FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FEDERATIONS OF NIGERIA, AND THE WEST INDIES

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ABSTRACT

FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FEDERATIONS OF NIGERIA, AND THE WEST INDIES

By Chukwuemeka Onwubu

Federalism is treated as a socio-political organisation. Consequently, an analysis of a federal system calls for the examination of the actual and potential issues of social conflict, normally associated with social processes.

The three sections of the study are constituted as follows:

Part I: This consists solely of Chapter 1, being the introductory chapter. The notion or concept of Federalism is considered, and an operational conceptualisation of a federation developed. The choice of the examples of Nigeria and the West Indies for study is rationalised, and the assumption of 'disintegration' of these two systems is justified on the basis of the conceptual framework. The comceptual framework, together with the consideration of the other historical cases of Federal experience, leads to the formulation of the central problem of the study: the question of the conditions for the constition of human societies into viable federal associations, in the face of both conflicting and overlapping interests of these societies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the two cases selected for investigation--Nigeria, and the West Indies.

Part II: Background to Federation

This consists of Chapters 2 and 3, and forms what is considered as 'back-

ground' to the process of federalism in both societies chosen for study. As elaborated later in the last chapter (5), the claim is made that social conflicts within a social system such as a federation, arise from two sources, in general--internal and external. It is therefore presumed that a real comprehension of the nature of social conflicts can only be acquired by considering both the internal and external aspects. In the particular cases being considered, it is suggested that the internal aspects of social conflict should be considered by examining the structural set-up of the units constituting the systems, prior to any "external influences", while the locus of the 'externals' should consist in the colonial and imperial intrusions.

Consequently, Chapter Two is devoted to the treatment of the peoples and cultures of the three major ethnic groups (in the case of Nigeria), and the three major racial communities (in the case of the West Indies), selected. Chapter Three deals with the economic and political developments in the context of the evolutionary processes within these two federal systems. Also dealt with in this chapter, is the process through which the internal and the external forces converge. Chapters Two and Three, taken together, then constitute the background over which the conflict issues raised in the subsequent chapter (Four) should be perceived.

PART III

This consists of Chapters 4 and 5, which, together constitute what could be considered as sources of social conflict, and the implications for social change.

Chapter 4 deals exclusively with what may be described as 'general conflict issues' and 'specific conflict issues'. The former consist in those issues of conflict whose origin may not be said to be localised within the given society; while the latter consist of those conflict issues unique to particular social systems. Thus, the fact of "imposed federalism", "anomalies of the federal

structuring", and "intensity of Nationalism", could be regarded as general conflict issues; whereas, "The Chaguaramas Affair" (West Indies), or "The Census Crisis" (Nigeria), for example, could be appropriately regarded as issues unique to the respective federal systems. While the general issues could be accounted for by considering external or colonial forces, the specific issues, may, to a great extent, be attributed to unique local factors, although, having indirect colonial, neo-colonial, or imperialistic implications.

Chapter 5 presents a theoretical perspective of the substantive considerations dealt with in the earlier chapters. In particular, it deals with a social system, by considering the dynamics of system change, and conflict. Moreover, it offers an evaluative schemata for the substantive analysis, as well as predictively--though in a limited sense--suggesting possible trends and tendencies.

In conclusion, it is proposed that the analytical efforts of the present study, can account, fairly adequately, for the federal experiences of both Nigeria and the West Indies; it is further proposed that this study has contributed--if in a modest way--to the general understanding of the mechanics of federalism and its institutions.

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by

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Federalism, as a political concept, is by no means of recent making. The incidence of political federations has almost kept pace with the organisation of human societies. The Lycian federation of Asia Minor, the Theasalian or Aetolian Unions of Greece, were cases in ancient history. The federation of Swiss Cantons constitutes a case in point at a later period in European history. The United States of America, the Dominion of Canada, are examples of federal unions in modern times.

Within the last quarter century, there have been several experiments in political federation. India, the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), Rhodesia and Nyasaland,[1] the projected East African Federation,[2] the Federation of Malasia, Nigeria, and the West Indies Federation, fall into this category. Except for India, these federations have all disintegrated; and except for Egypt, they were all former British colonies.

In all these instances, both ancient and modern, the federal unions have varied in structure and in function. Each case could be said to reflect both the political and social experiences of the time and place. Two of these federal systems, Nigeria, and the West Indies, will constitute the focus of the present study. Before proceeding further, it is imperative to address the question: 'What is a federation?'

A federation has been defined as:

> "a form of government consisting of a group of units or states which retain specific powers for themselves absolutely, while at the same time transferring other powers to a central government, which is not subordinate. A federation is characterized by the supremacy, not of the legislature or legislatures, but of the law as interpreted by a federal supreme court, in that a law duly passed by a federal or by a unit of legislature may be declared unconsitutional by the court."[3]

The major point of emphasis here is the equity in the allocation or distribution of power, between the federal entity, on the one hand, and the component units of the federal system, on the other. The primacy given to the supremacy of the "Federal Supreme Court" carries the obvious implication of the strategy of cooperation that should mark the relationships among the various units of the system. The Supreme Court, although a federal structure, is symbolic of power delegation from the member units to the central body. Bearing this in mind, one may also consider another view.

According to Georg Simmel, "That which characterizes a federation of states is its unit as a war-conducting power. (For), in all other respects, the individual states may preserve their autonomies." He further suggests that "The perfect federation of states (is) one which in its relation to other states—forms an absolute unit while in their relations to one another, its members possess absolute independence."[4] One is impressed by the two main points of relevance from this concept of federation:

1) Relationships of the units of the federation among themselves.
2) Relationships of the federal entity with an outside body.

In the latter case, there is implicit emphasis on the commonality of purpose; in the former, what is stressed is the autonomy of the units, vis-a-vis, one another, as well as the central body.

In summary, it is possible to conceptualise a Federation as a form of government in which two or more states come together under one central body to which authority is delegated by the unit states for the purpose of collectively executing certain functions relating to some tasks common to all the federating units. Federalism as a concept, as well as the notion of delegation of authority to the central body, presupposes <u>the existence, a priori, of two or more autonomous territorial units</u>, whose interests may overlap in

some cases, and conflict in others. In dealing with federalism, there is a concern not only with matters of concurrent interests of the units, but also with the issue of conflicting interests. The presumption of autonomy of units demands that, in an ideal situation, at least, the willingness of these member units be one of the pre-conditions for any embarkment on federalism. In the language of Rousseau it may be suggested that federalism is a form of social contract in which the contractual parties are autonomous states rather than individuals. Furthermore, one of the major goals of a federation should be the preservation of the federal units. In other words, a major preoccupation of a federal government should be the well-being of all the constituent states of the federation.

Needless to say, the correspondence and conflict of interests of the federating members creates problems, the resolution of which constitutes, at least in part, the task of the federal unit. The 'social contract' implicated in the system of federalism is based on the principle employing collective effort in solving group tasks. It would seem that the degree to which this collective effort can be harnessed effectively, would depend on the extent to which interests overlap among the constituent units of the federal system.

Statement of the Problem:

This study focusses on the defunct[5] federations of Nigeria, and the West Indies. In view of the foregoing considerations, the central problem of the present investigation is posed in the following question:

> Under what conditions can human societies constitute themselves into viable[6] federal associations in the face of conflicting and overlapping interests of the constituent federating societies?

The attempt to provide some answers to this question constitutes the major

task of the present study. And, in doing this, the primary concern is to understand the nature of social conflict. as considered from the standpoint of the defunct federations of Nigeria and the West Indies.

Nigeria and the West Indies are only two examples of federations that did not succeed.[7] When on 13 April, 1968, the Government of Tanzania accorded diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Biafra, its (Tanzanian) spokesman noted that "the purposes of society, and of all political organisation, is the service of man."[8] But if federalism is a practical socio-political philosophy, a federal government is certainly a bold experiment in the organisation of human societies.

As is quite often the case in every practical experiment, success cannot always be taken as a matter of course. And, as in every case of an experiment, practical procedures follow some underlying principles. But it is not always the case that principles in themselves are practically—if at all—immune from errors of misconception. Consequently, the failure to attain success in any such undertaking could be attributed to either procedural errors in its execution, or to some errors or inadequacies in the conceptual apparatus.

But, in the event success is not attained in a particular trial, the question might arise as to 'why?' To demand an answer to the question is to call for a diagnosis, without which the detection of the fault or identification of the problem would hardly be conceivable. Besides, it would appear quite irrational to proceed to the next issue (or problem) without first ascertaining the causes for the failure of the former. Consequently, in choosing for the present study, two defunct federations— Nigeria, and the West Indies— the primary goal is to diagnose in order to ascertain what went wrong in the

processes of political experimentation. One would like to understand—and therefore better appreciate—the problems, in order that one may better ascertain the basis upon which the operation of such systems of government could proceed so as to ensure "success". In the meantime, it would be worthwhile to record some empirical facts about these two defunct federal systems.

Nigeria and the West Indies: Some Basic Facts:

The defunct federations of Nigeria and the West Indies were former colonial territories of Britain—part of the one-time vast and extensive British Empire. At the time the British relinquished their colonial administration of Nigeria in 1960, the latter was made up of three[9] states or regions, namely, Eastern Region (Eastern Nigeria), Northern Region (Northern Nigeria), and Western Region (Western Nigeria). The West Indies Federation, on the other hand, was constituted by ten of the British Caribbean territories. These were constituted into four groups of islands, namely:

1) The Leeward Islands (Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat, Trinidad-and-Tobago);

2) The Windward group (Dominica, Greneda, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent);

3) Jamaica; and 4) Barbados.

As constituted before the break-up, the Federation of Nigeria encompassed a total area of about 360,000 square miles; whereas, all the land area of all the West Indian units added up to a mere 7,663 square miles.[10] But where Nigeria was made up of relatively contiguous units, the component island units of the West Indies, scattered over a vast expanse of the Atlantic waters, constituted a highly discontiguous ecology. For, although the Leeward and Windward groups of islands are relatively close to one another, Jamaica is located some 800 miles from the nearest of the Eastern group of islands.

Besides, Kingston, Jamaica, is 1000 miles away from Port-of-Spain, in Trinidad. In Nigeria, the boundary separating Northern Nigeria from the rest of the Federation was not marked by any physical barrier, although, the West[11] and the East were separated by the River Niger, only a mile or two across

Both Nigeria and the island units of the West Indies fall within the tropical belt. Whereas most of the West Indian islands are mountainous—with the notable exceptions like Barbados—in Nigeria, mountain ranges of any significance are found only in the Northern Region of the Federation. In the West Indies:

> "many of the islands are of volcanic origin including the western members of the Leeward group...and the Windwards. (Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Greneda). Antigua, and...a small portion of Barbados, Tobago, and northern Trinidad are of limestone formation. Most of Barbados and Southern Trinidad are coral covered with a thin layer of earth... Most have ample rainfall which falls much more heavily on the windward (Atlantic) side."[12]

In Nigeria, the Southern Region (East and West) falls within the equatorial rainbelt; the intensity of rainfall diminishes from the coastal South, thinning down to almost complete year-round drought in some northerly remote parts of the Northern Region.

The vegetation in Nigeria varies from the equatorial rain-forest in the South to the tropical grassland in the Northern portion. In the West Indian case, with the notable exception of Trinidad (which has the flora and fauna of the mainland continent) few of the plants are indigenous. Bananas, and cane-sugar were introduced by the early settlers. In Nigeria, the major plants of economic interest were palm trees, coconuts (mainly found in the East and some parts of the West), cocoa, and rubber (in the West), and rice, and cotton (in the North). The major mineral resources in the West Indies were oil (in Trinidad and to some extent, Jamaica), bauxite (in Jamaica). In Nigeria

the leading minerals were tin, copper (in the North), coal, iron—and later, oil—(in the East).

In both federations the constituent units were not evenly structured, both in size and in population. In Nigeria, the Northern Region was the largest state with a land area of about 281,000 square miles. It constituted about three-quarters of the total land mass of the Federation, whereas with an estimated[13] population of nearly 30 million, it was greater than the rest of the Nigerian population put together. The tables below give the distribution of land and population in both areas.

TABLE 1-1

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND POPULATION: NIGERIAN FEDERATION

Region	Land Area (Sq. Mis)	% of Total Area	Population	% of Total Population
Eastern Region	29,484	8.0	12,388,646	21.8
[14]Western Region	44,022	12.2	12,811,837	21.9
Northern Region	281,152	78.0	29,777,986	52.7
Lagos (Fed. Capital)	5,747	1.4	675,352	1.0
Total	360,405	100.0	55,653,821	100.0

Source: The population figures were from the preliminary figures of the 1963 National Population Census, released by the Census Board. (Quoted in Arthur A. Nwankwo, and Samuel U. Ifejika, The Making of a Nation : Biafra, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969. p. 49.

TABLE 1-2

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND POPULATION: THE WEST INDIAN FEDERATION

Islands	Area (Sq. mis.)	% of Total Area	Population	% of Total Population
Jamaica	4,411	57.8	1,613,148	51.70
Trinidad and Tobago	1,980	25.80	825,957	26.50
Barbados	166	2.20	232,085	7.40
Greneda	133	1.70	88,677	2.80
St. Vincent	150.3	2.00	80,042	2.60
St. Lucia	238	3.10	94,718	3.00
Dominica	289.5	3.80	59,124	1.90
Antigua	108	1.40	54,354	1.70
St. Kitts-Nevis	155	2.00	56,644	1.80
Montserrat	32.5	0.03	12,157	0.40
Total	7,663.3	99.63*	3,116,906	99.80

* The Jamaican dependencies are excluded.

Source: Statesman's Year Book, 1962-1963. Quoted in Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, 1965), p. 150.

The failure of federations primarily created by the British is not unusual. Malaya and Singapore, the Central African Federation, or the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are additional reminders. In each case, federation developed out of former colonial territiories. In each case, the federal structure wound up in disintegration. As Richard West keenly observed, "When these federations dissolved, the British Government shrugged so to speak and merely said, 'what a pity'. (But) when Nigeria, the largest, least homogenous (and) the most calamitous federation failed, the British Government paid for a war to restore it."[15] The question then arises as to why the collapse of the other federation, like the West Indies, was taken as a matter of course, but that of Nigeria, greeted with a ruthless hostility that was remis-

cent of the medieval 'Holy Crusades'. One of the tasks of the present study is to find some adequate explanation to this question. What strikes attention—and therefore, what provokes a spirit of inquiry—is not so much a situation in which things happen as expected, as it is situations in which there are marked departures from expectations.

It may be the case, as Bertrand Russell suggests, that "the fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics."[16] He delineates various forms of societal differentiation corresponding to different forms of power and their respective utilities or applications:

> "There are many ways in which different societies differ in relation to power. They differ , to begin with, in the degree of power possessed by individuals or organisations; it is obvious, for example, that, owing to increase of organisation, the state has more power now than in former times. They differ, again, as regards the kind of organisation that is most influential: a military despotism, a theocracy, a plutocracy, are very dissimilar types. They differ, thirdly, through diversity in the ways of acquiring power: hereditary kingship produced one kind of eminent man, the qualities required of a great ecclesiastic produce another kind, democracy produces a third kind, and war a fourth."[17]

But the primary task of the present study is not so much the analysis of power per se, than it is the exploration of those social settings in which the possession or use of power becomes manifest—if implicit—in human activities. The role of power, will be especially evident from the political and economic aspects of the subsequent analysis. That the notion of power does not constitute the central theme in the analysis, should not therefore be construed as a denial of the contention that Russell makes, and which he elegantly elaborates in subsequent arguments. For, otherwise, one could also argue, using Russell's logic, that in Newtonian mechanics, the fact that

it is "mass"—and not "energy"—that plays a prominent role in the theory of kinematics, would constitute a violation of the axiom that energy is the fundamental concept in physics. But on reflection, one finds that no violation is committed. For modern physics—thanks to Einstein's[18] formulations on mass-energy equivalence—has shown that "mass" and "energy", are,in fact, different manifestations of the same physical phenomenon.

At this juncture, an attempt should be made at the clarification of certain concepts used in this study, viz., race and ethnicity. In view of the fact that these concepts have generated controversies—as yet unresolved—among scholars, there will be no commitment here, to the search for the ultimate and "true" meanings of race and ethnicity. A good many of these controversies-especially as regards "race"—have been politically inspired, as was evident in the evolution of "anti-semitism" around the Nazi movement; or the concept of "negro" within the American social structure. The primary endeavour here would be to formulate an operational definition or conceptual scheme, which would facilitate the analytical task.

As defined by Greer, "Ethnicity refers to the differentiation of the population by racial and cultural backgrounds."[19] But, unfortunately, one is left in the dark as to what is meant by "racial". Consequently, in so far as the term "race" is regarded as problematic, the above definition of "ethnicity" does not lend itself adequately to conceptual clarity. One is therefore compelled to search elsewhere for a much clearer conceptualisation.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language gives the following definition of "ethnic":

"foreign, gentile, national; relating to community of physical and mental

> traits possessed by the members of a group as a product of their common heredity and cultural tradition; having or originating from racial, linguistic, and cultural ties with a specific group."[20]

It also difines "race" as:

> "generation, family; the descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock; a class or kind of individuals with common characteristics, interests, appearance, or habits, as if derived from a common ancestor; a group of human beings recognising a common history, and a common culture."[21]

Although an improvement on Greer's concept, Webster's definitions of ethnicity as well as race, show some elements of circularity and redundance. "Ethnicity" is defined in terms of race, whereas, race is conceived in terms of "nation" or "tribe", for instance. But it is also true that Webster gives one definition of "nationality" as " a group of people having a common and distinguishing racial and cultural background...an ethnic group."[22] Tribe is also defined in terms of "a national group".[23] In other words, we are back to where we started from. One wonders then, whether it is possible to make some sense out of this rather confounding mesh of conceptual circularities. The problem may not yield a unique solution, but certainly, some suggestions can be entertained as to how some forms of resolution may be effected.

One way of tackling this problem is via the "empiricist" approach. Empiricism is used here, in Hodgkin's sense that a technique "is normally developed piecemeal, in relation to specific situations, or as a means of solving specific problems."[24] In this sense, the approach being adopted here is pragmatic. Consequently, we shall mean by "ethnicity", a cultural-linguistic group or community. This would allow for the requisite of a cultural tradition as suggested in the earlier definitions; but it is also stipulated that language be one of the crucial elements characteristic of this tradition. It is therefore suggested that, the linguistic element here be indigenous. Thus, in the case of Nigeria, for example, although it may be argued

that English language is the lingua-fanca, it should be pointed out however, that English is indigenous to no given group or community. In this sense, then, we may consider the Igbo, the Yoruba, the Hausa-Fulani, as distinct ethnic communities. As will be shown in the next chapter, not only has each group a common culture rooted in historical tradition, but it is also a fact that the language of a given group is an essential part of this cultural tradition.

It is perhaps more difficult to be precise in the conceptualisation of "race" as in the case of "ethnicity". But it may prove fruitful in this case, to incorporate part of Webster's notions:"A group of human beings recognising a common history, and a common culture, yearning for a common destiny, assuming common habits."[25] It would seem, from Webster's definitions, that "race" and "ethnicity" are hardly distinguishable from each other. But then, in the West Indies, for instance, one would not consider, say, the black population, as constituting an "ethnic" community, in the same sense that the Yoruba of Nigeria would be regarded. It is true that they may be considered as sharing a common language—English, if of a peculiar dialect—, but then, English could not be considered as indigenous to them in the sense that Yoruba language is indigenous to the Yoruba people of Nigeria. As will be seen shortly, not only have they virtually lost the traditions indigenous to their African heritage, but it is also the case, that English language is indigenous to a specific European culture. The same argument could be applied to the Indian community who originally came from India. But in the sense of the Nigerian "ethnic" communities, only the white population could be regarded as an ethnic group in the West Indies, for, as will be evident later, most of

the members of the white-European population, in fact, are descendants of English migrants. In Webster's sense, there is a recognition of a common history among the white Europeans, among the Blacks, and among the Indian community; and it is in the sense of this conceptualisation that the Indians the English, and the blacks, may be regarded as different "racial" groups.

As conceived here, "ethnicity" and "race" differ, only in the linguistic element stipulated in the former, which may not be crucial for the latter. One obvious consequence of this conceptualisation is that whereas the members of an ethnic group must of necessity be of the same race, the converse need not be true. In other words, if one assumes the validity of common reference to black peoples as belonging to one "race", then, the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa-Fulani may be regarded as of the same race, in this sense; but it need not be the case, however, that all balck peoples constitute an ethnic community.

In considering the two cases of Nigeria and the West Indies, the proposition is that the subsequent rupture of the federation derived from causes rooted in social conflicts. These conflicts are linked to the cultural, political, and economic history of the federations. It is further suggested that these social conflicts have both internal and external aspects. It is with a view of obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of these conflicts, that the following organisation of material is presented. Ascertaining the nature and sources of the conflicts constitutes the major task of the next part of this study. Attention will focus on the cultural background of the peoples of the former federations of Nigeria and the West Indies, as well as on the political and economic history of the constituent

societies. While Chapter 2 deals with the peoples and their respective cultures, Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with an analysis of the political issues. By implication, questions pertaining to foreign domination in the former federations are also entertained.

PART II

NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: BACKGROUND TO FEDERATION.

CHAPTER 2

NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION: THE PEOPLES, THEIR CULTURES

Although, in the former Nigerian Federation, several ethnic-linguistic groups could be distinguished, only three major ethnic groups are considered as representative of the peoples of the former federation. These are, the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria, the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria, and the Yoruba of Western Nigeria. Not only does each of these ethnic units constitute a dominant population in each of the three Regions; the three together constituted between eighty and ninety per cent of the entire federal population. Consequently, when reference is subsequently made to the Igbo, the Hausa, or the Yoruba, it should be understood that they are taken to represent the respective Regions that constituted the units of the Federation.

Similar simplifications are adopted in the case of the West Indies Federation. Accordingly, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados, are taken as representative of the island units that constituted the West Indies Federation. In contrast with Nigeria, the rationale for the West Indian choice is not ethnic distribution. These three island units constituted the predominant population of the Federation (see table 1-2). In addition, these three island units also contain among themselves, a vast majority of the three main "racial" groups; the blacks of African heritage, the white European descendants, and the people of Indian origin (vide infra, pp. 18-19).

In Nigeria, three ethnic groups, the Igbo, (E. Nigeria), the Hausa-Fulani (N. Nigeria), and the Yoruba (W. Nigeria) are discussed. In the West Indian case, partly for reasons already stated, and partly for reasons that will be apparent shortly, the focus will be on the three predominant racial groups, (the people of European origin, the people of African origin,

and those of Indian[1] origin), distributed over three major island units, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barbados. To facilitate the task, it might be necessary to deal with the two groups separately.

The West Indies

Available historical records indicate that the indigenous inhabitants of the West Indian territories were the Arawak and the Carib Indians who were almost completely wiped out[2] by the first European settlers. The present population of the West Indies are descendants of African, European, and to some extent, Asian peoples. As Gordon Merril points out, "within the federation of the West Indies there is great cultural diversity. Englishmen, Sephardic Jews, Africans, Portuguese, East Indians, Chinese, Syrians, and other peoples have contributed to island population and ways of life."[3] The Jews are the descendants of the Sephardic Jews of Portugal, migrating with the early Portuguese explorers and adventurers, and whose influence on the West Indian life must have been quite significant in the seventeenth century.[4] The Chinese and Syrians probably arrived in the West Indies much later, for commericial reasons. At any rate, the main focus here is on the Blacks of African descent, the White Europeans, and the East Indian descendants.

The Black people of the West Indies were the descendants of the survivors of the historic slave phenomenon that lasted for over three centuries. A great majority of these enslaved men were exported from West Africa.[5]

> "The eighteenth century historian, Bryan Edwards, estimates that more than 600,000 Africans were introduced as slaves into Jamaica alone between 1700 and 1786—(And) in the days of the slave trade, Africans were identified by tribe or region as Carromantes, Ibboes (Igbos), Whydahs, and Congo and Angola Negroes (sic). In the Leeward Islands, the West African Negroes known as Carromantes were held in high esteem as slaves—the Ibboes were considered timid and prone to suicide—The Whydahs, or Papaws...were thought more tractable...the Congo and Angola natives were more fit for domestic service than for field labour."[6]

The Black population was predominant in virtually all the West Indian islands except in Trinidad, where the East Indian population was less than that of the Black by a small margin. Culturally, the surviving African heritage is practically nil. As Ayearst[7] points out; "There would seem to be a few remnants, what might be termed faint memories of West African culture among Negroes. Before emancipation the slave-owners were almost completely successful in stamping out the use of African languages and the traditional institutions of African tribal society. Having been de-culturised, the Negroes assimilated the only available one, that of the Europeans." He notes that "African tribal culture was bound to disintegrate under the conditions of slavery", admitting, however, of possible exceptions "in the fields of religion, music, and dance".

This phenomenon of cultural emasculation is seen in a better perspective when one realises that the slave-owners, that is, the slave masters, were usually outnumbered numerically by the African slaves in their possession. What the slave-master, the White-European plantation owner, least desired, was anything that would help to give the slaves an opportunity for collective action. It became imperative, therefore, to put them in groups or communities in which communication and normal social and cultural interaction were virtually impossible. One of the strategies for accomplishing this was to prevent a significant number of slaves sharing a common African language from residing in the same slave community. The late Malcolm X aptly described this emasculation as "slave-making".[8]

The members of the white community of the West Indies were descendants of European settlers. Although one could find evidence of significant French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch influences, by far the overwhelming majority of the white West Indians were the descendants of the peoples of English origin.

As Merrill points out;

> "the white folk who established the West Indian economy and whose descendants dominated it for centuries, arrived during the first fifty years of settlement. The identity of the English settlers is revealed in the sailing lists of vessels bound for the Indies in the seventeenth century. The names of many of them have survived as family estate names in the West Indies down to the present day—(And) most of these folk came from Southern England—(from) the counties of Cornwall, Somerset-Suffolk, Essex, Hertford, and Oxfordshire—Over the centuries the white folk of English origin have maintained close ties with the mother country."[9]

People of European origin were in relative numarical minority in most of the West Indian islands, although, they have, in almost all cases, dominated the West Indian economy. In Jamaica they constituted about one and a half per cent; in Trinidad, three percent; in Barbados, five percent; in St. Vincent, three percent; and they form less than two percent of the total population of the other units. That the whites dominated the economy of the West for centuries follows logically from the fact that they arrived in the West Indies in the first place as masters. Since they started in a position' of dominance, one cannot but agree with Ayearst that, "The only significant culture in the West Indies is European".[10] With the predominance of English life styles, including English as the official[11] language, one can understand why a West Indian would identify with England as the "mother country", or why there has been reference to West Indians as being "more English than the Queen". C.L.R. James of Trinidad makes a good point when he asserts that "...the languages, the pattern of life are English."[12]

The third major group constituting the West Indian population was the East Indians. These were the descendants of the indentured workers brought over to the plantations from India, in the period between the time of emancipation of the slaves and the First World War. Forming about twelve percent of

the federal population, the East Indians constitute the largest minority in the West Indies. Within the federation, the largest[13] group of East Indians are to be found in Trinidad where they number up to 330,000.[14] Jamaica has about 20,000 East Indians, and there are hardly any to be found in both Barbados[15] and the Leeward Islands.

Unlike in the case of the African descendants, the East Indians were not much interfered with, culturally, so that, a great deal of their Indian heritage has survived, and is being perpetuated. Although, as Lowenthal suggests,[16] "the East Indians in Trinidad became 'Creolized' and their mode of life is much like that of other Trinidadians", the fact still remains that the East Indians were a distinct cultural entity. They still identify with the cultural heritage of mother India as exemplified by their burning desire to preserve the Hindu religion. On the other hand, they have assimilated much of Western culture as conveyed through Western education.

Taking the Federation as a whole, Lowenthal concludes that the "West Indians are—in good part bilingual". Although "standard English is required in school and standard English alone is legitimate,—a more or less educated Creole is heard in most homes."[17] As one writer observed, the language and social structure is English in Jamaica, Barbados, and the Leeward Islands; whereas, in Trinidad, it is Spanish in origin, French in tradition, although having East Indian and Chinese elements. In summary, then, it can be said that the West Indies Federation reflected significant social differentiation. On the other hand, English cultural tradition and life style are dominant.

TABLE 2-1

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN WEST INDIAN TERRITORIES

Territory	Total (thousands)	African	E. Indian	European	Mixed	Others
Barbados	192.8	148.9	.1	9.8	33.8	0.1
Jamaica	2,249.9	971.4	21.4	16.0	232.2	8.8
Antigua	41.8	35.4	—	0.7	5.4	0.2
Montserrat	14.3	13.3	—	0.1	0.9	—
St. Christopher	46.2	40.0	0.1	0.9	5.1	0.1
Trinidad-Tobago	558.0	261.5	195.7	15.3	78.8	6.7
Dominica	47.6	11.9	—	0.1	35.5	0.1
Greneda	72.4	53.3	3.5	0.6	14.8	0.2
St. Lucia	70.1	40.6	2.6	0.3	26.3	0.2
St. Vincent	61.6	45.0	1.8	1.9	12.6	0.3

Source: Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies, The Search for Self-Government, (New York University Press, 1960), p. 64.

Nigeria

As indicated earlier, three[18] major ethnic groups, the Igbo, the Hausa-Fulani, and the Yoruba constitute the major focus of the present study. As in the case of the West Indies these three groups are considered to be largely representative of the peoples constituting the population of the defunct Nigerian Federation. Whereas in Nigeria the three groups were concentrated in three geographical regions, (the East, the North, and the West) that constituted the major states of the Former Federation; in the West Indies, the three major ethnic groups were distributed over three main islands, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, and Barbados.

There have been several and varied attempts to account for the origin of the peoples of Nigeria. But, not infrequently, some of the accounts—both

historically and archeologically—seem to contradict one another, and therefore, to add to the already existing confusion. The treatment of the social and cultural life of the peoples has been no less wanting. What is subsequently presented here is therefore, no more the "true account" than it constitutes another dimension to the already existing complexity.

The Hausa-Fulani

The Hausa-Fulani[19] constituted the predominant group in Northern Nigeria. According to the 1952 National Census report, the population of the region was distributed as follows:

Hausa	5,488,446
Fulani	3,022,581
Kanuri	1,298,306
Yoruba	536,109
Nupe	348,979
Tiv	772,771
Others	5,051,380
Total	16,518,572

It is apparent, then, that the Hausa-Fulani constituted over half the total population of over 16,000,000. Although the hegemony[20] was Fulani in character, the language commonly spoken was Hausa, the predominant population deriving from this ethnic origin. Most of the people were Moslems by religious inclination, although there were minor variations of other faiths.

According to some historians, the earliest states in Northern Nigeria were founded by some black migrants from the Northeastern part of Africa, possibly associated with the black kingdoms of Meroe and Kush, located by the Nile River, in what is now, the Republic of Sudan. Other accounts suggest that the Fulani migrated from the area of Senegal, and became mixed with the Hausa through intermarriage, after settling in Hausaland. The major wave of Fulani migration seems to have occurred early in the 19th century

following the Fulani conquest of Northern Nigeria under Sheik Othman dan Fodio. But Islamic influence appears to have been felt in this area as early as the 12th and 13th centuries. Sklar suggests that, "the original Habe states, seven in number, appear to have been established in the territory of modern Hausaland about the 10th century. (And) during the 12th and 13th centuries, they were at least partially within the sphere of influence of the Islamised kingdoms of Kanem-Bornu, unquestionably the dominant state in the central Sudan."[21] But according to the Willink Minorities Commission report:[22]

> Most of the main tribal groups (of Northern Nigeria) came into the country from the northeast; in the Middle Ages the centre of the northern part of the territory of the Region was held by a loose confederacy of Hausa City States occasionally at war with each other (sic) but usually linked in an intermittent alliance. There were seven Hausa states known as the Hausa Bakwai, or The Seven Hausa States, and seven associated states known as the Banza Bakwai, a somewhat derogatory term which means 'the seven states which are only imperfectly Hausa'. Islam had come into this area towards the end of the 14th century and there were many Muslims among the Hausa States, but there was no uniformity; not all professed Islam and many of those who did were lax in their observances.

Among the Hausa-Fulani, women were considered the social inferiors of men, to whom only, the prerogative of full citizenship was accorded. Marriage among the people was influenced by religious ethics, which allowed for limited polygamy. Under Moslem code, a man may have up to four wives. As will be seen later, this varied slightly with the traditional practice of the Igbo society of Eastern Nigeria, where polygamy was not only admissible, but where also, the limitation was imposed mainly by the economic and social exigencies existing in each case.

The Yoruba

The Yoruba people constituted the dominant population of Western Nigeria. From the official report of the 1952 Nigerian Census, the Yoruba constituted

about 4,302,000 of the Region's population of six million.[23] The origin of the Yoruba, not unlike that of the other peoples of Nigeria, has been much obscured by the myths and legendry, that are very often associated with oral traditions.

According to one of these traditions, the Yoruba are descendants of the legendary Oduduwa, a pseudo-deity believed to have resided at Ile-Ife, and whose six children, the legend goes on, established the six major states of the early Yoruba country, namely: Ila, Ketu, Cyo, Owu, Popo, and Sabe. But the most popular and common tradition indicates that the Yoruba people migrated to their present place of abode from the Northeastern[24] part of Africa about the 8th Century A.D. There is also the further suggestion that they might have had some connection with Gogobiri—the Hausa State of Gobir. ."...the Hausa traditions recognise 'Yoruba' as one of the seven 'illegitimate' (or bastard) states of Hausaland".[25] Some Yoruba scholars have even theorised on the possibility of the Yoruba coming originally from Egypt.

As suggested by S.O. Biobaku, a Yoruba scholar, the origin of the people could be traced to the ancient kingdom of Meroe, which was located in what is now the Republic of Sudan. If this be the case, then there is the logical conclusion that the Yoruba of the Western Region of Nigeria, and the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region, if not of the same stock, at least migrated from the same area.[26] In this context, it is interesting to note that chieftaincy systems, or kingdom states attained parallel stages of development among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria, and the Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region.

The Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani were also culturally similar in some other aspects. For example, "the flowing robes of the Yoruba resemble those

of the Hausa, and are usually brightly coloured...By tradition the buildings are grouped around a compound in which the family group lives... The customary law of the Yoruba allows a man to have more than one wife.[27] Family ties are very strong,[28] and the group feels responsible for the welfare of all its members, whether they are close relatives or more distant ones."[29]

Hodgkin contends that the Yoruba make excellent traders and are speculative. Moreover, the men are believed to be generally hard and strong, though cunning in their dealings with one another. Implicit obedience is known to be a characteristic mark of their life, and their sense of confidence in the advice and orders of elderly men is rather remarkable. It has been suggested that the Yoruba are generally passive and supine, inaccessible to curiosity, not easily moved by political vissitudes and, "as a rule parsimonious in the extreme."[30]

The Igbo People

The second[31] largest group of people in the former federation, and the predominant[32] ethnic community in the Eastern Region was the Igbo. It is perhaps true that among all the peoples of the former Nigerian Federation, the Igbo have attracted the greatest publicity. Perhaps, more has been written and said about them than about any other group. This is particularly evident because of the Nigeria-Biafra War. Yet, the Igbo, paradoxically, appear to be the least understood of all the peoples, constituting the former Nigerian Federation.

As with the case of other ethnic groups, the origin of the Igbo people is also highly speculative. Onwuka Dike, an eminent Igbo historian, suggests that:

> "throughout the 19th century the great majority of the Ibos claimed Nri town in Awka district as their ancestral home, and it has been (stated) that around Nri town, is to be found the heart of the Ibo territory."[33]

Flint offers a more elaborate theory:

> "Along the lower Niger, however, and in the area east of that river, there is no evidence of either kingship, or even chieftaincy before the late seventeenth century....For the historian this raises acute problems of interpretation...The absence of kingship is even more puzzling...in view of the extraordinary cultural, linguistic, and social uniformity of the people...The problem would be simpler if the Ibo were a Stone Age people; it could then be argued that the strength of their Northern neighbours, and perhaps the rise of the Jukun Empire in the sixteenth century, had shielded the Ibo from immigrant conquerors bringing iron weapons. However, the Ibo were as skilled[34] in iron technology as any of their neighbours. The only hypothesis, therefore, and it is no more than a hypothesis, is that the Ibo migrated into the area en masse, bringing their iron technology with them, and either completely expelled or destroyed the aboriginal inhabitants. To date, such a movement is impossible, although it may be argued that Ibo dialects differ sufficiently for us to conclude that they must have been evolving in separate areas for perhaps a thousand years."

And taking other things into consideration, Flint has come to the conclusion that:

> "Whatever the explanation, the Ibo are distinct from the other major peoples of Nigeria in having evolved no centralised state or states, in the European sense of the term. (For), kingship and chieftaincy were unknown to them, even on the village level...The Ibo culture, nevertheless, survived with remarkable uniformity, and the absense of a 'state' in no way inhibited the economic or cultural achievements of the people. Ibo agriculture, indeed, was perhaps the most efficient in Africa, and Ibo population developed a density... only matched in Africa by that of the Nile Valley. Though the Ibo village remained a sovereign law unto itself, the Ibo presented a remarkable unity and conformity of customary law and practice, so that even without a centralised state, they retained the social unity of a national group."[35]

While it is possible to agree that there were indeed some "aboriginal inhabitants" of this land now occupied by the Igbo people, it has not' been absolutely proved that the Igbo themselves were not the aboriginal inhabitants and that they have not always lived in what is now known as Igboland. The great population density previously alluded to, could logically have resulted in an outward movement, giving rise to what Diamond

has described as "an Ibo dispora".[36] Moreover, the substantial number of Igbo-speaking people on the Western bank of the Niger River seems to indicate that migration, if it did take place, must have been across the Niger from the East to the West Bank of the river at a remote period in history.

The following comments give some insight regarding the cultural life of the Igbo.

> "The dispersed power of the Igbo is characterised by a high degree of popular participation in the making of decisions. Ibo culture magnifies the value of individual achievement. Yet, Ibo people are known for their enthusiasm for community development and by the multitude of voluntary improvement associations. The Ibo people are famous for their exceptional receptivity to change.[37]
>
> From all I could gather by observation, the Iboes are very emulative. As in other things, so it will be in book learning.[38]
>
> Place them where you will, or introduce them to any manners and customs, you will find that they very easily adapt themselves to them... They always possess a desire for superiority, and make attempts to attain it, or excel in what is praiseworthy, without a desire for depressing others,...Place Igboe (sic) man in a comfortable position and he will never rest satisfied until he sees others occupying the same or similar position. The Ibos cannot be drawn to act; they are most stubborn and bull-headed; but with kindness they could be made to do anything, even to deny themselves of comforts. They would not, as a rule, allow anyone to act the superior over them nor sway their conscience by coercion to the performance of any act whether good or bad when they have not the inclination to do so... In fact, <u>everyone likes to be his own master</u>."[39]

The Igbo are traditionally animists by religious inclination, and pantheistic in the practice of their religion. The many sub-deities, "Chi's", are designated with specific functions. The supreme deity, "Chukwu", oversees the activities of the "Chi's" under him. There are, among others, "Chi-neke", the deity responsible for creation; "Chi-nedu", the deity who guides and leads; and "Chi-nenye", the deity who allocates amenities to humans. According to one Igbo anthropologist:

> "The world as a natural order which inexorably goes on its ordained way according to a 'master plan' is foreign to Igbo conceptions.

> Rather their world is a dynamic one—a world of moving equilibrium. It is an equilibrium that is constantly threatened, and sometimes actually disturbed by natural and social calamities. The events which upset it include natural disasters like long continuous droughts, long periods of famine, epidemic diseases, as well as sorcery and other antisocial forces; litigation, homicide, violation of taboo, and other incidents."[40]

In summary, the Nigerian peoples were culturally heterogenous and indigenous to the consideration that "the Yoruba, Hausa, or Ibo people,...each numbering several million...could be equally described as nations."[41] In contrast, the West Indies situation was quite different. The scene was succintly characterised by C.L.R. James:

> "The whole population is expatriate. Slaves, freed slaves, former non-slaves, immigrants from India, economic masters, none is native...(And) the languages, the pattern of life are European."[42]

One indirect relationship between the peoples of Nigeria and the West Indies, would be between the black (and perhaps 'coloured') descendants of slaves brought from Africa, and the Nigerian peoples, who also happen to be dark-complexioned. Of the three Nigerian ethnic groups, only one, the Igbo, was positively[43] identified as represented among the West Indian Blacks. But then, the cultural gap has been all but complete.[44]

Thus in Nigeria, there was a mere aggregation of diverse cultures, linked only by their common allegiance to a foreign power—Britain. In the West Indies, the human diversity was merely covered by the facade of a common aspiration to acquire the English life style and culture. In the former case, the illusion of "oneness" or commonality was created by the suppression of the indigenous cultures by the imperial Power; in the latter, it was facilitated by the vacuum created by cultural emasculation. The implications of this state of affairs will be elaborated in the next chapter which will focus on the political and economic history of the former Federations, of Nigeria and the West Indies.

CHAPTER 3

NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

On February 23, 1956, the agreement to federate the ten island units that constitued the West Indies was signed. On January 3, 1958, the West Indies Federal Constitution came into effect with the arrival of Lord Hailes to assume duties as the first Governor-General of the Federation, the first Federal Parliament being convened in April of the same year. On September 19, 1961, in a public referendum, the people of Jamaica decided to opt out of the Federation. On May 31, 1962, the constitution of the West Indies Federation was legally terminated. On August 6, 1962, the Federation of West Indies collapsed as Jamaica went on alone to independence. It was the end of a four-year period of political experimentation.

In 1914, the Southern (West and East) and the Northern regions of Nigeria were amalgamated. In 1946, the Richards[1] Constitution brought the (South and North) regions under one administrative authority, although, paradoxically, still retaining different administrative systems. The McPherson's Constitution[2] in 1951, instituted a federal system, thus establishing three separate administrative units in the three respective Regions and the Federal territory of Lagos[3] constituting a coordinating point. October 1, 1960 was the date the Federation of Nigeria attained independence from Britain. On May 30, 1967, Eastern Nigeria opted out of the Federation proclaiming the Republic of BIAFRA. Thus ended[4] some 53 years of federal experimentation.

In the Nigerian case profound disintegration occurred some six and a half years after self-government was attained. In the case of the West Indies, self-government was never achieved as a group before the life of the federation came to an end. It is in the hope of ascertaining and charting the causes of the conflicts leading to these disruptions that the present study is

undertaken.

To facilitate this end, the colonial history of the two federal systems is being treated. Within the confines of this study, colonialism has to do with the economic and political implications of the relationships of these societies with the colonial—or former colonial—power.[5]

The West Indies Federation

The political development of the West Indies is closely related to the historical development of the West Indian economy. It is a history of slave trade and slave economy. It is in this respect, perhaps, that the closest link between the West Indies and the West Africa—particularly Nigeria—can be drawn. It was the so-called "discovery" of the 'new world' which opened new frontiers of economic enterprise. The subsequent trans-Atlantic traffic in slaves that lasted over three centuries, initially was calculated to exploit these vast economic potentialities at minimum cost to the white European entrepreneurs; but before long, the trade had become an end in itself. As noted by one humanitarian, "the treatment of Africa by Christian Europe in the period of the slave trade constituted the greatest crime in history."[7]

The British and the French were known to have established their first successful tropical colony in the same year (1623), and on the same island—St. Christopher. By the year 1655, these early colonialists had extended their settlement up to Jamaica, where, as noted previously, the aboriginal Arawak Indians were all but exterminated in less than forty years. By the year 1655, also, the British had captured Jamaica from Spain. Subsequently, following Cromwell's proclamation, British immigrants were encouraged with offers of land grants, "and other enticements which drew settlers there."[8] By 1713, the British through the Treaty of Ultrecht, had taken over from France the contract to distribute African slaves to Spanish colonies, and Jamaica became the base for this operation.

Before the time of the emanipation, the political life was dominated by the white European settlers, the slave population enjoying no rights of citizenship. As noted earlier, the East Indian presence followed the demand for indentured labour, after many freed slaves had left the plantation to be on their own. The demand was more serious in islands like Trinidad and Jamaica but less so in Barbados. The government in most of the islands was "The Old Representative System", based on the proposition that "the colonies were and would remain areas of European settlement whose inhabitants would be familiar with representative institutions and would form a fairly homogenous society."[9]

The struggle for political power was a struggle for the control of the economy of the West Indies. The West Indian society was one based upon a single-crop economy, the chief crop being sugar. Sugar, played a role in both agriculture and industry. Most of the plantation owners had returned to England leaving their estates to the custody of agents in the islands. And the political involvement of these absentee landlords in the British government contributed a great deal in determining the political and economic relationship of the British colonial government, vis-a-vis, the West Indies. "Forty or more members of Parliament...were the owners of West Indian plantations...and sugar was so profitable and fitted so well into the mercantilist economy."[10] But the events follwing the First and Second World Wars contributed immensely in creating the present political and economic phase of the West Indies.

Just as in Nigeria, in the West Indies, the British had recruited troops to fight in the two wars—to safeguard the freedom of the British people. With the notions and ideals of freedom acquired during the years still fresh in their memory, the experience, no doubt, was frustrating for the troops coming back to the colonies, only to relapse into colonial bondage. To make

matters worse, "the continuance of economic distress over so many years became increasingly intolerable. (And) suddenly, the islands were swept by a series of bloody disturbances, out of which organized trade unionism was born."[11] These trade unions constituted the beach-head of the political movement. From that time on, as Mordecai clearly points out, "the flavor of West Indian politics ceased to be 'Liberal' (in the British party sense), and became 'Labour'."[12] A brief sketch of these disturbances is imperative.

The year 1935, could appropriately be regarded as a turning point in the political and economic development of the West Indies. This was the year the social disturbances began, with the eruption of the Sugar Strike in St. Kitts in January. A month later, in February, there was an oil strike in Trinidad accompanied by a hunger march led by Uriah Butler. September came with a sugar strike in the British Guiana,[13] and in October of the same year, there was a tax increase demonstration in St. Vincent. A coal strike took place in November in St. Lucia. In the words of Mordecai, "1935 was a year of great tension".[14] These social unrests, no doubt, did a great deal to generate a new type of political awareness among the people.

Consequently, following a relatively peaceful interlude in 1936, the confrontation between rulers and the ruled resumed in June 1937 with attempts to apprehend Butler, following the strike in Trinidad. The incident escalated to such a grave social upheaval, that it needed the aid of a warship from Bermuda, to bring it under control. Then, the social outbursts shifted over to Barbados, where fourteen people lost their lives. Eventually, the social unrests spread over to Jamaica, with the strikes that erupted in January 1938, and lingering through May of the same year. It was at this stage that political and labour movements started to take shape and the future leaders of the Federation were emerging with the movements. The course of the West Indian

political drama therefore started to take a dramatic turn.

These social movements brought men like Alexander Bustamante, Norman Manley,[15] Grantley Adams (later Sir Grantley), and later, Eric Williams, to the political limelight of the West Indies. In Jamaica, the labour movement was spearheaded by Bustamante, the founder of the subsequent Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU).[16] Manley came into the show when he instituted legal proceedings for the release of the arrested labour leaders, among whom was Bustamante. The founding of the BITU was shortly followed by the inauguration of the People's National Party (PNP), by Manley, in September of the same year. (See note #16). Although working cooperatively with Manley, up to this point, Bustamante's political split with his cousin began with the founding of his Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), in 1943, presumably masterminded by the British colonial representative, Governor Arthur Richards.[17] Morley Ayearst presents an interesting argument in this context:

> "There is an interesting example of the Governor in politics alleged to have taken place in Jamaica during the governorship of Arthur Richards... It is impossible to find proof for the widely held belief that the Governor, who had been holding Alexander Bustamante in detention under the Emergency Regulations, released him on the understanding that he would at once form a new political party in opposition to Manley's Peoples's National Party, despite the fact that hitherto Manley and Bustamante had been working together. (But) it is conceivable that the Governor took this step, if he did, because he was convinced that Bustamante's radicalism was confined to trades union objectives whereas he feared the extremist nationalism and avowed socialism of the PNP and thought a political sweep by this party might be disastrous to the British connection and the colony's economy."[18]

At any rate, the fact still remained that the two political forces had thence identified themselves in Manley and Bustamante. But the political consequences of the labour movements were not confined to Jamaica.

> "In Barbados, Mr. Grantley Adams...attained prominence after the riots of 1937, as legal counsel for some of the men arrested. He founded his 'Barbados Progressive League' (BPL) in August 1938, and after differences with more radical elements in 1939, converted it into the Barbados Labour Party (BLP)...(And) in Trinidad, Mr. Albert Gomes, who was to play a leading part in federal discussion in the

first half of the fifties, was just becoming known as a popular political speaker."[19]

But Eric Williams, who was to become the leading political figure in Trinidad, entered the West Indian political drama in 1956, under a federal banner. As the leader of the newly formed People's National Movement, (PNM), he had joined the ranks of the federalists with fresh zeal; and he had "thought it worthwhile to justify the federal case by argument."[20]

One major consequence of the waves of social disturbances resulting in the emergence of the political and labour movements, was the initiative taken by the British government to institute social reform. Thus, a Royal Commission was appointed in August 1938, with Lord Moyne as the chairman. The social unrests also started an era of fresh political awareness and generated some feelings of oneness among the various peoples of the West Indies. According to the report of the Commission:

> Although the question of closer union has remained officially in abeyance since (1933), there is evidence that a lively and growing interest has continued to be taken in it in many political circles in the West Indies, some of which now advocate, as part of their programmes, wide measures of federation to cover all the British colonies in the Caribbean area...Our general impression, from the evidence which we heard, is that which local opinion has made a considerable advance in the direction of political unity since 1932, it is doubtful whether the time is yet ripe for the introduction of any large scheme of federation.[21]

At any rate, by 1938, the Jamaican Legislative Council made proposals for constitutional reforms that tock effect in 1944. Ironically, over 95% of the island population did not go to the polls at this time, more because of the literacy and property requirememts, although in the same year, Jamaica had gained universal adult suffrage. The first major step towards constitutional advance to federalism was perhaps taken in 1945 when the British government, acting through the Colonial Secretary, issued a directive encouraging "federation" as a status to be favoured by the British Government.

The Secretary's directive resulted in the calling, in February 1947, of the Montego-Bay Conference that met in September of the same year "to discuss the establishment of federation".[22] The conference was preceded by the Caribbean Labour Congress Conference held in Kingston, Jamaica, days earlier; and the sole theme of the Kingston Conference was federation. Among the decisions reached at the Montego Bay Conference,[23] was the establishment of a Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC) which was to draft a federal constitution. In turn, the SCAC made a number of recommendations for the projected federation.

Among other things, it recommended that the federal legislature should be of a bicameral nature, the House of Assembly being based on Universal adult suffrage, while the Senate was to be appointed by the Governor- General at his discretion. This was, to some degree, a model of the British Parliamentary system, with relatively minor variations. Thus, seeing it as "the weakest federal systems ever to come into existence", Anglin contended that "the political institutions of the West Indies are, in the main, almost slavishly patterned on the British Parliamentary system."[24]

The SCAC recommendations were adopted with substantial modifications in the course of the two subsequent Constitutional Conferences held in London in 1953, and 1956. Following the 1953 conference, adult suffrage was introduced all over the Federation. But the Federation itself was not formally constituted after adoption in 1956, until 1958. By 1957, the British had instituted an Order-in-Council which gave it legal tender. The Federal constitution was formally put into operation in January 1958, and from then to the subsequent disintegration in August 1962, the task of nation-building became a rather arduous one.

The causes of the federal breakup will constitute part of the considerations in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention at this stage, however, Etzioni's suggestion that the West Indies Federal "system of administration did not tend toward unification...Each island was administered as a separate unit directly tied to the Colonial Office in London, and British aid...was as a rule given to each island individually."[25]

Federation of Nigeria

A prominent political figure in the former Federation of Nigeria had, at one point concluded that:

> "Nigeria is not a nation. (Rather) it is a mere geographical expression. (For) there are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinct appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of the (geographical entity) from those who do not."[26]

Most historians are of the opinion that the political history of what came to be the Federation of Nigeria dates back to the year 1851, when Kosoko, the then King of Lagos, was involved in a conflict with the British, over his refusal, supposedly, to sign a treaty abolishing all traffic in slaves. According to the "official" British report, King Kosoko was eventually deposed with the 'cooperation' of his uncle, Akitoye, whom the British installed as King of Lagos in 1852, upon his signing the treaty in dispute. Included in the treaty were such clauses as provided freedom of trade for British merchants and protection of European missionaries, granting them, as well, the right to build schools and churches. It seems obvious then, that the prime motive of the British in attacking and deposing King Kosoko, was not to bring peace and tranquility to the people of Lagos. and the neighbouring territories. For, much as they always appeared in the wings of angels, they (the British) also had daggers, sheathed in their feathers. At any rate, the real objective of the British people was soon to become apparent.

In 1853, Akitoye had died, to be succeded by his son, Dosunmu, who could not succeed in rallying the support of all the local chiefs. In 1861, Dosunmu was forced to surrender the sovereignty of Lagos to the British in exchange for an annual pension of one-thousand-and-two-hundred pounds (£1,200)—the equivalent of about three thousand dollars ($3,000). But it is highly doubtful whether the Brithish would have gone to such a length with their "peace" crusade in a remote part of the world from where they would get nothing in return.

It was not until the proceedings of the notorious "Berlin Slaughter House"[27] of 1884-85, that the British design in the area crystallised in their claim to the territory along the coast and around the River Niger. This territory—then known as Oil[28] Rivers Protectorate—which came to be known as the Southern Provinces of Nigeria, was gradually extended by means of "treaties" and "peace agreements". And by the year 1893, the British area of economic influence had been built up into what was referred to as "the Niger Coast Protectorate"—later to become the Southern Region of Nigeria. Commenting on these "treaties", a Biafran historian noted that they "were initiated by Britian—and invariably embodied coercive clauses designed to bring other nations into line with her policy of suppression."[29]

From the coast, the territorial expansion took a northward trend. The Royal Niger Company, to which the administrative charter of those territories had been granted, pursued this "peace-treaty" policy northwards, and where "peace" was not assured by treaty, it was imposed by force of arms. By 1897, the Emirates of Ilorin and Bida had been brought under the British control and the "recalcitrant" emirs replaced with more compliant ones. In 1900, the Charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked when direct British rule was introduced with the appointment of Frederick Lugard as the first

governor (of the Northern Provinces). The Southern Provinces were placed under the authority of a consul resident in Lagos.

Missionary activities operated pari-passu with colonial expansion.[30] But while they operated with relative ease and freedom in the South, they ran into serious problems in the Northern Provinces, for the following reasons, inter alia:

(1) Conditions of physical hardship involved in the long and rather treacherous trek from the coast up the interior. Transportation facilities inland were practically non-existent.

(2) Moslem resistance against the intrusion of other faiths. Long before this time, the Fulani conquerors of the North had, with the aid of Arabic influences, established a strong Moslem tradition among the people.

(3) The local establishment (the emirates) were highly suspicious of the missionaries as constituting potential threats to their authority, in view of their association with colonial politics. This fear was not completely unfounded, for

> "the climatic point of missionary endeavors coincided with the dramatic expansion of industralization and the need for new economic outlets, and thus with the climatic stage of European imperialism. (And) the initial effect of missionary work all over Africa was to make the African people more submissive to the inroads of the Europeans."[31]

It was not until the year 1914, that both the Northern and the Southern Provinces were welded into a single political entity. Prior to 1914, Lugard had utilised the local rulers for administering the Northern provinces. This administrative tactic which came to be known as 'indirect rule',[32] held a great deal of economic and other advantages, but its applicability could not be easily extended to all societies. As Lugard himself discovered, the principle could not be applied to the Southern Provinces without incurring ugly consequences. Thus when "applied to the South, it was disastrous among the Ibos,[33] whose loose political structure did not suit such a system."[34] Following a 1922 constitution, a legislative body was constituted in 1923,

with specific mandate to legislate only for the Southern provinces; while the North continued to operate under the indirect rule. It becomes evident then, that the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Regions of Nigeria had hitherto been nominal. The first attempts at the institution of a common administrative system came with the advent of the controversial Richard's[35] Constitution.

But just as in the case of the West Indies, the emergence of political movements in Nigeria came in the wake of social and economic inequities; and the emergent political parties constituted an outlet through which the pioneer nationalists expressed their indignation against colonial injustices. As in the West Indies also, troops from Nigeria had been required to fight in the two World Wars. Moreover, Nigerians had travelled to other parts of the world especially to Europe and America in other capacities.[36] As was seen in the case of the West Indies, the ideas, and ideals, which these Nigerians brought back with them, were instrumental in nurturing political awareness among the peoples of Nigeria. This fanned the flame of dissent against colonial malpractices within the colony. The provenance of what came to be the leading political mevement in the Nigerian Federation, followed the aftermath of these out-bursts of nationalistic indignations.

In 1944, towards the end of the Second World War, the students of King's College[37], Lagos, had called a strike to protest against what they had regarded as an unwarranted use of the college facilities for the service of the soldiers. The authorities responded by expelling seventy-five of the striking students, and eight of them—presumed to be the leaders—were drafted into the army. It was in the wake of this incident that the indignant Nigerian intellectuals[38] assembled in a meeting organised by the Nigerian Union of Students. One major outcome of this assembly was the inauguration of the

Nigerian National Council (NNC), later to be known as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons[39] (NCNC). Herbert Macauley, a Yoruba[40] by ethnic heritage, was elected President, and Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, the General Secretary. Though inaugurated at the spur of a provocation consequent upon a specific act of social injustice by the colonial administration the major objective of the new organisation was to liberate the country from the bondage of colonial imperialism.

Thus, in 1946, a team of the NCNC had embarked on a nation-wide political tour of the country to acquaint the people with what they regarded as the gross inequities of the newly introduced Richard's Constitution.[41] It was during this tour that Macauley passed away, and the leadership of the Party subsequently reverted to Azikiwe—a position he held until 1960, the year of the country's independence, when he resigned[42] to accept the appointment as the nation's first indigenous Governor-General. The NCNC dominated the Nigerian political scene until the emergence of the Action Group (AG) in 1951.

The emergence of the AG as another major political movement was one of the epoch-making dramas of the Nigerian political history. While a law student in London, in 1945,[43] Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, who was to become one of Nigeria's leading political figures, had organised the Egbe Omo Oduduwa,[44] regarded then as a purely cultural association, the aim of which was to preserve and perpetuate the cultural heritage of the Yoruba people. But in 1951, Chief Awolowo dramatically proclaimed the birth of a new political party—the Action Group.

The AG contrasted with the NCNC in the strict discipline and seemingly impermeable secrecy that tended to characterise its operations. It would appear that its primary goal was to establish political power in the Western Region, particularly, among the Yoruba population, in spite of its professed

national interest. Some critics had suggested[45] that, prior to its official inauguration, the AG had operated in secrecy for the duration of almost one year, within the NCNC, which, incidentally was the party in power in the Western Regional Government at the time. It had also been suggested that the AG was an offspring of the Oduduwa cult—in fact, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in disguise.[46]

The third of the major political movements—the Northern People's Congress (NPC)—came to be regarded as an anathema among Nigerian nationalists. It was originally organised in December 1949, by R.A.B. Dikko,[47] a Fulani scholar. As the name suggests, the organisation was originally formed to improve the culture and welfare of the people of Northern Nigeria. And its subsequent conversion to a political movement later in the 'fifties, was a matter of expediency rather than principles. For, with the NCNC and the AG representing respectively the interests of the East and the West, as it were, the Northern leaders had felt called upon by duty to procure for the Northerners, their own slice of the national cake. But a political party was the prescribed means through which this politically defined goal was to be attained. Thus, the NPC, the cultural association, became suddenly transformed into the NPC, the political organisation.

But it is also true that some of the pioneer members of the NPC, when it was a purely cultural institution, had founded a political party under the leadership of Mallam[48] Amino Kano—the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). Amino Kano, for instance, held simultaneous membership in both organisations until the NPC was converted into a political party that came to be regarded by many as ultra-conservative.[49]

Having thus followed the evolutionary paths of the major political movements, further consideration of the political developments seems

appropriate. The Richard's Constitution of 1946, attempted, for the first time, to bring the entire country under the administrative authority of one legislative council (vide supra, p. 28). It also marked the beginning of regionalism in Nigerian politics; for it was then that the country was administratively partitioned into three states or regions, (East, West, and North). These were later to constitute the intitial three units of the Nigerian Federation. But the Federal constitution was not to be instituted until the McPherson's[50] Constitution was introduced to rectify the ills of his predecessor's administration.

The dissatisfactions, objections, and dissent which greeted the Richards' Constitution, precipitated a major political crisis that required a constitutional conference for its resolution. The constitutional conference of 1947, had, as its major outcome, the McPherson's Constitution which took effect in 1951. This marked the beginning of federalism in Nigerian politics. But the McPherson's (federal) Constitution, though an improvement on the preceding one, did not, by any means, resolve all the political problems of Nigeria. It created some more problems of its own. Nigeria was at the brink of another political crisis as federalism intensified regionalism. Regionalism in turn fostered the growth of 'opportunistic ethnicity'.[51]

Another constitutional conference seemed inevitable. In 1953, the conference on the Nigerian Constitution met in London. It was to meet again in 1956 and finally in 1959. The conference of the 'fifties were to resolve political issues with deep economic roots. Federalism and the attendant regionalism, had intensified ethnic loyalties. This seemed to create a centrifugal force among the three major Regions, the federal assets, constituting, as it were, the central hub. This was the trend prior to the last constitutional conference in 1959, which was to grant Nigeria self-government.

It was the expectation of "Independence" that slightly eased the zeal for regionalism and induced the three Regional political parties into compromising some of their Regional commitments for the national interest. Prior to this, the parties were ethnically polarised. The NCNC, under Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had its major base in the Eastern Region, especially among the Igbo; the NPC, under Ahumadu Bello, the Northern Premier, was based on, and almost confined completely to, the Hausa-Fulani of the North. The Action Group, under its leader, Chief Awolowo, the Premier of the West, had its base among the Yoruba people of the Region.

In the 'fifties, the great demand for cocoa in the world market had rendered cocoa business a very lucrative enterprise at the time. This had made the Western[52] Region, where cocoa was mainly produced, the richest, and therefore, the most economically viable Region of the Federation. It also left Eastern Nigeria the poorest of the three Regions, its economy based primarily on palm produce. The Northern Region, was better off than the East, because of its cotton, tin and copper. To make matters worse for the East, the Nigerian Railway Corporation had changed to diesel, thus rendering the coal industry of the East virtually inoperative, thereby suffocating further the economy of that Region.

In this state of economic set-up, the regionalism which deeply permeated Nigerian politics with the institution of Federal constitution in 1951, did more to protract the economic warfare, which, if not clearly manifest, was latent in the inter-regional political struggles. Thus, the Yoruba-based Action Group Party, and the Government of the West which it controlled, were advocating revenue allocation <u>on the basis of derivation</u>.[53] But with the eventual slump[54] in the cocoa market, and the almost simultaneous discovery and production of oil in the Eastern Region, the scale of Nigeria's

economy suddenly tilted, making the Eastern Region the richest Region of the Federation, and the West, the worse[55] off. The sudden switch of the Western Region-based Action Group in advocating for revenue allocation on the basis of need, was a clear case of "opportunistic ethnicity" that had characterised the Nigerian political life. To fully appreciate the role of regionalism and ethnicity in Nigerian politics, it should be remembered that, prior to the intrusion of the European imperialist—and the British colonialists in particular—the three major ethnic groups had developed their distinct, and in most cases conflicting, political institutions.

In the North , for example, the influence of the Arabic and Fulani invaders had resulted in the establishment of a strong Moslem tradition among the Hausa-Fulani people. A form of feudal aristocracy had therefore marked the political life of the people. The situation, while appearing to be similar, was fundamentally different among the Yoruba of Western Nigeria.

The political system of the Yoruba was traditionally, one of constitutional monarchy. But the monarchical system was anything but absolute. The Yoruba King was responsible to a council or body of King-makers, who, in turn, held a mandate from the people. The colonial policy which subsequently conferred on the Yoruba Kings the absolute mandate that they had traditionally lacked, was essentially a conceptual parallax deriving from the situation existing among the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy of the North. For, when the British colonial administrators found a monarchical set-up in the Western Region, they pictured a pyramid-like structure in which authority flowed in a unidirectional pattern from top to base. Thus, the Yoruba leader , Chief Awolowo was to conclude that:

> "There is no doubt that in its original treatment of Paramount Chiefs, the British government mistook a part for the whole. It invested the

> part with the powers, the exercise of which properly belonged to the whole...The dictatorial powers which some Yoruba Chiefs are wielding today are the making of the British government, who at the beginning misconceived the true nature of the Yoruba monarchy."[56]

Nevertheless, the Yoruba of the West and the Hausa-Fulani of the North had at least one thing in common in the set-up of their political lives, viz., the institution of the chieftaincy system. But among the Igbo of the Eastern Region, the story was quite different.

For the British colonial administrator, the conspicuous absence of chieftaincy system among the Igbo created a problem unique in itself. This had constituted an effective hindrance to the extension of the indirect-rule which, though partially successful among the Yoruba of the West, was a major triumph in the administration of Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. In essence, "the Ibo-speaking peoples were traditionally and politically decentralized, egalitarian, and individualistic",[57] and "along smallness in scale went an essentially democratic[58] or consultative method of political decision-making".[59] Moreover, an eminent British anthropologist, Professor, G.I. Jones, had reported that:

> "The usual pattern here (in Igboland) is for public matters to be discussed at a general meeting at which every able-bodied male who is a full-blooded member of the community had a right to attend and to speak if he wished. After a general discussion the elders retire to consult and when they return a spokesman announces their decision to the full meeting who either accept by general acclamation or refuse it. The community...is not prepared to surrender its legislative authority to any chiefs, elders, or other traditional office-holders."[60]

In view of the foregoing, an Igbo educator, B.O. Ukeje, had come to the conclusion that:

> "The different political systems developed by the different elements (prior to the colonial era), possibly influenced the general character of the people; with autocracy and Mohammedanism in the North, there is apparent conservatism; with constitutional monarchy in Yoruba-land, there is apparent shrewdness and subtlety; and with republicanism in Iboland, there is apparent individualism and dynamism."[61]

Thus these ethnic characteristics, to a great extent, influenced the political life of Nigeria, being mainly responsible for the regional polarisation evidenced in the struggle among the leading political parties. But this ethnic polarisation in Nigeria, has a counter-part in the West Indian political drama. Just as in Nigeria, the political parties had regional bases, in the West Indies, the political movement had insular orientation. In both cases, although the major political parties had nominal national (Federal) commitments, a great deal of their activities and operations depended on the localised support they received from their respective regional bases.

In the West Indies, Manley's PNP, and Bustamante's JLP, both thrived on the island politics of Jamaica. Eric Williams' PNM was the major political movement in Trinidad, the rival political movement being the Democratic Labour Party headed by Albert Gomes. But just as in Nigeria where the Parties were associated with different ethnic groups, in Trinidad, Williams' PNM was regarded as a Black Party, and the Democratic Labour Party of Gomes considered an Indian Party. Thus ethnic politics in Nigeria in a way had a correspondence to the racial and the insular character of West Indian political life. Even so, in Nigeria, the operation of the political parties on the Federal level was as nominal as the inter-island bonds holding the Federal Parties were artificial. What came to be known as the Adams-Manley-Williams political axis, as manifested in the West Indian Federal Labour Party (FLP) inaugurated in 1956, was no more than a token of political affiliation of Manley's PNP (Jamaica), Williams' PNM (Trinidad), and Grantley Adam's Barbados Labour Party, BLP (Barbados). But then, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), whose principal affiliates were Bustamante's Jamaica Labour Party, (Jamaica), and Gomes' Democratic Labour Party (Trinidad),

constituted no more than a mere countervailing force against the Manley-Williams-Adams axis already alluded to. As Anglin aptly points out:

> "If the Federal Labour Party stands for independence, federation, and socialism, the Democratic Labour Party,...tends to be less militant in its nationalism, lukewarm towards federation and... socially more conservative."

This chapter has focussed mainly on the political and the economic transformations in the two defunct Federations. The attempt has been to highlight the significant landmarks along this process, with emphasis on certain aspects of their cultural history, which formed a sequel to subsequent developments. In the Nigerian case, the discourse has been carried up to the time just before independence; and in the case of the West Indies, it has been brought up to the eve of the Federation. The two Federations eventually collapsed; the one, after some six years of self-government, the other, before it was to have attained independence. The theme of the subsequent considerations will be the identification of the factors generating, directly or indirectly, the series of social conflicts, as well as those factors accentuating the existing conflicts. It is the cumulative effect of these, which conspired in the disruption of the respective federal systems. This will then constitute the major task of the following section.

PART III

SOURCES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE.

In part two, an attempt has been made to explore the cultural and socio-political background on which the dramas of federalism were staged in both the West Indies and Nigeria. Chapter 2 dealt with the internal aspects of the background to the drama, with an effort to delineate the initial conditions existing in the component units of the federation. At this stage, the emphasis was on the potential nature of the forces of social conflict. Chapter 3 focussed on the processes which brought these internal forces together, as well as the way in which they were brought into collision with the external forces.

The third part of the study places emphasis on the specific causes and sources of social conflict and the possible consequences for social change. Selected sources of tension among the various social groups, that eventually exploded into conflict, are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the primary concern is to determine or show how these cases of conflict conspired to effect the eventual disruption of the two federations.

Although this work is not a treatise on conflict resolution, some thoughts are entertained on how related conflict situations could be prevented from culminating in eventual social disruption apart from suggesting ways of avoiding the manifestations of such conflict situations in the first place. In view of the problem posed at the intial stage of this study, the main objective here is not so much to determine the sufficient conditions under which a federation operates, as it is to discern the conditions that are necessary and fundamental to social groupings of this type. In other words, the contention is not that the satisfaction of these conditions would guarantee the eventual coming into being of these social groupings. Rather, what is suggested is that where such groupings fail to occur, or where their occurance fails to persist, then this failure could be accounted for, at least

in part, by the non-existence of these conditions in one form or the other.

CHAPTER 4

FEDERATIONS OF NIGERIA AND THE WEST INDIES: SOURCES OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

> "Territories jointly administered by colonial powers, tend to form a single state, while those administered separately tend to maintain their distinct structures after independence."[1]

That the above proposition is plausible, is evident from the experiences of the Nigerian and the West Indian Federations. But one of the major reasons for ascertaining the causes and sources of social conflict, as undertaken in the present chapter, consists in providing an explication or rationale that would account for this trend or tendency. Following, are then some of the overriding issues. They typify, rather than exhaust, the totality of problems which conspired to bring about the collapse of the Federations. In other words, they merely highlight the disintegrative forces which militated against federalism.

Imposed Federation

In the cases of both Nigeria and the West Indies, the contention here is that the principle of federalism was negated when, from the on-set, the decision to federate was virtually imposed from the outside by the colonial power—Britain. In case of the West Indies, Etzioni maintains that:

> "The Federation...was initiated and supported by a country that never became or intended to become a member—the United Kingdom...(And) most of the West Indians who supported it did so for exterior and transient reasons."

He goes further to suggest that:

> "The idea was largely British, it was promoted by the Colonial Office and was 'sold' to a thin layer of West Indians...The Federation... followed the pattern Britain believed best; it was not the kind of federation that might have evolved in the region without outside interference."[2]

In the Nigerian case, the situation was not much different; for, "Nigeria

and the concept of a Nigerian nation were an entirely British creation."[3]

Bretton points out that:

> "The Nigerian Federation was imposed upon the area by the colonial Power—Great Britain—largely for reasons related to colonial interests."[4]

And just as in the case of the West Indies where Bustamante of Jamaica was to condemn the union as "a federation of paupers being foisted by Britain to escape her ancient resonsibility",[5] Chief Awolowo had argued in the Nigerian case:

> "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There is no 'Nigerian' in the same sense as there are 'English', 'Welsh', or 'French'. The word 'Nigeria' is merely a distictive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not."[6]

One major consequence of the fact that federalism was externally imposed on the constituent units, is the implication it had for the structuring of the federations. This constitutes the topic for the subsequent consideration.

Anomalies of the Federal Structure

The island units—in the case of the West Indies—had reacted to the British proposal for federation with some measure of skepticism. This suspicion of the British design was not, in fact, unfounded. The British-engineered federation failed!"...in part because the governmental structure established by the federal constitution was not congruent with the actual power relations among the member units."[7] The inter-island suspicions were based on certain concerns and fears. The smaller units, such as the Windward group, had feared a union in which they would be dominated by the larger, more populous partners, like Jamaica and Trinidad. The bigger units, in turn, expressed concern over a union, the major goal of which would be to place on their shoulders, the burden of sustaining the smaller, and poorer units. Thus, the Barbadians feared:

"that a union with the poorer Windwards would increase their economic

> burdens and would lead to a loss of autonomy by the imposition of a non-self-governing Crown Colony system. Barbados had a fully elected representative assembly, but under federation this would have been abolished."[8]

And when at the London Conference of 1956, Britain ruled out Dominion status for any 'single territory', it was quite apparent that the threat was directed mainly toward Jamaica, which felt itself capable of going on its own, both economically and politically. As Etzioni points out, this 'victimisation' motive manifested in the gerrymandering of the Federal Constitution by the British was responsible, "not only for the slanting of the federal structure in favour of the smaller islands, but also in terms of the so-called 'Colonial limitations' the residue of British control left in the West Indian Constitution."[9] This slanting of the constitution was responsible for the fact that the distribution of power among the units was not in keeping with the structure of the Federation. The incongruity was reflected in the allocation of federal seats, compared with the unit sizes and contribution to the Federal revenue, as illustrated in table 4-1, presented below.

TABLE 4-1

POWER INSTITUTION AND REVENUE ALLOCATION FOR WEST INDIES FEDERATION

Federal Units	Area (sq.mis.)	% of Total Area	Population (in mills.)	% of Total Population	Allocation of Federal Seats	% of Total Seats	Contribution to National Income (%)	Proposed Allocation of Colonial Dev. Funds
Jamaica	4,411	57.60	1.613	51.70	17	37.8	54.5	250,000
Trinidad-Tobago	1,980	25.80	0.825	26.50	10	22.2	31.3	100,000
Barbados	166	2.20	0.232	7.40	5	11.1	6.6	500,000
Greneda	133	1.70	0.089	2.80	2	4.4		540,000
St. Vincent	150.3	2.00	0.080	2.60	2	4.4	5.3	540,000
St. Lucia	238	3.10	0.095	3.00	2	4.4		900,000
Dominica	289.5	3.80	0.060	1.90	2	4.4		1 million
Antigua	108	1.40	0.054	1.70	2	4.4	1.10	680,000
St. Kitts-Nevis	155	2.00	0.057	1.80	2	4.4	1.1	900,000
Montserrat	32.5	0.03	0.012	0.40	1	2.2	0.2	200,000
TOTAL	7,663.3	99.63	3.117	100.0	45	100	100	3,240,000

(Source: Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, pp. 150-151, 173).

As the above table indicates, it is difficult to rationalise the structuring of the Federation, and the attendant distribution of responsibilities and amenities on the basis of any simple mathematical or logical formula. One cannot help but wonder if the primary rationale was not in large part, the whim or caprice of the British colonial administration.

What has been said of the West Indies, was also true of Nigeria. As Bretton points out, the British purposely arranged the constitutional structure "so as to favour the less progressive, or less developed Northern Region", condemning it "as a giant gerrymander".[10] This, no doubt, had serious implications for the manner in which power was distributed among the various units of the Federation. And, just as in the case of the West Indies, this was reflected on the allocation of seats to the regions, in the Federal legislature. For purposes of illustration, we may consider the distribution of the popular vote and federal seats by political parties, following the pre-independence federal elections in 1959.

TABLE 4-2

POPULAR VOTES AND FEDERAL SEATS BY PARTIES IN THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION

	NPC	Action Group	NCNC-NEPU
Popular Votes	1,992,179	1,992,364	2,594,577
Seats	134	73	89

(Source: Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of a Colonial Failure, American Committee on Africa, 1967, p. 36).

From the above, it becomes evident then, that, although the Northern People's Congress (NPC) was the most unpopular political party, in terms of numerical votes, it nevertheless won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Federal legislature. But, as Diamond accurately points out,

"if the allotment of seats were made on a national, rather than a regional basis, the NPC would have been deadlocked with the AG, while losing national primacy".[11]

TABLE 4-3

PROJECTED ALLOTMENT OF SEATS ON A NATIONAL BASIS

	NPC	Action Group	NCNC-NEPU
Federal Seats	86	86	112

(Source: See Table 4-2).

This arrangement would defintely have put the control of political power, on the national level, in the hands of the Southern Nigerian Parties, and in particular, Eastern Nigeria. But, as may already have been apparent—and as would be further appreciated subsequently—Southern Nigeria in general, and the Igbo, in particular, had constituted the greatest single obstacle to the operation of the British colonial administration in the Federation. Such political arrangement that would have given political power to the Eastern Nigerian people (the Igbo in particular) would not have been in the best interest of the British government. But this did not happen. Nigeria attained independence with the 'preferred' group (the Northern Region, in this case), in control of the game. It is pointed out, however, that:

"In a colonial situation it is not normally possible to resolve the struggle for power between political groups. Even if it happens that...the parties work out the constitution, they do so under the supervision of an autocratic colonial referee who inevitably modifies the forces of conflict. Hence, the pre-independence arrangements that become effective with independence seldom represent a real and natural division of power between the various groups... (But) this referee is in itself, an interest group."[12]

Intensity of Nationalism

Another major potential source of social conflict in both Nigeria and the West Indies was perhaps, nationalism that was low in intensity. This

was reflected in the conspicuous absence of what Etzioni has described as "identitive Power".[13] The logic of this is very simple. In the West Indies, the intensification of inter-island differences was a major consequence of ecological insularity. To the separate island nationists struggling for emancipation from colonial rule and imperial exploitation, Britain represented the oppressor. Moreover, there had been more interaction between Britain and the separate island units, and very little or no interaction among the units themselves. The proposal by Britain for the federation of the units, therefore, not only strengthened the skepticism about the British design, but also intensified inter-island suspicion. The identitive feeling was therefore lacking among the West Indians. Thus:

> "Where before federation, there had developed some sense of West Indian identity, its strength was not sufficient to establish its priority over island loyalties. Each island continued to be conscious of its uniqueness and individuality...(And) the West Indian nation exists only when the West Indian team plays cricket against an outside team."[14]

Also the Moyne Commission had reported that time was not "yet ripe for the introduction of any large scheme of federation". Pointing to local pride as a major hindrance to federation, the commission noted that:

> "efforts to secure co-operation for the common good from all the West Indian colonies are still...frustrated by insularity... (there being some doubt about) the readiness of West Indian opinion to accept federation in principle."[15]

Furthermore, Etzioni suggests that:

> "The development of a West Indian nationalism was (limited by) strong ethnic differentiations and identifications. These were especially important in accounting for the <u>separatist feelings and secession</u> of Trinidad. Relations between the East Indians and Negroes in Trinidad are tense and the former greatly fear a federation dominated by the latter. The East Indians who form...the second largest group in Trinidad view federation with suspicion...They see the possibility of being swamped in a predominantly African domination."[16]

But the West Indies Federation collapsed not so much because of the weak nationalism of its human diversity, but more because of the cultural poverty

that constituted the content of this diverse humanity. As Ayearst points out;

> "The colonies and ex-colonies in Africa...present the familiar picture of native peoples ruled...by European powers and, as they acquire self-government, reviving or developing a local nationalism based upon their own historic culture. In contrast...those of the West Indies contain no 'natives'. Instead, their populations constitute an amalgam of non-indigenous peoples."[17]

But if the absence of indigenous peoples constituted a hindrance to the working of a West Indies Federation, the presence of indigenous cultures by itself, did not prove to be a special asset in the case of Nigeria. The cultural incompatibility of these indigenous cultures militated against the principles of federalism. The major weakness of Nigerian nationalism consisted in the fact that commitment to national interest was neither extensive nor profound enough as to constitute an adequate countervailing force to ethnic loyalties. Bretton points out that, "what is significant about the ethnic composition of this nation of Nigeria is that its composition actually includes different races."[18] But the major issue was not the mere fact of ethnic differentiation. His contention was that the peoples of Nigeria and their cultures, were, in fact

> "so different...that in every respect they do not warrant being given the same national designation...A person living in S.E. Nigeria—a member of the Ibo tribe—is more different from a fellow Nigerian in the N.W. corner than can be said of a Greek peasant and a British Lord."[19]

As a matter of fact, Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the man who later came to be the Prime Minister of the Federation, had earlier contended:

> "Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united...Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country."[20]

In these circumstances, then, the cultivation of identitive sentiments by the peoples of the federation, vis-a-vis, one another, could not be taken as a matter of course. Hence, one is reminded that:

> "The naked letters of the constitution, however strongly worked, can never preserve the unity of the Federation unless the various ethnic groups are in their heart of hearts determined to live together as one."[21]

But in such a heterogenously constituted system, common sense would dictate that, for a smooth operation, the relationships among the constituent units of the Federation be based on some kind of equitable exchange. As Ahmadu Bello[22] himself admitted, "the political future (of the Nigerian peoples) must rest on an agreeable give and take between the parties".[23] But whether he believed in the actual practice of this reciprocity principle, was another matter. For, while struggling to grab their own share of the Nigerian cake, as it were, the Northern leaders were, at the same breath, engaged in a systematic process of absolving the North from any kind of obligations or responsibilities to the Federation. Thus, Bello was to state categorically at a latter time; "what happened in Lagos[24] was not of great consequence here in the North."[25]

It would seem that in Nigeria cultural diversity fanned the flame of ethnic animosity, thereby intensifying inter-regional antagonism, just as in the case of the West Indies, ecological insularity had accentuated inter-island suspicion. This was in spite of Ayearst's suggestion that whereas the ex-colonies in Africa:

> "are vividly conscious of their nationalism as they emerge from colonial status...in the West Indies the new nationalism is conditioned and somewhat blurred by the mixture of races in the population, the absence of any truly local culture."[26]

Having thus dealt with the general aspects of the issues of social conflict, attention will now be turned to the specific sources of social conflict, or conflict issues arising from unique local factors. To facilitate the task, it seems necessary to consider the two federal systems separately.

THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION: Source of Conflict

The Chaguaramas Affair

Perhaps one of the factors that contributed most to the ultimate disintegration of the West Indies Federation was the conflict that developed around the issue of Chaguaramas, where the United States had a huge military base. It is here perhaps that the collision of imperial and colonial forces, with those deriving from internal tension, is brought to a better perspective.

Back in 1940, during the Second World War, the naval harassment of the Atlantic shippings, by the German U-boats, had rendered American military shipments to Britain almost inoperative. The British evacuation at Dunkirk, and the almost simultaneous capitulation of France and her navy, had caused great consternations among Anglo-American policy makers. It was as part of the grand strategy to counter the German menace that Britain leased the Chaguaramas base in Trinidad, for ninety-nine years to the United States. Furthermore, part of the agreement was that, in time of emergency, the U.S. was to exercise absolute authority, not only over the base, but also throughout the island Territory of Trinidad. Here then was an example of a territory made a pawn between imperial powers—an incident that is very reminiscent of the historic "Berlin Slaughter House".

But how does this relate to the present issue under consideration? Back in 1957, the Standing Federation Committee (SFC) had chosen Trinidad for the site of the Federal capital, following which a site committee (S.C.) had been constituted to find and recommend a suitable site in Trinidad. The S.C. consequently put Chaguaramas at the top of their list of priorities, using the criteria laid down by the SFC. This then was the beginning of the tension that was to pull the Jamaican, the Trinidadian, and the Barbadian statesmen further apart.

When the SFC reconvened to consider the recommendations of the S.C., Manley of Jamaica and Grantley of Barbados pressed for the release of the base by the U.S., whereas Williams of Trinidad found himself in a dilemma. On the one hand, Williams, a federalist in every respect, could not very well oppose the release of the base, for this would have exposed him to ridicule, and earned him the label of an "imperial stooge". On the other hand, the Party he led (PNM) had, in its federal manifesto promised "a clear, distinct, and unequivocal guarantee before our election that we would honour all international obligations including the U.S. Bases Agreement. The Chaguaramas base was vital for the defense of Trinidad and its oil—an important basis of Federal revenue. If Trinidad supported the resolution, she would be exposed to the charge of using SFC to break international commitments. If Trinidad opposed it, she would be suspected of trying to foist some other site upon her federal partners."[27] At any rate, the delegates finally agreed to the intiating of a joint negotiation with the British government and the United States, that was convened in London.

Ironically, it was at the London meeting that Williams, who formerly advocated the path of caution, dramatically became the uncompromising federal proponent for the unconditional release of the base by the United States. It was perhaps this unexpected change of stance by Williams that tempered the unyielding position of both Washington and London into referring the issue to a Joint Commission. The report of the Commission was not released until after the Federal inauguration. But not surprisingly, it came out in favour of the American interest. A footnote to this, was the British-American offer of a ten year "amnesty", when the Base-Agreement shoud be brought under review.

But what alienated the authorities in Trinidad more from their colleagues in Jamaica and Barbados, was not the fact that Williams came later

to champion the cause already supported by Manley and Adams. What drove the wedge deeper into the already shaky Adams-Manley-Williams axis was the realisation later, by Williams, that his federal compatriots were reluctant to carry on to its logical conclusion, the struggle they had set out to win. Mordecai thus argues:

> "It was clearly by omission, that Sir Grantley did not intend to follow any cause which implied unit direction, but was intent upon keeping Chaguaramas as an issue of Federal direction...He and his government stood by holding such conference without being committed to pushing for a surrender."[28]

Manley, who was party to the initiation of the fight, was later to desert his comrade on the battlefield with a retreating apologia that the Chaguaramas issue "was not a Federal responisibility".[29] The Chaguaramas case was later to be complicated by the oil refinery issue.

The Oil Refinery Issue

By mid-1958, the Jamaican government had entered into negotiations with the American oil company, ESSO, for the construction of an oil refinery. Mordecai suggusts that the Jamaican government proposal for the refinery was in flat contradiction of internal free trade.

> "This was a proposal to protect oil refining in Jamaica by levying a consumption tax which would be refunded to Jamaican refiners. Its purpose was to afford protection to (the) refinery...at the expense of excluding imports from the refiners in Trinidad."[30]

As one would expect, this move by Jamaica was received in Trinidad with grave concern. It drew a strong protest, to both Jamaican and Federal authorities, from Williams who saw the economy of Trinidad, and therefore, that of the Federation, seriously threatened. The unconciliatory and recalcitrant responses which greeted his protests only served to accelerate the pace of the centrifugal forces already set in motion by the Chaguaramas Affair. To Williams' ultimatum that, "The Trinidad Government would be no

party to freedom of movement of people as soon as possible, and to freedom of movement of goods as late as possible,"[31] the Jamaican authorities responded with a threat of secession:

> "The Constitution must be rewritten so that the Federal Government would have no right whatsoever to impose any kind of taxation upon Jamaica, without Jamaica's prior agreement. Representation... must be based on population...Any Customs Union must be such as not to hurt our workers or our economy."[32]

The Jamaican authorities warned that:

"If these things are not met, Jamaica must withdraw (from the Federation)."[33]

It would appear that the major battle within the Federation from now on had been drawn maninly between Jamaica and Trinidad. The former was heading for an association with as weak a bond as possible; the latter could not buy anything less than a tight union. The oil refinery issue wound up, nevertheless, with Jamaica having her way. But this, by itself, did not mitigate the inter-island conflict.

The highlight of the Jamaican ultimatum of May 27, 1959 was the Government Ministry Paper No. 18 (M.P. #18) which "identified the wide ecological gap between Jamaica and Trinidad, with Jamaica determined to denude the Federal Government of vital powers, present and prospective,"[34] Trinidad's response to this was Eric Williams' 'Economics of Nationhood', which was a blueprint of what the federation ought to be. In the 'Economics of Nationhood', Williams had proposed that the Federal Government should control, among other things: defense, external affairs, immigration, and emigration; Freedom of Movement of persons "to be entrenched in the constitution"; Exchange control and Currency, customs, and the right to impose any kind of tax, subject to a Financial Agreement. It further suggested that the distribution of the financial responsibility be according to the following format:

TABLE 4-4

BLUE PRINT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY AS PROPOSED IN THE 'ECONOMICS OF NATIONHOOD'

	B.W.I. $ million		B.W.I. $ million
Trinidad	+ 22.8	Antigua	- 0.66
Jamaica	+ 13.5	St. Vincent	- 0.77
Barbados	3.7	Greneda	- 0.14
St. Kitts	0.23	Montserrat	- 0.18
Dominica	0.80	St. Lucia	- 0.21

(Source: John Mordecai, The West Indies: Federal Negotiations, (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1968), p. 164).

This would have meant the major burden of the federation being borne by the three biggest units, with five of the smaller units having a net gain from the federal coffer. But this proposal was not expected to be taken seriously by Jamaica whose mind, it seems, had already been made up, against the Federation.

From the foregoing, it would have been surprising if the union had lasted much longer than it did. The Trinidadian authorities, it appears, had appreciated Jamaica's concerns. They had noted the fact that Jamaica contributed about forty percent of the Federal revenue while getting much less than that, in return from, the Federation. But then, Williams had contended that

> "Jamaica had conspicuously underestimated the advantage it would derive from the Federation...(And) he did not agree with Jamaican fears with respect to Federal control of industry, (because) Trinidad-and-Tobago had similar problems...but was yet prepared to submit to Federal control."

He further maintained that

> "Trinidad-and-Tobago alone could not take over the responsibilities involved in a Federation without Jamaica."[35]

In any case, the inter-island tension, rather than cooling off, intensified,

and the internal conflict escalated. The result of the 1961 referendum which urged Jamaica out of the Federation did not, in fact, come as a surprise. The Federation had been dealt a fatal blow, and its complete suffocation required a formal ritual the following year when Jamaica finally took leave, to be followed shortly by Trinidad.

The Federation of Nigeria

The Western Nigeria Crisis: Phase 1

Perhaps, the wave of social crises which marked, and eventually culminated in the break-up of, post-independence Nigeria originated from the political upheaval which erupted in the Western Region in 1962. During the early period of the Action Group history, the primary concern of its Yoruba leadership[36] had been the consolidation of Regional power,[37] which was the only way—at least, so it seemed to these leaders—the Yoruba could have a voice in the policy-making processes of the Federation. And in adopting this policy, the AG leadership had received solid support from the masses of the Yoruba people.

In the early days of independence, Chief Awolowo had come to grips with the reality of the limited prospects in regionalism as a basis for political operation on a national scale. Moreover, with the setback in cocoa market which had once made Western Nigeria the richest Region in the Federation, the lucrative oil enterprise which had subsequently conferred on the Eastern Region the status of the richest—and therefore, the most economically viable—unit, and with the Northern Region emerging as the dominant political force, in virtue of its numerical majority, Chief Awolowo saw only one channel open for the AG, as well as the Western Region, to assert its right in the federal enterprise. The expansion of the political base, and the national scope of the AG seemed to be imperative. There was one more encouraging note. The

substantial in-roads which his party (AG) had made in the Northern Region during the 1959 elections had demonstrated that Northern Nigeria was not, after all, impenetrable, and neither was the NPC invulnerable, as had been the common belief.

But there were some dissenting opinions within the ranks of the Action Group leadership, vehemently opposed to the idea of 'over-extending' the operational scope of the party politics, to the detriment, as it were, of power-consolidation within the Region, especially Yorubaland. The leading exponent of Regionalism in this sense, was Chief Akintola, Awolowo's deputy.

Awolowo's neo-nationalism, so to speak, had been most articulated in his urge for the creation of more states—having in mind the Northern Region which the AG had sought to break up into segments compatible with the size of the Southern Regions. It is to be expected that the Northern leadership would not particularly be inclined to fraternise with Awolowo and his supporters in view of this avowed policy to 'disintegrate' the Northern Region. But if 'devils' ever have attributes of virtue or goodness, and if the Southern politicans were radical political scoundrels, vis-a-vis, the Northern statesmen, then, given a choice between Awolowo and his deputy, the Northerners would certainly take "the better of two evils"; and Chief Akintola was their candidate.

In the middle of 1961, the Northern legislature had been dissolved and reconstituted by a subsequent election in which the NPC was returned to power by an overwhelming majority. But the electoral processes were carried out in a manner that the AG and its leadership had regarded as clandestine. This had led Chief Awolowo to charge the NPC with irregularities in the conduct of the election. But meanwhile, the division within the AG itself had been growing wider.

This internal conflict in the AG came to a head during the Party's Annual Conference in Northern Nigeria in the middle of 1962, when the Party's deputy Chief, (and Western Region Premier), Chief Akintola, left the Conference against the will of his party, for home, to play host to the Northern Premier whose visit to the Western Region had, incidentally, coinqided with the AG Conference in the North. This by no means portrayed a good and exemplary image of Chief Akintola to the Yoruba citizenry still loyal to Chief Awolowo. Thus, alarmed, at the 'audacious' incursions of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy into their domain, the Yorubas had to act quickly in the face of this immenent 'invasion' from the North.

Consequently, sixty[38] members of the Western Legislature submitted a memorandum to the Regional Governor, in which they had disavowed confidence in the Premier, Chief Akintola. And, following consultations with the Region's attorney-general, the governor had dismissed the Premier, replacing him with another Yoruba appointee. But the Governor's action was subsequently challenged by Chief Akintola in a law suit, in which he had contended that the Governor exceeded his constitutional powers in removing him from office without the benefit of a hearing by the House. The Action Group countered the legal move by formally terminating[39] Chief Akintola's membership of the Party. Akintola was later to form his own party. Nevertheless, Chief Akintola's case was upheld; and with his subsequent reinstatement by the nation's court, a state of political schism thus prevailed within the Western Region. Its repercussions were to be felt all over the federation. This schism generated enormous forces of social conflict. It was the escalation of this conflict into violent actions, that brought the Federal intervention which placed the Region under emergency rule for the subsequent six months. But the Western Nigeria crisis was rooted in a more fundamental problem that had plagued the Federation right from its inception: 'How many Nigerians?'

The Census Crisis

The first population census ever to take place in post-independence Nigeria was organised in 1962. This was about the time the Federal Constitution was introduced in Nigeria. It was also the time that "opportunistic ethnicity" was injected into Nigerian political system, with the dramatic inauguration of the Yoruba-based Action Group party. According to the 1952 Census count, the Federal population was distributed as follows:

TABLE 4-5

NIGERIA: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1952

Regions	Population
Eastern Region	7,497,000
Northern Region	17,573,000
Western Region	6,408,000
Federal Territory of Lagos	272,000
TOTAL	31,750,000

(Source: 1952 Census Report).

The following remark seems perinent in this context:

> "The political significance of the (1952) Census was that it assured the dominance of the North in the Federal Government since seats in the Federal House of Parliament were then allocated on a population basis. Out of the 312 seats in the Federal House, the North received 174 seats, thus placing it in an absolute majority."[40]

But Professor S.A. Aluko,[41] has demonstrated that prior to independence, there had been no serious effort to ascertain the actual figure of Nigerian population, and that the figures officially used were based on careless estimates, and as such, quite, unreliable.

The Census of May 1962, was therefore, the first serious attempt to determine the real population of Nigeria, but as it turned out, it proved a failure, because of the manipulation of the figures to achieve regionalistic

political ends. Consequently, the report of the census was never pulicised. And with the rejection of the 1962 count, a second census trial was set for the following year. When the report of the second count was released early in 1964, the Federal population was distributed as follows:

TABLE 4-6

NIGERIA: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1963

Eastern Region	12,388,646
*Mid-Western Region	2,533,337
Northern Region	29,777,986
Western Region	10,278,500
Lagos	675,352
TOTAL	55,653,821

* The Midwest was carved out of the former Western Region in 1963 .

Source: 1963 Census Report, as quoted in Arthur A. Nwankwo et.al., The Making of a Nation: Biafra, (C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969), p.49.

Comparison of tables 4-5 and 4-6 would seem to indicate that the population of Nigeria increased by about eighty percent in one decade; Eastern Region by forty percent; Western Region (including the Midwest) by 100%; Northern Region by eighty percent; and Lagos by 100%. This would suggest an annual population increase of the form indicated below

*TABLE 4-7

NIGERIA: GROWTH RATE OF POPULATION

Federal Units	% Population Increase over 1952	Percentage Annual Growth
Eastern Region	40%	4%
Northern Region	80%	8%
Western Region	100% (includes the Midwest)	10%
Lagos	100%	10%
TOTAL	80%	8%

*(Derived from Tables 4-5 and 4-6).

As some observers accurately pointed out, "the United Nations demographers regarded a two percent increase per annum as normal in Africa",[42] but it is only the growth rate of the Eastern Region (four percent) that comes closest to the UN figure. Table 4-7 would also suggest that the East had the least growth rate of all the units of the Federation. But this would be in flat contradiction of what was said in the second chapter, regarding the high population density and high growth rate of the Igbo, who constituted the predominant population of that Region. As one observer noted, "The East, which many had thought to be the fastest growing region was... shown to have lost ground compared with the other regions."[43] But in spite of the protests[44] from many concerned quarters of the Federation, the NPC-controlled[45] government decided to accept the report as official and final. This decision further intensified the interethnic differences, and the inter-Regional conflicts, and crises followed, one after another. The inter-ethnic animosity was reflected in the Northernisation Policy.[46]

The Federal Election Crisis, 1964

The Census crisis was at the root of the subsequent Federal election crisis, which followed shortly after. As will be recalled, in the Western Region, Chief Akintola had been reinstated following the Federal intervention in that Region, and his chief political adversary, Chief Awolowo, subsequently convicted of treason;[47] but that Region was anything but peaceful. Following the Census, a federal election had been scheduled for December 1964. The social atmosphere all over the Federation was tense with inter-ethnic distrust. Some NCNC adherents of Yoruba heritage had resigned from the Party to join forces with Akintola's group to fight "Igbo domination"; and Akintola's newly-formed Party, United People's Party (UPP) had adopted a new nomenclature—the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)—to accommodate the 'new comers'.

Meanwhile, three members of the Federal Electoral Commission had resigned in protest against what they regarded as unfair: holding an election in an atmosphere of tension. But this did not move the NPC-controlled Federal leadership who insisted that the elections be held on schedule; and this was what happened.

Power realignments in political alliances were a reflection of the political and social forces at work at the eve of the federal elections. Thus, the Northern-based NPC and Akintola's NNDP joined forces as the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA); the NCNC and the AG,[48] the NEPU, and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) all came together to constitute the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). The campaigns were marked by open hostilities between the supporters of opposing groups. And campaign rallies and speeches became a rather precarious[49] enterprise in areas where members of a particular alliance did not enjoy popular support.

But the election which was initially boycotted by the Eastern Region and the UPGA supporters in parts of the Western Region, did not ease the tension; it rather intensified the inter-ethnic antagonism. And the 'victory' of the NPC-NNDP alliance only aggravated the apprehension of the Southerners, of Northern domination. What, to the Yoruba in particular, had appeared to be the use of Akintola's NNDP lackey as an instrument of the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy, had generated sentiment against Chief Akintola and his supporters while cultivating sympathy for the Action Group loyalists whose hero, Chief Awolowo, was still in jail. The election crisis brought the Prime Minister, Mr Bellewa (a Northerner) and the nation's President, Dr. Azikiwe (an Easterner) almost into head-on collision;[50] and the Federation would have exploded at this stage, had not the President given in, to the Prime Minister, at the last moment. But behind the facade of the NCNC-AG Alliance was the still unabated anti-Igbo sentiment

which was yet to be manifested in another incident.

The University of Lagos Crisis

In the spring of 1965, the Igbo[51] vice-Chancellor of the University of Lagos (a Federal institution), Dr. Eni Njoku, was replaced with a Yoruba scholar, Saburi Biobaku.[52] This change was carried out by the predominantly Yoruba Provisional Council of the University, against the recommendations of the University senate. One of the consequences was the resignation of several members of the senior faculty of the University, who saw this as a flagrant violation of, and an infringement on, the academic freedom of the University. This triggered demonstrations and protests both within and outside the University community, by indignant students and faculty, who saw Dr. Njoku as an innoncent victim of social injustice, political vindictiveness, and opportunistic ethnicity. The confrontation[53] between the University community and the essentially Yoruba authorities, was such that the University was temporarily closed. The chain of crises continued, nevertheless, and it was in this atmosphere of inter-ethnic tension that an election was scheduled in the Western Region for October 1965.

Western Nigeria Crisis: Phase 2

The unpopularity of the NNDP government of the Western Region, as reflected in the growing public sentiment, was such as would indicate that the Premier, Chief Akintola and his supporters, had all but lost ground in that Region. There was relatively high public expectation in the anticipated victory of the Action Group Party—which fact would warrant the release of the AG leader, Chief Awolowo from prison. But Akintola and his NNDP supporters, determined to stay in power at all cost, were known to have blatantly rigged[54] the election. At this point the general public of Western Nigeria felt driven to the limit of endurance. For, whereas Chief Akintola had the right to want to impose his leadership on the people, the people

also had even greater right to reject any form of leadership that did not meet their approval. This then, was the beginning of the last phase of the crisis in the Region, which subsequently threatened the very life of the Federation. It was a show-down between the ruler and the ruled.

Loss of human lives and damage of property, followed in the wake of the violent social upheaval which subsequently engulfed the entire Region. This violent confusion and utter chaos persisted—ironically, at the connivance of the Federal Government which, earlier in 1962, did not hesitate to declare a state of emergency in that same Region. Puzzled by the apparent indifference of the Federal authorities, some observers have asked:

> "If the Federal Government could declare a state of emergency in 1962, following the internal crisis in the Action Group, why did the same Federal Government refuse to take a similar line of action in 1965, when wholesale arson, looting, and murder were taking place in Western Nigeria following the fraudulent Western election of October that year? It was the same Federal Government under the same...Belewa."[55]

Perhaps the right answer to this question will ever remain a mystery. At any rate, the Federal action was never to come; the conflict escalated; the situation degenerated. The aimless drift continued until the situation was arrested by the January Revolution of 1966.[56]

The January Revolution[57]

The Army coup d'etat of January 15, 1966 should be considered in a perspective in which the foregoing sequence of crises forms a broad background. It was in the midst of murders, arson, and other aspects of the social turmoil threatening to destroy the nation that the Prime Minister of Nigeria undertook, on his own initiative, to play host to a Conference of Commonwealth[58] Prime Ministers in order to resolve the issues of the Rhodesian crisis[59]. The Prime Minister, Balewa, had himself opened the Conference on January[60] 14, 1966, in Lagos, in the vicinity of which his own people were killing themselves in large numbers.

But however good his intentions, vis-a-vis, the oppressed people of Rhodesia, the Army did not allow them to obstruct what it considered its duty to the Nigerian people—the protection of the people from both external and internal danger. Certainly the peoples of Nigeria were in danger. This then was the background to the January Revolution[61] that was to last but briefly.

The July Counter-Coup and its Tragic Aftermath

The January revolution inaugurated the first military regime in the country's history under an Igbo army officer, General Ironsi.[62] The Army considered the problem of ethnicity as constituting the root of Nigeria's social crises; and this consequently prompted the promulgation of the historic Degree No. 34 which sought to abolish regionalism thereby giving legal tender to a programme of a united Nigeria. Subsequently, this was interpreted in some quarters to be a prelude to the "Igbo domination" of the country. As a result of the schemings and intrigues of international opportunists—mainly the British—the Northern Nigerians were impressed with the idea that the Decree No. 34, was an Igbo design to control the whole country. As noted by some observers of the Nigerian scene,

> "the expatriates (mainly British) resident in Northern Nigeria, who can rightly be called the largest contributors of the break-up of the Federation...(the) great beneficiaries of the Northernisation' policy...saw in the military take-over an end to their long years of paternalism in that region...(and)saw in Decree No.34 a document which gave constitutional permanence to their displacement from their priveleged positions as 'expert' advisers to the Northern Nigeria Government and substitution by qualified Nigerians from the South."[63]

The consequence of this international collaboration was a series of rioting, killings, of the Easterners in a number of Northern cities, the looting and destruction of their property. West Africa commenting on the riots noted:

> "The riots in Northern Nigeria...are generally thought to have been the responsiblility of politicians disappointed in their expectation that they would soon be returned to the fruits of office...It is

> clear that the demonstrations were essentially tribalistic, anti-Ibo, in nature, and should not be elevated into serious expressions of political thinking about the constitution."[64]

The May riots were only a prelude to the major catastrophe which began on July 16, 1966 with the counter military coup and the subsequent pogrom that ensued. The victims were Eastern Army officers and civilians (especially those of Igbo heritage).

> "The aim of the July 29 (coup) was two-fold: (i) to split the country and effect the secession of the North from the rest of Nigeria; (ii) in the alternative, to re-establish the hegemony and domination of the North in the Federation."[65]

But without going into the details of the ensuing pogrom, a few comments on the highlights would be in order.

Writing in the New Leader, George T.Orick had the following comment on the events of post-July 1966 Nigeria:

> "Gowon, (the self-proclaimed head of the present Nigerian military government), has become little more than a mouthpiece for the Hausa-Fulani leaders, who...speak of national unity yet say, and not always privately, that unity (Meaning Northern domination) is not possible unless the Ibos are either killed or contained in their home land."

On the actual killings, he states:

> "Then in September 1966, the Moslem Hausa got down to the serious business of exterminating Ibos. In less than 10 days they slaughtered upwards of 50,000 Ibo men, women, and children who had been living and working in Northern cities...The Army units in the North already purged of Ibos in July and August, instead of stopping the slaughter participated in it."[66]

Stephen Lewis reminds skeptics, and apologists of "one Nigeria" not to ignore the fact "that 30,000 Biafrans died in the pogroms of 1966", noting that "the world press had reported the sheer madness of that episode and of the subsequent harassment and ferocity which forced two million Ibos to flee for home."[67] Frederick Forsyth[68] has documented the account of the 1966 atrocity against the Easterners in general and the Igbo, in particular. Below are some excerpts from the account of foreign eyewitnesses of the pogrom.

(i) From the correspondence of Time Magazine, October 7:

> The massacre began at the airport near the Fifth Battalion's home city of Kano...From the airport the troops fanned out through downtown Kano hunting down Ibos in bars, hotels, and on the streets. One contingent drove their Landrovers to the railroad station where more than 100 Ibos were waiting for a train, cut them down with automatic weapon fire...Somehow several thousand Ibos survived the orgy, and all had the same thought: to get out of the North.

(ii) From the Correspondence of the Daily Express, London, October 6:

> I do not know if there are any Ibos left in the town in the Northern Region...I saw vultures and dogs tearing at Ibo corpses, and women and children wielding machetes and clubs and guns... the Airline Charter pilots who flew hundreds of Ibos to safety last week...said 'the death toll must be far in excess of 30,000...The Hausa were carting wounded Ibos off to hospital to kill them there'...In Zaria...a saffron-robed Hausa...told me: 'We killed about 250 here. Perhaps Allah willed it.' One European saw a woman and her daughter slaughtered in his front garden after he had been forced to turn them away.

(iii) From Colin Legum of the Observer, London, 16 October, 1966:

> While the Hausa in each town and village in the North know what happened in their own localities, only the Ibos know the whole terrible story from the 600,000 or so regugees who have fled to the safety of the Eastern Region—hacked, slashed, mangled, stripped naked and robbed of their possessions; the orphans, the widows, the traumatised...After a fortnight the scene in the Eastern Region continues to be reminiscent of the gathering of exiles into Israel after the end of the last war. The parallel is not fanciful.[69]

Conspicuous absence of the Prospects for Peace

In light of the foregoing accounts, the subsequent polarisation of the Nigerian society into two antagonistic camps becomes logical. It was Eastern Nigeria versus the rest of the Federation. Perhaps the end of these frustrations could have come about at the Aburi[70] Meetings of the leaders of all the conflicting groups. Following, are the highlights of the Agreement reached during those meetings that lasted from January 4 through January 5, 1967.

(1) All the military leaders solemnly declared that they renounced the use of force as a means of settling the problems...and re-affirmed their faith in discussion and negotiations as the only way of resolving the Nigerian crisis.

(2) A Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions should meet to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunitions held in each unit of the army in all parts of the country. Unallocated stores of arms and ammunition held in the country should be shared out equitably between the various commands in the Federation.

(3) The Army itself should be reorganised in order to restore discipline and confidence. Specifically the Army should be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a Chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief-of-the-Armed Forces, and Head of the Military Government. Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under Area Commanders should be created. During the period, of the Military Government, Military Governors should have control over Area Commands for internal security.

(4) ...Army personnel of Northern Nigeria should return to the North from the West.

(5) All matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to Commissions or senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police should be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.

(6) The legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should be vested in the Supreme Military Council.

(7) Displaced civil servants and Corporation Staff (including daily paid employees) should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31 March 1967, provided they have not secured alternative employment. The Military Governors of the East, West, and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problems of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons.[71]

It would be futile to argue on the merits and shortcomings of these Agreements in the absence of any real efforts on the part of the Nigerian authorities, which would have facilitated their implementation. But it is in

the light of the internal and external pressures which precluded their implementation, that the following observation seems pertinent, even more so in view of the subsequent British hostility, vis-a-vis, Biafra:

> Never...has a confidential 'top-level' meeting been so fully published as was the Aburi encounter. But it is probable that only one or two members of the British Government and three or four journalists have ever taken the trouble of listening to the complete recording of the two-day session. Yet what was said at Aburi is of vital significance to the subsequent and prior behaviour of the protagonists in the drama.[72]

With this background the secession of the Eastern Region, and the simultaneous proclamation of the Republic of Biafra is considered.

The Birth of Biafra: The Termination of the Nigerian Federation

Following the failure of the Aburi episode, the gulf that divided the East from the rest of the Federation continued to widen and the crisis escalated in proportion. The Lagos Government increased its measures to suffocate the East, while the East, in turn, took counter measures to ensure self- preservation. On May 26, the Eastern Nigerian Consultative Assembly convened in a meeting in which they mandated the military governor, Lt. Col. C.O. Ojukwu, to proclaim the Region, at the earliest time possible, an independent, sovereign, Republic of Biafra. A few hours later, the Lagos regime countered this move by issuing a decree by means of which the Federation was arbitrarily split into 12 states. But the East had already been pushed beyond the point of no return. Consequently, on May 30, 1967, the formal ritual of the Federal disintegration was performed with the Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra.

> "Thus Nigeria, a federation created and destroyed by Britain, has unhappily taken a well-deserved seat among the federations that collapsed. Out of its decadence has emerged a young, virile, and amazingly promising African nation—the Republic of Biafra."[73]

The conflict issues so far delineated were just the highlights of the disintegrating forces that overwhelmed the Federation of Nigeria almost from

its very beginning. But were these by themselves sufficient to disrupt the federal set-up? one might ask. Are ethnic differences an insurmountable obstacle to federalism? Does a simple change of government warrant the disruption of a national structure? Perhaps, correct answers do not exist for these questions. Ethnicity per se, need not necessarily constitute a hinderance to federalism. However, it is never the case that problems can be resolved by merely ignoring them, or wishing that they did not exist. The July military coup d'etat, if it meant a mere change of military leadership, would probably not have occasioned any alarm. But the concurrent execution of some two hundred Igbo-speaking Army officers, the simultaneous and rather remorseless massacre of several thousand civilians of Eastern Nigeria origin, both in the Northern towns and the federal city of Lagos, constituted a national upheaval with no parallel in the history of federations. Even Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, who assumed federal leadership following the July coup admitted in his first broadcast to the nation on 1 August 1966: "Putting all considerations to the best test—political, economic, as well as social—the base of unity is not there, or it is badly rocked."[74] The Military Governor of the Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Ojukwu, echoed the same opinion when in a counter broadcast, the same day he concluded: "The brutal and planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigeria origin has cast serious doubts as to whether the peoples of Nigeria can ever sincerely live together as members of the same nation."[75]

In the opinion of this writer, therefore, the very essence of federalism has been negated. And, as has been accurately noted:

> "When the state ceases to stand for the honour, protection, and well-being of all its citizens, then it is no longer the instrument of those it has rejected. In such a case, the people have the right to create another instrument for their protection... in other words, to create another state."[76]

This was certainly what happened when the East opted out of the Federation.

Nigeria and the West Indies: The Process of Disintegration

In this Chapter, the path of disintegration of the two former Federations—Nigeria and the West Indies—had been followed. The focus has been on the major issues of social conflict which conspired to bring about the collapse of the two federations. These could be viewed as constituting the rationale for Etzioni's proposition[77] relating to the functioning of former colonial territories after independence. The implications of this have been reflected in the various problems considered: the initial difficulty in both cases arising from the fact the very principle of Federalism was introduced from the outside rather than originating from within the system; the problems of discontiguous ecology, human diversity and racial disparity in the case of the West Indies on one hand, and the problems of cultural incompatibility fostering opportunistic ethnicity in the case of Nigeria on the other hand; the problems of constitutional inequities reflected in the federal structuring by the Colonial Government, in both cases, and the socio-economic complications introduced from foreign, imperial interests, constituting what this writer alludes to, as international opportunism.

Thus, in the West Indies, the absence of indigenous political and cultural heritage, consequent upon cultural emasculation due to slavery and indentured labour, constituted in part a source of stress that developed into disruptive tension. In Nigeria, the forced amalgamation of feudal autocracy of the North, constitutional monarchy of the West, and participatory democracy of the East, resulted in a system with great explosive potentials. And the superimposition of Britain's "Parliamentary democracy" could only have hastened to trigger the explosion.

CHAPTER 5

IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is, perhaps, true in most cases that social change is an outcome of social conflict. In this sense, one may take as a given, the fact that social conflict leads to social change. But social changes occur in on-going social phenomena; and certainly, federalism may be conceived as an on-going social process. For the student of social change, or, in particular, for the sociologist, the study of federalism as a social process is relevant in so far as it provides him with an opportunity for identifying the sources of strain or tension which may in turn result in social conflict. The sources of this social strain or tension could be internal and/or external. But a good deal of the studies and analyses of social systems tend to place major emphasis on the external sources of social conflict, while ignoring the internal aspects. This theoretical orientation, of course, stems mainly from the funtionalist notion—perhaps, misconceived—of the 'boundary maintenance', 'self-sustaining', and 'integrative' attributes of the so-called social system, as exemplified in the works of the Parsonian school. This notion is based on the assumption—perhaps an erroneous one—that the so-called social systems are 'complete' wholes or entities with perfect mechanisms. Thus, just as in the Newtonian mechanics of uniform, rectilinear motion of a particle,[1] where the particle does not deviate from its path unless interfered with by externally impressed forces; so, too, does the functionalist assume that social conflict occurs in a social system only through the agency of external forces.

But Wilbert Moore,[2] for example, representing a different school of thought, deplores this customary practice of social scientists in general,

and sociologists in particular, in concerning themselves mainly with the external sources of social change while paying little or no attention to the internal determinants. He suggests therefore, that more emphasis be placed on the internal forces without minimising the import of the external aspects, in order to achieve a theoretical balance. In stressing the need to identify the sources of social change, Moore views with disfavour, the search for the so-called "single cause of social change", which he regards as "unrealistic", in spite of the simplicity implicated in this kind of theoretical enterprise. Perhaps Durkheim had anticipated Moore's theoretical orientation in affirming that social life[3] is a correspondence between the internal and the external milieu.

In the present work, therefore, it is suggested that, only in the exploration of both the external and the internal sources can the real nature of social conflict be grasped and better appreciated. It is further proposed that the circumstances surrounding the genesis of a social system should be taken into account in any meaningful attempt to ascertain the nature and sources of social conflict that may subsequently ensue. Federations are social systems, or socio-political organisations. Potential sources of conflict therefore exist in one form or another; and the two cases chosen for the present study—Nigeria and the West Indies—do not constitute an exception. What may be regarded as the internal sources of conflict here, derive primarily from the ethnic differentiations and cultural disparities of the peoples constituting the respective units of the two Federations; whereas the external sources stem principally from the intrusion of colonial imperialism.

At this point then, one may entertain the question as to how, in a federation, such as here considered, the potential sources of tension could

be prevented from developing into manifest coflict; or, are conflicts, in fact, necessary for social systems, such as federations, to operate? Is it possible that certain conflict issues strengthen the bonds which link the constituent units of a federation, while other forces of social conflict militate against the principles of federalism? Is federalism, in fact, a desireable form of political organisation? Or, could it be that some societies can adapt to federal system of political life much better than others? Perhaps no ready-made answers exist, to these questions. But much as one may not have the answers, one would like to search or probe for any realities which might be embodied in the problems.

A real understanding of some potential sources of conflict in a federation, however, would compel one to entertain some thoughts about those conditions which seem most favourable to the establishment and operation of fedaration. In this context, H.W. Springer's idea seems to be very relevant. He distinguishes between what he calls "predisposing conditions", and "inducements", to the establishment of federations. According to Springer:

> "Previous political association, geographical neighbourhood, and similarity of political institutions may be described as predisposing conditions; while the sense of need for common defense, the desire for independence, and the hope of economic advantage are clearly in the class of inducements...(and) it is the inducements that are the deciding factors. (For), it seems unlikely that countries will desire union unless at least one of the inducements is present, and present in sufficient strength to overcome the natural reluctance on the part of communities...accustomed to leading a separate existence and making decisions independently of their neighbours to relinquish to a central authority, any part of their freedom of decision."[4]

But, although Springer may be correct in suggesting that "at least one of these inducements" must be present, it is doubtful, however, that "inducements" per se, are, in fact, "decisive", if by this it is understood that federations could be successfully established on the sole basis of "inducements". Thus, it is difficult to imagine that any two or more communities would, in fact, proceed to federate if all the inducement conditions are satisfied, and

if these communities are highly dispersed ecologically, and/or if a high degree of cultural disparity exists amongst them. One can only make a modest claim, at this level of analysis, to the effect that the conditions for federating are slightly weighted on the side of inducements. Also, implicit in Springer's paradigm of "predisposing conditions" and "inducements" to federalism, is the presupposition that the federating communities must have a "dependent" status to begin with, as suggested in the phrase: "desire for independence".[5] Although this assumption holds true for the two federations considered in the present study, it should not necessarily be the case in general. In other words, the colonial experience by the federating communities should not necessarily constitute a precondition for federalism.

It is possible, however, to make some modifications of the paradigm without altering the basic format. Consequently, the following reformulation is suggested:

I <u>The Predisposing Conditions</u>
(1) Ecological Contiguity;
(2) Cultural compatibility;
(3) Actual and potential degree of inter-societal interaction.

II <u>The Inducing Conditions</u>
(1) The need and desire for a federation.
(2) The expectation of greater rewards.

It is evident that this reformulation subsumes the set of criteria suggested by Springer, apart from taking into consideration, those aspects of the problem which his paradigm seems to ignore. For example, under "predisposing conditions" it can be seen that mere "similarity of political institutions" precludes the potentials for conflict, which derive from other dimensions of the cultural category. Moreover, "previous political association" (especially in the case of former colonial territories) need not constitute a warrant for continued political association (after independence), nor should its absence necessarily create an absolute impediment to federalism

where the other conditions are satisfied. Nevertheless, the paradigm as modified, lends itself—as an adequate framework—not only to the integration of the content of the issues raised in the first, second, and third chapters of this work, but also to the placing into clearer perspective, the problems considered in the fourth chapter. It may therefore be fruitful to recast the problems of this study in this framework.

I. Predisposing Conditions

(1) Ecological Contiguity. Ecological discontiguity constituted a distinct feature of the West Indian communities. Springer, in considering the West Indian case, notes that "three million people on eight thousand square miles of land is not a very big country".[6] But, the crucial problem was not just the simple fact of "three million people on eight thousand square miles". What constituted a real obstacle to federalism was the manner in which the fragmented pieces of land constituting the eight thousand square miles were scattered over a relatively vast area of the Atlantic waters. Jamaica, for example, is separated from the Eastern group of islands by some one thousand miles of ocean water. But then, it has been argued that:

> "had it not been for separation by sea, it is unlikely that the communities could have separate personalities to the degree that would have made federal solution the appropriate one."[7]

In Nigeria, the ecology was relatively compact on account of the fairly close contiguity of the component units that constituted the Federation. This was, in spite of the fact that the River Niger—the major body of water—together with its two tributaries, constituted a kind of natural demarcation, separating[8] the three major ethnic communities, one from another. But many of the other inter-spaced and relatively minor ethnic groups further insulated the three major ones from one another.

One major consequence of ecological problems was the problem of communication, although, physically, this problem was less pronounced in Nigeria

than in the West Indies. Hence, although the ecological considerations, per se, would have constituted no major hinderance to federalism in Nigeria, the same could not, realistically, be said of the West Indian communities. As Lowenthal points out "physical insularity not only aggravates inter-island differences, it also intensifies a sense of belonging within each island, whatever its size."[9]

(2) Cultural Compatibility: The African, the European, and the Indian descendants constituted the three major West Indian communities considered. The phenomenon of slavery and 'slave-making', the fact of indentured labour, and the domineering role of the European plantation economy, conspired to uproot the African cultural heritage, and a great deal of the Indian cultural tradition, thus leaving the Europeaan (English) life style as the sole cultural survivor. In the case of the peoples of African descent the cultural emasculation consequent upon slavery could be seen as creating a cultural vacuum; in the Indian case, their potential for increasing-adaption to European ways, may be considered as lending itself to progressive acculturation, thus creating a culturally partial vacuum that increases with the degree of acculturation. This vacuum consequently becomes filled with European culture which becomes systematically accentuated. The West Indian communities, in this sense, could be seen as constituting a human diversity within a cultural homogeneity.

But in Nigeria, what existed was a mere agggregation of cultural diversities within an artificial[10] nationality. The distinct cultural traits of the Igbo, the Hausa-Fulani, and the Yoruba, were reflected in the disparity and incompatibility that marked their respective political and cultural institutions.[11]

It may then be said that, while the 'cultural uniformity'[12] of the West Indian peoples was to some extent compatible to federalism, the

incompatibility of the cultural institutions of the Nigerian communities militated against the forces of federalism and integration. Some qualification of the West Indian 'cultural uniformity' here seems appropriate. It would be a gross oversimplification to simply assert that the cultural life was uniform. It is a fact that English life-style dominated the West Indian culture. But it is also true that this dominant culture was not uniformly[13] assimilated by the various social groups, to the extent that would have given West Indian identity priority over island loyalty. This, therefore, constituted a source of cleavage not compatible with the forces of integration.

(3) Actual and Potential Degree of Interaction. The problem of inter-group activities or associations is closely tied to that of ecology. The problems of communication arising from ecological discontiguity, and the consequent intensification of inter-island differences, made this problem a particularly acute one in the West Indies. Prior to the advent of the aircraft, the principal mode of inter-island communication among the islands was the ocean-going vessels; the special difficulties and problems involved in sea travel were not comparable to the relative ease of overland transportation, as was primarily the case with the Nigerian peoples. Moreover, the cost of air-travel, not being within the normal means of the average person in both Federations, and in view of the fact that over-land travel was much easier in Nigeria than in the West Indies, the oridinary man-in-the-street in the West Indies was left with less options for communications with other island groups, than was his counterpart in Nigeria, with the different ethnic communities.

But this seemingly relative ease of mobility was all but superficial. The so-called Igbo "diaspora",[14] for example, did not at all generate inter-ethnic interaction to the extent that would have entailed cultural diffusion among the various ethnic communities. The institution of

"Sabon-Gari" (Strangers' quarter) in the Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern Nigeria would serve to dispel this illusion. Moreover, this arrangement appears to have been reinforced by the natural tendency of the Igbo to stay together, in a foreign land. This fact made it particularly easy for the effectiveness of their victimisation in the Northern Region in the pogroms unleased against them in 1966. Thus, "shortly after the start of the demonstration in Kano hundreds of armed thugs swept across the space between the city walls and the Sabon Giris where the Easterners lived,...and started burning, raping, looting and killing as many men, women, and children from the East as they could lay hands on."[15] It may be said then, that, the degree of interaction among the different ethnic groups in Nigeria, and among, the island territories, in the West Indies, was not high enough to override ethnic loyalty, and island solidarity in the respective Federations. This, therefore, did not foster the cause of federalism.

II The Inducement Conditions

(1) The Need and Desire for Federation. It is evident from the considerations in Chapter 4, that in either case of the two federations, being considered, federalism was initiated and imposed by an external colonial power—Britain. It could be argued in both cases, that the different federating units had a common need for collaborating in the struggle against colonialism. But this argument loses its force when it is recalled that the initiative for the 'collaboration in this struggle' came, not from the struggling groups themselves, but rather, from the party against whom the struggle was to be directed. This would lead one to question the genuineness of the parties concerned, in the "agreement" to unite in a federation. In the case of Nigeria, James O'Connell presents a rather interesting argument which clearly illustrates this point:

> "In a state composed of many nations the political class must lead the way in forging links between the communities and in founding or deepening a sense of state...The Nigerian ethnic communities, went on living with one another within one state in the kind of international relationship that they had lived traditionally with 'stranger' communities. But in living within the one state they no longer possessed the safeguards of a genuine international situation; there were constant possibilities for uneasiness and tension between the communities."[16]

As was conceptualised in Chapter 1, the 'autonomy' of the units at the initial stage of a federation was a major presupposition of Federalism in the present study (vide supra, pp. 1-3). In both Nigeria and the West Indies, this situation did not exist when initiatives towards federation were taken. Certainly, if the need existed among the different communities, for coming together in the respective federations, the principal motor that sustained this desire was their aspiration towards ultimate freedom from colonial rule. Thus, it could not be said that the need and desire for federation existed to a reasonably sufficient degree to warrant the different communities of both Nigeria and the West Indies to federate as they did.

(2) The Expectation for Greater Rewards: If one accepts the concept of man as a rational being, then, a person is considered to be "irrational" if he knowingly engages in an undertaking from which, it is obvious, he cannot expect any dividends. In other words, individuals or groups do not, normally, invest in a business where they know in advance that the out-come or dividends would not be such that would, at least, just compensate for the capital invested. There does not seem to be any reason for expecting that an enterprise in federalism should constitute an exception to this rule. Consequently, one of the primary inducements which prompt human societies to come together in a federal union is the expectation for, inter alia, greater economic dividends than each of the constituent units would expect as a separate entity. It is, in fact, this expectation that accentuates the need and desire for the units to seek a federal arrangement.

If this be the case, the degree of expectation for greater rewards would be reflected in the nature of the initiatives taken by the different units separately, and collectively, in constituting a federal system. But, as has already been demonstrated, neither in the case of Nigeria nor in that of the West Indies, were the initiatives primarily undertaken by the units of the system themselves. On the contrary, the instigation came mainly from the outside, from a party that did not intend to be, and was never, part of the system. This logically leads one to wonder whether the advantages of federalism would accrue more to the colonial power—Britain—or to the members of the federation in either case. No answer to this question is suggested at this stage; but, some may emerge in the course of the remaining part of this discourse.

The Dynamics of System Change and Conflict

The foregoing considerations would lead one to wonder whether federations can be established under any kinds of conditions. But the experiences of Nigeria and the West Indies, inter alia, seem to be in support of Etzioni's contention that:

> "territories jointly administered by colonial powers tend to form a single state, while those administered separately tend to maintain their distinct structures after independence."[17]

Etzioni maintains that "the West Indies conforms to this pattern",[18] further arguing that "The British...system of administration did not tend toward unification".[19] That Nigeria also conformed to the pattern is best attested to, by the pronouncement of the very person who was to become Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Balewa:

> "Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united...Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country."[20]

In view of this then, certain questions may be entertained at this juncture:

> Is federalism a desireable form of political organisation, and for what kinds of social groupings? In the particular cases of Nigeria and the West Indies, what was the rationale for the insistence on federalism as a prerequisite for independence?

It is not claimed that appropriate answers to these and related questions are provided here; but some suggestions are advanced.

It would be futile of course to argue on the relative merits of federalism without some means of guaging the degree of success of a given federation. But it is not usually fruitful to talk of "success" in an on-going process, since, there is an implicit assumption of a "terminal point" in the process. Moreover, any measure or calculation of "success" has to be undertaken in terms of the extent of accomplishment of objectives. But it is characteristic of on-going processes that the so-called 'objectives' or 'goals' cannot always be delineated at the initial stage, but are, in most cases, incidental to the process. It may therefore, be more meaningful and fruitful, analytically, to adopt the notion of 'viability' as a more adequate theoretical orientation. Consequently, 'viability' may be considered in terms of the conditions or circumstances under which a federation is established.

It is perhaps not very easy to provide adequate criteria for determining a 'viable' federal system. In view of this, attention may be focussed, primarily, on the circumstances surrounding the establishment, or constituting of a federation. Mainly for analytical ease, one may contrast the institution of the American Federation with the situations which gave rise to the establishment of the Nigerian and the West Indian Federations.

What brought the original former British colonies in America together into a federation was the need for a collective defense against the common threat posed by an external enemy—British colonialism. But it was the subsequent victory of these colonies over the common foe, and the continued need for coping with similar potential threats, which further cemented the

Union. It is true that, as British colonies, these states were administered separately. But, in what would have appeared to be a violation of Etzioni's proposition,[21] these states decided to come together after they had won their independence. On the other hand, this was in keeping with the earlier contention that previous political association need not be a guarantee for continued political association after independence; nor should the absence of previous association preclude its possibility after freedom has been won. But, rather, the conditions for federating, in the case of the American states, were weighted on the side of inducements—as suggested earlier in the paradigm.

One may, of course, attempt to draw a parallel between the Biafra-Nigerian War and the American Civil War, for instance. Both wars occurred at periods when the respective federations had been established. It is true that, in both cases, the Northern States of America and the Nigerian regime, were, supposedly, fighting to "preserve" the respective federations. But Simmel contended that; "The economic superiority (because of their slave economy) of the Southern States before the Civil War, over the Northern states, was the reason for that war."[22] But the international character of the Biafra-Nigerian War would make one feel quite uncomfortable in likening it to the American Civil War. It was demonstrated in the first chapter, for instance, that Britain[23] shouldered the major burden of the War on the Nigerian side, against Biafra. While the Biafrans, at least from their own stand point, were fighting for their survival, the same could not have been said of the Southern states of the United States, in the sense that they attempted to opt out of the federation because "their very lives were threatened". Besides, as C.L.R. James aptly noted, at the end of the American Civil War; "The <u>Southern States were offered the choice</u> of military

government or universal manhood suffrage without regard to colour, race, or previous condition of servitude."[24] By contrast, the victorious Nigerian government offered the Biafrans no alternative to an imposed military regime. C.L.R. James, further recalls that, "in a few years the Southern states were restored to Southern control";[25] this writer would certainly wish to see, the Nigerian government and their international collaborators relinquish to the Biafrans, the control of their own affairs. In view of the foregoing, one could say, with some measure of confidence, that the establishment of the American Federation satisfied, to a reasonable degree, the conditions stipulated in Springer's paradigm of "predisposing and inducement conditions."

But in either case of Nigeria or the West Indies, one could not be persuaded by earlier considerations in the present study, that the conditions prevailing at the inception of federalism were conducive to the establishment of the federation. And, as O'Connell points out:

> "the nationalist leaders add to the artificiality of independence settlement by being more bent on hastening independence than on definitely settling the location of power."[26]

But this problem cannot be ignored after independence had been won; it is bound to come up as a major factor in setting the tone of the dialectics and dynamics of a social system. At this point then, a simple argument may be suggested.

Generally, in the struggle for independence or freedom, two kinds of Commitment may be distinguished:

(1) Total commitment, which seeks complete disengagement from the existing system;

(2) Partial or limited commitment, which compromises certain aspects of the existing system.

In the first case, the demands tend to be unconditional, and to eschew any kind of compromise with the elements of the existing system. The struggle tends to be violent and the actions ruthless. This kind of commitment is

very likely to culminate in warfare. The struggle tends to permeate every facet of the society. In a situation of war, for instance, the burden of the struggle is fairly evenly distributed among the population constituting the social system, either by actual participation in the fight, or indirectly in the economic and other repercussions of the destructions entailed. Consequently, the sense of commitment is profound, and there is a commonly shared expectation of better prospects for all, in the event of victory. The commitment here may therefore be said to be total. The mood of the struggle is intrasigence.

In the second case, the struggle is often motivated by transient, rather than strong inducements. The exchange here seems to be on the verbal level; or euphemistically the struggle is confined to the category of 'diplomacy'. The mood is accented by compromise, rather than intrasigence. Since the 'elite class' invariably constitutes a minority of the populace, the sense of commitment is usually not widely shared; and since the gravity of the struggle is usually mild in intensity, this sense of commitment is never profound where it does exist. Consequently, for all the members of the community engaged in the struggle, the overriding goal is simply "freedom from domination". It may be said then that, what is achieved at the end of the struggle is 'common freedom without communal prospects'. Thus Azikiwe was to declare at the occasion of Nigeria's independence in 1960[27]

> "I am...<u>satisfied with the present arrangements</u>...My stiffest earthly assignment is ended and my major life's work is done. <u>My country is free</u>...What more could one desire?"

But the trouble with this kind of reasoning is that it presupposed that independence was an end in itself. But whereas the leaders of the former colonial territories (in the second category) had accepted federation as a means towards achieving independence (as in the cases of both Nigeria and the West Indies), the Colonial Power (Britain in this case), has granted

independence as a guarantee that federalism would be maintained. O'Connell, argues in the case of Nigeria, for example that:

> "The first effect of settlement that owed much to...the exercise of colonial influence was a situation that is an anathema to federal theorists; a federation in which one unit predominates even when the others combine."[28]

In contrast to Azikiwe's declaration in 1960 at the occasion of Nigeria's nominal[29] independence, a Biafran was quoted during the struggle with Nigeria as saying:

> "We in Biafra are overthrowing the mantle of colonialism left by the British. We are arranging our borders the African way, not the British way. If we succeed here, we will point to the way that other African nations must follow eventually, as they shed the trappings of colonialism."[30]

To the extent that the American states, Nigeria, and the West Indies, were former colonies of Britain, and that the attainment of independence from the colonial power involved some form of struggle in each case, then the following simple argument may be advance. The circumstances surrounding the establishment of the American Federation, may then be said to have involved commitments of the first kind. Although unsuccessful, the Biafran struggle could be characterised by this kind of commitment. On the other hand, the struggles related to the establishment, and the independence of the Nigerian and the West Indies Federations, could be said to have involved commitments of the second kind. In the first case (total), there is usually a considerable investment of common effort and energy, and enormous sacrifice is very often involved; so that, the post-struggle communality is further strengthened by the shared expectation of dividends well-earned by all. In the other case (partial), the superficial nature of the commitment results in the minimal investment of collective energy and effort; so that the sense of communality, after the struggle, is rendered vacuous by the relative want of common expectations.[31]

If the break-up of Nigerian and West Indian Federations conformed to the pattern suggested by Etzioni,[32] why then was the case of the West Indies taken as a matter of course, while the option of the Eastern Region of Nigeria from the Nigerian Federation resulted in one of the most violent conflicts of this century? We may not know the 'true' answer, but certainly, we can entertain some suggestions. Regarding the West Indies, C.L.R. James argues:

> "This is how the British West Indies Federation collapsed. The old colonial system consisted of insular economies, each with its financial and economic capital in London. A federation meant that the economic line of direction should no longer be from island to London, but from island to island. But that involved the break-up of the old-colonial system...This (federal break-up)...is the direct continuation of the old colonial system."[33]

And it is what the Colonial Powers wanted.

In the Nigerian Case, Diamond presents some interesting arguments:

> "In a very real sense, judgment of the British Raj, the perspective in which the British were to view their own history in so large a part a history of colonial formation and dissolution, centered on the denoumenti of the Nigerian drama. Nigeria was a symbol of the investment of British energy and pride in Africa, and more than a symbol...The federation was imagined to be a colonial success, an example of how well-intentioned powers, sober and lofty design, can create a nation and move people, with minimum displacement, from a position of tutelage to one of 'independence', through which the best interests of rulers and ruled are harmoniously united."[34]

Elsewhere, Diamond argues that:

> "it was and is vital to Englans's idea of itself that the ultimate brutality and greed of Empire be rationalised to more humane and altruistic ends...But <u>the primitive democracies</u> which criss-cross the primarily Ibo-speaking East <u>resisted domination</u>...Nevertheless, they (the Igbo) were the primary architects of Nigerian freedom, inevitably, their conception was that of an independent, democratic, economically sovereign unitary state...(But) the Biafrans finally opted out of the Nigerian Federation when it became clear that the British role was evolving from outright colonialism to neo-colonialism, and that <u>the cultural differences between Eastern and Northern Nigerians</u>, in particular, were too great to overcome...England (then) stared across the barricades at its old antagonists in a new guise. The former colonial power could not afford an independent Biafra, hostile to the trading and investment interests which Nigeria had accommodated, to the profit of both the local business and political elites, and the colonial companies...The British were still buying cheap in Nigeria and selling dear. Biafra intended to trade as

> equals and with whomever it pleased. Moreover, the political example of Biafra could well have broken up the oil and banking connections which helped to feed the British economy...Biafra, then, was an economic threat to England, and the final embarrassment to England's image of itself."[35]

Finally Conor Cruise O'Brien contends that:

> "The reason why the Federation of Nigeria has such a powerful appeal to certain minds is that it was, and is, a device for keeping the educated African in his place, under the control of the dignified rulers of the North."[36]

Nigeria and the West Indies: Problems and Prospects

It is not proposed here, that an adequate and most comprehensive answer has been provided to the questions posed and the issues raised in the first chapter of this study. However, given the facts presented in the second and third chapters, the analytical endeavors of the fourth and fifth chapters, it would have been difficult to imagine that the two federal systems under consideration would have proceeded in a manner different from the way they did—the path of disintegration. This is not to suggest, however, that a different form of associational arrangement could not have been effected with success. Rather, the contention is that, given the set of predisposing conditions, and the potential inducements as explicated in the earlier part of the present chapter, a working and effective federal system of distinct, autonomous[37] units could not be constituted without due consideration of the crucial factor of 'functional autonomy' of the constituent units. But how have the units of the two systems fared since the collapse of the federations?

Jamaica, and Trinidad-and-Tobago attained independence in 1962; and Barbados followed a few years later. Their relationship, vis-a-vis, one another, if they have not improved significantly, at least, they have not grown worse than they were during the period of federation. If the smaller units have not yet achieved self-government at least they have benefitted from the subsequent reorganisations and associations based on the commonality

of needs for one another. Foremost among these Post-Federation associations, is the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), instituted in May 1968. The membership of CARIFTA includes not only the members of the former West Indies Federation, but also Guyana, South America, which was not part of the original federation. As the associates themselves do appreciate:

> "CARIFTA...as a Free Trade Area is a somewhat loose form of integration."[38]

The establishment of CARIFTA was based on the rationale that political Union or political integration is a social process effected through stages of evolution of inter-societal co-operation and association CARIFTA as a Free Trade Area constitutes the first rung of this evolutionary ladder, thus:

A Free Trade Area

A Customs Union

A Common Market

An Economic Union

These stages are defined as follows:

(1) "A Free Trade Area is only one possible form of economic integration among countries...

(2) "A Customs Union goes beyond a Free Trades Area. Not only is there free trade among member countries; there is also a common external tariff and a common set of quantitative restrictions against outside countries.

(3) "A Common Market goes beyond a Customs Union. In addition to internal free trade, and a common set of external barriers, there is free movement of capital and labour within the Common Market.

(4) An Economic Union is the highest form of economic cooperation to a Common Market, there are common economic, financial, taxation and social policies. Because of the high degree of cooperation between countries involved, an Economic Union comes very close to potential union."[39]

What is very significant here is that CARIFTA constitutes a beginning, or the fundamental step that could eventually lead to a much closer form of West Indian Federation.

It is pertinent to note that these social units did perceive the major error in the constitution of the First Federation: the fact that the first step was not taken before they took the leap-or rather before they were forced[40] to take the leap, onto the Federation. But where would this lead to? This writer submits that the principles and rationale underlying CARIFTA, if consistently and logically pursued, would ultimately result in a 'desireable', and more meaningful CARIFTA as a new basis for Federation. Is the future as bright for Nigeria as it seems, relatively speaking, for the West Indies?

As indicated at the beginning, the termination of the Nigerian Federation following the secession of the Eastern Region in May 1967, was countered with an all out war, by the residue of the Federation, backed by the concert of international[41] military community against, Biafra. After some thirty-one months of desperate struggle for survival, Biafra was finally strangulated by this military cabal. Consequently, this writer maintains that the Federation of Nigeria has not been reconstituted. On the contrary, it is contended that the present arrangement places Biafra under international military occupation in which the Niegerians and their troops serve as mere instruments in the promotion of the interests of international imperialism. In

view of the predisposing and inducement conditions, the present arrangement of Nigeria, vis-a-vis, Biafra, is in violation of, and in flat contradiction to, the principles of federalism (vide supra, pp.1-3).

In conclusion then, it is suggested that:

(i) Any further aggregation of West Indian territories would be marked by a strong bond of association, if it be an undertaking initiated and consummated by the territorial units among themselves-in that case CAFIFTA offers an optimistic note;

(ii) In the Nigerian case, on the other hand, it would be difficult to expect anything but more violent conflict for the units of the former federation as long as the international community continues to place economic interest above human values. For, "Unity will be the fruit of the common will to live together and should not be imposed by one group upon another with force..."[42]

It seems that the West Indian territories are following this path. But whether this lesson would be taken in the Nigerian case, it is difficult to determine in the present circumstances. Only the complex process of social change will determine the issue. If the present CARIFTA holds any prospects for a future West Indian Federation, then this Free Trade Association is a first step towards a real and meaningful Union. But, "whatever unity that exists in Nigeria today is based on the common hatred for the Biafrans."[43]

NOTES

PART I: Chapter 1 Introduction

(1) Nyasaland is now the Republic of Malawi; while Northern Rhodesia constituted, what is now, the Republic of Zambia.

(2) This was to have been constituted by Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, each of which is now an independent, sovereign state. In 1965, following the military takeover in Zanzibar, that country joined with Tanganyika to form what is now known as the Republic of Tanzania.

(3) Caribbean Historiacal Review, # S III - IV, Dec. 1954, p. 9. This concept of federalism was attributed to a former British administrator in the West Indies.

(4) Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Affiliations, Free Press, 1955, p. 15.

(5) A note of clarification here would be quite in order. Since the events subsequent to the rupture of the federations will not constitute a major concern of this study, 'Eastern Nigeria' will be used in most cases instead of 'Biafra'. But when it is deemed necessary "BIAFRA" will be used in reference to events taking place after May 30, 1967. This was the point in time, when the Eastern Region of the Nigerian Federation seceded from the Federation to constitute the Republic of Biafra. In the present study, this point in time will be adopted as the stage when the Nigerian Federation collapsed. This claim is justified by the fact that the present military occupation of Biafra is not in keeping with the conceptualisation of a federation as stated earlier (vide supra, pp. 1 - 3).

(6) To remove misunderstandings, we must note that an 'empire' can be viable. But this would not be in keeping with the presupposition of 'unit autonomy' as stated earlier. Our definition of 'federal association' here, therefore precludes the consideration of imperial states. An imperial system may be regarded, for purposes of definition as an amalgamation of states by conquest. This precludes all aspects of mutual contract, and therefore cannot be considered for the purposes of the present study.

(7) Apolotists of "one Nigeria" might contend that 'Nigeria' is again "reunited". To begin with, this writer maintains that Biafra is presently under international military occupation, which uses Nigeria and the Nigerian troops

as mere instruments. Secondly, as to whether Nigeria constitutes a federation or not, in the present circumstances, the reader is referred to notes #5 and #6 above.

(8) C.Y. Ngonja, Tanzanian Foreign Minister, "Tanzania's Recognition of Biafra", in J.B.C. Ugokwe (ed.), The African Scholar: Journal of Research and Analysis, Vol. 1, #1, p. 17.

(9) A fourth Region, the Mid-Western Region, was carved out of the Western Region later in 1963. In addition, there was also, the Federal territory of Lagos, which, though physically located in the Western part of the Federation, was not considered part of any of the Regions, for administrative purposes.

(10) Figure for West Indies quoted from Statesman's Year Book, 1962-1963.

(11) See note #9 above.

(12) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Government, New York University Press, 1960, p. 11.

(13) As will be apparent later, this figure deriving from the controversial census report of 1963, is highly questionable.

(14) Figures for Western Nigeria, include those for Mid-Western Nigeria, not separated here, for reasons noted earlier.

(15) The Sunday Times (London) Magazine, June 1, 1969, pp. 39 - 40.

(16) Bertrand Russell, Power: The Role of Man's Will to Power in the World's Economic and Political Affairs, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1938, p. 12.

(17) Ibid, p. 14.

(18) In his theory of relativity, Einstein showed that, the energy, E, generated when a body of mass, M, is "destroyed", is given by the relation: $E=\frac{1}{2}MC^2$, where C represents the velocity of light in vacuum approximately, 186,300 miles per second.

(19) Scott A. Greer, The Emerging City: Myth and Reality, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, p. 32.

(20) Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, G and C Merriam Company, Springfield, Massachusetts, 1964, p. 781.

(21) Ibid, p. 1870.

(22) Ibid, p. 1505.

(23) Ibid, p. 2440.

(24) Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New York University Press, 1957, p. 40.

(25) See note #21.

PART II: Chapter 2

(1) That is, East Indians.

(2) As noted by Gorden Merrill, "Within forty years (of British settlement in Jamaica, in 1655), the aboriginal Indians had been all but eliminated." Gorden Merrill, "The Survival of the Past in the West Indies" in David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation, (Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 23.

(3) Ibid, p. 24.

(4) The introduction of Sugar technology to the West Indian islands was attributed to these Sephardic Jews of Portugal. (see Ibid., pp. 22, 25).

(5) As Dike points out "This reservoir of manpower (over population) accounts for the fact that Iboland supplied the greater part of the slaves shipped to the New World from the Bights of Benin and Biafra...(and) the Delta (Niger) formed the most important slave mart in West Africa." K.O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956) p. 28.

(6) Gorden Merrill, Op. Cit., p. 28.

(7) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies. The Search for Self-Government, New York University Press, 1960, p. 14. It is rather interesting to note that the West African Highlife music, and the West Indian Calypso have striking similarities in rhythm.

(8) Malcolm X, Malcolm X on Afro-American History, (Betty Shabazz and Merit, 1967), pp. 33 - 37.

(9) Gorden Merrill, Op. Cit., p. 24.

(10) Morley Ayearst, Loc. Cit.

(11) Creole is coloquially used by the majority of the common West Indians, and French Patios is common in some areas.

(12) C.L.R. James, "Towards a Caribbean Nation", (Appendix), Caribbean Conference, 1965.

(13) Actually the largest concentration is in Guiana, which did not constitute part of the defunct federation.

(14) They constitute 40 percent of the population of Trinidad.

(15) This is because for reasons that will be apparent later, slaves stayed in the plantations in Barbados after emancipation, although under a new set of arrangements. Consequently, there was little or no demand for labour in Barbados--in contrast with some of the other islands like Trinidad and Jamaica where most of the freed-men decided to leave the plantations and be their own masters, if even under more arduous conditions. The indentured labourers from India, therefore, were not needed in Barbados.

(16) David Lowenthal, "The Social Background of West Indian Federation", in David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation; (Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 82.

(17) Ibid, p. 93.

(18) The reader who considers this an 'over-simplification', and therefore, disappointing is refered to some major works dealing exclusively with this subject, see for instance:

(a) P. Amamry Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta (Frank Case and Co., Ltd., 1967).

(b) Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race--The Politics of Independence, The M.I.T. Press, 1965.

(19) Although, the Hausa were in numerical majority, the Fulani constituted the predominant hegemony. Hence our consideration of both groups in combination, instead of either, in isolation. As Professor Stanley Diamond points out, "Indirect rule is quite ancient in Northern Nigeria, (and) more recently... the Fulani replaced the Hausa." See Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of a Colonial Future, (American Committee on Africa, New York, 1967), p. 7.

(20) See note #19 above.

(21) Richard L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, (Princeton, 1963), pp. 7 - 8.

(22) Henry Willink, et.al., Nigeria Report, (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, July, 1958), p. 54.

(23) The actual figure was 6,085,000.

(24) Note that this same region of Africa, has also been indicated as the place from where the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria also migrated.

(25) John E. Flint, Nigeria and Ghana, (Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 57. This, in fact, is in keeping with the account of the Minorities Commission, cited earlier. See note #21 above.

(26) As already noted, one of the earlier suggestions was that the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria were supposed to have migrated from the Northeastern part of Africa, possibly from the region around the present Republic of Sudan.

(27) Here again, we note the similarity with the Hausa and to some extent, with the Igbo, as will be seen shortly.

(28) As will be apparent later, this is characteristic of Igbo cultural life though with its peculiar variants.

(29) S.S. Moody, NIGERIA, (Longmans, 1963), p. 10.

(30) Thomas Hodgkin, Nigeria Perspective: An Historical Anthology, (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 285.

(31) It must have been quite obvious to the reader, now, that the Hausa-Fulani were the largest ethnic group.

(32) According to the estimate of Dr. J.A.B. Horton, the Igbo population in the middle of the 19th Century was between 10 million and 12 million, although the eminent Biafran historian, Dr. Onwuka Dike, thinks this was an exaggeration. Dr. Horton was the first Igbo physician, educated in Edinburgh, though born in slavery in Sierra Leone (see K. O. Dike, Op. Cit., pp. 29 - 30; also, Thomas Hodgkin, Op. Cit., p. 285).

(33) K.O. Dike, Op. Cit., p. 44.

(34) This view is corroborated by Professor Dike. For, "Awka men were the smiths and the doctors; while Nkwerre people, in addition to their work in iron, played the role of professional...diplomatists" (sic). See Ibid., p. 28.

(35) John E. Flint, Op. Cit., p. 63.

(36) Stanley Diamond, Op. Cit., p. 43.

(37) Richard L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, (Princeton, 1953), pp. 14 - 15.

(38) Thomas Hodgkin, Op. Cit., p. 287. This remark was attributed to Bishop Crowther, a freed Yoruba slave who later came to be ordained a priest.

(39) Ibid., pp. 286 - 287.

(40) V.C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 12 - 13.

(41) John E. Flint, Op. Cit., p. 8.

(42) C.L.R. James, Loc. Cit.

(43) See note #6.

(44) See note #7.

(1) After Arthur Richards, the governor of Nigeria at the time.

(2) Robert McPherson, the governor.

(3) Lagos was the capital of the former Federation of Nigeria.

(4) For reasons stated earlier, (see note #5, Chapter 1) this study takes the point of the proclamation of Biafra as the legal termination of the Federal set-up. Consequently, attention in the present study is focussed up to that point, although occasional reference to the subsequent period may become necessary in certain cases.

(5) In the present case, the Colonial Power was Britain.

(6) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Government, (New York University Press, 1960), p. 11.

(7) This remark was attributed to Sir Reginald Corpland. See K.O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 3.

(8) Katrin Norris, Jamaica: The Search for Identity, (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1.

(9) Morley Ayearst, Op. Cit., p. 26.

(10) Ibid., pp. 22 - 23.

(11) John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1968), p. 26.

(12) Ibid., p. 27.

(13) As indicated earlier, Guana was not a member of the Federation.

(14) John Mordecai, Loc. Cit.

(15) Mr. Bustamante and Mr. Manley, incidentally, were first cousins.

(16) Founded in July 1938.

(17) Ironically, Arthur Richards, by virtue of political providence, after leaving Jamaica found himself later in Nigeria playing the same political role, and, as will be seen later, his constitutional reforms precipitated a major crisis in that country.

(18) Morley Ayearst, Op. Cit., p. 147.

(19) John Mordecai, Op. Cit., p. 27.

(20) Hugh W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the West Indian Federation, (Harvard, 1962), p. 9. See also, the succeeding passages.

(21) John Mordecai, Op. Cit., pp. 28 - 29.

(22) Ibid., p. 34.

(23) Although they did not join the Federation subsequently, Guiana and British Honduras were participants in this Conference.

(24) Douglas G. Anglin, "The Political Development of the West Indies", in David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation (Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 49, 54.

(25) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 156.

(26) Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London, 1947), pp. 47 - 48.

(27) This refers to the Berlin Conference where the imperial powers met to carve out for themselves, areas of influence within the African continent.

(28) The presence of the palm-tree (as indicated earlier) in proponderant vegetation in the Southern part of Nigeria, had led to palm oil and other palm produce constituting one of the major economic produce in this region. The interested reader is referred to the comprehensive account of the oil trade in K.O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956.

(29) Ibid., p. 81. It is also stated that "they (the treaties) served more as a cover for the employment of force which suppression tactics necessitated than a guarantee that (they) would be observed in their entirety by either Britain or the Delta States", p. 83.

(30) It will be quite pertinent here, to recall Rousseau's maxim that "only conquerors could be missionaries". Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Gateway edition, Willmoore Kendall, Trans., Henry Regnery Company, 1954, p. 207.

(31) Michael Marioghae and John Ferguson, Nigeria Under the Cross, Highway Press, 1965, p. 40.

(32) Lugard was regarded as the "Father of Indirect-Rule".

(33) The reason for this is apparent from the nature of the traditional cultures of the societies, as was shown in the previous chapter.

(34) Michael Marioughae and John Ferguson, Op. Cit., p. 11. This was an obvious case of cultural superposition.

(35) Arthur Richards, it should be recalled, was also a controversial figure while serving as governor of Jamaica earlier, in the West Indies. See note #17.

(36) Actually a secondary school. For more details on this incident see, for example:

(i) Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--The Politics of Independence, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, pp. 54 - 60.

(ii) Richlar L. Sklar, Nigeria Political Parties, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 55 - 64.

(37) Mainly as students in foreign institutions.

(38) This constituted, essentially, the nucleus of what evolved into the Nigerian political elite.

(39) Following the 1961 referendum, in which the Southern Cameroons opted out of the Federation, the party was renamed the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The Cameroons, a former German colony, was mandated to Britain by the defunct League of Nations, at the close of World War I.

(40) It is pertinent to stress this fact here, for, later when Nigerian political values come to be predicated by opportunistic ethnicity, many had come to regard the NCNC as an Igbo affair, for the simple reason that the leadership was Igbo. But if indeed, leadership should constitute the sole determinant, then it is suggested here that the "Igbo affair"--the NCNC--was, in fact, a Yoruba idea.

(41) Arthur Richards was the Governor of Nigeria at the time. See notes #17 and #35.

(42) He was succeeded by Dr. M.I. Okpara, an Igbo physician who later opted for a political vocation.

(43) 1948 was the year that the movement was activated in Nigeria.

(44) Oduduwa was the legendary ancestor of the Yoruba people. Translated, literally, Egbe Omo Oduduwa means, "the Union of the sons (children) of Oduduws".

(45) This appears to be corroborated by the fact that on its official inauguration, several Yoruba members of the NCNC defected and joined the new movement.

(46) To the knowledge of this writer, this charge has not been proved beyond doubt to be true. But if this was a mere speculation, it was a very plausible one. See Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New York University Press, 1956, p. 154.

(47) Dr. Dikko was the first Northern Nigerian to hold a university degree and, until the early 'fifties, remained the only university graduate from that region.

(48) "Mallam" is a title equivalent to "master", or "teacher", and was generally applied to teachers and instructors among the Hausa-Fulani people.

(49) But since NEPU was committed to programmes of social change and modernisation, Mallam Amino Kano had to break completely with the NPC. Both parties were to become bitter antagonists later in the process of the Nigerian political evolution.

(50) After Robert McPherson, the Nigerian governor who succeeded Arthur Richards.

(51) By this is meant extreme inter-ethnic hostility arising purely from blind ethnic loyalty.

(52) Western Nigeria is second only to Ghana in the world production of cocoa.

(53) This meant that the regions will be allocated revenue in exact proportion to the amount of revenue derived from each, respectively.

(54) This was primarily necessitated by the artificial synthesis of cocoa.

(55) It is true of course that the Western Region was still, economically better off than the North.

(56) Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--The Politics of Independence. (M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 32. (quoted from Obafemi Owolowo, Op. Cit., pp. 48, 73)

(57) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of Colonial Failure, (American Committee on Africa, New York, 1967), p. 43.

(58) In the opinion of this writer, the Igbo traditional society, was perhaps, one of the few systems in which the Lincolnian concept of democracy actually existed in practice. Furthermore it is suggested here, that the British attempt to impose the so-called 'parliamentary democracy' was nothing more than a gimmick by means of which a person's property is stolen, concealed in a disguised package, and then turned round and offered back to the owner at a considerable price.

(59) F. Schwarz, Jr., Loc. Cit.

(60) G.I. Jones, "Report of the Position, Status, and Influence of Chiefs and Natural Rulers in the Eastern Region of Nigeria", (Gov't. Printer, Enugu, 1957), pp. 10 - 11. Professor Jones was commissioned by the Eastern Nigerian Government to study the matter of chieftaincy system in the Region when the government was contemplating the establishment of a House of Chiefs. In spite of its artificiality, the government proceeded to institute the House of Chiefs, even against the recommendations of the Commission, mainly for the political exigency of maintaining a balance of institutions with the other two regions of the Federation. In corroboration of this report, see, for instance, the views of a Biafran economist-anthropologist, Dr. Chikezie Uchendu, in V.C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, pp. 41 - 42.

(61) B.O. Ukeje, Education for Social Reconstruction, MacMillan and Co., (Nigeria) Ltd., 1960, p. 8.

(1) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 155.

(2) Ibid., pp. 138 - 139, 147 - 148.

(3) Arthur A. Nwankwo and Samuel U. Ifejika, The Making of A Nation: Biafra, (C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969), p. 9.

(4) H. Bretton, "Africa: Nigeria and the United States", (TV Script), p. 12. Dr. Bretton was, before recently joining the faculty of New York University professor of political science at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. This was a programme-release-and-script produced by Professor Bretton and the U-M Television. Originally, recorded in June 1968, the programme was telecast over the NBC-TV stations on Sunday, December 29, 1968.

(5) John Mordecai, "Federation and After", in New World, (Vol. III, #s, 1, and 2, November, 1966), p. 89.

(6) Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London, 1947), pp. 47 - 48.

(7) Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., p. 139.

(8) Ibid., p. 140.

(9) Ibid., pp. 145, 148.

(10) H. Bretton, Loc. Cit.

(11) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria: Model of a Colonial Failure, (American Committee on Africa, 1967), p. 36.

(12) B.J.O. Dudley (ed.), Nigeria 1965 -- Crisis and Criticism: Selections from Nigerian Opinion, (Ibadan University Press, 1966), p. 13.

(13) Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., p. 166.

(14) Ibid., p. 166.

(15) John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1968), p. 29.

(16) Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., pp. 167 - 168.

(17) Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self-Government, (New York University Press, 1960), p. 14.

(18) H. Bretton, Op. Cit., p. 7.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Nigeria Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, 1947, (Government Printer, Lagos, 1947), p. 208.

(21) B.J.O. Dudley, Op. Cit., p. 49.

(22) Ahmadu Bello was the leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the Party that dominated the Hausa-Fulani Government of Northern Nigeria, as well as being in control of political power in the Federation. Content, himself, with being at the head of the Northern hegemony, as that Region's Premier, he had delegated his deputy, Prime Minister Balewa, to run the show at the center in Lagos. Ahmadu Bello lost his life in the January Revolution of 1966.

(23) Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 229.

(24) Lagos was the capital of the Federation.

(25) Ahmadu Bello, Op. Cit., p. 227.

(26) Morley Ayearst, Op. Cit., p. 15.

(27) John Mordecai, Op. Cit., p. 109.

(28) Ibid., p. 119.

(29) Ibid., Loc. Cit.

(30) Ibid., p. 124.

(31) Ibid., p. 126.

(32) Ibid., p. 138.

(33) Ibid., p. 139.

(34) Ibid., p. 158.

(35) H.W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation, (Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 32 - 33.

(36) The President and founder of the AG Party was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was also the first Premier of the Western Nigerian Government, as well as being the first leader of the Opposition in the post-independence Nigerian Government. The deputy leader of the Party was Chief S.L. Akintola, who succeeded Chief Awolowo as Premier of the Western Nigerian Government when the latter left to lead the Opposition in the Federal Legislature.

(37) Schwarz points out that "In the early 1950's, the Action Group and Awolowo appeared to be much less concerned with national unity than the NCNC and Azikiwe. Awolowo in the early days was primarily a Yoruba leader who saw a decentralised federal system organised along ethnic or linguistic lines

as the means to protect the Yoruba from interference. For him, at that time, additional states were primarily devices to preserve differences". (Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--The Politics of Independence, M.I.T. Press, 1965, p. 84.

(38) This was more than a sufficient number to constitute a majority in the Western Legislature.

(39) This, no doubt, was calculated to render void, any further claims of the Premier to office. The British-style Parliamentary democracy required that the Party with the majority of elected members form the Government, and the party leader, invariably, became the head of Government. But since the party leadership determined the governmental leadership, in this sense, it would be logical to expect that the head of government be responsible to the Party leadership, where--as in the present case--the two role-positions are not occupied by one and the same role-player. This probably accounted for the move of the Action Group in expelling the Premier from the Party.

(40) A.A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 45.

(41) See S.A. Aluko, "How Many Nigerians?", in the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 3, #3, October 1965, pp. 371 - 392.

(42) A.A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 49.

(43) Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or the Race--The Politics of Independence, (The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 141.

(44) Dr. M.I. Okpara, The Premier of the NCNC-dominated Eastern Nigerian Government had challenged the census report in the nation's Supreme Court. But "the Supreme Court dismissed the suit without reaching the merits." (F.O. Schwarz, Jr., Op. Cit., p. 141, footnote).

(45) Following the 1963 census, the allotment of seats in the Federal legislation was according to the following distribution:

Northern Region	167
Eastern Region	70
Western Region	57
Mid-Western Region	14
Lagos (Federal Capital)	4
Total	312

(46) See Appendix 4-2.

(47) For detailed account of the Awolowo episode see:
(i) Stanley Diamond, Op. Cit., pp. 30 - 41.
(ii) Arthur Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., pp. 40 - 45.

(48) This alliance (NCNC-AG) had it occurred earlier in 1959, perhaps, Nigeria's political evolution would have taken a different turn. One of the major goals that this alliance had hoped to accomplish had it been elected

into power, was to effect the release of Chief Awolowo who at this time was languishing in prison.

(49) The Action Group campaign team, touring the North was refused accommodation in a Kaduna (Northern capital) hotel; and five days before the NCNC leader, Dr. Okpara, was to speak at the Yoruba-based University of Ife, the NNDP-controlled government of the Western Region had barred all "outside" politicians from the University.

(50) For a full account of the Azikiwe-Belewa confrontation, see, Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., pp. 72 - 88.

(51) Dr. Eni Njoku, was later to become the vice-chancellor of the University of Nigeria Nsukka (later University of Biafra).

(52) The Provisional Council, dominated by the Yoruba, probably considered it unfair for the two federal universities to be headed by Igbos. Professor Onwuka Dike, another Igbo, was at the time, the vice-chancellor of the University of Ibadan. Dr. Dike shortly resigned from the post.

(53) For more details of this crisis, see, Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., pp. 55 - 71.

(54) Nwankwo and Ifejika, for instance contend that:
"The fraud of the 1964 Federal Election was repeated without the least dissimulation and on the grandest scale in the history of rigged elections. On the election day over 500,000 ballot papers were recovered from both the NNDP leaders and the NNDP electoral officers when they had tried to dump them into the ballot boxes...Ballot boxes already filled with ballot papers were recovered before polling began. The police also recovered lists of election results which the NNDP had prepared long before the polling day." (Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 91).

(55) Ibid., p. 45.

(56) For an analysis of the role of the Army in Nigerian politics see Stanley Diamond, Op. Cit., pp. 44 - 46.

(57) Of course, for those who later came to see the Army coup d'etat as an "Igbo-designed plan to dominate the rest of the Federation", the preferred terminology would be "rebellion". Admittedly, perspectives are, to some extent, reflections of people's sentiments and biases. But, in anticipation of the challenge of the choice of 'revolution' here, it should be pointed out that, as Adolf Hitler had observed several years ago, in any struggle or conflict, "the victor is always right". The reader who has been honestly following the Nigerian episode, is urged to draw his own conclusions. But just to back up my own bias in regarding the January event as a revolution, some samples of the public reaction as reflected in the Nigerian papers then is attached as part of the appendix to this study. (see Appendix 4-2)

(58) That is, the so-called British Commonwealth of Nations.

(59) In 1965, the white-minority of Rhodesia had unilaterally proclaimed that country independent from British rule, to establish a hegemony in which

the white minority would exercise absolute political authority over the black native majority indefinitely. This had resulted in a series of diplomatic maneuverings by the British Government supposedly to force the Ian Smith (the Rhodesian Prime Minister) regime to collapse. But, in the opinion of this writer, all the seemingly serious efforts by Britain were simply calculated to confound the black African nations. For, long before Ian Smith made the historic move, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had himself given the Rhodesian authorities the assurance that, whatever move they made, the use of force--military intervention--by Britain would be ruled out completely, as a means of resolution. In effect, Mr. Wilson, had, in fact, urged white Rhodesia to inaugurate a white oligarchy. As a footnote, it might be added that whereas the Biafran aspiration to self-determination has been unhesitatingly suffocated, the White Oligarchy, has, in fact, continued to thrive unperturbed, in Rhodesia.

(60) On the same day also, the Premier of the North and the West, Ahmadu Bello, and Chief Akintola, respectively, had held a secret meeting in Kaduna, the Northern headquarters. It has been suggested that these leaders--so-called--had, in fact met to work out final details of a plan to use the Army in "crushing the disturbances" in the Western Region as well as using it to effect a country-wide absolute regime. This plan was to have taken effect on January 17, 1966. If so, the Army's swift maneuver of January 15 saved the nation from a great catastrophe. (see for instance, African Research Bulletin, January 1-31, pp. 446 - 448).

(61) See note #57. For a full account of the January Revolution and the brief, subsequent short military regime of General Ironsi, see Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., pp. 123 - 153.

(62) For full details on this, see Ibid., pp. 123 - 153.

(63) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 148.

(64) West Africa, June 4, 1966.

(65) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 156.

(66) George T. Orick, "Nigeria: A Study in Hypocrisy", in The New Leader, Jan. 1, 1968, p. 9.

(67) Stephen Lewis, Journey to Biafra, (Thistle Printing Ltd., Ontario, Canada, 1968), p. 24. Mr. Lewis is a Canadian Legislator.

(68) Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story, (Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 69 - 78.

(69) Ibid., pp. 76 - 78.

(70) Aburi, a small town at the vicinity of Accra, Ghana, was the meeting site of the Nigerian military leaders in January 1967.

(71) The Meeting of the Nigerian Military Leaders, held at Aburi Accra, Ghana, 4-5 January 1967. (Official Document No. 5, of 1967, Govt. Printer, Enugu, 1967), pp. 6 - 8.

(72) George Knapp, Aspects of the Biafran Affair: A Study of the British Attitudes and Policy towards Nigeria-Biafra Conflict, (Britain-Biafra Association, 1968), p. 10.

(73) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 253.

(74) Chukwuemeka Onwubu, Nigeria: Problems of Unification, (unpublished paper), p. 50.

(75) Idem.

(76) Republic of Tanzania; Statement of Recognition of Biafra, April 13, 1968.

(77) Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., p. 155.

(1) According to the first law of Newtonian mechanics, a 'body' or an 'object' or a 'particle' continues in its state of 'rest' or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change from this state by an externally impressed force.

(2) Wilbert Moore, "A Reconsideration of Theories of Social Change", (ASR, Vol. 1, #25, Dec. 1960, pp. 810 - 818).

(3) 'Social life' here, may be interpreted simply as a series of social changes.

(4) Hugh W. Springer, Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation; (Harvard, 1962), p. 46.

(5) Ibid., passim.

(6) Ibid., p. 46.

(7) Ibid., pp. 46 - 47.

(8) Actually, the only natural demarcation between the three Regions of the former Federation consisted in the division of the East from the West, by the River Niger. Although the Niger and its tributaries would have constituted natural boundaries for the three Regions, nevertheless, this was not the case, neither between Northern Nigeria and the Western Nigeria, nor between the East and the North. The boundaries were purely arbitrary, the Southern bound of Northern Nigeria, extending further south beyond the two tributaries--the Benue and the Niger. This again goes to strengthen our claim that the slanting of the Federal structure by the British colonial administration, as implicated in the Richards' and McPherson's Constitutions, constituted a gerrymander of the federal Constitution by Britain.

(9) David Lowenthal, "The Social Background of West Indian Federation", in David Lowenthal (ed.), The West Indies Federation, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1961), p. 68.

(10) See note #6, Chapter 4.

(11) See note #6, Chapter 3.

(12) That is, in the sense that only one significant culture thrived.

(13) Lowenthal, for instance, points out that: "Standard English, sometimes called 'whitetalk', is spoken regularly only by upper-and-some middle-class folk, and not all the time by them; a more or less educated Creole is heard in most homes. But standard English is required in school and standard English alone is legitimate." David Lowenthal, Op. Cit., p. 93.

(14) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria, Model of A Colonial Failure; (American Committee on Africa, New York, 1967), p. 43.

(15) Frederick Forsyth, The Biafran Story, (Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), p. 48.

(16) James O'Connell, "The fragility of stability: The Fall of the Nigerian Federal Government, 1966", in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazuri (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Africa, (Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 1031.

(17) Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces; (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 155.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid., p. 154.

(20) Legislative Council Debates, March 20 to April 2, 1947, Government Printer, Lagos, 1947, p. 208; as quoted in Arthur A. Nwankwo and Samuel U. Ifejika, The Making of A Nation: Biafra, C. Hurst and Company, 1969, p. 30.

(21) Amitai Etzioni, Op. Cit., p. 155. (see note #17)

(22) Georg Simmel, Conflict And The Web of Group Affiliations; The Free Press, 1955, p. 109.

(23) Richard West, "BIAFRA: The Last Hope for African Independence", in The Sunday Times, (London) Magazine, June 1, 1969, pp. 39 - 41.

(24) C.L.R. James, A History of Pan-African Revolt, Drum and Spear Press, Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 37.

(25) Ibid., p. 38.

(26) James O'Connell, Op. Cit., p. 1013.

(27) Nnamdi Azikiwe, Respect for Human Dignity, (Inaugural Address at installation as Governor-General in 1960, Government Printer, Enugu, 1960), p. 2.

(28) James O'Connell, Op. Cit., p. 1018.

(29) Richard West, for instance, maintains that: "Biafra was the first place I had been to in Africa where the Africans themselves were truly in charge of government. It was the first place I have been with a sense of nationhood rather than mere statehood." Richard West, "Biafra: The Last Hope for African Independence?" in The Sunday (London) Times Magazine, June 1, 1969, p. 34. Diamond also suggests that "Biafra may well be the last hope for a self-determining black Africa, and a revolution based on indigenous model", Stanley Diamond, "Who Killed Biafra", in The New York Review of Books, Vol. XIV, Number 4, February 26, 1970, p. 26.

(30) John R. Sullivan, Breadless Biafra; (Pflaum Press, Dayton, Ohio, 1969), p. 97. In this context, it is interesting to note that in a recent interview

by a correspondent of the German paper, Der Spiegel, the current Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. K.A. Buaia, admitted that "the boundaries in Africa were drawn rather arbitrarily by the colonial powers, Germany, France, and Britain." In the course of the same interview the interviewer noted that: "Africa's boundaries are the most artificial and impossible boundaries in the world. They divide tribes that have lived together for thousands of years, and force people into one state territory who have nothing in common." (Democracy in Africa, in Daily Graphic (Ghana), Thursday, June 4, 1970, p. 11.)

(31) This argument then places into better perspective Etzioni's proposition regarding the manner in which former colonial territories operate, following independence. See note #17.

(32) See note #17.

(33) C.L.R. James, "Towards a Caribbean Nation," in Caribbean Conference, 1965; (A Caribbean Conference publication, October 1967), p. 21.

(34) Stanley Diamond, Nigeria, Op. Cit., pp. 5 - 6.

(35) Stanley Diamond, "Who Killed Biafra?", Op. Cit., pp. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

(36) Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Victory or defeat, a nation is born", in The Globe and Mail, (Canada), Wednesday, October 11, 1967, p. 7.

(37) See Chapter 1, for the definition and conceptualisation of a federation.

(38) CARIFTA and the Caribbean Economic Community (Government of Trinidad-and-Tobago, July, 1968), p. 7.

(39) Ibid.

(40) In Chapter 4, it was shown that the Federation was, to a great extent, an imposition by the British Colonial Administration.

(41) The fundamental assumption of the writer is, of course, that the chief adversary which Biafra was struggling against, was not just Nigeria. It is his contention that Biafra was overwhelmed by the monstrosity of international intrigue spearheaded by the British, the Soviets, and the United States. In support of this claim, it is sufficient in this writer's opinion, to call the reader's attention to the detailed analyses of the Biafra-Nigeria conflict by Professor Stanley Diamond, Professor Conor Cruse O'Brien, inter alia. See for instance:

(1) Conor Cruse O'Brien, "The Tragedy of Biafra", in The New York Review of Books, Dec. 21, 1967.
(2) Conor Cruse O'Brien, "Biafra Revisited", in The New York Review of Books, 22 May, 1969.
(3) Stanley Diamond, "Who Killed Biafra?", in The New York Review of Books, 26 February, 1970.

(42) President Houphouet-Boigny, Statement issued at press conference in Paris, France; prior to the recognition of the Republic of Biafra by Ivory Coast in 1968. Houphouet-Boigny is the President of the Ivory Coast Republic.

(43) Arthur A. Nwankwo, et.al., Op. Cit., p. 287.

Appendix 4 - 1

The Federal Legislature (A)

The British Government

↓

The Governor-General

↓

The Council of Ministers

Composition

The Governor-General (President)

The Prime Minister and twelve Ministers.

State of Parties

The NPC	4
The NCNC	6
The Action Group	2
*The KNC	1
Total	13

The House of Representatives

The Senate (instituted in 1960)

Composition 190 members distributed as gollows:

92 elected in the Northern Region

42 elected in the Eastern Region

42 elected in the Western Region

6 elected in the Southern Cameroons

2 elected in the Lagos (Federal capital)

6 special members appointed by the Governor-General

190 Total

*Kamerun National Congress, one of the Political parties in the Cameroons. The Cameroons, a former German colony, was mandated to Britain by the defunct League of Nations at the close of World War I.

State of the Parties

NPC	80
NCNC	54
AG	24
KNC	6
*UMBC	7
*UNIP	3
*NLCP	1
Independent Members	5
Vacancies	4
Special members (appointed by the Governor-General	6
Total	190

*UNIP - United National Independent Party. This emerged following the 1953 political crisis in the NCNC government of Eastern Nigeria.
UMBC - United Middle Belt Congress. This was a political movement based in the Southern part of Northern Nigeria.
NLCP - National Liberation Commoner's Party.

Northern Nigeria Legislature (B)

The Governor

The Executive Council

Composition

The Governor (President

The Premier and nine ministers, and the Attorney-General (Ex officio)

NPC Government

The House of Assembly

The House of Chiefs
68 members constituted as follows:

Composition

134 members distributed as follows:

NPC	106	First Class Chiefs	15
UMBC	12	Other Chiefs	35

*ITP-AG Alliance	3	Members of the E ecutive Council who are also members of the House of Assembly.	17
NEPU	5	Advisor in Muslim Law	1
Bornu Youth Movement	2		
Independents	3		
Special Members	3		
Total	136	Total	68

*ITP - Ilorin Talak Parapo. Literally this means, "Peasant (commoner) Party", and it professed to represent the interest of the common man (founded in 1955).

Western Nigeria Legislature (C)

The Governor

↓

The Executive Council

The Premier and 13 Ministers ↓ Action Group Government

The House of Assembly — The House of Chiefs

Composition and State of Parties

80 elected members distributed as follows:

Action Group	50
NCNC	30

Composition and State of Parties

Chiefs	52
Members of the Executive Council - also members of the House -	11
Total	63

Eastern Nigeria Legislature (D)

The Governor

↓

The Executive Council

The Premier and 14 Ministers ↓ NCNC Government

The House of Assembly — The House of Chiefs (non-existent*)

*The subsequent institution of the House of Chiefs in the Eastern Regional Legislature--essentially an artificiality--was a calculated design to maintain a balance of institutions within the constituent units of the Federation. This tendency of the Governments of the former federation of Nigeria to duplicate institutions for their own sake was a policy that verged on prodigality and conspicuous extravagance, to say the least.

Composition

85 members distributed as follows:

NCNC	64	Includes the Attorney-General who is appointed.
Action Group	15	
Independent	1	
Total	85	

Appendix 4 - 2

The Northernisation Policy

In support of the claims made in this study that:

i) Opportunistic ethnicity played a major role in the disintegration of the Nigerian Federation;
ii) The Federation was a composite of diverse cultural groups, who were in most cases incompatible in their ways of life;
iii) The Nigerian Federation was, indeed, an aggregation of at least three different Nations, who were better off staying apart than coming together;
iv) The "Northernisation policy" was, in fact, a policy for excluding one ethnic group (the Igbo) from the affairs of the Hausa-Fulani dominated Northern Region of Nigeria;

the following excerpts from the preceedings of the Northern Nigeria Legislature (Parliamentary Debates House of Assembly Official Report, session 1964 - 65) are appended. A sample of the speeches by a few legislators would suffice to convey to the reader, the intensity of the anti-Igbo sentiments prevailing among the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria. (Government Printer, Kaduna, 1965).

1) Mallam Muhammadu Mustapha Maude Gyan:
"On the allocation of plots to Ibos or allocation of stalls, I would like to advise the Minister that these people know how to make money and we do not know the way and manner of getting about this business...we do not want Ibos to be allocated with plots, I do not want them to be given plots..."

2) Mallam Bashan Umaru:
"I would like (you), as the Minister of Land and Survey, to revoke forth-with all Certificates of Occupancy from the hands of the Ibos resident in the Region (applause)..."

3) Mr. A.A. Abogede (Igala East):
"I am very glad that we are in Moslem country and the Government of Northern Nigeria allowed some few Christians in the Region to enjoy themselves according to the belief of their Religion, but building of hotels should be taken away from the Ibos and even if we find some of the Christians (that is non-Igbo) who are interested in building hotels and have no money to do so, the Government should aid them, instead of allowing Ibos to continue with the hotels."

4) Dr. Iya Abubakar (Special member: Lecturer in Mathematics, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria)
"I am one of the strong believers in Nigerian Unity and I have hoped for our having a United Nigeria, but certainly if the present trend of affairs continues, then I hope the Government will investigate

first the desirability and secondly the possibility of extending Northernisation policy to the petty traders (applause)".

5) Mallam Mukhtar Bellow:
"I would like to say something very important that the Minister should take my appeal to the Federal Government about the Ibos (sic) in the Post Office. I wish the numbers of these Ibos be reduced... There are too many of them in the North. They were just like sardines and I think they were just too dangerous to the Region."

6) Mallam Ibrahim Musa (Igala North-West)
"Mr. Chairman, Sir, well, first and foremost, what I have to say before this hon. House is that we should send a delegate to meet our hon. Premier to move a motion in this Budget session that all the Ibos working in the Civil Service of Northern Nigeria, including the Native Authorities, whether they are contractors or not, should be repatriated at once."

7) Mallam Bashari Umaru:
"...there should be no contracts either from the Government, Native Authorities, or private enterprises given to Ibo Contractors... Again Mr. Chairman, the Foreign Firms too should be given a time-limit to replace all Ibos in their firms by some other people."

8) The Premier, (Alhaji, The Hon. Sir. Ahmadu Bello, K.B.E., Sarduana of Sokito):
"It is my most earnest desire that every post in the Region, however small it is, to be filled by a Northerner (applause)."

9) Alhaji Usman Kiman (Sarkin Musawa):
"What brought the Ibos into this Region? They were here since the Colonial Days. Had it not been for the Colonial Rule there would hardly have been any Ibo in this Region. Now that there is no Colonial Rule the Ibos should go back to their Region. There should be no hesitation about this matter. Mr. Chairman, North is for Northerners, East for Easterners, West for Westerners, and the Federation (i.e., Lagos) is for us all (applause)."

10) The Minister of Land and Survey (Alhaji The Hon. Ibrahim Musa Gashash, OBE):
"Mr. Chairman, Sir, I do not like to take up much of the time of this House in making explanations, but I would like to assure Members that having heard their demands about Ibos holding land in Northern Nigeria my Ministry will do all it can to see that the demands of Members are met. How to do this, when to do it, all this should not be disclosed. In due course you will all see what will happen (applause)."

Certainly, the minister kept his promise to his people. From May 1966 through September 1966, everybody saw what happened. The "demands of Members" have been met, not only in the expropiation of the Igbo resedents of the

Northern Region, but also--and what was more atrocious--in the systematic policy by which the Northerners sought to eliminate the Igbo, in several waves of remorseless and genocidal massacres. By their own pronouncements, the Hausa-Fulani of Northern Nigeria, have irrevocably affirmed that they and the Yoruba of the West have not, are not, and cannot be regarded as belonging to the same nation as the Igbo, the vicarious victims of their unprecedented atrocities.

Appendix 4 - 3

The January 15 Revolution, 1966

As stated in Chapter 4 of this study this writer contends that the Army Coup d'etat of January 15, 1966, deserved the status of a Revolution. His rationale for this claim is the reaction of the public. This, he argues, was reflected in the statements appearing in the leading papers of the Nation, and in the opinions expressed by various groups and organisations all over the country. Bellow, is a sample of the opinions from the Nigerian Public, following the event of January 15, 1966.

1) The West African Pilot (Statement by an NPC Minister in the remnant of the Civilian Government that just formally handed power over to the Military), Wednesday January 16, 1966 - Front Page:
"We believe and accept that the present task of the new regime is the welfare of all peoples of Nigeria...we call on all the peoples of Nigeria...to rally round the new military government so as to make easy its great and noble taks."

2) University Students demonstrating, with placards, proclaiming:
"Long live our Saviour, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi...Freedom for All...Equality for All...This is the birth of real Nigerian Freedom." (January 17, 1966).

3) West African Pilot. Tuesday, Jan. 18, 1966. (Statement by the University of Lagos Student's Union):
"We...heartily congratulate the new Federal Military Government of Nigeria...the news...came to us as a great relief...We wholly pledge our full support and co-operation to the regime...We call on all peace-loving Nigerians to give implicit loyalty...in an era of peace, happiness, individual liberty and equal opportunity for all."

4) Statement by the NCNC Spokesman (Jan. 18, 1966):
"This is only (a) logical sequence of events and we hope that every true citizen of Nigeria will regard this (occasion) as a turning point in our national life."

5) Statement by the Action Group Spokesman, (Jan. 18, 1966):
"My Party believes that the take-over is only a continuation of the people's struggle to preserve parliamentary democracy and the unity of the Federation. The AG pledges its support to the new Regime."

6) West African Pilot (Statement by the National Union of Nigerian Students) January 18, 1966:
Calling on "all Nigerians to support the new government and work conscientiously to build a strong and united Nigeria."

7) The Daily Times (Editorial) January 18, 1966:
"The old order changeth yielding place to new...Today, there is a new regime in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, a military regime... The new administration deserves praise for the calm manner (in which) it effected the change without causing public panic."

8) West African Pilot (Statement by the NPC) January 19, 1966:
"We call upon our supporters to co-operate with the military government and to give the military administration support in its great task of bringing peace and stability to Nigeria."

9) The Daily Times (editorial) Jan. 19, 1966:
"Liberty Unchained: It is ironic that much liberties denied the ordinary Nigerian by the departed civil government, have been restored and guaranteed by a military regime. Is it any wonder, then, that the masses have welcomed the new order with joyful enthusiasm?"

10) Morning Post (editorial) Jan 19, 1966.
"We join all lovers of peace in this country in welcoming the military government of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi...A people get the government they deserve."

11) Morning Post (Front page (Comment) Jan. 20, 1966:
"We on the 'Morning Post' congratulate Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi. We congratulate his government on its determination to wipe out of the Nigerian scene anything that is undemocratic...We believe... that the 'New Nigerian' will be able to say: "We are Nigerians--one and all."

12) Morning Post (Editorial) Jan. 21, 1966:
"Gone are the days when, intoxicated with our dream-world euphoria, we saw little men and called them gods,...No longer shall tin-gods thrive on the simplicity of sycophants."

With this sample of opinion here presented, the reader is urged to draw his own conclusions regarding the event of January 15, 1966. These reflect the sentiment of the Nigerian general public following the January Coup. In the opinion of this writer, they more than suffice to sustain his claim that the coup was a society-wide revolution in Nigerian political evolution.

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