

THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE RUSSIAN
STATE DUMA 1906-1916

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY


Steven B. Zamara

1966

THESIS



ROOM USE ONLY



THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF
THE RUSSIAN STATE DUMA
1906-1916

by

Steven B. Zamara

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1966

I would like to thank those people who have helped in the preperation of this thesis and in particular Dr. A. E. Adams for all of the help and suggestions which he has extended to me.

Table of Contents

	Page
Introduction	1
Chapter I --- The Role and Influence of the Russian State Duma in Agricultural Reform, 1906-1911	3
Chapter II --- The Duma and Military Reform, 1907-1915	29
Chapter III --- Educational Reform	66
Conclusion	81
Appendix	89
Bibliography	94

INTRODUCTION

The October Manifesto issued by Nicholas II, on October 17, 1905,* inaugurated a new era in the political history of Russia. In granting the Manifesto, Nicholas limited his legislative authority, and granted the people of Russia a voice in the legislative process. It is the purpose of this study to discover what role the Duma he established played in determining the Government's policy in agricultural, military and educational reform from 1906-1916. Besides examining the Duma's influence in the formation of Government policy in these areas, this study is also concerned with the Duma's reaction to those measures which the Government put forth.

Legislative initiative was perhaps one of the most important rights given to the Duma in the Fundamental Laws. Proposed legislation was presented to the Duma either by one of its own members or by a minister on matters lying within the jurisdiction of his ministry. Duma committees were established to examine these proposals in detail and to present conclusions or to propose legislation on matters presented to them by the Duma. The establishment of committees and the number of members each contained were matters

*All dates in this work are Old Style (Julian.) To compute them to New Style (Gregorian), add twelve days in the Nineteenth Century and thirteen days after March 1, 1900.

determined by the Duma. Each committee selected its chairman and secretary from its membership. Members of the press and persons not connected with the Duma or the Government were barred from their meetings. In addition to the right of legislative initiative the Duma also possessed the right to interpellate ministers.

The internal organization of the Duma was established by an Imperial Decree on February 20, 1906. According to this decree the Duma's presiding officer was to be elected by the total membership of the Duma and serve for one year, with the right of re-election. He was assisted by two Vice-Presidents, also selected by the Duma. In addition to providing a President for the Duma the same decree provided for a Duma Secretariat. This Secretariat consisted of a secretary and any number of assistants, the exact number of which was to be determined by the Duma.¹

Elections for the First Duma were held at a time when Russia was still in the throes of revolution, March, 1906. These elections were the answer to the long awaited hopes and demands of Russia's liberals. The Government, however, wanted the greatest possible support from the Duma. Therefore, it arranged for the peasants to have the widest possible representation, since they were looked upon as the Czar's greatest pillar of support.²

¹For a detailed analysis of the President's powers and the office of Secretariat consult Alfred Levin, The Second Duma, (London: 1940).

²Sergei Witte, Memoirs of Count Witte, translated and edited by Avrahm Yarmolinsky, (New York: Doubleday, 1921), p. 372.

CHAPTER I

The Role and Influence of the Russian Duma in Agricultural Reform, 1906-1911

Nicholas in his address to the first session of the Duma on April 27, 1906, failed to state the government's position on agricultural reform. The land reform question, however, was one of the burning problems facing the nation. The government's failure to present concrete proposals led to a wide diffusion of proposals from the floor of the Duma.

Basically all the reform programs presented by the Duma, called for the transfer of all land for the limited use, not as the private property, of the peasant.¹ Paul Miliukov, the founder of the Cadet Party* writing in 1905, before the issuance of the October Manifesto, stated that the chief "crisis" of the Russian state was centered on agriculture. He based this argument on the fact that the Russian economy, of the early twentieth century, was one

*The Cadet or Constitutional Democratic Party was a political party based on the English ideas of a Constitutional Monarchy and civil rights.

¹V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma. (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 139.

founded almost exclusively on agricultural production. Miliukov stated that over 80% of the people were engaged in agriculture and that the prosperity of Russia was dependent upon the prosperity of the peasant. He concluded that since 1861 Russian agriculture had been in a state of steady decay brought on by a decrease in the average size of peasant holdings, which produced a corresponding decrease in individual production. Miliukov considered the indicators of this decay to be a decrease in the consumption of vodka, increases in tax arrears and increase in immigration. Miliukov considered the chief causes of the peasant's financial difficulty to be the forced sale of grain at low prices. This squeeze on the peasant's pocket-book was caused by both a lack of adequate storage facilities and an increase in taxes.²

The government extracted two types of taxation from the peasant, direct and indirect. Indirect taxes were the hardest for the peasant to bear, since they were placed on vodka, tea, sugar, matches, kerosene and the manufactures of the protected industries.³

Another problem facing the peasant, and affecting his economic position, according to Miliukov, was that of insufficient land. In the North, the Emancipation of 1861 gave the peasant as much land as he desired, but this land

²Paul Miliukov, Russia and its Crisis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905), pp. 434-443.

³Ibid., pp. 444-447.

was of low production and poor quality. For this land the peasant was forced to pay exorbitant prices, for he bore not only the cost of the land but also of his emancipation. In the Southern areas of Russia the reverse was true; here the peasant was given as little land as possible since it was of high yield. Here too the price of land was exorbitant.⁴

Miliukov inferred several ways of solving this problem. The first involved an intensive system of agriculture, the second capital investment, and the third an increase in individual holdings.⁵ In addition to these the liberals had proposed, at a Zemstvo assembly in 1902, that the peasant be given legal protection for his home and family by liberating him from "the whims of the Mir."⁶

The basic proposals of the Cadets, in the First Duma, as presented by Hertsenshtein, a Cadet deputy, embodied the broader points of Miliukov's program; more land for the peasant, and the abolition of all restriction stipulating class. Their draft of a land reform bill called for the expropriation of all land - crown, church and private estates. Owners of the expropriated land were to be given just compensation. The cost of the land was to be divided equally between government and peasants. Under the Cadet program all land was to be placed in a special "area of state land"

⁴Ibid., pp. 448-449.

⁵Ibid., pp. 449-459.

⁶Ibid., pp. 476-477.

for the exclusive use of the peasant. The Cadets proposed limiting the amount of land to the production norm,* taking the consumer into consideration.⁷

V. A. Maklakov, a conservative Cadet, believed the Cadet program was not one of long range reform, but one to meet the immediate needs of the peasant. He based this conclusion on Hertsenshtein's Duma speech of May 19, 1906:

It is impossible to propose now measures [sic] calculated to last a long time. Special measures are necessary, as the compulsory expropriation is a special measure. We are passing through a period when immediate actions [sic] is an urgent necessity. Is it not enough to have the experience of last year's May illuminations when 150 estates were put to the torch⁸ in the province of Saratov, all in one day?

Maklakov, furthermore was opposed to the official Cadet bill because it made no provision for releasing the peasant from the Mir. This he believed, was a violation of a basic Cadet tenet in civil liberties. The Cadet program, he concluded, was equalization at the lowest level; it was prepared to sacrifice the most productive segment of the population.⁹

The Trudovik** project and that of the Social

*The production norm was based on the idea of a surplus being produced which would be sold, thereby raising the peasant above the subsistence level.

**The Trudoviki were the labor segment of the Social Revolutionary Party, a party dedicated to agrarian socialism.

⁷ Maklakov, op. cit., p. 139.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 140-141.

⁹ Ibid., p. 140.

Democrats* called for the establishment of a land fund to be used by the entire population - peasants as well as factory workers. This plan was based on the labor norm.** Lands which the peasant received from the expropriation of private estates could not be transferred to others; and a change in the peasants status (loss of workers) could result in a loss of land.¹⁰

Introduction of a land reform proposal by thirty-three Duma members "forced" the Council of Ministers to break its silence on the agrarian question.¹¹ On May 13, 1906, the government, in the name of the Czar, issued a declaration of its attitude to the demands of the Duma. This declaration was the product of reports sent by local governors to the Council of Ministers. One of the major themes of the governors' reports was the unrest of the peasants and the lower levels of government employees.¹² In addition I. L. Goremykin, (Chairman of the Council of

*The Social Democrats were a party based on Marxist socialism, they split into two groups in 1903, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks (the party's full name is the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party).

**The labor norm was based on the number of workers available to a family, any change in the number of workers would result in a corresponding loss in the amount of land.

¹⁰ Alexander Izvolsky, Recollections of a Foreign Minister. trans. Charles Louis Seeger (Garden City: Doubleday, 1921), p. 178.

¹¹ V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past, (Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1939), p. 475.

¹² V. N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past. (Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1935), p. 137.

Ministers), P. A. Stolypin (Minister of the Interior), and Alexander Izvolsky (Foreign Minister), submitted reports to Nicholas on the Duma and its various land bills.

Izvolsky in particular stated:

The peasants are far from being represented by men who express the real spirit of the agricultural class. The Duma is especially dominated by the so called intellectuals of the cities and the semi-intellectuals of the rural districts.¹³

Izvolsky's statement can give some indication to the type of beliefs which prevailed in the formulation of the government's declaration.

Cadet proposals on agricultural reforms as presented to the peasant, according to Maklakov, were deceptive.

The government warned the peasants of this deception:

The Council of Ministers considers that it is its duty to declare the solution to this question [land reform] on the basis proposed by the Duma are absolutely inadmissible. The Government cannot recognize the rights of private property for some people and deny them to others; the Government cannot generally deny rights of private ownership to land without at the same time denying ownership to every other kind of property.¹⁴

In preparing a direct response to the Duma's demands Goremykin was determined to stress the inviolability of private property. At the same time, nevertheless, he expressed a willingness to work with the Duma within its area of competence. Particularly favorable concern was

¹³Izvolsky, op. cit., p. 185.

¹⁴Maklakov, op. cit., p. 91.

shown for those Duma proposals which were aimed at equalizing the peasant's legal status with those of other classes.¹⁵ Goremykin's speech, however, gave the Duma leaders the impression that the government's stand on the inviolability of private property was final.¹⁶ Albeit, the government was interested in lifting the restrictions on the ownership of allotment lands:

...Measures undertaken in this field must be directed both to the improvement of the conditions of the peasant's land tenure within the existing limits and to the extension of the landownership area to the landless part of the population, at the expense of crown lands and by the acquisitions of privately owned land through the co-operation of the Peasant Land Bank. In this respect the forthcoming field of government activity is wide in scope and fruitful. Raising the level of the agricultural industry, now on quite a low plane of development, this will expand the productivity of the land and thus raise the level of national prosperity...Extension of emigration will, therefore, be one of the first concerns of the Council of Ministers.¹⁷

The government strengthened its position on agricultural reform when it designated V. I. Gurko, assistant Minister of the Interior, to reply to the Duma's response to the Government's Declaration. He reiterated the major premise of Goremykin's speech, on the abolition of the commune as the key to the future prosperity of the peasant.

The Duma failed to respond favorably to Gurko's speech.

¹⁵Maklakov, op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁶V. I. Gurko, op. cit., p. 473.

¹⁷Maklakov, op. cit., p. 93.

It adopted a revolutionary course of action on the land question hoping the government would grant further concessions.¹⁸ In consequence on June 20, 1906, the government publicly presented, to the people, what it considered to be the limits of any land reform program. This statement reminded the peasants that it objected to "the widespread conviction among the peasants that land can belong only to those who work on it; therefore, expropriation of all privately owned land must be carried out."¹⁹ The Duma replied to this statement with an open appeal to the people:

- 1) On what basis did the ministry voice its proposals regarding the land question in the definite form of a government communication that may be considered by the people as an act of legislative character, emanating from the Supreme Authority?
- 2) What measures have been taken to ensure that all organs which published the communication make it quite clear that this announcement is simply a clarification by the ministry of legislative proposals they [the government] brought before the Duma for examination, which will not have any force or significance²⁰ if they are rejected by the State Duma?

With the Duma's public appeal to the Council of Ministers to withdraw its statement on land reform, the government was placed in a position where it could adopt one of two alternatives: 1) it could acquiesce to the Duma's demands; or 2) it would have to save face and dissolve the

¹⁸Gurko, op. cit., pp. 474-480.

¹⁹Maklakov, op. cit., p. 205.

²⁰Ibid., p. 208.

Duma. The second alternative was adopted and the First Duma was dissolved on July 8, 1906.

Protesting the dissolution of the Duma, a majority of the delegates adjourned to Viborg, Finland, and in their Viborg Appeal* called the government's action illegal and entreated the Russian people to boycott tax payments and military service, until the demands of the people were met. This appeal was ignored by the people. No popular clamor rose to support the Duma's demands. The government had regained the upper hand, and intended to use its power. In particular, Stolypin** brought pressure upon the Minister of Justice to prevent the signers of the Viborg Appeal from standing for the Second Duma.²¹ The Second Duma, it was officially hoped, would be more willing to co-operate with the government.

Stolypin's first concern in issuing his reforms of October and November, 1906, was to quiet liberal opinion. He believed that the Duma was opposed to the government because of its continuation of out-of-date practices. Stolypin hoped to correct this by effecting certain reforms and by repealing "certain regulations which caused the most

*The Viborg Appeal was a protest against the dissolution of the First Duma, and a call to the people not to pay taxes or comply with the army draft until a new Duma was assembled. The Appeal was issued in July, 1906.

**With the dissolution of the First Duma Nicholas II, replaced Goremykin with Stolypin as Chairman of the Council of Minister.

²¹Gurko, op. cit., p. 494.

exasperation."²² In this way he hoped to disarm the opposition in the Duma and gain public support, (for his side). It was hoped that important concessions on the land question would, also, get the Duma on his side. He hoped that these concessions would give the government public support and thereby strengthen it.

Reforms were judged successful by the degree of public acceptance. Stolypin divided the public into two groups: 1) those who would not accept or be satisfied with any reforms, and would only be happy with acquiring power for themselves; and 2) those who were concerned with the future of Russia. He resolved to work with the latter.²³ In a remark to Gurko, Stolypin stated:

There are 180 days before the Second Duma assembles. We must make good use of them so that when the Duma meets we may appear before it with a series of reforms already realized. This will demonstrated to government's sincere desire to remove from the existing order all things incompatible with the spirit of the times.²⁴

The first reform issued under these circumstances was the Ukaze of October 5, 1906. This decree brought one of Goremykin's proposals, in the government's declaration to the First Duma to fruition. It abolished nearly all the legal restrictions on the peasant and practically equalized the rights of all the people in the

²²Gurko, op. cit., p. 494.

²³Ibid., p. 495.

²⁴Ibid., p. 494.

Empire.²⁵

Stolypin's second reform was effected by the Ukaze of November 9, 1906. This decree abolished the Mir as the center of peasant life, and gave ownership of family plots to the head of the household.

Stolypin was willing to accept certain propositions voiced in the Duma in formulating his agrarian reform bills. He believed that expropriation should only be resorted to in cases where it was otherwise impossible for the peasant to secure woods, water and meadows. Expropriation would thereby result in the improvement of the peasant's economic condition.²⁶

Stolypin was opposed to the reform plans of both the Social Democrats and the Cadets. Opposition to the Social Democratic plan was based on the belief that it would equalize everyone at the lowest level. Under this plan the initial increase in production would be eaten up by the natural growth of the population. Also, the leftist plan was criticized because it presupposed a total social and economic revolution. He considered the Cadet project contradictory because it recognized property rights for the individual peasant, but not for the squire.²⁷

The conservative elements of the Royal Court actively opposed the measures introduced under the Ukazes of October

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Alfred Levin, The Second Duma (London: 1940), p. 188.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 186-187.

5, and November 9, 1906. They brought pressure upon Nicholas II to have Stolypin removed from his position. Nicholas, however, did not bow before their pressure, even though his sympathies were with the conservatives. Stolypin also faced severe opposition from within his own cabinet.²⁸ Stolypin took the economic point of view in these land reforms that preservation of the large estates was essential for agricultural development, and, therefore, opposed expropriation.²⁹

Cadet reaction to the Stolypin reform program was mixed. In general, the majority of the Cadets believed that the maldistribution of land was one of the chief causes of the peasant's economic backwardness and could only be rectified by breaking up the gentry estates. Furthermore, they believed that a voluntary solution of the problem through the Peasant Land Bank would only prolong the problem.³⁰ Maklakov took the opposite point of view. He believed that a majority of the peasants supported the program, and that the Cadet program was a product of fear, not reform.³¹

The Narodniks* were also opposed to Stolypin's land

*The term Narodnik is applied to those people who were interested in the welfare of the peasant, it is applied here to the Social Revolutionary Party.

²⁸Izvolsky, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 243-244.

³⁰Levin, op. cit., p. 169.

³¹Maklakov, op. cit., pp. 141-143.

bill. They did not consider this reform adequate to meet the peasant's needs. In its place they proposed the nationalization of all land which was to be doled out to the peasants as it was needed by them. It was to be administered locally through independent and democratically elected bodies.³²

Social Democratic opposition to the Stolypin program was based on the fear that an economically strong peasant class would not be susceptible to revolutionary propaganda. In addition the Social Democrats felt a majority of the peasants could not afford the cost asked by the Peasant's Land Bank. Finally, the economic division between the peasants would only be accentuated by Stolypin's reforms.³³

The Menshevik proposal to work with all parties in opposition to the government was accepted by the Social Democrats in preparing their program of action for the Second Duma. In addition, the Social Democrats advocated the obligatory expropriation of land without compensation. They planned to submit their bill to the Duma's Agrarian Committee, to direct their opposition to the government's program, and refrain from attacking the other opposition parties.

In drawing up a legislative program for the Second Duma, Stolypin planned to avoid the mistakes of Goremykin, and placed a series of liberal proposals before the Duma.

³²Levin, op. cit., p. 169.

³³Ibid., p. 172.

He hoped that such an approach would prevent the aimless debates which characterized the First Duma. Izvolsky described this program by stating that:

Outside of this programme, sufficient in itself [sic] to occupy the Duma for a long time, there were at that period certain burning questions which demanded immediate solution on the part to be avoided...but, above all, it was still the agrarian question that called for prompt measures, as it had by that time reached a most acute stage.³⁴

The land reform measure of November 9 was immediately challenged by the Second Duma. Various parties in the Duma offered a variety of land reform programs in answer to Stolypin's reform law. They believed Stolypin's answer only prolonged the problem and left unanswered the basic question surrounding land ownership among the gentry.

Prince Vasilchikov, Minister of Agriculture, presented the government's position. He welcomed the Duma's concern and its creation of an Agricultural Committee. The Duma was assured, by him, that the government was concerned with the people's welfare. In addition, he stated that the government was willing to change property rights when they conflicted with the "interest of the State." Although, at the same time the Government would continue to regard private property as sacred.³⁵

One of the first parts of the Stolypin reforms to be considered by the Duma was the one dealing with resettle-

³⁴Izvolsky, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

³⁵Levin, op. cit., p. 180.

ment. Debate on this subject commenced with the interpellation of the Minister of Agriculture by the Duma. The interpellators believed that certain actions taken by the Ministry were illegal. In December, 1906, the Ministry ordered that all state and surplus lands in Siberia be made available for immigrants. Arguments, in the Duma, were based on the laws of May 23, 1896, and June 4, 1898, which protected State lands as a surplus for the original settlers. Also under these laws the surplus lands of the village were protected for the village's use.

In defending himself Vasilchikov stated that the interpellation was based on a misunderstanding of the law of 1898. He pointed out that article three allowed for such resettlement. At the same time the Duma was asked to vote funds for carrying on the resettlement program. The Duma concluded that Vasilchikov did not prove his point and that the government failed to present the prospective colonist with a true picture.³⁶

General debate on the entire Stolypin program was opened by Tsereteli, a Social Democrat. He stressed the point that the gentry had received their land in exchange for state service, and that this service had not been performed since the time of Peter III. In concluding, Tsereteli believed that expropriation would not lower production, because once the peasants acquired the land they would increase their income and then could adopt

³⁶Ibid., p. 198.

modern methods of agriculture. The end result would be a strong domestic market for the growing Russian industries.

Each party introduced its respective agrarian reform programs. They were the same ones which were presented in the First Duma. These independent plans eventually were responsible for breaking the opposition's united front.

N. N. Kutler, a Cadet deputy, opened with an attack on both the Trudoviki and Social Democrats for their opposition to the Cadet program. He voiced the belief that the peasant could bear the cost of the land under the Cadet program.

Stolypin noticed that, although the Duma was unanimous in its opposition to his plan, it had wide agreement on expropriation. The Duma encountered difficulty, however, in agreeing upon a final solution. He tended to regard the Duma's actions as revolutionary and dangerous.

In addressing the Duma on May 10, Stolypin lectured them on the Government's immovable stand on the land question.³⁷ This speech ended all hope for a working arrangement between the Government and the Duma. Stolypin's speech was the cue for new debates on the agrarian question.³⁸

On May 28, the agrarian sub-committee voted to annul the law of August 27, 1906, regulating the sale of State Lands to the Peasants. Guarantees were provided for those peasants who made preliminary arrangements to purchase

³⁷Ibid., p. 186.

³⁸Ibid., p. 188.

land. It also asked for an abrogation of the Law of November 15, 1906, on mortgages from the Peasant Land Bank. The laws were opposed as being inadequate and a hinderance to reaching a solution of the agrarian problem.³⁹

The Duma and government did manage to reach agreement in one area. Michael Rodzianko, an Octobrists deputy,* proposed the creation of a Duma Famine Relief Committee, to work with the government, and its Famine Relief Committee. Stolypin praised this program as one which would be a significant contribution, demonstrating co-operation between the government and the Duma. Cadet response was highly favorable to Stolypin's action, and they believed that he acted in a truly parliamentary fashion. The left, however, felt that they were being sold out by the Cadets.⁴⁰

Duma Committees to oversee the work of the government's Famine Relief Committees were proposed by the Social Democrats. They hoped to use the data gathered by these committees as ammunition against the government, and to reveal official corruption in the government's work.⁴¹

The Cadets, on the other hand, felt they could not violate the government's prerogatives, if the Duma was to

*The Union of October 71, or Octobrists was a conservative party which accepted the October Manifesto, and was willing to use the powers given to the Duma to initiate reform.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 193-194.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 132.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 126.

survive. They realized that such committees, as proposed by the Social Democrats, would only raise false hopes in the people and might even result in the people losing faith in the Duma. Rodichev, a Cadet deputy, wanted the Duma's debates on this question to follow the accepted rules of debate.⁴² Following this procedure the Duma defeated the Social Democratic proposal. This defeat prompted Stolypin's praise for the Duma.

Stolypin resolved, shortly after his speech of May 10, to dissolve the Duma. The reasons for his decision were almost identical to Goremykin's for dissolving the First Duma. To begin with the Duma's debates on agriculture were still considered by the government to be revolutionary, and out of line with the government's ideas. Secondly, the Second Duma did not fit Stolypin's criterion as an institution "which was concerned with the future of Russia."

Prior to the dissolution of the Duma, which was effected by a Ukaze on June 3, 1907, Stolypin resolved to alter the representation of the peasant, the factory worker, and the minorities. The new Duma, Stolypin resolved, would be concerned with the "future of Russia." To this end, he issued the Electoral Ukaze of June 3, 1907. This Ukaze stripped the peasant of most of his representation and gave the gentry an overly proportionate rate of representation. Stolypin took an active part in the elections of 1907. Government money was appropriated for the use of selected

⁴²Ibid., p. 126.

candidates. At the same time Stolypin formed an alliance with the conservative Octobrist Party.

Stolypin's reform measures were finally adopted by the Third Duma, which convened on November 1, 1907. The reforms were initially approved by the Duma's Land Commission, under the Chairmanship of Shidlovsky. The Commission introduced improvements in the operation of the law.⁴³ In the main, the Land Law of June 14, 1910, was primarily the Ukaze of November 9, 1906. The Duma added certain provisions which clarified the finer points of the Ukaze.

The Duma's additions concerned the procedures employed in carrying out consolidation. In augmenting the Ukaze, the Duma proposed first of all, that if one-fifth of the village population demanded consolidation it must be voted upon. Secondly, it reduced the previously necessary two-thirds vote for complete consolidation to one-half. Finally, the Duma's version called for the abolition of the Commune if no redistribution had taken place since 1861.⁴⁴

The composition of the Third Duma, resulting from the Electoral decree of June 3, 1907, was finally responsible for the passage of Stolypin's reforms. There was still strong opposition from both the extreme Right and Left. The overwhelming center majority of the Third Duma, however,

⁴³ Bernard Pares, The Fall of Russian Monarchy (New York: Vintage Library, 1939), p. 113.

⁴⁴ Alexander Belimovich, The Land Settlement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 327-331.

was able to pass these measures.⁴⁵ In passing his reform measures the Third Duma demonstrated that Stolypin achieved his realization of a Duma which was a powerful collaborator of the government.⁴⁶

On May 29, 1911, the Duma passed further legislation concerned with agricultural reform. This act conferred on the peasant, who seceded from the commune, the right to lay claim to part of the common pasture and forest lands for his private use. It also allowed for the distribution of the land if the Mir was broken up - collectivization of the divided strips into consolidated holdings. In addition, it provided for consolidation if two or more villages held land in common. The Duma also provided for a division of land held in common by the peasant and the landlord. This law, plus the one of June 14, 1910, brought Stolypin's land reform decrees into legal existence. The Duma was now responsive to the desires of the government.

Taking advantage of the Duma's responsiveness, the government proposed additional legislation for the Duma's consideration, the government, at first, proposed a bill which would have abolished the servitudes between peasant and landlord which still existed in areas of South-Western and North-Western Russia. In addition, the government proposed a land bill similar to that of June 14, 1910, for

⁴⁵Izvolsky, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

⁴⁶Gurko, op. cit., p. 9.

land consolidation in Siberia.⁴⁷ These bills were never acted upon by the Duma, for the outbreak of the war interrupted their passage.⁴⁸

The Duma had, in addition to the agricultural reforms, a strong interest in the Government's management of the means of reform, particularly the Peasant Land Bank. Stolypin wanted to meet the demands of both the peasants and liberals in the area of land reform.⁴⁹ He proposed the transfer of all crown and state tillable lands to the Peasant Land Bank, to be sold by the bank to the peasants, at prices they could afford. Two Ukazes, those of November 5, 1905, and November 15, 1906, liberalized the operation of the Land Bank. They provided for full loans to cover the amount of the purchase, and a lowering of interest rates below that of other institutions.⁵⁰ There is also some evidence that Stolypin was even considering expropriations in some areas to add to the available land for Land Bank purchases. This supposed plan was to be carried out with the aid of the Cadets,⁵¹ but nothing came of these negotiations.

The operations of the Peasant Land Bank were brought

⁴⁷Belimovick, op. cit., pp. 340-341.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 327.

⁴⁹Gurko, op. cit., p. 8 and Izvolsky, op. cit., p. 245.

⁵⁰Michael Florinsky, Russia, A History and an Interpretation Vol. II, (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1947), p.1217.

⁵¹Gurko, op. cit., p. 496.

to the Duma's attention as part of the Budget of 1910.*

A. I. Shingarev, a Cadet deputy, raised questions concerning the Bank's purchase of private estates at what he considered to be inflated prices, and thereby forcing the peasant to pay a higher price for the land.⁵² The Duma did not take any specific action on Shingarev's inquiry.

Stolypin on his return from Siberia, recommended to Nicholas II that the functions of the Land Bank be transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Chief Administration of Land Management in the Ministry of Agriculture. He believed that the transfer would result in the Land Bank being more responsive to the needs on the peasants.⁵³ Nicholas II, however, refused to go along with the proposed transfer, and the Bank's operation remained in the Ministry of Finance.

The Duma's role in effecting agrarian reform was both direct and indirect. In evaluating these roles, the direct one is the more important. The direct role of the Duma forced the government to take a stand, and to formulate a program for agrarian reform; and the Duma's reaction to this program. The Duma was indirectly responsible for the Stolypin reform decrees, since he was trying to avoid

*The peasant did not bear the full cost of the land when it was purchased from the Land Bank. The Bank discounted the price to the peasant with the difference in price being made up through general government expenditures.

⁵²Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 245.

⁵³Ibid., p. 252.

the pitfalls encountered by Goremykin in the First Duma.

Reform proposals by the Cadets, and the parties of the left, in the First Duma, called for expropriation of all land for the peasant's use. Goremykin and his cabinet were opposed to any form of expropriation, and made this belief known to both the Duma and the people. In making its view known, the government dropped its silence on agrarian reform, and put forth a program of its own. This action was precipitated by the proposals of the Duma, and its debates on the agrarian question.

When the Duma failed to take favorable action on the government's proposals, the government had to defend its program before the people and the Duma. The government's program was rejected by the Duma with the hope that further concessions, on the land question, would be forthcoming from the government.

Goremykin had no intention of bowing to the Duma's demands, and made this point known on June 20, 1906. This statement of policy hit at the basic plank of all proposals put forth by the Duma - expropriation. Goremykin considered **private** property to be sacred, and would stick to this point. The Duma, at the same time, was not willing to yield the point of expropriation. It called upon the government, publicly, to withdraw its declaration. Finally, the Duma's severe opposition to the government's proposals, gave the government the choice of either bowing to the Duma's position or dissolving it. The government had no inten-

tion of giving in to the Duma, and it reacted by dissolving this body. In dissolving the Duma, the government demonstrated that it was fearful of both the Duma's position and the consequences which they might produce.

In preparing his reforms and a program for the Second Duma, Stolypin was indirectly influenced by the First Duma's actions, and Goremykin's reaction to them. This was brought out in Stolypin's conversation with Gurko, in which he made known both his desire to work with the Duma and the need for a change in the government's position, if co-operation was to exist.

Stolypin recognized the need for urgent reform in agriculture. This was demonstrated in the formulation of the Ukazes of October and November, 1906. Stolypin accepted the basic idea of expropriation, under limited conditions. In accepting expropriation, a major point of the Goremykin program was modified.

The Duma's reaction to the Stolypin reforms was anything but favorable. Instead of approving the Ukazes without debate, the Duma reintroduced the reform proposals of the First Duma. Stolypin answered the Duma's attacks upon his program with a lecture on the government's position. This lecture did not pacify the Duma, instead it opened a new round in opposition debates. Opposition to the Stolypin reforms culminated in the decision of the Agrarian sub-committee to annul the Ukaze of August 17, 1907, which regulated the sale of state land to the peasant.

After his speech of May 10, 1907, and the Duma's reaction to it, Stolypin gave up all hope of being able to work with this body. The Second Duma was looked upon by the Government as a breeding ground of revolutionary thought. With this idea in mind, Stolypin dissolved the Second Duma. At the same time, he issued the Electoral Law of June 3, 1907. This law removed the highly volatile peasant element from the Duma. The peasant was no longer looked upon as "the Czar's greatest pillar of support." He was now regarded as a revolutionary with a radical solution for the agrarian problem.

The government's reaction was again a direct response to the Duma's position. For in removing the peasant from the Duma the government was trying to assure itself a conservative majority for future Dumas. The Third Duma Stolypin hoped would be "interested in a great Russia."

Even though the government and the Duma could not reach agreement on the agrarian question, they demonstrated in the Second Duma that they could work together, in particular, the Duma's willingness to work with the government in famine relief. With the dissolution of the Second Duma there was an outward defeat of the radical proposals. At the same time, however, the modified ideas of the Duma's proposals, e.g., accepting modified expropriation, were embodied in the Stolypin reforms.

Another aspect of the Duma's direct role was found in the operation of the Peasant Land Bank. Stolypin was again sensitive to the liberal demands when he proposed modifica-

tion in the Bank's operation, which made it easier for the peasant to purchase and pay for land. This was illustrated by Stolypin's desire to have the Bank moved from the Ministry of Finance to that of Agriculture, after it was attacked in the Duma.

The Duma's direct role on agricultural reform is best illustrated by the Third Duma's passage and the changes which it made in the Ukaze of November 9, 1906. These changes may not have been very spectacular, but none the less, they demonstrated that the Duma did do something positive in agricultural reform. More importantly, these changes were accepted by the government.

With the passage of the Land Laws of June 14, 1910, and May 29, 1911, the Duma expanded the scope of the Stolypin reforms beyond their original boundaries. This action produced additional proposals from the government on the agrarian question. These proposals were debated in the Duma, but were never acted upon because of the outbreak of World War I.

The measures enacted in agricultural reform from 1906-1911, demonstrate that an interaction did exist between the government and the Duma. This interaction did produce a series of reforms in agriculture which had the approval of various segments of the population. If the Duma's role was to be characterized, it could be defined as that of a sounding board which the government used to initiate reform.

CHAPTER II

The Duma and Military Reform 1907-1915

Article XCVI of the Fundamental Laws gave exclusive power to the Czar in all matters pertaining to the military. This law, if followed to the letter, would have prevented the Duma from interfering in military matters. This, however, was one in which the Duma exercised considerable influence. One would assume that since the Fundamental Laws gave the Czar exclusive control of the military, conflict between the Czar and the Duma would develop. Quite to the contrary, the Czar in most cases fully approved the actions taken by the Duma. In fact, Nicholas II went out of his way in many instances to gain the Duma's favor.

World War I opened a whole new era for the Duma in military matters, especially in the formation of the Special Councils for Army Supply and the Duma's control of them. Also during the War the Duma was instrumental in forcing the Government to rid itself of most of its reactionary ministers, replacing them with men more acceptable to the Duma.

Nine years prior the War with Japan and the War's catastrophic effects completely destroyed Russia's military machinery. Defeat in 1905 was caused primarily by

poor organization on the part of the Ministry of War.

The Secondary causes were the lack of an adequately trained officer corps, a deficiency in the selection of non-commissioned officers, and the general physical condition of the army.¹

If the Military situation was to be rectified drastic measures had to be taken immediately. Russia also faced other problems in 1906 which needed immediate solution; foremost among them was the agrarian problem. It was on the area of agricultural reform that the First Duma centered most of its attention. The problems of the military were only given superficial attention by the First Duma. In the Address to the Czar, the Duma demanded that the Fundamental Laws be changed to give it a controlling voice in military matters. This demand, plus the revolutionary course of the Duma in other areas contributed to the Government's decision to dissolve the Duma.²

In preparing for the Second Duma, Stolypin resolved to prevent the "aimless debates" which had characterized the First Duma. It was part of his plan to present concrete proposals for the Duma to act upon.³ When the Second Duma

¹For a complete analysis of Russian defects in 1905 see Alexander Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, trans. A. B. Lindsay and ed. E. D. Swinton (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1909) I, pp. 106-107.

²V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma, trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 92.

³V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past (Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1939), p. 494.

convened* two proposals dealing with the army were presented by the Government. On April 17, 1907, Stolypin presented for confirmation two decrees dealing with revolutionaries in the armed forces. The first restricted the army from revolutionary agitators and the second increased the penalty for the distribution of revolutionary material to the armed forces.

On May 3, the first bill was sent to the Committee on the Inviolability of Persons.** It was reported out on May 21, with the recommendation that it be rejected. Adzhemov, a Cadet Deputy, presented the Committee's report, which stated that under Russian Law only those persons under judicial investigation or on trial were to lose their civil rights. By extending the effects of Articles CLXIV and CXCIV of the Law of 1897, the Government was in effect confusing judicial and administrative jurisdiction. This extension placed a hardship upon those who would not otherwise be called for military service, since they would have to fill the vacancies created by the law. This could result, Adzhemov reasoned, in a lowering of the physical quality of the army.⁴

Lykoshin, a member of the Ministry of the Interior,

*February 20, 1907.

**Before the Third Duma no specific military committee existed and those measures dealing with the army were sent to various committees.

⁴ Alfred Levin, The Second Duma, (London: 1940), p. 283.

replied for the Government. Adzhemov's reasoning, he declared, was in error. Police investigation was of a judicial nature, carried out under judicial investigators and used for judicial purposes. The primary purpose of the decree was to protect the government by keeping anti-government forces out of the armed services.⁵

The Duma defeated the government's measure. It was reasoned by the Duma that if the bill passed, the army would be composed solely of Government supporters. The army, it believed, should serve both the people and the Government.⁶

Also on May 3, the Duma received a second decree dealing with the armed services. This decree extended from three to six years, the penalty for those convicted of distributing or reading revolutionary literature in the armed services. Kuzmin-Karavaev, a Democratic Reform Deputy,* reported the decree out of committee on May 22. The report stated that the mere reading of an anti-government pamphlet did not constitute a reason for imprisonment and that the decree placed a greater penalty upon this act than upon espionage. In addition, the bounding over for Court Martial of people carrying on a propaganda campaign against the Government was in violation of the Law of 1862.

*The Democratic Reform element was a non-aligned group who was slightly left of the Cadets.

⁵Ibid., pp. 284-285.

⁶Ibid., p. 286.

This law provided that only those persons under Martial Law could be tried by Court Martial.

G. D. Rylke, Chief Military Prosecutor, defended the bill. He believed that the committee presented an unconvincing argument. He believed that if the bill were defeated, the government would be left with only one alternative - quarantine the army from the population. This was that if the decree were passed only the guilty would suffer. Liatze, Vice-Minister of Justice, added to Rylke's plea for passage. He stated that the law was only a temporary measure and would be repealed as agitation decreased.

I. N. Nagikh, a Social Democratic Deputy, replied to the Government's argument. It was not revolutionaries, he declared, but regular troops who were agitating in the army. They were protesting their poor physical treatment and abuse by the officers. Correct these, he stated, and agitation will cease. This line of reasoning was not accepted by the Duma and this decree was also defeated.⁷

It was the second Government proposal, however, on army affairs, which attracted the most attention. This was the draft quota for 1907. On April 10, 1907, Rediger, Minister of War, presented this measure for the Duma's consideration. He asked that it be considered immediately in a closed session. V. I. Gessen, a Cadet Deputy, backed Rediger's proposal and moved that the bill be referred to the Finance Committee. Objections were raised by some

⁷Ibid., pp. 288-289.

Duma members to this action; they believed that consideration should be postponed until after it disposed of the agrarian issue. Gessen argued that the Duma had to either act on the draft quota by May 1, or it would lose its control.* The Duma accepted his proposal and referred the bill to committee.

On April 16, the quota was reported out of committee. Kuzmin-Karavaev, in giving the Committee's report, stated that the number of recruits for 1907 was lower than 1906 by 463,050. The draft, however, still worked a tremendous hardship upon the economy. It was recommended by the committee that the entire draft system be reworked, but the committee recognized that this would take time. The committee's strongest criticism was the high ratio of draftees to the total productive segment of the population. Kuzmin-Karavaev concluded his report by stating that quality was preferable to quantity.⁸

The Cadets backed acceptance of the Government's quota. They reasoned that the empire had extended boundaries which had to be defended. In addition, the Duma had to act on the measure to safeguard its right to fix the conscription quota.

Zurabov, a Social Democrat, rejected the Cadet and Government positions. His speech was a masterpiece of

*Under the Fundamental Law, if the measure was not acted upon by this date, the quota of the previous year would stand.

⁸Ibid., pp. 290-291.

Marxist Ideology. It stated that the primary purpose of the army was to gain the selfish ends of those in power. It was proposed by the Social Democrats that the army be abolished and a militia be created in its place. The present army, he declared, was good for one purpose - putting down revolts, not winning wars.

These derogatory remarks prompted Ridiger and the other ministers present to walk out of the session. When they did so the right wing elements of the Duma raised cries of protest against what they called a profane treatment of the army. F. A. Golovin, a Cadet and President of the Duma, asked for order and a clarification of Zurabor's last statement. Zurabov clarified his position by stating that he was referring to the army prior to the issuance of the October Manifesto. By this time general confusion reigned in the Duma and Golovine recessed the session. Golovin proceeded to the Ministerial Pavillion to rectify the situation. As he arrived at the Pavillion, he found P. K. Schwanebach, State Auditor, trying to convince Rediger that Zurabov had gravely insulted the army. Golovin tried to persuade Rediger to return to the Duma, but his arguments were futile.⁹

Golovin retired to his office where he was contacted by Stolypin. He requested complete details of the incident so they could be forwarded to the Czar, who had already received a sketchy account of the incident. In

⁹Ibid., p. 295.

his conversation with Golovin, Stolypin pointed out that Nicholas was displeased with Golovin's failure to defend the army. Nicholas, it was reported, was even considering dissolving the Duma because of this speech. Golovin's defense was that the demonstrations of the right wing prevented any effective measures from being taken, and had in fact necessitated a recess.

Members of the Cadet Party assembled in Golovin's office to decide how the situation was to be met. Two alternatives were presented for Golovin's consideration: 1) Zurabov could be expelled from the Duma under article thirty-eight of the Duma's by-laws; or 2) he could be issued a reprimand and asked to apologize. It was decided to take the less drastic action, and Zurabov was asked to apologize to the Minister of War. This he refused to do, and Golovin countered by denying him the right to continue his speech. Zurabov's position was backed by Tsereteli, a Social Democrat, who declared that Golovin's action was a denial of free speech. The majority of the Duma sided with Golovin's position. Tsereteli and the Social Revolutionaries reacted to this censure by walking out of the Duma.¹⁰

Before deciding what action to take with the Duma, Nicholas wanted Rediger's report. Golovin heard of Nicholas' request and approached Rediger to present an unbiased account of what occurred. The significance of the Duma's censure of Zurabov was also pointed out. On April 17,

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 296-299.

the Council of Ministers requested the Duma's dissolution. This request was guarded, in that it was decided to wait until the new Electoral Law was perfected. Nicholas agreed with these recommendations. He added that such attacks would no longer be tolerated by the government because it was not ready to capitulate to the revolution.¹¹

Also on April 17, the Social Democrats hoped to launch another attack upon the government, the quota, and the army. Before this attack could create another Zurabov incident, Golovin asked the speaker to leave the tribune. Aleksinskii, the last Social Democrat to speak, asked for the quota's defeat to demonstrate the Duma's support of the people's demands.

The Duma passed the draft quota with a vote of 193 to 129. Coupled with the passage was a plea to Rediger for the fulfillment of his promises of the draft and army reform.¹²

The dissolution of the Second Duma and the Electoral Law of June 3, 1907, secured a favorable majority for the Government in the Third Duma. This majority, however, was not a passive tool of the government. It was composed of people who wanted reform, and they were determined to press the government for reforms. The Third Duma set the pace for military reform in the years preceding the First World War.

According to the Fundamental Laws, the military was

¹¹Ibid., p. 300.

¹²Ibid., p. 304.

reserved for the exclusive control of the Czar. It was through the use of budget examinations that the Duma was able to raise question about the "iron clad parts"* by means of some articles in the budget itself. Ministers were divided into two groups, those friendly to the Duma and those hostile to it. The Duma's rule was to work with those who accepted it and oppose those who were antagonistic.¹³ This tactic was devised by Alexander Guchkov.** an Octobrist Deputy. The criterion used in making the distinction between friendly and antagonistic ministers was the willingness of a minister to supply the Duma with full particulars on specific issues. Those ministers who cooperated with the Duma and gave guarantees that their estimates would be applied to the benefit of the country, often times had their estimates increased. These ministers were thus able to find favor not only with the Duma, but also

*Under the Fundamental Laws the various Ministers had to present the Duma their individual budgets. The Duma had the right to examine these estimates and either approve or reject them. "Iron clad segments" were those articles which were reserved to the sole prerogative of the Czar.

**Alexander Guchkov was the founder of the Octobrists Party. He was not a member of either the First or the Second Duma, but he was elected to the Council of State, the upper chamber of Russia's legislative structure. Prior to this he served with the Russian Red Cross in the Japanese War and was well acquainted with the causes of Russia's defeat in 1905. He was also asked to participate in the Governments of Witte and Stolypin, but he refused when his reform proposals were rejected.

¹³Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs, (London: 1931), p. 176.

with the Czar.¹⁴

The First and the Second Dumas were not overly concerned with military reform. It was left to the Third Duma to create the Duma's Committee on Imperial Defense. This committee worked closely with General Polivanov, an aide to General Sukhomlinov, Minister of War. Polivanov was capable of working harmoniously with the Duma. Bernard Pares, a close friend and an admirer of Guchkov, stated:

it was his [Polivanov's] discussion with the Duma that elucidated the importance of machine guns, and it was due to the Duma that much of the necessary provision was made before the Great War [World War I].¹⁵

This statement may be slightly biased, but none the less, it gives some indication as to the type of work accomplished by the Third Duma.

Nicholas' reaction to the Duma's activity was favorable. The same held true for most members of the government. Count Vladimir Kokovtsov, Minister of Finance, reported that the ministers did not hold with complete autocracy; they recognized "that conditions had changed - since the day the Romanovs became Tsars of Moscow and Lords of the Russian Domain."¹⁶ The Czar's opinion was also favorable since he was devoted to his army and was

¹⁴Bernard Pares, "Alexander Guchkov," Slavonic and East European Review, XV (July, 1936), p. 124.

¹⁵Pares, My Russian Memoirs. p. 179.

¹⁶Count Valdimir Kokovtsov, Out of My Past. (Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1935), p. 361.

impressed by the Duma's activity.¹⁷

In the budget debates of May, 1908, Guckhov decided to denounce the disorders in the armed services during the Japanese War. He used this speech to call upon the various Grand Dukes to resign their posts as Inspectors of the Armed Services:

If we consider ourselves entitled and even bound to turn to the people and to the country and demand from them heavy sacrifices for this work of defense, then we are entitled to address ourselves also to those few responsible persons from whom we have to demand no more than the renunciation of certain terrestrial advantages, and of certain satisfactions of vainglory which are connected with those posts which they at present hold.¹⁸

Paul Miliukov, the leader of the Cadet Party, criticized the speech. He believed the Czar would use it as an excuse to dissolve the Duma. Quite a different result occurred; the Government did not come to the Grand Dukes' defense, and the Grand Duke Nicholas Nichalayevich, Inspector of Cavalry and Chairman of the Government Committee of Military Defense, resigned. This resulted in the army being placed under the Ministry of War. The Grand Dukes continued on as Inspectors, but were prohibited from giving orders or issuing contracts. In addition, no Grand Duke was selected to succeed Alexis Alexandrovich as Viceroy in the Far East.

¹⁷Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 109.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁹Bernard Pares, "Alexander Guchkov," Slavonic and East European Review, XV, (July, 1936), pp. 125-126.

Constitutionalism in Russia was strengthened by the Third Duma raising the efficiency of the Armed Forces.²⁰ General Denikin concurred in the observation that the attitude of the officer corps was changing from a mystic adoration of the Monarch, and that they were beginning to differentiate between the idea of Monarchy and personalities, between the welfare of the country and the form of government. These changes, Denikin stated:

were brought about by the disclosures of the Country's weakness and the effect of political education on the officer class by the press and the Duma.²¹

Duma interest in military reform was not confined solely to the army. It also manifested itself in Naval reform. The Duma was impressed by the work done by a group of young Naval officers in reorganizing the Navy. Initially, this group confined its activity to creating a Naval General Staff. This work was carried on with the approval and co-operation of the Naval Ministry.²²

In expanding the work of Naval reorganization the same group of young officers associated itself with the Duma to effect a Naval building program. Admiral Kolchak recalled this work in his testimony before the Soviets in 1920:

It was a period of extremely close connection between the two staffs [Army and

²⁰ Maklakov, op. cit., p. 74.

²¹ Anton I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil (London: Hurchinson & Co., 1922), p.18.

²² Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 192.

Navy] and the State Duma with its military commissions as [sic] expert and was present at absolutely every discussion of questions concerning the Navy.²³

The attitude of co-operation between the Duma and the Naval Ministry was further pointed out by Kokovtsov. The Duma, he stated, was impressed by the detailed presentation given it by the Navy. The Navy defended its program in committee and adapted itself to the Duma's temper and to individual members of the Committee of Imperial Defense.²⁴

In 1909 the Duma acted upon an "iron clad segment" of the budget. This appropriation was restricted for the sole consideration of the Czar, but through a misunderstanding of the matter the Duma acted upon it. Stolypin recognized the nature of the Duma's action and requested the Council of State to also approve it. When the measure reached Nicholas, it was refused confirmation. Nicholas' action went against Stolypin's advice, for Stolypin valued the Duma's co-operation and saw the potential consequences of this action. In trying to minimize the consequences of Nicholas' veto, Stolypin recommended that the full responsibility for the matter be transferred to the government,²⁵ thereby, preserving the harmony which existed between the Government and Duma.

²³The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials, ed. Elena Varnech and H. H. Fisher, trans. Elena Verhech (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 19-21.

²⁴Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 219.

²⁵Ibid., p. 223.

This harmony was almost destroyed by certain actions contemplated by Nicholas in his relationship with Michael Rodzianko, an Octobrist and a President of the Third and Fourth Dumas. Rodzianko was asked by Nicholas to prepare a report on Rasputin's character; this report was completed and presented to the Czar. Nicholas was not pleased with the report's conclusions, and vowed he would not receive Rodzianko's Presidential report on Duma activities. In retaliation Rodzianko threatened to resign as President of the Duma.²⁶ Kokovtsov managed to have Nicholas modify his stand and send Rodzianko a note postponing the interview until after the Czar's return from Lavadia. The argument used by Kokovtsov was that it would not be to the Government's advantage to work with a hostile Duma on the naval rebuilding program.²⁷

Kokovtsov used every opportunity presented him in building a favorable relationship between the Czar and Duma. On a visit to Nicholas at Yalta in April, 1912, he requested that the Czar contact Alekseenko, chairman of the Duma's Finance Committee. Nicholas was asked to request Alekseenov to use his influence in the Duma for securing approval of the naval building program. It was also requested, if the measure passed that the Czar grant an audience to the Duma. Several members of the Duma had requested such an audience; they believed it would help

²⁶Michael Rodizianko, The Reign of Rasputin (London: 1927), p. 60.

²⁷Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 219.

their chances of being reelected to the Fourth Duma. Nicholas granted both of Kokovtsov's requests.²⁸

Naval reform was not the Duma's sole concern in 1912. High interest was also shown for conscription reform. This interest was not new; it first became evident in the conscription debates of 1907. Certain reservations were attached to the 1907 budget committee's recommendations on acceptance of the Government draft quota. The committee believed certain government practices regarding the use of troops needed correction. These practices included the use of soldiers to convey political prisoners, regular police work, and service as orderlies for officers. The government's defense at that time was economy. This argument was not acceptable to the Duma. It pointed out that this may be so initially, but in the long run it was more economical to have this type of work preformed by others. In drafting large numbers of men, the most productive segment of the population was removed. This prevented the economy from achieving full development.²⁹

In all budget appropriations for the military, the Duma made increased appropriations conditional on the reform of the Military Service Statutes.³⁰ Another tactic used by the Duma to secure conscription reform was opposi-

²⁸Ibid., p. 311.

²⁹Levin, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

³⁰Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 193.

tion to the yearly quota. General Danilov, Quartermaster General (1908-1914) and assistant to the chiefs of the General Staff during the war, wrote:

...the Duma, with a view to making sure that the reform would be advanced more rapidly decided to oppose the bill to increase the contingent of men liable to military service. Yearly submitted by the government, until the new Conscription Law³¹ was passed by the legislative bodies.

Governmental attitude as expressed in the Second Duma was not opposed to conscription reform. Rediger, in his reply to the Budget Committee's report of the Second Duma, expressed the Government's concurrence for reform in the conscription statutes. This reform, he believed, was necessary, but it would take time. In fact, the government had initiated reforms in several areas immediately following the Japanese War. The reform had to be gradual; some abuses could not be entirely abolished because all armies needed certain technical services. If the use of troops for police services could be abolished, he believed, the Government would be the first to welcome this change.³²

Constructive opposition to the Government's quotas, coupled with conditional increased appropriations, produced the desired results for the Duma's program. This was brought out on March 12, 1912, when Kokovtsov and Sukhomlinov, Minister of War, held a joint meeting with

³¹Nicholas N. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 13-14.

³²Levin, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

Nicholas. Kokovtsov opposed Sukhomlinov's draft quota figures. His resistance was a product of Duma opposition in increasing the draft.³³

Conscription reform, when it was realized in 1912, was a product of the Duma and the liberal ministers of the Government working together. Colonel B. A. Engelhardt, a member of the Duma's Imperial defense committee, stated that:

Unsatisfactory recruiting for the army and the continuous shortage of men were the underlying reasons for the law of 1912. The main effect of the law, therefore, was to make certain that the Army would obtain the number of recruits annually required. To this end certain changes in the regulation for exemptions were made, and a new plan for distributing the levy of recruits over various provinces was adopted.³⁴

The Conscription Law of 1912 was the beginning of reform in this area. It was hoped by the General Staff that additional reforms would be forthcoming, but the outbreak of World War I prevented their realization. General Nicholas Golovin, Quartermaster General of the Ninth Army, considered the chief defect of the new conscription bill to be the manner in which it was implemented by General Sukhomlinov.³⁵

Full co-operation between the Duma and General Sukhomlinov did not exist; this being the contributing

³³Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 364.

³⁴Golovin, op. cit., p. 20.

³⁵Ibid., p. 13.

factor in Russia's failure to effect complete military reform prior to 1914. The Assistant Minister of War, General Polivanov, was considered by the Council of Ministers and the Duma as acting Minister from 1906 to 1912.³⁶ This close association and co-operation with the Duma was responsible for his dismissal in 1912. Sukhomlinov considered such an association to be an intrigue against the Government, and persuaded Nicholas to remove him.³⁷

A friendly relationship did exist, however, between the Duma and officer corps. The officer corps participated unofficially in the work of the Duma's Imperial Defense Committee. A circle of young reforming officers formed around Alexander Guchkov, the Committee's chairman; they wished to provide an inspiration for the "stagnant Ministry."³⁸ At first, the Ministry of War provided the officers with full particulars, but later abandoned this course when Sukhomlinov became minister.

Sukhomlinov's appointment to the post in 1908 resulted from a reaction in court circles, after the immediate effects of the Japanese War subsided. Prior to Sukhomlinov's appointment, the Grand Duke Nicholas insisted on uncovering and revealing the causes of the army's unpreparedness. He was also willing to implement necessary reforms with the

³⁶Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 111.

³⁷Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1921) I, p. 277.

³⁸Denikin, op. cit., p. 37.

full co-operation of the officer corps.³⁹ Sukhomlinov destroyed the aura of this co-operation with the introduction of a private secret police system. These spies prevented a further uncovering of the army's inadequacies.⁴⁰

Sukhomlinov rarely appeared before the Duma's Imperial Defense Committee. His appearances usually caused the Duma to take adverse action on military matters. On one occasion, as he approached the Duma's Chamber, Rodzianko warned him of the effects that his presence would produce, "Get away, get away. You are to us as a red rag is to a bull. As soon as you come your requests are turned down."⁴¹ In dealing with Sukhomlinov the Duma applied its usual criterion of a minister's willingness to fully co-operate with it. Kokovtsov described one of Sukhomlinov's appearances before the Finance Committee; as a result of faulty preparation, Sukhomlinov was unable to answer the Committee's inquiries. He stated that the material under discussion was known only to the Commander-in-chief. Guchkov provided the Committee with its answer; his material was the product of testimony provided by witnesses before his committee.⁴²

Sukhomlinov's dislike of the Duma and its effects were pointed out by his failure to act upon a directive from the Commander-in-chief to immediately increase the

³⁹Golovin, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁴⁰Denikin, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 50.

⁴²Kokovtsov, op. cit., pp. 309-310.

army by one-third. This order was given early in the fall of 1913, but was not completed until May, 1914. A factor in this delay may have been the necessity of the Duma's approval of all such increases. Upon presentation the Duma quickly accepted the increase.⁴³

July, 1914, saw the Russian army in approximately a parallel position with that of 1904. The intervening years between 1906 and 1913 witnessed a rebuilding of the army after its complete destruction in the Japanese War. Most of the deficiencies of 1904, however, remained. General Knox, British Military Attaché to Russia, considered the lack of competent officers, above the rank of squadron commanders, a major shortcoming in Russia's defense system. He believed that the cause of the deficiency rested upon inferior training.⁴⁴

Grand Duke Sergius Mikhailovich, Inspector General of Artillery, advocated in 1906 the reorganization of eight artillery batteries into six. He also advocated the formation of a corps artillery consisting of twenty-one batteries of field artillery and two batteries of howitzers per army corps, comprised of two divisions. Credits for this reform were granted by the Duma in both 1909 and 1910, but the expenditures were not approved by the Ministry of Finance. Final agreement between the Duma and Ministry

⁴³Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 194.

⁴⁴Knox, op. cit., I, p. 264.

was reached in the Spring of 1914.⁴⁵

As a result of the defeat suffered at the hands of the Japanese in 1905, the reserves of the Ministry of War were completely exhausted. Two alternatives were thus open to the Ministry of War; it could either reduce the size of the army or maintain it at a lower cost. The second alternative was decided upon.

This was not the sole determining factor, however, in Russia's unpreparedness in 1914. The Duma appropriated 450 million rubles for rearmament; of this only 300 million were spent by the Ministry of War.⁴⁶ This, however, did not impede Sukhomlinov from requesting more money from the Ministry of Finance. Kokovtsov's usual reply was that he had not even expended the amount already allocated to him.⁴⁷ Sukhomlinov's tardiness in expending appropriations came under severe attack in the Duma. General Knox took note of this and remarked:

The Duma tried to force expenditures to secure efficiency, not as in other countries to save the taxpayers' pocket-book.⁴⁸

Unpreparedness in the armed forces did not enter into Nicholas' decision for war in 1914. He and Sukhomlinov believed that the army's spirit and aggressiveness would bring victory. They completely ignored the technical

⁴⁵Golovine, op. cit., p. 54.

⁴⁶Denikin, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴⁷Pores, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 119.

⁴⁸Knox, op. cit., I, p. 229.

improvements which had occurred in the waging of wars.

Elan would bring victory.

Declaration of war ended the strife and riots which gripped St. Petersburg for most of the summer. Rodzianko, in interviewing a worker who had previously been on strike, found that he now supported the Czar. The worker stated, "that was our family dispute," referring to the strike, "we thought reforms came too slowly through the Duma. But now all Russia is involved."⁴⁹ Patriotism permeated the relationship between Nicholas and the Duma. On July 20, 1914, Nicholas announced he would call an extraordinary session of the Duma; the purpose was to create perfect harmony between the Czar and his people.

Support for the war was offered by the Duma. As a token of this support the Duma placed a new tax on vodka, but the Ukaze of August 22, 1914, prohibited its sale during the war. Appreciation for the Duma's support was manifested by the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-chief of Russia's armed forces; in a conversation with Rodzianko said, "Now Rodzianko, I am your friend till death. I'll do anything for the Duma. Tell me what you want." Rodzianko requested that the suspension on the Cadet Paper, Retch (Speech), be lifted. The request was granted.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Maurice Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs (New York: Doran, 1924), p. 29.

⁵⁰Rodzianko, op. cit., p. 111.

The Duma was recessed by the Government following Nicholas' speech and its passage of the vodka tax. Its members, however, did not intend to remain inactive during the recess. They met privately with Rodzianko on the same day and formed "A Provisional Committee of the Duma for the Relief of Wounded and Sick Soldiers and War Suffering." Membership in this body was open to all Deputies who remained in St. Petersburg. Rodzianko as Duma President was automatically President of this organization. Vice-Presidents were selected from both the right and left wing factions of the Duma.* The Committee immediately established several medical units and field hospitals for the wounded. This de facto organization guarded the Duma's interest.⁵¹ It met at least twice a week, although it could be summoned whenever its President desired. Specific attention was focused on conditions at the Front; however, the meetings generally evolved into a general discussion of all policy matters. At the end of each meeting, Rodzianko was instructed by the Committee of the program it wished to have presented to the Czar.⁵²

On September 9, 1914, the first message arrived from the Front reporting shortages in artillery shells. General Ivanov telegraphed on October 26:

*Shingorev for the left and Prince Volkorsky for the right.

⁵¹Paul Gronskey and Nicholas Astrov, The War and the Russian Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 29.

⁵²Ibid.

Supplies of ammunition are entirely exhausted. If not replenished operations will have to be broken off and the troops retire under most difficult conditions.⁵³

The shortage in munitions adversely affected the Russian attempt to dislodge the Germans and Austrians from their positions in November, 1914. At approximately the same time, the Czar became aware of these shortages. In a letter to the Czarina dated November 19, 1914, he commented that the German penetration of Russia was caused by the lack of munitions and the consequent reliance on infantry attacks. These attacks, he believed, were resulting in high casualty figures.⁵⁴ Early in December, munitions shortages caused a large scale surrender of officers and men to the Germans, and the shortage became so acute that artillery brigades were ordered to fire only five rounds of munition per day. Sukhomlinov complicated the matter with his refusal to deal forthrightly with Russia's Allies. In a conversation with General Knox, he claimed the 1,400,000 recruits to be called in January, 1915, would be fully equipped with rifles. At that time, rifle reserves amounted to between 50,000 and 70,000.⁵⁵

Rumors began circulating in Spring, 1915, regarding

⁵³Knox, op. cit., I, p. 220.

⁵⁴Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, 1914-1917, trans. A. L. Hyles and ed. C. E. Vullismy, (London: John Lane The Bodley Head Limited), p. 14.

⁵⁵Florinsky, op. cit., p. 204.

lack of ammunition and graft in various military departments. These rumors were accepted by the Duma and were blown out of proportion by the time they reached the public.⁵⁶ The crisis itself, however, was caused by two factors, neither of which were the popular accepted reasons, 1) general condition in Russia's munitions industry and 2) governmental inability to organize and project the army's needs into the future.⁵⁷

Goremykin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, did not succeed in winning public support for the government. He cloistered himself in his residence and refused to see either his colleagues in the Council or Duma members. Finally, in February, 1915, a reception was held for the Duma's Deputies. The purpose of this reception was to demonstrate to the Duma that he was not antagonistic to them and desired their support.⁵⁸

In March, 1915, the first public organization was formed for meeting Russia's war needs. A. S. Ermolov, former Minister of Agriculture, and certain members of the State Council organized an Economic Conference. The purpose of this Conference was to discover means of supplying St. Petersburg with adequate food and coal. It was on the verge of reporting to the State Council when the Government dissolved it.⁵⁹ By late Spring Governmental attitudes

⁵⁶Gurko, op. cit., p. 545.

⁵⁷Golovine, op. cit., pp. 126-128.

⁵⁸Gurko, op. cit., pp. 546-547.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 546.

had changed; it was now realized that public organizations, and not the Government, controlled public opinion.⁶⁰

Retreat from Galicia, in the Spring of 1915, allowed the Duma to press for the active participation of its members in the process of supplying the army. The original proposal for the creation of public committees came from the Grand Duke Nicholas. In one of Rodzianko's visits to the Front, he was approached by the Grand Duke and asked to organize a plan for supplying the army with boots. Maklakov, Minister of the Interior and brother of a Duma member, opposed such a move on the grounds that it would produce revolutionary tendencies. This action was taken on his own initiative and was not presented to the Council of Ministers.⁶¹ Maklakov's opposition did not restrain Rodzianko's determination to form these committees.

The final plan was more encompassing than originally proposed by the Grand Duke. It provided for tackling the entire problem of supply. Rodzianko presented his proposals to Nicholas on May 18, 1915. These proposals were immediately accepted by the Czar. Early in June, 1915, a Ukaze was issued which created the Special Councils for National Defense. These committees were composed of representatives of the army, the Duma, the labor, and the management of Russian industry. Nicholas even accepted Guchkov, who had been persona non grata at court since

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 560.

⁶¹Rodzianko, op. cit., p. 121.

early in the Third Duma.⁶²

Rodzianko, in the same meeting with the Czar, pressed for the removal of certain reactionary and incompetent ministers.⁶³ Nicholas took no action at this time, but Rodzianko would not let the matter die. On June 12, 1915, Rodzianko again requested Nicholas to remove certain reactionary ministers. He reported that these ministers were hampering the war effort and were alienating the Monarchy's supporters.⁶⁴

The Council of Ministers was divided into two groups. One group, the right wing, included Goremykin, Maklakov, and Sabler, Procurator of the Holy Synod. This group found it difficult to reconcile itself to the existence of the Duma. A second group, comprised of liberal ministers, was in favor of change. They recognized that no institution was immune to change, including the Monarchy.⁶⁵ Serge Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, maintained that the only way internal peace could be restored was for the Government to adopt a policy of reconciliation and co-operation with the Duma. Such was impossible, he believed, as long as the reactionaries remained in office. Co-operation with the Duma was possible, Sazonov believed, but

⁶²Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, pp. 242-243.

⁶³Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia (London: Cassell & Co., 1923), I, p. 246.

⁶⁴Pares, Fall of the Russian Monarchy, p. 244.

⁶⁵Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years: 1909-1916 (London: Stakes & Co., 1928), p. 281.

the only communication which occurred was between the Duma and individual ministers. Sazonov stated:

I know from personal experience that it was not at all difficult to establish the necessary co-operation with the Duma. It was on the whole patriotically minded and the extremest played a secondary part. It was quite possible [sic] jointly with it to carry on constructive work for the benefit of the country.⁶⁶

Sazonov and the other liberal ministers recommended to Nicholas that the reactionary ministers be removed, in particular Sukhomlinov. Nicholas was immune to Sazonov's accusations even after the Duma's growing indignation was made known. Nicholas refused to take any action until definite proof could be provided of Sukhomlinov's incompetency. This evidence was provided by Maurice Paleologue, the French Ambassador, who had in his possession a series of dispatches between the French War Office and General Sukhomlinov. Early in the war, Russia was offered munitions, thereby, France hoped, to alleviate Russia's shortages. Sukhomlinov refused the offer; he replied that Russia was adequately supplied.⁵⁷

Paleologue's evidence was presented to Nicholas; it added to the burdens already created by munition shortages, the demands of the Duma and the liberal ministers. On June 15, 1915, Sukhomlinov was removed from office. His replacement was General Polivanov, who was highly popular with the Duma. His popularity was based on his co-opera-

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid. p. 287.

tion with the Duma during the years he served as Assistant Minister of War.⁶⁸

By the middle of June, 1915, pressure brought by the Duma and Council of Ministers was having a desirable effect upon Nicholas. He was now considering removing most of the offensive ministers. In the following letter to the Czarina he commented on the necessity of removing Sabler, Procurator of the Holy Synod:

It is remarkable how everyone understand [sic] this [removing Sabler] and wishes to see a clean [sic] pious and well meaning man in his place. Old Gorem, [Goremykin] and Krivoshein, and Scherbatov have all told me the same thing, and believe that Samarin would be the best man for post...I have given Gorem leave to send for Samarin and to offer him this appointment. I am sure you will not like this, because of his being a Muscovite, but changes must be brought about, and it is necessary to select a man whose name is known to the whole nation and who is unanimously respected.⁶⁹

When the Duma met in August, 1915, Sukhomlinov, Maklavov, and Sabler were out of office. All were known either for incompetence or reactionary views. V. I. Gurko, a former Assistant Minister of the Interior and a member of the Fourth Duma, believed their dismissal was in part effected by the Government's desire to have a favorable relationship with the Duma. In addition, Gurko gave credit to the progressive ministers who forced Nicholas to choose between them and the reactionaries:

⁶⁸Letters of the Czar, p. 58.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 60.

...The Czar was very much displeased; but the general excitement reflected in previous Duma debates, had forced Nicholas II to agree to the demands of the Kharitonov group. The Supreme Power evidently preferred to have a renovated ministry appear before the Duma in the hope of lessening its attacks on the government.⁷⁰

With the exception of Goremykin and a few others, the Council of Ministers, by the middle of 1915, was composed predominantly of liberals. These ministers were willing to risk their careers in order to bring a change in the government's attitude.⁷¹ By the end of 1915, the Czarina recommended the dismissal of Goremykin before he was compelled to resign by the Duma.⁷²

When the Duma assembled on August 1, 1915, it was immediately presented with the issue of calling out the Territorials of the Second Class.* Prior to the Duma's conversation, the Council debated the possibility of calling the Second Class without Duma approval. This plan failed to receive support because the council realized it would be impossible to raise an individual without the previous consent of the Duma.⁷³ General debate on the

*Territorials of the Second Class consisted of untrained men between the ages of 21 and 43. They were only called up twice before, in 1812 and 1854.

⁷⁰Gurko, op. cit., p. 551.

⁷¹Florinsky, op. cit., p. 85.

⁷²Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916, ed. Sir Bernard Pores (London: Duckworth & Co., 1923), p. 210.

⁷³Golovine, op. cit., p. 55.

issue commenced on August 9, when Shingarev, a Cadet Deputy, presented the Duma's attitude to the Government. The Duma was not opposed to calling out the Second Class. What it objected to was the Government's mismanagement of the war. Approval was given to the Government's proposal, but it was cautioned to use them with care since they were Russia's last manpower surplus.⁷⁴

In acting upon the Ukaze which created the Special Councils, the Duma introduced certain modifications. Foremost among them was a request for a civilian Assistant Minister of War to work directly with the Councils. General Polivanov approved this request only in part. A new assistant was created to work with the Special Councils, but he was a member of the army.⁷⁵ The Duma also reserved to itself the selection of its members who sat on the Special Councils. Finally under the Law of August 17, the Duma had the right of interpellating chairmen of the Special Councils on the same level as an ordinary minister.⁷⁶

Nicholas' decision to take direct command of the army was a contributing factor in forming the Progressive Bloc. On August 11, Rodzianko demanded an audience with Goremykin to discuss the Czar's decision. When Goremykin was entreated to dissuade the Czar from assuming command, he informed Rodzianko that the Czar's decision was not his con-

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁷⁵Pares, Fall of the Russian Army.

⁷⁶Gronsky, op. cit., pp. 34-40.

cern.⁷⁷ Goremykin's attitude in this matter, prompted the center of the Duma to join together to present a united front to the Czar and Goremykin.

A government possessing the confidence of the people was the major demand of the Bloc. It was hoped that such a government would be able to prosecute the war successfully and work in harmony with the Duma.⁷⁸

Many members of the Government favored the program of the Bloc, but it was opposed by Goremykin.⁷⁹ The liberal ministers were successful in appointing a commission to meet with the Bloc and discuss the possibilities of compromise. This commission met with the Bloc on September 9, and reported to the Council of Ministers on September 10 that compromise was possible. Goremykin was adamant in his decision not to work with the Duma and to press the Czar to prorogue it.⁸⁰ Nicholas' decree to prorogue the Duma was received by the Council on September 15. Many of the Ministers accused Goremykin of Misrepresenting the Bloc's program and the attitude of the Council to the Czar.

By September, 1915, the Duma was instrumental in influencing the Government's actions in reforming not only the army, but also the Government. Nicholas carried out a series of reforms which rebuilt the army following the chaos of the Japanese War and instituted reforms within

⁷⁷Gurko, op. cit., p. 568.

⁷⁸See Appendix A.

⁷⁹Golovine, op. cit., p. 158.

⁸⁰Rodzianko, op. cit., pp. 154-155.

his Government. These reforms were the product of the Duma and liberal ministers working together.

Initially, the Duma was preoccupied with reforms in agriculture. This preoccupation, however, did not prevent it from recognizing the necessity of army reform. In the First Duma's address to the Throne, it inserted a demand for giving the Duma a controlling voice in the Military. The Government would not grant this demand. Albeit, this request did influence the Government's decision to dissolve the Duma.

Stolypin was indirectly influenced by this request and was prepared to give the Duma a limited voice in military matters. When the Second Duma assembled, it was presented a series of proposals directly dealing with the military. Two of these proposals were Ukazes which attempted to curb revolutionary tendencies in the military; both were rejected by the Duma. The Government did not reissue them. A third proposal dealt with the conscription quota of 1907. This quota was accepted by the Duma with reservations. It requested the Government to reform the service statutes, thereby making them more equitable. Rediger, Minister of War, publicly recognized the need for reforms and promised to see that they were instituted. An incident created by the Social Democrats in the Conscription Debates was an instrumental factor in the Government's decision to dissolve the Second Duma.

Beginning with the Third Duma, a concerted effort was made to force quick Government action in the area of mili-

tary reform. A tactic was devised which compelled the ministers to be more amenable to the Duma's wishes. This tactic was to divide the ministers into opposing factions, giving co-operation to the Duma. The Minister of Finance, Count Kokovtsov, and Admiral Kolchak acknowledged the efficiency of this tactic. Both men recounted the long hours of preparation necessary before appearing before the Imperial Defense Committee. They also acknowledged the co-operation given them by the Duma. Sukhomlinov, Minister of War, fell into the second category. His lack of preparation in appearing before the Duma was acknowledged by both his colleagues in the Council of Ministers and the Duma. The consequences of his attitude were mitigated by the co-operation given the Duma by his subordinates and the officer corps.

The importance given to the Duma in military matters was pointed out in the Naval rebuilding budget debates of 1912. This time Kokovtsov as chairman of the Council of Ministers persuaded Nicholas to use his influence with the Chairman of the Budget Committee to secure passage. It was also recommended to Nicholas that he grant a reception to the Duma if the matter was approved.

Guckhov's speech, in the Third Duma, requesting the removal of the Grand Dukes as Military Inspectors vividly elucidated the Duma's influence. As a result of this speech one Grand Duke resigned, a vacancy caused by the death of another was not filled with a Grand Duke, and the remaining ones were stripped of their powers.

Finally, the Third Duma was responsible for conscription reform. Using the techniques of obstructionism and qualified appropriations, the Duma was instrumental in forcing the Government to submit a proposal for such reform.

Outbreak of war in July, 1914, opened a new era in the relationship between the Duma and the Government. This era was best exemplified by Nicholas' appearance before the Duma and its support of the war.

Defeat in the Spring of 1915, opened new areas for the Duma in which it could work. This area involved the direct supplying of the army through the Special Councils. These organizations had a preponderance of Duma members, who were directly appointed by the Duma, and responsible to it. In addition, the Duma, through the power of interpellation, kept a close check upon the work of these councils.

By August, 1915, the Czar came to recognize the importance of having Ministers who possessed the Duma's confidence. It was to this end that Nicholas reorganized his Government prior to the convocation of the Duma. This new government possessed a preponderance of liberal ministers who were willing to work with the Duma.

Nicholas' decision to take direct command of his army led to the formation of the Progressive Bloc. This Bloc hoped, among other things, to force the Czar to rid the Government of its remaining reactionaries. Nicholas' refusal to comply with the Duma's wishes and fearful of what actions it might take, prorogued it.

Prorogation of the Duma in September, 1915, ended

the harmony which existed between the Czar and Duma.
Prior to this date the Duma was instrumental in effecting
military reform, both on its own initiative and in co-
operation with the Government. After this date the influ-
ence of the Duma began to decline in military matters.

CHAPTER III

Educational Reform

Events in 1905 demonstrated to the Czar and the Russian government that certain basic changes were needed in Russia's social and political institutions. Foremost of those institutions which needed drastic revision was the Ministry of Public Instruction. The disastrous war with Japan laid bare the gross inadequacies of Russia's educational system. General Kuropatkin, the Russian Commander-in-chief during the War, believed that only a total reformation of the school system was necessary if Russia was to be victorious in any future war.¹ The General was not alone in this observation; Paul Vinogradoff, one of Russia's leading educators, also believed that the dislocations caused by the Japanese War and the constitutional changes of 1905:

called forth unprecedented activity of the State in regard to education...even so it was felt after the Japanese War that Russian disasters had been brought about by the neglect of intellectual efficiency and popular education.²

¹Alexander Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, trans. A. B. Lonsday and ed. E. D. Swinton (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909), II, p. 123.

²Paul Vinogradoff, Self-Government in Russia, (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1915), p. 82.

Nicholas also saw the necessity for educational reform in the Fall of 1905 and it was to this end that he appointed Count I. I. Tolstoy Minister of Public Instruction. Count Tolstoy saw the need for reform and convened a meeting of the Rectors of Russia's universities on January 6, 1906. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the needs of the universities and how these institutions could more adequately meet the needs of Russian society. As a result of this meeting a series of recommendations dealing with the question of university autonomy were presented to the Minister. These recommendations were embodied in a legislative proposal which the Ministry submitted to the First Duma. The quick dissolution of this body was primarily responsible for the lack of action on this measure.³

In dealing with the root of Russia's educational backwardness - primary education inefficiencies - the Ministry failed to present a comprehensive program. When the Ministry of Public instruction drew up its program for universal education in 1905-1906 no attention was given to the recommendations of the Zemstvo or organs of local government. The result of this oversight was a theoretical program which did not even closely meet local needs. Several attempts were made by the Duma to point out this shortcoming, but the Ministry was unresponsive to these

³For a comprehensive analysis of the Ministry's recommendations please consult Nicholas Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, (1701-1917), New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), p. 198.

suggestions.⁴

The Minister of Public Instruction addressed the Duma on the question of educational reform. He stated:

recognizing the necessity of raising the moral and intellectual standard of the masses of the population, the Government is putting forward a proposals for universal education and is preparing a scheme for the reform of the secondary schools and universities.⁵

These words did not bring governmental action; he failed to present any concrete proposals for reform, and in fact by 1914 the Ministry had not even prepared an elaboration of its grandiose proposals.⁶ The government's failure to present any concrete proposals created a void in educational reform. It fell to the Duma to fill this void and to provide the necessary leadership to realize educational reform in Russia.

A strong demand for the introduction of universal education was put forth by many sectors of Russia's population in the interval between the issuance of the October Manifesto and the convocation of the Second Duma. This demand was particularly evident in the election campaign for the Second Duma. Many candidates demanded a complete reorganization of Russia's educational establishment so as to facilitate the introduction of universal education. The

⁴Paul J. Novgorotsev and Demitry M. Odinetz, Russian Schools and Universities in the World War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp. 8-9.

⁵Ibid., p. 37.

⁶Ibid.

Ministry of Public Instruction hoped to quiet the clamor for reform when it introduced what it considered to be a comprehensive reform proposal to the Second Duma. This measure was presented to the Duma on February 20, 1907. Its main features were the introduction of free and universal education for all, the establishment of local responsibility to insure the construction of educational facilities and limited local autonomy in the district. This measure, the Duma believed, was not a complete reform, but only a beginning. The Duma was unable to take any action on this measure before it was disbanded on June 3, 1907.⁷

Realization that Russia could not wait for a complete program of educational reform prompted the Duma to enact a number of piecemeal measures. To meet the immediate situation it passed its first education law on May 3, 1908. This law defined the term of elementary instruction; it offered a timetable in which to effect universal education, and provided funds for teachers' salaries.⁸ Liberal members of the Duma realized the shortcomings of the 1908 Law and desired to rectify the situation by adopting the program of the liberally oriented Education League. This measure contained provisions for a free and universal system of education, and local educational autonomy, with all schools being united under the Ministry of Public Instruc-

⁷Hans, op. cit., pp. 212-213.

⁸Novgorotsev, op. cit., p. 10.

tion.⁹ Opposition to this measure in the State Council prevented it from becoming law.

In 1911 the Duma realized that the enactment of a comprehensive reform measure could not be delayed any longer. It therefore, proposed a measure which provided for all educational facilities and the responsibility for education, including church schools, to be turned over to the Zemstvos and local organs of government, and the re-legation of the Ministry of Public Instruction to one of general guidance, instruction in the local language, the creation of a ladder system,* and the adjustment of the schools to local conditions. The state council rejected the principal provisions of the measure and thereby assured the defeat of the proposal in the Duma. This defeat did not prevent the Duma from working for school reform through the Zemstvos, or from enacting fragmentary legislation.¹⁰

On June 25, 1912, the Duma passed another limited reform measure which transformed all Urban Schools into Higher Elementary Schools with a four year course of instruction. By late 1912 the Ministry of Public Instruction transformed twelve hundred Urban schools into Higher Elementary Schools, and opened an additional three hundred schools.

*Upper primary schools would serve as a connecting link between lower primary and secondary schools.

⁹Hans, op. cit., p. 218.

¹⁰Novgorotsev, op. cit., p. 11.

It was evident by 1913 that the Duma exercised its greatest influence on government policy in the field of elementary education reform. The influence of the Duma was most evident in the Law of July 7, 1913. This Law raised the minimum teachers' salaries from three hundred and sixty rubles to four hundred and eighty rubles a year. These increases swelled state expenditures,

but both the School and Budget Committees [of the Duma] warmly advocated the grants, and the latter were warmly passed by the Duma. Thus, in spite of the fact that there is no legal scheme establishing once for all the financial steps by which universal instruction has to be achieved, the idea of gradual progress to this goal has taken firm hold of the mind of the legislators...and¹¹ the movement goes on uninterruptedly.

In its desire to secure universal education the Duma was unsparing in providing money for teachers' salaries. It also provided for low interest loans for the erection of school buildings. The budget debates provided a forum from which the deputies leveled their attacks against an incompetent Ministry of Public Instruction. During the budget debates of 1908 Von Anrep, an Octobrist Deputy, a supporter of the government, and a former Curator of an Educational Region pointed an attack against an insensitive Ministry. The major criticisms aimed at the Ministry were:

- 1) its failure to analyze Russia's needs realistically; and
- 2) its failure to satisfy the educational needs of the Country. In 1910 the debates were used to condemn a Govern-

¹¹Vinogradoff, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

mental decree which intended to curb student demonstrations. These debates condemned the Government's habit of resorting to exceptional laws and "their system of administrative exile."¹² During the budget debates of 1911 Count Kokovtsov, the Minister of Finance, was forced to demonstrate to the Duma that he was interested in providing sufficient funds for Russia's educational needs.¹³

Stinging barbs were also leveled against Casso, the Minister of Public Instruction, in the budget debates. In 1913 he was accused of viewing Russia's educational needs with indifference and demonstrating little incentive for implementing a reform program. The Ministry's attitude was characterized as one of abnormality toward the teachers and discouragement towards the pupils.¹⁴ The budget debates of 1914 produced a Duma resolution which stated that the ministerial and district ordinances on education failed to account for local conditions and the desires of the student's parents.¹⁵

Positive results did occur as a consequence of the Duma's budget debates. The educational system benefited by having sufficient funds appropriated for school buildings, teachers' salaries and supplies. Between 1907

¹² ¹²Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, (London: Cassell and Co., 1923), I, p. 152.

¹³Count Vladimar Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, (Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1935), p. 258.

¹⁴Novgorotsev, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 40.

and 1912 the Duma doubled the appropriations for the Ministry of Public Instruction from eighty-five million rubles to one hundred and seventy million rubles. In addition to this, it allocated nearly three hundred and sixty million rubles for a self-perpetuating building fund which was expanded at a rate of seventy-seven million rubles a year.¹⁶ It was estimated by the Duma that by 1922 appropriation would be sufficient to secure free universal education for all sectors of Russian society.

The Council of Ministers and the State Council were opposed to the introduction of universal education. They attacked the appropriations of the Duma for economic reasons, but their real reason was a "vague dread of the Progressive tendency of popular education."¹⁷ The Duma, however, was successful in overcoming these objections and through its increased appropriations able to lead Russia toward the goal of universal primary education.

Secondary education was also subjected to the unproductive and non-creative policies of the Ministry of Public Instruction. In this field the Ministry devoted most of its attention to developing a program which would centralize school administration. The Duma's School Committee in 1912 presented a report which pointed out the necessity of opposing the unproductive, paralyzing and inexpedient centralization which prevailed in the Ministry.

¹⁶Vinogradoff, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 85-86.

This report further stated that the consequence of this centralization was frustration on the part of school officials, teachers and students.¹⁸

The Duma, however, managed to accomplish certain concrete reforms in secondary education. Between 1904 and 1916 it was able to increase the number of secondary schools by two hundred and fourteen. This increase raised the number of secondary schools from eight hundred sixty-three to ten hundred seventy-seven. During Casso's tenure as Minister of Public Instruction eighty-three Duma members introduced legislation which would have opened the secondary schools to all sectors of the population. Casso opposed this legislation on "educational ground" and the proposal did not become law.¹⁹

To facilitate the growth of secondary education the Duma passed, on its own initiative, a bill which widened the rights possessed by private secondary schools. The Law of July 1, 1914, allowed the creation of private co-educational institutions and for a curriculum which differed from the one approved by the Ministry. These institutions were prohibited from using any textbooks which were not approved by the Ministry.²⁰

Conflict between clerical and secular concept of education was one of the greatest hindrances to complete

¹⁸Novgorotsev, op. cit., p. 38.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 29.

educational reform in Czarist Russia. In 1908 the Holy Synod received an appropriation of 7,400,000 rubles for the operation of Church schools. When the Third Duma introduced an appropriation for teacher salaries in the secular schools the Synod demanded a similar appropriation. Such an appropriation was voted in 1909 and 1910. The Synod schools' standards were far below those set by the Ministry of Public Instruction. Expansion of the number of Church Schools was considered an extraneous element by the Duma, demanding that these schools be given aid only on the condition that they adhere to certain rules. The two principle conditions were:

- 1) the entering into an agreement with school authorities of the State in regard to filling up definite places in the authorized network of schools; and 2) the appointment of properly qualified teachers.²¹

The Synod did not comply with these regulations; it used every means of subterfuge to evade the guide-lines established by the Duma. When the Synod applied for its appropriation it failed to submit the necessary outline of its program and policy to the Duma. The Duma failed to make provisions for the Church Schools in 1911 and the government granted these schools six million rubles without the Duma's approval. It was hoped by the Duma that without the necessary funds the Church would turn its schools over to the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Governmental motives for opposing the unification of

²¹Vinogradoff, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

all schools under the Ministry of Public Instruction is best illustrated by the State Council's rejection of a unified school bill in 1911. This bill called for School unification under the local organs of government. Such a settlement the government feared would foster the rapid dissemination of revolutionary ideas.²² The future position of the Church Schools was a question which deeply affected the Czar. He believed that his father, Alexander III, was responsible for their creation and that it was his duty to foster his father's program. In an interview with Kokovtsov, after Guchkov leveled his attack on the Synod, Nicholas stated:

The conduct of the Duma is deeply revolting, especially Gutchkov's speech regarding the Synod estimates. I shall be very glad if my displeasure is made known to these gentlemen, I am tired of always bowing and smiling to them.²³

Nicholas had promised the Duma a pre-election interview in 1912, if it would pass the Naval Armament appropriation, but the Duma's attack on the Church Schools changed Nicholas' mind. Kokovtsov had to use all means of persuasion to compel Nicholas to relent and to meet the Duma. After the interview, the Deputies adjourned without approving an appropriation for the Church Schools.²⁴ A compromise be-

²²Michael Florinsky, The End of the Russian Empire, (New York: Collier, 1961), p. 21.

²³Kokovtsov, op. cit., p. 304.

²⁴Michael Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin, (London: 1927), p. 65.

tween the two systems was reached in the Fourth Duma when it adopted a course of least resistance. As a result of this compromise no overt attempt was made by the Duma to abolish the Church School and they were left to disappear naturally.²⁵

One of the immediate effects of War on education in Russia was a proposal by the Ministry of Public Instruction to curtail spending. Prior to the war an appropriation of 169,579,399 rubles was made for education. After the outbreak of war the government proposed a cut of 14,286,954 rubles to 155,829,445 rubles. In preparing the 1915 school budget the Ministry stated: "The financial burden laid on the Treasury could not but occasion an extensive reduction in the estimates for the Ministry in 1915."²⁶ The Duma did not follow the lead of the Ministry in providing appropriation cuts for education. It rejected the Ministry's estimate.²⁷

In 1914 Count P. N. Ignatiev was appointed Minister of Public Instruction and was responsible for the introduction of many liberal reforms. As a result of these reforms there was a growing public feeling that Count Ignatiev would be able to work harmoniously with the Duma. A Duma report characterized Count Ignatiev's appointment as a fount of living water bursting forth in the Ministry of

²⁵Hans, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219.

²⁶Novgorotsev, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 66.

Public Instruction.²⁸ In a speech before the Duma's Budget Committee Count Ignatiev reported that he was in favor of the immediate introduction of universal primary education, and that he was willing to consult with the Duma before any action was taken by the Ministry. This attitude was a complete reversal of the one followed by Ignatiev's predecessor Casso. During his tenure Ignatiev prepared a draft of a compulsory school attendance bill which was presented to the Duma. This legislation was passed by the Duma, and was considered a major step in the realization of universal education. Count Ignatiev also presented several draft bills which equalized boys' and girls' gymnasias, and proposed curriculum reform in all of the secondary schools. These proposals were opposed by many members of the Council of Ministers and they refused to give Count Ignatiev support for them. Realizing that he could not successfully prosecute his program he resigned in late December, 1916. With the resignation of Count Ignatiev, reform proposals were no longer put forth by the Ministry and events in January and February, 1917, were not conducive to further educational reforms. By this time the Duma and the population were more concerned with events within the government and with the prospect of a revolution than with educational reform.

In the interval between the 1905 Revolution and that of 1917 Russia witnessed the beginnings of a program for

²⁸Ibid., pp. 70-72.

universal primary education, a unified school system and reform in secondary and higher education. The responsibility for the introduction and partial achievement of these measures rests primarily with the Duma. One of the chief means used by the Duma to effect school reform was the use of its power to pass upon appropriations. As a result of the judicious use of this power the Duma was able to double the amount the central Government expended on education. When the Duma created the Peter the Great Building Fund it assured the Zemstvos, who were responsible for the erection of school buildings, a ready source of low interest loans for school expansion. In dealing with the Church Schools the Duma realized that they were more of a hindrance than a help in reaching universal education. These schools, the Duma recognized, had lower academic standards. It did all in its power to see them abolished, but was prevented from doing so by a blind and obstinate government. By 1912 the Duma realized that these schools would eventually disappear as new secular school arose, and it was to this end that they devoted their energy. In addition to using its budgetary power to effect school reform the Duma also introduced several piecemeal curriculum reforms. These reforms were finally accepted by the Government when Count Ignatiev was appointed Minister of Public Instruction. His appointment opened up a new era in the relationship between the Government and the Duma. Previously they worked at odds, but after his appointment a period of co-operation in school reform existed. It is

possible to speculate that if Count Ignatiev's appointment had come a few years earlier Russia would have been able to introduce universal and compulsory primary education before the outbreak of World War I. The resignation of Count Ignatiev coincided with the end of educational reform and the Revolution of 1917. If the Duma's role in education was to be characterized briefly it could be stated that between 1908 and the appointment of Count Ignatiev in 1915 the Duma was the prime force behind all educational reforms which were effected in Russia.

CONCLUSION

In examining the role and influence of the Russian State Duma it was possible to discern a number of diverse roles which this body assumed and the forms of influence which it exercised on Russia's Government. The Duma was presented with a number of critical problems which needed immediate attention. Foremost were the agrarian, military and educational reform questions which Russia faced in the period after 1905. In meeting the problem of agrarian reform the Duma assumed both a direct and indirect role. Its direct role concerns: the manner in which it forced the Government to assume a position where none previously existed; the reaction of the Duma to this position; and finally, the manner in which agreement was reached between the two. The indirect role of the Duma concerns the manner in which it influenced the reform proposals of Peter Stolypin. As the Duma came into contact with the problems facing Russia's military establishment, it found an entirely different set of circumstances. In this particular instance, the Government was willing to give the Duma a limited voice in determining the course which their reforms would follow. As a result of this, the Duma and the Government were able to work harmoniously in effecting a limited reform of Russia's military establishment. Finally, when

the Duma was presented with the educational reform question, it assumed a new role - that of leadership. In this particular instance, the Duma discovered that the Ministry of Public Instruction was failing to provide the necessary leadership for reform. The Duma was determined to fill this void and found the necessary means in its power over budget appropriations.

When the First Duma was convened, it discovered that the Government had not prepared a program to meet Russia's critical agrarian problem. In response to the peasants' cries for reform the Duma considered a number of reform proposals. Basic to all of these proposals was the idea that the landholdings of the crown, church and private individuals should be expropriated for the use of the peasant. The Government was adamantly opposed to this idea and made its position known to both the Duma and the people. Goremykin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, even went so far as to publish the Government's position in several newspapers. In so doing, the Government was forced by the Duma to take a position where none previously existed. The Duma believed that the Government had taken a position which was unacceptable to either itself or the Russian people. In taking this stand the Duma forced the Government into a position where it either had to bow to the Duma's demands or dissolve it. The Government accepted the latter course and dissolved the First Duma in July, 1906. When Nicholas dissolved the Duma, he also accepted Goremykin's resignation and appointed Peter Stolypin Chairman of the

Council of Ministers.

Stolypin was indirectly influenced by the First Duma's position when he formulated his agrarian reform decrees of October and November, 1906. These decrees embodied some of the ideas on agrarian reform which the First Duma presented. Stolypin hoped that the Duma would give unquestioning approval to these decrees. In this instance, he misjudged the stand the Duma would take. Instead of approving these decrees it violently opposed them. The main arguments given by the Duma were: 1) the decrees did not go far enough in solving the agrarian problems; and 2) they were presented as accomplished facts to the Duma. In assuming this position the Duma directly influenced Government policy, for it again forced the government to dissolve the Duma and institute a new Electoral Law. When the Third Duma was convened, the Government discovered that it was not as radical as the first two. As a result of this it again submitted the Stolypin decrees. These decrees were passed by the Third Duma and were designated the Land Laws of June 14, 1910, and May 29, 1911. In modifying Stolypin's decrees and by eventually passing them, the Duma made a positive contribution in the area of agrarian reform. These decrees, however, would not have come into existence if the First and Second Dumas had not taken their radical position, and thereby magnified the pressing need for agrarian reform.

As a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's military establishment was completely destroyed. The Duma

devoted considerable time in meeting the question of military reform. In the period prior to World War I the Duma devoted its attention to the problem of rebuilding Russia's war machinery and adequately supplying it with man power. After the outbreak of the War the Duma discovered that the army was not adequately supplied with war material. It believed that the major cause of this deficiency was a inefficient and mismanaged Ministry of War. The Duma used two techniques to rectify this situation: 1) it forced Nicholas II to create the Special Councils in which the Duma had direct voice in the supplying of Russia's army; and 2) it worked for a reorganization of the Council of Ministers.

In the pre World War I period, the Duma devised several techniques which it used to effect military reform. These techniques were: 1) granting only provisional approval to the yearly conscription quota; and 2) working only with those ministers who accepted the existence of the Duma and were willing to grant it their complete cooperation. In using the first technique the Duma was successful in gaining Governmental approval for a more equitable conscription law in 1912. When the second technique was applied by the Duma it discovered that a judicious use of its limited budgetary powers could be equally successful. The degree of this success can be judged by the actions of Nicholas and several of his Ministers when they desired the Duma's approval for military building programs. In one particular instance, the Naval Building program of

1912, Nicholas went so far as to personally request passage of the appropriation and to promise that he would grant a pre-election audience to the Duma which a great many Deputies had requested.

The Naval Ministry, according to both its own members and members of the Duma, was equally cautious with the Duma. When ever a member of this Ministry had to appear before the Duma he was careful to be fully prepared and to answer all of the Duma's inquires. In dealing with the Ministry of War the Duma discovered that it received its best results when it worked with individual officers or with assistant Ministers. The best example of this was the relationship which existed between the Duma and General Polivanov, Assistant Minister of War until 1911. In this particular instance, Polivanov worked closely with Alexander Guchkov, Chairman of the Duma's Imperial Defense Committee. This close co-operation was responsible for the Duma's granting the necessary funds for the reorgaization of the Army's Artillery Batteries. The value the Government placed on the Duma's good-will during this period was its reorganization of the army after the Duma called for the resignation of the Grand Dukes from the posts of Inspectors of the Army.

The severe defeats suffered by Russia's Armies in the Spring of 1915, was the cue for the Duma to demand complete reorganization of the Army's lines of supply. Michael Rodzianko, President of the Duma, was one of the moving forces behind the Czar's decision to create the

Special Councils. Rodzianko used his position as President of the Duma to demand the creation of these Councils. After their creation the Duma approved the Special Councils with certain modification. The foremost of these was the extension of the role played by the Duma in their operation.

Prior to the convocation of the Duma in July, 1915, Nicholas came to almost fully appreciate the role that the Duma had assumed in the political life of Russia and in the area of military reform. The best indications of this were: 1) his dismissal of most of the objectionable ministers; and 2) the appointment of men who enjoyed the Duma's confidence. Nicholas' decision to prorogue the Duma in September, 1915, marked the beginning of the Duma's decline as an instrument of influence in Russia's government.

In meeting educational reform, an entirely different set of circumstances presented themselves to the Duma, and it adopted itself to meet this particular situation. Where the Duma forced the Government to take a stand on agrarian reform and worked with it in military reform the problem of educational reform was given entirely to the Duma by the utter failure of the Ministry of Public Instruction to meet Russia's educational needs. The technique used by the Duma to effect educational reform bore a slight resemblance to its means of effecting military reform. This technique was the Duma's control of budget appropriations. The Duma, however, only adopted this method after

it failed to gain governmental support for a thorough education reform law. In using this power the Duma hoped to introduce universal and compulsory primary education in Russia and to unite the entire system of education under local authorities. The period between 1908 and 1912 saw the Duma increase by one hundred per cent the amount expended by the central government on education. This increase included the adoption of a minimum wage for teachers, appropriations for supplies and the creation of a building fund from which the Zemstvos could borrow money at low interest rates for local school construction. In addition to granting increased appropriations for education the Duma was able to enact several laws which attempted a piecemeal reform of the educational system. All of these endeavors were carried on by the Duma without the encouragement or active participation of the Ministry of Public Instruction.

The attitude of the Ministry only changed when Count Ignatiev was appointed Ministry of Public Instruction. During his brief tenure, January, 1915, to December, 1916, Ignatiev and the Duma were able to pass a compulsory school attendance law to equalize Boys' and Girls' Gymnasias, and to start a review of school curriculum which would have eventually resulted in curriculum reform. Ignatiev was forced to resign when he realized that he did not possess the confidence of his fellow ministers. By resigning he left the Ministry without the necessary leadership to effect educational reform and returned to the Duma its role of leadership in educational reform.

In the interval between the convocation of the First Duma in April, 1906, and the resignation of Count Ignatiev in December, 1916, the Duma was presented with many problems which demanded its attention. Those which were examined in this work demonstrated that the Duma reacted differently to each problem. The Duma's role and influence cannot be categorized by any one definition, for it was not the same in all cases. In agriculture it was one of prodding the Government into action, in military reform it was one of co-operation with the Government and in education it was one of leadership.

APPENDIX

PROGRAM OF THE PROGRESSIVE BLOC

September 7, 1915

The undersigned representatives of factions and groups of the State Council and State Duma, actuated by the conviction that only a strong, firm, and active authority can lead the fatherland to victory, and that such an authority can be only that which rests upon popular confidence and is capable of organizing the active coöperation of all citizens, have arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the most important and essential object of creating such an authority cannot be attained without the fulfilment of the following conditions:

1. The formation of a united Government, composed of individuals who enjoy the confidence of the country, and who have agreed with the legislative institutions upon the execution, at the earliest date, of a definite program.

2. Decisive change in the methods of administration employed thus far, which have been based upon a distrust of public self-help, in particular:

- (a) Strict observance of the principles of legal-

ity in the administration.

(b) Abolition of the dual authority of civil and military powers in questions having no direct bearing upon the conduct of military operations.

(c) Renewal of the local administrators.

(d) A sensible and consistent policy directed towards the maintenance of internal peace and the removal of cause of dissension between nationalities and classes.

For the realization of such a policy the following measures must be adopted, by means of administration, as well as legislation:

1. By means of Imperial clemency, a discontinuation of cases started on charges of purely political and religious crimes, not aggravated by crimes of a generally felonious character; the release from punishment and the restoration of rights, including the right of participation in the elections to the State Duma, Zemstvo, and municipal institutions, etc., of persons condemned for such crimes; and the amelioration of the condition of others condemned for political and religious crimes, with the exception of spies and traitors.

2. The return of those exiled by administrative order, in cases of a political and religious character.

3. Absolute and definite cessation of persecution on religious grounds, under any pretext whatsoever, and revocation of circulars issued in restriction and distortion

of the sense of the Ukaz of April 17 [30], 1905.

4. Solution of the Russo-Polish problem, viz.: abolition of restrictions upon the rights of Poles throughout Russia; the prompt drafting and presentation to the legislative institutions of a bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, and the simultaneous revision of the laws concerning Polish land ownership.

5. Entry upon the path of abolition of restrictions upon the rights of the Jews, in particular, further steps towards the abolition of the Pale of Settlement, facilitation of admission to educational establishments, and removal of obstacles to the choice of professions. Restoration of the Jewish press.

6. A policy of conciliation in the question of Finland, in particular, changes in the composition of the Administration and Senate; cessation of persecution against officials.

7. Restoration of the Little Russian press; immediate revision of cases of inhabitants of Galicia kept in confinement or exiled; and the release of those wrongfully subjected to persecution.

8. Restoration of activity of trade unions, and cessation of persecution of workers' representatives in the sick-benefit organizations, on suspicion of membership in an unlegalized party. Restoration of the labor press.

9. Agreement between the government and the legislative institutions regarding the early introduction of:

(a) All bills immediately concerned with

the national defense, the supply of the army, welfare of the wounded, care of the refugees, and other problems directly related to the war.

(b) The following legislative program aiming at the organization of the country for coöperation towards victory and maintenance of internal peace:

Equalization of peasants' rights with those of other classes.

Establishment of volost zemstvos.

Change of zemstvos statutes of 1890.

Change of municipal statutes of 1892.

Establishment of zemstvo institutions in the border regions, such as Siberia, Archangel Province, Don Territory, The Caucasus, etc.

A bill concerning the coöperative societies.

A bill concerning rest for commercial employees.

Improvement of the material condition of the post and telegraph employees.

Confirmation of temperance for all time.

Concerning zemstvo and municipal congresses and unions.

Statues concerning revisions.

Introduction of Courts of the Peace in those provinces where their establishment was held back by financial considerations.

Inauguration of legislative measures that
may be indispensable to the administrative execu-
tion of the above outlined program of action.

For the progressive group of Nationalists,
Count V. Bobrinski.

For the faction of the Center,
V. Lvov.

For the faction of Zemstvo-Octobrists,
I. Dmitriukov.

For the group of the Union of October 17th,
S. Shidlovski.

For the faction of Progressists,
I. Efremov.

For the faction of Popular Freedom,
P. Miliukov.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Collected Works and Documents

Antsiferov, Alexis, et al. Russian Agriculture During the War. New Haven: Yale, 1930.

The entire question of agrarian reform is examined:

- 1) The various laws (both Ukazes and Legislation),
- 2) Changes in methods of production and crops and
- 3) Agricultural trade.

Bilimovich, Alexander. The Land Settlement. New Haven: Yale, 1930.

Although concerned primarily with the land settlement question during the war, he examines the land reform decrees and the Duma's modification of them. The most pertinent articles of the land laws are included in his presentation.

Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917. Edited by Frank A. Golder. New York: Century, 1927.

Excellent source material of the minutes of the Council of Ministers meetings and on the formation of the Progressive Bloc.

Florinsky, Michael J. The End of the Russian Empire. New York: Collier, 1961.

The author examines the working of the Empire from 1914 to the Revolutions of 1917. It offers an unusual explanation for the Duma's fall in 1917. It examines the Duma's role in the war and the attitudes of the Czar, the Tsaritsa, and Government ministers to the Duma.

Golovine, Nicholas N. The Russian Army in the World War. New Haven: Yale, 1931.

The author was Quarter Master General of the Ninth Russian Army. A detailed analysis of the Military deficiency of Russia's army. Strong attention is given to the shortcomings of the Duma military reform work. On the whole it is favorable to the Duma.

Gronsky, Paul and Astrov, Nicholas. The War and the Russian Government. New Haven: Yale, 1929.

An analysis of the changes in Russia's government that followed the Declaration of War. Some attention was given to pre 1914 Russia. It was extremely useful in following the changes which took place in August, 1915.

Novgorotsev, Paul J. and Odinetz, Demitry M. Russian Schools and Universities in the World War. New Haven: Yale, 1929.

This work was published as a part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace series on Russia during the First World War. The work was a product of two Russian educators and a former Minister of Public Instruction. This work is particularly valuable for it traces the course of educational reform prior to World War I and examines the role played by the Duma in effecting this reform.

The Russian Provisional Government, 1917, Documents. Vol. I. Edited by R. P. Brower and A. F. Kerensky. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

These documents are concerned primarily with the revolution of March, 1917, and the eventual Bolshevik victory in November, 1917. Their value for this study comes from the testimony of certain Czarist officials on the role of the Duma in the structure of Russia's Government.

The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials.

Edited by Elena Varneck and H. H. Fisher. Translated by Elena Varneck. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935.

Most of the material deals with the Civil War in Siberia, but flashbacks are given of his work in Naval Reform prior to 1914. This testimony was given by Kolchak before the Soviet Tribunal at Itrusk in February, 1920.

Vinogradoff, Paul. Self-Government in Russia. London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1915.

This work is a combination of a series of lectures delivered by Vinogradoff in England in 1915. The value of this work stems from the interpretation given by Mr. Vinogradoff to events in Russia's educational system, an area in which the author was a competent judge. It was his contention that the Duma was the prime force behind the Reform of Russia's educational system.

Letters

The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa, 1914-1917.

Translated by A. L. Hyles and Edited by C. E. Vulliamy.
London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, Ltd., n.d.

These letters were written almost daily when the Czar was absent from the Capitol. Many of them deal with the family relationships of the Tsar and the Tsaritsa. Occasionally, however, one would deal with politics which would reveal the Tsar's private thoughts on many matters.

Letters of the Tsaritsa to the Tsar, 1914-1916. Intro.

Sir Bernard Pares. London: Duckworth & Co., 1923.

These letters compliment those written by the Tsar and reveal the Tsaritsa's reaction to Nicholas' proposals. They also reveal what type of influence she possessed in forming the Tsar's programs.

Primary Sources - Memoirs

Buchanan, Geo. My Mission to Russia. II vols. London: Cassell & Co., 1923.

British ambassador to Russia 1910-1918, a personal friend on many prominent Duma members and public men. He writes primarily criticizing the Czarist government's failure to institute reforms.

Denikin, Anton I. The Russian Turmoil. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1922.

Very little attention is given to pre-revolutionary Russia. What is given is extremely useful in charting the changing opinion of the officer corps and how they viewed the work of the Duma in Military reform.

Gurko, V. I. Features and Figures of the Past. Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1939.

Assistant Minister of the Interior and member of the Fourth Duma. He is primarily concerned with his own activity in his various posts. He was well acquainted with Stolypin and the reasoning behind the reforms of October and November, 1906.

Izvol'sky, Alexander. Recollections of a Foreign Minister. Translated by Charles Louis Seeger. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1921.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1906-1910. He presents insights into the ministerial relationship in Goreymkin's and Stolypin's reforms and the reasons for them. Also, the reaction of the conservatives at Court to them and their backstairs politics.

Kerensky, Alexander. Russia and History's Turning Point. New York: Collier Paperbacks, 1965.

This work is less of an apologia for Mr. Kerensky's failure in 1917 than previous works by the author. In this particular work the author recounts the events which preceded the March, 1917, Revolution and the role of the Duma during the First World War.

Knox, Sir Alfred William. With the Russian Army. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1921.

He was Military attaché of the British to Russia during the war years (1914-1918) and for some years preceding. He was associated with Duma members especially Col. Englehardt. In addition he was acquainted with the High Command of the Russian Army and well versed in its work and difficulties.

Kokovtsov, Count. Out of My Past. Stanford: Hoover War Library, 1935.

This book provides useful material on the workings of the Duma in regards to fiscal matters (its reaction to the budgets and taxes as proposed by the government). The author at points tends to use this book to answer the charges of his critics especially Witte .

Kuropatkin, Alexander. The Russian Army and the Japanese War. II vols. Translated by A. B. Lindsay. Edited by E. D. Swinton. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909.

Kuropatkin was commander-in-chief in the Russo-Japanese War from March 27, 1904, until March, 1905. These volumes are an account of the War, Russia's military tradition and the changes necessary if Russia was to be successful in future wars.

Maklakov, V. A. The First State Duma. Translated by Mary Belkin. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964.

Maklakov was not a member of the First or Second Dumas, but he was in the Third and Fourth. He gives his impression of why the Cadets could not hold power in 1917 by examining their actions in the First Duma. Specific attention is paid to the Cadet's proposals for agrarian reform.

Miliukov, Paul. Russia and its Crisis. Chicago: n.p., 1905.

Millukov examines the causes of Russia's economic and social plight and reaches the conclusion that Russia needed democratic institutions which would facilitate the growth and improvement of the peasants.

Paleologue, Maurice. An Ambassador's Memoirs. III vols. Doran, N. Y.: n.p., 1924.

The memoirs of the French ambassador to the Russian Court. They cover the war years of 1914 to 1917. Paleologue was an intimate acquaintance of many notables in St. Petersburg Society. Of primary interest were his comments on the Duma and the Czar's attitude toward that body.

Pares, Bernard. My Russian Memoirs. London: n.p., 1931.

Pares is concerned particularly with the conduct of the war. He was personally acquainted with many Government Ministers and Duma members. He records both his own observations and those of his Russian acquaintances. Some attention is paid to agricultural reform and the work of the Duma in general.

Sazonov, Serge. Fateful Years: 1909-1916, Reminiscences of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. London: Stokes and Co., 1928.

Sazonov was Foreign Minister from 1909-1916 and in this work recounts his activities in office. The work offers a good account of Russia's foreign affairs but offers relatively little on domestic politics.

Rodzianko, Michael. The Reign of Rasputin. London: n.p., 1927.

These memoirs contain a certain amount of commentary on the Duma's work on munitions during World War I. Most of what Rodzianko says should be taken with a grain of salt. Although when his interpretation is included with others it is possible to get a fairly accurate picture of attitudes and events.

Witte, S. Memoirs of Count Witte. Translated and edited by Abraham Yarmolinsky. New York: Doubleday, 1921.

Witte is primarily concerned with comparing his administration with that of Stolypin's.

Primary Journal Articles

Pares, Bernard. "Alexander Guchkov," The Slavonic and East European Review. XV. (London), July, 1936.

This article was Pares commemorative to Guchkov's work on the occasion of the latter's death in 1936. The material was later incorporated into Fall of the Russian Monarchy.

Maklakov, V. A. "On the Fall of Tsardom," The Slavonic and East European Review, XVIII. (London), July, 1939.

Maklakov presents basically a review of Pares' book the Fall of the Russian Monarchy. He emphasizes the difference between his interpretation and that of Pares.

Secondary Sources

Florinsky, Michael F. Russia, A History and an Interpretation, II. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1947.

Designed primarily as a general text, it does offer a good background for the era 1905-1917. Some attention is paid to the specific problems faced by the Duma in agricultural reform.

Hans, Nicholas. History of Russian Educational Policy - 1701-1917. New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1964.

Mr. Hans was a student of Sir Bernard Pares and prepared this work as a Doctoral Dissertation under Sir Bernard's direction. The materials used in this work were Russian Government documents in the British Museum. This work was extremely helpful in analyzing the course of educational reform in Russia in the period between 1905-1917. Mr. Hans devoted considerable attention to the role assumed by the Duma.

Levin Alfred. The Second Duma. London; n.p., 1940.

Levin deals with the Second Duma from the thesis that the Cadets were working for co-operation with the government, the SD for Revolution, and that Stolypin was not adverse to use both legal and illegal means to bring about his reforms. It is a very close analysis of the Second Duma's work. The book is very useful in describing the internal organization and structure of the Duma and its operation. It offers detailed accounts of the Duma's work in Agriculture and Military Affairs.

Pares, Bernard. Russia between Reform and Revolution. New York: n.p., 1962.

This work was based upon Sir Bernard's Russian Memoirs. In this particular instance the author devotes more time to interpretation than he did in the previous work.

Pares, Bernard. The Fall of the Russian Monarchy. New York: Vintage Press, 1939.

It duplicates in many respects the work of his Russian Memoirs. More attention is paid though to the various reforms in the Duma era.