THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUERWLLA WARFARE Thesis 501' flze Degree of Dim. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY K0 - wang Mei 1965 This is to certify that the fi ._'.._ “(—— thesis entitled THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE presented by Ito-Vang Mei has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Pho Do degree in POIitngl SCience I". I /“0 .. ,. J Hv .~ . . h” {.1- I " ‘ ., \— ‘ l I I... _ V ' Major professor V4," Date f «Ag/7:5; F) / 0-169 ABSTRACT THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE by Ko-wang Mei Guerrilla warfare is one of the major concerns of our time . More than twenty countries have undergone this torrent process,- almost half of the world population has been involved. Millions of lives have been sacrificed be- cause of it. In an age of nuclear stalemate, guerrilla war— fare has become a major weapon for national and international power struggle- It deserves the greatest attention of political science students. The problem of guerrilla warfare is here tackled from both theoretical and operational aspects. Generalizations about its causation, strategy, tactics, counter-measures, and means of prediction are discussed. Relevant data are collected and compared; and a typical case—-the case of the guerrilla movement in China is fully presented. Through analysis of facts and statistics, it is hOped that the phe— nomenon of guerrilla warfare can be better understood. Guerrilla warfare, in its modern sense, is a war of totality based upon a mass movement, and aimed at a new 3 Ko—wang Mei political order. It is the weapon of the weak and character- ized by unconventionality and irregularity. As a protracted struggle behind enemy lines, it demands utmost devotion and sacri fice . It is caused by a group of frustrated, rebellious, aspiring, and determined intellectuals and flourishes under a weak , i neffective, and at times corrupt government. Revo- lutionary goals, political grievances, international con- spiracy, deviant personality, economic disturbances, uneven distribution of wealth, especially land, and social injustice all contribute to its intensity and prevalence. It is a complicated phenomenon. Its success or failure causes politi- cal change 5 - A successful guerrilla struggle must have a good cause and an excellent organization. Propaganda and in- telligence must be used to the highest degree. Sabotage and terrorism must be ruthlessly carried out. Political maneuver and military operation must go hand-in—hand.- Bases must be built. Weapons and supplies must be secured. Foreign aid and sanctuary must be sought whenever possible. But above all, the minds of the populace must be won. Only with the ardent suppOrt 0f the People can guerrillas survive and ex— pand. To achieVe Victory in a guerrilla struggle, extra- ordinary leadership is needed. To defeat a guerrilla movement is by no means an easy task Inlsuch a confrontation, it .is necessarily ideology Ko—wang Mei versus ideology; causes of the struggle must be faithfully upfiuald. It is organization versus organization; the people HHlSt be fully mobilized and motivated. It is military Oper— zation versus military operation; victory must be scored in the battlefield. Persuasion must couple with coercion. Political, economic, social and military reforms and reorgani— zations must be undertaken by an honest and efficient govern- ment. It must be a total effort against a total war° Only if national reconstruction is vigorously carried out under war emergency can a guerrilla movement be successfully pre— vented and checked. Can the outcome of modern guerrilla warfare be fore— cast? Various measurements and scales have been suggested. Since so many variables are involved in such a process and since the research on guerrilla movement is still in its in— fancy, to find an accurate tool for this purpose, continuous and persistent endeavours on the part of political scientists are urgently needed. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE BY Ko-wang Mei A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1965 PREFACE The problem of guerrilla warfare has troubled me siruze rny teenage days. As a native of Taolin, a small town of lgirflisiang, Hunan, central China, Communist-led guerrillas wereaoo ooom new mflnmuoumooaoleucm p.>om .ucwpcmampea. w .smaepapmasauauam. szU smcume> rusom p.>om :ucoccomoUCH= w :EmHHMHHoQEHIHucm: oocoo Aoooono £pfl3 uneasy mflmocm wsumxo o>onm mm mEMm memflcse m>oom mm mEMm OUUOHOE o>oom no menu excox m>onm on menu mammGOUCH o>ogm on menu MCA:UOUCH mocoecmmoUCH Hmcoflumc can EmflHMHCOHOUIHucm MHHmoH¢ Hoono amoeuflaom umAcSEEOU m coflmmouomMIHpcm mfl>mawomow u.>oo toom .ooeomofl Hodge .Euowou coma: coflwmoummMIflucm mmcflmmfiaflsm mocwecmmotcfl e EmHHMACOHOUIHucw coflwmwummwlflocm mamas: Hoeuo Hmoflueaom uchsEEoo m coflwmoHOmMIHucm mooono :homuuoaoez d :Euowon cmauman= GOHmmemmMIflucm mcHSU Hoeuo Hmoeuflaoo umflcssfiou m conmoHooMIHucm mecmna< Amo>eoowhnov Amo>euchCHv HH ems pesos Hosea HH up: pesos sneeze mofluucooo momomu amoeuflaom .mHMmum3 mHHHHHosm_mo momsmo HMUHoHHom .m wanme 48 party, the abhorrence of the existing regime, etc. . . . may have their part to play. But whatever the motivation, the overthrow of the existing political order and the establish- ment of a new one is the aim of the guerrillas. In short, the guerrillas are always politically oriented. Effectiveness of the Government Under what kind of government is guerrilla warfare likely to happen? Among the seventeen countries listed in Table 3, ten of them had colonial governments when guerrilla movements were underway; five were under foreign occupation. Two of them, Cuba and South Vietnam, were charged of foreign domination. It is, however, clear that colonial and occu— pational regimes are most prone to guerrilla attack. To look a little bit further, among the fifteen nations which had foreign control, eight of them, Albania, China, the Congo, Greece, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, and Yugo— slavia, experienced continuous guerrilla struggles after foreign influences were removed. In those countries one of the rivaling groups had become incumbents; formal government had been established. Nonetheless, guerrilla struggles con— tinued. So the second generalization would be: guerrillas tend to develop under young regimes. But among thirty-seven new nations in Africa only one has experienced guerrilla war— fare after their independence, that is the Congo. More African new states preferred coup d'etat for their political 49 upheaval; and this is also true in Asia.36 So guerrilla war- fare does not necessarily occur in young countries. The in- cumbents in these eight nations were comparatively strong militarily through their own efforts and/or the assistance of their allies. However, probably with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania where the rivaling guerrillas were quickly liquidated right after the War, the common features of the new regimes are political instability and administra- tive ineffectiveness. Their bureaucracies are inexperienced; grass-roots appeal is weak; social organizations are loose or non—existent; political articulation and aggregation are inadequate; communication between the government and the people is particularistic and regional; and some degree of political corruption and injustice may be present. James E. Cross observed: "governments are too weak and inexperienced to meet popular needs," and ”the regimes have become too stiff in the joints to respond in time to the demands of changing conditions."37 In short, administrative and politi- cal incapability of the ruling elites is the main contributor to guerrilla warfare. 36African countries which had coups after their inde~ pendence are Egypt, French Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Sudan, and Zanzibar. In Asia, Burma, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, South Korea, and South Vietnam have had the same ex— perience. Some of them, like Yemen and South Vietnam have had both coup and guerrilla warfare. 7Cross, 0 . cit., p. 15. 50 Facts fully support this argument. The weaker party conducted activities against the stronger incumbents who were administratively ineffective. But when the administra- tive ability of the government was improved, the guerrillas suffered defeat; Malaya, the Philippines, Greece, and China (before 1936) are good examples. When the incumbents failed to improve their political ability and leadership, like in China (after 1946), the Congo and South Vietnam, they suffered setbacks at the hands of the guerrillas. A weak, disintegrated, or corrupt political machine is the sure proof for guerrilla successes, whereas a dynamic and clean one would be able to withstand the pressure. Indeed politi- cal corruption and deterioration speed up the guerrilla process while an efficient government tends to stop it. Reference, however, must be made to one exception to these rules: if the governments are colonial, statistics show that none of them have ever been saved from guerrilla struggles, without regard to their efficiency. Of course, most colonial governments are exploitative. None of the colonial governments have ever reached the political and ad— ministrative efficacy which has been maintained in their home countries. This ironic fact explains at least in part why the colonialists are doomed under the acid test of guer— rilla struggles. One may argue that counterguerrilla operations of any government are both expensive and highly inconvenient. Political and economic aspects of counterinsurgency campaigns 51 may be hard for a weak government to face up to. Further- more, the rebel leaders have usually worked hard and long to identify themselves with popular grievances. But the real issue is that the authorities are often reluctant to make reforms. The slowness of the response and the inertia of action are the worst enemies of the incumbents. When the political situation has been successfully manipulated by the guerrilla leaders, the incumbents have no excuse for their own failure. Guerrilla warfare is a life and death struggle between the opposing political factions, and the law of ”survival of the fittest” can be fully applied to it. How a government must improve itself to meet the challenge will be discussed in Chapter V. Guerrilla Warfare and Political Change As mentioned in Chapter I, there have always been some political changes without regard to the success or failure of guerrilla warfare. The fluctuations of guerrilla movement in China provides a very interesting example. The defeat of Mao in southern China in 1934 brought forth a uni~ fied nation and a popular and effective government which permitted China to resist Japanese aggression for eight years. While the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 brought China into Communism. In other countries also, guer- rillas have brought changes. They might be in the form of national independence, democracy, Communist regime, popular government, or others. 52 Table 4 gives a good illustration of political changes owing to guerrilla struggles. Table 4. Political changes caused by guerrilla warfare. Political Changes Country Before guerrilla After guerrilla warfare warfare Albania kingship Communist regime Algeria colonial government national independence China (1935) disunified unified & popular government government China (1949) constitutional Communist regime government Cuba dictatorship Communist regime Cyprus colonial government national independence Greece weak constitutional strong constitutional monarchy monarchy Indochina colonial government Communist regime Indonesia (1950) Indonesia (1961) Kenya Malaya Philippines Tunisia Yugoslavia colonial government constitutional government colonial government colonial government democracy colonial government kingship national independence "guided democracy”* national independence national independence more responsible democracy national independence Communist regime *the term is used by President Sukarno to explain his rule in Indonesia. The change so caused is not necessarily destined for de~ mocracy, fare. nor does it always end with increased people's wel— The merit of the establishment of a Communist regime after the success of a guerrilla struggle has been quite a controversy. But to set aside its value connotations, guer- rilla warfare has never failed to bring along political 53 changes with it. This is the most important phenomenon to be watched. Summing up, the interrelations between political situations and guerrilla warfare are identified as follows: A deteriorated political situation is the major cause of modern guerrilla warfare. Political inefficiency and corrup— tion speed up the guerrilla process; guerrilla warfare is always politically oriented; and whether it results in victory or failure, guerrilla warfare does bring changes to the existing political system. Foreign Intervention and Guerrilla Warfare According to the "political school,” there is a growing concern with regard to foreign intervention in guer- rilla warfare. According to Miksche: "Popular risings or revolutions rarely succeed without outside assistance."38 Just how big a role that foreign intervention has played in guerrilla struggle has to be clarified. Is foreign assistance the key to guerrilla warfare? Can guerrilla warfare be used for aggression and conquest; and, is guerrilla warfare more and more internationalized? Since World War II new developments in transportation, communication, weaponry and its delivery systems have shrunk the globe considerably. Countries on various continents are 38Miksche, o . cit., p. 66. 54 no longer indifferent inhabitants separated by mountains and oceans, but neighbors who can communicate with each other within a short time. Events in one locality may find instant reactions all over the world. Since guerrilla warfare means a violent, total, and armed struggle in one country, and its success or failure may change the balance of power in world politics, it is inevitable that it should attract inter- national attention. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism in colonial areas and the expansion of international Com_ munism have put guerrilla struggle under the limelight. There is little doubt that international interest in guer— rilla warfare has immensely increased. But interest in itself is not a substantial action. One must not interpret that international interest is the equivalent to foreign intervention. A foreign power may as— sist the guerrillas only when their success coincides with its own national interest. The desire to aid and the capa- bility to aid, however, are two different things. Russia was certainly eager to assist the Congoles guerrillas, but the sheer distance between them made the assistance quite difficult, if not impossible. How can the Chinese Communists support the Angolan rebels is also a big problem. Even if foreign aid is possible, the attitude of the receiver is an— other factor to be considered. "The surprising coolness of the Algerian rebels toward Communist aid"39 was an interesting 9Paret & Shy, o . cit., p. 37. 55 case. So, to say foreign intervention is a major contributor to guerrilla warfare is an oversimplified statement. To be sure, guerrillas in several countries did re- ceive foreign support and were instigated sometimes by a foreign power. In Indochina, Greece, South Vietnam, Cyprus and China (after 1945), guerrillas had been both instigated and supported by one or more foreign powers. In Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Yemen, Albania, and Yugoslavia, they were aided by neighboring or friendly countries. Guerrillas in China (before 1935), the Philippines, Malaya and Cuba re- received little foreign aid. Guerrilla movements in Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, and Kenya had received no foreign sup~ port at all. Thus the theory that guerrilla warfare has al_ ways been assisted by foreign power cannot be verified. Is foreign intervention one of the decisive factors in a guerrilla struggle? Superficially speaking, the as— sistance from outside, whether it is in money, firearms, food, medicine, sanctuary, manpower, advisors, moral or technical support, seems to strengthen the position of the guerrillas. But it also inherits some drawbacks. In the opinion of Paret and Shy, "Foreign aid dampens the emotions that provide the fuel for guerrilla warfare, and renders the ideological struggle more difficult. Inevitably there will be some conflict between the aims of indigenous guerrillas and their foreign benefactors."4O Galula found that outside 4OIbid. 56 support "can destroy or harm self—reliance in the insurgent ranks."41 The defeat of the Greek Communist guerrillas could have been caused, at least in part, by its over- reliance on foreign support both in arms and sanctuary. The closing of borders by Tito in the summer of 1949 proved fatal to the Greek insurgents. Russia's eagerness in aiding guerrillas all over the globe certainly keeps the vigil of new emerging nations alive. Red China's tremendous interest in supporting African rebels has resulted in the severence of diplomatic relations between her and Burundi, while nations in the French Federation started to talk about ”Red Chinese imperialism" in Africa. As a matter of fact, guerrilla warfare is basically an indigenous mass movement. It can be and has been ex- ploited by a foreign aggressive power for subversion purposes. This kind of international vandalism does not mean that a foreign power can send in its own troops to be disguised as local guerrilla fighters, nor can foreigners do the essential jobs for the native people. Foreigners may instigate, ad- vise, assist, and support the movement; it may even be con- venient, economical and profitable for the leaders of an ag- gressive nation to "persuade citizens of the state they wish to attack to espouse their cause to fight the matter out 41Galula, o . cit., p. 42. 42For the story between Red China and Burundi, see Time, vol. 85, no. 7, February 12, 1965, pp. 29—30. 57 43 But so far no foreign inter— with their own countrymen." vention has ever gone far by fighting a guerrilla war for the indigenous people. Students of guerrilla warfare must agree with Crozier that ”external influences and intervention may be of great importance, but they cannot by themselves, initi- ate a successful rebellion."44 Aggression and conquest through guerrilla warfare is an indirect and clandestine process. It is not the annexion of territory openly, but the exercise of control through influence and manipulation. Is foreign intervention the necessary condition for guerrilla Victory? Not at all. There are guerrilla wars which have gained their success by means of securing foreign aid, but as cited before, many of them have become victorious without substantial outside support. However, one thing must be kept in mind: when guerrillas receive substantial aid from outside, they are difficult to defeat. Even the royalists in Yemen have put up an impressive guerrilla struggle with the republican revolutionaries supported by the 45 Foreign inter— neighboring Saudi Arabian government. vention thus by no means can be underestimated. Is guerrilla warfare getting more internationalized every year? Yes. The rebels in Congo forests are not only 43Cross, 0 . cit., p. 116. 44Crozier, 0p. cit., p. 157. 45See George DeCarvalho, "Yemen's Desert Fox," Life February 19, 1965, pp. 97-109. 58 the concern of nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but also a major problem under the care of the United Nations. In fact, it indirectly cost the life of the U. N. Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. More than one dozen countries have been involved in the guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam. The guerrilla movement in Angola has become the major concern of most African nations. The trend is that guerrilla warfare. like regular wars, will be more internationally involved if it cannot be ended within a short span of time. Needless to say, guerrilla struggle may be escalated into an all-out open global war. As long as this unique form of struggle is manipulated continuously by foreign powers, the danger re— mains great. To conclude, modern guerrilla warfare is immensely saturated with foreign interests and its international flavor is on the increase. But no foreign power can take over the guerrilla fighting from the indigenous people. Foreign support is not the decisive factor to guerrilla victory, yet guerrilla warfare can be used by aggressive foreign power for subversive purpose. The Socio—Psychological Approach In the "socio-psychological school," guerrilla war- fare is explained as the outcome of unique personality patterns, and economic social and cultural conflicts. Is it true that by natural endowment or later experience, there 59 are men who are most adapted to be guerrilla leaders and fighters, without whom there would be no guerrilla warfare? Are economic conflicts caused by poverty and unevenly dis— tributed wealth the major contributors of guerrilla warfare? Do social inequality and class differentiation inspire guer- rilla struggles? All these questions must be carefully examined. Personality Pattern Are there people with a special personality pattern which would be destined to guerrilla warfare? Indeed, there is evidence that certain personality types are rebellious against established authority and likely to join in guerrilla warfare. However, to devote himself to guerrilla fighting, as a rule, one has to undergo a frustrating process. Take some noted guerrilla leaders for example: Mao Tse—tung had been a normal school graduate and a librarian before he joined the Chinese Communist Party at the age of twenty- eight. Six years later he served as the Acting Minister of Propaganda under the Chinese Nationalists which was leading the Northern Expedition. He showed no intention to conduct guerrilla movement before then. Even the split between the Nationalists and the Communists did not make him a guerrilla. It was only when he was cornered after his defeat in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927 did he resort to guerrilla 60 struggle.46 Ho Chi Minh has the same kind of story. Seeking for national independence of Vietnam, Ho had appealed to the Geneva Peace Conference in 1919 and many times to the French government after that.47 It was not until all hopes of peace- ful settlement were dampened that Ho finally took up guer- rilla struggle in 1945 against the French. Table 5 shows the background of famous guerrilla leaders in our time. In general, they share the following characteristics: 1. reared in rural areas, mostly in villages or small towns; 2. grew up in a middle-class or a poor family; 3. received higher education either in colleges or mili— tary academies; 4. got started in military, governmental or other pro- fession, only a small minority had been workers; 5. engaged in guerrilla warfare in their thirties or forties, the time when they were intellectually mature and physically strong. The table reveals that most guerrilla leaders were not guerrilla—prone in their early years. Though most guer- rilla leaders were from poorer families, they strived to get a decent education and prepared for a career. Then why did 46For Mao's personal history, see Anne Fremantle, Meg Tse—tung: An Anthology of His Writings (New York: The New American Library, 1962) "Introduction," vii-xxxiv. How he started his guerrilla struggle, see chapter IV, stage 1. 47For Ho's struggle, see Crozier, o . cit., pp. 29~33. 61 .mmnme .aa ..peo .mo .umHNOHU pew “lemme ..oo a .Hooaoo .2 "meanest uxuow Bozo Mom one Eoum mCOmqu .coomaumm .m .D “Aaoma .muogwflaoom .muonuoum w Hmmumm mmHMQEmU >mooe omouom meemcH .Honucoo stop “Aoooa ..©w cum .wocmHHH¢ memmmBoz mflwfllcmm "ocom mcomv 0:3 m.0£3 m.mHm< "mmUHDOm mCHBOHHOM ozu Eoum we wanna weep CH some ones .Hmcoflmmowoumllm .Qofl women no pcoEcuo>omllo .Hoonmo mumuHHHEIIZ .HoMHOBIJB "coflommsooo “mEoemom humuHHHE no omwaaoollu .Hoonom oHUUHEIIE .Hoozom wumEHHQIJm "coHumosom “evening .mmmHo oHUUHEIIE .Hoomnim ”ocoouoxomm >HHEmm “huflollu .monm Honoullm "mowam nuuflm umMHMEom x x x x x ouummu x x x x x nonwhcmx x x x x x maaom com x x x x x mm>fluo x x x x x whom x x x x x ones x x x x x USHMB x x x x x ocom Geno x x x x x anew x x x x x om x x x x x om: 0m 0m 0m m o 2 3 O z m m E m U m uo>o ou om zoaom oEmz waafluuooo ocooumxomm woman oEmoom coLB 00¢ coflummsooo coHuwootm waflemm nuuem e.wuwcmma maaauumsm cooUOE mo cssoumxomm .m wanes 62 they turn into guerrilla leaders? The answer may be found in a personality pattern. From their personal history, we learned that they are highly aspired men. But their aspir— ation which may include national independence, socialism or Communism, personal ambition, etc., could not be fulfilled through regular, legal, or traditional channels. At times they were cornered and their life and freedom were threatened. In desperation, frustration, fear, and anguish, guerrilla struggle remained their only choice. Mao, Ho, Chin, Taruc, Ben Bella, Kenyatta and Castro had all tried to achieve their goal through more moderate ways, but to no avail. It is probably not wrong to say that guerrilla leaders are desper— ate and frustrated individuals. But this frustration and desperation has its roots in their political aspirations and ambitions. A dogged determination which is motivated by the combination of aspiration, frustration and fear is the unique personality pattern of'a guerrilla leader. This psychologi— cal complex can even be applied to a former king of Yemen, Imam Badr, who is leading a brilliant guerrilla campaign against the republican Yemenite government under General Abdullah Sallal.48 Evidently, this kind of personality is formed by one's later experience. As to guerrilla fighters, they are overwhelmingly the peasants and the underprivileged, the ”have-nots" of the land. They follow their leaders in return for a promise of See DeCarvalho, Life, loc. cit. 63 a brighter future. They are manipulated and inspired by their leaders. Their mentality is to hope for something better because nothing can be worse. Pye's study of Malayan guerrilla fighters clearly demonstrates this point.49 Economic Conflict How much does economic deterioration contribute to guerrilla warfare? Under the impact of "economic determin- ism," many people are led to believe that poverty, underde— velopment, and economic chaos are the main factors of modern guerrilla movement. True, those who fight in guerrilla bands are mostly "have-nots,” but put on a comparative basis, countries which have guerrilla experience are neither the poorest nor the most undeveloped. Economy-wise, Malaya is much better off than Pakistan; Cuba is richer than most of the Central American states; Algeria and the Congo are much more developed than their African neighbors. Indochina used to be the "rice bowl" of Asia, and Kenya has the largest coffee plantation in East Africa. Yet, there have been guer- rilla struggles in these nations. In the most economically backward countries like Bhutan, Jordan, Syria, Somaliland, Niger, Chad, Haiti, Paraguay, etc., there have not been guer- rilla disturbances. So the proposition that guerrilla war- fare is the outcome of poverty or underdevelopment is not valid. 49See Part IV, Pye, op. cit., pp. 115—140. 64 Then could it be the unevenness of wealth distri- bution as the cause? Certainly the feeling of injustice be— tween the poor and the rich plants the seeds of hatred and grievance. The polarization of personal wealth may tear the society apart. The inequality in wealth has been attacked as social evil throughout human history, from Mencius to San Yat-sen and from Socrates to Lenin.50 But to say economic polarization is the most significant factor of guerrilla war- fare is none the less an over—simplified conclusion. Eco— nomic equality has not been achieved in any nation; indeed not even under Communism. Djilas' book, The New Class, gives a good description of that. If economic injustice alone were the motivating force behind guerrilla warfare, then countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya, to mention a few, should have experienced the phenomenon long ago. Disregarding the invalidity of the role that economic conflicts have played in guerrilla struggle, there is one phenomenon which is shared by many guerrilla-torn countries. It is the land problem. It has been known that in China, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, Kenya, and Cuba, the struggle for land between the peasants and the absentee land— lords has been the major issue taken up by the guerrillas. 50Said Mencius around the 4th century B. C., "Our trouble is not poverty but uneven distribution." San Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, stated in his Three Peoples' Principles in 1924: "Our problem is not production, but distribution so far as people's livelihood is concenred." Socrates advocated Communism in his Republic; and Lenin's state farms and collectives are well—known to the world. 65 Though there are exceptions to the case, such as the Congo, and Yemen, where land has not been an important problem, it is nevertheless true that wherever land is highly valued by the people and the majority of the farmers are landless, it is rather easy for guerrilla leaders to build up a powerful cause against the land gentry. Redistribution of land has thus become the dynamic factor in fomenting a guerrilla move- ment. Indeed ”we can generalize that intrasocietal guer— rilla warfare is facilitated by a peasantry which does not possess the soil it cultivates and a rural population which lacks adequate employment.”51 In sum, the conflict between the rich and the poor, the "haves" and the "have—nots," the landlords and the land— less peasants does help the fomentation of guerrilla warfare. But it plays only a contributive role. Guerrillas would not appear automatically under economic distress or polarization. When they do appear, however, a great following is expected. Undoubtedly, economic distress makes guerrillas easier to operate and grow. Social Conflict Guerrilla warfare is doubtlessly a social phenomenon which indicates the maladjustment and the deterioration of relations between social groups. The underlying causes may be personal, political, and economical, as previously 51Merle Kling, Annals, op. cit., p. 49. 66 discussed. Of course, it may also be caused by genuine social conflict. The Algerian case serves as a good example. Guerrilla movement in Algeria has not merely been an anti- colonial struggle. Racial and religious differences between the Europeans and the Arabs were so acute that reconciliation became impossible. A circular sent to local administrators by the former Governor-General of Algeria, M. Jacques Soustelle gives a good description of the situation: A big effort is still needed for courtesy to be— come normal practice. . . . The 'native' wishes to be treated as politely as anybody else. He is attached, legitimately, to his human dignity. Wounds of self-respect, in a naturally proud people imbued with the rules of oriental courtesy, are always the longest to heal In brief, if the 'Algeria problem' is of an economic and political character, it is also, and perhaps even more, a problem of human relations.52 Social conflicts between the native Moslems and European whites supplied the fuel to the guerrilla flames in Algeria. In Malaya before its independence, the Chinese were treated as second-class citizens. In fact the majority of them were not citizens, although they comprised more than 40% of the total population. They were debarred from certain civil service jobs and were denied the right to own land. There should be no surprise, therefore, that most guerrillas in Malaya were of Chinese origin. But social conflict cannot be applied to all guer- rilla movements. In China, for instance, guerrillas and 52As cited by Crozier, 0p. cit., pp. 25-26. 67 counterguerrillas may be brothers, cousins, classmates, rela- tives, neighbors, or other intimate relations. Rivaling groups were socially and culturally homogeneous. The same holds true in the Philippines. Social conflicts embrace racial, ethnical, religious and cultural differences. Tribal antagonism in the Congo fanned up guerrilla fires. To a certain extent, ethnic fragmentation in Albania laid the cornerstone for the guer- rilla struggle between Hoja and Kupi. Guerrilla warfare is certainly a deviant social be- havior. The breakdown of harmonious personal, economic, social and cultural relations among social groups lays the foundation for popular turmoil. With the distressed, as- pired, and ambitious rebels leading the way, various con— flicts which exist in the community are exploited and manipu- 1ated. The exploitation and manipulation differ from one cultural setting to another. But the presence of an insur- rective group is absolutely necessary. Once enough masses are recruited for the armed venture, guerrilla warfare is then bound to begin. From the discussions above, we learn that socio- economic-psychological factors are related to guerrilla war- fare; a group of aspired, yet frustrated rebellious intel- lectuals are indispensible to start a guerrilla movement. However, the theory that they are born that way cannot be empirically verified. Poverty and economic distress are not 68 necessarily associated with guerrilla struggle, but the un— even distribution of wealth, and especially land, bears a strong impact on guerrilla movement. Social and cultural conflicts do add fuel to guerrilla flames, yet guerrilla war- fare has occurred in homogeneous social and cultural settings. Summary Guerrilla warfare is a complicated phenomenon. Any over-simplification in its theorization may lead to misunder— standing and confusion. To have a clear recognition of this torrent struggle, we have approached it from different directions. From the above study, we find these theories are inadequate, however, it may be concluded that: (l) Governmental ineffectiveness and a determined re- bellious group are the two necessary conditions of modern guerrilla warfare. Without either one of them guerrilla warfare can hardly materialize. (2) Social and economic conflicts contribute to the out- break and intensification of modern guerrilla war- fare; their respective weights in the struggle vary with the social setting in which the guerrilla move— ment takes place. (3) The "cause-and—effect" and ”ends—and—means” re- lations do not necessarily exist between revolution and modern guerrilla warfare; i.e., neither all revo- lutions resort to guerrilla struggle, nor are all guerrilla movements revolutionary. 69 (4) Modern guerrilla warfare can be manipulated for sub- versive and aggressive purposes by a foreign power, but the fighting must be carried out by the indigenous people. (5) Modern guerrilla warfare is always politically ori— ented; political changes would result, irrespective of the success or failure of a guerrilla struggle. These propositions will be re—examined after the case study in chapter IV. CHAPTER III STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE The theoretical aspect of guerrilla warfare has been ' discussed in the preceding chapters. Hereinafter, its oper- ational aspect will be discussed. How is guerrilla warfare conducted strategically and tactically? How do guerrilla forces recruit their personnel and maintain their leadership? How is the guerrilla process carried through? These are the questions that this chapter ventures to answer. The discussions in this chapter come under the follow— ing headings: (1) general principles, (2) cause, (3) organi— zation, (4) propaganda, (5) terrorism, (6) intelligence and sabotage, (7) mass struggle, (8) military operations, (9) base, (1) weapons and supplies, (ll) personnel, and (12) the guerrilla process. Thus arranged, it is hoped that the essentials of guerrilla operation can be thoroughly understood. General Principles As indicated in chapter one, modern guerrilla war— fare is a war of totality based upon a mass movement. Being a form of war, guerrilla warfare consists of imposing one's .own will on the opponent, and destroying the opponent's will 70 71 and strength to resist. In the simplest terms, it aims at the conquest of the enemy. But to accomplish this, the guer- rillas, unlike regular armies, put more emphasis on the will of the rivalry. They zero at the mind of the opponent first, and his armies next. As Bjelajac observed: ”Unconventional warfare may consist of violent actions like guerrilla attacks, civil insurrections, mass riots, sabotage or terrorism——or of such 'non—violent' techniques as propaganda, infiltration, strikes, boycott and espionage. Indeed, its distinctive characteristic is that of blending violence and non—violence into a new synthesis of warfare."1 The conduct of guerrilla operations has been regarded as "political” by some students of war because it covers a wide range of activities which are closer to political maneuvering than to military cam— paigning.2 Whatever the terminology, guerrilla warfare dis— tinguishes itself by ideological indoctrination, crowd manipulation, psychological warfare, and paramilitary actions. Strategically, as well as tactically, guerrilla warfare is unique and unconventional. However, for the guerrillas to begin to develop into an effective force, certain basic premises must be satisfied. If this type of warfare is to have a chance to survive and expand and eventually to win, it must have something more 1S. N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era," Osanka, op. cit., p. 440. 2See James Burnham, "Sticks, Stones, and Atoms," Osanka, op. cit., p. 420. 72 than its unconventional strategy and tactics. Essentially, guerrilla warfare must take place in a broad expanse of broken terrain, thus able to cloak its operations and dis- courage enemy sweeps and pursuits. It must have at least the passive support of the population. It must have moti- vation. It must be waged by tough, independent people inured to hardship. It must have more than a modicum of organi— zation and discipline, and logistical support. Valeriano and Bohannan added: ”The guerrilla habitually must: Fight only at a time and place of his own choosing. Develop comprehen- sive intelligence and counter-intelligence screens. Rely generally on decentralized command. Punish his enemies among the civilian population. Rely on primitive, often improvised, communication and transportation facilities. Emphasize gain_ ing popular support and good will. Seek to overcome the enemy's will to resist more by psychological than by physi~ cal force."3 In brief, grand objectives of modern guerrilla warfare are three: (a) to gain popular support, (b) to achieve self—maintenance and expansion, and (c) to destroy the enemy's will to resist and/or to defeat his physical force. Strategies, stratagems, tactics, operations in guer- rilla warfare lead toward these paramount goals. As stressed in Chapter I, the major purpose of a mass movement is to gain popular support. To win the populace to their side, the guerrillas resort to the following practices: 3Valeriano and Bohannan, o . cit., p. 24. 73 the creation of a cause, the organization of the people, and the persuasion and coercion of the masses with psychological and physical means. To achieve self-maintenance and ex— pansion, highly instigated and disciplined personnel, a secured base, and adequate weapons and supplies are needed. To defeat the enemy's will and strength, military operations must couple with mass struggles, and they must be supple— mented with propaganda, terrorism, sabotage and intelligence. In short, guerrilla warfare in its modern context is a mammoth, yet smoothly concerted, operation which influences the whole society whose members are directly or indirectly involved. In addition, leaders of guerrilla warfare must ex— ploit every possible situation in the society for their ad- vantage. Hilsman listed nine conditions which may be manipu- lated by the guerrillas: l. Antagonisms between underdeveloped states. 2. Disagreements between regions of a state or between a region and the center. 3. Social class antagonism. 4. Intense disagreement over foreign policy. 5. Traditional political rivalries within a social class. 6. Lack of popular belief in the state as a sovereign entity. 7. Ethnic or racial issues. 74 8. Banditry. 9. Constitutional crises. The multiple conditions manifest that the guerrillas have plenty of grounds to build up their cause, and the stage for their rebellion can be easily set. If the rebels are capable enough, there is a good chance for them to get under way. Finally, guerrilla leaders must always keep the fire burning, to convince supporters, and individual guerrillas alike, that their movement is effective; that it is con- tributing to the achievement of their goal. In other words, hope must always be present. When good morale is kept among the partisan, guerrilla warfare can last for a long time. The conduct of modern guerrilla warfare is the ruth— less application of ideological, political, organizational, psychological, and military means to the total struggle. The guerrilla's process is a complicated and SOphisticated one. When guerrilla leaders are imbued with this kind of concept, they are in the position to direct a viable and dy- namic guerrilla movement. The Cause The first element of strategical importance to guer- rilla warfare is a "cause." It spells out the ultimate ob~ jective of the struggle, and inspires the fighters, as well 4Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," Osanka, op. cit., pp. 461—62. 75 as the people rallying behind the movement. Basically, it is an ideological appeal which is carefully tuned to justice, honor, pride and emotion. Its final goal is the capture of the human mind so that people will participate in violent struggle. Guerrilla leaders know very well that human beings are the slaves of their minds. Once a cause has its grip on one's mind, one can do nothing but comply. Students of modern guerrilla warfare realize well the value of a cause. Mao Tse-tung's statement "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail,"5 has been widely cited all over the world. Valeriano and Bohannan as— serted that "a cause” is ”imperative for a viable guerrilla movement."6 Galula insisted that "The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an insurgency unless he has a well— grounded cause with which to attract supporters among the population."7 And "man (guerrilla) so dedicated must have an ideal, one that is plain and simple and worth dying for,”8 is Guevara's conviction. Indeed a cause is indispensable to modern guerrilla warfare. In practice, no guerrilla movement in our time has failed to espouse a respectable cause. Chapter II has 5Griffith, 09. cit., p. 43. 6Valeriano and Bohannan, op. clp., p. 19. 7Galula, op. cit., p. 13. 8Guevara, op. cit., p. 35. We. ni- 76 listed the causes of various guerrilla struggles all over the globe.9 But why have some guerrillas succeeded and others failed? Are there any correlations between the cause and the outcome of a guerrilla struggle? What kind of appeal makes the best cause? To these questions there have not been any empirical studies, yet there are some generali- zations which are worthy of note. First of all, the cause must meet the strongest desire of the masses. The greater the appeal of the cause to the people, the greater its in- fluence. However, the cause may contain more than one propo— sition in order that different appeals may reach different people, hopefully that an overwhelming majority of the popu— lation will be attracted. For instance, when anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa ran high after World War II, the cause of "national independence" was strong enough to rally native people behind it. But in China, Cuba, and Greece, anti- colonialism remained no longer an issue, so various prOpo_ sitions had to be worked out. The land problem had been fully exploited by the Chinese guerrillas. It had a tremen- dous appeal because land—thirsty peasants are the majority of the people in these two countries. In Malaya, Chin Peng first stressed anti—colonialism, which stopped functioning when.his country gained independence from the British in 1957. So he shifted to "overthrow of the government, the 9See Table 3, Chapter II. 77 expulsion of Europeans, and the redistribution of wealth."10 Though there were several propositions, the cause was not very strong. It contributed considerably to Chin's defeat. The failure of Communist guerrillas in the Philippines and Greece can also be attributed, in part, to the weakness of their causes. We come now to the second generalization of a sound cause: it must be impossible or at least very difficult for the incumbents to fulfill the appeal. This explains why anti- colonialism and national independence have won in almost every guerrilla struggle when they were used against foreign colonialists who could never back down from their original position. But Luis Talruc's "land reform, equal justice, and good government” appeals failed in the Philippines be— cause of Magsaysay's enlightening reform programs in land and in politics. The ten—point proposal laid down by the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation contains politi- cal, economic and social appeals.ll Whether guerrillas in South Vietnam would succeed eventually would be decided to a certain extent by the capability of the South Vietnamese government to take up the challenge and to make necessary re— forms as indicated in the guerrillas' causes. From past loSee Anthony Crockett, "Action in Malaya," Osanka, 0p. cit., p. 309. 11See William J. Pomeroy, Guerrilla and Counter— Guerrilla Warfare (New York: International Publishers, 1964) . pp. 53-4. 78 experience, one thing seems sure; if the cause can be easily adopted by the government, the guerrilla's chance of success is rather slim. So a sound cause for the guerrillas must be the kind of appeal unacceptable to the ruling elites. To make the cause more attractive to the people and less acceptable to incumbents, it must be somewhat abstract, yet with high moral qualities. Terms like "justice," "equal- ity," "freedom," and ”democracy" are certainly better than "wealth redistribution," because the latter is more concrete, therefore more easily carried out. The former ones are with— out definite boundaries. Even if the government resolves to do something about them, the rebels have plenty of grounds to complain. Needless to say, to build a strong and effective cause is on the highest order in a guerrilla leaders calendar. But it also presents a paradox. It must be con- crete enough to make a heart—felt appeal to the people, yet abstract enough that the ruling elite is unable to fulfill it at ease. It must be able to rally the support of the ma— jority, yet engender opposition from the incumbents. Thayer has tried to work out the major ingredients of a guerrilla cause. He listed: 1. The cause must be both plausible and compelling. 2. It must possess a high moral appeal that justifies violations of traditional norms of behavior. 3. It must be achievable by less violent means. 79 4. It has some hope of fulfillment. But he also cautioned that "every insurgent movement has a large element of the irrational. Fanatical nationalism, extreme frustration with prolonged social or political in— justice and the madness of revenge are among the most frequent motives of guerrilla violence in civilized communities.”12 Thus the embracement of a cause is no easy task to the guerrillas. In sum, the cause provides the ideological convic- tion which is essential and fundamental to a guerrilla move— ment. Its content varies with national culture, social con— ditions, economic situation, and political atmosphere. A sound and powerful cause needs a good mixture of rationality and emotionalism, concreteness and abstraction, morality and craving, facts and illusions. It is the job for an artist, a creative leader, and in most instances, a statesman. Only with the right cause firmly set, can guerrilla leaders march toward their risky and violent adventure. Organization ”A guerrilla movement requires organization if it is to live and win more than transient success . . . Organi— zation may be regarded as the first imperative of a guerrilla movement, since it is essential for the success of any but a mob—type revolution, even though it may not precede guerrilla 12Thayer, 0p. cit., p. 39. 8O actions."13 "The power of the people cannot be manifested without organization.“14 These words of Valeriano and Bohannan and Mao Tse—tung have forcefully stressed the stra- tegic value of organization in a guerrilla struggle. As a matter of fact, cause and organization are inseparable twins of any modern guerrilla movement. They always go hand-in- hand, and it is hard to tell which should come first. Organization can last long only with a cause; in turn, a cause can be widely spread only with an organization. These two strategic moves lay down a solid foundation for modern guerrilla warfare. Organization of a viable guerrilla movement is quite unique. It is a combination of secret and open structures, political and military apparatuses, nucleus and operational units, and mass and “front" institutions. It is character- ized by its comprehensiveness, flexibility and effectiveness. Comprehensiveness means that the organization reaches every— body who is under the influence of the movement. Flexibility means its structural forms may fit into every group in a com— xnunity. Effectiveness indicates its structure is formidable, hard to destroy and suitable for both attack and defense. How should a guerrilla organization be built? Zawodny listed its seven basic structural elements: l3Valeriano and Bohannan, 0p. cit., p 17. l4Mao Tse-tung, Aspects of China's Anti—Japanese Struggle (Bombay, 1948), p. 68. 81 l. Headquarters, where the locus of formal power is crystalized; 2. Intelligence; 3. Communication; 4. Propaganda; 5. Logistics; 6. Cadres in reserve and training; 7. Fighting arms-—guerrilla and sabotage units.15 The list, however, is by no means complete. It is mainly sketched from the functional standpoint. Guerrilla organi— zation is much more complicated than this. Galula viewed it from a different angle. He wrote: In order to mobilize the population for a total war effort, every inhabitant under the insurgent's control is made to belong simultaneously to at least two organizations: one, horizontal, is a geographic organization, by hamlet, village, or district; the other, vertical, groups the inhabitants by categories of every kind, by age, by sex, by profession. The party cells criss-cross the whole structure and pro— vide the cement. Galula has a wider concept than that of Zawodny, but the functional aspect is somewhat neglected. Actually, modern guerrilla movement must be organized in a way that both Zawodny's and Galula's principles are included. Its es— sential parts are the nucleus, "fronts," mass organizations, and the military machine. The Nucleus The nucleus of a guerrilla movement is started by a group of dedicated, resolute, and desperate men who are the lSJ. K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organi- zation, Operations, Motivation, Escalation, p. 9. 16Galula, 0p. cit., p. 56. " Annals, o . cit. ) 82 leaders of the venture. Once firmly established, they set out to expand the organization. Agents from the nucleus are sent to various parts of the country to form new organi— zations or to infiltrate existing institutions by means of "nuclei process."17 When new members are recruited in different areas, the original nucleus becomes the nerve center, the high command, or the headquarters of the guer- rilla movement. It begins the division of work right away. Specialized units are formed to assist the high command in directing, supervising and coordinating field activities, or in performing a special duty. In general, the guerrilla headquarters is composed of the following units: (a) The command and his staff——including the top—leaders and their immediate staff with the functions of policy—making, directing, planning, initiating, co— ordinating, and supervising. (b) The specialized units--including all highly special— ized services which must be centralized, such as organization, intelligence, communication, propa— ganda, training, logistics, military operations, sabotage, mass struggle, terrorism, etc.. In the early stage of the movement, the nucleus takes direct actions in the specialized fields. When the movement spreads l7"Nuclei process” means to send secret agents into an existing organization and to build ”cells" within, so that power in that organization can be wrestled from the old command. viu' w-.. L. ¢-~ I 5 hu- 4 .“ ‘1 B, L. t,” nu, 83 out, the specialized units gradually become commanding offices which, in turn, are subject to control by the higher echelon. The nucleus distinguishes itself as highly clan— destine. It is always undercover, for its activities are mainly conspiratory. It is in the form of a political party or association; the Communist Party in various countries and the FLN in Algeria are good examples. No modern guerrilla warfare has ever been started without a political party or association behind it. From the very beginning it is in the position to command. Indeed it is the dynamo of the whole operation. The "Fronts" Front organization or "fronts” are overt organs of the guerrillas. They can be both old or new creations, but all of them are under secret manipulation and control of the guerrilla high command through the "cells" it has built with- in.18 They are legitimate structures under the law of the existing government, operating in ”enemy" territory openly within legal limits, but serving as the mouthpiece, the covering agency, and/or the recruiting machine of the guer— rillas. Communist led guerrillas are experts in this respect. 18"Cells" are first formed by secret agents from the guerrilla headquarters, but may take in trusted members from the organization in order to build additional cells. They are the loci of control in the organization. 84 For instance, in Greece, the KKE (Greek Communist Party) con- trolled at least twelve "front" organizations after World 1 . War II. 9 They covered people from almost every walk of life, and with such attractive names as "Democratic Women's Organi— zation," "Protective Organization of the People's Right," ”Seamen's Partisan," etc. Members of the fronts are not di— rectly related to the guerrillas. In fact, some of them may not even know that they are being manipulated. Members of the cell are skillfully exploiting them. The agents are undercover, but the front and its activities are in the open. Mass Organizations Mass organizations are the creations of guerrilla agents. They can be either overt or covert. In case of the former, they are designed for mass struggles such as demon— strations, rallies, riots and strikes. They are composed of students, workers, and petit merchants in cities, and farmers in rural areas. Various associations are established within the limits of law but under secret leadership of the guerrilla agents. In case of the latter, secret organi— zations are built for intelligence, communications, terror— ism, sabotage, and propaganda. However, their membership is more selective than the overt ones. Only the trusted and capable persons are chosen, so that they can perform a rather satisfactory job. 19E. R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49,” Osanka, o . cit., p. 219. 85 Mass organizations try to cover everybody in the com- munity; women and children are included. The guerrilla leaders know very well that only with the masses behind them can they balance the military superiority of their opponents. Lt. Col. Geneste, a French army officer who had experience in Indochina, provided a vivid description of how guerrillas organized the masses in a Vietminh village: The Organization has made each village a military entity-—a little theater of operations self-sufficient with its cells, its political commissar, its tax collector and its supply system. We have discovered the 'medical' organization of one village; only women. They confirm that, willingly or not, everyone has a role. Even children bring messages or weapons. The organization of this village is typical of a guerrilla- controlled area. After mass organizations are well under way, regional offices are established to coordinate and command the oper- ations in that area. The office is secret to outsiders, but known to the indigenous people. It is the prototype of civil government of the guerrillas. The Military Machine The nucleus, fronts and mass organizations, however, all have one top objective in their mind, that is, the cre— ation of a fighting force. There must be men to bear arms so that the final goal of guerrilla warfare, the defeat of 20Marc E. Geneste, ”Guerrilla Warfare," Osanka, pp. cit., p. 266. 86 the enemy, can be achieved. As a result, guerrilla bands are formed and gradually expanded to company, battalion, and even division strength. But the guerrilla fighting force is not solely mili- tary in nature. Structurally and functionally, it is a politico—military machine. It is empowered to fight the enemy, in the meantime, it has the capacity to win over the people. A French veteran of the Algerian war diagramed the . . . . . 2 organization of Algerian guerrillas as follows on page 87. l Paret and Shy made the following observation about the Algerian guerrilla military organization: Certainly, the political officers help to establish and retain control over forces that are potentially dangerous to the civilian leadership. But it would be wrong to see their functions only in this light. Their presence with the troops constitutes a recog— nition that political problems are part of all com— bat operations, and that enthusiasm and fanaticism among the soldiers aid military effectiveness. Indeed, as Mao declared: "All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless 23 Mao himself is a of the source or size of such units." faithful practitioner of this principle. In his armies, from his early crude guerrilla bands to the multi-million 21J. Perret-Gentil, "L'Armes francaise face a la guerre subversive: II. La technique et les procedes de la rebellion organisee en Algeria," L'Armes—-La Nation, XIII (November, 1959), 24-26. The ranks of the commands may vary. As quoted by Paret and Shy, op. cit., p. 23. 22Ibid., p. 22. 23Griffith, 09. cit., p. 44. 87 Amuflmmmg >MMpHHsz wcmwmuwm Amsflmmma msmuflaflzv umpmo F. “whammma sumpflaflzv uCMCWWSOHA Amuflmmw< snmuflaflzv “ohmz _ AmocwmflaamuCH w COmHMHAV usmwmumm k _ Honmzlucmmmumm mOBUHm AmocmmflaamwcH o COmHmflQV wmpmo _ pcmcmpsmflq pcm BUHmBmHQ AmocwmflaaoaCH d COmHmflqv ucmcmuswflq P. a samummo MZON AmocmmflaaouCH w COmHquv Hoflmz _ d HmcoHOO ZOmem Amuflmmmm Hmofluflaomv ucmmmumm r— Amsnmmms Hmoflpaaomv pmwmo Amuammmm Hmofluflaomv HCMC®#5®H.H l. Amuflmmm< Hmofluflaomv “ohm: iL 88 strong "Liberation Army,” political commissars are powerful figures. They are responsible not only for morale boosting but also for propaganda, intelligence, and coordination with the local people.24 Modern guerrilla forces have never neglected their political arms. The organization of modern guerrilla warfare can be put into the following model: Cells Open Mass Organizations (For mass struggles-—strikes demonstrations, riots, etc.) 1‘ . [I Nucleus Guggiéiia l Political Party . . . . . ‘iHigh Command Specialized Cells Military Political — :7 Un'ts U 't & Staff Commands FIOHtS 1 n1 S ~ L_ Regional Offices (For propa- $ / ganda, Pro" tection & Cells recruiting) Secret Mass Organizations (For intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, & communication) In this model, the organization operates in such a way that not only the nucleus is commanding, directing, and coordin- ating through the regional offices and cells, but also the various sub-structures are closely correlated with one 24The Wuhan Army Group. A Study of Communist Guer- rilla Warfare and its Counter Measures (in Chinese, Taipei, Taiwan: The Wuhan Army Group, 1962), p. 94. 89 another. They are mutually reinforcing and supporting so that the organization becomes a solid whole. Thus the total- ity of guerrilla warfare is made possible. Furthermore, when the people are organized vertically and horizontally, openly and secretly, politically and mili- tarily, every person is under the control of the guerrilla mechanism with a definite role to perform. Instigated and inspired by the cause, people under organizational manipu- lation are working toward the single goal, the defeat of the enemy. Thus oriented, the masses create a solid front to support the fighting guerrillas, and Mao's theory that "the people are like water and the guerrillas the fish who in- habit it”25 becomes a reality. Propaganda Can the masses be organized and infused by the guer- rillas with a cause at will? Not at all. People the world over are mainly politically apathetic. Before they take a step to side with the guerrillas, they have to be wooed, per— suaded and convinced. This is why propaganda becomes im- portant. But to win the people is just one facet of the job. The will of the enemy to resist must be weakened. Moreover, the mind of the guerrilla himself must always be on the right track. So propaganda in guerrilla warfare is essen— tially a three—dimensional operation: 'ZSSee Griffith, op. cit., p. 93. 90 1. To win over the masses with propaganda; 2. To attack the enemy with psychological warfare; and 3. To maintain self—confidence with political indoctrination. Psychologically, people confronted with the guer- rilla's cause, may be divided into three groups: (1) the sympathizers or supporters; (2) the opponents; and (3) the neutrals. So in guerrilla warfare the strategy of propa- ganda must be to encourage the supporters, to discourage the opponents, and to persuade the neutrals. It must not be carried out merely in the form of ideological exhortation; on the contrary, it must be as homely and practical as possible. Modern guerrillas emphasize the benefits to be de— rived under their cause and follow this up with concrete actions. The word—of—mouth tactic, including rumors and gossip, is often employed. Above all, they stress again and again that they are the winners in the long run, because they know that “people become actually aware of the im— portance of ending up on the right side. The temptation to defer judgment initially and then to jump on the right band- wagon at the appropriate time is compelling, for the penal— ties of guessing and acting wrongly are vividly evident."26 With consistent wooing and persuading, coupled with promises and threats, the guerrillas intend not only to win over the 26Cross, 0 . cit., pp. 36—37. 9l neutrals but also bring about a change in the opponents' original position. In the field of psychological warfare, to direct propaganda "consistently and vigorously against the enemy, employing those themes which arouse doubt, suspicion, mis- trust, or discontent"27 is the principle that the guerrilla follows. In the exploitation of successful armed attacks by guerrillas, propaganda is accompanied by deliberate rumor— making in order to spread terror and panic amOng the people and weaken their faith in the existing government and its leaders. Meanwhile, there are strategical moves. The enemy camp is repeatedly told that they are espousing a losing cause thus to join the guerrilla is the best way out. Backed up with the length of the struggle and the improving fortune of the guerrillas, long-range psychological assault like this may at times work miracles. It has been proved in China, Indochina and Cuba. However, psychological warfare is a delicate operation. Its success and failure may be quite un— predictable. As observed by Paul M. A. Linebarger: "It is not controlled by the laws, usages, and customs of war; and it cannot be defined in terms of terrain, order and battle, or named engagements. It is a continuous process. Success or failure is often known only months or years after the exe— cution of operation. Yet, success, though incalculable, can be overwhelming; and failure, though undetectable, can be 27George B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Com- Inunist Guerrilla Warfare," Osanka, 0p. cit., p. 406. 92 mortal.”28 Since the rewards and punishments of psycho- logical warfare are great, guerrilla leaders all over the world have attempted to master it for their own advantages. They have not only used words, newspapers, pamphlets, and radios for this purpose, but also actions. The kind and gentle treatment of enemy prisoners and their release after political indoctrination, which have been successfully used by Mao and Castro, serve as excellent examples of psycho- logical offensive against the enemy.29 The versatility of this psychological weapon is of course beyond the descrip— tion of this paper, but the basic rule of the game is put yourself in the position of the enemy and try to find out what is the most attractive proposal. It seems that guer- rilla leaders have always kept this in mind. The indoctrination of one's own comrades-at—arms is another important task of guerrilla leaders. It may be re- garded as "internal propaganda" because everybody under the guerrilla's control is subject to this kind of treatment. The so-called ”rectification" under Communist guerrillas are in this category. It is not a loosely conducted activity but a well-organized process. People are grouped into mass 28Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington: Combat Force Press, 1948), p. l. 29Said Mao in 1928: "The most effective method in propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give the wounded medical treatment." And he did just that. See Selected Military Writings, pp. cit., p. 31. The story about Cuba, see Guevara, op. cip., p. 32. 93 meetings, discussion panels and study units. Policies of the guerrilla movement are explained and discussed. Frequent self-criticism and mutual criticism are vigorously practiced. and constant ideological exhortations are experienced.30 This kind of practice would keep the rank and file, as well as the general public under guerrilla control, constantly on vigil and well—informed. A sense of participation is in— creased, and deviant ideas are located and weeded out. In the meantime, symbols, signs, slogans, music, crowd—leader dialogue, and other rhetorical and psychological tricks are widely applied in mass rallies. The whole battery of psycho— logical manipulation may be collectively called "brain wash— ing," which is regarded as indispensable by guerrilla leaders, especially those in the Communist camp. ”Properly evaluated and properly conducted propa- ganda is an exceedingly useful weapon in all military oper- ations. In irregular warfare, where public opinion is ’the center of gravity', it is indispensable,"31 wrote Thayer. Though propaganda, psychological offensive and political in- doctrination are no substitutes for military operations, if well-planned and skillfully applied, they can successfully attain strategical and tactical objectives. 30For a detailed account of the indoctrination of guer— rillas, see Pye, op. cit., pp. 248-62. Also see Chen fen in Chapter IV. 31Thayer, op. cit., p. 48. 94 Terrorism In a guerrilla movement, not all people can be per- suaded with propaganda, nor can a big portion of the enemy be conquered with psychological warfare; even members of the guerrilla camp may defect to the enemy in spite of indocrtin_ ation. To remedy this situation, leaders of guerrilla war— fare have resorted to terrorism. Terrorism is the "use of violence for political ends," and it is ”the natural weapon of men with small resources, fighting against superior "32 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that strength. the weaker party invariably uses terror, nor does it imply that it cannot be employed by the stronger party. However, when practiced by the incumbents, it is called ”repression.” Functions of terrorism are manifold: 1. It can intimidate the enemy, so it is often used against capable and determined leaders in the com— munity and the government at both the national and local level, in the hope of dissuading strong characters to take a decisive stand against the guer- rilla movement, or simply for reprisal. Weaker characters, seeing what the stronger ones have re— ceived, will tend to be timid and soft toward guer- rillas, thus facilitating guerrilla warfare. 2Crozier, op. cit., pp. 159, 160. 95 2. It persuades the neutrals who refuse to take sides. Now they know that riding on the fence is risky. If they do not go along with the guerrillas, the conse- quence is grave indeed. In case the government fails to provide adequate protection, the majority of them will play ball with the rebels under the threat of terrorism. The ranks of the guerrillas are thus strengthened. 3. It dissuades the possible ”traiters" and disserters in the guerrilla's own camp. 4. It may gain publicity for the guerrillas whose status and prestige are thus enhanced. In people's minds they become onmipresent and omnipotent. The use of terror as a weapon is a standard practice in both Communist and non-Communist—led guerrilla warfare. As to the former, South Vietnam serves as an excellent ex- ample; as to the latter, Cyprus is typical. Invariably, im- placable foes are assassinated; waverers are kidnapped or killed; deserters are liquidated; and the uncooperative public is threatened. Panic sweeps across the community. The iron grip of the guerrilla is in. Terrorism, deadly effective as it is, has warranted strong opposition of its use. Needless to say, it can be criticized on moral and ethical grounds. But it is more than that. Thayer argued "history provides few cases where terror by itself has been successful in achieving a major {/1 l)’ [3 I)! I. “Av... 645,“- . § I}! (I) ) tn ‘fi 1 (I) (I' I! III 443 96 political aim."33 Crozier asserted that "rebellion may or may not be 'good', but terrorism cannot be anything but 'bad'. Terrorism is an inefficient, and often self—defeating, instrument of rebellion."34 Certainly, if terror is used un— wisely and blindly, the danger of alienating the people or popular reaction is great. Mau Mau atrocity in Kenya serves as a good example. However, when terrorism is applied se— lectively and purposefully in accordance with the strategy of the guerrilla struggle, it can be quite fruitful. So "se- lectivity" becomes the watch word for the application of terrorism. Put into Guevara's words, "Under special con- ditions, assassinations of individuals guilty of major re- pressive actions are permissible. No indiscriminate terror— ism is to be employed."35 Another argument is whether the application of terror~ ism should be absolute or relative. Ney advocated that ''the use of terror, to be effective, must be absolute. Terror, the guerrilla leader's most potent weapon, is used by him not only to demoralize the enemy and extort the support of his own people, but also to exact unswerving loyalty from the individual guerrilla, who is made to understand that de— fection or betrayal is punishable by death."36 To be k 33Thayer, op. cit., p. 124. 34Crozier, op. cit., p. 127. 35Guevara, 0p. cit., p. 56. 36Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy,” OScanka, op. cit., p. 321. 97 absolute, once the subject is selected, "massacre or indi- vidual murder is often supplemented by mutilation before death, and sometimes by torture. Favorite methods of torture were red-hot pokers and boiling water poured from a kettle. Mutilation consisted of the amputation, by knife, of nose, "37 The selective but tongue, lips, ears or sexual parts. not indiscriminate, absolute but not lenient use of terror is the common practice among guerrillas. In fact, the killing carried out under terrorism is not the prime objective. In the context of modern guerrilla warfare, it is the atmosphere which is created by terror that influences the behavior of the people deserving special attention. As Paret and Shy put it: “An atmosphere of violence creates new emotions and commitments, so that in the end a whole society may become revolutionary. Violent experience does change people, whether they are perpetrators, victim, or witnesses.”38 It is in this light that terrorism gains its strategic value in modern guerrilla warfare. Terror has been an indispensable weapon in guerrilla movement. Though it has its pros and cons, its strategical and tactical importance should not be neglected. It makes life unendurable for the enemy, eliminates traitors, "paci— fies" and persuades the public, and changes the behavior of 37Crosier, op. cit., pp. 174—75. 8Paret & Shy, op. cit., p. 78. 98 the community. When wisely and relentlessly applied, it gives a boost to the cause and operation of modern guerrilla warfare. Intelligence and Sabotage Intelligence and sabotage are two potent weapons of guerrilla warfare. The former aims at the collection of information and the latter, the destruction of enemy instal— lations and resources. Both of them can be used strategi- cally and tactically, and can accomplish political as well as military purposes. They have been widely employed by guerrilla leaders. In fact, it is justified to say that without these two weapons, modern guerrilla warfare can hardly be conducted effectively. Intelligence ”Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles.” The words of Sun Wu Tze in 600 B. C. are still valid today. Only with excellent intelli- gence work can this adage become a reality. Intelligence is extremely important to guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas, who cannot fight except on their own terms, must know enough of their enemy's plans and movements to avoid being trapped into battles which they cannot win, and enough of the enemy's weak spots to make their own strikes as safe and effective as possible. In this sense intelligence is essential for the survival and victory of the guerrilla struggle. 99 The guerrilla leader is always pressing and search— ing for information vital for his decision-making. Guerrilla intelligence is mainly concentrated in three fields: 1. To know the enemy's political and military plans which deal with the elimination of guerrillas. This is called strategic intelligence. 2. To know the enemy's actions to be taken in the political, military and police fields dealing with guerrillas, and the distribution of the enemy forces. their particular tasks, their state of mind, weapons, equipment, etc. This is called tactical intelligence. 3. To know what is going on in the community, including people's feelings, power structure, production, re- sources and terrain, both in the enemy and the guer- rilla's own territory. This is called social intelligence. Without any one of them, guerrilla struggle cannot be suc— cessfully conducted. How can all this information be obtained? Otto Heilbrunn gave the following answers: through penetration, through guerrilla agents, through interrogation of prisoners and evaluation of captured documents, through reconnaisance by partisan detachments or partisan observers, and interro— gation of partisans returning from operations, and through . . . 9 . monitoring enemy telephone conversations.3 But he missed 39Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 76. buy. -~5. . fru- o. otv‘. -- -,.A " v... A. ' “‘ can i... .5; h: m... a» s :5. '«‘§&‘ ‘F‘A. ~n.“ a”. ' ~ ‘fih‘. 100 one huge reservoir of intelligence, the organized masses themselves. Intelligence is a highly organized operation. From the intelligence command in the guerrilla's headquarters (the nucleus), down to intelligence units in regional offices, to secret operational units in the masses, and finally to the penetrations and infiltrations made into the enemy's political, military, security (police), transportation, com— munication, economic, educational and industrial insti- tutions, as well as agents and co—workers or sympathizers as- signed to numerous social organizations, they constitute a mammoth espionage network. Usually more than one channel of information is structured; two or more parallel yet entirely separated lines of intelligence are conducted in one area in order to check the correctness of the information. In the meantime, when one line is broken by the enemy, there is still at least one other line in operation. Because of the complexity and secrecy of the in— telligence network, a good liaison is needed. Regional and institutional liaison agents are assigned. But no one liaison man is allowed to know the whole intelligence appar- atus in one organization or one area. Only the top and sub- commanders in the espionage heirarchy know the general setup and personnel under their respective jurisdiction. Intelligence work is carried out ruthlessly and at times romantically. Human weaknesses are manipulated to the highest degree. Money, sex, friendship, threats, blackmail, lOl extortion and an array of attractions, rewards and punish— ments are frequently employed. Only if the guerrilla's in- telligence men and espionage agents are masters in these "arts," can they be successful in the collection of valuable information. Sabotage Sabotage, in common practice, is directed against objects in the enemy territory. Its main functions are to make the theater of guerrilla warfare more favorable to guer— rilla operations by blowing up bridges, rail lines, and the like, and to increase attrition of the opponent's resources by destroying arsenals, power stations, and all kinds of economic assets, especially those of importance to the in— cumbents' war effort. Most of these activities have tacti_ cal purposes. But when the saboters succeed in paralizing enemy war production and the stoppage of vital national trans— portation, they have achieved strategic goals. Furthermore, sabotage may also serve the purpose of demonstrating to the public at large the inability of the incumbent government to protect the country and, by inciting the incumbents to initia ate sharp and perhaps indiscriminate measures of repression or reprisal, thus weakening the public's identification with the incumbents. In this respect, it also has a strategic connotation. In a higher order, however, sabotage may embrace all actions against the incumbent government's policy and 102 administration. This is a long-range project with the de- struction of the efficiency of the government, the bankruptcy of national economy and the demoralization of the people as ultimate objectives. It takes a long time to accomplish. But once they are done, the guerrillas have a good chance to win. Of course, sabotage of this kind is of the highest strategic value. Operationally, Miksche divided sabotage into two major forms: the passive and the active: 1. Passive sabotage: It aims at the enemy's morale and can at the same time inflict material losses by means of fanning up non—cooperative attitudes and antagonistic spirits on the part of the population under the incumbents' control and employees in the government. In the meantime, public trust in of- ficial currency is lowered. As a result, administra— tive efficiency and industrial production decreases and inflation is underway. People lose their faith in the government, and psychologically, lean more to— ward the guerrillas. Passive sabotage is accomplished by clandestine organizational activities and per- sistent propaganda. The methodological creation of grievances and hardships in people's daily lives and the ceaseless circulation of vicious rumors against the government are the major tricks. 103 2. Active sabotage: This includes all destructive activities mentioned above. They are violent actions which are well—planned and coordinated in time and space. Of course, they are carried out secretly but let the enemy and the public know that the guerrillas are the ones who are behind them. In addition to in— flicting damages and losses to the enemy, they also boost the image of the guerrillas. In this respect, the function of sabotage is identical with that of terrorism.40 As a matter of fact, terrorism, espionage and sabo- tagee Irrust be highly coordinated in a guerrilla struggle. Witfi ggcood intelligence providing the ground work, the de- strticztzzion of persons and things are systematically carried out. CDnce they are accomplished, guerrilla warfare has won its :Eii_17st round against the enemy. Mass Struggles Iqass struggle means the manipulation of the masses to hEiITEiESS the government in power, to disturb peace and 0rdEIT: 1:c> stOp industrial production and finally to create lawleSsness and chaos in the community so that the incumbents WOULd lose the control of the situation. Once the guer— rlllai' S czause is soundly laid, organizations well-established. ___________ _1 4O . . Miksche, o . c1t., pp. 126—29. 104 Exropaganda forcefully slashed out, intelligence network tulilt, terrorism and sabotage started, time is ripe for the gmuerrillas to wrestle power from the government. And mass strnJggles is one of the major means. Mass struggles are carried out mainly in the cities. qwugyr constitute an essential part of modern guerrilla war- As observed by Roger Hilsman: They (the guerrilla leaders) foster discontent in leading to demonstrations and strikes, Here their targets and left-wing in- fare. t;r1e cities, spearhaps to riots and mob action. are student groups, labor unions, 1;ealllectuals. Whenever possible, in both urban they endeavor to create 'people's airici rural sectors, eriulitias' as a device for organizing mass support to sstlzpplement their full—time combatants. The ggw:>211 of mass struggle is evident: the guerrilla leader is deatzeerndhed to "cause the government as much inconvenience and t:1:<311ble as he can."42 So the strategy and tactics that guerzrjlejlas are using in mass struggle are quite different frmn ‘t:}1ee ordinary sense. Take some common operations in mass struggle for illustration: 1 - EStrikes: In guerrilla warfare, strikes are not for 1:he improvement of living conditions or the increase c>f salary of the workers. They are used to paralyze EDroduction, harass the management, and even to (lestroy the factory when deemed necessary by the gyuerrilla leader. When a strike is on, the strikers lander the direction of the clandestine agents, —\ l . . Hilsman, o . c1t., or p. 454. 2 . Cross, 0 . c1t., p. 53. 105 the cell members, will challenge the police to clash with them. Sometimes they attack the police with stones and bottles. If the arms of law have hurt the strikers in their counterattack or in way of self-defense, it would be blamed by the guerrilla- led "fronts” and mouthpieces as "brutality" which would provide fair grounds for more strikes and a good opportunity for demonstrations and riots. Demonstrations are the march of masses in great quantity in streets and public places to show off the strength of guerrilla sympathizers. They are not limited to the manifestation of public sentiment, but to arouse mass uprisings. They are well-planned and highly organized. During demonstrations, govern: ment and prominent public figures are under maliCious ‘vocal attacks. They insist on entering a government c>ffice to present their grievances. Once they get in 'they will ruin the office. If they are denied en- t:rance, clashes between the police and the demonstraw tnors will result. Bloodshed is their goal. When (Dine or more of the demonstrators are seriously hurt C>r killed it is time for widespread riots. IKallies: Mass rallies in a guerrilla struggle are rubt just for people to sound out their different <3pinions but serve as the launching pads for demon- strations and riots. Speakers and speeches are well- Planned_in advance. When the crowd has reached 106 emotional frenzy through careful manipulation and stimulation, a demonstration is called under such slogans like, ”Let's march to the City Halli” and "Let's get the Mayor!" If the police try to stop them, fist-fighting and stone—throwing will begin and every consequence will be blamed on the government. 4. Riots are the mustering of excited masses to destroy property maliciously in public places. They are planned by the guerrilla underground to paralyze the community and to immobilize the government, so the guerrilla-led rioters become uncrowned rulers in the cities. The mob is organized into ”militia." If it cannot be defeated, the government is then at the mercy of the well—organized rioters. Mass struggle, when successful, means chaos to the incumkxents but the ”command of the streets" to the guer- rillas,, Can a city's guerrilla force be formed under such a PrOCeEHs? Answering this question, students of modern guer_ rilla Vvarfare have different opinions. In practice, however, no Citx’ finilitia" has ever been able to maintain itself as a laStiHEI guerrilla force. They invariably have been eliminated bY'StITDnger government military forces. Thus in guerrilla warfare mass struggles in metropolitan areas are used to ParaLYZe the nerve centers of the nation so the incumbents are f\lrther weakened. This gives the guerrilla bands in the 107 countryside an unrestricted hand to operate. In the mean— time, the ranks of city militia will eventually jOin their rural comrades. The strategic importance of mass struggles is, therefore, evident. Military Operations The foregoing actions taken by the guerrillas do have tremendous influences on the outcome of the struggle, hmt tliey are neither very decisive, nor final. To achieve the'ultimate goal of guerrilla warfare, the establishment of axmnv political order, physical forces of the enemy must be destroyed. This is the task left for the military arm of the