of the original federation. As the associates themselves do
appreciate:

"CARIFgA. . .as a Free Trade Area is a somewhat loose form of integra-

tion." 8

The establishment of CARIFTA was based on the rationale that politi-

cal Union or political integration is a social process effected through
stages of evolution of inter-societal co-operation and association CARIFTA
as a Free Trade Area constitutes the first rung of this evolutionary
ladder, thus:

A Free Trade Area

A Customs Union

A Common Market

An Economic Union

These stages are defined as follows:

(1) "A Free Trade Area is only one possible form of economic integra-
tion among countries...

(2) "A Customs Union goes beyond a Free Trades Area. Not only is
there free trade among member countries; there is also a common
external tariff and a common set of quantitative restrictions
against outside countries.

(3) "A Common Market goes beyond 3 Customs Union. In addition to
internal free trade, and a common set of external barriers, there

is free movement of capital and labour within the Common Market.

97

(4) An Economic Union is the highest form of economic cooperation
to a Common Market, there are common economic, financial, taxa-
tion and social policies. Because of the high degree of coopera-
tion between countries involved, an Economic Union comes very
close to potential union."39
What is very significant here is that CARIFTA constitutes a beginning, or
the fundamental step that could eventually lead to a much closer form of
West Indian Federation.

It is pertinent to note that these social units did perceive the ma-
jor error in the constitution of the First Federation: the fact that the
first step was not taken before they took the leap-or rather before they
were forced 40 to take the leap, onto the Federation. But where would
this lead to? This writer submits that the principles and rationale under.
lying CARIFLA, if consistently and logically pursued, would ultimately re-
sult in a 'desireable', and more meaningful CARIFTA as a new basis for
Federation. Is the future as bright for Nigeria as it seems, relatively
speaking, for the West Indies?

As indicated at the beginning, the termination of the Nigerian Federa-
tion following the secession of the Eastern Region in May 1967, was countered
with an all out wZE, by the residue of the Federation, backed by the concert
of international military community against, Biafra. After some thirty-
one months of desperate struggle for survival, Biafra was finally strangu-
lated by this military cabal. Consequently, this writer maintains that the
Federation of Nigeria has not been reconstituted. 0n the contrary, it is
contended that the present arrangement places Biafra under international mili-

tary occupation in which the Niegerians and their troops serve as mere instru-

ments in the promotion of the interests of international imperialism. In

98

view of the prediSposing and inducement conditions, the present arrange-
ment of Nigeria, vis-a-vis, Biafra, is in violation of, and in flat con-
tradiction to, the principles of federalism (vide supra, . pp.l-3).

In conclusion then, it is suggested that:

(1) Any further aggregation of What Indian territories would be
marked by a strong bond of association, if it be an undertak-
ing initiated and consummated by the territorial units among
themselves-in that case CAFIFTA offers an optimistic note;

(ii) In the Nigerian case, on the other hand, it would be difficult
to expect anything but more violent conflict for the units of
the former federation as long as the international community
continues to place economic interest above human values. For,
"Unity will be the fruit of the common will to live together and

42
should not be imposed by one group upon another with force..."

 

It seems that the West Indian territories are following this path. But
whether this lesson would be taken in the Nigerian case, it is difficult to
determine in the present circumstances. Only the complex process of social
change will determine the issue. If the present CARIFTA holds any prospects
for a future West Indian Federation, then this Free Trade Association is a
first step towards a real and meaningful Union. But, "whatever unity that

43
exists in Nigeria today is based on the common hatred for the Biafrans."

NOTES
PART I: Chapter I Introduction

(I) Nyasaland is now the Republic of Malawi; vfifile Northern Rhodesia con-
stituted, what is now, the Republic of Zambia.

(2) This was to have been constituted by Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika,
each of which is now an independent, sovereign state. In I965, following
the military takeover in Zanzibar, that country joined with Tanganyika to
form what is now known as the Republic of Tanzania.

(3) Caribbean Historiacal Review, # S III - IV, Dec. I95“, p. 9. This con-
cept of federalism was attributed to a former British administrator in the
West Indies. ~

(A) Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Affiliations, Free Press, I955,
p. l5.

 

(S) A note of clarification here would be quite in order. Since the events
subsequent to the rupture of the federations will not constitute a major
concern of this study, 'Eastern Nigeria' will be used in most cases instead
of 'Biafra'. But when it is deemed necessary ”BIAFRA” will be used in
reference to events taking place after May 30, I967. This was the point in
time, when the Eastern Region of the Nigerian Federation seceded from the
Federation to constitute the Republic of Biafra. In the present study,

this point in time will be adopted as the stage when the Nigerian Federation
collapsed. This claim is justified by the fact that the present military
occupation of Biafra is not in keeping with the conceptualisation of a
federation as stated earlier (vide supra, pp. 1 - 3).

(6) To remove misunderstandings, we must note that an 'empire' can be via-
.213. But this would not be in keeping with the presupposition of 'unit
autonomy' as stated earlier. Our definition of 'federal association' here,
therefore precludes the consideration of imperial states. An imperial
system may be regarded, for purposes of definition as an amalgamation of
states by conquest. This precludes all aSpects of mutual contract, and
therefore cannot be considered for the purposes of the present study.

(7) Apolotlsts of ”one Nigeria” might contend that 'Nigeria' is again ”reu-

nited“. To begin with, this writer maintains that Biafra is presently under
international military occupation, which uses Nigeria and the Nigerian troops

99

100

as mere instruments. Secondly, as to whether Nigeria constitutes a federa-

tion or not, in the present circumstances, the reader is referred to notes
#5 and #6 above.

(8) C.Y. Ngonja, Tanzanian Foreign Minister, “Tanzania's Recognition of
Biafra“, in J.B.C. Ugokwe (ed.), The African Scholar: Journal of Research
and Analysis, Vol. I, #I, p. I7.

 

(9) A fourth Region, the Mid-Western Region, was carved out of the Western
Region later in I963. In addition, there was also, the Federal territory of
Lagos, which, though physically located in the Western part of the Federa-
tion, was not considered part of any of the Regions, for administrative pur-
poses.

(IO) Figure for West Indies quoted from Statesman's Year Book, I962-I963.
(ll) See note #9 above.

(I2) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Govern-
ment, New York University Press, I960, p. II.

(I3) As will be apparent later, this figure deriving from the controversial
census report of I963, is highly questionable.

(lh) Figures for Western Nigeria, include those for Mid-Western Nigeria,
not separated here, for reasons noted earlier.

(IS) The Sunday Times (London)gMagazine, June I, I969, pp. 39 - 40.

(I6) Bertrand Russell, Power: The Role of Man's Will to Power in the World's
Economic and Political Affairs, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, I938,
p. I2.

(I7) Ibid, p. I4.

(l8) In his theory of relativity, Einstein showed that, the energy, E,
generated when a body of mass, M, is “destroyed“, is given by the relation:
E=%MC2, where C represents the velocity of light in vacuum approximately,

I86,300 miles per second.

(I9) Scott A. Greer, The Emerging City: Myth and Reality, The Free Press
of Glencoe, I962, p. 32.

(20) Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,
G and C Merriam Company, Springfield, Massachusetts, l96h, p. 78I.

(21) Ibid, p. 1870.
(22) Ibid, p. 1505.

(23) Ibid, p. 2440.

10]

(2h) Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New York University
Press, I957, p. ho.

(25) See note #2I.
PART II: Chapter 2

(I) That is, East Indians.

(2) As noted by Gorden Merrill, ”Within forty years (of British settlement
in Jamaica, in I655), the aboriginal Indians had been all but eliminated.“
Gorden Merrill, “The Survival of the Past in the West Indies” in David
Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation, (Columbia University Press,

I96I), p. 23.
(3) Ibid, p. 2h.

(9) The introduction of Sugar technology to the West Indian islands was
attributed to these Sephardic Jews of Portugal. (see lbid., pp. 22, 25).

(5) As Dike points out “This reservoir of manpower (over pOpuIation) ac-
counts for the fact that Iboland supplied the greater part of the slaves
shipped to the New World from the Bights of Benin and Biafra...(and) the
Delta (Niger) formed the most important slave mart in West Africa.“ K.0.
Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, I956)
p. 28.

 

 

(6) Garden Merrill, Qp.‘£i£., p. 28.

(7) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Govern-

ment, New York University Press, I960, p. lh. It is rather interesting to

note that the West African Highlife music, and the West Indian Calypso have
striking similarities in rhythm.

 

 

(8) Malcolm X, Malcolm X on Afro-American History, (Betty Shabazz and Merit,
1967), PP- 33 - 37.

 

(9) Gorden Merrill, 92° Cit., p. 24.
(IO) Morley Ayearst, Loc. Cit.

(II) Creole is coloquially used by the majority of the common West Indians,
and French Patios is common in some areas.

(I2) C.L.R. James, ”Towards a Caribbean Nation”, (Appendix), Caribbean
Conference, I965.

 

(I3) Actually the largest concentration is in Guiana, which did not consti-
tute part of the defunct federation.

(I4) They constitute 40 percent of the population of Trinidad.

l02

(l5) This is because for reasons that will be apparent later, slaves stayed
in the plantations in Barbados after emancipation, although under a new set
of arrangements. Consequently, there was little or no demand for labour

in Barbados--in contrast with some of the other islands like Trinidad and
Jamaica where most of the freed-men decided to leave the plantations and be
their own masters, if even under more arduous conditions. The indentured
labourers from India, therefore, were not needed in Barbados.

(l6) David Lowenthal, “The Social Background of West Indian Federation”, in
David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation; (Columbia University Press,
I96I), p. 82.

 

(I7) Ibid, p. 93.

(I8) The reader who considers this an 'over-simplification', and therefore,
disappointing is refered to some major works dealing exclusively with this
subject, see for instance:
(a) P. Amamry Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta (Frank Case and Co.,
Ltd., 1967).
(b) Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the
Race--The Politics of Independence, The M.I.T. Press, I965.

 

(I9) Although, the Hausa were in numerical majority, the Fulani constituted
the predominant hegemony. Hence our consideration of both groups in combina-
tion, instead of either, in isolation. As Professor Stanley Diamond points

out, ”Indirect rule is quite ancient in Northern Nigeria, (and) more recently...
the Fulani replaced the Hausa.“ See Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of a
Colonial Future, (American Committee on Africa, New York, I967), p. 7.

 

 

(20) See note #l9 above.
(2l) Richard L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, (Princeton, I963), pp. 7 - 8.

(22) Henry Willink, et.al., Nigeria Report, (Her Majesty's Stationery 0f-
fice, July, I958), p. 54.

(23) The actual figure was 6,085,000.

(24) Note that this same region of Africa, has also been indicated as the
place from where the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria also migrated.

(25) John E. Flint, Nigeria and Ghana, (Prentice Hall, I966), p. 57. This,
in fact, is in keeping with the account of the Minorities Commission, cited
earlier. See note #2I above.

 

(26) As already noted, one of the earlier suggestions was that the Hausa-
Fulani of Northern Nigeria were supposed to have migrated from the Northeastern
part of Africa, possibly from the region around the present Republic of Sudan.

(27) Here again, we note the similarity with the Hausa and to some extent,
with the Igbo, as will be seen shortly. '

103

(28) As will be apparent later, this is characteristic of Igbo cultural
life though with its peculiar variants.

(29) 5.5. Moody, NIGERIA, (Longmans, I963), p. I0.

(30) Thomas Hodgkin, Nigeria Perspective: An Historical Anthology, (0x-
ford University Press, I960), p. 285.

(3l) It must have been quite obvious to the reader, now, that the Hausa-
Fulani were the largest ethnic group.

(32) According to the estimate of Dr. J.A.B. Horton, the Igbo pepulation

in the middle of the l9th Century was between IO million and I2 million,
although the eminent Biafran historian, Dr. Onwuka Dike, thinks this was an
exaggeration. Dr. Horton was the first Igbo physician, educated in Edinburgh,
though born in slavery in Sierra Leone (see K. 0. Dike, Qp.‘£i£., pp. 29 -

30; also, Thomas Hodgkin, 92-.Ei£°: p. 285).

(33) K.0. Dike, 93. 915,, p, 44,

(34) This view is corroborated by Professor Dike. For, “Awka men were the
smiths and the doctors; while Nkwerre people, in addition to their work in
iron, played the role of professional...diplomatists” (sic). See lbid.,

p. 28.

 

(35) John E. Flint, 92°.£l£°: p. 63.
(36) Stanley Diamond, 93°.ELE': p. 43.

(37) Richard L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, (Princeton, I953), pp.
l4 - IS.

(38) Thomas Hodgkin, Op. Cit., p. 287. This remark was attributed to BishOp
Crowther, a freed Yoruba slave who later came to be ordained a priest.

(39) lbid., pp. 286 - 287.

(40) V.C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, (Holt, Rinehart and Win-
ston, I965), pp. l2 - I3.

 

(4i) John E. Flint, QB: £i£,, p. 8.
(42) C.L.R. James, £22. £15.

(43) See note #6.

(44) See note #7.

Chapter 3 Nigeria and the West Indies: Political and Economic History

 

(l) After Arthur Richards, the governor of Nigeria at the time.

(2) Robert McPherson, the governor.

(3) Lagos was the capital of the former Federation of Nigeria.

(4) For reasons stated earlier, (see note #5. Chapter I) this study takes
the point of the proclamation of Biafra as the legal termination of the
Federal set-up. Consequently, attention in the present study is focussed

up to that point, although occasional reference to the subsequent period may
become necessary in certain cases.

(5) In the present case, the Colonial Power was Britain.

(6) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Govern-
ment, (New York University Press, I960), p. ll.

 

 

(7) This remark was attributed to Sir Reginald Corpland. See K.0. Dike,
Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, l956), p. 3.

 

(8) Katrin Norris, Jamaica: The Search for Identity, (Oxford University
Press, I962), p. I.

 

(9) Morley Ayearst, 922 gig,, p. 26.
(IO) lbid., pp. 22 - 23.

(ll)- John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations, (George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, I968), p. 26.

 

(l2) lbid., p. 27.

(I3) As indicated earlier, Guana was not a member of the Federation.

(l4) John Mordecai, Loc. Cit.

(I5) Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Manley, incidentally, were first cousins.

(l6) Founded in July I938.

(I7) Ironically, Arthur Richards, by virtue of political providence, after
leaving Jamaica found himself later in Nigeria playing the same political
role, and, as Will be seen later, his constitutional reforms precipitated a

major crisis in that country.

(l8) Morley Ayearst, Qp.‘gi£., p. I47.

l04

105
(I9) John Mordecai, 92°.£l£°v p. 27.

(20) Hugh W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the West Indian Federa-
tion, (Harvard, I962), p. 9. See also, the succeeding passages.

(2I) John Mordecai, 92, £i£., pp. 28 - 29.
(22) lbid., p. 34.

(23) Although they did not join the Federation subsequently, Guiana and
British Honduras were participants in this Conference.

(24) Douglas G. Anglin, l'The Political Development of the West Indies“, in
David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation (Columbia University Press,
1961). pp. 49. 54.

(25) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, I965),
p. l56.

(26) Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London, I947), pp. 47 - 48.

(27) This refers to the Berlin Conference where the imperial powers met to
carve out for themselves, areas of influence within the African continent.

(28) The presence of the palm-tree (as indicated earlier) in proponderant
vegetation in the Southern part of Nigeria, had led to palm oil and other
palm produce constituting one of the major economic produce in this region.
The interested reader is referred to the comprehensive account of the oil
trade in K.0. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, I956.

 

(29) lbid., p. 8l. It is also stated that “they (the treaties) served more
as a cover for the employment of force which suppression tactics necessitated
than a guarantee that (they) would be observed in their entirety by either
Britain or the Delta States”, p. 83.

(30) It will be quite pertinent here, to recall Rousseau's maxim that llonly
conquerors could be missionaries“. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Con-
tract, Gateway edition, Willmoore Kendall, Trans., Henry Regnery Company,
1955. p. 207.

(3i) Michael Marioghae and John Ferguson, Nigeria Under the Cross, Highway
Press, I965, p. 40.

(32) Lugard was regarded as the “Father of Indirect-Rule”.

(33) The reason for this is apparent from the nature of the traditional
cultures of the societies, as was shown in the previous chapter.

(34) Michael Marioughae and John Ferguson, 92- Cit., p. II. This was an
obvious case of cultural superposition.

(35) Arthur Richards, it should be recalled, was also a controversial figure
while serving as governor of Jamaica earlier, in the West Indies. See note

#17.

l06

(36) Actually a secondary school. For more details on this incident see,
for example:
(i ) Frederick A.0. Schwarz, Jr. Nigeria: The TribesJ the Nation,
or the Race--The Politics of Independence, The M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, I965, pp. 54 - 60.
(ii) Richlar L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, Princeton University
Press, I963, pp. 55 - 64.

 

(37) Mainly as students in foreign institutions.

(38) This constituted, essentially, the nucleus of what evolved into the
Nigerian political elite.

(39) Following the l96l referendum, in which the Southern Cameroons Opted
out of the Federation, the party was renamed the National Convention of
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The Cameroons, a former German colony, was man-
dated to Britain by the defunct League of Nations, at the close of World
War I.

(40) It is pertinent to stress this fact here, for, later when Nigerian
political values come to be predicated by Opportunistic ethnicity, many had
come to regard the NCNC as an Igbo affair, for the simple reason that the
leadership was Igbo. But if indeed, leadership should constitute the sole
determinant, then it is suggested here that the llIgbo affair“--the NCNC--
was, in fact, a Yoruba idea.

(4i) Arthur Richards was the Governor of Nigeria at the time. See notes

#17 and #35.

(42) He was succeeded by Dr. M.I. Okpara, an Igbo physician who later Opted
for a political vocation.

(43) I948 was the year that the movement was activated in Nigeria.

(44) Dduduwa was the legendary ancestor of the Yoruba people. Translated,
literally, Egbe Omo Dduduwa means, “the Union of the sons (children) of

(45) This appears to be corroborated by the fact that on its official
inauguration, several Yoruba members of the NCNC defected and joined the
new movement.

(46) To the knowledge of this writer, this charge has not been proved be-
yond doubt to be true. But if this was a mere Speculation, it was a very
plausible one. See Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New
York University Press, I956, p. l54.

(47) Dr. Dikko was the first Northern Nigerian to hold a university degree
and, until the early 'fifties, remained the only university graduate from
that region.

(48) “Mallam” is a title equivalent to “master”, or “teacher”, and was gen-
erally applied to teachers and instructors among the Hausa-Fulani people.

l07

(49) But since NEPU was committed to programmes of social change and mod-
ernisation, Mallam Amino Kano had to break completely with the NPC. Both
parties were to become bitter antagonists later in the process of the Niger-
ian political evolution.

(50) After Robert McPherson, the Nigerian governor who succeeded Arthur
Richards.

(5l) By this is meant extreme inter-ethnic hostility arising purely from
blind ethnic loyalty.

(52) Western Nigeria is second only to Ghana in the world production of cocoa.

(53) This meant that the regions will be allocated revenue in exact prOpor-
tion to the amount of revenue derived from each, reSpectiver.

(54) This was primarily necessitated by the artificial synthesis of cocoa.

(55) It is true of course that the Western Region was still, economically
better off than the North.

(56) Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. Ni eria: The Tribes, the Natiogiior the
Race--The Politics of Independence. iM.I.T. Press, I965), p. 32. (quoted
from Obafemi Owolowo, QE-.£l£-: pp. 48, 73)

 

(57) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of Colonial Failure, (American Com-
mittee on Africa, New York, I967), p. 43.

(58) In the opinion of this writer, the Igbo traditional society, was per-
haps, one of the few systems in which the Lincolnian concept of democracy
actually existed in practice. Furthermore it is suggested here, that the
British attempt to impose the so-called 'parliamentary democracy' was nothing
more than a gimmick by means of which a person's pr0perty is stolen, con-
cealed in a disguised package, and then turned round and offered back to the
owner at a considerable price.

 

(59) F. Schwarz, Jr., Loc. gig,

(60) G.I. Jones, “Report of the Position, Status, and Influence of Chiefs
and Natural Rulers in the Eastern Region of Nigeria”, (Gov't. Printer, Enugu,
I957), pp. l0 - ll. Professor Jones was commissioned by the Eastern Nigerian
Government to study the matter of chieftaincy system in the Region when the
government was contemplating the establishment of a House of Chiefs. In
spite of its artificiality, the government proceeded to institute the House
of Chiefs, even against the recommendations of the Commission, mainly for

the political exigency of maintaining a balance of institutions with the
other two regions of the Federation. In corroboration of this report, see,
for instance, the views of a Biafran economist-anthrOpologist, Dr. Chikezie
Uchendu, in V.C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, pp. 4I ~ 42.

(6I) B.O. Ukeje, Edugation fog Social Reconstruction, MacMillan and Co.,
(Nigeria) Ltd., I960, p. 8.

Chapter 4

(I) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unificationi (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,

I965), P. I55.

 

(2) lbid., pp. 138 - 139. 147 - 148.

(3) Arthur A. Nwankwo and Samuel U. Ifejika, The Making of A Nation: Biafra,
(C. Hurst and Company, London, I969), p. 9.

 

(4) H. Bretton, “Africa: Nigeria and the United States“, (TV Script), p.
I2. Dr. Bretton was, before recently joining the faculty of New York Uni-
versity professor of political science at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. This was a programme-release-and-script produced by Professor Bretton
and the U-M Television. Originally, recorded in June I968, the programme

was telecast over the NBC-TV stations on Sunday, December 29, I968.

 

(5) John Mordecai, “Federation and After”, in New World, (Vol. III, #5, l,
and 2, November, I966), p. 89.

(6) Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London, I947), pp. 47 - 48.
(7) Amitai Etzioni, 92,.£i£., p. I39.

(8) 1213., p. I40.

(9) .igid., pp. I45, I48.

(IO) H. Bretton, Egg. gig.

(ll) Stanley Diamond, Ni eria: Model of a Colonial Failure, (American Com-
mittee on Africa, I967), p. 36.

(l2) B.J.O. Dudley (ed.), Nigeria I965 -- Crisis and Criticism: Selections
from Nigerian Opinion, (Ibadan University Press, I966), p. l3.

(I3) Amitai Etzioni, 92..£i£., p. I66.
(14) lbid., p. 166.

(I5) John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations, (George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, I968), p. 29.

 

(l6) Amitai Etzioni, Op. 913., pp. I67 - I68.

(I7) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Govern-
ment, (New York University Press, I960), p. I4.

(18) H. Bretton, 92°.ELE" p. 7.

IO8

IO9
(I9) Ibid.

(20) Nigeria Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, I947, (Gov-
ernment Printer, Lagos, I947), p. 208.

(2l) B.J.O. Dudley, QB° Cit., p. 49.

(22) Ahmadu Bello was the leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC),
the Party that dominated the Hausa-Fulani Government of Northern Nigeria,
as well as being in control of political power in the Federation. Content,
himself, with being at the head of the Northern hegemony, as that Region's
Premier, he had delegated his deputy, Prime Minister Balewa, to run the
show at the center in Lagos. Ahmadu Bello lost his life in the January Revo-
lution of I966.

(23) Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (Cambridge University Press, I962), p. 229.
(24) Lagos was the capital of the Federation.

(25) Ahmadu Bello, 92° Cit., p. 227.

(26) Morley Ayearst, QE- Cit., p. IS.

(27) John Mordecai, Op, Cit., p. IO9.

(28) Ibid., p. Il9.

(29) Ibid., Loc. Cit.

(30) Ibid., p. l24.

(3l) Ibid., p. l26.

(32) Ibid., p. I38.

(33) Ibid.. 13- I39.

(34) Ibid., p. l58.

(35) H.W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian
Federation, (Harvard University Press, I962), pp. 32 - 33.

 

(36) The President and founder of the AG Party was Chief Obafemi Awolowo,
who was also the first Premier of the Western Nigerian Government, as well
as being the first leader of the Opposition in the post-independence Ni-
gerian Government. The deputy leader of the Party was Chief S.L. Akintola,
who succeeded Chief Awolowo as Premier of the Western Nigerian Government
when the latter left to lead the Opposition in the Federal Legislature.

(37) Schwarz points out that “In the early l950's, the Action Group and
Awolowo appeared to be much less concerned with national unity than the NCNC
and Azikiwe. Awolowo in the early days was primarily a Yoruba leader who
saw a decentralised federal system organised along ethnic or linguistic lines

IIO

as the means to protect the Yoruba from interference. For him, at that

time, additional states were primarily devices to preserve differences”.
(Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--
The Politics of Independence, M.I.T. Press, I965, P. 84.

 

(38) This was more than a sufficient number to constitute a majority in the
Western Legislature.

(39) This, no doubt, was calculated to render void, any further claims of
the Premier to office. The British-style Parliamentary democracy required
that the Party with the majority of elected members form the Government,

and the party leader, invariably, became the head of Government. But

since the party leadership determined the governmental leadership, in this
sense, it would be logical to expect that the head of government be reSponsi-
ble to the Party leadership, where--as in the present case--the two role-
positions are not occupied by one and the same role-player. This probably
accounted for the move of the Action Group in expelling the Premier from

the Party.

(40) A.A. Nwankwo, et.al., 22. Cit., p. 45.

(4I) See S.A. Aluko, “How Many Nigerians?”, in the Journal of Modern
African Studies, Vol. 3, #3, October I965, pp. 37I - 392.

 

 

(42) A.A. Nwankwo, et.al., 92' Cit., p. 49.

(43) Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Ni eria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the
Race--The Politics of Independence, (The M.I.T. Press, I965), p. l4l.

 

(44) Dr. M.I. Okpara, The Premier of the NCNC-dominated Eastern Nigerian
Government had challenged the census report in the nation's Supreme Court.
But “the Supreme Court dismissed the suit without reaching the merits.“
(F.O. Schwarz, Jr.,.Qp..£i£., p. I4l, footnote).

(45) Following the I963 census, the allotment of seats in the Federal legis-
lation was according to the following distribution: -

Northern Region I67
Eastern Region 70
Western Region 57
Mid-Western Region I4
Lagos (Federal Capital) __11

Total 3l2

(46) See Appendix 4-2.

(47) For detailed account of the Awolowo episode see:
(i ) Stanley Diamond, 92° Cit., pp. 30 - 4I.
(ii) Arthur Nwankwo, et.al., QE- Cit., pp. 40 - 45.

(48) This alliance (NCNC-AG) had it occurred earlier in I959. Perhaps,
Nigeria's political evolution would have taken a different turn. One of the
major goals that this alliance had h0ped to accomplish had it been elected

lll

into power, was to effect the release of Chief Awolowo who at this time was
languishing in prison.

(49) The Action Group campaign team, touring the North was refused accommo-
dation in a Kaduna (Northern capital) hotel; and five days before the NCNC
leader, Dr. Okpara, was to Speak at the Yoruba-based University of Ife, the
NNDP-controlled government of the Western Region had barred all “outside“
politicians from the University.

(50) For a full account of the Azikiwe-Belewa confrontation, see, Arthur A.
Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., pp. 72 - 88.

(SI) Dr. Eni Njoku, was later to become the vice-chancellor of the University
of Nigeria Nsukka (later University of Biafra).

(52) The Provisional Council, dominated by the Yoruba, probably considered

it unfair for the two federal universities to be headed by Igbos. Professor
Onwuka Dike, another Igbo, was at the time, the vice-chancellor of the Uni-

versity of Ibadan. Dr. Dike shortly resigned from the post.

(53) For more details of this crisis, see, Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., 92°
Cit., pp. 55 ' 7|.

(54) Nwankwo and Ifejika, for instance contend that:
“The fraud of the I964 Federal Election was repeated without
the least dissimulation and on the grandest scale in the history
of rigged elections. On the election day over 500,000 ballot
papers were recovered from both the NNDP leaders and the NNDP
electoral officers when they had tried to dump them into the ballot
boxes...Ballot boxes already filled with ballot papers were recov-
ered before polling began. The police also recovered lists of elec-
tion results which the NNDP had prepared long before the polling
clay.‘I (Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Qp.'£i£., p. 9I).

(55) Ibid., p. 45.

(56) For an analysis of the role of the Army in Nigerian politics see
Stanley Diamond, Op. Cit., pp. 44 - 46.

(57) Of course, for those who later came to see the Army coup d'etat as an
“Igbo-designed plan to dominate the rest of the Federation“, the preferred
terminology would be ”rebellion“. Admittedly, perspectives are, to some
extent, reflections of peOple's sentiments and biases. But, in anticipation
of the challenge of the choice of 'revolution' here, it should be pointed
out that, as Adolf Hitler had observed several years ago, in any struggle

or conflict, “the victor is always right“. The reader who has been honestly
following the Nigerian episode, is urged to draw his own conclusions. But
just to back up my own bias in regarding the January event as a revolution,
some samples of the public reaction as reflected in the Nigerian papers then
is attached as part of the appendix to this study. (see Appendix 4-2)

(58) That is, the so-called British Commonwealth of Nations.

(59) In I965, the white-minority of Rhodesia had unilaterally proclaimed
that country independent from British rule, to establish a hegemony in which

ll2

the white minority would exercise absolute political authority over the
black native majority indefinitely. This had resulted in a series of diplo-
matic maneuverings by the British Government supposedly to force the Ian
Smith (the Rhodesian Prime Minister) regime to collapse. But, in the Opin-
ion of this writer, all the seemingly serious efforts by Britain were simply
calculated to confound the black African nations. For, long before Ian
Smith made the historic move, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had
himself given the Rhodesian authorities the assurance that, whatever move
they made, the use of force--military intervention--by Britain would be
ruled out completely, as a means of resolution. In effect, Mr. Wilson, had,
in fact, urged white Rhodesia to inaugurate a white oligarchy. As a footnote,
it might be added that whereas the Biafran aspiration to self-determination
has been unhesitatingly suffocated, the White Oligarchy, has, in fact, con-
tinued to thrive unperturbed, in Rhodesia.

(60) On the same day also, the Premier of the North and the West, Ahmadu
Bello, and Chief Akintola, reSpectivelx had held a secret meeting in Kaduna,
the Northern headquarters. It has been suggested that these Ieaders--so-
called--had, in fact met to work out final details of a plan to use the
Army in “crushing the disturbances“ in the Western Region as well as using
it to effect a country-wide absolute regime. This plan was to have taken
effect on January I7, I966. If so, the Army's swift maneuver of January I5
saved the nation from a great catastrophe. (see for instance, African Re-
search Bulletin, January I-3I, pp. 446 - 448).

 

 

(6I) See note #57. For a full account of the January Revolution and the
brief, subsequent short military regime of General Ironsi, see Arthur A.
Nwankwo, et.al.,.QE. Cit., pp. l23 - l53.

(62) For full details on this, see lbid., pp. I23 - l53.

(63) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., 92. Cit., p. I48.

(64) West Africa, June 4, I966.

(65) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., QB- Cit., p. I56.

(66) George T. Orick, “Nigeria: A Study in Hypocrisy“, in The New Leader,
Jan. I, I968, p. 9.

 

(67) Stephen Lewis, Journey to Biafra, (Thistle Printing Ltd., Ontario,
Canada, I968), p. 24. Mr. Lewis is a Canadian Legislator.

(68) Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story, (Penguin Books, Inc., I969), pp.
69 - 78.

(69) Ibid., pp. 76 - 78.

(70) Aburi, a small town at the vicinity of Accra, Ghana, was the meeting
site of the Nigerian military leaders in January I967.

(7l) The Meeting of the Nigerian Military Leaders, held at Aburi Accra,
Ghana, 4-5 January I967. (Official Document No. 5, of I967, Govt. Printer,
Enugu, I967), pp. 6 - 8.

ll3

(72) George Knapp, Aspects of the Biafran Affair: A Study of the British

Attitudes and Policy towards Nigeria-Biafra Conflict, (Britain-Biafra Asso-
ciation, I968), p. IO.

(73) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., QB. Cit., p. 253.

(74) Chukwuemeka Onwubu, Nigeria: Problems of Unification, (unpublished
paper), p. 50.

(75) Idem.

(76) Republic of Tanzania; Statement of Recognition of Biafra, April I3,
I968.

(77) Amitai Etzioni, 93.-£13., p. l55.

Chapter 5

(I) According to the first law of Newtonian mechanics, a 'body' or an 'ob-
ject' or a 'particle' continues in its state of 'rest' or of uniform motion
in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change from this state by an
externally impressed force.

 

(2) Wilbert Moore, ”A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change“, (ASR,
Vol. I, #25, Dec. I960, pp. 8IO - 8l8).

(3) 'Social life' here, may be interpreted simply as a series of social
changes.

(4) Hugh W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian
Federation; (Harvard, I962), p. 46.

 

(5) Ibid., passim.
(6) Ibid., p.46.
(7) Ibid., pp. 46 - 47.

(8) Actually, the only natural demarcation between the ghree Regions of the
former Federation consisted in the division of the East from the West, by
the River Niger. Although the Niger and its tributaries would have consti-
tuted natural boundaries for the three Regions, nevertheless, this was not
the case, neither between Northern Nigeria and the Western Nigeria, nor
between the East and the North. The boundaries were purely arbitrary, the
Southern bound of Northern Nigeria, extending further south beyond the two
tributaries--the Benue and the Niger. This again goes to strengthen our
claim that the slanting of the Federal structure by the British colonial
administration, as implicated in the Richards' and McPherson's Constitutions,
constituted a gerrymander of the federal Constitution by Britain.

(9) David Lowenthal, ”The Social Background of West Indian Federation“, in
David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation, (Columbia University Press,
New York, I96I), p. 68.

(IO) See note #6, Chapter 4.

(II) See note #6, Chapter 3.

(l2) That is, in the sense that only one significant culture thrived.

(l3) Lowenthal, for instance, points out that: “Standard English, sometimes
called 'whitetalk', is spoken regularly only by upper-and-some middle-class
folk, and not all the time by them; a more or less educated Creole is heard

in most homes. But standard English is required in school and standard
English alone is legitimate.“ David Lowenthal, 92° Cit., p. 93.

ll4

Il5

(l4) Stanley Diamond, Nigerigy Model of A Colonial Failure; (American Com-
mittee on Africa, New York, I967), p. 43.

 

(I5) Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story, (Penguin Books, Ltd., I969), p. 48.

(I6) James O'Connell, I'The fragility of stability: The Fall of the Nigerian
Federal Government, I966“, in Robert I. Rotberg and All A. Mazuri (eds.),
Protest and Power in Black Africa, (Oxford University Press, I970), p. l03l.

(I7) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders
and Forces; (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., I965), p. l55.

 

(19) Ibid., p. 151+.

(20) Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, I947, Government
Printer, Lagos, I947, p. 208; as quoted in Arthur A. Nwankwo and Samuel U.
Ifejika,The Making of A Nation: Biafra, C. Hurst and Company, I969, p. 30.

(2i) Amitai Etzioni, Op, £i£., p. I55. (see note #l7)

(22) Georg Simmel, Conflict And The Web of Group Affiliations; The Free
Press, I955, p. IO9.

(23) Richard West, I'BIAFRA: The Last H0pe for African Independence“, in
The SundgyTime§J(London) Magazine, June I, I969, pp. 39 - 4l.

(24) C.L.R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt, Drum and Spear Press,
Washington, D.C., I969, p. 37.

(25) Ibid., p. 38.
(26) James O'Connell, QE-.Ei£°: p. IOI3.

(27) Nnamdi Azikiwe, Respect for Human Dignity, (Inaugural Address at in-
stallation as Governor-General in I960, Government Printer, Enugu, I960),

p. 2.
(28) James O'Connell, 92' Cit., p. lOl8.

(29) Richard West, for instance, maintains that: “Biafra was the first place
I had been to in Africa where the Africans themselves were truly in charge

of government. It was the first place I have been with a sense of nation-
hood rather than mere statehood.‘I Richard West, “Biafra: The Last Hope for
African Independence?” in The Sunday (iondon) Times Magazine, June I, I969,
p. 34. Diamond also suggests that “Biafra may well be the last h0pe for a
self-determining black Africa, and a revolution based on indigenous model“,
Stanley Diamond, I'Who Killed Biafra“, in The New York Review of Books, Vol.
XIV, Number 4, February 26, I970, p. 26.

(30) John R. Sullivan, Breadless Biafra; (Pflaum Press, Dayton, Ohio, I969),
p. 97. In this context, it is interesting to note that in a recent interview

ll6

by a correSpondent of the German paper, Der Spiegel, the current Prime Min-
ister of Ghana, Dr. K.A. Buaia, admitted that “the boundaries in Africa were
drawn rather arbitrarily by the colonial powers, Germany, France, and Bri-
tain.“ In the course of the same interview the interviewer noted that:
“Africa's boundaries are the most artificial and impossible boundaries in
the world. They divide tribes that have lived together for thousands of
years, and force people into one state territory who have nothing in com-
mon.” (Democracy in Africa, in Daily Graphic (Ghana), Thursday, June 4,
I970, p. ll.)

 

(3i) This argument then places into better perspective Etzioni's prOposi-

tion re arding the manner in which former colonial territories Operate, fol-
lowing Independence. See note #I7.

(32) See note #I7.

(33) C.L.R. James, “Towards a Caribbean Nation,” in Caribbean Conference,
I965; (A Caribbean Conference publication, October I967), p. 2I.

 

(34) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria, Op. Cit., pp. 5 - 6.

(35) Stanley Diamond, "Who Killed Biafra?", Op. Cit., pp. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

 

(36) Conor Cruise O'Brien, “Victory or defeat, a nation is born“, in The
Globe and Mail, (Canada), Wednesday, October ll, I967, p. 7.

 

(37) See Chapter I, for the definition and conceptualisation Of a federation.

(38) CARIFTA and the Caribbean Economic Community (Government of Trinidad-
and-Tobago, July, I968), p. 7.

 

(39) Ibid.

 

(40) In Chapter 4, it was shown that the Federation was,to a great extent,
an imposition by the British Colonial Administration.

(4l) The fundamental assumption of the writer is, of course, that the chief
adversary which Biafra was struggling against, was not just Nigeria. It is
his contention that Biafra was overwhelmed by the monstrosity of international
intrigue Spearheaded by the British, the Soviets, and the United States. In
support of this claim, it is sufficient in this writer's Opinion, to call the
reader's attention to the detailed analyses of the Biafra-Nigeria conflict

by Professor Stanley Diamond, Professor Conor Cruse O'Brien, inter alia. See
for instance:

(I) Conor Cruse O'Brien, ”The Tragedy of Biafra“, in The New York
Review of Books, Dec. 2l, I967.

(2) Conor Cruse O'Brien, “Biafra Revisited“, in The New York Review
of Books, 22 May, I969.

(3) Stanley Diamond, I'Who Killed Biafra?“, in The New York Review of
Books, 26 February, I970.

 

 

Il7

(42) President Houphouet-Boigny, Statement issued at press conference in
Paris, France; prior to the recognition of the Republic of Biafra by Ivory
Coast in I968. Houphouet-Boigny is the President of the Ivory Coast

Republic.
(43) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., 92,

Appendix 4 - I

 

The Federal

Legislature (Ai

The British Government

The Governor-General

The Councilvbf Ministers

Composition

 

The Governor-General (President)

The Prime Minister and
twelve Ministers.

State of Parties

The NPC 4
The NCNC 6
The Action Group 2

*The KNC I

Total I3
The House owaepresentatives

Composition

 

92 elected in the Northern Region

42 elected ' the Eastern Region

42 elected ' the Western Region

6 elected ' the Southern Cameroons
2 elected '

..é special

I90 Total

 

\/
The SenaQunstituted in I960)

I90 members distributed as gollows:

the Lagos (Federal capital)

members appointed by the Governor-General

*Kamerun National Congress, one of the Political parties in the Cameroons.
The Cameroons, a former German colony, was mandated to Britain by the
defunct League of Nations at the close of World War I.

Il8

lI9

State of the Parties

NPC 8O
NCNC 54
AG 24
KNC 6
*UMBC 7
*UNIP 3
*NLCP I
Independent Members 5
Vacancies 4

Special members (appointed
by the Governor-General ._§

Total I90
*UNIP - United National Independent Party. This emerged following the I953
political crisis in the NCNC government of Eastern Nigeria.
UMBC - United Middle Belt Congress. This was a political movement based in

the Southern part of Northern Nigeria.
NLCP - National Liberation Commoner's Party.

Northern Nigeria Legislature (B)
The Governor
\l/
The Executive Council

Composition

The Governor (President

 

 

The Premier and nine ministers, and NPC Government
the Attorney-General (Ex officio) \/
0 <9
The House of Assembly The House of Chiefs

68 members constituted
as follows:

Composition

I34 members distributed as follows:
NPC IO6 First Class Chiefs l5

UMBC I2 Other Chiefs 35

l20

*ITP-AG Alliance 3 Members Of the E ecutive
Council who are also mem-
bers of the House of As-

sembly. i7
NEPU 5 Advisor in Muslim Law I
Bornu Youth Move-
ment 2
Independents 3
Special Members '3 __
Total I36 Total 68

*ITP - Ilorin Talak Parapo. Literally this means, IIPeasant (commoner) Party“,
and it professed to represent the interest of the common man (founded in
1955).

Western Nigeria Legislature (C)

The Governor

 

The Executive Council

 

 

 

The Premier and I3 Ministers \/ Action Group Government

The House of\%ssembly The Houseyof Chiefs
Composition and State of Parties Composition and State of Parties
80 elected members distributed Chiefs 52

as follows:
Members of the Executive Council - also

 

 

 

 

Action Group 50 members of the House -
ll
NCNC 30 Total '3
Eastern Nigeria Legislature (D)
The Governor
\I/
The Executive Council
The Premier and I4 Ministers \/ NCNC Government
I
The House ochssembly The House of Chiefs (non-existent*)

*The subsequent institution of the House of Chiefs in the Eastern Regional
Legislature--essentially an artificiality--was a calculated design to main-
tain a balance of institutions within the constituent units of the Federa-
tion. This tendency of the Governments of the former federation of Nigeria
to duplicate institutions for their own sake was a policy that verged on

prodigality and conspicuous extravagance, to say the least.

I2l

Composition

 

85 members distributed as follows:

NCNC 64 Includes the Attorney-General who is appointed.
Action Group I5
Independent l

Total 85

Appendix 4 - 2

 

The Northernisation Policy

 

In support of the claims made in this study that:

i ) Opportunistic ethnicity played a major role in the disintegration of
the Nigerian Federation;

ii ) The Federation was a composite of diverse cultural groups, who were
in most cases incompatible in their ways of life;

iii) The Nigerian Federation was, indeed, an aggregation of at least three
different Nations, who were better off staying apart than coming
together;

iv ) The ”Northernisation policy“ was, in fact, a policy for excluding one
ethnic group (the Igbo) from the affairs of the Hausa-Fulani dominated
Northern Region of Nigeria;

the following excerpts from the preceedings of the Northern Nigeria Legisla-
ture (Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly Official Report, session I964 -
65) are appended. A sample of the speeches by a few legislators would suf-
fice to convey to the reader, the intensity of the anti-Igbo sentiments pre-
vailing among the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria. (Government Printer,
Kaduna, I965).

I)

2)

3)

4)

Mallam Muhammadu Mustapha Maude Gyan:

“On the allocation of plots to Ibos or allocation of stalls, I
would like to advise the Minister that these peOple know how to
make money and we do not know the way and manner of getting about
this business...we do not want Ibos to be allocated with plots,

I do not want them to be given plots...“

Mallam Bashan Umaru:

“I would like (you), as the Minister of Land and Survey, to revoke
forth-with all Certificates of Occupancy from the hands Of the Ibos
resident in the Region (applause)...“

Mr. A.A. Abogede (Igala East):

”I am very glad that we are in Moslem country and the Government of
Northern Nigeria allowed some few Christians in the Region to

enjoy themselves according to the belief of their Religion, 23;
buildingiof hotels should be taken away from the Ibos and even if

we find some of the Christians (that is non-Igbo) who are interested
in building hotels and have no money to do so, the Government

should aid them, instead of allowing Ibos to continue with the

hotels.”

Dr. Iya Abubakar (Special member: Lecturer in Mathematics, Ahmadu
BeIIo University, Zaria)

“I am one of the strong believers in Nigerian Unity and I have hoped
for our having a United Nigeria, but certainly if the present trend
of affairs continues, then I hOpe the Government will investigate

l22

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

IO)

l23

first the desirability and secondiy the possibility of extending
Northernisation policy to the petty traders (gpplause)“.

Mallam Mukhtar Bellow:

II'I would like to say something vepy important that the Minister
should take my appeal to the Federal Government about the Ibos (sic)
in the Post Office. I wish the numbers of these Ibos be reduced...
There are too many of them in the North. They were just like sar-
dines and I think they were justtxx>dangerous to the Region.”

Mallam Ibrahim Musa (Igala North-West)

“Mr. Chairman, Sir, well, first and foremost, what I have to say
before this hon. House is that we should send a delegate to meet
our hon. Premier to move a motion in this Budget session that all
the Ibos working in the Civil Service of Northern Nigeria, includ-
ing the Native Authorities, whether they are contractors or noty

 

should be repatriated at once.“

 

Mallam Bashari Umaru:

”...there should be no contracts either from the Government, Native
Authorities, or private enterprises given to Ibo Contractors...
Again Mr. Chairman, the Foreign Firms too should be given a time-
limit to replace all Ibos in their firms by some other pegple.“

 

 

 

 

The Premier, (Alhaji, The Hon. Sir. Ahmadu Bello, K.B.E., Sarduana
of Sokito):

I'It is my most earnest desire that every post in the Region, however
small it is, to be filled by a Northerner (applause).”

Alhaji Usman Kiman (Sarkin Musawa):

”What brought the Ibos into this Region? They were here since the
Colonial Days. Had it not been for the Colonial Rule there would
hardly have been any Ibo in this Region. Now that there is no
Colonial Rule the Ibos should go back to their Region. There should

 

 

be no hesitation about this matter. Mr. Chairman, North is for
Northerners,iEast for Easterners, West for Westernersy and the Fed-
eration (i.e., Lagosijs for us all (applause).“

 

The Minister of Land and Survey (Alhaji The Hon. Ibrahim Musa Gashash,
OBE):

”Mr. Chairman, Sir, I do not like to take up much of the time of

this House in making explanations, but I would like to assure Mem-
bers that having heard their demands about Ibos holdingiland in
Northern Nigeria my Ministry will do all it can to see that the de-
mands of Members are met. How to do this, when to do it, all this
should not be disclosed. In due course you will all see what will

happen iapplause).“

Certainly, the minister kept his promise to his peOple. From May I966
through September I966, everybody saw what happened. The “demands of Members”
have been met, not only in the exprOpiation of the Igbo resedents of the

l24

Northern Region, but also--and what was more atrocious--in the systematic
policy by which the Northerners sought to eliminate the Igbo, in several
waves of remorseless and genocidal massacres. By their own pronouncements,
the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria, have irrevocably affirmed that they and
the Yoruba of the West have not, are not, and cannot be regarded as belonging
to the same nation as the Igbo, the vicarious victims of their unprecedented
atrocities.

Appendix 4 - 3

The January l5 Revolution, I966

As stated in Chapter 4 of this study this writer contends that the Army
Coup d'etat of January l5, I966, deserved the status of a Revolution. His
rationale for this claim is the reaction of the public. This, he argues,
was reflected in the statements appearing in the leading papers of the Nation,
and in the opinions expressed by various groups and organisations all over
the country. Bellow, is a sample of the Opinions from the Nigerian Public,
following the event of January I5, I966.

l)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

The West African Pilot (Statement by an NPC Minister in the rem-
nant of the Civilian Government that just formally handed power over
to the Military), Wednesday January I6, l966 - Front Page:

“We believe and accept that the present task of the new regime is
the welfare of all peoples of Nigeria...we call on all the peoples
of Nigeria...to rally round the new military government so as to
make easy its great and noble taks.“

University Students demonstrating, with placards, proclaiming:
“Long live our Saviour, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi...Freedom for
AII...Equality for All...This is the birth of real Nigerian Free-
dom.“ (January l7, I966).

West African Pilot. Tuesday, Jan. l8, I966. (Statement by the

 

University of Lagos Student's Union):

”We...heartily congratulate the new Federal Military Government of
Nigeria...the news...came to us as a great relief...We wholly
pledge our full support and co-Operation to the regime...We call
on all peace-loving Nigerians to give implicit loyalty... n.gg
era of peace, happinessJ individual Iibertyiand equal opportuniiy

 

for all.”

Statement by the NCNC Spokesman (Jan. l8, I966):

“This is only (a) logical sequence of events and we hOpe that every
true citizen of Nigeria will regard this (occasion) as a turning
point in our national life.ll

Statement by the Action Group Spokesman, (Jan. I8, I966):
“MyParty'believes that the take-over is only a continuation of the
people's struggle to preserve parliamentary democracy and the unity
of the Federation. The AG pledges its support to the new Regime.“

West African Pilot (Statement by the National Union of Nigerian Stu-
dents) January l8, I966:

Calling on “all Nigerians to support the new government and work
conscientiously to build a strong and united Nigeria.”

 

The Daily Times (Editorial) January l8, I966:

”The old order changeth yielding place to new...Today, there is a
new regime in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a military regime...
The new administration deserves praise for the calm manner (in
which) it effected the change without causing public panic.“

 

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West African Pilot (Statement by the NPC) January l9, I966:

“We call upon our supporters to co-Operate with the military govern-
ment and to give the military administration support in its great
task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria.“

 

The Daily Times (editorial) Jan. l9, I966:
“Liberty Unchained: It is ironic that much liberties denied the
ordinary Nigerian by the departed civil government, have been re-

 

 

 

stored and guaranteed by a military regime. Is it any wonder, then,

 

that the masses have welcomed the new order withijoyful enthusiasm?“

Morning Post (editorial) Jan I9, I966.

 

“We join all lovers of peace in this country in welcoming the
military government of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi...Aipeopleiget
the government they deserve.”

 

 

Morning Post (Front page (Comment) Jan. 20, I966:

 

“We on the 'Morning Post' congratulate Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi.
We congratulate his government on its determination to wipe out of
the Nigerian scene anything that is undemocratic...We believe...
that the 'New Nigerian' will be able to say: I'We are Nigerians--
one and all.”

Morning Post (Editorial) Jan. 2I, I966:

 

“Gone are the days when, intoxicated with our dream-world euphoria,
we saw little men and called them gods,...No longer shall tin-gods
thrive on the simplicity of syc0phants.”

With this sample of opinion here presented, the reader is urged to draw
own conclusions regarding the event of January I5, I966. These reflect
sentiment of the Nigerian general public following the January Coup. In
opinion of this writer, they more than suffice to sustain his claim that
coup was a society-wide revolution in Nigerian political evolution.

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