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L I B R A R Y
Michigan Stan .
University

THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF
THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA
1906-1916

by

Steven B. Zamiara

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History
1966

I would like to thank those peeple who have helped
in the preperation of this thesis and in particular
Dr. A. E. Adams for all of the help and suggestions

which he has extended to me.

Table of Contents

Page
IntrOduCtion 0.0.00000000000000000000000.0.0.0.00...O. 1

Chapter I --- The Role and Influence of the
Russian State Duma in Agricultural
Reform. 1906'1911 000.00.00.000000000000 a

Chapter II --- The Duma and Military Reform,
1907-1915 000.000.0000.0000000...0.000 29

Chapter III --- Educational RGfOIm 00000000000000.000066

conCluSion OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0....0.00.00.00.00 81

Appendix 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000C 89

Bibliography OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00...OOOOOOOOOOO... 9n

INTRODUCTION

The October Manifesto issued by Nicholas II, on
October 17, 1905,* inaugurated a new era in the political
history of Russia. In granting the Manifesto. Nicholas
limited his legislative authority, and granted the people
of Russia a voice in the legislative process. It is the
purpose or this study to discover what role the Duma he
established played in determining the Government's policy
in agricultural, military and educational reform from
1906-1916. Besides examining the Duma's influence in
the formation of Government policy in these areas. this
study is also concerned with the Duma's reaction to those
measures which the Government put forth.

Legislative initiative was perhaps one of the most
important rights given to the Duma in the Fundamental Laws.
PrOposed legislation was presented to the Duma either by
one of its own members or by a minister on matters lying
within the jurisdiction of his ministry. Duma committees
were established to examine these prOposals in detail and
to present conclusions or to prOpose legislation on matters
presented to them by the Duma. The establishment of commit-

tees and the number of members each contained were matters

 

*All dates in this work are Old Style (Julian.) To
compute them to New Style (Gregorian), add twelve days in
the Nineteenth Century and fhirteen days after March 1, 1900.

2

determined by the Duma. Each committee selected its chair-
man and secretary from its membership. Members of the press
and persons not connected with the Duma or the Government
were barred from their meetings. In addition to the right
of legislative initiative the Duma also possessed the right
to interpellate ministers.

the internal organization of the Duma was established
by an Imperial Decree on February 20, 1906. According to
this decree the Duma's presiding officer was to be elected
by the total membership of the Duma and serve for one year,
with the right of re-election. He was assisted by two Vice-
Presidents, also selected by the Duma. In addition to
providing a President for the Duma the same decree provided
for a Duma Secretariat. This Secretariat consisted of a
secretary and any number of assistants. the exact number
of which was to be determined by the Duma.1

Elections for the First Duma were held at a time when
Russia was still in the throes of revolution. March. 1906.
These elections were the answer to the long awaited hepes
and demands of Russia's liberals. The Government, however.
wanted the greatest possible support from the Duma. There-
fore, it arranged for the peasants to have the widest
possible representation, since they were looked upon as the

Czar's greatest pillar of support.2

 

1For a detailed analysis of the President's powers and

the office of Secretariat consult Alfred Levin. The Second
Duma, (London: 1900).

2Sergei Witte, Memoirs 2; Count Witte. translated and
edited by Avrahm Yarmolinsky, (New York: Doubleday, 1921),
p. 372.

CHAPTER I

The Role and Influence of the Russian Duma in
Agricultural Reform, 1906-1911

Nicholas in his address to the first session of the
Duma on April 27. 1906, failed to state the government's
position on agricultural reform. The land reform question.
however, was one of the burning problems facing the nation.
The government's failure to present concrete preposals
led to a wide diffusion of preposals from the floor of the
Duma.

Basically all the reform programs presented by the
Duma, called for the transfer of all land for the limited
use, not as the private preperty, of the peasant.1 Paul
Miliukov, the founder of the Cadet Party* writing in 1905.
before the issuance of the October Manifesto, stated that
the chief "crisis" of the Russian state was centered on
agriculture. He based this argument on the fact that the

Russian economy, of the early twentieth century. was one

 

*The Cadet or Constitutional Democratic Party
was a political party based on the English ideas of a
Constitutional Monarchy and civil rights.

1V. A. Maklakov. The First State Duma. (Bloomington
Indiana: Indiana University Press. 19655, p. 139.
3

 

founded almost exclusively on agricultural production.
Miliukov stated that over 805 of the peOple were engaged in
agriculture and that the prosperity of Russia was dependent
upon the prosperity of the peasant. He concluded that since
1861 Russian agriculture had been in a state of steady
decay brought on by a decrease in the average size of
peasant holdings, which produced a corresponding decrease
in individual production. Miliukov considered the indica-
tors of this decay to be a decrease in the consumption of
vodka, increases in tax arreansand increase in immigration.
Miliukov considered the chief causes of the peasant's finan-
cial difficulty to be the forced sale of grain at low prices.
This squeeze on the peasant's pocket-book was caused by both
a lack of adequate storage facilities and an increase in
taxes.2
The government extracted two types of taxation from
the peasant, direct and indirect. Indirect taxes were the
hardest for the peasant to bear, since they were placed on
vodka, tea, sugar, matches, kerosene and the manufactures
of the protected industries.3
Another problem facing the peasant, and affecting his
economic position, according to Miliukov, was that of in-
sufficient land. In the North, the Emancipation of 1861

gave the peasant as much land as he desired, but this land

 

2Paul Miliukov, Russia and its Crisis, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1905), pp. 434-443.

 

31bid., pp. nun-uu7.

5

was of low production and poor quality. For this land
the peasant was forced to pay exorbitant prices, for he
bore not only the cost of the land but also of his emanci-
pation. In the Southern areas of Russia the reverse was
true: here the peasant was given as little land as possible
since it was of high yield. Here too the price of land was
exorbitant.“

Miliukov inferred several ways of solving this problem.
The first involved an intensive system of agriculture, the
second capital investment, and the third an increase in in-
dividual holdings.5 In addition to these the liberals had
proposed, at a Zemstvo assembly in 1902, that the peasant
be given legal protection for his home and family by liber-
ating him from "the whims of the Mir."6

The basic proposals of the Cadets, in the First Duma,
as presented by Hertsenshtein, a Cadet deputy, embodied the
broader points of Miliukov's program; more land for the
peasant, and the abolition of all restriction stipulating
class. Their draft of a land reform bill called for the
exprOpriation of all land - crown, church and private estates.
Owners of the expropriated land were to be given Just com-
pensation. The cost of the land was to be divided equally

between government and peasants. Under the Cadet program

all land was to be placed in a Special "area of state land"

 

EIbid., pp. 448-449.

51bid., pp. 449-459.

61bid., pp. 476-477.

6
for the exclusive use of the peasant. The Cadets proposed

limiting the amount of land to the production norm,* taking
7

the consumer into consideration.
V. A. Maklakov, a conservative Cadet, believed the

Cadet program was not one of long range reform, but one to
meet the immediate needs of the peasant. Re based this
conclusion on Hertsenshtein's Duma speech of May 19, 1906:

It is impossible to prOpose now measures

[sic] calculated to last a long time.

Special measures are necessary, as the

compulsory exprOpriation is a Special meas—

ure. We are passing through a period when

immediate actions [sic] is an urgent neces-

sity. Is it not enough to have the experi-

ence of last year's May illuminations when

150 estates were put to the torch81n the pro-
vince of Saratov, all in one day?

Maklakov, furthermore was Opposed to the official
Cadet bill because it made no provision for releasing the
peasant from the Mir. This he believed, was a violation
of a basic Cadet tenet in civil liberties. The Cadet pro-
gram, he concluded, was equalization at the lowest level:
it was prepared to sacrifice the most productive segment
of the papulation.9

The Trudovik** project and that of the Social

 

*The production norm was based on the idea of a surplus
being produced which would be sold, thereby raising the
peasant above the subsistence level.

**The Trudoviki were the labor segment of the Social
Revolutionary Party, a party dedicated to agrarian socialism.

 

7Maklakov, op. cit., p. 139.
81b1d.. pp. 140-141.
9pygg;, p. 140.

Democrats* called for the establishment of a land fund to
be used by the entire pepulation - peasants as well as fac-
tory workers. This plan was based on the labor norm.**
Lands which the peasant received from the expropriation
of private estates could not be transferred to others; and
a change in the peasants status (loss of workers) could
result in a loss of land.10
Introduction of a land reform prOposal by thirty-
three Duma members "forced" the Council of Ministers to

break its silence on the agrarian question.11

On May 13,
1906, the government, in the name of the Czar, issued a
declaration of its attitude to the demands of the Duma.
This declaration was the product of reports sent by local
governors to the Council of Ministers. One of the major
themes of the governors' reports was the unrest of the
peasants and the lower levels of government employees.12

In addition I. L. Goremykin, (Chairman of the Council of

 

*The Social Democrats were a party based on Marxist
socialism, they Split into two groups in 1903, Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks (the party's full name is the Russian Social
Democratic Labor Party).

**The labor norm was based on the number of workers
available to a family, any change in the number of workers
would result in a corresponding loss in the amount of land.

 

10Alexander Izvolsky, Recollections of a Foreigg
Minister. trans. Charles Louis Seeger (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1921), p. 178.

11V. I. Gurko, Features and F1 res of the Past,
(Stanford: Hoover War Library, I939), p. 475—

War Librér§; §§§gvtso Yo1393§_ ofM Past. (Stanford: Hoover

Ministers), P. A. Stolypin (Minister of the Interior), and
Alexander Izvolsky (Foreign Minister), submitted reports
to Nicholas on the Duma and its various land bills.
Izvolsky in particular stated:

The peasants are far from being repre-

sented by men who express the real spirit

of the agricultural class. The Duma is

expecially dominated by the so called in-

tellectuals of the cities and the semiB

intellectuals of the rural districts.
Izvolsky's statement can give some indication to the type
of beliefs which prevailed in the formulation of the gov-
ernment's declaration.

Cadet proposals on agricultural reforms as presented

to the peasant, according to Maklakov, were deceptive.

The government warned the peasants of this deception:

The Council of Ministers considers that
it is its duty to declare the solution

to this question [land reform] on the
basis proposed by the Duma are absolutly
inadmissible. The Government cannot rec-
ognize the rights of private prOperty for
some peOple and deny them to others; the
Government cannot generally deny ‘rights
of private ownership to land without at
the same time denying owflership to every
other kind of prOperty.1

In preparing a direct response to the Duma's demands
Goremykin was determined to stress the inviolability of
private preperty. At the same time, nevertheless, he
expressed a willingness to work with the Duma within its

area of competence. Particularly favorable concern was

 

13Izvolsky, op. cit., p. 185.

1“Maklakov, 0p. cit., p. 91.

shown for those Duma proposals which were aimed at equaliz-
ing the peasant's legal status with those of other classes.15
Goremykin's speech, however, gave the Duma leaders the

impression that the government's stand on the inviolability

of private prOperty was final.16 Albeit, the government

was interested in lifting the restrictions on the owner-
ship of allotment lands:

...Measures undertaken in this field

must be directed both to the improvement

of the conditions of the peasant's land
tenure within the existing limits and to

the extension of the landownership area

to the landless part of the population,

at the expense of crown lands and by the
acquisitions of privately owned land through
the co-operation of the Peasant Land

Bank. In this respect the forthcoming field
of government activity is wide in scOpe and
fruitful. Raising the level of the agri-
cultural industry, now on quite a low plane
of develOpment, this will expand the pro-
ductivity of the land and thus raise the
level of national prosperity...Extension

of emigration will, therefore, be one of

the first fencerns of the Council of
Ministers.

The government strengthened its position on agricultural
reform when it designated V. I. Gurko, assistant Minister
of the Interior, to reply to the Duma's response to the
Government's Declaration. He reiterated the major premise
of Goremykin's speech, on the abolition of the commune as
the key to the future prosperity of the peasant.

The Duma failed to respond favorably to Gurko's Speech.

 

15Maklakov, op. cit., p. 91.

16V. I. Gurko, o . cit., p. 473.

17Maklakov, op. cit., p. 93.

10

It adopted a revolutionary course of action on the land

question heping the government would grant further con-

cessions.18 In consequence on June 20, 1906, the govern-

ment publicly presented, to the people, what it considered
to be the limits of any land reform program. This state-
ment reminded the peasants that it objected to "the wide-
spread conviction among the peasants that land can belong
only to those who work on it; therefore, eXprOpriation of
all privately owned land must be carried out."19 The Duma
replied to this statement with an open appeal to the people:

1) On what basis did the ministry
voice its prOposals regarding the

land question in the definite form

of a government communication that

may be considered by the people as

an act of legislative character,
emanating from the Supreme Authority?

2) What measures have been taken

to ensure that all organs which publish-
ed the communication make it quite

clear that this announcement is simply
a clarification by the ministry of
legislative prOposals they [the govern-
ment] brought before the Duma for ex-
amination, which will not have any force
or significancezaf they are rejected by
the State Duma?

With the Duma's public appeal to the Council of Min-
isters to withdraw its statement on land reform, the gov-
ernment was placed in a position where it could ad0pt one
of two alternatives: 1) it could acquiesce to the Duma!s

demands: or 2) it would have to save face and dissolve the

 

18Gurko, cp. cit., pp. 474-480.

19Maklakov, op. cit., p. 205.

2°lbid., p. 208.

11

Duma. The second alternative was adOpted and the First
Duma was dissolved on July 8, 1906.

Protesting the dissolution of the Duma, a majority of
the delegates adjourned to Viborg, Finland, and in their
Viborg Appeal* called the government's action illegal and
entreated the Russian peOple to boycott tax payments and
military service, until the demands of the peeple were met.
This appeal was ignored by the people. No pOpular clamor
rose to support the Duma's demands. The government had re-
gained the upper hand, and intended to use its power. In
particular, Stolypin** brought pressure upon the Minister
of Justice to prevent the signers of the Viborg Appeal

21 The Second Duma, it

from standing for the Second Duma.
was offically hOped, would be more willing to co-operate
with the government.

Stolypin's first concern in issuing his reforms of
October and November, 1906, was to quiet liberal opinion.
He believed that the Duma was Opposed to the government
because of its continuation of out-of-date practices.

Stolypin hoped to correct this by effecting certain reforms

and by repealing "certain regulations which caused the most

 

*The Viborg Appeal was a protest against the dis-
solution of the First Duma, and a call to the people not
to pay taxes or comply with the army draft until a new Duma
was assembled. The Appeal was issued in July, 1906.

**With the dissolution of the First Duma Nicholas II,
replaced Goremykin with Stolypin as Chairman of the Council
of Minister.

 

21Gurko, cp. cit., p. 494.

12

exasperation."22 In this way he hoped to disarm the 0p-

position in the Duma and gain public support, (for his side).
It was hoped that important concessions on the land question
would, also, get the Duma on his side. He h0ped that these
concessions would give the government public support and
thereby strengthen it.
Reforms were judged successful by the degree of public

acceptance. Stolypin divided the public into two groups:
1) those who would not accept or be satisfied with any
reforms, and would only be happy with acquiring power for
themselves: and 2) those who were concerned with the future
of Russia. He resolved to work with the latter.23 In a re-
mark to Gurko, Stolypin stated:

There are 180 days before the Second

Duma assembles. We must make good use

of them so that when the Duma meets we

may appear before it with a series of

reforms already realized. This will

demonstrated to government's sincere

desire to remove from the existing order

all things incgmpatible with the spirit

of the times.2

The first reform issued under these circumstances

was the Ukaze of October 5, 1906. This decree brought one
of Goremykin's preposals, in the government's declaration
to the First Duma to fruition. It abolished nearly all

the legal restrictions on the peasant and practically

equalized the rights of all the pe0ple in the

 

22Gurko, op. cit., p. 494.

231b1d., p. 495.
24Ibid., p. 494.

13

Empire.25

Stolypin's second reform was effected by the Ukaze of
November 9, 1906. This decree abolished the Mir as the
center of peasant life, and gave ownership of family plots
to the headcf the household.

Stolypin was willing to accept certain prepositions
voiced in the Duma in formulating his agrarian reform bills.
He believed that exprOpriation should only be resorted to
in cases where it was otherwise impossible for the peasant
to secure woods, water and meadows. Expropriation would
thereby result in the improvement of the peasant's economic
condition.26

Stolypin was Opposed to the reform plans of both the
Social Democrats and the Cadets. Opposition to the Social
Democratic plan was based on the belief that it would equal-
ize everyone at the lowest level. Under this plan the ini-
tial increase in production would be eaten up by the natural
growth of the p0pulation. Also, the leftist plan was
critized because it presupposed a total social and economic
revolution. He considered the Cadet project contradictory
because it recognized preperty rights for the individual
peasant, but not for the squire.27

The conservative elements of the Royal Court actively

Opposed the measures introduced under the Ukazes of October

 

251pm.

26Alfred Levin, The Second Duma (London: 1940), p. 188.

27Ib1d.. PP. 186-187.

14

5, and November 9, 1906. They brought pressure upon
Nicholas II to have Stolypin removed from his position.
Nicholas, however, did not bow before their pressure, even
though his sympathies were with the conservatives. Stolypin
also faced severe Opposition from within his own cabinet.28
Stolypin took the economic point of view in these land re-
forms that preservation Of the large estates was essential
for agricultural develOpment, and, therefore, Opposed
expropriation.29
Cadet reaction to the Stolypin reform program was mixed.
In general, the majority Of the Cadets believed that the
maldistribution of land was one Of the chief causes of the
peasant's economic backwardness and could only be rectified
by breaking up the gentry estates. Furthermore, they be-
lieved that a voluntary solution Of the problem through the
Peasant Land Bank would only prolong the problem.30 Maklakov
took the Opposite point Of view. He believed that a majority
of the peasants supported the program, and that the Cadet
31

program was a product Of fear, not reform.

The Narodniks* were also Opposed to Stolypin's land

 

*The term Narodnik is applied to those peOple who were
interested in the welfare of the peasant, it is applied here
to the Social Revolutionary Party.

 

28Izvolsky, Op. cit., pp. 240-241.

291b1d0. pp. 243-24”.

30Levin, Op. cit., p. 169.

31Maklakov, op. cit., pp. 141-143.

15

bill. They did not consider this reform adequate to meet
the peasant's needs. In its place they proposed the nation-
alization Of all land which was to be doled out to the
peasants as it was needed by them. It was to be administer-
ed locally through independent and democratically elected
bodies.32

Social Democratic Opposition to the Stolypin program
was based on the fear that an economically strong peasant
class would not be susceptible to revolutionary prOpaganda.
In addition the Social Democrats felt a majority Of the
peasants could not afford the cost asked by the Peasant's
Land Bank. Finally, the economic division between the
peasants would only be accentuated by Stolypin's reforms.33

The Menshevik prOposal to work with all parties in
Opposition to the government was accepted by the Social
Democrats in preparing their program Of action for the
Second Duma. In addition, the Social Democrats advocated
the obligatory expropriation Of land without compensation.
They planned to submit their bill to the Duma's Agrarian
Committee, to direct their Opposition to the government's
program, and refrain from attacking the other Opposition
parties.

In drawing up a legislative program for the Second
Duma, Stolypin planned to avoid the mistakes of Goremykin,

and placed a series of liberal proposals before the Duma.

 

32Levin, Op. cit., p. 169.

33Ibid., p. 172.

16

He hOped that such an approach would prevent the aimless
debates which characterized the First Duma. Izvolsky des-
cribed this program by stating that:

Outside Of this programme, sufficient

in itself [sic] to occupy the Duma for

a long time, there were at that period

certain burning questions which demand-

ed immediate solution On the part to be

avoided...but, above all, it was still

the agrarian question that called for

prompt measures, as it had that time

reached a most acute stage.

The land reform measurecf November 9 was immediately
challenged by the Second Duma. Various parties in the
Duma Offered a variety of land reform programs in answer
tO Stolypin's reform law. They believed Stolypin's answer
only prolonged the problem and left unanswered the basic
question surrounding land ownership among the gentry.
Prince Vasilchikov, Minister Of Agriculture, presented

the government's position. He welcomed the Dumazs concern
and its creation of an Agricultural Committee. The Duma
was assured, by him, that the government was concerned with
the people's welfare. In addition, he stated that the gov-
ernment was willing to change prOperty rights when they
conflicted with the "interest Of the State." Although, at
the same time the Government would continue to regard
private prOperty as sacred.35

One of the first parts of the Stolypin reforms to be
considered by the Duma was the one dealing with resettle-

 

34Izvolsky, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
35Levin, O . cit., p. 180.

1?

ment. Debate on this subject commenced with the interpella-
tion Of the Minister Of Agriculture by the Duma. The inter-
pellators believed that certain actions taken by the Min-
istry were illegal. In December, 1906, the Ministry ordered
that all state and surplus lands in Siberia be made availa-
ble for immigrants. Arguments, in the Duma, were based

on the laws of May 23, 1896, and June 4, 1898, which pro-
tected State lands as a surplus for the original settlers.
Also under these laws the surplus lands of the village were
protected for the village's use.

In defending himself Vasilchikov stated that the inter-
pellation was based on a misunderstanding of the law of
1898. He pointed out that article three allowed for such
resettlement. At the same time the Duma was asked to vote
funds for carrying on the resettlement program. The Duma
concluded that Vasilchikov did not prove his point and that
the government failed to present the prospective colonist
with a true picture.36

General debate on the entire Stolypin program was
Opened by Tsereteli, a Social Democrat. He stressed the
point that the gentry had received their land in exchange
for state service, and thatthis service had not been per-
formed since the time Of Peter III. In concluding,
Tsereteli believed that exprOpriation would not lower
production, because once the peasants acquired the land

they would increase their income and then could adOpt

 

36Ibid.. p. 198.

18

modern methods Of agriculture. The end result would be a
strong domestic market for the growing Russian industries.
Each party introduced its respective agrarian reform
programs. They were the same ones which were presented in
the First Duma. These independent plans eventually were
responsible for breaking the Opposition's united front.
N. N. Kutler, a Cadet deputy, Opened with an attack on both
the Trudoviki and Social Democrats for their Opposition to
the Cadet program. He voiced the belief that the peasant
could bear the cost of the land under the Cadet program.

Stolypin noticed that, although the Duma was unani-
mous in its Opposition to his plan, it had wide agreement
on exprOpriation. The Duma encountered difficulty, however,
in agreeing upon a final solution. He tended to regard
the Duma’s actions as revolutionary and dangerous.

In addressing the Duma on May 10, Stolypin lectured
them on the Government's immovable stand on the land
question.37 This speech ended all hOpe for a working ar-
rangement between the Government and the Duma. Stolypin's
speech was the cue for new debates on the agrarian
question.38

On May 28, the agrarian sub-committee voted to annul
the law Of August 27, 1906, regulating the sale of State
Lands to the Peasants. Guarantees were provided for those

peasants who made preliminary arrangements to purchase

 

371bid., p. 186.
381bid., p. 188.

19

land. It also asked for an abrogation Of the Law Of
November 15, 1906, on mortages from the Peasant Land Bank.
The laws were Opposed as being inadequate and a hinderance
to reaching a solution Of the agrarian problem.39
The Duma and government did manage to reach agreement
in one area. Michael Rodzianko, an Octobrists deputy,*
prOposed the creation of a Duma Famine Relief Committee,
to work with the government, and its Famine Relief Commit-
tee. Stolypin praised this program as one which would be
a significant contribution, demonstrating co-Operation be-
tween the government and the Duma. Cadet response was
highly favorable to Stolypin's action, and they believed
that he acted in a truly parliamentary fashion. The left,
however, felt that they were being sold out by the Cadets.“O
Duma Committees to oversee the work of the government's
Famine Relief Committees were prOposed by the Social Demo-
crats. They hoped to use the data gathered by these commit-
tees as ammunition against the government, and to reveal
Offical corruption in the government's work.“1

The Cadets, on the other hand, felt they could not

violate the government's prerogatives, if the Duma was to

 

*The Union Of October 71, or Octobrists was a conser-
vative party which accepted the October Manifesto, and was
willing to use the powers given to the Duma to initiate reform.

 

391b1d.. pp. 193—194.
40

41

Ibid., p. 132.

Ibid. 9 p. 126.

20

survive. They realized that such committees, as proposed

by the Social Democrats, would only raise false hOpes in

the peOple and might even result in the people losing faith
in the Duma. Rodichev, a Cadet deputy, wanted the Duma's
debates on this question to follow the accepted rules of
debate.42 Following this procedure the Duma defeated the
Social Democratic proposal. This defeat prompted Stolypin's
praise for the Duma.

Stolypin resolved, shortly after his speech of May 10,
to dissolve the Duma. The reasons for his decision were
almost identical to Goremykin's for dissolving the First
Duma. TO begin with the Duma's debates on agriculture were
still considered by the government to be revolutionary, and
out of line with the government's ideas. Secondly, the
Second Duma did not fit Stolypin's criterion as an institu-
tion "which was concerned with the future Of Russia."

Prior tO the dissolution of the Duma, which was effect-
ed by a Ukaze on June 3, 1907, Stolypin resolved to alter
the representation of the peasant, the factory worker, and
the minorities. The new Duma, Stolypin resolved, would
be concerned with the "future Of Russia." To this end, he
issued the Electoral Ukaze Of June 3, 1907, This Ukaze
stripped the peasant of most of his representation and gave
the gentry an overly prOportionate rate of representation.
Stolypin took an active part in the elections Of 1907.

Government money was appropriated for the use of selected

 

uzIbid., p. 126.

21

candidates. At the same time Stolypin formed an alliance
with the conservative Octobrist Party.

Stolypin's reform measures were finally adopted by
the Third Duma, which convened on November 1, 1907. The
reforms were initially approved by the Duma's Land Com-
mission, under the Chairmanship of Shidlovsky. The Com-
mission introduced improvements in the Operation of the
law.43 In the main, the Land Law of June 14, 1910, was
primarily the Ukaze Of November 9, 1906. The Duma added
certain provisions which clarified the finer points Of the
Ukaze.

The Duma's additions concerned the procedures employed
in carrying out consolidation. In augmenting the Ukaze, the
Duma prOposed first Of all, that if one-fifth Of the village
population demanded consolidation it lust be voted upon.
Secondly, it reduced the previously necessary two-thirds
vote for complete consolidation to one-half. Finally, the
Duma's version called for the abolition of the Commune if
no redistribution had taken place since 1861.un

The composition Of the Third Duma, resulting from the
Electoral decree Of June 3, 1907, was finally responsible
for the passage of Stolypin's reforms. There was still
strong Opposition from both the extreme Right and Left.

The overwhelming center majority Of the Third Duma, however,

 

. uBBernard Fares, The Fall 9: Russian Monarchy (New
York: Vintage Library, 1939), p. 113.

unAlexander Belimovich, The Land Settlement (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 327-331.

22

was able to pass these measures.“5 In passing his reform
measures the Third Duma demonstrated that Stolypin achieved
his realization Of a Duma which was a powerful collaborator
Of the government.46

On May 29, 1911, the Duma passed further legislation
concerned with agricultural reform. This act conferred
on the peasant, who seceded from the commune, the right to
lay claim to part of the common pasture and forest lands
for his private use. It also allowed for the distribution
of the land if the Mir was broken up - collectivization Of
the divided strips into concolidated holdings. In addi-
tion, it provided for consolidation if two or more villages
held land in common. The Duma also provided for a division
Of land held in common by the peasant and the landlord.
This law, plus the one Of June 14, 1910, brought
Stolypin's land reform decrees into legal existence. The
Duma was now responsive to the desires Of the government.

Taking advantage of the Duma's responsiveness, the
government prOposed additional legislation for the Duma's
consideration, the government, at first, prOposed a bill
which would have abolished the servitudes between peasant
and landlord which still existed in areas of South-Western
and North-Western Russia. In addition, the government pro-

posed a land bill similar to that Of June 14, 1910, for

 

“SIszlsky, Op. cit., pp. 245-246.

uéGurkO, op. cit., p. 9.

23

land consolidation in Siberia.“7 These bills were never
acted upon by the Duma, for the outbreak Of the war inter-
rupted their passage.”8

The Duma had, in addition to the agricultural reforms,
a strong interest in the Government's management of the
means of reform, particularly the Peasant Land Bank.
Stolypin wanted to meet the demands Of both the peasants
and liberals in the area of land reform.“9 He prOposed the
transfer Of all crown and state tillable lands to the
Peasant Land Bank, to be sold by the bank to the peasants,
at prices they could afford. Two Ukazes, those Of November
5, 1905, and November 15, 1906, liberalized the Operation
Of the Land Bank. They provided for full loans to cover
the amount Of the purchase, and a lowering Of interest
rates below that of other institutions.50 There is also
some evidence that Stolypin was even considering expro-
priations in some areas to add to the available land for
Land Bank pruchases. This supposed plan was to be carried
out with the aid of the Cadets,51 but nothing came of these
negotiations.

The Operations of the Peasnat Land Bank were brought

 

u7Belimovick, Op. cit., pp. 340-341.

usIbid., p. 327.

49Gurko, Op. cit., p. 8 and Izvolsky, op. cit., p. 245.

50Michael Florinsky, Russia, §_History and pp Inter-
pretation Vol. II, (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1947), .1217.

SlGurkO, Op. cit., p. 496.

24

to the Duma's attention as part of the Budget of 1910.*

A. I. Shingarev, a Cadet deputy, raised questions concern-
ing the Bank's purchase Of private estates at what he con-
sidered to be inflated prices, and thereby forcing the
peasant to pay a higher price for the land.52 The Duma
did not take any specific action on Shingarev's inquiry.

Stolypin on his return from Siberia, recommended to
Nicholas II that the functions of the Land Bank be trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Chief Administra-
tion of Land Management in the Ministry of Agriculture. He
believed that the transfer would result in the Land Bank
being more responsive to the needs on the peasants.53
Nicholas II, however, refused to go along with the prOposed
transfer, and the Bank's Operation remained in the Ministry
of Finance.

The Duma's role in effecting agrarian reform was both
direct and indirect. In evaluating these roles, the direct
one is the more important. The direct role of the Duma
forced the government to take a stand, and to formulate a
program for agrarian reform; and the Duma's reaction tO
this program. The Duma was indirectly responsible for the

Stolypin reform decrees, since he was trying to avoid

 

*The peasant did not bear the full cost of the land
when it was purchased from the Land Bank. The Bank dis-
counted the price tO the peasant with the difference in
price being made up through general government expenditures.

 

52Kokovtsov, Op. cit., p. 245.

53Ibid.. p. 252.

25

the pitfalls encountered by Goremykin in the First Duma.

Reform proposals by the Cadets, and the parties of
the left, in the First Duma, called for expropriation of
all land for the peasant's use. Goremykin and his cabinet
were Opposed to any form of exprOpriation. and made this
belief known to both the Duma and the peOple. In making
its view known, the government dropped its silence on
agrarian reform, and put forth a program of its own. This
action was precipitated by the prOposals Of the Duma, and
its debates on the agrarian question.

When the Duma failed to take favorable action on the
government's proposals, the government had to defend its
program before the peOple and the Duma. The government's
program was rejected by the Duma with the hOpe that further
concessions, on the land question, would be forthcoming
from the government.

Goremykin had no intention Of bowing to the Duma's
demands, and made this point known on June 20, 1906. This
statement Of policy hit at the basic plank Of all prOposals
put forth by the Duma - exprOpriation. Goremykin consid-
ered private prOperty to be sacred, and would stick to this
point. The Duma, at the same time, was not willing to
yield the point Of expropriation. It called upon the gov-
ernment, publicly, to withdraw its declaration. Finally,
the Duma's severe Opposition to the government's prOposals,
gave the government the choice of either bowing to the Duma's

position or dissolving it. The government had no inten-

26

tion of giving in to the Duma, and it reacted by dissolving
this body. In dissolving the Duma, the government demon-
strated that it was fearful of both the Duma's position and
the consequences which they might produce.

In preparing his reforms and a program for the Second
Duma, Stolypin was indirectly influenced by the First Duma's
actions, and Goremykin's reaction to them. This was brought
out in Stolypin's conversation with Gurko, in which he
made known both his desire to work with the Duma and the
need for a change in the government's position, if co-
Operation was to exist.

Stolypin recognized the need for urgent reform in
agriculture. This was demonstrated in the formulation of
the Ukazes of October and November, 1906. Stolypin accepted
the basic idea of exprOpriation. under limited conditions.
In accepting eXpropriation, a major point of the Goremykin
program was modified.

The Duma's reaction to the Stolypin reforms was any-
thing but favorable. Instead of approving the Ukazes with-
out debate, the Duma reintroduced the reform prOposals of the
First Duma. Stolypin answered the Duma;s attacks upon
his program with a lecture on the government's position.
This lecture did not pacify the Duma, instead it Opened a
new round in Opposition debates. Opposition to the
Stolypin reforms culminated in the decision of the Agrarian
sub-committee to annul the Ukaze of August 17, 1907, which

regulated the sale of state land to the peasant.

27

After his speech Of May 10, 1907, and the Duma's re-
action to it, Stolypin gave up all hOpe of being able to
work with this body. The Second Duma was looked upon by
the Government as a breeding ground Of revolutionary thought.
With this idea in mind, Stolypin dissolved the Second Duma.
At the same time, he issued the Electoral Law of June 3,
1907. This law removed the highly vdbtile peasant element
from the Duma. The peasant was no longer looked upon as
"the Czar's greatest pillar of support." He was now re-
garded as a revolutionary with a radical solution for the
agrarian problem.

The government's reaction was again a direct response
to the Duma's position. For in removing the peasant from
the Duma the government was trying to assure itself a con-
servative majority for future Dumas. The Third Duma
Stolypin hOped would be "interested in a great Russia."

Even though the government and the Duma could not
reach agreement on the agrarian question, they demonstrated
in the Second Duma that they could work together, in par-
ticular, the Duma's willingness to work with the govern-
ment in famine relief. With the dissolution Of the Second
Duma there was an outward defeat of the radical prOposals.
At the same time, however, the modified ideas of the Duma's
prOposals, e.g., accepting modified eXprOpriation, were
embodied in the Stolypin reforms.

Another aspect Of the Duma's direct role was found in
the Operation of the Peasant Land Bank. Stolypin was again

sensitive to the liberal demands when he proposed modifica-

28

tion in the Bank's Operation, which made it easier for the
peasant to purchase and pay for land. This was illustrated
by Stolypin's desire to have the Bank moved from the Ministry
of Finance to that Of Agriculture, after it was attacked in
the Duma.

The Duma's direct role on agricultural reform is best
illustrated by the Third Duma's passage and the changes
which it made in the Ukaze Of November 9, 1906. These
changes may not have been very spectacular, but none the
less, they demonstrated that the Duma did do something
positive in agricultural reform. More importantly, these
changes were accepted by the government.

With the passage of the Land Laws Of June 14, 1910, and
May 29, 1911, the Duma expanded the scOpe of the Stolypin
reforms beyond their original boundries. This action pro-
duced additional prOposals from the government on the agra-
rian question. These proposals were debated in the Duma,
but were never acted upon because Of the outbreak Of WOrld
War I.

The measures enacted in agricultural reform from 1906-
1911, demonstrate that an interaction did exist between
the government and the Duma. This interaction did produce
a series Of reforms in agriculture which had the approval
of various segments of the population. If the Duma's role
was to be characterized, it could be defined as thatcf a

sounding board which the government used to initiate reform.

CHAPTER II

The Duma and Military Reform 1907-1915

Article XCVI Of the Fundamental Laws gave exclusive
power to the Czar in all matters pertaining to the military.
This law, if followed to the letter, would have prevented
the Duma from interfering in military matters. This, how-
ever, was one in which the Duma exercised considerable in-
fluence. One would assume that since the Fundamental Laws
gave the Czar exclusive control of the military, conflict
between the Czar and the Duma would develOp. Quite to the
contrary, the Czar in most cases fully approved the actions
taken by the Duma. In fact, Nicholas II went out of his
way in many instances to gain the Duma's favor.

World War I Opened a whole new era. for the Duma in
military matters, especially in the formation of the Spec-
ial Councils for Army Supply and the Duma's control Of them.
Also during the war the Duma was instrumental in forcing
the Government to rid itself of most Of its reactionary
ministers, replacing them with men more acceptable to the
Duma.

Nine years prior the War with Japan and the War's
catastrophic effects completely destroyed Russia's mili-

tary machinery. Defeat in 1905 was caused primarily by
29

30

poor organization on the part Of the Ministry Of War.
The Secondary causes were the lack Of an adequately train-
ed Officer corps, a deficiency in the selection Of non-com-
missioned officers, and the general physical condition of
the army.1

If the Military situation was to be rectified drastic
measures had to be taken immediately. Russia also faced
other problems in 1906 which needed immediate solution;
foremost among them was the agrarian problem. It was on
the area of agricultural reform that the First Duma center-
ed most Of its attention. The problems of the military
were only given superficial attention by the First Duma.
In the Address to the Czar, the Duma demanded that the
Fundamental Laws be changed to give it a controlling voice
in military matters. This demand, plus the revolutionary
course of the Duma in other areas contributed to the Govern-
ment's decision to dissolve the Duma.2

In preparing for the Second Duma, Stolypin resolved
to prevent the "aimless debates" which had charaterized the
First Duma. It was part of his plan to present concrete

prOposals for the Duma to act upon.3 When the Second Duma

 

1For a complete analysis or Russian defects in 1905
see Alexander KurOpatkin, The Russian Armr and the Japanese
War, trans. A. B. Lindsay and ed. E. D. Swinton ‘(New York:
E. P. DUtton and CO0. 1909) I, pp. 106-107.

2V. A. Maklakov, The First State ngg, trans. Mary
Belkin (Bloomington Ind.: Indiana. University Press, 1964),
Po 92.

3V. I. Gurko, Features and F1 res Of the Past
(Stanford: Hoover War Library, _1939], p.494.

 

 

31

convened* two prOposals dealing with the army were pre-
sented by the Government. On April 17, 1907, Stolypin
presented for confirmation two decrees dealing with revo-
lutionaries in the armed forces. The first restricted the
army from revolutionary agitators and the second increased
the penalty for the distribution of revolutionary material
to the armed forces.

On May 3, the first bill was sent to the Committee on
the Inviolability of Persons.** It was reported out on
May 21, with the recommendation that it be rejected.
Adzhemov, a Cadet Deputy, presented the Committee's re-
port, which stated that under Russian Law only those per-
sons under Judical investigation or on trial were to lose
their civil rights. By extending the effects of Articles
CLXIV and CXCIV of the Law of 1897, the Government was in
effect confusing Judical and administrative Jurisdiction.
This extension placed a hardship upon those who would not
otherwise be called for military service, since they would
have to fill the vacancies created by the law. This could
result, Adzhemov reasoned, in a lowering of the physical
quality of the army.“

Lykoshin, a member of the Ministry of the Interior,

 

*February 20, 1907.

**Before the Third Duma no specific military committee
existed and those measures dealing with the army were sent
to various committees.

 

“Alfred Levin, The Second Duma, (London: 1940), p. 283.

32

replied for the Government. Adzhemov's reasoning, he de-
clared, was in error. Police investigation was of a Judi-
cial nature, carried out under Judical investigators and
used for Judical purposes. The primary purpose of the de-
cree was to protect the government by keeping anti-govern-
ment forces out of the armed services.5
The Duma defeated the government's measure. It was
reasoned by the Duma that if the bill passed, the army
would be composed solely of Government supporters. The
army, it believed, should serve both the peOple and the
Government.6 I
Also on May 3, the Duma received a second decree
dealing with the armed services. This decree extended from
three to six years, the penalty for those convicted of
distributing or reading revolutionary literature in the
armed services. Kuzmin-Karavaev, a Democratic Reform
Deputy,* reported the decree out of committee on May 22.
The report stated that the mere reading of an anti-govern-
ment pamphlet did not constitute a reason for imprisonment
and that the decree placed a greater penalty upon this act
than upon espionage. In addiflan, the bounding over for

Court Martial of people carrying on a propaganda campaign

against the Government was in violation of the Law of 1862.

 

*The Democratic Reform element was a non-aligned
group who was slightly left of the Cadets.

 

5Ibid.. pp. 284-285.
61bid., p. 286.

33

This law provided that only those persons under Martial
Law could be tried by Court Martial.

G. D. Rylke, Chief Military Prosecutor, defended the
bill. He believed that the committee presented an uncon-
vincing argument. He believed that if the bill were de-
feated, the government would be left with only one alter-
native - quarantine the army from the p0pulation. This was
that if the decree were passed only the guilty would suffer.
Liatze, Vice-Minister of Justice, added to Rylke's plea
for passage. He stated that the law was only a temporary
measure and would be repealed as agitation decreased.

I. N. Nagikh, a Social Democratic Deputy, replied to
the Government's argument. It was not revolutionaries, he
declared, but regular tr00ps who were agitating in the
army. They were protesting their poor physical treatment
and abuse by the officers. Correct these, he stated, and
agitation will cease. This line of reasoning was not ac-
cepted by the Duma and this decree was also defeated.7

It was the second Government prOposal, however, on
army affairs, which attracted the most attention. This was
the draft quota for 1907. On April 10, 1907, Rediger,
Minister of War, presented this measure for the Duma's
consideration. He asked that it be considered immediately
in a closed session. V. I. Gessen, a Cadet Deputy, backed
Rediger's prOposal and moved that the bill be referred to

the Finance Committee. Objections were raised by some

 

7Ibid., pp. 288-289.

3H

Duma members to this action; they believed that considera-
tion should be postponed until after it disposed of the
agrarian issue. Gessen argued that the Duma had to either
act on the draft quota by May 1, or it would lose its con-
trol.* The Duma accepted his proposal and referred the
bill to committee.

On April 16, the quota was reported out of committee.
Kuzmin—Karavaev, in giving the Committee's report, stated
that the number of recruits for 1907 was lower than 1906 by
#63,050. The draft, however, still worked a tremendous
hardship upon the economy. It was recommended by the com-
mittee that the entire draft system be reworked, but the
committee recognized that this would take time. The com-
mittee's strongest criticism was the high ratio of draftees
to the total productive segment of the population. Kuzmin-
Karavaev concluded his report by stating that quality was
prefereble to quanity.8

‘ The Cadets backed acceptance of the Government's quote.
The resoned that the empire had extended boundaries which
had to be defended. In addition, the Duma had to act
on the measure to safeguard its right to fix the con-
scription quota.

Zurabov, a Social Democrat, rejected the Cadet and

Government positions. His speech was a masterpiece of

 

*Under the Fundamental Law, if the measure was not acted
upon by this date, the quota of the previous year would stand.

 

3I'bid.o, pp. 290-2910

35

Marxist Ideology. It stated that the primary purpose of
the army was to gain the selfish ends of those in power.
It was proposed by the Social Democrats that the army be
abolished and a militia be created in its place. The
present army, he declared, was good for one purpose —
putting down revolts, not winning wars.
These derogatory remarks prompted Ridiger and the
other ministers present to walk out of the session. When
they did so the right wing elements of the Duma raised
cries of protest against what they called a profane
treatment of the army. F. A. Golovin, a Cadet and President
of the Duma, asked for order and a clarification of Zurabor's
last statement. Zurabov clarified his position by stating
that he was referring to the army prior to the issuance of
the October Manifesto. By this time general confusion
reigned in the Duma and Golovine recessed the session.
Golovin proceeded to the Ministerial Pavillion to rectify
the situation. As he arrived at the Pavillion, he found P.
K. Schwanebach, State Auditor, trying to convince Rediger
that Zurabov had gravely insulted the army. Golovin tried
to persuade Rediger to return to the Duma, but his argu-
ments were futile.9
Golovin retired to his office where he was contacted
by Stolypin. He requested complete details of the in-

cident so they could be forewarded to the Czar, who had

already received a sketchy account of the incident. In

 

9lbld., p. 295.

36

his conversation with Golovin, Stolypin pointed out that
Nicholas was displeased with Golovin's failure to defend
the army. Nicholas, it was reported, was even considering
dissolving the Duma because of this speech. Golovin's de-
fense was that the demonstrations of the right wing pre-
vented any effective measures from being taken, and had in
fact necessitated a recess.

Members of the Cadet Party assembled in Golovin's
office to decide how the situation was to be met. Two al-
ternatives were presented for Golovin's consideration:

1) Zurabov could be expelled from the Duma under article
thirty-eight of the Duma's by-laws; or 2) he could be
issued a reprimand and asked to apologize. It was decided
to take the less drastic action, and Zarabov was asked to
apologize to the Minister of war. This he refused to do,
and Golovin countered by denying him the right to continue
his speech. Zurabov's position was backed by Tsereteli, a
Social Democrat, who declared that Golovin's action was a
denial of free speech. The majority of the Duma sided with
Golovin's position. Tsereteli and the Social Revolution-
aries reacted to this censure by walking out of the Duma.10

Before deciding what action to take with the Duma,
Nicholas wanted Rediger's repnrt. Golovin heard of Nicholas'
request and approached Bediger to present an unbiased
account of what occured. The significance of the Duma's

censure of Zurabov was also pointed out. On Arpil 17,

 

1Olbld.. pp. 296-299.

37

the Council of Ministers requested the Duma's dissolution.
This request was guarded, in that it was decided to wait
until the new Electoral Law was perfected. Nicholas
agreed with these recommendations. He added that such
attacks would no longer be tolerated by the government
because it was not ready to capitulate to the revolution.11

Also on April 17, the Social Democrats hOped to launch
another attack upon the government, the quota, and the army.
Before this attack could create another Zurabov incident,
Golovin asked the speaker to leave the tribune. Aleksinskii,
the last Social Democrat to speak, asked for the quota's
defeat to demonstrate the Duma's support of the peOples
demands.

The Duma passed the draft quota with a vote of 193 to
129. Coupled with the passage was a plea to Rediger for the
fulfillment of his promises of the draft and army reform.12

The dissolution of the Second Duma and the Electoral
Law of June 3, 190?, secured a favorable majority for the
Government in the Third Duma. This majority, however, was
not a passive tool of the government. It was composed of
peOple who wanted reform, and they were determined to
press the government for reforms. The Third Duma set the
pace for military reform in the years preceding the First

World War.

According to the Fundamental Laws, the military was

 

11Ibid.. p. 300.

12Ibid., p. 30#.

38

reserved for the exclusive control of the Czar. It was
through the use of budget examinations that the Duma was
able to raise question about the "iron clad parts"* by
means of some articles in the budget itself. Ministers
were divided into two groups, those friendly to the Duma
and those hostile toit. The Duma's rule was to work with
those who accepted it and Oppose those who were antagonis-
tic.13 This tactic was devised by Alexander Guchkov.**

an Octobrist Deputy. The criterion used in making the dis-
tinction between friendly and antagonistic ministers was
the willingness of a minister to supply the Duma with full
particulars on specific issues. Those ministers who co-
operated with the Duma and gave guarenties that their esti-
mates would be applied to the benefit of the country, often
times had their estimates increased. These ministers were

thus able to find favor not only with the Duma, but also

 

*Under the Fundamental Laws the various Ministers had
to present the Duma their individual budgets. The Duma
had the right to examine these estimates and eithr approve
or reject them. "Iron clad segments" were those articles
which were reserved to the sole prerogative of the Czar.

**Alexander Guchkov was the founder of the Octobrists
Party. He was not a member of either the First or the
Second Duma, but he was elected to the Council of State,
the upper chamber of Russia's legislative structure. Prior
to this he served with the Russian Red Cross in the Japanese
War and was well acquainted with the causes of Russia's
defeat in 1905. He was also asked to participate in the
Governments of Witte and Stolypin, but he refused when his
reform prOposals were rejected.

 

13Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs, (London: 1931),
p. 176.

39

with the Czar.14

The First and the Second Dumas were not overly con-
cerned with military reform. It was left to the Third
IMma.to create the Duma's Committee on Imperial Defense.
This committee worked closely with General Polivanov, an
aide to General Sukhomlinov, Minister of War. Polivanov
was capable of working harmoniously with the Duma. Bernard
Pares, a close friend and an admirer of Guckhov, stated:

it was his [Polivanov's] discussion with
the Duma that elucidated the importance
of machine guns, and it was due to the

Duma that much of the necessary provision
waslgade before the Great War [World war

I].
This statement may be slightly biased, but none the less, it
gives some indication as to the type of work accomplished
by the Third Duma.

Nicholas' reaction to the Duma's activity was
favorable. The same held true for most members of the
government. Count Vladimir. Kokovtsov, Minister of Finance,
reported that the ministers did not hold with complete
autocracy; they recognized "that conditions had changed -
since the day the Romanovs became Tsars of Moscow and
Lords of the Russian Domain."16 The Czar's opinion was

also favorable since he was devoted to his army and was

 

1I'I'Bernard Pares, "Alexander Guchkov," Slavonic and
East Eurogean Review, x1 (July, 1936), p. 124.

15Pares, My Russian Memoirs. p. 179.

16Count Valdimir Kokovtsov, Out 9;; 14% Past.
(Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1935), p. 3 1

4O

impressed by the Duma's activity.17

In the budget debates of May, 1908, Guckhov decided
to denounce the disorders in the armed services during
the Japanese War. He used this speech to call upon the
various Grand Dukes to resign their posts as Inspectors
of the Armed Services:

If we consider ourselves entitled and
even bound to turn to the peOple and to
the country and demand from them heavy
sacrifices for this work of defense, then
we are entitled to address ourselves also
to those few responsible persons from
whom we have to demand no more than the
renunciation of certain terrestrial ad-
vantages, and of certain satisfactions of
vainglory which are connected withBthose
posts which they at present hold.

Paul Miliukov, the leader of the Cadet Party, criti-
cized the speech. He believed the Czar would use it as
an excuse to dissolve the Duma. Quite a different result
occurred; the Government did not come to the Grand Dukes'
defense, and the Grand Duke Nicholas Nichalayevich, In-
spector of Cavalry and Chairman of the Government Commit-
tee of Military Defense, resigned. This resulted in the
army being placed under the Ministry of War. The Grand
Dukes continued on as Inspectors, but were prohibited from
giving orders or issuing contracts. In addition, no Grand

Duke was selected to succeed Alexis Alexandrovich as

Viceroy in the Far East.

 

17Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 109.

181b1d., p. 109.

19Bernard Pares, "Alexander Guchkov," Slavonic and
East European Review, XV, (July, 1936), pp. 125-126.

41

Constitutionalism in Russia was strengthened by the
Third Duma raising the effeciency of the Armed Forces.20
General Denikin concurred in the observation that the
attitude of the officer corps was changing from a mystic
adoration of the Monarch, and that they were beginning to
differentiate between the idea of Monarchy and personalities,
between the welfare of the country and the form of govern-
ment. These changes, Denikin stated:

were brought about by the disclosures of the
Country's weakness and the effect of political
education on the officer class by the press
and the Duma.

Duma interest in military reform was not confined'
solely to the army. It also manifested itself in Naval re-
form. The Duma was impressed by the work done by a group
of young Naval officers in reorganizing the Navy. Initally,
this group confined its activity to creating a Naval Gener-
al Staff. This work was carried on with the approval and
co-Operation of the Naval Ministry.22

In eXpanding the work of Naval reorganization the
same group of young officers associated itself with the
Duma to effect a Naval biulding program. Admiral Kolchak
recalled this work in his testimony before the Soviets in
1920:

It was a period of extremely close con-
nection between the two staffs [Army and

 

20Maklakov, op; cit., p. 74.

21Anton I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil (London:
Hurchinson & Co., 1922), p.18.

22Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 192.

42

Navy] and the State Duma with its military
commissions as [gig] expert and was present
at absolutly every déficussion of questions
concerning the Navy.
The attitude of co-operation between the Duma and the
Naval Ministry was futher pointed out by Kokovtsov. The
Duma, he stated, was impressed by the detailed presenta-
tion given it by the Navy. The Navy defended its program
in committee and adapted itself to the Duma's temper and
to individual members Of the Committee of Imperial Defense.2n
In 1909 the Duma acted upon an "iron clad segment" of
the budget. This apprOpriation was restricted for the
sole consideration of the Czar, but through a misunder-
standing Of the matter the Duma acted upon it. Stolypin
recognized the nature of the Duma's action and requested
the Council of State to also approve it. When the measure
reached Nicholas, it was refused confirmation. Nicholas'
action went against Stolypin's advice, for Stolypin valued
the Duma's co-operation and saw the potential consequences
Of this action. In trying to minimize the consequences of
Nicholas' veto, Stolypin recommended that the full respon-
sibility for the matter be transferred to the government,25

thereby, preserving the harmony which existed between the

Government and Duma.

 

23The Testimony g; Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials,
ed. Elena Varnech and H. H. Fisher, trans, Elena Verhech
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 19-21.

2“Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 219.

25Ibid., p. 223.

43

This harmony was almost destroyed by certain actions
contemplated by Nicholas in his relationship with Michael
Rodzianko, an Octobrist and a President of the Third and
Fourth Dumas. Rodzianko was asked by Nicholas to prepare
a report on Rasputin's character: this report was completed
and presented to the Czar. Nicholas was not pleased with
the report's conclusions, and vowed he would not receive
Rodzianko's Presidential report on Duma activities. In
retaliation Rodzianko threatened to resign as President of
the Duma.26 Kokovtsov managed to have Nicholas modify his
stand and send Rodzianko a note postponing the interview
until after the Czar's return from Lavadia. The argument
used by Kokovtsov was that it would not be to the Govern-
ment's advantage to work with a hostile Duma on the naval
rebuilding program.27

Kokovtsov used every opportunity presented him in
building a favorable relationship between the Czar and Duma.
On a visit to Nicholas at Yalta in April, 1912, he re-
quested that the Czar contact Alekseenko, chairman of the
Duma's Finance Committee. Nicholas was asked to request
Alekseenov to use his influence in the Duma for securing
approval of the naval building program. It was also re-
quested, if the measure passed that the Czar grant an

audience to the Duma. Several members of the Duma had

requested such an audience: they believed it would help

 

26Michae1 Rodizianko, The Reign of Rasputin (London:
1927), p. 60.

27KOkovtsov, Op. cit., p. 219.

44

their chances of being reelected to the Fourth Duma.
Nicholas granted both of Kokovtsov's requests.28
Naval reform was not the Duma's sole concern in 1912.
High interest was also shown for conscription reform.
This interest was not new; it first became evident in the
conscription debates of 1907. Certain reservations were
attached to the 1907 budget committee's recommendations on
acceptance of the Government draft quota. The committee
believed certain government practices regarding the use of
trOOps needed correction. These practices included the use
of soldiers to convey political prisoners, regular police
work, and service as ordennes for Officers. The government's
defense at that time was economy. This argument was not
acceptable to the Duma. It pointed out that this may be so
initially, but in the long run it was more economical to
have this type of work preformed by others. In drafting
large numbers of men, the most productive segment of the
population was removed. This prevented the economy from
achieving full develOpment.29
In all budget apprOpriations for the military, the
Duma made increased apprOpriations conditional on the re-

form of the Military Service Statutes.30 Another tactic

used by the Duma to secure conscription reform was Opposi-

 

28Ibid.. p. 311.

30Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 193.

45

tion to the yearly quota. General Danilov, Quarter-
master General (1908-1914) and assistant to the chiefs of
the General Staff during the war, wrote:

...the Duma, with a view to making sure

that the reform would be advanced more

rapidly decided to Oppose the bill to

increase the contingent of men liable to

military service. Yearly submitted by

the government, until the new Conscrip-

tion Laglwas passed by the legislative

bodies.

Governmental attitude as expressed in the Second
Duma was not Opposed to conscription reform. Rediger, in
his reply to the Budget Committee's report of the Second
Duma, expressed the Government's concurrence for reform in
' the conscription statutes. This reform, he believed, was
necessary, but it would take time. In fact, the govern-
ment had initiated reforms in several areas immediately
following the Japanese war. The reform had to be gradual:
some abuses could not be entirely abolished because all ar-
mies needed certain technical services. If the use Of
trOOps for police services could be abolished, he believed,
the Government would be the first to welcome this change.32
Constructive opposition to the Government's quotas,

coupled with conditional increased appropriations, pro-
duced the desired results for the Duma's program. This

was brought out on March 12, 1912, when Kokovtsov and

Sukhomlinov, Minister of war, held a joint meeting with

 

31Nicholas N. Golovine, The Russian Ar [53 the World
War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931 , pp. 13-14.

32Levin, Op. cit., pp. 291-292.

 

46

Nicholas. Kokovtsov opposed Sukhomlinov's draft quota

figures. His resistance was a product of Duma Opposition

33

in increasing the draft.
Conscription reform, when it was realized in 1912,

was a product of the Duma and the liberal ministers of the

Government working together. Colonel B. A. Engelhardt,

a member of the Duma's Imperial defense committee, stated

that:

Unsatisfactory recruiting for the army

and the continious shortage of men were

the underlying reasons for the law of

1912. The main effect of the law, there-
fore, was to make certain that the Army
would obtain the number of recruits an-
nually required. To this end certain changes
in the regulation for examptions were

made, and a new plan for distributing

the levy of ggcruits over various provinces
was adOpted.

The Conscription Law of 1912 was the beginning of reform
in this area. It was hOped by the General Staff that
additional reforms would be forthcoming, but the outbreak
of World Ear I prevented their realization. General
Nicholas Golovin, Quartermaster General of the Ninth Army,
considered the chief defect of the new conscription bill
to be the manner in which it was implemented by General
Sukhomlinov.35

Full co-Operation between the Duma and General

Sukhomlinov did not exist; this being the contributing

 

33Kokovtsov, Op. cit., p. 364..
34

Golovin, Op. cit., p. 20.
351bid., p. 13.

47

factor in Russia's failure to effect complete military

reform prior to 1914. The Assistant Minister of War,

General Polivanov, was considered by the Council of

Ministers and the Duma as acting Minister from 1906 to 1912.36
This close association and co—Operation with the Duma was
reSponSible for his dismissal in 1912. Sukhomlinov con-
sidered such an association to be an intrigue against the
Government, and persuaded Nicholas to remove him.37

A friendly relationship did exist, however, between
the Duma and Officer corps. The officer oorps participated
unoffically in the work of the Duma's Imperial Defense
Committee. A circle of young reforming Officers formed
around Alexander Guchkov, the Committee's chairman; they
wished to provide an inspiration for the "stagnant Ministry."38
At first, the Ministry of War provided the officers with
full particulars, but later abandoned this course when
Sukhomlinov became minister.

Sukhomlinov's appointment to the past in 1908 resulted
from a reaction in court circles, after the immediate
effects of the Japanese Jar subsided. Prior to Sukhomlinov's
appointment, the Grand Duke Nicholas insisted on uncovering

and revealing the causes of the army's unpreparedness. He

was also willing to implement necessary reforms with the

 

36

Fares, Fall _§ the Russian Monarchy, p. 111.

 

 

37Alfred Mnox, With the Russian Army (London:
Hutchinson & Co., 1921) I, p. 277.

38

 

Denikin, on. cit., p. 37.

48

full co-Operation Of the officer corps.39 Sukhomlinov
destroyed the aura of this co-Operation with the intro-
duction of a private secret police system. These spies
prevented a further uncovering of the army's inadequacies};O

Sukhomlinov rarely appeared before the Duma's Imperial
Defense Committee. His appearances usually caused the
Duma to take adverse action on military matters. On one
occasion, as he approached the Duma's Chamber, Rodzianko
warned him of the effects that his presence would produce,
"Get away, get away. You are to us as a red rag is to a
bull. As soon as you come your requests are turned
down."41 In dealing with Sukhomlinov the Duma applied its
usual criterion of a minister's willingness to fully co-
operate with it. Kokovtsov described one of Sukhomlinov's
appearances before the Finance Committee: as a result of
faulty preperation, Sukhomlinov was unable to answer the
Committee's inquires. He stated that the material under
discussion was known only to the Commander-1n-chief.
Guchkov provided the Committee with its answer: his material
was the product of testimony provided by wfrtnesses be-
fore his committee.”2

Sukhomlinov's dislike of the Duma and its effects

were pointed out by his failure to act upon a directive

from the Commander-in-chief to immediately increase the

 

39Golovin, Op. cit., pp. 11-12.
40

1+1lbid.. p. 50.
42

Denikin, Op. cit., p. 17.

Kokovtsov, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

49

army by one-third. This order was given early in the fall
of 1913, but was not completed until May, 1914. A factor
in this delay may have been the necessity of the Duma's
approval of all such increases. Upon presentation the
Duma quickly accepted the increase.“3
July, 1914, saw the Russian army in approximately
a parallel position with that of 1904. The intervening
years between 1906 and 1913 ‘witnessed a rebuilding of
the army after its complete destruction in the Japanese
War. Most of the deficiencies of 1904, however, remained.
General Knox, British Military Attache to Russia, con-
sidered the lack Of competent officers, above the rank
of squadron commanders, a major shortcoming in Russia's
defense system. He believed that the cause of the def-
iciency rested upon inferior training.uu
Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich, Inspector General of
Artillery, advocated in 1906 the reorganization of eight
artillery batteries into six. He also advocated the for-
mation of a corps artillery consisting of twenty-one
batteries of field artillery and two batteries of howitzers
per army corps, comprised of two divisions. Credits for
this reform were granted by the Duma in both 1909 and 1910,

but the expenditures were not approved by the Ministry of

Finance. Final agreement between the Duma and Ministry

 

“BPares, Fall 3: the Russian Monarchy, p. 194-

“”Knox, o . cit., I, p. 264.

50

was reached in the Spring of 1914 45

As a result of the defeat suffered at the hands Of
the Japanese in 1905, the reserves of the Ministry of War
were completely exhusted. Two alternatives were thus
Open to the Ministry of war; it could either reduce the
size of the army or maintain it at a lower cost. The second
alternative was decided upon.
This was not the sole determining factor, however,
in Russia's unprepardness in 1914. The Duma appropriated
450 million rubles for rearmament; of this only 300 million
were spent by the Ministry of War.46 This, however, did
not impede Sukhomlinov from requesting more money from
the Ministry of Finance. Kokovtsov's usual reply was that
he had not even eXpended the amount already allocated to
him.“7 Sukhomlinov's tardiness in expending appropriations
came under severe attack in the Duma. General Knox took
note of this and remarked:
The Duma tried to force eXpenditures to
secure efficiency, not as in other
countgées to save the taXpayers' pocket-
book.
Unpreparedness in the armed forces did not enter into
Nicholas' decision for war in 1914. He and Sukhomlinov
believed that the army's spirit and aggressiveness would

bring victory. They completely ignored the technical

 

1+5Golovine, Op. cit., p. 54.

“6Denikin, Op. cit., p. 29.

#7Pores, Fall 9: the Russian Monarchy, p. 119.
48

 

Knox, op. cit., I, p. 229.

51

improvements which had occurred in the waging of wars.
Elan would bring victory.

Declaration Of war ended the strife and riots which
gripped St. Petersburg for most of the summer. Rodzianko,
in interviewing a worker who had previously been on
strike, found that he now supported the Czar. The worker
stated, "that was our family dispute," referring to the
strike, "we thought reforms came too slowly through the
Duma. But now all Russia is involved."49 Patriotism
permeated the relationship between Nicholas and the Duma.

On July 20, 1914, Nicholas announced he would call an
extraordinary session of the Duma: the purpose was to create
perfect harmony between the Czar and his peOple.

Support for the war was Offered by the Duma. As a
token of this support the Duma placed a new tax on vodka,
but the Ukaze of August 22, 1914, prohibited its sale during
the war. Appreciation for the Duma's support was manifist-
ed by the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-chief of Russia's
armed forces; in a conversation with Rodzianko said, "Now
Rodzianko, I am your friend till death. I'll do anything
for the Duma. Tell me what you want." Rodzianko re-
quested that the suspension on the Cadet Paper, ggpgp

(Speech), be lifted. The request was granted.50

 

I
1+9Maurice Paleologue, Ap’Ambassador's Memoirs (New
York: Doran, 1924), p. 29.

SORodzianko, op. cit., p. 111.

52

The Duma was recessed by the Government following
Nicholas' speech and its passage of the vodka tax. Its
members, however, did not intend to remain inactive during
the recess. They met privately with Rodzianko on the same
day and formed "A Provisional Committee of the Duma for the
Relief of Wounded and Sick Soldiers and War Suffering."
Membership in this body was open to all Deputies who re-
mained in St. Petersburg. Rodzianko as Duma President was
automatizfly President of this organization. Vice-Presidents
were selected from both the right and left wing factions
of the Duma.* The Committee immediately established several
medical units and field hospitals for the wounded. This
de facto organization guarded the Duma's interest.51 It
met at least twice a week, although it could be summoned
whenever its President desired. Specific attention was
focused on conditions at the Front: however, the meetings
generally evolved into a general discussion of all policy
matters. At the end of each meeting, Rodzianko was in-
structed by the Committee of the program it wished to have
presented to the Czar.52

On September 9, 1914, the first message arrived from
the Front reporting shortages in artillery shells. General

Ivanov telegraphed on October 26:

 

*Shingorev for the left and Prince Volkorsky for the
right.

 

51Paul Gronsky and Nicholas Astrov, The War and the
Russian Government (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1929). p- 29.
521bld.

 

 

53

Supplies Of ammunition are entirely

exhausted. If not replenished Opera-

tions will have to be broken off and

pggdtppgp:.§§tire under most difficult
The shortage in munitions adversely affected the Russian
attempt to dislodge the Germans and Austrians from their
positions in November, 1914. At approximately the same
time, the Czar became aware Of these shortages, In a
letter to the Czarina dated November 19, 1914, he commented
that the German penetration of Russia was caused by the
lack of munitions and the consequent reliance on infantry
attacks. These attacks, he believed, were resulting in
high casualty figures.5u Early in December, munitions
shortages caused a large scale surrender of officers and
men to the Germans, and the shortage became so acute that
artillery brigades were ordered to fire only five rounds
of munition per day. Sukhomlinov complicated the matter
with his refusal to deal forthrightly with Russia's Allies.
In a conversation with General Knox, he claimed the 1,400,000
recruits to be called in January, 1915, would be fully equip-
ped with rifles. At that time, rifle reserves amounted to
between 50,000 and 70,000.55

Rumors began circulating in Spring, 1915, regarding

 

53Knox, op. cit., I, p. 220.

—“-_-.-

A. L. Hyles and ed. C. E. Vullismy, (London: John Lane
The Bodley Head Limited), p. 14.

 

55Florinsky, op. cit., p. 204.

 

54

lack of ammunition and graft in various military depart-
ments. These rumors were accepted by the Duma and were
blown out Of prOportion by the time they reached the public.56
The crisis itself, however, was caused by two factors,
neither of which were the pOpular accepted reasons, 1) gen-
eral condition in Russia's munitions industry and 2) gov-
ernmental inability to organize and project the army's
needs into the future.57
Goremykin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, did
not succeed in winning public support for the government.
He cloistered himself in his residence and refused to see
either his collegues in the Council or Duma members. Fin-
ally, in February, 1915, a reception was held for the Duma's
Deputies. The purpose of this reception was to demonstrate
to the Duma that he was not antagonistic to them and de-
sired their support.58
In March, 1915, the first public organization was
formed for meeting Russia's war needs. A. S. Ermolov, form-
er Minister of Agriculture, and certain members of the
State Council organized an Economic Conference. The pur-
pose Of this Conference was to discover means of supplying
St. Petersburg with adequate food and coal. It was on the

verge of reporting to the State Council when the Govern-

ment dissolved it.59 By late Spring Governmental attitudes

 

56Gurko, Op. cit., p. 545.

57Golovine, op: cit., pp. 126-128.

58Gurko, Op. cit., pp. 546-547.

591bid., p. 546.

55

had changed; it was now realized that public organizations,
and not the Government, controlled public opinion.60

Retreat from Galicia, in the Spring of 1915, allowed
the Duma to press for the active participation of its mem-
bers in the process of supplying the army. The original
prOposal for the creation of public committees came from
the Grand Duke Nicholas. In one of Rodzianko's visits to
the Front, he was approached by the Grand Duke and asked
to organize a plan for supplying the army with boots.
Maklakov, Minister of the Interior and brother of a Duma
member, Opposed such a move on the grounds that it would
produce revolutionary tendencies. This action was taken
on his own initiative and was not presented to the Council
of Ministers.61 Maklakov's Opposition did not restrain
Rodzianko's determination to form these committees.

The final plan was more encompassing than originally
prOposed by the Grand Duke. It provided for tackling the
entire problem Of supply. Rodzianko presented his pro-
posals to Nicholas on May 18, 1915. These prOposals were
immediately accepted by the Czar. Early in June, 1915, a
Ukaze was issued which created the Special Councils for
National Defense. These committees were composed of rep-
resentatives of the army, the Duma, the labor, and the

management of Russian industry. Nicholas even accepted

Guckxw, who had been persona non grata at court since

 

 

6O
61

Ibid. ’ p. 560.

Rodzianko, Op. cit., p. 121.

56

early in the Third Duma.62

Rodzianko, in the same meeting with the Czar, pressed
for the removal of certain reactionary and incompetent
ministers.63 Nicholas took no action at this time, but
Rodzianko would not let the matter die. On June 12, 1915,
Rodzianko again requested Nicholas to remove certain re-
actionary ministers. He reported that these ministers were
hampering the war effort and were alienating the Monarchy's
supporters.64

The Council of Ministers was divided into two groups.
One group, the right wing, included Goremykin, Maklakov,
and Sabler, Procurator Of the Holy Synod. This group found
it difficult to reconcile itself to the existence of the
Duma. A second group, comprised of liberal ministers,
was in favor of change. They recognized that no institution

65

was immune to change, including the Monarchy. Serge
Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, maintained that the
only way internal peace could be restored was for the
Government to adOpt a policy of reconciliation and co-
Operation with the Duma. Such was impossible, he believed,

as long as the reactionaries remained in office. Co-Op-

eration with the Duma was possible, Sazonov believed, but

 

62Fares, Fall pf the Russian Monarchy, pp. 242-243.

 

63Sir George Buchanan, Mp Mission pp Russia (London:
Cassell & Co., 1923). I, p. 2 6.

64Fares, Fall 2; the Russian Monarchy, p. 244.

 

 

65Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years: 1909-1916 (London:
Stakes & Co., 1928), p. 281. .

57

the only communication which occurred was between the Duma
and individual ministers. Sazonov stated:

I know from personal eXperience that it
was not at all difficult to establish the
necessary cO-Operation with the Duma. It
was on the whole patriotically minded and
the extremest played a secondary part.

It was quite possible [sic] jointly with
it to carry on construcggve work for the
benefit of the country.

Sazonov and the other liberal ministers recommended to
Nicholas that the reactionary ministers be removed, in
particular Sukhomlinov. Nicholas was immune to Sazonov's

accusations even after the Duma's growing indignation was

 

made known. Nicholas refused to take any action until
definite proof could be provided of Sukhomlinov's incom-
petency. This evidence was provided by Maurice Paleologue,
the French Ambassador, who had in his possession a series
of dispatches between the French War Office and General
Sukhomlinov. Early in the war, Russia was Offered munitions,
thereby, France hoped, to alleviate Russia's shortages.
Sukhomlinov refused the Offer; he replied that Russia was
adequately supplied.57

Paleologue's evidence was presented to Nicholas; it
added to the burdens already created by munition shortages,
the demands of the Duma and the liberal ministers. On June
15, 1915, Sukhomlinov was removed from office. His re-
placement was General Polivanov, who was highly pOpular

with the Duma. His pOpularity was based on his co-opera-

 

66Ibid.

671bid. p. 287.

 

tion with the Duma during the years he served as Assistant
68

Minister of Mar.

By the middle Of June, 1915, pressure brought by
the Duma and Council of Ministers was having a desirable
effect upon Nicholas. He was now considering removing
most of the Offensive ministers. In the following letter
to the Czarina he commented on the necessity of removing r—r.
Sabler, Procurator of the Holy Synod:

It is remarkable how everyone under-
stand [sic] this [removing Sabler]

and wishes to see a clean [sic] pious
and well meaning man in his place. Old
Gorem, [Goremykin] and Krivoshein, and
Scherbatov have all told me the same
thing, and believe that Samarin would

be the best man for post...I have

given Gorem leave to send for Samarin
and to Offer him this appointment. I

am sure you will not like this, because
of his being a Muscovite, but changes
must be brought about, and it is neces-
sary to select a man whose name is known
to the whole nation and who is unaniimusly
respected.69

 

M

When the Duma met in August, 1915, Sukhomlinov, Maklavov,
and Sabler were out of office. All were known either for
incompetence or reactionary views. V. I. Gurko, a for-

mer Assistant Minister of the Interior and a member of the
Fourth Duma, believed their dismissal was in part effected
by the Government's desire to have a favorable relation-
shipwith the Duma. In addition, Gurko gave credit to the
progressive ministers who forced Nicholas to choose between

them and the reactionaries:

 

68Letters 2: the Czar, p. 58.

69Ibid., p. 60.

59

...The Czar was very much displeased;

but the general excitment reflected in

previous Duma debates, had forced Nicho-

las II to agree to the demands of the

Kharitonov group. The Supreme Power

evidently preferred to have a renovated

ministry appear before the Duma in the

hOpe of lessening its attacks on the

government.
With the exception of Goremykin and a few others, the
Council of Ministers, by the middle Of 1915, was composed
predominantly of liberals. These ministers were willing
to risk their careers in order to bring a change in the
government's attitude.71 By the end of 1915, the Czarina
recommended the dismissal of Goremykin before he was com- '7
pelled to resign by the Duma.72

When the Duma assembled on August 1, 1915, it was

immediately presented with the issue Of calling out the
Territorials of the Second Class.* Prior to the Duma's
conversation, the Council debated the possibility of call-
ing the Second Class without Duma approval. This plan
failed to receive support because the council realized it

would be impossible to raise an individual without the

previous consent of the Duma.73 General debate on the

 

*Territorials of the Second Class consisted of un-
trained men between the ages of 21 and 43. They were
onlycnlled up twice before, in 1812 and 1854.

 

7OGurko, op. cit., p. 551.

71Florinsky, Op. cit., p. 85.

72;;ppgpp p: the Tsaritsa pp pp; Tpap, 1914-1916,
ed. Sir Bernard Pores (London: Duchworth & Co., 1923),
p. 210.

73Golovine, Op. cit., p. 55.

60

issue commenced on August 9, when Shingarev, a Cadet Deputy,
presented the Duma's attitude bathe Government. The Duma
was not Opposed to calling out the Second Class. That
it objected to was the Government's mismanagement of the
war. Approval was given to the Government's prOposal, but
it was cautioned to use them with care since they were
Russia's last manpower surplus.7u
In acting upon the Ukaze which created the Special
Councils, the Duma introduced certain modifications.
Foremost among them was a request for a civilian Assistant
Minister of Mar to work directly with the Councils. Gen-
eral Polivanov approved this request only in part. A new
assistant was created to work with the Special Councils,
but he was a membercf the army.75 The Duma also reserved
to itself the selection of its members who sat on the Special
Councils. Finally under the Law of August 17, the Duma
had the right of interpellating chairmen of the Special
Councils on the same level as an ordinary minister.76
Nicholas' decision to take direct command of the army
was a contributing factor in forming the Progressive Bloc.
On August 11, Rodzianko demanded an audience with Goremykin
to discuss the Czar's decision. When Goremykin was entreat-

ed to dissuade the Czar from assuming command, he informed

Rodzianko that the Czar's decision was not his con-

 

741b1d-. PP- 57-58,

75Fares, Fall 2; the Russiap Aggy.

76Gronski, Op. cit., pp. 34-40.

O\
]_J

77

cern. Goremykin's attitude in this matter, prompted
the center of the Duma to join together to present a
united front to the Czar and Goremykin.

A government possessing the confidence of the people
was the major demand of the Bloc. It was hoped that such
a government would be able to prosecute the war success-
fully and work in harmony with the Duma.78

Many members of the Government favored the program of (
the Bloc, but it was opposed by Goremykin.79 The liberal
ministers were successful in appointing a commission to i
meet with the Bloc and discuss the possibilities of com-
promise. This commission met with the Bloc on September 9,
and reported to the Council of Ministers on September 10
that compromise was possible. Goremykin was adamant in
his decision_ not to work with the Duma and to press the
Czar to prorogue it.80 Nicholas' decree to prorogue the
Duma was received by the Council on September 15, Many of
the Ministers accused Goremykin of Misrepresenting the
Bloc's program and the attitude of the Council to the Czar.

By September, 1915, the Duma was instrumental in in-
fluencing the Government's actions in reforming not only
the army, but also the Government. Nicholas carried out

a series Of reforms which rebuilt the army following the

chaos of the Japanese Mar and instituted reforms within

 

77Gurko, op. cit., p. 568.

78See Appendix A.
79Golovine, op. cit., p. 158.

80Rodzianko, op. cit. pp. 154-155.

M,

62

his Government. These reforms were the product of the
Duma and~liberal ministers working together.

Iniually, the Duma was preoccupied with reforms in
agriculture. This preoccupation, however, did not prevent
it from recognizing the necessity of army reform. In the
First Duma's address to the Throne, it inserted a demand
for giving the Duma a controlling voice in the Military.
The Government would not grant this demand. Albeit, this
request did influence the Government's decision to dissolve
the Duma.

Stolypin was indirectly influenced by this request
and was prepared to give the Duma a limited voice in
military matters. When the Second Duma assembled, it was
presented a series of prOposals directly dealing with the
military. Two of these proposals were Ukazes which attempt-
ed tO curb revolutionary tendencies in the military; both
were rejected by the Duma. ~The Government did not reissue
them. A third proposal dealt with the conscription quota
of 1907. This quota was accepted by the Duma with reserva-
tions. It requested the Government to reform the service
statutes, thereby making them more equitable. Rediger,
Minister of War, publicly reGOgnized the need for reforms
and promised to see that they were instituted. An incident
created by the Social Democrats in the Conscription Debates
was an instrumental factor in the Government's decision to
dissolve the Second Duma.

Beginning with the Third Duma, a concerted effort was

made to force quick Government action in the area of mili-

 

rmw

63

tary reform. A tactic was devised which compelled the
ministers to be more amenable to the Duma's wishes. This
tactic was to divide the ministers into Opposing factions,
giving co-Operation to the Duma. The Minister of Finance,
Count Kokovtsov, and Admiral Kolchak acknowledged the ef-
ficiency of this tactic. Both men recounted the long
hours of preparation necessary before appearing before the
Imperial Defense Committee. They also acknowledged the Fm‘
co-operation given them by the Duma. Sukhomlinov, Minister

of Mar, fell into the second catagory. His lack of prep-

aration in appearing before the Duma was acknowledged by
both his colleagues in the Council of Ministers and the
Duma. The consequences of his attitude were mitigated by
the co-operation given the Duma by his subordinates and
the Officer corps.

The importance given to the Duma in military matters
was pointed out in the Naval rebuilding budget debates of
1912. This time Kokovtsov as chairman of the Council of
Ministers persuaded Nicholas to use his influence with the
Chairman of the Budget Committee to secure passage. It was
also recommended to Nicholas that he grant a reception to
the Duma if the matter was approved.

Guckhov's speech, in the Third Duma, requesting the
removal of the Grand Dukes as Military Inspectors vividly
elucidated the Duma's influence. As a result of this speech
one Grand Duke resigned, a vacancy caused by the death of
another was not filled with a Grand Duke, and the remain-

ing ones were stripped of their powers.

 

64

Finally, the Third Duma was responsible for conscrip-
tion reform. Using the techniques of obstructionism and
qualified apprOpriations, the Duma was instrumental in
forcing the Government to submit a proposal for such reform.

Outbreak of war in July, 1914, Opened a new era in
the relationship between the Duma and the Government.

This era was best exemplified by Nicholas' appearance before Lg
the Duma and its support of the war. r

Defeat in the Spring of 1915, Opened new areas for the
Duma in which it could work. This area involved the direct
supplying Of the army through the Special Councils. These
organizations had a preponderance of Duma members, who were
directly pppointed by the Duma, and responsible to it.

In addition, the Duma, through the power of interpellation,
kept a close check upon the work of these councils.

By August, 1915, the Czar came to recognize the im-
portance of having Ministers who possessed the Duma's
confidence. It was to this end that Nicholas reorganized
his Government prior to the convocation of the Duma. This
new government possessed a preponderance Of liberal minis-
ters who were willing to work with the Duma.

Nicholas' decision to take direct command of his army
led to the formation of the Progressive Bloc. This Bloc
hOped, among other things, to force the Czar to rid the
Government of its remaining reactionaries. Nicholas'
refusal to comply with the Duma's wishes and fearful of
what actions it might take, prorogued it.

Prorogation of the Duma in September, 1915, ended

65

the harmony which existed between the Czar and Duma.

Prior to this date the Duma was instrumental in effecting
military reform, both on its own initiative and in co-
operation with the Government. After this date the influ-

ence of the Duma began to decline in military matters.

CHAPTER III
Educational Reform

Events in 1905 demonstrated to the Czar and the
Russian government that certain basic changes were needed
in Russia's social and political institutions. Foremost
of those institutions which needed drastic revision was
the Ministry of Public Instruction. The disastrous war
with Japan laid bare the gross inadequacies of Russia's
educational system. General KurOpatkin, the Russian Com-
mander-in-chief during the War, believed that onlyeatotal
reformation Of the school system was necessary if Russia
was to be victorious in any future war.1 The General
was not alone in this observation: Paul Vinogradoff, one
Of Russia's leading educators, also believed that the
dislocations caused by the Japanese War and the constitu-
tional changes of 1905:

called forth unprecedented activity Of
the State in regard to education...even
so it was felt after the Japanese War
that Russian disasters had been brought

about by the neglect of intellectual ef-
ficiency and pOpular education.2

 

1Alexander KurOpatkin, The Russian Army and the
Japanese War, trans. A. B. Londsay and ed. E. D. Swinton
(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909), II, p. 123.

2
Constable and Co. Ltd., 1912%, p. 82.

Paul Vinogradoff, Self-Government in Russia, (London:

67

Nicholas also saw the necessity for educational reform in
the Fall of 1905 and it was to this end that he appointed
Count I. I. Tolstoy Minister of Public Instruction. Count
Tolstoy saw the need for reform and convened a meeting of
the Rectors of Russia's universities on January 6, 1906.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the needs of
the universities and how these institutions could more
adequately meet the needs of Russian society. As a re-
sult of this meeting a series of recommendations dealing
with the question of university autonomy were presented to
the Minister. These recommendations were embodied in a
legislative proposal which the Ministry submitted to the
First Duma. The quick dissolution of this body was pri-
marily responsible for the lack of action on this measure.3
In dealing with the root of Russia's educational back—
wardness - primary education inefficiencies - the Ministry
failed to present a comprehensive program. When the
Ministry of Public instruction drew up its program for
universal education in 1905-1906 no attention was given to
the recommendations of the Zemstvo or organs of local
government. The result of this oversight was a theoretical
program which did not even closely meet local needs.
Several attempts were made by the Duma to point out this

shortcoming, but the Ministry was unreSponsive to these

 

3For a comprehensive analysis of the Ministry's recom-
mendations please consult Nicholas Hans, History 9; Russian
Educational Policy, (1701-1917), New York: Russell and
Russell Inc., 1964), p. 198.

68

suggestionsfl'

The Minister of Public Instruction addressed the Duma

on the question Of educational reform. He stated:

recognizing the necessity of raising the

moral and intellectual standard of the

masses of the pOpulation, the Government

is putting foreward a prOposals for uni—

versal education and is preparing a scheme

for the reform ofsthe secondary schools

and universities.
These words did not bring governmental action; he failed
to present any concrete prOposals for reform, and in fact
by 1914 the Ministry had not even prepared an elaboration
of its grandiose prOposals.6 The government's failure to
present any concrete proposals created a void in education-
al reform. It fell to the Duma to fill this void and to
provide the necessary leadership to realize educational
reform in Russia.

A strong demand for the introduction of universal
education was put forth by many sectors of Russia's pOpula-
tion in the interval between the issuance of the October
Manifesto and the convocation of the Second Duma. This de-
mand was particularly evident in the election campaign for
the Second Duma. Many candidates demanded a complete re-

organization of Russia's educational establishment so as to

facilitate the introduction of universal education. The

 

“Paul J. Novgorotsev and Demitry M. Odinetz, Russian

Schools and Universities pp the World War, (New Haven:
‘Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 8-9.

 

51b1d., p. 37.
bid.

 

69

Ministry of Public Instruction hoped to quiet the clamor
for reform when it introduced what it considered to be a
comprehensive reform prOposal to the Second Duma. This
measure was presented to the Duma on February 20, 1907.
Its main features were the introduction of free and uni-
versal education for all, the establishment of local re—
sponsibility to insure the construction of educational
facilities and limited local autonomy in the district.
This measure, the Duma believed, was not a complete re-
form, but only a beginning. The Duma was unable to take

any action on this measure before it was disbanded on

 

June 3, 1907.7

Realization that Russia could not wait for a complete
program of educational reform prompted the Duma to enact a
number of piecemeal measures. To meet the immediate situa-
tion it passed its first education law on May 3, 1908.
This law defined the term of elementary instruction; it
Offered a timetable in which to effect universal education,
and provided funds for teachers' salaries.8 Liberal mem-
bers Of the Duma realized the shortcomings of the 1908 Law
and desired to rectify the situation by adopting the pro-
gram of the liberally oriented Education League. This
measure contained provisions for a free and universal system
of education, and local educational autonomy, with all,

schools being united under the Ministry of Public Instruc-

 

7Hans, cp. cit., pp. 212-213.

8Novgorotsev, oppicit., p. 10.

 

70

tion.9 Opposition to this measure in the State Council
prevented it from becoming law.

In 1911 the Duma realized that the enactment of a
comprehensive reform measure could not be delayed any long-
er. It therefore, proposed a measure which provided for
all educational facilities and the responsibility for
education, including church schools, to be turned over to [—
the Zemstvos and local organs of government, and the re-
legation of the Ministry of Public Instruction to one of

general guidance, instruction in the local language, the

 

creation of a ladder system,* and the adjustment of the

M

schools to local conditions. The state council rejected
the principal provisions of the measure and thereby assured
the defeat of the prOposal in the Duma. This defeat did
not prevent the Duma from working for school reform through
the Zemstvos, or from enacting fragmentary legislation.10
On June 25, 1912, the Duma passed another limited re-
form measure which transformed all Urban Schools into
Higher Elementary Schools with a four year course of in-
struction. By late 1912 the Ministry of Public Instruct-
tion transformed twelve hundred Urban schools into Higher

Elementary Schools, and Opened an additional three hundred

schools.

 

*Upper primary schools would serve as a connecting link
between lower primary and secondary schools.

 

9Hans, Op. cit., p. 218.

10Novgorotsev, Op. cit., p. 11.

71

It was evident by 1913 that the Duma exercised its
greatest influence on government policy in the field of
elementary education reform. The influence of the Duma
was most evident in the Law of July 7, 1913. This Law
raised the minimum teachers' salaries from three hundred
and sixty rubles to four hundred and eighty rubles a year.
These increases swelled state expenditures,

but both the School and Budget Commit-

tees [of the Duma] warmly advocated the

grants, and the latter were warmly pass-

ed by the Duma. Thus, in spite of the

fact that there is no legal scheme es-

tablishing once for all the financial

steps by which universal instruction

has to be achieved, the idea of gradual

progress to this goal has taken firm hold

of the mind of the legislators...and 11

the movement goes on uninterruptedly.
In its desire to secure universal education the Duma was
unsparing in providing money for teachers' salaries. It
also provided for low interest loans for the erection of
school buildings. The budget debates provided a forum
from which the deputies leveled their attacks against an
incompetent Ministry Of Public Instruction. During the
budget debates of 1908 Von Anrep, an Octobrist Deputy, a
supporter of the government, and a former Curator of an
Educational Region pointed an attack against an insensitive
Ministry. The major criticisms aimed at the Ministry were:
1) its failure to analyze Russia's needs realisticly; and

2) its failure to satisify the educational needs of the

Country. In 1910 the debates were used to condemn a Govern-

~

11Vinogradoff, Op. cit., pp. 91-92.

72

mental decree which intended to curb student demonstrations.
These debates condemned the Government's habit of resort-
ing to exceptional laws and "their system of administrative

exile."12

During the budget debates of 1911 Count Kokovtsov,
the Minister of Finance, was forced to demonstrate to the
Duma that he was interested in providing sufficient funds
for Russia's educational needs.13
Stinging barbs were also leveled against Casso,
the Minister of Public Instruction, in the budget debates.
In 1913 he was accused of viewing Russia's educational needs
with indifference and demonstrating little incentive for
implementing a reform program. The Ministry's attitude
was characterized as one of abnormality toward the teachers
and discouragement towards the pupils.1u The budget debates
of 1914 produced a Duma resolution which stated that the
ministerial and district ordinances on education failed
to account for local conditions and the desires of the
student's parents.15
Positive results did occur as a consequence of the
Duma's budget debates. The educational system benefited
by having sufficient funds apprOpriated for school

buildings, teachers' salaries and supplies. Between 1907

 

12 12Sir George Buchanan, My Mission pg Russia, (London:
Cassell and Co., 1923), I, p. 152.

13Count Vladimar Kokovtsov, Out pf My Past, (Stanford:
Hoover War Library, 1935), p. 258.

1LPNOVgorotsev, op. cit., p. 27.
15Ibid., p. 40.

73

and 1912 the Duma doubled the appropriations for the
Ministry of Public Instruction from eighty-five million
rubles to one hundred and seventy million rubles. In
addition to this, it allocated nearly three hundred and
sixty million rubles for a self-perpetuating building fund
which was expanded at a rate Of seventy-seven million rubles
a year.16 It was estimated by the Duma that by 1922 appro- F
priation would be sufficient to secure free universal ed-

ucation for all sectors of Russian society.

The Council of Ministers and the State Council were 1

 

I'r.‘ 9‘

Opposed to the introduction of universal education. They
attacked the apprOpriations of the Duma for economic rea-
sons, but their real reason was a "vague dread of the Pro-
gressive tendency of popular education."17 The Duma, how-
ever, was successful in overcoming these objections and
through its increased appropriations able to lead Russia
toward the goal of universal primary education.

Secondary education was also subjected to the un-
productive and non-creative policies of the Ministry of
Public Instruction. In this field the Ministry devoted
most of its attention to develOping a program which would
centralize school administration. The Duma's School Com-
mittee in 1912 presented a report which pointed out the
necessity of Opposing the unproductive, paralyzing and in-

expedient centralization which prevailed in the Ministry.

—¥

16Vinogradoff, Op. cit., pp. 87-88.

171b1d.. p. 85-86.

74

This report further stated that the consequence of this
centralization was frustration on the part of school
officials, teachers and students.18

The Duma, however, managed to accomplish certain con-
crete reforms in secondary education. Between 1904 and
1916 it was able to increase the number of secondary
schools by two hundred and fourteen. This increase raised
the number of secondary schools from eight hundred sixty-
three to ten hundred seventy-seven. During Casso's tenure
as Minister of Public Instruction eighty-three Duma members
introduced legislation which would have opened the secondary
schools to all sectors of the population. Casso Opposed
this legislation on "educational ground" and the prOposal
did not become law.19

To facilitate the growth of secondary education the
Duma passed, on its own initiative, a bill which widened
the rights possessed by private secondary schools. The
Law of July 1, 1914, allowed the creation of private co-
educational institutions and for a curriculum which dif-
fered from the one approved by the Ministry. These in-
stitutions were prohibited from using any textbooks which
were not approved by the Ministry.20

Conflict between clerical and secular concept of ed-

ucation was one of the greatest hindrances to complete

 

18Novgorotsev, op. cit., p. 38.
191b1d.
20

Ibid., p. 29.

75

educational reform in Czarist Russia. In 1908 the Holy
Synod received an appropriation of 7,400,000 rubles for
the Operation of Church schools. When the Third Duma
introduced an apprOpriation for teacher salaries in the
secular schools the Synod demanded a similar appropriation.
Such an apprOpriation was voted in 1909 and 1910. The
Synod schools' standards were far below those set by the
Ministry of Public Instruction. EXpansion of the number of
Church Schools was considered an extraneous element by the
Duma, demanding that these schools be given aid only on the
condition that they adhere to certain rules. The two
principle conditions were:

1) the entering into an agreement with

school authorities of the State in regard

to filling up definite places in the

authorized network of schools; and 2) the

appointment of prOperly qualified teachers.
The Synod did not comply with these regulations: it used
every means of subterfuge to evade the guide-lines estab-
lished by the Duma. When the Synod applied for its ap-
propriation it failed to submit the necessary outline of
its program and policy to the Duma. The Duma failed to
make provisions for the Church Schools in 1911 and the
government granted these schools six million rubles with-
out the Duma's approval. It was hoped by the Duma that
without the necessary funds the Church would turn its

schools over to the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Governmental motives for opposing the unification of

 

 

76

all schools under the Ministry of Public Instruction is best
illustrated by the State Council's rejection of a unified
school bill in 1911. This bill called for School unifica-
tion under the local organs of government. Such a settle-
ment the government feared would foster the rapid dis-
semination of revolutionary ideas.22 The future position

of the Church Schools was a question which deeply affected "
the Czar. He believed that his father, Alexander III, was I
responsible for their creatinn and that it was his duty to

foster his father's program. In an interview with Kokovtsov,

 

after Guchkov leveled his attack on the Synod, Nicholas

‘r

stated:

The conduct of the Duma is deeply re--
volting, especially Gutchkov's speech
regarding the Synod estimates. I shall
be very glad if my displeasure is made
known to these gentlemen, I am tired of
always bowing and smiling to them.23

Nicholas had promised the Duma a pro-election interview

in 1912, if it would pass the Naval Armament apprOpriation,
but the Duma's attack on the Church Schools changed Nicholas'
mind. Kokovtsov had to use all means of persuasion to
compel Nicholas to relent and to meet the Duma. After the
interview, the Deputies adjourned without approving an ap-

propriation for the Church Schools?!+ A compromise be-

 

22Michael Florinsky, The End 2; the Russian Empire,

(New York: Collier, 1961), p. 21.

23Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 304.

24Michael Rodzianko, The Reigprpg Rasputin,

(London: 1927), p. 65.

 

77

tween the two systems was reached in the Fourth Duma when
it adOpted a course of least resistance. As a result of
this compromise no overt attempt was made by the Duma to
abolish the Church School and they were left to disappear
naturally.25
One of the immediate effects of War on education in
Russia was a proposal by the Ministry of Public Instruction
to curtail Spending. Prior to the war an appropriation of
169,579,399 rubles was made for education. After the out-
break Of war the government prOposed a cut of 14,286,954
rubles to 155,829,445 rubles. In preparing the 1915 school
budget the Ministry stated: "The financial burden laid on
the Treasury could not but occasion an extensive reduction
in the estimates for the Ministry in 1915."26 The Duma did
not follow the lead Of the Ministry in providing appro-
priation cuts for education. It rejected the Ministry's
estimate.27
In 1914 Count P. N. Ignatiev was appointed Minister
of Public Instruction and was responsible for the introduc-
tion of many liberal reforms. As a result of these reforms
there was a growing public feeling that Count Ignatiev
would be able to work harmoniously with the Duma. A Duma

report characterized Count Ignatiev's appointment as a

fount of living water bursting forth in the Ministry Of

 

25Hans, Op. cit., pp. 218-219.

26NOVgorotsev, Op. cit., p. 64.

271bid., p. 66.

 

78

Public Instruction.28 In a speech before the Duma's

Budget Committee Count Ignatiev reported that he was in
favor of the immediate introduction of universal primary
education, and that he was willing to consult with the
Duma before any action was taken by the Ministry. This
attitude was a complete reversal of the one’followed by
Ignatiev's predecessor Casso. During his tenure a
Ignatiev prepared a draft of a compulsory school attend- F
ence bill which was presented to the Duma. This legisla-
tion was passed by the Duma, and was considered a major

step in the realizationcf universal education. Count

 

Ignatiev also presented several draft bills which equalized
boys' and girls' gymnasia, and proposed curriculum reform
in all of the secondary shcools. These prOposals were
opposed by many members of the Council of Ministers and
they refused to give Count Ignatiev support for them.
Realizing that he could not successfully prosecute his
program he resigned in late December, 1916. With the re-
signation of Count Ignatiev, reform prOposals were no long-
er put forth by the Ministry and events in January and
February, 1917, were not conducive to further educational
reforms. By this time the Duma and the pOpulation were
more concerned with events within the government and with
the prospect of a revolution than with educational reform.
In the interval between the 1905 Revolution and that

Of 1917 Russia wittnessed the beginnings of a program for

 

28Ibid., pp. 70-72.

79

universal primary education, a unified school system

and reform in secondary and higher education. The respon-
sibility for the introduction and partial achievement of
these measures rests primarily with the Duma. One of the
chief means used by the Duma to effect school reform was
the use of its power to pass upon appropriations. As a
result of the judicious use of this power the Duma was able as
to double the amount the central Government expended on
education. When the Duma created the Peter the Great
Building Fund it assured the Zemstvos, who were reSponsi-

bile for the erection of school buildings, a ready source Of

 

l“. ..-‘n-x

low interest loans for school eXpansion. In dealing with
the Church Schools the Duma realized that they were more

of a hindrance than a help in reaching universal education.
These schools, the Duma recognized, had lower academic stand-
ards. It did all in its power to see them abolished,

but was prevented from doing so by alflind and obstinate
government. By 1912 the Duma realized that these schools
would eventually disappear as new secular school arose, and
it was to this end that they devoted their energy. In ad-
dition to using its budgetary power to effect school re-
form the Duma also introduced several piecemeal curriculum
reforms. These reforms were finally accepted by the
Gpvernment when Count Ignatiev was appointed Minister of
Public Instruction. His appointment opened up a new era

in the relationship between the Government and the Duma.
Previously they worked at odds, but after his appointment

a period of co-Operation in school reform existed. It is

 

80

possible to speculate that if Count Ignatiev's appointmentlumi
came a few years earlier Russia would have been able to
introduce universal and compulsory primary education before
the outbreak of World War I. The resignation of Count
Ignatiev coincided with the end of educational reform and

the Revolution Of 1917. If the Duma's role in education

was to be characterized briefly it could be stated that
between 1908 and the appointment of Count Ignatiev in 1915
the Duma was the prime force behind all educational reforms

which were effected in Russia.

 

CONCLUSION

In examining the role and influence of the Russian
State Duma it was possible to discern a number of diverse
roles which this body assumed and the forms of influence
which it exercised on Russia's Government. The Duma was
presented with a number of critical problems which needed
immediate attention. Foremost were the agrarian, military
and educational reform questions which Russia faced in
the period after 1905. In meeting the problem of agrarian
reform the Duma assumed both a direct and indirect role.
Its direct role concerns: the manner in which it forced
the Government to assume a position where none previously
existed; the reaction of the Duma to this position; and
finally, the manner in which agreement was reached between
the two. The indirect role of the Duma concerns the manner
in which it influenced the reform proposals of Peter
Stolypin. As the Duma came into contact with the problems
facing Russia's military establishment, it found an entire-
ly different set of circumstances. In this particular in-
stance, the Government was willing to give the Duma a limit-
ed voice in determining the course which their reforms would
follow. As a result of this, the Duma and the Government
were able to work harmoniously in effecting a limited re-

form of Russia's military establishment. Finally, when
81

 

82

the Duma was presented with the educational reform question,
it assumed a new role - that of leadership. In this par-
ticular instance, the Duma discovered that the Ministry of
Public Instruction was failing to provide the necessary
leadership for reform. The Duma was determined to fill
this void and found the necessary means in tis power over
budget appropriations.

When the First Duma was convened, it discovered that
the Government had not prepared a program to meet Russia's
critical agrarian problem. In response to the peasants'

cries for reform the Duma considered a number of reform

 

prOposals. Basic to all of these prOposals was the idea
that the landholdings of the crown, church and private in-
dividuals should be eXprOpriated for the use of the pea-
sant. The Government was adamantly Opposed to this idea
and made its position known to both the Duma and the people.
Goremykin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, even went
so far as to publish the Government's position in several
newspapers. In so doing, the Government was forced by the
Duma to take a position where none previously existed.

The Duma believed that the Government had taken a position
which was unacceptable to either itself or the Russian
peOple. In taking this stand the Duma forced the Govern—
ment into a position where it either had to bow to the
Duma's demands or dissolve it. The Government accepted the
latter course and dissolved the First Duma in July, 1906.
When Nicholas dissolved the Duma, he also accepted Goremykin's

resignation and appointed Peter Stolypin Chairman of the

83

Council of Ministers.

Stolypin was indirectly influenced by the First Duma's
position when he formulated his agrarian reform decrees of
October and November, 1906. These decrees embodied some
of the ideas on agrarian reform which the First Duma pre-
sented. Stolypin hoped that the Duma would give unquestion—

ing approval to these decrees. In this instance, he misjudg-

‘1

ed the stand the Duma would take. Instead of approving

these decrees it violently Opposed them. The main arguments

-_) Cl. IBI- .~ .’;-1 "'5’

given by the Duma were: 1) the decrees did not go far

enough in solving the agrarian problems; and 2) they were

 

1.’

presented as accomplished facts to the Duma. In assuming
this position the Duma directly influenced Government
policy, for it again forced the government to dissolve the
Duma and institute a new Electoral Law. When the Third
Duma was convened, the Government discovered that it was
not as radical as the first two. As a result Of this it
again submitted the Stolypin decrees. These decrees were
passed by the Third Duma and were designated the Land Laws
of June 14, 1910, and May 29, 1911. In modifying Stolypin's
decrees and by eventually passing them, the Duma made a
positive contribution in the area of agrarian reform.
These decrees, however, would not have come into existence
if the First and Second Dumas had not taken their radical
position, and thereby magnified the pressing need for
agrarian reform.

As a result Of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's

military establishment was completely destroyed. The Duma

84

devoted considerable time in meeting the question of
military reform. In the period prior to World War I the
Duma devoted its attention to the problem of rebuilding
Russia's war machinery and adequately supplying it with
man power, After the outbreak of the War the Duma dis-
covered that the army was not adequately supplied with war

material. It believed that the major cause of this de-

 

ficiency was a inefficient and mismanaged Ministry of War. r
The Duma used two techniques to rectify this situation:

1) it forced Nicholas II to create the Special Councils

in which the Duma had direct voice in the supplying of L

Russia's army; and 2) it worked for a reorganization of
the Council of Ministers.

In the pre World War I period, the Duma devisied
several techniques which it used to effect military re-
form. These techniques were: 1) granting only provision-
al approval to the yearly conscription quota; and 2) work-
ing only with those ministers who accepted the existence
of the Duma and were willing to grant it their complete co-
Operation. In using the first technique the Duma was suc-
cessful in gaining Governmental approval for a more equita-
ble conscription law in 1912. When the second technique
was applied by the Duma it discovered that a judicious
usecf its limited budgetary powers could be equally suc-
cessful. The degree of this success can be judged by the
actions of Nicholas and several of his Ministers when they
desired the Duma's approval for military building programs.

In one particular instance, the Naval Building program of

85

1912, Nicholas went so far as to personally request passage
of the appropriation and to promise that he would grant

a pre-election audience to the Duma which a great many
Deputies had requested.

The Naval Ministry, according to both its own members
and members of the Duma, was equally cautious with the
Duma. When ever a member of this Ministry had to appear F"
before the Duma he was careful to be fully prepared and
to answer all of the Duma's inquires. In dealing with
the Ministry of War the Duma discovered that it received

its best results when it worked with individual officers

 

or with assistant Ministers. The best example of this
was the relationship which existed between the Duma and
General Polivanov, Assistant Minister of War until 1911.
In this particular instance, Polivanov worked closely with
Alexander Guchkov, Chairman Of the Duma's Imperial Defense
Committee. This close co-Operation was responsible for
the Duma's granting the necessary funds for the reorgaiza-
tion Of the Army's Artillery Batteries. The value the
Government placed on the Duma's good-will during this
period was its reorganization Of the army after the Duma
called for the resignation of the Grand Dukes from the
posts of Inspectors of the Army.

The severe defeats suffered by Russia's Armies in
the Spring of 1915, was the cue for the Duma to demand
complete reorganization of the Army's lines of supply.
Michael Rodzianko, President of the Duma, was one of the

moving forces behind the Czar's decision to create the

86

Special Councils. Rodzianko used his position as President
of the Duma to demand the creation of these Councils.

After their creation the Duma approved the Special Coun—
cils with certain modification. The foremost of these was
the extension of the role played by the Duma in their
Operation.

Prior to the convocation of the Duma in July, 1915,
Nicholas came to almost fully appreciate the role that the
Duma had assumed in the political life of Russia and in
the erea of military reform. The best indications of this

were: 1) his dismissal of most of the objectionable

 

ministers; and 2) the appointment of men who enjoyed the
Duma's confidence. Nicholas' decision to prorogue the

Duma in September, 1915, marked the beginning of the Duma's
decline as an instrument of influence in Russia's govern-
ment.

In meeting educational reform, an entirely different
set of circumstances presented themselves to the Duma, and
[it adopted itself to meet this particular situation. Where
the Duma forced the Government to take a stand on agrarian
reform and worked with it in military reform the problem
of educational reform was given entirely to the Duma by
the utter failure of the Ministry of Public Instruction
to meet Russia's educational needs. The technique used
by the Duma to effect educational reform bore a slight
resemblance to its means of effecting military reform.

This technique was the Duma's control of budget appropria-

tions. The Duma, however, only adopted this method after

87

it failed to gain governmental support for a thorough ed-
ucation reform law. In using this power the Duma hoped

to introduce universal and compulsory primary education

in Russia and to unite the entire system of education under
local authorities. The period between 1908 and 1912 saw
the Duma increase by one hundred per cent the amount ex-
pended by the central government on education. This in-
crease included the adoption of a minimum wage for teachers,
apprOpriations for supplies and the creation Of a building
fund from which the Zemstvos could borrow money at low in— 1

terest rates for local school construction. In addition to

 

granting increased apprOpriations for education the Duma
was able to enact several laws which attempted a piecemeal
reform of the educational system. All of these endeavors
were carried on by the Duma without the encouragement or
active participation Of the Ministry of Public Instruction.
The attitude of the Ministry only changed when Count
Ignatiev was appointed Ministry of Public Instruction.
During his brief tenure, January, 1915, to December, 1916,
Ignatiev and the Duma were able to pass a compulsory school
attendance law to equalize Boys' and Girls' Gymnasia,
and to start a review of school curriculum which would
have eventually resulted in curriculum reform. Ignatiev
was forced to resign when he realized that he did not
possess the confidence of his fellow ministers. By
resigning he left the Ministry without the necessary

leadership to effect educational reform and returned to

the Duma its role of leadership in educational reform.

88

In the interval between the convocation of the First
Duma in April, 1906, and the resignation of Count Ignatiev
in December, 1916, the Duma was presented with many
problems which demanded its attention. Those which were
examined in this work demonstrated that the Duma reacted
differently to each problem. The Duma's role and in-
fluence cannot be categorized by any one definition, for
it was not the same in all cases. In agriculture it was
one of prodding the Government into action, in military
reform it was one of cO-Operation with the Government and

in education it was one of leadership.

 

1'.“

APPENDIX

PROGRAM OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

September 7,1915

The undersigned representatives Of factions and groups
of the State Council and State Duma, actuated by the con-
viction that only a strong, firm, and active authority can
lead the fatherland to victory, and that such an authority
can be only that which rests upon pOpular confidence and
is capable of organizing the active cOOperation of all
citizens, have arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the
most important and essential object of creating such an
authority cannot be attained without the fulfilment of the
following conditions:

1. The formation of a united Government, composed of
individuals who enjoy the confidence of the country, and
who have agreed with the legislative institutions upon
the execution, at the earliest date, of a definite program.

2. Decisive change in the methods of administration
employed thus far, which have been based upon a distrust
of public self-help, in particular:

(a) Strict Observance of the principles of legal-
89

 

9O

ity in the administration.

(b) Abolition of the dual authority of civil

and military powers in questions having no

direct bearing upon the conduct of military
operations.

(c) Renewal of the local administrators.

(d) A sensible and consistent policy directed to-
wards the maintenance of internal peace and

the removal of cause of dissension between
nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following
measures must be adOpted, by means of administration, as
well as legislation:

1. By means of Imperial clemency, a discontinuation
of cases started on charges Of purely political and re-
ligious crimes, not aggravated by crimes of a generally
felonious character: the release from punishment and the
restoration of rights, including the right of participation
in the elections to the State Duma, Zemstvo, and municipal
institutions, etc., of persons condemned for such crimes:
and the amelioration of the condition of others condemned
for political and religious crimes, with the exception of
spies and traitors.

2. The return of those exiled by administrative
order, in cases of a political and religious character.

3. Absolute and definite cessation of persecution on

religious grounds, under any pretext whatsoever, and revo-

cation of circulars issued in restriction and destortion

 

91

of the sense of the Ukaz of April 17 [30], 1905.

4. Solution of the Russo-Polish problem, y;§.: aboli-
tion of restrictions upon the rights of Poles throughout
Russia; the prompt drafting and presentation to the legis-
lative institutions of a bill for the autonomy of the King-
dom of Poland, and the simultaneous revision of the laws
concerning Polish land ownership.

5. Entry upon the path of abolition of restrictions
upon the rights of the Jews, in particular, further steps
towards the abolition of the Pale of Settlement, facilita-
tion of admission to educational establishments, and re-
moval Of obstacles to the choice of professions. Restora-
tion of the Jewish press.

6. A policy of conciliation in the question of Fin-
land, in particular, changes in the composition of the
Administration and Senate; cessation of persecution against
Officials.

7. Restoration of the Little Russian press: immediate
revision of cases of inhabitants Of Galicia kept in con-
finement or exiled: and the release Of those wrongfully
subjected to persecution.

8. Restoration of activity of trade unions, and cessa-
tion of persecution of workers' representatives in the sick-
benefit organizations, on suspicion of membership in an
unlegalized party. Restoration of the labor press.

9. Agreement between the government and the legisla-
tive institutions regarding the early introduction Of:

(a) All bills immediately concerned with

92

the national defense, the supply of the army,
welfare of the wounded, care of the refugees,
and other problems directly related to the
war.
(b) The following legislative program aiming at
the organization of the country for coOpera-
tion towards victory and maintenance of in-
ternal peace:

Equalization of peasants' rights with those 7
Of other classes. I

Establishment of volost zemstvos.

 

Change of zemstvos statutes of 1890.

Change of municipal statutes of 1892.

Establishment of zemstvo institutions in the
border regions, such as Siberia, Archangel Province,
Don Territory, The Caucasus, etc.

A bill concerning the coOperative societies.

A bill concerning rest for commercial employees.

Improvement of the material condition of the
post and telegraph employees.

Confirmation of temperance for all time.

Concerning zemstvo and municipal congresses
and unions.

Statues concerning revisions.

Introduction of Courts of the Peace in those
provinces where their establishment was held back

by financial considerations.

93

Inauguration of legislative measures that
may be indispensable to the administrative execu-
tion of the above outlined program Of action.

For the progressive group of Nationalists,
Count V. Bobrinski.

For the faction of the Center,
V. Lvov.

For the faction of Zemstvo-Octobrists, r-
I. Dmitriukov.

4.3

For the group Of the Union of October 17th,
S. Shidlovski.

A”!

For the faction Of Progressists,
I. Efremov.

 

1].?-
i

For the faction of Popular Freedom,
P. Miliukov.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Collected Works and Documents

 

 

E

Antsiferov, Alexis, et al. Russian Agriculture During the

Egg. New Haven: Yale, 1930.

The entire question of agrarian reform is examined:

1) The various laws (both Ukazes and Legislation),

2) Changes in methods of production and crOps and

3) Agricultural trade. ,
Bilimovich, Alexander. The Land Settlement. New Haven: E

 

 

Yale, 1930.

Although concerned primarily with the land settle-
ment question during the war, he examines the land re-
form decrees and the Duma's modification of them. The
most pertinent articles of the land laws are included
in his presentation.

Documents pngussian History, 1914-1917. Edited by Frank

A. Golder. New York: Century, 1927.

Excellent source material of the minutes of the
Council of Ministers meetings and on the formation of
the Progressive Bloc.

Florinsky, Michael J. The End of the Russian Empire.

 

New York: Collier:_I96IT'—_
The author examines the working of the Empire

from 1914 to the Revolutions of 1917. It offers an

unusual explanation for the Duma's fall in 1917.

It examines the Duma's role in the war and the attitudes

of the Czar, the Tsaritsa, and Government ministers to

the Duma.

Golovine, Nicholas N. The Russian Army 13 the World War.

New Haven: Yale, 1931.

The author was Quarter Master General of the
Ninth Russian Army. A detailed analysis of the
Military deficiency Of Russia's army. Strong atten-
tion is given to the shortcomings of the Duma military
reform work. On the whole it is favorable to the Duma.

94

95

Gronsky, Paul and Astrov, Nicholas. The War and the Russian
Government. New Haven: Yale, 1929.

An analysis of the changes in Russia's govern—
ment that followed the Declaration of War. Some
attention was given to pre 1914 Russia. It was
extremely useful in following the changes which
took place in August, 1915.

Novgorotsev, Paul J. and Odinetz, Demitry M. Russian
Schools and Universities $3 the World War. New
Haven: Yale, 1929.

This work was published as a part of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace series on Russia
during the First World war. The work was a product
of two Russian educators and a former Minister of
Public Instruction. This work is particularly
valuable for it traces the course of educational re-
form prior to World War I and examines the role
played by the Duma in effecting this reform.

Th2 Russian Ppovisional Government, 1917, Documents. Vol. I.
Edited by R. P. Brower and A. F. Kerensky. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1961.

These documents are concerned primarily with
the revolution of March, 1917, and the eventual
Bolshevik victory in November, 1917, Their value
for this study comes from the testimony of certain
Czarist officals on the role of the Duma in the
structure of Russia's Government.

The Epstimony p§_Kolchak and Other Siberian Matgpials.
Edited by Elena Varneck and H. H. Fisher. Trans-
lated by Elena Varneck. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1935.

Most Of the material deals with the Civil War
in Siberia, but flashbacks are given Of his work in
Naval Reform prior to 1914. This testimony was given
by Kolchak before the Soviet Tribunal at Itrusk in
February, 1920.

Vinogradoff, Paul. Splf-Government ;p_Russia. London:

Constable and Co., Ltd., 1915.
This work is a combination of a series of lec-

tures delivered by Vinogradoff in England in 1915.
The value of this work stems from the interpretation
given by Mr. Vinogradoff to events in Russia's ed-
ucational system, an area in which the author was a
competent judge. It was his contention that the Duma
was the prime force behind the Reform of Russia's
educational system.

 

96

Letters

The Letters 22 phg.Tsar pp the Tsaritsa, 1914-1917.
Translated by A. L. Hyles and Edited by C. E. Vulliamy.
London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, Ltd., n.d.

These letters were written almost daily when
the Czar was absent from the Capitol. Many of them
deal with the family relationships of the Tsar and
the Tsaritsa. Occasionally, however, one would deal
with politics which would reveal the Tsar's private
thoughts on many matters.

Letters 9; Egg Tsaritsa pp ppp Tsar, 1914-1916. Intro.
Sir Bernard Pares. London: Duchworth & Co., 1923.
These letters compliment those written by the
Tsar and reveal the Tsaritsa's reaction to Nicholas'
proposals. They also reveal what type of influence
she possessed in forming the Tsar's programs.

Primary Sources - Memoirs

Buchanan, Geo. My Mission pg Russia. II vols. London:
Cassell & Co., 1923.

British ambassador to Russia 1910-1918, a per-
sonal friend on many prominent Duma members and
public men. He writes primarily criticizing the
Czarist government's failure to institute reforms.

Denikin, Anton I. Th3 Russian Turmoil. London: Hutchinson
& Co., 1922.

Very little attention is given to pre-revolu-
tionary Russia. What is given is extremely useful in
charting the changing Opinion of the officer corps
and how they viewed the work of the Duma in Military
reform.

Gurko, V. I. Features and Figures 9f the Past. Stanford:
Hoover War Library, 1939.
Assistant Minister of the Interior and member
Of the Fourth Duma. He is primarily concerned with
his own activity in his various posts. He was well
acquainted with Stolypin and the reasoning behind the
reforms of October and November, 1906.

 

Izvolsky, Alexander. Recollections gg‘a Foreigp Minister.
Translated by Charles Louis Seeger. Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1921.

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.
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- I
-
.
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V
I
o
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I ' D
d
o
I ( A (
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o
..
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, C
,. .

   

97

Minister Of Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910. He
presents insights into the ministerial relationship
in Goreymkin's and Stolypin's reforms and the reasons
for them. Also, the reaction of the conservatives
at Court to them and their backstairs politics.

Kerensky, Alexander. Russia and History's Turning Point.
New York: Collier Paperbacks, 1965.

This work is less of an apologia for Mr.
Kerensky's failure in 1917 than previous works by the
author. In this particular work the author recounts
the events which preceded the March, 1917, Revolution
and the role of the Duma during the First World War.

Knox, Sir Alfred William. With the Russian Army. London:
Hutchinson & Co., 1921. ,

He was Military attache of the British to Russia
during the war years (1914-1918) and for some years
preceding. He was associated with Duma members
especially Col. Englehardt. In addition he was
acquainted wiflithe High Command of the Russian Army
and well versed in its work and difficulties.

Kokovtsov, Count. 922 93 My Past. Stanford: Hoover War
Library, 1935.

This book provides useful material on the workings
of the Duma in regards to fiscal matters (its reaction
to the budgets and taxes as proposed by the govern-
ment). The author at points tends to use this book
to answer the changes Of his critics especially Witte .

KurOpatkin, Alexander. The Russian Army and the Japanese
flag. II vols. Translated by A. B. Lindsay. Edited
by E. D. Swinton. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909.

Kuropatkin was commander-in-chief in the Russo-

Japanese War from March 27, 1904, until March, 1905.
These volumes are an account of the War, Russia's
military tradition and the changes necessary if
Russia was to be successful in future wars.

Maklakov, V. A. The First State Duma. Translated by

Mary Belkin. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University
Press, 1964.

Maklakov was not a member of the First of Second
Dumas, but he was in the Third and Fourth. He gives
his impression Of why the Cadets could not hold power
in 1917 by examining their actions in the First Duma.
Specific attention is paid to the Cadet's prOposals
for agrarian reform.

Miliukov, Paul. Russia and its Crisis. Chicago: n.p.,
1905.

 

98

Miliukov examines the causescf Russia's econom-
ic and social plight and reaches the conclusion
that Russia needed democratic institutions which
would facilitate the growth and improvement of the
peasants.

Paleologue, Maurice. An AmbassOdor's Memoirs. III vols.

Doran. No Yo: flop-T, 1921'“.
The memoirs of the French ambassador to the

Russian Court. They cover the war years of 1914 to
1917. Paleologue was an intimate acquaintance of
many notables in St. Petersburg Society. Of primary
interest were his comments on the Duma and the Czar's
attitude toward that body.

Pares, Bernard. My_Russian Memoirs. London: n.p., 1931.
Pares is concerned particularly with the conduct
Of the war. He was personally acquainted with many
Government Ministers and Duma members. He records
both his own observations and those his Russian
acquaintances. Some attention is paid to agricultural
reform and the work Of the Duma in general.

Sazonov, Serge. Fateful Years: 1909-1916, Reminiscences
of the Minister of Foreigp Affairs. London: Stokes
and_ Co., 1928.

Sazonov was Foreign Minister from 1909-1916 and
in this work recounts his activities in Office. The
work offers a good account of Russia's foreign affairs
but offers relatively little on domestic politics.

Rodzianko, Michael. Egg Reigp pg Rasputin. 'London: n.p.,
1927.

These memoirs contain a certain amount Of
commentary on the Duma's work on munitions during
World War I. Most of what Rodzianko says should be
taken with a grain of salt. Although when his interp-
retation is included with others it is possible to
get a fairly accurate picture of attitudes and events.

Witte, S. Memoirs Of Count Witte. Translated and edited

by Abraham Yarmolinsky. New York: Doubleday, 1921.

Witte is primarily concerned with comparing his
administration with that Of Stolypin's.

Primary Journal Articles

Pares, Bernard. "Alexander Guchkov," The Slavonic and
East EurOpean Review. XV. (London), July, 1936.

99

This article was Pares commemerative to Guchkov's
work on the occasion of the latter's death in 1936.
The material was later incorperated into Fall of the
Russian Monarchy.

Maklakov, V. A. "On the Fall Of Tsardom," The Slavonic
and East European Review, XVIII. (London), July,
1939.

Maklakov presents bashziv a review of Pares'
book the Fall of the Russian Monarchy. He emphasizes
the difference between his interpretation and that of
Pares.

Secondary Sources

Florinsky, Michael F. Russia, A History and an Inter -
retation, II. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1957.
Designed primarily as a general text, it does
Offer a good background for the era 1905-1917.
Some attention is paid to the specific problems faced
by the Duma in agricultural reform.

Hans, Nicholas. History of Russian Educational Policy -

1291-1912. New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1964.
Mr. Hans was a student of Sir Bernard Pares and

prepared this work as a Doctoral Disseration under
Sir Bernard's direction. The materials used in this
work were Russian Government documents in the British
Museum. This work was extremely helpful in analyzing
the course Of educational reform in Russia in the
period between 1905-191?. Mr. Hans devoted consid-
erable attention to the role assumed by the Duma.

 

Levin Alfred. The Second Duma. London: n.p., 19u0.

Levin deals with the Second Duma from the thesis
that the Cadets were working for co-Operation with
the government, the SD for Revolution. and that
Stolypin was not adverse to use both legal and illegal
means to bring about his reforms. It is a very close
analysis of the Second Duma's work. The book is very
useful in describing the internal organization and
structure of the Duma and its Operation. It Offers
detailed accounts of the Duma's work in Agriculture
and Military Affairs.

Pares, Bernard. Russia between Reform and Revolution.
New York: n.p., 19 2.
This work was based upon Sir Bernard's Russian
Memoirs. In this particular instance the author
devotes more time to interpretation than he did in
the previous work.

100

Pares, Bernard. The Fall of the Russian Monarchy. New York:
Vintage Press, 1939.
It duplicates in many respects the work Of his
Russian Memoirs. More attention is paid though to
the various reforms in the Duma era.