

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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ABSTRACT

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE

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Guerrilla warfare is one of the major concerns of our time. More than twenty countries have undergone this torrent process; almost half of the world population has been involved. Millions of lives have been sacrificed because of it. In an age of nuclear stalemate, guerrilla warfare has become a major weapon for national and international power struggle. It deserves the greatest attention of political science students.

The problem of guerrilla warfare is here tackled from both theoretical and operational aspects. Generalizations about its causation, strategy, tactics, counter-measures, and means of prediction are discussed. Relevant data are collected and compared; and a typical case--the case of the guerrilla movement in China is fully presented. Through analysis of facts and statistics, it is hoped that the phenomenon of guerrilla warfare can be better understood.

Guerrilla warfare, in its modern sense, is a war of totality, based upon a mass movement, and aimed at a new

political order. It is the weapon of the weak and characterized by unconventionality and irregularity. As a protracted struggle behind enemy lines, it demands utmost devotion and sacrifice. It is caused by a group of frustrated, rebellious, aspiring, and determined intellectuals and flourishes under a weak, ineffective, and at times corrupt government. Revolutionary goals, political grievances, international conspiracy, deviant personality, economic disturbances, uneven distribution of wealth, especially land, and social injustice all contribute to its intensity and prevalence. It is a complicated phenomenon. Its success or failure causes political changes.

A successful guerrilla struggle must have a good cause and an excellent organization. Propaganda and intelligence must be used to the highest degree. Sabotage and terrorism must be ruthlessly carried out. Political maneuver and military operation must go hand-in-hand. Bases must be built. Weapons and supplies must be secured. Foreign aid and sanctuary must be sought whenever possible. But above all, the minds of the populace must be won. Only with the ardent support of the people can guerrillas survive and expand. To achieve victory in a guerrilla struggle, extraordinary leadership is needed.

To defeat a guerrilla movement is by no means an easy task. In such a confrontation, it is necessarily ideology

versus ideology; causes of the struggle must be faithfully upheld. It is organization versus organization; the people must be fully mobilized and motivated. It is military operation versus military operation; victory must be scored in the battlefield. Persuasion must couple with coercion. Political, economic, social and military reforms and reorganizations must be undertaken by an honest and efficient government. It must be a total effort against a total war. Only if national reconstruction is vigorously carried out under war emergency can a guerrilla movement be successfully prevented and checked.

Can the outcome of modern guerrilla warfare be forecast? Various measurements and scales have been suggested. Since so many variables are involved in such a process and since the research on guerrilla movement is still in its infancy, to find an accurate tool for this purpose, continuous and persistent endeavours on the part of political scientists are urgently needed.

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PREFACE

The problem of guerrilla warfare has troubled me since my teenage days. As a native of Taolin, a small town of Linhsiang, Hunan, central China, Communist-led guerrillas were operating in the adjacent area--the Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupei border region. I can still vividly remember how the guerrillas temporarily occupied my hometown, launched their mass movements, and conducted their "land-revolution" at various intervals from 1928 to 1930. The bloodshed caused by the guerrilla struggle was amazing. It was a frightening experience in the mind of a youngster. Of course, at that time I had no idea of what was going on.

In the 1940's, guerrilla warfare reached a nationwide scale in China. As a senior officer of the Nanking Metropolitan Police Department and the Ministry of Interior, I had not only the privilege to read confidential documents about guerrilla operations in cities and the countryside, but also the chance to witness the guerrilla warfare in action. The features and patterns of such a struggle were eventually understood. Frankly, I was absorbed, fascinated, and yet awed by this unique phenomenon. Since then there has been a secret desire in my heart that someday I would make a systematic study of it, so that people would know better about this torrent struggle.

The chance came when I registered as a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, Michigan State University. I am highly grateful to my major professor, Dr. Charles R. Adrian who permitted me to take modern guerrilla phenomenon as the topic of my Ph.D. dissertation. It is the fulfillment of an old dream. In the meantime, his advices to the writing of the thesis were most valuable. I am deeply indebted to Professor Baljit Singh who labored very hard to provide me with important guidelines, and served as the most resourceful consultant. Professors Wesley R. Fishel, A. F. Brandstatter, and Frank Pinner have eagerly assisted me in various ways. To them I am heartily thankful. However, I must confess all the possible mistakes in this thesis are those of the author alone. He is solely responsible for the writing.

In case this dissertation may help the reader to have a better understanding of the guerrilla problem, I feel we are one step closer to the control of this world-wide phenomenon.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Evolution of a Concept	1
Common Properties	14
Roles and Functions	27
II. THEORIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE	32
Revolution and Guerrilla Warfare	40
Political Situation and Guerrilla Warfare	45
Foreign Intervention and Guerrilla Warfare	53
The Socio-Psychological Approach	58
Summary	68
III. STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE	70
General Principles	70
The Cause	74
Organization	79
Propaganda	89
Terrorism	94
Intelligence and Sabotage	98
Mass Struggles	103
Military Operations	107
The Base	114
Weapons and Supplies	120
Personnel	124
The Guerrilla Process	129
Summary	135
IV. GUERRILLA WARFARE: A TYPICAL CASE--THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN CHINA	137
Stage I: 1927 to 1935: From Initiation to Defeat	138
Prelude to Guerrilla Warfare	138
The Bitter Start	147
The Growth	149

Chapter	Page
Three Satisfactory Campaigns	154
The Defeat	157
The Long Flight	170
Stage II: 1936 to 1945: From Survival to Expansion	174
The Struggle for Existence	174
The Second Coalition	180
Consolidation and Expansion	185
Duel Behind Enemy Lines	193
Happy Ending	200
Stage III: 1946 to 1949: Civil War and Victory	209
The March to Manchuria	209
The Political Maneuver	216
Cracks on the Wall	221
The Civil War	231
Road to Victory	242
Stage IV: 1950 to 1965: Anti-Communist Guerrilla Warfare	247
Uncoordinated Guerrilla Uprising . . .	249
Clandestine Sabotage Activities . . .	254
From "Bloom and Contend" to Guer- rilla Fighting	261
Prospects	269
Summary	271
V. COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE	276
Important Concepts in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare	277
Preventive Measures	281
Strategic Considerations	288
Counter-Guerrilla Military Operations . .	301
A Workable Plan	309
Summary	315
VI. THE OUTCOME OF GUERRILLA WARFARE--SOME MEASUREMENTS	318
VII. CONCLUSION	333
BIBLIOGRAPHY	337

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Length of guerrilla warfare in ten countries	18
2. Forms of revolution	42
3. Political causes of guerrilla warfare	47
4. Political changes caused by guerrilla warfare	52
5. Background of modern guerrilla leaders	61
6. Inflation in China from 1945 to 1948	230
7. Anti-Communist guerrilla forces eliminated by the Red Army	252
8. Numerical growth of the CCP: 1921-1962	328

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II guerrilla warfare has attracted world-wide attention. Some twenty countries have undergone extensive guerrilla activities. Almost half of the population on the earth has been involved in this struggle. Millions of lives have been sacrificed and billions of dollars spent.¹ Indeed guerrilla warfare is one of the most serious concerns of our time.

The Evolution of a Concept

Just what is guerrilla warfare? Who may be called a guerrilla? Was the legendary Robin Hood a guerrilla? Can primitive tribal wars be regarded as guerrilla struggles? Are "hit-and-run" rebellious peasants guerrillas? Are lightly equipped commandos operating behind enemy lines conducting guerrilla warfare? Were the French Maquis, the

¹The cost in lives and money in guerilla warfare probably will never be exactly known. In China alone, the loss of human lives was estimated from 900,000 to 25,000,000 (see Brian Crozier, The Rebels; Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p. 193). Financially, the British spent 20,000 pounds a day in Malaya, and the American bill in South Vietnam is over \$1,500,000 per day.

Russian partisans, and the Chinese "Yu Chi" bands² guerrillas? Generally speaking, all of them may be regarded guerrillas, and their military operations guerrilla warfare.

Historically, the term "guerrilla" originated in Spain during the Peninsular War (1808-14) when the Spanish irregulars and civilians harassed the troops of Napoleon while he was trying to control the country and to expel the English from the Iberian Peninsula. Literally, it meant "small war," and the man who participated in waging such a war was called a guerrillero, but he also called himself a partido, or a partisan. That is how the terms guerrilla and partisan became interchangeable. In the meantime, through the generations, rebels used to crown themselves with honorable names, whereas the incumbents tended to degrade them. For instance, during the last war, Russian irregulars called themselves partisans or "fighters of freedom"; yet the Germans termed these same partisans Banditen or bandits. By the same token, Mao Tse-tung and Chin Peng and their "liberation fighters" were labeled as "bandits" by the Chinese Nationalists and the British, respectively. Thus the word "bandit" sometimes becomes identical with "guerrilla."

As a matter of fact, during the past few years guerrilla has become a badly overworked word, for it has been

²"Yu Chi" is the Chinese term for guerrilla warfare which literally means "roving and attack." It was originated in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to 221 A.D.), and used as the title for a minor military officer.

generally applied to almost all forms of violent and armed revolt against government authority. Hence there has been a tendency to refer to all forms of sustained disorder and rebellion as guerrilla warfare, and the term guerrilla has come to cover all sort of armed miscreants from bandits to devoted political revolutionaries. Sighed Valeriano and Bohannan: "Probably no areas of military thought and practice are so plagued with semantic and definitional difficulties (and misconceptions)."³

"Guerrilla warfare is scarcely new," wrote Franklin M. Osanka.⁴ But its content has continuously changed with the march of time. Guerrilla warfare, like regular warfare, started in a very simple and primitive way. Slowly yet steadily, it proceeded toward its present form, with the help of advancing political thinking, science, and technology. The first guerrilla war was recorded in Chinese history, around 3600 B.C. when Emperor Huang of the Han race was engaged in a long-drawn-out war with the Miao race under the leadership of Tsi Yao. Emperor Huang employed guerrilla warfare and finally defeated his enemy.⁵ Through China's long history, guerrilla wars have been the favorite instrument of

³Valeriano and Bohannan, Counter guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 4.

⁴Franklin M. Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 1.

⁵Of. China At War, Chungking, vol. ii, no. 4, April, 1939, p. 8.

rebellious peasants. The same is true of Europe and North America. Caesar encountered irregulars in Gaul and Germany. American colonists engaged in continuous unconventional wars with the Indians. In its crude form, the guerrillas rose spontaneously, aiming at the elimination of oppressive local authorities. The conflict was usually limited, and the bands dispersed soon thereafter. Most of them operated in such an irregular way that in a matter of time they could hardly maintain the support from the people, and finally became outlaws and bandits.

The "hide-and-seek" and "hit-and-run" games between the guerrillas and government troops may last for a few years, even a decade. But the outcome has often been the same: the primitive guerrillas are defeated and status quo maintained. To be sure, the goal might be worthwhile, honorable, noble and even sacred, but the weakness in primitive guerrilla's political appeal plus poor planning, loose discipline, absence of nation-wide coordination, and piece-meal military operations spell their doom. Emotional reactions and amateur practices may win a few battles, but they can seldom win a war, not even a small one. Owing to its unglorified history, scholars tend to forget the importance of the crude form of guerrilla warfare, and write it off the books.

The Spanish resistance against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814 changed all that. Karl Marx and Frederic Engels wrote of that struggle:

. . . the Franco-Spanish War is exceptionally enlightening. Armies which, for their time, were of considerable size--they totalled 670,000 men and 520 guns--crossed the Pyrenees between 1807 and 1813 to conquer Spain. Only 250,000 men and 250 guns returned to France.

Napoleon's generals . . . in their struggles with the Spanish people, their superiority counted for little. The Spaniards appeared suddenly where they were least expected, disappeared in some entirely different places. . . . Obviously this kind of fighting could not lead to any decision, but the Spanish managed to keep the French constantly on the move, and so brought about a fatal dispersal of their forces.⁶

This description tells us some new features of guerrilla warfare: it was a "universal uprising," and the people were highly organized. In the meantime, the Spanish had a powerful ally--the British.

Another celebrated example is T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), who led the Arabs to fight against the Turkish occupation army during World War I. He is regarded as the first theorist on partisan warfare. It was Lawrence who initiated the "gas concept" which means that guerrillas must be "an idea, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas."⁷ Throughout his writings, Lawrence stressed that guerrillas, instead of destroying the enemy, had to harass, confuse, exhaust, isolate, and discredit him. Like a gradually consuming fire,

⁶Article by Karl Marx and Frederic Engels entitled "Revolutionary Spain" in the New York Daily Tribune, December 30, 1854.

⁷T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1935), p. 192.

the partisans burned out the resources of the enemy who would thus feel there was no sense to stay on but to withdraw. Tactically, Lawrence advocated "Tip and run, not pushes but strokes," and the use of "the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place," like the kingfisher flashing across the pool."⁸

Doubtless Lawrence's concept of guerrilla warfare has been adorably accepted in later decades. The partisan movements in France, Russia, the Balkans and Southeast Asia during World War II were mostly of this vintage. All of them characterized with universal uprising, better organization, strong outside support and irregular operations. Guerrillas had accomplished much, but they still held an "adjunct" status to their strong ally--a national army or a foreign power. Russia and France are good examples of the former, and the Balkan states good examples of the latter.

In late 1927, however, in a remote mountainous area of south China, a new concept of guerrilla warfare was in the making. Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader, started a new guerrilla movement. After one year of trial-and-error he was able to lay down his now-famous five principles of guerrilla struggle:

- (1) A sound mass basis.
- (2) A first rate Party organization.
- (3) A Red Army of adequate strength.

⁸Ibid., pp. 193, 337.

- (4) A terrain favorable to military operations.
- (5) Economic strength sufficient for self-support.⁹

Among the five conditions listed, military is but one of them. Moreover, Mao put it in the third place, whereas "mass basis" and "party organization" were the first and the second. In the meantime, factors like "terrain" and "economic strength" were added. It was the prototype of a new kind of guerrilla warfare. From that time on it was no longer merely an irregular war carried on by independent bands, nor quasi-military groups in connection with a regular war, but a multi-phased and well-concerted struggle on political, economic and military fronts. It was no longer a spontaneously incited struggle but under the direction of a highly organized party. It was no longer carried by frustrated and desperate rebels, but based upon widespread mass movements. With such distinctions, it is therefore easy to explain why Mao was so successful in his early years of venture. Though a few years later, Mao suffered a serious defeat, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War gave him time and space to refine and practice his theories and tactics. As a result, mass movements were stepped up, organizations tightened, "fronts" established, ideological instigation strengthened, military maneuvers streamlined, and the struggle was carried to a high degree of totality. He was

⁹"The Independent Regime in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area and the August Fiasco," A Report by Mao Tse-tung to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in November, 1928.

finally able to drive out his longtime foe, the Chinese Nationalist Party from Mainland China, and established the "Chinese People's Republic" in 1949, twenty-two years after he started his new type of guerrilla movement in Ching Kangshan. A detailed study of Mao's guerrilla warfare will be presented in Chapter IV. What should be realized here is that Mao's concept of guerrilla war is a great departure from his predecessors. His model has been faithfully followed by many newcomers in this field.

Certainly Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap are Mao's ardent followers. Wrote Giap:

The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was a just war, aiming to win back the independence and unity of the country. . . . The adopted form of fighting was guerrilla warfare . . . the people would stay his advance with rudimentary weapons: sticks, spears, scimitars, bows, flintlocks. . . . These formations were, in the field of organization, the expression of the general mobilization of the people in arms.

. . . In the end, . . . we heroically rose in the cities and the countryside, smashed the rule of the imperialists and feudalists and set up people's democratic power.¹⁰

From Giap's concept it is crystal clear that guerrilla warfare is mass-based, applying every form of weapons, thickly stuffed with ideological causes, and operating not only in the countryside but also in cities. Furthermore, organization, mobilization and party leadership are stressed. It is a

¹⁰ Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 27, 47, 51, 87.

total war on many fronts with the participation and support of the people.

The new concept of guerrilla warfare spread all over the world. Some rebels might not have learned from Mao, as guerrilla warfare was under the process of evolution. The new idea, however, stayed and was enriched. To list only a few noted cases: Said Charles W. Thayer of the Yugoslav guerrilla struggle: "This was a total war, a people's war, and everyone, whether he liked it or not, was involved and had to share the risk."¹¹ General Sir Gerald Templer, addressing a press conference in London soon after his appointment as High Commissioner for Malaya, observed:

I should like to be clearly understood that in Malaya we are conducting the campaign against Communism on all fronts. We are fighting not only on the military front, but on the political, social, and economic fronts as well.¹²

Merle Kling made the following observation about the Cuban guerrilla struggle:

When guerrilla warfare is waged with success, military tactics are coordinated with political, social, economic, and psychological variables.

The Cuba experience suggests that guerrilla warfare is not exclusively a problem in military tactics, that publicity may promote the interests of a guerrilla movement, that the motivations of guerrilla

¹¹Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 58.

¹²See Lt. Col. T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla--And How To Fight Him (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 120

leaders probably originate in distinctive traits of personality.¹³

Dixon and Heilbrunn noticed another feature of new guerrilla warfare: "Guerrilla warfare has revolutionized the conception of war. . . . Guerrillas there (in Malaya and Kenya) fought on their own and they had no national army behind them."¹⁴

From guerrilla experience in China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, Kenya, Cuba, and Algeria, most of them taking place during and after the Second World War, the story remains the same: the character of guerrilla warfare has changed. We may, therefore, properly say that modern guerrilla warfare is a war of totality, based upon mass movement, and aims at a new political order.

It is a total war in the sense that it is by no means a mere military struggle, nor are only the armed forces involved. Political, economic, social and psychological means are fully applied. Its totality has far superseded the idea originated by Ludendorff. As one observer put it: "Whilst Ludendorff thought principally in terms of modern weapons, his predecessors (Marx and Engels) had already turned their minds to the employment of the politically fanaticized

¹³Merle Kling, "Cuba: A Case Study of a Successful Attempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of Unconventional Warfare," The Annals, Vol. 341, May 1962, pp. 42, 50.

¹⁴Dixon & Heilbrunn, Communist Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. xiii, xv.

masses."¹⁵ Indeed, contemporary guerrilla warfare demands every bit of available resources, both human and material, tangible and intangible. Men and women, the young as well as the old, are inspired and enlisted in the struggle. There is no exemption for anybody. All available weapons, from the most primitive to the ultra-modern, are employed in the fighting. All material resources, no matter how trivial, are thoroughly collected and utilized to supply and support the war cause. Furthermore, its totality reaches every means which can be used to inflict damage upon the enemy. To guerrillas, only the ends matter, not the means. So terror, sabotage, espionage, smear campaigns, mass demonstrations, strikes, etc. are utilized to their fullest. The destruction of the enemy is their sole objective and ethics, morality, humanity, legality and even national tradition do not count for much.

But to achieve totality is no easy task. Only with an inspired mass movement can the war be shifted into such a high gear. To successful guerrilla leaders, their primary concern is the populace. How to arouse the masses, organize and discipline them, and finally their manipulation are the crucial questions to which a guerrilla leader must find correct answers. The answers might be different in accordance with different cultural settings; yet, mass movement remains

¹⁵F. O. Miksche, Secret Forces (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1951), p. 23.

the indispensable basis of guerrilla warfare. Government, police, military, and other persuasive and coercive apparatuses are but the upper structures of guerrilla war. It is the mass movement which cements the people together and supports them all. Without a mass movement the guerrillas may well have their feet on quick sands and be submerged in no time.

A genuine mass movement is a marriage between fanaticism and prudence. Thayer has termed it as "a modern, sophisticated guerrilla movement."¹⁶ Its fanaticism is built up through ideological stimulation, political indoctrination and the exploitation of personal desires; and its prudence is achieved through a well-planned, yet carefully and ruthlessly controlled organization. With fanaticism, all resources, including human lives, can be selflessly devoted into the struggle of guerrilla warfare. With prudence or sophistication, the sacrifice can be assured of the most treasured return. The highest prize for the struggle, of course, is a new political order.

The political goal of the guerrilla is always highly emotionally charged. It may be "national independence," or "down with colonialism," or "drive the enemy out of our fatherland," or "throw the rascals out." But whatever the slogan, the unchangeable aim of a guerrilla struggle is the

¹⁶Thayer, op. cit., p. 180.

overthrow of the existing political regime and the establishment of a new order with them as the masters.

Traditional guerrilla wars used to end either in bitter defeat for the guerrillas or in their complete victory. Yet, strange as it may seem, modern guerrilla warfare has induced significant political changes in old political orders. This will be discussed in Chapter II.

Tactically also, modern guerrilla warfare is different from the former ones. For instance, it is no longer a complete clandestine operation; instead, it seeks publicity of its operations to attract attention from both the attentive and inattentive public. It maintains a highly disciplined force instead of a loosely constructed one in order to win sympathy and friendship from the people. It is a well-organized body instead of ill-coordinated independent bands, in order that they can attack the enemy from all directions. Indeed, as one expert on guerrilla war has put it: "It is a weapon which depends not only on physical forces but on a wide variety of psychological and moral factors."¹⁷

In short, guerrillas have evolved from independent, loosely disciplined, and ill-coordinated armed bands, aimed at harassing the enemy, to better organized auxiliary forces aiding a powerful ally, and eventually graduating into an independent force capable of creating a new political order.

¹⁷ Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches," The Annals, op. cit., p. 75.

Modern guerrillas are no longer "adjunct" to national armies and regular wars. On the contrary, the guerrillas may "father" an army, and may not cease to grow even after the creation of a regular army. They may continue to push forward toward enemy territory, support, strengthen, enlarge, and nourish the regulars so that someday the strong army can be used to seek a decisive battle like the Vietminh did at Dien Bien Phu and Mao's action in the Hsuechow-Bonpu area. This process will be discussed in Chapter III.

Common Properties

What are the common properties of guerrilla warfare, modern and pre-modern? Generally speaking, seven important features can be listed. It: 1) is a weapon of the weak; 2) takes place behind enemy lines; 3) involves protracted struggle; 4) involves heavy losses; 5) requires popular support; 6) requires mobility and fluidity; and 7) utilizes irregular operations. Without any of them, the nature of guerrilla warfare is perverted. It would end in defeat, or change to another form of struggle, or not exist at all.

Weapon of the Weak

Guerrilla warfare is essentially the weapon of the weaker party in a struggle. This does not mean, however, the weak always resort to guerrilla war. For instance, they might use peaceful means, but it is evident that the stronger

party has little need of this tool. In case the dissident faction feels strong enough to overcome its opponent, a coup is certainly a short cut to power. If it feels there is an even chance to win, an open revolt with the elements of surprise would do the trick. Events taking place in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam and most Latin American countries during the recent years are in this category.

It is only the much weaker party which figures there is no chance at all to stage a coup or to instigate a storming revolt that would consider guerrilla warfare as a possible way out. T. E. Lawrence, Mao Tse-tung, Ben Bella and Castro all took the slim chance for their success in the irregular armed uprising. There was little else they could have done as in the beginning they were much weaker than their rivals. Wrote Valeriano and Bohannan: "The distinguishing characteristic of the war of the weak against the strong is called guerrilla."¹⁸ Agreed Samuel Huntington: "Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare by which the strategically weak side assumes the tactical offensive in selected forms, times and places. Guerrilla warfare is the weapon of the weak."¹⁹

It is interesting to note that once the guerrillas come to power, they abandon their guerrilla tactics. Mao did not establish his guerrillas in Taiwan, the remaining

¹⁸Valeriano & Bohannan, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁹Osanka (ed.), op. cit., "Introduction," xvi.

bastion of the Chinese Nationalists. Even in Laos, when the Communists were sure of their share in the political arena and their superior military position, they adopted regular war instead of irregular operations. To be sure some incumbents had trained men for guerrilla warfare; Stalin did just that before Nazi invasion; Mao is reportedly training over 100,000,000 for any future eventuality. Even the United States has trained considerable "Special Force" for guerrilla warfare. Presently, however, Mao's militia and American Special Forces are not used for guerrilla warfare but for "counter-guerrilla" warfare.²⁰

As mentioned earlier, it is the weak who rely on this unconventional weapon. Now, even Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has picked up the tool, laid down by Mao, and Nationalists guerrillas are sent to the Mainland from Taiwan. When the Germans were victorious in the first stage of the European War, no one in the Wehrmacht ever thought of guerrilla warfare; only when its defeat was coming, was the idea of Werwolf created.²¹

It is therefore crystal clear that guerrilla warfare has no place in the house of the strong, but gives some faint hope to the ones who are really weak. Indeed it has always been the weapon of the weak.

²⁰About Chinese Communist militia, see National War College, An Analysis of Militia under the Chinese Communist Regime (Chinese ed., Taiwan, China: National War College Press, 1960), pp. 15-19.

²¹Miksche, op. cit., pp. 44, 85.

Behind Enemy Lines

Wrote Dixon and Heilbrunn about Russian guerrillas in World War II:

The Soviet partisans . . . fulfilled two distinctive tasks: the one as fighting units, the other as an intelligence agency. Both their tasks received their characteristic imprint from the fact that the partisans were deployed 'on the other side of the hill', viz. in enemy territory.²²

This feature, of course, is not limited to the Russian partisans. All guerrillas operate in enemy territory. The explanation is simple: they have no territory of their own, or at least they cannot claim it. When an armed force operates in its own territory, it becomes a regular army.

Protracted Struggle

Guerrilla warfare also distinguished itself as a protracted struggle. The statistics in Table 1 are impressive enough. The average is longer than most regular wars. Meanwhile, there are no exceptional cases. The present guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam is over ten years old and the end is still nowhere in sight. Early in the nineteenth century, Karl von Clausewitz had already sensed this characteristic; wrote he in his military classic, On War: "The protracted, irregular war is like a slow, gradual fire."²³ Slow yet keeping alive is the reason for its unusual length. Can

²²Dixon & Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 179.

²³Karl von Clausewitz, On War (English trans., Washington, D. C., 1950), p. 458.

guerrilla warfare be shortened considerably? It seems very unlikely if not impossible. Argued Galula:

The protracted nature of a revolutionary war does not result from a design by either side; it is imposed on the insurgent by its initial weakness. It takes time for a small group of insurgent leaders to organize revolutionary movement. . . .

A revolutionary war is short only if the counter-insurgency collapses at an early stage, as in Cuba; or if, somehow, a political settlement is reached, as in Tunisia, Morocco, and Cyprus. To date, there has never been an early collapse of an insurgency.²⁴

Table 1. Length of guerrilla warfare in ten countries.

Country	Span of Time	Length of Struggle (in years)
China	1927-49	22
Greece	1944-49	5
Indochina	1945-54	9
Malaya	1948-60	12
Cuba	1956-59	3
Algeria	1954-62	8
Cyprus	1955-59	4
Morocco	1952-56	4
Tunisia	1952-55	3
The Philippines	1946-54	8
AVERAGE		7.8 years

Why are guerrillas so hard to defeat? To put it simply, most of their initial operations are clandestine and are sophisticatedly planned and directed. When the guerrillas

²⁴David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 10.

enjoy some popular support, their resistance, if suppressed in one area, would manifest itself in others. Aroused emotions, when somewhat widespread and well-organized, can hardly be cooled down within a short time. It takes a mammoth effort and a long time for a government to put down modern guerrilla resistance. Galula remarked: "The guerrillas, like the head of the legendary Hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed at the same time."²⁵ And to destroy all of them at the same time is by no means easy. The measurement of guerrilla's survivability through its constants and variables will be discussed in Chapter VI.

On the other hand, most incumbents have been well-established when guerrilla warfare breaks out. They are stronger in the first place; and to topple a sure-footed government is always a torturing long process. As W. W. Rostow put it, "It is a victory that will take many years and decades of hard work and dedication--by many people--to bring about."²⁶ The length of guerrilla struggles should by no means be neglected.

Heavy Losses

Since guerrilla warfare is conducted by the weak in enemy territory within a duration of time, the sacrifices of

²⁵ Ibid., p. 107.

²⁶ From a speech by W. W. Rostow; see T. N. Greene, op. cit., p. 57.

the parties involved are heavy. As stated previously, the losses in this kind of struggle may never be exactly known, but what has been known is impressive. Take a few cases for illustration: From August 1934 to August 1935, before and during Mao Tse-tung's "Long March" to the Northwest from southern China, the estimated loss on the side of Mao was well over 200,000 men, not including the loss of his opponent, the National Army.²⁷ It would not be surprising if the total fatalities came close to half a million. And the loss of half a million men within one year is a heavy sacrifice even to a populous nation like China. In Malaya where more reliable information and statistics were collected, the cost of guerrilla warfare is amazing. On the side of guerrillas, "fatal casualties" were "about 600 per year in the 1949-50 period" and increased to "more than 1,000 per year from 1951 onward."²⁸ It was estimated that "1,000 man-hours of patrolling were needed to make one contact with the partisans," and "1,500 man-hours for each partisan killed."²⁹ To a small country like Malaya, the sacrifices are terrible indeed. In Cuba, an observer estimated that 1,000 guerrillas died on the battleground and about 10,000 died before firing squads due to repression.³⁰ In Indochina, the French lost

²⁷Osanka, op. cit., pp. 149-57.

²⁸Ibid., p. 306.

²⁹Ibid., p. 19.

³⁰T. N. Greene, op. cit., p. 223.

some 95,000 men, including 4 generals, and 1,300 lieutenants.³¹ No exact figures for Vietminh losses are available, but it would be reasonable to assume that the Vietminh suffered greater casualties than the French.

Wholesale death is common place in guerrilla warfare. It is either caused by direct combat, and/or terrorism carried out by both sides in the conflict. Grivas' terror in Cyprus caused numerous senseless deaths. General "Jake" Smith's repression of guerrillas on the Island of Samar in the Philippines was "to kill everything over ten years old."³² French authorities slaughtered 20,000 Algerians in Setif, a town of 34,000 people, and killed no less than 30,000 in Malgache.³³ Terrific losses have become the trademark of guerrilla struggle.

Reasons for these enormous sacrifices? Answered one: "Partisan warfare was characterized by unmitigated ruthlessness. Partisans cannot be lenient with the enemy; they kill the wounded enemy and prisoners since they cannot take them along. Partisans do not expect any pardon from the enemy either. Innocent people will always suffer in this kind of warfare: the enemy who cannot master the guerrilla menace

³¹Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (London: Mall Press, 1963), p. 17.

³²Thayer, op. cit., p. 30.

³³Crozier, op. cit., pp. 197-201.

take hostages and shoot them instead."³⁴ Furthermore, "under situations of particular stress, guerrillas kill not only their prisoners but even their own wounded."³⁵ Add to this the facts that guerrillas apply terrorism toward their own people to punish "traitors," and government terrorism caused by repression, the cost in lives has, of course, mounted to an unbelievable degree. Concluded Zawodny: "Guerrilla fighting is probably the most vicious form of human warfare."³⁶

Though the tangible cost of lives and property is very dear, the intangible cost of guerrilla warfare is even more disastrous. Miksche has the following to say:

The People's Underground War destroys the soul of a nation systematically, leading it into disobedience and disrespect of law and order. As in all revolutions, the People's War means complete chaos, a savage struggle in which the end justifies the means, and vengeance, trickery, and even treachery play a great part.³⁷

As history has shown, it takes a nation long to recover from the wounds of guerrilla warfare.

³⁴Dixon & Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 52.

³⁵J. K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, Escalation," The Annals, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Miksche, op. cit., p. 14.

Popular Support

Guerrillas can survive only with the support of the populace, and a guerrilla war can be won only when it is actively participated in by the majority of the people. Declared Mao Tse-tung: "Guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them."³⁸ Wrote Giap: "The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was succeeded in leading the whole people to participate enthusiastically in the resistance, and to consent to make every sacrifice for its victory."³⁹ Stressed Guevara: "It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves."⁴⁰ Without popular support the guerrilla would turn to banditry which could be easily destroyed by government forces.

Doubtless, guerrilla warfare needs popular support. The rebellious peasants in China were themselves the people. The fame of Lawrence and many other successful guerrilla leaders was built on the cooperation and participation of the people. In modern times, it is even more so. Before

³⁸ Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 44.

³⁹ Giap, op. cit., p. 34.

⁴⁰ Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 17.

Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner in Malaya, was ambushed and killed in 1951, he made a famous statement which became the slogan of the anti-guerrilla campaign there:

"This is a war for the hearts and minds of the people."⁴¹

The importance of popular support in guerrilla warfare is evident. It is the most essential condition for its survival, protraction, and eventual victory. Wrote James E. Cross: "Supplies, recruits, and intelligence are the three essentials of any insurrection, and from the people these must come."⁴² Acknowledged Klaus Knorr: "In order to wage prolonged guerrilla war, the insurgents require considerable support from the population which will, at least in part, offset their inferiority in regular military strength."⁴³ Concluded Paret and Shy: "The true objective of guerrilla warfare is control of the people, this is one type of war in which friend-or-foe thinking is inapplicable."⁴⁴ The support may be obtained by persuasion, coercion and organization; it may be voluntary or involuntary. It may be manifested in active participation or tacit consent. Whatever its forms,

⁴¹See T. N. Greene, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴²James E. Cross, Conflict In The Shadows (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 35.

⁴³Klaus Knorr, "Unconventional Warfare: Strategy and Tactics in Internal Political Strife," The Annals, op. cit., p. 63.

⁴⁴Peter Paret & John W. Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 51.

popular support there must be. Without it, guerrilla warfare would certainly wither away.

Mobility and Fluidity

"The very nature of guerrilla warfare," wrote Sir Fitzroy Maclean, "remains mobility and a capacity for taking the enemy by surprise. . . . Guerrilla warfare is a war of movement in its extreme form."⁴⁵ Why does mobility become a common property of guerrilla warfare? The answer lies in its inherited characteristic--it is the tool of the weak. As the weaker party, guerrillas cannot afford direct confrontation with the adversary unless they want to commit suicide. Therefore they must choose their own time and place to fight. This calls for mobility. As Mao Tse-tung put it, "An ability to run away is the great characteristic of the guerrilla."⁴⁶ On the other hand, when the enemy is tired or relaxing its vigil, the guerrillas should be able to move swiftly to deliver a crushing blow with lightning speed.

Guerrilla fighters may ignore this rule of high mobility only at great expense. Giap's forces were almost entirely annihilated by the French when the former made the mistake of resorting to stationary warfare in 1951. Mao made almost the same error in 1934 when he gave up his mobility and was pinned down by the Chinese Nationalists. The tragic

⁴⁵Foreward to Thayer's book, Guerrilla, op. cit., xii.

⁴⁶Samuel B. Griffith, op. cit., p. 101.

Long March was the consequence. Greek Communist guerrillas met their fate when they resorted to positional war with government troops commanded by General Papagos.⁴⁷

Mobility is closely related to "fluidity" which means war without a fixed front, or as Bernard Fall put it, "It was often enough without rear areas."⁴⁸ It was described by Mao as "wind" and "water," and by Lawrence as "gas." To be sure, guerrillas do need bases, but their bases should be fluid, too. They must not fight for any definite front, base, or territory if it is to their advantage. Everyone realized that Yen-an was Mao's "capital" before he came to power, yet he gave up Yen-an in 1947 before the advance of the stronger Nationalist army. "The insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets," explained Galula, "he alone can initiate the conflict" and "free to choose his hour, or wait safely for a favorable situation, unless external factors force him to accelerate his moves."⁴⁹ Fluidity and mobility give protection and initiative to the guerrillas. These are the main attributes to their security and expansion.

Irregular Operations

Guerrillas, throughout generations, have been called irregulars. However, terms like irregularity or

⁴⁷ See Greene, op. cit., p. 81.

⁴⁸ Fall, op. cit., p. 15.

⁴⁹ Galula, op. cit., pp. 6, 12.

unconventionalism are relative. They connote that guerrillas are not bound to conventional principles and rules of war; rather, they have full freedom to act. The only regularity of guerrilla operations, it may be said, is their irregularity.

Do guerrilla operations manifest no regularity at all? It is certainly not the case. Tactics like hit-and-run, ambush-and-attack, dispersion and concentration, disguise and disappearance, etc. do fall into certain rules and patterns which will be discussed in Chapter III. The irregularity of guerrillas is in the sense that they have never been as formal, rigid, legal and conventional as regular troops, and they never will be. If regularities are to be isolated from irregularities, they are: the lack of uniformity and formality in clothing and weaponry, the absence of supply bases and legal authority, and complete license in the choice of means of operations. Only through this kind of irregularity can guerrillas survive and grow.

Thus far, common properties of guerrilla warfare have been clarified. It is because of these unique features that guerrillas are playing an increasingly important role in contemporary history.

Roles and Functions

Paret and Shy wrote succinctly about the new roles of guerrilla warfare in the 1960's:

The employment of guerrillas against a foreign invader is well established in military history and theory, and certainly remains conceivable today and in the future. However, two further uses of the guerrilla have clearly emerged: he may be a weapon of insurrection, and he may be the agent of foreign aggression. . . .

Guerrillas . . . have become weapons of subversion and aggression, as well as weapons of defense, and they have proved their use in a variety of political and military theaters of war.⁵⁰

It is obvious that modern guerrilla warfare is now playing an independent and important role, not only in the military arena, but also in politics. Why has the guerrilla soared into its eminence? Doubtless the world situation after the Second World War has contributed to it greatly. The sheer cost of a conventional total war, the bi-polarization of world politics, and the nuclear stalemate, all have something to do with it. Wrote Sir John Slessor, then Marshal of the British Royal Air Force, in 1954:

The first and most far reaching consequence of this revolution (massive retaliation with atomic weapons and an intercontinental delivery system) is a thing of the past.⁵¹

And its logical successor is the handy yet deadly effective guerrilla warfare which could reach a high degree of totality in its prosecution. Most military students have realized this point. Asserted Joseph P. Kutger: "During the 'no war, no peace' situation of the present, conspirational techniques

⁵⁰ Paret & Shy, op. cit., pp. 16, 24.

⁵¹ James D. Atkinson, "American Military Policy and Communist Unorthodox Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. XLIII, (Jan. 1958), p. 22.

have played the major rather than the minor role."⁵² Warned Slavko N. Bjelajac: "In an age when all other types of wars are recognized by ourselves and the Communists as being too dangerous to fight, revolutionary war is likely to become the rule rather than the exception as a mode of military action."⁵³ Prophesied Nikita Khrushchev:

Now a word about national liberation wars. . . .
Can such wars occur in the future? They can. . . .
But these wars are popular uprisings. In other words, can conditions be created in which people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one. . . . The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.⁵⁴

Confronting this new weapon which the Communists all over the world have so deliberately and expertly employed, the late U. S. President John F. Kennedy gave the following answer:

The Free World's security can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltration, . . . guerrilla warfare or a series of limited wars.

In this area of local wars, we must inevitably count on the cooperative efforts of other peoples and nations who share our concern. . . . We need a

⁵²Joseph P. Kutger, "Irregular Warfare in Transition," Osanka, op. cit., p. 42.

⁵³Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches," The Annals, op. cit., p. 81.

⁵⁴Khrushchev's Report on the Moscow Conference of November 1960 as printed in Pravda on January 6, 1961.

greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion.⁵⁵

It is then evident that guerrilla warfare has become one of the major weapons for the struggle of power between the Communist bloc and the Free World. Its new role must not be neglected. Meanwhile, it should be understood that guerrilla warfare is more than a handy weapon. It is a reliable, enduring and effective weapon in this atomic age. It is good for offense as well as for defense. Its functions are manifold. When properly applied, it can achieve political, military, economic, and social goals. This has been fully proved from China to Cuba and from Indochina to Algeria.

Guerrilla warfare has not only survived into the era of airplanes, tanks and massed armies, but in this era it has reached its highest development. In a sense, guerrilla now means overcoming material superiority, not by the employment of the most perfect and advanced weapons, but by the use of superior intelligence, stratagem, organization, and indoctrination. (The strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare and their defense will be discussed in Chapters III and V.) It has its faith in the motto that the thinking human being remains the perfect war machine. With the masses firmly on their side, modern guerrillas realize that even if they cannot win the struggle, their enemy would often lose

⁵⁵President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, March 28, 1961.

it. No one seems as sure and confident about their roles and functions as the guerrillas themselves.

CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

Modern guerrilla warfare is a complicated phenomenon. In order to explore its causes, various theories are offered. Roughly, they may be grouped into three schools of thought: (1) the "revolutionary school" which emphasizes that guerrilla warfare is the essential form of revolution; (2) the "political school" which stresses that guerrilla warfare is the consequence of maladjusted national and/or international politics; and (3) the "socio-psychological school" which asserts that guerrilla warfare is the outcome of rebellious personality and/or economic, social and cultural maladjustments and conflicts. To learn the differences and unique properties of the theories among the various schools, it is necessary to cite some well-known propositions.

Communist theoreticians from Lenin to 'Che' Guevara are of course all in the revolutionary school. To them, Communism and revolution are indivisible; so it is only natural for them to conclude that the Communists must adapt themselves to guerrilla warfare. Vladimir I. Lenin wrote in 1906: "Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising. . . . This is an absolutely inevitable

phenomenon of the revolution."¹ Josef Stalin made the following appraisal of revolution and guerrilla war:

Transformation of the imperialistic into a civil war means, first of all, revolutionary mass uprisings. . . . The situation permitting, Communists must take advantage of this kind of mass movement to form guerrilla troops for the immediate instigation of civil uprisings against imperialists and of the immediate formation of national-revolutionary guerrilla units.²

Mao Tse-tung was more certain about the interrelationship between revolution and guerrilla warfare. He said in 1937:

"In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. . . . These guerrilla operations . . . are one aspect of the revolutionary struggle."³ Giap, clearly, associated himself with Mao when he said: "The war of liberation of the Vietnamese people was a long and vast guerrilla war," and "the Vietnamese people's war of liberation was essentially a people's national democratic revolution."⁴ Guevara advocated that "Guerrilla warfare" is "the basis of the people's fight for liberations."⁵

¹V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XI (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), pp. 219-21.

²Cf. T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 439-441.

³Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Trans. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 41.

⁴Giap, op. cit., pp. 27, 47.

⁵Guevara, op. cit., p. 5.

From the statements cited above, it is clear that the Communist leaders believe that guerrilla warfare is the outcome of revolution, and that guerrilla warfare is one of the most essential weapons of revolution. To the Communists, revolution and guerrilla warfare are synonymous. In addition, they regard guerrilla warfare as their special province. Mao declared: "Guerrilla warfare can be preserved only when led by the Communist Party."⁶ Giap remarked: "The Vietnamese people's war of liberation (i.e. guerrilla warfare) attained this great victory . . . above all because it was organized and led by the Party of the working class; the Indochinese Communist Party."⁷

A few well-informed students of guerrilla warfare in the non-Communist world are willing to go along with this line. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, a veteran of guerrilla operations, classified Communist-led guerrillas as "revolutionary guerrilla movements," whereas others referred to guerrilla movements as "patriotic partisan resistance."⁸ Certain groups in the French Army who experienced guerrilla war generalized its doctrine and expressed it in an equation: guerrilla warfare + psychological warfare = revolutionary

⁶Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963), p. 278.

⁷Giap, op. cit., p. 35.

⁸Griffith, op. cit., p. 27.

warfare.⁹ And W. W. Rostow asserted that "The guerrilla warfare problem . . . is a product of the revolutionary process and the Communist effort and intent to exploit it. . . . The process is truly revolutionary."¹⁰ Evidently, theories in the revolutionary school have been widely spread.

The "political school" is led by Carl von Clausewitz whose statement, "War can never be separated from political intercourse,"¹¹ is accepted as the cardinal rule all over the world. In his famous work On War, he devoted one chapter to military actions of the civilian population. It provided the basis for most subsequent theories of irregular or guerrilla warfare whose genesis, he declared, lies in political reasons.¹² In later generations, many students of military science have believed in this theory. Said Miksche: "In each conflict, the political background is the determining factor. . . . The basic element of people's war is political infiltration through the weak spots of the State's social structure."¹³ Galula put it in the same terms: "All wars

⁹Griffith, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁰Paret & Shy, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

¹¹Col. Joseph I. Greene, The Living Thoughts of Clausewitz (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943), p. 147.

¹²Book VI, chap. 26. The German title of the chapter, "Vaolsbewaffnung" ("Arming the People"), is rendered in the standard English edition by O. S. Matthijs Jolles (Washington, D. C., 1950).

¹³Miksche, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

are theoretically fought for a political purpose. . . . In the revolutionary war . . . politics becomes an active instrument of operation."¹⁴ Thayer is more succinct: "Guerrilla war is a continuation of political intercourse chiefly by political means and supplemented by military, economic, sociological and psychological measures. . . . Practically all the crucial problems of the guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations are political."¹⁵ Mao Tse-tung observed, "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. . . . Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed."¹⁶ Therefore, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that according to this school of thought, guerrilla warfare starts and ends with politics.

With the progress of time, politics becomes increasingly internationalized. Guerrilla warfare may be caused not only by domestic political disturbances, but also by foreign intervention. Thus students of this school further theorized that, "Few of the rebellions . . . were entirely home-grown. In most of them external influences played a part, often a major one."¹⁷ Wrote a noted columnist: "A guerrilla movement can become effective only under certain

¹⁴Galula, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

¹⁵Thayer, op. cit., pp. 178, 182.

¹⁶Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 227.

¹⁷Crozier, op. cit., p. 130.

conditions. One requirement is the support, or at least the passivity, of the mass of the population. Another is powerful external support."¹⁸ Summed up Thayer: "There are two types of guerrilla warfare. First, it may be a spontaneous uprising of part of the population against its own government, in which case it is a rebellion. . . . Second, the uprising is either instigated by or derives its chief support from a neighboring country attempting to weaken, harass, or overthrow its enemy indirectly by exploiting discontented elements in the enemy's own country or in countries occupied by enemy forces."¹⁹ It is therefore justified to conclude that the political school regards foreign intervention as one of the major causes of guerrilla warfare.

Why do discontented political elements in a country resort to guerrilla struggle? Cross gave the following answer: "Almost all recent insurgent campaigns have been innovative. Their leaders seek to destroy an established order and to create something wholly new."²⁰ This probably may serve as a good explanation of Mao's proposition, "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail."²¹ Thus guerrilla warfare is "political" from beginning to end.

¹⁸ Stewart Alsop, "Foreword," Cross, op. cit.

¹⁹ Thayer, op. cit., "Introduction," xvi.

²⁰ Cross, op. cit., p. 6.

²¹ Griffith, op. cit., p. 43.

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Last but not least comes the "socio-psychological" school. The advocates of this school insist that guerrilla struggles, like other social disturbances, are the outcome of personality problems, psychological conflicts, economic difficulties, and social maladjustments, as well as the interplay of social, economic and psychological factors. One of the spokesmen of this school is Brian Crozier who asserted: "Rebellions are made by rebels. . . . In any event, men do not necessarily rebel because their conditions of life are intolerable: it takes a rebel to rebel."²² However, he also has an eye on man's personal experience, "Frustration is the one element common to all rebels, . . . What is frustration? It is simply the inability to do something one badly wants to do, through circumstances beyond one's control."²³ Lucian W. Pye's study of Malayan guerrilla fighters is along this line. He wrote: "they (the guerrillas) were peculiarly dissatisfied with the traditional life their parents had known and yet were unsure of themselves and their ability to succeed in a more modern world."²⁴ Valeriano and Bohannon disagreed with the "frustration" element: "One driven principally by his frustration, however, is not likely to last long as a guerrilla;" nevertheless,

²² Crozier, op. cit., p. 9.

²³ Ibid., pp. 15-16.

²⁴ Lucian W. Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 127.

they agreed that "an individual will initially join the guerrillas" because of such motivations as "personal devotion to, or hatred for, a cause, social pressure, compulsion, fear of an established authority, adventurousness, ambition and the hope of personal gain."²⁵

A. H. Sollom brought forth another facet of the problem. Said he: "It is those who have nothing to lose who ordinarily become the active guerrilla members. The peasant farmer, the poorer rural dweller are in this category."²⁶ Julian Amery, after his personal observation of Albanian guerrilla warfare for five years (1940-45), arrived at a similar conclusion:

The elements most naturally inclined to revolt were the young who had no family responsibilities and the 'have-nots' who had no property to lose. To them revolt offered faith, discipline, and a way of life; and the strength which they acquired collectively in battle afforded hopes of wealth and power in the event of victory. . . . Prolonged guerrilla warfare was thus natural military expression.²⁷

Pye's thorough study of guerrillas has confirmed that most of the SEP (Surrendered Enemy Personnel) he interviewed "realized that there was little stability in any situation." And the "basic characteristic of the SEP's gave to much of their behavior an opportunistic quality."²⁸ He also found

²⁵Valeriano & Bohannon, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶A. H. Sollom, "Nowhere Yet Everywhere," Osanka, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁷Julian Amery, Sons of the Eagles (London: Macmillan & Co., 1948), p. 167.

²⁸Pye, op. cit., pp. 133, 134.

that most of them were from lower-middle class families and their childhood days had not been happy.²⁹

However, the socio-psychological school embraces a much broader context other than personality difficulties. Social, economic and cultural conflicts all have their roles to play. Observed one: "In the present world situation, the more bitter the internal social conflicts become, the greater will be the possibility of the military and political use of resistance movements in future wars."³⁰ Echoed another: "extensive participation in unconventional warfare certainly does involve an appreciable degree of value conflict and socio-psychological strain."³¹ Indeed, socio-psychological differences are but regarded as the major cause of modern guerrilla warfare.

To sum up, it is probably reasonable to generalize that these three schools of thought do have their respective merits in the explanation of the guerrilla warfare phenomenon, but their validity needs further discussion.

Revolution and Guerrilla Warfare

To know the interrelations between revolution and modern guerrilla warfare, using the theories of the

²⁹ Ibid., p. 142.

³⁰ Miksche, op. cit., p. 41.

³¹ Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Are Americans and their Cultural Values Adaptable to the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?," Annals, op. cit., p. 91.

revolutionary school as the guide, the following questions are brought up: Is guerrilla warfare the outcome of a revolution? Is it the most essential weapon of revolution? And finally, can guerrilla warfare surely achieve its revolutionary goals? Before the answers are given, the meaning of revolution should be examined.

According to Crane Brinton, "Revolution is one of the looser words. Revolution has come in common usage to be hardly more than an emphatic synonym for 'change', perhaps with a suggestion of sudden or striking change."³² Then, are all sudden or striking changes revolutions? Not necessarily, at least not in the political field. For instance, can Communist-takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and Batista's coup in Cuba in 1952, in all of which constitutional governments were substituted with totalitarian or dictatorial regimes, be regarded as revolutions? The changes were sudden and striking, but few students of political science would admit them as revolutions. In the political arena it seems that revolution has a connotation of morality which hints to something progressive and good for the people. In other words, sudden political changes are revolutions only when they are for the good of the populace. If the change brings in suppression, exploitation, misery, instead of happiness and welfare, it is usually termed as insurrection

³² Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1952), p. 3.

or subversion. Thus defined, we proceed to discuss the relationship between revolution and guerrilla warfare.

Forms of Revolution

Revolution takes place in various forms. It can be accomplished through either open armed uprising, or guerrilla warfare, or coup d'etat, or peaceful settlement. Table 2 shows how revolutions in different countries have been successfully conducted.

Table 2. Forms of revolution.

Country	Forms of Revolution			
	Open Armed Uprising	Guerrilla Warfare	Coup d'etat	Peaceful Settlement
Algeria*		x		
Burma*				x
China (1926)#	x			
Congo*	x			
Cuba#		x		
Cyprus*		x		
Egypt#			x	
India*				x
Indochina*		x		
Indonesia (1950)*		x		
Iraq#			x	
Kenya*		x		
Malaya*				x
Morocco*		x		
Pakistan*				x
Philippines*				x
Tunisia*		x		
Yemen#			x	

Remarks: * from colonial status to independence (however, there are many new nations in Asia and Africa which have achieved their independence through peaceful settlement and are not listed here).

from feudalism or monarchy to a republican state.

Guerrilla warfare is employed when the rebels are extremely weak and unable to start an open armed uprising, or to stage a coup, and the incumbents, stronger and stubborn, refuse to have a peaceful settlement. It is the only avenue available to the revolutionaries.

But sometimes guerrilla warfare has nothing to do with revolution. It is a post-revolution development. After the overthrow of the old regime, different revolutionary forces take their rivaling positions. The degree of adversity varies with their ideological commitments, historical background, interests, relative strength, and nature of organization of the opposing parties. Usually there are two leading adversary blocs. One of them is more imbued with national values. Members of this group are here termed the "traditionalists." Their opponents believe in violent changes and imbued with more radical ideologies, such as socialism or communism. They are called the "radicals" here. When the traditionalists and radicals are almost equal in their strength and consensus can be reached through bargaining, a coalition government would thus be established. If the differences between the groups are unmendable, a civil war would break loose. The former was witnessed in India and Burma, while the latter in Indonesia (1958-61) and China (1946-49).

When one of the rivaling parties is considerably weaker yet quite determined to hold its own, and the stronger

party has no intention to compromise, the outcome is therefore a guerrilla war. It is revolutionaries fighting against revolutionaries. Though each side tries hard to brand the other as "counter-revolutionary," "feudalistic," or "bandits," they had been revolutionaries and comrade-at-arms just before the civil strife. For instance, how can we label one side more revolutionary than the other in the struggles between Tito and Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia, Magsaysay and Taruc in the Philippines, and Hoja and Kupa in Albania? The winner-loser scale is surely not the justified measurement. Chin Peng's struggle in Malaya did have revolutionary flavor before Malaya's independence in 1957, but thereafter the flavor was somehow lost. Whether the guerrilla-type, foreign supported rebellions in Greece, South Vietnam and the Congo are revolutions is "doubtful." One may regard them as either revolution or subversion, depending on which side of the conflict he favors.

After the examination of important cases in revolution and guerrilla warfare, one finds that revolution takes various forms--guerrilla warfare is but one of them. Whenever it is possible to have a short-cut or a less costly way, resorts other than guerrilla struggle are preferred. Though guerrilla warfare may be the outcome of revolution, there are guerrilla struggles which can hardly be labeled as revolutions.

Revolutionary Goals

Another question is whether revolutionary goals can be fully achieved without resort to guerrilla warfare. In all revolutions here discussed, only a portion of them have employed guerrilla warfare. Even among this portion, several have betrayed their original goal of revolution. Cyprus can serve as a good example.³³ On the other hand, many revolutions which have not used guerrilla warfare did achieve their goals remarkably well. India, Malaya, and Egypt are in this category. Therefore, it might well be that guerrilla warfare is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for the attaining of revolutionary goals.

Summing up, revolution is a process which can be carried out through different forms of which guerrilla warfare is but one; it may and may not be revolutionary in nature; revolutionary goals can be fully attained through various types of revolution; and guerrilla warfare is no guarantee to their achievement.

Political Situation and Guerrilla Warfare

Each war, including guerrilla war, has its causes. Theorists in the "political school" insist that guerrilla warfare is the outcome of an unsatisfactory political

³³The Cyprus story is witnessed by the failure of Enosis movement and continuous bloody struggle between Greeks and Turks after the independence of the country.

situation. Said Miksche: "In each conflict, the political background is the determining factor."³⁴ Agreed Valeriano and Bohannan: "Guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare are 'irregular warfare'; perhaps a better term would be 'irregular political activity'."³⁵ Foregoing discussion has disclosed that Communist leaders also stressed the important role of politics in guerrilla warfare. The idea that guerrilla struggle is closely linked with a political situation has been unanimously accepted. Facts also support this argument. In the seventeen cases cited in Table 3, guerrillas in the six countries during the War were fighting for the liberation of their respective fatherland from foreign occupation, eight against colonialism and for national independence, and four for other political demands. Among the six where guerrilla struggles were carried on after World War II and subsequently changed into civil wars, new political objectives were introduced. Table 3 displays an array of political causes of modern guerrilla movement.

Whether or not these causes are justified is another matter, but political causes there must be. We are unable to find any guerrilla warfare without putting forth a political goal. The underlying motivation of the political causes, however, may vary greatly. Ideology, personal ambition and grievances, patriotism, identification with a political

³⁴Miksche, op. cit., p. 18.

³⁵Valeriano & Bohannan, op. cit., p. 3.

Table 3. Political causes of guerrilla warfare.

Countries	Political Causes	
	During World War II (incentives)	After World War II (objectives)
Albania	anti-aggression	a Communist political order
China	anti-aggression	"agrarian reform" & "democracy"
Greece	anti-aggression	a Communist political order
Malaya	anti-aggression	anti-colonialism & independence
Philippines	anti-aggression	"land reform, equal justice, good gov't
Yugoslavia	anti-aggression	a Communist political order
Algeria	anti-colonialism	and national independence
Indochina	same as above	
Indonesia	same as above	
Kenya	same as above	
Morocco	same as above	
Tunisia	same as above	
Cyprus	Enosis (unity with Greece)	
Congo	"anti-imperialism" & "independent" gov't	
South Vietnam	"anti-imperialism" & "independent" gov't	
Cuba	anti-dictatorship and good gov't	

party, the abhorrence of the existing regime, etc. . . . may have their part to play. But whatever the motivation, the overthrow of the existing political order and the establishment of a new one is the aim of the guerrillas. In short, the guerrillas are always politically oriented.

Effectiveness of the Government

Under what kind of government is guerrilla warfare likely to happen? Among the seventeen countries listed in Table 3, ten of them had colonial governments when guerrilla movements were underway; five were under foreign occupation. Two of them, Cuba and South Vietnam, were charged of foreign domination. It is, however, clear that colonial and occupational regimes are most prone to guerrilla attack. To look a little bit further, among the fifteen nations which had foreign control, eight of them, Albania, China, the Congo, Greece, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia, experienced continuous guerrilla struggles after foreign influences were removed. In those countries one of the rivaling groups had become incumbents; formal government had been established. Nonetheless, guerrilla struggles continued. So the second generalization would be: guerrillas tend to develop under young regimes. But among thirty-seven new nations in Africa only one has experienced guerrilla warfare after their independence, that is the Congo. More African new states preferred coup d'etat for their political

upheaval; and this is also true in Asia.³⁶ So guerrilla warfare does not necessarily occur in young countries. The incumbents in these eight nations were comparatively strong militarily through their own efforts and/or the assistance of their allies. However, probably with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania where the rivaling guerrillas were quickly liquidated right after the War, the common features of the new regimes are political instability and administrative ineffectiveness. Their bureaucracies are inexperienced; grass-roots appeal is weak; social organizations are loose or non-existent; political articulation and aggregation are inadequate; communication between the government and the people is particularistic and regional; and some degree of political corruption and injustice may be present. James E. Cross observed: "governments are too weak and inexperienced to meet popular needs," and "the regimes have become too stiff in the joints to respond in time to the demands of changing conditions."³⁷ In short, administrative and political incapability of the ruling elites is the main contributor to guerrilla warfare.

³⁶ African countries which had coups after their independence are Egypt, French Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Sudan, and Zanzibar. In Asia, Burma, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, South Korea, and South Vietnam have had the same experience. Some of them, like Yemen and South Vietnam have had both coup and guerrilla warfare.

³⁷ Cross, op. cit., p. 15.

Facts fully support this argument. The weaker party conducted activities against the stronger incumbents who were administratively ineffective. But when the administrative ability of the government was improved, the guerrillas suffered defeat; Malaya, the Philippines, Greece, and China (before 1936) are good examples. When the incumbents failed to improve their political ability and leadership, like in China (after 1946), the Congo and South Vietnam, they suffered setbacks at the hands of the guerrillas. A weak, disintegrated, or corrupt political machine is the sure proof for guerrilla successes, whereas a dynamic and clean one would be able to withstand the pressure. Indeed political corruption and deterioration speed up the guerrilla process while an efficient government tends to stop it.

Reference, however, must be made to one exception to these rules: if the governments are colonial, statistics show that none of them have ever been saved from guerrilla struggles, without regard to their efficiency. Of course, most colonial governments are exploitative. None of the colonial governments have ever reached the political and administrative efficacy which has been maintained in their home countries. This ironic fact explains at least in part why the colonialists are doomed under the acid test of guerrilla struggles.

One may argue that counter guerrilla operations of any government are both expensive and highly inconvenient. Political and economic aspects of counterinsurgency campaigns

may be hard for a weak government to face up to. Furthermore, the rebel leaders have usually worked hard and long to identify themselves with popular grievances. But the real issue is that the authorities are often reluctant to make reforms. The slowness of the response and the inertia of action are the worst enemies of the incumbents. When the political situation has been successfully manipulated by the guerrilla leaders, the incumbents have no excuse for their own failure. Guerrilla warfare is a life and death struggle between the opposing political factions, and the law of "survival of the fittest" can be fully applied to it. How a government must improve itself to meet the challenge will be discussed in Chapter V.

Guerrilla Warfare and Political Change

As mentioned in Chapter I, there have always been some political changes without regard to the success or failure of guerrilla warfare. The fluctuations of guerrilla movement in China provides a very interesting example. The defeat of Mao in southern China in 1934 brought forth a unified nation and a popular and effective government which permitted China to resist Japanese aggression for eight years. While the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949 brought China into Communism. In other countries also, guerrillas have brought changes. They might be in the form of national independence, democracy, Communist regime, popular

government, or others. Table 4 gives a good illustration of political changes owing to guerrilla struggles.

Table 4. Political changes caused by guerrilla warfare.

Country	Political Changes	
	Before guerrilla warfare	After guerrilla warfare
Albania	kingship	Communist regime
Algeria	colonial government	national independence
China (1935)	disunified government	unified & popular government
China (1949)	constitutional government	Communist regime
Cuba	dictatorship	Communist regime
Cyprus	colonial government	national independence
Greece	weak constitutional monarchy	strong constitutional monarchy
Indochina	colonial government	Communist regime
Indonesia (1950)	colonial government	national independence
Indonesia (1961)	constitutional government	"guided democracy"*
Kenya	colonial government	national independence
Malaya	colonial government	national independence
Philippines	democracy	more responsible democracy
Tunisia	colonial government	national independence
Yugoslavia	kingship	Communist regime

*the term is used by President Sukarno to explain his rule in Indonesia.

The change so caused is not necessarily destined for democracy, nor does it always end with increased people's welfare. The merit of the establishment of a Communist regime after the success of a guerrilla struggle has been quite a controversy. But to set aside its value connotations, guerrilla warfare has never failed to bring along political

changes with it. This is the most important phenomenon to be watched.

Summing up, the interrelations between political situations and guerrilla warfare are identified as follows: A deteriorated political situation is the major cause of modern guerrilla warfare. Political inefficiency and corruption speed up the guerrilla process; guerrilla warfare is always politically oriented; and whether it results in victory or failure, guerrilla warfare does bring changes to the existing political system.

Foreign Intervention and Guerrilla Warfare

According to the "political school," there is a growing concern with regard to foreign intervention in guerrilla warfare. According to Miksche: "Popular risings or revolutions rarely succeed without outside assistance."³⁸ Just how big a role that foreign intervention has played in guerrilla struggle has to be clarified. Is foreign assistance the key to guerrilla warfare? Can guerrilla warfare be used for aggression and conquest; and, is guerrilla warfare more and more internationalized?

Since World War II new developments in transportation, communication, weaponry and its delivery systems have shrunk the globe considerably. Countries on various continents are

³⁸Miksche, op. cit., p. 66.

no longer indifferent inhabitants separated by mountains and oceans, but neighbors who can communicate with each other within a short time. Events in one locality may find instant reactions all over the world. Since guerrilla warfare means a violent, total, and armed struggle in one country, and its success or failure may change the balance of power in world politics, it is inevitable that it should attract international attention. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism in colonial areas and the expansion of international Communism have put guerrilla struggle under the limelight. There is little doubt that international interest in guerrilla warfare has immensely increased.

But interest in itself is not a substantial action. One must not interpret that international interest is the equivalent to foreign intervention. A foreign power may assist the guerrillas only when their success coincides with its own national interest. The desire to aid and the capability to aid, however, are two different things. Russia was certainly eager to assist the Congolese guerrillas, but the sheer distance between them made the assistance quite difficult, if not impossible. How can the Chinese Communists support the Angolan rebels is also a big problem. Even if foreign aid is possible, the attitude of the receiver is another factor to be considered. "The surprising coolness of the Algerian rebels toward Communist aid"³⁹ was an interesting

³⁹Paret & Shy, op. cit., p. 37.

case. So, to say foreign intervention is a major contributor to guerrilla warfare is an oversimplified statement.

To be sure, guerrillas in several countries did receive foreign support and were instigated sometimes by a foreign power. In Indochina, Greece, South Vietnam, Cyprus and China (after 1945), guerrillas had been both instigated and supported by one or more foreign powers. In Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Yemen, Albania, and Yugoslavia, they were aided by neighboring or friendly countries. Guerrillas in China (before 1935), the Philippines, Malaya and Cuba received little foreign aid. Guerrilla movements in Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, and Kenya had received no foreign support at all. Thus the theory that guerrilla warfare has always been assisted by foreign power cannot be verified.

Is foreign intervention one of the decisive factors in a guerrilla struggle? Superficially speaking, the assistance from outside, whether it is in money, firearms, food, medicine, sanctuary, manpower, advisors, moral or technical support, seems to strengthen the position of the guerrillas. But it also inherits some drawbacks. In the opinion of Paret and Shy, "Foreign aid dampens the emotions that provide the fuel for guerrilla warfare, and renders the ideological struggle more difficult. Inevitably there will be some conflict between the aims of indigenous guerrillas and their foreign benefactors."⁴⁰ Galula found that outside

⁴⁰Ibid.

support "can destroy or harm self-reliance in the insurgent ranks."⁴¹ The defeat of the Greek Communist guerrillas could have been caused, at least in part, by its over-reliance on foreign support both in arms and sanctuary. The closing of borders by Tito in the summer of 1949 proved fatal to the Greek insurgents. Russia's eagerness in aiding guerrillas all over the globe certainly keeps the vigil of new emerging nations alive. Red China's tremendous interest in supporting African rebels has resulted in the severance of diplomatic relations between her and Burundi, while nations in the French Federation started to talk about "Red Chinese imperialism" in Africa.⁴²

As a matter of fact, guerrilla warfare is basically an indigenous mass movement. It can be and has been exploited by a foreign aggressive power for subversion purposes. This kind of international vandalism does not mean that a foreign power can send in its own troops to be disguised as local guerrilla fighters, nor can foreigners do the essential jobs for the native people. Foreigners may instigate, advise, assist, and support the movement; it may even be convenient, economical and profitable for the leaders of an aggressive nation to "persuade citizens of the state they wish to attack to espouse their cause to fight the matter out

⁴¹Galula, op. cit., p. 42.

⁴²For the story between Red China and Burundi, see Time, vol. 85, no. 7, February 12, 1965, pp. 29-30.

with their own countrymen."⁴³ But so far no foreign intervention has ever gone far by fighting a guerrilla war for the indigenous people. Students of guerrilla warfare must agree with Crozier that "external influences and intervention may be of great importance, but they cannot by themselves, initiate a successful rebellion."⁴⁴ Aggression and conquest through guerrilla warfare is an indirect and clandestine process. It is not the annexion of territory openly, but the exercise of control through influence and manipulation.

Is foreign intervention the necessary condition for guerrilla victory? Not at all. There are guerrilla wars which have gained their success by means of securing foreign aid, but as cited before, many of them have become victorious without substantial outside support. However, one thing must be kept in mind: when guerrillas receive substantial aid from outside, they are difficult to defeat. Even the royalists in Yemen have put up an impressive guerrilla struggle with the republican revolutionaries supported by the neighboring Saudi Arabian government.⁴⁵ Foreign intervention thus by no means can be underestimated.

Is guerrilla warfare getting more internationalized every year? Yes. The rebels in Congo forests are not only

⁴³ Cross, op. cit., p. 116.

⁴⁴ Crozier, op. cit., p. 157.

⁴⁵ See George DeCarvalho, "Yemen's Desert Fox," Life February 19, 1965, pp. 97-109.

the concern of nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but also a major problem under the care of the United Nations. In fact, it indirectly cost the life of the U. N. Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold. More than one dozen countries have been involved in the guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam. The guerrilla movement in Angola has become the major concern of most African nations. The trend is that guerrilla warfare, like regular wars, will be more internationally involved if it cannot be ended within a short span of time. Needless to say, guerrilla struggle may be escalated into an all-out open global war. As long as this unique form of struggle is manipulated continuously by foreign powers, the danger remains great.

To conclude, modern guerrilla warfare is immensely saturated with foreign interests and its international flavor is on the increase. But no foreign power can take over the guerrilla fighting from the indigenous people. Foreign support is not the decisive factor to guerrilla victory, yet guerrilla warfare can be used by aggressive foreign power for subversive purpose.

The Socio-Psychological Approach

In the "socio-psychological school," guerrilla warfare is explained as the outcome of unique personality patterns, and economic social and cultural conflicts. Is it true that by natural endowment or later experience, there

are men who are most adapted to be guerrilla leaders and fighters, without whom there would be no guerrilla warfare? Are economic conflicts caused by poverty and unevenly distributed wealth the major contributors of guerrilla warfare? Do social inequality and class differentiation inspire guerrilla struggles? All these questions must be carefully examined.

Personality Pattern

Are there people with a special personality pattern which would be destined to guerrilla warfare? Indeed, there is evidence that certain personality types are rebellious against established authority and likely to join in guerrilla warfare. However, to devote himself to guerrilla fighting, as a rule, one has to undergo a frustrating process. Take some noted guerrilla leaders for example: Mao Tse-tung had been a normal school graduate and a librarian before he joined the Chinese Communist Party at the age of twenty-eight. Six years later he served as the Acting Minister of Propaganda under the Chinese Nationalists which was leading the Northern Expedition. He showed no intention to conduct guerrilla movement before then. Even the split between the Nationalists and the Communists did not make him a guerrilla. It was only when he was cornered after his defeat in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927 did he resort to guerrilla

struggle.⁴⁶ Ho Chi Minh has the same kind of story. Seeking for national independence of Vietnam, Ho had appealed to the Geneva Peace Conference in 1919 and many times to the French government after that.⁴⁷ It was not until all hopes of peaceful settlement were dampened that Ho finally took up guerrilla struggle in 1945 against the French. Table 5 shows the background of famous guerrilla leaders in our time. In general, they share the following characteristics:

1. reared in rural areas, mostly in villages or small towns;
2. grew up in a middle-class or a poor family;
3. received higher education either in colleges or military academies;
4. got started in military, governmental or other profession, only a small minority had been workers;
5. engaged in guerrilla warfare in their thirties or forties, the time when they were intellectually mature and physically strong.

The table reveals that most guerrilla leaders were not guerrilla-prone in their early years. Though most guerrilla leaders were from poorer families, they strived to get a decent education and prepared for a career. Then why did

⁴⁶For Mao's personal history, see Anne Fremantle, Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings (New York: The New American Library, 1962) "Introduction," vii-xxxiv. How he started his guerrilla struggle, see chapter IV, stage 1.

⁴⁷For Ho's struggle, see Crozier, op. cit., pp. 29-33.

Table 5. Background of modern guerrilla leaders.*

Name	Birth Place			Family Background			Education			Occupation				Age When Became Guerrilla		
	R	C	P	P	M	R	P	M	C	W	M	G	P	Below 30	30 to 50	Over 50
Mao	x				x			x					x		x	
Ho	x				x			x		x					x	
Giap	x								x				x		x	
Chin Peng	x		x		x			x				x				
Taruc	x		x					x		x						
Tito	x		x						x	x					x	
Hoja	x		x						x			x			x	
Grivas	x				x				x		x				x	
Ben Bella	x		x													
Kenyatta	x		x		x			x			x					x
Castro	x				x				x				x		x	

Remarks: Birth place: R--rural area, C--city;

Family Background: P--poor, M--middle class, R--rich;

Education: P--primary school, M--middle school, C--college or military academy;

Occupation: W--worker, M--military career, G--government or party job, P--professional.

*The data in this table is from the following sources: Asia's Who's Who (Hong Kong: Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance, 3rd ed., 1960); John Gunther, Inside Europe Today (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1961); U. S. Baclagon, Lessons from the Huk Campaign (Manila: M. Colcol, & Co., 1956); and Crozier, op. cit., pp. 15-89.

they turn into guerrilla leaders? The answer may be found in a personality pattern. From their personal history, we learned that they are highly aspired men. But their aspiration which may include national independence, socialism or Communism, personal ambition, etc., could not be fulfilled through regular, legal, or traditional channels. At times they were cornered and their life and freedom were threatened. In desperation, frustration, fear, and anguish, guerrilla struggle remained their only choice. Mao, Ho, Chin, Taruc, Ben Bella, Kenyatta and Castro had all tried to achieve their goal through more moderate ways, but to no avail. It is probably not wrong to say that guerrilla leaders are desperate and frustrated individuals. But this frustration and desperation has its roots in their political aspirations and ambitions. A dogged determination which is motivated by the combination of aspiration, frustration and fear is the unique personality pattern of a guerrilla leader. This psychological complex can even be applied to a former king of Yemen, Imam Badr, who is leading a brilliant guerrilla campaign against the republican Yemenite government under General Abdullah Sallal.⁴⁸ Evidently, this kind of personality is formed by one's later experience.

As to guerrilla fighters, they are overwhelmingly the peasants and the underprivileged, the "have-nots" of the land. They follow their leaders in return for a promise of

⁴⁸ See DeCarvalho, Life, loc. cit.

a brighter future. They are manipulated and inspired by their leaders. Their mentality is to hope for something better because nothing can be worse. Pye's study of Malayan guerrilla fighters clearly demonstrates this point.⁴⁹

Economic Conflict

How much does economic deterioration contribute to guerrilla warfare? Under the impact of "economic determinism," many people are led to believe that poverty, underdevelopment, and economic chaos are the main factors of modern guerrilla movement. True, those who fight in guerrilla bands are mostly "have-nots," but put on a comparative basis, countries which have guerrilla experience are neither the poorest nor the most undeveloped. Economy-wise, Malaya is much better off than Pakistan; Cuba is richer than most of the Central American states; Algeria and the Congo are much more developed than their African neighbors. Indochina used to be the "rice bowl" of Asia, and Kenya has the largest coffee plantation in East Africa. Yet, there have been guerrilla struggles in these nations. In the most economically backward countries like Bhutan, Jordan, Syria, Somaliland, Niger, Chad, Haiti, Paraguay, etc., there have not been guerrilla disturbances. So the proposition that guerrilla warfare is the outcome of poverty or underdevelopment is not valid.

⁴⁹ See Part IV, Pye, op. cit., pp. 115-140.

Then could it be the unevenness of wealth distribution as the cause? Certainly the feeling of injustice between the poor and the rich plants the seeds of hatred and grievance. The polarization of personal wealth may tear the society apart. The inequality in wealth has been attacked as social evil throughout human history, from Mencius to San Yat-sen and from Socrates to Lenin.⁵⁰ But to say economic polarization is the most significant factor of guerrilla warfare is none the less an over-simplified conclusion. Economic equality has not been achieved in any nation; indeed not even under Communism. Djilas' book, The New Class, gives a good description of that. If economic injustice alone were the motivating force behind guerrilla warfare, then countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya, to mention a few, should have experienced the phenomenon long ago.

Disregarding the invalidity of the role that economic conflicts have played in guerrilla struggle, there is one phenomenon which is shared by many guerrilla-torn countries. It is the land problem. It has been known that in China, Indochina, the Philippines, Malaya, Kenya, and Cuba, the struggle for land between the peasants and the absentee landlords has been the major issue taken up by the guerrillas.

⁵⁰ Said Mencius around the 4th century B. C., "Our trouble is not poverty but uneven distribution." San Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, stated in his Three Peoples' Principles in 1924: "Our problem is not production, but distribution so far as people's livelihood is concerned." Socrates advocated Communism in his Republic; and Lenin's state farms and collectives are well-known to the world.

Though there are exceptions to the case, such as the Congo, and Yemen, where land has not been an important problem, it is nevertheless true that wherever land is highly valued by the people and the majority of the farmers are landless, it is rather easy for guerrilla leaders to build up a powerful cause against the land gentry. Redistribution of land has thus become the dynamic factor in fomenting a guerrilla movement. Indeed "we can generalize that intrasocietal guerrilla warfare is facilitated by a peasantry which does not possess the soil it cultivates and a rural population which lacks adequate employment."⁵¹

In sum, the conflict between the rich and the poor, the "haves" and the "have-nots," the landlords and the landless peasants does help the fomentation of guerrilla warfare. But it plays only a contributive role. Guerrillas would not appear automatically under economic distress or polarization. When they do appear, however, a great following is expected. Undoubtedly, economic distress makes guerrillas easier to operate and grow.

Social Conflict

Guerrilla warfare is doubtlessly a social phenomenon which indicates the maladjustment and the deterioration of relations between social groups. The underlying causes may be personal, political, and economical, as previously

⁵¹Merle Kling, *Annals*, op. cit., p. 49.

discussed. Of course, it may also be caused by genuine social conflict. The Algerian case serves as a good example. Guerrilla movement in Algeria has not merely been an anti-colonial struggle. Racial and religious differences between the Europeans and the Arabs were so acute that reconciliation became impossible. A circular sent to local administrators by the former Governor-General of Algeria, M. Jacques Soustelle gives a good description of the situation:

A big effort is still needed for courtesy to become normal practice. . . . The 'native' wishes to be treated as politely as anybody else. He is attached, legitimately, to his human dignity.

Wounds of self-respect, in a naturally proud people imbued with the rules of oriental courtesy, are always the longest to heal . . .

In brief, if the 'Algeria problem' is of an economic and political character, it is also, and perhaps even more, a problem of human relations.⁵²

Social conflicts between the native Moslems and European whites supplied the fuel to the guerrilla flames in Algeria. In Malaya before its independence, the Chinese were treated as second-class citizens. In fact the majority of them were not citizens, although they comprised more than 40% of the total population. They were debarred from certain civil service jobs and were denied the right to own land. There should be no surprise, therefore, that most guerrillas in Malaya were of Chinese origin.

But social conflict cannot be applied to all guerrilla movements. In China, for instance, guerrillas and

⁵²As cited by Crozier, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

counterguerrillas may be brothers, cousins, classmates, relatives, neighbors, or other intimate relations. Rivaling groups were socially and culturally homogeneous. The same holds true in the Philippines.

Social conflicts embrace racial, ethnical, religious and cultural differences. Tribal antagonism in the Congo fanned up guerrilla fires. To a certain extent, ethnic fragmentation in Albania laid the cornerstone for the guerrilla struggle between Hoja and Kupi.

Guerrilla warfare is certainly a deviant social behavior. The breakdown of harmonious personal, economic, social and cultural relations among social groups lays the foundation for popular turmoil. With the distressed, aspired, and ambitious rebels leading the way, various conflicts which exist in the community are exploited and manipulated. The exploitation and manipulation differ from one cultural setting to another. But the presence of an insurrective group is absolutely necessary. Once enough masses are recruited for the armed venture, guerrilla warfare is then bound to begin.

From the discussions above, we learn that socio-economic-psychological factors are related to guerrilla warfare; a group of aspired, yet frustrated rebellious intellectuals are indispensable to start a guerrilla movement. However, the theory that they are born that way cannot be empirically verified. Poverty and economic distress are not

necessarily associated with guerrilla struggle, but the uneven distribution of wealth, and especially land, bears a strong impact on guerrilla movement. Social and cultural conflicts do add fuel to guerrilla flames, yet guerrilla warfare has occurred in homogeneous social and cultural settings.

Summary

Guerrilla warfare is a complicated phenomenon. Any over-simplification in its theorization may lead to misunderstanding and confusion. To have a clear recognition of this torrent struggle, we have approached it from different directions. From the above study, we find these theories are inadequate, however, it may be concluded that:

- (1) Governmental ineffectiveness and a determined rebellious group are the two necessary conditions of modern guerrilla warfare. Without either one of them guerrilla warfare can hardly materialize.
- (2) Social and economic conflicts contribute to the outbreak and intensification of modern guerrilla warfare; their respective weights in the struggle vary with the social setting in which the guerrilla movement takes place.
- (3) The "cause-and-effect" and "ends-and-means" relations do not necessarily exist between revolution and modern guerrilla warfare; i.e., neither all revolutions resort to guerrilla struggle, nor are all guerrilla movements revolutionary.

(4) Modern guerrilla warfare can be manipulated for subversive and aggressive purposes by a foreign power, but the fighting must be carried out by the indigenous people.

(5) Modern guerrilla warfare is always politically oriented; political changes would result, irrespective of the success or failure of a guerrilla struggle.

These propositions will be re-examined after the case study in chapter IV.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

The theoretical aspect of guerrilla warfare has been discussed in the preceding chapters. Hereinafter, its operational aspect will be discussed. How is guerrilla warfare conducted strategically and tactically? How do guerrilla forces recruit their personnel and maintain their leadership? How is the guerrilla process carried through? These are the questions that this chapter ventures to answer.

The discussions in this chapter come under the following headings: (1) general principles, (2) cause, (3) organization, (4) propaganda, (5) terrorism, (6) intelligence and sabotage, (7) mass struggle, (8) military operations, (9) base, (10) weapons and supplies, (11) personnel, and (12) the guerrilla process. Thus arranged, it is hoped that the essentials of guerrilla operation can be thoroughly understood.

General Principles

As indicated in chapter one, modern guerrilla warfare is a war of totality based upon a mass movement. Being a form of war, guerrilla warfare consists of imposing one's own will on the opponent, and destroying the opponent's will

and strength to resist. In the simplest terms, it aims at the conquest of the enemy. But to accomplish this, the guerrillas, unlike regular armies, put more emphasis on the will of the rivalry. They zero at the mind of the opponent first, and his armies next. As Bjelajac observed: "Unconventional warfare may consist of violent actions like guerrilla attacks, civil insurrections, mass riots, sabotage or terrorism--or of such 'non-violent' techniques as propaganda, infiltration, strikes, boycott and espionage. Indeed, its distinctive characteristic is that of blending violence and non-violence into a new synthesis of warfare."¹ The conduct of guerrilla operations has been regarded as "political" by some students of war because it covers a wide range of activities which are closer to political maneuvering than to military campaigning.² Whatever the terminology, guerrilla warfare distinguishes itself by ideological indoctrination, crowd manipulation, psychological warfare, and paramilitary actions. Strategically, as well as tactically, guerrilla warfare is unique and unconventional.

However, for the guerrillas to begin to develop into an effective force, certain basic premises must be satisfied. If this type of warfare is to have a chance to survive and expand and eventually to win, it must have something more

¹S. N. Bjelajac, "Unconventional Warfare in the Nuclear Era," Osanka, op. cit., p. 440.

²See James Burnham, "Sticks, Stones, and Atoms," Osanka, op. cit., p. 420.

than its unconventional strategy and tactics. Essentially, guerrilla warfare must take place in a broad expanse of broken terrain, thus able to cloak its operations and discourage enemy sweeps and pursuits. It must have at least the passive support of the population. It must have motivation. It must be waged by tough, independent people inured to hardship. It must have more than a modicum of organization and discipline, and logistical support. Valeriano and Bohannon added: "The guerrilla habitually must: Fight only at a time and place of his own choosing. Develop comprehensive intelligence and counter-intelligence screens. Rely generally on decentralized command. Punish his enemies among the civilian population. Rely on primitive, often improvised, communication and transportation facilities. Emphasize gaining popular support and good will. Seek to overcome the enemy's will to resist more by psychological than by physical force."³ In brief, grand objectives of modern guerrilla warfare are three: (a) to gain popular support, (b) to achieve self-maintenance and expansion, and (c) to destroy the enemy's will to resist and/or to defeat his physical force. Strategies, stratagems, tactics, operations in guerrilla warfare lead toward these paramount goals.

As stressed in Chapter I, the major purpose of a mass movement is to gain popular support. To win the populace to their side, the guerrillas resort to the following practices:

³Valeriano and Bohannon, op. cit., p. 24.

the creation of a cause, the organization of the people, and the persuasion and coercion of the masses with psychological and physical means. To achieve self-maintenance and expansion, highly instigated and disciplined personnel, a secured base, and adequate weapons and supplies are needed. To defeat the enemy's will and strength, military operations must couple with mass struggles, and they must be supplemented with propaganda, terrorism, sabotage and intelligence. In short, guerrilla warfare in its modern context is a mammoth, yet smoothly concerted, operation which influences the whole society whose members are directly or indirectly involved.

In addition, leaders of guerrilla warfare must exploit every possible situation in the society for their advantage. Hilsman listed nine conditions which may be manipulated by the guerrillas:

1. Antagonisms between underdeveloped states.
2. Disagreements between regions of a state or between a region and the center.
3. Social class antagonism.
4. Intense disagreement over foreign policy.
5. Traditional political rivalries within a social class.
6. Lack of popular belief in the state as a sovereign entity.
7. Ethnic or racial issues.

8. Banditry.

9. Constitutional crises.⁴

The multiple conditions manifest that the guerrillas have plenty of grounds to build up their cause, and the stage for their rebellion can be easily set. If the rebels are capable enough, there is a good chance for them to get under way.

Finally, guerrilla leaders must always keep the fire burning, to convince supporters, and individual guerrillas alike, that their movement is effective; that it is contributing to the achievement of their goal. In other words, hope must always be present. When good morale is kept among the partisan, guerrilla warfare can last for a long time.

The conduct of modern guerrilla warfare is the ruthless application of ideological, political, organizational, psychological, and military means to the total struggle. The guerrilla's process is a complicated and sophisticated one. When guerrilla leaders are imbued with this kind of concept, they are in the position to direct a viable and dynamic guerrilla movement.

The Cause

The first element of strategical importance to guerrilla warfare is a "cause." It spells out the ultimate objective of the struggle, and inspires the fighters, as well

⁴Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," Osanka, op. cit., pp. 461-62.

as the people rallying behind the movement. Basically, it is an ideological appeal which is carefully tuned to justice, honor, pride and emotion. Its final goal is the capture of the human mind so that people will participate in violent struggle. Guerrilla leaders know very well that human beings are the slaves of their minds. Once a cause has its grip on one's mind, one can do nothing but comply.

Students of modern guerrilla warfare realize well the value of a cause. Mao Tse-tung's statement "Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail,"⁵ has been widely cited all over the world. Valeriano and Bohannan asserted that "a cause" is "imperative for a viable guerrilla movement."⁶ Galula insisted that "The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an insurgency unless he has a well-grounded cause with which to attract supporters among the population."⁷ And "man (guerrilla) so dedicated must have an ideal, one that is plain and simple and worth dying for,"⁸ is Guevara's conviction. Indeed a cause is indispensable to modern guerrilla warfare.

In practice, no guerrilla movement in our time has failed to espouse a respectable cause. Chapter II has

⁵Griffith, op. cit., p. 43.

⁶Valeriano and Bohannan, op. cit., p. 19.

⁷Galula, op. cit., p. 13.

⁸Guevara, op. cit., p. 35.

listed the causes of various guerrilla struggles all over the globe.⁹ But why have some guerrillas succeeded and others failed? Are there any correlations between the cause and the outcome of a guerrilla struggle? What kind of appeal makes the best cause? To these questions there have not been any empirical studies, yet there are some generalizations which are worthy of note. First of all, the cause must meet the strongest desire of the masses. The greater the appeal of the cause to the people, the greater its influence. However, the cause may contain more than one proposition in order that different appeals may reach different people, hopefully that an overwhelming majority of the population will be attracted. For instance, when anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa ran high after World War II, the cause of "national independence" was strong enough to rally native people behind it. But in China, Cuba, and Greece, anti-colonialism remained no longer an issue, so various propositions had to be worked out. The land problem had been fully exploited by the Chinese guerrillas. It had a tremendous appeal because land-thirsty peasants are the majority of the people in these two countries. In Malaya, Chin Peng first stressed anti-colonialism, which stopped functioning when his country gained independence from the British in 1957. So he shifted to "overthrow of the government, the

⁹See Table 3, Chapter II.

expulsion of Europeans, and the redistribution of wealth."¹⁰ Though there were several propositions, the cause was not very strong. It contributed considerably to Chin's defeat. The failure of Communist guerrillas in the Philippines and Greece can also be attributed, in part, to the weakness of their causes.

We come now to the second generalization of a sound cause: it must be impossible or at least very difficult for the incumbents to fulfill the appeal. This explains why anti-colonialism and national independence have won in almost every guerrilla struggle when they were used against foreign colonialists who could never back down from their original position. But Luis Talruc's "land reform, equal justice, and good government" appeals failed in the Philippines because of Magsaysay's enlightening reform programs in land and in politics. The ten-point proposal laid down by the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation contains political, economic and social appeals.¹¹ Whether guerrillas in South Vietnam would succeed eventually would be decided to a certain extent by the capability of the South Vietnamese government to take up the challenge and to make necessary reforms as indicated in the guerrillas' causes. From past

¹⁰ See Anthony Crockett, "Action in Malaya," Osanka, op. cit., p. 309.

¹¹ See William J. Pomeroy, Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 53-4.

experience, one thing seems sure; if the cause can be easily adopted by the government, the guerrilla's chance of success is rather slim. So a sound cause for the guerrillas must be the kind of appeal unacceptable to the ruling elites.

To make the cause more attractive to the people and less acceptable to incumbents, it must be somewhat abstract, yet with high moral qualities. Terms like "justice," "equality," "freedom," and "democracy" are certainly better than "wealth redistribution," because the latter is more concrete, therefore more easily carried out. The former ones are without definite boundaries. Even if the government resolves to do something about them, the rebels have plenty of grounds to complain.

Needless to say, to build a strong and effective cause is on the highest order in a guerrilla leaders calendar. But it also presents a paradox. It must be concrete enough to make a heart-felt appeal to the people, yet abstract enough that the ruling elite is unable to fulfill it at ease. It must be able to rally the support of the majority, yet engender opposition from the incumbents. Thayer has tried to work out the major ingredients of a guerrilla cause. He listed:

1. The cause must be both plausible and compelling.
 2. It must possess a high moral appeal that justifies violations of traditional norms of behavior.
 3. It must be achievable by less violent means.
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4. It has some hope of fulfillment.

But he also cautioned that "every insurgent movement has a large element of the irrational. Fanatical nationalism, extreme frustration with prolonged social or political injustice and the madness of revenge are among the most frequent motives of guerrilla violence in civilized communities."¹² Thus the embracement of a cause is no easy task to the guerrillas.

In sum, the cause provides the ideological conviction which is essential and fundamental to a guerrilla movement. Its content varies with national culture, social conditions, economic situation, and political atmosphere. A sound and powerful cause needs a good mixture of rationality and emotionalism, concreteness and abstraction, morality and craving, facts and illusions. It is the job for an artist, a creative leader, and in most instances, a statesman. Only with the right cause firmly set, can guerrilla leaders march toward their risky and violent adventure.

Organization

"A guerrilla movement requires organization if it is to live and win more than transient success . . . Organization may be regarded as the first imperative of a guerrilla movement, since it is essential for the success of any but a mob-type revolution, even though it may not precede guerrilla

¹²Thayer, op. cit., p. 39.

actions."¹³ "The power of the people cannot be manifested without organization."¹⁴ These words of Valeriano and Bohannan and Mao Tse-tung have forcefully stressed the strategic value of organization in a guerrilla struggle. As a matter of fact, cause and organization are inseparable twins of any modern guerrilla movement. They always go hand-in-hand, and it is hard to tell which should come first. Organization can last long only with a cause; in turn, a cause can be widely spread only with an organization. These two strategic moves lay down a solid foundation for modern guerrilla warfare.

Organization of a viable guerrilla movement is quite unique. It is a combination of secret and open structures, political and military apparatuses, nucleus and operational units, and mass and "front" institutions. It is characterized by its comprehensiveness, flexibility and effectiveness. Comprehensiveness means that the organization reaches everybody who is under the influence of the movement. Flexibility means its structural forms may fit into every group in a community. Effectiveness indicates its structure is formidable, hard to destroy and suitable for both attack and defense.

How should a guerrilla organization be built?

Zawodny listed its seven basic structural elements:

¹³Valeriano and Bohannan, op. cit., p 17.

¹⁴Mao Tse-tung, Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (Bombay, 1948), p. 68.

1. Headquarters, where the locus of formal power is crystalized;
2. Intelligence;
3. Communication;
4. Propaganda;
5. Logistics;
6. Cadres in reserve and training;
7. Fighting arms--guerrilla and sabotage units.¹⁵

The list, however, is by no means complete. It is mainly sketched from the functional standpoint. Guerrilla organization is much more complicated than this. Galula viewed it from a different angle. He wrote:

In order to mobilize the population for a total war effort, every inhabitant under the insurgent's control is made to belong simultaneously to at least two organizations: one, horizontal, is a geographic organization, by hamlet, village, or district; the other, vertical, groups the inhabitants by categories of every kind, by age, by sex, by profession. The party cells criss-cross the whole structure and provide the cement.¹⁶

Galula has a wider concept than that of Zawodny, but the functional aspect is somewhat neglected. Actually, modern guerrilla movement must be organized in a way that both Zawodny's and Galula's principles are included. Its essential parts are the nucleus, "fronts," mass organizations, and the military machine.

The Nucleus

The nucleus of a guerrilla movement is started by a group of dedicated, resolute, and desperate men who are the

¹⁵J. K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivation, Escalation," Annals, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁶Galula, op. cit., p. 56.

leaders of the venture. Once firmly established, they set out to expand the organization. Agents from the nucleus are sent to various parts of the country to form new organizations or to infiltrate existing institutions by means of "nuclei process."¹⁷ When new members are recruited in different areas, the original nucleus becomes the nerve center, the high command, or the headquarters of the guerrilla movement. It begins the division of work right away. Specialized units are formed to assist the high command in directing, supervising and coordinating field activities, or in performing a special duty. In general, the guerrilla headquarters is composed of the following units:

- (a) The command and his staff--including the top-leaders and their immediate staff with the functions of policy-making, directing, planning, initiating, coordinating, and supervising.
- (b) The specialized units--including all highly specialized services which must be centralized, such as organization, intelligence, communication, propaganda, training, logistics, military operations, sabotage, mass struggle, terrorism, etc..

In the early stage of the movement, the nucleus takes direct actions in the specialized fields. When the movement spreads

¹⁷"Nuclei process" means to send secret agents into an existing organization and to build "cells" within, so that power in that organization can be wrestled from the old command.

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out, the specialized units gradually become commanding offices which, in turn, are subject to control by the higher echelon.

The nucleus distinguishes itself as highly clandestine. It is always undercover, for its activities are mainly conspiratory. It is in the form of a political party or association; the Communist Party in various countries and the FLN in Algeria are good examples. No modern guerrilla warfare has ever been started without a political party or association behind it. From the very beginning it is in the position to command. Indeed it is the dynamo of the whole operation.

The "Fronts"

Front organization or "fronts" are overt organs of the guerrillas. They can be both old or new creations, but all of them are under secret manipulation and control of the guerrilla high command through the "cells" it has built within.¹⁸ They are legitimate structures under the law of the existing government, operating in "enemy" territory openly within legal limits, but serving as the mouthpiece, the covering agency, and/or the recruiting machine of the guerrillas. Communist led guerrillas are experts in this respect.

¹⁸"Cells" are first formed by secret agents from the guerrilla headquarters, but may take in trusted members from the organization in order to build additional cells. They are the loci of control in the organization.

For instance, in Greece, the KKE (Greek Communist Party) controlled at least twelve "front" organizations after World War II.¹⁹ They covered people from almost every walk of life, and with such attractive names as "Democratic Women's Organization," "Protective Organization of the People's Right," "Seamen's Partisan," etc. Members of the fronts are not directly related to the guerrillas. In fact, some of them may not even know that they are being manipulated. Members of the cell are skillfully exploiting them. The agents are undercover, but the front and its activities are in the open.

Mass Organizations

Mass organizations are the creations of guerrilla agents. They can be either overt or covert. In case of the former, they are designed for mass struggles such as demonstrations, rallies, riots and strikes. They are composed of students, workers, and petit merchants in cities, and farmers in rural areas. Various associations are established within the limits of law but under secret leadership of the guerrilla agents. In case of the latter, secret organizations are built for intelligence, communications, terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda. However, their membership is more selective than the overt ones. Only the trusted and capable persons are chosen, so that they can perform a rather satisfactory job.

¹⁹E. R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49," Osanka, op. cit., p. 219.

Mass organizations try to cover everybody in the community; women and children are included. The guerrilla leaders know very well that only with the masses behind them can they balance the military superiority of their opponents. Lt. Col. Geneste, a French army officer who had experience in Indochina, provided a vivid description of how guerrillas organized the masses in a Vietminh village:

The Organization has made each village a military entity--a little theater of operations self-sufficient with its cells, its political commissar, its tax collector and its supply system. We have discovered the 'medical' organization of one village; only women. They confirm that, willingly or not, everyone has a role. Even children bring messages or weapons.²⁰

The organization of this village is typical of a guerrilla-controlled area.

After mass organizations are well under way, regional offices are established to coordinate and command the operations in that area. The office is secret to outsiders, but known to the indigenous people. It is the prototype of civil government of the guerrillas.

The Military Machine

The nucleus, fronts and mass organizations, however, all have one top objective in their mind, that is, the creation of a fighting force. There must be men to bear arms so that the final goal of guerrilla warfare, the defeat of

²⁰ Marc E. Geneste, "Guerrilla Warfare," Osanka, op. cit., p. 266.

the enemy, can be achieved. As a result, guerrilla bands are formed and gradually expanded to company, battalion, and even division strength.

But the guerrilla fighting force is not solely military in nature. Structurally and functionally, it is a politico-military machine. It is empowered to fight the enemy, in the meantime, it has the capacity to win over the people. A French veteran of the Algerian war diagramed the organization of Algerian guerrillas as follows on page 87.²¹ Paret and Shy made the following observation about the Algerian guerrilla military organization:

Certainly, the political officers help to establish and retain control over forces that are potentially dangerous to the civilian leadership. But it would be wrong to see their functions only in this light. Their presence with the troops constitutes a recognition that political problems are part of all combat operations, and that enthusiasm and fanaticism among the soldiers aid military effectiveness.²²

Indeed, as Mao declared: "All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units."²³ Mao himself is a faithful practitioner of this principle. In his armies, from his early crude guerrilla bands to the multi-million

²¹J. Perret-Gentil, "L'Armes française face à la guerre subversive: II. La technique et les procédés de la rébellion organisée en Algérie," L'Armes--La Nation, XIII (November, 1959), 24-26. The ranks of the commands may vary. As quoted by Paret and Shy, op. cit., p. 23.


²²Ibid., p. 22.

²³Griffith, op. cit., p. 44.



strong "Liberation Army," political commissars are powerful figures. They are responsible not only for morale boosting but also for propaganda, intelligence, and coordination with the local people.²⁴ Modern guerrilla forces have never neglected their political arms.

The organization of modern guerrilla warfare can be put into the following model:



In this model, the organization operates in such a way that not only the nucleus is commanding, directing, and coordinating through the regional offices and cells, but also the various sub-structures are closely correlated with one

²⁴The Wuhan Army Group. A Study of Communist Guerrilla Warfare and its Counter Measures (in Chinese, Taipei, Taiwan: The Wuhan Army Group, 1962), p. 94.

another. They are mutually reinforcing and supporting so that the organization becomes a solid whole. Thus the totality of guerrilla warfare is made possible.

Furthermore, when the people are organized vertically and horizontally, openly and secretly, politically and militarily, every person is under the control of the guerrilla mechanism with a definite role to perform. Instigated and inspired by the cause, people under organizational manipulation are working toward the single goal, the defeat of the enemy. Thus oriented, the masses create a solid front to support the fighting guerrillas, and Mao's theory that "the people are like water and the guerrillas the fish who inhabit it"²⁵ becomes a reality.

Propaganda

Can the masses be organized and infused by the guerrillas with a cause at will? Not at all. People the world over are mainly politically apathetic. Before they take a step to side with the guerrillas, they have to be wooed, persuaded and convinced. This is why propaganda becomes important. But to win the people is just one facet of the job. The will of the enemy to resist must be weakened. Moreover, the mind of the guerrilla himself must always be on the right track. So propaganda in guerrilla warfare is essentially a three-dimensional operation:

²⁵ See Griffith, op. cit., p. 93.

1. To win over the masses with propaganda;
2. To attack the enemy with psychological warfare; and
3. To maintain self-confidence with political indoctrination.

Psychologically, people confronted with the guerrilla's cause, may be divided into three groups: (1) the sympathizers or supporters; (2) the opponents; and (3) the neutrals. So in guerrilla warfare the strategy of propaganda must be to encourage the supporters, to discourage the opponents, and to persuade the neutrals. It must not be carried out merely in the form of ideological exhortation; on the contrary, it must be as homely and practical as possible. Modern guerrillas emphasize the benefits to be derived under their cause and follow this up with concrete actions. The word-of-mouth tactic, including rumors and gossip, is often employed. Above all, they stress again and again that they are the winners in the long run, because they know that "people become actually aware of the importance of ending up on the right side. The temptation to defer judgment initially and then to jump on the right bandwagon at the appropriate time is compelling, for the penalties of guessing and acting wrongly are vividly evident."²⁶ With consistent wooing and persuading, coupled with promises and threats, the guerrillas intend not only to win over the

²⁶Cross, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

neutrals but also bring about a change in the opponents' original position.

In the field of psychological warfare, to direct propaganda "consistently and vigorously against the enemy, employing those themes which arouse doubt, suspicion, mistrust, or discontent"²⁷ is the principle that the guerrilla follows. In the exploitation of successful armed attacks by guerrillas, propaganda is accompanied by deliberate rumor-making in order to spread terror and panic among the people and weaken their faith in the existing government and its leaders. Meanwhile, there are strategical moves. The enemy camp is repeatedly told that they are espousing a losing cause thus to join the guerrilla is the best way out. Backed up with the length of the struggle and the improving fortune of the guerrillas, long-range psychological assault like this may at times work miracles. It has been proved in China, Indochina and Cuba. However, psychological warfare is a delicate operation. Its success and failure may be quite unpredictable. As observed by Paul M. A. Linebarger: "It is not controlled by the laws, usages, and customs of war; and it cannot be defined in terms of terrain, order and battle, or named engagements. It is a continuous process. Success or failure is often known only months or years after the execution of operation. Yet, success, though incalculable, can be overwhelming; and failure, though undetectable, can be

²⁷George B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," Osanka, op. cit., p. 406.

mortal."²⁸ Since the rewards and punishments of psychological warfare are great, guerrilla leaders all over the world have attempted to master it for their own advantages. They have not only used words, newspapers, pamphlets, and radios for this purpose, but also actions. The kind and gentle treatment of enemy prisoners and their release after political indoctrination, which have been successfully used by Mao and Castro, serve as excellent examples of psychological offensive against the enemy.²⁹ The versatility of this psychological weapon is of course beyond the description of this paper, but the basic rule of the game is put yourself in the position of the enemy and try to find out what is the most attractive proposal. It seems that guerrilla leaders have always kept this in mind.

The indoctrination of one's own comrades-at-arms is another important task of guerrilla leaders. It may be regarded as "internal propaganda" because everybody under the guerrilla's control is subject to this kind of treatment. The so-called "rectification" under Communist guerrillas are in this category. It is not a loosely conducted activity but a well-organized process. People are grouped into mass

²⁸ Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington: Combat Force Press, 1948), p. 1.

²⁹ Said Mao in 1928: "The most effective method in propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give the wounded medical treatment." And he did just that. See Selected Military Writings, op. cit., p. 31. The story about Cuba, see Guevara, op. cit., p. 32.

meetings, discussion panels and study units. Policies of the guerrilla movement are explained and discussed. Frequent self-criticism and mutual criticism are vigorously practiced, and constant ideological exhortations are experienced.³⁰ This kind of practice would keep the rank and file, as well as the general public under guerrilla control, constantly on vigil and well-informed. A sense of participation is increased, and deviant ideas are located and weeded out. In the meantime, symbols, signs, slogans, music, crowd-leader dialogue, and other rhetorical and psychological tricks are widely applied in mass rallies. The whole battery of psychological manipulation may be collectively called "brain washing," which is regarded as indispensable by guerrilla leaders, especially those in the Communist camp.

"Properly evaluated and properly conducted propaganda is an exceedingly useful weapon in all military operations. In irregular warfare, where public opinion is 'the center of gravity', it is indispensable,"³¹ wrote Thayer. Though propaganda, psychological offensive and political indoctrination are no substitutes for military operations, if well-planned and skillfully applied, they can successfully attain strategical and tactical objectives.

³⁰For a detailed account of the indoctrination of guerrillas, see Pye, op. cit., pp. 248-62. Also see Chen fen in Chapter IV.

³¹Thayer, op. cit., p. 48.

Terrorism

In a guerrilla movement, not all people can be persuaded with propaganda, nor can a big portion of the enemy be conquered with psychological warfare; even members of the guerrilla camp may defect to the enemy in spite of indoctrination. To remedy this situation, leaders of guerrilla warfare have resorted to terrorism. Terrorism is the "use of violence for political ends," and it is "the natural weapon of men with small resources, fighting against superior strength."³² Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the weaker party invariably uses terror, nor does it imply that it cannot be employed by the stronger party. However, when practiced by the incumbents, it is called "repression."

Functions of terrorism are manifold:

1. It can intimidate the enemy, so it is often used against capable and determined leaders in the community and the government at both the national and local level, in the hope of dissuading strong characters to take a decisive stand against the guerrilla movement, or simply for reprisal. Weaker characters, seeing what the stronger ones have received, will tend to be timid and soft toward guerrillas, thus facilitating guerrilla warfare.

³²Crozier, op. cit., pp. 159, 160.

2. It persuades the neutrals who refuse to take sides. Now they know that riding on the fence is risky. If they do not go along with the guerrillas, the consequence is grave indeed. In case the government fails to provide adequate protection, the majority of them will play ball with the rebels under the threat of terrorism. The ranks of the guerrillas are thus strengthened.
3. It dissuades the possible "traiters" and dissenters in the guerrilla's own camp.
4. It may gain publicity for the guerrillas whose status and prestige are thus enhanced. In people's minds they become omnipresent and omnipotent.

The use of terror as a weapon is a standard practice in both Communist and non-Communist-led guerrilla warfare. As to the former, South Vietnam serves as an excellent example; as to the latter, Cyprus is typical. Invariably, implacable foes are assassinated; waverers are kidnapped or killed; deserters are liquidated; and the uncooperative public is threatened. Panic sweeps across the community. The iron grip of the guerrilla is in.

Terrorism, deadly effective as it is, has warranted strong opposition of its use. Needless to say, it can be criticized on moral and ethical grounds. But it is more than that. Thayer argued "history provides few cases where terror by itself has been successful in achieving a major

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political aim."³³ Crozier asserted that "rebellion may or may not be 'good', but terrorism cannot be anything but 'bad'. Terrorism is an inefficient, and often self-defeating, instrument of rebellion."³⁴ Certainly, if terror is used unwisely and blindly, the danger of alienating the people or popular reaction is great. Mau Mau atrocity in Kenya serves as a good example. However, when terrorism is applied selectively and purposefully in accordance with the strategy of the guerrilla struggle, it can be quite fruitful. So "selectivity" becomes the watch word for the application of terrorism. Put into Guevara's words, "Under special conditions, assassinations of individuals guilty of major repressive actions are permissible. No indiscriminate terrorism is to be employed."³⁵

Another argument is whether the application of terrorism should be absolute or relative. Ney advocated that "the use of terror, to be effective, must be absolute. Terror, the guerrilla leader's most potent weapon, is used by him not only to demoralize the enemy and extort the support of his own people, but also to exact unswerving loyalty from the individual guerrilla, who is made to understand that defection or betrayal is punishable by death."³⁶ To be

³³Thayer, op. cit., p. 124.

³⁴Crozier, op. cit., p. 127.

³⁵Guevara, op. cit., p. 56.

³⁶Virgil Ney, "Guerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy," Osanka, op. cit., p. 321.

absolute, once the subject is selected, "massacre or individual murder is often supplemented by mutilation before death, and sometimes by torture. Favorite methods of torture were red-hot pokers and boiling water poured from a kettle. Mutilation consisted of the amputation, by knife, of nose, tongue, lips, ears or sexual parts."³⁷ The selective but not indiscriminate, absolute but not lenient use of terror is the common practice among guerrillas.

In fact, the killing carried out under terrorism is not the prime objective. In the context of modern guerrilla warfare, it is the atmosphere which is created by terror that influences the behavior of the people deserving special attention. As Paret and Shy put it: "An atmosphere of violence creates new emotions and commitments, so that in the end a whole society may become revolutionary. . . . Violent experience does change people, whether they are perpetrators, victim, or witnesses."³⁸ It is in this light that terrorism gains its strategic value in modern guerrilla warfare.

Terror has been an indispensable weapon in guerrilla movement. Though it has its pros and cons, its strategical and tactical importance should not be neglected. It makes life unendurable for the enemy, eliminates traitors, "pacifies" and persuades the public, and changes the behavior of

³⁷Crosier, op. cit., pp. 174-75.

³⁸Paret & Shy, op. cit., p. 78.

the community. When wisely and relentlessly applied, it gives a boost to the cause and operation of modern guerrilla warfare.

Intelligence and Sabotage

Intelligence and sabotage are two potent weapons of guerrilla warfare. The former aims at the collection of information and the latter, the destruction of enemy installations and resources. Both of them can be used strategically and tactically, and can accomplish political as well as military purposes. They have been widely employed by guerrilla leaders. In fact, it is justified to say that without these two weapons, modern guerrilla warfare can hardly be conducted effectively.

Intelligence

"Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles." The words of Sun Wu Tze in 600 B. C. are still valid today. Only with excellent intelligence work can this adage become a reality. Intelligence is extremely important to guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas, who cannot fight except on their own terms, must know enough of their enemy's plans and movements to avoid being trapped into battles which they cannot win, and enough of the enemy's weak spots to make their own strikes as safe and effective as possible. In this sense intelligence is essential for the survival and victory of the guerrilla struggle.

The guerrilla leader is always pressing and searching for information vital for his decision-making. Guerrilla intelligence is mainly concentrated in three fields:

1. To know the enemy's political and military plans which deal with the elimination of guerrillas. This is called strategic intelligence.
2. To know the enemy's actions to be taken in the political, military and police fields dealing with guerrillas, and the distribution of the enemy forces, their particular tasks, their state of mind, weapons, equipment, etc. This is called tactical intelligence.
3. To know what is going on in the community, including people's feelings, power structure, production, resources and terrain, both in the enemy and the guerrilla's own territory. This is called social intelligence.

Without any one of them, guerrilla struggle cannot be successfully conducted.

How can all this information be obtained? Otto Heilbrunn gave the following answers: through penetration, through guerrilla agents, through interrogation of prisoners and evaluation of captured documents, through reconnaissance by partisan detachments or partisan observers, and interrogation of partisans returning from operations, and through monitoring enemy telephone conversations.³⁹ But he missed

³⁹Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 76.

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one huge reservoir of intelligence, the organized masses themselves. Intelligence is a highly organized operation. From the intelligence command in the guerrilla's headquarters (the nucleus), down to intelligence units in regional offices, to secret operational units in the masses, and finally to the penetrations and infiltrations made into the enemy's political, military, security (police), transportation, communication, economic, educational and industrial institutions, as well as agents and co-workers or sympathizers assigned to numerous social organizations, they constitute a mammoth espionage network. Usually more than one channel of information is structured; two or more parallel yet entirely separated lines of intelligence are conducted in one area in order to check the correctness of the information. In the meantime, when one line is broken by the enemy, there is still at least one other line in operation.

Because of the complexity and secrecy of the intelligence network, a good liaison is needed. Regional and institutional liaison agents are assigned. But no one liaison man is allowed to know the whole intelligence apparatus in one organization or one area. Only the top and sub-commanders in the espionage hierarchy know the general setup and personnel under their respective jurisdiction.

Intelligence work is carried out ruthlessly and at times romantically. Human weaknesses are manipulated to the highest degree. Money, sex, friendship, threats, blackmail,

extortion and an array of attractions, rewards and punishments are frequently employed. Only if the guerrilla's intelligence men and espionage agents are masters in these "arts," can they be successful in the collection of valuable information.

Sabotage

Sabotage, in common practice, is directed against objects in the enemy territory. Its main functions are to make the theater of guerrilla warfare more favorable to guerrilla operations by blowing up bridges, rail lines, and the like, and to increase attrition of the opponent's resources by destroying arsenals, power stations, and all kinds of economic assets, especially those of importance to the incumbents' war effort. Most of these activities have tactical purposes. But when the saboters succeed in paralyzing enemy war production and the stoppage of vital national transportation, they have achieved strategic goals. Furthermore, sabotage may also serve the purpose of demonstrating to the public at large the inability of the incumbent government to protect the country and, by inciting the incumbents to initiate sharp and perhaps indiscriminate measures of repression or reprisal, thus weakening the public's identification with the incumbents. In this respect, it also has a strategic connotation.

In a higher order, however, sabotage may embrace all actions against the incumbent government's policy and

administration. This is a long-range project with the destruction of the efficiency of the government, the bankruptcy of national economy and the demoralization of the people as ultimate objectives. It takes a long time to accomplish. But once they are done, the guerrillas have a good chance to win. Of course, sabotage of this kind is of the highest strategic value.

Operationally, Miksche divided sabotage into two major forms: the passive and the active:

1. Passive sabotage: It aims at the enemy's morale and can at the same time inflict material losses by means of fanning up non-cooperative attitudes and antagonistic spirits on the part of the population under the incumbents' control and employees in the government. In the meantime, public trust in official currency is lowered. As a result, administrative efficiency and industrial production decreases and inflation is underway. People lose their faith in the government, and psychologically, lean more toward the guerrillas. Passive sabotage is accomplished by clandestine organizational activities and persistent propaganda. The methodological creation of grievances and hardships in people's daily lives and the ceaseless circulation of vicious rumors against the government are the major tricks.

2. Active sabotage: This includes all destructive activities mentioned above. They are violent actions which are well-planned and coordinated in time and space. Of course, they are carried out secretly but let the enemy and the public know that the guerrillas are the ones who are behind them. In addition to inflicting damages and losses to the enemy, they also boost the image of the guerrillas. In this respect, the function of sabotage is identical with that of terrorism.⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, terrorism, espionage and sabotage must be highly coordinated in a guerrilla struggle. With good intelligence providing the ground work, the destruction of persons and things are systematically carried out. Once they are accomplished, guerrilla warfare has won its first round against the enemy.

Mass Struggles

Mass struggle means the manipulation of the masses to harass the government in power, to disturb peace and order, to stop industrial production and finally to create lawlessness and chaos in the community so that the incumbents would lose the control of the situation. Once the guerrilla's cause is soundly laid, organizations well-established,

⁴⁰ Miksche, op. cit., pp. 126-29.

propaganda forcefully slashed out, intelligence network built, terrorism and sabotage started, time is ripe for the guerrillas to wrestle power from the government. And mass struggles is one of the major means.

Mass struggles are carried out mainly in the cities. They constitute an essential part of modern guerrilla warfare. As observed by Roger Hilsman:

They (the guerrilla leaders) foster discontent in the cities, leading to demonstrations and strikes, perhaps to riots and mob action. Here their targets are student groups, labor unions, and left-wing intellectuals. . . . Whenever possible, in both urban and rural sectors, they endeavor to create 'people's militias' as a device for organizing mass support to supplement their full-time combatants.⁴¹

The goal of mass struggle is evident: the guerrilla leader is determined to "cause the government as much inconvenience and trouble as he can."⁴² So the strategy and tactics that guerrillas are using in mass struggle are quite different from the ordinary sense. Take some common operations in mass struggle for illustration:

1. Strikes: In guerrilla warfare, strikes are not for the improvement of living conditions or the increase of salary of the workers. They are used to paralyze production, harass the management, and even to destroy the factory when deemed necessary by the guerrilla leader. When a strike is on, the strikers under the direction of the clandestine agents, or

⁴¹Hilsman, op. cit., p. 454.

⁴²Cross, op. cit., p. 53.

the cell members, will challenge the police to clash with them. Sometimes they attack the police with stones and bottles. If the arms of law have hurt the strikers in their counterattack or in way of self-defense, it would be blamed by the guerrilla-led "fronts" and mouthpieces as "brutality" which would provide fair grounds for more strikes and a good opportunity for demonstrations and riots.

2. Demonstrations are the march of masses in great quantity in streets and public places to show off the strength of guerrilla sympathizers. They are not limited to the manifestation of public sentiment, but to arouse mass uprisings. They are well-planned and highly organized. During demonstrations, government and prominent public figures are under malicious vocal attacks. They insist on entering a government office to present their grievances. Once they get in they will ruin the office. If they are denied entrance, clashes between the police and the demonstrators will result. Bloodshed is their goal. When one or more of the demonstrators are seriously hurt or killed it is time for widespread riots.

3. Rallies: Mass rallies in a guerrilla struggle are not just for people to sound out their different opinions but serve as the launching pads for demonstrations and riots. Speakers and speeches are well-planned in advance. When the crowd has reached

emotional frenzy through careful manipulation and stimulation, a demonstration is called under such slogans like, "Let's march to the City Hall!" and "Let's get the Mayor!" If the police try to stop them, fist-fighting and stone-throwing will begin and every consequence will be blamed on the government.

4. Riots are the mustering of excited masses to destroy property maliciously in public places. They are planned by the guerrilla underground to paralyze the community and to immobilize the government, so the guerrilla-led rioters become uncrowned rulers in the cities. The mob is organized into "militia." If it cannot be defeated, the government is then at the mercy of the well-organized rioters.

Mass struggle, when successful, means chaos to the incumbents but the "command of the streets" to the guerrillas. Can a city's guerrilla force be formed under such a process? Answering this question, students of modern guerrilla warfare have different opinions. In practice, however, no city "militia" has ever been able to maintain itself as a lasting guerrilla force. They invariably have been eliminated by stronger government military forces. Thus in guerrilla warfare mass struggles in metropolitan areas are used to paralyze the nerve centers of the nation so the incumbents are further weakened. This gives the guerrilla bands in the

countryside an unrestricted hand to operate. In the meantime, the ranks of city militia will eventually join their rural comrades. The strategic importance of mass struggles is, therefore, evident.

Military Operations

The foregoing actions taken by the guerrillas do have tremendous influences on the outcome of the struggle, but they are neither very decisive, nor final. To achieve the ultimate goal of guerrilla warfare, the establishment of a new political order, physical forces of the enemy must be destroyed. This is the task left for the military arm of the guerrillas. As Mao Tse-tung has said: "Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."⁴³ Military operations indeed are the core of guerrilla warfare.

How to win the military struggle? Sound military strategy and tactics of course are needed. There is not enough room in this writing to discuss guerrilla military strategies and tactics in detail, but their essentials are listed.

Guerrilla Strategy

Mao Tse-tung is regarded as the authoritative guerrilla strategist of our time. In his earlier writings Mao

⁴³ Griffith, op. cit., p. 12.

first listed six basic considerations of guerrilla military operation:

1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategical defense; tactical speed in a war strategically protracted; tactical operations on exterior lines in a war conducted strategically on interior lines.
2. Conduct of operations to complement those of the regular army.
3. The establishment of bases.
4. A clear understanding of the relationship that exists between the attack and the defense.
5. The development of mobile operations.
6. Correct command.⁴⁴

Then he proceeded to discuss the principles which guide dispersion and concentration of guerrilla forces. As for dispersion, Mao declared that it should be practiced when the enemy is in over-extended defense, and sufficient force cannot be concentrated against him, when encircled by the enemy; when the nature of the ground limits action; when the availability of supplies limits action; and when to promote mass movement over a wide area. As for concentration, he asserted that it should be practiced when there is opportunity to fall upon and destroy the enemy, and when the enemy is on the defensive and there is chance of eliminating his isolated

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 96.

detachments. In addition, he stressed the importance of "alert shifting" which means the guerrillas must consider the situation and decide at what time and place they wish to fight. If they find they cannot fight, they must shift immediately. The enemy may be destroyed in piecemeal.⁴⁵ Eventually, he formulated the three strategic principles which are followed by guerrillas everywhere:

1. Yield any town or terrain you cannot hold safely.
2. Limit yourself to guerrilla warfare as long as the enemy has numerical superiority and better weapons.
3. Organize regular units and pass over the general counter-offensive only when you are sure of the final victory.⁴⁶

In brief, Mao's early strategical teachings are that guerrilla warfare is a war of mobility and fluidity, and the skillful shift between strategical offensive, tactical defensive, and strategic defensive and tactical offensive must be vigorously exercised. Speed, surprise, and attack are indispensable; "the first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy."⁴⁷

But in 1947 when his military forces were much stronger and his thinking more mature, Mao firmly set-up ten principles of guerrilla warfare:

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 102-103.

⁴⁶As cited by Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma," Osanka, op. cit., p. 259.

⁴⁷Griffith, op. cit., p. 20.

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated strong enemy forces later.
2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
3. Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective.
4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net.
5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning.
6. Give full play to our style of fighting--courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting.
7. Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move.
8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended.
9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the army.
10. Make good use of the intervals between campaign to rest, train and consolidate our troops.⁴⁸

It seems that no other guerrilla strategists have surpassed Mao's principles.

Guerrilla Tactics

Students of guerrilla warfare have written numerous articles on guerrilla tactics of which Mao's sixteen-word creed is outstanding: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy entrenched, we harass; enemy exhausted, we attack; enemy retreating, we pursue."⁴⁹ Then he added: "To defend in order

⁴⁸ Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., pp. 347-48.

⁴⁹ Mao Tse-tung, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (Chinese ed., Yenan: 1941), p. 51.

to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to take a flank-ing position in order to take a frontal position, and to zig-zag in order to go straight."⁵⁰ He also invented the so-called "sparrow-tactic," "sack-tactic," "hit-the-heart tactic," "reinforcement-resisting and post-attacking tactic," "post-circling and reinforcement-attacking tactic," etc.⁵¹ The effectiveness of his tactics has been tested on the battlegrounds. The Vietminh Manual on partisan warfare is nothing more than the regularization of Mao's tactics, and Guevara's writing is but the reflection of Mao's thinking, though the "Minuet" might be a Cuban innovation.⁵²

Since the guerrillas are the military weak, they are no match for their opponent, the government's regular army. They are usually defeated when a direct confrontation between

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 35.

⁵¹ Sparrow-tactic means concentration of an overwhelming force and attack with lightening speed then disperse immediately like the sparrows eating up grain in the field; sack-tactic means first to encircle the enemy from three sides, then close the fourth one with a strong force, so the enemy has no way to escape but to surrender; attack-the-heart tactic means a surprise attack on the headquarters of the enemy who thus can be easily defeated when his nerve center is destroyed; other tactics are self-explanatory.

⁵² Vietminh's Manual, see Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 78-106. The "minuet," explains Guevara, means "the guerrillas surrounded the enemy . . . on all four sides. . . . The dance (minuet is the name of a dance) begins as one side fires on the enemy, who naturally moves toward the side. The guerrillas on that side move back, without breaking visual contact, and succeed in drawing the enemy out. Then another guerrilla side begins firing and draws out the enemy to a different side. Thus, as the partners on all sides participate in the dance, the enemy column is rendered immobile. expends vast quantities of ammunition, and loses morale, while the guerrillas remain unharmed." See Guevara, op. cit., pp. 14, 15.

them takes place; and a defeat like this can be fatal. This is why Mao and his followers have always advocated flexible tactics. The avoidance of pinned down battles and the preference of ambushes and sneak attacks are supreme rules of the partisans. This is what Guevara advocated as: "Hit and run. wait, stalk the enemy, hit him again and run, . . ."53

Another important tactic is concealment. As an observer of guerrilla fighting in Indochina said: "By day, all appeared peaceful as the peasants worked in their rice fields, and it remained that way until nightfall when these 'peaceful peasants' became guerrillas and under the cover of darkness attacked the French forces."54 Dispersing and concealing in the masses in daytime or under pressure, then emerging and regrouping to attack when the enemy is in an unfavorable situation are the favorite games of the guerrillas. One more widely applied tactic is the cut of communication lines in enemy territory. Railroads, highways, and telephone polls are good targets for the guerrillas. This tactic forces the enemy to disperse its men to guard vital arteries of the nation, and thus make it possible for the guerrillas to eliminate those tiny and somewhat isolated posts.

It is impossible to exhaust guerrilla tactics in such a brief discussion. To conclude, simplicity,

⁵³ Guevara, op. cit., p. 9.

⁵⁴ George B. Jordan, "Objectives and Methods of Communist Guerrilla Warfare," Osanka, op. cit., p. 404.

informality, and evasiveness provide the basis for the guerrillas' tactical maneuvering. Cooperation and support from local people facilitate their movements and concealment. Good intelligence and speedy marches create their surprise attacks. Familiarity with local terrain helps them to disperse and concentrate. Moreover, the guerrillas have no responsibility inside the vast territory of the incumbents, whereas government troops must abide laws and regulations. As a result, the guerrillas have their hands free to operate, but government troops are considerably restricted. This fact alone puts the guerrillas in a superior position in military operations. Observed Otto Heilbrunn:

Several well-known factors make these tactics (of guerrillas) possible. The enemy (government troops) has to protect the population and guard his bases and communication. Part of the troops are therefore stationary and, as it were, sitting targets. . . . The guerrillas, however, protect and guard almost nothing. . . . The guerrillas, if attacked, just vanish. Government troops find it difficult to collect superior forces to attack, while the guerrillas can more easily do so. . . . Again, wearing no uniform and being natives of the country, they can easily disappear among the people, the enemy soldier will always be conspicuous, as will the enemy's paraphernalia of war.⁵⁵

With this in mind, the superiority of the guerrilla's strategic and tactical maneuverability can hardly be questioned.

⁵⁵Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

The Base

Foregoing discussions are mainly restricted to strategical and tactical measures to achieve popular support and the destruction of the enemy. Hereinafter, self-maintenance and expansion will be studied. To attain this goal three strategic steps must be taken: the establishment of a base, the acquisition of weapons and supplies, and the recruitment of personnel.

Securing a base is of course a fundamental requirement in any guerrilla struggle. "The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance," said Mao Tse-tung, "this is so because this (guerrilla) war is a cruel and protracted struggle."⁵⁶ And "because the guerrilla is almost always outgunned and outnumbered, he needs a background, a hinterland from which and in which he can operate, and into which he can fade back when things become too difficult for him."⁵⁷ Base, indeed, is essential to the survival of the guerrillas. So in the course of guerrilla warfare, one of the basic considerations of guerrilla leaders is how to build up a base.

The choice of a viable base must meet certain conditions. Successful guerrilla campaigns in contemporary history have been conducted from various types of bases:

⁵⁶Griffith, op. cit., p. 107.

⁵⁷Gen. Fitzroy Maclean's Foreward to Guerrilla, Thayer, op. cit., xii.

Russian partisans during World War II operated from swamps and huge forests; Lawrence of Arabia directed his guerrillas from vast empty deserts, Mao, Tito, and Castro established themselves in remote mountains. All of them share one common characteristic--a difficult terrain which is hard to access by the enemy. However, terrain must not be the sole consideration. A good guerrilla base must also meet the following requirements: (1) remote from modern transportation system; (2) land is cultivable; (3) a friendly local population; (4) climate is hospitable to ill-clad guerrillas; and (5) close to a foreign sanctuary, when possible. There is some argument about whether the base should be easy to contact the enemy as Guevara advocated.⁵⁸ But since the guerrillas stress mobility and fluidity, the distance between the base and the enemy does not make too much difference. Another argument arises from the state of economic development.⁵⁹ In general, as past experiences have revealed, most guerrilla bases are at a low level of development. However, to say that only an undeveloped base is viable is entirely a different thing. A remote base can also be well-developed.

How about a guerrilla base in the cities? Thayer asserted:

⁵⁸Guevara stated: "Contact with the enemy is important. If the region is completely inaccessible to an organized army, the guerrillas should advance to areas where they can engage the enemy in combat." op. cit., p. 20.

⁵⁹Klaus Knorr argued that the base should have "a low-level of economic development," Annals, op. cit., p. 57.

As the Polish Home Army discovered, a great city too can provide hidden paths through alleys and cellars, attics and roof-tops, just as inaccessible to strangers as a hidden jungle trail. The labyrinthine sewer system of Warsaw may not smell as sweet as a forest path but for a time at least it provided the Polish patriots with a highly effective system of communication.⁶⁰

But as guerrilla cases have shown, no city has ever been able to be used as a base for any length of time. The Warsaw struggle lasted a little over one month. Irish resistance in Dublin in 1916 and the Hungarian uprising in Budapest in 1956 were both short-lived. As Cross reasoned: "open revolt in cities and built-up areas has become more and more the prerogative of regular military forces, for they are the only ones which possess the weapons, equipment, and training to overcome the security and military forces of a large city and seize effective control."⁶¹ In other words, cities are good only for a military coup, not guerrilla warfare. Disadvantages of guerrilla operations in cities are clear: in the first place, they are painfully vulnerable to detection and exposure by traitors and spies who manage to infiltrate the guerrilla organization. Secondly, the danger of betrayal is always high. Most important of all, in cities guerrillas are so close to the heart of the incumbents who are thus gravely threatened, and will do everything possible to eradicate the rebels. Furthermore, the military arms of

⁶⁰Thayer, op. cit., p. 150.

⁶¹Cross, op. cit., p. 44.

the government, including the army and the police, are just as familiar to the city terrain as the guerrillas. With their superiority in number and in arms, and the practice of identity and ration cards, block wardens, security checks, and other means of control, the possibility of eliminating the guerrillas is within their reach, and they are usually successful. Therefore, cities are good for secret sabotage activities but unfavorable for guerrilla warfare. The impossibility of developing city militias into effective guerrilla forces as discussed previously also proves this point.

What are the functions of a guerrilla base? Generally speaking, it is mainly for the training, regrouping, resting, and hospitalizing of guerrilla forces; it is also the location for supply dumps, propaganda mills, industrial shops, and communication centers. It is where the headquarters are situated. But it is more than these. As Heilbrunn indicated: the base is a political testing ground for the mass appeal of the guerrilla's program; it is the place for the consolidation and expansion of political power. It serves the purpose of denying the enemy more and more territory; and finally, it may be used together with other bases to form an encirclement line around enemy held territory.⁶² Without doubt, a base is a physical, psychological, as well as a political and military, necessity of guerrilla warfare.

⁶²Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

How to establish a base? If the guerrilla leader has no military force on hand, that is, when guerrilla warfare is at the earliest stage, he should start secret organizations and clandestine activities in the chosen region. When people are well-organized and flamed up with political instigation, public uprising should be staged. Local leadership, both formal and informal, are wiped out, and the guerrilla nucleus takes over the administration. The region now becomes a "guerrilla area" according to Mao's terminology. Then the guerrilla leadership organizes a guerrilla force from the indigenous people and rallies all the masses to support it. After government forces are defeated several times in their attempts to recover the region, the locality is rather safe from enemy attack. A formal administration is then established and semi-permanent installations, such as training centers, storages, firearm repair shops, field clinics, etc. are constructed. The place now becomes a "guerrilla base." After the muscles of the guerrilla forces are toughened, they are sent out to conquer neighboring territories. Once the expansion succeeds and the guerrilla base is immuned from enemy attacks, the region is secured and becomes a "regular base."⁶³ After the guerrilla's military arm is strengthened, when the high command intends

⁶³ Mao's theory and practice on guerrilla base-building, see his article "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan," chapter 5, the Establishment of Base Areas: Selected Military Writings, op. cit., pp. 165-74.

to build up another base elsewhere, the process can be simplified by sending an expedition to the designated area. With a surprise attack, local garrison and government officials are captured or flee. The guerrillas would of course take over, organizing the people and making it into a "guerrilla area." If government troops retake the place from the guerrillas, "our soldiers as well as our propaganda cadres must go back during the following nights in order to carry out propaganda activities among the population," as the Vietminh Manual puts it, "the population will be asked to form itself into popular organizations; popular group detachments and guerrilla units must be created."⁶⁴ The process will go on until the enemy withdraws from the region which of course is now raised to the "guerrilla base" status. In short, the base-building process starts from "guerrilla area" to "guerrilla base" and finally to "regular base." The process will not stop until the whole country is converted into the hands of the guerrilla leaders.

The base is of course a liability of the guerrillas. They have to administer to it, and above all, defend it. But according to the general practice of modern guerrilla leaders, they will give up any base to maintain the survival of the guerrilla movement if they are really hard-pressed. However, after a base is established through this kind of process, a tremendous effort and heavy sacrifice on the part

⁶⁴See Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 96.

of the government is needed to get rid of it. As a rule, carefully built guerrilla bases can be maintained and expanded.

Weapons and Supplies

Guerrilla warfare, like other forms of war, needs weapons and supplies to carry on the struggle. Being the weaker party and situated in a difficult terrain, the guerrillas do not and cannot have the kind of logistic support that a regular army used to enjoy. As a matter of fact, if they are equipped with all modern means of war, like artillery pieces, tanks, and fighter-bombers and supported by trucks, ships and cargo planes, they simply cease being guerrillas and become a regular army. So the weapon and supply problem in guerrilla warfare is distinguished by its primitiveness and simplicity, practicality and ingenuity.

Weapons urgently needed in guerrilla warfare, especially in its early stage, are light arms which are easy to carry, yet have considerable fire power. Rifles, sub-machine guns, heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns, mortars, bazookas, carbines, hand grenades, mines, and pistols are in this category. In their ambush, sneak attack, and hit-and-run maneuvers, the guerrillas get very close to the enemy and open up. Using guerrilla tactics no heavy weapons are necessary. Since the guerrillas are weak and isolated from the outside world, the government in power would do

everything possible to bar them from acquiring firearms. So even small arms are denied to the guerrillas.

How do the guerrillas solve their weapon problems?

Usually they use the following methods:

1. Make the weapons themselves. This is what Guevara has advocated, the establishing of industrial workshops for the repair of guns and manufacture of gunpowder, etc.⁶⁵ Sometimes, when their regular base is well-established, they may be able to make rifles and hand grenades. Because of the scarcity of materials in the base area, and the lack of technicians and machinery, home-made firearms are usually poor in quality, low in quantity, and offering no variety. They can hardly meet the demands of weapon-thirsty guerrillas.
2. Capture weapons from the enemy. This is the most outstanding way for the guerrillas to get their weapons. To be successful, audacity and craftiness are needed. At times bribery is applied. They get weapons from the enemy by defeating them, stealing from the enemy's arm depots, capturing enemy convoys, and buying from enemy guards. Strange as it may seem, this is the major way for the guerrillas to get most of the weapons. Indeed, to use the enemy's arsenals

⁶⁵ See Guevara, op. cit., p. 23.

as their own is a remarkable achievement in guerrilla warfare.

3. Acquire from a foreign ally. When an outside ally is in the position to supply the guerrillas with arms, the acquisition of weapons becomes easier. However, there are difficulties. If the guerrillas' hideouts are far away from the ally and are surrounded by government-controlled territory, the problem of transportation and delivery is terrific. As a result, such means as air-drops, underground channels, arming bands in the ally's territory and sending them in, etc. are employed. But they are by no means very reliable. Only when the guerrilla base is adjacent to a friendly nation can the problem be satisfactorily solved.

Owing to the limitations posed on the problem of weaponry, the guerrillas are always short of arms. They must fight with what there is to get. To overcome this disadvantage, guerrilla leaders stress two things: first, to rely on primitive weapons which are in abundant supply in the locality. Knives, spears, bows, flintlocks, scimitars, sticks, and even stones are used.⁶⁶ Second, there are strict demands on the maintenance of weapons and the consumption of ammunition. No weapon should be neglected or lost, and no bullets are allowed to be wasted. Because of measures like this,

⁶⁶See Giap, op. cit., p. 51.

guerrillas can carry on their fighting disregard to their inferiority in weapons.

Supply is another headache to guerrilla leaders. Food, clothing, shoes, medicine, and means of transportation and communication must be provided. The first four items are indispensable to the subsistence of the guerrillas. Like weapons they may be obtained through local production, from the enemy, or from an ally. But since they are more perishable than firearms and are under consumption everyday, tremendous quantities of them are in demand. Even if they can be gotten from the capture of enemy storages or from a foreign country, their transportation becomes unsolvable. Thus the best way-out is to increase local production. With a large fighting force in operation, the production of food and clothing, including shoes, is often inadequate and the manufacture of medicine is almost impossible in base areas. In order to survive with the extremely limited supply on hand, guerrilla leaders used to take two rigid steps: first, a well-planned and strictly enforced ration system; everyone gets an equal share and no more. Second, there is a stress on thriftiness; not a thing is to be wasted. The sense of equality and sharing of hardships among officers and men, keep the morale of the guerrillas high without regard to adversity and poverty.

As for transportation and communication facilities, they are indispensable to war efforts. The guerrillas are

exceedingly lucky if they can get some radio sets, telephones, and motor vehicles. But this is unlikely to happen in the early stage of the struggle. Dealing with such a situation, animals and human beings are used for transportation; drums, smoke signals and couriers are employed for communication. Of course they are slow, yet when properly administered, they can be effective.

Personnel

Modern guerrilla warfare, as indicated above, has to overcome tremendous odds and hardships. Guerrillas must start something from nothing, and to run a risk which people are not ordinarily willing to take. How can all of these be accomplished? Essentially, there must be the right kind of men who will devote themselves to this hazardous venture. As Miksche observed: guerrilla warfare "can only be waged successfully if every individual in the guerrilla force is convinced of his importance in the struggle. He should be persuaded that the smallest effort of a single man carries weight in the final result and that, in the last resort, success depends upon his will-power, tenacity and personal valor."⁶⁷ To achieve such a goal, two factors are decisive: good recruitment, training and disciplining of personnel, and excellent leadership.

⁶⁷Miksche, op. cit., pp. 142-43.

What kind of men are most suitable to guerrilla warfare? As discussed in Chapter II, the "have-nots," the discontented ones, and the aspired yet frustrated youths in the cities and rural areas are the best candidates. "Since they lack personal wealth or the backing of a tribe, they are easily subjected to the discipline of a movement on which they depend for their daily bread. With no resources of their own, the partisans have to fight if they are to eat, and thus are driven from one raid to another by sheer necessity. Nor (is) their zeal for war and plunder restrained by fear of reprisals against property; for they are, by definition, of the dispossessed."⁶⁸ Of course, good guerrilla fighters should have more qualifications than their unglamorous background. They must also be brave, dedicated, wily, and hardy, as described by Col. Frank B. Clay: "the same spirit as the Crusaders and Saracen soldiers who established the medieval empires--all fired up for a cause."⁶⁹ Or as stressed by Guevara: "they must be adaptable, imaginative, inventive, discreet, never revealing what he knows, iron constitution," and "can live as a harassed animal."⁷⁰ Naturally, there are very few people who are endowed with these qualities, if any. Training and discipline are absolute necessities.

⁶⁸Amery, op. cit., p. 168.

⁶⁹As cited by Fall, op. cit., p. 356.

⁷⁰Guevara, op. cit., pp. 32-36.

Political indoctrination as mentioned early in this chapter is a good part of the training for guerrilla personnel. In addition, as Dixon and Heilbrunn specified: the training of recruits must include the use of weapons, the blowing-up of enemy's transportation lines and military installations, the understanding of enemy behavior, map-reading, tactics on reconnaissance and intelligence, etc.⁷¹ Guevara urged that guerrillas should be "toughened by commando courses and long, arduous marches," and "need indoctrination on national history, national heroes, behavior in the face of injustice, analysis of the current situation."⁷² Technical training is of course relatively simple and easy to accomplish. Political indoctrination is more difficult for the simple reason that it takes a much longer time, and time is just unavailable to the guerrillas. As a result, Political training becomes a long process; it is conducted continuously and consistently. They learn as they fight and work, from what they hear and see, and by following and accepting the behavior of their seniors and leaders.

In most cases training is not enough to get the desired result from the personnel. Rigorous and progressive discipline must be practiced. Mao advocated "organizational discipline" which means the encouragement of guerrilla fighters to voice their opinions as fully as possible; once

⁷¹Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

⁷²Guevara, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

the issue is decided, the minority must submit to the majority. In the meantime, inner-Party criticism must be properly used.⁷³ Mao's discipline is still in the indoctrination bracket. Guevara is more succinct; he insisted that "breach of discipline must be punished drastically and painfully." As for methods of punishment he suggested: (1) take off the offender's arms, (2) deprive him of his candy, cigarettes or food, and (3) instigate long guard duties and long marches.⁷⁴ Actually, almost every form of punishment and reward has been applied to the guerrillas by their command in order to maintain good discipline.

Rules of conduct for the guerrillas are numerous, but Mao's "Three Rules and Eight Remarks" may serve as a model. The three rules are: (1) all actions are subject to command; (2) do not steal from the people; (3) be neither selfish nor unjust. His eight remarks are: (1) replace the door when you leave the house (In China, doors are usually lifted off and used as beds in summer time, especially in rural areas); (2) roll up the bedding on which you have slept; (3) be courteous; (4) be honest in your transactions; (5) return what you borrow; (6) replace what you break; (7) do not bathe in the presence of women; (8) do not, without authority, search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.⁷⁵ The breach of

⁷³Selected Military Works, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

⁷⁴Guevara, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁷⁵Griffith, op. cit., p. 92.

these rules and remarks causes disciplinary actions. These are minimum requirements of a fighting force; and their compliance means a disciplined army.

But to lead a guerrilla movement, to command a guerrilla force and to win in guerrilla warfare are no ordinary tasks. It needs the most extraordinary leadership for its accomplishment. Speaking of guerrilla leadership, Mao has the following to say:

All guerrilla units must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies--resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well-educated in revolutionary techniques, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people.⁷⁶

Thayer asserted that a guerrilla leader must have "the charisma to attract and hold a loyal following, organizational skills, and above all ruthless determination in order to maintain discipline within the ranks and enforce discipline among the nonactive. . . . He is in fact the political governor of the areas where his writ runs, the administrator of the civil government, the police force and the judiciary to mete out punishment as he sees fit. But beyond this, there are two very special qualifications: a knowledge of the terrain and the ability to extract from it the maximum advantage." And the terrain Thayer had in mind was not only the geographical aspects of the area, but also the social,

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 44-45.

economic, and above all, political features of the region.⁷⁷

Guerrilla warfare, as an uphill struggle, needs leadership more than anything else. The leaders should not be merely good military commanders, but also veterans in organization, agitation, indoctrination, propaganda, and intelligence. The leadership in modern guerrilla warfare must play the role of a philosopher who gives its followers the will to fight and the determination to die, the role of a prophet who leads the masses to the "promised land," the function of cement which sticks the people together into a solid whole, and above all, the body of an omnipotent and omnipresent god who is highly respected and awed and thus worshipped not betrayed. It is justified to say that leadership is the key element in a guerrilla struggle. Its qualifications probably cannot be found in any single man. Only the collective wisdom of a well-organized political body (the nucleus) can perform the job satisfactorily and successfully. When good leadership is secured, guerrilla warfare can be smoothly executed.

The Guerrilla Process

Modern guerrilla warfare is a complicated phenomenon and a life-and-death struggle. Because of its complexity and seriousness, it has never been and cannot be started overnight. It is not incidental but sophisticated. Indeed

⁷⁷Thayer, op. cit., p. 63.

it has to be built up step by step. It is a process that takes years to complete.

Studying guerrilla cases in modern time, Galula grouped the guerrilla process into two major patterns: the orthodox pattern (Communist) and the bourgeois-nationalist pattern. As for the former, he divided it into five steps: (1) the creation of a party, (2) the establishment of a united front, (3) guerrilla warfare, (4) movement warfare, (5) annihilation campaign. As for the latter, he said it only took two steps: (1) blind terrorism, and (2) selective terrorism.⁷⁸ Galula regarded the bourgeois-nationalist pattern as "a shortcut to power," and the insurgents are not very much interested in post-insurgency problems.⁷⁹ He neglected the cause and organizational factors in the second type. In his study of the first pattern, though he has made some revision on Mao's three-stage theory,⁸⁰ sabotage, terrorism, and mass struggles which are the essentials of guerrilla

⁷⁸ Galula, op. cit., pp. 44-60.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁸⁰ Mao's three-stage or three-phase theory is that guerrilla warfare has to undergo three different phases: (1) retreat before enemy attack, concentrate on build-up activities, like organization, consolidation, and preservation, most in clandestine way, when weak: (2) begin to worry the enemy by attacking his communications, harrying him with ambushes and sneaking attacks when picking up strength, and (3) move to the offensive to defeat the enemy when strong. Giap named them as stage of contention, stage of equilibrium, and of counteroffensive. See Griffith, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

warfare are scarcely mentioned. Thus Galula's scheme is by no means perfect.

Another student of guerrilla warfare tried to improve Mao's three-phase rule by adding one more at the beginning of the struggle. He said:

Mao's three-phase rule omits what is often the most decisive phase of all--the pre-combat, organizational or conspiratorial phase. During this preparatory stage, the guerrilla leader organizes his immediate staff and recruits and trains the nucleus of his fighting force. At the same time he tries to enlist the sympathy of the population in order to be sure of its support when combat operations start.⁸¹

Doubtless there is such a preparatory stage in guerrilla warfare, but in Mao's first phase these activities are included. Thayer's innovation is thus invalid.

Guevara generalized from the Cuban experience and divided guerrilla process into three stages: "first, there is a partially armed band that takes refuge in some remote, hard-to-reach spot. It strikes a lucky blow against the authorities and is joined by a few more discontented farmers, young idealists, etc. . . . Next, the band sets up semi-permanent encampments, establishes service echelons, and adopts the characteristics of a government in miniature. . . . An enemy attack is beaten off, more arms are captured, and more guerrillas armed. . . . Meanwhile, the nucleus grows with fresh support from even further areas. . . . Thus, having paralyzed the enemy's logistics by sabotage and exhausted his

⁸¹Thayer, op. cit., p. 73.

combat forces by attrition, the guerrillas seize the initiative, attacking on all fronts at will. The enemy can stand it no longer and the remaining forces capitulate."⁸² His scheme is quite identical with that of Mao Tse-tung.

From discussions above, it is perhaps proper to suggest another scheme which would describe the development of a modern guerrilla process and include the major ingredients in other schemes. After careful analysis of various guerrilla movements, the process may properly be divided into the following stages:

The first stage: The stage of preparation. In this stage a group of determined rebels join together to find a cause, and to form an organization. After the nucleus is formed, they start clandestine propaganda and organizational activities in order to sell their cause to the people and to attract new members to the organization. When they feel strong enough, organizationally and ideologically, to take some actions, the second stage is reached.

The second stage: The stage of initiation. In this stage non-military destructive operations are initiated. These include sabotage and terrorism. "Fronts" are built; mass organizations are set up openly. Organizational and propaganda activities are wide-spread and intensified. Public attention is attracted by terror and sabotage;

⁸²Guevara, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

anti-guerrilla elements both in and out of the government are intimidated; the community is considerably aroused and regular government functions disturbed. Intelligence network is formed, and regional offices are set to direct and coordinate those activities in various areas. More people join the movement. After all this is done, a new era is approaching.

The third stage: The stage of violent struggle. This stage is distinguished by its widespread violence. There will be strikes, demonstrations, and riots in cities, and guerrilla operations in the countryside. As a result, metropolitan areas are considerably paralyzed and rural districts are under turmoil. In this stage organizational work and propaganda are still under full swing; the cause is now universally spread; fronts and mass organizations are extremely active; intelligence tendrils penetrate into every governmental agency and every social group; and sabotage and terror carried out whenever and wherever they are deemed necessary. However, military operations proceed cautiously. Their development can also be divided into three different phases:

- (1) the phase of self-preservation: This is the first phase of the military struggle. The guerrillas are usually much weaker than their opponent--the regular army of the incumbents. They operate in a small way, mostly in hit-and-run fashion. Direct encounter with

the army must be avoided. The guerrilla leader does everything possible to preserve his newly created military arm. The region they are operating can only be regarded as an unstable "guerrilla area."

- (2) The phase of expansion: This phase is reached when the guerrilla forces are bigger and stronger, and are in the position to deal lightning blows at the enemy, continuously. They cut communication lines and stage ambushes. Though as a whole they are still weaker than the opposing army, the guerrillas are able to achieve regional superiority at will and gain local victories. They start to build semi-permanent "guerrilla bases."
- (3) The phase of conquest: Now the guerrilla military power has an even break or stronger than the enemy. They start to operate in battalion or regiment or even division strength. Big military campaigns are conducted. They try to annihilate government troops; in the meantime, psychological warfare is carried to the high gear wooing the enemy to talk peace or surrender. Formal government is established in their "permanent bases." Administrative cadres are trained in the preparation of taking over the whole nation.

Of course, not all guerrilla struggles have under-
gone such a process, but many of them did, such as China,
and Indochina. The incompleteness of the process is either

caused by the early collapse of the incumbents, as in Cuba, or peaceful settlements, as in Cyprus, Algeria and Kenya, or the defeat of guerrillas by the national army, as in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. The continuum between the first stage and the third phase of the third stage can be broken at any point depending on the capability and behavior of the incumbents. But the process will be carried through in case the guerrillas may have their own way. From such a process we learn that modern guerrilla warfare is a deeply rooted mass movement and a war of totality. No government should take this kind of struggle lightly.

Summary

Modern guerrilla warfare is a sophisticated process. Its three grand objectives are self-preservation and expansion, winning popular support, and the destruction of the existing political order. Cause, organization, propaganda, and to some extent terrorism are applied to win over the people; espionage, sabotage, terrorism, fronts, secret, as well as open, organizations, mass struggles, and finally military campaigns are employed to defeat the enemy; and bases, weapons, supplies and personnel are used for self-maintenance and expansion. However, these three kinds of operations are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. When there is a capable and dynamic leadership to coordinate and command the whole struggle, and when proper strategies

and tactics as stated above are skillfully applied, the guerilla process will become extremely persistent and formidable, and a new political order is thus in the making.

CHAPTER IV

GUERRILLA WARFARE: A TYPICAL CASE--

THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN CHINA*

Theoretical and operational aspects of modern guerrilla warfare have been discussed in preceding chapters. Then the next question is: how is guerrilla warfare actually conducted? In this chapter a typical case, the guerrilla movement in China is introduced. The case is typical, not only because China was the first nation to experience modern guerrilla warfare, but also its pattern and process have been copied in other countries. Moreover, the struggle is still going on since the time of its origin some thirty-eight years ago. Probably, it might well be said that the Chinese guerrilla movement can serve as a model for this kind of struggle.

Guerrilla warfare in China is the result of sharp, persistent conflict between two political parties, the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communists or Kunchantang (CCP). The thirty-eight year old (1927-65) guerrilla struggle between the two rivaling parties may be divided into four stages:

*In this chapter, many Chinese sources are cited. The translations from Chinese to English are those of the author, unless specified otherwise.

- Stage I: From 1927 to 1935 when the Communists staged guerrilla uprisings against Nationalist Government; ended in bitter defeat.
- Stage II: From 1936 to 1945 when China was at war with Japan. The struggle between Nationalist and Communist guerrillas was very bloody with the Communists gaining an upper hand.
- Stage III: From 1946 to 1949 when guerrilla warfare developed into a full-scale civil war, with the Communists winning over China Mainland as the result.
- Stage IV: From 1950 to present time when the Nationalists tried to stage a comeback from their bastion in Taiwan (Formosa), mainly in the form of anti-Communist guerrilla activities.

Each stage has its unique features, and the reasons for the success and failure of the guerrilla struggle can be clearly recognized.

Stage I: 1927 to 1935: From
Initiation to Defeat

Prelude to Guerrilla Warfare

July 1, 1921, the CCP made its formal appearance in Shanghai, the largest city in China, after three years of fermentation.¹ Chen Tu-hsiu, dean of Peking University, was elected Chairman of the Party, and Chang Kuo-tao, its Vice-Chairman. Mao Tse-tung, then a librarian of the university, who was one of its original members, was made secretary of

¹In the spring of 1918, Marxist study groups were formed at Peking University. To help the Communist movement, in 1920 Voitinsky, a Russian Communist, arrived in China. The Chinese Communist Youth Corps was formed in France and the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps was founded in Shanghai. The CCP, however, was not formalized until the summer of 1921.

the human branch of the CCP setup three months later.² From the very beginning, the Party was deeply involved in mass movement. January 12, 1922, it led the first seamen's strike in Hong Kong; one year later it instigated the Peking-Hankow Railway workers' strike. But since the CCP was young and small, it did not have enough following among the people, nor had it any prestige.

Twenty-seven years earlier, the KMT had been organized under the inspiring leadership of Sun Yat-sen who led his Party in a successful revolution against the Manchu Dynasty and in the overthrow of Yuan Shih-kai, a self-made emperor five years after the birth of the young Republic.³ Sun and his Party were thus enjoying a tremendous popularity. But in the early 1920's, China was dominated by warlords. Sun tried to eliminate those feudalistic warlords by enlisting help from pro-KMT military forces in southern China without any success. He wooed assistance from foreign

²Hatano, p. 194. As cited in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 30.

³The KMT had its genesis in 1892, when Dr. Sun gathered together a group of revolutionaries at Macao and called the organization Hsing Chung Hui (Regenerate China Society). The society was established as a political party in Honolulu in 1894. In 1905, it changed to the name of Shung Kuo Tung Meng Hui (China Brotherhood Society). It rebelled against the Manchus and succeeded in 1911 and the Republic of China was proclaimed on Jan. 1, 1912. Five years later, Yuan Shih-kai, a warlord, made himself the Emperor of the so-called Chinese Empire, was also overthrown by Dr. Sun and his compatriots. The Party changed to its present name in 1919.

powers;⁴ all countries lent him a deaf ear except Russia which sent over an envoy immediately to confer with Sun and promised cooperation, friendship, and military aid.⁵ In the meantime, with tips from Russia, the CCP openly advocated that "the KMT should be the central force of the national revolution and should assume its leadership."⁶ After lengthy negotiations, Sun agreed to the "admission of the Communists" at the KMT's First National Congress on the condition that CCP members ought to join the KMT as individuals not as a body. The Communists agreed and their representative, Li-Ta-chao, promised just that.⁷ But from the very beginning

⁴Sun wrote a book entitled The International Development of China in 1919. It was in English and was distributed to European and American powers urging their help and cooperation. No replies were received from any governmental sources except Russia.

⁵Lenin sent A. Joffe as his envoy to confer with Sun and they issued a Joint manifesto in January, 1923. It declared that Russia would give up its extraordinary rights in China and promised cooperation and necessary help. See Brandt et al., op. cit., pp. 70-71.

⁶The advocacy of KMT leadership was manifestly expressed in the Manifesto of the 3rd National Congress of the CCP, June, 1923. Ibid., p. 71.

⁷January, 1924, the KMT held its First National Congress in Canton and resolved the "Alliance with Russia" and "Admission of the Communists." However, CCP members were allowed to join the KMT only as individuals not as a Communist body. Li Ta-chao, speaking for the Communists in the Kuomintang, submitted a memorandum to the Congress, in which he stated in part: "We have joined this Party (KMT) because we have something to contribute to it and to China's National Revolution, certainly not because of any intention to take advantage of the situation to propagate

the coalition was regarded by both sides as a matter of expedience. The KMT tolerated the CCP because of Russian aid, and CCP's angle was to use the prestige of the KMT as a shield to their own advantage.

Sure enough, disregarding the loyalty pledge of Li Ta-chao, the Communist "nuclei process" was extremely active inside the KMT structure. In its most powerful Central Executive Committee, one third were Communist members.⁸ On March 12, 1925, Sun died in Peking after months of illness. The KMT lost its prominent leader and there was nobody to succeed him. The CCP saw its chance. Next year (1926) when the KMT held its Second National Congress, among the 250 delegates, over 100 were Communists. Staunch CCP

Communism in the name of Kuomintang. We join this Party as individuals, not as a body. We may be said to have dual-party membership. But it may not be said of the Kuomintang that there is a party within a party. . . . Since we have joined the KMT, and so long as we remain its members, we shall carry out its political program and abide by its constitution and by-laws." See Ku Quan Chao, The Chinese Communists During Last Thirty Years (in Chinese; Hong Kong: Asian Publication, 1955), pp. 21-22.

⁸Prominent Communists like Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-pa, Lin Teu-han, Chang Kuo-tao, Mao Tse-tung, and Tang Pin-san were elected to the KMT's Central Executive Committee. Ibid., p. 22.

members actually took over the KMT apparatus.⁹ So the KMT leadership was greatly alarmed and threatened.

Before Sun's death, he decided to establish a military force for his revolutionary party. Since the Russians were sending aid, he assigned one of his capable young lieutenants, Chiang Kai-shek to Russia to study revolutionary tactics. Chiang spent three months (from September to December, 1923) in Russia, and was appointed by Sun as the Commandant of the newly created KMT military academy, known as the Whampoa Military Academy (WMA), immediately after his return. The Academy had a hard start in 1924, but owing to Chiang's ability the training institute nevertheless was developed into a substantial military force. Early in 1925, Chiang and his cadets were able to defeat a local warlord who was opposing the KMT. With such a victory Chiang's status skyrocketed, especially after the death of Sun. The same year he was appointed Garrison Command of Canton, the biggest city in southern China and the bastion for KMT's National Revolution. Chiang's character and ability kept the Communists uneasy for they knew that this man was strongly

⁹Under the direction of the shrewd Russian adviser Vorodin, Communists Tang Pin-san headed the Ministry of Organization, Mao Tse-tung, Acting Minister of Propaganda, Lin Pai-chu, Minister of Farmers, and many others as Secretaries of various KMT ministries. Ibid., p. 24.

anti-Communist and that he had military power in his hands.¹⁰ To get rid of Chiang the CCP planned a plot, but failed.¹¹ So in 1926 the relationship between the KMT and the CCP was already tense.

July 9, 1926, the KMT started its victorious Northern Expedition. The coalition between these two Parties still existed; Chiang was chosen by his Party as the Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army. He advanced very rapidly. Warlords in the north could only offer weak resistance. In October, the KMT moved its government to Wuhan, the largest city in central China. By spring, 1927, Shanghai and Nanking were taken successively. Chiang became a national hero and vowed to unify China and to make Nanking

¹⁰Chiang, after his return from Russia, wrote a letter to his friend Liao Chung-kai on March 14, 1924, copies of which were circulated among members of the KMT Central Standing Committee, so his political position became well-known. In that letter he overtly declared: ". . . the Russian Communist Party can not be trusted . . . (it) has only one aim, namely, to turn the Chinese Communist Party into an instrument for its own use. It does not believe that our Party can really cooperate with it for long. It is the Communists' policy to convert the Northeast Province (Manchuria), Mongolia, . . . into parts of a sovietized domain." See Chiang Kei-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958), pp. 25-26.

¹¹The CCP plotted with Russian advisers, trying to kidnap Chiang to Vladivostok by a gunboat. Chiang got a tip in advance and crushed the plot. See Ministry of Defense, History Bureau, History of Political Warfare (in Chinese: Taipei, Taiwan: History Bureau, Ministry of Defense, 1964), p. 376.

the national capital as Sun had hoped.¹² But when Chiang asked to move the government from Wuhan to Nanking, the Communists linked up with the KMT Left, refused. Thus the split between the KMT and the CCP erupted.

When the National Revolutionary Army swept northward, the political commissars in the armed forces were mostly Communists who wasted no time in organizing the masses wherever they went. In the meantime, Communist cells were busy in factories and on farmlands. Within a rather short time, millions were under their control.¹³ This was the strength that the Communists counted on for support.

When the split between Nanking and Wuhan was openly pronounced, both sides moved fast. Chiang got whole-hearted support from the KMT Right and the Moderates, his WMA cadets were of course faithful followers and some intellectuals as well as people with traditional views, including part of the farmers and workers were also behind him. The CCP put up a

¹²Dr. Sun Yat-sen, when he was inaugurated as the Provisional President of the new Republic in 1912, proclaimed Nanking as the national capital. He advocated in his writings many times of moving the capital from Peking to Nanking. Meanwhile, he insisted that China should be unified. See his writing The Three Peoples' Principles, Chapter I, "Nationalism."

¹³In Mao Tse-tung's "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (February, 1927), he stated that "The membership of the Peasant Association jumped up to 2,000,000 and the number of people under their direct command increased to 10,000,000." See Brandt, et al., op. cit., p. 81.

KMT Left opportunist Wang Chin-wei¹⁴ as the front man, and it had its commissars, labor unions and farmers' associations. The clash started in Shanghai where Chou En-lai led thousands of workers on strike and later attacked military arsenals and foreign settlements in that city. They were, however, subdued by Chiang's forces. On April 15, 1927 the KMT high command resolved the "purification of the Party" which meant to throw out the Communists. The purge was initiated in the Nanking-Shanghai area. Then on May 21, local anti-Communist leaders jumped into action. Thousands and thousands of Communists were arrested. It was known as the "Equine Day Incident."¹⁵ The CCP, however, called it "Chiang's coup d'etat." The CCP and Wang planned to fight back from Wuhan. But a telegram from Stalin to the CCP got into the hands of Wang and woke him up from his personal dreams.¹⁶ Wang and his colleagues broke with the Communists so the KMT was finally united. From July, 1927 on, the struggle became the confrontation between the KMT and the CCP.

¹⁴Wang Chin-wei, one of the top men under Sun, was later the head of the puppet government under Japanese occupation during World War II.

¹⁵Equine Day is the telegraphic code for the 21st day in any month. The leader of the rising was Hsu Ke-hsiang, a colonel in the Chinese army who died in Taiwan in 1964.

¹⁶On June 1, 1927 a telegram from Stalin reached Wuhan. It was shown to Wang by Roy, an Indian Communist and the representative of the Comintern. It read in part: 1. Land should be confiscated. 2. All unreliable military officers should be removed, 20,000 Communist members armed, and a new army of 50,000 men formed of selected workers and farmers. 3. New elements from among workers and farmers should replace the older members of the KMT Central Committee, etc., as recorded in Chiang, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

The Communists fought with everything they had. Because of their political commissars, they instigated 30,000 soldiers to mutiny in Nanchang. One of the mutinous leaders was Chu Teh who later became the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Army. Mao Tse-tung led the "Autumn Harvest Uprising" in Hunan; where thousands of workers and farmers were involved. Liu Tse-tan started a farmer's riot in Shensi, a province in northwest China. And Peng Pai fanned rural revolution in Kwangtung, the province where Canton was located. All these operations took place from August to October, 1927.¹⁷ But the Communists probably evaluated the strength of their newly formed mass organizations too highly and that of tradition too lowly. Certainly, they misunderstood that they had gotten all the credit for the success of the National Revolution. As a result, all the uprisings were entirely defeated. Wrote the China Weekly Review, an American-operated magazine in Shanghai, on August 20, 1927: "The peasant and labor unions of Hunan, probably the most effectively organized in the whole country, are completely smashed. Those leaders who have escaped . . . have fled the country or are in such careful hiding that they can not be found."¹⁸ An international Communist organ, the Pan-Pacific

¹⁷For a detailed account of the uprisings, see Wan Ya-kang, A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party (in Chinese: Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Problems Institute, 1951), pp. 21-25.

¹⁸Jui Fu-san, "What has Happened to the Seething Revolution?" China Weekly Review, August 20, 1927.

Trade Union Secretariat, reported: "The mass movement is crushed for the moment. All the labor organizations and peasant unions are being reorganized."¹⁹

Mao Tse-tung, after the failure of the "Autumn Harvest Uprising," was at one point arrested by local self-defense units in Au-Yuan. But he escaped. With some four hundred armed men Mao fled to a most remote mountainous area, Chingkangshan, at southern Hunan-Kiangsi border. He joined forces with two local bandit leaders, Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai. It was October 1927.²⁰ The era of modern guerilla warfare was dawning.

The Bitter Start

Once Mao settled himself in Chingkangshan, the following units came to join him: (1) troops formerly under Ho Lung and Yeh Ting in Swatow and Chaochow, (2) the Guards Regiment of the former Wuhan National Government, (3) peasants from Pingkiang and Liuyang, (4) peasants from southern Hunan and workers from Shuikowshan, (5) men captured from the rivaling army, and (6) peasants from the counties on the border area. By the end of 1927 Mao had some 5,000 men.²¹

¹⁹"The Immediate Basks of the Chinese Trade Unions in the Present Situation," Pan-Pacific Worker, September 15, 1927.

²⁰Wan, op. cit., p. 23.

²¹As listed in Mao's report submitted to the Central Committee of the CCP in November 1928, see Anne Fremantle, op. cit., p. 66.

Early in the next year, Chu Teh joined Mao. They started to build the army as well as the Party right away. From April to July, Mao's men fought the Nationalist armies which surrounded them and scored several local victories. Their territories were expanded. He accumulated 20,000 men during that summer. But the Nationalists staged their counterattack in late July. Heavy battles raged from August to October. Mao suffered defeat after defeat. By the end of October he could barely defend Chingkangshan, his last bastion.

Summing up his ill-fated first year of guerrilla warfare, Mao had the following to say:

The causes of the defeat were: (1) Some of our officers and men, vacillating and home-sick, lost their fighting capacity, while others, reluctant to go to southern Hunan, were not very active. (2) Long marches in sweltering summer tired our men. (3) Having ventured several hundred li (one li is about 1/3 of a mile) away from Ling (a county east-central Hunan), our men lost contact with the border area and became an isolated force. (4) The masses in southern Hunan not having risen, the campaign proved to be a sheer military adventure. (5) We were uninformed about the enemy situation. (6) The preparations being inadequate, officers and men did not understand the significance of the operation.²²

Mao admitted that the masses were not awakened, his men had not enough political training, intelligence was poor, and communication was bad. Furthermore, it was worthwhile to note that in the year of 1928, there were no riots in cities of any size, and only one farmer's uprising broke out in

²²Ibid., p. 65.

Pingkiang-Liuyang area in northeast Hunan.²³ Thus Mao's guerrilla struggle was virtually an isolated military operation. The defeat was destined and his bitter lesson was learned.

The Growth

After his defeat, Mao proposed the five conditions for a viable guerrilla movement as already cited in Chapter I.²⁴ His emphases were put on strong party leadership, mass basis and economic self-sufficiency. On the political front the CCP got busy again. After the Sixth Party Congress of the CCP was held in Moscow, many of its leaders who remained in Russia were ordered by Comintern back to China to revive the mass struggle.²⁵ They adopted a two-prong offensive. Politically, they followed the so-called 'Li-san Line.'²⁶

²³The Pingkiang-Liuyang uprising was led by Peng Teh-hua (later Chinese Communist volunteers' C-In-C in Korean War) and Teng Tai-Yuan, and found a guerrilla base force there.

²⁴See note No. 9, Chapter I.

²⁵Among those who were sent back to China were Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Hsiang Chung-fai, who were regarded as mass organization experts.

²⁶Li Li-san, a young Communist fanatic, was trained in Russia. He regarded himself the Lenin of China. He was one time strong man of the CCP (1928-31). Soon after his return from Moscow, he advocated "General National Strike," "city lead the country," "welcome the climax of revolution" and "win in one or several provinces first." He started riots in cities and ordered Mao's guerrillas to attack big cities, all of which suffered defeat. His policies were termed as "Li-san Line" and he was later accused by Mao as "Left Opportunism" and was disposed. See Wan, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

Mass movement was resumed and intensified; general national riots were called in cities, while farmer's uprisings were stimulated in rural areas. Militarily, Mao's new theory was put in practice: military struggle went hand-in-hand with land revolution and the establishment of guerrilla base.²⁷ How was his new theory put into practice, we could not find any detailed description in Communists documents. But based upon personal experience of the author whose home town, Taolin, Linhsiang, Hunan, was deeply affected by the Pingkiang-Liuyang uprising in 1928 and later at the fringe of the Communist guerrilla base in the Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupei border area, the process of base building in relation to land reform and guerrilla organization can be understood to a certain degree.

As the Communists practiced in Linhsiang, in order to build up one of its districts to a guerrilla area, they would send in party cadres to organize the dissatisfied elements in the community secretly. Then a detachment of guerrilla force was sent over from the base area. Local authorities fled, and mass organizations were formed. The organized elements came to the open under the leadership of party cadres who conducted mass meetings and demonstrations. Their

²⁷ Mao said in 1930: "The style of Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung and Fang Chih-min (in guerrilla struggle) is following the policy of base building, establishment of local government, thorough land revolution, expansion of people's military force, etc. . . . Doubtless they are correct." See Selected Works of Mao (Chinese ed., Peking: People's Publication, 1954), p. 102.

slogans were: Down with the landlords and the country gentry, and the redistribution of land and property. In public meetings, names of "notorious" landlords and gentries were announced. Under the instigation of cadres, the mass was led to the homes of the condemned. Using crude farming tools and clubs, the culprits were beaten to death by the mass. The author knew at least three landowners who were put to death in this way. People who engaged in violence were encouraged to take anything they liked from the house of the dead. The redistribution of the land of the deceased was promised. The process took a few days to a week. By now government troops were closing in and the people who had engaged in the violence were of course scared. The Communists then organized them into guerrilla bands. When the army came, both Communist forces and local bands fled to their hideouts in the mountains. Local bands would come out of their sanctuary and harass garrison forces in the district frequently. Because Lingsiang was strategically important, government troops were increased consistently. Though it had been changing hands several times, Communists guerrillas were driven out of the border area in 1932. Many young men in the author's neighborhood, however, were in the bands and eventually joined the Red Army. This case manifested how party organization was closely related to land reform and the establishment of local guerrilla forces.

In 1927, the Nationalists adopted a demobilization plan. They thought the National Revolution was about over,

and therefore the number of armed forces should be sharply cut down. The Communists used this advantage to buy off discharged veterans to their side.²⁸

When Mao and his comrades were busy strengthening themselves, the Nationalists, taking Mao's defeat in 1927 and 1928 for granted, engaged themselves in a power struggle. The duel between Chiang and Wang and other KMT old-timers started soon after Mao was defeated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Chiang was abdicated twice from 1927 to 1931.²⁹ Though he was restored to his post by his Party after each abdication owing to necessity, during these four years leadership in the KMT was by no means stable. Factions were fighting each other quite fiercely.³⁰ Moreover, the National

²⁸The price that the CCP offered to Nationalist demobilized veterans was: (a) for one hundred men to join the Red Army, 20,000 dollars in silver, and (b) those who could occupy one county, 50,000 silver dollars were offered. Under such high rewards, quite a few discharged veterans joined the ranks of the Red guerrillas. See History of Political Warfare, op. cit., pp. 390-91.

²⁹Chiang's first abdication occurred in August, 1927 under the pressure of the KMT high echelon. Once he resigned, armies of the warlords were pressing from the north. He was asked to resume his command in January 1928. In December, 1931, he resigned again when his comrades-at-arms accused him as "the target of all arrows" (an old Chinese saying which means the source of all troubles). But he was asked to return within three months, for the Communists were advancing rapidly and the National Government was in a chaotic situation. This time he accepted no political post but as the Generalissimo of the National Revolutionary Army. In reality, however, he became the strong man in the KMT, thereafter. The Nationalists finally found their new leader. For the whole story see H. H. Chang, Chiang Kai-shek (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1944), pp. 180-83, 235-36.

³⁰Nationalist leaders in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hunan, and Fukien were in constant squabble, and at times sent troops against each other.

Government had only the control of the central and southern China, since the warlords to the north were not defeated. In 1929 the Nationalists fought the so-called "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang, who later joined force with another warlord Yen Hsi-san and attacked the Nationalists in 1930.³¹ Thus Chiang was pre-occupied with military campaigns in the north and had little time to deal with problems in central and southern China.

Under such circumstances, Mao's guerrillas became extremely active. During January 1929, Mao's forces occupied southern Kiangsi; in October, he entered Fukien, another province to the east. In March 1930, the First Red Army was formed, with Mao as the General Political Commissar and Chu Teh the Commander-in-Chief. In addition, guerrilla bases were established in Hupeh-Hunan-Anhwei border, Hunan-Hupeh border, Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupeh border, northern Shensi and Lake Hung area (in central Hupeh).³² In the summer of 1930, Mao

³¹Feng Yu-hsiang, a shrewd warlord rose as a private, claimed that he had been baptized thus a "Christian General." However, he was not better than any of his peers. He was defeated by Chiang in 1929 and 1930; then he pledged his loyalty to the National Government and was appointed as Chiang's deputy. Later he sided with the Communists and played the role as a liberal. He died in a Russian ship when he was returning from the U. S. to China after the Communist takeover in 1950. Yen Hsi-san was another warlord who had Shansi Province as his bastion. He was regarded as a capable administrator. After his defeat in 1930, like Feng, he sided with Chiang who let him retain the governorship of Shansi in northern China. Yen later became a foe of the CCP and was one time Premier of the National Government (1949-50). He died in Taiwan a few years ago.

³²Hu Hwa, A Reader of China's Revolutionary History (in Chinese; Peking: Chinese People's University Press, 1959), pp. 229-230.

was able to attack on Changsha, the capital city of Hunan and held it for a few weeks.³³ The rapid growth of Mao's guerrilla forces and their success in various provinces certainly alarmed Chiang and his government a great deal. Something should have been done about it and it should have been done at once. The vis-a-vis military struggle between the KMT and the CCP was therefore imminent.

Three Satisfactory Campaigns

Chiang and his strategists decided to attack Mao's main bastion in southern Kiangsi first. The Nationalists used six divisions under the command of General Lu Ti-ping, commander of the Nineth Army Group. The campaign was launched in October, 1930. At first Nationalists troops advanced rather smoothly; but in December, when they were getting close to Mao's headquarters something odd happened. As described by a Nationalist general years later:

Whenever our troops arrived, people had already evacuated. Roads and bridges were all destroyed. Our movement was slowed down. It was practically impossible for us to get any information. When our reconnaissance was some four or five kilometers away from the main body, he was usually killed by the enemy.³⁴

On December 29, 1930, fierce fighting finally broke out.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ General Chao Chen-yu, Anti-Communist Guerrilla Warfare (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Military Police Press, 1964), p. 32.

But it was too late for the Nationalist troops; two divisions in advanced positions were wiped out by Red guerrillas within two days of engagement. One of the division commanders, General Chang Fei-chain, was captured. He refused to surrender and was beheaded. The remaining Nationalist divisions withdrew to their original positions to the north. Thus concluded the First Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign; and it was the first big victory in Mao's guerrilla warfare.

But the Nationalists had not yet learned their lesson. Early in the spring of 1931, Chiang appointed one of his capable commanders, General Ho Ying-chin, to take over the Second Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign. Ho had ten divisions under his command. He advanced cautiously. But the same story repeated itself again. Real fighting lasted for two weeks. By the end of May, Ho had lost four of his ten divisions and was forced to withdraw.³⁵

The Generalissimo was of course furious about these setbacks. Losing no time at all he jumped into action again. In July, less than two months after the second campaign, the Third Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign was under way. This time Chiang himself assumed command. Mao and his comrades miscalculated, unaware that the Nationalists were so soon in a position to strike again. Chiang's troops, numbered 300,000 this time, advanced along three parallel

³⁵ Details of the first and second campaign, see ibid. pp. 32-34.

lines pointing straight towards Mao's bastion. Fierce battles developed. Both sides claimed victory. Though Mao's forces did inflict losses to some of Chiang's troops, but the latter's strength was ten times stronger than the former; Chiang persistently refused to lift off the pressure. As Mao wrote years later:

The enemy's strategy of the campaign was to 'drive straight forward' into our territory--a strategy greatly different from that 'consolidating at every step' in the second campaign. . . . There was only an interval of one month between the end of the second and the commencement of the third campaign. The Red Army (now about thirty thousand strong) had received neither rest nor replacement after much hard fighting. . . . The enemy's main forces . . . converged at furious speed to seek battle, and descended upon us in a big, compact encirclement. Then we sneaked through over a big mountain in the east . . . we attacked the forces of Chiang Kuang-nai. Tsai Ting-kai . . . resulted in stalemate and finally we let them get away.³⁶

Stalemate was probably the real situation. Why did Chiang's troops leave the battlefield? According to the Nationalists, they had to leave because the Japanese invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931. Government troops had to be sent to the north to resist the foreign aggressor. But whatever the reason on the Nationalists side, Mao had managed to maintain his forces, which were in extreme numerical inferiority, during the third campaign. So far the performance of Mao's guerrilla warfare was quite satisfactory. He listed five conditions for the success:

³⁶Mao, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War, 1936, as in Fremantle, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

1. The people give active support to the Red Army;
2. The terrain is favourable for operations;
3. The main forces of the Red Army are completely concentrated;
4. The weak spots of the enemy are discovered;
5. The enemy is worn out both physically and morally; and
6. The enemy is induced to commit mistakes.³⁷

His new style of guerrilla warfare had stood up against crucial tests in the field. He was therefore more confident than ever before. Taking the advantage now that the Japanese were pressing the Nationalists hard from the north, Mao assembled the First National Congress of Workers, Farmers, and Soldiers in Juichin, the major town in his territory, on November 7, 1931. The "Chinese Soviet Republic" was proclaimed and Mao was elected Chairman.³⁸

The Defeat

Three successive setbacks in their encirclement and annihilation campaigns against the Communists made Chiang and other Nationalist leaders to do some hard thinking. It seemed certain that Mao's guerrillas were hard to beat with sole military might. Thus from 1932 to 1934, the National Government, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek³⁹ devoted itself to the following tasks:

³⁷Ibid., p. 100.

³⁸Hu, op. cit., p. 260.

³⁹Chiang took over the Military Affairs Commission in 1932 and assumed the post of Generalissimo. Though he had no political post, he was powerful in the KMT which determined policies and personnel problems. In the meantime, owing to his prestige, he had tremendous influence in the political field. He was regarded as the national leader after he returned from his second resignation. H. H. Cheaf, op. cit., pp. 236-40.

1. Political reform. From August 1932, Chiang started to renovate the governmental structure. The first step was taken at the local level, especially in the province where Communist guerrillas had their bases. Since Mao's Soviet Republic was in Kiangsi, Chiang made Nanchang, the capital city of Kiangsi province, his headquarters, and Kiangsi the "laboratory" for his new political setup. The age-old pao-chia system was built,⁴⁰ and the Special Commissioner of Administrative Inspection was appointed.⁴¹ As a result, the political apparatus from the provincial government and down was highly reinforced. The new organizational structure was followed up with vigorous training of local leaders from pao

⁴⁰ Pao-chia system was an old name but infused with new content. Ten to twenty families were organized into a chia which had an elected headman. Ten to twenty chia made up a pao which had an appointed chief who had been trained for his job. Ten to fifteen pao made a district which had a director with adequate staff help and several districts made a county. So under pao-chia system all people in rural areas were organized. Furthermore, families in the pao were required to guarantee one another that none of them would join or help the Communists. If any one of them did, all the families would be punished. It was called the "Five Families Mutual Guarantee Practice," because five families were usually put into one group. Meanwhile, adult males were organized into militia, supported by the police and peace-preservation troops, so they could defend themselves against guerrilla attacks. See Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935), pp. 155-159.

⁴¹ The Special Commissioner of Administrative Inspection was authorized to command several counties. He had both administrative and military power and was in the position to take necessary steps against the guerrillas. He also served as liaison between the administration and military forces in his area. With such an office, the political apparatus could move fast to deal with any emergencies at the local level. This office was the political arm of the Generalissimo's headquarters. Ibid.

and up. Militia and peace preservation troops⁴² were universally organized and trained.

At the national and provincial level, college professors and presidents were "drafted" into governmental services. Drs. T. F. Tsiang, Mon-ling Chiang, When-kian Tin, Chih-chieh Wang, and other leading scholars in history, politics, economics, medicine, technology, international relations, management, etc., were asked to serve pivot posts in the government. Hundreds of them answered the call with enthusiasm and cooperation. Commissions on Administrative Efficiency and Civil Service Commission were established. All civil servants were required to pass open and competitive examination before they went into general governmental service.⁴³ As a result, a new breeze blew through the political scene; morale and efficiency increased considerably.

2. Economic reform. In November 1931, the National Economic Council was organized and a Three-Year Plan was adopted. Its major goal was the industrialization of the

⁴²Militia was organized with local people and serving on part-time basis, while the peace preservation troops served full-time. Militarily, the militia assisted the peace preservation troops, which in turn, assisted the regular army.

⁴³See Kwei, op. cit., pp. 162-183, 257-271.

vast Yantze River Basin. The achievement was amazing.⁴⁴ The vicious lichin system was abolished.⁴⁵ A formal budget system was put into practice. Land tax was reduced.⁴⁶ And above all, in April, 1933, the National Government gave up the age-old tael unit for its monetary system and replaced it with a new silver unit of weight and fineness, viz., the national silver dollar (or fa pei in Chinese).⁴⁷ The financial situation was thus stabilized, a big step forward toward modernization.

3. Social reform. Social reform included the following items: the New Life Movement, suppression of opium smoking, gambling and prostitution, help to the poor, loans to the

⁴⁴Within these three years (1931-34), 1,000 kilometers of railroads and 98,161 Km. of highways were built; commercial aviation increased from 977,256 to 2,553,284 passengers miles. Industrial investments in 1934 amounted to \$156,061,246. In Kwangtung province alone, \$15,394,586 were invested in 14 industries. For details see Kwei, *op. cit.*, pp. 297-306, 603, 610; and Tang Leang-li, (ed.), Reconstruction in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1935), pp. 5, 33, 57, 169, 194, 223, 245.

⁴⁵Lichin was a system that provincial government could put up tariff on every kind of merchandise which was imported or exported to and from that province. It stopped the fluent flow of goods and corruption prevailed. When it was abolished, goods for inter-province commerce was therefore greatly facilitated. See Kwei, *op. cit.*, pp. 1185-86.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 1185-91, 1239, 1246.

⁴⁷Fa pei literally means "legal currency," and it was put into practice in April, 1933. It was mainly in paper currency but backed up with silver dollars. Only paper notes printed by four national banks were used as legal money; no other banks or any government were allowed to print notes. Before that, almost everybody could print paper currency, including public, local, and private banks. It was a chaos. Fa pei stopped all that. See Tang, *loc. cit.*

destitute, and care of the refugees.⁴⁸ Among them the New Life Movement was of utmost importance. It stressed on neatness, cleanliness, promptness, swiftness in daily life; equity or propriety, justice, integrity, and conscientiousness were the new rules of behavior in the community; nationalism, patriotism, loyalty, and diligence were highly encouraged. The masses were trained and indoctrinated on these principles. It was aimed at the modernization of the Chinese society. The New Life Movement burned off old and corrupt social practices like a fire. The people became healthier, more informed, better organized and full of national pride.⁴⁹ It was an infusion of ideology and the strengthening of moral fiber of the people.

4. Military reform. In the military field the progress was even more salient. The military apparatus was entirely reorganized and reequipped through the help of capable German advisers like Bauer, Kriebel Watzell, von Seeckt, and

⁴⁸Kwei, op. cit., pp. 1646-47.

⁴⁹The New Life Movement, though it was announced to the whole nation in March, 1934, in Kiangsi, the guerrilla-infested area, it had been practiced long before that. It was essentially a citizen training program, aiming at the renewal of the Chinese traditional ideology which was termed as "neo-Confusianism" by some foreign observers, and "the cause" of anti-Communist campaigns. It encouraged "the industrious and Spartan life, as well as to cultivate good habits of personal appearance and the observance of traditional Chinese virtues." See Robert Berkov, Strong Man of China (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1938), pp. 175-78; Kwei, loc. cit.; and Tang, op. cit., pp. 33-42.

von Falkenhausen.⁵⁰ A total of forty-eight divisions were organized, all with adequate training and modern equipment. A small yet effective air force was built.⁵¹ A Special Movement Force was formed to serve as the Liaison and a task force between the army and the people.⁵² Military intelligence was entirely renovated under the capable director Tai Ti.⁵³ Moreover, a blockade policy was adopted and rigidly

⁵⁰About the influence of German military advisers to Nationalists forces, see F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), Chapters 7 and 10; pp. 60-75, 90-102.

⁵¹See Gen. Yang Chi's article on the Nationalist Army, Kwei, op. cit., pp. 581-84.

⁵²As a foreign observer recorded: "The Special Movement Force was organized much along the lines of a similar body of Soviet youths, . . . In all there were about 20,000 of them, their duties smacked more of the Y.M.C.A. than is usual in modern armies. They wore plain clothes and were supposed to round up deserters or stray Communists, enforce the blockade, search travelers, see that troops didn't molest the farmers and other civilians, organize and train the masses, shepherd the troops and billet them, elevate popular morale, re-establish schools, train volunteers--everything, in fact, except put the cat out at night. All of them were educated men, some of them graduates of higher primary or middle schools. . . . The members were required to take a special oath to act justly and to deal fairly in all things." See Emily Hahn, Chiang Kai-shek (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 176-77.

⁵³Tai Ti, a genius of intelligence, who first built a military intelligence network in the Generalissimo's headquarters in Kiangsi, later became the Director of Investigation and Statistics (counterpart of the FBI).

enforced.⁵⁴ From 1932-33, forts mushroomed around Mao's Soviet Republic. Highways were built to support the forts from the Nationalist rear.

But in order to concentrate their might on the final blow, Chiang and his political and military lieutenants were doing a thorough cleaning job in places other than Mao's bastion in Kiangsi. As Chiang admitted: "On January 28, 1932, the Japanese Navy attacked Shanghai. Thereupon, the Communists began to enlarge their soviet areas in Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien Provinces. They set up a so-called Soviet Provisional Central Government at Juichin in Kiangsi, and extended their occupation over numerous districts on the Honan-Hupeh-Anhei borders and in central, western and southern Hupeh. Their roving bands overran 20,000 square kilometers in seven provinces."⁵⁵ The Communists claimed, however, that they had some 300,000 square miles and more

⁵⁴The blockade, as a foreign observer put it: "Already the campaign had begun, with advance guards of soldiers making roads and building blockhouses. The whole sovietized area was marked out and encircled with these little forts and an efficient network of communications. Slowly tightening the circle, the Nanking army of about four hundred thousand men set up a blockade, preventing supplies of any sort going in or any exports coming out. The people inside the circle . . . soon felt the pinch. They began to desert the Communists, for when things got tight, even the amiable Reds took their food from them by force. The Communists ran out of ammunition and they needed salt. All the while, the Nanking soldiers, with their allies, moved inward, coolly and methodically tightening the belt." See Hahn, loc. cit.

⁵⁵Chiang, op. cit., p. 67; the seven provinces are Hunan, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Fukien, Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei.

than 300 counties under their control.⁵⁶ This explains why the cleaning job elsewhere was important to the Nationalists.

According to Communist sources, before the end of 1932 the Nationalists forces had been successfully taken, including their bases at the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border, Hunan-Kiangsi-Hupeh border, and Lake Hung area. Some of the remnants fled to Szachwan and the Hunan-Kweichow border.⁵⁷ Minor guerrilla bases in the Yangtze Valley were all eliminated, but the one in Shensi which was far to the northwest was intact.

In the meantime, the KMT apparatus, led by the Cheng Brothers⁵⁸ was busy in the organization of labor unions, student associations, and other social groups. Its effort in this respect dealt a death blow to the "Li-san Line" in Shangshai, Nanking, Canton, Tientsin, Chintao, etc. Riots and

⁵⁶The Communists insisted they had occupied some 330,000 square miles, about 1/6 of China proper, see M. James and R. Doonpiag, Soviet China (New York: International Pamphlets, 1932), p. 16, also see Hu, op. cit., p. 260.

⁵⁷A detailed description of Chiang's campaign against these minor bases, see Hu, op. cit., pp. 267-68.

⁵⁸Cheng Ko-fu and Cheng Ti-fu were brothers who controlled the KMT under the leadership of Chiang. Ko-fu died a few years ago in Taiwan; Ti-fu left the KMT command after 1949, and is now operating a farm in New York.

strikes were either broken up or smashed.⁵⁹ Front and underground organizations in Shanghai and other cities were also crushed,⁶⁰ thus peace and order in cities were maintained.

However, Mao's main force in Kiangsi was quite strong in the spring of 1933. Despite Nationalist's victories elsewhere, Mao's armies started to attack Chiang's forces which were under the command of General Chen Chen. Thus the Fourth Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign got underway. Chen had nine divisions. Battles raged from January to March. Four of Chen's divisions suffered heavy casualties. It was not until April when the Generalissimo took over the

⁵⁹ Communist Hu Ewa's comment on Li Li-san's cities revolution: "At this time revolutionary strength in cities, though being restored, was rather weak. Those participated labor unions only number a little over 32,000; and in Shanghai only 2,000, Wuhan over 1,000, Tientsin, 500. Adventurous city uprisings were either unable to carry out or defeated. Our secret organizations and revolutionary strength in the KMT territory suffered greatly." See Hu, op. cit., p. 244.

An official publication in Shanghai in 1934 entitled Five Years of Labour-Capital Disputes in Shanghai stated that: "1. The number of disputes in which labor gained complete victory had been decreasing year by year. In 1928, it was 41.35% of the total number disputes; in 1929, 20.12%; in 1930, 18.58%; in 1931, 19.45%; in 1932, 17.00%. 2. The number of disputes in which labor suffered defeat had been gradually increasing. In 1928, it was only 10.55% of the total number, but in 1931, it was 17.59%." This document was quoted by Chen Po-ta, Notes on Ten Years of Civil War: 1927-36 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), p. 22.

⁶⁰ According to Hu, one of the major "front" organizations, the Anti-Imperial League, was broken by the KMT, next year another front the Anti-Fascist Assembly, was eliminated; many "progressive bookstores" were closed, hundreds of "progressives" fled or were arrested. See Hu, op. cit., p. 282.

campaign did the situation stabilize.⁶¹

Once Chiang took over, pressure was increasingly stepped up against Mao. In October 1933, he planned the Fifth Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign. He proclaimed it as "a combined political-military offensive based on 30 percent military and 70 percent political effort."⁶² All the remaining year of 1933, his forts and forces, political and military organs, were pressing in. In January 1934, Mao reported to the Second National Congress of Workers, Farmers, and Soldiers that his Soviet Republic still controlled a population of 3,000,000 and had an army of 300,000; nevertheless he admitted that Chiang had mustered 1,000,000 soldiers and built 9,000 blockhouses surrounding him.⁶³ At such a critical moment when the CCP should have devoted their utmost endeavor to fight the KMT, a bitter power struggle broke up inside Mao's party. After Li Li-san failed in his mass movements in large cities, the CCP was compelled to move

⁶¹General Chen Chen was one of Chiang's top lieutenants and a capable commander, who later became the governor of Taiwan and then the Premier and Vice-President of the Republic of China. He died on March 5, 1965 in Taiwan. The details of the fourth campaign see Chao, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

⁶²See Chiang, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶³Mao's report see Hu, op. cit., pp. 269-70, 282. At that time the Soviet Republic was limited to the territory in Kiangso.

its headquarters from Shanghai to Mao's guerrilla base.⁶⁴ Terrific quarrels developed in the Second National Congress. Accusations and counter-accusations were exchanged between the so-called "Returned Students" faction headed by Li Li-san, Chen Shao-yu, and Chin Pong-hsien and other so-called "Native Communists" faction led by Mao Tse-tung. Chin (aliased Po Ku) attacked Mao for his "countryside policy" and "banditry doctrine" and used every effort to keep his growing power in bounds.⁶⁵ While Mao counter-charged them with "left opportunism" which should be responsible for the CCP's defeat in the cities.⁶⁶

When the Communists were quarrelling, Chiang and his Nationalists were closing their iron grip. Mao called for an aggressive program to save the Soviet Republic and to enlarge

⁶⁴The CCP used to make their headquarters in Shanghai where foreign settlement could be used as refuge. But after 1932, they could stay there no longer. Commented Hu: "Finally, early in 1933, we (the CCP) lost ninety percent of our strength inside the KMT territory. The 'Left'-leaning Party Central found it impossible to exist behind the KMT lines, and was forced to move into the revolutionary bastion (Mao's guerrilla area)." See Hu, op. cit., p. 280. According to records, the KMT authorities arrested 110 of the CCP Central Committee members, 370 provincial committee members, 1,000 county committee members and 2,900 party members (See Wan, op. cit., p. 42). Hu's estimate of 90% loss was not far from the truth.

⁶⁵As in Chang Kuo-tao's interview by Robert C. North, Hong Kong, November 3, 1950. As recorded in North's book, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 37. Chang, Vice-Chairman of CCP in its early days, later became a guerrilla leader in Szechwan, and broke with Mao in 1935. He is now a resident in Hong Kong.

⁶⁶See Hu, op. cit., pp. 280-83.

it in the face of the Nationalist offensive. He wanted to build Red Army strength to a million men, to increase the size of reserve units, and to boost production, both agricultural and industrial.⁶⁷ But it was too late. The Nationalist forces were tightening their encirclement of Mao's areas. Hard fighting took place during the spring and summer of 1934. Chiang ruthlessly pushed in his forts, political organizations and armies, assisted by a few squadron of airplanes, some fighters and some bombers. His fifth campaign advanced slowly, yet steadily and smoothly. By the summer of 1934, the Communists were driven to a few mountainous regions in southern Kiangsi with a total area of less than 4,000 square kilometers which was only one-fiftieth (1/50) of the Soviet territory in 1932.⁶⁸

Bitter fighting continued through the fall. Because of the success of Chiang's over-all strategy and his new ways of fighting, Mao's guerrillas were no longer effective. Red forces were pinned down for positional warfare instead of mobile ones. Before winter came, Mao and his comrades faced a grim choice; either to flee or to be annihilated completely. Mao decided to take a chance on the former. In October, 1934, the Communists organized a nearly complete evacuation. Before the Chinese Soviet Republic's capital, Juichin, fell to the hands of the Nationalists on November

⁶⁷See North, loc. cit.

⁶⁸See Chiang, op. cit., p. 68.

10, 1934, the Reds' long flight to China's northwest was on. Mao's carefully built bastion in Kiangsi was taken over by the National Government. It was a terrible blow to the Communists.

Years later Mao reviewed the defeat in the fifth campaign with the following comments:

1. Strategically and tactically, the guerrilla forces lost the initiative and the dynamics.⁶⁹
2. Politically, the power struggle stayed by the Left and its fellow-travellers paid for the campaign very dearly.⁷⁰
3. Over all, the guerrillas were isolated from any ally, so they could not get help from outside, thus were weakened by blockade.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Mao wrote on Campaigns of 'Encirclement and Annihilation' and Counter-Campaigns--Main Forms of China's Civil War: "All through the fifth counter-campaign, which lasted a year, we did not show the slightest initiative or dynamic force. Finally we had no alternative but to withdraw from our base area in Kiangsi." As in Fremantle, op. cit., p. 107.

⁷⁰ Regarding this point Mao said: "During the enemy's fifth campaign of encirclement and annihilation, the mistake of the strategic direction of the "Left" opportunist line and Chang Kuo-tao's line lay mainly in the failure to do these things. (i.e., a better strategy than the enemy)." Ibid., p. 109.

⁷¹ Mao reviewed his over-all strength in 1934: "Our political power is dispersed and isolated in mountainous or remote regions, and is deprived of any outside help. In economic and cultural conditions the revolutionary base areas are more backward than the KMT areas. The revolutionary bases embrace only rural districts and small towns. They were extremely small in the beginning and have not grown much larger since. Moreover, they are often shifted and the Red Army possesses no really consolidated bases. The Red Army is small in numbers, its arms are poor, and its access to food, bedding, clothing and other supplies is extremely difficult." Ibid., p. 90.

4. The KMT or Chiang had a better strategy.⁷²

Indeed Mao had learned the lesson, so he decided to move toward a new location where his ally was much closer. The long flight was on.

The Long Flight

The Long Flight was also called the "Long March" which covers the period from October, 1934 to October, 1935 when Mao and his guerrilla force fled for their lives with the Nationalist armies behind them in hot pursuit. It was not much of guerrilla warfare, nor was it a war, but a highly determined military roving force seeking a remote sanctuary in order to settle down and survive.

Mao's armies broke Chiang's encirclement on October 16, 1934 at the southwestern part of the ring. They rapidly drove westward, and their immediate objective was evidently western Hunan where another Communist guerrilla force under Ho-Lung was operating.⁷³ Mao's total force on the march was estimated at 90,000 men from the start. Nationalist troops in Hunan failed to check them. But when they reached Kwangsi, they were turned back by local garrisons. During December, Mao was met by Ho Lung in western Hunan. Heavily reinforced,

⁷²Mao's kind words about the enemy were: "It should be borned in mind that the enemy's supreme command has some strategic insight. It is only when we have trained ourselves to attain a level higher than the enemy's that strategic success will be possible." Ibid., p. 109.

⁷³Ho Lung was originally from Hupeh where he was defeated and driving to Hunan-Kweichow border region. See footnote No. 57 of this chapter.

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the Red Army went further westward and entered Kweichow province. January, 1935, Mao settled down temporarily at Tsunyi, a small town in the northeast of Kweichow. Here Mao consolidated his position as the leader of the CCP. Important personalities of the "returned students" faction were purged.

Nationalist troops were pressing hard from the rear. Difficult terrain was now waiting for Mao's men. There were rapids, deep canyons, and steep mountain ranges. They drove toward the west and reached the Yunan border, and then shifted northward into Szechwan. There they merged with Chang Kuo-tao and Hsu Hsiang-chin, another Communist guerilla force originally from central China.⁷⁴ Though the whole force expanded considerably after the merge, trouble developed immediately between Mao and Chang. The former, as the newly consolidated leader, insisted on marching north and building their new bastion in Shensi province where Russia was in close reach; the latter, the senior member of the Party, insisted that their present location, Szechwan province was much richer in resources, thus was good for further development. In reality, it was a power struggle. Chang was already well-established in Szechwan, to remain there meant that he was to take over the leadership; whereas Mao, knowing the situation, in order to maintain his leadership the only way out was to move on. In spite of reconciliation efforts

⁷⁴Chang and Hsu were from the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border then shifted to Szechwan after their defeat there. See footnote No. 57 of this chapter.

of other CCP notables, the two could not reach the same decision. Mao went northward to Shensi and Chang to Szechwan-Sikang border, but both were stopped by the crack troops of Nationalist General Hu Chung-nan.⁷⁵ They were forced to seek refuge in a prairie-swamp area at the Szechwan-Kangsu border which was also decorated with snowy mountains. For weeks they were marooned in that region, foodless and cold. Thousands died on the spot. With incredible endurance and hardship, Mao and a few thousand of his men finally survived the ordeal and got out of the place.⁷⁶ They were already in Kangsu, a sparsely populated province in China's northwest. Fortunately, local resistance was weak. They turned toward north first then to the east. October, 1935, one year and some 6,000 miles after they broke the Nationalist encirclement

⁷⁵General Hu Chung-nan, a graduate of the WMA, was a faithful follower and a capable commander of Chiang, who later became the high military commander in the northwest and was directly confronted with the Communists in all the war years. Hu died two years ago in Taiwan.

⁷⁶Edgar Snow wrote about the venture: "North of the Tatu River the Reds climbed 16,000 feet over the Great Snowy Mountain, and in the rarefied air of its crest looked to the west and saw a sea of snow peaks--Tibet. It was already June, and in the lowlands very warm, but as they crossed the Ta Hsueh Shan many of those poorly clad, thin-blooded southerners, unused to the high altitudes, perished from exposure. Harder yet to ascent was the desolate Paotung Kang Mountain, up which they literally built their own road, felling long bamboos and laying them down for a track through a tortuous treacle of waist-deep mud. 'On this Peak', Mao Tse-tung told me, 'one army corps lost two-thirds of its transport animals. Hundreds fell down and never got up.'" See Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Modern Library, 1938), pp. 209-210. Also see Ku Quan-chao, The Chinese Communists During Last Thirty Years (in Chinese; Hong Kong: Asia Publication, 1955), pp. 88-91.

in Kiangsi, their final destination--Yenan was reached. They were in the comfortable arms of local Communist leaders, Kao Kan and Liu Tse-tan.⁷⁷ When they left central China, he had 90,000 men, later they were joined by Ho Lung and Hsu Hsiang-chien who had a combined strength of over 80,000. But when Mao reached Yen-an, only some 20,000 were left, a loss of 90% of his men.⁷⁸ From the military standpoint Mao suffered a terrific defeat. As Chiang put it, "the Chinese Communists no longer constituted a serious problem."⁷⁹ But Mao's guerrilla warfare was by no means over. After such a crucial test, Mao and his comrades started to work out a different strategy which would not only keep the struggle going but also aimed at expansion. A new era of China's guerrilla movement was approaching.

⁷⁷ Kao Kan was later the highest Communist political leader sent to Manchuria after Russia's occupation of that territory in August 1945. He was liquidated by Mao in February 1954. Liu was killed in a campaign against Yen Hsi-san in 1936.

⁷⁸ It was generally agreed that Mao had some 20,000 men when he arrived in Yen-an (See Ku, op. cit., p. 92); but Chiang said Mao had "only some 5,000 armed Communists left." (See Chiang, op. cit., p. 70). Mao admitted "the loss of 90% of the bases, of the Party membership and of the armed forces," (See Fremantle, op. cit., p. 92). Perhaps no accurate number of the remnants can be consented upon. Nevertheless, the defeat was terrific.

⁷⁹ Chiang, loc. cit.

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Stage II: 1936 to 1945: From
Survival to Expansion

The Struggle for Existence

When Mao arrived in northern Shensi during October 1935, the regions under the control of Communist guerrillas were limited to six or seven counties which were extremely poor in resources. It had a population of some 1,500,000.⁸⁰ Mao immediately built up an administrative apparatus entitled "the Northwest Office of the Central Democratic Government." To boost the morale of his followers, he divided the small region into four political areas: namely, North Shensi Province, Shensi-Kangsu Province, Kanchun Special District, and Shenfu Special District. A miniature soviet government was put into operation.⁸¹

Though Mao's new base was 2,000 miles closer to the Soviet Union than his former bastion in Kiangsi, it remained a quite isolated area in addition to its economical backwardness. To the north situated the Ordos Desert, a waste of hundreds of square miles. To the east, Yen Hsi-san, the shrewd governor of Shansi presented a formidable threat. To the west, a Moslem general Mar Hun-kwei was staunchly anti-Communist. To the south, Chiang's troops were pressing in.⁸²

⁸⁰Ku, op. cit., p. 94.

⁸¹People's Press, The Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance (in Chinese; Peking: People's Press, 1953), p. 6.

⁸²Ku, op. cit., p. 96.

Under such circumstances, the problem of survival was imminent. Mao tried to solve the problem through two ways: politically, he played up the tune of anti-Japanese aggression; militarily, he sent his cracked guerrillas to the east in the hope of gaining some territory from Yen.

Since the Japanese invaded Manchuria in September 1931, the local Chinese command under General Chang Hsueh-liang, also known as the "Young Marshal,"⁸³ was driven out by the aggressor. In the next three years, Japanese powerful Kwan Tung Army was pressing south. In 1933, Chiang put up a fight at the Great Wall which divided Manchuria from the Chinese interior and succeeded only in slowing down their advance. In 1935, the Japanese were penetrating into Hopei province where the ancient city, Peking, was located. Public sentiments were highly against Japanese aggression. Chiang, aware that his government was fighting a war on two fronts,⁸⁴

⁸³Chang Hsueh-liang, whose father Chang Tso-lin was the warlord in Manchuria. The older Chang was nevertheless a nationalist who refused to submit to Japanese demands in his territory. He was assassinated by the Japanese. His son, Hsueh-liang took over the command after his father's death and sided with the Nationalists in 1929. He was a play-boy type yet red-blooded person. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931, he was dancing with a couple of movie actresses in Peking. His army withdrew into north China and later assigned to duties in Shensi. Chang was affectionately called the "Young Marshal" but labelled by the people as "General of Non-Resistance" for his failure in Manchuria. In 1936, he was one of the protagonists in the "Sian Incident." After the incident was over, he was put under surveillance by Chiang. Few years ago he was freed, and is now living in Taiwan.

⁸⁴As Chiang declared: "Communist troops coordinated their rebellion with the quickening pace of Japanese aggression. This was tantamount to a pincer movement against the Government from within and without." See Chiang, op. cit., p. 67.

decided to take the weaker one first, but also preparing for the fight against the stronger foe.⁸⁵ Mao and his strategists knew that in order to survive, the pressure from the National Government should be slackened; and the only way to achieve this goal was to hasten the government to declare war on Japan. So on November 28, 1935, the CCP proclaimed the "Ten Anti-Japan Proposals."⁸⁶ December 9, student associations instigated by the Communists underground, staged a demonstration in Peking.⁸⁷ The Nationalists were not too much impressed, but the public opinion was aroused.

In February 1936, Mao sent his regrouped forces under the command of Liu Tse-tan to invade Yen's territory. Yen, who had no previous experience with Mao's fighting forces, suffered heavy losses. At one time Yen's capital city, Taiyuan, was threatened. Chiang immediately dispatched Chen

⁸⁵The CCP was the weaker foe, and the Japanese, the stronger one. For the preparation of war against Japan in the National Government under Chiang, see Chapters 10, 11, 13 & 14 of Liu, op. cit., pp. 90-108, 131-161.

⁸⁶The proposals stressed the importance of resistance against Japanese aggression, and pleaded the ending of civil war, the formation of a national united front, and the democratization of the National Government, etc., see The CCP South China Branch, The Selected Works in the Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the CCP (in Chinese; Canton: Hsin Hwa, 1951), pp. 104-105.

⁸⁷Wrote the CCP years later: "December 9, 1935, under the instigation, organization, and leadership of the CCP, students in Peking held a tremendous demonstration for anti-Japan and National salvation." Ibid

Chen to Yen's rescue. After bloody battles, Liu was defeated and was killed by Yen's troops.⁸⁸

By this time the Young Marshal's forces were assigned to Shensi to fight the Communists. Mao performed one of the most brilliant stratagems in his lifetime. Chang's forces were mainly natives of Manchuria or the Northeast Province, as the Chinese called it. They were strongly anti-Japan, but had little knowledge about the Communists. Above all, they were homesick. When Chang's forces were advancing toward Mao's base, the latter managed a counter-attack. A few thousand of Chang's soldiers were captured by Mao who indoctrinated them and sent them back with the message that Manchurian troops should make their revenge against the Japanese, and the only way out was of course to fight the Japanese right now. A personal letter from Chou En-lai was delivered to the Young Marshal in person by a high-ranking prisoner-of-war urging cooperation between Chang and Mao's forces so that they could go to the Northeast and fight the Japanese together. Chang was deeply moved. As a result, the state of "cease fire," "mutual non-aggression" and the "establishment of anti-Japanese fronts" prevailed between Mao and Chang. Pressure from the south was therefore virtually lifted. The first step for survival was achieved.⁸⁹

⁸⁸Ku, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 97.

Chiang, after his acknowledgement of Chang's change of attitude toward the Communist guerrillas, was very unhappy about the situation. He tried to use his prestige to persuade Chang to continue the anti-Communist struggle. Chiang argued that Mao's guerrillas were very close to the stage of elimination; once the Reds were gone, the whole nation then could devote all its energy to the war against Japan. Manchuria could be recovered by then. But he did not know that Chang Hsueh-liang and Chou En-lai had already had several meetings together; not only Chang had accepted Chou's recommendation to reorganize the Manchurian army with the political commissar system, but also another Nationalist commander, Yang Fu-chen, in a neighboring area had been converted to the Communist camp.⁹⁰

Chiang first received the Young Marshal in Loyang, a strategic town about 200 miles from Sian. Chiang, who was senior to Chang and who had treated the latter as a younger brother, exhorted Chang about the importance of defeating the Reds first. Chang insisted that war against Japan should be the highest order and that civil war was no good. The meeting broke up in disappointment. Once Chang returned to Sian, Chou En-lai encouraged him and Yang to start a mutiny.⁹¹

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 98. Yang Fu-chen, a warlord general who sided with the Nationalists after Chiang's military success, represented military power in the Northwest. He was another protagonist of the Sian Incident. After the incident, he was imprisoned and was executed in 1949.

⁹¹Ibid.

Words of military unrest of course soon reached Chiang's ears. Too sure of himself, Chiang, against unfavorable information, flew to Sian with a group of top military advisors on December 11, 1936. Early next morning the mutiny broke out. Chiang was arrested by Chang's soldiers. It was called the "Sian Incident." The kidnapping of Chiang who had become a real national leader after his victory in southern China caused stormy protests from all over the nation. Even Chiang's political rivals condemned Chang and Yang and demanded Chiangs immediate release. Nationalist troops in the neighborhood of Sian under the command of Ho Ying-chin were closing in. Meanwhile, in Sian, Chiang had several private settings with Chang. The Generalissimo's private diary was seized and read by Chang. It revealed the real intention of the Generalissimo's war plan against Japan. Chang was deeply moved. Coupled with heavy pressures from national-wide public opinion and the Nationalist military strength, Chiang was finally released on December 25.⁹²

⁹²There are many books written about the Sian Incident. The data used here is based upon H. H. Chang's book, Chiang Kai-shek, op. cit., chapter 33, "Sian Incident," pp. 241-52. After reading the diary, Chang confessed to Chiang himself: "We have read your diary and other documents and from them have learned the greatness of your personality. Your loyalty to the revolutionary cause and your determination to bear the responsibility of saving the country far exceed anything we could have imagined. . . . If I had known one tenth of what is recorded in your diary I would certainly not have done this rash act." Ibid.

However, historians said there were international complications about Chiang's release. The CCP would like to have Chiang executed, but Stalin, who always had an eye on his potential enemies, the Germans and the Japanese, learning that Chiang's political rival Wang Chin-wei being received by

The Sian Incident was a new milestone in China's contemporary history. As a foreign observer wrote:

The stunning news of Chiang's capture overshadowed all bargaining possibilities. No foreign observer had ever before, seen anything like it in China for unanimity. In provinces like Kiangsi, where until ten years before the people couldn't have cared less who was head of the government, everyone took the event as a blow. Children were sent home from closed schools to chastened households. The treaty ports were silent and worried. In Communists territories there was rejoicing, but in all the rest of China there were sorrow and apprehension, and much indignation against the Young Marshal . . . China was a nation at last.⁹³

The Incident also earmarked another historical event. After his diary was made public, Chiang could no longer prepare for the war of resistance against Japan, clandestinely. The cat was out of the bag. Japan would not let him continue the preparation. He had to get ready quickly for the stronger enemy, thus the weaker foe became the secondary concern. Considering Chiang's strategic concern, Mao thus had time to take a comfortable breath.

The Second Coalition

To speed up the Nationalists to fight against the Japanese, the CCP proclaimed its "five requests" and "four pledges" on February 10, 1937. The five requests were:

Hitler and rushing home to take Chiang's vacancy so that an alliance among Germany, Japan and China could be formed, demanded that Chiang should be protected from harm. With Stalin's insistence, the CCP withdrew their demand of executing Chiang. Thus Chang had a free hand to release Chiang. See Ku, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

⁹³Hahn, op. cit., p. 206.

(1) stop civil war and rally the strength of the nation to resist the foreign aggressor, (2) assure freedom in speech, assembly, and association and release all political prisoners, (3) call a national congress which should include representatives from all parties and associations so that the whole country could stand together for the task of national salvation. The four pledges made by the CCP were even more appealing: (1) Cease to employ the policy of over-throwing the National Government with military uprising; (2) The Communist government becomes a special regional government of the Republic of China, and the Red Army changes its name to National Revolutionary Army subject to the direction of the National Government and the Military Affairs Commission in Nanking. (3) Within the special administrative region, thorough democratic systems would be practiced. (4) Cease to enforce the policy of land confiscation, and resolutely carry out the national anti-Japan united front policies.⁹⁴

The KMT held its own conference five days later to consider these proposals. It was generally agreed that if the Communists were sincere, their offerings should be accepted. The most serious consideration was whether the CCP would repeat as they did in their first coalition with the KMT in 1925 to 1927. Negotiations went on. Mao and his comrades finally revised their four pledges which were more attractive to the Nationalists:

⁹⁴As recorded in Hu, op. cit., pp. 315-16.

1. The San-min chu-i (Three People's Principles) enunciated by Sun Yat-sen are the paramount need of China today. This Party is ready to strive for their thorough realization.
2. (This Party) abandons all its policy of overthrowing the KMT by force and the movement of sovietization, and discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of land from landlords.
3. (This Party) abolished the present Soviet government and practices democracy based on the people's rights in order to unify the national political power.
4. (This Party) abolishes the designation of the Red Army, reorganized it into the National Revolutionary Army, places it under the control of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government (i.e. at Nanking), and awaits orders for mobilization to shoulder the responsibility of resisting Japanese aggression at the front.⁹⁵

These pledges were known to the people of China as the most important part of the "Joint Effort to Face National Crisis." Under such conditions the second coalition between the KMT and CCP was formed. From the Communist point of view it was a "united front," but to the Nationalists, it was the submission of the CCP to the National Government. The masses were rejoicing about the reunification of the two rivaling parties.

The Japanese started their war of aggression on July 7, 1937. The war of resistance was on. On August 22, 1937, the Military Affairs Commission, headed by Chiang who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, appointed Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the former Communist troops now renamed the Eighth

⁹⁵Brandt, et al., op. cit., p. 246.

Route Army (later enlarged to the 18th Army Group) of the National Revolutionary Army. The Eighth Army, composed of three divisions with some 45,000 men, was assigned to the Second War Area in northern Shansi under the command of Yen Hsi-san. In the political field, the Communist-controlled area was renamed the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghasia Border Region; Lin Tsu-han and Chang Kuo-tao were appointed chairman and vice-chairman of the border area government. All the re-organized government employees and army personnel were paid and equipped by the National Government.⁹⁶ The promises of both sides seemed to be faithfully kept. The coalition seemed true and encouraging.

However, attentive observers noticed one missing piece of the puzzle: Mao Tse-tung, the CCP leader in power had neither official position in the border government nor in the Eighth Route Army. Whether Mao, as party leader, refused to serve in an official capacity under a rivaling party, or that Chiang preferred to keep Mao out of the lime-light was a myth which probably could never be solved. However, Lin Tsu-han, an elder member of the CCP served as Mao's front man, perfectly. Mao's authority remained the highest in the Communist Party.

On September 25, 1937, the 115th division of the Eighth Route Army engaged the Japanese at Pin Sin Kwan,

⁹⁶All the events as recorded in Ku, op. cit., pp. 101-104.

northern Shansi, and gained victory. It was the first important battle participated in by the Communists during eight long years of the war of resistance.⁹⁷ One month later, Communist guerrilla remnants in central and southern China which went underground and inactive after Chiang's victory in Kiangsi in 1934 now emerged because of the coalition. They numbered about 10,000. Chiang re-equipped them and named them New Fourth Army; Communist generals Yeh Lin and Hung Yin were appointed commander and deputy commander.⁹⁸ Within the first few months of the reunification, there was little trouble between these two long-rivaling parties. Mao's speech on September 29, 1937 showed a somewhat harmonious spirit between them:

. . . Mr. Chiang Kai-shek pointed out in his statement of September 23 that 'it is my opinion that we faithful followers of the revolution should not lay stress on personal differences and prejudices. For the sake of the realization of the Three People's Principles at this critical hour, (we should) let bygones be bygones and work for consolidation with the entire people in order to preserve the existence of our nation.' This is entirely correct. Our urgent tasks at present are to work for the realization of the Three People's Principles, to forget personal

⁹⁷ See The Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance, op. cit., pp. 25-26. The battle of Pin Sin Kwan was known to the nation and credit was given to the CCP. No other important campaigns were recorded thereafter. To some Chinese military historians, it was the only major battle the Communists fought during the war. See Ku, op. cit., p. 105. Commander of the 115th division was Lin Piao, now the Minister of Defense of the Chinese Communist regime.

⁹⁸ See Communist Military Research Institute, A Chronological Study of Chu-Mao's Armed Rebellion (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Communist Military Research Institute, 1958), p. 6.

and clique differences and prejudices, to revise old practices adopted in the past, to carry out immediately a revolutionary policy compatible with the Three People's Principles, and to begin working anew with the people.⁹⁹

But in the same speech Mao also casted some dark clouds in the bright horizon of the KMT-CCP cooperation. He accused that "the government is still a one-party dictatorship under the KMT and not a government of the national democratic united front," and "the formation of a new government is imperative." In addition, he insisted that the "political, military, and organizational merits" of the Red Army "are worthy of adoption by the friendly armies in the country"; and his formula of military reform was "the political liquidation of feudalism and the carrying out of the principle of cooperation between officers and men and cooperation between army and people."¹⁰⁰ Political and military reform and reorganization urged by Mao were certainly unacceptable by the KMT at that time. So even in their honeymoon of cooperation difficulties ahead were sensed by keen observers.

Consolidation and Expansion

Once the KMT-CCP cooperation was basically settled, i.e., right after the Sian Incident, Mao and his comrades

⁹⁹Mao's speech on: "Urgent Tasks of the Chinese Revolution since the Formation of the KMT-CCP United Front," September 29, 1937, as in Brandt, et al., op. cit., p. 255.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 255-57.

were busy in consolidating their position in the Border Region. In the summer of 1937, when the united front was formally announced, there was an informal demarcation line between the KMT and the CCP territories. It was in the middle of Shensi. On the side of the KMT it was guarded by General Hu Chung-nan and his First National Revolutionary Army. On the side of the CCP, it was guarded by Chu Teh and his Red Army. Both sides kept their high vigilance but nevertheless peaceful co-existence prevailed.

From December 1936 to December 1938 marked the consolidation and expansion of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. During these two years, the CCP recovered from their wounds suffered from the Long March and emerged as a power to be reckoned. In the field of guerrilla warfare, Mao carefully reviewed its mistakes and achievements and formulated new laws and theories. He made four important speeches which were also put into written form.¹⁰¹ These were his most productive years in the theorization of modern guerrilla warfare. In addition, he wrote two more articles on Communist ideology which had immense influence on the

¹⁰¹Mao's four important articles on guerrilla warfare during 1936-38 are:

- a) Problems of Strategy in China's Revolution War, December 1936;
- b) Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, May, 1938;
- c) On Protracted War, May 1938; and
- d) Problems of War and Strategy, November 6, 1938.

Parts of these writings had been cited in previous chapters of this paper.

conduct of guerrilla struggle.¹⁰² Now the solid theoretical foundation was laid actual practices could be carried out, accordingly.

What was the grand strategy for Mao's struggle for consolidation and expansion. As Communist historian Hu Chao-mu put it:

Internally, there are the forces of the people (i.e. the CCP), the KMT, and the traitors (i.e. those who work for the Japanese). . . . The problem is the KMT which mainly represents big landlords, big capitalists and basically a Anglo-American compradore group. It had for many years devoted itself against the people, and vowed to destroy the CCP. . . . Thus, on one hand we have to unite with Chiang so that we could promote his forces to fight the Japanese; but on the other, we have to carry our decisive struggle against the reactionary policies of Chiang, so that the people's strength can be maintained and the conspiracies of Chiang and his master, the American imperialist, can be suppressed.¹⁰³

It was therefore evident the basic policy of the CCP after the start of the war of resistance against Japan was to encourage the Nationalists to fight the Japanese, but at the same time the CCP would fight the KMT whose influence could be drastically cut down. This policy was evidenced by Mao's speech to the Eighth Route Army in the autumn of 1937:

¹⁰²The two important articles that Mao wrote on Communist ideology during that period of time are: a) On Practice, July 1937, and b) On Contradiction, August 1937. These two articles had great influence to his guerrilla struggle for they laid the principles for all sorts of "campaigns" within the border area. And the "campaigns" were essential for the indoctrination of party members as well as the populace. For the campaigns, see footnotes No. 137-39 in this chapter.

¹⁰³See Hu Chao-mu, Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party (in Chinese; Peking: Hsin Hwa, 1952), pp. 45-48, in the discussion of the CCP policies when war broke out between China and Japan.

The Sino-Japanese War gives us, the Chinese Communists, an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy is to devote 70 per cent of our effort to this end, 20 per cent to coping with the Government (the KMT), and 10 per cent to fighting the Japanese.

This policy is to be carried out in three stages. During the first stage, we are to work with the KMT in order to insure our existence and growth. During the second stage, we are to achieve parity in strength with the KMT. During the third stage, we are to penetrate deep into parts of Central China to establish bases for counter-attacks against the KMT.¹⁰⁴

Subsequent events showed that this grand strategy had been faithfully followed, and its payoff was tremendous.

The consolidation was started in their first base, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. In order to rally people solidly behind his guerrilla struggle, Mao made significant changes to his practices in Kiangsi. For the first time, Mao stressed the importance of "democracy," "election," "people's rights" and "equality for women."¹⁰⁵ He also

¹⁰⁴The speech is recorded in General Chen Hsiao-wei's books, Why We Lost the Mainland? (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Arts Press, 1964), p. 34. Also see General A. C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports (New York: Holt, 1958), p. 283, and U. S. General Staff, The Chinese Communist Movement (Washington, 1952), p. 2307.

¹⁰⁵See "A Real Democratic Program for the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region" in which the "Programme of Administration of the S-K-N Border Region" submitted by the Border Region Political Bureau of the CCP and approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, was included; as collected in a mimeographed booklet entitled Progress for Victory (Chungking, 1942), pp. 1-7. The Programme stressed the election of local council members, the safeguard of civil rights, political rights, property rights and rights of freedom of speech, press, etc., and the equality between man and woman (articles 5, 6, & 16).

tolerated private ownership of land to a certain degree.¹⁰⁶ In the meantime, mass organizations were tightened.¹⁰⁷ Persuasion was stepped up,¹⁰⁸ militia built,¹⁰⁹ and the Party took full control of the region.¹¹⁰ It was essentially in the form of totalitarianism mixed with a well-organized mass

¹⁰⁶In the "Regulations for Guaranteeing the Civil and Property Rights," it states: "Tenants and landlords and creditors and debtors should effect to pay and reduce the rent and the interest according to the law." (article 5) And "the property and residence of any citizen in the B. R. should not be unlawfully confiscated, commandeered, occupied and searched by any government organs." (article 6). Ibid., pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁷The important mass organizations in the Border Region as reported by Lin Tsu-han in 1938 were: Workers' and Employees' Association, the Federation of Peasants' Associations, the Students' Union, the Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Women's Associations, the Self-defenders' Brigade, the Young Vanguards, and the Children's Corps, etc., see Lin Tsu-han, The Border Region Government Annual Report (Hongkong: New China Information Committee, 1938), p. 3.

¹⁰⁸In an article entitled "A Year Regarding the Introduction of Democracy," it states in part: "everything is discussed by the people and also executed by the people. The organs that make decision are also in charge to put them into practice. . . . The coincidence of discussion and execution came to such a point what one says when he is sitting; immediately he does it when he stands up, action follows words." Evidently persuasion was conducted by discussion which became a general practice in later years. See Progress for Victory, op. cit., pp. 25-30.

¹⁰⁹According to the Communists, by the end of 1938, 224,325 persons were organized into militia in the Border Region. See The Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance, op. cit., p. 20.

¹¹⁰All documents which are available indicate that laws and regulations as well as political and military policies were not determined by the political and military structure in the Border Region but by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP of which Mao was the Chairman. This can be proved by the data used in footnotes 104-107 of this chapter.

movement, which in later years Mao called it "People's democratic dictatorship."¹¹¹ It was a new approach to guerrilla struggle. There were criticisms but in general it worked much better than the old days in Kiangsi.¹¹²

Once the CCP consolidated their power and position in the Border Region, it started its expansion, mainly by means of guerrilla warfare. Since the Japanese started their war of aggression in northern China in 1937, the Chinese people, highly inspired by nationalism and patriotism, were eager to fight the aggressors. By that time, however, the Japanese army was much stronger than that of the Chinese. Within one year, important communication lines and major cities in the

¹¹¹The people may discuss related issues but the Party makes policies. Once policy is made, people must comply. This was termed by Mao as "democratic centralism" which was the basis for his democracy.

¹¹²Lin Tsu-han, in his annual report of 1938, listed the following criticisms against the Border Region:

- a) The Border Region Government is a feudal state.
- b) The Border Region Government has no legitimate existence, because the appointment of its personnel has not been confirmed by the Central Government.
- c) There are two magistrates in one county.
- d) There are multifarious and tyrannous taxes in the Border Region Gov't.
- e) The Border Region Government preaches class war.

Though Lin defended the Border Region government's innocence and branded these criticisms as "misconceptions and rumours," they nevertheless showed that there was a group of people who were discontented about the practices of that government. For the argument, see Lin, op. cit., pp. 8-10. The system worked better than old days was evidenced by the rapid economic reconstruction of the backward border region from 1936-38. For instance, the cultivated land in the region increased from 8,431,006 acres to 8,994,483 acres within these two years. See The Liberated Areas during the War of Resistance, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

the north were in the hands of the Japanese. When the Japanese took over, local governments were smashed, with their armed units defeated and officials killed or captured. Local authorities were all under the National Government. After their defeat, they usually tried to rebuild the government in a region somewhere remote from the Japanese. But to rebuild a ruined political structure took time, regardless of the fact that the Nationalists (or the National Government) still maintained their provincial governments behind the enemy lines. The Communists who bore no responsibilities in the local governments saw the political vacancy between the Japanese takeover and the Nationalists' return, and it was their golden chance for expansion. As a general practice, they would send in a task force from the Eighth Route Army to the area where the newly arrived Japanese were unfamiliar with the terrain, yet the Nationalists had just been defeated and had to be regrouped. So the Communists set up their base in this no-man's land. The people who knew little of nothing about the difference between the CCP and the KMT welcomed those who led them to fight the Japanese at such a critical moment. January 1938, Communist guerrillas had their foothold in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar border region, northeast to their original base in Shensi, and behind the fighting lines between the National Revolutionary Army and the Japanese. Within six months the guerrillas penetrated into the heartland of the various provinces from the border region. In

the summer of 1938, when the Japanese army reached central China, Communist guerrillas followed them into Shansi-Hopei-Honan, border area to the south. The Taihan Mountain Range was used as their base. The expansion was a rapid one.¹¹³

The process of their expansion as described by Chu Teh, the Commander of the Eighth Route Army was as follows:

Our troops made flanking movements to disturb the enemy's outer line of activity. The guerrillas succeeded in establishing their bases and projected surprise attacks everywhere behind the enemy's lines. . . . The masses were organized and armed to support the army. They should not only contribute their wealth and energy indirectly to the prosecution of the war but also enter active military service as regulars or guerrillas. They should fight behind the enemy's lines, create disturbances, cut off communication lines, capture the enemy's foodstuffs, and war materials. They should attend to wounded soldiers, supply foodstuffs and materials, report about the enemy, send messages, and serve the troops in many other ways.¹¹⁴

The pivot of guerrilla success, according to Chu's words depended upon the organization and manipulation of the masses. Masses were treated with patriotic propaganda instigated with nationalism, organized with democratic form of structure yet under the solid and firm leadership and control of the Communist Party. Mao's theory of three-phase guerrilla struggle was put into practice; that is, personnel-wise, from armed peasants to guerrillas, and then to regulars;

¹¹³The establishment of two new border regions, see ibid., pp. 25-27, 41-43.

¹¹⁴Chu Teh, How the Eighth Route Army Fights in North China (Chungking: New China Information Committee, 1938), p. 10.

territory-wise, from guerrilla areas to guerrilla base and then to regular base.¹¹⁵ Also tried out were his principles of mobility, flexibility, concentration and dispersion.¹¹⁶ All of those had proved to be quite effective. Evidently the Japanese had difficulties eliminating the guerrillas from their established bases.¹¹⁷ The expansion of Mao's forces were considerably secured from Japanese attacks. The next thing on their calendar was how to compete with Nationalists local governments and their regular and irregular forces who also stayed behind the enemy lines.

Duel Behind Enemy Lines

As stated before, the Japanese army could only occupy communication lines and big cities. The Nationalists, who were the original legal authorities in those provinces, maintained their provincial and local governments in the areas which were remote from the Japanese forces. Most of the government leaders left behind were military men who had regular army and guerrilla forces under their command,

¹¹⁵ See Mao's writing, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," the chapter on the establishment of base areas, Selected Military Works, op. cit., pp. 165-70.

¹¹⁶ See Mao's writing, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," the chapter on strategic defensive, ibid., pp. 121-45.

¹¹⁷ For the failure of some of Japanese "mop up" campaigns against Red guerrillas, see Claire and William Band, Two Years with the Chinese Communists (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 99-103.

subject to control by the National Government in Chungking, the wartime capital. As in 1938, Nationalists commanders behind enemy lines were:

- 1) Hopei province: Governor, General Lu Chung-lin; guerrilla commander, General Chang Yin-wu;
- 2) Shangtung province: Governor, Admiral Shen Hung-lai;
- 3) Shansi province: Governor, General Yen Hsi-san;
- 4) Kiangsu province: Governor, General Han Teh-chin.¹¹⁸

The military arm of local commanders, though not an equal match to the highly mechanized Japanese Imperial Army, could be regarded as formidable enough to conduct guerrilla activities. Besides, they did have the support from the people, because everyone was deeply committed to the sacred task of fighting against Japanese aggressors.

The rapid expansion of the CCP forces immediately caused conflict with local government authorities. According to the military report prepared by the National Government presented to the People's Political Council,¹¹⁹ the CCP forces had launched six major attacks against the government forces behind enemy lines, from 1938 to 1940:

¹¹⁸ See Chen Hsiao-wei, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

¹¹⁹ The People's Political Council was established in July 1938 for the purpose of "utilizing the best minds in national affairs and to rally all elements in the country in time of war." Its members were first selected by the KMT, but later elected by local and provincial councils both on regional and professional basis; Communist members were included. It served in part as the legislative and advisory body of the National Government. See Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 112-13.

In 1938, the 18th Army Group marched into Hopei. In December of that year, it mustered the forces of Ho Lung, Chao Chen-kin, Leu Chen-chao, and the Chih-Shih-Chin column, the Youth column, etc., and used the tactics of encirclement and ambush to attack the localities, all in Hopei. The guerrilla forces of the National Government under Commanders Chang Yin-wu, Chiao Min-li, Kin Su-pen, Chan Si-ju, Shan Chun-nei, Yang Yu-quen and Chao Tien-chin were defeated successively.

In 1939, the 18th Army led by Hsu Hsiang-chain invaded Shangtung province. He attacked local militia, such as the 1st and the 14th Peace Preservation Headquarters, and the militias in Yu-tai, Chu-yeh, Lai-wu, and Mon-yin were either eliminated or suffered heavy losses. After September, another eight local self-defense units were destroyed by Hsu's forces. The provincial government of Shangtung found it very difficult to exercise its authority.

In the winter of 1939, when the National Revolutionary Army was launching a general offensive against the Japanese in southern Shansi, the 18th Army Group staged the mutiny of Po I-pao, Han Chum and Yun Sen-wu; Ho Lung's forces supported them openly. Thus our offensive was seriously upset.

In January 1940, the 18th Army Group mustered the 129th, 115th divisions and the forces of Ho Lung, Hsu Hsiang-chain, Leu Chen-chao, Yang Yu, Yang Su-fen, fiercely attacked National Government's forces in central Hopei. The supreme commander of the Hopei-Chahar War Area, General Lu Chung-lin and Generals Chu Wei-bin, Kao Su-shun, in order to avoid civil war, withdrew from that area. Still the 18th Army Group pressed them very hard from behind. They even neglected the orders from the C-in-C. Their goal was to eliminate the Hopei Provincial Government.

In June and July of 1940, the 18th Army Group crossed the Yellow River to the south and attacked the forces of Lu and Kao who withdrew from Hopei. When the latter moved to the east, the attackers pursued them. Owing to the withdrawal of our forces in Hopei, the Japanese were thus able to build the Tehchow-Shihchiachan Railroad and started their firm control in that province. Certainly, the 18th Army

was interested only to attack its allies but forgot its real enemy.¹²⁰

In the same report, the National Government claimed that the CCP forces had deliberately killed 1,000 administrative and military personnel, guerrillas included, in the guerrilla area, while deaths in military conflicts were not included.¹²¹ Among them included a hero of Chinese guerrilla warfare, Chao Tung.¹²²

¹²⁰As recorded in a booklet entitled A Summary of Chinese Communist Problems which was edited and published by the National Government in Chungking and distributed to the members of the People's Political Council in November, 1944. The military report was from page 74 to 84, and the cited section, pp. 75-77.

¹²¹National Government personnel killed by the 18th Army Group from January 1939 to February 19, 1940 included the following persons:

army officers-----	46
soldiers-----	747
administrative personnel---	49
KMT workers-----	5
<u>pao-chia</u> workers-----	53
others-----	100
Total	1,000

See ibid., pp. 95-109; most of the people killed had names, ranks, and the places of the killing. It was a quite detailed document.

¹²²Chao Tung's mother, Mrs. Chao Yu-tung was known to the people of Manchuria as "Mother of the Chinese Guerrillas" who started her private guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in 1932. At that time her son returned from Peking with six schoolmates. Immediately they organized guerrilla units and took into the hills. His force grew to 1,000 within a short time. He fought the Japanese for five years and gained national reputation. In 1937, he sneaked out of Manchuria for medical treatment in Peking, later he met the Generalissimo who greatly admired his bravery. But Peking fell to the hands of the Japanese on July 29, 1937. Chao rushed back to the north and organized a guerrilla force in the suburb of the old city. At one time he had 30,000 men. Of course, he was faithful to the National Government and admired Chiang. The fall of 1939, Chao visited Chungking. The author had the privilege to hear him talk. He was regarded as a hero by the

Why the guerrilla forces and troops of the government behind enemy lines were so sheepish? The reasons were clear: First of all, northern China was far from their logistical bases, mostly in southern and southwestern parts of the nation, and supply lines were cut off by advancing Japanese army. Secondly, and probably the most important one was that most of the Government forces (under the Nationalists) had never had any experience in guerrilla warfare, except men like Chao Tung, of course. They lacked the skill and knowledge of organizing the people and coordinating the activities of their regulars and irregulars. Even their guerrillas were more or less operating in the regular way. As a result, once conflict broke up between the CCP and the National Government troops, the former was always the winner.

But chance finally arrived for government troops to fight back. The New 4th Army which was led by the CCP and originally stationed in south of Yangtze River crossed the river and entered northern Kiangsu in July 1940. The National Government had its Kiangsu provincial government there. Fighting started at once. As usual, Communist troops were winning. Immediately the New 4th Army under its commander Yeh Tin and vice-commander Hun Yin set its political apparatus

youths of the day. His official title was the Commander of the 7th Guerrilla of the Hopei-Chahar and his 120 lieutenants were all killed by the Communists. It was a tremendous shock to the people of the nation as a whole. For Chao's story, see China Information Committee, China's Guerrilla Fighters (Hankow, China: China Information Committee, 1938), pp. 2-4, and A Summary of CCP Problems, op. cit., p. 51.

and refused to take orders from governor Han Teh-chin. On October 4, they staged a surprising attack on Han's forces. Thousands of Han's officers and men were either captured, killed, or missing. In the meantime, the 18th Army Group attacked from the north. Battles raged for more than a week. Han, hardly pressed from both north and south by the CCP forces had to fight his way out and withdrew to the south of the river where the Nationalist's regular army was near by. On October 19, the General Chief of Staff of the National Army, General Ho Ying-chin and Deputy General Chief of Staff, General Pai Chung-shih wired to Communist Generals Chu Teh, Peng Teh-huai, and Yeh Ting asking the New 4th Army to stop the attack and return to the place of its assigned station within one month.¹²³ But the New 4th Army gave the telegram a deaf ear. On December 8, Ho and Pai sent Chu and Peng another telegram and asked them to obey orders from the high command, for the Communist armies were a part of the National Revolutionary Army and were also under the command of Military Affairs Commission. Still, there was no reaction. The next day, December 9, the Generalissimo himself, as the C-in-C of the armed forces of the nation, ordered the New 4th Army to move to the north of the Yellow River. It took no steps to carry out Chiang's order. January 3, 1941, Chiang gave a stern order to the Commander of the New 4th Army and asked him to move as directed, promising that when he went north

¹²³Ibid., pp. 20-22 which had the whole text of the telegram.

his troops would be assisted by local authorities. But instead, Yeh's army moved westward and attacked one government division. This time government troops were well prepared. Supreme commander of the Southeast War Area, General Kuo Chu-tung took swift action. Within one week, the New 4th Army was completely wiped out and disbanded, and all its commanders arrested and court-martialled. It was known as the "New 4th Army Incident" which aroused national-wide attention. It also was the first serious break between the Nationalists and the Communists after their second coalition in 1937.¹²⁴

¹²⁴The New 4th Army Incident aroused a political storm in Chungking, the wartime capital. The CCP accused that the attack was a deliberate one, and those generals who directed the attack should be punished as "criminals." The KMT was accused as engaged into an "anti-Communist plot" in collaboration with the Japanese and its puppet government, and thus defeating the cause of the sacred war against Japan. It insisted that all orders issued regarding the New 4th Army should be invalidated, and rallied the people of the country to devote themselves in the struggle against "the reactionaries" in the KMT. See Hu Hwa, op. cit., pp. 414-15.

On the side of the National Government, the illegal activities of the New 4th Army before its defeat were published in detail. The confession of the Chief of Staff of the New 4th Army, General Chao Lin-pao went as follows: "Commander Yeh Tin, after receiving the order to move north, decided marching toward southern Kiangsu, . . . and enlarging the Southeast Political Bureau (of the CCP). . . . First, political commissars were sent to southern Kiangsu to build up cells, and then the regular force would follow and to destroy the National Army there." On January 27, 1941, Chiang made a speech to the nation and asserted that the action taken against the New 4th Army was a disciplinary one. It had nothing to do with party or faction strife. "It was because that the New 4th Army disobeyed orders from the supreme command, attacked its comrades of arms, engaged in mutinous activities, and sabotaged war efforts," said Chiang, that the disciplinary action was necessary. . . . When there is no discipline in our army, we shall be defeated by the enemy." See A Summary of CCP Problems, op. cit., pp. 29-33.

The "New 4th Army Incident" did not, however, lead to an open split between the two parties; in order to carry on the life-and-death struggle against the mutual enemy, Japan, they managed to maintain cooperation. But the duel was highly intensified, politically as well as militarily.

Happy Ending

Militarily, the CCP's answer to the "New 4th Army Incident" was the re-establishment of that army. One week after the incident, Mao appointed Chen Yi the Acting commander of the new army.¹²⁵ In all the areas behind enemy lines, the struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists forces were stepped up. In addition to universal organization and indoctrination of the masses, a new form of struggle was developed by the Communists. It was the "public trial" of "traitors." The term "traitor" had been used against those who served under the Japanese or the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei.¹²⁶ But now, anyone who worked for the National Government was also regarded as a "traitor." "Public trials" were conducted to bring about the execution of those who were sympathetic to the rivaling party. The

¹²⁵Chen Yi led the re-established New 4th Army with excellent records. Later he became the conqueror of Shanghai. Now he is foreign minister of Red China.

¹²⁶Wang left the KMT camp on December 29, 1938 and formed the puppet government under Japanese occupation in 1939. He died in Japan before the end of the war. Also see footnote No. 14 of this chapter.

liquidation of "traitors" became one of the "most important and urgent tasks" in the Border Region.¹²⁷ In reality, the anti-traitor campaign was an indispensable operation in the new innovated guerrilla movement. As Lin put it: "We must persist in collaboration between the leaders and the masses, educate the cadres and the masses, unite the active elements and the anti-spy heroes of the various government offices, schools, and troops together, and make them nuclei of our anti-spy work."¹²⁸ How did they put this campaign into practice? Two eyewitnesses had the answer: public trials were held for the "traitors." The "active elements" would lead the trial meeting in which all people in the locality were required to attend. The traitor under trial was humiliated and tortured and finally put to death by various hair-raising ways. Local people were encouraged to join in the inhuman treatment of the condemned.¹²⁹ After the government (or KMT) sympathizers were put to death, blood was on the hands of the proletariat, and the "point of no return" was

¹²⁷ Report of Lin Tsu-han, chairman of the Border Region in 1944: "the most important and urgent tasks in the Border Region this year shall be: . . . (3) To liquidate all traitors and special agents, to persist in the leniency policy toward them, and to try as much as possible to win over those who are still remediable, . . ." Lin, Annual Report of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region (Yenan, 1944), p. 24.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

¹²⁹ For a detailed description of public trials in Communist-controlled guerrilla areas, see Father Raymond J. DeJaegher & Irene C. Kuhn, The Enemy Within (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1952), Chapter 10, pp. 113-23. The authors had stayed inside these areas for years. They were eyewitnesses of the public trials.

reached in the Communist-led guerrilla movement. When a stronger government force advanced into the locality, everybody was afraid of indiscriminate revenge from the government which, without inside information, was often ignorant enough to arrest suspects casually and punish them. Thus the threatened indigenous people had no choice but to join the Communist guerrillas. Consequences like this convinced government authorities that the punishments they meted out were justified. The guerrilla process eventually worked like this: public trials eliminated pro-National Government elements which exercised leadership in the locality, thus government authorities lost their intelligence sources, and the revenge practiced by the authorities made more people side with the Communist guerrillas. The new process coupled with their much superior techniques in organization, propaganda, political indoctrination, and guerrilla fighting, helped the CCP gain victory after victory in struggles behind enemy lines. Before the end of 1944, the National Government admitted that they had lost 34,758 men to the Communist forces.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ According to statistics compiled by the National Government, from April 1939 to October 1944, 34,758 persons under the Government were killed by the Communists behind enemy lines; they were

KMT workers-----	1,387
administrative personnel-----	3,069
military personnel-----	26,834
political appointees-----	129
educational workers-----	92
others-----	3,247

See A Summary of CCP Problems, op. cit., pp. 110-11. A list of names was also attached; most were high ranking personnel.

On the political front, in coordination with their guerrilla warfare in the field, the CCP had not been idle. Under the name of cooperation and united front, the Communist propaganda organ, the New China News Agency (or Hsin Hwa News Agency) was set up in Chungking. The Hsin Hwa Daily News was published in the Nationalist territory along with nearly a dozen of CCP-sponsored magazines. They stressed the theme that the KMT was seeking peace from the Japanese; that the National Government was a dictatorship; that the Government forces were interested only in civil war but not fighting the enemy, etc.¹³¹ Through the People's Political Council they worked hard to win friends from other political forces. Though they were not very successful during wartime, a solid foundation was laid for further exploration.¹³² Their remarkable achievement, however, was the winning of sympathy and admiration from American Embassy personnel in Chungking. How the CCP manipulated the situation was not

¹³¹ See Ku, op. cit., pp. 111-12. The charges were all false.

¹³² Political forces operating in China other than the KMT and CCP included the Socialist Party, the Chinese Youth Party and many "independents" who regarded themselves as non-partisan. The CCP tried to win over all those who were outside of the KMT. Even in the KMT, they tried hard to split it into the Right and the Left and to win the friendship from the Left as they did in 1926-27. Because of the determination of the National Government to carry through the war against Japan, the establishment of the People's Political Council, and the prestige of the KMT in wartime, the CCP was not too successful in their persuasion. However, owing to their efforts in wartime, they were quite successful in the post-war period. See stage 3 of this chapter, with regard to the Democratic League.

known exactly. But the intangible help they got from such U. S. Embassy personalities such as John S. Service, John P. Davies, and Raymond P. Ludden was tremendous. The relationship between the United States and the National Government was greatly damaged, and a most favorable image of the CCP was created in Washington.¹³³ At the time when the United States had just started to send aid to Chungking, an accomplishment like this could be regarded as a political victory to the CCP.

Domestically, Mao launched the "Chen Fen Campaign."¹³⁴ After the second coalition with the KMT, some of the CCP leaders believed that the whole nation should be unified in name and in deeds; there should be no semi-independent army, and no semi-independent government; so that the whole nation would be truly under the National Government and the armed

¹³³How some of the personnel in the U.S. Embassy in Chungking helped the cause of the CCP consciously and/or unconsciously, see the documents collected in U. S. Dept. of State, U. S. Relations with China (Washington: GPO, 1949), pp. 64-65, 564-76. The three names mentioned here held important positions in the Embassy, and they endorsed the CCP very strongly. After General Patrick J. Hurley took over the ambassadorship, eleven persons from the Embassy were sent home because of their conspicuous sympathy to the Communists. Also see Chen, op. cit., p. 105.

¹³⁴Chen Fen literally means the improvement of social usage. To the CCP it means the change of people's attitude. When it becomes a campaign the change is made through mass movement. The campaign was started in February 1942 after Mao's report of "How to Change the Attitude of the Party?" The campaign was started right away and lasted about a year. Many party members were purged through the campaign. Because of its sheer effectiveness, campaigns of this kind had been widely applied hereafter. See stage 4 in this chapter.

forces under the Military Affairs Commission, thus the strength of the people could be unified for the cause of resisting the foreign aggressor. This viewpoint was represented by Chen Shao-yu and Cheng Kuo-tao. Mao labeled them as "Right-leaning surrenderists" which means the submission to the KMT. Chang was purged and fled to Chungking. Chen, a leader of the "return students" remained but lost his position in the party.¹³⁵ However, most young people who joined the CCP after the war were inspired by patriotism not communism. Most of them thought Chang and Chen were right. Moreover, as Hu observed: "After the war started, the Party was greatly expanded and the majority of our members are new. Among them, 90% are petty bourgeois whose minds have not been well-reformed, neither did they have adequate indoctrination."¹³⁶ As a result, the chen-fen campaign was on.¹³⁷

The pillars of the campaign were: (1) the elimination of subjectivism in learning, (2) the elimination of factionism in the party, and (3) the elimination of dogmatism in literature. As Mao wrote in "Improve Our Learning," the campaign was aimed at the faithful obedience to Marx-Leninism, loyalty to the party plus everybody must work for the

¹³⁵The purge of Chang and Chen, see Hu Hwa, op. cit., pp. 378-82.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 423.

¹³⁷For important documents of "chen-fen," see Brandt, et al., op. cit., pp. 372-419.

interest of the party.¹³⁸ The campaign set the pattern for political indoctrination and brain-washing of the party members. It was essentially a "struggle-and-liquidation" process. With study groups, self-criticism and mutual-criticism sessions, and purges, the CCP was therefore highly purified and disciplined.¹³⁹ With a strengthened party apparatus Mao's guerrilla warfare found a dynamic pushing and guiding force behind it which, in turn, became more successful when time went by.

Improved party organization, active political maneuvering in government area, highly organized masses behind enemy lines, plus public trial techniques, energetic propaganda, and experienced guerrilla forces, helped Mao's struggle to become more effective every year. In 1943, Chiang organized the Special Action Corps to counter Mao's

¹³⁸ See Selected Works of Mao (in Chinese; Peking: People's Press, 1955), 2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 800-829.

¹³⁹ Under chen-fen, authority of the Party became even more powerful than ever. Party dogmas and doctrines were patiently explained and exhorted. All members were required to examine themselves in the light of these doctrines. First, they should criticize themselves until the director assigned from the Party was satisfied. Then they should criticize each other, in order to help others to achieve progressiveness. Those who could not or would not follow Party line were purged from the Party. Since Party members were the ruling elites of the CCP regime, the purge really meant political "death." With such ruthless brain-washing, discipline was therefore well-maintained.

guerrilla activities.¹⁴⁰ But by then government guerrillas as well as regulars were driven out of northern provinces like Hopei, Chahar, and Shangtung almost completely. The Communists, with closely coordinated operations of their guerrillas and regulars, firmly established their bases in Chih Mong Mountains (Shangtung), Chung Tuai Mountains (Honan), Tai Hun Mountains (Shansi) and other areas of difficult terrain. They had replaced the Nationalists there. The Communist guerrillas had been successful in stopping Japanese "sweeping campaigns," but never attempted to drive the Japanese out of large cities, communication lines and other digged in positions.¹⁴¹ In central China, Communist guerrillas also held part of the territory in Honan, Kiangsu and Anhwei, but they had failed to re-establish any bases in their old bastion, the Kiangsi-Hunan-Fukien-Kwangtung

¹⁴⁰The Special Action Corps were a combination of commandos, intelligence agents, and guerrilla fighters. They were under the command of General Tai Ti, the Nationalist intelligence chief who had made his name since "encirclement and annihilation" days in Kiangsi. The Corps main goal was to prevent Communist guerrillas from infiltrating into central and south China. They were somewhat successful in this respect, but did not achieve much in the recovering of territory from the Communist guerrillas.

¹⁴¹The Nationalists accused Communist guerrillas as "roving but not attacking" the Japanese. Even in Communist works, there are little or no comments of how their guerrillas or regulars had attacked and taken Japanese strongholds, but gave tremendous emphasis on how they had defeated Japanese encirclement and sweeping campaigns. See North China Unconquered, apparently printed in Chungking in June, 1943 by Communist authorities, and A Summary of CCP Problems, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

area; a very interesting phenomenon indeed. In short, Communist guerrilla warfare was most successful behind enemy lines in the north where people had never had Communist guerrilla experience before; whereas to the south where people did have such experience, the CCP was less successful, even if the area was behind enemy lines.

On August 13, 1945, after the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, Mao Tse-tung made the following statement: "The war of resistance against Japan is now over. Our new situation and new task are internal struggle. The present condition of our party is quite different from that of 1927. Within eight years, we have gained the control of 175 cities and towns, a regular army of 1,000,000 strong has been built, and there are 2,200,000 men in the militia. Liberated areas numbering nineteen have been established in nineteen provinces. We achieved such a remarkable result because we aimed at the reconstruction of a new Chinese Republic under New Democracy. Thus we must fight for every inch of power and every bit of interest."¹⁴² It was indeed a happy ending for Mao's guerrilla struggle.

Summing up the second stage, Mao's guerrilla warfare entered a new dimension. It was a concerted operation of strong political appeal (nationalism, patriotism plus Communist-style democratic practices), powerful party

¹⁴² See Mao's speech "Our Political Policy after the Victory," delivered on August 13, 1945, as collected in Selected Works of Mao (in Chinese; Peking: People's Press, 1960), Vol. 4.

leadership (through chen-fen), universal mass organization and manipulation, population purification (through public trials), and the clever maneuvering of regular and guerrilla attacks. Thus in the far-flung areas behind enemy lines, government authorities which stuck to traditional ways of fighting, were no match to them. But in the rear areas of the government, as well as in the south, the KMT and Chiang's prestige were still high, government troops numbered 4,000,000 and were still better equipped, Communist guerrillas had little or no success. When compared with the National Revolutionary Army, the CCP forces remained inferior both in number and in fire-power. It was under such situations that V-J Day arrived.

Stage III: 1946 to 1949:
Civil War and Victory

The March to Manchuria

Upon Japanese surrender, the National Government military supreme command immediately instructed all armed forces in the country to wait for orders pertaining to the acceptance of surrender in accordance with Allied agreements. In an order to the 18th Army Group, it specifically instructed all its units to remain where they were until further orders; and, for those committed to combat operations to abide by orders of their respective war area commanders. Under no circumstances were they to take any unauthorized moves.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ See Chiang, op. cit., p. 137.

But the Communists flatly disobeyed Chiang's order. Chu Teh, the Communist commander, in the name of the "Yenan Headquarters," issued on August 10, 1945 "Seven Orders of the Day," directing Communist forces to various places marching northward to connect with Russian and Outer Mongolian troops. In the meantime, communication lines should be cut, so the operations of the government army could be delayed and their own area of control extended.¹⁴⁴ One week later,

¹⁴⁴The Seven Orders of the Day were: to direct the movements of the CCP armies as follows:

1. For the sake of coordinating with the Soviet Red Army's entry into China: (a) troops under Lu Cheng-tsao move from Shansi and Suiyuan into Cahar and Jehol; (b) troops under Chang Hsueh-shih move from Hopei and Chahar into Jehol and Liaoning; (c) troops under Wan Yi move from Shantung and Hopei into Liaoning; (d) troops under Li Yung-chang move from Hopei and Jehol into Liaoning and Kirin; and (3) Korean Communist troops enter to Northeast Provinces (i.e. Manchuria).

2. For the sake of coordinating with the Outer Mongolian troops entry into Inner Mongolia, Suiyuan, Chahar, and Jehol; (a) troops under Ho Lung move northward from Suiyuan; and (b) troops under Nieh Yung-tseng move northward from Chahar and Jehol.

3. All troops in Shansi were to be placed under Ho Lung's unified command and to occupy the areas along the Ta-tung-Pucheng Railway and in the Fen River valley.

4. In order to seize or sever all principal arteries of communication in the country: all Communist troops along railways . . . , and on both sides of principal arteries of communication in other liberated areas (i.e. area under the CCP's control) are to go actively into attack.

The document is recorded in General Chen's book, Why We Lost the Mainland?, op. cit., p. 268. Also see Ku, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

The provinces mentioned in the order are all in northern China. Manchuria was divided into three provinces by the Chinese namely, Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungiang. Jehol, Chahar, and Suiyuan bordered with Outer Mongolia. At the present time, under the CCP rule, those parts are put into one administrative unit which is called the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Area with the same status of a province. The order of Chu certainly indicated that the Red Army was trying to get connected directly with the Russians in Manchuria right after the war.

Chu on the behalf of the CCP presented a set of six demands to the National Government asking for the rights to disarm the Japanese and puppet troops. Politically, he demanded the formation of a coalition government and representation in the United Nations. Chu neglected completely the four pledges that the CCP made eight years ago, and was now playing the role of the spokesman of another independent political entity which had the same status of the National Government, and thus should enjoy the same kinds of rights, internally and externally.¹⁴⁵ As a matter of fact, on

¹⁴⁵The six demands of Chu are as follows (in full text):

"1. In accepting the surrender of Japanese and puppet forces (i.e. military forces under the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei) and in concluding agreements or treaties for the purpose, the Government (National Government) should consult first the Anti-Japanese People's Armed Forces in 'liberated areas' (i.e. the CCP in the areas under their control) in order to reach unanimity of views.

2. All Anti-Japanese People's Armed Forces in 'liberated areas' and in occupied areas should have the right, under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and the procedure as laid down by the Allies, to accept the surrender of Japanese and puppet troops and to take over their arms and supplies.

3. The Anti-Japanese People's Armed Forces in 'liberated areas' and in occupied areas should have the right to send delegates to take part in accepting Japanese surrender and in administering local affairs after the surrender.

4. All Anti-Japanese People's Armed Forces in 'liberated areas' should have the right to designate representatives to the peace conference and to United Nations meetings.

5. Generalissimo Chiang should be asked to stop the civil war by assigning troops in 'liberated areas' to accept the surrender of Japanese and puppet troops they have surrounded in their areas, and by assigning 'KMT troops' to accept the surrender of Japanese troops they have surrounded in their own areas.

6. A multi-party conference, including also non-partisan representatives, should be called at once to form a democratic coalition government to effect democratic political and economic reforms."

See Chiang, op. cit., pp. 138-39; also see ibid.

Chu in these demands called the National Revolutionary

August 15, Chu had already sent a wire to the Japanese supreme commander in China asking Japanese troops to surrender to him. He signed the telegram as the Commander-in-Chief of the "Chinese Anti-Japanese People's Armed Forces."¹⁴⁶ As an independent political entity with its own government and military forces the CCP felt that they had the right to get into Manchuria through the consent and help of the Russians. Owing to the fact that government troops had lost their footholds in northern China, and that they were far south from Manchuria at the time when the war was ended. With deliberately planned assistance from the Russians who occupied Manchuria by that time, Mao's troops entered the Northeast Provinces (Manchuria) without a scratch.

September 10, 1945, Communist troops crossed the Great Wall and entered Manchuria. Among them, General Lin Piao who led some 40,000 men and 3,000 political cadres.¹⁴⁷ Later that year, more than 100,000 men were dispatched into that area. Once they got in, under the protection and direction of the Russians, local governments were set up.

Army under the National Government which eight years ago he and his Communist Party pledged loyalty and obedience, the "KMT troops." As a subsystem under the National Government, he demanded the right not only to receive the surrender of the enemy independently, but insisted that in the areas under his control (liberated areas) the Government should have no say to it. Moreover, he demanded, on behalf of the CCP, that they should have the right to attend the U. N. It was therefore evident that the CCP was an independent political entity, not a subsystem of the Chinese government as they pledged eight years ago. The split between the CCP and KMT was now breaking into open.

¹⁴⁶ See Ku, op. cit., p. 131.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

Natives who had served in the Manchukuo Army were recruited to the Communist forces.¹⁴⁸ Late in 1945, Mao was able to declare: "Our armed forces of more than 100,000 strong had entered the Northeast and Jiaol province. Our expansion programs there added another 200,000 men. We are still expanding. Plus political cadres, we will have more than 400,000 within one year."¹⁴⁹ Thus the CCP was well-settled in Manchuria in early 1946. Most important of all, Mao had the firmest support from the Russians. They turned over all Japanese arms they captured to Mao and stripped off industrial installations in Manchuria. The arms were more than enough to equip 400,000 of Mao's troops. The industrial equipments that the Russians took away had a cost of two billion dollars. In addition, they tortured and killed Mr. Chang Shin-fu, the economic envoy of the Chinese National Government assigned

¹⁴⁸After the Japanese invaded Manchuria (or the Northeast Provinces) of China in 1931, in order to show that they were not occupying the territory of another nation, they made the abdicated emperor of the Manchu Dynasty, Pu Yi, (when he was enthroned in 1908, he was only three years old; he ruled for three years and then was dethroned by the KMT on October 10, 1911) the King of that area and proclaimed a puppet government called Manchukuo. It had a puppet army, too. For the recruiting of Manchukuo army into Communist forces, it was estimated that at least 75,000 of them were converted. See R. B. Rigg, Red China's Fighting Hordes (Harrisburg, Penn.: Military Service, 1951), p. 268.

¹⁴⁹Selected Works of Mao, op. cit., Vol. Iv, p. 1180.

to Manchuria.¹⁵⁰ People all over China, except the CCP were highly aroused. National-wide demonstrations were held against Russian pillage and atrocity.¹⁵¹

The Russians in Manchuria had done their best to obstruct the National Government from recovering the territory from the Japanese. Under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed on August 14, 1945, Stalin had promised to respect the sovereignty of Nationalist China in Manchuria and Russian troops there would commence to withdraw within three weeks after the capitulation of Japan and the withdrawal would be completed within three months. The Japanese surrendered on August 10, 1945. But the Russians had no intention of withdrawing on October 2, almost two months after the surrender, when the Chinese delegation arrived at Chan Chun, the capital city of Manchuria. On October 7, Hsiung Shih-hui, Director of the Northeast

¹⁵⁰As Japanese arms for Communist forces of Manchuria, wrote military historian Liu: "In a most mysterious manner huge quantities of surrendered equipment belonging to 594,000 Japanese troops (in Manchuria) reappeared in the hands of the Chinese Communists. The 300,000 rifles, 138,000 machine guns, and 2,700 pieces of field artillery formerly belonging to the Japanese were never properly accounted for. Many thousands of former Manchukuo regular soldiers, were also released from their Russian captivity. With these additions, Lin Piao organized 8 columns, 7 cavalry divisions, 1 artillery division, and 3 other independent divisions." See Liu, op. cit., p. 228.

As to Russian pillage in Manchuria see Chen, op. cit., pp. 299-301.

¹⁵¹Mass demonstrations against Russian pillage in Manchuria and the murder of Chang Shin-fu took place in Chungking, Kuming, Chengtu, and all major cities in China (except those under the CCP control) in the fall of 1945.

Headquarters assigned by the National Government met Russian commander General R. Malinovsky in Chan Chun discussing the transporting of Chinese army into Manchuria through the port of Dairen and was refused. Six days later Hsiung suggested that the Nationalists land troops at another port, Yingkow and was again turned down. On October 27, government troops approached Hulutac, a seaport in Hopei, and were shot at by Communist troops, so they turned toward Chinfantao, another seaport in Hopei, and landed successfully. Step by step they marched toward Manchuria. On their way they were attacked by Communist troops. So the progress was very slow. In the meantime, Hsiung and his colleagues in Chan Chun was not protected by the Russians at all. The Chinese guards of the Northeast Headquarters were suddenly disarmed by the Russians on October 16; Hsiung was forced to leave Chan Chun and returned to Chungking. Russian troops stayed in Manchuria to the end of 1945 and showed no intention to leave. Thus Russian promises in the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship and Alliance concerning their withdrawal and the sovereignty of the National Government in Manchuria were practically broken into pieces.¹⁵² The National Government had no choice but to fight into Manchuria with force. The campaign started in January 1946. With the help of U. S. Navy transports, ten armies were sent into the Northeast

¹⁵²For the whole story of how Russians obstructed the Chinese National Government recovering the Northeast Provinces, see Chen, op. cit., pp. 276-94.

Provinces in the early part of 1946. They numbered some 300,000 and were equipped with American arms. So, in 1946, as the military situation stood in Manchuria the National Government still enjoyed some superiority; they recovered a big portion of Liaoning, the southmost province in Manchuria and made a stand in Chan Chun. The march to Manchuria ended in a stalemate between the Nationalists and the Communists in the first year after V-J Day. The Russians sided with the CCP without reservation and disregarded their Friendship and Alliance Treaty with the National Government.¹⁵³

The Political Maneuver

In 1944, one year before V-J Day, the political entanglement between the two parties was also brought into the open. On September 15, 1944, chief delegates of both parties reported their negotiations to the People's Political Council. Main issues involved were: (1) how could the Border Government run by the CCP become a subsystem of the National Government in words and deeds? (2) how could the 18th Army Group become a part of the military unit under the National Revolutionary Army in words and in deeds?¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³The detailed study of Russia's treaty violations in the Northeast provinces (Manchuria), see Chiang, op. cit., pp. 150-52.

¹⁵⁴The chief delegate of the KMT was General Chang Chih-chung and that of the CCP was Lin Hsu-han, chairman of the S-K-N Border Region. Both of the text of their reports were printed in China Handbook, op. cit., pp. 81-94. Chang, a shrewd politician, defected to the CCP when the KMT was defeated in 1949.

National unity was pleaded and supported by political forces and public opinion of the nation, but differences between the two long-rivaling parties remained unsolved. On the part of the KMT who ran the National Government and the National Revolutionary Army at that time, the answers to the problems were quite simple. Based upon the four pledge made by the CCP in 1937, both the Border Government and the 18th Army Group ought to subordinate themselves to their respective superiors in the National Government. A pledge was a pledge; the CCP should keep it; and it was both moral and legal for the National Government to make such a demand. To the Communists the answers were different. They insisted that their government and army were doing a fine job. In order to unify with the Nationalists, they must have their even share in the National Government; this meant the Nationalists should give up their overwhelming majority in the government. Furthermore, the Communists demanded that the Nationalists should adopt the "democratic" policies of the Communists. As to the armed forces, the 18th Army Group was already too small to accommodate all the personnel it had recruited. A big expansion should be agreed by the National Government. Since ideas of both sides were poles apart, no agreement was reached in 1944 despite the reconciliation efforts of other political elements.

Now that the war was over, due to the Japanese surrender, the prestige of Chiang reached a new height. People

of China, except the Communist faction, gave their credit to Chiang for the victory. In the meantime, as previously stated the National Government controlled some 4,000,000 men in the armed forces. In his V-J Day message to the Nation, Chiang stressed: "the most important condition for national unity is the nationalization of all armed forces in the country. There should be no private army within the country's boundary, nor should armed forces be kept by any political party. Only when armed forces are no longer directed by personal interests or individuals, no longer guided by the private wishes of political party, can national unity be secured."¹⁵⁵ He was of course, referring to the contest by the CCP for the control of areas formerly held by the Japanese, including Manchuria.

National unity was indeed the most agreed upon issue in the nation right after the war. Though the CCP acted as an independent political entity, they knew for the moment national consensus could not be neglected. And the military might of the government had to be reckoned. It was no time for an open break. Political maneuvering was needed. Through the good office of the U. S. Embassy, Mao Tse-tung arrived from Yen-an to talk over national unity with Chiang on August 28, 1945 in Chungking. He stayed in the wartime

¹⁵⁵ Chiang Kai-shek, "V-J Day Message to the Nation, Sept. 3, 1945," China at War, VX, 3-4 (Sept.-Oct. 1945), p. 1.

capital for 41 days. Agreements reached between the two parties included the following points:

1. Establish a democratic government with the co-operative efforts of both parties; the government should devote itself to national reconstruction and prevent civil war.
2. The leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek should be respected.
3. Follow the ideology of Sun Yat-sen to build up a strong and democratic government.
4. The CCP agreed to cooperate with the KMT in the period of political transformation from party tutelage to democracy.¹⁵⁶

Mao, in order to show he was all for Chiang's leadership, shouted "Long Life Generalissimo Chiang!" several times in a couple of political gatherings, including one in the People's Political Council.¹⁵⁷ In principle, both sides agreed upon the nationalization of the armed forces and a democratic form of government. But when it came down to the real issues, consent could hardly be reached. For instance, the CCP demanded that five governors, six lieutenant governors, four assistant mayors to special municipalities be appointed from its party ranks, and the administration in "liberated areas" be recognized, but the KMT insisted that the unification of government should come first.¹⁵⁸ It was

¹⁵⁶As recorded in Chen, op. cit., pp. 245-46.

¹⁵⁷See Chen Chih-tien, A Memory of Political Life (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: 1958), chapter 5, p. 102; and Chen, op. cit., p. 253.

¹⁵⁸See the "Record of the Conversation on Double Tenth Day," as abridged by Chen, op. cit., pp. 255-58.

integration versus separation. On the surface, Mao's visit created an atmosphere of peace and friendly relations between the two parties; Chiang also received him quite warmly. But fundamentally neither side had changed much of its original position.

However, Mao's visit did the CCP much good. He succeeded in cooling down the tensions between his party and the National Government after Chu's Seven Order of the Day and six demands. He gave the public as well as the People's Political Council the impression that the CCP had no intention what-so-ever in breaking with the government. Moreover, he showed that he was for the Generalissimo. Internationally, Mao's visit gave the illusion to the United States that a coalition government could be formed in China. This led to General Marshall's mission, which will be discussed later. In short, Mao's political maneuvering during his days in Chungking had succeeded in buying time and in covering the aggressive activities of Communist troops at that critical moment. As Chiang recalled in 1956:

The 41-day negotiation in Chungking riveted the nation's attention and gave the Communist troops an opportunity to carry out Chu Teh's 'Seven Orders of the Day' without drawing too much public notice. According to an account in the October 17 issue of the Hsinhua Daily News, the Communists seized as many as 200 cities and towns during the month from September 11 to October 11 (practically all within the 41-day period), and brought under their control numerous points along the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, . . . They were thus able to disrupt the principle communication systems in North and Central China.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹Chiang, op. cit., pp. 147-48.

Thus on the political front, Mao scored another victory right after the war.

Cracks on the Wall

The Japanese Imperial Army in China surrendered formally to the National Government on September 3, 1945 in Nanking. Crack troops of the government were dispatched to large cities and strategic points to take over the control from the Japanese. Within one month the National Government had all Japanese-occupied territory under their command, except Manchuria and those areas under the rule of the CCP. With his prestige and power at zenith, Chiang neglected the potential danger of Red forces. With an eye toward national economy, the government adopted a bold demobilization plan in early 1946. It was decided that 1.5 million troops of the National Revolutionary Army be disbanded. Some 200,000 officers alone were released from the service. The KMT authority had apparently forgot their lesson in 1927 when the demobilization of the Northern Expedition forces resulted in the swelling of Communist guerrillas. History repeated itself. In China, the draft system was not being reasonably enforced, even in time of war. Most officers and men, once they got into the army, became professionals and depended upon the military for their living and career. Though the National Government tried very hard to rehabilitate them for non-military jobs, there were just not enough opportunities

available to the disbanded thousands. Jobless and disgruntled, many of these officers and men swelled the ranks of the Chinese Communists.¹⁶⁰ Most serious of all, the morale of the army which was not demobilized was badly affected, because they feared that once the Communists were defeated they would be disbanded too. So generally speaking, the demobilization plan of the National Government, despite its good intentions, had a bad influence on the armed forces as a whole.

On the other hand, when the National Government was drastically cutting down its troops, the Communists were rapidly increasing them. The following two tables show the relative strengths of the rivaling parties from 1945 to 1948.

According to the National Government the military strengths on both sides from 1945 to 1948 were as follows:¹⁶¹

	<u>September, 1945</u>		<u>June, 1948</u>	
	<u>Government Forces</u>	<u>Communist Forces</u>	<u>Government Forces</u>	<u>Communist Forces</u>
Men	3,700,000	320,000	2,180,000	2,600,000
Rifles	1,900,000	160,000	980,000	970,000
Artillery	6,000	600	2,100	2,280

The Communists however, had different figures:¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ See Liu, op. cit., p. 229.

¹⁶¹ Sources: Report of the Defense Minister, General Ho Ying-chin, to the Secret Session of the Legislative Yuan, Sept. 24, 1948.

¹⁶² G. B. Ernburg, Ocherki National 'no-osvoboditel' nio Bor'by Kitaiskogo Narada (Moscow, 1951), p. 227; as cited by Liu, op. cit., p. 254.

	Government Forces	Communist Forces	Ratio
July 1946	4,300,000	1,200,000	3.58:1
June 1947	3,730,000	1,950,000	1.9 :1
June 1948	3,650,000	2,800,000	1.3 :1
June 1949	1,490,000	4,000,000	0.3 :1

From these figures, it was rather clear that the cracks were already visible on the military wall of the National Government as early as 1949.

In the field of allied relations, the National Government was not doing any better. The staunchest ally of the Chinese government, the United States, had a bitter experience with each other from late 1945 to late 1946. It was the unsuccessful mission of General of the Army George C. Marshall. In November 1945, President Truman sent Marshall to China as his special envoy with the task of bringing about the "unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods" and the cessation of Nationalist-Communist hostilities as quickly as possible.¹⁶³ Marshall hoped to achieve these goals partly through adhering to the principle of "the separation of the army from politics" by creating a national, non-political military force along the lines of Western tradition.¹⁶⁴ In the American view, the two armies, Nationalist and Communist, had to be fused into one national army. Americans policy stated that "with the institution of a broadly representative government, autonomous armies should

¹⁶³ U. S. Relations with China, op. cit., pp. 605-606.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively in the Chinese National Army."¹⁶⁵ The Americans, moreover, intended to play their strongest card, the promised assistance, to achieve that goal. General Marshall, with his tremendous prestige in the wartime and his excellent ability as an organizer and an arbitor, probably had confidence in the success of his mission at the beginning.

But evidently the General had little understanding of Chinese politics, still less about the nature of the Chinese Communists. When the CCP showed their independent entity right after the war, and especially after their march into Manchuria against governmental orders, leaders in the National Government were in discord about what should be done about the Communists. One school proposed resolute action against the Communists and had it not been for the almost assured loss of American support which would have resulted, those of that mind might have succeeded in convincing the government to launch an immediate offensive, because at that time, government forces were decisively stronger than that of the Communists. And the strategy would at least have been better than suffering defeat as a result of inaction. Time was of the essence in this plan, for the Communists were growing in strength while the government was losing it.

¹⁶⁵"Statement by President Truman on U. S. Policy toward China, Dec. 15, 1945," Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1945.

Another school was of course to respect Marshall's mission which the government adopted. But the Communists had never trusted the Americans, still less General Marshall. They played ball with him just to gain time for their military expansion. Months passed while the government and the Communists engaged in the futility of negotiating some kind of entente. Certain hopes for a peaceful solution were being entertained by Marshall, although they were based more upon optimism than upon observation. It was, however, in the happy conviction of complete success that he left Chungking on March 13, 1946, to present to his president a report that plans had been made for the integration of the 50 government and 10 Communist divisions in a single national army. Three days later, while Marshall was in the United States, the Chinese Communists attacked Szepingkai, a strategic Manchurian town, shrewdly timing their assault to coincide with the withdrawal of Russian troops. Marshall hurried back to China, arriving on April 16, just one day before Changchun, the capital of Manchuria, fell to the Communists. (The city was recovered by government troops a few weeks later after heavy fighting.)

General Marshall was firmly opposed to the attitude of pursuing a settlement by force. Both government and the Communists jockeyed for position, bargained for a truce and as the truce collapsed, resumed fighting. It was called the da da, tan tan (fight, fight, talk, talk) period. The

Communists, however, were the gainers because time was on their side. The government was unable to stop the fighting either by military pressure or by political concession. By now, the Communists, assured of their strength, launched a bitter attack on American interference, protesting against United States assistance to the National Government. The Nationalists also blamed America for the criticism that they had received and pointed to the Communist violation of the agreement and to the Reds' clear intention of overthrowing the government.

Criticized from both sides, General Marshall strove to be both impartial and, at the same time, the instrument of American foreign policy. The U. S. government announced that in an effort to preserve Marshall's mediating role a ten-month embargo on the shipment of American arms to China would be established.¹⁶⁶ On August 10, 1946, Truman warned Chiang that the United States might "re-define and explain"--diplomatic phraseology for some vague change--in its policy toward China.¹⁶⁷ While the Nationalists were complaining against what they considered to be one-sided pressure against them from the Americans, the Communist propaganda campaign attacked Marshall's personal integrity and questioned his honesty of purpose. These attacks, combined with solid

¹⁶⁶ "House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of General Marshall, February 20, 1948," quoted in U. S. Relations with China, op. cit., p. 355.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 652.

refusal on the part of the Communists to entertain any overture of peace the Americans could persuade the Nationalists to make, made Marshall's position untenable; as a result, he withdrew as mediator.

The Marshall mission gave one year for the Communists to prepare themselves for the final assault on the National Government which, treasuring the friendship of the United States, lost its golden opportunity to defeat the opponent militarily when it was definitely more powerful. But the friendship was also not secured. During Marshall's term as U. S. Secretary of State and thereafter, the relationship between the National Government and Washington remained cool and distant. Even at the critical moment of the National Government downfall on the Mainland, there had been no warm words from its former ally. The Marshall mission showed the serious crack between the National Government and its long-time friend, the United States.

But the misfortune of the National Government did not end here. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, knowing the responsibility of a national leader, tried very hard to adopt democracy and to build a constitutional government for the nation. As a result, a National Assembly specially for the drafting of the Constitution was held in 1946. The CCP boycotted the Assembly but its political ally--the Democratic

League¹⁶⁸ succeeded in cutting down the power of the President in the Constitution almost to a figure head. The cabinet system was made into something like that of the fourth French Republic. Undiscouraged, Chiang proceeded to open the First National Assembly. On March 29, 1948, it was held in the national capital, Nanking, the first of its kind in China's history. 2,700 delegates attended. The Communists boycotted and denounced it. Nevertheless, the Assembly deeply impressed foreign observers by its democratic atmosphere.¹⁶⁹ However, democracy was a new experience to the Chinese. The KMT which had never had strict political indoctrination and irony discipline like that of the CCP, now fully manifested its internal weakness. First, it lost its influence to other political parties in the Assembly. Then, when the seat of Vice-Presidency was under hot contest, the Nationalist Party, itself broke into dueling cliques. Since Chiang's status inside and outside of the party was unchallengeable, presidential candidate was different; it was

¹⁶⁸The Democratic League was formed mostly by Left-wingers during the wartime. Because of nuclei process directed by Chou En-lai, the CCP chief delegated in Chungking, the League eventually became a mouthpiece of the CCP. But the government tolerated it which became a formidable political power in post-war years. For the whole story about the League, see Chou Ching-wen, Ten Years of Storm (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), pp. 33-35.

¹⁶⁹Wrote a foreign observer: "China's First National Assembly . . . provided a good many surprises for those who expected it to be nothing more than a colorless and meaningless Kuomintang show, put on to impress naive observers at home and abroad." For the whole story, see Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 59-70.

open for everyone. There were a total of six candidates, each representing some political force within or without the KMT. The bitterest competition was between Sun Fo, son of the great revolutionary Sun Yat-sen, and General Li Tsung-jen, who represented local KMT interests. Chiang endorsed Sun thus Li was antagonized. But, strange as it may seem, Sun was finally defeated by Li, a tremendous blow to Chiang's prestige. Chiang's leadership was therefore by no means secure even in the Nationalist Party. The factional duel in the National Assembly created a wide crack in the KMT.¹⁷⁰

Last but not least was the deteriorated economic situation. China had undergone eight years of war. It had drained the resources of the nation. The civil strife between the CCP and the government worsened the financial condition. The following table showed how inflation was creeping toward its devastating stage from 1945 to 1948. From the table it is evident that inflation got out of hand in 1947. Those who suffered most were the salary class in which government employees, military personnel, and teachers were included. During the war years inflation had been mild and all sufferings were blamed on the enemy. Now Japan had been defeated; who should be blamed for the hardship? Of course the Communists might be responsible but why could not the National Government do something about it? When inflation was getting worse, the image of the government changed

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Table 6. Inflation in China from 1945 to 1948*

Year	Currency Issued	Government Expenditure	Government Income	Balance
(unit: 1,000,000 <u>fa pei</u> dollars)				
1945	1,031,900	238,085	1,211,389	-1,106,696
1946	3,726,100	7,574,790	2,876,988	-4,690,802
1947	33,188,500	43,393,895	14,064,383	-29,329,512
1948	374,762,200	655,471,087	220,905,475	-431,565,612

*Source: Records of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of China, as used in Chen, op. cit., p. 415.

in the minds of the people; naturally, complaints started, and efficiency of the salary class decreased. Grievances piled up and morale ran low. People lost their faith in paper notes; instead, they tried to purchase materials for subsistence. The government practiced price-control and ration card systems, but they only helped to create black markets for all merchandise. In January 1948, price of goods doubled within less than two months. Black market exchange rate of one U. S. dollar was 2,665 fa pei dollars in June 1946, in August 1948 it climbed to 8,686,000 fa pei dollars, almost 4,000 times within a little over two years. Everybody was hard hit. It was unbearable to the salary class and certainly had destructive effects.¹⁷¹ The crack on the economic wall became a huge hole.

¹⁷¹Source of the black-market rate: Economic Research Institute of the Central Bank of China; as used in Chen, op. cit., p. 430.

With such salient cracks on the National Government facade, the relative strength of the CCP became stronger than ever before in 1948.

The Civil War

From July 1946 to June 1947, government troops still had the will and means to fight. After Marshall's withdrawal as mediator on August 10, 1946, Chiang's army was free to take positive actions against the Communists. Within a few months government forces recovered 191,000 square miles of territory, 18,000,000 people, and 84 cities and towns from the Red Army.¹⁷² Even Yen-an, the capital of Mao, was lost to the Nationalists on March 19, 1947. The CCP was shocked. To remedy their military setback, in addition to speeding up their military build-up in Manchuria, a sanctuary was built for them by the Russians. The following measures were employed:

First, spread their guerrilla activities all over the country. Since the war ended, the efforts in the establishment of a constitutional government had created a democratic atmosphere at every level of the government. Control in all fields were slackened. It became much easier for Communist agents to conduct their clandestine activities. In 1946, numerous guerrilla bands were operating in the

¹⁷²Liao Kai-lun, How New China was Born (in Chinese; Shanghai: Hai Yen Books, 1950), p. 80.

Nationalist's territory from north to south, including the southernmost island, Hainan. Peace and order in the countryside was disturbed. The National Government established a "pacification area" system which was somewhat identical to the practice in Kiangsi from 1933 to 1934. But it did not work very well, because guerrilla areas were widely spread, and the government found it impossible to master overwhelming forces to surround all of them as in the old days. Furthermore, the guerrillas were better equipped and more experienced than before. Even with a big force, it was difficult for government troops to liquidate them. Thus in Maosan, a mountainous region only fifty miles from Nanking, the national capital, Communist guerrillas managed to survive.

However, there was one case deserving special attention. Wang Feng-kan, a local leader in Hopei, succeeded in eliminating Communist guerrillas from 1946 to 1948. Wang started with the support of the local military commander. The steps that he took were as follows: (1) after the national army had recovered an area from the guerrillas, he summoned local people for individual and secret interviews from which Communist agents who were assigned by their party to lead the underground in that region were identified. (2) With the help of the army, the agents were arrested. (3) Mass organizations in that region were started right away. Men and women, the young and the old were all organized. Those who had friends and family members killed or

mistreated by Communist guerrillas were appointed leaders of those organizations. A portion of able-bodied men were organized into full-time "self-defense" units. (4) Local leaders were politically indoctrinated and militarily trained. (5) Communist agents who had no bad records and who surrendered themselves to Wang were pardoned and sent to a training school to change their minds about Communism. Those who refused to surrender or who had notorious reputations among the local people were sentenced to death and the death penalty was carried out by the local "self-defense" units, not by the regular army or the court. (6) All mass organizations supported the self-defense units in case of Communist guerrilla attack. Ordinarily, sentry and guard duties in villages were performed by old ladies and children, but they were supported by the armed self-defense units who digged in a few hundred yards behind. No strangers could sneak into any village without being spotted by the widespread sentry posts. If they tried to force their way in, alarms were sounded and the defense units would be ready. (7) Detailed defense plans of every village were worked out. Under a strong Communist attack, all mass organizations took their respective positions and put up a last ditch fight and waited for reinforcements from the regular army. Under such a setup, Wang was not only able to maintain his position, but also succeeded in expanding his area from one county to ten counties. Communist guerrillas suffered defeat after

defeat from Wang and they decided to keep away from his territory. Wang's methods could be summarized into the following formula: it was population "purification" plus mass organization, plus political indoctrination, and plus a highly concerted coordination between the regular army, the full-time self-defense units and the universally organized people. It was almost the parallel way of what the Communists had done against the Nationalists behind enemy lines during the war years.¹⁷³

Unfortunately Wang's practice, though attracting some attention in other parts of the country, had not been faithfully adopted by other "pacification" authorities. Before the Communists took over Peking in 1949, they dispatched some 200,000 men to converge upon Wang's forces. National Army was then no longer able to help Wang and his men, who, despite the enemy's superiority, fought bravely and succeeded in breaking through the encirclement and fled to the south. A most remarkable achievement indeed.

Secondly, Communist mass movements returned to large cities after an absence of ten years (1936-46). Labor and student unions were successfully controlled by the Communist underground organ. Their first target was the United States.

¹⁷³The whole story of Wang was reported to the Political Warfare Committee, Department of Political Warfare, Ministry of Defense, by Lt. Gen. Chao Lung-wen, in July 1958. Chao visited Wang's area in 1948 and was deeply impressed. The same story was told by Gen. Yuan Pu who commanded the government troops in helping Wang to build up his area, 1946-47, to the author in 1962.

The station of American troops in China after the war was regarded as a serious threat to the CCP's power struggle. In September 1946, students' organizations under Communist manipulation kicked off "Americans Get Out of China Week." Because the friendship between China and the U. S. was still strong, only a small portion of students were involved. Three months later, the Communist underground "created" the so-called "Shen Shun Incident."¹⁷⁴ They played on the dignity of the Chinese people. This time considerable emotion was aroused. Anti-American demonstrations were held in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, Chungking, Canton, Kuming, and other large cities. The withdrawal of American troops from China was the theme. A month later when U. S. authorities announced that American troops were withdrawing, Anti-U. S. demonstrations stopped at once.

Their second target was, of course, the National Government. With mass organizations now firmly in their hands and operating in an environment of "democratic

¹⁷⁴ Shen Shun was a coed of one of the universities in Peking. In the night of December 24, 1946, it was said she was raped by two U. S. marines in a dark alley. Headlines on Communist newspapers read like this: ANIMAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICANS. The two marines were court-martialled and a trial was held and attended by university presidents and professors. The accused insisted that they did not know she was a coed for she used to come to their club to dance. But when the U. S. promised to withdraw its marines from north China, the case disappeared as suddenly as it appeared. See A Chronology of the CCP Rebellion, op. cit., p. 9.

spirit,"¹⁷⁵ the arm of law became helpless. On December 2, 1946, 5,000 Shanghai peddlers surrounded the city police department and demanded freedom to peddle their goods which meant that they could do their business on any location wherever they wanted to. The police, for the sake of freedom and individual rights, gave in and thus traffic in the largest city of China was considerably blocked. On May 1947, mobs in eleven cities, including the capital city of Nanking, started "rice riots."¹⁷⁶ At the same time, student unions in Shanghai promoted the so-called "anti-civil war," "anti-suppression" and "anti-starvation" marches. Labor unions followed up with strikes. Police were hit with stones, clubs, bottles and everything that the mob could lay their hands on. But the poor police had nothing to defend themselves with, nor were they able to maintain peace and order, because they had been ordered by the higher echelon that they should not

¹⁷⁵"Democratic spirit" as the Chinese took it right after the war meant that people could do anything they wanted to and the government should put no restriction to it. Freedom became license and democracy became anarchy. The police, as the author witnessed in Nanking, could do nothing about demonstrations, strikes, rallies and riots. No tear gas was ever used, not saying anything of firearms. The only thing they could do was to link up their arms in the streets trying to stop the demonstrators. But usually they were outnumbered. Scores of policemen were hospitalized everyday. If they hurt any demonstrators in self-defense, it would be charged as "police brutality"; more demonstrations and riots followed. Universities were unofficially closed for weeks because of mass movements. In a word, the mobs had the full control of the streets.

¹⁷⁶In 1947, inflation got out of hand. Rice, as the main thing on the Chinese diet, was strictly rationed by the government. But the unruly mobs led by the Communist underground started to rob rice stores. It was called "rice riot" by the Communists. See Liao, op. cit., p. 103.

take strict measures against mass movements which were regarded as people's fundamental rights and thus should be protected. In 1947, from summer to fall, mass demonstrations became daily practices. Students had their "sit-ins" in government offices, workers occupied factories and refused to work, even taxi-dancers in Shanghai succeeded in smashing the offices of the Municipal Social Affairs Department.¹⁷⁷

When the First National Assembly was opened in Nanking in 1948, demonstrators paraded in front of the Assembly Hall with a big coffin; and the police could do nothing about it. Communist manipulation and exploitation, low morale on the part of government employees including the police, misinterpretation of democracy and freedom, and dissatisfaction among the people in general owing to unchecked inflation, contributed to the chaotic situation in cities. Intellectuals openly admitted their pro-Communist attitudes. Because the Communist propaganda mechanism had impressed the intellectuals that the CCP would provide a democratic, effective and prosperous government.¹⁷⁸ Neither the government nor the

¹⁷⁷ There were about 2,000 taxi-dance girls in Shanghai, and they were regulated by the Municipal Social Affairs Department. In May 1947, the girls complained about the unjust regulations put up by the Department; as a result, they marched into the Department and smashed everything in the offices. The director of the Department had to escape through a window. The police on the scene, surprised and somewhat frightened, did not do a thing about it. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁸ For the intellectuals' attitude toward the CCP in 1948, see Barnett, op. cit., pp. 40-51.

KMT had been able to counter the chaos with sensible programs. As early as 1947, the CCP in fact had won the battle of the masses in the municipalities.

When the CCP felt sure that its mass movements were successful in government-controlled areas and its military strength in the north was strong enough, its offensive campaigns got underway. In July 1947, the CCP high command announced the establishment of five field army groups: the northeast, the northwest, northern China, central China and eastern China. September 12, the order of "General Counter-Offensive" was declared. The civil war was formally started by the CCP. This was what Mao called the third phase of guerrilla warfare. The following is a list of important military campaigns from October 1947 to December 1948.

October 8, 1947, Chen Yi's forces in Shangtung attacked Weihai-wei, an important navy base on the Shangtung peninsula. On the same day, Communist forces attacked the southernmost seaport of Manchuria, Yingkow.

November 12, 1947, Nieh Tseng-yun's forces occupied Shihkai-chang, the capital of Hopei province; Mao later made his headquarters there.

December 15, 1947, Lin Piao kicked off "winter campaign" in Manchuria, fierce battles developed all over the three Northeast Provinces.

February 19, 1948, Lin's forces occupied Yingkow, a seaport, and Anshan, a steel town in southern Liaoning, Manchuria.

March 4, 1948, Lin's forces took Szepinghai, an important railroad juncture in central Manchuria.

March 9, 1948, Lin's forces drove government forces out of Kirin, the capital city of Kirin province in Manchuria.

March 14, 1948, Communist army took over Loyang, a strategic town in Honan province, central China.

April 4, 1948, Lin's forces beseiged Chan Chun, the capital city of Manchuria.

April 22, 1948, the Communists recovered Yen-an from Nationalist troops.

May 8, 1948, Chen Yi's forces took Wei Hsien, another important seaport in Changtung.

May 13, 1948, Communists armies surrounded Sanhaikuan and Chinchow, two most strategic points between Manchuria and Hopei province.

June 12, 1948, Chen Yi and Liu Pai-ch'en's force attacked Kaifeng, the capital city of Honan province and was repulsed.

September 24, Chen Yi captured Chinan, the capital city of Shangtung.

October 10, Chen's forces took Yentai, another naval base in Shangtung.

October 15, 1948, Lin's force marched into Chinchow after two-month heavy battle.

October 19, 1948, Lin's forces finally captured Chan Chun after six-month seige.

October 24, 1948, the forces of Lin took Kaifeng.

October 28, 1948, the campaign of Liaoning was started. Shenyang (Mukden) lost to the Communist. Manchuria was almost entirely in Communist hands.

November, 1948, the CCP high command innovated its armies; Peng Teh-huai was appointed as the commander of the First Field Army Group in charge of the northwest, Liu Pai-ch'en, the commander of the Second Field Army Group, in charge of Honan-Anhwei area, Chen Yi, the commander of the Third Field Army Group, in charge of Shangtung-Kiangsu area, and Lin Piao, the commander of the Fourth Field Army Group, in charge of the Northeast Provinces.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ For important campaigns during the period of civil war, see A Chronology of the CCP Rebellion, op. cit., pp. 11-13, and Chen, op. cit., pp. 441-509.

In the summer of 1948, Chiang planned a showdown with the Communist forces which were pressing southward steadily from Manchuria. The place chosen for the decisive battle was Hsuchow, a traditional strategic town in northern Kiangsu just south of the Shangtung border. The National Government still had half a million of highly mechanized troops. Since Hsuchow was in the middle of the North China Plain where in the winter, the land was dry and hard, it was therefore ideal for motorized armies with heavy weapons to operate. The Communists were also aware that Chiang could never be defeated without a decisive battle; so they were also preparing for it feverishly.

In November, Chiang mustered more than 400,000 men in Hsuchow area and appointed one of his old lieutenants, General Liu Chi as the supreme commander in the field. The Communists encountered with some 700,000 men and "single-eyed dragon" General Liu Pai-chen took over the command. The latter enjoyed superiority in number but inferiority in fire power. The conflict started on November 21 to the east of Hsuchow. One of the Nationalist army groups was surrounded by Chan Yi's superior forces at Yenchan. Within one week, the army group was perished. With the loss of its east wing, the Nationalists were compelled to leave Hsuchow and seek battle in its southwest vicinities close to Ponpu. So the campaign was called Hsuchow-Ponpu Campaign. Fierce battles raged from November 25 to the end of that year. Supported by

some 2,000,000 guerrillas, the 700,000 Red regulars in the field were always refreshed and tireless; in the middle of December they surrounded the Nationalists troops in an area about five miles in diameter. Deep dikes were dug around the besieged area, thus the tanks of the Nationalists lost their momentum; the supply lines of the Nationalists were also cut. Desperately, Chiang tried air-drops, but it snowed for ten straight days and airplanes were grounded. In the meantime, "human sea" tactics were put into full operation by the Communists. Government forces, cold, hungry, and without reinforcement, were sharply cut down in number. But they refused to surrender. Attempts of breaking out of the encirclement were discouraged by superior Communist forces. When the new year arrived, weather cleared up, more than one hundred warplanes were sent to the battleground everyday to help the Nationalist troops, but they were too weak to do anything, constructively. Yet the Communists were reinforced from Manchuria and other northern provinces. The final assault against the Nationalists was launched on January 6, 1949; heavy artillery bombardments coupled with human sea attacks. The next day, the Nationalist defense line was broken, and the fighting developed into hand combat. It lasted for three days. On January 10, 1949, the Hsuehchow-Ponpu campaign was over. Chiang's losses were over 300,000 men, with most of his capable generals captured or killed, and those were the elite of his troops. Mao won the most

decisive battle in his guerrilla movement. His time of victory was approaching.¹⁸⁰

Road to Victory

Chiang's terrific defeat in the Hsuchow-Ponpu campaign left him in a helpless state. There was nothing in his hands that could stop the advance of Mao's victorious armies. If the Nationalists could rally after him as a united whole, Chiang probably still had a slim chance to make a last stand somewhere in southern or southwestern China, because to the south of the mighty Yangtze River more than a dozen provinces and about half of the nations' population were still in the hands of the National Government. But the impact of Communist military victories during the previous year had deeply worsened the political, economic, and social conditions of the government.

Politically, right after his defeat in Hsuchow-Ponpu areas, internal power struggle developed right away between Chiang and his Vice-President Li Tsung-jen. Li had not forgiven Chiang's support to Sun, the rival vice-presidential candidate, one year ago. Since Chiang had lost all of his crack troops and Li still had some 300,000 combat-ready soldiers in central and southern China, Li's hands were

¹⁸⁰The details of the Hsuchow-Ponpu campaign, see Ministry of Defense, History Bureau, The Hsuchow-Ponpu Campaign (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: History Bureau, Ministry of Defense, 1952), pp. 1-23, also see Chen, op. cit., pp. 510-43. The CCP called it "Huai-Hai Campaign," see Liao, op. cit., pp. 147-48.

certainly much stronger. The CCP, well aware of the existing contradictions between Chiang and Li, sounded out the opinion that there should be no "peace" as long as Chiang was in power. That suited Li's personal taste to a "T." With pressure from inside of the National Government and the KMT, Chiang announced his resignation on January 29, 1949, the third one in his long career. Li was made Acting President of the government. Now the stronger KMT leader was gone; Li, a man with much less prestige and following, could not hold the disintegrating KMT together at such a critical moment. His 300,000 men were no opponent to Mao's 3,000,000 at all. Thus Li was in no position to talk either war or peace with the Communists.¹⁸¹

Economically, in 1948 the National Government, aiming at the check of inflation, abolished the 15-year old fa-pei and issued a new currency called kin-yuan-chuan (the gold dollar note), on August 29. A very strict economic control was exercised to eliminate the black market and for the even distribution of food and clothing. But since industrial production was paralyzed by strikes and the lack of raw materials, and military defeats followed one after another, people lost their faith in the government. At first rice, meat, and other merchandises, which were needed daily, simply disappeared from open market. A panic was created in large

¹⁸¹ About Chiang's resignation and Li's takeover, see Chen, op. cit., pp. 569-73.

cities. Within a few months kin-yuan-chuan was devalued much worse than the old fa-pei ever did. On August 31, 1948, only 296,800,000 k.y.c. dollars were issued; the exchange ration between U. S. dollars and the k. y. c. was 1:4; on April 25, 1949, 2,037,105,700,000 k. y. c. dollars were issued, the exchange rate dropped to 1:813,880, an increase of 200,000 times within about six months.¹⁸² The k. y. c. dollars almost became useless in May.¹⁸³ It was a financial collapse. The cost of living was of course skyrocketed. For instance, the price of rice increased 47,069 times from September 1945 to May 1949; in the same period the general price index jumped 35,036 times.¹⁸⁴ Certainly no salary-owners could make a living with his pay checks. The effects of economic collapse were devastating.

Socially, the organized masses were all in the hands of the CCP. Those who disliked the Communists were longing for a change, because under economic collapse it seemed nothing could be worse. Of course, the CCP kept steady promises that when they came to power everything would be

¹⁸²Source: The Research Institute of the Central Bank of China.

¹⁸³The author had the hair-raising experience in Canton, May 1949; with two months pay in my pocket, an amount of 36,000,000 k.y.c. dollars, it was not enough to pay for the breakfast for my wife and myself.

¹⁸⁴See Shanghai Social Science Academy, Economics Institute, The Collection of Price Data before and after the Liberation of Shanghai (in Chinese; Shanghai: People's Press, 1958), p. 32.

all right. An illusion was created in the minds of the people. After Chiang's resignation, there was not an iota of hope for the National Government. Frustration and helplessness prevailed.¹⁸⁵

Under such circumstances, Communist armies advanced after Chiang's abdication were like a hot knife cutting into a piece of butter. Indeed, there was no resistance at all. From January 31 to May 22, Mao's troops, with their guerrillas as spearheads, took over Peking, Sian, Hsinyang, Wuhan, Nanchang and many other cities in northern and central China without any opposition. Garrisons either surrendered to the Reds or fled in advance. Even when Mao's army attacked the national capital, Nanking, Li, the Acting President, failed to make a gesture of resistance.¹⁸⁶

Early in 1949, the CCP had already proposed eight conditions for "peace."¹⁸⁷ The KMT and other non-Communist

¹⁸⁵ See chapter 9, "Collapse of Public Morale," Barnett, op. cit., pp. 96-99.

¹⁸⁶ Nanking failed on April 24, 1949 without a fight; the author was one of those who took the last train and fled on the eve of its fall.

¹⁸⁷ The eight conditions for peace proposed by Mao were: (1) punish war criminals; (2) abrogate the bogus constitution (which had been passed by the National Assembly at Nanking at Christmas time, 1946, without the participation of the CCP); (3) abolish the pretended legitimacy of the (KMT) power (this meant that the KMT was no longer to be considered the legitimate holder of political power); (4) reform all reactionary armies in accordance with democratic principles (this meant to reform according to Communist principles); (5) confiscate bureaucratic capital; (6) reform the agrarian system; (7) abrogate treaties of national betrayal;

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groups in the government regarded them as "unconditional surrender." A five-man peace delegation was sent to Mao's headquarters, first in Shihkaichang, and later in Peking. Since the Red Army was advancing rapidly, Mao never budged from his proposals. After the fall of Nanking, even the peace delegation surrendered to Mao. Chiang, acting on the capacity as Director General of the KMT, tried to line up his followers to make a last stand in central, southern, and southwestern China. He flew from Shanghai to Canton, and Chungking, Chengtu. But nowhere could he find any solid support except Shanghai where his comrades put up one week of bitter fighting against the Red Army and were defeated. Mao got that big seaport on May 24, 1949. Before the end of September, the Communist "Liberation Army" with guerrilla bands as spearheads had conquered almost all of Mainland China, except some far-flung provinces and off-shore islands. The Acting President Li fled to the United States in August. The National Government was thus without a chief of state. Chiang, after a fruitless trip to Chungking in September, went to Taiwan and vowed to make that island the last bastion in his anti-Communist struggle. On the side of the Communists, Mao made Peking the national capital. On October 1, 1949, the "Chinese People's Republic" was proclaimed with

(8) convoke a political consultative conference without the participation of reactionary elements, establish a democratic coalition government, take over all power from the Nanking KMT reactionary government and its lower levels of government. See Brandt, et al., op. cit., p. 440.

Mao as its Chairman. A new political order was established. The 22-year old guerrilla struggle led by Mao was won.

Stage IV: 1950 to 1965: Anti-Communist
Guerrilla Warfare

While the National Government was undergoing a series of evacuations in 1949, first from Nanking to Canton, then to Chungking, and finally to Taipei, Taiwan, it was very unstable. Since August there had been no chief of state thus no Commander-in-Chief. The cabinet was headed by Yen Hsi-san, the long-term governor of Shansi, who was defeated by the Communists in his home base that spring. Chiang had no official position. Most people inside and outside of China figured that the National Government was close to the end of the rope. Nothing was more wrong than such an evaluation. On October 25, five days after the inauguration of the "People's Republic," 15,000 Communist troops invaded the off-shore island, Kinmen (Quomoy). Miraculously, Nationalists garrisons on that tiny island thoroughly defeated the attackers, with 8,000 of them killed and 6,000 captured.¹⁸⁸ Government soldiers found out that they still could fight and win. Morale suddenly shot sky-high. Because of that victory Taiwan was at least temporarily immune from Communist assault.

¹⁸⁸For the battle of Kinmen, see A Chronology of the CCP Rebellion, op. cit., p. 15.

From the summer of 1948, Chen Chen was appointed as the governor of Taiwan. As an experienced fighter against Communists,¹⁸⁹ Chen Chen now proved that he was also a capable administrator. Within half a year he stopped inflation by the issue of a sound new currency, the New Taiwan dollar, on that island. March 1, 1950, Chiang resumed his office as the President of the Republic after the insistence of the National Assembly and the KMT. Chen was immediately made Prime Minister. Politically as well as economically, Taiwan was relatively well stabilized. May 26, the Korean War erupted. President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosan Strait, thus Taiwan was safe militarily. Chiang now had a chance to keep his promise that he was to build up the island as an anti-Communist bastion. He lost no time getting into operation. Because Chiang learned from his intelligence channels that anti-Communist guerrilla activities were spreading all over Mainland China, a "Mainland Service Bureau" was established under the Ministry of Defense, with a veteran Communist-fighter, General Chen Kai-min as the Director.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹Chen started to fight the CCP in 1927, served as the commander of the fourth encirclement and annihilation campaign in Kiangsi, see footnote 60 of this chapter.

¹⁹⁰General Chen Kai-min was a long time friend and comrade-at-arms of Tai Ti, the talented intelligence master. After Tai's death in 1946 (in a plane accident), Chen took over his job; he was highly respected by his colleagues. Chen died of cancer a few years ago in Taiwan.

Uncoordinated Guerrilla Uprising

Indeed there were anti-Communist guerrilla uprisings on the China Mainland from 1940 to 1952. Mao's sweeping victories in 1949 caught non-Communists and anti-Communists in surprise. When Mao's regime was first formed, there were illusions that the CCP would certainly keep its promise to build up a democratic and free country. But Mao's answer was "people's democratic dictatorship"¹⁹¹ which literally meant that the CCP was the absolute master. Furthermore, on June 6, 1950, Mao kicked off the Land Reform Movement which started the redistribution of land all over the country.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹The "People's Democratic Dictatorship," commented Brandt, et al., "During the Yen-an period, Mao Tse-tung use of the phrase . . . was heavily weighted on the side of its 'democratic' aspect. . . . Now, however, . . . the weight has definitely shifted to the side of 'dictatorship'--to a definite emphasis on a single, uniform policy. The dictatorship is, to be sure, presumably a dictatorship of four classes, all of which are represented in the new government by a variety of political groups.

"How, then, does the new regime meet the problem raised above; that is, the problem of maintaining a dictatorship based on a coalition? The answer is simple. It is merely asserted that the 'People's Democratic Dictatorship' must have 'the leadership of the working class' (by 'the working class' is meant, of course the CCP). See Brandt, et al., op. cit., p. 447.

¹⁹²A detailed study of the CCP Land Reform Movement was done by Chow Ching-wen, a well-known writer and scholar and former president of Northeastern University in Manchuria. Before he escaped to Hong Kong in 1957, Chow had served for eight years in high-ranking positions in the CCP and in the People's Government. He was an eyewitness of the feared and hated land reform program in Communist China. For the whole story, see Chow, op. cit., pp. 95-106. Chow estimated that more than 2,000,000 people were liquidated in that movement.

Landowners and local influential people were executed in "public tribunals" just as he had done in the so-called "traitors" in his Yen-an days. The movement was aimed at the elimination of existing local leadership so that it would be easier for the Communists to take over. Disillusion and panic swept over the land. Guerrilla resistance started at once. As Mao reported to his Party in that summer:

The KMT reactionaries adopted bandit-like guerrilla warfare in various parts of the mainland. They instigated the backward persons in the attempt to strive against the people's government. They assigned secret agents and espionage to spread rumors in the masses for the purpose of destroying the prestige of our government. . . . They sabotaged people's economic activities, assassinated government workers, and collected intelligence for the KMT and the imperialists.¹⁹³

Mao admitted in the same report that from April 1949 to May 1950, the "Liberation Army" had fought against some 1,500,000 anti-Communist guerrilla forces.¹⁹⁴

The outbreak of the Korean War greatly encouraged the anti-CCP guerrillas who felt that the Communists would be defeated by the United States, and Chiang might return to the mainland. As a top Communist leader said: "In some places, (those reactionaries) organized anti-revolution (anti-Communist) underground armies, and got ready to revolt."

¹⁹³ Mao's report to the CCP Central Committee on June 6, 1950, as recorded in Hsin Hwa Monthly, No. 3, Vol. 2; July 1950.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., said Mao: "We defeated 980,000 bandit-guerrillas, and there are still some 400,000 of them to be liquidated."

In some places, the whole family of the village cadre was killed. . . . In Kwangsi province alone more than 3,000 government officials perished."¹⁹⁵ From Manchuria where Korea was to its eastern border, to Kwangtung where Hong Kong was in its reach, mass uprisings spread like prairie fires.¹⁹⁶ It was a terrific shock to the Communists. As a result, the "Anti-Revolutionary Punitive Code" was promulgated.¹⁹⁷ With their party organization effective and the Red Army powerful, Mao was quite successful in the repression of the widespread guerrilla uprisings. The following table shows how many people were involved in the anti-Communist guerrilla struggle in the first year of Mao's regime.

In the cities there were clandestine resistance activities, too. According to statistics issued by Communist sources, within the first few months of the CCP rule, some 28,000 persons were arrested for anti-government activities,

¹⁹⁵ Peng Chen's report "On the Suppression of Anti-Revolutionaries and the Anti-Revolutionary Punitive Code," February 20, 1951, as in a pamphlet named Decisively Repressing Anti-Revolutionary Activities (in Chinese; Peking: People's Press, 1951), p. 14. Peng is now the mayor of Peking, and a top member of the CCP hierarchy.

¹⁹⁶ See The Northeast Daily, November 25, 1950, and the Hsin Hwa Monthly, No. 6, Vol. 2, October 1950, p. 1,231.

¹⁹⁷ The Code was promulgated on February 22, 1951, heavy punishments were meted out to anti-Communist elements in accordance with the Code.

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1,176 underground radio stations were uncovered, and 20,000 firearms were confiscated.¹⁹⁸

Table 7. Anti-Communist guerrilla forces eliminated by the Red Army.*

Place	Number of Guerrillas Killed	Time of Data Issued
East China	137,000	October 1950 (a)
South-Central	611,000	same (b)
Southwest	400,000	same (c)
Northwest	58,000	same (d)
Inter-Mongolia	1,300	same (e)
Total	1,207,300	

*Sources of the figures in the table are:

(a) Yao Su-shih's report "A Summary of the First Year in East China," Hsin Hwa Monthly, October 1950. Yao was the First Secretary of East China Bureau, CCP, at that time, but was later liquidated by Mao for his "anti-party activities."

(b) Ibid., Teng Tze-hui, "A Review of the First Year in the South-Central."

(c) Ibid., Teng Shao-pin, "The First Year of Our Government in the Southwest."

(d) Ibid., Peng Teh-huai, "One Year Work in the New Northwest."

(e) Ibid., Ulanfu, "One Year Reconstruction Work in Inter-Mongolia."

¹⁹⁸The data were incomplete. They were collected by Ju Kung-yun in his book, Anti-Communist Tyranny Mass Movements on China Mainland (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Chen Chung Books, 1957), pp. 31-32.

Why these nationwide anti-Communist guerrilla uprisings in which more than a million people had participated ended in a complete failure? First of all, the counter-guerrilla measures taken by the Communists. Their basic guiding principles were: (1) concerted actions of military operations and political maneuverings; (2) concerted actions of politico-military strength and mass movements; and (3) concerted actions of suppression and persuasion.¹⁹⁹ In the military and suppressive side, they used much superior forces to deal with the ill-equipped guerrillas. After the guerrillas were defeated and dispersed, the Red Army also dispersed its forces and tirelessly pursued their preys until the latter were completely crushed. In the political and persuasive side, the land reform program had a two-edged effect, it did help to stir up guerrilla resistance, however, it also helped to dampen the movement. After land was redistributed, original local leadership was thus liquidated, peasants well-organized, and militia was formed. With Communist cadres serving as its leaders. people's organizations and the militia were very effective in assisting the Red Army to mop up the guerrillas. In cities as well as in rural areas, mass meetings were held, Communist policies were explained, guerrilla leaders were executed, but pardons were given to some guerrilla fighters. Most important of all, Communist appeal was still quite strong in the first few

¹⁹⁹ Hsin Hwa Monthly, op. cit., see the article by Ten Tze-hui, "A Review of the First Year in the South-Central."

years of the regime. Under such circumstances, the guerrilla resistance, though widespread, had little chance of succeeding.

In the meantime, there were inherent weaknesses in the guerrilla movement. The uprisings were caused by disaffection for Communist dictatorial practices, fear and hatred evoked by the forthcoming land reform, and the opportunistic intention of the KMT to re-establish its rule through the defeat of the CCP in Korea. Most guerrillas were composed of landowners, former National Government employees and soldiers, and discontented intellectuals and bourgeoisie. Their mass basis was poor and political appeal was weak. In addition, the National Government in Taiwan was not fully recovered, thus the assistance it provided to the guerrillas was very limited despite the establishment of the Mainland Service Bureau. There was no nationwide leadership and little coordination among the anti-Communist guerrillas. So when the Korean War ended in a stalemate, even the dimmest hope of winning was gone. The first phase of anti-Communist guerrilla struggle ended in disaster.

Clandestine Sabotage Activities

From 1950 to 1953, the National Government in Taiwan marked a period of reorganization and reform. Both the

government and the KMT were completely renovated.²⁰⁰ Real universal suffrage was put into practice.²⁰¹ A land reform program which gave the land to the tillers scored a complete success without bloodshed.²⁰² The beaten army was gradually rebuilt with the help of newly arrived American advisers. When U. S. economic aid started to pour in, the first Four-Year Plan of reconstruction was put into practice in 1953. Chiang made two pledges to the Chinese people at home and abroad: the recovery of the Chinese Mainland from the Communists and the reconstruction of Taiwan as a model of the

²⁰⁰ When Chen Chen took over the cabinet, he sharply cut down the number of ministries (only eight were left) and government employees (a mere 5% of the mainland days). Clique politics were barred from the government, and younger men were appointed to offices. The KMT had a re-registration program. Corrupt and deviant members were purged from the party. Party functionaries were put into new hands--hands younger and clean of clique affiliation.

²⁰¹ Self-rule at local government level was practiced in 1950. From that year onward, all mayors, magistrates, councilmen, district administrators, district representatives, and village heads were elected by the people through secret ballot. A provincial assembly was set up in 1951, all legislators were elected. See National War College, A Fifty-Year History of the Republic of China (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: National War College, 1962), pp. 174-76.

²⁰² In 1949, the Provincial Government of Taiwan cut down the rental of land to 37.5% of its total harvest. In 1953 the Law of Tiller's Ownership of the Land was promulgated and enforced. 84.7% of the farmers owned their land. There were no public tribunals and no bloodshed. For the details of the land reform program see ibid., pp. 119-21.

ideals of the Three People's Principles.²⁰³ Because of significant improvements made by the National Government, almost ten thousand Communist agents surrendered or were rounded up in Taiwan; the danger of Communist subversion was eliminated. On the other hand, accompanying with its growing strength, the Government sent its agents into the Mainland systematically to build up underground resistance against Communist rule. The National Security Department was established under the President's Office. Taking over the job from the Mainland Service Bureau, it coordinated all underground activities, including guerrilla warfare, on the Mainland.

1953 was also a good year for the People's Republic. An armistice was signed in Korea. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements started in 1952 were satisfactorily concluded.²⁰⁴ After war and purges people sighed with relief

²⁰³The reconstruction of Taiwan as the model of the Three People's Principle's ideals meant that there should be a democratic and efficient government, a prosperous yet evenly distributed economy and a nationalistic culture as Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic, outlined in his writing--the Three People's Principles.

²⁰⁴The Three-"Anti" included, anti-waste, anti-corruption and anti-bureaucratism, and the Five-Anti included, anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-theft of government property, anti-fraud and anti-theft of economic state secrets. As an eyewitness put it: "the Three-Anti Movement (was) to punish and re-educate offender (gov't employees). As it turned out, those who were corrupt, but loyal to Mao, escaped with only their money confiscated and light punishment, while those who were found to be wavering in their support of Mao were killed." The Five-Anti Movement "was aimed directly at industrialists and businessmen." But "the five evils covered by the movement were so broad that they

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and relaxation. Furthermore, open military uprisings were successfully suppressed. The First Five-Year Plan for reconstruction was adopted. Under such circumstances, guerrilla warfare was impossible. Anti-Communist elements and agents from Taiwan were limited to clandestine organizational and sabotage activities. The following is a list of their operations from 1953 to 1956:

- (1) "At present time, there are a few bandit remnants operating in the country, conducting sabotage activities which occurred mainly in factories."²⁰⁵ Chu Teh made this casual remark in 1953. Indeed that year marked the lowest ebb of anti-Communist operations on the mainland.
- (2) In 1954, a total of 619 espionage cases were reported in eight provinces and one city. 83 anti-Communist organizations were broken down and 1,074 agents were arrested.²⁰⁶ From January 1954 to March 1955, 255,091 sabotage cases were handled by the People's Courts.²⁰⁷
- (3) In 1955, there were no nationwide statistics reported. However, in different localities, sabotage cases were increasing. For instance, Shanghai had a 4.8% increase over the previous

might have encompassed anything. . . . The result was that after the movement was over, private business and industry was almost entirely ruined." See Chow, op. cit., pp. 125, 131. Thus the movements were really purges inside and outside of the government. A strict discipline was built up.

²⁰⁵Chu's statement was recorded by the Jen Min Yu Pao (People's Daily), Peking, August 11, 1953. And scattered sabotage activities on the mainland were reported by Central Daily News, Taipei, Taiwan, June 2, 1955.

²⁰⁶The statistics were in the report of Lo Hui-chin, Minister of Public Security (police) of the People's Government, to the Second National People's Congress held in July 1955, as recorded in the Hong Kong Times, July 27, 1955.

²⁰⁷The People's Daily, July 3, 1955.

year, Kweichow province, a 13% increase. Anti-Communist activities became more sophisticated. As Lo, the CCP police chief put it: "(they) wore the uniform of our government workers and joined the Communist Youth Corps; they covered themselves with Marx-Leninism and conducted subversive activities."²⁰⁸

- (4) In 1956, a new surge of anti-Communist activities emerged. In Manchuria 26,262 cases were handled by authorities. Unrest was also reported in the Northwest, Wuhan, Shanghai, Kwangtung and Kwangsi.²⁰⁹

KMT authorities reported that the number of their agents sent to the mainland was increasing year after year since 1953.²¹⁰ They were able to establish underground anti-Communist organizations with the assistance of various strata of the community.²¹¹ Even some Communist government

²⁰⁸ According to Shih Liang, the CCP Attorney General, who made the report on anti-Communist sabotage cases in the first half of 1955 to the Second National People's Congress in July 1955. Lo's quotation was in People's Daily, June 30, 1955.

²⁰⁹ The reports were quite fragmentary. In Manchuria 2,040 cases were reported; in the Northwest only 16 important cases were made public; in Shanghai and Kwangtung more KMT agents were arrested, and their firearms seized; in Kwangsi, anti-Communists elements appeared in schools. See Shenyang Daily News, December 27, 1956, China Youth News, Peking, February 27, 1956, Yangtze Daily News, Wuhan, January 13, 1957, Southern Daily News, Canton, December 12, 1956, and Kwangsi Daily News, Wuchow, June 30, 1956.

²¹⁰ See Ju, op. cit., pp. 62-64. It increased from 26 in 1953 to over 200 in 1955.

²¹¹ There were many secret political parties formed against the Communists and for the KMT cause in these years. Those which had been discovered by the CCP were: the Chinese Democratic Party (see Sinkiang Daily News, Tihwa, August 8, 1955), Chinese New Society Revolutionary Party (see New Hunan News, Changsha, May 15, 1954), the Progressive Party (see the Liberation Daily, Shanghai, August 5, 1955), the Chinese United Party (see Hong Kong Times, September 7, 1955),

officials and Communist cadres became sympathetic.²¹² A new anti-Communist movement was in the making.

The background for the new surge of anti-Communist activities consisted of the following conditions: (1) the creation of cooperatives in October 1955 which immediately became "high cooperatives" in June 1956. Under cooperatives, and the high cooperatives especially, farmers who got their land from the CCP under the Land Reform Movement could no longer use and control it at will. Instead, all of them had to join the cooperatives. According to the Communists, the participation was 'voluntary', but those who refused to join would lose their privilege to get seeds, fertilizers, and animal power. As a result, every farmer joined the cooperatives. The cooperatives were controlled by the Party and all products were put into public storages. Farmers were paid in accordance with their respective "ability" to produce. Thus the farmers owned their land only in name; in

Chinese Civil Administration Party (see People's Daily, December 8, 1954), Chinese Mainland National Salvation Party (see the Amoy Daily, January 8, 1957), and the Labor Party (see the Amoy Daily, January 8, 1957).

²¹² Some local CCP government officials and party functionaries were discovered engaging in anti-Communist activities; most of them were in the lower echelon. Those cases were recorded in both Communist and Nationalist newspapers. See the Liberation Daily, Shanghai, August 16, 1956, and the Central Daily News, Taipei, Taiwan, November 30, 1945.

reality, they were working for the cooperatives.²¹³ Naturally many farmers were disappointed and grumblings started. (2) In 1954, all stores entered "public-private partnership"; in 1955, no private stores existed on the China Mainland. Businessmen, big and small, lost their holdings to the state.²¹⁴ Merchants were certainly not happy. (3) The de-Stalinization in Russia. Those who were filled up with Mao's personal cult felt their chance had come. (4) The Hungarian Revolution in October 1956 made intellectuals restless. (5) The hatred toward the CCP dictatorship had been on the increase since 1949; minor political parties which had helped and collaborated with the CCP before the latter came

²¹³ Important documents for the cooperatives on farm include: "On the Farm Cooperativization Problem," a speech delivered by Mao Tse-tung on July 31, 1955, "A Resolution on Farm Cooperativization," passed by the Central Committee of the CCP on October 11, 1955, and "Model Code of Farm Cooperatives," passed by the Standing Committee of National People's Congress on November 9, 1955. "The Model Code for Higher Agricultural Productive Cooperatives" was promulgated by Mao on June 30, 1956. Farmers were highly organized and controlled.

²¹⁴ The Nationalization of stores started in the fall of 1954. The state invested at least 51% of the capital in every store, thus each store was owned by the state. In practice, the state invested no capital except in the form of merchandise. Because all industries' import and export were under the control of the state, those who refused to join would lose their supply of merchandise; as a result, all store keepers "welcomed" state capital and "voluntarily" joined "public-private ownership." The whole process was completed in August 1955. See National War College, A Textbook on the Study of the Enemy (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: National War College Press, 1962), pp. 522-23.

to power were highly disillusioned.²¹⁵ (6) The viability of the National Government in Taiwan and the agents it sent to the mainland.²¹⁶ With frustration and planned instigation, a thunderstorm was approaching the CCP political horizon.

From "Bloom and Content" to
Guerrilla Fighting

The storm hit the CCP in the spring of 1957. Prior to that Mao had spoken of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought content" in 1956. At that time, the CCP launched a Rectification (purification) Campaign in their own party and asked the people and the minor parties to criticize the attitude and behavior of high and middleclass cadres in the Party and government organizations to offer suggestions. Since the CCP had purged thousands of intellectuals in its "Opposition Liquidation Movement" from

²¹⁵The minor political parties were those that joined the Democratic League which helped the CCP to struggle against the KMT in the post-war period. Though Mao gave some cabinet posts to the leaders of those parties, no party other than the CCP was allowed to recruit new members. In addition, those cabinet members really had nothing to say in decision-making, because all decisions were made by the CCP. They were nothing more than figure heads. At times, these parties were instructed to follow the leadership of the CCP. So their discontent was evident. See Ju Kung-yun and Hung Nei-kwang, An Analysis of the Psychology of the People on the Mainland (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Central Committee of the KMT, 1960), pp. 187-93.

²¹⁶Top CCP member Lu Tin-I spoke to the Third National Assembly of the New Democracy Youth Corps with the following words: "The existence of Taiwan, the activities of anti-Communist elements, the stability of farm cooperatives, and the indestructable bourgeois mind are seriously threatening our government." As recorded in Kwang Ming News, Peking, May 23, 1957. It showed that the Communists felt the pressure from the National Government.

1954 to 1955,²¹⁷ nobody was willing to take the risk of criticizing. But in the winter of 1956, Mao invited a party of high-ranking officials and leaders of the minor parties for a meeting. He declared: "I know that there is friction between Party and non-Party members, and in all the Party organizations as well. I hope that everybody will express his opinions openly. It's no crime to talk, and nobody will be punished for it." Then he promised: "We must let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend, and see which flowers are the best blooms and the best thoughts."²¹⁸ His personal invitation ignited the expulsion. Severe criticisms against the CCP started in early spring of 1957 and continued to summer. Professors, students, workers, merchants, writers, editors, artists, soldiers, high and low-ranking government employees, members of minor parties, and finally that grass-roots of the CCP itself attacked the evil of Communism and the Communist regime. As an observer put it, "During the Bloom and Contend period, the Chinese people in every walk of life and every race, including members

²¹⁷In the "Opposition Liquidation Movement," in Shanghai alone, intellectuals who were adversely criticized by the CCP numbered 36,000, politically scrutinized 24,000, and 2,800 were regarded as "fully proved to have engaged in serious criminal actions" thus were "suppressed" by the authorities. See Liu Shui-chou's (a member of the Political Consultation Council of Shanghai) written report to the Shanghai Political Consultation Council, as in the People's Daily, Peking, March 23, 1957.

²¹⁸See Chow's personal recollection of the meeting which he attended. Chow, op. cit., pp. 162-63.

of the CCP and armed forces, were shown to be against the CCP."²¹⁹ In June, criticisms and protests developed into rallies, demonstrations, riots, and strikes. Some intellectuals spoke to the masses in such strong terms as "Killing the Communists and overthrowing the CCP cannot be regarded as non-patriotic."²²⁰ Anti-Communist activities were close to the stage of an open revolt. Frightened, the CCP leadership started its counterattack at once. With the powerful party apparatus and its army, police, secret agents, coupled with mass communication media which was its monopoly, an Anti-Rightists Movement was launched. Tens of thousands of people, including students and teachers who had criticized the CCP bitterly were termed Rightists and sent to "labor reform camps." Thousands of them died there.²²¹ Minor party leaders, notably Tseng Chao-lun, Lo Lung-ge, Chang Nei-chi who held cabinet posts were purged.²²² The opposition was suppressed with coercion, but the seed of anti-Communism was planted deeply in the hearts of Chinese people. After eight years of rigid rule, the Bloom and Contend Movement told the

²¹⁹ Ibid., p. 166. The scope of anti-Communist movement during the One Hundred Flower Bloom and One Hundred Thoughts Contend period see Ju, op. cit., pp. 136-44.

²²⁰ Ju, loc. cit., p. 152.

²²¹ See Li Li-hen, New Slave Society on China Mainland (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: International Relations Institute, 1961), pp. 120-22. There are other evidences; quite a few friends and relatives of the author were sent to labor reform camps because of their criticism of the CCP, some of them died in these camps.

²²² Ibid.

CCP that there were many enemies to its regime on Mainland China. The Nationalists had successfully exploited the situation.

The Bloom and Contend Movement hit not only the CCP hard in cities, its chain reactions created guerrilla activities in rural areas. According to the Communists, in July and August of 1957, seventeen guerrilla bands were located in nine different provinces, at least four of them were led by KMT agents.²²³ It was the first time that guerrillas emerged in Communist territory since 1953. And this time a few of them were led by elements from Taiwan. The guerrillas operated on much smaller scale but were not as uncoordinated as they were in earlier days.

To prevent the spread of an organized guerrilla struggle Mao established the People's Commune in 1958. Formally, as the CCP declared, the Commune system was a short cut to Communism.²²⁴ Land was nationalized and farmers

²²³ See Ju, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-83. The units led by KMT elements were: (1) the Pai Yun Mt. column of the Southeast People's Anti-Communist National Salvation Army operated in Fukien province, (2) the Shensi guerrilla column of the KMT operated in Shensi province, (3) the 14th column of the National Revolutionary Army operated in Kwangtung province, and (4) the Kwangsi group of the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army operated in Kwangsi province.

²²⁴ As it was stated in the "Resolution on the Establishment of the People's Commune in the Countryside," promulgated by the CCP in August 1958. It was aimed toward the achievement of the goal of Communism "from each according to ability, and to each according to needs." For the details of the commune system see Enemy Research Institute, National War College, An Analysis of the People's Commune under the CCP (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: National War College Press, 1960), pp. 1-23.

no longer owned the land even in name. But in the eyes of anti-Communist guerrilla fighters the system was indeed an effective measure to curb their activities. Because farmers were organized into labor bands under village cadres' leadership and ruled with rigid discipline. The whole country became a mammoth military camp. Isolated villages in remote areas were torn down. Farmers were required to live together in bigger villages. Women were also organized into work teams. Children were sent to nurseries which were in the hands of old ladies. The age-old family system of China was breaking to pieces. Furthermore, public mess halls were established. People had no food in their homes and not even cooking utensils and knives which were made of iron; they had contributed these "voluntarily" to make steel in backyard furnaces.²²⁵ Under such a system, it was virtually impossible for guerrillas to operate, because they could not

²²⁵The backyard furnaces were built on the Great Leap Forward program under the slogan to "overtake England within 15 years." A majority part of China does not have any iron ore. In order to keep the furnaces going, local residents were asked to donate anything which was made of iron in their homes. Since public mess halls were in operation, cooking utensils and cutting knives became unnecessary. "Voluntary" contributions were encouraged by the cadres. And of course such contributions were made. But when one year later the mess halls were abandoned, and family cooking resumed, housewives did not have anything to cook with. The authorities had to order utensils for the people in a hurry. It resulted in confusion and tremendous waste. This fact was confirmed by an interview with a Mrs. C. H. Ho who got out of Mainland China in January 1963 and lived in New York City where her husband worked in the United Nations. For the practice of Great Leap and backyard furnace, see Enemy Research Institute, National War College, An Analysis of the Great Leap Forward (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: National War College Press, 1961), pp. 7-15.

get food from their supporters; the life of the people was highly organized and they were under the surveillance of party cadres 24 hours a day. The problem of shelter was also very difficult for houses were razed in remote areas. It seemed that anti-Communist guerrilla activities had reached a dead end.

But the inhuman commune system proved too much even for the patient Chinese farmers. The family was the last thing they possessed, now it was also lost. Within two years a serious famine got underway. It was one of the worst in China's long history. The causes were bad weather and the silent resistance of the farmers who, after the loss of their land and families just did not have the incentive to work. With starvation becoming more acute in 1961, public unrest spread. The Nationalists in Taiwan made the situation more unbearable to the CCP by airdropping food parcels.²²⁶ Mao finally backed down from his original position and ordered reforms in the communes. Family life was partly restored; public mess was no longer rigidly enforced; farmers

²²⁶The National Government has airdropped food parcels to the Mainland from 1960 to this day. Most of them were dropped in coastal provinces facing the Formosan Strait. Each parcel contains five to ten pounds of rice and one pound of sugar and cookies. It is attached to a small parachute. On the cover of the parcel the following words are printed: "To our needy brothers on the mainland; a gift from your brothers in Taiwan." The work is conducted by the Mainland Relief Commission, a non-profit social organization with the backing of the National Government. In these years, some 500,000 parcels have been delivered.

were allowed to have small pieces of "self-cultivated" land from which the products could be sold to a free market. The communal organization and discipline were still there, but were less closely adhered to.²²⁷ However, people could not forgive the ruthless measures in the first two years of commune system. For the first time Nationalist agents could get cordial help from the rural folks. The rigid commune system now worked to the advantage of the guerrillas. As a result, guerrilla activities were intensified in the fall of 1961. Twenty-eight sabotage operations were conducted in coastal provinces facing the Formosan Strait.²²⁸ In May 1962, a refugee exodus was in the making, hundreds of thousands of refugees crowded to the border between China Mainland and Hong Kong.²²⁹ The National Government felt it was high time for them to launch bigger scale guerrilla warfare. The operation was initiated in December 1962. With the assistance of their underground agents and the help of indigenous people, eight groups of Nationalists guerrillas successfully

²²⁷The retreat that Mao made to his original position from the commune system see Valentin Chu, Ta Ta, Tan Tan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.), pp. 188-92.

²²⁸General Yeh Chan-tze's report to the research fellows of the National War College, Taipei, Taiwan, in April 1962. The author was one of the research fellows. General Yeh is the Director of Intelligence Bureau under the Ministry of Defense of the National Government. He planned and directed all the operations.

²²⁹The author had the privilege to talk with eight of the refugees who got into Hong Kong successfully and later came to Taiwan that fall. About 1/7 of the refugees got out of the mainland. For the whole story, see China Yearbook, 1962-1963 (Taipei, Taiwan: China Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 1-3.

landed on the coast of south China. It was not until February 1963 that the Communist admitted their landing. They claimed victory over the guerrillas by the concerted efforts of the Red Army, public security forces (police), and the militia. Some 60,000 men were used and more than 2,000 officers and men were cited for their "exceptional bravery" in dealing with the anti-Communist guerrillas, which were composed of some 200 men.²³⁰

Encouraged by their initial success and having learned from experience, the Nationalists increased their guerrilla activities on the mainland in 1963. Both sides claimed victory. Concluded the Nationalists by the end of 1963:

This year, Communists armed forces have carried out 26,679 operations against our guerrilla bands. According to enemy sources, the Communist Ministry of Public Security has openly admitted that during the second half of 1963 there were 15 groups of our guerrillas which successfully landed on the coast of Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung provinces. The exact landing spots were listed. And there were another thirty groups, the origin of which the Reds cannot account for. They reported a total of 538 guerrilla fighters involved in those operations.

But according to our informed sources, we had 18 fruitful operations; twelve bases have been built up. There are two guerrilla transportation routes in Shangtung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien provinces, respectively, four in Kwangtung and three Kiangsi. The guerrillas have killed 419 Communist soldiers, demolished 18 bridges, captured 740 firearms, and 90 horses. . . . It is evident then that our guerrilla activities on the mainland have been quite successful.²³¹

²³⁰ People's Daily, Peking, from February 7 to March 1, 1963.

²³¹ Central Daily News, Taipei, Taiwan, February 12, 1964.

Of course, Communist authorities claimed all guerrillas were either killed or captured. But in 1964, the KMT claimed their guerrilla bases increased to fifteen and were situated in mountainous areas in Kwangtung, Chekiang, Fukien, Honan, Kweichow, Hunan, Kwangsi, Yunan, and Szechwan provinces.²³² In the meantime, their sabotage activities had also stepped up.²³³

Prospects

This year (1965) the Nationalists further claimed that their guerrilla and sabotage activities had deeply penetrated into remote provinces of China's northwest and southwest like Sinkiang, Sikang, and Tibet.²³⁴ It is evident that the National Government in Taiwan has taken anti-Communists guerrilla warfare very seriously. Under the tireless effort of the National Security Department it seems some progress has been made every year. But the fact remains that the KMT so far has failed to build up a sizable army from in their guerrillas as Mao did from 1927 to 1931 in Kiangsi and from 1937 to 1940. Probably the guerrilla

²³²Tsia Shun, "Annual Report on People's Anti-Communist Tyranny Movements on the Mainland, 1964," as in the Annual Report to the Central Committee of KMT (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: the KMT Secretariat, 1965), pp. 1-6.

²³³Ibid.

²³⁴According to the Central News Agency, Nationalist guerrillas had successfully attacked the Tai Erh Collective Farm in Sinkiang, ambushed Communist cadres in the vicinity of Lhasa, and burned storages at the Sikang-Yunan border. See Central Daily News, Taipei, Taiwan, May 6, 1965.

struggle led by the Nationalists in mainland China is still in the second stage, or at least in the first phase of the third stage as was proposed in Chapter III. It is still an uphill struggle. Under the pressure of the CCP who are guerrilla veterans themselves, Nationalist guerrilla operations on the Mainland would probably be as perilous as before.

But on the other hand, despite claims of overwhelming victories in their counter-anti-revolutionary campaigns, the CCP had failed to eliminate anti-Communist guerrillas completely. During the last three years anti-Communist guerrillas managed to survive under the Communist rule. No one can deny that there are serious grievances among the people in mainland China, especially after the farmers lost their land due to the commune system. Meanwhile, the determination of the Nationalists to carry on the guerrilla struggle cannot be doubted. So whether the formidable Communist Party and its political and military arms can eventually eliminate all anti-Communist guerrilla forces on the Mainland is also questionable.

The success and failure of the anti-Communist guerrilla movement on China Mainland seems to depend mainly upon the following factors; first, the possibility of attracting more people for the anti-Communism cause, and secondly, the efficacy of the CCP apparatus. These two factors are closely interrelated. If the CCP and its government machinery become corrupt and ineffective, more people would lean to the

side of the guerrillas. If more people are attracted by the guerrillas, Communist efficacy would certainly decline. So far the Communist apparatus is concerned, it has not declined significantly, despite small cracks here and there. The continuous internal purification campaigns have helped the CCP to keep its alertness and efficiency. But after the death of old revolutionaries like Mao Tse-tung and his old comrades, the story may be different.

The guerrilla struggle on the China Mainland, as elsewhere, is a protracted one. Only history can tell when it will be ended.

Summary

Summing up the thirty-eight-year old guerrilla struggle in China, it may be concluded that modern guerrilla warfare is the outcome of bitter conflict between two rivaling parties. They are in irreconcilable ideological contradiction which makes genuine cooperation impossible even under heavy foreign influence, such as the Japanese aggression before World War II and the American mediation effort after the war. The weaker party has always relied upon guerrilla movement as its major weapon when threatened by the stronger incumbents. Though governmental instability and inefficiency remain the necessary condition of the struggle, it seems that a group of frustrated, desperate, determined and ambitious rebels whose existence is at stake sparks the fire of guerrilla warfare. This generalization can be

applied to Mao's venture in 1927, and that of the anti-Communist guerrillas in 1950. Thus the threatened rebellious group who has an irreconcilable political ideology with the incumbents should be regarded as the sufficient condition of modern guerrilla movement, not the necessary condition as identified in Chapter II.

The salient properties of modern guerrilla warfare as they stand out in this chapter are: (1) it is a multi-dimensional struggle. Political, psychological, ideological, organizational, economical, social, and military means are fully employed. The higher is its degree of totality, the better is its chance of success. On the contrary, when it is limited to military means, such as Mao did in his first year in Chinkang shan and again in 1934, or the anti-Communist guerrillas did in 1950-52, their fate is doomed. (2) It is essentially a mass movement. Only with the support of the people can the guerrillas exist and grow. The success of Mao behind enemy lines from 1937 to 1945 and the failure of the anti-Communist guerrillas from 1950 to 1952 speak for themselves. So the foundation of modern guerrilla warfare should be a widespread mass movement. Short of the support of an aroused, organized, indoctrinated, and disciplined people, the weaker party does not have the slimmest chance to win. (3) The goal of the guerrillas is crystal clear: to overthrow the incumbents and take over the government by themselves. There is no compromise whatsoever. Mao

had never forgotten to grab power from the National Government even when he pledged to submit his party to the KMT. Chiang will not give up his guerrilla struggle on the Mainland unless the CCP is defeated. Guerrillas may cooperate with the opponent under expedience as Mao did in 1935; however, their ultimate goal--the establishment of a new political order with themselves as the masters has never been abandoned.

Modern guerrilla warfare is a protracted struggle. It can only survive and expand under a weak, ineffective, and unstable government. Mao's guerrillas grew rapidly when the KMT was suffering from internal struggle from 1928 to 1931, and economic and social chaos from 1947 to 1949. The anti-Communist guerrillas made their debut when Mao's regime was young and unstable in 1950 and they emerged again after the failure of the people's commune system in 1961. When the incumbents are strengthened and consolidated after reforms and reorganizations, like Chiang did from 1932 to 1934 and Mao did from 1950 to 1951, the guerrillas are soundly defeated. From the fluctuations of the guerrilla movement in China, the clue of counter-guerrilla warfare can be found.

What kind of changes that guerrilla warfare has brought to China? After the first stage, the defeat of Mao's guerrillas ended in a unified nation which was able to put up a war of resistance against Japan, a world power by that time, for eight years, a remarkable achievement indeed for a

nation newly emerged from industrial backwardness and internal struggle. The victory of Mao in 1949 made China a Communist nation which was quite different from her long tradition. The peace-loving Chinese suddenly appeared as a threatening and aggressive political entity. The anti-Communist guerrillas in early 1950's created a short period of relaxation of Communist control from 1953 to 1956 which marked fast national reconstruction as evidenced by the implementation of the First Five Year Plan. The anti-Communist guerrillas in the 1960's are still dragging on; their influence is too early to tell; but if it persists, the political picture of the CCP is bound to change significantly. Mao's back away from his original position in the commune system may be regarded as one of the signals. Modern guerrilla warfare has never failed to bring changes in China.

Finally, guerrilla warfare is a costly struggle in terms of lives and resources. In order to stop or to prevent such a violent movement, first of all, various reforms must be vigorously carried out like Chiang did in 1930's and Mao did in 1950's. Thus the necessary condition of guerrilla warfare can be eliminated. Secondly, ideological duels in the society must be conciliated, grievances reduced, and rebellious groups carefully heeded so that the sufficient condition can never be cumulated. Thirdly, economic and social stability must be maintained so that oil would not be poured into the guerrilla fire; and fourth, only through an all-out

effort on the part of the incumbents can the guerrillas be subdued. It is necessarily a total effort to deal with a war of totality. Chiang's victory over Communist guerrillas in early 1930's and Mao's success over anti-Communist guerrillas in early 1950's all give solid proof to this point. With these propositions in mind we proceed to the discussion of counter-guerrilla warfare.

CHAPTER V

COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE

Can a government win in a counter-guerrilla struggle? In theory as in practice the answer is positive. Counter-guerrilla warfare in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines clearly points out that guerrillas can be defeated, provided that correct measures are taken. The case study in Chapter IV also indicates that the incumbents have a good chance of winning. But what are the keys to victory in a counter-guerrilla struggle? Generally speaking, there are five major factors: (1) the winning of the minds of the people, (2) a clean and efficient government, (3) a concerted effort in political, economic, and social fields, (4) dynamic military operations, and (5) an enlightened leadership. But to achieve these conditions, there must be correct concepts about counter-guerrilla warfare; preventive measures must be put into practice; strategic considerations must be carried out; military campaigns must be rigorous and formidable, and steady and decisive steps must be taken under careful planning. In the meantime, specific conditions and the unique situation of the nation involved must be taken into consideration. It is with these factors in mind that this chapter is written.

Important Concepts in Counter-
Guerrilla Warfare

"Machinery does not win wars. Men do."¹ The words of Dickey Chapells saliently stand out in the struggle against guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare, as discussed above, is essentially a mass movement to win the people's mind. It takes human ingenuity and endeavor of the highest order to accomplish such a goal. Thus to evaluate the strength and validity of a government engaging in counter-guerrilla warfare, neither the territory nor the resources, nor the number of armed forces under its control can be used as the most feasible scale for measurement. It is only the people, their organization and indoctrination, their loyalty and faith, and their participation in and enthusiasm for the struggle that can be applied as the best index. Without wholehearted support from the masses, counter-guerrilla warfare, like guerrilla warfare, must necessarily fail. It is therefore clear that one of the most important concepts in counter-guerrilla warfare is to win the people first. Once the battle of minds is won, there is no doubt that the guerrilla movement can be checked. Magsaysay's counter-guerrilla campaign is a case in point. Indeed, "there is no more effective weapon for combatting sabotage and guerrilla activities than marshalling attitudes of the local population

¹Dickey Chapelle, "How Castro Won," as in Greene, op. cit., p. 231.

against them. (And) the inability to do this implies ineptitude or a lack of vision of the political leadership."² Unless "representatives of the government can develop and exhibit an enthusiasm and determination to win popular support comparable to that displayed on behalf of the guerrillas, failure is possible."³ The defeat of the KMT in its second and third stages against the CCP forcefully speaks for the necessity of such a concept.

In counter-guerrilla warfare, one must remember that the greatest danger in dealing with guerrillas is oversimplification. Modern guerrilla warfare, as previously stressed, is a complicated phenomenon and a sophisticated process. To deal with it successfully, the human-oriented concept could serve as a sound basis, but more than that is needed. Counter-guerrilla warfare should never be regarded simply as a military operation, neither merely a political operation. As a war of totality, guerrilla movement can only be effectively defeated with a total effort. Ideological and organizational means, political and military campaigns, intelligence and propaganda, and persuasion as well as coercion must be skillfully employed by the counter-guerrillas. As Galula put it: "military and political actions cannot be separated, and military action--essential

²J. D. Zawodny, loc. cit., p. 18.

³Charles T. R. Bohannon, "Antiguerrilla Operations," Annals, op. cit., p. 29.

though it is--cannot be the main form of action."⁴ The incumbants of a country with guerrilla problems in their minds must always think in terms of totality. Ways and means must be found to mobilize every iota of strength in the country to cope with the problem. Whenever and wherever something is neglected and left unorganized, the opportunity for exploitation is left open to the guerrillas. Transcendence from the military context to the espousal of the total war idea forms the second important concept of counter-guerrilla warfare in modern times.

Thirdly, although it may be true that "there is little indication in the history of unconventional warfare that guerrillas themselves are effective counterguerrilla weapons,"⁵ it would be a gross mistake to suggest that guerrilla strategy and tactics cannot be used by counter-guerrillas. As a matter of fact, "the anti-guerrillas must get away from the conception that all wars are fought of necessity on a long, continuous front,"⁶ but "guerrillas must be fought with guerrilla methods by specially trained units which can be trained and equipped without great cost and without detriment to the force."⁷ Important guerrilla practices like mobility,

⁴Galula, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵Paret and Shy, op. cit., p. 71.

⁶Otto Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 100.

⁷Osanka, op. cit., p. 109.

initiative, ambush, surprise attack, concealment, concentration and dispersion, etc., must be mastered by counter-guerrillas who want to be successful. The opponent can be overcome only when the incumbents are better. To learn from the guerrillas and then surpass them in the battlefield is one of the surest means to victory.

Finally, no effective counter-guerrilla measures can be taken without an efficient governmental mechanism. The struggle is the direct confrontation between two rivaling organizations. In a protracted duel the most durable and dynamic political machine is always the winner. The China case gives a good illustration to this. When Chiang's government was clean and strong, Mao's guerrillas were doomed. On the other hand, when the National Government was weakened by economic and social chaos, Mao's fortune skyrocketed. The same holds true to anti-Communist operations on China Mainland after Mao came to power.

What kind of government is most suitable for counter-guerrilla warfare? To this question there is no definite answer. Both democratic and totalitarian governments had been effective and ineffective. Cases in China and the Philippines give full proof to this point. The decisive condition seems not the type of government but its appeal, leadership, cleanness and efficiency. The counter-guerrillas must have a viable, dynamic, and stable government behind it in order to win. This is an idea for every incumbent to

keep in mind. How a government can be clean and efficient will be discussed below.

Preventive Measures

"Prevention is better than cure." This adage is true in medicine as well as in counter-guerrilla warfare. The preventive measures taken with regard to guerrilla evidently serve the interest of the nation better than anything else. Prevention of the outbreak of a protracted guerrilla movement, or its stoppage in the infant stages would save the country from bloodshed, chaos, moral and material destruction, and above all, the disintegration of the society. So the prevention of guerrilla warfare should be the grand strategy of any government.

What does prevention mean in terms of counter-guerrilla warfare? Pustay answered with the following words: "The preventive aspects must be carried out through socio-economic-political reform within an infected underdeveloped state."⁸ Yes, "reform" is the key word in prevention. However, there are two arguments. First, is it "mistaken to think that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments are popular and where modernization, economic development, and reform are going forward?"⁹ Certainly no one can guarantee

⁸John S. Pustay, Counter-insurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 83.

⁹Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: the New Communist Tactic," Osanka, op. cit., p. 459.

that reform can bring guerrilla warfare to a dead stop. As a matter of fact, as shown in Chapter IV, Chiang's attempt to build up a constitutional government and Mao's land reform program had to a certain extent sped up the guerrilla process. Nevertheless, to say that reform does not help in the prevention of guerrilla struggle is entirely misleading. A genuine reform program which is carried out faithfully and thoroughly dampens the fire of guerrilla warfare. Chiang's reform in 1932-34 and Mao's land redistribution in 1950 had helped them greatly in defeating the opposing guerrillas. Genuine reform enlightens the people and strengthens the appeal of the government. It takes the cause away from the rebels and wins friendship and allegiance for the incumbents. Though guerrilla movement can and has been started under reform, it has never been able to survive and succeed after the reform is completed. Magsaysay's program in the Philippines is another good example.

Secondly, is reform more costly and less effective than high-handed repression? Some would point to Hungary and East Germany where Russian repression has been quite successful. Or they may point to Setif (in Algeria) and Malgache where the French have subdued rebellion by wholesale man-slaughter.¹⁰ In those cases armed uprisings were suppressed within a short time and no costly reform was practiced. As for the French case, within less than a decade

¹⁰ See footnote no. 33 in Chapter I.

more violent armed resistance erupted again, and the French had no other way out but to give up. What the Russians had done to the Hungarians and East Germans has certainly not been forgotten by the indigenous peoples. Whether they can get away with it will only be revealed by future history. The repression of a guerrilla struggle may be effective for a short while. It may help the incumbents to gain time for reform. Yet in the long run it remains ineffective and very costly in terms of human lives and property damage. Observed Crozier: "Plain repression is the easiest, though in the long run the costliest, way to deal with a rebellion. . . . Pure repression is not necessarily obsolete, but it has definite limitations. Pure repression never solves political problems; suppressed today, a rebellion will break out again tomorrow. . . . The trouble is that the very fact of repressing a rebellion in the first place makes it all the harder to initiate an enlightened policy, for violence troubles the calm which alone enables the voice of reason to be heard."¹¹ Thus repression is not the substitute to prevention. On the other hand, if prevention is successful no repression is necessary.

How should the government conduct reform so that guerrilla warfare can be prevented? Pustay's socio-economic-political theme may be the most comprehensive answer. Among the three, political reform should have priority for the

¹¹Crozier, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

simple reason that modern guerrilla warfare is always politically oriented and it starts and ends with politics. As discussed in Chapter II, political inefficiency is the sufficient condition of guerrilla struggle, thus "action against (guerrilla movement) should be taken principally in the political field."¹² What is the most essential action in this respect? "A policy designed to capture the sympathy of the great mass of people will effectively prevent, in advance, any sudden popular rising." As Mikshe explained: "such measures are the best antidote to guerrilla warfare, which can only flourish where there exists discontent among masses on social or national grounds. Very often, such political campaigns are the most economical; certainly they cost less in human lives and property."¹³ Then what policy would capture the sympathy of the masses? In the first place, the government itself must be strengthened and purified. The whole governmental structure from the national down to the local grass-roots level should be overhauled, just as Chiang had done in 1932-34. Special attention must be given to grass-roots political mechanisms. Young, honest, and capable men must be enlisted for government service. Corruption must be routed out. The rule of law should take the place of the rule of man. Training and discipline must be applied to governmental employees. Factionalism, schism and cliques

¹²Miksche, op. cit., p. 157.

¹³Ibid.

should be discouraged and eradicated. Political inter-play at the grass-roots level should be encouraged with sound and energetic political organization as the foundation. When people are well-organized, and led by qualified men, the government becomes an integrated whole, able to handle any emergencies which come up.

The second step should be the adoption of progressive political program. In accordance with national consensus, grievances in politics should be eliminated. Citizen training and political recruitment must be stepped up. Democracy should be exercised; anarchy and chaos avoided. Political communication between the government and the populace must be complete and unrestricted. A sense of service and mission must be evidenced in all levels of the government workers, and the people must be inspired to loyalty, patriotism, and cooperation. Reactionary and destructive political elements should be persuaded or coerced to accept national consensus, or at least their destructive tendencies should be curbed. When a highly organized governmental structure is serving an enlightened people, there is no fear of guerrilla warfare. In fact, any guerrilla activities can hardly be viable under such circumstances.

Next comes economic reform. Fair distribution of resources and means of subsistence should be on the top of the list. Every citizen should have a chance to make a living. Working opportunities should be open to all with emphasis on

ability, professional training and competency, not personal ties and spoils. A sense of justice should prevail. Furthermore, the land problem deserves great attention. Where the thirst for land exists among peasants, a land reform program must be carried out regardless of the opposition from the land gentry. A peaceful land redistribution program is undoubtedly better than the "public tribunals" process undertaken by the Chinese Communists. Probably there is no need to "soak the rich" in any country to bring about economic reform, but progressive income tax should be vigorously enforced so that the distance between the rich and the poor can be shortened. In a land which is prone to guerrilla attack, the sense of fairness in economic life sometimes is even more important than the increase of productivity.

Of course, the industrialization of the nation should by no means be neglected. Overhead capital must be accumulated first.¹⁴ Handicraft and light industries must be built up. Birth control must be exercised. Per capita income must be increased so that a middle class can gradually be created. When people are well-fed, or at least sufficiently fed, and resources are comparatively evenly distributed, the attraction of rebellion is decreased. At least the followings of guerrilla leaders can be drastically cut down, because in previous chapters we learned that guerrilla fighters are mostly "have-nots."

¹⁴For an excellent discussion on economic development in emerging nations, see Millikan and Blackmer, The Emerging Nations (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1961), pp. 43-53.

With regard to social reform, two things are urgently needed to prevent the outbreak of guerrilla warfare. The first is the elimination of injustice in the community; and the second one is the upholding of the national value system. As to the former, racial, ethnic, religious, regional, and class prejudices which can be exploited by the guerrillas must be uprooted by enlightening educational and human-relations programs. Progressive laws must be promulgated to protect the rights of underprivileged minority groups. The exploited souls like labourers, peasants, and other manual and unskillfull workers must be given the chance and means to improve and salvage themselves from misery. When justice prevails in the community, the danger of guerrilla uprising is cut down. As for the latter, national values must be stressed so that the population can become a coherent and homogeneous entity. With patriotism, solidarity and harmony, sharp internal strife like guerrilla warfare may be avoided.

To sum up, prevention by means of reform is a nation-building process which aims at the winning of people's minds, and the strengthening of the government as well as the society. It also diminishes the chances of guerrilla exploitation. The preventive goal can be achieved through a competent and clean government, a well-organized and sufficiently trained population, a developing economy, with evenly distributed resources, absence of inequality and injustice, elimination of exploitation and corruption, espousing of

national values, and homogeneous community relations. It would take the greatest endeavor of the incumbents to accomplish such a goal. But if one keeps in mind that counter-guerrilla warfare is a task of nation-reconstruction rather than a nation-destruction one, any amount of spiritual and material investments that the government puts into the enterprise is worth its while. There is no price too high for the prevention of guerrilla struggle, especially the price in terms of money, resources, and human energy, not in blood, destruction and misery.

Strategic Considerations

When preventive measures have not been practiced or have failed, and guerrilla warfare is already underway, what can and should the government do to cope with such a crisis? Basically, the following principles must be adopted:

- (1) Since the first grand objective of the guerrillas is to gain popular support, the first principle of the counter-guerrillas is the separation of people from the insurgents and winning them over to the government side.
- (2) Since the second grand objective of the guerrillas is to achieve self-maintenance and expansion, another principle of the counter-guerrilla warfare is to annihilate their operational forces and stymie their chances for growth.

- (3) Since the third grand objective of the guerrillas is to destroy the physical force of the government, counter-guerrillas must respond by consolidating the position of the government and expanding militarily and politically.¹⁵

In short, the strategic consideration of the incumbents is an all-out response to the guerrilla movement. B. I. S. Gourlay, a colonel of the British army made the following observation of counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya: "If there is one great lesson that Britain has learned in dealing with security (guerrilla) problems the world over, it is that they can only be solved when the civil, police, and military authorities work together in unison."¹⁶ No anti-guerrilla warfare can be successful short of an all-out effort. It must be a total war against a total war.

What are the characteristics of counterinsurgency warfare? They do bear some similarities to the properties of guerrilla warfare, yet there are certain differences. For instance, while the guerrillas are devoted to a protracted struggle, the counter-guerrillas must try their best to destroy the opponent at its earliest stage of development but

¹⁵The three main objectives of the guerrillas are based upon the discussion in Chapter III, the first subtitle "General Principles."

¹⁶Lt. Col. B. I. S. Gourley, "Terror in Cyprus," as in Greene, op. cit., p. 240.

never be lured by shallow opportunism. As declared by Otto Heilbrunn: "The best chance of destroying a partisan movement is to suppress it at the outset, the opponent must be familiar with the technique of its inception so that he can diagnose the signs and act in time."¹⁷ Since the guerilla movements are rather weak at the early stages, it is of course comparatively easy for the incumbents to destroy them, provided the government knows their clandestine activities. But when the struggle has already been started in the earnest, no government should take the opportunistic attitude of trying to end it in a hurry. Indeed, impatience is the worst enemy of the counter-guerrilla.

Another difference is rooted in the fact that the guerrillas are the weaker party. Enjoying their superior strength, militarily, the incumbents always prefer positional wars. Through encirclement and clear front lines, counter-guerrillas try hard to pin down the roving guerrillas for a decisive battle. As General Maclean put it: "a good general rule is to take the basic principles of guerrilla warfare and apply them in reverse. The guerrilla's first principle being mobility, to pin them down, and encircle them. Again you must try to deny them the element of surprise; in fact you must use it against them. Equally, while they try to

¹⁷Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 16.

avoid a pitched battle, you must try to force them into a pitched battle."¹⁸

There is also some difference in the creation of the causes of the rival parties. As indicated in Chapter III, the rebels used to create a cause which has had the greatest appeal to the populace. The counter-guerrillas, of course, may create a stronger counter appeal, like Chiang's neo-Confucianism in 1934 and Mao's land reform in 1950. But they also can do it the other way: just meet the challenge by taking over the cause from the guerrillas and put it into practice by themselves right away. Thus the incumbents are "taking the thunder off" from guerrillas whose following would be cut down drastically. "Taking the thunder off" is one of the most important counter-guerrilla strategic considerations which will be discussed later.

The Struggle for Masses

To win over people from the guerrillas, the government must take three strategic steps: (1) the struggle for the cause, (2) necessary reforms, and (3) organization and indoctrination. The struggle for the cause means to "take the thunder from" the insurgents. When the highest goal of the guerrillas has been put into practice by the government, they lose the basis for their struggle. Their followers and

¹⁸General Maclean's "Foreward" in Thayer's book Guerrilla, xiii-xiv.

sympathizers would say: "Why keep on the fighting? Our goal has been achieved." Assistance and sacrifices become hard to get, and their ranks eventually fade away. This was what happened in Malaya when national independence was declared in 1957. The same held true in the Philippines. Magsaysay's land reform program and the resettlement of surrendered guerrillas in Mindanao sharply cut down the appeals of the Huks. Chiang, during the war against Japan, could keep his territory intact except that which was behind enemy lines from Mao's guerrilla attacks because both sides were for the cause of anti-Japanese aggression. Whenever possible, grabbing the cause from the rebels and making it as one's own proposal is one of the cleverest strategies for the incumbents.

Reforms have been stressed as essential measures for the prevention of guerrilla struggle. They are just as important after the guerrilla movement is underway. Of course, reform in a national emergency might be difficult and at times harmful. However, with resolution and skill reform can still be carried out. To prosecute counter-guerrilla warfare effectively, the government must be efficient and clean; economy must be stable; and social injustice must be minimized. Without these conditions there is a great risk of losing the struggle.

As previously stated, counter-guerrilla warfare is the direct confrontation between two organizations. Like a football game, the more highly organized and better trained


has the better chance of winning. Chiang lost in the third stage because his government and his people were in a chaotic condition. Mao's power remained rather stable in spite of anti-Communist guerrillas and his failure in the commune system chiefly because his party and mass organizations had not been significantly deteriorated. Organizing, training, indoctrinating, and leading the people with the greatest zeal and tact and trying hard to destroy the guerrillas' cells and nuclei are the surest ways of defeating guerrillas.

Checking the Growth of the Guerrillas

How to check the growth of the guerrillas and cut down their physical strength? This is of course mainly a matter of military operations which will be discussed later. However, other than military operations, the following important steps must be taken in order to confine the expansion of the guerrillas:

First, military forces of the government must be thoroughly reorganized. In addition to the regular army, paramilitary forces must be formed. This would be composed of able-bodied men under the age of 45 or 50 who are not drafted into the armed forces. It is desirable to divide them into two groups, one full-time and the other part-time. The former is the younger and more progressive and aggressive group which can be used to fight smaller guerrilla bands and defend villages. The latter are used for sentry, intelligence,

logistical and other auxiliary duties. Furthermore, other mass organizations such as those of women and children must be enlisted to assist the military and paramilitary when necessary. Everybody in the community must have a role to perform in counter-guerrilla operations. Thus the military setup of the counter-guerrillas is a four-level structure:



The regular army itself must also be under a process of reform. At least part of the forces should be trained as rangers and commandos who can fight and act as guerrillas. They are used in scouting and patrolling guerrilla-infested areas and pursuing their preys tirelessly. Whenever possible the armed forces should be equipped with helicopters. With such a military outfit, the government would have little difficulty in achieving overwhelming superiority in the battlefield.

Secondly, the military must not limit itself to military operations when fighting the guerrillas. It must also be a political and propaganda machine. Pustay suggested a "six-element program" for this purpose: (1) troop

public relation activities--including friendship building through mutual respect and assistance and excellent discipline of the troops, (2) military-civic action programs--including the utilization of the technological, medical, and administrative experts of the deployed military units in the execution of easily discernible and quick-impact community improvement projects, (3) informational programs--including psychological warfare, propaganda and information service, etc., (4) creation of pacification committees--including organizational activities at the grass-roots level to help the non-guerrilla elements to pull their strength together, (5) institution of reward and punishment systems--including the punishment of guerrilla agents and informers and the encouragement of surrender of guerrilla elements, and (6) provision of physical security to village inhabitants--including the elimination of guerrilla agents and the repulse of guerrilla attacks.¹⁹ The elimination of enemy agents is of utmost importance and will be discussed under the next subtitle. When the counterinsurgents are capable to devote themselves in such a total struggle, they deserve the best chance to win.

Self-Maintenance and Expansion

How can the counter-guerrillas safely control their own territory and acquire additional territory from the

¹⁹Pustay, op. cit., pp. 94-98.

enemy when the struggle goes on? Of course discussions above concerning the winning of the populace, and military reorganizations have much to do with this problem. But there are other strategic steps to be taken to achieve this special goal, namely, resettlement of inhabitants, purification of the population, pardon of guerrillas, care of guerrillas' families, and release of guerrilla prisoners.

The best measurement of the effectiveness of government control in a guerrilla-infested area is the viability and functionality of the local civil administrative structure. To put the government apparatus into a guerrilla region and expect it to operate well, one of the following two things should be done: resettlement of the inhabitants and the purification of the population.

Resettlement has been practiced by the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, and the Americans in South Vietnam. They had different degrees of success.²⁰ The most successful one was that of the British. Reviewing the Malayan success Thayer made the following evaluation:

The Chinese squatter (those who were resettled), whom the strategy chiefly affected, had not been attached to their lands for generations. Many, indeed, had taken them over during the war years when food

²⁰For the French program see George A. Kelly, "Revolutionary Warfare and Psychological Action," Osanka, op. cit., pp. 435-37; for the American program, see John Flynn, "Young Civilian Tries to Win the Fight on the People Front," Life, November 27, 1964, pp. 40-46; for the British "Brigg's Plan," see Crozier, op. cit., pp. 212-13. Also see Pomeroy's evaluation on South Vietnam and Malaya, Pomeroy, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

supplies under the Japanese occupation had run low in the towns and work on the plantations and in the mines had been drastically curtailed. Their attachment to the soil was therefore considerably less than one might expect in other rural communities.²¹

Crozier added other factors:

The agricultural experts assessed the value of the crops and of machinery that could not be removed, for compensation purposes. These were no deportations to Siberia . . . the sites of the New Villages to which the squatters were removed were often enough only a couple of miles away from the 'old villages' which they had left. If the villagers were mine-workers, they worked in the same mine; if they were tappers, they worked the same trees. . . . They had guarded gates and were wired in. In most cases--though there were bad exceptions--amenities were better than those that had been left behind, and standards of nutrition, welfare and health rose appreciably.²²

Indeed, resettlement of local population when carefully and properly handled helps the government to extend its rule. Thus the officials responsible for such an operation must try to convince the indigents that the resettlement is for their own benefits and protection. Government actions must support this argument. People must be prevented from any material losses; on the contrary, it is always better for the authority to provide them something which they could not afford in the old days. Thus resettlement means the improvement of livelihood and the beginning of a new life. Grievances are diminished and public spirit is lifted. It is then easier for the government to consolidate its control among the newly acquired people.

²¹Thayer, op. cit., p. 108.

²²Crozier, op. cit., p. 213.

Resettlement of population is a costly program, while purification is not. The latter needs no new buildings, no additional supplies for daily subsistence, and no over-all movement of the people. It is essentially the change of local leadership through the elimination of the old leadership or the elimination of enemy agents. This was just what Mao had done from 1943 to 1945 behind enemy lines, and what Wang had done from 1946 to 1948 in Hopei.²³ The purification process is simply to completely eradicate the tangible and intangible control of the guerrilla underground from the locality. This includes the removal of the control of mass organizations, fronts, and other associations by scrutinizing and liquidating their agents, cells, and by other means of manipulation. Their anti-guerrilla counterparts must be made to function in their stead. The success of the program depends upon the following factors: (1) agents or cells of the guerrillas are correctly located, (2) they are driven out or arrested by the government and have no strings left behind, (3) punishment of agents when necessary is carried out by those who are in the organizations or the locality, (4) the counter-guerrillas effectively take over the leadership, (5) measures are taken to prevent further infiltration, and (6) guerrilla threat from outside is kept off. When the population is purified and the guerrillas consequently no longer able to carry out

²³ See stages 3 and 4 in Chapter IV.

either terrorism or propaganda, governmental control is thereby secured.

A third strategic move to extend the control of the anti-guerrillas is the pardon of guerrillas. Mao did this very effectively in 1950-51; Magsaysay was successful in the Philippines. Pardon or amnesty to guerrilla fighters gives the rebels a choice between hardship and a peaceful life. Those who are not determined enough in the guerrilla camp would tend to choose the soft way. Thus the ranks of the insurgents are weakened. However, a program like this works best when the political and military situation favors the incumbents. When government is in adversity, an offer of pardon or amnesty loses its attraction. Magsaysay's surrender appeal to the guerrillas worked miracles when his military forces had scored victory after victory in central Luzon. Finally even the guerrilla leader Luis Taruc gave himself up.²⁴ The psychological effects of a pardon program should never be underestimated.

Treatment of guerrilla's families is another strategic psychological move which may result in the consolidation of government position. It is a two-edged sword: on one hand the treatment could be really tough. As Thayer said: "The Germans were well aware that the Achilles' heel of the guerrilla movement was not the guerrilla in the

²⁴How Magsaysay used the surrender program to extend government influence, see Baclagon, op. cit., pp. 179-92.

forest but the family and property he left at home. They made the most of this circumstance."²⁵ The German's hard-line in handling the guerrillas' families in Yugoslavia had successfully curbed the activities of Mikhailovitch's partisans. The same was true to Kupi's men in Albania. But it did not work well against Tito's or Hoja's guerrillas who were "have-nots" and thus had nothing to lose at home.²⁶ Thus the other edge of the sword is to treat the families of the guerrillas nicely. They are under the care of government which provides them with needy items. After learning such message from home, the fighting guerrillas would certainly lose some of their antagonism toward the incumbents. Their psychological defense is broken down and surrender or defection become possible. Unfortunately, this aspect has been largely neglected by counter-guerrillas.

The last item on the list is to return prisoners to their own bases. This has been an effective strategic move of the guerrilla leader. Mao demonstrated it fully by sending the prisoners back to the "Young Marshall." Castro practiced it in Cuba. The same thing can be done against the guerrillas. Though no former cases can be cited, it is the belief of the author that when guerrillas are taken prisoners, they should be treated well and given political indoctrination, then sent back to their respective bases.

²⁵Thayer, op. cit., p. 57.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 57-58.

The effect may be explosive. At any rate it should be better than beatings or other inhuman treatment which create a bad impression in the minds of the guerrillas. They would fight to the last ditch which presents a tremendous obstacle to the success to the anti-guerrillas.

After these five strategic considerations, in order to maintain and expand its control, government forces must, as Cross put it: (a) actively destroy and pursue guerrilla units in the field, and (b) decisively cut off the rebels from their sources of supply inside and outside of the country.²⁷ These objectives can only be accomplished through victorious military operations in the battlefield.

Counter-Guerrilla Military Operations

Military victory is indispensable to counter-guerrilla warfare, because "other measures help to shorten the war if, and only if, the anti-guerrillas are successful on the battlefield."²⁸ How can military operations be carried out so as to insure success? In addition to the factors mentioned above, superior military strategies and tactics must be applied by the commanders.

First of all, the armed forces under the counter-guerrillas must always have "initiative." As the German directives in Warfare Against Bands stated: "in the fight

²⁷ See Cross, op. cit., pp. 94-108.

²⁸ Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 37.

against bands (guerrillas) the initiative must always rest with us. Even if the commander has only a small force at his disposal he must not fail to show resolution. If possible, each action of bands must be followed by counter-action."²⁹

How can initiative be obtained? Otto Heilbrunn gave the following answer: "Attack the guerrilla's base and destroy it first. Put the guerrillas always on the go without time to rest and regroup, let alone expand."³⁰ Taking over the initiative from the guerrillas and determining the time and place of fighting is the maxim that counter-guerrilla commanders have to follow. Chiang did that in 1934 and Mao in 1951. Both of them were successful.

Secondly, the anti-insurgents should have tremendous speed in the concentration of their forces for attack or defense. In the case of attack, superiority in the decisive place must be achieved, thus making it possible to split up the enemy quickly and to pursue him relentlessly until he is wiped out. In the case of defense, rapid mustering of a greater force to a certain point would usually scare the guerrillas away. However, precautions must be taken against the ambush of re-inforcements by guerrillas. The ability to concentrate quickly can be easily achieved through the use

²⁹ Warfare Against Bands for all Services of the Armed Forces as issued by the German High Command of the Armed Forces on May 6, 1944, Article 23, as in Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 203.

³⁰ Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 51.

of airplanes, armed convoys and a good system of communication and transportation.

Surprise is another factor that no counter-guerrilla leader can afford to neglect. Wrote the German directive: "Surprise in the battle against bands is a special tactical principle in the command."³¹ And surprise can only be attained through good intelligence and top secrecy in troop movement. If the guerrillas are often caught by surprise they will abandon their base and seek a place which is more secure. The experience of a German communications battalion in Bezhitsa, Russia, fully proves this point.³² Indeed, surprise is not and should not be the special province of the guerrillas.

Initiative, speed, and surprise are possible only when the counter-guerrillas are carefully chosen, well-trained and under a rigorous leadership. It is not necessary to elaborate on the personnel selection process here. In general, however, any physically fit and mentally sound male can make a good anti-guerrilla fighter, provided that he gets the right kind of training. As Heilbrunn describes the kind of training he should have, in addition to military

³¹As in Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 204.

³²For the full story of the successful anti-guerrilla operation of the German communications battalion in Bezhitsa, Russia in the winter of 1941-42, see Ernst von Dohnanyi, "Combating Soviet Guerrillas," as in Greene op. cit., pp. 209-14. The major achievement of the battalion was that it was able to surprise the guerrillas nearby, and they moved away.

techniques: "the most important anti-guerrilla requisite is the capacity to march on foot at least as fast as the opponent. Moreover, the anti-guerrillas need many such foot-soldiers to succeed."³³ Anti-guerrilla warfare is mostly fought in difficult terrain where motor vehicles are limited in their usefulness. If counter-guerrillas do not have the ability to endure hardships and to march on foot, they usually become setting ducks for the swift partisans. As for leadership, perhaps it is just as important to the anti-guerrillas as to the guerrillas. Agility, aggressiveness, persistence, endurance, sophistication and at times, ruthlessness are required. While leading his men under the regular army with the support of a government in an unconventional struggle, it is easy to be caught in such pitfalls like inertia, passiveness, clumsiness, and arrogance. The leader must have tremendous drive and determination. The personality of President Magsaysay of the Philippines and that of General Papagos of Greece may serve as models of counter-guerrilla leadership. So it is probably not an over-statement that "warfare against bands is a matter for leadership. . . . Its success depends on superiority in leadership."³⁴

Last but not the least is intelligence. To win over the guerrillas in the battlefield, counter insurgents must have high intelligence which is the foundation of any

³³Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 105.

³⁴Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., p. 212.

successful military campaign. It must be widely spread, and maintain close touches with the population. Mass organizations, police, security forces, local population, and other sources of intelligence must be utilized to the utmost.

Whenever possible, inside informers, enemy prisoners, and airplanes must be used for this purpose. An intelligence network must be build and under the control of the high command. Furthermore, counter-intelligence should be put into full operation. Guerrilla's intelligence channels must be crushed. As Col. Wainhouse wrote about the Greek campaign: "army and police security forces took steps to destroy or render inoperable the guerrilla intelligence net in an area prior to the start of any operation. This involved the arrest and temporary internment of known Communist sympathizers or suspected informers. As a result the armed guerrillas, operating without their 'eyes and ears', could no longer avoid surprise attacks by Greek National Army units."³⁵

Shut up the "eyes and ears" of the enemy but keep those of the counter-guerrillas widely open is one of the surest ways to win in an anti-guerrilla struggle.

The success in counter-guerrilla warfare also demands some organizational innovation. When dealing with an enemy who stresses irregularity and unconventionality, as previously stated, part of the anti-guerrilla forces must be assigned as rangers and commandos who can fight as guerrillas.

³⁵ Lt. Col. Edward R. Wainhouse, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49; A Case Study," Osanka, op. cit., p. 226.

They must be specially trained and appropriately equipped with light firearms which have tremendous firepower; they must be completely mobile in summer and winter; and they are designated to such difficult jobs as patrol, ferret, and reconnaissance in guerrilla territory. Among the veterans, hunter-killer teams and pursuit groups are formed. They hunt down persistent guerrilla bands inside or outside of the government territory. These forces present a constant menace to the guerrillas whose sense of security is lost because of their operations. The German Jagdkommandos during World War II and the American Special Forces are in this category.³⁶

In the field of stratagem, pseudo-bands may be used quite effectively by the counter-guerrillas. This has been proved in Kenya and the Philippines.³⁷ However, its success depends on an accurate knowledge of the enemy and most careful planning of the operation. Otherwise, it may end in disaster.

The use of aircraft in counter-guerrilla operations has been on the increase since the last war. It is now extensively employed in South Vietnam. Light airplanes and

³⁶How the Germans used their Jagdkommandos see Warfare Against Bands, articles 86-93, Dixon and Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 220-22. The functions of the U. S. Special Forces, see Pomeroy, op. cit., pp. 35-59.

³⁷The success of pseudo-bands in Kenya see Heilbrunn, op. cit., pp. 69-70. Its success in the Philippines, see Baclagon, op. cit., pp. 133-38.

helicopters are most preferred. They can be used not only in reconnaissance, support, supply, rescue, and target-pointing, but also in attack and defense. Sometimes they are even employed for psychological warfare such as the British did in Malaya with considerable success.³⁸ In future guerrilla struggle, aircraft is destined to play a much more important role for the counter-insurgents.

Finally, a word on "mopping campaigns." Mopping campaigns are widely applied in counter-guerrilla warfare. They are essentially the deployment of a superior military force to attack the guerrillas fiercely from all possible directions at the same time. The goal is to wipe out the rebels from their bases once and for all. The degree of success depends upon the comparative strength of the rivaling parties, the area involved, and the mood of the indigenous population. When the counter-insurgents are overwhelmingly stronger in number and in firepower and the guerrilla area is rather small, victory is easier to achieve. But once the campaign is conducted in a large area, the mood of the population is the determinant. When it sides with the guerrillas, government forces can hardly fulfill their mission. This is why the struggle for people's minds becomes so important in counter-guerrilla warfare.

³⁸Dougherty, "The Guerrilla War in Malaya," Osanka, op. cit., p. 306. The British used "voice aircraft"--helicopter equipped with loudspeakers to broadcast at night over guerrilla territory and dropped leaflets asking the guerrillas to defect or surrender. During 1953, more than 350 of them did.

Follow-ups of sweeping campaigns are "isolation" practices in case of failure, and "rehabilitation" in case of victory. The former means to surround the guerrilla area with heavy troops coupled with barbed wires, ditches, and forts. Communication is strictly controlled; trade is entirely cut off. It is mainly a weakening process, so that after a certain period of time, the counter-guerrillas can launch their attacks again. Chiang did that in 1933-34, and the French did that in Algeria. Without a foreign sanctuary, effective isolation can be lethal. The latter means after the recovery of guerrilla territory, the population there is thoroughly indoctrinated and well-organized so that no guerrilla movement can be started in the same area again. When Chiang defeated Mao in Kiangsi, he assigned his elder son Ching-kuo as the Special Commissioner of Administrative Inspection in that area. Young Chiang did a good rehabilitation job there; it was not until 1949 that the CCP returned to their old bastion.³⁹

Mopping or sweeping campaigns may be militarily effective to a certain extent. But they are strictly limited by the strength of the guerrillas, the size of the guerrilla

³⁹Chiang Chin-kuo rehabilitated southern Kiangsi with mass education, political indoctrination, grass-roots organization and an energetic local government. He stayed there for three years. Schools were erected, modern roads built, and light industries mushroomed. It was known as "New Southern Kiangsi" to the nation. For his policies of rehabilitation see Shan Yen Shih Lu or A Collection of Daily operations (in Chinese; Taipei, Taiwan: Chen Chung Press, 1963).

area, and above all, the mood of the people. Only a well-concerted political-military campaign has the best chance to succeed.

A Workable Plan

In previous chapters, different patterns of counter-guerrilla struggles have been introduced. Chiang's pattern in 1933-34 was to confine the guerrillas in a certain area. After reforms in the government, a military-political offensive was steadily pushed forward against the enemy. This may be called the "geographical-control" plan. Mao's pattern was somewhat different; from 1950 to 1952, he tackled the class basis of the population. He organized the peasants, who were in the majority, through land reform, and attacked the anti-Communist guerrillas with political, social and military might. This may be called the "class-control" plan. Wang's pattern in 1946-48 was mainly a population purification process concerted with mass organization and indoctrination. It may be called the "population-control" plan. Papagos' pattern was very similar to that of Chiang. Magsaysay's program was paralleled to that of Mao, but he destroyed the class basis of the guerrillas by putting their causes into practice. The British pattern in Malaya bore a similarity to that of Wang. The British separated guerrillas from non-guerrillas like goats from sheep, and fought the goats by military-political means. To be sure, the three

different patterns do share many important characteristics which foregoing discussions in this chapter have revealed. However, they have different emphasis. The differences occurred because of different circumstances. So to have a workable plan in counter-guerrilla warfare, the important thing to have in mind is the objective situation of the operations. The political atmosphere, economic conditions, social setting, and cultured background of the arena must be carefully identified. In accordance with the circumstances, either one type of plan or a mixture of the plans can be employed as the model for the counter-guerrilla struggle. When a guerrilla-infested area is limited and a clear boundary can be defined, the "geographical control" model is probably the best solution. When the geographical boundary is by no means clear, and the area is fluid and widespread, "class-control" pattern is certainly the better answer. When guerrilla control is deeply rooted in a community, the "purification" type would do the trick. Different patterns may be used at the same time in various regions, and in the same region at different times. The wise choice depends upon the statesmanship and generalship of the counter-guerrilla leaders.

But aside from regional and national variations, to recover and secure a guerrilla-infested area, the following steps are suggested as a workable counter-guerrilla plan.

The first step is to collect much information about the target area as possible. Special attention should be given to human factors, such as local leadership, active pro-guerrilla elements, public opinion toward the rebels, the interests of the majority, and pro-government forces, etc. Whenever possible, inside links should be made. Guerrilla's garrison conditions must be known. With such information in hand the counter-guerrilla leader can proceed to the next step.

The second step is to send a military force to take over the place from the guerrillas. A surprise attack is preferred; so at least part of the guerrilla forces can be destroyed and local leadership rounded up. Once the location is successfully occupied, the military should make it clear that it has no intention to leave the place in the foreseeable future. Additional troops must be sent in whenever necessary. This stabilizes the mental state of the indigenous people who become more willing to cooperate with the troops. Pro-government elements are of course encouraged.

The third step is to bring in political workers to set up local administration. They should first devote themselves openly to census checking, but secretly to identifying underground guerrilla agents who are the clandestine leaders of the community. This can be done through the techniques Wang used in Hopei. In the meantime, pro-government persons should be located and contacted. Moreover, extensive

propaganda activities must be carried out by the joint efforts of the military and political apparatuses in the locality.

The fourth step is the organization of the people. Everybody, except the young (below 12) and the old (above 65), must be organized into mass organizations. Leaders are appointed from pro-government elements and they are trained politically and militarily from the local authorities. A paramilitary force is formed from the able-bodied men, some of them full-time, and some part-time. Adequate military training is given and they are equipped according to needs. Once the paramilitary force is established, their first task is to try the arrested guerrilla agents and leaders. The guiding rule of the trial should be that severe punishment is limited to those who had notorious reputation and vicious records against local people under the guerrilla rule. Local forces are authorized to carry out the punishment. Those who are convertible to the government side should be given intensive political indoctrination. Mass organizations are given special roles, each member is assigned a job, and their interests are played up by various meaningful activities. The community now becomes an integrated whole.

The fifth step is political and economic reforms. Politically, the election of local leaders should gradually take the place of appointment. Young and capable persons should be encouraged to have the opportunity to serve.

First, local councils are formed and followed up with the election of village heads and town mayors. They should have special training and average pay. Political workers from outside now serve as advisors and supervisors. Economically, wherever there is a land problem, land reform must be resolutely carried out. It may follow the pattern of the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan. Land redistributed evenly among the peasants who till the fields, and landlords are paid in cash for their lost land on a mortgage basis. Roads are built, farming methods improved, and handicraft started. Social injustice, if any, is eliminated.

The sixth step is to test the local leadership with fire. The full-time paramilitary force is given some tasks of the military, such as scouting in guerrilla territory and pursuing fleeing guerrillas. A part-time paramilitary force takes over the bulk of garrison jobs with the regulars firmly behind them and other mass organizations assisting them. Elaborate plans are drawn up to deal with enemy attack. They are discussed and fully understood by local leaders of all organizations. In case of such an emergency, each organization would take its position automatically. Discipline is reasonable yet is rigid; rewards and punishments are seriously meted out. Mocked exercises are conducted. After several tests under fire, the indigenous people are sure of themselves, having proven themselves competent to take care of the community to which they belong.

The seventh step is the use of the regular military force in a neighboring guerrilla area and recover it from the rebels. Outside political workers follow the advance. The locality is now an independent entity in itself. However, it gets necessary support and assistance from the government. Indeed, it has become a reliable part of the government clear of the guerrilla menace. In the newly acquired area, the counter-guerrilla process is repeated.

The whole process probably takes from three to six months. The success of such a plan depends on (1) the ability and discipline of the military and political arms of the government, (2) the validity and morale of local organizations, (3) the thoroughness of purification, (4) the degree of success of the reforms, especially the land problem, and (5) the training and potentials of local leaders. But if the government has the determination and will to win in counter-guerrilla warfare, all of these conditions can be easily met. Especially when a guerrilla struggle becomes internationalized, the government in power should have little difficulty in getting adequate material and financial support from a strong ally. With fortitude and drive, counter-guerrilla leaders will be able to reach their goal by carefully taking these steps.

Of course, all of these can be fully accomplished only with a visible, energetic and clean national government. The degree of success varies with the capability and prestige

of the national leadership without which the struggle would be on the decline, regardless of the amount of aid pumped in from the outside.

Summary

Counter-guerrilla warfare is an effort to save the nation from multi-phased attack by guerrillas. Its success cannot be achieved solely through "military operations," (but through) a "combination of political, social, economic, and military action."⁴⁰ Indeed, like guerrilla warfare, it must also be a war of totality. It is ideology, the cause of the struggle must be highly upheld. It is political maneuver versus political maneuver; people's minds must be won. It is mass organization versus mass organization; all social strata must be thoroughly mobilized. It is reform versus reform; social miseries and grievance must be cut down. It is military operation versus military operation; victorious campaigns are needed. It is enlightened leadership versus enlightened leadership; national government must be clean and strong. Persuasion should go hand-in-hand with purification and coercion. Counter-guerrilla warfare can thus be won.

The victory over guerrillas means the success in national reconstruction. As Cross put it: "the government of an underdeveloped nation subjected to unconventional

⁴⁰Osanka, op. cit., p. 291.

(guerrilla) attack is actually fighting two wars. One is to defeat the immediate threat posed by the guerrillas. The other is to carry the country through the turmoil and frustration of modernization and early industrialization."⁴¹ To reconstruct a nation under war emergency is something like a "one stone, two birds" process. This is why counter-guerrilla warfare becomes such a strenuous task. It is therefore evident that "a successful response to the problem posed by the guerrilla is neither simple to plan nor easy, cheap, and quick to carry out. . . . Lasting success requires a viable political settlement, and constant operational success over a period of time demands the proper political framework for effective military action."⁴² It is one of the greatest challenges for any government to face. But with enlightened leadership and workable programs, counter-guerrilla warfare has every chance of winning. To conclude his chapter, probably Crozier's words about Magsaysay's success are adequate.

Pure repression was ineffectual, so was a presidential amnesty against a background of administrative chaos. In the end, 'enlightened repression'--efficient operations combined with visible reform--did the trick.⁴³

When political, military, and social operations are "efficient," reforms in all fields are "visible," and even

⁴¹Cross, op. cit., p. 104.

⁴²Paret & Shy, op. cit., p. 81

⁴³Crozier, op. cit., p. 220.

repression is "enlightened," the "trick" of counter-guerrilla warfare can be done anywhere in the world.

CHAPTER VI

THE OUTCOME OF GUERRILLA WARFARE--

SOME MEASUREMENTS

Thus far the theory and practice of modern guerrilla warfare, as well as its counter measures, have been discussed. As students of political science, our last question is: can the outcome of a guerrilla struggle be forecast or predicted? Indeed there have been attempts to solve this problem. For one, Samuel B. Griffith, an ardent student of modern guerrilla movement, has worked out a scale to measure the outcome of such a struggle. He listed ten determinants for the measurement. Each of them was arbitrarily weighed on a scale of 0 to 10. The belligerents were scored in accordance with their performance on the determinants. From the difference between the total scores of the parties involved, the winner or loser can be roughly predicted. Griffith's ten determinants are: (1) appeal of program, (2) popular support, (3) quality of leadership, (4) quality of troops, (5) military efficiency, (6) internal unity, (7) equipment, (8) base area terrain, (9) base area communication, and (10) sanctuary.¹ He used his scale to measure

¹Griffith, op. cit., pp. 27-31.

the comparative strength between Castro and Batista, and Ho Chi Minh and the French, and asserted that the determinants were "valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative."² Doubtless his scale helps to evaluate the outcome of a guerrilla struggle a great deal. However, it is by no means flawless. Evidently he put too much emphasis on the factor "base." Three determinants are in this area (no. 8, 9, and 10). It outweighs all other variables. For instance, how can "base area communication" have equal weight with either "popular support" or "quality of leadership?" The weight of the military is also tremendous. It covers another three variables (no. 4, 5, and 7). Actually "quality of troops" and "military efficiency" can hardly be separated. On the other hand, important constants and variables like human and natural resources under actual control of the belligerents, aid from foreign allies, and the stability of political, economic, and social conditions are not mentioned at all. It is therefore not only "other determinants no doubt (can) be adduced,"³ but also some of the factors can be merged or even dropped.

As a revision of Griffith's scale, the following factors are suggested for the measurement of the outcome of guerrilla warfare:

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

(1) Resources under actual control. Human and natural resources are absolutely necessary in a guerrilla struggle. But they must be under the actual control of the belligerents. For instance, the National Government of China had limited control over Tibet, Sinkiang, Inter-Mongolia and other remote provinces before 1936. In the same token, the Chinese Communists did not have the actual control of the cities masses which were organized by the CCP in the first stage of their struggle. Actual control means that human and natural resources can be tapped for the guerrilla or counter-guerrilla efforts without reservation. It is an important constant factor because the quantity and quality of the resources determine the potential strength of the rivaling parties.

(2) Appeal and support. Appeal of programs correlates with the popular support that they receive. Appeal is the cause of support which, in turn, is the effect of appeal. Without appeal there would be little support, and an unsupported appeal is not appeal at all. To get more popular support, both sides have to reinforce their respective appeal. This variable is most important, because as stated before, in a guerrilla struggle, people's minds must be won first. Only with the support of the people can resources under control be effectively used.

(3) Economic and social stability. The importance of stability in the community with regard to guerrilla

struggle fully manifests itself in the third stage of the Chinese case. Social chaos and economic collapse contribute greatly to the defeat of the Nationalist counter-guerrillas. To a certain extent, the instability in South Vietnam has definitely severed the efforts of the government. Mao had complained that economic adversity was one of the major causes of his defeat in Kiangsi. Stability in economic and social conditions makes the appeal easier to accept by the populace; meanwhile, the use and development of resources can be carried out as planned by the opposite parties. Indeed stability is the pre-requisite in carrying out any war effort.

(4) Political unity and efficacy. This variable includes the honesty and efficiency of the political apparatus, the degree of organization and indoctrination of the people, the cooperativeness among factions or cliques within a party, and political validity at the grass-roots level. As previously stated, without a highly organized party or association, guerrilla warfare can hardly be started; and without an incorruptable and efficient government counter-guerrilla warfare would be greatly handicapped. The organizational factor is doubtless a decisive one.

(5) Military strength. This item includes the physical strength of armed forces under the command of the opponents. Paramilitary forces should be counted. In the meantime, how the military is organized and administered must

also be taken into account. For instance, the existence of a political arm and the excellence of its intelligence set-up should be rated. Since military strength is the striking power of the rivaling parties, its importance is assured.

(6) Morale and training. The military structure is functional only when the morale of the troops is high, and morale is kept through training and discipline. Training also determines the capacity of the fighting force. Government troops without special training cannot deal squarely with the guerrillas, while partisans must be trained thoroughly in order to survive and grow under difficult terrain and hardships. Morale and training decides the quality and capability of the troops. Without them, the military arm can hardly operate effectively.

(7) Equipment and logistics. No soldier can fight with his hands and stomach empty. Disregarding their morale and training, troops must have something to fight with and they have to be supported by somebody else. Even the guerrillas who are supposed to be able to get their equipment and supply from the enemy must have some definite resources of their own. Everything needed for fighting and subsistence must be delivered into their hands. Indeed equipment and logistics are indispensable factors in a guerrilla struggle.

(8) Base terrain. Terrain means the geographical features of the base area, whether it is easy or difficult for the enemy to operate. It is most important in the early

stage when the guerrillas are weak. In the same token, if the terrain in government-controlled area is difficult for the guerrillas to operate, such as big plains and good communication networks, the same effect will result.

(9) Ally and sanctuary. How much aid the belligerents are getting from their respective allies, especially when sanctuary is given so that one side is immune from enemy attack, are quite influential to the outcome of the struggle. When guerrilla warfare is highly internationalized, this factor becomes even more salient.

(10) Leadership. Leadership is regarded as the most decisive factor in guerrilla warfare. Under enlightened leadership other factors can be developed to their highest level. But as discussed before, leadership does not necessarily mean the qualifications of the man on the top. Collective wisdom and organizational decisions of the leading groups or the elites are just as important.

With such a revision, the determinants would certainly give a better indication of the comparative strength of the belligerents in a guerrilla struggle. However, to assign weights to each of them is a risky thing. The variables and constants discussed above can hardly be put into concrete numbers. Any attempt like this, as Griffith did, is rather subjective and without empirical proof. The non-availability of relevant data prevents the comparison of rivaling strength in solid figures. It is probably only fair to say that with those determinants in mind, prudent students of guerrilla


warfare can roughly tell which side is in a more advantageous position or on the way of winning. A scale like this, needless to say, does provide some help to the prediction of the outcome of a guerrilla struggle.

Another scale which may be helpful is the basic model of the Richardson process which is used for the analysis of international conflict. According to Kenneth E. Boulding, the viability of two opposing powers depends upon three important variables: (1) the geographical distance between them, (2) national strength at their respective home bases (or home strength), and (3) the loss-of-strength gradient (or LSG).⁴ Viability increases with the increase of distance, home strength, and LSG.⁵ In order to survive, the weaker party must keep itself from the stronger opponent as far as possible; in the meantime, it should work hard to increase its own home strength and the LSG of the rivalry. On the other hand, if a stronger party intends to destroy its weaker opponent, it must move toward its prey as close as possible; raise its own home strength and decrease its LSG. The first stage of the Chinese case serves as a good example. While Mao settled himself in the mountains in Kiangsi, he had in mind to keep away from Nanking, the national capital and power center of the KMT, as remote as possible. Meanwhile, the difficult terrain in his base area

⁴Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 229-32.

⁵Ibid.

would increase the LSG of the National Government and Mao's efforts to build up a Red Army sufficiently enhanced his home strength. Chiang counteracted by moving his headquarters from Nanking to Nanchang, the capital city of Kiangsi which was only some 200 miles from Mao's bastion. Then he built roads leading to Mao's guerrilla area, thus his LSG was decreased. Meanwhile, he made necessary reforms and military reorganizations to boost his home strength. As a result, the viability of the CCP was changed from "unconditional" to "conditional" close to the end of the first stage.⁶ To use a Richardson game of survival or extermination diagram, the situation is shown below:




⁶ Defined Boulding: "A party that cannot be absorbed or destroyed as an independent source of decisions is said to be "unconditionally viable." A party that can be absorbed or destroyed by another is "conditionally viable" if the party that has the power to destroy it refrains from exercising this power." Ibid., p. 58.

A was the original position of the KMT, Nanking; B was the original position of the CCP, Juichin. AH was the home strength of the KMT in 1927, and BK that of the CCP in the same year. The LSG of both sides, HE and KE, meets at E; thus to the left of DE was the territory of the KMT, and to the right that of the CCP, as in 1927. Then from 1927 to 1934 the strength of the KMT increased from H to H', and the CCP from K to K'. If the KMT stayed at Nanking and its LSG remained unchanged, their boundry would be moved to D'E'. But Chiang moved his headquarters to A', Nanchang, and leveled off his LSG by road building in the guerrilla area from the slope of H'E' to that of H'F', the whole picture was changed. The CCP became conditionally viable instead of unconditionally viable.⁷ It could no longer hold its own territory.

Stage 4 of the Chinese case can also be demonstrated with this model. Mao would like to make Taiwan, the KMT's last bastion, from unconditionally viable to conditional. By reorganizing his army and stationing them on the coast facing Taiwan, he was able to cut down the distance and increase his strength. But the Formosan Strait is patrolled by the joint forces of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and the National Chinese Navy, Mao's navy and air-force were weak so his LSG was then decreased very sharply. In the meantime, Chiang

⁷When the LSG line of one side covers that of the other side without a joint, the other side becomes conditionally viable. Ibid., p. 232.

made reforms in Taiwan and increased his home strength, and the Sino-American navy forces boosted his LSG quite a bit, so the KMT became more viable than ever before. The following diagram shows how the situation changes.⁸



Now the KMT's position is at A, or Taipei, Taiwan, and the CCP at B, or Peking. Their forces are in balance at DE which to its left is the territory of Chiang, and to the right that of Mao. From 1950 to 1958, Mao had his strength grew from K to K' and Chiang from H to H'. Then Mao moved his forces to the coast that was from B to B'. Ordinarily his LSG would be G'K'F', and that of Chiang GH'F, so the KMT's viability should become conditional just like Mao had encountered in 1934. But the Formosan Strait and the strong U. S.-China navy kept Mao's armies from any effective military action. They shelled Quemoy in 1958, but failed to get

⁸For the discussion about the change of slope of LSG and its implications, see *ibid.*, pp. 260-64.

air and sea superiority. Thus Mao's LSG decreased from G'K'F' to G'K'E'. On the other hand, Chiang had all the control in the air and on the sea, so his LSG was leveled from GH'F to GH'E'. As a result, the boundary maintained at DE'. The status quo was achieved.

From the analysis above, it is possible for students of guerrilla warfare to measure the viability of a guerrilla movement by such variables like geographical distance, home strength, and the loss-strength-gradient. The Richardson model proves to be helpful. The difficulty is that neither home strength nor LSG can be accurately measured.

Another measurement can be found in any Communist-led guerrilla struggle. The scale is the number of the Communist party members. The Chinese case also provides an excellent example. From 1921 to 1962, the number of CCP membership is shown in Table 8. The ups and downs of the CCP membership clearly indicate the fortune of the Communist-led guerrilla movement. There had been three decreases and two slow-downs. The first sharp decrease came after the "long flight." In 1937, already two years after the CCP arrived in Yen-an, the membership was only 15% of that in 1933. The second decrease came after the Communist-led New Fourth Army was wiped out by the National Government in 1941. It took them two years to recover from that wound. The third decrease in 1951 was evidently caused by the widespread anti-Communist guerrillas from 1950 to 1951. It took the CCP three years to return to its regular growth rate. After

Table 8. Numerical growth of the CCP, 1921-1962.*

Year	Number of Members	Avg. Annual Increase	In Relation to Guer. Warfare
1921	57	66	
1922	123	66	
1923	432	309	
1925	950	259	
1927 (before 'coup')	57,967	28,508	
1927 (after 'coup')	10,000		guer. war. started expansion in Kiangsi
1928	40,000	30,000	
1930	122,318	41,159	
1933	300,000	59,227	soviet republic days "long flight" & after expansion in S-K-N
1937	40,000	-65,000	Border Region & behind enemy lines.
1940	800,000	253,333	defeat of the New Fourth Army
1941	763,447	-36,553	"
1942	736,151	-27,296	victory behind enemy lines
1944	853,420	58,635	
1945	1,211,128	357,708	V-J Day
1946	1,380,320	137,192	enter Manchuria
1947	2,759,456	1,411,136	secured in Manchuria
1948	3,065,533	306,077	big-scale civil war
1949	4,488,080	1,422,547	the CCP victory
1950	5,821,604	1,333,524	first year rule
1951	5,762,293	-59,311	anti-Communist guer. warfare
1952	6,001,698	239,405	anti-Communist guerrillas defeated

1953	6,612,254	610,556	
1954	7,859,473	1,247,219	
1955	9,393,394	1,539,921	
1956	10,734,384	1,340,990	
1957	12,720,000	1,985,616	
1959	13,960,000	620,000	after "100 flowers" campaign and the commune system
1961	17,000,000	1,520,000	
1962	18,000,000	500,000	anti-Communist guerrilla warfare started again

*Sources: The major sources for this table are Shih-shih Shou-Tse, (Current Events Handbook) no. 18, 1956. and People's China, no. 18, September 16, 1956, pp. 17-26. The figures for 1956 are found in Teng Hsiao-ping, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution," Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), I, 209. Figures for 1957 are given in Teng's Report on the Rectification Campaign (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), p. 45. The 1959 figures are from Ten Glorious Years (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960), p. 283; the 1961 figures are from Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) July 1, 1961; and the 1963 figures are based upon a mimeographed document issued by the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Defense, An Investigation of the 7th and 8th Central Committees Personnel of the CCP (Taipei, Taiwan: November, 1963).

1954, the first slow-down of its growth came in 1959, evidently the result of the failure of the "One Hundred Flowers Bloom and One Hundred Thought Contend" campaign and the "people's commune" system in 1957 and 1958. The second slow-down happened in 1962-63 when the anti-Communist guerrilla warfare was renewed in 1962. Since the Communist party assumes the leadership of its guerrilla struggle, it is only natural that its membership reveals the success and failure of the movement. When a Communist party is leading such a movement, a look at the growth or decreased rate of its membership would give the correct hint of the development. The trouble of this Scale is that outsiders probably cannot get the statistics from the Communists at the right time. Usually, it takes months or even years for the Communists to publish their statistics. However, if such figures are available from reliable sources, they serve as a good indicator of the trend of a guerrilla struggle. These three measurements, i.e., Griffith's scale, Richardson's model, and Communist party membership, which have been discussed here, are by no means delicate tools. Neither can they be accurately applied. They can only be regarded as crude instruments. Tremendous refinements are needed. Their application must be very careful and no prediction should be made solely depending on them. Yet, when they are handled with consideration and care, the general trend of a guerrilla movement can be forecast and its outcome roughly predicted.

Modern guerrilla warfare has arrived at its mature stage, but its research and measurement are still in their infancy. Probably it would be a long time before students of political science will find the panacea to cure the guerrilla ill; and no less time will be needed for the structure of an accurate tool to measure the outcome of a guerrilla movement. However, with ardent zeal and persistent research in this unique field, it is quite possible that such a cure and measurement can be developed.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Modern guerrilla warfare is one of the biggest problems of our times. Over twenty countries have experienced this violent struggle; half of the population on the earth has been directly or indirectly involved; and under a nuclear stalemate its role in national and international politics is becoming more important with the progress of time. Indeed it deserves the greatest attention of political science students.

Guerrilla warfare, in its modern sense, is not merely an armed mass uprising, nor is it simply a military operation. It is a sophisticated process, with an ineffective and unstable government as its necessary condition, and a desperate, frustrated, and ambitious group of men who hold contradictory political ideology from and threatened by the incumbents as the sufficient condition. Assisted by such contributive conditions like economic backwardness and inequality, social conflicts and injustice, cultural heterogeneity, and foreign manipulation, guerrilla warfare is then well underway.

Guerrilla warfare is a war of totality which employs every possible means and mobilizes every possible resource

for this torrent struggle. Ideological causes and political maneuvers, organizational techniques and psychological offensives, terrorism and sabotage, intelligence and stratagems, and military strategies and tactics are carefully planned and highly concerted. Slowly yet steadily, step by step modern guerrillas march toward their goal--the destruction of the enemy and the establishment of a new political regime of their own.

Modern guerrilla warfare distinguishes itself with universal and deep-rooted mass basis. Sociologically speaking, it is essentially a mass movement. Being the weapon of the weaker party in the struggle, the guerrillas must win the minds of the people with ideological persuasion, cumulate their strength with thorough and comprehensive organization, discipline them with indoctrination and coercion, purify them with purges and campaigns, train them for guerrilla activities, and finally lead them into political and military operations. Only with the majority of the people firmly sided with and in the hands of the guerrillas can their struggle be won.

Guerrilla warfare is always political-oriented. To gain control of the government is its ultimate aim. Guerrillas cooperate with their enemy only for expedience. Whenever and wherever possible, they would strive to overthrow the government. A new political order under their control is the final goal. They resort to protracted struggle to wear

out the enemy. Though there have been early collapses of the incumbents, so far there have never been easy defeat of guerrillas. Thus, dogged determination, the will to win, and fearlessness of hardships and sacrifice become the outstanding features of any guerrilla movement.

Can guerrillas be defeated? The answer is positive, provided that certain conditions are met. Political, economic, and social reforms must be vigorously carried out. Military and governmental reorganizations must be decisively implemented. With significant improvements in various branches of government services, people's loyalty and allegiance can be maintained. In addition, the masses must be organized, indoctrinated, disciplined and used under the tireless leadership of the incumbents. Once these are accomplished, the basis of guerrilla warfare is destroyed. Public grievances must be reduced, conflicting ideologies must be conciliated, and anomic groups must be heeded and disbanded by persuasion and/or coercion. Finally, victorious military campaigns and population purification process must be taken so that guerrillas can be completely routed out.

Basically, counter-guerrilla warfare is a national reconstruction process under war emergency. Only enlightened programs, multi-dimensioned war efforts, tireless endeavour and excellent leadership can counter-guerrilla warfare be successfully conducted.

The outcome of a guerrilla struggle can be forecast and the comparative strength of rivaling parties can be

measured through various means and ways. However, they are far from accuracy. To control and predict such a complicated process, much more extensive research in this unique field is needed.

To conclude this writing, may students of political science always remember: modern guerrilla warfare is a special form of human behavior. The center of gravity is the man. The winning of the minds of men is the most decisive factor in this violent struggle. Men, not weapons, remain the best war machines.

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