. _ '-
. _ . _ . .. .. . . .v . .. _ . ‘ . .
. . ‘ a . U i . c a . I.
l . . ‘ 0.. . . _ . . u
u . o . v .. . . .
. I :. . . . o . o. .
.u . . . . . . . . . . .... .
. L . . . . O . l . v _ . . _. . . . . . A. . avv
. . .- . . . . I . .
. in . . .~. . t . . n u I . . . . . v ,
v . . . . . .. ’
w . v .’ _ ‘ 1.. . § . g. . . . . u ‘p
v _ . y . . . o . v . ‘ . . ,0 .
.. . , O c ‘ . . . . . .
.. o _.. . I . . .
_ V .. . . . .
p C v . .
w ..l . . v ._ . . . _ . . .. . ..A..
A. . . .. a v. _. C O‘ n I. a f .4. ‘ .o w
. V . . O . . . .. I
. . . . . - _
.1. o I I. . . n u .
. . . . . . o v
o . . o A. . . . . . . .
_ .
v o . n . o n A '
v . . . _ . . . . . r .. a .
. . V . . o ‘ . . . . u 0 . ..I I
.
« . o . I - .nVQ . . a . . D . . u . . o...
u . .
u . v r ..o. . . . . . ‘ . . . .. . . . . .. V. c. .
Q . o o . .. . . ~ - . .. . . l . o 2 .o I ..o . o . . . . L . .
. . . .
O . . ' . . V . . . . . . . . r u . I
I. . n . .o I . I . . . . .o f. . Ad .
N . _ . ‘ . ..o, ‘ . . . . . . ‘ . . . . .. .
o . a . . 1 . . . . . . .o.
' . . . . <. o o . .- . . ‘ ~ . . . . I o ~.
’ . . . . . . O u o u .
a . .01 . . . . o . . . .
. . . . . .. . . .
. - I . . . o . o ‘ . .
n . . . . . . .. . . . . . . _ r z .- - .
N . . . - . . . . . .7 . . v . ..
c l I . ‘ . _ . . . .
. . . . ‘
I i o o
. i . - . . . . :4 .l?
u . Q r I A
H .‘ . . o c . . u . u .
‘ 1 I -' 9 J u n I P. —
Q . . c . c v .. . . u.
C . . . . _ . o . o.. .
Q. Q A, u I
C ‘ . . . a . I .O —
‘ _ . o o .. . 1.. .
. O A n . d . u
n‘ . o s . o _ . I . u n I o . £. .0 u .o
. _ . o . ‘v o . .
. . a . .
. n u . A O I. ‘ 0 q ‘
o r . . u- A
. . . . . . .. v .
I r. .- v I . .. . ., .. o . .,
. , . I.
‘ o - I I
. . . . .. . . r
. . . . . _ . . .y . .
. o. I
. . \t o .
. . . . _ . ' _. A. .
. .
. . . . . . 1
. o. .
. . .
. 9 . . . . _ . . .. I
a, . _ .o .l o .
. y y _ .
I o _ I - 0
. . O . c . . ..
. I
. . . . .
u . I . n
. . .0 ‘ . . In
. . .‘ f v .. -
. . ... an. \IA
. s . . o L
I . o . . . . . . . . L y
_ . . ~ ..r.
. I .1. .s
c u . n0-
. . .
_ . v
. .
. O. 5 A! .
O . - _ .
. I - u
0 _ o c
.
. n .
. . I . .r
. u .
I I
. .
u c. 1
. o o I.
o a _
r; v 0 n. I
1 . n . o . .
. u .
. _ .
n
. . . . . . u
‘
u A
o
A | U
.
a I
I
. u
. .
I O
0
I A
I u
. .
I u .
. .
O '
.
o
h
.
C
o
h; .0 . . t .
. — . . .
.I . _ .. _ . . . \u .. A. .. ‘ . . .. . _
q .2 . .. . . .2. f' 1.. _. . .. , . 7. pa v _ ..... . .13.; .. w“. r.. 1.. . .._ . . . _ . .. _ . . . , . _ s o .
. , ... . _ . ... 1 , .. .. , , . . . ‘ .. _ . .. . . .. . . .
u .o. T. . . 3 Z... J. . .8... . . .. . _ . o. .r. . . . . _ ._ . 1.. . . ,2- . .. A. . .. o . . . re..\
. . .. _ . I _ _. K . .. .XN . ‘
a Q . .. . 0.1 f u. I ~ .. 3.. . A
. . ,. t .V .. 5.1 $34 .uw.

    

  

.. Oil

 

i?

- LIBRARY

  

 

OVERDUE FINES ARE 25¢ PER DAY
PER ITEM

Return to book drop to remove
this checkout from your record.

 

 

 

 

 

 

fl LIBRARY

' Michigan State
University

 

SGEE WMS 01' THE WTIW AND
MODIFIGLTIQ‘I OF um EELIEF SYSPEB

Alfred Dram

ATHESJS

Suhnitted to the School of Sciences and Arts of
Michign State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in Inrt 1&1 fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

MLSI'ER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1957

”1
{1‘
[U m

 

 

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

AWWIEDGIFNI‘S

 

The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Dr. Milton
Rokeach whose glidance and patient encouragement nude this study possible.
Acknowledgnent is also made to Dr. M. Ray Denny who made numerous suggest ions
in reprds to the foundation of the experimental design itself. and

also made various criticians about the write-up of the thesis.

To Dr. Charles Henley. who read and suggested various revisions about
the thesis. and to Mr. Jack Iafi’ey. who assisted in the testing of the
subjects; the author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude for their

assistance in canpleting this thesis.

 

 

 

I.

III.

IV.
V.
VI.

TABIE OF CONTENI'S

Introduction

Experiment #1

Subjects and Procedure
Results

Experiment #2

Subjects and Procedure
Results

Discussion

A Canparitive Analysis of EIperiments #1 and #2
Discussion

Smmnry and Conclusions

Bibl iogra phy

ll
19

28

31
51
58
61

 

 

worm

'l‘able

1o

2.

3.

h.

5.

6.

7o

8.

9.

Canmrison between high and la! dogmtic groups on the total
time taken to solve the No-Canopy and Canopy problems in the

Page

first position of the practice order - hnediate Card Conditiono 20

Casparison between higi and low dogmtic gasps on the total
time taloan to solve the Wow and Canopy problems in the

second position of the practice order -- hnediate Card Condition.20

Canparison between hi9: and low dogmtic groups on the total
time taken to solve the No-Canopy and CanOpy problans in the

first position of the practice order -- Spaced Card Condition.

Canparison between high and low dogmtic groups on the total
time taken to solve the No-Canopy and Canopy problems in the

second position of the practice order -- Spaced mrd Condition.

A canparison of experimental conditions and total and integra-

tion times for the No-Canopy and Canopy problems when these
problems are given in the first position of a counterbalanced
practice order.

Casparison between the experimental conditions on the total
time taken to solve the No-(hnomr and CanOpy problems when
these problems are given in the first position of a counter-
balanced practice more

Canparison between the experimental conditions on the time
taken to integ‘ate the three new beliefs of the No-Canopy and
Canopy problsns when these problens are given in the first
position of a practice order.

Canparison between big: and low dogmatic groups under two
experimental conditims on the total time taken to solve the
No-Canopy and mnopy problems when these problems are given
in the first position of a counterbalanced practice order.

Number of sets overcane within the first ten minutes by high
and low dogmtic groups on the lie-Canopy and Canopy problans
canbined.

29

29

36

38

no

is

 

L131? 01' TLBIES

Table Page

10.

ll.

Casparison between high and low domtic groups under two
experimental conditions on the time taken to integ-ate the

three new beliefs of the No-Canopy and Canopy problsns when

these problems are given in the first position of a counter-
balanced practice order. hi;

Canparison between high and low dogmatic groups under two
experimental conditions on the time taken to integrate the

three new beliefs of the No-Canopy and Canopy problsns when

these nroblans are given in the second position of a counter-
balanced practice order. h?

Canxnrison between high and low dogmtic groups showing the
posit ion effects of the No-Canopy and Canopy problems under
the two experimental conditions. ’9

 

SM DETERIDQNI‘S OF THE FORM ION AND LIODIFICAT ION

OF NEW BELIEF SYSI‘RIS

Alfred Cram

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School of Sciences and Arts of
Michign State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

l'i'ASI‘ER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

Year 1957

Approved M W

 

 

Alfred Cram -1-

This study was an experimental and theoretical analysis attempting
to differentiate 'party-line' and "genuine'I thought processes. The
theoretical posit ion was derived from Boheach's belief-thought model with
the greatest emphasis being placed upon his analysis of what he terms
the 'fitting-filing process.‘ New information given to an individual
takes on the psychological form of a new belief or disbelief. Communi-
cation with other beliefs in the system is dependent upon the degree of
isolation among such beliefs. The 'part'y-line' (non-integrative) change
is therefore, one in which a great deal of isolation exists among beliefs;
whereas, the 'genuine' (integrative) change is one in which their exists

a high state of intercommunicat ion.

The experiment was directed towards obtaining a measure of either the
presence or absence of this hypothesized isolation of beliefs in the process
of solving in sequence two specially designed problems. Both problems
involved the integ'ation of three beliefs in order to reach the solution;
and, furthemore. two of the beliefs to be integrated were identical in
both problems. An individual attempting to solve a problem in the second
position, therefore. needed to integrate only one new belief if a 'genuine"
integrative change had occurred in the first problem. By the use of a
counterbalanced design any savings in time required to integrate the beliefs

was measured.

The women-solving sequences were studied under two experimental
conditions: (a) an Immediate Card Condition. in which all the new beliefs

were presented on cards immediately at the start of the experiment, and

 

 

 

 

Alfred Cram -2-

(b) a Spaced Card Condition. in which the beliefs were presented indivi-

dually at predetermined time intervals.

Eighty subjects were selected by the use of Form E of the Rokeach
Dogmatism Scale such that forty were high in dognat ism and forty were low
in dognatism. Ten subjects were tested in each of the eight possible

exper imental cond it ions .

Under an Imnediate Card Condit ion. where mesmbly there was inst i-
cient time for conflicts to develop between old and new beliefs, th high
and low dogmat ic groups exhibited a distinct savings in integration time
for a problem given in the second posit ion of the practice order. This
savings in integration time was equated with the theoretical assumption of
a high state of intercomunication among beliefs. therefore, indicating

that a genuine change had occurred in the first problem.

Under a Spaced Card Condition. where time was available for conflicts
to develop between old and new beliefs. low dogmatic individuals again
nanifested a distinct savings in’integration time for a problen in the
second posit ion. However, high dogmt ic individuals, those with closed
systans of thought. under a Spaced Card Condition did go; show a significant
decrease in integration time. This lack of savings was equated with the
idea that higily dogmatic individuals, under a Spaced Card Condit ion, do
not manifest a 'genuine' change in the first problem, but in reality

exanplify what has been labeled as 'party-line.' non- integrative thinking.

mom ION

This study was designed to obtain sane insight into the phenanenon
popularly labeled "partyoline'I thinking. Furthermore. it is also an
extension of the expertnental work that has been previously conducted
at lichign State University upon the belief-thought model of Dr. Milton

BOkfiCh (2.3.5.6).

The first stuw by Rokeach. McGovney. and Doom (3) was an attempt
to distinguish between the two basic constructs of rigidity and dogmt ism.
Dogmtian. as it is utilized by Rokeach. refers to (a) a relatively
closed cognitive ermintion of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality.
(b) ermined around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority
which. in turn. (c) provide a framework for patterns of intolerance and
qualified tolerance toward others (2). Rigidity is distinguished from
dognatisn by its conception as a lower-order and less canplaxly organized
form of resistance to change. Although rigidity. like domtism. refers
to a resistance to change. it is a resistance to change of single ideas.
beliefs. sets. or expectancies; whereas dogmtian refers to a resistance

to change of systems of ideas. beliefs. sets. or expectancies.

Testing of the hypothesized distinction between rigidity and dogratisn
was accomplished by the utilization of a special problen devised by )5. Pay
Denny. Specifically. this problan involves the invent ion of a new system

of reality incorporating two necessary conditions for experimentally

contrasting the concepts of rigidity and domtians (a) the rules of
this fictional world are in contradict ion to those one would expect

fran everyday living. and (b) the formulation of these rules necessitates
their being integ‘ated into a systan exhibiting a high degree of inter-

cannunication in order for the problan to be solved.

Due to the fact that an individual attanpting to function adequately
in this new world would have to overcame not only the specific sets. but
also integrate than into a meaningful system. two types of measures were
obtained: (1) a rigidity measure an number of sets (beliefs) overcane
within given periods of time. and (2) a dognatian measure --- the time

taken to solve the problem following the overcaning of the specific sets.

Results of the experiment were in the anticipated direction. High

and Low Rigid Groups. as chosen by the Cough-Sanford Rigidity Scale (1),
_d_igl_ but the High and law Dogmtic Groups. as chosen by the Dognatian
Scale (1;). L19, 3.92. differ significantly frcm each other on the number of
sets (beliefs) overcome in the specified time intervals of the first

ten and fifteen minutes. In regards to the time taken to solve the
problem after the second set was overcane. the 3191 and low Dognatic
Groups in but the Big: and Low Rigid Groups gig got differ significantly

fran each other.

The second study in the series was conducted by Vidulich (6) and
was directed towards answering the question '... what it is about the
cognitive process of the highly dogmtic individual which leads him to
have difficulty in integrating new beliefs into a new system.“ It was

 

 

theorized that the highly dognatic individual has more difficulty in the
integ‘ation process than individuals low in dognatisn because the higily
dogmatic individual is '... unwilling to accept or entertain new systans
of thinking and reject old systans of thinking.‘II The essential pranise
of this position revolves around the concept of selective forgetting.
Highly dognatic individuals in attempting to alter or reject the problem
situation fail to remanber the hints and the integration process is

necessarily nape ired.

All subjects were given the Doodlebug Problem which this time involved
modifications designed to facilitate the integration process. The three
new beliefs were typed upon separate 315 cards in the form of hints.

Upon the overcaning of a belief by a subject. the appropriate card was
placed before him; failure to overcame a belief in a given specified time
interval was canpensated for by placing the appropriate card in the indivi-
dual's visual field. The Rig: and low Dogmt ic Groups were subdivided into
two experimental groups; (1) Keep Card Condition -i- individuals permitted
to retain the cards in front of them througiout the remaining time needed
to gin the appropriate solution. and (2) Take Gard Away Condition «-
individuals that had the cards taken away from than as soon as they had

time to read the card.

The Vidulich study substantiated the earlier conclusions that Higi
Dogmtic Groups require a significantly longer period of time to solve
the problem after the beliefs have been overcome but do not differ frcm

the low Dogmtic Groups in regards to speed of overcoming individual beliefs.

 

 

Moreover. individuals allowed to keep the beliefs integrated the beliefs
consistently faster than individuals from whom the beliefs were taken

away with the High Dogmtic Group profiting most by the experimental
assistance. llaasures of both inmediate and delayed recall further substant i-
ated the underlying theoretical position that the highly dognatic individual's
difficulty in integ'ation is the result of his really not having the

new beliefs at his finger tips. A questionnaire measure devised to tap

the degree of acceptance of the problem and the beliefs, indicated a
siglificantly higher rejection of the entire problea situation by individuals

scoring high on the Dognatian Scale.

The underlying assmnpt ion of Rokeach's beliefs-thought model is
that all cognitive systems are organized into two interdependent parts.

a belief-system and a disbelief-systan (2). This intervening variable
was designed to unite the orgnization of thought with belief.

The belief systan is conceived to represent all the sets. or

expectancies. or hypotheses a person may have at any given

time which he accepts as true. to one degee or another. The

disbelief system is conceived to be canposed of a series of

disbelief sub-systems rather than just a single one within

which are represalted all the sets. expectancies or hypotheses

which a person at any given time accepts as false. to one

degee or another.

The belief-disbelief system is conceived as possessing additional
properties by which it may vary in addition to the specific beliefs or
disbeliefs held by a particular. individual at any given time. A summary
of these preparties are presented in Rokeach's paper. The Unit: 9; Thougt
39g Belief. and are essentially as follows: (1) isolation - the degee of

conmunication or interconnectedness between and within belief and disbelief

 

systans. (2) differentiation - the varying degrees of discrepancy in the
degree of differentiation of the belief system as canpared with the
disbelief gates. and among the several disbelief sub-systems with respect
to each other. and (3) ganpgehfliveness 9;; narrowness 9; 35h; £13359. - the
total number of disbelief sub-systans represented in a given belief-

disbelief systan.

Furthermore. there is an important theoretical conceptualization of
an organization along a central-peripheral dimension. Rokeach distinguishes
between three sets of belief-regions corresponding to the theorized
central-peripheral dimensions (1) central g_e_gi_o_n_ - representing an indi-
vidual's 'primitive' beliefs which have to do with all the beliefs an
individual has developed through interpersonal experiences rather than
through forml indoctrination about the nature of the world one lives in.
the nature of the 'self' and the "geitleralized'I other. (2)1ntemedigte
M92. - the beliefs a person has in and about the nature of authority
depended on to form a picture of the world he lives in. and (3) pgipheral
22512.2 - the beliefs perceived to emanate from authority which fill in

the details of this world picture.

According to Rokeach .

It is the structural interrelations among central. intermediate.
and peripheral beliefs and disbeliefs. rather than solely logical
consistency. which gives the total belief-disbelief system its
holistic or systenntic character. All information impinging upon

the person from the outside must be processed or coded in such a
way so that the informtion is rejected or also fitted sanehow in

this systan. It is this processing-coding activity which we call
thinking. and surely it met be within sane ‘sort of a context like
the belief-disbelief system that thinking takes place.

The processing-coding operation is hypothesized as involving the follow-
ing steps: (a) an initial screening which my result in a rejection or
mrrowing out of new information taking place in the central region due
to an incompatibility of new infomation with the primitive beliefs.

(b) assimilat ion of new infomtion into the belief-disbelief system that
could necessitate the alterat ion-rat ionalization of the new infonmt ion

by finding out what one's authority sources have to say about it --- occurs
in the intermediate belief region. and (c) the fitting-filing of this
information into what ever world outlook one may have as his own --- occurs

in the peripheral belief region.

The present study was derived from Rokeach's analysis of this fitt ing-

filing process.

The new information is communicated fran the intermediate (authority)
region to the peripheral region not in the form of infonmt ion

but in the psychological form of a new belief or disbelief. This
belief -- new or modified -- may or my not canmlnicate with other
beliefs in the systan. depending upon the degree of isolation among
such beliefs. The greater the isolation the less effect will a
change in one part of the peripheral region have upon adjacent

parts. and vice versa. It is essentially in this way that one can
differentiate conceptually' a fparty-line' change from a more “genuine"
change.

Since the primary factor differentiating between a 'party-line' and
a I'genuine" change is the hypothesized isolation of beliefs; the experimental
design was specifically directed towards obtaining a measure of either the
presence or absence of this isolation in the process of solving the Doodle-
bug Problem. The possibility of measuring a phenomena as elusive as this
was derived from a theoretical analysis of what effect this isolation of

beliefs would have upon subsequent problem solving tasks.

 

Vidulich's study (6) suggests that individuals who are highly
dogmtic do not possess as satisfactory a working knowledge of the indivi-
dual beliefs as do individuals low in dognatian. If his findings are
correct. one my logically infer that highly dognat ic individuals
attempting to solve a similar Doodlebug task would not receive as yeat
a facilitative effect as individuals low in dognatimn. This impoverished
transfer would be indicative of the absence of a 'genuine' change in the
first problem. The existence or non-existence of the hypothesized iso-
lation of beliefs was therefore considered to be amenable to experimental
mnipulation and measurement by studying the transfer effects within a
series of similar problem solving tasks specifically designed to induce
positive transfer. Since the original Doodlebug Problan requires the
overcoming and integtion of mltiplc sets. is of sufficient difficulty
to pennit enperimaltation upon how this solution is accanplished. and is
alnenable to subsequent tampering; it was considered to be the logical

starting point for devising a series ‘of higlly related problems.
The two coalitive tasks utilized in the present study were as follows:

mom #1
m canon-ms:

Joe Doodlebug is a strange sort of imginary bug. He can and
cannot do the following things:

1. He can jump in only four different directions; north. south.
east. and west. He cannot junp diagonally (e.g.. southeast.
northeflto BtOe).

2. Once he starts in any direction. that is north. south. east.
or west. he must jump four times in that same direction before
he can switch to another direction.

3. He can only juinp. not crawl. fly. or walk.

1;. He can jump very large distances or very amll distances. but
not less than one inch per jump.

5. Joe cannot turn around.
TB SEUATICN:

Joe has been jumping all over the place getting sane exercise
whal his mater places a pile of food three feet directly west of him.
Joe notices that the pile of food is a little larger than he. As soon
as Joe sees all this food he stops dead is his tracks facing north.
After all his exercise Joe is very hungry and wants to get to the food
as quickly as he possibly can. Joe mines the situation and then
says. 'Ihrn it. I'll have to jump four times to get the food.’
THE mom:

Joe Doodlebug was a mrt bug and he was dead rigit in his conclusion.
'hy do you suppose Joe Doodlebug had to take four jumps. no more and no
less. to reach the food? ‘

The correct solution to the problem is that Joe had already jumped
once to the east when his meter presented the food; therefore. he had
to make three more jumps to the east and one jump back to the west landing
on top of the food. As was previously stated. this solution is not an
easy one for the average subject. The difficuly lies in the fact that
an individual must not only overcqne three beliefs contrary to his every-
day thinking. but must then proceed to integ‘ate these three new beliefs

into a new system of reality.

PROM #2
ms OONDIl‘IQB:

Joe Doodlebug is a strange sort of innginary bug. He can and
cannot do the following things:

1. He can junp in only four different direct ions; north. south.
east. and west. He cannot jump diagonally (e.g.. southeast.
northwest. etc.).

2. Once he starts in any direction. that is north. south. east.
or west. he met junp four times in that same direction before
he can switch to another direction.

3. la can only junp. not crawl. fly or walk.

2;. He can jump very large distances or very smll distances. but
not less than one inch per jump.

5. Joe cannot turn around.
ma SII'UATIQU:

I .J’oe Ins been jumping all over the place getting sane exercise
when his master places a pile of food three feet directly west of him.
Joe notices that the pile of food is a little larger than he. As soon
as Joe sees all this food he stops dead in his tracks facing north.
After all his exercise Joe is very hungry and wants to get to the food
as quickly as he possibly can. Joe examines the situation noticing
that there is a low canopy over the food. than sys. 'Darn it. I'll
have to jump four times to get the food.‘

THE PROM:

Joe Doodlebug was a smart bug and he was dead right in his conclusion.
lhy do you suppose Joe Doodlebug had to take four jumps. no more and no
less. to reach the food?

Inspection of the two Doodlebug Iroblans readily illustrates how
the revision of the original problan was accanplished. In the first
problan Joe did not have to face the food in order to eat it. he could
had directly on top of the food. The revised problem is identical to
the original problan with the exception that this time there is a canopy
over the food. Thus Joe Doodlebug can no longer eat the food by landing
directly on top of the food. He met take an additional jump backward
of the canopy landing slightly to the south of the food. He is now in

posit ion to eat. In other words. the set of not having to face the food

10

in order to eat it that was applicable in the original problem is no
longer a 'true' belief. The subject in solving this problem is forced
to work with a belief directly opposed to one that has clearly worked
earlier. However. it is also important to note at this time that only
one of the three beliefs necessary for the solution of the first problan
has been changed; the remaining two beliefs being identical in both

problems.

The correct solution to this revised Doodlebug Problan is that Joe
had already taken one jump to the west and therefore had to take three
more jinnpe to the west. his last jump putting him on top of the canopy.
At this point he is free to mks a change in direction and jumps backward

once to the south landing facing the food.

In subsequent~ discussions througiout the reminder of this paper
the original Doodlebug Problen will be referred to as the bio-flop; Problen
and the revised problen will be referred to as the m Problem. The
modification of the experimental procedure which had been inaugurated in
the Vidulich experiment (6) was, retained througlout this study. The three
new beliefs an the facing. direction. and movanent sets --- for each
problan were typed on 31:5 cards.

mm #1

scanners AND PROM:

Six hundred and twenty-five students enrolled in an introductory
psychology course at Michim State University during the winter term of
1956 were given. under classroan conditions. a questionnaire canposed of
the forty itens comprising Form 3 of the Rokeach Dognatisn Scale (1;) plus
a number of filler itans interspersed among the dogmtian items."l Forty
experimental subjects were selected fran this original population; twenty
on the basis of extranely high scores and twenty on the basis of extremely
low scores. The range utilized for high domatic subjects was 188 to 231;
with a mean dogmtian score of 197.2. Iow doglntic subjects ranged frxn

a score of 60 to 119 with a mean score of th.8.

Subjects taking the Dognatisn Scale are required to select one of
six possible responses for each item. These six responses for each itan
(4- 3 to - 3. with no neurtal response permitted) were then converted into
scores by the following method: ’ (+3 equals 7 points. «0-2 equals 6 points.
etc.. down to -3 equals 1 point). Total scores on the scale. therefore.
could range fran a score of ho points (low dognatism extrane) to a score
of 280 points (high dognatian extrane).

 

1 Form 8 of the Dogmtian Scale was reported by Rokeach to have a corrected
reliability of .81 for the English College II sample and a reliability of
.78 for the Elglish lorker sample (1;). The Vidulich study (6) gives a
corrected reliability of .78 which is canparable to the previously cited
reliabilities of Bokeach.

The following is a list of the forty dogmtism items included in
the questionnaire with the instructions given to the original population

of students:

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels
about a nunber of important social and personal questions. The best answer
to each statement below is m Esonal Opinion. We have tried to cover
many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with sane of the statanents. disagreeing just as strongly with
others. and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you eyes or disag'ee
with any statement. you can be sure that many other people feel the same
as you do.

llark each statanent in the left margin according to how much you agee
or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1. «I- 2. 4-3. or --1.
- 2. -3. depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: IAGEEA LII‘TIE -1: roman-m; mm:
4-2: rim mmmom -2: IDEAGREE mmwnom
+3: um mums -3: IDBAGREEVERYMUCH

l. A person who thinks prinmrily of his own happiness is beneath
contempt.

2. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do sanething
important.

3. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I an being understood.

1;. liost people just don 't know what's good for than.

5. In times like these. a person inlet be pretty selfish if he considers
his own happiness prinarily.

6. A man who does not believe in sane great cause has not really lived.

7. I'd like it if I should find saneone who would tell me how to solve
my personal problems.

8. Of all the different philosophies which have existed in this world
there is probably only one which is correct.

9. It is when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that his
life because meaningful.

10.

11.

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

23s

21;.

26.

In this canplieated world of ours the onlywaywe ean know
wint ispingon istorelyupon leadersorexpertswhoeanbe
trusted. '

Therearean-berorpersonslhaweco-etohatebeeauseofthe
thingstheystandfor.

Thereissonuohtobedoneandsolittletinetodeit in.
It isbettertobeadeadharothenaliweeaard.

Q
A coup which tolmtes too such differnee of opiniu along its
own We cannot exist for long.

It is onlynatural theta person shouldhawes-ehbettu'
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

Ihile I don't like to shit this even to uself. I soothes have
the ambition to beoane a cast In. life linsteih. or Bedhewm.
or aiahspeare.

Even thong: freedm of speech for all coups is a win-Mile goal.
it is unfortunately necessary at tines to restrict the freeda
of certain politial coups.

Iranian istoaccanplishhisnission in life it issaetines
necessary to gable 'all or nothing at all.‘

lost people Just don't giwe a 'dam' abmt others.

A pcson who gets enthusiastic about a m of causes is likely
to be a pretty 'wishywwashy' sort of person.

To companies with our political oppaluts is dangerous because
it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

If given the chance Iwould do scathing that would be of great
bnefit to the world.

Intineslilnethese itisoftennecessarytobenereoamard
aainst ideasmtoutbycertainpeopleerpoupsinone'sown
eanp than bythose in the opposing eanp.

1h . heated discussion I mm becane so absorbed in what I
an going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

a.
«ice I get wound up in a heated discussion I Just can't stop.

Therearetwokindsorpeopleinthisworlde thosswhoareonthe
side of truth and those who are aainst it. '

30.

31.

38.
39.

1.0.

km on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

The United States and Rissia have just about nothing in cannon.

' In the history of mankind there have mobably been just a handful

of really great thinkers.

highest form of govermnent is a desecracy and the highest form
of democracy is a government run: by those who are most intelligent.

The present 1. .11 too often run of unhappiness. It is the
future that counts.

Unfortunately. a good many peeple with when I have discussed important
social an! moral problens don't really understand what is going on.

Fundamentally. the world we live in is a pretty lonely place.

It is often desirable to reserve judgnent about what 's going on
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

The worst crime a person can cannit is to attack publicly the people
who believe in the same thing he does.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

llost of the ideas which get published nowadays aren't worth the
Inper they are printed on.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

By blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's
wrong.

Ihen it canes to differences of opinion in religion we nust be
careful not to canpranise with those who believe differently frcm
the way we do.

Subjects were assigned to the various experimental conditions by a

process of randan selection. This selection was performed by a fellow

yaduate student in order to insure aginst any possibility of bias upon

the part of the experimenter. since he would consequently not know the

dogmtisn score for any particular individual. All subjects were notified

 

15

that they had been chosen by a process of randan selection involving the
entire introductory psycholog course. Subjects were then requested to
appear for individual experimentation with each session requiring approxi-

mtely one and one-half hours.

The experimental design utilized in this part of the study was as

follows:
(moor n ' - coommmcm worm om
mm mm ROBIN A PROM B
High Dognatic 5 5
low Dogmtic h 6 No-Canopy Canopy
High Dosmntic 5 5
Low Dogmtic 6 h Canopy No-Canopy

Sibjects were tested upon an individual basis by A. Cram and J. Iaffey.
Timing was accanplished by the use of a stop watch calibrated for seconds.
All subjects were verbally given the following standardized instructions
which were typed on the Experimenter's instruction sheet. As the subject
was seated the Experimenter reads.

Today you are going to be given two Inrts of a newly
devised test of general intelligence. Arrangements for
taking the final part of the test will be nude following
this testing period. In order to obtain an accurate
masure of your ability it is necessary that you complete
all three parts of the test. The problems are not simple

ones but the solutions can be reached by good logical
analysis. Here is the first problem. Read it over carefully.

At this time the Experimenter placed the problem in front of the
subject. The Lilo-Campy and Canon problems were typed upon beige and

light blue paper. respectively and were mounted within a clear acetate cover.

r——————:-

The mac of this was to help subjects differentiate between the two
woblans. As soon as the subject indicated that he had read the problem

the Experimenter said:

I'd like to ask you to think out loud as you work the
problem so I can let you know whether you are correct or
not. Youmey ask questions as you go along and you may
refer to the problem at any time. You may use the scratch
paper in any way you wish. Now let's read the problem over

together.
The Experimenter proceeded to read the problen out loud to the
subject while the subject followed in the reading. Following this the
Experimenter gave the hints to the subjects stating:

Here are sane hints to help you solve the problan.

The three beliefs. in the form of hints. were then placed upon the
table to the left side of the problm (hints were typed upon 3315 cards
identical in color to the problem sheet and placed within individual

acetate folders of identical size to the cards). The Experimenter then

told the subject to I'begin.".

The total time permitted for the solution of the problan was forty-
five minutes.2 When a abject successfully solved the problm. or at the
and of forty-five minutes. he was given sane mgzines with instructions
to read the mpzine for a few minutes while the Experimenter made arrange-

ments for the second problem. After five minutes had elapsed the Experimenter

O

asked :

 

2 The time limit of forty-five minutes was predetermined by the performance
of four individuals in a pilot study which indicated that a time limit
speller than this would eventuate in an undesireable number of unsolved

[ problems.

 

 

 

 

 

1?

\\

'hat was the solution you ave to the problan about Joe
Doodlebug?

The subject was then asked:
Ibat were the hints that I ave you on the typed cards?
following this the Experimenter aid:

Here is the second problem about Joe Doodlebug. Read it
over carefully.

Whm the subject had finished reading the problan the Experimenter
stated:
I'd like to ask you to aain think out loud as you work
the problem so I can let you know whether or not you are
correct. You may ask quest ions as you go along and you
may refer to the problan at any time. You my use the
scratch paper in any way you wish. Now let's read the
problan over together.
At this time the mperimenter read the problem to the subject and
upon finishing this. he said:
Here are sane hints to help you solve the problem.
Lain the three hints were placed upon the table to the left side
of the problan sheet. Also. the Experimenter placed the first problem
and its hints upon the table’stat ing:

Here is the first problem and hints. You my use than in
anyway you feel will be of help to you.

Following the solution of this problan. or at the end of forty-five
minutes if the problem: was not solved. the Experimenter again asked the
subject to read in a mazine‘. After a five minute period the Ebcperixnenter
asked the anus questions utilized following the first problan in order to .
test for recall of beliefs. The subject was then thanked for his cOOperation i

and requested to refrain from discussing the problen with any of his

 

 

F—é———-——-——- 18

friends since it was possible that they would also be tested upon it
in a few days. Furthermore. arrangements for the second testing session

were mde at this time.3

The specific hypotheses that were tested by the use of the two
cognitive tasks were as follows:
A. Individuals hid: in dogmtian should require more time
to solve the problans than individuals low in dognat in.
B. Individuals mg: in dogmtism mid _n_g_t_. but individuals
low in dognatisn M. exhibit a facilitative effect when
a problan appears in the second posit ion of the counterbalanced

practice order.

 

3 The second testing session was not part of this thesis but was a
continued study of the problan solving behavior of these same subjects.
This work will be presented in a proposed thesis by I. Iaffey. Mr.
Iaffey and this author shared equally the task of testing one-half of
the subjects in both theses with each author testing five subjects in
each of the possible experimental blocks of subjects.

 

 

 

RESUITS:

The statistical analysis of the data was accanplished by the use of
the rank test for the significance of the. difference between two groups
as described by White (7). A normal curve approximation involving

corrections for continuity and for ties in scores was used throuaout

the study.

. Table l maents the mean solution times for hia and low dognatic
acups on the m and Flo-Canon problems when these problems are given
in the first position of the practice order. It is readily apparent that
the 18.65 minutes required by the hi3: dogmatic group on the No-Canoox
problem is for all practical purposes identical to the 20.13 minutes required
by the low dognatic aoup. Likewise. the solution times of 24.76 minutes
and 25.1;3 minutes on the 9393px problas. for the big: and low dognat ic

poops respectively. indicates a similar lack of significant differences.

The findings presented in Table 2 affords additional neat ive evidence
of experimental differences between high and low dogmt ic individuals.
For both the lie-Canopy and 952921 problem the expected differences not
only failed to mterialize (.214 level of significance) but the low dognatic

aoups required longer periods of time for the problem solutions than

the high dogmt ic groups.

Hypothesis A, which states that individuals hi3: in dogmtism should
require more time to solve the problems than individuals low in dogmtism.

cannot be upheld in view of the experimental data. At this point in the

 

TABIE].

codename: mm Hm AND IN DOME GROUPS

ON THE TOTAL TIME Tm TO SOLVE THE NO-GANOPY

AND GlNOPYI-ROBIEB JN‘IHEFIRSI‘ POSII'IONOFTHE
MOTIOE (BEER

 

 

 

 

 

 

Probles Group N Mean Time‘ z p
High Dognatic 10 18.65

No-Ganopy Iow Dogmt ic 10 20.13 0.31; 0.73
High Dogmtic 10 21.46

anopy low Dogmtic 10 25.113 0.11 0.91

 

'I‘he mean times are presented on this and subsequent tables for
casparison purposes only. they do not enter into the casputat ion of
the rank-order statistic utilized.

TABLEZ

comparison mm H]!!! AND IN DOME GROUPS

0‘! THE TOTAL TIME m TO BONE THE NO-CANOPY

AND CANOPY momma IN THE SEECND PCBII‘KN OF
THE marina ORDER

 

 

Robles Grmp N liean Time 2 p
No-Canopy Iow Doant ic 10 5.30 1 .17 0 .21;
@nopy low Dogmt ic 10 21.18 1 . 17 0 .21:

 

2O

research it was found that what had been originally designed to investi-
ate I'party-line" versus 'genuine' type thouat. processes had paradoxi-
cally not only failed to answer the original quest ion posed, but had in
addition suggested may new and challenging ones. The implications of
these findings were extrenely important and definitely required at least

sane tentative answers.

Typical of the quest ions that had to be analyzed were: (a) Do these
findings represent a failure to replicate the differences between high
and low dogsatic subjects reported in the Rokeach. McGovney. and Denny (3)
and Vidulich (6) studies? (b) Can the failure to obtain the postulated
differences be attributed to an Experimenter factor indicative of faulty
Experimenter techniques? (o) Is the theorized differences between big:
and low dognatic individuals in reards to 'party-line' and 'genuine' types

of problem solving correct?

The decisions that were reached about these quest ions were as follows:
(a) The findings could not represent a failure to replicate the differences
evidenced in the earlier studies due to the fact that the experimental
desias are thenselves different as will be evident shortly. (b) The
findings are not indicative of an Experimenter variable since the subjects
were tested by two independent Experimenters and their findings were
essentially identical. (e) The theorized distinction between 'party-line'
and I'genuine' type thought processes was predicated upon the existence of
different integration times between big; and low dogmatic groups being

manifested on the first problan and therefore had not been adequately tested.

 

 

Inplicit in the original theorizing and experimental design was
the assumption that attempts at solving the problems would result in
the interaction of conflicting beliefs. The three hints. or beliefs.
given to the subjects on the cards were anticipated to Operate in an
antagonistic mnner with the beliefs the individual would bring into
the nobles situation frqs his own experiences in the past. Hialy dog-
matic individuals. according to theoretical assunptions. would experience
more difficulty in intonating these novel beliefs which were necessary

for the nobles solution which would eventuate in the desired result of

an increased solution time for high dognat ic aoups.

However. in retrospect it occurred to the writer that the problem
situation is nesented in such a way that it does not permit a fair test
of the hypothesis regarding 'party-line' thinking. It will be remembered
that all three new beliefs were presented to the subject at the very
beginning of the experiment. Consequently. we have unwittingly deprived
the subject of the need. or opportunity. to luring these new beliefs into
connnmioat ion or conflict with the corresponding three older beliefs which
are in contradiction to the new beliefs. If this is really the case. the
lack of differences between high and low dognatic individuals is under-
standable and nedictable. Dognatims. or closed systems of thouat arrl
belief. will not be manifested unless nu belief systems are put into
conflict with older more established belief systems. This we have failed
to make possible by presenting the three new beliefs all at once at the
beginning of the experiment. The ransining part of this thesis is an

attempt to substantiate this theoretical position by experimental validation

while transforming the original error into a more comprehensive

understanding of the dognatic thought processes.

 

mmiz

Wampum.

l'orty abjects were selected for erperimentsl testing in the same
runner that the selection was acoanplished in Experiment #1. All students
taking the introductory psychology course at lichian State University
for the spring ten of 1956 were given under classroom conditions the
identical questiomnire that has already been discussed. The apainsntal

design and breahlown of subjects was as follows:

9—0172. E W m m
mu: m1: ROBIN A mom B

Big: Dognt ic 6 A

low Domtic h 6 No-Ganopy unopy

sign Doptic ' 5 5

In Bout ie 6 h Canopy No-Ganopy

Since the results reported in Experiment #1 were attributed to a
lack of conflicting beliefs. the second experimental procedure was an
attahpt to mdify the original design in such a way as to woduce the
necessary omflict between beliefs: In order to eliminate the ranote
possibility that the lack of results in the first experiment might still
sashes be idiosyncratic of the Iroblus. tin-selves. it was desireable
to change the origiml study as little as possible. This it was felt
could be met reasonably aeouplished by merely mnipulsting the times
at which the individual beliefs would be given to the subject. The
rationale for this was used upon the implicit assmption that witholding

 

of beliefs would provide the hialy dognat is subject with time to rake

a personal investment into the problem solving task. With noihing to guide
the individual other than his own past experience it was felt that he
would of necessity resort to those beliefs that were continually used in
everyday living. When the new beliefs are now presented there would be
sanething with which they could be in actual conflict. For purposes of
future discussion the first experimental desigx under which all three
beliefs were given imediately at the start of the problem will be simply
referred to as the lhmediate __Ca_g‘_d_ Condition. This revised experimental

procedure we will simply refer to as the Smced Card Condition.

Testing of subjects under the med $13; Condition was conducted
in an identical manner to the @ediate Card Condition with the following
important modification. The new beliefs (in the form of hints typed on
cards) were not immediately presented to the subject. for five minutes
the subject was permitted to work upon the problem in his own way but
following this time interval he was given one of the cards with the
statement:

Here is a hint to help'you solve the problen.

The card was then left in the subject's visual field throughout the
mining time. required to solve the problem. If an individual overcame
a belief prior to the five minute time interval. he was presented with the
appropriate card at this time and. the time was recorded by the Eacperimentsr.
'hm the five minute interval was up he was then given a second hint. The
procedure. therefore. was that of giving hints on cards to the subjects at
intervals of five minutes; one hint being given at the end of each five minute

interval until all sets were overcome.

 

Hints given experimentally to the subjects were always in the
following order: (1) facing set. (2) direct ion set. (3) movement set.
The hints were typed on the individual cards as follows:

ls. hey a; «nu (No-CanOpy Problan)
'J'oe does not have to face the food in order to eat it.‘

lb. Mg m ------ (finopy Problan)
'Joe must face the food in order to eat it.‘

2. Dirggtign £95. "'- (No-Canopy and Canopy Problens)
'Joe can jump sideways and backwards as well as forwarded

3. Movement get ----(No-Canopy and Canopy Problems)
'J’oe is not necessarily at the beginning or end of a
series of jumps. He may have been sanewhere in a
series of jumps.‘

The following measures were obtained for each of the subjects tested:
1. Total time taken to solve the problem.

2. Time taken to overcome the first. second. and third sets.

3. Time taken to solve the problan after all three sets were
wmmee

1;. Number of sets correctly recalled following the five minute
refit Dame.

5. Recall of correct solution of the problen following the
five minute rest period.‘

 

‘ This recall measure served a dual purpose: (U it provided a recall
measure of the solution for the problem and of the sets. also (2) it
served as a basis for starting all subjects on problem two with the
correct answer to the first problen.

26

 

 

H.56- ..-.~a~“ ~ -.,-,

 

 

fi-—————

 

The specific hypotheses that were tested by the use of the two

cogiitive tasks were identical to those used in Experiment #1.

A.

B.

Individuals big: in dognatism should require more time
to solve the problems than individuals law in dogmtism.
Individuals high in dogmtian M 921. but individuals
low in dognatism §_h_9_u_lgl_ exhibit a facilitative effect
when a problan appears in the second position of the

counterbalanced practice order.

HESUITS:

Table 3. which canpares the perfomance of high and low dogmtic
groups on the problens when these problans appear is the first position
of the practice order. is seen as substantiating hypothesis A. The h1g1
dognatic groups exhibited solution times of 31.05 minutes and 3h.82
minutes for the No-Canom and 22222 problens respectively anesignificantly
more than the low dogmtic solution times of 18.37 minutes and 27.58

minutes at the .02 an! .07 levels of significance. ‘

A quick review of Table 1;. which gives a canparat ive analysis to
that used in Table 3 with the exception that this the it is when the
problans appear in the second position of the practice order. indicates
that the desired differences between high and low dogmt ic groups has
apparently been accanplished. The 18.52'minutes required by the high
dogmtic group to solve the No-Canopz problem is significantly longer
than the 8.12 minutes required by the low dognatic goup at the .06 level
of confidence. On the m problan the difference between the mg:
and low dogmatic youps evidesiced by the solution times of 20.20 minutes
and 15.62 minutes is spin in the anticimted direction although it is

only at the .07 level of confidence.

4/

new 3

COMBISON mm Hm AND I" DOGJATIC GROUPS

(N THE TOTAL TIME THEN TO SOLVE THE NO-CANOPY

AND CANOPY PROBLEMS IN THE FIRST 1(8qu OF THE
PRACTICE ORDER

 

 

T

 

 

Problan Group N Mean Time 2 p
High Dognatic 10 31.05

No-Canopy Low Dogmtic 10 18.37 2.08 0.02‘
High Dogmtic 1° 3he&

mnopy low Dogmt ic 10 27.58 1.48 .07‘

 

' one-tailed test

menu.

WISON BETWEEN Hm AND I.” DOCEJLTIC QWPS

ON THE T0111. TIIE TAKEN TO SOLVE THE NO—CANOPY

AND CANOPY PROBIES IN THE SECOND WHEN OF
THE PRACTICE ORDER

 

 

 

Problem Group N . _ Mean T he 2 p
Hid: Dognatic 10 18 .52
No-Canopy low Dogmt ic lo 8.12 1.59 .06‘
High Domatic 10 20.20
Canopy low Dognat ic 10 1,5 .62 l .151; .07“

‘ one-tailed test

30

DEWSSICN:

This quick review of the data obtained in Experiment #2 suggests
that the desired contrast between h1g1 and low dogmtic groups has been
accomplished. Rather than analyze this data by itself it is felt that
a canparative analysis of the two experiments will provide a more meaning-
m1 and canprehensive height into the problem solving methods of the

Mg: and low dognat ic individuals.

A CQIPARII‘IVE ANALYSIS OF
MEWS #1 AND #2

Prior to the testing of subjects in Experiment #2 a series of

interrelated hypotheses were drawn up in an attenpt to anticipate

the relationships between the finned iate Card Cond it iog and the Smced

Card Cond it ion.

These hypotheses were as follows:

1. Concerning the effects of the Innediate Card versus Sgced Card

Cond it ions .

1.

2.

concerning the total time taken to solve the cogiitive tasks.

1).

Individuals high in dogmtisn should require less time
to solve the cognitive problems under the hnediate _C_§__r_d_
Condition than under the M gird Condition.
Individuals low in dogmtism should solve the cognitive
problems in the same amout of time under the mediate

Card Condition as under the Smced Card Condition.

Concerning the time required to integrate the three beliefs.

1).

Individuals him: in dognatism should integ'ate the three
beliefs as rapidly under the finnediate gay; Condition as
under the Med __;Cerd__e_ Condit ion.

Individuals low in dognatisn should integrate the three

beliefs more rapidly under the SEced Card Condition than

under the hmediate Card Condition.

B. Concerning the effects of M versus __Ia__w_ Doggtisn.

1.

Concerning the total time taken to solve the cogiitive problems.

 

a. Individuals high in dognatism should solve the problems
as rapidly as individuals low in dagnatian what the prob-
lens are presented under the W Card W!

b. hidividuals h1g1 in dogmtian should require more time to
solve the problems than individuals low in dognatian when
the problems are presented under the m Card Condition.

2. Concerning the time taken to overcane the individual beliefs.
a. Individuals high in dogmtism should overcome the specific

beliefs as rapidly as individuals low in dognatian.

3. Concerning the the required to integrate the three beliefs.
(Integration time is defined as the amount of time required
to reach the problem solution after all three sets have been
overcane. Under the innediate 9313 Condition the total time
and integration time will be identical).

a. Individuals high in dogmtian should integ‘ate the three
beliefs as rapidly as individuals low in dogmatism when
the problems are presented under the finnediatg Card

Conditim. (This twpothoois is identical with hypothesis
B9193 e ' .

b. Individuals h1g1 in dogmtism should require more time to
integrate the three beliefs than individuals low in dogmat ism
when the problem is presented under the M _Qa;_r_d_ Condition.
(This hypothesis is really identical with the one put forward
by Rokeach. McGovney and Denny (5) and by Vidulich (6).

C. Concerning the transfer effect of the first problem upon the

solut ion of the second nroblm.

 

:This is self-evident frcm Experiment :31. It is included for comparative

m1h‘nanaa “1w! -

 

 

ll‘l'i Ix

l. Individmls big: in dogntila and individuals la in dogntm
should exhibit a similar fac ilitativo effect when a prob].
appears in the second position of the cautarhlanced unstiee
order whu the problus are given under the mm
W-

2. Individuals his: in dognti-s mm. hit individuals
low in dogmtian 9mg. erhibit a facilitative effect than
a problem appears in the secmd position of the counter-

balanced practice order who the poblsu are givn under
the am 9.9.4. mm-

Consider first the data shown in hble 5 giving the man solution am
intention times for the m and m petal-s for hid: and low
dognatic poops under the M and mmmmmh the '
problems are given in the first position of the practice order. Tables
6.7. and 8 deal with various aspects of this table and M statistical
canparisons relevant to the theoretical analysis of 'party-line' and

'gaiu ine' thought processes.

The most striking feature of Table 5 is that whereas the integration
times ruined mbstantially identical fa- high deptic groups under
either experimental condition; low dog-tic my. intepate faster under
aMCandCo nditg than underanmmm Total the f
required for the solution of the you. .1” ”a“ an interesting
contrast between high and low dognatic individuals. low deactie coups
exhibit similar scores for the total solution time under both experimaital i

conditions. but the big dognatic groups under the mum

required an increased amount of time to solve the identical moblen
which was also given under an hnediate gig Condition. The implication
of these differences between the h1g1 and low dognat ic groups in regrds
to total time required to solve the problem and the integration time
following the overccniing of the specific beliefs is presented more fully

in the discussion section of this paper.

The experimental findings relating to hypotheses A.l.a and A.l.b
are reported in Table 6. Hypothesis 1.1.a states that individuals high
in dognatian should require less time to solve the cognitive problems
under the limediate Card Condition than under the Smced @rd Condition.
The mean solution times for the big: dognat ic groups under the Immediate
gird Condition for the No-Canogz and 929m. problems were 18.65 and 2h..76
minutes respectively. The mean thee reported under the gage; ga_1_‘_d_
Condit ion of 31.05 and 3h.82 minutes were both significantly longer at

the .03 level of confidence.

low dognat ic individuals were postulated to require the same amount
of time for the problem solutions under both the huedig' te 9231 Condition
and the M 9313} Condition. hypothesis A.l.b. The reported means of
20.13 minutes and 18.37 minutes for the solution of the bio-Canopy problan
under the Imediate 9333 Condition and the M gag; Condition respectively.
were not significantly different. Likewise. the mean solution times of
25.13 minutes and 27.58 minutes for the 99.11921 problan were also not sig-

nificantly different.

 

TABLE5

L CWISCN OP MWAL commons AND TOTAL

AND MWIW TIMES FOR THE NO—CANOPY ADD CANOPY

mommrm PROBIEBLRE GIVEN JN'IHE Fm
POSITION OF A COUNTERBLIANCPD PRACTICE cams

W

Problan Graip ' Mists mrd Spaced Card
Condition Condition

Total 8: Integration The Total The Integration

 

No-Canopy low Dogmtic 20.13 18.37 8.96
High Dognatic 2h.76 34.82 20.96

Canary 1m Bonnet ic 25-143 27.58 13 .31»

 

 

36

342

undo cream

pans and 3.28 .

 

2
mm. 3.0 oESnoo :3
«11mm 2 28 3385
30:8
8.2m 2 28 8on
one. mm!" 303on gm
2.1a 2 onoo oosooaea
5.2 2 E8 ooooom
2.. 86 oflaomoo :8 ,
2.8 2 28 Bananas _
223062
9.3 2 onto 8on
emo. mm; swan—Eon gm
3.2 2 28 35.252
a a as; noon z 26.6 8a 2on8 ”Sandstone 6292

iii;

go @3903 ago 4 ho 3H5”?

05mg.

ghga Ecgamofiggaog
E0240 924 E02852 HEB Egon on. 2538 EB HEB
Huh. ,5 gHgHBGO REE E g yam—”g

 

 

- L...._--. .‘hh. __-

4 Table 6. therefore. indicates that the total time necessary to solve
' the cognitive tasks has a relationship to the experimental condition
under which the problem is presented to the subject. Highly dognatic
individuals require a sigiificantly smaller amount of time under an
Imnediate _& Condition than under a m _C_a_r_<1 Condition. whereas.

i low dogmtic individuals require substantially the same amount of time

under either experimental condition.

 

The data presented in Table 7 is agin a canparison between experi-
mental conditions. but the measure rather than being the total time to
solve the cognitive tasks is now the time required to integate the three
beliefs and arrive at the problem solution. Integation time has already
been Operationally defined as the time required to reach the problan
solution following the overcoming and presentation of all three beliefs.

This definition of integration time is consistent with that used in both

- , 'Rs-‘NW‘M' ”4. -

the Rokeach. McGovney. and Denny study (3) and the Vidulich study (6).

Hypothesis 1.2.a states that individuals high in dOgnatism should
integ'ate the three beliefs in the same amount of time under the Innediate
M Condition as under the Spaced 9335; Condition. The results reported

in Table 7 clearly substantiates this. On both of the cognitive tasks.

c “M“...A. : --.—.. A

the No-Canopz and M problems. the contrasting mean integration times
of 18.65 minutes versus 20.11 minutes for the No-Canonz problem and 2h.76
minutes versus 20.96 minutes for the Canopy problan are not significantly

different from each other.

 

38

33 82 3.58 ..

 

fish." 3 choc vacuum
8. no.8 23sec .8
2.8 2 88 333
Rocco
8.8 2 case cache
2. 2.6 2358 82m
2.8 2 88 3333s
was 2 88 802m
28. , 3.8 2:88 .3
2.0m on 230 cannons
328062
2.8 2 88 .eooam
no. 26 0338 83 .
90.2 2. 88 02325
a a 8.: n8: z 395 :2 228 2382.85." 3.32m

 

go Mann—DE
aoggnzso 4 ho aHpHg .852 BE. 2H go
g 350% mama Ems EOE E0240 024 E05002
Emu mum—”Hum 52225228; 095948355
E a maHan—ao REE E SE yam—”go

b Mama.

 

In mwds to the integration times for the low dogmatic groups it
was postulated that under the M 93;; Condition the intemt ion times
would be signifiuntly less than under the humediate _C_a_r_d Condition.
hypothesis 1.2.b. For the No-Canopz problem the reported means were
20.13 minutes for the Immediate 9_a__r_d Condition and 8.96 minutes for the

 

M _C_a_r_d_ Condition; this difference being siglificant at the .001 level.
On the .03—11.9.21 problem the mean integation time under the immediate gag
Condition was 25.43 minutes as contrasted to 15.31; minutes under the
M 93111 Condition. This difference is significantly different at

the 002 level.

 

Table 8 provides further insight into the performance of high dogaat ic
and low dognatic individuals under the two experimental conditions. This
time the canparison is being made between the personality variables of
high versus low dognatian. Hypothesis B.l,a states that individuals low in
dogmtism should solve the problans as rapidly as individuals high in
dogmtism when the problems are presented under the Til-fined iate gag; Comm.
The reported mean solution time of. 18.65 minutes for the high dognat ic
poup on the'bflm problan was not significantly different from the
mean time of 20.13 minutes exhibited by the low dogmatic group. Likewise,
on the 993931 problem the mean times of 24.76 minutes and 25.16 minutes for
the high dogmt ic group and the low dognatic group respect ively. were not

s ignif icant 1y, d ifferent .

Under the Sp_a_ced Gard Condit ion, however. it was hypothesized that

individuals high in dognatism should require more time to solve the

 

problems than individuals low in dognatism. hypothesis B,1,b. Mean

no

end...

 

0H

038mg :3

 

an.» ea: 3-23 .

 

 

.8. 0.1." 3230
8.5. 2 2.358 23
833:8 28 8.an
R62 2 03.58 :8 .
.No. 84.. 288.02
92m 2 “.3958 swam
SAW 2 03g8 8
a. 2.0 388
21a 2 3qu8 seam
s2 2 B8 28 33 RE"
2.2 2 2 £38 .8 .. \
me. as . 28862
3.2 2 2258 s2:
8 a .33 s8: 2 88.6 5308 as 32.8 238.5%
g

 

 

ammo HOHHUE 0“wa
05280 4 ho ZOHmHmdm Bah BF 2H EHO 298.393
@839 E 50mm 302.30 G24 E93102 an. Eden 08

g Bfia 44.39 E v6 mEHmHono RES 036

ES $905 "figs.” ggmggmnfigo

 

 

manna.

1:] 1].... III.‘

phi-1| II. I.

i2 ~A...“ an- n“—

“w-Huno -~.. , _

 

 

N: a 41

solution times for the No-Canogz problem were 31.05 minutes and

l8.fl minutes for the high and low doennt ic groups respect ively indi-
cating that a difference in solution times did exist. with the high
dogmatic group requiring the longer period of time. This difference
was significant at the .02 level. ’On the 93m problem the difference
in solution times approached sigmificance being at the .07 level with

the high dogmatic group requiring 3h.82 minutes and the low dogmatic

youp requiring 27.58 minutes.

A canparison of Tables 6 and 8 affords additional insight into the
problan solving performances of the high and law dognat ic individuals
on the two cognitive tasks. The high dogmt ic goupe. reardless of the
cogzitive ta-slc employed. required a significantly increased amount of time
to solve the problan under the m £3 Condition. Low dogmatic
coups. however. solve the problans in substantially the same amount of
time under either of the experimental conditions. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that the increased solution times of the high domt ic goups
under the M 9333; Condition are significantly greater than the amount
of time required by low dognatic youps to arrive at the problem solutions

under the identical experimental condition.

Before comparing the integration times required by the high and low
dogmatic subjects it is important to determine whether or not the increased
total time required by high dogmatic subjects to solve the cognitive
tasks can be attributed to the fact that they my require a longer period

of time to overcome the individual beliefs. themselves. Hypothesis B,2.a

 

 

 

 

Ii NI I
l!‘ All."

 

addresses itself to this quest ion. It was hypothesized that individuals
him: in dogmtisn should overccme the specific beliefs as rapidly as

individuals low in dogmtian.

The data presented in Table 9 substantiates hypothesis B.2.a and
also the findings reported in the studies by Rokeach. Way. and
Danny (3) and Vidulich (6). Dogmtim. in the two preceding studies.
as equated with the integration process. per se: the overccming of sets
being dependent upon the rigidity of an individual. 1 Chi-square
analysis of the number of beliefs (sets) means in the first ten
minute interval indicates that there were no significant differences in
time between the high and law dogmtic youps in regrds to the over-
caning of individual beliefs. Therefore. the increased time exhibited
by big: dognatic groups in relation to the low dogmtic groups \mder

the m Gard QM cannot be attributed to this factor.

Table 10 which is a canparison between high and low dognatic
coups on the time taken to integ-ate the three new beliefs when the
moblans are presented in the first. posit ion of the practice order.
clearly substantiates hypotheses B,3,a and B.3.b which state that
high and low dognatic groups should exhibit similar integ-ation times
under an Eediate _C_§._r_d_ Condition.but not under a M _;Ca_1_'_¢_i. Conditign.
The mean integration times of thehigh dogmtic groups on the No-Ganogy
and 931m problems under an Immediate 99.39 Condition were 18.65 minutes
and 24.76 minutes respectively; with the low dogmatic youp exhibiting

integration times of 20.13 and 25.1;3 minutes. The reported probabilities

{5‘1

 

 

 

.__K____.

-— \q— ... .

 

45

TABLE 9

Nil-BER 0F SETS OVERCQE IIHUN THE

rnvsr TNMJNUI'I'BBYHM AND Ill

WTIG GROUPS (N THE NO-GLNOPY
AND CANOPY PROBLEMS mm

W

 

Group Nmber of Sets Overcane Chi2 ' df p
o 1 2 3
High Dosnat 1c h 7 h 5
0.13.0. 1 NOS.
low Dagnatic 2 6 3 9

 

"0 and 1 combined. 2 and 3 canbined to eliminate theoretical frequencies
below 5

 

 

 

32 822.28 .

8.2 2 2288 :2
.00. Odo." E050
8.8 2 2288 42m
. 82 228 28 303m
8.» 2 2388 .2
one. no..." 33862
2.8 2 2388 82:

2.8 2 2 988 .8
.3. 3.0 .3930
8.8 2 2 £38 88

£3080 0200 3.3003
9.8 0H 0." anemon— BQH .. ..

mm. 3.0 328062
3.2 2 2238 22m

a u as; 5.: z 88.6 8298 :2 228 23:32.83"

55'
S

 

 

 

I!

 

go HDHBE Bozdgeznfio 4 ho gunfigm ugh
a Zn EHO my: 9230mm man. a Samoa E0240
024 mogloz SE. ho mag E E5. HE Egan
09 g an. a 20 MZOHnHBGU ASHEE 03H.
g5 $005 Hafign 5 024 gm 2 zomnfigo

0..” mama.

of .73 and .91 for these mean differences indicates that high and
low dogmtic individuals require substantially the same amount of

time for the integration process when the hints are given innediately

at the start of the problem by experimental means.

When the identical cognitive tasks are presented with the utili-
zat ion of the M __Ce_._r_d_ Condition. the postulated differences between
h1g1 and low dogmtic groups stated in hypothesis B.3.b merger The
integrat ion times required by the big: dogmt ic groups in the Eo-Canooz
and gem problems were 20.11 and 20.96 minutes respectively. The
faster rate of integetion exemplified by the low dogmt ic youp's mean
integation time of 8.96 minutes on the No-Canopz problan is significant
at the .03 level. Although the integration time of the low dogmtic
group on the 993221 problem is also in the hypothesized direction. it is

significant at only the .08 level.

ban the reported integration times for high and low dognat ic groups

1:5

in Table 10. it may therefore be, concluded that in so far as the N 4.8110131

problem is concerned. the hypothesized distinctions between high and low
dognatic gulps under an Innediate £133 Condit ion and under a M 931
Condition areupheld by the experimental evidence. The data presented in
Tables 6.7.8 and 10 also suggests that the 99m problem is inherently

a more difficult problan than the No-Ganooz problan.

 

 

M _
he i7

 

 

 

 

Tables 11 and 12 present the data on the two cognitive tasks when
these problems are given in the second posit ion of the practice order.
Inspection of the integration times for hie: and low dognatic youps
(Table 11) illustrates that hypothesis 13.3.; and hypothesis 3.3.1: are _|
agin upheld. That is. under the Immediate Card (Edit ion the big: E—
dognatic group integrates the three beliefs as rapidin as the low
dognat ic group. and under the Med gag; Loading the high dogmtic

group requires more time to integ‘ate the three beliefs than the low

 

 

dognat ic group.

The mean integration times of h.10 minutes and 5.30 mimtes for
the high dogmatic and low dogmatic youps respectively in the W
problem were not significantly different and the integation times of
15.& minutes and 21.18 minutes for the gem problem were also not
liinficantly different. Under the Med .951 Condit ion, when the
cognitive task is presented in the second position. the low dognatic
youps integrate the beliefs faster than the h1g1 dognatic groups. The
difference between high and low dogmatic groups of 17.18 minutes for
highs and 6.h6 minutes for lows on the No-Ganom problem is significant
at the .05 level of confidence. On the m problem the high dognatic
group required a mean time of 17.61 minutes for the integation process
with the low dogrntic group requiring 11.9? minutes. This difference

althougi not significant ( .09 level) is in the expected direct ion.

So far all that the data presented on the second cognitive task

can be used to explain is that the hypothesized differences between

 

 

“iv
“I“

It]!

3

‘ll‘ll
4 .‘

I.|I|ll
. I

 

 

‘H

one» cod“ 3:36 e

$.33 3 Shannon .3
.8. «m3 328
3.3 3 3358 fig
83:58 38 3.8m
3.0 3 3338 .3
.9. $3 336.02
3.3 3 3».qu gm

3.3 3 Spence .3
am. 5...” Rosco
8.3 3 Samoa 5n , .
83338 3.8 3:325
can 3 enhance :3
in. 3.3 388.02
3.: 3 3358 swam

a a .39 :8: 2 has 838m 83380 Huafiflhfifi

a

g NUHHDE gauge—Doc 4 ho ZOHHHmom 9200mm.
HE. E E0 E4 Qamofi Mary 255 anmm 30240
EROSIOZ E me g E E mag

09 Eda. Mafia. ”E... a man—H960 Adgafimmg 03......
Egg aagggfimgaago

HA Rama

.4 -n-...u.a v.. V ‘ .

m. ,-
~‘ " ‘*-~”V-._h 4”

48

n; ‘__”__1,

mg: and low dognatic groups under a Spaced Card Condition appears
to be a valid one. The question that raisins to be answered is whether

or not there is any 'real' savings in the secmd problen. In other
words. it must be shown that the integration time in the second posit ion

of the practice order is significantly less than the integration time F
required when the identical problen appears in the first position. The

data presented in Table 12 addresses itself to this quest ion.

 

signs dogmtic individuals. under the innediete C_§_r§_ Conditig. Q
exhibit a considerable savings in having the cognitive task given in the
second position. The difference in mean times on the No-ggopl problem
of 18.65 minutes for the first position and h.10 minutes when the prob-
lem is in the second position. is higily significant (.0001; level).
On the m problen the mean integration times of 21;.76 minutes versus

1.5.& minutes is also significant; this time at the .02 level.

low dognatic individuals also show a facilitative effect of having
the flo-Ganogz problem appear in the second position when the problans are
given under the immediate 9333 Condition. The mean integration times of
20.13 and 5.30 minutes are sigiificantly different at the .0001 level.
However. in regards to the 933921 problan. the low dognatic youp did
not receive as much of a facilitative effect as was anticipated. The
reported differences of 25.13 minutes for the first posit ion and 21.18

minutes for the second position had a probability level of only .m.“

 

1)- An analysis of the Campy Problen is presented in the discussion
section of this paper.

vhvflu
“LE 8‘“ aHKVNB UH vflhéu

II I! ll]- .i
I.- l l' lull-I-
.lllll‘ I ll |III

 

 

 

47

 

 

 

 

anon unflaopioso e

 

 

.8. 113.]; a m l 1
3.3 3 3238 .3 3
banana
em. 3.3 3.3 3 season 33 m
3.8 3 oaseenon 63m 3
.9. 3.3 93 3 32.88 .3 m
86 3 season :3 H .
AfloauOuoz
on. 86 3.3 3 323.8 swam a
3.3 3 Season 3m 3
.3. 8.3 3.3.... 3 finance .3 N
3.3 3 season .3 3
unease
.mo. 34. No.3 3 Season seem m
and 3 season 3m H
.38. Sum om.n 3 egosaon .3 w
3.8 3 3 season .3 a
haennoaoz
.sooo. mmé. 3.: 3 3 3&8 swam w
3.3 3 3 «Smog swan 3
s e .39 z 98.6

 

 

 

 

 

nowoauaoo undo noengm

nowadugoo undo oauacoaan

 

 

 

mZQHaanco.H4§zmsHmumHH OBQ_mmH mmnza

mfiflumomfi.8902do azaflaAOZHOIOZHMME_hU msomhhm zaHnHm0m_MmB
czH-Dmm mmbomu unaizoon can aza.muHmflzmm:hmm.zcmfimamsuo

50

The £29299. 9953 Condition. which was the crucial experimental condi-
tion. substantiates hypothesis 0.2 which stated that individuals high in .
dogmtism should not. but individuals low in dogzatian should. exhibit a
facilitative effect when a problem appears in the second position. Their.
higily dogmatic individuals. integration times on the No-Ganopz problan
of 20.11 minutes for the first position and 17.18 minutes for the second
position are not significantly different. On the 939221 problem the re-
sults are again in the anticipated direction with a probability of .26

being reported for the differences of 20.96 minutes versus 17.61 minutes.

low dognatic individuals. under the $2299. _C§_I_‘_d_ Condition. not only
integrated faster than the high dognatic individuals on the tasks when
they appeared in either the first or second position; but also showed a
facilitative effect in having a problan appear in the second position of
the practice order. The mean integration times on the No-canonz problem of
8.96 and 6.1;? minutes we significantly different at the .05 level.
Although the difference in integration times on the m problan was
a@111 of a lower level of sigiificance it was. however. clearly in the
upected direct ion. In the first position a mean integration time of
15.31; minutes was found. whereas in the second position only 11.97 minutes

was needed. This reported difference was at a probability level of .07.

- -n..-.w~'¢- ¢:“’~ ‘-‘

-__—~.".-.M- -

 

 

DISCUSSICN

The unjor purpose of this study was to attempt an experimental and

'1

theoretical analysis which would serve to differentiate 'party-line'
thinking fran the more constructive mode of thougit. It is fully realized
that the distinction made entails an implicit value judgement in stating

that the one is thinking upon a higier, more efficient level. 'Party-line' i

 

thinkingwwas conceived as being a non-integative process and involving ~—-—
.11 low transfer of training effect; or in other words. a mode of thougit
which does not lend itself readily to solving similar tasks in future
situations. 'Genuine' thought processes were conceived as being of an
integrative nature. being readily adaptable and transferable to new

situations in which the past experience could be utilized.

lhy high dogmatic individuals should solve the problems as rapidly
as low dognntic individuals when hints are given imediately at the start
of the problem situation is an interesting question. The explanation
upheld by this author. which 15.1.0 consistent with the 'thought-belief'
model of Bokeach (5) hinges upon two considerations. First of all, it is
readily apparent that the Doodle—bug problems are extremely novel to a
subject and. therefore. in attanpting to solve it one finds himself con-
fronted with a puzzling set of conditions foreign to everyday thougxt and
problan-solving behavior. Secondly. the Experimenter in charge of the
problan-solving task is in a posit ion of an authority figure with the

ultimte acceptance of any proposed solution having to be reconciled with
his viewpoint. It is the interaction of these two facts that promotes the

 

‘—-_—'Z'Ih

The Vidulich study (6) indicated that the poorer integration of
higily dognatic individuals was the result of their attempting to modify
al- reject the problan situation. including in sane cases the kperimenter.
himself. 'hen beliefs are presented at the beginning of the problem-

‘ solving task they take on an added deg-ea of importance. Rokeach (5)
ment ioned that I111 intonation impinging upon the person from the

outside mist be processed or coded in such a way so that the information

 

is rejected or also fitted sanehow in this system." Also. in regrds to
the 'fitting-filing process' he states. 'The new information is commi-
cated fran the intermediate (authority) region to the peripheral region
not in the fem of information but in the psychological fom of a new
belief or disbelief.‘ 'hat appears to be happening in the humediate gag
Condition is that the entire problan situation has become a miniature
closed systh with the Experimenter in the role of authority; consequently
the beliefs are wholeheartedly accepted as 'true' beliefs upon the part
of the higily dogmtic individual. floreover. these beliefs. by virtue

of the fact that they are all presented inmediately to the subject at
the beginning of the experiment are not seen as contradictory beliefs in

their present belief systan. Hence. there is less resistance to their

acceptance.

In contrast to the Miate Gard Condition. consider now the beliefs

 

which are presented under a Smced Card Condition. The high dogmt ic
individual has to arrive at each nu belief by first over-caning a contra-
dictory belief which he holds in his everyday world. This leads to greater

resistance by the high dogmtic subject whose present belief system is more

 

 

 

 

 

 

———

The performance of the low dognatic groups under the two experi-
maltal conditions also needs further analysis to fully present the
theoretical position advanced in this paper. It must be rananbered in
viaing the experimental data athered on law dogmatic individuals that {

they represent the theorized I'genuine" or integrative thinkers. What

 

is meant by the term 'integration.‘ and how does this information lend

itself to the theoretical analysis of the reported data? Integration is

 

usually defined in terms of an act of combining the several parts into

a whole. In the Doodlebug Problem it is equated with the canbining of
the sets and arriving at a satisfactory solution. However. both the high
and low dogmtic groups do. in time. canbine the parts of the system
arriving at the correct solution to the problan. In other words. both
groups exanplify the fact that integration has occurred. Does this
imply that the processes are the same in both instances although the

times required for the process to occur are different?

The time factor involved in the integration process is conceived
as being a crucial variable. vidulieh'e study (é) illustrated that the
increased time for integ'ation exhibited by high dogmatic individuals
was due in part to the attanpts at altering and rejecting the beliefs
needed for the problem solution. y This attanpted reject ion and alteration
is hardly consistent with the meaning of the word integration. The
performance of the higlly dogmtic individuals in the studies of Rokeach.
McGovney and Denny (3) and Vidulich (6) was in reality a “pseudo-intege-

tionI low dogmtic individuals in solving the cognitive tasks were

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

attempting to carbine the beliefs into a systamtic. meaningful system; ;
high dognatic individuals were also attanpting to canbine the beliefs

in order to arrive at a solution. but they were prinarily concerned with
retaining the consistency of their own beliefs and diebeliefs. This new
attanpt upon the mrt of highly dogmtic individuals to retain the
consistency of their own previously formulated systan about reality.
resulted in the new information being 'narrowed' out or else altered
in acne manner. The low dogtic individual does not have g-mug at

take o as the rat tion 0 a eviousl conceived a stan is

cogcgged and therefore attempts to Qt, Eta the new beliefs as thgz
gt__a. nd.

 

 

Under an Immediate Card Condition the high dogmatic individual has
not had sufficient time to test his own beliefs aginst the newly pro-
posed ones. lhen given time for sane personal invesnnent in the problem
situation and finding his own belief system inoperative (M 9311
Conditig) he finds it easier to alter or reject altogether the new
beliefs than to disavow the utility of his own belief systan in this
newly created situation. The low dogmtic individual. being one who will
quite readily test the practical utility of his own previously held beliefs
in a novel situation. realizes their shortcomings and concentrates upon
understanding and operating within the sphere of new beliefs. The
mm Condition produces a faster integation time since it has
already provided him with time to reject his own previously conceived
belief-system and now he need only integrate the newer beliefs. Under

an Immediate Card Condition this rejection of the utility of one's own

 

k __ __

 

55

beliefs in the new system is confounded in the time measure with the

actual integration process. itself.

Table 5. which contrasts the integration and total time measures
under the two experimental conditions. may be viewed as lending support
to this theoretical position. The low dogmatic youps under an limediate
93rd Condition ani a m 9333 Condition require substantially the
sauna amount of time for the problan solution. Integration time. however.
is shorter under a M _;Ca__r_d. Condition. The procedure of the low
dognatic individual in his attanpts to solve the cognitive task is
identical under the two experimental conditions but the integat ion measure

is confounded in the pmediatp our; Condit i9__n.5

Higlly dognatic individuals can be seen in Table 5 as exhibiting
similar integration times for the' Immediate M Condit ion and the m
9933 Condition. When one studies the data for total time to solve the
cOgnit ive task. it becanes readily apparent that the total time increases

drastically under. the §paceg Card Condition. It is under this experimental

 

5 The relatively poorer performance of the low dognat ic goup upon the
Canopy problem. Table 5. my actually be an additional assertion of the
superior quality of performance on the part of these individuals. The
one jump south necessary in the Canopy problan lacks somewhat in elemce
cf problem design due to the fact that it is not quite cogent with the
laws of physics. High dognatics under the immediate Card Condition
probably do not test the reality of this type of jump. e.g. under the
S ced Card Condit high dognatics integrate in 20.11 minutes
fio-Canopy Problang and 20.96 minutes (Canopy Problem) ----- low dog-
matics integrate in 8.96 minutes (No-Canopy Problem) but require
13 .31; minutes (Canopy Problan).

 

3.. w m wafi'. "' ‘—

. m“ .m - » -
uncut» “*mm.~‘p_’ w I ~ ‘1 u

-. or

I. .5

 

 

 

 

 

 

condition that the high dogmtic individual becones entangled with
the problem of refuting his previously held beliefs in favor of the

' newly presented beliefs.

Table 12 wesents the data which provides a quantitative measure
of the quality of the integration process that took place when a problan
appeared in the first position of the practice order. If a truly integra-
tive process occurred in the solution of the first problem. one would
logically expect this integration to facilitate later problem-solving
conducted under similar circumstances. From the design of the two
cognitive tasks. it is readily apparent that an individual attempting
to solve a second Doodlebug Problem. be it the No-Cenom or the m
problem. has already had experience in utilizing two of the new beliefs.
Birthermore. there is nothing new that really has to be relearned about
these two beliefs. The necessary interaction of these two beliefs has
already been experienced. Therefore. if a 'true' integ'at ion has occurred
we can expect this to’nanifest itself in a decreased integration time for
a given cognitive task when this, problem is given in the second posit ion

of the counterbalanced practice order.

The theoretical analysis presented earlier predicts that under an
finnediate _C_a;l:_d_ Condition both the hi3: and low dogmatic groups should
exhibit a 'genuine' type of inteéation. In all cases. with the exception
of the low dogmt ic group solving the CanOpy problem. this postulated
savings in time occurs at a highly significant level. The performance of

the high and low dognatic groups under the §paced Card Condition clearly

substantiates the theoretical distinct ion between 'party-line' and I'genuine"

 

 

thought processes. Highly dogmatic individuals do not show a savings
in having a problem.appear in the second position of a counterbalanced
practice order (.50 and .26 levels of significance); low dogmatic

individuals do show a facilitative effect in the second position
(.05 and .07 levels of significance).

 

 

‘ ’v'se'nm- 0 m"" "‘—‘

are .n aha}

. a we. ”twfl‘tm“"

 

 

 

['11'.

SIMJLRY AND CCNCIDS IONS

The purpose of this study was to present a theoretical and experi-
mental analysis of the phencmenon popularly labeled 'party-line' thinking.
It was accomplished by the use of two specially devised problans both of
which involved the integration of multiple sets into a new belief systan.

'Party-line' thinking was conceived as being primarily a non-integrat ive

 

procedure. whereas. "genuine'I thinking was equated with an integrative .e-.._i
activity. Furthermore. the study was also conceived as an extension and
validation check upon earlier experimental work conducted at Michigan

State University upon the belief-thought model of Rokeach (2.3.5.6).

ho experimental conditions were imposed upon the problem-solving
tasks; (a) an finnediate _C_a_rd_ Condition. in which all the new beliefs were
presented on cards in the form of hints inmediately at the start of the
experiment. and (b) a M gag-p Condition. in which the beliefs were

presented individually at predetermined time intervals.

Under the Immediate 993; Condition the problems were solved in
substantially the same amount of time by 11in and low dogmatic groups.
When the problems were given under a M gag; Condition it was
hypothesized that high dognat ic groups would require more time for the
integration process than those low in dogmtism. and this integration

would be of a‘less efficient nature.

 

ie entire introductory psychology class for both the winter
ring terms of 1956 were given the Dogmt ism Scale with an
dental group of eighty subjects being chosen for testing such
>rty were high in dognat ism and forty were low in dogmat ism.
ixperimental subjects were then randcmly assigned to the

I experimental conditions with ten subjects per group. The

rental design for both the firmediate Card and Spaced Card

Lons was as follows:

 

101?; E COUNTERBAIANCED PRACTICE @315
PROBIIM A PROBIEJ B

.gh Dogmatic 10' No-Canopy CanOpy

>w Dogmt ic 10 -

gh Dognatic 10 CanOpy No-Canopy

w Dognat io 10

.e two cognitive tasks. labeled the No-Canonz and the m

s. were given in the counterbalanced practice order to determine
sible transfer effect of having a probleh appear in the second

:1 of a series of similar problems. It was hypothesized that

:10 of the three beliefs to be integ‘ated in a problem in the

posit ion would have already been used in solving the first problem;
tance in which a significant decrease in time 9;; occur would be
ive of 'genuine' thinking and any instance in which a significant

9 in time did not occur would be indicative of 'party-line'

3.

 

n « MEN-W” 'W’Mfi'fla’. t F“ .

"vi. vow-"fawn“

|~"‘o “

. 7th cf! 32‘“ Au‘

lew‘ -J|"~ -.:.

 

 

in.“ a; ‘5

 

 

60

In regrds to the second problem in the practice order. it was
found that high dogmtic and low dognat ic groups both display a facili-
tative effect indicative of a 'genuine' integration having occurred
in the solution of the first problem when the problan is given under _- If?!
an finnediate gird; anditiog. Under a m gag-d Condition it was ‘
hypothesized that low dogmt ic individuals would agin manifest a 6 3

 

distinct savings in integ-ation time exanplifying the existence of
'geuuine' integration on the first problem. However. high dogmtic
individuals under a m _Ca_;;d_ Condition should 291 show a sigificant .
decrease in integ'at ion time when a problan appears in the second

posit ion of the counterbalanced practice order. This lack of savings

is equated with the idea that highly dogmtic individuals under a m

__;Card__q Condition do not manifest a 'genuine' change in the first problem.

but in reality exemplify what has been labeled as 'party-line' (non-

integrative) thinking.

The findings of the study are in accord with the hypotheses posed
and lend support to the construct of dognatism while also demonstrating
the importance of personality variables in problan-solving behavior.

An important implication of the study is that terms derived fran everyday

 

discourse. in this instance 'party-line' thinking. are amenable to

theoretical and experimental manipulation.

1.

2.

3.

h.

5.

6.

7.

OJ.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cough. H.G.. and Sanford. Rm. Rigidity as a psychological
variable. Berkeley: University of Calif. Inst. of Pers.
Assessment and Res.. 1952 (mimeographed).

Rokeach. M. The nature and meaning of dognatism. ggychgl. Rev..
1951;. 61. l9ll-20h.

Rokeach. 15.. McGovney. W.C.. and Denny. “.12. A distinction between
dogcatic and rigid thinking. 1. Abnorm. Soc. chholu 1955.51. 87-93.

Rolceach. M. Political and religious dognatism: an alternat ive to
the authoritarian personality. Psych. Monog. 1956. 70.

Bokeach. M. On the unity of thought and belief. 1. Pers.. 1956.
25. 224-250.

Vidulich. R.N. The integation of multiple sets into a new belief
system. Unpublished M4. thesis. Michim State University of
Agriculture and Applied Science. 1956.

White. 0. The use of ranks in a test of significance for comparing
two treatments. Biometrics. 1952. 8. 33-h1.

w-

 

II
III
III!
I
III
I
I
.II
I
I
l
l
l
l

146 3148