THE MASS FIRE POTENTIAL OF URBAN STRUCTURE AND FORM Thesis for the Degree of M. U. P. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY STEPHEN. WARREN SCHAR 1969 1H is“; “.m‘ "4‘ yv) I! Limb I.’\- Michigan «11 . I I: Universi“ ..*__v BINDING BYTE: IIIIAII & SIIIIS' BIIIIII BINDFRY INC. LIBRA E DEBS .- ~ d N.- a 3.3. - . .. ' I. - 0 .AA‘ 50'. In ,;I “\I V. a h-‘ 5H Q.‘ ‘1 "r ABSTRACT THE MASS FIRE POTENTIAL OF URBAN STRUCTURE AND FORM by Stephen warren Schar This thesis addresses the potential for the spread of mass fire which exists in many urban areas. The specific physical pattern of each community possesses all the variants in form and structure possible, yet some of these forms and patterns create hazards to the effective provision of public safety and community needs. When the physical features of any community, by their congestion, deteriorating condition or mere distribu- tion, create a block to the ability of fire departments to end the fire, then conditions of spread exist. In situations where uncontrolled fires join, mass fire is the result. It is the primary objective of this thesis to examine and identify the parameters which determine when, where, and how a fire can be expected to spread to mass fire proportions. The parameters which are identified are all descriptors of the physical condition of the community as well as the atmospheric environment. It is shown that all parameters concerned with fire can be classified as either atmospheric conditions, fuel conditions, or tOpographical features. These three major classifications are examined for the elements which are critical in the spread of fire. Concepts of heat transfer by conduction, convection, and radiation are examined for pertinence to urban fire spread, and related to the types of fuels found "typically". These general mechanics by which fire spreads are related to the urban "fire environment". The importance of the expected volume of the fire in relation to the expected water supply is discussed, and is shown important in the ability 1w? Stephen W. Schar of a community to contain the fire. The distribution of fire facilities is briefly discussed in relation to the distribution of residential and commercial areas of the community. Standards for the areal distribution of control forces as well as water supply are presented as derived by the American Insurance Association. An important element in the identification of basic parameters for mass fire spread is the schedule for fire grading and rating applied by fire engineers in the determination of fire insurance rates. The importance of "conflagration breeding blocks" as derived from this table lead directly to the identification of those elements of the block's condition which make it a breeder. These elements are applied directly to the basic parameters of fire spread to provide descriptive fire spread parameters for an urban area. The ten parameters identified for basic fire spread are refined to five directly applicable to areal description. This translation allows the author to present the parameters in the form of two models, as taken from fire research sources. The parameters of urban fire spread, as applied within the models, involve (a) the construction features of buildings and structures, (b) the likely configuration and intensity of initial fire, (c) the intensity of development of the area, (d) the expected atmospheric conditions, and (e) the fuel type. The models which result are directed at the Hazard within blocks, and the Spread between blocks. These models are sensitive to differences in the types of land use found within blocks, the amount and kind of Open space found, and the distribution Stephen W. Schar of buildings within the blocks. The concern of planning in these three areas is no less important. Urban planning seeks to plan the physical development of the community along principles which respect the health, well-being, and safety of the community. This thesis identifies those parameters and Ehgi£_critical values which would enable a planner to determine the areas of maximum fire danger within the community. Historical evidence of the occurrence of mass fire is cited as a justification of this tOpic's relevance to urban planning. The relevance lies chiefly, however, in the final determination of the importance of physical planning to the prevention or attenuation of conditions which cause fire spread in massive proportions. If individual fires spread through relatively high density areas because of unfavorable structural and design characteristics, a mass fire may logically be the result of inadequate physical planning and corrective action. THE MASS FIRE POTENTIAL OF URBAN STRUCTURE AND FORM BY Stephen warren Schar A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER IN URBAN PLANNING School of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture 1969 6 52573 5’0 M/m/W Acknowledgement Throughout the process of research and writing for this study, I received valuable assistance from several institutions and individuals. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Judson D. Blakslee, Director of Training and Education, Region Four, Office of Civil Defense. His help and inspiration typify the involvement and dedication of the top professionals currently engaged in disaster preparedness. His influence was a welcome element throughout my study at 0CD Staff College and 0CD Research Library. I would further like to acknowledge the patience and support, both moral and financial, of the Department of Urban Planning, Michigan State University. In particular, the support of Professor Charles W. Barr and Dr. Richard Anderson was extremely welcome at the latter stages of work. Lastly, I wish to thank my wife, Ann, for her devoted patience. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF TABIES . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 LI ST OF FIGUMS O O O O 0 O O O 0 O O O O O O I INTmDUCT ION O O O O O C O O O O O O O 0 O . O 0 CHAPTER I. THE CONCEPT OF MASS FIRE. . . . . . . . Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . Control of Mass Fire . . . . . . . II. THE URBAN MASS FIRE . . . . . . . . . . Fire Loss. . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire Spread Contributors . . . . . III. THE URBAN FIRE ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . Fire Volume and Area . . . . . . . water Supply . . . . . . . . . . . Mutm 1 Aid 0 O O O O O O O O O O O Fire Departments . . . . . . . . . Department Distribution Standards. Fire Environment Grading_and Rating. Correlation to Community Population Structural Condition of the Community 1. Area of the District 2. Street Widths 3. Accessibility of Blocks 4. Area in Qpen Space iii 11 l4 14 15 17 19 21 24 24 29 5. Per Cent Built Upon 6. Height of Buildings 7. Frame Areas 8. Conflagration Breeding Blocks 9. Ex sure Environmental Conditions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. High Winds Frequency 2. Excessive Snowfall 3. Hot Dry Weather 4. Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Divergency in water Supply and Fire Control Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV. MODELING URBAN MASS FIRE SPREAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Urban Vulnerability Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Classifying the Urban Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forest Service Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civil Defense Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . StudygApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conflagration Potential Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hazard Value Per Block. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire Loading by Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Relative Potential Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Application of the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Firebreak Potential Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 35 36 38 38 4O 45 46 48 49 52 54 55 S7 58 62 64 V. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Area and Firebreak Typology . . . . . . . . . . . Radiating Surface Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . StruCtural surface MOdel O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Application of the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . CONCLU S IONS O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 APPENDIX. . A. B. THE MECHANICS OF FIRE AND FIRE SPREAD . . . . . . . . . . . DATA Fire Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elements of the Fire Environment . . . . . . . . . . . Fuel. 0 I O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O 0 Air Mass. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Tom raphy O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The Mechanics of Spread . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 1. SELECTED FIRES AND CONFLAGRATIONS SINCE 1910 . . . 2. RANKING OF PRINCIPAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SPREAD. 3. CHANGE IN RANKING BETWEEN TIME PERIODS . . . . . . 4. COMPARATIVE FIRE STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES. FOR 1966 AND 1967 5. COMPARATIVE FIRE STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES. BY CITY SIZE 6. POTENTIAL FIE MAS - 1967. O O O O O O O O O O O 7 0 WATER ”PL ICAT ION MTE O O O C O O O O O O O O O O 65 66 69 71 74 82 A-12 B-l 10. 11. 12. 13. WATER SUPPLY DEFICIENCIES - 1967 . . . . . . . MUTUAL AID RESPONSE - 1967 . . . . . . . . . . REQUIRED FIRE FLOWS UNDER AMERICAN INSURANCE . ASSOCIATION STANDARDS - 1967 RECOMMENDED AREAS SERVED FOR HYDRANTS-AIA-l967 MULTIPLIERS FOR BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS . . . REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCES IN FEET. . . . . vi B-lO B-ll B-12 B-13 so Table 10. LIST OF TABLES Principal Factors Contributing to Conflagrations in the United States and Canada Since 1900. . . . . Relationship of Fire Department Coverage to Population Density - 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interrelationship and Composition of Municipal Classification and Specific Fire Insurance Rates. . Distribution of Cities over 10,000 Population According to Total Fire Insurance Classification. . Penalty Schedule for Assessing Points for Area of District in Open Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . Penalty Schedule for Assessing Points for Per Cent Of BlOCk area Built Upon O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Classification Divergence Penalty Scale For water Supply and Fire Control Capability. . . . . . Ranked Importance of Parameters Governing the Destruction of Resources by Various Fire Types. . . Variables for Calculating Mass Fire Potential Numerical Values for Hazard by Block. . . . . . . . Block Hazard Rating Model Application . . . . . . . vii Page 11 20 25 28 31 32 37 44 55 61 Figure 1 Figure 2 LIST OF FIGURES Title Page Relationship Between Insurance Classification and POPUl ation o o o e e o o o 0 e o o o o o o o o o o o o 2 7 Radiating Area vs. Exposure Distance For a Rectangular Mdiater O O O O O O O O O ' O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 68 viii INTRODUCTION This thesis is directly concerned with the passive, but vital, role of urban physical form in the public safety of the community. The specific physical pattern of each community possesses all the variants in form possible, yet some of these forms and patterns create blocks and hazards to the effective provision of public safety and community needs. The extent of these restrictions, and their nature, are of the most urgent concern in the planning and provision of those services which deal with emergencies and the protection of life and prOperty. Such emergency or public safety services generally include fire protection, law enforcement, pollution control, and civil defense. The specific emphasis in this study deals with the violent, disas- trous emergency of fire. In each municipality, the organization most directly involved with fire protection control and prevention is the fire department. Yet in either peacetime or wartime situations where loss of life or property may assume large and disastrous prOportions, civil defense is also concerned. The factors which affect the operations or effectiveness of these two agencies will be our major interest. The objectives of the fire protection function are generally con- sidered to be (1) the prevention of fire starts: (2) the prevention of loss of life and property in the event a fire does start; (3) the con- finement of a fire to the place of origin; and (4) the extinction of the fire. These involve the services of those trained in fire prevention and fire fighting. Both are strongly influenced in their effectiveness by the physical form of a community and its pattern of land uses. The objective of this thesis is to examine, in depth, the critical parameters governing the spread of a fire of conventional magnitude to that of a mass or group fire. These parameters must,of course, include large human variables, such as the performance of fire department operations. As elements in fire spread, human errors merit much consideration. The focus of this study is upon physical, environmental variables however; and we shall, therefore, limit ourselves to a discussion of community structure as an element. Ambient fire conditions must be included, as we shall show. The importance of this topic lies in its relevance to the intense urbanization of our society today. Fire cannot be considered a small danger to life and prOperty in developed areas, especially in areas of high intensity of land use and structural development. People cause fires by commission or omission and, therefore, where people congregate so may fires be expected to develop. When a high probability of fire ignition is coupled with a dense distribution of "fuel," fire may be expected to spread. The extent of spread is our concern here. Our objective, as stated above, is a close examination of the urban structure as a fuel array, a spread determinant, and a critical parameter in the early attenuation of mass fire. The treatment of mass as a fuel and space as a channel for heat flow are somewhat alien to the urban planner and designer. He is unaccus- tomed to having his well-structured setting of buildings and space referred to as fuel loads and fire breaks. This concept is the target of this study. Unless the urban planner is inclined to an understanding of the problems faced by disaster experts and pre-planners, he may well be working at cross purposes with them. CHAPTER 1 THE CONCEPT OF MASS FIRE The danger of uncontrollable fire exists in every area of the country, be it urban or non-urban. Destructive fires may vary in nature and size from those involving small amounts of fuel to some involving vast areas of combustible material. While small fires may be extinguished with little effort, the large-scale fire may continue to burn unchecked until the available fuel is consumed. Somewhere between the two extremes of scale an uncontrolled fire passes beyond the capabilities and investments of human control. Such instances are termed major fires. If, however, such fires involve several structures, areas or large quantities of combustibles at one time, the term "mass fire" is rightfully used. Definitions Three terms are commonly involved in the discussion of major fires. These terms are mass-fire, conflagration, and fire-storm. They differ significantly in physical behavior, conditions necessary for their propa- gation and continuance, and impact upon fire fighting efforts. Mass Fire. Mass-fire is commonly taken to mean "a fire which occurs when a single fire extends to cause simultaneous burning of many individual structures or when several separate fires merge into a single fire involving a large number of buildings."1 Mass fires need not involve only structures in urban areas, however. Forest fires frequently evolve into mass fires. Forest fires are, in fact, the most prevalent form of mass fire in this country today. 1B.M. Cohn, L.E. Almgren, and M. Curless, A System for Local Assessment of the Conflagration Potential of Urban Areas. (Chicago: Gage Babcock Associates, Inc., 1965), p. 7. Conflagration. The conflagration might best be defined as a 'mass-fire' involving many simultaneously burning structures and having a moving front. The direction of spread is generally in the direction of the prevailing wind and is influenced by topography as well as by the availability of fuel and combustibles.”2 The point of importance here is the "moving front," generally in the direction of the "prevailing wind." Conflagrations, as a form of mass fire, can occur in both cities and forests. In both, the moving front is long compared to its width and ignites new fuel ahead of it and leaves smoldering ashes in its wake. The designation of many large-scale fires as conflagrations is frequently improper. In general practice the term is applied only to fires extending over a "considerably large" area and destroying large numbers of buildings. It is best to use the term conflagration conserva- tively. For certain fires of a moving nature the term "group fire" may be more descriptive. These include fires within the limit of an industrial plant pr0perty even if several buildings are involved, and fires in a group of mercantile buildings, particularly within a single city block. In both such cases, buildings may be so close together that a fire may spread from some of the buildings to adjoining ones, but it is unlikely to spread outside the plant area because of fire wall barriers, streets, or other Open spaces. Conflagrations, as described by the above definition, generally take one of four different forms in urban areas. The first of these include fires which start in hazardous structures in congested and high building— density areas. These spread in one or more directions before being brought under control. These fires usually spread first to nearby structures of similar quality and chiefly spread in the direction the wind is blowing. 2 Ibide’ Po 6. V n 1.” 2“. I e" I n ‘\ ‘\I A second type of conflagration includes fires which occur in primarily residential sections, and spread beyond control due to closely built com- bustible construction and wooden shingle roofs. Conflagrations which result from extensive forest and brush fires entering a municipality over a wide frontage comprise a third type. Finally, eXplosions and intense flame-out 3 may result in fire over a wide area. Fire Storm. The fire-storm is the third of the large-scale fires. It is a mass fire which involves many simultaneously burning structures and has a stationary front. It is characterized by strong inward-rushing winds created by the incredible demand for oxygen to support combustion in a large area of fire. Complete destruction within the burning perimeter is the result. "Essentially all the fuel over the fire area is simultane- ously ignited and simultaneously burns, producing a thermal convection column so strong that it completely dominates all normally important atmospheric factors. The very strong inflow of air at the periphery prevents any significant outward fire spread."4 Certain fundamental characteristics of a fire storm occur in any fire, but are seldom of the right combination to produce a fire storm even in large areas where a high density of combustibles exists. On a similar scale is the familiar column of smoke and superheated gases that rise over the fire, while air is drawn in at the sides. The difference is chiefly in the volumetric scale of the inward rushing wind, and its speed. In either case, total destruction is the result in the innermost area of the fire, in the area of most complete combustion. The "front," as it were, is 3George H. Tryon, Editor, Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition, (Boston: National Fire Protection Association, 1962), pp. 1-56, 57. 4National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, A Study of Fire Problems, (Washington: The Academy, 1961), p. 24. concentrated on the rising column of flame and hot air. Although certain buildings or areas may escape destruction in a conflagration (due to con- vection currents, fire barriers, or fire fighting efforts), near complete destruction is the result of the fire storm. One of the major factors necessary for the creation of a fire storm is the simultaneous ignition of many fires, and their joining. This requirement was used during World War II on several German and Japanese cities. In Dresden, Hamburg, Leipzig and a few other cities, fire storms occurred with great loss of life. These fire storms were the result of the merging of thousands of individual building fires. They were started by saturation incendiary bombing with a mix of high explosives to "Open up" the structures to fire bombs. In one of these fire storms, the heavily built-up areas of the city were blanketed with a high density of incendiary bombs and high explosives. Within minutes of the first attack with these weapons, roughly two-thirds of the structural units within a four and one-half square mile area were burning. This entire area develOped as one mass fire. A vertical heat column develOped over the central area in the absence of a strong ground wind. This thermal column was estimated to have attained a height of more than two and one-half miles with a diameter of one and one-half miles. The rapid upward movement of "superheated smoke and burning vapors in the thermal column induced strong indrafts of air from around the entire perim- eter of the burning area. Streets entering the burning area became air intake channels. The inrush of air through these channels assumed gale- like prOportions."5 Within forty-eight hours, complete destruction was accomplished. 5Lloyd Layman, First Fire Reseagch Coppelagion Conference. (wash- ington: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 1957), p. 8. --,"l .U ---'.- o e v--‘ r ...-r a“. .. .__'- -_ - T: “'~.~ I I'.' " T “:V . . ‘-v .3d.: ‘. F'.‘ h.‘ I‘- 4: 9% v.1 J I a“ .l- A 'h N.» Control of Mass Fire There are several essential differences between peacetime and wartime mass fires. These shall be discussed briefly later. Their simi- larity rests upon one point, however. That is their effect upon fire fighting capability which is geared to fighting normal fire problems. Prominent fire-research groups have concurred in the philosophy that fire— control action which can minimize the effects of these disasters involves concepts inherent in most fire control practices today, but with added emphasis on pre-planning and hazard reduction. Such pre-planning might be directed along lines involving "(1) the reduction of the number of potential ignitions, (2) the provision for isolation or rapid extinguishment of fire starts to prevent formation of serious fires, and (3) the minimization of fire-spread potential should large-scale fires be produced."6 It should readily be apparent that in situations in which equipment and/or manpower is incapacitated or insuf- ficient to meet all fire starts, the form of the urban area itself may become the most effective deterrent to further fire spread. Not only should it be possible to reduce the probability of large-scale fire Spread through develOpment principles, it is conceivable that once fires threaten to Spread, their effects might be minimized through the passive nature of urban design. The mass-fire problem can certainly not exist in all urban areas. We shall later examine the reasons why. What is important to realize from the very beginning, however, is that the physical urban form, as shaped by natural land forms and man-made development, is a prime determinant of the relative danger of mass fire. 6National Academy of Sciences, A Study of Fire Problems, p. 24. wO-t- - . .- . y" .‘Old .0 .I‘ I v ‘."_ ...: I I... CHAPTER II THE URBAN MASS FIRE The uncontrolled Spread of fire within human settlements is by no means a recent phenomenon. The first recorded conflagrations and mass fires occurred as far back as 2000 B.C., and reportedly destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah. Troy was razed by fire, and prior to the Christian era, Rome suffered six great fires. Rome's worst conflagration occurred in 64 A.D., and reportedly lasted seven days. London has likewise had its share. As early as 1086, the city has been reported to have burned from one end to the other. The Great Fire of London in 1666 destroyed 13,200 houses and many important buildings. That fire, which continued for five days, was fought with little else than buckets, swabs, and little two-quart hand squirts.7 Fire Loss There can be little doubt that the factors which led to such large- loss fires included the building methods of the day, and inadequate fire control facilities. One would expect that the relatively SOphisticated fire control equipment and building controls of today would make the mass fire much less of a danger. Such a conclusion is contrary to fact. Fire losses in the United States annually run in excess of $1.8 billion. In 1966, losses included an estimated $1.5 billion damage to buildings and contents, and another $.3 billion to vehicles, forests, and other 8 prOperty. Deaths from fire numbered 12,100. Much of this prOperty loss, it must be noted, occurred in fires which can be classified as mass fires. 7Layman, p. 9. 8Percy Bugbee, "Fire Administration," The Municipal Yearbook 1967, Orin F. Nolting, Ed., (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1967), p. 374. . D .3. ecu—- 'UA‘ .p. a '5- u.‘ .- s‘. {I II. During the period from 1926 to 1961 conflagrations and mass fires in the United States and Canada caused destruction to "more than 6000 £2£l222223"9 Table B-1 in Appendix B, lists some selected mass fires and conflagrations in the United States and Canada since 1910. Conflagrations are still possible, especially so when the elements discussed in the previous chapter occur in the correct proportions. The relative infrequent occur- rence of the conflagration in prOportion to the total number of building fires may tend to provide a false sense of security. It can be seen from close examination of Table B-1 that many of the major fires occurred in relatively small communities. There can be little doubt of their economic and psychologic impact upon those areas. This chapter is devoted to a study of the 25222 fire environment. The reasons the fires in Table B-1 became conflagrations are therefore important, for they shed valuable light on the means of controlling the spread of mass fire. A study of the causes of spread of all the major mass fires in the United States and Canada from 1900 to 1961 reveals the major elements in the spread of these fires. Table 1 below lists these for the periods 1901-1925, 1926-1961, and 1901-1961. Note should be made, in examining fire loss tables, of elements of inflation in monetary value, of increased fire reporting and recording skill and accuracy, of changing definitions of loss typologies and cate- gories, etc. The point to be taken, however, is that despite our techno- logical improvements, fires are still capable of running uncontrolled and destroying dozens of lives, hundreds of buildings and structures, thousands of acres of forest land, and millions of dollars of real and personal property. 9Tryon, pp. 1-58. 10 .00IH .0 ..a.m.0.z .«00H .coHuHom gumHoze .Hoonccmm coHuomuoua muHm xoouu mo>flmonxo mo :ononxm meadow suede swam ucoeuummoo swam mo uncommon 3on ousuuws EoHoans mo sowmonxm moo Henson: omfiuaovwa mo soflmonxm mmofloafion use: coflusummm> mun oumx Renaud Eoum mooswn mowcwom mmcfioHHSQ oofimuoo venoum mmmm mmoaamdoo smog osmossumncoz msmofluwdn .mooon .mxsovnuwsm mcoflufiosoo Houses muo>om common when some“: money Hmnuo us Doosuusmoo swam oofluoououm ouwm oum>awm ousovmomoH mcHuanu muHm m>Huoommqu wwmmdm nouns mo mwdawsm osou essence swam among no phenom wwm>oomflo swam :0 hmHmQ mmmoom mowugmam swam voodoou ooflummmcou EHmHs wow>0m ow moama Hmnumo3 amp no no: wadedmoso cofluomuoum oaanom mumovmomsH soauoouowm wwdmomxm mo xosq Emumam cowuonwuumflo umus3 musovmomcH .o.m.8 on can» Housswm >ufioon> coax moon mamcfinm poo: 000H 000H 000H R00 «0« asH U “Null." «.0 0.0 0 H H 0 «.0 0.0 0.0 H 0 H «.0 0.0 0 H H 0 «.0 0.0 0 H H 0 «.0 0.0 0 H - H 0 0.0 0.0 0 « « 0 0.0 0.0 0 « « 0 5.0 0.0 «.H 0 H « 5.0 0.0 «.H 0 H « 0.0 H.H 0.0 v 0 H H.H H.H «mm 0 0 « 0.H 0.H «.H 0 0 « 0.H H.H 0.« 0 0 0 0.« 0.0 0.0 0H 0 H 0.« 0.« 0.« 0H 0 0 0.« 0.« 0mM1. 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When viewed as a characteristic of a special "fuel," the flammability of the exposure surfaces of a building or structure is of major concern--not only to the protection of that structure-~but to the prevention of fire-brand ignition and creation. It is important to note that the NFPA statistics show the contribu- tion of wood shingle roofs to conflagration to be diminishing, while the "lack of exposure protection" is shown to be increasing in importance as a parameter. Exposure protection relates to the variables of distance (from an exposed structure to a fire source) and construction material and type on the exterior building surface. Both parameters pertain to fuel characteristics, and both are subject to building restrictions and legal standards. Wind velocity is (Table B-2) a prime determinant in mass fire spread. It would not seem reasonable to assume that wind speed has increased over the years, but more likely that investigatory methods after mass fires have become more thorough and scientific. The importance of wind in spreading forest fires is well documented. The chief value of Tables 1, 8-2, and B-3 lie in the presentation of relatively stable elements in the spread of mass fires. Those variables which have decreased within the last four decades have been subject to public regulation and physical planning. As the public services of a community are improved, the public safety likewise improves. The improvement of the fire insurance based "rating and grading schedule" for communities has allowed municipalities to compare their general "fire 12 environment" with that of other areas, and so improve along certain areas. Failures in control practices have, therefore, decreased in importance. We will later document the importance of "mutual aid" in achieving greater fire fighting ability. Factors not immediately subject to improvement (Table B-3), such as weather conditions, have subsequently risen in importance as spread parameters. In communities relatively isolated from other urban areas, the danger of uncontrolled rural fire entering the town is of vital concern. An example of such would include the destruction of isolated southern California subdivisions by forest fire. The congestion of large urban areas has frequently contributed to the spread of fire by delaying the arrival of sufficient fire control forces.10 In addition, the inaccessibility of buildings in highly develOped areas has not only hampered control efforts, but increased the possibility of transfer of fire by mass. Despite these conditions, however, a high percentage of fires do not reach mass-fire proportions. Table B-4 presents the average building fire loss as being approximately $1342 in 1967. The annual loss per capita by fire amounts to approximately $5.90. This seems a relatively small amount, unless you multiply it by 180 million persons. The size of a community can be an important variable in the amount of fire loss which might result. Quite often the generally higher fire control capability of larger urban areas, and the greater reliability of water supply are important fire loss factors. The per capita fire loss in 1967 for communities under 20,000 persons was $8.24, as compared to $5.90 10Such delay has not always been the result of congested auto traffic and such as found under normal operating conditions. Under conditions of riot and civil disorder, as existed in the Watts uprising in August, 1965, the presence of rubble in the streets, burned automobiles, and the kindling and re-kindling of numerous fires present monumental problems to fire services. - See H.F. Jarrett Fire Data from the Watts Riot: Results of Preliminary Analysis and Evaluation, (Santa Monica, California: System Development Corporation, May 10, 1966). 13 for those over 20,000 in size. Larger cities had fewer building fires per 1000 population as well as a lower average building fire loss. 14 CHAPTER III THE URBAN FIRE ENVIRONMENT One of the prime determinants in the potential magnitude of a fire is the size of the area vulnerable to the rapid spread of fire. In repeated instances in past years, large-loss fires have involved extensive areas, thus placing the distance fire will spread among the first parameters of concern. The horizontal distance of possible fire spread is not the only dimension of concern. The entire fire envelope, a gppig_space, must be considered. This cubic space is most frequently bounded by structural members, as in a building fire, but in the case of fires which spread beyond a closed environment, the stratification of atmospheric conditions might conceivably create an effective wall or ceiling for the fire envelope. Fire Volume and Area In the "usual" instance of an urban fire, active control measures will be brought to bear. The effectiveness of fire fighting methods and proper use of extinguishing agents are important factors in controlling the spread and volume of fire. The exposure planes of a fire when considered as a volume or cubic mass, rather than as a strictly linear function, carry geometrical growth implications relating to both distance and intensity of heat radiation. An examination of large-loss fire statistics will indicate that the majority of large-loss (implying an individual loss of $250,000 or more) structural fires may be expected to occupy more than 100,000 cubic feet in volume.11 Such a volume, when abstractedly considered as a fire envelope, can be seen to present large exposure planes for both radiative spread and control measures. In this vein, the National Fire 11Warren Y. Kimball, "Control of Large-Loss Fires," Fire Journal, Vol. 62, No. 6, November, 1968, p. 73. 15 Protection Service has indicated that 25,000 cubic feet is approximately the maximum volume in which fire can be readily controlled and extinguished with manual application of fire hose streams. 12 The availability of additional water for control has been of little effect, since the require- ments of volumes greater than this size outweigh the ability of control groups to provide effective application. Table B-6, abstracted from the Kimball NFPA study, presents data gathered on 396 large-loss fires in the United States in 1967. It can be determined from the table that in excess of 78 per cent (243 of the 311 fires where area could be determined) of the large-loss fires resulted in loss of greater than 80 per cent of the property involved. Of these, 23 per cent caused extensive damage to other areas as well. The 80 per cent destruction mark was taken in this study to indicate whether or not the fire fighting forces were able to control the fire in the immediate areas of involvement. Significantly, Kimball states that the majority of fire fighting effort in these fires was aimed at protecting the exposure faces of adjacent areas. 13 Water Supply A prime purpose of the application of water to fires concerns the lessening and absorption of the heat of the fire area. A usually acceptable standard of pgg_gallon per minute per 100 cubic feet of fire area is seen necessary for efficient containment and cooling of fire by hose streams. 14 Kimball states, however, that it is not unusual for fire fighters in urban areas, where supply and flow are ample, to apply water at the density rate 12Ibid. 13Ibid., p. 74. 14Ibid., p. 76. 16 of £225 or more gallons per minute per hundred cubic feet of involved fire envelope. Under fire conditions in the presence Of large-volume, large-area fires, as shown in Table B-7, the water application rate does not as a rule even approximate the one gallon per minute per hundred cubic feet ratio. In fact, in only 20.4 per cent of the cases reported by Kimball did the water density equal or exceed the 1.00 g p m mark necessary for cooling and extinguishing the fires. The efforts of fire fighters in such instances must be limited to the protection of exposure faces, and the blocking of further expansion. Reflection as to the large number of fires involving in excess of 80 per cent loss (Table 7) would lead one to suspect that the inability to deliver enough water to the right place at the right time is crucial to the spread and size of major fires. Had more water been available, fire fighters would in all likelihood have applied it at greater densities. Several reasons for the failure or inadequacy of water supply under heavy draught conditions are presented by Kimball.15 In more than 20 per cent of the instances involving fires in prOperties protected by public 25’ private water systems, inadequate supply at the hydrants was listed as a problem. These hydrant deficiencies were found to include four chief factors: 1 Excessive distance to hydrants from fire site 800 to 1500 feet or more 2 - Poor hydrant distribution 3 - Nearby hydrant fenced or locked 4 Inadequate hydrant connections Fire hydrant inadequacy is by no means a new problem. Yet it can be generally stated that lay Opinion holds that fire hydrants are 15 Ibid. l7 "everywhere" and well distributed. There is ample evidence to indicate that many recent shopping center and industrial development sites are not as well protected as they might be. Kimball cites instances of long hose lays necessitated by fenced or "protected" hydrants--lays of as much as 1500 feet. "That delay (caused by the need for long hose lays) was considered one of the principal reasons for the loss of the plant. At another fire, in a large university dairy barn, only one hydrant was provided on a large water main. Although the hydrant was used to capacity, the amount of water applied on the fire was needlessly limited." The importance of water supply, and adequate distribution of hydrants cannot be overstressed. Table B-8 indicates, however, that although inadequate water supply at hydrants is chief among reported supply deficiencies, laxity of upkeep, inattention to safety precautions, and other human factors are of recurring importance. Mutual Aid The majority of large-loss fires in 1967 were fought by more than one fire department. The fire services' concept of mutual aid, with appli- cation also tO civil defense is applied daily by large as well as small communities to augment and bolster their physical and human fire resources. This mutual aid from neighboring communities must be supported by a water supply system at the fire scene capable of meeting the demands of multiple units. Kimball states that it is clear that those responsible for the fore- sight Of mutual aid plans frequently neglect to plan and provide an adequate fire flow to implement their plan. The plan, which on paper seems adequate, is sometimes inadequate in practice. In such cases, the result is a waste of manpower and equipment. 161bid., p. 75. 18 Where water supplies are adequate, a good mutual aid system can generally give a small community the emergency resources needed. Table B-9 presents the mutual aid response to the 1967 large-loss fires reported by Kimball. In 54.5 per cent of the reported fire cases, mutual aid response was used. Conversely, however, this ability of nearly every community to gather resources much in excess of its normal capacity may be responsible for a major problem at many large-loss fires. The ability to rapidly mobilize pumping and tanking capacities may be a causal factor in the in- adequate provision Of water storage and consequent flow. The implications of an inadequate water supply and a greater dependence on mutual aid are broad for mass-fire situations. Such mass- fire situations may require wholesale protection of mile-square areas. The protection of eXposure flanks under such conditions, even assuming ideal atmOSpheric conditions, will necessarily involve a massive water supply 35 ‘ggll_2§_a high level of mutual aid. The lessening of a community's ability to provide either of these control elements will require a reliance upon some other element of protection-~an element which will not vary with deployment decisions but remain an integral part of the community's form. We earlier spoke in terms of fuel needs, fuel density, and the like. These basic fire needs may well present the Opportunity for the least expensive and most reliable form of mass-fire protections I refer, of course, to the living pattern, the develOpment pattern of the community. Adequate building codes, together with effective inspection and strict enforcement provide the basis for a good fire prevention program for the community. The Spacing requirements of all types of structures have been researched and studied quite carefully in terms of individual structures. What has not been so carefully researched is the overall distribution of the urban "fuel" 19 in terms of its mass-fire capability. The density of development, and the "strategic" separation requirements of buildings and structures, are of importance both in terms of fuel spread and protection distribution. One need not think in terms of nuclear holocaust to realize the importance of fire protection unit deployment. Fire Departments The degree of overt fire protection afforded a city is not so much a function of its pOpulation as of its density of pOpulation and the inten- sity and value of its developed property. As a corollary statement, people cause fires, reflecting the direct prOportionality of an area's fire "frequency" to the density of its pOpulation. Within cities and among cities, however, the pOpulation density varies widely. Among the cities in the United States with population in excess of 500,000, the population per square mile varies from 2,000 to 25,000 persons. Unquestionably, population density is related to land use, as is the 33123 of develOped property in monetary terms. Areas with intense pOpulation densities, implying much built-up land, multi-story dwellings, and buildings of all types present a potential fire hazard. In light of these concerns, Kimball points out that "the average resident population per fire department pumper company in New York City is 37,200 persons and per ladder truck company, 61,500. A first-alarm response of four pumper and two-truck companies involves fire companies protecting an average of approximately 15,000 persons. These fire companies cover an average of about six square miles."17 Table 2, below, presents the relationship between fire department coverage and pOpulation density for twenty of our most populous cities. l7Warren Y. Kimball, "Population Density and Fire Company Distribu- tion," Fire Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2, March, 1965, p. 39. 20 .H0I00 .0 .momH .noumz .HmCHDOU 000m :.coHuonfluumHQ hcsmaou swam com wuflmcoo coflumHsmom= .HHOQEflM .M nouns: "mowoom 0.00 00.0H 0 00«.« 00« 000 000H0 000 0.0« H0.0 0 000.« 0.00« 000 00HH00 0.0H 00.0 «H 000.« 000 000 0000000 0.0H 0H.0 0 00H.0 0HH 0«0 0000H00 302 0.«H 0«.0 0H 000.0 000 000.« 00H0000 00H 0.0 00.« 0H 000.0 0.00 000 0H00000 0.0 00.« 0« 000.0 00 000 H0000H00HO 0.0 0«.« H« 00H.0 H.H0 H00 000003HH2 0.H 00.H 0« 000.0H H.00 000 H0000000H0 0.0 00mm0---:;2-:;;a;mm-::. 00«.HH 00 000 000H0>0H0 0.0 00.« . __ 00. _ 000.HH 0.00H 000.H 0H00000 0.« 00.H «0 000.«H 0.00 000 muoerHmm 0.« «0.H 00 000.«H H0 000 0H00H .00 0.0 00.H H0 000.0H 0.H0 000 .O.0.00000H0003 0.« H0.H 00 000.0H 0.00 000 0H00000 0.H 00.H 00 000.0H 0.00 000 000000 0.0 00.H 00 000.0H 0.0«H 000.« 0H00H000HH00 0.« H0.H H0 000.0H 0.00 000 000H00000 000 0.0 00.H 00 000.0H 0«« H00.0 0000H00 0.« 00.H 00 000.0« 0H0 000.0 000» 302 hcsmsoo xooua mcsmEoo Henson 0002 .wm Hem 0H0: «mm Mom Ammawz smmv Aooov muwu use moaaz .om Hem moawz .ow woufim mcaoaflom cowumaomom 0004 pong coflumanmom mo .02 ommwobm mme NBHMZMQ ZOHBdADmOm OE MO¢MM>OU BZHZHmdme MMHm ho mHmmZOHBQAmm N mqmda 21 Cities with population densities in excess of 12,000 persons per square mile average well under 2 square miles per pumper company. In cities with population densities under the 12,000 figure, the average coverage per pumper company is well gyg£_2 square miles. A notable exception, Pittsburgh, has topography requiring much closer coverage, resulting in a 1.04 square mile per pumper company. The distribution of truck companies is, of course, related to the number of multi-story buildings and structures in a given area. The median distribution of ladder truck companies for these twenty cities is one truck company per 50,000 peOple and for each 4.3 square miles. Dallas has one truck company for each 23.4 square miles and each 56,700 persons. Boston, on the other hand, maintains one truck company for every 1.7 square miles, and each 24,800 persons. Policy in Boston requires, however, that two trucks respond to every first alarm building fire. This would imply then that Boston's truck coverage is based on 3.4 square miles and 49,600 persons. 18 The determinant of the "doubling" here is undoubtedly the degree of congestion and structural quality. Both these factors have been previously mentioned as crucial in the distribution of fuels as well as protection units. Department Distribution Standards The American Insurance Association (AIA), which succeeded the National Board of Fire Underwriters (NBFU) in 1965, has revised the distri- bution standards for fire companies. Prior to 1963, the response distances were predicated upon the type of district (high-value of residential) to be protected, but revised standards are now also dependent on the volume 18 _ Ibid., p. 40. 22 of water (fire flow) required. Because of general improvements in streets, equipment and other factors, the standard response distances have also been adjusted. The standard response distances depend to a large degree upon the ability of public water systems to supply sufficient volumes of water at hydrants. The AIA's Safety and Engineering Division, in reappraisal of standards, formulated a schedule for water system adequacy based on "average" conditions in communities of varying sizes. These standard required fire flows are presented in Table B—lO. It is deemed essential by the AIA that in setting required fire flows consideration must be given to the congestion of buildings and structural conditions in the district under consideration. If conditions of these two variables warrant, the required flows may be adjusted accordingly. The AIA does not ignore the differences between residential and high-value (commercial and industrial) districts, either. "For districts other than residential, outside the high- value district considered, the required fire flow shall be considered on the basis of structural conditions and the congestion of buildings and . . . the required duration shall be as indicated for four to ten hours . . . For residential districts, the required fire flow shall be determined on the basis of structural conditions and congestion of buildings. In districts with about one- third the lots in a block built upon having buildings of small area and low height, at least 500 gpm is required; if the buildings are of larger area or higher, up to 1000 gpm is required; where districts are more closely built or the buildings consist of high-value residence, apartments, tenements, dormitories, or similar structures, 1500 to 3000 gpm is required, and in densely built districts with three-story and higher buildings, up to 6000 gpm is required."19 These capacities, as well as those required by Table 8-10, do not ignore the concept of area served, however. Adequacy cannot be con- sidered only a function of the total supply of water deliverable to a district, but must also consider the number of hydrants available as outlets. 19James F. Casey, Editor, The Fire Chief's Handbook, Third Edition, (New York: Reuben H. Donnelly Corporation, 1967), p. 66. 23 The use of excessively long hose lines reduces the water pressure as well as limiting flexibility of control efforts. Prior to 1963, the NBFU conducted a study on the placement of hydrants, in which they expressed a preferance for the area-served distribution rather than the lineal spacing method. The AIA adOpted these proposed figures for spacing as shown in Table 8-11. Implicit in these figures is the variation based not only on community size (reflecting the overall demands on the water system and the probability of multiple fires) but on the degree of high-value development (which may result in lowered water pressures and an inadequate fire flow) and the physical congestion more likely to be found in higher level communities. In addition, the use of automatic sprinklers in high-value commercial and industrial structures is now commonplace. The AIA has recognized the supply to these sprinklers can be taken from the municipal water mains without providing for a secondary supply. This use of primary supplies may present problems of system failure in older structures, necessitating changes in supply procedures. Each such change affects the total effectiveness of the water system.20 The importance of the fire flow available in any response district has become a prime factor in pre-planning for fire actions as well as the placement of pumper and truck companies. The AIA has set the following standards for the distribution of fire companies.21 "High-Value Districts. The standard response distance. . . is now 15 miles for districts requiring fire flows less than 4500 gpm. The standard distance is 1 mile for districts requiring fire flows of 4500 gpm or greater but less than 9000 gpm. The standard distance is 3/4 mile for districts requiring fire flows of 9000 gpm of more. "The standard response distance for the first-due ladder company. . . is 2 miles for districts requiring . . . 201010., p. 68. 211010., p. 71. 24 less than 4500 gpm. The standard . . . is 15 miles for districts requiring . . . 4500 gpm. . . but less than 9000 gpm. The standard distance is 1 mile for districts requiring fire flows of 9000 gpm or more. "Residential Districts. The standard response distance is 2 miles for the first-due engine company and 3 miles for the first-due ladder company. For sparsely built residential districts with buildings having an average separation of 192_feet or more, the standard response distance for both engine and ladder service is 4 miles. For closely built residential districts requiring more than 2000 gpm fire flow or having buildings three or more stories in height, including tenement houses, apartments or hotels, the standard response distances are 1% miles for engine companies and 2 miles for ladder companies, but are to be reduced to l and 15 miles, respectively, when the life hazard is above normal." Fire Environment Grading and Rating The emphasis which we have placed on the provision of adequate water supply and fire company distribution is not only of concern to pre- fire planning. It is reflected strongly in the municipal fire grading and rating system used by insurance companies in determining fire insurance rates. The Standard Schedule for Grading Cities and Towns of the United States with Reference to Their Fire Defenses and Physical Conditions is administered by the AIA. It classifies communities on a relative basis. Under its classification system, a Class 2 city is a better risk than a Class 3 city, but poorer than a Class 1 city. Revision is periodic, and generally thorough. Table 3, below, presents an abbreviated listing of the items of concern to fire engineers. Correlation to Community POpulation For various reasons, the determination of classification for a city has had strong correlation to the ranked size of that community. Figure l purports to show a significant relationship between insurance clas- sification and population growth. As a relatively small and unprotected a-Z/N Znu- .~.<.Jh .._ — “Han/00.5.0 JAN.— — . 0 - Z. .2 5:.-.» ZFOW.~..~ v.10 0:50.170 0.0/«ah a h :U.¢r..h:.fl pt...- ..-.....:II. II u...-I.<.-. 25 0H000000 00H0000 HmoHoHasz .00 .m .0OmH ..ocH .MHHoccoo .m conoom 0x00» 302 .xoonocsm m.m00£0 muwh 0:9 .hmmmo .m nosed "mousom 0000 0000 0000 0000 000m 000m ooom coma OOOH oom .I.oe aucOHowumo Home Hoov Homm Hoom HomN doom HomH HOOH 00m 0 _.I.zomm mo mucaom OH 0 m 0 m m 0 m m H mmsqu mHm msmm Hssz u . ooom wooa 0NH mamuoa III III H mocomuo>wo cofluoououm mus>0um + III III m mcofluwpcou 000m5000 monomomxm + on 00H 00 mcowuflocou Handboouum museums + 0mm 00 m coflucm>mum swam 00000000O + 00« 00 0 030a 00H0HHsm coHuoowumooo + omm wad mm ahead 000m 00H0000 0309 000H 000 00 0000u00000 mnHm oona 00m mm mammsm nouns .mucfiom OoHs> cwoocoo owmaoomm mo cumocou oaooosom mcflusm uocoaoaumo o>wusaom maeuH mo Honasz mo some assocmw mmadm m024MDmZH MMHh UHmHUmmm 02¢ ZOHB¢UHmHmm4AU AflmHUHZDZ m0 ZOHBHmOAZOO Q24 mHmmZOHfidflmMImmBZH m mqmdfi £15: . ,H'IHI . I . I. a .1 .I . 1 . 0 up". ”u" ”I a 0h 0 MI— .«m .0 h Saw I. .nlh .ac a 0: .h‘ an- uhu A..." J.- p...- p\~ 0‘ 1." u.“ up $0.9 .7:- V- c v 0 . - 0n- .0 0 as. 3 Q.“ _ . \‘-. b..': 26 town, a community is likely to be in Class 9 or 10. As a village with some water supply and a fire department, it may find itself in Class 7 or 8. As general improvements are made and municipal services are added, the classification tends to advance toward Class 3. Table 4, below, presents data for 1967, and would tend to support the general conclusions one might draw from Figure 1. In 1967 only 18 cities (out of the 1542 reporting) are in Class 2. No cities qualify for Class 1, chiefly because of "deficiency points resulting from a failure of cities to provide specific restrictions on building construction."22 A further element was "climatic" conditions, which create greater fire spread risks and mobility problems. It is important to remember that the variations in achievement. by different communities as measured by the fire defense grading is as much dependent on the city's financial and provision of public service status as its physical improvements. Fire protection is still a community service, and as such, is subject to variances in management, internal pricing and allocation of resources, and changes in municipal policy. The point is that the sudden demands of a large scale mass-fire emergency are much more likely to be successfully met by a well-run fire protection system in a well- graded city. In that the adequacy of the municipal water system and the responsiveness of the fire agency represent nearly 65 percent of the grading scheme, (Table 14), a high rating may be taken as a good approximation of ability to meet the disaster. As a counter to this point, however, it must be noted that the "preparedness" parameter is only one of a dozen which determine the extent of mass fire spread. The contingencies which inevitably result in any 22Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold, Editors, Municipal Year_ Book, 1967, (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1967), p. 392. HIMWH<0~HJ .‘62 h .H. -u re PI h- -H 3 If, —— Inn-1 F" I—q — I—q» L—II -— I—T 2 -I— r —- —-I III-- —II :11» L1 In.“ 1 Under 500 31001 2001 4001 10,000 25,001 Over 500 to to to to to to 50,000 1000 2000 4000 10,000 25,000 50,000 POPULATION SIZE OF COMMUNITY NOTE: CLASS 1 insurance rating reflects the highest possible fire preparedness, CLASS 10 the lowest. Source: The International City Managers Association, Municipal Fire Administration, (Chicago: The Association, 1956), p. 32. 5000 DEFICIENCY POINTS 28 .Nmm .m .0000 .0000050 .c00um0OOmm¢ 00000002 >000 00:00ussw0uc0 .00m0 .xoom 000» 0smwO0csz 0:9 ”0OHsom mc0uuom0m 000 000 00H 00 0« H« 00.00H «00.H H0009 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.0 0 0H H 0 0 0 0 0 0H.0 H 0 0«H H 0 0 0 0 00.H 0« 0 0HH 0H 0 H 0 0 00.0 00H 0 000 00 0H. H 0 0 00.0« 000 0 H0« 0«H 00 0 0 0 0«.0« 0«0 0 0HH 00H 00 00 0 H 0«.0« HH0 0 0« 00 00 00 H« 0H 00.HH 00H 0 0 0 0 H 0 0H 0«.H 0H « 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.0 0 H 000.0« 000.00 000.00H 000.00« 000.000. 000.000 000H0 0000 000H0 0000 000Ho 00 on on on o» w0>o 000000 :0 0mmus0ow0m :0 000000 00cmwomc0 000.0H 000.0« 000.00 000.00H 000.00« 000000000 0000 00000 an 000000 ms0uuom0m mo c000005mom ZOHBdUHmemflqu MUZ¢MDmZH NMHM 0&808 OB GZHQMOOU¢ 000.00 mm>0 wWHBHU ho ZOHBDmHMBmHQ v mamdfi .,,._.., :0-vm. H... 0" in. II- b 0,- csr w u»- — ‘V. -v 0.“, D v .5! o 9' ti. 5. v.3. 0... u; . , - 31 I ~ I :--. ‘ u k... 29 emergency can easily offset the ability of a water supply to adapt to large volume demands. The elements of community form and structure are fully considered in the AIA fire defense grading schedule. When combined with building law considerations, the structural conditions of a community account for 18 per cent of the final municipal grading. Structural Condition of the Community The 14 per cent of the fire defense grading schedule allotted to structural conditions is designed to be applied in a "district" wide manner of study. In large cities, a separate grading may be applied to each high-value district; in smaller cities, it is designed for application to the principal commercial, high-value area. The important factors used for the grading of this section include the size of the area or district bounded by fire breaks or elements of the city's form which will act as fire breaks, the widths of streets, and the accessibility of blocks. Narrow streets, the inaccessibility of buildings, congestion of the district and of individual blocks, poor general structural conditions and eXposures from surrounding sections all increase the probability of sweeping fires. Buildings of fire resistant construction, sprinklered brick buildings, fire breaks, and fire barriers all tend to constrict a spreading fire. Briefly, then, the important elements of the structural conditions division of the AIA fire defense grading schedule are as follows: 1. The Area of the District. Since an undivided area increases the probability of fire spread, breaks and barriers in the area are important. To be recognized as substantial breaks the specific breaks should have a total width of at least 150 feet. Such breaks would include rivers, parks, streets, railroad tracks, vacant land, railroad embankments, depressed or raised freeways, 30 and possibly groupings of mutually supporting fireproof or sprinklered structures which effectively subdivide a district. Since overall size of the subject district is important, deficiency points are allocated for areas greater than 10 acres in size. For example, a SO-acre contiguous dis- trict is assessed 4 points, while a 400-acre contiguous district is charged with 50 deficiency points.23 2. Street Widths in the District. The critical street width dimension for grading purposes is 50 feet. Where buildings are uniformly set back of the street line, the width of the street may be "assumed" (in the schedule's terminology) as the distance from building front to building front. Deficiency points are charged on the basis of the percentage of total street length within the district of width less than 50 feet. For instance, "for each 10 per cent of total length 50 feet wide or less, assess 5 points."24 Such factors as street widths in high value districts may be seen as having mixed value, especially when viewed in light of the wide range of construc- tion materials possible, window exposure and the like. The principle of the distance of separation of "fuel piles" is an important one, however. 3. Accessibility of Blocks. A block "shall be considered inaccessible if more than 50 per cent of the numbér of buildings have only one side accessible from a street, alley, driveway, or courtyard and other Open spaces readily accessible from the tration, 23International City Managers Association, Municipal Fire Adminis- (Chicago: The Association, 1956), p. 398. 24Irid. 31 street."25 The inability of fire control equipment to reach an area of fire, or to set up a fire line to control a spreading fire is crucial. The presence of closed "fuel piles" is a definite invitation to spreading. 4. Area of District in Open Space. The mitigating value of undeveloped land for fire breaks is again recognized here. The deficiency point system is based upon the per cent of the area of the district in streets and Open spaces which cannot be built upon, including one half the width of the district- bounding streets. This measure, of course, recognizes those areas prohibited from development or structural use by codes and ordinances. It assesses points on the basis of the schedule listed below: TABLE 5 PENALTY SCHEDULE 50 per cent Open or over 0 penalty points 40 per cent 20 penalty points 50 penalty points 30 per cent l 20 per cent 90 penalty points 10 per cent 130 penalty points (Source: Municipal Fire Administration, 1956, p. 399.) i ___1 It can be seen that an extremely high value is placed on the degree of Open space in a high-value district. This is, of course, 25110541., p. 399. 32 consistent with basic combustion principles. It would also seem that the high degree of development of large central core cities would, through this grading factor, prevent that core city from achieving a Class 1 grading, even if its other elements rank high in relation to other cities. 5. Per Cent of Block Area Built Upon. As a corollary to item 4, this factor attempts to assess deficiency points and award credit points for the degree of development by blocks. An example of the assessment scale is below: TABLE 6 ASSESSMENT SCALE Per Cent Built Upon 0 per cent = 140 credit points i 30 per cent 40 credit points 50 per cent = 0 points .__ ~——--—“..-a———. -—- 80 per cent 35 deficiency points 100 per cent 70 deficiency points (Source: Municipal Fire Administration, 1956, p. 399.) Parking spaces, though a develOped use, are not considered as built upon here. It can be seen that 50 per cent of an area in developed use, and likewise 50 per cent in open space is seen as the desirable norm by the standard grading schedule. Obviously, the configuration of the space around the structure is an important variable. The schedule implies, however, that 33 where less than 50 per cent of the block is built upon, the lack of congestion is considered below "normal, and "credit" or minus-deficiency points are allowed. 6. Height of Building_. The height of buildings influences not only the fire environment of a district, but also that district's classification as to density of population, intensity of use, and level of value. In determining the number of points to be charged for the character of the district, however, the schedule bases its scale upon the previously measured quality of the Water Supply and Fire Department. Undoubtedly, it has been determined by fire engineers that the ability of a well-trained fire control group to apply an adequate stream of water and other control measures to upper stories of frame buildings and non-fireproof structures and buildings will offset a certain amount of the problems caused by these large buildings. Where water supply and fire control fall below a certain level, points are assessed on the basis of frame buildings 2 and 3 stories high, frame buil- dings 4 stories and over, frame buildings 6 stories and over, non-fireproof non-frame buildings over 2 and over 5 stories, and for non-fireproof non-frame and semi-fireproof buildings over 6 26 stories. These assessments of deficiency points all attempt to recognize the exposure problem of upper-story fires as well as the difficulties encountered in fighting multi-story fires. 26 Ibid. 34 7. Frame Areas. A frame area "shall be construed as including continuous frame buildings which do not have a separation equal to 2 feet of clear space or a brick-filled wall with no Openings in the wall.27 This portion of the schedule attempts to recognize the extreme hazard of such frame areas as breeder areas as well as easily ignited spread areas. The total lack of exposure protection (either in terms of geometric distance or physical non-flammable barrier) is emphasized not only in the grading schedule section on building laws and fire prevention, but here under structural conditions as well. It assumes much importance for matters of mass-fire prOpagation and spread as well as for individual control efforts. Points of deficiency are assigned under this category in terms of the percentage of the district in contiguous frame construction as well as the size of the area in such construction. 8. Conflagration Breeding Blocks. Closely allied to item 7 , this evaluation section attempts to single out blocks within the district which "have a hazard distinctly greater than normal for the district, and are grouped; that is, the separating space is less than 100 feet . . ."28 The system assesses 5 deficiency points for each block in groups of two or more adjoining blocks. Thus, blocks which are penalized under the frame construction, section are quite likely to be additionally penalized here. 9. Expggure to the District. The fire engineer here attempts to take into account the prevailing wind direction and the 27Ibid., p. 400. ZBIbid. 35 prevalence of frame construction and wooden shingle roofs in the eXposing sections. He considers each of the four exposure sides or planes separately, and then assigns from 5 to 20 points per side. Environmental Conditions It can be seen that the consideration of structural conditions attempts to measure not only the type of materials and conditions existing, but also the placement Of those materials throughout a district, and the quantity of each condition in each block of the district. If up to date and well done, it is an exceptionally comprehensive analysis of the fire environment of the community as well as the municipalities' ability to control and extinguish fire. Since two subject cities of possibly similar construction in two different areas of the country may be exposed to different climatic situations, however, it is necessary that a consideration of various restricting climatic conditions be taken. The AIA fire engineers determine climatic conditions or data for each municipality in four distinct categories. These are: l. The Frequengy of High Winds. The frequency of high winds as well as their duration are important not only to the spread Of fire, but to the humidity of an area as well. Certain areas are exposed to continual or high winds for the major portion of the year, and so are penalized a certain number of points. 2. Snowfall in Excess of 10 Inches per Month. The amount of snowfall received can hamper fire control efforts by restricting control apparatus access, damaging water supply, or causing structural failure and consequent exposure of building contents to fire hazard. An allied hazard is the severity of cold weather. The severity of a winter, as well as its 36 length can immobilize storage of water supplies as well as fire fighters. It presents a very real problem in the freezing of water during fire fighting. 3. Hot Dry Weather. Hot dry weather is an exceptionally dangerous atmospheric condition, especially in forested areas. The lack of humidity in the air increases the danger of spontaneous combustion as well as reduces the amount of humidity in fuels and makes them more susceptible to ignition. 4. Unusual or Exceptional Conditions. These conditions include those disasters or natural phenomenon which are not measurable by the above and which offset protection and increase the probability of fire starts. These include the frequency by which forest fires may enter a city, the probability of tornadoes, or hurricanes in the region which may result in numerous fires and interruption of fire control mobility. Blizzards and severe snow storms impede the fire Operations. Earthquakes may injure buildings, rupture water supply mains and cause fires. Divergence in Water Supply and Fire Control Capability Finally, the NBFU (and now the AIA) have determined that the rela- tive strength of the community water supply and the relative ability of the fire department should n2£_differ by a significant amount, in order to insure that a lack of supply or an inefficient control group will not be tolerated by the community. Where the Class assigned to water supply (that is, Class 1 through 10) differs by more than 2 Classes from that assigned to the fire department (that is, Class 1 through 10), there shall be added to the total points of deficiency (of the community) a certain number of points varying "29 with the amount of divergence between the classes of the two factors. The table is represented below in part. 291bid., p. 401. 37 TABLE 7 CLASS DIVERGENCE PENALTY SCALE -.- -.- -..— -H_.—-.._-~ ... S Divergence in Class Additional Deficiency Points 2 o i g 3 45 l 4 90 E 5 150 i 8 420 ’ 10 680 It can be seen that a community which develOped a sound water supply and attempted unwisely to rely heavily on mutual aid agreements would find itself penalized additional deficiency points. The purpose of the standard fire defense grading system then would appear to be the insurance of a balanced ability by the community to meet a fire disaster. As we shall see, the public service orientation of much of the grading system must be accompanied by a recognition that the physical form of the community is equally as important in the control of massive Spreading fires. The grading schedule considers the community structure, but places little emphasis upon the overall form. This is perhaps understandable, for it is undoubtedly difficult to establish parameters of physical form which are meaningful to mass-fire control not to mention the determination of critical levels for those parameters. The establishment of critical parameters requires an examination of the basic prOperties of fire prOpagation and spread as well as an understanding of the urban fuel environment. With such a basis, a discussion of the parameters of mass fire can begin. 38 CHAPTER IV MODELING URBAN MASS FIRE SPREAD The most desirable form for a section on parameters would be a simple listing, with modeled results attached indicating their respective degrees of variability from the ideal. Such a form would require exten— sive experimentation and observation. Much of this has taken place, yet on a scaled version not yet sufficient for our purposes. We are forced, therefore, to either undertake our own research, or to search the literature for an examination of the critical parameters concerning mass- fire prOpagation and spread. There is a small amount of literature avail- able, and some of it is excellent. Urban Vulnerability Model Perhaps the most direct and applicable is a study carried out at the United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in San Francisco, California.30 It not only presents a vast amount of scientifically ob- tained research material, but presents conclusions and hypotheses in a convincing and logical manner. The authors realize that entirely different sets of parameters may dominate the fire environment under different atmospheric, natural, and cultural conditions. It would be possible to imagine large group fires which could jump all bounds of reality and consume vast areas of an urban area. Such conditions might result under certain types of nuclear thermal pulse and damage. Yet this is an extreme case, in which the conditions would all favor unlimited expansion of the blaze. Such an extreme must be considered less probable than other combina- tions of parameters. 30R.H. Renner, S.B. Martin, and R.E. Jones, Parameters Governing Urban Vulnerability to Fire From Nuclear Bursts, Phase I, (San Francisco, United States Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, June 30, 1966), pp.70-86. 39 A second type of extreme would involve the damage done by blast from a nuclear weapon, or a phenomenally large area of damage done by an earthquake. Under this extreme, though large amounts of fuel are exposed, the conditional parameters are not found in the right combinations and sequences, and massive fires which might be expected do not materialize. The extreme might also occur in urban areas where the fuels are generally "hardened," and although all other conditions seem favorable for fire spread, the fuel is not suitable. In both of these instances the extreme conditions of fuels and ambient conditions affect the outcome of the fire not only as sensitive parameters, but also by bringing about a "gross change in character of the fire from that of the more usual range of values" of the parameters.31 Therefore, the result is likely to be an extensive reordering of the sensi— tivity of the parameters to their critical combinations and interactions. If we remove from consideration both these extremes of end result, the outcome is liable to be, as Renner, Martin, and Jones determined, the "cases where the final fire outcome is in large measure determined by the magnitude of the primary fire."32 In fires resulting from nuclear blast, this will bear direct relation to the area "flashed over" by initial thermal radiation. In the non-nuclear case, with which we are concerned this will not hold true since we are primarily involved with the spread of fire beyond the primary ignition. This assumes that the end result fire was born of a single fire, lost beyond control. In the event of non-nuclear 311bid., p. 73. 321bid., p. 74. 40 multiple ignitions, which might result from natural disasters which precede and cause fire starts, this postulate of self limitation may be applicable. Multiple initial fires may mark the perimeters of the fire, or merge and consume the urban kindling fuels within their immediate range. The end expression of the mass fire in such a case may have been well outlined by the initial fires. Basic Parameters In the terms of the previous discussion on fuel geometry and ambient atmospheric conditions, the parameters in the propagation of mass fire might be stated as those below. They are listed in order of decreasing sensitivity, that is, in the order of the decreasing magnitude of their effect upon the furtherance or attenuation of mass fire. 1 1. Fuel Concentration 2. Size of Initial Fuel Area Determine Occurrence 3. Initial Fire Density 4. Fuel Type i 5. Surface Wind 6. Distribution of Initial Fire Determine Severity 7. Atmospheric Structure 1 8. Topography J The first four of these parameters determine whether a mass fire will occur, and "influence its magnitude of severity.“ The last four "determine whether it will behave as a conflagration or a firestorm."33 These basic parameters must be "translated" to the urban environment, however, to be of value to a substantive study. When the parameters are thus translated, and applied to a specific type of fire, they are quite 33Ibid., p. 72. 41 likely to shift somewhat in order of importance and sensitivity. Renner, et al., postulate that these parameters do indeed shift in emphasis varying with the type of mass fire and its agent--namely conflagration, firestorm, or spreading fires of conventional magnitude.34 In these three types of mass-burn there is little relationship between the number of structures initially fired and the number ultimately destroyed. Indeed, the extent of fire vulnerability of the area is a function primarily of the spread and ultimate magnitude of the fire's physics. Spreading fires of conventional magnitude may well be an early stage of conflagrations or firestorms, dependent on the satisfaction of several factors. The parameters for conventional fire Spread must be satisfied, yet the conditions for mass fire spread must not be achieved. The fuel configuration must evince a high concentration and contiguity of buildings and fuels, combined with buildings and structures which have combustible exteriors. Further, atmospheric conditions must be considered as hazardous fire weather. Conflagrations, as differentiated from spreading fires of conven- tional magnitude, require a "high density of fuel loading, a brisk surface wind, a large number of structures in (the) fire area simultaneously on fire, "35 (and) a large fire area. The Naval researchers estimated that surface wind velocities would have to be greater than 8 miles per hour, with an initial fire density of greater than 50 per cent of the structures in the initial fire area on fire. They further postulate a required minimum initial fire area of .5 square mile.36 34Ibid., p. 33. 351bid., p. 84. 36Ibid. 42 Firestorm start criteria include requirements for a high fuel density, a low initial surface wind (as contrasted to the high wind required for conflagrations), a large number of buildings and structures in the fire area simultaneously on fire, and a large, roughly circular, fire area. The surface wind would probably be below 8 miles per hour, with initial fire density and fire area similar to that for conflagrations. In all three cases we are concerned (in the urban area) with the spread of fire either from structure to structure or from an exterior fuel to a structure. The parameters governing these two types of spread in urban areas vary to a slight degree in their order of importance and sensitivity. In the instance of spreading fires of conventional magnitude the parameters have been fairly clearly delineated by Renner, Martin, and Jones. For example: Structure to Structure Spread 37 l. The specific construction features of the structures are the major parameter in this spread type. Of concern are the number, size, and location of outer wall Openings. The combus- tible nature of the outer coverings, both roof and side wall as well as the roof type all affect the exposure criteria. Further, the overall building dimensions and the shielding it provides for interior fuels are elements of concern. 2. The degree of intensity of the immediate urban "sub-area" is the second parameter of concern. This parameter must con- sider building densities, height of structures, and the separa- tion distances between structures. 37Ibid., pp. 79-80. 43 3. Fuel type is a vital parameter, determining the general cOmbustibility of an area. Under this parameter are grouped concerns with the density, size, age, composition and other factors governing the ignition thresholds, burning times, and heat concentration and radiative properties of the structural fuels. 4. The building fuel load reflects not only the quality of the structure, but the general quantity and type of interior fuels. 5. Of a non-structural nature, the configuration and intensity of the initial fired-structure is a vital factor. The place- ment of the ignitors determines the path the fires will follow, and hence the specific extent of the ultimate burn. 6. The moisture content of urban fuels is chiefly determined by atmospheric quality. The atmospheric measures of relative humidity, recency of precipitation, and general air temperature are all elements determining the general susceptibility of fuels to flame. 7. The wind speed and direction not only determine the area of final burn but the rapidity of spread and the duration of the fires as well. The ability of winds to cause "jumping" fires is crucial in this type of fire. 8. The number, geometry, weight and life times of firebrands are affected both by fuel quality and wind geometry. If mass— transfer of fire occurs, the likelihood of jumping fires is very great. Further, the susceptibility of structures to firebrands is an important element. JNwImh .mm .uamzmb ..0 000:0 .000050 0000052 5000 0000 O0 h00000000:05> :0000 m:0cuu>00 0000060000 .mGCOh. fin.“ UCM sGHHHMZ .mom sHQCGmm cm.“ «mugom 00:0000020 0000000002 no 0:02 “Iv 00:0000050 000050000 00 0:0xcmm 000:00: A00 "0902 44 I]: I I «H I 0000Hom an 00000 00 0000Hm000“ I I «0 I 0005005000 :0 0:0:050 000000xm 00 :0000000m I I 00 I 0:0000x005omw I I m I 00:0:000 005005000 00 00000 000000xm mo >00s0xoumm I I b I :000000000000 0:0 0000065: 0>00000m I I o I 00050 000000xm mo 0000000000000£0 0:0000000 I I N I 0mhe 0:0 0000 0050 000000xm I m 0 I 0005005000 00 00050 000000xm mo >00E0xonm HH 0H 0H 0H . 0000000000 I 00 O0 00 00050 00.:0000ucou 0:00080. O0 0 I 00 :0005000000O 0050 I 0H 0H 0H 00>oo 3000 0 00 I «0 00000 0>on¢ 00000 00 300m 0 0 0 HH 0000000000 0o 00000000000oo 000 00003 I m I O0 00:0000000 00 00000000000050 0005005000 0 m0 I m 00:0:000 scum 0w500m mo 0&030 0:0 000000 I N I 0 00:0000000 no 00005000 0:0 000252“ 0 0 0 0 000000000 000 00000 0003 M m0 O0 I 0 00050 00 0:00:00 00500002 m 0 I 0 00000 00000c0 mo h000:00:0 0:0 :000005000:00 0 0 I 0 0000 H000 0000H000. 0 00 I 0 090.0 0050 H HH 0 m 0000I050 00000 00 0000050H000” m 0 m 0 0005005000 00 00050000 :00005000:00~ mc0xcmm Imc0xcmm mc0xcmm m:0x:0m M 000000 000umw 005005000 005005000 0000000000 “ 000000000 :000000000:00 O0 00 m 000000xm 005005000 M 0000mm 00:000:0>:00. mmmHm Hm memDOmmm m0 ZOHBUDMBme mma 02Hzmm>00 mmmafl2¢M€m mom WUZxooum mmcapflasn omm mmcnpansn omm mmcnpansn was mmcapsnsn owe mxoodn ow ..mmpan oooa pmaaax mmm ..mmpan ooov mmcnpsflsn mmmn pmasax p ..mmpan oops mocnpaflsn mam mmcaoaacn mo mouom mm mxumamm momcmu ocm moumum owuaco .SM .maaa>mnsoq .uaamu .mmaomc< moo .mno .mndnmmom cacnOmaamu .coaamz monam amonom scam: mcst .auao mcxoa .m.z .mmm gonna .6.z .aunu hmmnmn .waamo .moaomcm moq mannad .mEoz .HHH .ommoanu moan: .cuonsm .m.z .msnmmz .mq .uuomc>cunm .oaamo .smflmxumm .U.z .cuom 3oz monam ummnom snowmccaz .mo .mucoaum .mmmz .Emamm .xum .mmcaumm uom scam: .uomcmm Nuau Oama MUZHm mZOHfidmwdquOU QZ¢ mmmHm Qmaumamm aim mamdfi u OUHDOW moma aoma mmma omoa hvma hvma mvma avma mmma vmma vmma mmma omma mNma mmma NNma mama hama oama mama aama use» TABLE B-2 RANKING OF PRINCIPAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SPREAD OF CONFLAGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA Period 1901 to 1925 Percent of Total 1 - Wood Shingle Roofs 25.4% 2 - Inadequate Water Distribution System 13.0 3 - Inadequate Public Protection 13.0 4 - Wind Velocity Greater than 30 m.p.h. 12.5 5 - Lack of Exposure Protection 10.2 6 - Delay in Giving Alarm 2.8 7 - Congestion Reduced Fire Fighting Access 2.8 8 - Failure of water Supply 2.8 Period 1926 to 1961 l - Wind Velocity Greater than 30 m.p.h. 15.3% 2 - Inadequate Water Distribution System 3 - Lack of Exposure Protection 4 - WOod Shingle Roofs 5 - Inadequate Public Protection 6 - Unusually Hot or Dry Weather 7 8 9 0 ...: N [.4 ..a O (DONOUJ-h-bNI-‘N - Delay in Fire Discovery — Delay in Giving Alarm - Congestion Reduced Fire Fighting Access - Forest or Brush Fire Entered Town wa‘lUlmCDKO 1 Source: Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition, 1962, N.F.P.A., p. 1-64. TABLE B-3 CHANGE IN RANKING OF FACTORS BETWEEN TIME PERIODS 1901 - 1925 and 1925 - 1961 Those Increasipg in Importance in Spread of Conflagrations 1. Lack of Exposure Protection 10.2% to 11.1% 2. Wind Velocity Greater than 30 m.p.h. 12.5% to 15.3% 3. Delay in Giving Alarm 2.8% to 5.0% 4. Congestion Reduced Fire Control Access 2.8% to 4.6% 5. Unusually Hot or Dry Weather 8.4% 6. Forest or Brush Fire Entered Town 3.8% Those Decreasing in Importance in the Spread of Conflagrations 1. Wood Shingle Roofs 25.4% to 9.2% 2. Inadequate water Distribution Systems 13.0% to 12.2% 3. Inadequate Public Protection 13.0% to 8.4% 4. Failure of Water Supply 2.8% to less than 1% Source: Fire Protection Handbook, Twelfth Edition, 1962, N.F.P.A., p. 1—64. TABLE B-4 COMPARATIVE FIRE STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1966 and 1967 125.5. 19.51 Alarms per 1000 pOpulation 20.1 20.0 Fires per 1000 pOpulation 10.8 10.4 Losses per capita $5.60 $5.90 Buildings fires per 1000 pOpulation 4.2 4.1 Average building fire loss $1241 $1342 Source: "Fire Record of Cities, 1967," Fire Journal, Vol. 62 #4, July 1968, p. 35. TABLE B-5 COMPARATIVE FIRE STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES BY CITY SIZE Under 20,000 20,000 and over Alarms per 1000 pOpulation 16.6 20.0 Fires per 1000 population 11.6 10.4 Fire losses per capita $8.24 $5.90 Building fires per 1000 population 4.8 4.1 Average building fire loss $1605 $1342 Source: "Fire Record of Cities, 1967," Fire Journal, Vol. 62 #4, July, 1968, p. 36. TABLE B-6 POTENTIAL FIRE AREAS - 1967 (Cubic Feet) # of Fires Involving # of Fires Involving # of Fires Fire Area Less than 80 Per Cent More than 80 Per Cent Extending to (Cubic Feet) of Potential Fire Area of Potential Fire Area Other Properties Under 50,000 3 2 1 50,000 to 99,999 2 11 0 100,000 to 249,999 8 45 12 25C),000 to 499,999 16 55 13 500,000 to 999,999 16 44 11 l,()00,000 to 1,999,999 10 16 11 2,000,000 and over 13 14 8 TOTAL 68 187 56 Area not Reported 9 27 7 Extinguished by Sprinklers 8 0 0 Area not a Factor or No Data 34 0 0 ource: Warren Y. Kimball, "Control of Large-Loss Fires," Fire Journal, November , 1968, Vol. 62 #6, p. 73. TABLE B-7 WATER APPLICATION RATE GALLONS PER MINUTE PER 100 CUBIC FEET OF FIRE AREA Water Density Applied Per 100 Cubic Feet of Number of Fires Fire Area, GPM Reported - 1967 None 2 0.5% ' Under 0.10 33 8.3% 0.10 to 0.24 48 12.1% 0.25 to 0.49 65 16.4% 0.50 to 0.74 36 9.1% 0.75 to 0.99 27 6.8% Total Under 1.00 211 53.3% 1.00 to 1.49 27 6.8% 1.50 to 1.99 13 3.3% 2.00 to 2.99 24 6.1% 3.00 to 3.99 11 2.8% 4.00 and over 6 1.5% Total Over 1.00 81 20.4% Fires where not a factor 10 2.5% Fires where data not available 94 23.8% Total Reported Fires 396 100.0% Source: Warren Y. Kimball, "Control of Large-Loss Fires," Fire Journal, November, 1968, Vol. 62, #6, p. 74. TABLE B-8 WATER SUPPLY DEFICIENCIES - 1967 Cause No. of Reported Occurrences Inadequate supply at hydrants 2 Small dead-end mains Water storage depleted during fire Private water supply inadequate Public and private water storage quickly exhausted Valve closed and pumps not operating Valve partly closed Closed valve reduced pressure Valve found closed when fire started Low pressure Water lost through large pipes in fire building .5me PIPIP*F’F‘P' Failure to start fire pumps Failure of power to city pumps Building standpipe inadequate Small, low-pressure main Volume adequate for only one hydrant P'P'P‘P‘P‘P' Source: Warren Y. Kimball, "Control of Large-Loss Fires," Fire Journal, November, 1968, Vol. 62, #6, p. 77. B-9 TABLE B-9 MUTUAL AID RESPONSE - 1967 | Number of Outside Fire Number of F Departments Responding, Fires ( 1 35 “ 2 36 j‘ 3 30 .. 4 24 5 23 6 - 9 38 10 or more 10 Total with Mutual Aid Response 216 No Mutual Aid Used 164 No Data 16 Total Reported Large Loss Fires 396 Source: Warren Y. Kimball, "Control of Large-Loss Fires," Fire Journal, November, 1968, Vol. 62, #6, p. 76. TABLE B-lO REQUIRED FIRE FLOWS UNDER AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION STANDARDS - 1967 Population Required Fire Flow Duration of Community (gpm) (mgd) (hours) 1,000 1,000 1.44 4 1,500 1,250 1.80 5 2,000 1,500 2.k6 6 3,000 1,750 2.52 7 4,000 2,000 2.88 8 5,000 2,250 3.24 9 6,000 2,500 3.60 10 10,000 3,000 4.32 10 13,000 3,500 5.04 10 17,000 4,000 5.76 10 22,000 4,500 6.48 10 27,000 5,000 7.20 10 33,000 5,500 7.92 10 40,000 6,000 8.64 10 55,000 7,000 10.08 10 75,000 8,000 11.52 10 95,000 9,000 12.96 10 120,000 10,000 14.40 10 150,000 11,000 15.84 10 200,000 12,000 17.28 10 Over 200,000 Source: James F. Casey, Ed. 12,000 plus 2,000 to 8,000 gpm additional for a second fire for a 10- hour duration The Fire Chief's Handbook, New York: Reuben H. Donnelly, Corp., 1967, p. 66. gpm = gallons per minute mgd = million gallons per day TABLE B-ll THE RECOMMENDED AREAS SERVED FOR HYDRANTS (AIA) - 1967 Fire Flow Required Average Area per Hydrant (gallons per minute) (square feet) 1,000 120,000 2,000 110,000 3,000 100,000 4,000 90,000 5,000 85,000 6,000 80,000 7,000 70,000 8,000 60,000 9,000 55,000 10,000 48,000 11,000 43,000 12,000 40,000 Note: 1 acre = 43,546 square feet Source: James F. Casey, The Fire Chief's Handbook, New York: Reuben H. Donnelly, Inc., 1967, p. 67. TABLE B-lZ MULTIPLIERS FOR BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS Class 1 Roof Construction - Fire Resistive, 2-Hour or Better Story w A L L o p E N I N c 5 Height None Few Average Many All 1 .4 1.8 3.6 7.2 1 12 2 .7 3.6 7.2 14 24 3 1.1 5.4 11 22 36 4 1.4 ' 7.2 14 29 4s 5 1.8 9 18 36 6O 6 2.2 11 22 43 72 7 2.5 13 25 50 84 8 5 Over 2.9 14 29 58 96 Class 2 Roof Construction - Noncombustible or Fire Resistrve» Story A w A L L 'o p s N I N c 3 -Height None . Few Average Many All 1 10 11 12 14 18 2 10: 12 , 14 17 27 3 10 13 15. 21 35 4 10 14 17 24 44 S 10 15 19 28 52 6 10 15 21 32 60 7 10 17 23 _ 35 69 8 5 Over 10 17 24 39 77 Class 3 Roof Construction - Wood, Flat or Peaked Up to 15 Feet Story W A L L O P E N I N G S Height None r Few Average Many All 1 30 31 32 34 38 2 30 32 34 37 47 3 30 33 35 41 55 4 30 34 37 44 64 5 30 34 39 48 72 6 30 35 41 52 80 7 30 36 43 55 89 8 & Over 30 37 44 59 97 B-l3 TABLE B-12 Continued ’— Class 4 Roof Construction - WOod, Bow String Truss or Peaked 16 - 25 Feet Story WALL OPENINGS Height None Few Average Many All 1 45 46 47- 49 53 2 45 47 49 . 52 62 3 45 48 50 56 70 4 45 49 52 59 79 S 45 49 54 63 87 6 45 50 56 _ 67 95 7 45 - 51 58 70 104 8 6 Over 45 52 59 74 112 .r—vw A [Class 5 Roof Construction — Wood, Peaked 26 Feet and Over Story ‘ wALL OPENINGS Height None Few Average Many A11 1 60 61 62 64 - 68 2 '60 - 62 64 67 77 3 60 63 65 71 85 4 60 64 67 74 - 94 5 60 64 69 78 102 6 60 65 71. 82 110 7 60 67 73 85 v 119 8 6 Over 60 ’ -67 ' 74 89 127 Source: B.M. Cohn, L.E. Almgren, M. Curless, A System for the Local Assessment of the Conflagration Potential For Urban Areas, (Chicago: Gage. Babcock and Associates, Inc., 1965), p. A48. B-l4 TABLE B-13 REQUIRED SEPARATION DISTANCES IN FEET [Average Windn> Low Normal High L Velocity (7 mph or less) (18 mph or less) , (31 mph or less) fi.hape of . Rectan- Lon ' Rectan- Long Rectan- Long ' Radiating M5? Square gular Recz. Square gular . Rect. Square gular Rect. 1500 120 1600 . 120 120 2200 . 130 130 120 2300 120 ' 130 130 120 2600 125 120 140 135 125 3200 ~ 135 130 120 150 145 135 3800 120 145 140 130 160 155 145 4100 125 120 1§0 145 135 165 160 150 5000 135 130 120 160 155 145 180 170 160 6000 150 145 130 175 170 155 190 , 185 170 7000 160 155 140 185 180 165 200 195 180 8000 170 i__}65 150 "_1931_ 190 175 210 205 190 9000 180 175 160 205 200 185 220 215 200 10,000 190 185 165 215 210 195. 230 225 205 11,000 200 195 170 225 220 200 240 — 235 215 12,000 210 200 180 235 y_4225 205 250 245 220 137600 220 210 185 240 235 215 260 250 230 . 14,000 225 220 195 250 245 220 270 260 235 9 15,000 235 225 200 260 250 225 275 265 240 , m 16,000 240 31-239_____HZQ§ 265 . 260 235 280 11.3721.11_Z§9__ 17,000 250 240 210 275 ‘ 265 240 290 280 255 . 18,000 255 245 220 280 270 245 295 285 260 <3 19,000 265 255 225 290 280 250 305 295 265 m 20,000 270 260 230 295 285 255 310 300 270 - 21,000 275 265 235 300 290 260 320 305 275 - 22,000 285 270 240 310 295 265 325 315 280 4 23,000 290 275 245 315 305 270 330 320 285 m 24,000 295 285 250 - 320 310 275 340 .325 290 m 25,000 305 290 255 325 315 280 345 330 295 2 26,000 310 295 260 330 320 285 350 335 300 27,000 315 300 265 340 325 290 355 340 305 0 28,000 320 205 270 345 330 295 360 345 310 2 29,000 325 310 275 350 335 300 365 350 315 F, 30,000 330 315 280 355 340 305 375 355 320 ‘. 32,000 340 325 290 365 350 315 385 365 330 ‘ 34,000 350 335 300 375 360 325 395 375 340 .4 36,000 360 345 305 385 370 335 405 385 350 l a 38,000 370 355 315 395 380 340 415 395 355 1 . 40,000 380_ 365 320 405 390 350 425 405 365 f " 42,000 390 375 330 415 395 355 435 415 375 3 m 44,000 400 380 340 425 405 365 440 425 380 1 46,000 410 390 345 430 415 370 450 ' 430, 390 I ‘3 48,000 420 395 355 440 420 380 460 440 395 , °1 50.000 425 405 360 450 430 385 470 445 400 z 6' 52,000 435 415 365 460 440 395 475 455 410 i to 54,000 440 420 375 465 445 400 485 460 415 a 56,000 450 430 380 475 450 405 490 470 420 6 58,000 460 435 385 485 460 415 500 475 430 o 60,000 465 445 390 490 465 420 485 435 2 62,000 470 450 400 500 475 425 , 490 440 64,000 480 455 405 480 430 495 445 66,000 485 465 410 y 490 440 500 450 68,000 495 470 420 495 445 460 70.000 500 480 425 500 450 465 Source: B.M. Cohn, L.E. Almgren, M. Curless, A System For The Local Assessment of The Conflagration Potential of Urban Areas, (Chicago: Gage Babcock and Associates, Inc., 1965): p. A51. "'CITI'ITH‘Ijl’iIIIflfijflfilMillfili‘lflil’nflt(I'HTITH’I‘ITI'ES 69 3959