A CRITIQUE OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MiCHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Kim Rodner
1959

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A CRITIQUE OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

by

KIM RODNER

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthr0p010gy

1959
/7

(/ 7 j? if) i
)6 {.Lé'lL t " KM IL?
(“IN- C. '

Approved:

KIM BODNEB

The problem of motivation in social psychology has had
a long and involved history; numerous theories have been
advanced to account for motivation yet none commands univer-
sal assent. Apparently the assessment of individual moti-
vational theories is not itself adequate to settle the gen-
eral question of motivation in social psychology. A new
approach is required in which individual motivational theories
are placed in classes which share common structural char-
acteristics. So placed the justification of motivational
theories may then be assessed in general. If positive assess-
ment is forthcoming, empirical testing of motivational theor-
ies may then proceed with greater clarity and direction, but
if positive assessment is not forthcoming it will be unnec-
essary to proceed to the testing of individual motivational
theories.

Four classes of motivational theory in social psychology
are examined: theories of global correlation, theories of
identification, theories of legitimation, and theories of
non-motivated purposive systems. The first group—~theories
of global correlation--comprises a wide range of theories
which postulate a fundamental ”push mechanism” or basic
source of motivational force; the second group--theories of
identification--suggest that identification of a social
actor with a role constitutes the motivation of that role;
the third group--theories of legitimation--stress the role

of vocabularies of motive as functioning in role preformance;

 

Ill-II «6%.!

KIM BODNER 2
and finally, the fourth group--theories of non-motivated
purposive systems-~stress the role of self-regulative home-
static systems and the position of teleological conceptions
in accounting for motivation.
Having presented the classes of motivational theory
the analysis moves on to the development of an explicated
model of the logic of empirical science and the nature of
teleology. Such an analysis is drawn from the literature
of modern empiricism and is employed to attain agreement
on the nature and meaning of the logic of science. Prob—
lems treated include such topics as the nature and manner
of concept formation, the structure of scientific laws, ex-
planation of "facts" by concept and by law, and the explana-
tion of laws by more general laws; it also includes an analysis
of the role of theory, the meaning of initial conditions,
and the structure of classificatory systems, prediction, and
generalization in empirical science. In a further section
the problem of teleological or self-regulating systems is
examined and the meaning of teleological eXplanation assessed.
Against this background of scientific analysis the four
classes of motivational theory are then cast, and it is in
terms of such analysis that the general justification of
motivational arguments may then be assessed. It is found
in each case that the classes of motivational theory examined
are either redundant of eXplicated law statements or that

they involve categories which appear to have no empirical

KIM RODNEE 3
significance. Furthermore such categories suffer from vague—
ness so that objective assessment of them is nearly impossible.
It is concluded that on the basis of the total investigation
motivational theory is duplicative and repetitious of the
general construction of explanations in science, and that
where this might appear otherwise no empirical meaning can

be assigned to the various claims that motivational theories
either covertly or overtly make. If some further significance
is intended, then it is incumbent upon the proponents of

motivational theory to develOp it.

A CRITIQUE or MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
By

KIM RODNER

A THESIS

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthr0p010gy

1959

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to thank the following persons for their
interest and stimulation in the genesis and preparation of
this thesis. I wish first to recall the aid rendered me by
my adviser Dr. Jack Preiss. His many comments and insights
helped me greatly in formulating the problem more precisely
and dealing with it more directly. In a sense the problem
was to handle old matters from a new perspective. The fact
that Dr. Preiss was willing and anxious that I approach them
in this manner accounts in no small part for the existence
of the present thesis. I wish to thank Professor Harold
Walsh of the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State Uni-
versity for his interest in my concern with the general area
of the philosophy of science and social science methodology.
An invaluable reading course covering the work of Richard
Bevan Braithwaite which I took with Professor Walsh proved
fundamental to the formulation of the intermediate stages
of the problem. I should also like to thank Dr. T. Shibutani
of the University of California at Berkeley for what perhaps
may be called the root of the entire undertaking. His sug-
gestions concerning the present task as well as his insight
into systems of social psychology which do not necessitate
motivational concerns may certainly be credited with the
original suggestion of the problem. Finally I should like
to thank Dr. William Form and Dr. Jay Artis for their
willingness to serve on my thesis committee and for their
considered comments on the present work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . w . . .
PART I - CLASSES OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORY . . .
1. Global Correlation . . . . . . . . . .
2. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Legitimation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Non-motivated Purposive System . . . .
PART II - METHODOLOGY AND TELEOLOGY . . . . .
l. The Logic of Explanation . . . . . . .
2. Teleological Systems and Their Analysis
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . .
FOOTNOTES AND SOURCES . . . . . . .

B IBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O 0

PAGE

15
24
31;
an
an

96
116
136

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE
1. Global Correlation . . . . . .
2. Identification . . . . . . . .
3. Legitimation . . . . . . . . .

4.

Non-motivated Purposive System

PAGE

\0

to
(‘0

b0

A CRITIQUE OF MOTIVATIONAL THEOBIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

2m

Motivational theories in social psychology address
themselves to the question of what it is that compels an
actor to social action. To make this initial statement
more precise considerable attention would have to be given
to the word “compels" and in so doing the investigator
would be called upon to critique motivational theories. He
would attempt to assess their relative claims in accounting
for social action and he would do so by first considering
the justification for motivational theory in general, and
secondly, once the first consideration was answered in the
affirmative, by attempting to empirically test particular
motivational theories.

The concern of the present undertaking is to examine
the justification for motivational theories in general.
For if such justification is called in question we need not
proceed to the second consideration. Therefore it should
not be eXpected that in a study such as this detailed con-
sideration of the pros and cons of any particular motivation-
al theory will be encountered. To be sure we shall find
that in at least two classes of motivational theory--that
of identification and legitimation--a more or less detailed
presentation will ensue, but in these cases this is simply
because these positions have a limited number of adherents

so that the broad methodological classes into which they

fall, and which alone merit our attention, are classes of
one or two members each. As for the rest we shall find
numerous adherents both inside and outside sociology and
social psychology and our treatment will necessarily take
on a somewhat more generalized form.

When we consider the broad limits motivational theories
embrace it is not surprising that they occupy a significant

place in the literature of social theory.1

This is especially
obvious when it is realized that many sorts of theories are
by some considered anything but motivational, while by
others they are taken as exemplars of such theory. In
order to cover as much ground as possible what we shall do
in this thesis is frame a set of categories of sufficient
abstraction to cover the many and various theories which
concern us. We shall not maintain that the concepts cover-
ing these classes are the only set of concepts useful in
motivational analysis, or that indeed they are even fruit-
ful for every sort of concern which an author might enter-
tain. Generalized concepts require, so far as we can see,
especially one characteristic in science, and that is that
they be fruitful in organizing our understanding of an area
of experience. Other investigators may cut the corpus of
motivational thought differently, since this will always
depend on the purposes and aims of their investigation. In

other words we are not suggesting that our present under-

taking is the only approaoh to motivational considerations

in social psychology and elsewhere; what we would hope to
claim is that for our purposes it is adequate. And our
purpose is, we may repeat, to critically examine the justi-
fication of motivational theories when considering human
social action.

The classes of motivational theory that we choose to
critique appear to us to be inadequate because of (1) certain
fundamental methodological* misconceptions which they embody
or, (2) because they seem to involve certain unnecessary
redundancies which suggest but do not fulfill the logical
requirements, of a scientific explanation. Our purpose
will be to point out these two inadequacies wherever they
occur in the discussion of our general classes of motiva-
tional theory.

To accomplish this end we propose to critique these
theories on the one hand against a background of the basic
structure of scientific explanation and on the other in
terms of the analytical work that has been done concerning
the foundations of functionalism and teleological systems.
Such a critique concerning the logical adequacy and justi-
fication of motivational theorizing should, if its results

are positive, lay the foundations for empirical testing of

 

*By methodology we mean the ”logic of science”, its abstract
structure and not any empirical techniques employed in con-
firming or disconfirming hypotheses.

particular theories. On the other hand if the results
prove negative it should, by that token, obviate the necess-
ity of further consideration of particular motivational
theories falling under our generalized classes. The latter
result would have been achieved by virtue of having called
into question their very necessity. In short, it would
seem unlikely that the scientist consider the empirical
testing of a theory which is either unnecessary or logically
corrigible.

Part I of this thesis will concern itself with a broad
presentation of the four major classes of motivational
theory as we conceive them. These four classes we shall
call the theories of “global correlation“, “identification”,
'legitimation', and I'non-motivated purposive systems”. The
first class--theories of “global correlation”--are not
strictly social psychological, but many of them falling
within this class have been employed, indeed still are
employed, in social psychology and therefore some gener-
alized category capable of handling them was necessary.

The last class of theories--theories of "non-motivated
purposive systems'--is primarily sociological and social--
psychological but at the same time it has and is being em-
ployed to explain a broader class of events, mainly aspects
of biological behavior. Nevertheless it is certainly funda-
mental to our considerations as it comprises the general

framework of structural-functionalism in present day

5

sociology. The two remaining classes of theory--the theory
of identification and the theory of legitimization--are
today centrally contending for social-psychological consider-
ation since in some ways they meet most fully the require-
ments specified by current social thought.

Part II of this thesis will develOp in some detail the
logical foundations of scientific explanation and the
logical foundations of functional or directively-organized
systems. Against this combined background we will then be
able to assess the claims of the various classes of motiva-
tional theory. This will provide us with a fairly detailed
and yet at the same time general framework against which
to critique our theories. The importance of this is seen
when it is realized that much of what we will have to say
will depend upon what we'mgan,by a scientific explanation
or prediction and what we have in mind when we talk about
the functional relation of a social or biological system.
Since traditionally a certain amount of vagueness surrounds
these notions the specification of our vocabulary and the
referrents to which it applies must be delimited.

Finally, in the conclusion of this thesis we may hope
to reap the results of our effort. It is in the conclusion
that the actual task of deducing the consequences of Part
I and Part II taken together will occur. And it is in this
section that we will suggest the broader implications of
this critique of motivational theories.

It may be remarked before beginning Part I that the
footnotes are intended as an integral part of the total
thesis. This is especially true in Part I and only to a
slightly lesser extent in Part II. The footnotes are in-
tended to act as further substantiation of the points dis-
cussed, but even more they are intended as a necessary
addition to the bare outlines developed in the text. The
nature of our subject is such that hundreds of pages could
be devoted to illustrative digressions which would be fruit-
ful and convincing when so develoPed. we have attained
economy only by the means of employing the footnotes to
suggest the avenues that might be explored in various
classes of motivational theory. We feel that any attention
devoted to them will add much weight and meaning to the

necessarily brief presentation in the text.

PART I--CLASSES OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORY

Silebal Wilma

The first class of motivational theory to which we
direct our attention is what, following Lazarsfeld, we may
call the theories of ”global correlation”. This particular
class comprises a very large and disparate group not all
of which we can even hope to indicate. Furthermore this
class, more than the others, contains theories not all of
which have always been considered motivational. Neverthe-
less they pan be so considered and as such merit our
attention.

When we employ the phrase "global correlation” we have
in mind those motivational theories that attempt to take
some fairly limited aspect of experience and correlate it
with some very general or broad area of experience, the
latter generally being that which they wish to explain.In
particular, when dealt with u motivational theories they
essay an account of the motivations involved in the second
or broad realm of events. This second area is most often
human behavior and at times even aspects of animal behavior
depending upon how far the author feels it is necessary to
explain motivations in nature.

This initial statement is quite abstract but it does
serve to indicate the general framework or formula for this

class of theories. It is from the tie up of some limited,

8
fairly definite area of experience with some other unlimited,
fairly indefinite area that we derive the name “global corre-
lation”. Two examples may serve to concretize these matters.
Freud's book W m In, W, presents
Freud's theory of culture.3 It presents a picture in which
the essential motive force or more simply motivation in
the creation of human culture derives from the correlation
of cultural productivity with a fixed source of biological
or libidinal energy. There is here a global correlation
between the entire, literally global, production of culture
in all its manifestations and the relatively limited and
fairly definite biological energy of the human system.

The second example is found in A. L. Kroeber's motiva-
tional theory of culture change. This theory is found in
Kroeber's Anthrgpglggx,and may be called the theory of
”labile structure")+ In this theory Kroeber correlates a
fairly fixed and limited "play impnuse' with the motivation
of large segments of social and cultural change. A con-
crete manifestation of this theory is to be found in his
study of dress style5 and of the Hawaiian Islander's
"cultural fatigue” as manifest in the overthrow of their
religion.6 The play impluse is correlated with the global
manifestations of social-cultural change.

These two examples should suffice to indicate the
general formula for a theory of motivation involving global

correlation. However to make it even more succinct perhaps

it will help to summarize it with the aid of a diagram.

QLQEALHQQBEELAIE
that which is motivated: broad, general
and fairly unspecified

4\ 7/7

  
  

.Nsxns.a£

more generalized explana

 

EHB:QQBBELAIE
that which does the motivating: narrow,
limited, and fairly specified

It will be noted that the connecting arrows in the
paradigm are splayed. This suggests that in motivational
theories of our first class there is a glbbal correlate that
is broad, general, and vaguely unspecified (in Freud cultural
production, in Kroeber cultural change). This is connected
with a sub-correlate which is narrow, limited, and clearly
specified (libido, play impulse). The manner in which this
is correlated is referred to as the nexus of correlation,
and really amounts to a demand for an even more general
correlation under which the first global correlate and its
sub-correlate can be subsumed i.e., the ”reason” (wider
correlation) libido is correlated with culture production
is that the frustration of libidinal expression forces
sublimation which in turn is manifest in the form of culture
productivity, or the ”reason” the play impluse is correlated
with culture change is that normative patterns of response

fix and thus frustrate the normal release of labile energy

10
and correspondingly result in cumulative explosions and
altered culture.

It is not necessary that there be nexus of correlation
in any theory of global correlation, but in point of fact
they have often been developed and in many cases are felt
to be the key points by which the theory lives or dies. The
reason for this seems to be that they offer an “explanation”
of the first correlation and thus confer upon it this
additional confirmation.7

Having thus characterized the general nature of this
class of motivational theories it is useful to indicate the
range of its deve10pment. To a considerable extent Kenneth
Burke in his more recent writing on motivation summarized
this matter. It is not our intention in utilizing Burke's
research to subscribe to any of his conclusions or general
reflections on the subject of motivation, but he does aid
us in pointing out motivational theories of global correla-
tion in areas where they are not generally acknowledged.
This is useful for it helps us appreciate the mercurial
quality of this class and it suggests a certain ambiguity
in regard to them which will prove vital in their Justi-
fication.

As Burke has commented: “A purely historical survey
(of motivational theory) would require no less than a
universal history of human culture; for every Judgment,

exhortation, or admonition, every view of natural or super-

11
natural reality, every intention or expectation involves
assumptions about motive or cause."8 In the Grammanngfi
m and the W 91 W Burke has provided us
with a chronicle of such theories. Burke preposes that
in discussing them we consider a pentad of categories into
which they may fit. He comments: "In a rounded statement
about motives, you must have some word that names the g9;
(names what took place, in thought and deed), and another
that names the §g§n§,(the background of the act, the
situation in which it counted); also, you must indicate
what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act,
what means or instruments he used (agengy), and the pun:
ngfig’w9

Taking these categories--not necessarily in the order
given--as the basis for discussing motivational theories
of global correlation we find that ”scenic” motivational
theories are generally some variant of environmentalism.

The work of Semple10 11

and Huntington are outstanding in
the area of geographic determinism.12 Arnold Toynbee's
work employs this dimension largely in his discussion of

the “genesis of civilization”.13 The ”frontier thesis”

14 16

as employed by Webb, Parrington,15 and Owen Lattimore
are variants of the same basic scheme. So too is the still
viable field of geopolitics.17 One may even consider in
this category Sheldon's theory of somatic types wherein

the physical environment of the body becomes the motivator

12

of diverse acts related to personality.18

Marxism and
most utopian socialism were scenic in the sense we employ:
actions are eXplained in terms of economic situations
(scenes), to produce “good” people they must be provided
with ”good” environments.19 In American economic thought
Veblen's notion of ”the cultural incidence of the machine
process” is another variant of this conception.20 In
anthropology if an author chooses to account for human

21

social action in terms of ”techniques” or "man and his

”22 or “man the maker”23 then again human social

works
action is accounted as motivated by such techniques, or
works, or fabrications.

We might go on at great length but mention of a few
of the more important applications should suggest that
this type of global correlation is fairly common and cer-
tainly still in evidence today. With many motivational
theories of this first type it has not always been the
case that their authors considered them ”theories of
motivation". Nevertheless it does no violence to common
usage to speak of the economic relations of production as
motivating the ideology as a class. In fact, if an in-
vestigator were to avoid discussion of economic and social
strugtnzg,and focus instead upon social persons within
economic structure we would expect that Just such a mention

of motives would appear: that is, if he acted as social

psychologist rather than structural sociologist or

13

macro-economist.

”Agency“ motivational theories--the second sub-type
of global correlation--are the sorts of theories found in
sephistated discussions of the role of language in human
thought, the upshot of which is roughly that without it
there is none. BiOIOgists such as Julian Huxleyzu that
look upon human culture as an agency of biological survival
and anthropologists that think in terms of technological
determinism hold to similar thoughtways. The point here
is that they focus n9; upon a general background or scene
whence spring--in some manner-~social sets, but they rest
their attention instead upon a global correlation between
the means or agencies and the social acts they make possible.
There may be some overlap between scenic and agency theories
but the difference is pronounced in certain area. This
is no where better exemplified than in the recent studies
of linguistic structure and concept formation exemplified
in the work of Kluckhohn,25 thrf,26 and HoiJer.27

There are a number of global correlations that center
upon the social actor (“agent") himself rather than the
scene or agencies against and in terms of which he sets.
Voluntarism has a long history in Germany28 and is certainly
represented in France29 and England30 as well. Nor are
representations lacking in the social sciences. Karl

Mannheim's discussion of “creative elites” in fl§n_ang,

W in an Ass. 91.“. Wan leans far out 1n this

14
direction,31 as does Joseph Schumpeter in his prepensity

to stress the role of unusually creative entrepreneurs in
the process of capitalist expansion.32 Any great man
theory is orientated in the same direction. A correlation
is attempted between a small segment of the human resources
in a population and the gamut of cultural production: men
are motivated to act because of their natures (”genius will
out”) or because of the acts of such great men.33

when we consider the ”act" itself as a category of
global theorizing we find that it is under—represented
today but was a steady source of motivational theorizing
in the past. Today representations are to be found among
the existentialists who consider that the "Act” to be
self-creative and that little that came before or will
come after can modify it.3u Mysticism in general has pro-
duced motivational theories that correlate ”pure workings“
or ”pure acts” with cultural creation especially in the
realm of legal and value production.35

Our last type of global correlation involves theories
that conceive of motives as flowing from the goals or pur-
poses that persons entertain. These are generally what
are called teleological theories; we learn in these theories
of such conceptions as ”entelechies”, "intensities of
satisfactions”, 'elan vitals”, ”progress”, ”ends in view”,
and ”goal directed behavior”. It is still a viable form

of theory though in rather disguised circumstance in present

15

day thinking. We shall pay close attention to it latter
on for it differs from our other global correlates in
certain respects, forming a.c1ass by itself.36

So much for theories of motivation of the first class.
In concluding this section the following quotation from
the recently published W 2:, 3.529451 W is
noteworthy of the sort of orientation that has produced
the numerous global correlations we have so briefly reviewed.
Gardner Murphy in speaking of the problem of social motiva-
tion says: “The problem could fairly be reduced to a
simple form of asking what it is within us that disposes
toward social action, in contradistinction to what it is
that determines the kind of action we take. Our psychological
theories assume for the most part that although the organism
consists largely of devices for adjusting to (the) environ-
ment...there is always room for the question: what makes
the thing work? Attention will first be given to the
biological sources of motivation; thereafter we shall

attempt to show the ways in which these energies are elab-

orated and W ism 5.9.9.121 mamas.'37

Win

The second class of motivational theories that require
our attention have only a limited number of adherents; all
of them are within the social sciences and especially

social psychology. It is tempting to refer to this second

16

class as the extreme sociological position for it does
have the characteristic feature of avoiding what has often
been referred to, especially in discussions of motivational
theory, as "reductionism in the social sciences."38 Reduc-
tionism is not our concern here but it may be suggested
that the approbrious application of this term has most
often been applied to theories of global correlation, theories
that might well take the form indicated in the quotation
from Gardner Murphy in the paragraph above. Our second class
of theories, the theories of identification avoid reduction-
ism as that term is generally employed.

A major statement of the theory of identification is
to be found in an article by Nelson N. Foote entitled
”Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation'.39
A somewhat similar statement by a co-author is to be found
in Leonard S. Cottrell's and Nelson Foote's.1d§n§i1y.flnd
W Wflo what is of interest in this
latter work is not the broader theory concerning the role
of the family in society but the theory of identification
that forms part of the conceptual apparatus. In addition
to these efforts there is the important section on moti-
vation to be found in the introductory text entitled.§gg;gl
‘Zfixghglggx co-authored by Alfred B. Lindesmith and Anselm
L. Strauss.“1 Professor Strauss also has a volume on

identification that has not yet been published.“2

17

The theory of identification, following Foote, may be
briefly summarized as follows. Role theory has suffered
from its inception from the lack of an account of motivation.
Apparently the phrase ”from its inception” refers to the
early theorists such as Cooley, Dewey, and Mead. ”Boles as
such do not provide their own motives."l+3 Foote points out
that attempts to overcome this difficulty have resulted in
recourse to the expedient of eelecticism. Electic theories
Foote argues "all share the postulation of motives as pre-
dispositions, purportedly inferred from behavior'uh (global
correlations are the sorts of theories he refers to). But.
this has difficulties as far as Foote is concerned in that
it suggests an infinite regress on the one hand and fallacious
circularity on the other. With these comments Foote dismisses
nearly all other forms of motivational theory.

However there have been intimations of at least two
other sociologically significant attempts to account for
motivation. In the 1956 edition of W 2.319.139.1931
Lindesmith and Strauss, comments Foote, included a section
on ”Morale and Social Structure”.u5 The conception there
developed is tantamount to the essentials of Foote's theory
of identification. Lindesmith and Strauss conceive of
motivation as essentially equatable with morale, which is
to say, an individual performs social functions "and he is
willing to do so because he identifies his own essential

interest with that of the party"l+6 or social group. And

18
should this fail to happen, that is: "When a social structure
fails to elicit the minimal allegiance necessary for its
proper functioning, then we speak of poor morale. Presumably
there are different kinds of morale, depending on the kind
of group structure, but essentially, it comes down to a
lack of effective coordination because of discrepant in-
dividual aims.”u7

Foote's analysis follows similar lines but more fully
develops the position. By a motivated act he means any
problematic consciously chosen course of action. ”We take
motivation to refer to the degree to which a human being,
as a participant in the ongoing social process in which he
necessarily finds himself, defines a problematic situation
as calling for performance of a particular act, with more
or less anticipated consumaticns and consequences, and
thgpgby his organism releases the energy appropriate to per-
forming it."l+8 As contrasted with situations involving
physiological processes and long habituation, Foote asks
that we contemplate the "game”. He notes that such a game
as, say, baseball is composed of roles and statuses. De—
fined behavior accompanies each position and the task of
the player is to learn the behavior overtly related to his
roles and to learn covertly the role behavior of the others.
Foote sees in this conception of the game the exemplication
of anomie. This is the stage in which Mead left the analysis

and supposedly according to Foote role performance would be

l9

apathetic and generally lack-luster. He continues: "Now
by contrast, consider a ball game like last year's World
Series, when the Dodgers came up against the Yankees. The
roles and statuses are the same, as are the rules of the
game.'u9 But in fact what a difference. ”And what is the
nature of the difference? It is the fact that the empty
bottle of role and status suddenly has a content. That
content is not drives, tensions, energy or needs (not, in
other words, a theory of global correlation); it is Adaptitz
...Except for the special identify which gives value to
their ensuing activity the behavior of the players would
be mere rote--a perfect example of anomie"..50

Identity, in Foote's theory, is concerned with this
extra something, ”that which makes the thing work“. It
is the process, so far as we can make out, whereby the
learned behavior which is the role is taken in an affirmative
manner. One might say that it is a sort of ”role expertise“,
induced under the impetus of ”ultimate social values“. It
is a rather complicated phenomena as we see when Foote
suggests that: ”To interact intelligently with another,
he (a person) must learn correctly to anticipate the responses
of that other-—that is, to empathize. But implicit role-
taking is no metaphysical transmigration of consciousness.
It requires playing sub-overtly the role appropriate to the
identity of the other in the situation, as accurately as

one can read off that identity. In role-playing experiments,

20
a person may disclose the great range of this latent reper-
toire. The reason he limits his real or realistic behavior
to a select few of all the roles he has learned is that he
knows and defined only these certain ones as hisygxn. And
he can only ascertain which role is his in each situation
by knowing who he is. Moreover, he must know who he is
with considerable conviction and clarity, if his behavior
is to exhibit definiteness and force, which is to say degree

«51

of motivation. This last phrase “definiteness and force"

is here seen to be what is mgan§,by the identification
theory of motivation. A theory of motivation, in other
words, has the Job as Foote sees it of accounting for this
”definiteness and force" and not for the particular content
of the roles and statuses themselves.

Continuing, Foote comments that, ”We mean byylggnpifii-
cation appropriation of and commitment to a particular
identity or series of identities."52 So it is by a process
of pigeon-holing, of classifing, that social interaction,
at least at this level of abstraction goes on. ”The common
man is always classifying thus. And to make things harder
for the social psychologists, his classifications vary with
time and place, as identities are elaborated and re-determined
...If the regularities in human behavior are organized re-
sponses to situations which have been classified more or

less in common by the actors in them, thmnames motivate

behavior. It is by analysis of the function of language,

21
and especially of names as ascribed to categories of people,
that we can dispense with predispositions and yet maintain
a theory of motivation subject to empirical test...."53

~For Foote identities are the key to motivation, yet
most identities are "habitual and taken for granted”.5u
However in problematic situations doubt of identity may
occur; if that happens ”action is paralized". Such con-
siderations lead Foote to the question of how it is that
”one acquires and gets commited to particular identities”.
His answer is simple, ”...the compulsive effect of identifi—
cation upon behavior must arise from absence of alternatives,
from unquestioned acceptance of the identities cast upon
one by circumstances beyond his control (or thought to be).
From the point of view of the experiencing individual,
however, the process is bound to seem much less like a pro-
cess of limitation to a few among infinite possibilities
than a process of discovery.”55

It follows from this that identity is lgggngfi?6 and
being learned it tends to be conservative, for it acts as
the filter through which further experience is interpreted,
"...we can only mobilize for our next act when it or its
elements can be construed as similar to acts which have
gone before."57 It follows then that identity according
to this account is the source of ”value” in the face of

Albert Camus' "benign indifference of the universe”. Value

must be looked upon as something which is "discovered in

22
experience not conferred upon it from without";8 For,
”without the binding tread of identity, one could not evalu-
ate the succession of situations. Literally, one could
say there would be no value in living, since value only
exists or occurs relative to particular identities--at
least as experienced by organisms which do not live in the
more present, as animals presumably do, devoid of self and
unaware of impending death. Moreover, it is only through
identification as the sharing of identity that individual
motives become social values and social values, individual

59

motives.”
It should be possible to summarize the theory of identi-

fication more precisely if, at this point, we present a

diagram such as we employed in discussing theories of global

correlation.

IDENTIFICATIONS ---------- EALQES

specialized expectations involving
commitment to statuses and roles i.e.

role expertise.
A\ 15 1\ /\ /\ /\ /\ A /\ Ah
ABSENCE of
alternatives; L
and learning of
social roles
mediated by
significant
others

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4 A J J >

ANDHSIAIESES
generalized expectations

There are a number of features to note about this

relatively simple schematization. First of all the connecting

23

arrows in this diagram, in contrast to the fan pattern in
the diagram of global correlation, suggests that there are
different identities appropriate to different roles and
statuses. There is a match between the elements of one
area and the elements of the other. This is rather unlike
the situation in global correlations in which from some
limited source sprang entire social and cultural worlds.
Secondly, the manner in which this matching developes is
abetted by the lack of alternative social roles and is
structured by the significant groups which socialize the
new recruit. At the bottom of the schematization this fact
is suggested again by the use of the word ”available”,

and it is also suggested in the middle section that the
initial situation in acquiring social roles and statuses
is by the process of learning them. They are not built
into us nor are they resultants of ”basic energy“ etc.

‘At the bottom again the use of the phrase ”generalized
expectations” suggests that roles and statuses are merely
the first approximation to the acquisition of role behavior,
and this is confirmed in the comment at the top where we
learn that identification involves ”commitment” via the
acquisition of specialized,expegtgtigng, a kind of ”role
expertise”. This too is learned, being aided by the
limited number of complete absence of alternatives cpen to
the social person in life situations. In fact from the

point of view of organization theory this "expertise"

2h
appears to be the empirically meaningful kernel about
which discussion of ”informal” as cpposed to ”formal“
structure revolves. It is only that we have approached it
from the point of view of role theory while structuralists
approach it from the perspective of organization.

The theory of identification seen in this summary
paradigm avoids the derivations of "culture” or ”society"
from any single source. Identification is a characteristic
learned response of roles but it is not itself generative
of them. Another feature of this theory that emerges is
that problems of identification occur especially in socially
uncertain situations. Traditional behavior is traditional
precisely because such identification problems are not
especially important. And this is more apt to be the case
in opaque social situations, situations in which the actors
cannot readily distinguish the various expectancies involved.
As such the more complex societies would seem the most
logical candidates to examine for problems of identity.

Yet the fact that this is not always the case suggests

that there may be other mechanisms at work which modify
this situation. Such considerations form a natural trans-
ition to the examination of our third class of motivational

theories.

Woman

Our third class of notivaticnal theories have a more

25

extensive representation of authors than did the theories
of identification. Among the eSpecially prominent are
again Lindesmith and Strauss, and also Hans Gerth, C.
Wright Mills, Howard 5. Becker, and James Carper. In
addition we may again note that Kenneth Burke developed,

in an early work (Permanence and Change) a conception very
similar to the theories we shall now delineate. In fact
Burke's position was directly involved in the conception
developed by C. Wright Mills as early as 1940. It may
prove useful to review Burke's position at this point.
Burke writes: ”A man informs us that he 'glanced back

in suspicion‘. Thus, suspicion was his motivation. But
suspicion is a word for designating a complex set of sign
meanings, or stimuli not wholly in consonance with one
another. The concoction is somewhat as follows: danger-
signs ('there is something ominous about that fellow');
social signs ('I don't want to make a fool of myself if
there is nothing wrong, but I could Just glance back along
the pavement as though I had dropped something'), etc.

By his word 'suspicion' he was referring to the situation
itself--and he would invariably pronounce himself motivated
by suspicion whenever a similar pattern of stimuli recurred.
Incidently, since we characterize a situation with reference
to our general scheme of meanings, it is clear how motives,
as shorthand words for situations, are assigned without

reference to our orientation in general.”

26

This conception of motives tends to see them as merely
the verbal expression standing for complex patterns of
interaction; they are symbols of symbols. If a person gives
suspicion as a motive then he is really summarizing a pro-
cess of symbolic interaction which he is about to under-
take. This position of Burke's is actually identical to
that of the other authors in this section, only its impli-
cations remain to be developed.

It is noteworthy that motivations conceived of in the
foregoing manner are situated; they apply to actual social
occurances and will be as numerous and varied as those
situations. Furthermore, such motives would of course be
relative and a verbal manifestation meaningful in one
situation may not be meaningful in another. Thus ”sus-
picion” may be a legitimate summary of a situation probable
in a complex urban environment; it may be quite the other
extreme in a small face to face village of late 19th Century
Wisconsin.61 Which is to say that there probably is no
patterns of expectation relative to which the summary word
”suspicion" may attach when men walk down the streets of
such a village.

Gerth and Mills have developed a theory of motivation
that is essentially the foregoing. However they have pro-
ceeded somewhat further in ascertaining the social usage
of such motives, or summary words. They suggest a dichotomy

between ”opaque” and ”transparent” social structures and

27
their various constituent situations on the one side and
the corresponding vocabularies of motive on the other. In
a simple society ”a single vocabulary of motives may be
used by.a person for all his roles, or at least he will
use the same motives in speaking of the same conduct pattern
to his wife and to his neighbor, to his working mates and
to the village head. His children will learn these same
homogeneous vocabularies of motive. And these vocabularies
of motive are not likely to be questioned, for they are
used in public, in private, and when alone, and their
chances of being integrated firmly and smoothly with the
psychic structure of the character will be high”.62 Things
are somewhat different in the case of the industrial
metrOpolis. “In an industrial metropolis, the person is
confronted with a variety of roles and situations. Not
only is there a typical split between his more intimate
roles but the differences between any two intimate roles
or between any two public roles may be very wide. Different
motives may be employed for roles involving one's wife and
for those involving one's acquaintances on the commuter
train”.63 Therefore a ”...person will internalize many
vocabularies of motive which may very well be in conflict.
Then the individual must keep one set of motives secret
from the other, for they may appear 'silly' to some, even
though 'beautiful' to others. He compartmentalizes not

only his conduct but also his reasons for it, and insofar

6
as he cannot do this, his motives may be in conflict.” a

28

But why would such a dichotomy exist between industrial
metropolis and isolated village. Gerth and Mills answer
that the situations of the latter village are ”transparent”
that is, they tend to be such that every member of the
society understands what is going on and is able to at
least implicitly respond to it. Such persons understand
the functions and ”meaning“ that interactions performed
by every member of the society have and therefore it is
only to be expected that the vocabularies of motives (such
as "suspicion") are commonly shared and commonly employed
insofar as such situations are actual.

In contrast is the complicated social interaction of
the ”industrial metropolis”. Such interactions are for
Gerth and Mills apt to be ”opaque”, in that it is difficult
or often impossible to grasp even a small number of roles
adequately relative to the range available. The situat-
tions and accompaning roles are so numerous and diverse
that it is often impossible to ascertain the functions and
social meanings that are attached to various types of ex-
pected behavior. In such interactions, such diverse social
worlds, there may arise the need to legitimize situations
that are not commonly comprehended. This will be all the
more the case in situations that are actually in conflict,
and they are more apt to be in societies undergoing rapid
cultural and social change.

The vocabularies that result in such situations will

29
tend to reflect the interests of groups engaged in the
social situation in question, and they will reflect it in
such a way as to legitimize such behavior. This is why to
one set of persons in one social world motives may appear
“silly" while to another set in a different world they may
appear ”beautiful'.* There arises the fact, say Gerth
and Mills, that in such situations different vocabularies
of motives will be employed in different situations, as
well as the fact that the same social acts may have a
different vocabulary of legitimation depending upon the
social perspective in terms of which it is orientated.
Motives in such cases are not ”underlying forces” or ”pre-
dispositions" or "drives” found in theories of global
correlation, nor are they the ”role eXpertise” that may
come with the learning of specialized expectations, rather
they are social legitimations of a verbal form in ”opaque”
interactions.

But are we to assume that ”transparent" societies have
no such legitimating “motives”? “As Spelled out by Gerth
and Mills this is largely correct, for what they are saying
is that in such societies a large segment of behavior is
mere rote, people simply do not think to question or even

Speculate about it. And where in transparent societies

 

*See: T. Shibutani: ”Reference Groups as Perspectives",

Amen. lam:- 21W. vol. 61. #3. Nov. 1955-

 

 

30
such vocabularies of motive do exist then they are con-
sistant throughout and shared by all members as a common
source of normative reinforcement. Motives in such inter-
actions are reinforcing to the in-group rather than legiti-
mating to the out-group. This is of course a relative
matter and no society may be expected to exhibit either
extreme without qualification. However it is not our
purpose in this section to discuss concept formation.

Gerth and Mills sum up their position in the follow-
ing manner. ”When a person confesses or imputes motives,
he is not usually trying to describe his social conduct,
nor is he merely stating reasons for it. More usually he
is trying to influence others, to find new reasons which
will mediate the enactment of his role--and in so trying
to influence others, he may often influence himself. The
verbalization of motives for an act is itself a new act;
it, 13, a phase 21', 12159, M which lines up the role with
or against the expectations of others.65

Lindesmith and Strauss hold a position very similar
to that of Gerth and Mills as one aspect of their general
theory of motivation. In this respect they hold that motives
and the imputations of motivation are essentially functional
in gaining legitimation of social acts.66 Howard S. Becker
and James Carper independently maintain a similar conception
of motivation. However Lindesmith, Strauss, Becker, and

Carper do present rather incisive differences from the

 

31
over-all position of Gerth and Mills especially when we
ask the question of how it is we explain identification,

a point they have in common regarding the theory of identi-
fication. For the moment however let us take a careful
look at the Becker and Carper position on the legitimating
character of motives.

In their article entitled “The Development of Identi-
fication with an Occupation"67 the major linnments are set
forth. Becker and Carper list several factors or mechan-
isms that are involved in developing identification with
an occupation. The occupation in this case is that of a
university professor in three different academic depart-
ments; the mechanisms involved are “peer and informal
groups” as instrumental in the acquisition of ”occupational
ideology”; the "apprentiship situation” and the concommitant
development of ”interest and skill”; and the ”formal
academic structure".68 These are factors that are instru-
mental in forming identifications. They have, so to speak,
a dual aspect. On the one hand there are the ”visable"
social positions and definitions supporting them; in addition
there are the internalized vocabularies of motive that go
with an occupational identity. It is this vocabularyof
motives that serves in the process of acquiring identities
as a legitimating factor. Identification with the role
of professor evolves via the objective mechanisms of

apprentiship, peer groups, and formal academic structures.

32

It evolves via the verbal or internalized avenue manifest
in vocabularies of motive apprOpriate to the evolving
situations. In short as in the Gerth and Mills position
such vocabularies are functional in that they tend to

legitimate the newly acquired behavior among competing

available roles.

Again it may be useful to attempt to diagram this

third class of motivational theory;

mamas T
from perspective of several sub-
groups within on—going system

W of A x{\ /’\ /\ A ,Ah /\ /\
vocabularies .
instrumental «>
i.e., (func- ‘
tional) in
promoting role
performance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

worm
internalized locus, verbally manifest,
short-hand eXpression of interaction
As in the diagram on identification we note that the

arrows connecting the personal manifestations with the
social structure are not splayed out as they were in the
global correlates. This indicates that there is a one to
one correspondence between acts on the one hand and the
vocabularies which stand as shorthand expressions of them.
This would be the case in the theory of legitimation almost
by definition since such vocabularies are summary state-

ments.

In summary the theory states that in situations of

33

competition, conflict, or poor communication where the
functions of particular roles do not command society-wide
consensus, summary vocabularies (apparently by meg: itera—
tion) may serve to legitimate what may otherwise be called
in question. They serve to defend, enhance, abet situations
by providing legitimating schemes for evaluating social
acts. The schemes are words standing for the situation

in question (as ”suspicion”) and insofar as they promote
interaction they "motivate”. Nevertheless they are only
another way, so to speak, of performing the interaction in
question. The several authors taking this stand wish to
distinguish clearly between such functions vocabularies

of motive may serve and the older, more traditional notion
of motives as causes of social acts. On the other hand these
writers do equate the notion of motive with that of pgppgfie.
Motives as they conceive them may be thought of as purposes.
This interesting conjoining may be summed up by the follow-.v
ing quotation from Lindesmith and Strauss: “Purposes or
motives, as we have said are formulated. This means that
they arise in communication and are either partially or
fully stated in words. When thought of in this manner,
motives do not exist in a mysterious nonverbal realm such
as "the unconscious“. As Mills says, 'Motives are of no
value apart from delimited societal situations for which
they are appropriate vocabularies. They must be situated

....Motives vary in content and character with historical

 

 

 

34
epochs and societal structtires'”.69 And from Gerth and
Mills we have the following: ”Avowals and imputations of
motives seem to arise in interpersonal situations in which
'purposes' are vocalized and carried out with close refer-
ence to the speech and actions of others."70

In the foregoing passages the equation of motive with
purpose suggests that the purpose of an act, that is, its
motive, is the function that that act serves in an on-going
social system. It should now be clear why Gerth, Mills,
Becker, and Carper are well disposed to this particular
position. They are interested in analyzing the interrela-
tions of social phenomena and they are thus interested in
the {gaggign that vocabularies of motive serve in such
systems. Thus the equations of motive with purpose seems
a logical one given this position. In Lindesmith and
Strauss we find the same interesting equation, apparently
they think of the two terms as simply interchangeable. Such
considerations suggest the final class of motivational

theories with which we will concern ourselves.

Mgg-mgtiygted ngposiye System

The title of this final section on motivational
theories may seem to be a contradiction in terms. Actually
it comprises an interesting and diverse group of theories

and forms the logical transition to the second part of this

thesis.

 

 

 

 

35

The present section however concerns itself much less
with motivational theories than it does with certain
singular ways of asking questions. Properly considered it
covers a great literature in modern sociology and it will
be impossible therefore to give anything more than an
outline presentation. As we suggested in the last section
dealing with theories of legitimation several theorists
equate motives with purposes: the motives that compel
social action are the purposes that an actor entertains.
Yet to talk of the purpose of an actor is to employ a tele-
ological vocabulary, one that involves some attitude re-
garding future states of affairs toward which an actor or
system is orientated. Systems that involve ”future states
of affairs” as significant elements or variables are tele-
ological systems.71

Our final group of theories are those that involve
such concerns in explaining the motivation of social acts.
For our purposes teleological theories refer to any,such
use of teleological categories, whether it be that of
equating motives with purposes as Gerth, Mills, Lindesmith,
Strauss, etc. have done or even the more subtle usage
employed in the ”functibnalist" vocabulary. With regard to
the first group it seems straight forward enough to assume
that if a person asks for a motive such a motive is a pur-
pose, the purpose that the person in question has in per-

forming an act. That is, the act is performed with some

 

 

 

 

36
end in view. Now to speak this way may seem natural enough
for human beings, though it must be remembered it does not
make sense to ask for the motive or purpose a bridge has
in spanning a river or the purpose a river has in wearing
down a mountain. We often refer to the ”false” imputation
of purpose in the natural world as a fallacy, ”the pathetic
fallacy”.

Yet it seems to be the case that this fallacy does
not apply to human imputations of purpose. Between running
water and steel spans on the one hand, and human beings
and perhaps the higher mammals (many would rule them out)
on the other, the dividing line between purposive behavior
and "mere events” occurs. 'So much for considerations of
meaning; what really interests us in the present context
is that this final class of motivational theories is tele-
ological. Because of this it in some ways crosscuts all
of the categories of motivation we have discussed, while
in others, such as the present class, it forms the sub-
stance of such theorizing. In the first group it forms
a perspective or accepted framework in terms of which the
theorist orientates his questions, in the latter it is
the theory. These statements will become more obvious when
we analyze in Part II the nature of such systems.

For the moment we must note that theories concerned

with teleological systems refer to them variously as ”pur-

posive systems”, ”adaptive systems", ”homeostatic or

 

 

37

self-regulating systems”, "boundary maintaining systems”,

or ”directively organized systems". All these phrases refer
to the same set of phenomena. Modern exponents form a
guard of honor in contempory social science: Talcott Parsons,72
Robert K. ierton,73 Clyde Kluckhohn,7u E. A. Shils,75 Philip
Selznick,77 Abba Lerner,78 Werner S. Landecker,79 and in

80 Norbert Wiener81 to mention

other fields Walter Cannon,
only a few. The list could be greatly extended to cover
many fields ranging from biology to switching theory, from
psychiatry to control systems and communication theory.
This fact should serve to stress the point that such a
group of theorists partake more of an engulfing perspective
than an actual theory as such. We employ the ph'nase ”en-
gulfing perspective” mainly because it is engulfing and be-
cause we wish to indicate something more general than any
particular theory, a difference which will lead us to
question whether it is a legitimate perspective at all.

If we eXplore this conception further we find that,
for instance, to ask what a man's motive is in going to
work we may be told that it serves a purpose, to attain
money, or achieve status, or occupy time. The motive in
this case is the purpose, and that is only another way of
saying that such motives or purposes serve fungtignsd either
in maintaining a social system, or in maintaining an in-
dividuals personality system. This conception has nothing

to do with the functional legitimation of acts such as

38

Gerth and Mills discussed but instead refers to the role
that an act or series of acts has in maintaining an on-going
system. In other words to speak of "purposive systems”,
”motivated systems”, ”adaptive systems”, ”teleological
systems”, or 'boundry maintaining systems” is really to
refer to functional systems. In any discussion of teleo-
logical entities the terms "purpose", ”motive", and ”func-
tion" are synonyms.

Such a conjunction of terminology may seem difficult
to absorb at first encounter, but a moments reflection will
confirm the fact that the functionalist vocabulary is quite
tele010gical, referring as it does to the role played by
certain select elements in the maintenance of on-going
wholes and in the attainment of selected ends. Calling
attention to such a conjunction of meanings (purpose-motive-
function) is important in that it allows us to discuss the
nature of systems to which such terms apply in a general
context and apply findings of recent work in the analysis
of such entities to any argument of this form.82

Even so it may seem idiosyncratic to think of the
authors we have listed in this section as motivationalists.
But if we are correctly understood it makes as much sense
to call them motivationalists as functionalists and vise
versa. As for the other meanings of motivation: as global
correlation, as identification, as legitimation we will

find that the very problems these theorists pose when they

 

~‘___

“_______-_ _.—.

39

seek a ”theory” of motives is itself teleological. Tele-
ological considerations therefore form a framework that is
in many respects an ernest of motivationalists generally,
and because of this it warrants our careful attention.

Our present class of motivational theories is then a
venerable one being largely co-extensive with structural-
functionalism in sociology. To ask for the motive of a
social act is to ask for the purpose, which is only another,
though cryptic way of asking for the function that that act
serves.

Yet even if ”functionalism” were a non-existent per-
spective-~for it is a perspective and not a theory as we
shall see--even if this perspective did not exist we should
still have to construe the fourth class of motivational
theories along these lines. This is necessary because
somewhere along the line we are going to have to acknow-
ledge all those instances in which motives stand as purposes
or causes or generators of social action. And furthermore
we are going to have to acknowledge the fact that such
causes or generators serve functions in social and personal
systems. Such usage is-fairly common even if not graced
with theoretical status and it must be taken into account.
We are face to face with such matters if we recall Gardner
Murphy's comment ”there is always room for the question:
what makes the thing work?". The fact that a theorist may

analyze social and personal systems into numerous inter-

no
connected elements exhibiting lawful regularity and then
_still ask the question ”what makes it go“ suggests that
teleological thinking is not dead.
In ending this section let us again attempt a simple
schematizaticn. It will not be as complex as the former
paradigms since this class of theories is nothing more

than a way of asking questions:

m
sub and final of
personal and soc-
ial systems

A A /\/\/\

as

S -1----<>

, . v 1
N TIT OT L .

mechanisms for the attain-
ment of ”ends”

 
     

served by normative m an
of attainment

 

 

 

 

Again the arrows indicate that there is a one-to-one
correSpondence between the means, the functions, and the
ends of "functionally conceived systems”. How one accounts
for so-called dysfunctions and the extent of a particular
function is another problem. As we shall see,these are
really pseudo problems but for the moment seemingly real.
According to one reasonable construal, for every means
employed there is a corresponding function which it serves
in the attainment of social ends; and like ”situated motives”

the diagram indicates that this function is unique in each

case. The point being that we thereby avoid the negative

—_—.—- _
.7 “-M

..r '—
—_——-

#1
connotations of ”reductionism” by avoiding any universal
predispositions or push mechanisms.

Such a conception is one of great generality. It
suggests that since motives and functions are equatible
when we Speak of any functional system we have already
said everything there is to say about motivated systems.
However if this is the case then when we employ such a
scheme our Job is done, there can be no further problem of
”what makes the thing work”. On the other hand if this is
denied and some further ”cause" is felt necessary, the
position can only be maintained i£,some independent sense
can be made of teleological conceptions which is not already
given in the eXplication of functionalism and teleology
which we are about to develop. If teleology and thereby
functionalism turn out to be merely an alternative render-
ing of the ”logic of explanation" then there is no question
of motivation. For motivation in the present context to
prove viable there must be some independent sense made of
it which is not capable of analysis in terms of the general
structure of empirical science. We will attempt to show
that there is no such additional meaning, that such systems
are not peculiar, and that therefore teleology (and function-
alism) are without independent status in motivational
theorizing and in science generally. Our point in this
thesis is going to be that concerns of this sort are un-

necessary concerns, that they resolve themselves into one

#2
of three categories: statements of lawful regularity,
statements of purpose and function which in turn are re-
placable by law statements, and finally redundancy state-
ments.

It is in this sense then that the title of our present
section, ”Non-motivated Purposive System” must be evaluated.
It is not a contradiction because the "purposive system" in
this case refers to systems that “appear" to possess char-
acteristics or properties that distinguish them from systems
that spanned straits, such as bridges, and systems that
wear down mountains, such as streams. Actually, as we shall
show there is no such distinction to be made. By the same
token the phrase ”non-motivated" refers to the fact that
once such an analysis is provided considerations of moti-
vation in any sense become dubious.

This is not a new conception; Lundberg has intoned
for such a handling of motivation for years. One is re-
minded of Nelson Foote's uneasy treatment of Lundberg's
comment that ”there is no more justification scientifically
to seek the motives of a man who runs down the street than
there is of paper which blows‘down the street....84 Lund-
berg is not fooled by the motivational argument in any
guise but on the other hand he has not fully provided for
its dismissal. However, this is hardly his fault since
certain aSpects of the necessary research have only recently

been published. His exhortations that sociology become a

“3
“natural science” are actually a salubrious corrective in

an area often cloaked by confusion.

cu
mggcpmocg mp memories;

mmmw
It is commonly held that there are many kinds of

explanation. The process of knowing is supposed to con-
sist of several types of eXperience: scientific, intuitive,
mystic, aesthetic, descriptive, and so forth.1 It is not
our purpose to argue these matters in this thesis. When
n§,speak of knowledge, scientific knowledge, we will mean
knowledge that has the logical structure of the sort we
are about to develop. This type of knowledge is only an
explicit rendering of what scientists implicitly assume.
The other sorts of ”knowing" have been senerely challenged
and, as far as we can see, are without foundation, but that‘
will not be our concern here.2

Before we begin it is worth noting that for our pur-
poses it will not be necessary to investigate the area of
th§p1y_gon§tzggtion as such in this eXposition (the word
theory is here used in the technical sense as a specialized
construct in the explanatory scheme of empirical science).
The relation between theory and law statements has recently
been clarified by some of the advanced students of modern
analysis, and the work of B. B. Braithwaite stands out as
perhaps the most concise statement dealing with this vexing
problem.3 Nevertheless law statements are, for our purposes,

sufficient to eXplicate the nature of motivation and tele-

1+5

ological systems. Therefore the reader is urged to dis-
count the casual use of the word “theory” as it has appeared
in this thesis. There is a common usage of the word "theory”
which seems to refer to any very general sort of explanation
whether of conceptual, lawful, or truly theoretical form.
When we speak of motivational "theory” we mean that term

to be taken in this manner.

We may begin our analysis of the logic of science by
noting that when we speak of concepts (as apposed to pre-
cepts) we have in mind not particular definite events but
"kinds?. We take the world to be composed of an indefinitely
large number of particulars each one in some sense possessed
of properties or characteristics not shared by any other
particular: we refer to each particular as a unique event.)+
Supposedly if we but had the patience we could attain closer
and closer approximation to a complete description of such
particulars by listing all of the characteristics it
possessed. While this may, for certain purposes, be what
we wish to do it is seldom what we do in science. The
reason for this is that one of our aims in science is to
achieve general knowledge regarding broad classes or kinds
of events. To be sure science occasionally concerns itself
with particulars as in the case of geology. Yet even while
the geologist is concerned with a unique and supposedly
particular event (the earth) he assumes that the regularities

he establishes relative to it would hold for any "similar

#6
planet”. Now this amounts to saying that he is interested
in ”kinds” not particulars. Let us briefly see what this
entails.

The scientist is concerned with general knowledge and
he attains such generality by the use of abstraction. The
distinction between abstraction and generalization is
roughly that generality is a predicate that applies to
fiLfiLfiQfiflEfi; it involves some use of quantification (existen-
tially quantified: ”some”, "a few”, ”most”, ”many”, etc.;
universally quantified: ”all”, ”every” etc.). Abstractiom
on the other hand is roughly a predicate that applies to
entitie§_and it refers to ghagggtgzlfitlgfi those entities
possess.5 In order to generalize over large areas it is
necessary to abstract. This entails the selection of certain
characteristics, qua characteristics, and subsequent attempts
to establish universally general relations between them (in
the case of statistical regularities or conjunctions: exis-
tentially general).

Now gpngeptg may be looked upon as statements formed
by constant conjunctions6 of such abstract characteristics.
Thus the concept ”gold" constantly conjoins several abstract
characteristics in a universally quantified manner, that
is, in a general statement of the form: all gold is yellow,
has a certain measure of ductility, a metric of weight per
cubic volume and so forth. The same may be said for the

concept ”folk". The abstract properties or characteristics

47
that are constantly conjoined in this concept include
"isolation”, ”limited pOpulation”, ”strong primary rela-
tions”, ”non-literate”, ”homogeneously shared culture” and
so forth. These constant conjunctions censist then of
abstract preperties held universally. Whatever the nature
of the ”actual world” really is (”what really is real”) may
at least be ignored by science and still obtain results.
Whether in fact it is even meaningful to speak of concrete
particulars or complete descriptions of ”things as they
actually are” is cpen to question. At any rate so far as
we are concerned it need not detain us.

There is however an aspect of scientific activity
that may seem to be crucially concerned with just such
particulars qua particulars; this is the reputed interest
scientists have in facts. Now the opposite of abstract is
generally considered to be "concrete" and the alternative
to general, ”singular”. Facts are, for the purposes of
science, singular statements which may be either concrete
or abstract. Facts refer to true states of affairs in the
world. They may be entirely specific as when we seek the
explanation of an individual occurence or event; they may
make reference to a single glg§§_(still singular) of entities
as when we ask for the explanation of a class of-laws
(Kepler's three laws of planetary motion). They are not
the substance of science as is often assumed but they do

form the verification basis upon which it rests.7

#8

If we turn to scientific laws we find that they too
are ”constant conjunctions” or ”invariant relations” as
between entities. But in this case the entities which
they conjoin are the concepts of which we have just spoken.
Laws are statements that must be true, while lawlike state-
ments may or may not be true even though they have the
logical structure of conceptual conjunctions. Also we
must note that a further requirement of laws is that they
be, like concepts, universally quantified. This restric-
tion must be revised in the light of statistical laws but
for our purposes we will consider it accurate enough. Thus
if law statements in science are universal conjunctions of
kinds of events what does it mean to say we explain some-
thing by means of laws in empirical science.

First of all let us be very clear of what we mean in
talking about explanations. When we are asked to explain
something, generally we are asked ”why”, that is, for a
”reason” or ”cause” or ”determinant” of the event in ques-
tion. Often this usage is opposed to ”merely descriptive
statements” or ”statements of fact”. It is not always
easy to know just what someone has in mind when they make
this distinction or employ any one of the above terms.

Very often the use of ”description” as Opposed to ”ex-
planation” refers to a psychological difference; it suggests
the ”feeling" of comprehension that an individual may obtain

in being given an eXplanation. Feelings of psychological

#9
case or understanding or unease and lack of understanding
are perhaps important but of no concern to us. All that
we are interested in is the logical structure of explana-
tion whether or not in any particular case the explanation
is accompanied by feelings of comprehension. When a person
asks a ”why” question as opposed to a request for descrip-
tion we take this to mean a question that distinguishes
between concepts and laws. This point requires further
comment.

When we classify we are conceptualizing; so if a person
asked ”why” we called 12th Century Japanese social structure
”feudal” we should take,§n1§,”why” question as a request
for the abstract characteristics which comprise the concept
”feudal”. These would then be compared to the Japanese
instance and the social structure labeled (classffiod)
feudal if it possessed these characteristics. The same
would hold for the classifications of fish, birds, plants,
atoms, compounds, rocks, communities, and so forth. Gen-
erally we refer to such a process as descriptive or defi-
nitive and while it may at times satisfy a ”why” question
very often something more is indicated. In'a moment we
shall see what this something more is, but for the present
let us investigate the conceptual or classifictory ex-
planation a little further.

We said that we have explained on event (in a perfectly

good sense of the term) when we have shown that event to

50
be a member of a class of similar events. For what it is
worth psychologically we probably reduce our burden of
thought as we see generality emerge from particularity.

As we have said this is the process of classification that
is a necessary part of language and explanation. But

as everyone knows there are good classifications and

there are bad classifications. Actually the distinction
between good and bad classifications has been given an
objective meaning; to understand this meaning helps us to
understand the nature of classification, concept forma-
tion, and laws in science. A classification is ”good"
when it is a "natural classification”; it is "bad" when it
is an "artificial classification".8 The distinction is
objective and refers to the fact that some classifications
of phenomena allow us to explain and predict a rather
modest range of events that are not already included in
the basis of the classification (the defining characteristics
of the classification) while others go further. Thus in
the case of animals and plants classified in terms of their
adult shapg we have an instance of an ”artificial" classi-
fication. Opposed to this the ”natural” classification of
animals according to their method of reproduction on a
phylogenetic scale. In the case of "shape" we can predict
and explain very little about the life and habits of a
creature classified on this basis. To be sure we can tell

in advance a few things about the mode of support or perhaps

51
locomotion but that is all. Contrast this to the phylogen-

etic classification. On the basis of a few crucial char—
acteristics, especially reproductive and physiological char-
acteristics a competent biologist can derive an almost
indefinite number of generalizations about the living
creatures in his classification. Not only can he tell the
medium in and through which the form moves, but he can
tell as well the probable method of rearing, the sorts of
reproductive structures, food habits, and the structures
that must be present if the creature in question is to
adjust to the various environments and ranges of climate
available.

Conceptual explanation can, after all, provide us with
a significant body of knowledge. Classifications into
kinds or types by use of abstract characteristics is infor-
mative. It allows us to predict and explain and depending
upon how well the defining characteristics that go into
its basis were chosen it will give us more or less informa-
tion. But generally concept formation goes space with the
discovery of laws in science and cannot be dissociated from
it. Medieval herbalists' classifications of plants accord-
ing to the "doctrine of signature” suggests one type of
concept formation. The defining basis consisted of the
resemblance of a plant part (seeds, flowers, stems, roots,
leaves) to a part of the human anatomy. The law stated

that insofar as an aspect of plant anatomy resembled an

52

aSpect of the human anatomy then that plant would be useful
in curing the diseased area. As it turned out this rela-
tion did not hold and a new basis was discovered. Concept
formation and laws can never be dissociated from one another.
Furthermore concept formation will depend upon the focus
of interest of the classifier: how we will cut up the
world will depend upon what we want to know, that is, what
we are interested in.9

So much for facts and concepts. We suggested a few
pages back that while conceptual explanations were common
and useful in science as in life they are not the only
import of a ”why” question. Classification is closely re-
lated to what is commonly called description. The other
.meaning that ”why” questions suggest is more generally
thought of as a ”true” explanation. A person may be satis-
fied (we employ the psychologically orientated illustrations
as heuristic aids only) with the suggestion that the com-
plex social structure he has been studying in Japan is a
feudal system. As well, an individual may be satisfied
with being told that the radiator of the car he is now
viewing--a radiator from which a large icicle is protruding
--is of the class of phenomenon that burst under the requi-
site conditions. Certainly many children will accept this
sort of explanation. If a child asks why it is that babies
are so thirsty and is told that it is the nature of babies

to be thirsty, this explanation will often satisfy them.

53

What the child has received in this case is a conceptual

or classificatory explanation. However the student of
Japanese society may remain unmoved by our reply that he

is studying a type of feudal society; the chagrined viewer
of the burst radiator may be unimpressed by our classifica-
tion of his radiator as one of a large class of objects
that burst (especially if he is a denizen of the equatorial
regions visiting the north); and finally the child too may
counter with the further question as to why it should be
the ”nature” of babies to have thirst. It behooves us to
give, at this point, careful consideration to the nature

of these requests.

”Why” requests of this second sort are generally
requests for explanation by general law. As is well known
laws not only form the basis of science but its ultimate
goal as well. Systems of them form the criteria of coherence
which we shall shortly discuss. General laws are often
spoken of as generalizations or universal generalizations.
There is however some suggestion of uncertainity regarding
the question of whether general laws are the same sorts of
things as generalizations. Of late this distinction has
been clarified, as we shall see, by the analyses of B. B.
Braithwaite, but for the present we will use the two terms
as simply synonyms.lo If laws or generalizations form the
basis and the end of scientific investigation we must ask:

What is the nature of a general law?

5#

As we have suggested they too are constant conjunction
statements. They are statements asserting some sort of
invariancy between classes of events--as we have already
seen. Therefore they are conjunctions of concepts. Gen-
erally they take the form--they have the form even though
the scientist may neglect to always phrase them in just
this manner--”Everything that is of class or kind A is
also of class or kind B".11 Or more simply: Every A is
B". Examples of laws (whether true or not) are the follow-
ing: in constant volume gases increase their pressure as
their temperature increases"; all Sierran big‘tees occur
at elevations of 5,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level"; ”in
situations of perfect competition supply equals demand”;
"the angle of reflection of light from a dense surface is
equal to the angle of incidence"; ”it is a universal fact
that suicide rates in a society are prOportional to the
index of anomie“; "the degree of systematization found in
the literary and oral tradition of a people will depend
upon the degree to which they are politically centralized”;
and so on and on. In order to qualify as a lawful statement
the proposition must be true but it need not be metrically
stated. It is easy to see that qualitative (and quantitative)
statements of this sort cover a class of great magnitude.

Nevertheless they all possess the abstract form of
"Everything that is of kind A is also of kind B" and this

plus their truthfulness is all that is required to be laws

55

in science.

Now even though laws have this form and even though
the number of laws in science is extremely vast there is a
limit to them. This limit is interesting and will aid us
in comprehending the nature of scientific explanation.
Eugene Wigner has prescribed a criterion of ”limit” to
what he pr0poses we call "our science". Wigner adopts as
his basis of "our science" all the scientific knowledge
that men have actually learned at any particular time.

For our purposes it is better to denote by science all that
is contained in the literature of science.

Now what is contained in the literature is rather vague
but it does suggest that there is some knowledge that never
finds its way into scientific books. Such simplistic laws
as ”redhot objects burn”, ”the movement of air is experi-
enced by us as wind", "water conducts current”, ”grass
clumps if not grazed”, ”earthworms come to the surface at
night”, ”trout like earthworms”, and so forth are examples.
Such rather simple and imprecise laws (not so simple for a
child first learning them) could be made more precise but
still not find their way into the scientific literature.

It is not that they are not laws but rather that they are
not of sufficient scope to warrant our concern.12 In fact,
we shall see that most of these laws are already accounted
for by more general laws. Nevertheless just what laws

will be included in "our science” is not a highly precise

56
matter. Some of them will be considered too obvious or
well known to warrant inclusion, some will not, and the
boundary between the two realms will always be shifting as
long as science is viable.13

Now that we have at least a suggestion of what a law
amounts to we must ask how the second ”why” question is
to be taken. It, just as the first, is a request for
eXplanation. How does a law explain? A law explains in
exactly the manner in which a concept explains, that is,
by subsumption. When we eXplain an event we subsume it
under a lawful regularity. If we wish to explain why it
is that the 12th Century Japanese system was Feudal we do
so by subsuming this particular class event (this member
of the class of feudal entities) under a general law of
feudal systems. We may know of no such law at present but
if and when it is discovered it will provide the explana-
tion required. For instance, suppose that you were able
to substantiate the hypothesis that feudal systems develop
whenever structures of central authority disintegrate in
agrarian society. If this hypothesis were substantiated
(were a law) then we should eXplain the Japanese system
by subsuming it under our law. Of course, if it was the
case that the Japanese system had all of the abstract
characteristics that feudal systems have and yet did not
have a disintegrated central authority then it would not

be a true law or true eXplanation, but that is not the point

57

at issue here.

Similar explanations may be given in the instance of
the burst radiator and the thirsty baby. The law that
water expands when it freezes and the law Stating the
relative strength of radiator materials may both be evoked
to explain why this particular radiator burst. So too may
thisbaby's thirst be explained by the law that certain
types of organisms (generally mammals) require water intake
of such and such amount, which itself rests upon laws of
mammalian physiology, and so on.

All of this may be easier to grasp if we detail an
illustration that we have used above. Actually Carl Hempel
had done most of the job for us and we will now quote at
some length from his interesting paper: "The main function
of general laws in the natural sciences is to connect
events in patterns which are usually referred to as eagle:
,napjgn,and pzedigtign. The eXplanation of the occurrence
of an event of some specific kind E at a certain place and
time consists, as it is usually expressed, in indicating
the causes or determining factors of E. Now the assertion
that a set of events--say, of the kinds 01’ 02,..., Cn"
have caused the event to be eXplained, amounts to the state-
ment that according to certain general laws, a set of events
of the kind mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event
of kind E. Thus, the scientific explanation of the event

in question consists of

58

(1) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of

certain events C1..., On at certain times and
places

(2) a set of universal hypotheses (laws), such that

(a) the statements of both groups are reason-
ably well confirmed by empirical evidence
(requirement of truth),

(b) from the two groups of statements the sentence
asserting the occurrence of event E can be
logically deduced.

In a physical explanation, group (1) would describe the
initial and boundary conditions for the occurrence of the
final event; generally, we shall say that group (1) states
the determining gondit10p§ (latter called antecedent or
initial conditions) for the event to be explained, while
group (2) contains the general laws on which the explana-
tion is based; they imply the statement that whenever events
of the kind described in the first group occur, an event

of the kind to be explained will take place.

Illustration: Let the event to be explained consist
in the cracking of an automobile radiator during a cold
night. The sentences of group (1) may state the following
initial or boundary conditions: The car was left in the
street all night. Its radiator, which consists of iron,
was completely filled with water, and the lid screwed on
tightly. The temperature during the night dropped from
39° F. in the evening to 25° F. in the morning; the air
pressure was normal. The bursting pressure of the radiator

material is so and so much. --Group (2) would contain

empirical laws such as the following: Below 320 F., under

59

normal atmospheric pressure, water freezes. Below 290 F.,
the pressure of a mass of water increases with decreasing
temperature, if the volume remains constant or decreases;
when the water freezes, the pressure again increases. Finally,
this group would have to include a quantitative law con-
cerning the change of pressure as a function of its temper-
ature and volume.

From statements of these two kinds, the conclusion
that the radiator cracked during the night can be deduced

by logical reasoning; and explanation.of the considered

event has been established."ll+

While the quotation from Hempel makes specific reference
to the physical sciences it does so only because the para-
digm of explanation will then be shown to apply to all
sciences and even areas not thought of as scientific (see
title). In fact this was the intention in writing the
article.15

Now from this illustrative passage several facts emerge.
First and most obvious is the fact that the "Hempel paradigm”
(if we may call it that) is the same as the paradigm we
have been deve10ping. This suggestion is reinforced by the
appearence several years later (in collaboration with Paul
Oppenheim) of a long study in the ”logic of explanation”
following exactly these lines though with greater refine-
ment and depth.16 Also in this lateu' study there appears

a long footnote the import of which shows that this paradigm

60

is not idiosyncratic but really an eXplicit formalization
of what a great_number of eminent writers (from Mill and
Pearson on) have had to say on the subject of eXplanation.l7

A scheme such as we have developed--really only a
summary of the Hempel-Oppenheim paradigm (hereafter referred
to simply as the H—0 paradigm)--is then, what is meant by
explanation in empirical science. This is an analysis of
what is going on when an event or a law is explained. So
far as we can see, and so far as competent writers have
been able to see, explanation consists of this sort of
structure (logically) and noting more.

The second thing that we notice in examining the
passage quoted above is that in addition to category #2,
the category of general laws, Hempel has still another set
of statements (sentences he calls them) stating "determining
conditions”. The determining conditions figure into all
models of explanation. They take a variety of names of
which the following are the most prevalent in the liter-
ature: "antecedent conditions", ”boundry conditions”,
”initial conditions”, ”state conditions”, occasionally
”parameters” when somewhat incorrectly employed, and some-
times "state descriptions” or merely ”descriptions". The
statement of these conditions is as important as the laws
themselves for the process of explanation. Let us illus-
trate what is meant by these various designations.

Suppose that there has just occurred an eclipse of the

61
sun by the moon and we ask an astronomer for an explana-
tion of just this event (not of eclipses in ggng;gl_for
which general laws would be sufficient). What we want to
know is why ELLE. w at m 11m. To answer our
question the astronomer needs two sorts of statements:
he needs of course the general laws stating the regularities
of motion of the satelites about the sun (Kepler's laws)
and perhaps certain laws stating the behavior of large
bodies generally (Newton's laws). But he also, in addition,
needs initial or antecedent conditions relative to the
solar system. The initial or antecedent conditions consist
of such statements as l) the relative positions of the
earth, moon, and sun one to another at some arbitrarily
selected time (t). Coupled with these statements or ”state-
conditions” must be 2) numbers describing the relative
velocity of the earth, moon, and sun, one to another. All
of these statements we call initial, boundary, antecedent
or determining conditions. They are also often called
descriptions of the state of a particular system at some
specified time. Such statements of conditions or state-
conditions of a system allow the scientist to apply laws
to particular situations. They are not aSpects of laws
as such, but they are necesSary if the laws are to be
applied to events for explanation. They are always relative
to some kind of event that we wish te explain. In the case

of the eclipse the particular initial conditions that we

62

will choose will be selected in terms of our desire to
explain just this event and no other. All of this is very
obvious and is generally summed up in the adage that we
must know the nature of our subject (the facts) before we
can hOpe to explain what went on. EVery detective story
operates identically; the detective must first ”get the
facts” (i.e., initial conditions of the crime) and then
drawing on the ”laws” of human behavior (cultural and social
regularities) the sleuth can deduce, in classical H-O
paradigmatic fashion the probable hypotheses to be tested,
that is, the probable explanations.

So far, in drawing out the implications of what it
means to eXplain something, we have said nothing about pre-
diction. Ideally when we explain an event we should be
able to predict it as well. In fact the analysis we have
just made of the explanation of solar eclipses suggests
that it is identical to what we might do in a prediction.
These indications are in fact correct, for as many authors
have observed explanation and prediction have an identical
logical structure;18 the sole difference between them is
a pragmatic one. It rests on the purposes at hand. Karl
Popper has summarized this nicely in his famous Th§_ngn
Sggjfity gpd_lt§,§p§mie§,19 and J. W. N. Watkins, an economist,
in full agreement with Popper puts the matter even more
succinctly: ”It has been established by Professor Karl E.

Popper that the formal structure of prediction is the same

63
as that of a full-fledged eXplanation. In both cases we
have (a) initial conditions; (b) universal statements (i.e.,
general laws); and (c) deductive consequences of (a) plus
(b). We explain a given event (0) by detecting (a) and
postulating and applying (b); and we predict a future event
(0) by inferring it from some given (a) and postulated (b)."*
However while the two processes are only pragmatically
disjoined Watkins feels that the distinction is a useful
one particularly, though not exclusively, in the social
sciences._He notes ”...even the social scientist who can
provide a full filedggd (in contradistinction to what is
more often the case in the social sciences: Hempel's
”eXplanation sketch", an incomplete statement of the laws
and initial conditions) of a past event will run into
difficulties if he tries to predict similar events, because
they will occur in a system which is not isolated from the
influence of factors which he cannot ascertain beforehand.
The Astronomer Royal can prepare a Nautical Almanac for
1953 because he is predicting the movements of bodies in
a system isolated (for his purposes though never absolutely
isolated i.e., from cosmic radiation or stellar dust) from

extraneous influences, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer

 

*J. W. N. Watkins, "Ideal Types of Historical Explanation",

Regdipgg ;Q.the Philosophy pf,§gieng§, H. Fiegl and M.
Brodbeck, New York, 1953, pp. 723-72u. _

6#
cannot prepare an Economic Almanac for 1953 because, even if
he possessed sufficient knowledge to eXplain completely
the 1951 level of prices, production, investment, exports,
etc., his predictions of future levels would undoubtedly be
upset by unforseeable, world-wide disturbing factors, the
effects of any of which might be cumulative."20 This
identical situation of course holds for meterology and also
for aspects of geology (certainly a physical science); the
geologist cannot predict earthquakes though he certainly
has no trouble explaining them. Actually in this situation
the social sciences seem better off.

The upshot of this discussion is that prediction and
eXplanation differ in no important resPects. Therefore
when we speak of explanation in this thesis it will be
understood that we mean prediction as well. Also it should
be noted that Watkin's suggestions regarding isolated
systems is itself merely pragmatic in intent. As Bertrand
Russell has remarked21 the end of science is not the
explanation of isolated systems. The elucidation of isolated
systems serves as a means. We isolate so that we may dis-
cover with ease the laws operative in a simplified system.
The final aspiration of science may reasonably be construed
as the total lawful eXplanation of every phenomenon that
compels our attention. Nevertheless there is strong reason
to believe that explanations of this sort would prove so

complex that we simply could not handle them (except in

65

principle). After enough tests have been performed to verify
a universal theory it would probably not find much further
use except in challenging further theorizing. Pragmatically
there is some justification for being concerned with isolated
systems; they limit our focus of attention and to that

extent increase our precision in limited eXplanation and

prediction.22

Thus far we have talked almost exclusively of the ex-
planation of ”events". However events, that is simple
occurnmues, are not the only entities that we explain in
the world. We have seen that both concepts and laws eXplain
by subsumption. But what they explain may be "events”,
that is ”facts” such as an eclipse or a business cycle, or
suicide, or, on the other hand they may explain 21h§2,1anfi.
Now to eXplain a law is not the same thing as to explain
events. Laws are universal statements that are true
(general statements universally quantified). To explain
laws we do not require initial, boundary, or antecedent
conditions. Since a law is not an event occundng in the
actual world it may be explained simply by subsuming it
under a more general law. Thus it is that Kepler's laws
of planetary motion and Galileo's laws of falling bodies
were subsumed under Newton's laws, and in turn Newton's
laws were subsumed under Einstein's laws.23 In biology
this process occurs constantly. The Mendelian laws of

plant hybridization were subsumed under Mendel's own rather

66
simple genetic theory ("theory of unit characters") and
it in turn has been subsumed under a more advanced statis-
tical theory.24 Natural selection has been "explained”
that is, subsumed under laws of genetic mutation and the

laws of heredity.25

The laws governing embryological
maturation have been subsumed (hopefully) under the biochem-
ical theory (laws) of ”organizers".26 Such explanations
also occur in the social sciences though they are far less
precise. For instance, suppose that Durkheim were correct
in asserting that anomie is inversely prOportional to the
degree of social cohesion.27 Suppose also that culture-wide
quantifications of cohesion were obtained and that they
bore this out. This law might then be eXplained by a more
general law connecting indexes of social interaction in
later life with indexes of social interaction in the first
10 years of life. The law being something to the effect
that relative degrees of early interaction are connected
with a necessary degree of adult interaction. If these
interaction levels are diaparate the social consequences
are manifest as suicide or some anomic equivalent. Frankly
we do not know of any such law, but it is certainly clear
that if we had one such as this it would serve as an ex-
planation of Durkheim's law. Or taking Michel's theory

of democratic organization we notice that the author himself
provides the wider regularity by noting that the abrogation

of perogative to a leader rests finally upon an even wider

67
econonic basis: that once in power social differentiation
and status conSiderations tend to pervert the purpose of
organization. 50 we might say that some form of the Marxian
situation is the more general theory used to explain Michel's
position. Some economists often try to explain the laws
of business cycles by reversion to psychological states of

the individual actors.28

Institutional economists are often

concerned with similar types of explanations resulting from

the engulfing normative structure in which economic rela-

tions develop. Social psychology may be regarded as largely

concerned with attempting to frame a series of laws that

explain the laws of large scale institutional analysis,

though many sociologists have their fingers in both pies

and it is not always obvious that they are conducting a

dual study.29
Such considerations incidentally provide additional

information on the nature of ”reductionism”.30 Legitimate

"reduction” occurs in science when we explain one set

of laws (with their specialized conceptual basis) by another

set of laws (with a wider conceptual basis). Nothing is

wrong with this procedure. In fact it is what we mean when

we talk of the empirical ”unification of science”. Empirical

scientific unification envisages a situation in which all

the special sciences arrange themselves within a hierarchy

of deductive relations constituting our knowledge of the

world. This goal has not been achieved yet but it is one

68

which science entertains as a hoped for goal. It should
be distinguished from the ”formal unification" of science
which is what we have been discussing and is a matter of

fact. All science has the same ormrl structure; the

 

methodological "language" of science is uniform. And it
therefore makes sense to speak of reductionism as legiti-
mate within the formal unity of science. Reductionism is
spurious and pernicious insofar as it empirically suggests
but cannot attain the derivation of one branch of science
from another. In other words what is generally labeled
reductionism in the nefarious sense cf the term denotes
any attempt to explain the laws of one science by an in-
adequate theory from another. The meaning of reductionism
in this latter sense is the same as that we apply to any
unconfirmed theory.31

Therefore if we adequately explain events we do so by
subsuming them under laws, and in the weaker or conceptual
sense by subsumption under class terms. Laws themselves
are explained by subsumption under more general laws. And
these laws must be true or we are ”reducing" in the spurious
sense of the term. Finally in any science we eventually
hope to attain the most general laws of that science and
our explanation stops. The "most general" laws of any
science are relative of course to time and place, for they
may be replaced by still more general laws at some other

time or place. Nevertheless scientific eXplanation does

69
cease somewhere at any particular time. This does not mean
that there is something faulty about it, er as Whitehead
rather foolishly maintains, that it shows the world to be at
bottom ”irrational and arbitrary”.32 To ask of science,
that is, of eXplanation more than it ever offered is a
childish response to the necessities of logical analysis.

In summary we notice that our rather simplified model
follows the H-0 paradigm closely. To explain events we
either confer upon them class membership by conceptual
placement or we deduce them by employing initial conditions,
general laws, and appropriate formal manipulations. Such
deductions constitute the traditional basis for the dis-
tinction that exists between description and explanation.

To then explain laws we deduce them from still more general
laws. We have mentioned the fact that the term ”law" and
”generalization” are closely related. Since these notions
are not, as commonly used, construed as referring to the
same thing, and since we will find some use for this dis-
tinction it is important that we now distinguish the grounds
upon which this difference of usage rests. R. B. Braithwaite
in his extremely important full scale study of scientific
explanation has hit upon what seems to be the basic differ-
ence. A generalization is a statement of the form ”Every

A is B” where the gyidgngg for this statement is instanges

iny. 'A law statement is of the form ”Every A is B“ where

this statement is dgdpggd £39m.alg§nergliga§ion gs_n§;l a3

7O
Ming W m stand £91; .11. Thus every inductive
generalization such as ”All crows are black" has instances
standing for it. Perhaps one has seen 500 black crows and
then inductively infers that ”All crows are black”. That
is, there are 500 instances standing as verification for
this induction. Now suppose we discover the following more
general law (which so far as we can tell is not true but
still will serve to indicate our point) "Every bird that
evolves in dark coniferous forest conditions will be black”.
For it we also have instances supposedly garnered from in-
specting coniferous forest faunas. However it is now clear
that from this more general proposition we can deduce the
less general law that ”All crows are black” by the addition
of the premise: ”Crows evolved in coniferous forests". The
latter we take to be a law; the former we take to be a ”mere”
generalization. And the reason we do so is because we feel
that the ”law” is more fully confirmed; not only does it
have instances substantiating it but it is deduced from a
generalization which itself has instances.33

We have mentioned the requirement of coherence in

empirical science and we now see more clearly what this
amounts to. The criterion states that laws in empirical
science are mutually reinforcing, and for them to be mutually
reinforcing or coherent they must either be the highest
level law of that science from which deductions can be made

to lower level laws, or such laws must be deductive conse-

71
quences from some higher level law. It takes only a moments
reflection to see that coherence is really only another way
of stating a highly valued goal of science: that the laws
of science--and eventually all science conceived as the
totality of knowledge--should come to form vast pyrmidal
hypothetical-deductive systems. At the top occur the most
general laws, at the bottom the least general (often referred
to as common sense statements). The entire structure is
related logically by the rules of deductive inference, it
is related empirically by the criterion of verification.

Finally we come to the question of theories in the
strict sense. Theories actually form the final pinion of
scientific explanation and we must say a word about them.
At the highest level they are what "explain" laws in the
strict sense. However, as we suggested they are not the
only entities that explain laws. Laws are legitimately
eXplained by more general laws. But in some advanced areas
of science-~though not all sciences--theories are construc-
ted which perform the explanatory-~subsumptive--task.
Strictly Speaking the work "theory” should be reserved for
a very special sort of construct in science. Theoretical
terms have traditionally been recognized as suCh: ion,
atom, wave-function, gene, energy-levels, organizers, libido,
instinct, etc. One thing we note about theoretical terms
is that none of them are simple observables. All require

that we observe imputed effects of their operation. This

72

fact has given rise to a full scale controversy as to the
"ontological status of theoretical entities” out of which,
in part, grew the precept that meaningfulness was related
to testibility, at least in principle. As it turned out
the ”in principle” restriction came to mean either ”until
we have the technical mean to perform the test” as in the
case of the ”other side of the moon”; or it came to mean
contextual confirmation, as in the case of theoretical
entities. By contextual confirmation we mean that while
we may never be able to confirm a true theory by direct
observation we can confirm deductions from that theory.
Also we can say, with Braithwaite, that the meaning of
theoretical terms derives from their context in a theory.
Nevertheless the problem is extremely involved and requires
considerably more Space than is available in a study such
as this. Richard Bevan Braithwaite's Splendid analysis
(often cited in this thesis) of theories in his book
figlentiflig.§xplanatign will prove an admirable guide.

We have suggested these considerations because even a
thumbnail sketch of the ”logic of explanation” must at
least mention the role of theories. Nevertheless for our
purposes we do not need to draw upon any more difficult an
explanatory entity than the Hempel-Oppenheim paradigm of

laws in scientific explanation that we have outlined

73
Teleologicgl Systems gpg,2h§;§ Analysis

In our presentation of the various classes of motiva-
tional theories we found that at least one of them involved
some mention of teleological and functional concerns. And
in the discussion of "non-motivated purposive systems" we
also saw that the concepts ”motive", ”purpose”, ”function”
were interchangeable. We must now provide ourselves with
a schema which analyzes the systems to which such concepts
refer.

There exists today several alternative analyses that
deal with teleological or directively organized systems.
Some of these analyzes are of a fairly low degree of ab-
straction. They attempt to discuss actual systems, biological,
physical, social in terms of fairly concrete elements. They
attempt to show what it is about such systems that makes
us think of them as purposive or teleological and how this
is to be understood in terms of empirical science. On the
other hand there is a fairly large number of logical con-
structions whose aim is not to examine the structure of
any particular system but to ascertain the general character-
istics common to all such systems. In short such attempts
analyze teleology in terms of logical variables; and it
is of course the nature of such variables that they may
take any number of concrete constants as long as they ful-
fill the general requirements of that variable.

It is in particular the latter sort of analysis that

7n
interests us in our discussion of teleological systems;
for if we can understand the abstract logical relations
involved in teleological systems then we can evaluate
teleological claims to ascertain whether or not they possess
characteristics unique to such systems. The amount of
interest aroused by the modern analysis of teleology is
impressive, and before we attempt to present the logical
structure of such systems shorn of all concrete reference
we may at least mention a few of the more prominent writers
in this field and the basic position they occupy. As a
matter of fact it is useful in examining the question of
teleological systems and teleological explanation to
approach it in terms of increasing abstractness. After
this very brief review of major investigators of teleological
and (by the same token) functional systems, we will then
examine in detail the fully formalized conceptions of
Ernest Nagel.

Among the major writers in this field an early investi-
gator who did more to illustrate the nature of such systems
than to analyze them was Walter Cannon, author of the
theory of "homeostasis” the import of which was to show
the complex self-regulative effect of physiological organ
systems.3u Today modern physical science eXponents include
Norbert Wiener, Julian Bigelow, and Arturo Rosenbleuth and
the theory of control systems or cybernetics.35 These

authors and their followers are interested in establishing

75
analogies that will amount to homologies between self-
regulative or self-controlling biological systems and
certain fundamental physical or mechanical devices such as
error-correcting computers and so forth. The most general-
ized notions to which they attain however are essentially
those of universal physical laws (entrOpy or the second law
of thermodynamics) and not formal analysis. These con-
ceptions hinge upon a construal of life systems as revers-
ing the second law by employing part of the energy of a
system to control the system.36 Jacob Bronowski folloWs
in the same vein with his analysis of computer machines and
"science as foresight”.37 Again his analysis rests upon
either biological categories or very general physical prin-
ciples.

Two writers partially bridge the gap between concrete
analysis and formal systems. G. Sommerhoff, a mathe-
matician, is concerned with certain types of variables and
the notion of self-regulative or purposive behavior. In
part his study is biologically orientated, but in part it
suggests the possibility of general, abstract conceptions
that may be handled by the notations of formal mathematics.38
More detailed and more sophisticated is the analysis of
Ross Ashby.39 We encounter here purely formal presenta-
tion which is illufiprated'by reference to biological analogies
(the homostat). Two other authors do achieve the stripped

abstract system we seek. By so doing they demonstrate the

76
n§g§§§g3y_foundations involved in such systems and disallow
the possibility of confusion often suggested by assuming
that what holds for biological systems need not hold for
social systems and what holds for social systems need not
hold for adaptive machines. In this connection we mention
again the work of Braithwaite and his study of ”variancy
systems”40 and finally the intensive investigations carried
on by Ernest Nagel in directively-organized systems, tele-
ology, and the formalization of functionalism]+1

It would be impossible and unnecessary to expand each
of these positions in the space available without distorting
the intention of the present investigation. In addition
to the men that we have mentioned there are of course many
other investigators in this field. But at this point it
seems most fruitful to develOp the conceptions of Ernest
Nagel rather fully for they provide us with the soundest
foundation for discussing the implications of such systems.

The reader's indulgence is requested regarding the
length of the following quotations from Nagel's article
Tglgologigal Explazgtigp angbgeleplggigal,fiyfitems. While
it may seem unduly long it will prove far shorter than any
attempt to render it in non-technical terms. Teleological
considerations are not the least difficult of the perplex-
ing problems of science, nor is their analysis the most
simple. The already dense nature of Nagel's prose frankly

belies further condensation as the reader will see. We

77

begin with a general characterization cf teleological
systems in which certain complicating features have not
been introduced. These features will be introduced after
the general presentation.

"With the homestasis of the temperature of the human
body before us as an exemplar, let us now state in general
terms the structure of systems which have a goal-directed
organization. The characteristic feature of such systems
'is that they continue to manifest a certain state or property
G, or to develOp ' in the direction' of attaining G, in the
face of aIeLatively extensive class of changes in their
ekternal environments or in some of their internal parts-—
changes which, if not compensated by internal modifications
in the system, would result in the vanishing of G or in an
altered direction of development. This feature can be
formulated more precisely though schematically as follows.

Let S be some system, E its external environment, and G
some state or prOperty which S possesses or is capable of
possessing under suitable conditions. Assume for the
moment—-this assumption will presently be relaxed--that E
remains constant in all relevant respects, so that its
influence upon S can be ignored. Suppose also that S
is analyzable into a structure of parts, such that the
activities of a certain number of them are casually relevant
for the occurnxme of G. For the sake of simplicity,
assume that there are just three such parts, the state of
each of which at any time can be Specified by a determinate
form of the complex predicates "A", "B", and "C", respec-
tively; numerical subscripts will serve as indicators of
such determinate forms. Accordingly, the state of S at
any time causally relevant to G will be expressed by
Specializations of the matrix "(A ByCz)". One further
general assumption must now be made eXplicit. Each of these
state-variables (they are not necessarily numerical variables)
can be assigned any determinate values that are compatible

78

with the known character of the part of S whose state it
Specifies. In effect, therefore, the states which can be
values of ”A 9 must fall into a certain class K ; and there
are corresponding classes K, and K for the other two state
variables. The reason for, his restriction will be clear
from an example. If S is a human body, and ”A " states the
degree of dilation of peripheral blood-vessels, it is ob-
vious that this degree cannot exceed some maximum value;

for it would be absurd to suppose that a blood-vessel could
acquire a mean diameter of, say, five feet. On the other
hand, the possible values of one state-variable at a given
time will be assumed to be independent of the possible
values of the state variables at the same time. Accordingly
any combination of values of the state variables will be a
permissable Specialization of the matrix «AXE CZ)”, provided
that the values of each variable belong to thg classes K ,
KB, and KC respectively. This is tantamount to saying t at
the state variables which are stipulated to be causally
relevant to G are so postulated as to be capable of having

values at a given time which are mutually independent of
one another.

Suppose now that if S is in the state (AOBOCO) at
some given time, then 8 either has the property G, or else
a sequence of changes will take place in S in consequence
of which 8 will possess G at some subsequent time. Call
such an initial state of S a ”casually effective state with
respect to G”, or a ”G-state”_for short. Not every possible
state of S need be a G-State: for one of the causally
relevant parts of 8 may be in such a state at a given
time, that no combination of possible states of the other
parts will yield a G-State for S. Thus, suppose that S
is the human body, G the property of having an internal
temperature lying in the range of 97° to 99° F, Ax again
the state of peripheral blood-vessels, and B the state
of the thyroid glands; it may happen that B assumes a
value (e.g., corresponding to acute hyperactiVity) such
that for no possible value of Ax will G be realized. It
is also conceivable that no possible state of S is a G-
state, so that in fact G is never realized in S. For
example, if S is the human body and G the property of
having an internal temperature lying in the range 150° to
1600 F, then there is no G-state for S. On the other hand,
more than one possible state of S may be a G-state, though
only one of them will be actual at a given time; but if
there is more than one possible G-state, we shall assume
that the one which is realized at a given time is uniquely
determined by the actual state of S at some previous time.
In short, we are assuming that S is a deterministic system
with reSpect to the occurmnua of G-states. The case in
which there is more than one possible G-State for S is of

79

particular relevance to the present discussion, and we must
now consider it more closely."“2

We now have a general characterization of the major
assumptions and a simplified system. What we need is to
gradually complicate this scheme so that it will be able
to handle the complex Systems that actually occur (biological,
social, physical); also it will be necessary to relax some
of the earlier assumptions. What we want in other words is
to arrive at a system that can make compensations for a
series of internal and eventually external changes--boundary
maintaining systems, as Parson's would have it. Nagel con-

tinues as follows:

”Assume again that at some time t 0, S is in the G-state
(A 00BOC ). But suppose now that a change occurs in S so
that in consequence A is caused to vary, and that at time
t1 subsequent to tO tge state variable ”. “ has some other
value. Which value it will have at t wi l depend on the
particular changes that have occured n S. We Shall assume,
however, that there is a range of possible changes, and
that the values which "Ax " may have at time t fall into
some class K'A (a sub- class of KA) which contains more
than one member. To fix our ideas, suppose that Al and
A are the members of K'A; and assume further that neither
(Elsoco) nor (AB. cg) nor (A a c ) is a G-state--that is,
a variation in 3% lone would gage S out of a G-State.
Accordingly,.if the changes mentioned thus far were the only
changes in the state of S, S would no longer be in a G-state
at time t1. Let us, however, make the contrary assumption.
Assume S to be so constituted that if A is caused to vary
so that the value of "Ax” at time t1 falls into K' there
will also be further compensatory changes in the vélues of
some or all of the other state variables. More specifically,
these further changes are stipulated to be of the following
kind: if K' H is the class of sets of values which "By " and
”C ” have at ime t1, then for each value of "AX ” in Ky
there is a unique set in K' such that S continues to Se
in a G-state at time t1;b M? these further changes un—
accompanied by the first mentioned ones would take S out
of a G-state--that is, if at time t1 the state variables

80
of S have a set of values such that two of them belong to
a set in K'JC while the remaining one is not the corres-
ponding memger of K' , then S is not a G-State. For
example, suppose tha if A is changed into A , the initial
G-state (AOBOCO) is changed into the G-state AlBlCl) with
(A B101) not a G-State; and if A0 is changed into A , the
initial G-state is changed into the G-state (A B10 , with
(AOBlcO) not a G-state. In this example, K'A is tge class
(A1A2), and K'BC the class of sets ((Bl, Cl), (B , C9a)’
with Al corresponding to (31,01) and A2 Lg,(Bl, & ). 3

We now have all of the elements of our system and a
Specification of the Specializations that they may take.
The system elements and sub-elements may be elaborated
to any degree of complexity that is desired; the degree
depending mainly upon the complexity of the system under
consideration and the complexity of the "end” or "goal"
or simply ”event” that must be explained. As the system
stands it is not, perhaps, obvious how it is to be applied.
For this we need some definitions based upon the purely
formal aspects and a Slight further complication. In so
doing we will see how it comes to grips with actual prob-
lems of directively-organized Systems and how an explication
of teleological terms is possible without recourse to non-
empirical entities or to any conception not developed in
the "logic of explanation". Nagel continues:

”We now introduce some definitions, based upon the
above discussion. Assume S to be a system satisfying the
following conditions: 1) S can be analyzed into a struc-
ture of parts, a certain number of which (say three) are
causally relevant to the occurrence in S of some property
or feature G; and the causally relevant state of S at any
time can be specified by means of a set of state-variables.

These state-variables at any given time can be assigned
values independently of each other, though the possible

81

values of each variable are restricted to some class of
values. 2) If S is in a G-state at some time t during
period T, and a variation occurs in one of the state para-
meters (say ”A") such that this variation alone would take

S out of its G-state, then the possible values of this
parameter at time t1 subsequent to tO but still in T fall
into a certain class K'A. Call this variation a "primary
variation" in S. 3) If the state parameter "A" varies in
the indicated manner, then the remaining parameters also
vary so that their variation alone would take S out of its
G-State, and so that their possible values at time t1 con-
stitute sets belonging to a class K' . h) The elements of
K'A and K'BC correspond to each other in a uniquely recipro-A
cal fashion, such that when the state of S is Specified by
these corresponding values S is in a G—state at time t1.
Call the variations in S which are represented by the members
of K'BC the ”adaptive" variations in relation to the vari-
ations represented by members of K' . When these assump-
tions hold for S, the parts of S that are causally relevant
to G will be said to be "directively organized", if the
reference to T and G can be taken for granted. This defini-
tion can be easily generalized for a larger number of state-
variables, and for the primary variation of more than one
state-variable; but the present incompletely general de-
finition will suffice for our purposes.

”It will be clear from this account that if S is
directively organized, the persistence of G is in a certain
sense independent of the variations (up to a point) in any
one of the causally relevant parts of S. For although it
is the state of these parts which by hypotheses determine
the occurence of G, an altered state in one of them may be
compensated by altered states in the other parts of S so
as to preserve S in its G-state. The structure or char-
acter of so-called "teleological” systems is therefore
expressed by the indicated conditions for a directively
organized system; and these conditions can be stated, as
we have seen, in a manner not requiring the adoption of

teleology as a fundamental or unanalyzed category. What

82

may be called the "degree of directive organization" of a
system, can also be made eXplicit in terms of the above
analysis. For the property G is maintained in S (or S
persists in its deveIOpment which eventuates in G) to the
extent that the range of K'A of possible primary variations
is associated with the range of induced compensatory changes
K'BC such that S is preserved in its G-state. The more
inclusive the range of K'A that is associated with such
compensatory changes, the more is the persistence of G,
independent of variations in the state of S. Accordingly,
on the assumption that it is possible to Specify a measure
fOr the range K'BC the ”degree of directive organization”
of S with respect to variations in the state-parameter A
can be defined as the measure of this ranged",+4

We now see, as McCulloch has put it,“5 what the em-
prical significance of "purpose" or ”directive-organization"
in systems amounts to, and we have seen that the nature of
such systems does not involve us in any unique or unanalyzable
categories. It remains only to relax the restriction that
Nagel placed on the environmental (E) phenomenon for the
purposes of exposition to give the full picture of such
systems. Functionalism should now appear as a variant in
the vocabulary of teleological systems; the W
helps that the. W W stresses ease am
flhggh,element§ 22’systemg cgptpibute; fpngtiopa; yggapur
MMM new em t mwtem mammalian

83
§h§§§_§nd§,(in Nagel's scheme the state—variables and classes
of values they may take). Functionalism also will be elu-
cidated by relaxing the environmental restriction. Nagel
concludes the formal analysis thusly:

”We may now relax the assumption that the external
environment has no influence upon S. But in dropping this
assumption we merely complicate the analysis, without intro-
ducing anything novel into it. For suppose that there is
some factor in E which is causally relevant to the occurrence
of'G in S, and whose state at any time can be Specified by
some determinate form of the state-variables "EN”. Then
the state of the system S' (which includes both S and E)
that is casually relevant to the occurrence of G in S is
Specified by some determinate form of the matrix "(AxByCZFw)";
and the discussion proceeds as before. However, it is gen-
erally not the case that a variation in any of the internal
parts of S produces any significant variation in the en-
vironmental factors. What usually is the case is that the
latter vary quite independently of the former; that they
do not undergo changes which compensate for changes in the
state of S; and that while a limited range of changes in
them may be compensated by changes in S so as to preserve
S in some G-state, most of the states which environmental
factors are capable of assuming cannot be so compensated by
changes in S. It is customary, therefore, to talk of the

"degree of plasticity” or the "degree of adaptability” of

84

organic systems in relation to their environment, and not
conversely. However, it is possible to define these notions
without reference to organic systems in particular, in a
manner analOgous to the definition of “degree of directive
organization" already suggested. Thus suppose that the
variations in the environmental state F, compensated by
changes in S so as to preserve S in some G-state, all fall

into the class K' ; then if a measure for this class is

:11

available, the "degree of plasticity" of S with respect to
G in relation to F can be defined as the measure of K'F'HLL6

We have now seen the formal structure of directively-
organized systems and we have sampled a few implications of
such analysis. It should be clear that it is of no impor-
tance how the empirical construal or application of these
formal relations is spelled-out, the particular mechanisms
that may be biologically involved or socially required are
of importance only in the concrete applications of the
scheme.

But we must now note an important point, mainly that
it is only our parochalism that confers upon such systems
whatever priviledged status they possess. It makes as much
sense to employ teleological or functional vocabularies as
to avoid them in favor of a non-teleological physicalist
vocabulary. For understood in Nagel's terms there is nothing
that ultimately separates the two phenomena except our

particular focus and point of interest. One might quite

85
truly say why look upon a kitten, for instance, as a Special
sort of system different from the world around it. Consider
the atoms and molecules and compounds that comprise the
animal and we are forced to concede that from this point of
view nothing in fact separates the "kitten" complex of matter
from any other complex of matter. Besides, when does the
"food" or the "oxygen" it requires cease to become ”food"
and "air" and start to become "kitten" and vice versa with
the waste products of the "kitten". From one perspective
there are simply a series of lawful occurences which explain
the events in question. There are no "natural" entities in
the world just as there are no "uh—natural” entities. In
short, functional systems, purposive system, motivated systems
--all of them rest upon a focus of attention and, in the
last analysis, upon parochalism in the perspectives that we
as selective (i.e., valuing) creatures entertain. They are
inevitably tied up with what we are interested in and cannot
be dissociated from it.”7 It is much like asking whether
for a fox living in settled farm country there are any’hon-
natural" objects.

Such systems employ a vocabulary that is acceptable if
prOperly eXplicated, but which must not carry the traditional
overtones of hidden "push mechanisms" or "unique properties
not found outside such systems". This suggests that there
is good reason for dropping such an idiom; it adds nothing

new to the discussion of systems and it is often guilty of

86
confusion. It dqgg make sense to talk of the function that
a stream has in the degradation of a mountain system, or the
functions of degradation generally, but then all that we find
ourselves affirming in this rather peculiar usage is that
there is a general law stating an invariancy to exist between
running water and steep gradients on the one hand, and the
process of erosion on the other. Thus too, we may say that
the function of the lungs is to oxygenate the blood and re-
move C02. We might even say rather loosely that the purpose
of the lungs is to do this. But how much less confusing it
would be to say that there is a general law stating a regular-
ity of conjunction between lungs and oxygenation-C02 levels.
In short, our explication of the entire functional or tele-
ological conception is indicative of the redundancy of such
systems at best and their confusing and metaphysical sugges-
tiveness they confer at worst. Let us review these findings
now in a more precise and detailed manner.

1-

, ragel's scheme is neutral as regards the partic-

’11
E

ular mechanism that will be employed in the empirical analysis
of a particular system. The vocabulary may be biolOgical,

or it may be physical or social. We should eXpect that ”S"

in a biOIOgical system would be an organism or complex of
organisms (biota), ”E" to be the geographical and climatic
conditions or the internal body chemistry, and "G" the
property or state of food getting, searching behavior,

maintenance of internal temperature, reproduction, and so

87

on. In the case of a physical system "S" would comprise,
for example, a thermostatic control system, "E” the variations
of temperature in a furnace or home, and "G" the prOperty
or state of maintaining constant temperature. Finally in
the case of social systems or sub-systems (S) we might have
an environment (E) consisting of a threatening "external
proletariat" or a new system of warfare (the phalanx or the
British Square), and the property of continuance (G) repre-
senting the persistence of S system, or more specifically:
maintainance of political authority by effective monopoly
of the means of force. In short, with regard to this first
point Nagel has achieved the goal of formal analysis by pro-
viding us with a system of abstract variables into which we
may "plug" any and every concrete aSpect of a teleological
or functional system--be that system social, biological, or
physical.

Sggppd, the system he develops is so abstractly general
that it seems to suggest that it may be applied to almost
any system whether or not it is usually considered teleological
or functional. To this Nagel would answer a qualified yes.
The distinctions that most writers have maintained are
supposed to divide such systems from the rest of the physical
world (the world of ”mere events") appear to be so vague and
imprecise that if there is something that universally differ-
entiates between teleological and functional systems on the

one hand and non-teleological systems on the other it remains

88

to be demonstrated. Nagel has Shown what the claims of
such writers can be meaningfully said to consist, if there
is more to it than this it remains for the claimants to
specify.

Inipd, it appears that from time to time what was once
considered teleological or functional is re-classified
into non-teleological categories. "Nature abhors a vacuum"
and the doctrine that physical objects "sought their own
levels” were once laws of science; it was obviously teleological
to talk in this manner. We now classify such statements as
simply general law formulations. The same Shift has, as we
suggested, occurnfl in biological science since Darwin. AS
science advances it seems to steadily eschew such usage
though as we have seen there is nothing ultimately wrong
with maintaining the older vocabulary as long as it is
explicated.

Fggzth, while the trend of science has been in the
direction of law statements the system developed by Nagel
does have the virtue, of conceptualizing features that seem
to have been on men's minds when they first suggested tele-
ological explanations. Not every system possesses teleological
features in an obvious manner, that is, not every system
invites--however adequate—-the use of teleological terms.

And the qualified yes that Nagel gave to question #2 suggests
that some do not possess them at all. Nagel notes that

an oscillating pendulum may be thought of as a teleological

89

system even if it is seldom so considered. The harmonic
oscillations of the pendulum are related to the gust of wind
that moves the pendulum originally. Nevertheless, the gust
of wind (force) ”E” and the oscillations of the pendulum
”G” are ppt_independent of one another, as is the external
temperature and the human body temperature, but instead are
causally related. Yet in a more subtle sense this is also
so for the homeostasis of temperature beygnd a geptaip
pplnp; it is the relative complexity, and the point of
interest that seems to produce the necessary "opaqueness"
leading to the imputation of purpose—~and motives--in such
systems. Nagel's scheme at least has the value of formal-
izing the pragmatic, if not absolute, difference.

EAjLLJ the reason then that teleological eXplanations
persist is asNagel suggests, because "teleological explana-
tions focus attention on the culminations and products of
Specific processes, and upon the contributions of parts of
a system to its maintenance. They view the Operations of
things from the perspective of certain selected wholes to
which the things belong; and they are therefore concerned
with prOperties of parts of such wholes only in so far as
these prOperties are relevant to some complex features or
activities assumed as characteristic for those wholes. Non-
teleological explanations, on the other hand, place chief
emphasis on certain conditions under which specific pro-

cesses are initiated and persist, and on the factors upon

90
which the continued Operations Of given systems are contin-
gent. They represent the inclusive behavior of a thing as
the Operation Of certain selected constituents into which
the thing is analyzable; and they are therefore concerned
with features that are related to the assumed characteristis
of those constituents. The difference between teleological
and non-teleological explanations, as already suggested is
one of emphasis and perSpective in formulationflfl8

Sixth, our final point is that the criticism that in-
vestigators focus on "wholes" or teleological systens in
spite Of the fact that they are now known to be without in-
dependent status, and that therefore such investigations are
redundant, turns out to be a two edged sword. It is true
that there is no inherent terminus in events. As Nagel
SHggests white blood cells are parts Of the system ”blood
stream", Of the system "human body", and Of the ”solar system",
as well as the universe. There is no arbitrary reason that
one should be judged any more "natural” or "real" than an-
other, therefore the focus upon "wholes" or "culminations"
'Or ”ends” does seem pointless. But says Nagel this is too
strong a position, for just as there are no inherent termini
in nature so there exist no reason that any particular seg-
ment may not be studied. Human beings may dictate according
tO interest and value what will be studied and how the cake
of the universe will be sliced, but this is neither true or

false since values are never true or false. The laws so

91
formulated are true or false but the entities and interests,
the subjects we choose to investigate are simply given by
our particular focus of attention. Thus we may decide to
study the system labeled "white oak tree" but we might as
well have settled on the system "passage of water molecules
x, y, x, in the water cycle”. In this latter case we might
have found that molecules x,y,x, passed into the root hairs
of the system, which for other purposes, we choose to label
"white oak tree" and that after moving up through the bole
they passed out into the air through the stomata of the oak
leaf. From there they formed into a cloud and rained upon
the earth. Either system is legitimate, there are no "nat-
ural entities" and apparently no limit to independent vari-
ation.

And what we have said regarding teleological or adaptive
systems goes equally and co-extensively for functional theory
and functional analysis. Functional analysis is, as we have
suggested, merely a variant of the gauze. It is sometimes
held that functional analysis is a theory, or at least that
it is a perspective in terms Of which one theorizes. It is
of course nothing of the kind. As our analysis has shown
it is a sort of double edged bias; human interest (culturally
defined) and the purpose Of investigation (also culturally
defined) bid us select this and not that as a unit of study,

by convention we adopt a functional vocabulary and for no

other reason. Functionalism is simply another way of talking

92
about statements of law. It places the "functional theorist"
in the strange and rather embanassing position of promul-
gating a ”theory" or "perspective" which states that the
scientist is interested in discovering lawful regularities
in society and biology. While this cannot be denied it is
certainly no news. However when a functional investigation
spells out spegifiig connections Of a functional nature in a
society or in an organism then we have something of scientific
worth to consider, not merely a statement Of one of the
goals Of science. Example: if the biologist suggests that
biological systems are functional systems or if the sociOlOgist
or anthropologist suggests that the proper theory of society
and culture is a functional theory then he is merely assert-
ing that we must seek lawful connections probably extant in
such systems. This of course is the leading proviso Of
science, that the world is not mere chaos. To make such a
statement is not to utter nonsense but is certainly program-
matic in terms of an ideal that has been around for several
centuries and should stir no emotion. On the other hand to
state that the function of the liver is to maintain proper
blood chemistry, or that the function of ideology is to
legitimize power is to make a substantive claim. But this
claim may as well be made in the more generalized language
Of scientific explanation, mainly law statements. That is,
we assert a law to the effect that "if the liver is in prOper

working order the blood will maintain a constant property"

93
or ”if a position Of power is to be maintained there must
be a legitimating ideology”. Presented in these terms there
is no chance of mistaking the import Of the claim. There
is no chance of imputing Special characteristics or "entele-
chies” to directively-organized systems. Nevertheless if
we are clear as to our claims we may employ the idiom Of
teleology in explaining any system, for such vocabularies
are translatable, that is tantamount, to generalized concept-
ions eXplicated in the previous section on the "logic of
explanation”. And this is important: many disciplines es-
pecially sociology and anthropology are apparently convinced
that such perspectives add something to our knowledge. As
we have shown they do not. We do not wish to deplete the
vocabulary of these sciences as long as they recognize the
ultimate poverty Of such conceptions.

One final comment remains to be made. Systems investi-
gated by scientists such as individual organisms, species,
societies, and cultures come into and go out of existence.
It may seem puzzling that the teleological regularities
found in such systems should be universally translatable
into law statements. The reason why this may seem puzzling
is that supposedly laws are universal and true, which means
true here, now, and always. Does it not seem strange, then,
that the regularities Of laws of a society should come into
existence and pass out of existence as that society comes

into and passes out of being? It may seem so at first but

9a
in fact there is no problem. Zilsel has noted that laws to
be laws need only hold so long as the systems to which they
apply exist.”9 Ten to the tenth power years ago astronomers
tell us that there were nO solid bodies in the universe,
clearly then there existed no laws of solid bodies. If
again the bodies that make up the universe should become
gaseous there would be no laws of solid bodies. This does
not mean that while in existence the laws were not genuine.
It merely suggests a fact about the systems to which we apply
laws. Laws, to be laws need hold only so long as the systems
to which they apply exist. The situation is identical for
social and biological systems.

In closing we may review our findings in Part II. We
have presented an outline sketch of the foundation of modern
science as elucidated by modern analysis. We first investi-
gated the "logic of explanation". We fornd such a "logic"
to be the basic structure of all science regardless of
specific content and interest. The formulation centered
around the notions of "fact", "concept", "generalization",
"laws”, and "theory"; and we also found that the difference
between eXplanation and prediction was merely a pragmatic
one centering around our purposes at hand. This foundation
included a simplified statement of the criterion of mean-
ing, as science, by its own precept and percept has spelled
it out. To be meaningful in empirical science statements

must be of lawful form capable Of being tested (at least in

95

principle) and coherent within the corpus Of scientific
knowledge. Finally, in this section, we were at pains to
analyze the teleological mode of explanation and the nature
of functional systems. We saw that in doing this we could
draw upon a number Of authors all Of whom fell into one of
two camps: those that thought rather concretely in terms
of particular systems such as organisms, and those that were
primarily interested in the abstract structure of such
systems independent of any particular concrete manifestation.
We spelled out the implications of such analysis and found I
that there was nothing about such systems that could not be
stated in the considerably less loaded language that we
employed in our analysis of the lOgic of eXplanation.

Our final task is to apply these findings to the
construal Of meaning that we developed for our four types

of motivational theory.

96

Our intension in this final section is to deduce the
implications of the two sections that preceded it. We will
try to show how the investigations carried out in Part II
of this thesis help us to evaluate the general claims of
motivational theories. /In doing this we hOpe to clear away
some of the-ambiguity and vagueness that has surrounded
motivational theories in the past. Put in a study such as
this we cannot expect to come up with final answers on
questions of motivation; what we can expect is that we may
emerge with a clearer idea Of what is involved when an
author prOposes a motivational theory and just what it is
that such a theory may be expected to do. If that much is
accomplished then our goal will have been reached.

Taking our first class of motivational theories what
can we say about them on the basis of the second part of this
thesis? Using a concrete example it is clear that such a
theory of global correlation as, for instance, A. L. Kroeber's
theory of "labile structure" (Discussed on page 8) is not
necessarily a motivational theory at all. That is, global
correlations such as this are really statements Of general
law connecting two conceptual areas of eXperience: that
dealing with social and cultural change and that dealing
with the "play impulse". "Change" and "play impulse" are
concepts as we understand them in this theory they have been

tentatively linked in the manner indicated by the Hempel-

97
Oppenheim paradigm of scientific explanation. Such a linkage

amounts to a statement of general law and need not mention
motivations at all. It is however the case that the motiva-
tional vocabulary employed in discussing global correlations
(as in Burke's case) is legitimate if one understands pre-
cisely what is meant by it. There is no necessary reason
why the vocabulary developed in the explication Of scientific
explanation should triumph over that of motivational cate-
gories. One problem that it does create however is that in
using motivational categories in place of law categories
(When discussing such theories) the theorist Offers the
possibility of mistaken identity. It is often the case

that the mere use Of such a vocabulary is instrumental in
suggesting that there is something else, something besides
the simple conjunctions Of concepts into lawful form. This
something §l§§,is, it seems to us, responsible for much of
the nonsense that surrounds motivational thinking. Speak-
ing loosely, when we ask for the motives that compel social
action we tend to think of them as inside the action pushing
or driving him onward--Foote's "predispositions"--or we
think of them as being external forces operating in the

same manner: both types have representatives as we have
seen in the theories Of global correlation. But to ask

such questions is Often to create spurious problems. As

scientists all we are legitimately interested in is pre-

_§1Qt1ng and explaining hUman behavior; and to predict and

93
explain such behavior all that is necessary is that individual
instances Of it be subsumed. under general laws, for this
is what is meant by an explanation or prediction. Instead,
to lead the chase after "forces" or "internal compulsions"
is to miss the point completely unless all that is maintained
by the use of such terms amounts tO an alternative rendering
of the vocabulary we have develOped. The fact that this is
ng1,always what is meant, and the fact that much of the
general quest for motivational theories originates in a
search for this ”something else" is no better seen than in
the following passage from Kenneth Burke: "It is not our
purpose to import dialectical and metaphysical concerns into
a subject that might otherwise be free of them. On the
contrary, we hOpe to make clear the ways in which dialectical
and metaphysical issues necgssagily,figure in the subject
of motivation. Our speculations, as we interpret them,
should show that the subject of motivations is a philosophic
one, not ultimately to be solved in terms of empirical
science".5O

Such a passage as this suggests something about the
nature of motivational theory in general, especially as
regards theories of global correlation. It suggests that
since there have been so many motivational theories, perhaps
there is p2,theory that is really adequate. Perhaps, in
fact, there is something about motivation that is ultimately

enigmatic. This is suggestive simply because if we look

99

at the tremendous range Of such theories, as Burke has done,
and have seen that no single one is adequate then perhaps
there ig,"something else" going on that is simply part of
the ”nature of man" or ”motivations" and not capable of being
elucidated by empirical science. And even if we do not
care to go as far as Burke would go we still end up asking
the question (from this point of view) "what makes the thing
work?"

But from our perspective one thing is certain, questions
of this sort never arise. What we set out to do is devise
a body of knowledge that will enable us to explain and pre-
dict social action. We do this by means of subsrmuhu; par-
ticular social acts, and even laws governing social acts,
under other laws of wider compass. The question of what
makes the thing work never arises simply because having
established our laws or regularities we have said all there
is to say regarding such action. Such an elimination Of
global correlations by law statements has at least the
advantage of never suggesting more than it states. We
know with some precision what we mean by concepts and
laws in science and they carry few ambiguous and vague over-
tones. The same cannot be said for the motivational theories
of global correlation.

Second, in our schematization of theories of global
correlation we had a category which we labeled "nexus Of

correlation" and which we suggested was really the request--

lOO
whenever it was present in such a theory--for an even more
general correlation. Using the example drawn in the section
from Freud's book Qiyj,liz_ation and m Diagontggpgfl we
first notice that a global correlation was posited between
basic energy and culture. The nexus Of correlation in this
case amounts to an even more general regularity under which
the first correlation may be subsumed. It is on this pciht
that Freud's theory really arouses interest for here he ~ex—
plains" why libido and culture should be correlated at all.
In this case the wider correlation is contained in the
theory of repression and sublimation. Now it is Often the
case in theories of global correlation that more general
correlates are really the key point of interest for the
theorist, but we see here again that a more general corre-
lation is merely a request for a more general law than the
first. It differs in no respect from the structure Of the
first except that it is more general and can subsumed
the former. Thus a linkage is established between frustra-
tion Of energy and its expression in other areas, and from
such a law it is possible to deduce the first law that there
is a correlation between libido and culture.

Incidentally this latter point is important in that it
manifests the distinction between generalizations and laws
as developed in the "logic Of explanation". We see here
an exemplification Of_that distinction: the more general

law has only instances that stand for it (Freud and others

101

supposedly Observed many instances Of frustrated libidinal
energy being subliminated). But a less general law connec-
ting libido to culture not only has instances in its favor
but in addition there is the fact that it is deduced from a
more general law. Such a situation is important in the con-
firmation of such theories for it adds additional evidence
for the lower level correlation.

We see again then that there is nothing said by motiva-
tional theories Of global correlation that is not said by
explicating such theories in terms of the logic of eXplana-
tion. We may ask therefore what our justification is in
calling such theories motivational? Why attach to them a
special category as though they assorted something not
already asserted by a fully explicated methodological
scheme?

Finally, we have said nothing about the empirical con-H
firmation of such theories. Needless to say Freudian
theory and Kroeber's theory of labile structure (for in-
stance) are far from being confirmed by the necessary ob-
servation statements. And this is also so for other theories
of global correlation. Geographic determinism, Sheldon's
theory of somatic types, frontier theory, and so forth are
not theories that commonly attract large scale endorsement
among the knowledgable scientists of the world. This alone
is perhaps enough to indicate that as theories of motivation

they are suspect. But it is not and has not been our concern

102
in this thesis to empirically challenge motivational thought.
It was felt that we can do a more satisfactory Job by demon-
strating certain deficiencies in the methodological apparatus,
in the tyranny of words, and in the area of concept formation.
It may well be that few if any of the global theories can
be confirmed. That is to say that few if any of these
general laws will stand the test of experience. Neverthe-
less if they do it only indicates that we now have a general
law relating to an area which before we ch: not comprehend.
Whether we would still want to call this a motivational
theory is an open question but if we did then it should
carry few if any of the connotations that it possessed in
the past.

When we turn to our second class of theories, those of
identification we find further reason for taking a critical
attitude. In the first place we note that identities are
learned. Foote cites, for instance, the game of baseball
and illustrates what he means by identification by con-
trasting two sorts of teams: a Werld Series team and a
spontaneously formed team that has never played together.
Naturally he notices a difference and he attributes it to
identification. The former team members are identified with
their roles, and the latter are not, this supposedly makes
the difference.

Such a position would seem to make sense until we

examine what the various authors, including Foote, mean by

103
identification. It turns out, as we have suggested, that
identities like any aspect of role behavior are acquired by
learning them; in fact it turns out that to speak of identity
is merely a manner of affirming the performance of role
expectations with “definiteness and force”. Such ”definite-
ness and force” apparently derives from the acquisition of
"eXpertise", which is certainly learned and not mysterious-
ly given. But if identification is learned--by the theorists
own admission--then does it not merely constitute an sepect
of the role in question? Is it not merely the case that
the distinction Foote notes between the two baseball teams
derives from the fact that one team has mastered iusrole
expectations and the other has not: that the World Series
team possess ”definiteness and force" simply because it
knows the game in detail (even to the point of knowing
the idiosyncrasies of the other players) and has acquired
the formal and informal expectations incumbent upon its
members while the other team has not? As to why one group
should do this so much better than another Foote himself
has given the answer when he stressed the limited alterna-
tives available to an actor in society. Some men acquire
role expertise and others do not simply because the life
agiaagions (class, status, values) lead them in one direc-
tion or another. Yet if all identification amounts to is
this acquisition of informal and subtle aSpects of roles

then what has become of identification as a basis for a

104
theory of motivation? To be sure men do acquire such ex-
pertise but is anything gained by calling it a theory of
motivation? After all it is merely an aspect of role, ac—
quired and sustained as roles are acquired and sustained and
there is nothing about it that ”motivates” social action in
any other way than ordinary role behavior.

We are again confronted with the fact that we wish to
explain and predict human behavior and to do this we must
subsume such behavior under general laws. Bole theory--
adequate or not--attempts such a subsumption and all that
Foote, Strauss, Lindesmith, Becker, and Carper have added
to it is to call our attention to certain informal aspects
of role theory that had not apparently been given their Just
preposition. Foote's (et. al.) stressing of these informal
role expectations may be useful and it may even be that we
wish to retain for it the name ”identification“. But what
his statements regarding identification as a basis for a
theory of motivation can mean escapes us.

It would seem that overtly or not Foote and company
have that ”something else" in mind which we mentioned seems
to lurk in the hinterland of most motivational thinking.
What that ”something else” is we do not pretend to know but
it seems to be the sort of thing that has engendered so
many of the typical motivational questions. ”What makes
the thing go” is its prototype and this sort of question

we have seen is without foundation. Nonetheless the attentive

105
reader cannot help but gain the impression from a careful
reading of motivational literature that some additional
thing i§,implied beyond simple law statements. And if this
is so what alternative is there for a theorist but to attempt
to discover it? Half the Job in science is constructing
the right questions. The presumption is very strong that
motivational theorists have not been overly successful at
this endeavor.

Second, there is a point closely related to the first:
what does it mean to explgzn identification itself? To ask
this question is to approach from another angle the error
that Foote seems to embrace. Why are there identities at
all: what is their explanation? To a certain extent Foote
has answered this question in his discussion of the manner
in which social persons acquire new identities but we get
an even better picture from the revealing article of Becker
and Carper that we already mentioned in another context.

The article “The Development of Identification with an
Occupation” reveals in point blank form the manner in which
identities are to be eXplained (the wider regularity under
which they are to be subsumed). As we have noted this
article deals with the acquisition of identity in the role
of university professor. How do Becker and Carper explain
it? Simply by noting the social agencies (institutions)
responsible for the acquisition of appropriate role behavior

(role expertise). They note that ”peer groups” (other graduate

106

students) and "informal groups" (parties, cliques, coffee
discussions) are in part responsible. The student acquires
the norms and eXpectations from them that are requisite to
the future role. Also from the apprentiship situation of
the student with the professors other clues of expected and
expectable behavior are learned. Finally from the formal
academic structure certain over-all and generalized expec-
tations are acquired. But this is merely the point we have
been making: identification far from being a theory of
motivation is a ggnggpt referring to informal aspects of
roles. In many ways identification is the obverse side of
discussions relating to “informal organization“. The wider
generalization or law that Becker and Carper subsum identi-
fication under turns out to be some form of learning theory,
as manifest by the fact that all three areas in which the
incipient academician acquires identity are simple learn-
ing situations. They "eXplain" identities by showing how
they are learned which only underlines the fact that identities

are aspects of roles.

What it can mean to call this position a motivational
theory is then, to say the least, puzzling. At best it
explains how persons acquire "definiteness and force! in
role situations. If that is the theory then good enough
but let us be sure that is the theory. ENen the most
casual reading of the literature reinforces a directly

opposite impression; we wish to combat the suggestion of

10?
“something else“ that is implied in such theories, and we
feel certain that if the type of analysis we have developed
were generally available such theorists would be far from
willing to grant that‘gll they meant was what we have
indicated. Yet if there is some additional import to their
position then it is for them to develop it, as far as we
can see such is not the case.

We may in fact hazard a normative suggestion. Social
psychology would be in a better position to frame compre-
hensive theory if the motivational category were simply
dropped. As in the case of theories of global correlation
there seems to be far more to be gained from a depletion of
vocabulary then from maintaining the present ambiguities
inherent in it. It would seem more plausible to avoid all
mention of motives, at least as regards theories of global
correlation and identification, and employ a fully explicated
system of explanatory categories such as we have developed
or some variant of it. Ambiguity is at least minimal in the
latter while this is not the case in the former.

Turning to our third class of motivational theories we
confront a somewhat different problem. So far as we are
concerned there is nothing methodologically amiss in the
theory of legitimation. It is in fact the case that the
term ”motive” is often employed as Gerth and Mills (et. al.)
employ it: to indicate how words as shorthand expressions

for situations, may function in the promotion of role behavior.

108

One thing however must be noted, mainly that motives as
here employed bear little resemblance to motives as causes
ofsocial action. There is nothing wrong with stressing the
legitimating nature of motives if the empirical evidence
bears this out, since in all cases their authors clearly
recognize them for what they are. Since they are merely
symbols of symbols it may appear strange that they can aid
in the legitimation of roles but that is not a point we will
argue. Whether the evidence indicates an affirmative or a
negative pronouncement regarding this theory is not our
concern, at least not in this thesis.

The only point we wish to make is that when a theory
of motivations is purposed, such as the present one we must
be careful to evaluate what we are getting. The traditional
connotations of motivational theory have been to suggest
that if you possessed a theory of motivation then it was
possible to get at the causes or push mechanisms that made
men act. In this sense it was a truly general theory cross-
cutting time and place. The theory of legitimation clearly
can do nothing of the sort since by definition motives are
merely generalized symbols standing for situations. At
best they ”metivate' in the manner in which language is
supposed to motivate: as symbolic interaction.

And finally even this manner of Speaking might better
be reduced to law statements if ambiguity is going to be

the price that is paid for maintaining the old motivational

109
vocabulary. We wonder frankly whether any of the authors
espousing the legitimacy position would have bothered with
it if they understood clearly what they were saying. For
all they are saying is that symbols aid and in fact reinforce
the process of social interaction. This may be an important
law however stated but it sounds very much like old hat in
sociology. Indeed the presumption is that Mill's early dis-
cussion of ”situated motives"52 might never have seen the
light of day had it not been graced with the trappings of a
”theory of motives”. Seen in its true light the theory of
legitimation hatches a mouse, and but for the traditional
aura that motivational arguments have attracted it might not
have seemed worth the effort.

Such a perspective incidentally suggests that the theory
of identification, and that of legitimation are largely
redundant. ‘They add nothing that is not in some way accounted
for in other theories except by deve10ping a vocabulary that
duplicates the meanings already extant. Perhaps it is amus-
ing to play such word games but it hardly seems likely that
it can attract serious attention once it is realized what
is going on.

We turn finally to the last class of motivational theory
which we investigated, theories of non-motivated purposive
systems. In presenting this class of theories we allowed
ourselves a few critical remarks which formed a transition

to the second part of this thesis. Let us now see what

110
these remarks amount to.

In the first place we commented that teleological con-
siderations form a general ”perspective” of almost all
motivational theorizing. What do we mean by such a state-
ment? It is difficult to really pin down what is meant by
a ”perspective”, but roughly what we think it indicates is
that certain very general unanalyzed, often unacknowledged,
categories limit the sorts of questions that an investigator
puts to nature. Such a perspective existed (and perhaps
still exists) in physics from the time of Newton to that of
Einstein. Theorists during that period took it for granted
that there existed an absolute space and an absolute time
in and against which relationships among bodies could be
measured. Until toward the end of the 19th Century no one
really considered questioning this assumption: it acted as
the almost unconscious starting point for all theory.53

A similar position, essentially teleological in nature,
is what we have in mind when we speak of a general per-
Spective against which theories of motivation have their
being. It strikes us that the "something else” (that
elusive and incohate suggestion that motivationalists make)
has as its basis a teleological perspective. It is diffi-
cult to pin down the statements that exemplify such attitudes
but the mere search for ”motives” to begin with (as opposed
to explanations and predictions) is indicative. For when

an investigator makes the seminal decision that a theory of

111
motives is necessary he is always asking some variant of the
purposive question.

However the important point for us is not so much this
unanahnedperspective as it is the actual theory that employs
it. Teleology is the theory of any and all theorists that
are concerned with purposes, motives, or functions that
social actors entertain or perform in social systems. As
a functionalist it is possible never to mention motives or
purposes, but in fact it is seldom avoided. Any reference
to "ends in view”, ”future states of affairs towards which
an actor of system is orientated”, or even ‘goals' involves
its author in teleology. And insofar as such states of
affairs are employed to account for why an actor acted as
he did then some form of motivation is involved. Further—
more functionalism as we have seen is often itself consider-
ed a general theory of society (often called an ”approach“
--whatever that may be taken to mean). It should be clear
that directively-organized systems such as Nagel analyzed
do have characteristics that distinguish them from non-
directively organized systems; however the distinction is
not absolute since it rested upon the focus of attention--
culturally induced--that the investigator entertains. In
other words Nagel's general analysis of such systems estab-
lished that teleological systems or functional systems are
merely variant vocabularies describing the connectedness of

our world. They are adeequate vocabularies for dealing with

112
a range of experience--if properly understood--but in
every way they are ultimately interchangeable with the
explicated and unambiguous vocabulary that has become
standard form in discussing the logic of explanation. Tele-
ology and functionalism far from being theories turn out
once again--in the most charitable estimate--to be simply
redundancies.

It is with some irony then that the present writer
views the utterances of such a "functional” theorist as
Talcott Parsons. Parsons is extremely partial to the notion
of "system” by which he clearly means functional system.5n
He seems to feel that it must form one of the basic categories
of his entire theory. It is unfortunate that so much effort
should have been devoted to so small an idea, especially
when it turns out to be simply a way of talking about one
of the aims of science--the discovery of laws. Nor is
Parsons alone; most functionalists who devote themselves to
functional theory as such fall into the same error. In
short we are confronted in much of sociology's truly general
theory not with theory at all but with a hope disguised as
theory.

This suggests, we trust, the extremely general pene-
tration teleological considerations have in sociology:
they often form the backdrop for motivational theories, and
they penetrate the basis of functionalism. Yet we have seen

from Nagel's exhaustive analysis that teleology is duplicative.

113

Several motivational authors-~as we have seen-~established
connections between motives, purposes, and functions but
they have not provided us with a theory of motives any more
than the other investigators we examined.

It is obvious that teleological and functional analyses
cannot possibly provide us with a theory of motives unless,
once again, all we mean by this is that they provide us
with the laws of society. And in fact they cannot even do
that as general theories since we have seen that such general
attempts are merely manifestos urging the non-random nature
of our world. They can provide us with laws only if they
gongzgtgly,spell out the connections. How do we explain?,
by proposing hypothese to be tested, not by preposing that
we prepose hypothese to be tested. The first is actual,
the latter is programatic.

So again we see that theories of motives are generally
ambiguous. They assert one thing by suggestion or conno-
tation and they affirm another upon analysis and careful
examination. The same redundancy that followed us through
the other classes of motivation plagues us here again in
the teleological and functional camp. Might we not better
abandon the misleading vocabulary in question?

0n the other hand we must be fair: ,pgzhgp§,motivational
theories are saying something that has escaped us; penhgnfi
they are asserting a meaning which we have simply missed.

Certainly the literature of motivation is suggestive of some

. 11h
deeper, additional meaning, and if it is legitimate it
should emerge. Nevertheless try as we may we can not dis-
cover it; at best we can refer to the ”something else”
that seems to be in the minds of motivationalists when they
framed their questions. If there is ”something else” to be
said then by all means they should say it. If this thesis
has no other purpose it may provoke a clear statement of
what is really meant. But unless such a statement is forth-
coming then we are forced to the conclusion that the quest
for motives among the classes we have analyzed is chimerical.

The same point may be made more specifically for tele-
ological and functional authors. Perhaps theorists employ-
ing these systems are asserting something that escapes the
author and has escaped the numerous analysts of such
systems. If so it should emerge. But the work of analysis
has been around for over 15 years and as yet no counter-
statement has been able to suggest any additional meaning.
The burden of proof rests with the positive claimant. Let
him speak. 1

Sir Considering our discussion in this thesis it is one of
the ironies of modern sociology that the weakest link in
George Herbert Mead's system of social psychology should

so often be attributed to his lack of a motivational theory.55
Why, we may conclude, did Mead have no motivational theory?
The answer seems to suggest itself that he did not need

one. Having laid out--to his satisfaction--the elements

115
of symbolic interaction, he had said everything there was
to say. Having provided for the explanation and prediction
of human interaction what could be the possible need of a
motivational theory? Whether Mead's regularities are all
or in part confirmed, the ”modern” theorist will not help
in the least by interjecting considerations which Mead

himself rightly saw were unnecessary or in error.55

EOOTEQIES. AND WE.

116
FOOTNOTES

Mansion}.

1They occupy a prominent place in social psychology
though the reaction is not alwasy positive. See: Nelson
Foote, "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motiva-
tion", Am§;_.‘agg. Beyie 3, vol. 16, #1, Feb. 1951; Hans
Gerth and C Wright Mills. guarantee and 5.9.9.131 Stratum
Harcourt, Brace& Co., 1953; Alfred Lindesmith and Anselm
Strauss, figglg1_2§ygh2;ggy, The Dryden Press, (rev. ed.),
1956; George Lunsburs. W of. 529121221. The Mac-
millan Co., 1939; Gardner Murphy, ”Social Motivation”, in
W 21; 53:43], , Gardner Lindzey (ed.),
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., l95h: Theodore Newcomb,
“Sociology and Psychology” . in £22 a aims: at Social Man
John Gillin, (edt.), The Macmillan Co., 195a; Talcott Par-
sons, "Psychology and Sociology” , in F311 3 W 9:;
figglgLMMan, John Gillin, (edt.), the Macmillan Co., l95h;
Anselm Strauss. The finial W 21‘. fiestas
(ed. ) see esp. the introductory essay, The University of
Chicago Press, 1956.

2We do not intend to enter in this thesis into a dis—
cussion of "meaningfulness” in science. In explicating the
nature of scientific explanation we will offer a few sugges-
tions as to our position. But it is important at this point
to at least state our conception. Basically our positions
is that to be meaningful in empirical science a proposition
must be testible, it must be capable of verification. What
other types of ”knowing" there may be frankly escapes us;
in this thesis we associate meaningfulness with tesitibily.
See: Rudolf Garnap, ”Testibility and Meaning“, Ehilgsgnhy
g£_§gi§ng§, 3, 1936 and b, 1937 for the basic statement of
this position. It has been somewhat modified and refined
in the more recent literature. See: Hans Reichenbach, "The
Verifiability Theory of Meaning” , ggntzihgtign§,t ‘thg
WMWQEW vol. 80. 1951 of the
mummmmmmw

381s mund Freud W ins iii 21W
Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City,

New York, 1958. For the position actually basic to the
thesis developed in this boc< see "Totum and Taboo” in

Waiting: 2: disease Erase. Modern Library Education.
New York, 1938, A. A. Brill tr.

“Alfred L. Kroeber, Anthggpglggy, Harvourt, Brace and
Co., l9h8, esp. p. 398. See also the source of much of
Kroeber's thinking in Johan Huizinga, m m, Beacon

117

Press, 1950. Huizinga's theory is a close parallel to that
of Kroeber's. It is interesting also that Bertrand Russell
should pick this theme up in W Essays where he
attempts to make the point that much of history might be
simply construed as a reaction to ennui.

5Alfred Lewis Kroeber and Jane Richardson, 213m Qan-

tunies of. Meals Dress Restless. University of California
Press, Berkeley, 19b0.

6Alfred L. Kroeber, Anthzgpglggy, Harcourt Brace and
Co., 19h8, pp. #03-405.

7The ”nexus of correlation" really refers to a law of
greater generality than the original correlations in question.
This fact is of some importance for the general theory of
confirmation, especially the distinction between generaliza-
tion and law developed on pages hj—hh of this thesis.

8Kenneth Burke, The W of m, George Braizller,
Inc., 19h5, p. xvi.

9M0: P0 x.

10E. 0. Sample. The. Influence of. Win Enum-
ment, New York, 1911.

11Charles 0- Huntington. The W Basis of. mutt.
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1933. Hungtinton's work is more sophis-
ticated than Semple's and as Owen Latimore noted in review-
ing Toynbee's m 21‘, W became an important factor
in the latter's general scheme. Toynbee has often been
represented as essentially concerned with religious systems;
the strong strain of motivation derived from environmental
factors is however equally important.

12"Determinism‘" is a word found at two or three points
in this thesis; it has earned in recent times a certain
nefarious reputation. Whenever we employ the word we will
mean that the area of experience it is used to modify (i.e.,
'geographic) is governed by lawful regularities, that it is
not random. See the section in Part II of this thesis
entitled “Legic of Explanation”.

13Arnold Toynbee, Abfitudy,gfi, Hist 92y, Oxford University
Press, 2 vol., 1946-1957 (abridged edition).

1“Walter Prescott Webb, Th§,fig§at_2;gxn§, Grosset and
Dunlap, 1931.

118

15Vernon L. Parrington, flain_ggnnent§ in, me
,Ihgught, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1927-1930.

l6Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiegs g£_ghinn,
Capitol Publishing Co., New York, 19uo.

17Brooks Emeny, i r pfi,flpzld,£glitigs, Foreign
Policy Association, 195 . Ryan the title of this work is

interesting and instructive. The older vocabulary of moti-
vation frequently employed some conception of the "mainsprings"
of human action, Just as geography is here construed. Com-
pare, for instance, Jeremy Bentham's Table ,9; the W

,gi‘ggtign, Hermiss Publications, Los Altos, California,
195 .

18William Herbert Sheldon, The W 91‘, Human W:
Anlntnsmutiunttgunstitutmdlfismm. Harper &
Brothers, 1940. It is interesting to note that once the
”scenic“ element is gotten "inside“ the human anatomy we
are more inclined to grant it the status of a true motivational
theory. Somehow common usage is not quite solidfied on
external environments as "motivational forces”, at least
to the same extent as physiological, anatomical, and
psychological factors seem to be. In this case the question
of what is “in" and what is ”out” may cause some trouble.

Burke construes scenic in such a way that no distinction is
made between them

19Karl Marx, The Gezmgn ldgglggy, International Publis-
hers, l9h7; and especially see Capital, The W m,
Random House, 1906. No more fundamental picture of the
“scenic“ influence has been presented than the section of
,Qgpital (chapter 10), ”The Working Day”. The depiction of
the 19th Century industrial scene is certainly here pre-
sented with an eye to its motivational force. The same
comments apply to even so indirect a section of ggpipgl,as
the concluding Part VIII, ”The So-Called Primitive Accumu-
lation”. Here the famous thesis ”...that in actual history
it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder,
briefly force, play the great part" in capital accumulation
(p. 785). Such a view is in line with the scene Marx wishes
to expose: proletariat enslaved 19th Century EurOpe. How
different from Henri Pirenne's thesis regarding primitive
accumulation. Pirenne paints a picture of energetic St.
Godric's beach combing establishing the initial goods of
the capitalist ”carrying trade”. Also note the concommittant
role of the Viking's and north Italian merchants. How
different are the societies that derive from these scenes:
one is the backdrop of an enslaved Europe, the other that
of a free Europe. In fact one could employ just such a

119

notion as ”the problem of primitive capital accumulation”
as an index of Burke's scenic component. Karl Polanyi's
The. Sims}. W. Binehart and Co.,. Inc., 1944.
for instance, involves a mechanism of accumulation on a
vast ”functional” plane. In this case the "enclosure acts”
in England are not derived from a scenic background of
rapacious bourgeoisie, ad with Marx, nor form energetic
freebooters, as with Pirenne and to some extent Schumpeter,
but instead from the ”functional requirements of a whole
social system”. Indeed the permutations of motivationalism
are dazzling.

20Thorstein Veblen, m Them 2;; B 1
Charles Scribner's Sons, Inc., 19h0, pp. 302-373. Veblen
relied heavily upon Marx and shares many of his ”scenic
components”. Being more detached he apparently preferred
the impersonalized idiom of ”technology" to the ”social
relations” of production found in the ”class struggle”.

21'V. Gordon Childe,‘men,flekee,fl;geelfi, The New American

Library. 1951; and mm W in Him. Penguin Books
Ltd., 195n.

22Melville J. Herskovits, Men end me We, Alfred A.
KnOph, New Yong 19h8.

23R. J. Forbes, Men,§he_fleken, Henry Schuman, New York,
1950.

2“Julian Husley, Eyeleeeien,1nhAe§ien, New American
Library, New York, 1953. This fine little book presents
the biologists final view of culture. Derived from a uni-
verse of chance in a struggle to persist culture is evolu-
tiont's trump card, the ace in the hole for life on earth.
Thus it is not derivative background for personality or
social action but an instrument to be employed.

25Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorothea Lei hton, Thehflexehe,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 19 6, especially pp.
182-215 0

26Bensam1n Lee wharf. Lamaze. W. ens; _eeiiJB t .
The Technology Press & John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York,

1956.

27Harry Hoijer (ed.), Lengeege,;n_ge1§epe, University
of Chicago Press, 195k. The Kluckhohn, Wharf, and Hoijer
materials taken together suggest demensions of language as
agency of the human state. Jean Piaget's The

Language. and
W 21, the m suggests even more directly the function

120

of language if becoming human at all; is this sense we may
speak of language as an ”agency”.

28Iiier’crand Russell. A 31.83.9121 91‘. New W110 .
Simon & Schuster, New York, l9h5, esp. see Book Three,

”Part II”.

29Henri Ber SOD:.QZ§§L112.EYQLB£A£EJ The Modern Library,
Random House, 19 7. Bergson's ”dure” in which all the past
is captured in the specious present, in which nothing is
ever lost, a conception very close to Whitehead's ”creative
advance” certainly seems to suggest a picture of the agent
as locus of motivation and reality. Especially is this so
when concepts of freedom and creativity are included.

30Georg-e Berkeley. A W W ins W
efipflnmen,finenlegge, the Liberal Arts Press, 1957. At first
brush Berkeley may seem removed from the "agent” conception
of motivation, however the train of thought that conceives
of agent as motivator is present if in no other manner than
as literal creator of anything at all. If existence is the
construction of mind then agent is foremost.

31Kar1 Mannheim. Man and. mm in an Ass. 2: Em-
eezeeeien, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1951. This work is
concerned with growing disproportions in capitalist and
Western society generally. The development of ”mass society"
is Spelled out in Mannheim's book in terms of the destruction
of “elites” via the concommitant destruction of descrimina-
ting publics. It is interesting to note the similarities of
this position to that of Joseph A. Schumpeter's, fleplfiellem,

, engflpemeezeey and to the present context. Schum-

peter's and Mannheim's conceptualizations even employ the
same basic language in discussing elites: ”breakdown of
exclusiveness of elites" (Mannheim) vs. "destruction of
the protecting strata“ of elites (Schumpeter). Both men,
though with different emphasis, are clearly concerned with
what they feel to be the latent rampages of modern society
if such elites finally vanish. In other words elites seem
to take the role of ”agents” or motivators for the whole of
Western society.

32Joseph A. Schumpeter, Cepiteligm, m,_eng,
‘Qemeeneey, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 3rd ed.), 1950,

3BSee: Thomas Carlyle, Henge em Here W: New
York, 1911. Also Bertrand Russell has commented in A W

21; W W, ”in all history, nothing is so sur-
prising or so difficult to account for as the sudden rise of

121

civilization in Greece”. And elsewhere he has made the
comment that without Galileo Western science would never
have developed. History must always seem of the nature of

a mirical if it consists, as it does for Russell, of events
waiting around for enough bright men to utilize them. As

a historical explanation a great man theory employs agent as

force or agency, but from the agent's perspective it is he
who is in command.

3“As fair a statement as any that does not attempt to
analyze the foundations of existentialism is to be found

in Jean Paul Sartre. Weller. and Humanism. Methuen
& Co., Ltd., London, l9#9.

35See the following authors for various aspects of
”pure working” as a mystical conception. Aldous Husley,
The W W. Harpers & Brothers. 19%; also
his Am: Ham 3 Mme: Dies the Eran. Avon Publishing Co. .
Inc., 1939. Also in the latter sections of the Qzemmezmefl
Maeleee_Burke suggests that the best way to approach motiva-
tionalism is through the "divine act of creation“ which
should be the prototype of all acts. Notice the reasoning
that leads Burke to this conclusion for it is instruc tive
of many varieties of motivational thought centering on the
”act”. Burke notes that the act is more than simply the
resultant of the other four aspects of our pentad, it re-
serves a ”modicum” to itself. Burke comments “...if the,
motives properly assignable to eeene,legene,‘egeney, and_pe;p
peee_are already given, there could be novelty only if we
could also assign motives under the heading of act itself.
That is, there would be something new intrinsic to the act;
and this novelty would be the modicum of motivation assignable
under the heading of act rather than under the heading of
the other four terms, singly or in combination. There
must be brief be some respect in which the act is eenee.eui,
a motive of itself”, (p. 66). Such a reSpect is that Husley
discusses.

Regarding these matters see Ruth Benedict, Ineflghnyr
W end 2h: m. where she develops a conception
supposedly common to Zen believers in Japan to the effect
that thought and action when disciplined form a unity:
”there is no break, not even the thickness of a hair between
a man's will and his act”, (pp. 228-252). And she comments
that Zen is looked upon as "expertness" in mental discipline.
The act in other words is conjoined with the will in pure
form. Such conceptions do not have to make empirical sense
in order to be culturally effective (”real in their conse-
quences”).

122

36Falling under this heading would be any author that
employed a teleological or purposive vocabulary. Talcott
Parsons. The W 2: 5.22191 Mien. The Free Press.
Glenco, Illinois, 1949 embraces such a conception in employ-
ing "goal orientated“ or "future states of affairs towards
which the action is orientated” in his system. Philosophers
of various camps have been prone to the teleological idiom;
most recently and heroically Alfred North Whitehead, Ezeeeee
.eneugeelley, The Humanities Press, 1929. “It is notable
that no biological science has been able to express itself
apart from phraseology which is meaningless unless it refers
to ideals prOper to the organism in question”, (p. 128),
which is to say teleological phraseology. Whitehead goes
on to apply this to a vacabulary generalized to cover the
entire universe of events and thus arrives at a conception
of a purposive universe striving for "intensities of satis-
factions” in the concresesent prehensions that compose it,
(p. 127). It is noteworthy that Talcott Parsons has acknow-
ledged his greatest debt to philoSOphy to be Kant on the one
hand, and the writings of Whitehead on the other. His tele-
ological holdovers find support in his acknowledged mentors.

37Gardner Murphy, “Social Motivation”, Themflgngheek.e£
fieelel , Gardner Lindsey (ed.), Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., l95h, vol. 2, p. 601. Not only is this
quotation of interest when we consider what sorts of ques-
tions theorists are asking themselves when they think
about motivation, but it is also interesting that this major
compendium of recent date should employ the same basic
motivational framework as has been current for at least 75
years.

It may be worth noting that the perduring quality of
motivational thinking is to be found even in so astute and
socially orientated a scientists as Harry Stack Sullivan.
For Sullivan nearly everything that constitutes the self
is social. Yet he manages, apparently without being aware
of it, to slip in a few basic drive mechanisms from whence
the system flows. In W Menu W.

W. W. Norton, Co., Inc., 1939, he suggests (p. 19) ”0f the
very unpleasant experiences which the infant can have we may
say that there are generically two, pain and fear. Now comes
the third“. The third is ”anxiety”. These forces act as
sorting or selective instruments for the self within the
larger framework of personality as Sullivan conceives it.
They serve the same function as the old style "defense
mechanisms” in psychoanalytic theory. Gardner Murphy's

”what makes the thing work" is here answered in only slightly
disguised motivational vocabulary.

123

38The nature of reductionism in the social sciences and
science in general is involved in controversy. Unfortunately
we will have to wait for a throughal explication until a
latter time. However, it is useful to make a few intro-
ductory remarks at this point. In an article on reduction-
ism which we shall fdflow in Phillip Wiener's Beedenge.;n .

ef,§e;eeee, Ernest Nagel suggests two aSpects

of reductionism in science. 0n the one hand we may speak
of reducing some proposition or regularity of a science if
we subsume that regularity or proposition under a wider
generalization, regularity, or proposition (for the moment
we are not trying to distinguish the several sorts of
entities that figure into a scientific scheme). Thus we
may reduce Kepler's laws of planetary motion by deducing
them from Newton's more general laws of motion and universal
gravitation. In the case of sociology where there are few
precise deductive techniques we still make such deductions
on the basis of some form of ”propositional calculus“ deve-
loped in logic and employed in our ”natural language" (Eng-
lish etc.). So if we know some well substantiated propositions
relating to the problem of bureaucratic development then
ideally we could deduce, that is reduce, prOpositions whose
generality extended only so far as to cover the regularities
of Chinese bureaucracy from Han times to the 19th Century.
In short such reductionism is a continuous and healthy pro-
cess in science as knowledge grows and singular instances
take their place in broader, that is, more general contexts.

There is another meaning generally labeled "reductionism”
that is not so salubrious as that we have Just mentioned.
It is the sort of thing that Burke rather crudely entertains
when he suggests in the Qgemmeg,that: ”Its vulgar variant
is to be found in techniques of 'unmasking', which would
make for progress and emancipation by apply materialistic
terms to immaterial subjects (the pattern here being, 'X
is nothing but Y', where X designates a higher value and Y
a lower one, the higher value being thereby reduced to the
lower one).” However this rendition of the second pattern
of reduction hardly helped us to clarify the matter, though
it does suggest that something is fishy about it. What is
actually involved in the sort of reduction that goes on when
"mind is reduced to neuronic pathways”, when ”The social
level is reduced to the psychological level”, when ”biology
is reduced to chemistry” may, as we have suggested, consti-
tute an eXplanation of one level by another via the means
of subsumption under more general laws. However such reduc-
tionist statements may be merely programatic, there being
no theory which can realize such an explanation at time ”t".
It may be that at "t" such statements serve as directors or
indicators for future research, the end of which would be
to effect such reductions. On the other hand it may also be

124

that even if we had a theory capable of such reduction (as
apparently we do with atomic theory in chemistry--see physist

Eugene P. Wigner's "The Limits of Science”, Reeegnge.;g'§he
W in figiepee, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1953) it might

still be the case that teehnigelly the derivation of one level

of investigation (the biological, social, mental) from
another level (the chemical, psychological, physiolOgical)
would be impossible. There seems to be a certain sense in
which the various sciences that investigate our world are
simply economical duplications and re-duplications of one
another at each level of abstraction. And this seems to
be determined (that is, it seems to be that the selection
of levels is determined) by the shear un-economy of attempted
reductions, even programatically. In other words while we
may have no theory that, even in principle, can derive one
science or level of abstraction from another we may yet
entertain the hOpe of acquiring one. Well enough, but on
the other hand it does seem likely (as we are informed in
the case of quantum theory—~op. cit. Wigner above) that
even if such theories did exist the practical possibility
of derivation might itself be nearly insurmountable, except
in principle. In that case there would be strong pragmatic
grounds for maintaining each level or science with its own
unique vocabulary of terms, rather than attempting a reduc-
tion of one level to another. And in the case where no
theory exists at all, at least no theory that is adequate
even in principle, then clearly it is absurd to suggest
such reduction evenlezi. ‘

This appears to be the status of much of motivational
thinking as we shall see. Such theories as those discussed
under the class term ”global correlation” are often so vague,
ill-formulated, and ambiguous that it is not even clear
what can be meant by them. Freudian theory, as in the case
of Ernest Jones' study of Hamlet certainly does not spell
out how the culture (one level of abstraction) of Denmark is
"reduced”, that is, explained by the Freudian scheme. It
is in no way clear how the basic energy sources and id impul-
ses can ”account” for this variant of Western European culture.
Merton's suggestion that we follow W. I. Thomas' dictum:

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences" would seem to go much further in explaining
Hamlet's situation. People did believe in ghosts, and in
the Devil as deceiver. Does it add anything to be informed
that an oedipus situation held Hamlet in its grip when in
fact we have the resources to eXplain the events in question
at the cultural level? In short we must ask how does the
basic stuff, the libidinal substrate, operate such that it
can account for this, that, and the other cultural trait,
and do so cross-culturally. If the theory can not accom-
plish this--and clearly it can not--then it will not qualify

125

for a useful reduction, even in principle. It may instead
exhibit all of the most flagrant qualities negatively
attached to the second meaning of ”reductionism".

39Nelson Foote, ”Identification as the Basis for a

Theory of Motivation”, Amer. flee, Eeyieu, vol. 16, #1, Feb.
1951.

hoNelson Foote, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Igenpity ene

IELEIEEEEQEQL Qempetegee, The University of Chicago Press,
1955-'

ulAlfred Lindesmith, and Anselm Strauss, fieele;
Eeyehelegy, the Dryden Press, 1956.

1+
2Anselm Strauss, leeniifleeelen, (unpublished manu-
script), cited in Ibid. above.

”3Foote, ep, eie., p. 1h.
nulhlg.

“5Alfred Lindesmith, and Anselm Strauss, fieeie;
Eegehelegy, The Dryden Press, 1956, pp. 307-315.

u6lblg., p. 308.

“711219... p. 309.

48Nelson Foote, ”Identification as the Basis for a
Theory of Motivation", Amen. See. Renew, vol. 16, #1, Feb.
1951, p. 15.

h9;e1e,, p. 1h.

5°Ihlim: p. 16.

Stlbid., p. 16.

5glbid,, p. 17.

53;p;g,, p. 17.

54;p;g,, p. 18.

551nm” p. 19.

56By ”learned" we refer to the fact that behavior is
subject to alteration incident upon experience. Clearly
there are all manner of learning theories to choose from,

126

but for our purposes it is sufficient that we merely indicate
the broad nature of learning as opposed to some form of
biologically fixed, generally genetic response.

57Foote, 1p;g., pp. 19—20.
58;p;g., p. 19.
5911112.. p. 20.

60Kenneth Burke, W egg ghenge, Hermes Publi-
cations, l95h, p. 31.

61 '
Norman Larson, The mm e1; Neenah, (unpublished

manuscript, Neenah Public Library, Neenah, Wisconsin.

62Hans Gerth, and G. Wright Mills, W and
fiIIHQLBIE. Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1953, p. 121.

6312;Q., p. 122.
6nlhid.,jp. 122.
651b;g,, p. 117, (italics mine).

66Alfred Lindesmith, and Anselm Strauss, fiee;el,2eyehel-
cgy, The Dryden Press, 1956, p. 298ff.

67Howard S. Becker, and James W. Carper, "The Develop-
ment of Identification with an Occupation", Ameg, lee:..e£
Seelelegy, vol. 61, #4, Jan. 1956. It may seem singular
that we use an article dealing with ”identification" when we
have only just finished our discussion of this subject.
However as we shall show the import of this article suggests
lines other than those developed by the authors of ”identifi-
cation theory”. Also see: ”The Elements of Identification
with an Occupation", Amen..§ee. Reyiew, vol. 21, #3, June
1956, by the same authors. wAnd, Howard S. Becker, and
Anslem Strauss, "Careers, Personality, and Adult Socializa-

tion”. Amer; Jenn-.2£.Seeielesxa vol. 62. #3. Nov. 1956-

68Howard S. Becker, and James W. Carper, ”The DevelOp-
ment of Identification with an Occupation", Amen, 1e33, efi,

W1: V010 61: #1}, 1956: p0 296ff.

69Alfred Lindesmith, and Anslem Strauss, §291§2.2§£Y£h&r
legy, The Dryden Press, 1956, p. 305.

70Gerth and Mills, 0p. cit., p. 115.

127

71For a fair coverage of the nature of teleology and

the defining characteristics of such systems generally see
the fdlowing books and articles: in Reedings $2.£b2.Ph$1-
2§2221H22.§£A§2£§: Herbert Fiegl, and May Brodbeck, (edt.),
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1953-“Philosophy
of Organic Life", by Moritz Schlick; "Teleological Explanation
and Teleological Systems", by Ernest Nagel; and for dis-
cussion of the supposed generic properties of such systems
see, in the same compendium, ”The PhilOSOphy of Science in
Gestalt Theory", by Edward H. Madden. Also in R gg,
P 11 1c 1 Ahelygis, Herbert Fiegl, and Wilfrid Sellars
(edt. , Appleton-Certury-Crofts, Inc., New :ork, 1949, see
”Mechanical and Teleological Causation”, by A. C. Mace;
”Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology”, by C. J. Ducasse.
For other analyses and characterizations of teleological
systems see: Selehggjfie,gxplehee;en, R. B. Braithwaite,
Cambridge University Press, Cambrid e, England, 1955, the
section on variancy systems (ch. 10 ; also the brilliant and

cdncise article by Warren S. McCulloch, ”Mysterium Ini-
quitatis-—of Sinful Man Aspiring into the Place of God”,

in Phillipp c. Frank (ed.) The.Yaliee£ien.e£.fieleniéfiie.
Theories, The Beacon Press, Boston, 1954, 1955, 195 .

72Talcott Parson has as a fundamental concept of his
general theory of action the notion of the ”unit-act”.
Action is the basic category of social analysis and the “unit-
act” is its subdivision. The fundamental characteristic
of unit-acts is that they imply "ends“, which is to say ”a
future state of affairs to which the action is orientated”.
See pp. 44 et passim in Talcott Parsons, Ih§.§££H££BZ§.Qfi
Social Action, The Free Press, Glenco, 1949. And, Themfieeiel
Syeeem, The Free Press, Glenco, 1950. Also, ”Some Comments
on the State of the General Theory of Action”, Amen..§ee.
Eeylen, vol. 18, #6, Dec. 1953.

73Bobert K. Merton. Moi Theerx ens. m1 Wm.
The Free Press, Glenco (revd. ed.), 1957.
74

Clyde Kluckhohn, Naxah0.Hiiehena£§. Harvard University,
Peabody Museum Papers, 1944. ”Myths and Rituals: A general
Theory”. Harland Theeleaieel Eexien. #35. Alec. ”Covert

Culture and Administrative Problems”,{Agehieeh_Ah§h;epele¢
gist, #45, 1943.

75Edward Albert Shils, with Talcott Parsons, Temarg e
General Theory e; Aetioh, Harvard University Press, 1951.

76Marion Levy, The fitguetepe e£,$ee;ety, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1952.

128

77Philip Selznick, ”Institutional Vulneralibility in
Bass Society, Am QZ- gee . of Sociolegy, vol. 56, #4, Jan.
1951. And, "Foundations of_ the Theory of Organization,
Amer. gee. Revie , #13, 1948.

78a. P. Lerner. Fame in. M19 Anslem. Newman.
London, 1953; also "Alternative Formulations of the Theory
of Interest", Eeohemie Jourhal, vol. #48, June, 1938. Lerner's
general Keynesian formulation and elaboration may be con-
strued in the vocabulary of teleology even though economists
have been loath to do so. In part one may conjecture that
this is because of their mathematical orientation which pro-
ceeds with contingent matters in terms of the model we shall
deve10p in Part II of this thesis. The fact that it is
possible, as with so many sociologists and anthropologists,
to construe the social subject matter of economics in tele-
ological terms is materially demonstrated by Lerner.

79Werner S. Landecker, ”Types of Integration and Their
Measurement”, in Ihe_;ehgeege.e£ Soeial geeeegeh, The Free
Press, Glenco, edt. by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Morris Rosen-
berg, 1955. Also, his obvious contribution, considering the
foregoing article, to Egghelple§,efi,§eeielegy, (revd. ed.),
Ronald Freedman, Amos H. Hawley, Werner S. Landecker, Ger-
hard E. Linski, Horace M. Miner, Henry Holt and Co., New
York, 1956.

80Walter Cannon, The W efi Lhe Bedy, W. W. Norton
& Co., Inc., 1939 (revd. ed.). It is interesting to note
that Parson's acknowledges this great work in physiology
and the theory of homeostasis as a partial source of his
own social theorizing. It is equally indicative that his
stress on "system” is, so to speak, derived from it empiric-
ally, rather than analytically from more QKELLQLL sources.

81Norbert Wiener, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Julian
Bigelow, ”Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology” , Philosophy of

Science, vol. 10,1943; Norbert Wiener, QYDQLREELQE: New
York, 1948.

82See footnote 71. Also, R. B. Braithwaite, ”Tele-

ological explanation". 2.29.2 enmenisietelisnfieielo t .
vol. 47, 1947; G. Sommerhoff, Analytical Biology, London,

1950, W. Ross Ashby, 293.1211 Lena Begin, New York, 1952.

83Our demonstration of this proposition Will take place
in the discussion of teleological systems in Part II. How-
ever, it rests upon the literature referred to in footnotes
#71 and #82 and especially on an article by Ernest Nagel:
“A Formalization of Functionalism", in Legge W hege-
,phyelee, The Free Press, Glenco, 1956. This article is

129

especially noteworthy in that while our analysis of tele-
ological systems implicitly suggests our conclusion regard-
ing functionalism it does not explicitly develop this position.
This article however does; and it is well worth referring to

when considering any question of functionalism in social or
biological science.

84George Lundberg, Feundatiehe e£,§oeiology, The Mac-
millan Co., 1939. Also the article setting forth the general
perspective, “The Natural Science Trend in Sociology”, Am I-
iehz, efflfieelelegy, vol. 58, #3, Nov. 1952. It is inter-
esting that a general perspective is more at stake in Lund-
berg's writings than any particular question of the theory
of motivation. Given one perspective, and questions of
motivation never arise, given another and they arise all the
time. And yet this should not be taken to mean that all
knowledge is relative or that we must arbitrarily select a
position and then engage in scientific investigation in
terms of that position. There are procedures that avoid
these pitfalls by becoming cognizant of them and making
explicit their grounds. But until recently the techniques
and the published accomplishment were not generally available.
In such a situation Lundberg starting from a strong--perhaps
too strong--behaviorist position finds no need for motivation-
al thinking; while many social psychologists and sociolog-
ists commencing from quite different positions can think
in no other terms. Our feeling is that had the latter been
as chary of their presuppositions as they might have been
we would not have had to engage in the present corrective
undertaking. The burden of Part II and the Conclusion is
to demonstrate this.

MEWW

1John Dewey, and A. F. Bentley, W and the m,
Oxford Press, New York, 1945.

280 that the reader may gain a more adequate impress-
ion of the basis of "the logic of explanation“without undue
digression in the text itself, the footnotes have been made
rather extensive. In them will be found what amounts to an
annotated bibliography of the concerns at hand. Naturally
certain key works stand out as pre-eminently valuable. In
general these works are the most recent, a fact which reflects
the accumulative nature of the field and the growing pre-
cision of its product.

130

3Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Seieniifie.£znlenaiieu= 4A
fiflnEu:em;ibe.£eneiien.e£.lheerx. Ezeeeeiliix.ene.ien:in.§eienee.
Cambridge, At the University Press, 1955. See also the
comments and difficulties envisioned by Carl G. Hempel and
Paul Oppenheim in their study, "The Logic of EXplanation”,
.;QIEhe_2hilo§ophy‘e§ figienee, Appleton-Crofts-Century,
New York, 1953, esp. pp. 331-343. Also for various related
aspects see, Philipp G. Frank, The_ye;;ge&;ehfle§ e t
EIEEEIESJ The Deacon Press, Boston, 1954, 1955, 1956. For
an unacceptable but at the same time very instructive dis-
tinction between law and theory see the popular Khfl§.lfi
, by Norman Campbell, Dover Publications, Inc” New
York, 1952, first pub. 1921; and his technical Ehyelee:
t , Cambridge University Press, 1920, pp. 120-140,
”The Structure of Theories”.

“Henry S. Leonard. W of Eleni Beam. Henry
Holt and Co., Inc., New York, 1957, esp. Part III and Part
IV “The Theory of Terms” and ”The Theory of Definition”.
While there may be some objection to the formulation presented
in Leonard's book regarding the ”existence” of ”characteris-
tics” the formulation is quite adequate for our purposes.

5mg... pp. 190-208.

6The phrase ”constant conjunction” is borrowed from
Morris R. Cohen, and Ernest Nagel, Ah Wen Le £22.19.
ehe W m, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York,
1934, p. 246 and forms one of the sub-types of ”invariant
relations” that Cohen and Nagel develOp. This book remains
a classic in scientific method and is still widely read and
cited in sociological literature. It is however, like most
scientific classics, badly dated and in some places now con-
sidered to be in outright error.

7Henry S. Leonard, ep,.e1§., pp. 44-55.

8Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in
Empirical Science", - W efi
fielehee, Volumes I and II: Foundations of the Unity of
Science, Vol. II, #7, The University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago, 1952, pp. 52-54. ”The rational core of the distinction
between natural and artificial classifications is suggested
by the consideration that in so-called natural classification
the determining characteristics are associated, universally
or in a high percentage of all cases, with other character-
istics, of which they are logically independent”, (p. 53).

9Reference to ”what we are interested in" or ”what we
want to know" should not be construed as positioning a
residual category for explaining enigmatic aSpects of human

131

behavior. Obviously studies in the sociology of knowledge
suggest how we are to explain such phrases as ”what we are
interested in” or ”what we want to know". We are not sug-
gesting that there is some faculty innate in the human being--
such as Veblen's ”idle curosity”. It should be obvious from
ideological, economic, and social studies in the history and
development of science that it is no longer necessary to

posit residual categories in explaining the focus of inter-
est that men have at various times entertained. See, for
example, Robert K. Merton, ”Science and Economy of 17th

Century England”. in mini MT 0 and 5.991311 W. The
Free Press, Glenco, 1949.

10Richard Bevan Braithwaite,
At the University Press, Cambridge, 1955, pp. 300—303.

11m” 13' 9°
lzIplQe, pp. 293-319.
13Eugene P. Wigner, "The Limits of Science". in Readings.

%h,2hilesephieel finelyele, Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck
edt.), Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953.

1”Carl G. Hempel, ”The Function of General Laws in

History”. in Bassinet. in 10 Analysis. Herbert
Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, (edt. , Appleton-Century-Crofts,
New York, 1949, p. 460.

15lhig,, p. 459. This excellent article states in
clearer form than nearly any other brief presentation avail-

able the basic tenets of eXplanation in science, natural or
social.

16Carl G. Hempel, and Paul Oppenhim, ”The Logic of
Exnlanation" . Readings in the W 21‘. Seienee. Herbert
Fiegl, and May Brodbeck, Appleton-Crofts-Century, New York
1953.

17;p;e,, pp. 342-343 footnote. Notice the similarity
of the Hempel-Oppenheim position to the English school in
this summary statement by R. B. Braithwaite: ”Any incor-
poration of a fact--be it a particular instance of a law or
the law itself--into a deductive system in which it appears
as a conclusion from other known laws is, by virture of that
incorporation, an explanation of that fact or law....What
matters is that we know more than we did before of the
connectedness of the fact or law with more fundamental laws
covering a wider range. We have not only attained more
knowledge of the inter-connectedness of Nature, but we have
also acquired the possibility of a power of making predic-

tions that was not cpen to us before.” In, Seienigjie
Ezelehetion, p. 349.

132

18Carl G. Hempel, ”The Function of General Laws in
History”, Reedipge ;g_2hilo§ophieal Ahelyeie, pp. 462-3.

19Karl R. Popper, The Qpeh fieeiety egg Its am! e,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, pp. 443-4 3.--

"Has History any Meaning". This position is incidently
identical to that of the Hempel-Oppenheim theory of explana-
tion and constitutes one more illustration of the ubiquitous
nature of the position we are trying to characterize.

20J. W. N. Watkins, "Ideal Types and Historical Ex-

planation”. Headings in the W o of. Seienee. Herbert
Fiegl, and May Brodbeck, pp. 723-724.

2lBertrand Russell, ”On the Notion of Cause, with
Applications to the Free-Will Problem”, W in Lhe
211112522111 er. Selassie. pp. 397-8.

22Eugene P. Wigner, ”The Limits of Science”, Beedihgs
in the 211112522111 21‘. Seienee. pp. 762-76Lu

230er1 c. Hempel, ”The Logic of Explanation”, Readings
ln.&h§.2hllQSODhY 22.5922222» Herbert Fiegl, May Brodbeck.
Also see: Albert Einstein, and LeOpold Infield, Theflfiye-
21,2hyeiee, Simon and Schuster, 1938, esp. Part I
and III; R. E. Peierls,.Ihe.Leme.efi,Nethze, Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, New York, 1956, esp. ch. 1 and 6.

zuTheodcsium Dobzhansky, mm, mm, end Men,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1955, ch. 2, 4, and 14.

25George Gaylord Simpson, Colin S. Pittendrigh, and
Lewis B. Tiffany, , Harcourt, Brac and Co., New York,
1957, ch. 12, 13, 1 , 17, and 18.

261mg. , ch. 1t.

27Emile Durkheim, Suieide. The Free Press, Glenco, 1951,
tr. John A Spending, and George Simpson.

28516mm Schoeffler. _heT Failures ef. Hematite: A
.QLEEHQELLQ Stugy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955.

The reader is urged to consult this work for the point in
question and general criticism of it; but more important is
the fact that Schoeffler's book is an attempt to do for the
whole of economics--and the findings have social science
significance generally--what we are attempting for only a
small sector of social psycholOgical theorizing. Schoeffler's
work draws on much of the same critical and analytic material
as the present thesis utilizes; it also suggests how the im-
plications of such work extend to much wider fields.

133

29Hans Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, gheraeter ehd Seele;
fagggfiag§_is one of the few attempts to relate the two areas
explicitly.

30See footnote #38 for an introductory statement.

31B. F. Skinner, ”Critique of Psychoanalytic Concepts",

The Validation e; Seientifie Theoriee, Philipp G. Frank,
(edt.), The Beacon Press, Boston, 1954, 1955, 1956.

32Alfred North Whitehead, Seienee.ane.the.M06ezn H921 ,
The New American Library, New York, 1925, pp. 19-20.

33Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Seientifie.fiznlenetien.
p. 300-303.

3I"'Wa1ter Cannon, _h£.fll£Q2Q.2I.£h§. Bedy, W. W. Norton,
New York, 1939 (revd. ed. ).

35Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener, Julian Bigelow,

”Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology”, Philesephy e: Seiehee,
vol. 10, 1943; Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, MIT Press, 1948.

36Norbert Wiener, The Human Ese.e£.fiumen Beehge, Double-
day & Co., Inc., 1954, see esp. the Preface: "The Idea of a
Contingent Universe".

37Jacob Bronowski, ”Science as Foresight”, in Wheh,le
Seeehee, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1955.

38G. Sommerhoff, Analytieel Bielegy, London, 1950.
39W. Boss Ashby, Deelgn_£ez,e,gze;nJ New York, 1952.

uoRichard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific Emplanation,
p. 319-340.

ulErnest Nagel, "Teleological EXplanation and Teleolog-
ical System" in We in Ehileeenhieel Assails: "A

Formalization of Functionalism" in _2£1§.Kl£b&L_..§_EEDYfi$£§:
The Free Press, Glenco, 1956.

qurnest Nagel, ”Teleological Explanation and Teleolog-
ical Systems", Reedinge _h,2h;losophiea1Analysie, p. 547.

u31bid., p. 548.
hulking.- ’ P0 549.

134

45Warren S. McCulloch, ”Mysterium Iniquitatic--Of Sin-
ful Man Aspiring Into The Place of God”, in The yelidetieh

e£,§ciehtifig Theori , Philipp G. Frank, (edt.), The Beacon
Press, Boston, 1954, 1955, 1956.

“Nagel. on. 211. p. 550.

“7For the nature of ”valuing" see footnote #93.

“8Naee1. ee- alto. p. 553.

ugEdgar Zilsel, "Physics and the Problem of Historico-

sociological IeWS" in Readings in _bet W Seienee.
Herbert Fiegl, and May Brodbeck, Appleton-Crofts-Century,
New York, 1953, p. 720.

50Kenneth Burke, The_§pemme;,efflfle§l1ee, George Braziller
Inc., New York, 1955, p. xvi.

5lsiemund Freud. Mitigation ane.tel W1 t t .
Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1958.

52C. Wright Hills, ”Situated Action and Vocabularies of
Motive“, American Sociological Review, Oct. 1940.

53Albert Einstein, and Leopold Infield, The Eyelutieh
Qihfihxeieed Simon and Schuster, New York, 1938, ch. 1, 2.

5uTalcott Parsons, "Some Comments on the State of the

General Theory of Action", Amen, See, Reyiew, vol. 18, #6,
Dec. 1953.

55George Herbert Mead, mpg, Self. and. Sceiezy, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934. It is instru-

tive that Mead should have referred to himself as a ”social
behaviorist'. This we recall is essentially Lundberg's
perspective and in like manner he eschews motivational
theories. There is nothing in Mead's writings so far as we
can detect that would have led Mead in the direction of moti-
vational theorizing. For his system starting with the per-
spective he did such questions never arose. It is doubly
ironic that later students such as Strauss should feel the
need to revise what careful consideration shows to be satis-
factory. One begins to wonder how many times the cycle of
formulation and revision must go on before someone settles
the matter.

56Anselm Strauss, (edt.) The Seeiel Esyehelogy of. Geogge
Hezhenemmeed, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956.
Strauss states that Mead's ”...symbolic approach prepares

135

the way for a sociologically orientated motivational theory
akin to that developed by Kenneth Brake and C. Wright Mills",
(p. xv).

136
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ashby, W. B., Design for a Brain, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
152.

Becker, H. S., and J. Carper, "The Development of Identi—

fication with an Occupation", Ane_, Jen .‘ei Soeielogy,
vol. 61, #fl, Jan. 1956.

 

, "The Elements of Identification with an Occu-
pation”, Amer. S 9. Re iew, vol. 62, #3, Nov. 1956.

Becker, H. S., and A. L. Strauss, ”Careers, Personality,

and Adult Socialization”, Amer. Cour. e£_§oeielegy,
vol. 62, #3, Nov. 1956.

Benedict, B., The Chnyeennnemun end nhe Sworn, Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston, 19h6.

Bergson, B., Cneetive Evelution, Modern Library, Random House,
1947.

Berkeley,G ., A_ Tneatiee Coneerning Humen Understanding,
Gateway Editions, Inc., 1956.

Blumer, H., ”Attitudes and the Act”, Seeial Pneblene, vol. 3,
1955-

Braithwaite, R. B., Seientifie Ezn_ene§ien: ‘A,§t Hg! in, the

Wflim: ob bilt mmmm
Cambridge, At the University Press, 1955.

Brodbeck, K., see entry under H. Fiegl.

Bronowski, J., ”Science as Foresight”, J. H. Newman, fine;
l§_§e;enee, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1955.

Burke, K., The Cnemmer ei_Motive§, George Braziller, Inc.,
New York, 1945.

, Permenenee end Chang : Anatemy Purfiose,
195

Hermes Publications, Los Altos, revd. ed.

 

Campbell, N., Hhat,;e fieience, Dover Publications, Inc.,
New York, 1952.

 

9 Ehlfilfifi; ine,Eleme t , Cambridge, At The Uni-
versity Press, 1920.

Cannon, W. B., The fliegem e; tne Body, W. W. Norton & Co.,
Inc., (revd. ed.), 1939.

137
Carlyle. T., flame and Piano Womble. New York. 1911.

Carnap, B., ”Testibility and Meaning”, Pniloeonhy a; Seienee,
3, 1936 and 4, 1937.

Childe, V. G., Man Makee Himself, The New American Library,
1951.

 

, unat Happened Ln,Hi§tory, Peguin Books Ltd., 1954.

Cottrell, L. S. Jr., ”Some Neglected Problems in Social Psy-
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