TOULON AND 13 VENDÉMIAIRE:
TWO IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE EARLY MILITARY CAREER OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

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Edward V. Zavell

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TOULON AND 13 VENDÉMIAIRE: TWO IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE EARLY MILITARY CAREER OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

by

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The French Revolution, besides bringing about an enormous change in the lives of the people of France, produced a new elite in both the army and the national political arena. Of all the individuals emerging from the new system, beyond question the most spectacular was Napoleon Bonaparte. Rising from the ranks of the French army, Napoleon, a Corsican, seized the reins of the government and proceeded to rule France from 1799 to 1815. During this brief span of time he transformed France from a country ridden by internal and external strife into the most formidable Empire the modern world had witnessed to that time. This thesis concerns itself with the beginnings of Napoleon's meteoric rise, namely the siege of Toulon in 1793 and 13 Vendémiaire (October 5, 1795).

Napoleon's true role at these episodes still remains an enigma. Just as important, for the historian, is the fact that his activity has been the subject of disagreement and controversy. In an attempt to discover the facts and more clearly define these occurrences, all available source materials have been examined. Primary sources such as the Archives Parliamentaires and the Gazette Nationale, ou Le Moniteur Universel have been utilized whenever possible.

In the study of Toulon and 13 Vendémiaire, it is found that there are marked differences of opinion as to what really happened and of what importance Napoleon was to these victories. For instance, Napoleon's versions, as reported by his faithful followers Las Cases, Bertrand, Gourgaud, and Montholon are so divergent from General Paul Barras' descriptions that it hardly seems Napoleon and Barras are referring to the same events. Barras, a politician of considerable importance during

this time, recognized the potentialities of Napoleon and favored the young Corsican. Yet his Memoirs reflect a bitter hatred and desire to calumniate him.

The siege of Toulon in 1793 was the first event to bring Napoleon recognition in France. A Royalist reaction at Toulon had enabled the enemies of revolutionary France to occupy that city. Napoleon, although of minor rank, took charge of the artillery of the besieging Republican army and caused the allies great distress. Moreover, the major portion of the successful plan for the conquest of Toulon was conceived by Bonaparte.

The revolt of 13 Vendémiaire had been precipitated by a proposal which allowed two-thirds of the members of the terminating Convention to be retained under the New Constitution without the requirement of re-election. When this uprising reached serious proportions, General Barras was given the task of suppressing it. Barras sought the aid of able officers, one of whom was Bonaparte. In the ensuing encounter, the Convention forces, although outnumbered approximately five to one, crushed the insurrectionists with incredible ease. Napoleon, as second in command, obtained artillery for the defense of the Convention, set up the defense, and at one particular location directed the Convention forces with conspicuous ability. Exploiting his performance on 13 Vendémiaire to the fullest, Napoleon subsequently vaulted to great heights in the French military organization.

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Chapter I. Introduction

Perhaps the phrase, active but uncertain, can best describe the early military career of Napoleon Bonaparte. The young Corsican certainly experienced periods when he was on the brink of rising to prominence only to have his efforts frustrated by strokes of ill fortune. This thesis will lay stress on the details of the battles of Toulon and of 13 Vendémiaire showing primarily what roles Napoleon Bonaparte had in each. After one of these encounters, fortune finally smiled on Bonaparte. Before beginning the study of these two events, however, a brief outline of the life of Napoleon up to Toulon should aid the reader to become acquainted with the setting. Napoleon was born in Ajaccio, Corsica, on August 15, 1769, the second son of Carlo and Letizia Buonaparte.[1] In his childhood, the fiery Napoleon possessed an agressive and quarrelsome spirit which was controlled only by the influence of his mother. In order to improve his manners, Napoleon had to attend a girl's school in the city of Ajaccio.[2] Although the many fascinating stories of Napoleon's passion for soldiering during

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[1] The French form of Bonaparte was not used generally until 1796.

[2] Frederick Max Kircheisen, Napoleon, trans. Henry St. Lawrence (New York, 1932), p. 8. Hereafter referred to as Kircheisen.

his boyhood appear to be inventive afterthoughts, it is fairly certain that his father, Carlo, correctly surmised that little Napoleon had talents which marked him as a potential soldier.[3]

However, for a family of modest means, such as the Bonapartes, higher education appeared as an impossibility. It did not take Carlo long to determine his course of action. Since France had annexed Corsica in 1768, it became possible to obtain education for the sons of noblemen at the King's expense. Since the Bonapartes were of obscure Italian nobility, the offspring of Carlo could qualify. In preparation of this opportunity, Carlo took his two oldest sons, Joseph and Napoleon, to Autun to have them learn the French language, a necessary preliminary of entrance to the French schools. After much petitioning and waiting, the happy day for the Bonapartes arrived: young Napoleon was admitted to the Military Academy of Brienne.[4]

At Brienne, he was not liked particularly by his fellow students and remained anti-social and aloof for several years. The students teased him, often referring to his foreign birth. Infuriated by these taunts, Napoleon was led more than once to say that he would do the

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[3] August Fournier, Napoleon The First: A Biography, trans. Margaret Bacon Corwin and Arthur Dart Bissell, ed. Edward Gaylord Bourne (New York, 1903), p.5. Hereafter referred to as Fournier.

[4] John Holland Rose, The Life of Napoleon I (New York, 1924), I, 10. Hereafter referred to as Rose, The Life of Napoleon I. Napoleon entered Brienne in 1779.

French all the mischief he could.[5] After his education at Brienne was finished in 1784, Napoleon wished to enter the Royal Navy, but instead he was recommended and appointed to the Ecole Militaire in Paris. The following year Napoleon, at the age of sixteen, was promoted to lieutenant and assigned to an artillery regiment known as La Fère stationed in Valence.[6] In August 1786, Lyons was harassed by disturbances among silk-workers. Napoleon was sent to this city with his battalion for a brief occupation.[7] From late 1786 to early 1788 Bonaparte spent numerous leaves visiting Corsica, and little in the way of military occurrences are recorded for him during this period.

The military service of the little Corsican resumed when he reported to his new station at Auxonne in May of 1788. Here his talents were recognized by General Duteil, commander of the artillery school, who taught him much in the basic principles of military science.[8] In March, 1789 a series of riots rocked the city of Seurre and Napoleon was given command of a company ordered to restore peace in that locality. By his skillful choice of words, Napoleon succeeded in dispersing the tumultous

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5 Louis Fauvelet De Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, ed. R. W. Phipps (New York, n.d.), I, 7. Hereafter referred to as Bourrienne. This man was a classmate of Napoleon's at Brienne.

6 Louis Madelin, Histoire Du Consulat Et De L'Empire: La Jeunesse De Bonaparte (Paris, 1937), I, 49-51. Hereafter referred to as Madelin.

7 Kircheison, p. 21.

8 J. Colin, L'Éducation Militaire de Napoleon (Paris, 1901), p. 129.

mobs without resorting to the use of cannon.[9]

While the nation of France was in the throes of the great revolution Bonaparte again sought and obtained leave for Corsica. During this visit he first met the hero of boyhood, Paoli, who had always appeared to be the symbol of liberty for all Corsicans. However, for various reasons, Napoleon's fiery ardor for the old warrior waned considerably.[10] Moreover, he began to conceive of wresting authority from the reigning government by organizing a National Guard group for the purpose of ejecting the French garrison from the fortress of Ajaccio. But this early scheme of Napoleon's came to an ignominious end when the French forces were reinforced and his National Guard outfit was ordered disbanded.[11] The following year, Napoleon again concentrated his efforts on an active revolution in Corsica through the organization of the Jacobin Club. His goal, as before, was the seizure of the stronghold held by the French in Ajaccio.

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[9] Kircheisen, p. 25. Bonaparte, before giving the order to fire, exclaimed to the crowd that his orders were to fire on the rabble. None of the mob was willing to be classified as such, and they dispersed.

[10] Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 27-28. Paoli had favored Bastia as the city to be the official capital of Corsica. This annoyed the Ajaccio aspirants which included the Bonapartes. Paoli also began showing signs of a dictatorial nature. Moreover, Paoli's disposition of the Corsican troops in their attempt to gain freedom from France irked Napoleon who declared that such arrangements would spell defeat for Corsica.

[11] Fournier, p. 26

But his proposal to lay regular siege of the fortress was rejected by the Jacobin Club.[12] To this rebuff Napoleon reacted by writing a scathing letter attacking the Comte de Butafucco, the deputy for the nobles of Corsica to the National Assembly of France, as a traitor to Corsica. As a leader, Paoli was berated for his failure to understand anything but passionate fanaticism as the criteria for liberty and independence.[13] Leaving Corsica in disgust, Bonaparte returned to his artillery regiment at Auxonne in February, 1791.

In June, 1791, Napoleon received his promotion to the grade of first lieutenant and was transferred to the Fourth Artillery Regiment of Grenoble, at that time stationed in Valence.[14] When the French National Assembly decided to create battalions of paid volunteers, of which Corsica was to have several, the young first lieutenant again obtained leave to return to Corsica in hopes of receiving a battalion command.[15] In part, Napoleon succeeded since he was chosen second in command of the battalion from his native city of Ajaccio. But his glances repeatedly directed themselves to that formidable and desirable fortress which housed the French troops. During Easter week of 1792, Napoleon contrived the seizure of Ajaccio,

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[12] Fournier, p. 26.

[13] Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 28.

[14] Madelin, I, 119-120.

[15] Kircheisen, p. 33

however, the influential Paoli refused to support him. Furthermore, the restless Corsican was ordered to leave Ajaccio. Upon his return, to France, Napoleon proceeded to Paris.[16] During his stay, Napoleon witnessed the historic event of June 20, 1792, when the mobs stormed the Tuilleries and insulted the king and queen. His revulsion at such an exhibition prompted him to exclaim the need for sweeping off four or five hundred of the rabble with cannon in order to disperse the rest of them.[17] More than three years later, Napoleon was to prove the accuracy of his declaration by using artillery on the sectionaries during the fray of 13 Vendémiaire. He also was a spectator to the scenes of August 10, 1792, in which the aroused Parisians dealt the coup de grace to the Bourbon monarch, Louis XVI, by forcing him to flee and seek protection in the National Assembly where his monarchial rule was suspended.[18]

Promoted to captain in August, 1792, Napoleon still did not show any particular interest in France. Instead of proceeding to his regiment, which was stationed at the eastern frontier of France, Napoleon ignored this order and debarked for Corsica.[19] It was

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16 Fournier, pp. 30-32.

17 Bourrienne, I, 17.

18 The Life of Napoleon I, I, 33.

19 Kircheisen, pp. 35-36.

during this time that a plan, formulated in 1791 by the now defunct Legislative Assembly, was ordered to be promulgated. Sardinia was to be invaded and conquered on February 19, 1793. The main concentration of forces was hurled against the Sardinian capital of Cagliare while a simultaneous attack from the north by way of the island of Maddelena was to be made. Bonaparte, with a rank of lieutenant colonel, was among the 600 regular troops and Corsican volunteers who took part in the Maddelena expedition. The invading party took possession of a little island south of Maddelena called San Stefano, but when it attempted to seize Maddelena it met unexpectedly strong resistance. Bonaparte took charge of one battalion and ordered artillery to be showered on the harbor defenses. The intended assault for the following morning was ruined by the fearful Corsican troops who mutinoed in the belief that the defense had an overwhelming superiority in numbers. Lieutenant Colonel Quenza, the commander of the other battalion, and Napoleon tried to persuade the soldiers to advance, but to no avail. The troops ingloriously fled, abandoning all artillery pieces and infantry positions.[20]

Upon his return to Corsica from the Sardinian catastrophe, many violent verbal contests ensued between Napoleon and Paoli. Napoleon

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[20] Kircheisen, pp. 36-37. The rank of lieutenant colonel was in the Corsican army rather than a French commission.

resumed the command of the volunteer forces of Ajaccio as if nothing had occurred in his absence. Furthermore, Paoli, being a French general, was ordered to the French Army of the South. He refused to comply. Consequently, the Convention issued an order for his arrest on April 2, 1793.[21] When this occurred, Napoleon broke completely with Paoli and espoused the cause of France. Nevertheless, the Corsican people were still in favor of Paoli. Napoleon was declared an outlaw and the rest of his kin were labelled as subversive. In a final desperate effort to win Corsica, the young captain assayed to throw his battalion against the alluring fortress in Ajaccio. This venture likewise failed.[22] The furious Corsicans now sought revenge on Napoleon. Being unable to catch him, they satisfied their anger by wrecking the Bonaparte estate while the entire Bonaparte clan was fleeing en masse to the French port city of Toulon, arriving there in June, 1793.[23] After getting the family well settled in La Valette, located several miles northeast of Toulon, Napoleon traveled to Nice where a portion of his regiment was stationed.[24] A certain General Dugear, commander of the Army of Italy, requested the services of

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[21]Fournier, p. 30.

[22]Why it was unsuccessful is an interesting point. Kircheisen asserts that the garrison in the fort did not side with Napoleon although he had predicted they would. See Kircheisen, p. 40.

[23]Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 37.

[24]Kircheisen, p. 41.

Napoleon for an undetermined number of weeks. When Marseilles revolted, General Dugear sent Napoleon to convince the revolters that convoys for the Army of Italy should be allowed to pass through that city or else Marseilles would create resentment from members of the Army of Italy. According to Napoleon, this assignment was successful.[25] It was during this time, July, 1793, that Toulon revolted against the French government. Bonaparte apparently remained with General Dugear until early September. While traveling to Nice in early September, Napoleon met a fellow Corsican by the name of Salicetti. What happened during and after that meeting will be explained in the next chapter.

Napoleon's next military day occurred almost two years after the siege of Toulon. The third chapter will deal with this two year period in more detail, however a few cursory remarks at this time would aid the reader to understand the problems related to 13 Vendémiaire. During this interval, Napoleon's star seemed to fade quite markedly. The radical faction of Jacobins was overthrown in 1794 and all suspected adherents to that party suffered either death or banishment or discrimination. Because Napoleon was identified with them, he also felt the sting of reprisal. He was arrested but later released and ordered to join the Army of the West. This Bonaparte refused to do since he considered the transfer to the infantry, which the order

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[25] Somerset De Chair, Napoleon's Memoirs (London, 1949), p. 11. Hereafter referred to as De Chair.

included, as an insult.[26] Instead, he drifted to Paris to plead his case for the artillery position with the Army of Italy. Destitute, on half-pay, and relatively unknown, Bonaparte's future looked dim. But, as so often happened in his life, Napoleon showed up at the most strategic moment. And when the insurrection broke out in Paris, he was in a position to receive his second big opportunity, which was 13 Vendémiaire.

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[26] Napoleon was a great adherent of artillery and considered the infantry as a branch of secondary importance at this time.

Chapter II. Toulon - First Act for Napoleon

The battle of Toulon in 1793, besides being an interesting episode in the period of the French Revolution, heralded the opening chapter of Napoleon Bonaparte's meteoric career. Before Toulon the revolution had pursued a rather precarious and uneven course. At first, the peasants in the various provinces had championed the cause of the revolution, since the great landed estates had been divided among them. But this initial enthusiasm diminished steadily as the successive legislative bodies became garrulous gatherings which appeared to accomplish nothing more than pave the way for a Parisian dictatorship. Moreover, the devout peasants vociferously opposed the religious innovations of the government. As confusion and foreign wars beseiged the Republic of France, the pendulum of provincial opinion began swinging back in favor of the monarchy. However, King Louis XVI was deposed by the radical faction in the National Convention. In January, 1793, the extremists perpetrated the crowning blow to monarchism by executing the King as disloyal to France. Immediately, the cry of rebellion against the revolutionary government was raised in sixty of the eighty provinces in France. The opposition of the people found its vent in the support of Royalism. The Vendéean, Breton, and Angevin peasantry, who had opposed the Civil Constitution of the clergy, became willing advocates of monarchy through the persuasive exhortations of the Royalists. In Toulon,

France's chief Mediterranean naval base, the revolt initially had appeared as a reaction against the radical Mountain faction only, but on August 24, 1793, the Toulonese leaders proclaimed Louis XVII as King of France.[1]

This was considered an opportune time for Great Britain to deal the deathblow to the revolution by invading France from the port cities of the mediterranean with the aim of restoring the monarchy. The majority of the French people appeared willing to collaborate with such a plan. Royalist leaders from Marseilles had sent feelers to the British fleet indicating the possible occupation of that city.[2] However, such proposals came too late. The hordes of the French regular army, under the direction of General Carteaux who commanded the Army of the South, crushed the rebellion in that city before the British could intervene. Not so in Toulon. The allies, consisting of British, Spanish, Piedmontese, and Neapolitan troops, were cordially received by the Royalist sympathizers. But even at this favorable moment for the allies, there were indications that strong opposition would be encountered from the French Republicans. One sign was the rapid advance of the victorious French army from Marseilles.

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[1] A. Aulard, The French Revolution: A Political History, trans. Bernard Miall (London, 1910), II, 309.

[2] John Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Defense of Toulon (Cambridge, 1922), p. 19. Hereafter referred to as Rose, Defense of Toulon.

During one of the early skirmishes between the allies and the Republican forces, the French artillery officer, Donmartin, was incapacitated by injuries. A search for a replacement was conducted by the representatives of the Revolutionary Convention and the military alike. It was during this period that Salicetti, a representative of the people, encountered Napoleon at Nice. Before arriving at Nice, Napoleon had been at Marseilles obtaining some artillery wagons for the French Army of Italy. After a few exchanges of friendly words, Salicetti proposed the position of artillery director at Toulon, which Napoleon readily accepted.[3] Thus, Napoleon Bonaparte entered the scene of Toulon around the middle of September, 1793.[4] Here his budding military genius was given its first great test. Napoleon had shown talent before this time, also, in the political field by composing a little pamphlet in July, 1793 which was entitled

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[3] Kircheisen, p. 44. How Napoleon happened to be sent to Toulon is a topic which is described in many ways. Kircheisen's presentation seems to be the most logical. For divergent views, see Memoirs at Saint Helena to the Generals Who Shared His Captivity and Published from the Original Manuscripts Corrected by Himself, dict. General Gourgaud (London, 1823), I, 11-12. Hereafter referred to as Gourgaud, I, or Montholon, III. In Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 42-43, another interesting, but unlikely, view is given.

[4] This would seem a logical time sequence, since Donmartin was injured in an engagement with the allies on September 9, 1793. A version which must be read with caution is that of George Duruy, in the introduction of Paul Barras, Memoirs of Barras: Member of the Directorate, trans. C. E. Roche, ed. George Duruy (New York, 1895), I, lxxiv. Hereafter referred to as Barras. Mr. Duruy attempts to place Napoleon at Toulon when Donmartin was injured and receiving the command shortly thereafter.

Le Souper De Beaucaire. In effect, this pamphlet was a propaganda effort directed toward the Marseillaise, striving to persuade them that their rebellious course would only lead to the destruction of their city and woe to themselves.[5] This pamphlet had a temporarily beneficial effect on Napoleon's career by placing him in the ranks of those who supported the present regime, however it later caused his dismissal from the army when the Jacobin rule in Paris collapsed. Nevertheless, at this time Napoleon was considered a good patriot and upon his appointment by Salicetti he journeyed to Toulon.

On his arrival to the republican camp near Ollioules, Bonaparte reported to General Carteaux in order to receive his authorization as commander of the artillery.[6] Napoleon described Carteaux as a haughty and incompetent man who asserted strenuously that he needed no assistance in retaking the city, but that Napoleon could share in the glory of burning Toulon once it was recaptured.[7] However, this overconfident air was speedily deflated when Carteaux was faced with the cold realization that Toulon was not going to fall before the

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[5] Napoleon Bonaparte, Le Souper De Beaucaire (Paris, n.d.), pp. 20-30.

[6] Ollioules is situated approximately 3½ miles northwest of Toulon. See Map, p. 14a.

[7] Count De Las Cases, Memoiral De Sainte Helene: Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon at Saint Helena (London, 1823), I, pt. 1, 140-141. Hereafter referred to as Las Cases.

TOULON IN 1793



MAP TAKEN FROM J. W. FORTESCUE, A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY; MAPS (LONDON, 1915), III, PT. 1.

onslaught of sheer numbers. More than likely, he became less adamant in his declarations of refusing aid from others and became no great barrier to the young artillery officer's activity.

On September 17, 1793, Napoleon erected his first battery. The next day he ordered this battery to be fired on the ships of the allies in the inner harbor near the port of Toulon.[8] The allies retaliated by concentrating gun fire on this battery and destroying it many times. Nevertheless, Bonaparte merely ordered it to be reconstructed time and again.[9] His tenacity was further demonstrated by his order to have another battery erected on the 20th of September.[10] With these batteries firing continually on the British fleet three significant events were brought about. First, the British had to raise anchor and take their ships to the outer harbor.[11] Second, Lord Hood had to withdraw his floating battery since it had received extensive damage by Napoleon's battery fire.[12] Hood perceived that the Republican artillery was getting the better of the fight because it could hit tangible targets, whereas the British floating batteries had to

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[8] Charles James Fox, Napoleon Bonaparte And The Siege of Toulon (Washington, D. C., 1902), p. 19. Hereafter referred to as Fox.

[9] Mémoires Du Duc De Raguse De 1792 A 1832 (Paris, 1857), I, 40. Hereafter referred to as Raguse. Raguse did not arrive until December, thus it must be assumed this portion of his memoirs was gained by accounts of other officers or from Bonaparte himself.

[10] Fox, p. 19.

[11] Raguse, I, 40.

[12] Fox, p. 20.

contend with partially hidden land objectives. Moreover, the shots which did not hit the land structures ended up harmlessly on the sandy ground nullifying any possibility of damage by ricochet. Third, Hood declared that if the French took possession of the high ground dominating the roadstead between the inner and outer harbors, the fleet would be driven from the harbor of Toulon. Hence, Admiral Lord Hood ordered Lord Mulgrave to take a sortie of 500 men to the heights of La Grasse and construct a fort there. This fort, reasonably dubbed Fort Mulgrave, commanded the top of the promontory which overlooked the narrow strait between the inner and outer harbors of Toulon.[13]

To the northeast of Toulon, the hills and the mountain position also forced the allies to establish and maintain a string of forts and defense posts. The British high command had correctly apprehended that the enemy could easily devastate Toulon if such positions were seized and converted into artillery posts. By the end of September the French on the eastern front had struck on a plan of seizing one of these heights. General Lapoype, commander of the eastern sector, conferred the execution of this scheme on Victor, an able officer who later became one of Napoleon's marshals during the period of the Empire. The plan was to ascend the cliffs near the Pas de La Masque and overwhelm a small British piquet located in that area. The

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[13] J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London, 1915), IV, pt. 1, 163. Hereafter referred to as Fortescue.

original 800 men were then to be reinforced by a contingent of 1000 trusted soldiers.[14] Because of the excellent coordination of this plan, the allies were taken completely unawares and were driven from the critical positions of Mount Pharon, Pas de La Masque and Croix de Pharon. The allies, in a high state of consternation, because of the loss of these critical spots, quickly retook the overrun areas within the same day. Lord Mulgrave led the allies in this determined and successful counter-attack.[15] Napoleon has been mentioned by one historian as being present and participating in the attack by Victor.[16] However, such an assertion has no support either by contemporary witnesses or official reports. Rather, it appears that Napoleon concentrated his efforts on the western sector only. He may have visited the eastern front on many occasions, but this is only conjecture.

From the beginning Napoleon had discerned, as Hood did, the importance of the land heights of La Grasse as the point where the land dominated the sea on the western front. Bonaparte asserts that

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[14] Fortescue, IV, 164

[15] Edwin Sidney, The Life of Lord Hill, GCB: Late Commander of the Forces (London, 1845), p. 16. Hereafter referred to as Hill.

[16] William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, From the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV (London, 1886), I, 79. Hereafter referred to as James. The use of the Dictionnaire Historique, IV, 131, by James is of questionable advisability since this work appears to be the official French version of history.

after reconnoitering the area for a month, he proposed the plan of attack which would reduce the city of Toulon. The engineer officers had been advocating a regular siege, but he declared that this was unnecessary. All that had to be done was to occupy a position where mortars, artillery, and red hot cannon balls could be used to shell the enemy ships. If such a plan was effected, then the entire garrison would be blockaded. The points which he felt most favorable for such a design were Balaguier and Eguillette which were on the tip of the promontory called La Grasse. Napoleon added that the British had become sensitive to the importance of these spots, prompting them to risk a landing there and constructing Fort Mulgrave. His plan was to attack Fort Mulgrave by forming batteries mounted with 24 pounders and mortars which would destroy the wood epaulements, break down the palisades, and shower the fort with shells by continuous fire. After two days, he predicted, Toulon would be won after pounding it and the vessels in the harbors incessantly. Even if this last project could not be accomplished, the plan could be considered constructive since the engineers had accepted it as the necessary preliminary to a regular siege by a strict blockade. Such a restrictive measure could only be done by acquiring control of the promontory.[17]

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[17] Gourgaud, I, 13-15. For supporting accounts of Bonaparte's memoirs dictated to others at St. Helena see Barry E. O'Meara, Napoleon In Exile: Or a Voice From St. Helena (New York, 1853), I, 127, hereafter referred to as O'Meara, and De Chair, pp. 16-17. In the latter book the memoirs are a conglomeration of the dictation by Napoleon to Gourgaud and to Montholon placed in sequence.

One contemporary strove to show that Napoleon, although a good officer, had little to do with the actual planning of the scheme to retake Toulon from the allies. This man, General Paul Barras, asserts in his memoirs that he needed an intelligent officer for the job of reconnoitering and also for the task of erecting battery placements. He intrusted these responsible missions to Bonaparte who fulfilled them punctually and promptly. Because of this exemplary conduct, Barras promoted Napoleon to the rank of Captain.[18] It is clear that Barras, by intimation, attempted to place credit upon himself by showing that he was active in the artillery branch of the army. Furthermore, Napoleon's role at Toulon is pictured as that of a subordinate officer who executed orders in an approbatory manner. These are Barras' words concerning Bonaparte at Toulon:

> The taking prisoner of General O'Hara, attributed to Bonaparte, the British ship he is alleged to have sunk, the plan of campaign in which he is said to have participated, are so many mendacious assertions drawn from the imagination of the man who later was to fabricate still other statements, to be repeated by his flatterers when the day dawned that he had money wherewith to buy them. Bonaparte gave proofs of his military talent, then beginning to develop itself, but he only played a secondary part on this occasion.[19]

As will be shown later, Napoleon's version is, by far, the more supportable.

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[18] Barras, I, 129. According to Kircheisen, p. 35, Napoleon had been promoted to captain in August, 1792.

[19] Barras, I, 148. General O'Hara will be discussed later. The supposed sinking of the British ship is not mentioned by any source other than Barras.

In the meantime, General Carteaux was becoming anxious and worried because of his inability to retake Toulon in a swift manner. He was receiving additional troops from various Republican armies. For instance, after the fall of Lyons on October 9, 1793, approximately 3000 troops were dispatched to Toulon.[20] The Army of Italy withdrew many corps from its ranks in order to bolster the forces at Toulon.[21] Yet, a successful attack was wanting from the French commander. According to Napoleon, Gasparin, a representative from the National Convention, decided that Carteaux should devise a general plan of attack which would reduce the city of Toulon. Carteaux devised a scheme in which the artillery was to batter Toulon for three days, and at the end of this period Carteaux would then attack and carry the city. The engineer committee in Paris was not persuaded by this scheme, considering it more humorous than wise.[22]

The allies also were having their trials and tribulations. Despite Lord Hood's rosy outlook, the strategic position of Toulon became increasingly less tenable. Although the allies were successful in repelling the French during the month of October, reinforcements of any substantial quantity were not being sent to Toulon by any of the

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[20] Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 59.

[21] Mémoires Militaires Du Lieutenant General Comte Roguet (Paris, 1862), I, 113-114.

[22] Las Cases, I, pt. 1, 142-143.

allied nations. Hood, an able sea captain but a fledgling in military land tactics, was deceived by the initial failures of the Republican forces, and sent misleading reports to the home officer in England. On October 28, Major General O'Hara arrived from Gibraltor to assume the positions of Governor of Toulon and commander of the combined ground forces of the Allies.[23] O'Hara readily perceived the precariousness of the Toulon garrison and the overly optimistic views of Admiral Hood. In a letter to Hood, dated November 11, 1793, he pointed out the weaknesses of the Toulon defense. Some posts, he opined, had been fortified injudiciously and means to improve them were quite inadequate. Furthermore, stations such as Balaguier and Cape Cepet could be communicated with by water only and insurmountable difficulties would occur in trying to maintain these posts during the winter. The men at these outposts numbered 7000 which O'Hara felt was not substantial. In O'Hara's opinion, the only way to keep Toulon secure was to have an army in the field which would cover a considerable section of the surrounding countryside.[24] In strength, the French

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[23] Rose, Defense of Toulon, pp. 59-60. Hood retained his position as supreme commander of the allies.

[24] Rose, Defense of Toulon, pp. 149-150. This letter is in Appendix E entitled Lord Hood's Correspondence.

outnumbered the allies by an almost two to one margin. By November 1, 1793, the allies totaled 16,912 whereas the Republican forces stood at 33,000 men.[25]

With this great advantage in numbers, Carteaux still was unable to make any headway. Finally, orders came from Paris which transferred General Carteaux to the Army of the Alps on November 3, 1793. General Dugommier was named general in chief of the Army of Italy and charged specially with the responsibility of the siege of Toulon.[26] For some inexplicable reason, General Doppet had been named by several prominent historians as Carteaux's successor who was in turn replaced by Dugommier. Yet, in the same order naming Dugommier as the one in charge of the siege of Toulon, Doppet's position is clearly stated as general in chief of the Army of the Pyrenées-Orientales.[27] It is without doubt then that Doppet was merely a temporary commander at Toulon, holding this

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[25] James, I, 81-82

[26] Archives Parliamentaires De 1787 A 1860 (Paris, 1913), LXXVIII, 223. Hereafter referred to as Archives Parliamentaires. The Archives Parliamentaires are a compilation of the debates, discussions, and decrees made by the national legislature from 1787 to 1860.

[27] Archives Parliamentaires, LXXVIII, 223.

position until the new general in chief arrived at Toulon.[28]

Along with Dugommier came General Jean Phillipe Duteil who replaced Bonaparte as the commander of the artillery.[29] Just how much Duteil contributed to the events on the western front is quite hazy. It is conceivable that, as one contemporary said, Duteil came to improve the artillery on the western sector, but seeing Napoleon exercising such sound decisions in that area, he left him there and betook himself to another portion of the front where his services would be more critically needed.[30] General Duteil had met Napoleon before. While commander of the Artillery School at Auxonne in 1788, Duteil had recognized readily the extraordinary talents of Napoleon as an artillery officer and had favored him over senior officers.[31]

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[28] In Kircheisen, p. 45, Doppet is described as an ineffective commander who finally had to be replaced by General Dugommier on November 16, 1793. That Napoleon's fury toward the bungling Doppet was responsible for Doppet's transfer is the theory put forward by Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 62. See also De Chair, p. 19, and Barras, I, 130. In these memoirs Napoleon and Barras both attempt to show that the Committee of Public Safety had Doppet replaced, Barras claiming that the committee did so on his and Salicetti's recommendations. Doppet admits that he was only a temporary commander and cites a letter from the ministry which in effect said as soon as Dugommier arrived to relieve him, he was to convey himself to the Army of the Pyrenées-Orientales. This is in Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du General Doppet (Paris, 1824), p. 206. Hereafter referred to as Doppet.

[29] The able Jean Phillipe Duteil is not to be confused with his younger and less gifted brother Jean, also a general who spent some time at the siege of Toulon.

[30] Raguse, I, 39.

[31] Kircheisen, pp. 23-24.

Thus, five years later, Duteil encountered again one of his favorite protégés. Unhesitatingly, Duteil delegated the highly responsible task of artillery head on the western sector to the capable Corsican.

Napoleon was free to continue his favorite project of seizing Fort Mulgrave. He constructed batteries against this location and continued the secret building of la Poudrière near Fort Malbousquet.[32] The latter battery was to be unveiled at the proper time in an effort to deceive the enemy into believing that a general attack was to be made on Fort Malbousquet. Napoleon also had a large battery established near Fort Malbousquet called the Battery of the Convention. This was a counter-battery which Raguse described as one constructed for diversion while other batteries were established in various positions close to the redoubt of Eguillette which was to be the true point of attack.[33] It can be assumed that Napoleon's scheme was as follows: the allies seeing the construction of the counter-battery Convention would be diverted in their attention from Fort Mulgrave and the critical points of Eguillette and Balaguier. When the secret battery, la Poudrière, opened fire, the allies would suspect a general attack on Fort Malbousquet and rush troops to that vicinity. Then the true attack would be made, that on Fort Mulgrave. When this post was overrun, the points on the promontory, Eguillette and Balaguier would

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[32] Fort Malbousquet was located about 1 mile west of Toulon.

[33] Raguse, I, 41.

accordingly be seized. Artillery would be rushed up to these points and Napoleon would direct fire upon the allies fleeing from the shore of the promontory. Later, mortar and artillery fire would be pointed at vessels in the outer and inner harbors and upon Toulon itself.

A different interpretation of Napoleon's activity is put forth by Baron Joseph Duteil who wrote on a portion of the life of General Duteil. It is asserted that the new General of the Artillery, Duteil, recognized the exemplary direction of the siege operations made by Napoleon and consequently kept him close by as his second in command.[34] Duteil's biographer attempted to place much credit on the old general. For instance, he was described as quite active by beginning again the completion of the battery of la Convention, and had laid out simultaneously a second redoubt which he called the battery of la Poudrière.[35] Whether Duteil was as active as this on the western sector is dubious. No report of an official nature mentions him as the initiator of la Poudrière. Napoleon was described by one historian as the officer who had set up two new batteries, la Farinière and la Poudrière.[36] Even Barras intimates that Napoleon constructed

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[34] Joseph Du Teil, Napoléon Bonaparte Et Les Généraux Du Teil 1788-1794 (Paris, 1897), p. 168. Hereafter referred to as Duteil.

[35] Duteil, pp. 171-172.

[36] Rose, Defense of Toulon, pp. 66-67

some batteries, although it is, as usual, in a derogatory manner. Napoleon, says Barras, was temporarily in command of the artillery. But Dugommier had to change the artillery placements which had been poorly placed, leaving the French at a disadvantage.[37] Another contemporary, General Doppet, appears to corroborate the idea that Napoleon had constructed many batteries by stating that he saw Duteil applauding all the measures the young artillery officer had fashioned, and that Napoleon united with his many talents a rare intrepedity and indefatigable activity. Doppet further asserts that he had always found Napoleon at his post, and when the Corsican needed rest he placed himself on the ground and slept near his batteries.[38]

Besides constructing many batteries Napoleon also recommended a plan for the capture of Toulon which was amalgamated with one sent by Dugommier. Salicetti, dispatched by the Committee of Public Safety to urge the speedy recapture of Toulon by the Republican forces, placed before the Committee of Public Safety the two plans. Carnot, the director of military operations, examined them closely, studied the advantages of each and then decided that both plans should be combined and authorized as the method of taking Toulon. The committee also felt that it was proper to delegate the command of

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[37] Barras, I, 140-142. Barras does not specify these batteries.

[38] Doppet, pp. 206-207.

that portion of the attack which Napoleon had suggested. Furthermore, since he was only a captain, it was necessary to promote him immediately to major so that he would have a rank which warranted the command of so important an operation.[39] From the memoir cited, two significant items can be discerned. First, Napoleon was merely a captain when he arrived at Toulon. Second, it can be deduced that the portion of the plan which Napoleon had recommended was the seizure of the Fort Mulgrave and consequently the points Eguillette and Balaguier. His purpose was to bring up artillery and shell the enemy from these strategic locations. Apparently Dugommier's portion of the plan concerned the seizure of the Mount Pharon area, an expedition which was to be simultaneous with the taking of Fort Mulgrave. However, as commander of the army, Dugommier more than likely delegated his scheme to one of the subordinate officers located on the eastern front and continued to direct operations from his headquarters on the western sector.

Much to Napoleon's dismay, his plan was foiled temporarily. Some of the representatives from Paris had inspected the front and, upon discovering the hidden battery la Convention, summarily ordered the artillerymen to open fire.[40] The firing from a hitherto unknown

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39 Memoirs of Bertrand Barère, trans. De V. Payen-Payne (London, 1896), II, 112-113. Hereafter referred to as Barère. Barère was a member of the Committee of Public Safety. He claimed he saw the inner workings of the Committee of Fortifications which was studying the plans submitted for the conquest of Toulon.

40 Gourgaud, I, 16.

battery caused the allies to determine a sortie in order to destroy the battery. Major General O'Hara organized this sortie and placed Major General Dundas as the commanding officer of the 2300 men who set out at 4 A.M. on the morning of November 29. This attack completely surprised the 6000 defenders who could do no more than save their lives by fleeing from the artillery emplacements of la Poudrière and probably la Farinière. Soon the redoubts were securely in the hands of the allies. Some French pieces were spiked and all seemed to work like clockwork efficiency to the well prepared plan of O'Hara. Then disaster hit the allies. Elated by their sudden success and flushed with the desire for more, the troops from most of the columns spontaneously broke ranks and charged the fleeing Frenchmen. The pursuers, said Hood, looked like so many foxhounds.[41] General O'Hara arrived at the redoubt greatly displeased with the behavior of the troops in abandoning the hill. He tried to reform them and sent one of his lieutenants back to bring up artillerymen to spike the guns and destroy them as completely as possible.[42]

In the meantime General Dugommier began formulating his plans for a counter-attack. When the disorganized allies exhausted themselves in the senseless pursuit of the French, Dugommier gave the

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[41] Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 156.

[42] Hill, pp. 17-18. This is taken from a passage quoted from Lord Hill's private papers.

order for the advance. The allies had no other alternative but to retreat. In the process many were left behind. The British casualties alone amounted to 200 soldiers, and altogether the allies lost over 700 of the original 2300 men who had debouched from Fort Malbousquet.[43] Among those captured was General O'Hara. Why he was captured and who accomplished this feat are points of controversy. For instance; Fortescue indicates that O'Hara may have gone up to the captured batteries in the hope of meeting his death.[44] Another version is that O'Hara intentionally allowed himself to be captured in order to negotiate with the French since the allies saw the inability to hold Toulon.[45] Still, a third view is that O'Hara was taken prisoner by his own despondency and inactivity.[46] None of these opinions is correct, however. O'Hara had remained at the end of the sortie even though he had promised Lord Hood he would not go outside of Fort Malbousquet. When the disaster became apparent by the disorganized pursuit of the allies, O'Hara could not stand by in a passive manner and hurried up to the redoubt in an effort to reorganize the allies.[47]

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[43] Fortescue, IV, pt. 1, 169, and Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 68.

[44] Fortescue, IV, pt. 1, 170.

[45] M. Z. Pons, Mémoires Pour Servir A L'Histoire De La Ville De Toulon en 1793 (Paris, 1825), pp. 136-137.

[46] The Journal of Elizabeth Lady Holland, ed. Earl of Ilchester (London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta, 1908), I, 113.

[47] Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 155 and p. 67.

During this effort the counter-attacking Republicans overran the redoubt. At this time O'Hara was wounded in the arm and loss of blood forced him to lie down.

Who captured him is another fascinating question. Napoleon tried to show that he was responsible for the capture of O'Hara. One of his accounts goes in this manner. After he had led a battery of grenadiers through a bayou hidden by brambles, causing the enemy to be unaware of its presence, he ordered the troops to fire upon the British. Imagining this fire to be originated by mistaken friendly troops, O'Hara hurried over to inform them of their error, but he was wounded instead, a musketball hitting him in the hand. A sergeant then seized him and dragged him into the bayou as prisoner.[48] But this version of Napoleon's memoirs is contradicted in part by another account. In this description, Napoleon goes further and asserts that he actually captured the Englishman. The same plot is used as in the version above, but when O'Hara advanced toward the troops, he was wounded in the arm by the fire of a sergeant. Napoleon then seized him.[49] But no sources support such a claim. Furthermore, it is more likely that Napoleon was the prime mover of the artillery

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[48] Gourgaud, I, 17-18

[49] O'Meara, I, 126-127

instead of taking part in any infantry attack.[50] It is the opinion of the writer that O'Hara was captured by French soldiers after the skirmish had ended.

A magazine article, which is the hackneyed version of the Napoleonic legend, makes a gross error in asserting that the battery Hommes Sans Peur caused the English to attack, and that the battle was centered around this particular locality.[51] The battery Hommes Sans Peur did not figure in the battle of November 29 at all. Furthermore, this battery was several miles south from the real point of attack centered around the batteries of la Poudrière, la Farinière, and la Convention. More than likely Bonaparte's activity ran in this vein. When the encounter began, he hurried to the artillery redoubts nearest those being attacked which would have been la Rade or the Batterie de Bragallion consisting of the two emplacements called Sans Culottes and la Montagne. All of these were located between a mile and a mile

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50 Salicetti, in a report to the Committee of Public Safety, stated that Mouret, Garnier, and Bonaparte had conducted themselves in a distinguished manner; Archives Parliamentaires, LXXXI, 33. Dugommier reported that O'Hara was wounded in the right arm and taken prisoner. Those who aided him the most to rally and advance were the citizens Bonaparte, commandant of the artillery, Arena and Cervoni, adjutants-general; Archives Parliamentaires, L XXXI, 33-34. It will be noticed that Dugommier does not credit anyone in particular for the capture of O'Hara, moreover Napoleon is mentioned in relation to artillery.

51 Germain Bapst, "Captain Napoleon Bonaparte at Toulon", Harper's New Monthly Magazine, LXXXVII (January, 1894), 210-211.

and a half from the overrun batteries. Here, probably he ordered, without hesitation, artillery and mortar fire on the sites conquered by the allies. When word was received that the allies were being pushed back beyond la Farinière and la Poudrière, he proceeded, in all likelihood, to these spots and directed, upon the retreating enemy, all of the fire he could muster from the unspiked pieces.

After the disaster of November 29, 1793, the allies smarted under the steadily decreasing fortune for them at Toulon. The Toulonese were becoming alienated toward the allies and began viewing them as strangers meddling in domestic feuds. Also a latent spirit of national sentiment surged in the ranks of the citizens. Early in December, Hood decided to disarm the town troops as a precaution against possible treachery. This in itself caused more suspicion and estrangement between the French citizens and the allies. The Republican troops, on the other hand, were bolstered by the emergence of this sudden zeal of national sentiment. Furthermore, Dugommier was incited to more strenuous measures when the Committee of Public Safety sent a suggestive message signifying that he should capture Toulon or merit the regrets of the Committee.[52] Between the first and fifteenth of December, few clashes between the allies and the Republicans occurred. The allies clinged to a false hope that reinforcements would soon be following when, on December 16, a captain

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[52] Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 71.

and 50 artillerymen arrived with news that two regiments were being rushed to Toulon. In reality, the regiments were delayed by fortuitous circumstances and did not approach Toulon until a fortnight after the evacuation of the allies.[53] The Republicans now had 40,000 soldiers. Napoleon menaced Toulon with a threatened direct attack by his batteries of la Poudrière and la Farinière. The redoubts of Jacobins, Hommes Sans Peur and Chasse-coquins opened fire on Fort Mulgrave. Little Gibraltor, or Fort Mulgrave, had a poor defense set-up and the construction of its defense was still in the process when the Republicans began a steady bombardment of it on December 15-16.[54]

The French forces were now prepared for the final push against the allies. Napoleon's portion of the master plan was effected in the early hours of December 17, 1793. A force of 7000 men was ordered to begin the attack against Fort Mulgrave. The garrison of allies, consisting of only 700 men, put up a determined and effective resistance which made the Republican plan appear precarious for the moment.[55] Three columns were formed. Victor commanded the first one which had the task of proceeding along the coast of the promontory and attacking the fort from the right in order to cut off any help from either Balaguier or Eguillette. The second column under the leadership of

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53 Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 70.

54 Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 72.

55 Gourgaud, I, 24.

Brule was to march against the front of the redoubt.[56] Darkness caused this column to become disorganized and forced Dugommier to send for his third column held in reserve by Bonaparte and Muiron. The bringing up of this third force turned the tide. However disinclined, the allies were impelled to retreat.[57] Finally, the Republicans pursued the allies into the sea after forcing them from the points Eguillette and Balaguier.[58] At the same time, the attack from the eastern sector succeeded. The French seized the mountain of Pharon by a prodigious bit of fortune in which a group crossed over an escarpement which had appeared inaccessible. The allies, fearing that Fort Malbousquet was also in an inferior position and not desiring to be there if it was seized like Eguillette and Balaguier, evacuated the fort. The French occupied that post immediately after its evacuation.[59] There, Napoleon ordered field pieces to shell the town with howitzers and later with mortar fire.[60] Before leaving the promontory on which Fort Mulgrave stood, Napoleon gave the command of the artillery to his trusted subordinate Raguse. This officer shelled the inner harbor, setting three ships ablaze and opening ten embrasures. At 3 P.M., the allied ships were forced to move out of range of the shells which enabled the French to attain an

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56 Fox, p. 49.

57 Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 73.

58 Fox, p. 50.

59 Raguse, I, 43.

60 Gourgaud, I, 23-29.

effective blockade on Toulon.[61]

Lord Hood held a council of war on the afternoon of the 17th of December. It was decided that the outer forts and posts were to be evacuated. All ships not used in the retreat were to be burned along with stores in the dockyard. Sir Sidney Smith was in command of the destruction party in Toulon. However, such an operation was hindered greatly by the panic which arose in the allied camp.[62] Because of the lack of wind, the damage was minimized to a great extent, and eight of the thirteen ships which escaped destruction at this time were later to become the bulwark of Bonaparte's eastern expedition to the Nile in 1798.[63] In the throes of the continuous shelling and fire, Toulon became ablaze. An occasional explosion was heard and then the sight of debris flying in all directions was viewed by the besiegers. When the doors were flung open, the population seemed to have disappeared from the port city.[64] It was inevitable that some Toulonese would be convicted as traitors to the nation of France. The most

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61 Raguse, I, 42-43.

62 John Barrow, The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith G.C.B. (London, 1848), I, 155.

63 Rose, Defense of Toulon, p. 81. In The Diary of Sir John Moore, ed. J. F. Maurice (London, 1904), I, 42-43, Sir John Moore relates that both Generals Dundas and O'Hara had felt that Toulon should have been abandoned long before. Dundas asserts that Hood chose to follow his own opinion which resulted in the failure to destroy the fleet and arsenal completely.

64 Raguse, I, 44.

reasonable estimate of the number executed is approximately two hundred.[65]

Exactly what was Napoleon's position at Toulon? The young artillery officer would have us believe that he alone took Toulon. For instance, Las Cases says:

> It will be seen that it was he, and he alone, who took the fortress... the emperor never looks back to this period without pleasure, and always mentions it as the happiest portion of his life. The taking of Toulon was his first successful achievement and it naturally excites the fondest recollections.[66]

Bonaparte even claims that he might have become general in chief before the seige was over since Dugommier was delaying too long. The representatives of the people sought Napoleon, but he refused to accept the command. Rather, so Napoleon claims, he went to his beloved general and persuaded him to attack Little Gibralter. But Dugommier was too fatigued, consequently Napoleon took possession of the town and then counselled Dugommier to rest himself.[67] However, Barras states that Napoleon only played a secondary role at Toulon and that Dugommier was the actual captor of the town.[68] It is quite certain that Dugommier

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[65] Kircheisen, p. 47. In James, I, 89, the Dictionnaire Historique is again cited to back the assertion that thousands of Toulonese, regardless of age, sex, or political insignificance, were slaughtered by the order of the Committee of Public Safety. It is inconceivable why James used this source as authority.

[66] Las Cases, I, pt. 1, 139.

[67] Las Cases, I, pt. 1, 148-159.

[68] Barras, I, 148.

was not in such a state of fatigue as Napoleon depicted, and that he was able to direct the operations against Toulon. But Napoleon played more than a secondary role. Bertrand Barère, a member of the Convention, brings out the significant points that Dugommier directed the operations and Bonaparte headed his gunners in a brave manner.[69] Moreover, from the sources studied, it is also patent that Napoleon did participate quite significantly in the actual operations even to the point of heading a reserve infantry column against Fort Mulgrave. However, Napoleon's activity as the director of artillery overshadowed any contributions made by him in the infantry branch.

Concerning the plan for the conquest of Toulon, Bonaparte was a highly significant figure. Some historians disagree with this contention. For instance, Paul Cottin says that Napoleon was not the only one to calculate the proper method of attack. He cites a certain Brunet as having declared that Balaguier and Eguillette must be carried. This letter was sent to Paris, dated October 22, 1793. Also on September 4, 1793, Gasparin wrote a letter speaking of burning the fleet, and that on September 10, 1793, Gasparin, Salicetti, and Albitte declared to the Committee of Public Safety that measures had been taken for firing the English fleet or forcing it to retreat. Moreover, the true role of Napoleon was in obtaining the artillery for the army.[70] Another historian, Fox, asserts

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[69] Barere, II, 113.

[70] Paul Cottin, Toulon et Les Anglais en 1793 D'Apres Des Documents Inedits (Paris, 1898), pp. 208-209.

that Napoleon is not entitled to any great credit for having discovered the vulnerable point of Toulon since any well schooled officer would have done the same. Furthermore, his great merit lay in the fact that he alone organized and commanded the artillery which played such an important role at Toulon.[71] At least both of these writers are in agreement that Napoleon was invaluable in the field of artillery. As for the declaration made by the representatives on September 10, 1793, it must be kept in mind that there is quite a difference between the words, measures, and plan, a point which Cottin overlooks too easily. Brunet's letter, dated October 22, 1793, was sent more than a month after Napoleon had been at Toulon. In Napoleon's own words; after reconnoitering the area for about a month, he proposed the plan of attack which would reduce the city of Toulon.[72] Thus, his plan preceded any letter, (if such a letter was sent) of Brunet's, which, in itself, may have been an adaptation of Napoleon's verbal recommendations to the superior officers of the Army of the South. Fox, in claiming that any well schooled officer would have discerned the weakness in the Toulon defense, assumes a truth which is obviously relative and also unprovable.

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71 Fox, p. 102.

72 Gourgaud, I, 13-15. Of course Napoleon cannot be trusted either. But his claim of formulating the plan is at least supported by Barère. On the other hand, the enigmatic figure of Brunet is not mentioned by anyone except Cottin in relation to the plan of attack on Toulon.

Joseph Duteil brings out with considerable acumen that Bonaparte's plan was modified by the ministers who decided to have two simultaneous attacks on Malbousquet and Mulgrave, whereas Napoleon had advocated successive attacks.[73] This indicates that Napoleon's idea was based on deception. Apparently he desired an attack on Malbousquet as a feint. When the allies would become convinced that the Republicans were planning to conquer Toulon by a land attack and would in turn rush troops to this area, then the plan of Napoleon was to begin the advance on the true point of attack, namely Little Gibralter. More insight is brought out by Duteil when he states that Dugommier asserted that the taking of Toulon was by an attack on the English redoubt and at the same time on Mount Pharon. In other words, a general attack.[74] Thus, it can be seen that Dugommier's portion of the amalgamated plan was essentially one of an all out effort including an advance on the eastern sector principally around Mount Pharon. On the other hand, Napoleon had advocated, only, the need of seizing Fort Mulgrave which would enable them to gain possession of the promontory on which the points Eguillette and Balaguier were located. From these spots, the harbors and Toulon would be bombarded, and eventually the allies would

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[73] Duteil, p. 170.

[74] Duteil, p. 171. This is quoted from Dugommier's memoirs found in Ceston, II, 246-247. General Duteil was quite impressed by Napoleon's activity at Toulon and in a letter, found in the Archives de la Guerre, he stated that he lacked the expressions to portray the merit of Bonaparte, an extraordinary officer with many gifts which the minister of war should devote for the glory of the Republic. See Duteil, p. 186.

be forced to withdraw. When Barère speaks of the amalgamation of the plans of Dugommier and Bonaparte, it becomes certain that Napoleon not only organized and directed the artillery, but he also was one of the major contributors to the downfall of Toulon by his astute plan to capture the promontory on which Fort Mulgrave rested.

Chapter III. Interlude

For the valuable services rendered at Toulon, Napoleon was elevated to the rank of general of brigade. This was affirmed by a provisional decree from the Commissioners of the Convention dated December 22, 1793, and was later confirmed by the Committee of Public Safety.[1] Napoleon was then charged with the arming and defense of the coasts of the Mediterranean.[2] To this appointed task, Napoleon applied his characteristic enthusiasm and efficiency. He fortified the coasts of Provence and the Isle of Hyeres which had been recently evacuated by the English. In every town, he had to encounter public officials who attempted to persuade him that it was essential, for the defense of France, that a battery site be established near their city.[3] Some cities, Napoleon regarded, were of the highest importance to the defense of the Mediterranean coast. Toulon, for instance, was one such city. Another was Marseilles. At the latter municipality, Napoleon aroused the ire of the citizens by his conscientious efforts to secure them from English attack. With General Lapoype, another officer who had participated in the Toulon siege, Napoleon began the rebuilding of a fort which had been ruined by the people in imitation of the destruction of the Bastille on

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[1] Fournier, pp. 43-44.

[2] Raguse I, 47.

[3] De Chair, pp. 26-27

July 14, 1789. The two generals were denounced by the public, and a written petition was carried to the Assembly by the residents of Marseilles. Bonaparte and Lapoype were both summoned to Paris to explain their behavior. However, Lapoype was the only one to arrive and present the reasons for the rebuilding of the fort. He explained that Napoleon alone was chargeable for the repairing of the fort, but that his only thought was to complete the defense of the town against the English. Carnot then initiated an order from the committee specifying Napoleon to establish batteries along the coast from Marseilles to Cette as protective measures. This enabled the committee to continue the utilization of Napoleon's services and also took him from Marseilles. The Committee of Public Safety suspended the rebuilding of the Marseilles stronghold. The Assembly did not pursue the issue any further since it appeared useless to do so.[4]

France, at this time was embroiled in conflicts with the major powers in Europe. The defeat of the allies at Toulon was an ominous sign of things to come. Everywhere the surprising strength of Republican France had contained its foes. The Army of Italy, to which Napoleon was assigned in March, 1794, after he had concluded the fortification of the Mediterranean coast, was engaged with the allied forces of Austria and Sardinia. However, the Army of Italy appeared to have difficulty dislodging the allies who were encamped

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[4] Barère, II, 154-156.

on the heights of the Appenines. Wasting no time, Napoleon soon devised a plan designed to drive the Sardinian enemy beyond the Alps. At a council, at which Ricord and the younger Robespierre attended, his plan was unanimously approved. On April 8, 1794, part of General Massena's army debouched into a portion of Piedmont to effect Napoleon's scheme. The Piedmontese soldiers, alarmed by this sudden move and fearing to be cut off or destroyed, abandoned the city of Saorgio with its valuable supply depot.[5] Another plan of Napoleon's was one which, if successful, would put the French in possession of the upper chain of the Alps. However, it was necessary to borrow some of the territory of the Republic of Genoa which could have aroused political objections. Yet, it was rationalized that the allies had borrowed Genoese territory when the Piedmont garrison had advanced to Toulon in 1793. On April 6, 1794, the plan was put into successful operation by having 14,000 men set out on the mission.[6]

The Duc De Raguse described the first campaign in this manner. Three columns were sent out, Raguse being in a group sent in reconnaissance above the town of Oneille. This town was entered April 9, 1794, without a fight. The same thing occurred at Loano. Meanwhile, the division of Massena, winning in its struggle, advanced toward Saorgio. This operation was conceived by Bonaparte and was ended in less than 15 days. Now the army was in a position to enter Piedmont in order

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[5] De Chair, pp. 28-29.

[6] De Chair, pp. 30-32.

to operate against Genoa.[7] Of the second scheme, Raguse again states that the plan was made by Napoleon. The proposal was to enter Piedmont at the point of the Apennines which attached itself to the Alps. The enemy was met and defeated on September 21, 1794 near Cairo. The representative Albitte, however, became alarmed and feared for his personal safety. As a result of his unfounded apprehensions, the army was obliged to retreat to Savonne and Vado.[8]

In the meantime Napoleon had been sent on a mission to Genoa by the representatives of the people in order to confer with the Genoese government. This mission took place around July 13, 1794.[9] The ostensible purpose of this visit was to gain satisfaction from the government of Genoa on such matters as provisions, but in reality it was made to study and learn the positions and obstacles which had to be overcome if a seizure of the city was considered necessary. Napoleon traveled with several officers, the Duc De Raguse being one of them. After remaining in Genoa for 5 days, during which time all the information they had come for was collected, the party of Frenchmen returned to Nice.[10] Shortly thereafter, the 9th of Thermidor, July 27, 1794, occurred in which the Jacobin party in Paris collapsed. The

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[7] Raguse, I, 50.

[8] Raguse, I, 57.

[9] Bourrienne, I, 20.

[10] Raguse, I, 51-52.

The new deputies, Albitte and Salicetti, were given an exaggerated picture of Napoleon's allegiance to Jacobinism. By consequence, Napoleon was suspended from his rank, arrested on August 9, and arraigned before the committee.[11] The justification for these actions, besides Napoleon's affinity to the fallen Jacobins, was his trip to Genoa which undoubtedly was depicted as a plot of the Corsican. Napoleon defended himself in rather strong language and vindicated himself by showing that the trip to Genoa had been ordered. The representatives then decreed his conduct above suspicion and he was given his liberty and rank back within 10 days of the arrest.[12] The tireless and undeterred Napoleon immediately flung himself into new military ventures. Paoli had allowed Corsica to become British territory. The Republicans reacted to this by planning a maritime expedition against Corsica in which Napoleon participated. However, the British fleet encountered this expedition and caused the French to abandon the seizure of Corsica.[13]

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[11] Bourrienne, I, 21.

[12] Raguse, I, 55.

[13] Kircheisen, p. 50. See also Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 55, and Fournier, p. 48. The Duc De Raguse gives an interesting but unsupported view asserting that this maritime venture was directed against Tuscany. This was a scheme formulated by Napoleon. However, the British ruined this operation by sinking two of the French vessels in the waters of Genoa; Raguse, I, 58.

The occupation of Corsica by the British caused many Corsicans to arrive in the vicinity of the Army of Italy. The government of France was determined to eliminate this concentration of questionable patriots. Corsican officers were no exceptions to the rule. Consequently, Napoleon was transferred to the Army of the Vendée with the rank of general of infantry.[14] He rejected this transfer vehemently on two grounds. First, Napoleon felt that area unworthy of his talents. Second, he regarded the transfer to the infantry as an indignity and pleaded officially on this basis.[15] Realizing the futility of seeking recourse within the Army of Italy, the young Corsican decided to go to Paris where he could personally plead his case. However, Aubrey, the member of the Committee of Public Safety who had the power of staff appointments, refused to aid Napoleon in his petition.[16] Though a small consolation, Bonaparte succeeded in obtaining a job as a member of the topographical board, since he knew the terrain of Italy well and could supply the Committee of Public Safety with information on the positions of the army.[17] In a letter to his brother Joseph he mentions this office but appears to overstate his importance by asserting that he was the director

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[14] Raguse, I, 59.

[15] Bourrienne, I, 26.

[16] Kircheisen, p. 52.

[17] De Chair, p. 35.

of the armies, replacing Carnot in that post.[18] De Chair credits Napoleon with the design of the Berghetto line for the Army of Italy which saved it from the repeated but fruitless attacks of the enemy. De Chair asserts that Bonaparte was then appointed by special decree to a position of brigadier-general of artillery and attached to direct the military operations of the armies.[19] This view appears overly optimistic of Napoleon's status. Fournier points out that Napoleon's fortune decreased at this time. A special decree, dated September 15, 1795, is mentioned to show that Bonaparte was stricken from the list of French generals as a result of his refusal to join the Army of the Vendée.[20]

During this time, Bonaparte had conceived, also, the idea of being sent to Turkey as general of artillery in order to organize the Grand Seignior's artillery. Sanguinely, he writes to his brother Joseph that this plan was deferred temporarily since the Committee decided he could not leave France. Instead he is to be reappointed to the artillery and probably will continue to serve the Committee.[21]

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[18] The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte With His Brother Joseph, Sometime King of Spain (New York, 1855), I, 23. Hereafter referred to as Confidential Correspondence.

[19] De Chair, p. 35. Why he received such a lofty position is not explained. If De Chair's version is correct, it may have been because of his excellent plan of the Berghetto line.

[20] Fournier, p. 53

[21] Confidential Correspondence, I, 26. Letter dated September 5, 1795.

But after his dismissal from the list of French officers on active duty, Napoleon again renewed hopes of the Turkish mission. In another letter to Joseph, dated September 26, 1795, he labors on the proposed scheme saying that it was being talked of more and more , and that it would probably have been approved if there had not been so many disturbances.[22] These disturbances, of course, were caused primarily by the proposal of the New Constitution which planned to retain two-thirds of the members of the Convention in the new governmental arrangement. Although Napoleon was no longer on the list of active officers, he was acquainted with several powerful individuals in Paris. One of these persons was a man he had met during the siege of Toulon. His name was Paul Barras.

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22 Confidential Correspondence, I, 31.

Chapter IV. 13 Vendémiaire - Prelude to Napoleon's Rise

Immediately prior to 13 Vendémiaire, the condition of the French national government was far from satisfactory. After the fall of Danton and Robespierre in the Summer of 1794, the Convention was governed by successive factions which succeeded in achieving neither influence nor an effective and constructive policy.[1] Moreover, there were rumblings of a Royalist plot in the making. The feeble Convention was to be succeeded on September 22, 1795 (1 Vendémiaire, Year IV) by the Constitution of the Year III. Legislative power was to be invested in two councils namely, the Council of 500 and the Council of Ancients. Executive authority was entrusted in a Directory composed of five men.[2] In order to avoid the same error of the Constitution of 1791, which denied all members of the Constituent Assembly to become members of the legislature, the Convention drew up the Constitution so that it could stay in virtual control for two more years. This Constitution of 1795 was to be moderate in character so that a return to the radicalism of the past few years would be avoided. Moreover, it was devised to prevent the accession of a Royalist or malcontent majority in the national legislature. To accomplish these goals the Constitution of the Year III was applied to the present Convention. In this way, one-third of the deputies

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[1] Montholon, III, 63.

[2] Fournier, p. 54.

only were to be re-elected while the rest of the members were to remain in the forthcoming Councils.[3] When this maneuver was made known in Paris, the Sections indignantly refused to recognize the Constitution, and any efforts to impose order or to dismiss the unlawful electoral meetings of the Parisians met with failure. The people were discontented generally because of the existing poor economic conditions. Furthermore, the restrictions on political clubs and societies caused some discontent, and the prohibiting of the Jacobins to reappear at their clubs aroused that faction to resistance. Whether the revolt in Paris was in any way originated or aided by the Royalists and Émigrés is a topic which will be discussed more in detail later on. Finally, the Convention passed a decret de circonstance which ordered the many electoral meetings dissolved temporarily. But the police were repulsed in their efforts to enforce the decree. The Section Lepelletier, leader in this revolt, eventually declared itself in permanent session and ordered the drums of the various sections to beat the call to arms.[4]

In the evening of 12 Vendémiaire, the insurrectionists armed several groups of National Guardsmen, to wit, the battalions of

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[3] Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 62.

[4] Memoirs of Baron Hyde De Neuville: Outlaw, Exile, Ambassador, trans. Frances Jackson (London, 1913), I, 58. Hereafter referred to as Neuville. Neuville was a Royalist who fought on the side of the sectionaries during 13 Vendémiaire.

Petits Peres and Filles St. Thomas. General Menou, the commander in chief of the Army of the Interior, went out to the Section Lepelletier, confronted the insurrectionists, and ordered them to disperse. However, a fiery orator advanced and attempted to persuade the general to side with the sectionaries. Menou blundered by hesitating to carry out his mission of dispersing the recalcitrant revolters and eventually he withdrew. This irresolution had an encouraging effect on the Sections and left Menou's loyalty in doubt.

The failure of Menou was not the only thing which assured the Sections of a reasonable opportunity for success in their revolt. According to one eyewitness, on 12 Vendémiaire the military attempted to deceive the sectionaries concerning the number of troops loyal to the Convention by having a garrison march continually out of one gate and into another. This abortive ruse only emboldened the sectionary leaders.[5] The Convention swiftly dismissed General Menou, but to replace him with a suitable commander was not an easy decision. France had several brilliant generals, but these were not available at a moment's notice, they being stationed with the armies on the frontiers of France. From the scant choice of military officers in Paris, the Convention finally chose General Paul Barras for the position.[6] Being more wise politically than militarily,

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[5] Memoirs of Count Lavelette (London, 1894), p. 95. Hereafter referred to as Lavelette. This man later became adjutant and private secretary to Napoleon. During the Empire, Lavelette was made Postmaster-general.

[6] Kircheisen, p. 60.

Barras began searching for the aid of talented officers in the hope that one of them could implement the defense of the Convention successfully. Barras remembered Napoleon Bonaparte, the young artillery officer who had served the Republican cause at Toulon so well. It is reported by one eyewitness that Barras had visited the Bureau of the Armed Forces on both 11 Vendémiaire and 12 Vendémiaire, and that Napoleon had likewise been seen there more than once.[7] It is indicated also that Napoleon had attended salons, with Barras, several weeks before 13 Vendémiaire. At these gatherings he probably made the acquaintance of his future wife, Josephine Beauharnais, who at one time was the mistress of Barras.[8] Barras placed the name of young Napoleon before the Convention and this request was approved without difficulty.[9] Bonaparte claims that he was at the theatre Feydeau when informed of the crisis. He hastened to the Assembly where each member was putting forth his favorite officer to direct the operation. Some even mentioned his name. Napoleon refused to be considered because he did not want to direct a defense which would be interfered with by officious representatives.[10] The refusal by the ambitious Bonaparte sounds inconceivable.

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[7] Mémoires du Vice-Admiral Baron Grivel (Paris, 1914), p. 30. Hereafter referred to as Grivel.

[8] Kircheisen, pp. 65-72.

[9] Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 64.

[10] Las Cases, I, pt. 2, 168-170

A question arises here whether Barras had anticipated his elevation to the command of the Convention troops, and in this expectation he had sought the services of Napoleon beforehand. Kircheisen intimates that this was a possibility.[11] In Paul Frischauer's, England's Years of Danger, the words essentially quoted by Kircheisen are also found.[12] This message states that Bonaparte is invited to be at Chaillot at 10 A.M. on 11 Vendémiaire to meet Citizen Director Barras on priority business. However, neither Kircheisen nor Frischauer identify the source for this message which leaves it open to question. The mention of Barras as Citizen Director, moreover, is a misnomer since Barras did not become a Director until after 13 Vendémiaire. Possibly then, if the message is authentic, which is doubtful, the date is in error and Barras may have sent it much later than 11 Vendémiaire.

Exactly what position was obtained for Napoleon has been a matter of dispute. In his Memoirs, Barras pictures Napoleon as neither more nor less than an aide-de-camp.[13] Fréron, a member of the Convention, spoke of him as the general of artillery whose strategic placements had such favorable effects on the outcome of

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[11] Kircheisen, p. 60.

[12] (New York, 1938), p. 14.

[13] Barras, I, 295.

the battle.[14] In the only monograph written on 13 Vendémiaire, the author asserts that Napoleon, although his role was quite active on that day, was neither an aide-de-camp nor second in command, but simply reintegrated into the army and placed at the disposal of Barras.[15] But all of these views are quite unsatisfactory and unsupportable. When Barras wrote his Memoirs, he conveniently overlooked his official words spoken to the Convention. In the Moniteur, he is found to have declared that Bonaparte, who was well known for his military talents and great attachment to the Republic, was named by his proposal as second in command.[16] Also, at the sitting of the Convention of 18 Vendémiaire, Barras called attention to Bonaparte's prompt and favorable dispositions and demanded that the nomination of Napoleon as second in command of the Army of the Interior be confirmed. This demand was promptly

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[14] Gazette Nationale, ou Le Moniteur Universel, 22 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 14, 1795), p. 88. Hereafter referred to as Moniteur. Why Fréron volunteered this information to the Convention is a debatable point. Since he was interested in Napoleon's sister Pauline, it is possible he did so in order to gain favor with the Bonaparte family. There is no definite proof on this matter however. For interesting accounts of Fréron's attraction to Pauline see Frédéric Masson, Napoleon Et Sa Famille (Paris, 1904), I, 148-156. Also Joseph Turquan, The Sisters of Napoleon, trans. and ed. W. R. H. Trowbridge (London, 1908), pp. 86-93.

[15] Henry Zivy, Le Treize Vendémiaire An IV (Paris, 1898), p. 77. Hereafter referred to as Zivy.

[16] Moniteur, 5 Brumaire, l'an 4 (October 27, 1795), p. 139.

passed by the Convention.[17] The interpretation by Zivy hardly seems credible, and to dismiss the problem by leaving Napoleon in a foggy suspended status neither solves the point nor justifies the conclusion.

Fréron's statement that Napoleon was general of artillery is a very fascinating one. For instance, was the position of second in command a real military position in the French military organization or was it merely an unofficial title? If it was only a nominal position, then it is possible that Napoleon was general of artillery with an extra official title of second in command. Perhaps the general of artillery was considered, at that time, as automatically second in command of the army. Unfortunately, these feasible solutions cannot be determined here since no organizational chart of the French military staff has been located. Fréron, incidentally, was the first person to direct any credit toward the name of Bonaparte by his statement to the Convention on 18 Vendémiaire.[18] Barras had reported some of the events to the Convention as early as the evening of 13 Vendémiaire, but did not mention Napoleon's name at this time.[19] Barras' first reference of Napoleon came on the same day, but after Fréron had praised Bonaparte for his activity as the general of artillery.

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[17] Moniteur, 23 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 15, 1795), p. 89.

[18] Moniteur, 22 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 14, 1795), p. 88.

[19] Moniteur, 17 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 9, 1795), p. 67.

These acclamations by Fréron and Barras of Napoleon's activity on 13 Vendémiaire seem to be linked quite closely. As stated before, Fréron's utterance may have been prompted by his desire for the hand of Napoleon's sister, Pauline. More than not, Barras' praise appears to be the direct result of Fréron's speech. In the writer's opinion, the astute Barras realized that he had to confirm or deny the words of Fréron publicly to the Convention. Since he confirmed Fréron's words, then Fréron probably spoke the truth. This does not eliminate, however, the possibility of complicity between Barras and Fréron to advance the fortunes of Bonaparte. Barras' reason may have been his realization that Napoleon was a valuable officer whose support might be important in the future.

In the writings of contemporaries, as in the official newspaper of the Republic, Napoleon is constantly identified as second in command. Napoleon states that he was appointed second in command.[20] However, Bonaparte must be substantiated by others because he, like Barras, is prone to exaggerate his contributions on that day.[21] Baron

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[20] Confidential Correspondence, I, 32.

[21] In one of his dictations, for instance, Napoleon claims that the committee made Barras general in chief and gave the active command of the forces to Napoleon; Las Cases, I, pt. 2, 170. In the Mémoires De M. Le Comte De Vaublanc, ed. M. F. Barriere (Paris, 1888), p. 303, this idea is supported, Vaublanc saying that Barras was named the general in chief and he immediately gave the command to Bonaparte. Vaublanc fought on the side of the sectionaries, but later he became an advocate for Bonaparte.

Thiébault, an officer in the army of the Republic brings out quite significantly that Napoleon was second in command. On the morning of the fifth of October, Thiébault had sought General Menou, to his knowledge the commander of the defense, in order to report that several groups of sectionaries were moving toward the Tuilleries area. He received, in reply to his interrogation, that Barras was now the commander in chief and Bonaparte was second in command.[22] Another pertinent passage in the memoirs of Thiébault refers to Barras' elevation to the high government post of a Director and Bonaparte's promotion. Thiébault says:

> As Barras had become a Director he had to be succeeded in his command by Bonaparte, who from a brigadier-general on half-pay had, in a moment, become Barras' second in command, and having been made a division general almost at once, was in three weeks commander-in-chief of the Home Army and of the Paris National Guard.[23]

Regardless of this apparent uncertainty of designated military titles, one fact is beyond doubt; the defense of the Convention was weak in both manpower and cannon.[24] Little could be done in the way of obtaining

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[22] The Memoirs of Baron Thiébault, trans. Arthur John Butler (New York, 1896), I, 259. Hereafter referred to as Thiébault. This man was considered with high regard by Napoleon, but Thiébault did not rise to the peak of military fame because of his frequent acts of insubordination. As a lucid and accurate writer, however, Thiébault rates very high.

[23] Thiébault, I, 267.

[24] Best estimates indicate that the Convention had only 4000-5000 men, whereas the Sections had 20,000 - 30,000 troops. See Kircheisen, p. 60 and Thiébault, I, 263.

The Battle Area of 13 Vendémiaire



From: The Memoirs of Baron Thiébault (New York) 1896), I.

more men loyal to the Convention, but there was still a possibility of acquiring the much needed artillery located at the park of Les Sablons outside of Paris. A point of issue centers around the procurement of this artillery. Did Barras or Napoleon order Major Murat to the Les Sablons to obtain the cannon for the Convention forces? Barras had entrusted the protection around the Convention to Napoleon according to one member of the Convention.[25] If this is so, and since Napoleon was primarily an artillery officer, his most logical first move would be the acquisition of cannon. Napoleon, in his own words, declared that he dispatched Murat for the artillery.[26] This is corroborated by Thiébault.[27] In the monograph, Le Treize Vendémiaire, Zivy affirms again that Murat received the order to acquire the artillery pieces at Les Sablons.[28]

Yet, Barras vehemently denies that Napoleon thought of the idea. Rather, the order was merely a repetition of one he had given to Napoleon who had in turn transmitted it to Murat.[29] Barras also

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[25] A. C. Thibaudeau, Mémoirs Sur La Convention Et Le Directoire (Paris, 1824), I, 212.

[26] De Chair, p. 40. A very good description of Napoleon's activity in his own words is also found in Napoleon at St. Helena: Memoirs of General Bertrand: Grand Marshal of The Palace, trans. Frances Hume, ed. Paul Fleuriot De Langle (London, 1953), pp. 94-95. Hereafter referred to as Bertrand.

[27] Thiébault, I, 262.

[28] Zivy, p. 79.

[29] Barras, I, 296-297.

takes credit for this in his statement to the Convention in which he said that, knowing the artillery at Les Sablons was poorly guarded, he made haste to drag off these pieces.[30] The impression given by these words, is not that he ordered someone else to get the artillery, but that he personally hurried to the Les Sablons which is located approximately five miles outside of Paris. However, it is logical to assume that he did not mean this literally. Herein lies the key to interpret many of Barras' remarks made in the Moniteur, which later he adopted as factual in his Memoirs. His continual allusions that he accomplished this defensive position or uttered that order is to be considered mainly as a convenient method of reporting, as simply as possible, the important occurrences of that eventful day. Barras even hints that all the credit for the success of 13 Vendémiaire should be attributed to him by using

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[30] Moniteur, 5 Brumaire, l'an 4 (October 27, 1795), p. 139.

quotations from the writings of Baron Fain and P. F. Réal.[31] No eyewitness backs up Barras' insistent demand that he first thought of the idea of obtaining the artillery from Les Sablons and transmitted this order to Major Murat through Napoleon.

As second in command, Napoleon was given nearly carte blanche

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[31] See Barras, I, 328. Here he quotes from Baron Fain, the secretary of the future Directorate and later permanent secretary to Napoleon. Fain stated that Barras was known as the sole commander of the Army of the Republic and that all orders were given in his name. By such an implication then, Barras could technically assert that complete credit should be directed to himself. Also Barras includes in his memoirs some excerpts from P. F. Réal, Essai sur les Journées des le 13 et 14 Vendémiaire. These passages applaud Barras as the mastermind in the complete defeat of the insurrectionists; see Barras, I, 315-326. However, it must be kept in mind that neither Baron Fain nor Réal, who was later one of Bonaparte's life councillors, was an eyewitness of the battles. Why two men who were to become such important officials of Napoleon would attribute the success to Barras is not easily explained. A possibility is that these writings were made long before Napoleon was considered as the future leader of France, whereas Barras' star had risen greatly as a result of 13 Vendémiaire and he appeared as the probable strong man needed by France. Bourrienne claims in his memoirs, Bourrienne, I, 36, that Napoleon always regretted his part of 13 Vendémiaire and even attempted to shove the responsibility onto Barras. This explanation is not very likely since in all of his memoirs dictated at St. Helena, Napoleon repeatedly claimed his contribution to the victory was of the highest importance. See Bertrand, p. 95. This is essentially the same version as that found in both Las Cases and Montholon. In the Correspondance De Napoléon I, Publiée Par Ordre De L'Empereur Napoléon III (Paris 1858), I, 99-100, a report allegedly made by Napoleon on the events of 13 Vendémiaire credits Barras with the order to acquire the cannon at the Les Sablons. In fact, Napoleon gives Barras credit for the entire success of 13 Vendémiaire. This report appears to be inserted by Napoleon III for the purpose of exonerating Napoleon I of any guilt in the defeat of the Parisians and thus to strengthen the idea that Napoleon I was the champion of the people.

responsibility for the defense of the area around the Convention. He assembled the officers and determined their obedience. Next, he deployed the cannon acquired from Les Sablons at the crucial areas in the following manner. Two artillery pieces were placed at the entrance of the Rue St. Nicaise; one was set facing the church of St. Roch at the end of the Rue de Dauphin or Cul de Sac Dauphin; two pieces were dispatched at the Rue St. Honoré near the Place Vendome and finally two cannon were sent to defend the Pont Royal by being placed on the quai Voltaire. In addition, infantry reserves supported these locations or were held in readiness in the Place du Carousel.[32] Some of the generals pertinent to the battle of 13 Vendémiaire and their locations were as follows. General Brune had charge of the Rue St. Nicaise and Rue de Rohan; General Berruyer had command of the Cul de Sac Dauphin and the passage of Feullans; General Carteaux guarded the Pont Neuf and the quai du Louvre; and General Verdier guarded the Pont Royal and the debouches of the quai Voltaire.[33] The forces of the Convention were now

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32 Lavelette, p. 97. Also in John Gideon Millingen, Recollections of Republican France from 1790 to 1801 (London, 1848), pp. 344-345. Hereafter referred to as Millingen. This individual is, to my knowledge, the only English eyewitness and participant to the events of 13 Vendémiaire. His father was a dedicated advocate to Republican France, in fact so much so that he moved his entire family to Paris for residence. Millingen's father was required to be a member of the military force of the Section he lived in. However, young Millingen volunteered to substitute for his father. This Englishman asserts that Napoleon planted field-pieces and howitzers at every likely spot of attack.

33 Agathon Jean Francois Fain, Manuscrit De L'An Trois (1794-1795) (Paris, 1828), pp. 353-354. Hereafter referred to as Fain.

strengthened by artillery and the able command of Napoleon. Lavelette declared that Napoleon told the sectionaries they were at liberty to remain where they stood, but if they either fired one musket or advanced beyond the stipulated boundaries, artillery would be employed to resist them.[34]

Could any one man have been present at all the crucial clashes which were to take place on 13 Vendémiaire? This would be plausible only if the battles had been staggered over a period of time enabling one officer to move about through the many passageways as each crisis arrived. But the sources indicate, in various ways, that the fighting began at most locations simultaneously. If so, then no one individual, specifically Napoleon or Barras, can claim full credit for the victories since to be at more than one spot at a given moment is a physical

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[34] Lavelette, p. 96.

impossibility.[35] It would be highly essential then, to determine where Napoleon and Barras were prior to and immediately after the the commencement of hostilities. The ascertainment of the commander in chief's headquarters would also be an important point which must be clarified. It is not illogical to assume that the Place du Carousel was the likely place for the headquarters because not only

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35 In De Chair, p. 41, Napoleon states that a column led by Lafond began advancing up the quai Voltaire at about the same time the artillery was fired at the Cul de Sac Dauphin. Thiébault, I, 262-263, indicates that fighting took place at Venua's Passage and Carousel at the time the clash at St. Roch occurred. In the Moniteur, 5 Brumaire, l'an 4 (October 27, 1795), p. 140, Barras gives the impression of simultaneous activity by describing the revolutionaries placed in a line at every post defended by the Convention ranks. In Neuville, I, 59, the author, in the forces of the insurrectionists, asserts that the attack against the Tuilleries was to be made by three columns simultaneously at different locations. A complementary question arises here; that is, where was the first shot fired which precipitated the battle of 13 Vendémiaire? It appears that the fighting was initiated at Venua's Passage, but which side started it is questionable. For instance, Thiébault, I, 262, points out that the strife began at Venua's Passage by the impatience of General Solignac who was also exasperated by the sectionaries who flaunted his soldiers persistently. But another contemporary feels that the sectionaries started the clash when they fired three shots from the premises of Venua on the street St. Honoré; G. V. Vasselin, Mémoirial Revolutionnaire De La Convention ou Histoire des Révolutions de France, depuis le 20 Septembre 1792 jusqu'au 26 Octobre 1795 (Paris, 1797), IV, 313, hereafter referred to as Vasselin. Contrary views of the beginning of the battle include Napoleon's who claims that at 4 P.M., some muskets were discharged from the Hotel de Noailles which hit on the steps of the Tuilleries; Montholon, III, 76. In Barras, I, 301, the claim is forwarded that the first shots were caused by the enemy which had advanced toward General Brune's defense in the Rue St. Nicaise adjacent to the Place du Carousel. Still, another version is that the initial shots were fired neither from the Hotel de Noailles nor from the restauranteur Venua's hotel, but from an adjoining neighboring house near Venua; see Fain, p. 362. Barras is contradicted by the editor of his memoirs, George Duruy, who quotes in a footnote from Thibaudeau, Vie de Napoleon, which gives essentially the same description as Fain does, cited above; Barras, I, 329.

was it centrally located, but it also provided ready access to the palace of the Tuilleries where the Convention was in session.[36] Barras states definitely that this was the assigned position of his headquarters.[37]

Since Napoleon was second in command, his duty would be to assist the commanding officer in the operation of the army. It appears likely that Napoleon and Barras were both at the headquarters in the Carousel when word was received that a gathering of sectionaries was concentrated at the church of St. Roch. It is the opinion of the writer that Napoleon was either ordered by Barras or went on his own accord to the Cul de Sac Dauphin which faced St. Roch on the opposite side of the Rue St. Honoré. Here Napoleon encountered an increasingly larger, but poorly organized, mob under the leadership of General Danican. The blustering Danican demanded unsuccessfully that the troops of the Convention be removed. At last the commander of the sectionaries decided it was time to act. However, his plan was both vague and senseless. The attack was directed against the Tuilleries by three columns which were to advance on the Rue St. Honoré, the quais [apparently Louvre and Voltaire] and the Fauborg St. Germain.[38] One third of the troops were ordered to

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[36] Lavelette, p. 96. Lavelette says that infantry reserves were placed in the Place du Carousel. Reasonably, reserves would be near the headquarters from which they would be committed, if needed, during the engagement.

[37] Barras, I, 295.

[38] Neuville, I, 59-60.

attack the Tuilleries by gaining entrance through the Cul de Sac Dauphin opposite the church of St. Roch. The other two thirds were dispatched down the Rue St. Honoré and across the Pont Neuf. They were then to advance up the quai Voltaire and to gain access to the Tuilleries by passing over the Pont Royal.[39] However, discord and confusion were rampant in the ranks of the sectionaries. In the words of one of them, no strong hand was directing the movement and it was very disorganized. Danican, moreover, was considered incapable and the opportunity for success had slipped by because of the procrastination and disorder.[40]

Millingen, an adventurer who was a member of the Butte des Moulins Section, describes the activity around St. Roch quite pertinently. The generale was played and all the Sections in that vicinity exhorted the National Guards to oppose the Convention troops. At the beginning of the battle, Millingen ran to join the National Guardsmen on the steps of the church. However, the ranks

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39 Charles De Batz, Les Conspirations et la Fin de Jean, Baron De Batz 1793-1822 (Paris, 1811), p. 426. This description is quoted from an unpublished memoir called; De La Journée appelee des Sections de Paris ou des 12 et 13 Vendémiaire, an IV, Octobre 1795, supposedly written by Jean De Batz. The number of troops, however, seems rather high when Batz declares that the two thirds debouching over the Pont Neuf in order to return to the Tuilleries by way of the Pont Royal was 40,000 men.

40 A History of My Life: Memoirs of Chancellor Pasquier, trans. C. E. Roche, ed. Audiffret Pasquier (New York, 1893), I, 132-133.

were thinned by fire from musketry, a four-pounder artillery piece and a howitzer doing the damage from the Cul de Sac Dauphin. The revolutionaries continued to fire on the Convention soldiers while General Danican, to little avail, exhorted them to go forward. The skirmishers, rather, generally moved backward. Millingen even suggested a plan to General Danican. He had noticed that at the corner of the Cul de Sac Dauphin there were several shops which had windows facing the Convention soldiers. If these could be occupied, the sectionaries would be able to fire better and more effectively from a broadside angle on Napoleon's troops. But Danican hesitated and became alarmed by heavy fire coming from the direction of the Place Vendome and the Rue de l'Echelle. So, the uneven battle continued, the musket-fire of the Sections accomplishing little damage compared to the grape-shot of the Convention forces. After that time, Danican was seen no more by Millingen.[41] Where the commander disappeared is a point which will be answered very shortly.

Napoleon has asserted in his memoirs that he commanded and won the victory at St. Roch.[42] His role, however, has been disclaimed by

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[41] Millingen, pp. 343-347. Millingen adds that the next time he saw Danican was in London where Danican was relating the drama of 13 Vendémiaire in such a divergent manner that if Millingen hadn't possessed the hat he wore which contained a musket ball hole in it from the activity of that day, he would have doubted himself and considered his presence at Paris on 13 Vendémiaire as a vision.

[42] All of the memoirs dictated by Napoleon at St. Helena agree in substance with the version found in De Chair, p. 41. See Las Cases, I, pt. 2, 175, and Montholon, III, 77.

Barras and Zivy. In his formal report to the Convention, Barras makes no mention of Napoleon at St. Roch. Instead, Barras declared that he himself hurried to St. Roch and ordered General Berruyer to repel force with force.[43] Barras avows that the only mission Bonaparte had on that day was to go to the Pont Royal and report to him the occurrences in that vicinity; moreover, he had no authority to give any order on his own and had been at no point of attack except the Carousel.[44] Furthermore, Barras claims that while at the St. Roch area, he ordered a gun to destroy a little penthouse on the church of St. Roch since it was sheltering a group of sectionaries.[45] But Thiébault describes the action at St. Roch and attributes the victory, as does Millingen, to the young Bonaparte.[46] This counters quite significantly the claim by Barras that the only point of attack at which Napoleon had been was the Carousel. Zivy makes the incredible statement that the battle at St. Roch was a legend of unknown origin, and also that Napoleon was a stranger to that area.[47] Clearly, Zivy either failed to discover or he glossed

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[43] Moniteur, 5 Brumaire, l'an 4 (October 27, 1795), p. 140.

[44] Barras, I, 332.

[45] Barras, I, 302. This is the extent to which Barras mentions St. Roch as relative to 13 Vendémiaire. This leaves the reader with the impression that little really happened at St. Roch which of course would greatly reduce the significance of Napoleon.

[46] Thiébault, I, 263.

[47] Zivy, p. 90.

over such accounts relative to 13 Vendémiaire as those of Thiébault, Lavelette, Neuville, and Millingen. All of these versions preceded Zivy's book Le Treize Vendémiaire, yet no mention is made of them.[48] In further controverting Zivy, the following words are taken from a contemporary who said that the Convention troops had constant success at St. Roch. Cannon was directed from the Cul de Sac Dauphin onto the church making more noise than injury, while the sectionaries entrenched themselves in the church allowing the bullets and grape-shot to pass in the middle of them.[49] An eyewitness and sectionary also declared that a few shots had sufficed to stop the column advancing by the Cul de Sac Dauphin and, where thousands of sectionaries failed, a few Vendéean peasants would have overwhelmed Bonaparte and his handful of men in the little street. The sectionaries, however, confined themselves at the St. Roch church, in the Rue St. Honoré and two corners of the Cul de Sac Dauphin. There they charged their muskets behind shelters and only exposed themselves while firing.[50]

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[48] Thiébault's memoirs had been translated into English in 1896, and Lavelette's were translated in 1894. Thus, these accounts were certainly available to Zivy whose book was not published until 1898. In Lavelette, p. 97, the author declares that the enemy was not frightened by Napoleon's warnings and felt he dared not fire on them. The front ranks were pushed by the rear ranks and a musket started the attack. Grape-shot from three field-pieces were set off and caused terror in the ranks of the revolutionists who rapidly fled. In the Mémoires et Souvenirs du Baron Hyde De Neuville (Paris, 1888), I, 132, hereafter referred to as Mémoires du Neuville, Neuville affirms that Napoleon riddled the sectionaries on the steps of St. Roch. Millingen's accounts were published in 1848, fifty years before Zivy attempted to analyze 13 Vendémiare.

[49] Vasselin, IV, 315.

[50] L. L. Gosselin, A Gascon Royalist In Revolutionary Paris: The Baron De Batz 1792-1795, trans. Mrs. Rodolph Stowell (London and New York, 1910), pp. 264-265. Hereafter referred to as Gosselin. The portions used are quotations from Batz's personal letters.

In the meantime General Danican slowly but surely deduced that his master plan of entering the Tuilleries by way of the Cul de Sac Dauphin was doomed. More than likely, he decided to join his larger force on the other side of the river Seine in the hope to succeed via the Pont Royal. Because of the confusion, his departure probably was not realized by the greater portion of the sectionaries who continued to harass the artillery and Convention troops under Napoleon. With some of his troops, plus his staff, Danican proceeded down the Rue St. Honoré toward the Pont Neuf. The Convention forces in the Rue St. Nicaise, Rue de l'Echelle, and the Rue Rohan, apparently upon seeing this formidable mass of insurrectionists, wavered since it was reported that some troops retreated into the Carousel.[51] Some of the sectionaries undoubtedly pursued the fleeing Conventionals down the Rue St. Nicaise, however, as will be shown very shortly, they were confronted by the cannon of General Brune adjacent to the Place du Carousel. At this point, General Barras enters into the active drama of 13 Vendémiaire.

In the opinion of the writer, it is not inconceivable that prior to the battle, Barras had moved from one point of the defense to the other, checking to insure that everyone was at the right posts. But seeing these positions were secure he returned to his headquarters. After the conflict had begun, Barras continued to stay at the Place

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[51] Vasselin, IV, 314.

du Carousel directing, as best he could, the defense from the desk and dispatching his reserves wherever they were needed. When the sectionaries confronted General Brune, however, he hurried to this spot and ordered Brune to disperse them. Barras asserts that he commanded General Brune to have the artillery fired over the heads of the aggressors which frightened and scattered them.[52] This version appears correct except for the claim that Barras ordered the artillery to be fired over their heads. To substantiate this conviction, the following sources are employed. Baron Thiébault stated that, after the sectionaries had been defeated at St. Roch, he had crossed through the Place du Carousel on his way to the quai Voltaire and observed that the insurrectionists had been dispersed from the Carousel.[53] This lends credence not only to Barras' declaration that a confrontation had taken place near the Place du Carousel-Rue St. Nicaise vicinity, but also that Brune must have fired into the revolutionists and that some physical evidence such as rifles, injured combatants, and corpses had been observed by Thiébault. How else could Thiébault have deduced that the sectionaries had been scattered from the Carousel? In further evidence that a clash did take place and that the artillery was fired into, not over, the heads of the sectionaries, Baron Grivel is cited. This man had

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[52] Barras, I, 301

[53] Thiébault, I, 263.

sided with the Convention. He stated that on 14 Vendémiaire he remembers seeing, in the Rue de l'Echelle and in the court of the Carousel, rows of bodies which were left there during the evening by the order of the general.[54] From this it can be deduced that the bodies in the Rue de l'Echelle were the casualties caused by the famous fight at St. Roch, and the corpses in the Carousel were the result of the encounter between the sectionaries and Convention troops which had taken place in the Rue St. Nicaise close to the Carousel.

After this brief skirmish, Barras returned to his headquarters but in a state of apprehension and agitation. Should he stay at his headquarters or would it be more advisable to move about to determine the progress of the various skirmishes? He did not contemplate long. With a great roar the sectionaries, led by one of their leaders, Lafond, were debouching by way of the quai Voltaire. Barras hesitated no longer and made haste toward this new point of attack. He describes his actions to the Convention in this manner: first he went to St. Roch, then he moved to the Rue de l'Echelle which was located approximately a block from St. Roch; next he

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54 Grivel, p. 30. The general who ordered the bodies to be left overnight is not specifically stated, but since Barras was commander in chief, it is likely that this is who Grivel was referring to. Apparently the bodies were left in these areas as reminders of what happens to those who revolt against the government.

advanced to the vicinity of the Place du Carousel and Rue St. Nicaise, and finally he proceeded to the quai du Louvre.[55] The only interpolation needed in this description is to suggest that his visits to St. Roch and Rue de l'Echelle were made prior to the beginning of warfare. From the quai du Louvre, Barras unquestionably crossed over the Pont Royal in order to reach the artillery and infantry defenses located at the quai Voltaire.

The sectionaries, composed principally of the two thirds which Danican had originally dispatched, were attempting to advance up the quai Voltaire under the direction of Lafond. However, these troops were likewise doing more shouting than fighting and were beaten back in this initial charge.[56] Some of Danican's troops, on the way to the Pont Neuf, had noticed the forces of General Carteaux and stated their desire to rush them. However, Danican opposed this move and commanded his band over the bridge.[57]

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[55] Moniteur, p. 140. In his Memoirs, Barras depicts his movements in a divergent manner. He declared that he had ordered Brune to disperse the insurgents at the Place du Carousel, then he went to the St. Roch area and ordered artillery fired at a sentry box located on the church, and lastly he went to the quai Voltaire where he participated in the defeat of the rebels; Barras, I, 301-304. This description shows either the complete lack of knowledge Barras had of the incidents at St. Roch or his intentional design to dismiss the affair as inconsequential. However, his depiction of the quai Voltaire attack shows that he probably did take part in that battle.

[56] Neuville, p. 60.

[57] Vasselin, IV, 314.

General Carteaux had been stationed at the Pont Neuf with a battalion of infantry in order to interrupt communication between the two banks of the Seine. Lavelette declares that he was sent to Carteaux with the order to hold his post, but that Carteaux had already retreated to the garden of Infante.[58] When this retreat occurred is not hard to discern. Baron Jean De Batz mentions that Danican sent 40,000 sectionaries, by the original plan, over the Pont Neuf with the order to return by the Pont Royal into the Tuilleries.[59] Indubitably, it was at this time that Carteaux wisely considered the use of discretion in place of valor by ordering his battalion of infantry to retreat. This gave the insurrectionists access to both sides of the Seine.

Upon crossing the Seine over the Pont Neuf, Danican, more than likely, collected his troops together including the group which had been under the command of Lafond and had been repulsed by the Convention cannon.[60] But this uninspiring Danican again wasted time and seemed confused. No better plan than Lafond's i.e., of advancing

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[58] Lavelette, p. 97.

[59] Batz, p. 426. This figure of 40,000 is prohibitively high It is more likely that the amount of the group was about 20,000.

[60] Neuville I, 60. Neuville says that they, the insurrectionists, dispersed once, but reformed for another attack up the quai Voltaire.

straight up the quai Voltaire in the face of the artillery, was formulated. When the order to charge was given, the sectionaries once more emerged into the quai Voltaire. However, in front of the Pont Royal, a single piece of cannon and 200 men sufficed to disperse the hugh disorganized mass of revolutionaries. The cannon was shot into the group which appeared more anxious to avoid the fire by fleeing into the sidestreets than taking time to aim their weapons at the Conventionals. This impotent showing was caused by a general panic rather than by the destruction of the gun which was termed as insignificant.[61]

One sectionary attributes the defeat at the quai Voltaire to Danican's indecision coupled with Napoleon's activity. Bonaparte is described as taking ready advantage of the poor organization of the insurrectionists and directing artillery which dispersed the sectionaries at Pont Royal.[62] But Napoleon himself describes the fight at the quai Voltaire in a cursory manner and does not specifically

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61 Batz, p. 428, and Gosselin, pp. 262-263. Why the sectionaries did not advance on the cannon by rear or flank appears to be the result of both lack of leadership and the disorganization of the rebels. General Danican was in charge of the sectionaries, but he was no inspiration; see Millingen, pp. 343-347. Lafond seemed to possess the bravery necessary to lead, however his strategy lacked imagination and resulted in disaster.

62 Neuville, I, 60, and Mémoires du Neuville, I, 132-133.

state that he was the router of the insurrectionists at that location.[63] Only by inference could his words conceivably attribute this particular success to his name. Baron Thiébault states that after the action at the St. Roch area, he had rejoined Bonaparte at the southern end of the Pont Royal just as the insurrectionists were receiving battery fire from several posts of the defending army.[64] Thiébault does not verbally credit Napoleon with this victory unless it is, again, to be implied. Lavelette claims that after he had reached General Carteaux, who was adjacent to the quai du Louvre, he noticed that the general who commanded the foot of the bridge Pont Royal ordered the sectionaries not to advance any further. But the rebels took no heed of this warning and consequently received the discharge of the cannons which resulted in their dispersion.[65] If the general who was at the foot of the bridge was Bonaparte, the Citizen Lavelette would surely have recognized him either by his appearance or voice and would have mentioned that fact. This does not eliminate the possibility that Lavelette could not distinguish who the general was. In such a case it would have been either Verdier, who was posted at that spot, or it

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63 Las Cases, I, pt. 2, 175-176. Bonaparte only mentions the attack made by Lafond; nothing is said of a second attack which he probably would have mentioned if he had been present at that location any length of time.

64 Thiébault, I, 263.

65 Lavelette, p. 97.

may have been Barras. If it had been Bonaparte, and Lavelette still did not recognize him, it is possible that this fact would have been learned by him through normal military conversations with his fellow officers.

Barras states that Lafond and Danican advanced their men and that some of the insurgents fired. At this time Barras ordered the troops to fire the grape while supported by Verdier, and by Carteaux from the wicket-gate of the Louvre across the river Seine.[66] Suffice to say that, from the evidence studied, the conclusion that Napoleon was the big victor at St. Roch while Barras might have been partially instrumental in the success at the Pont Royal-quai Voltaire area is quite defensible. At least Barras may have given the order to fire the cannon during the second charge; General Verdier might have commanded the defense at the Pont Royal during the first attack if Barras did not arrive at that location in time. Such a conclusion, then, lays the foundation for the belief that no man was completely responsible for the victory of 13 Vendémiaire. Nevertheless, Napoleon and Barras were key men in the success.

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66 Barras, I, 301-303. In the Moniteur, 5 Brumaire, l'an 4 (October 27, 1795), p. 140, Barras described himself as running to the quai, in all probability Louvre, and seeing an enemy column advance toward the quai Voltaire. Artillery placed at the Pont Royal, supported by Carteaux, Verdier, and Lestranges at the galerie du Louvre, made quick justice of the sectionaries.

Meanwhile, an attempt was made to rally the insurrectionists who had been fighting in the St. Roch locality. This was fruitless, however, since the sectionaries only exposed themselves while firing at the Convention troops and then quickly hid behind shelters. Furthermore, when news arrived of the disastrous outcome of the endeavors to enter the Tuilleries by way of the quais, the sectionaries became discouraged and abandoned their feeble struggle by dispersing and disappearing in the streets.[67] At 6 P.M., the sectionaries deemed it advisable to return to their homes.[68] Napoleon followed up his victory by having cannon dragged in pursuit of the retreating groups.[69] Millingen gives a pertinent description of this operation by Napoleon:

> The rumbling of gun-carriages announced the advance of the Conventional force, and in a few minutes they were in possession of the post we had occupied; when Bonaparte, wheeling his guns to the right and to the left, poured a shower of grape up and down the Rue St. Honoré - I should think with little effect, as most of the fugitives, very wisely, made off by the adjoining later streets.[70]

Baron Jean De Batz corroborates this by his statement that Napoleon prolonged the intimidation of the sectionaries by having artillery dragged about the streets of Paris charged only with powder and that

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67 Gosselin, pp. 264-265.

68 Millingen, pp. 347-348.

69 In Montholon, III, 77, Napoleon says that the Rue St. Honoré, Rue St. Florentin and adjoining areas were swept by gun fire.

70 Millingen, pp. 347-348.

the streets soon became empty.[71] The most determined of the sectionaries gathered for another attack and took possession of the Palais Royal. However, these unconvinced few finally dispersed when the leaders went home on the following morning.[72] The casualties were relatively light for such a concentration of troops in the area of the battle.[73]

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[71] Gosselin, p. 265.

[72] Lavelette, p. 97.

[73] Lowest estimates show that only 15 to 20 rebels were killed and 50 to 60 wounded while the Conventionals' losses were trifling; Millingen, p. 348. In Lavelette, p. 98, it is asserted that the insurrectionists lost 40 killed and 200 wounded compared to the Convention total of only 4 or 5 troops. Napoleon, in his dictation to Montholon, III, 77, claims that each side lost a total of 200 in killed and wounded. Most reasonable appraisal is found in O'Meara, I, 271. The Convention forces are reported to have lost 30 killed and 250 wounded while the insurrectionists suffered 70 to 80 killed and 300 to 400 wounded. This estimate seems to be the most reasonable since the Convention forces were more ably led and also had the valuable support of artillery, whereas the revolutionaries had only muskets and were on the offense. Moreover, these rebels had no sensible plan of attack and exposed themselves to the devastating cannon in a foolhardy manner.

Chapter V. The Consequences of 13 Vendémiaire to Napoleon

Such was the drama of 13 Vendémiaire. Out of this day's action two additional pertinent questions arise. First, was the battle of 13 Vendémiaire a result of a Royalist plot? Second, what effect did 13 Vendémiaire have on the military and private fortune of Napoleon? In answer to the first inquiry, it would appear that although the uprising by the Sections was not primarily instigated by the Royalists, it was supported by that group since any revolt against the present government contained a possibility of a Bourbon restoration. Some writings indicate that the insurrection was strictly a Royalist notion. In fact, in the unpublished memoir of Jean De Batz called De La Journée appelee des Sections de Paris ou des 12 et 13 Vendémiaire, An Iv, Octobre 1795, it is asserted by Batz that he was instrumental in getting the Sections to establish a Central Committee opposing the Convention. This was part of his plan to make Royalism ascendant again by causing an insurrection.[1] This memoir, however, if actually in existence, appears to be of dubious reliability in some portions. Moreover, the books written on Baron Jean De Batz appear to overrate his influence. Millingen also was of the opinion that the insurrection was a Royalist reaction.[2] He

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[1] Gosselin, pp. 254-255.

[2] Millingen, p. 348.

mentioned, moreover, that the Sections were determined to fight over the passage of the new constitution and that youths, Vendéean supporters, and Émigrés were also among those who made up the ranks of the Sections.[3] Zivy indicates his belief in a Royalist uprising.[4] Napoleon even states in a letter to his brother Joseph that the Royalists were becoming bolder every day, which intimates the conviction of Royalist leadership in the insurrection.[5]

However, to base the revolt of 13 Vendémiaire completely on Royalist intrigue would seem unreasonable. In the first place, the Sections were genuinely angered at the Convention for proposing the New Constitution with the provise that only one third of the members were required to seek re-election while the other two thirds were automatically to become members of the new government set-up. Secondly, the Parisians had an overestimated opinion of their influence throughout France, and it is not unlikely that they felt all Frenchmen were sympathetic and in agreement with them. The writings of contemporaries indicate that it was not a Royalist scheme. Baron Hyde De Neuville asserts that the capital was not aroused by the contrivances of Royalists but rather that a revolt had to be the unanimous opinion of the people. Surely though, Neuville adds, the Royalists did aid in

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[3] Millingen, p. 343.

[4] Zivy, p. 90.

[5] Confidential Correspondence, I, 32.

bringing about 13 Vendémiaire and probably would have inherited the success if the Convention forces were overthrown.[6] One contemporary says that when the article of the new Constitution, which left two thirds of the old Convention still in power, was made known, it caused a revolt in all of France and that this indignation burst forth in the capital.[7] An eyewitness asserts that he saw no desire in the people or their leaders to return to a Bourbon monarchy. Furthermore, he questioned some of the ardent revolutionaries who replied in the negative when confronted with the proposition that they fought for a restored monarchy. What the insurrectionists wanted, rather, was a Republic governed by honest men.[8]

The second pertinent question arising from 13 Vendémiaire is: what effect did 13 Vendémiaire have on the personal and military career of Napoleon? After 13 Vendémiaire, Napoleon gained several promotions culminating in the command of the Army of Italy in 1796. Napoleon shortly after 13 Vendémiaire also met and married Josephine Beauharnais, widow of General Beauharnais who was a victim of guillotine several years before. A popular theory attempts to link

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6 Mémoires De Neuville, I, 130.

7 Vaublanc, p. 302.

8 Lavelette, p. 99.

these two incidents.[9] One early publication declares that Napoleon had entreated Barras, who was now one of the five Directors in the new French government, for a more important command than the post of commander of the Army of the Interior to which Barras yielded on the condition that Napoleon marry Josephine Beauharnais who was acknowledged publicly as Barras' mistress. Josephine, although old and ugly according to this publication, appeared young and handsome to Napoleon since his marriage to her procured for him the generalship of the Army of Italy.[10] Such a view appears more of an effort to vilify Napoleon

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9 Fournier, p. 69. Here Josephine is depicted as saying that Barras assured her if she marries Napoleon, the appointment as commander in chief of the Army of Italy would be obtained for Napoleon. But the marriage took place on March 9, 1796, whereas Bonaparte was made chief of the Army of Italy, by a decree of the Directory, on March 7, 1796; Fournier, pp. 68-69. Thus, the marriage was performed after the promotion indicating that the latter may not have been a prerequisite to the former. Kircheisen, p. 57, describes Napoleon as determined to marry someone, and that he sought the hand of several women before Josephine was wooed and won. In Rose, The Life of Napoleon I, I, 69, the important point is made that the Directory was dissatisfied with General Scherer's performance in Italy and when Bonaparte's plan for the Italian campaign was forwarded, Scherer replied that the man who drafted such a scheme ought to enforce it. The Directory took Scherer at his word and replaced him with Bonaparte.

10 General Sarrazin, Confession of General Bonaparte to the Abbé Maury (London, 1811), p. 13. Sarrazin, a former officer in the French Armies of Italy and Germany, deserted to the English in 1810. The book strives to show the worst side of Napoleon through his purported confessions to the Abbé. The only reason it is used is for the purpose of showing that the rumor connecting Josephine to Napoleon's promotion is included in it. Possibly, this is the earliest book containing such a story.

than to ferret the truth. Barras later corroborates such a story by stating that he grew tired of his mistress. Madame Beauharnais then concocted a wild tale that Barras made advances toward her. When her suitor, Bonaparte, heard of this, he flew into a rage. But Josephine calmed him by suggesting that Barras could be useful. Napoleon then replied that he would forgive everything if Barras obtained for him the command of the Army of Italy. In order to get rid of Josephine, Barras claims that he obtained for her prospective husband the command he desired.[11] Even Baron Thiébault saw in the promotion a possible link to Josephine. He says that the promotion to the command of the Army of Italy seemed more a desire to oblige Madame Bonaparte than a genuine interest for the solicitude of the country.[12]

Although the two occurrences seem inextricably united, a closer look will show that Napoleon's intimacy with Josephine may have been an influence, but it was not a requirement to his promotion to the Army of Italy. Napoleon claims that he merely met Josephine, fell in love with the Creole beauty, and married her. His promotion to the Army of Italy was the result of Scherer's unsatisfactory performance.[13] This explanation, however, is lacking in totality. It appears that

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[11] Barras, II, 71-80.

[12] Thiébault, I, 269.

[13] Montholon, III, 82-83.

Napoleon considered the marriage to Josephine as a necessary step to the higher society of Paris, moreover, it was a link to France since he was Corsican by birth. Several sources bring this point out. One person states that Napoleon had entered upon the stage of his destiny and in order to secure his position and also justify his quick elevation it was necessary for him to live in society and win more victories. The former condition was fulfilled by his marriage to Josephine Beauharnais while the second requirement was satisfied by his promotion to the post of commander in chief of the Army of Italy.[14] Bourrienne asserts that Napoleon was enthusiastic about the widow Beauharnais and her family name, moreover, Bonaparte would probably marry her since such a prospective union seemed to make him happy. Bourrienne gathered from Napoleon's remarks that such a marriage would also assist him in gaining some of his goals seeing that, through Josephine, he had already met many influential people.[15] By either neglect or design Bourrienne does not specify what objectives he thought Napoleon had in mind. The Duc De Raguse also commented on the marriage by describing Josephine as Napoleon's first passion and that somehow she found a way to satisfy him. Frankly though, Raguse was perplexed by Bonaparte's attraction to the old class society concept and judged the marriage as the result of the conviction held by Napoleon that he was making a great step forward in the social order.[16]

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[14] Thiébault, I, 268.

[15] Bourrienne, I, 42.

[16] Raguse, I, 93-95.

Napoleon narrated to General Bertrand at St. Helena that Josephine did not make his fortune. Prior to meeting his future wife, he had already to his credit the siege of Toulon, 13 Vendémiaire, and the position of general in command of the Army of the Interior. Bertrand further quotes Napoleon as claiming he married Josephine because he believed her to possess a large fortune. Also, he wished to make himself appear more mature. All in all, Napoleon felt the marriage was beneficial since he, a Corsican, became associated with a good French family.[17]

Concerning strictly the military advance of Bonaparte, an interesting view is set forth by Lavelette who says that Napoleon, as commander in chief, humbled the government by his authority and discovered that he could not obey them. Disliking the unmilitary Paris life, Napoleon created a plan for the Italian campaign and solicited the government for the command of the Army of Italy. The Directory, eager to get rid of one who awed them by his strange character and whose projects seemed wild and fanciful, complied with Napoleon's petition.[18] It is quite plausible that some members of the government sensed the overly-ambitious personality of Napoleon, and through the machinations of the Directory, the youthful officer would be sent to the previously unsuccessful Army of Italy where his wild schemes would ultimately destroy

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[17] Bertrand, pp. 124-126.

[18] Lavelette, pp. 103-104.

his military name. Another version of Bonaparte's promotions strives to show that Fréron and Barras desired to alter the truth of 13 Vendémiaire in favor of Napoleon by reason of their special interests in him. Zivy claims that Fréron aspired for the hand of Napoleon's sister Pauline, while Barras chiefly favored the ambitions of the young Corsican since Bonaparte had served the fortune of the future Director. In fact, Barras, says Zivy, allowed it to be believed and attributed to his protégé the position of second in command on 13 Vendémiaire.[19] Although it is not verified by any source, reasonably, Fréron may have had an ulterior motive behind his declaration to the Convention on October 14, 1795, in which Napoleon was first mentioned as the great factor to the victory of 13 Vendémiaire.[20] Barras then mentioned, after Fréron's praise, Bonaparte as second in command.[21] Barras' statement appears to be one of compulsion. It is not unlikely that the eyes of the legislators turned to Barras after Fréron had finished his short speech in order to receive the commander in chief's affirmation or denial. In agreeing with Fréron, Barras thus changes, to a degree, his original version of the fray to the Convention in the evening of 13 Vendémiaire when he described it in such a way that the victory was attributed completely to himself.

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19 Zivy, p. 77.

20 Moniteur, 22 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 14, 1795), p. 88.

21 Moniteur, 23 Vendémiaire, l'an 4 (October 15, 1795), p. 89.

To attribute the promotion of Napoleon to the command of the Army of Italy on Barras' efforts entirely does not appear supportable. Rather, it is likely that a new commander for the Army of Italy was needed.[22] Napoleon was a likely candidate because of his efforts on 13 Vendémiaire which became revealed in the subsequent months. There is little doubt that Napoleon probably tried and succeeded in getting aid from those high in the government. Barras, once the role of Napoleon on 13 Vendémiaire was disclosed, more than likely deemed it advisable to favor him publicly. Another Director, Carnot, who had been impressed by Bonaparte not only by his activity on Vendémiaire, but also at Toulon in 1793, probably supported him. Moreover, Napoleon knew the terrain in Italy perhaps better than any other officer in the French military organization. The enemies of Bonaparte undoubtedly felt that his appointment to the continuously impotent Army of Italy would send him into obscurity and finish him professionally. The gaining of the Italian post on March 7, 1796, and his subsequent marriage to Madame Beauharnais on March 9, 1796, may appear, if one is seeking such appearances, as natural steps to a clandestine arrangement between Napoleon and Barras. It is much more likely, however, that

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22 See A. Debidour, Recueil Des Actes Du Directoire Exécutif Procès-Verbaux Arrêtés Instructions, Lettres Et Actes Divers (Paris, 1910), I, 462-465. The Directory forwarded a letter to Scherer, dated January 22, 1796, which expressed disappointment in him for not following up his victories and for stopping his operations. The Directory then enumerated its ideas and ordered Scherer to fulfill them.

Napoleon sought through Josephine the social status and influence which could be gained by such a union. It is also probable that Josephine attracted Napoleon for some particular reason which can be explained only by the enigmatic term of love. This is not to deny the premise that Josephine exerted some influence in Napoleon's appointment. How much weight she carried is questionable, but it is evident that her marriage to Napoleon was not the decisive or sole factor for his promotion to the Italian command.

Chapter VI. Summary and Conclusions

In the early military career of Napoleon, a period from 1785 to 1795, his two outstanding performances were at the siege of Toulon and at the battle of 13 Vendémiaire. At Toulon, Bonaparte demonstrated precocious ability as an organizer and leader. Being primarily an artillery officer, he proceeded vigorously to apply the knowledge of this field to the campaign against Toulon. Before his arrival, little use of cannon was made against the allies, however, upon the advent of Napoleon as artillery chief a sudden display of activity in that branch occurred. Napoleon concentrated on the construction of artillery placements which would pave the way for the conquest of Toulon either by land or sea. His favorite idea was the occupation of a promontory called Little Gibraltor from which the allied ships could be bombarded and destroyed. Later he developed this into a formal plan which was sent to the Committee of Public Safety in Paris. Such a scheme was amalgamated with a plan forwarded by General Dugommier and the city of Toulon was retaken by carrying through their recommendations. Thus, Bonaparte must be given generous acknowledgment for his part in the subjugation of Toulon. Although possessing only the epaulets of captain when arriving at the Republican headquarters near Toulon, Bonaparte's activity and responsibility far outstripped such an insignificant rank. Actually, he was the chief of the artillery until General Duteil arrived in the middle of November, 1793. But apparently

Duteil encouraged Napoleon rather than relegating him to a position where his talents would be unused. Napoleon consequently, although having a subordinate rank, contributed immensely not only by his plan but also by his continued important role as actual leader of the artillery. Bonaparte took part in at least one infantry advance during the contest at Toulon. However, his share in such a movement is not conspicuous. In fact, it is the opinion of the writer that his participation in any infantry attack was merely a preliminary to the acquisition of areas from which artillery could be brought up and employed.

The significance of Toulon on the career of Napoleon is two-fold. First, Napoleon received his baptism of warfare against the enemies threatening revolutionary France. Second, his deportment throughout the campaign of Toulon favorably impressed several influential patriots of France among whom was General Paul Barras. More important, Barras, at a later time, recollected the dynamic qualities of young Napoleon and utilized them to save the Convention on 13 Vendémiaire.

The 13 Vendémiaire episode had a tremendous impact not only on the fate of France, but ultimately upon Europe also. Before that time, Napoleon was just another officer in the French army. As shown above, he had made a name for himself at Toulon; however as fortunes often go, this brilliant showing appeared to be forgotten very quickly. In reality, Napoleon was planning to leave France as soon as his petition to head the artillery of the Grand Seignior' of

Turkey was affirmed. Immediately prior to 13 Vendémiaire he was on the inactive list, living in Paris on an austere budget of half-pay and known by few people in the French capital. Nevertheless, one of them was Barras who, when made commander in chief of the Army of the Interior, obtained for Napoleon the rank of second in command. Barras was in need of an able officer who would take the responsibility for the defense since, it must be remembered, Barras had little experience in the field of military operations. His profession was primarily one of political intrigue. On the issues concerning Napoleon and 13 Vendémiaire, the findings indicate that although he cannot receive total credit for the victory, Napoleon was highly instrumental in the success of the Convention forces. Bonaparte was made second in command of the Army of the Interior by Barras' recommendation. He ordered Major Murat to the Les Sablons for the highly valuable artillery pieces. Beyond doubt, Napoleon set up the defense around the Convention which was in session in the Tuilleries. And he played a role which was second to no one at the St. Roch area. Moreover, he followed up this victory by pursuing and scattering the insurrectionists throughout the city. Little credit can be given to him, though, for the defeat of the revolutionists at the quai Voltaire. This engagement was at the opposite line of the defense organized by the Army of the Republic, and at a place where Barras probably aided in repelling the enemy. The maze of small streets coupled with the many buildings placed in jumbled spots throughout the area between St. Roch and quai Voltaire make it impossible for any person to observe both places at the same time. To

assert that one individual personally directed the defense at St. Roch and quai Voltaire in an encounter, which by all indications was simultaneous, would be not only illogical but also paradoxical.

The larger importance of 13 Vendémiaire is that Napoleon's star rose to a phenomenal height because of his successful encounter with the army at St. Roch and, of equal importance, his defense plan which included the wise acquisition of cannon. Not to be overlooked is Napoleon's ability to exploit his success to its fullest. Napoleon soon became general in chief of the Army of the Interior. But he was to rise even higher. When General Scherer became recalcitrant, the young Corsican happened to be at the right spot at the right time. Undoubtedly, Napoleon did not hesitate to use his friends and influence to gain the command of the Army of Italy. There were other generals with higher fame and name, such as Massena and Hoche, who would have been likely successors to Scherer. Nevertheless, they were in the various field commands when Napoleon was in Paris. The grateful Barras and the astute Carnot more than likely supported Napoleon's nomination. Josephine Beauharnais also may have been an influence, however, it does not appear that she was the deciding factor or that Napoleon's promotion and subsequent marriage to her are to be considered as cause and effect. More than likely, Napoleon desired a relation to France by marriage which would secure his position and also enable him to gain access to the influential circles. Moreover, as he asserts, he wanted to appear mature. No small wonder that the Duc De Raguse was perplexed by Napoleon's sudden attraction to the ideas of nobility and

of advancement in the social order. The 13 Vendémiaire became the prelude to 19 Brumaire, November 10, 1799, at which time Napoleon seized power and set himself up as first consul. From the time of Napoleon's appointment as commander of the Army of Italy in 1796, a result of Vendémiaire, to his return from the Egyptian campaign, the name of Bonaparte was thrust upon France. By 1799, many people of that country, hypnotized by the extraordinary exploits of the little general, were willing to follow him in blind admiration. Napoleon fulfilled their will. Whether this would have been possible without a 13 Vendémiaire is mere speculation. Yet, if such an event had not occurred, it is not beyond the realm of prognostication that the name of Napoleon Bonaparte would have been remembered in history only for his allegiance to Jacobinism and his fine talent displayed at Toulon in 1793.

Bibliography

Primary Sources:

The most complete collection of the official words of the French government was found in the Archives Parliamentaires De 1787 A 1860, first series (82 vols.), Paris, 1913. These volumes are a compilation of the debates, discussions, and decrees made by the national legislatures. Unfortunately, in the libraries consulted, there is a gap between 1794 to 1800 in which no records can be located of the deliberations of the legislative branch of the French government. The official government views on 13 Vendémiaire consequently cannot be studied. In lieu of this, the Gazette Nationale, ou Le Moniteur Universel, 1789 to 1868 (184 vols.), Paris, has been used for reference to 13 Vendémiaire. This publication was the official newspaper of the government from the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. The reports, however, are excerpts of the more important debates and speeches of the governing body and are far from complete. The sittings were not published on the very next day, as would be the case of present government assemblies, thus, there is a lag of usually four or five days before the reports were published. Another reference of source material used was A. Debidour, Recueil Des Actes Du Directoire Exécutif Procès-Verbaux, Arrêtés Instructions, Lettres Et Actes Divers (8 vols.), Paris, 1910. This work contains the official reports, decrees, and letters issued by the Directorate between the years 1795

to 1799. In the Correspondance De Napoléon I Publiée Par Orders De L'Empereur Napoléon III (32 vols.), Paris, 1858, the most complete publication of the correspondence of Napoleon I is found. These volumes should be consulted in any study of Napoleon, but it must be kept in mind that Napoleon III had those portions of his uncle's correspondence left out intentionally which would not picture Napoleon I in a favorable light.

A wealth of material was obtained from the memoirs of contemporaries and eyewitnesses of the events of Toulon and 13 Vendémiaire. Before discussing these works, however, it would be well to mention and describe the memorials and writings of those individuals who accompanied and wrote the memoirs of Napoleon at St. Helena. Foremost is that of the Count De Las Cases who compiled the Memorial De Sainte Helene: Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon At Saint Helena (4 vols.), London, 1823. This is a valuable source of information of Napoleon's words concerning his participation in and the making of history during his lifetime. A word of caution must be stated concerning all of these dictations by Napoleon; they must be read with a certain amount of skepticism since Napoleon often disposed of the truth when it was convenient to do so, or he exaggerated his own importance. Another primary source for the personal views of Napoleon is that of Memoirs of the History of France During the Reign of Napoleon, Dictated by the Emperor at Saint Helena to the Generals Who Shared His Captivity: and Published from the Original Manuscripts Corrected by Himself, dict. Gourgaud and Montholon (7 vols.), London, 1823. These

volumes bring out essentially the same material found in Las Cases, nevertheless some material is found in them which is not mentioned in Las Cases, making it a necessary collaborative study of Bonaparte's dictations. In Barry E. O'Meara, Napoleon In Exile or A Voice From St. Helena (2 vols.), New York, 1853, some pertinent, but also contradictory, information to the versions of Las Cases and Gourgaud-Montholon is found. This book was first published in 1822 and the author, O'Meara, declared in his last will and testament that it was a truthful text in which the accounts of the treatment inflicted on Napoleon by his British captors are recorded. Finally, there is a memoir called Napoleon At St. Helena: Memoirs of General Bertrand: Grand Marshal Of The Palace, trans. Frances Hume, ed. Paul Fleuriot De Langle, London, 1953. This book has some very significant data, however, General Bertrand made his notes in a sort of quasi-shorthand style which De Langle endeavored to decipher. Whether this translation into longhand is entirely correct is a difficult question to determine. Nevertheless, since there is some doubt, the importance of the text is lessened to some extent. A systematic and chronological arrangement of the writings of Gourgaud-Montholon, O'Meara, and Bertrand is found in Somerset De Chair, Napoleon's Memoirs, London, 1949. De Chair refuses to use any of Las Cases' words which he considered only a day to day collection of the conversations between Napoleon and Las Cases. Although this is hardly a good reason, since the other books are on the same order, De Chair does an admirable job of putting Napoleon in proper sequence.

The Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte With His Brother Joseph, Sometime King of Spain (2 vols.), New York, 1855, is a collection of letters between Napoleon and his oldest brother Joseph. The letters appear to be fairly accurate, and although at times Napoleon gets overly optimistic, there is no indication that he intentionally exaggerated his status or importance to his brother.

Of the personal memoirs of contemporaries and eyewitnesses to the events of Toulon and Vendémiaire, it is the writer's opinion that The Memoirs of Baron Thiébault, trans. Arthur John Butler (2 vols.), New York, 1896, is the best one for interest, accuracy and brevity. Thiébault, although an officer of much promise, failed to reach the peak of military fame perhaps because of his acts of insubordination and also his dislike of Napoleon's arbitrary methods. His description of 13 Vendémiaire is no longer than several pages, yet it displays Thiebault's extraordinary ability to recall minute details of that famous day. The map included in the first volume of Thiébault's Memoirs is the best one discovered of the area concerned with 13 Vendémiaire. It is a map taken from the Plan de la Ville et Faubourgs de Paris, Paris, Deharme, 1763. A book of great controversy is that of Paul Barras, Memoirs of Barras: Member of the Directorate, trans. C. E. Roche, ed. George Duruy, (4 vols.), New York, 1895. Although the volumes are riddled with many half-truths and lies, their importance lies in the fact that sometimes Barras speaks the truth which can be confirmed by others or by the fact that it would not profit Barras to

utter a falsehood. Mr. George Duruy warns in the preface that Barras' Memoirs are an attempt to vindicate his behavior in public life and contain many false understatements of Napoleon's ability. Another interesting text is that of Louis Antoine Fauvelet De Bourienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, ed. R. W. Phipps (2 vols.), New York and Boston, n.d. Bourienne was a school chum of Bonaparte's at Brienne, and his subsequent contact with Napoleon enabled him to give one of the few first hand accounts of some of Napoleon's activity prior to Toulon. However, his words must be read cautiously since they are unreliable. This is probably the result of his loss of favor with Bonaparte by his dishonest dealings as French charge d'affaires at Hamburg during the period of the Empire. The Memoirs of Bertrand Barère, trans. De V. Payen-Payne (4 vols.), London, 1896, is a pertinent text showing the inner workings of the Committee of Public Safety of which Barère was a member. It is invaluable in pointing out Napoleon's contribution to the plan for the conquest of Toulon and also throws light on some of the activity of Napoleon shortly after Toulon. On the whole, Barère's reports appear to be reliable. The Mémoires et Souvenirs du Baron Hyde De Neuville (3 vols.), Paris, 1888, is a significant work by a Royalist who was a sectionary during the action of 13 Vendémiaire. This book has been translated into English as The Memoirs of Baron Hyde De Neuville: Outlaw, Exile, Ambassador, trans. Frances Jackson (2 vols.), London, 1913. However, the translation leaves something to be desired in parts, and if the French version is

available it is recommended over the translated one. Neuville, incidentally, is not totally reliable as can be seen by his insistence that Napoleon directed the artillery at the quai Voltaire. One of the most valuable sources is John Gideon Millingen, Recollections of Republican France from 1790 to 1801, London, 1848. This account is the only one found of an Englishman who actually participated in the drama of 13 Vendémiaire. Millingen's account shows quite strongly that there was a battle at St. Roch and that this fray was not of short duration. Furthermore, during this time, it was Napoleon who directed grape shot into the sectionaries in that area. Another memoir of consequence is the Mémoires du Duc De Raguse De 1792 A 1832 (9 vols.), Paris, 1857. Raguse was with Napoleon for most of the time from Toulon almost to 13 Vendémiaire. The portrayal of Napoleon in the Army of Italy during this period, his arrest after the Thermidorian reaction, and his reaction to the transfer to the Army of the Vendée are important descriptions and for the most part appear trustworthy. Another devoted follower of Napoleon was Lavalette who describes Bonaparte's activity on 13 Vendémiaire in the book Memoirs of Count Lavalette, London, 1894. Some of his words, however, leave one in doubt as to his total reliability since he claims that Napoleon was at the Convention on 12 Vendémiaire, an assertion which does not have support from anyone except Napoleon. Furthermore, his estimate of the number of Convention troops killed and wounded on 13 Vendémiaire is unbelievably small. A book of import is G. V. Vasselin, Mémorial

Revolutionnaire De La Convention ou Histoire des Révolutions de France, depuis le 20 Septembre 1792 jusqu'au 26 Octobre 1795 (4 vols.), Paris, 1797. This is the earliest publication discovered which reports the events of 13 Vendémiaire. Whether Vasselin was an eyewitness to 13 Vendémiaire or merely a compiler of information is a question which cannot be answered. Nevertheless, what he reports in his book is valuable in piecing 13 Vendémiaire together. In the Mémoires Politiques et Militaires du General Doppet, Paris, 1824, little is used except to show Doppet's description of how Duteil commended the actions taken by Bonaparte at Toulon. A book of some interest is that of Agathon Jean Francois Fain, Manuscrit De L'An Trois (1794-1795, Paris, 1828, which describes 13 Vendémiaire from what can be considered the official view. Barras is depicted as the real victor of that day. It must be recalled, however, that Barras became a Director after 13 Vendémiaire and probably influenced Fain who was then the secretary to the military committee of the National Convention. Another memoir of a sectionary during 13 Vendémiaire is Mémoires De M. Le Comte De Vaublanc, ed. M. F. Barriere, Paris, 1883. Unfortunately, Vaublanc does not go into any detail concerning the events of 13 Vendémiaire. The Mémoires Militaires du Lieutenant General Comte Roguet (4 vols.) Paris, 1862, is used cursorily to show that troops from the Army of Italy were transferred to the Army of the South during the Toulon siege. This book would have some value for those desiring to study the campaigns of the Army of Italy from a period of 1792 to 1800. A

significant text is the Mémoires du Vice-Admiral Baron Grivel, Paris, 1914. Baron Grivel was at the bureau of the armed forces when the insurrection on Vendémiaire broke out and he later went to the Convention. He personally saw some of the results of the battle of 13 Vendémiaire. A book by a Royalist which was used briefly to show the futile efforts of the insurrectionists on 13 Vendémiaire is A History of My Life: Memoirs of Chancellor Pasquier, trans. C. E. Roche, ed. Audiffret-Pasquier (6 vols.), New York, 1893. His memoirs run into many volumes and may be of interest to those seeking information on Royalist views during and after the Napoleonic era. The Diary of Sir John Moore, ed. J. F. Maurice (2 vols.), London, 1904, is a revealing and careful record of an eye-witness of a portion of the French Revolution as seen through the eyes of a British general. However, Sir John Moore did not witness either 13 Vendémiaire or the siege of Toulon. The Journal of Elizabeth Lady Holland, ed. Earl of Ilchester (2 vols.), London, 1908, is useful to those interested in the writings of an Englishwoman who was traveling on the continent during part of the period of the French Revolution. One of Napoleon's early pamphlets, Le Souper De Beaucaire, ed. Albert Morance, Paris, n.d., is an effort by Napoleon to convince the people of Marseilles to cease their struggle against the Republic. Although an obvious propaganda work, it displays quite well the literary style of Napoleon which, in credit to the young Corsican, is commendable.

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The best monograph on Toulon is that of J. Holland Rose, Lord Hood and the Defense of Toulon, Cambridge, 1922. Mr. Rose, in showing the plight of the allies at Toulon, does a real service to this event of history. Although Napoleon is not his primary concern, his wonderful knowledge of the Corsican enables Rose to point out quite accurately the role which Napoleon played for the victorious French forces. For anyone studying either the siege of Toulon or Napoleon's life, this book is a must. Another monograph is that of Charles James Fox, Napoleon Bonaparte And The Siege of Toulon, Washington D. C., 1902. Fox upholds Napoleon's importance at Toulon, but he considers his plan for the conquest of Toulon one which any tactician would have proposed. The execution of the plan was Napoleon's, according to Fox. His book is one of the scholarly research, yet it is disappointing not only because Fox fails to credit Napoleon fully, but also because there is an extremely large number of French passages in the text which detract from its effectiveness. The only monograph concerning 13 Vendémiaire is that of Henry Zivy, Le Treize Vendémiaire An IV, Paris, 1898. Considering the access to primary sources which Zivy had available in Paris, many of which he did not use, his book is highly unsatisfactory. Some of the conclusions he reaches are rather strange and indicate a strong anti-Napoleon sentiment. Two books which depict the adventures of the Royalist Baron De Batz are: Baron Charles De Batz, Les Conspirations et la Fin de Jean, Baron De Batz

1793-1822, Paris, 1911, and L. L. J. Gosselin, A Gascon Royalist In Revolutionary Paris: The Baron De Batz 1792-1795, trans. Mrs. Rodolph Stowell, London and New York, 1910. The portions of these books used in the thesis are from Batz's personal papers, letters and an unpublished memoir entitled De La Journée appelee de Sections de Paris ou de 12 et 13 Vendémiaire, An IV, Octobre 1795. Batz was an avowed Royalist who repeatedly plotted against the leaders of the revolution. However, his influence appears to be greatly overstated by both Gosselin and Baron Charles De Batz. Another book in which only the quoted words were rephrased is Edwin Sidney, The Life of Lord Hill, G.C.B. Late Commander of the Forces, London, 1845. This work is valuable in showing the activity of Major-General Charles O'Hara in the skirmish on November 29, 1793 in which he was captured. Another book, that of John Barrow, The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney G. C. B. (2 vols.), London, 1848, gives a good description of the evacuation and destruction of Toulon by Sir Sidney Smith. Yet, this publication must be read with scrutiny because it includes a letter purporting to the barbaric behavior of Napoleon at Toulon in mowing down the Toulonese with artillery fire. The letter is supposedly sent to Smith by an unnamed friend and is not substantiated. Several books which deal more with either the allies at Toulon or the city itself rather than Napoleon are M.Z. Pons, Mémoires Pour Servir A L'Histoire De La Ville De Toulon en 1793, Paris, 1825, and Paul Cottin, Toulon Et Les Anglais En 1793 D'Apres Des Documents Inedits, Paris, 1898. A work of interest is Frédéric Masson,

Napoleon Et Sa Famille (13 vols.), Paris, 1904. Masson concentrates on the intimate details of Napoleon's family and includes the many trials and tribulations caused Napoleon by his blood relations. In the field of general histories, a commendable one is J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13 vols.), London, 1915. Fortescue's version shows the participation of the English at Toulon and is a scholarly and accurate effort. One of questionable accuracy, however, is William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, From the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV (6 vols.), London, 1886. James uses the Dictionnaire Historique which apparently is the official French court history and is not commendable for use as an authority. For instance, it depicts Napoleon erroneously as a hero of a skirmish he did not participate in, and also it grossly exaggerates the number of executions of Toulonese by the conquering Army of the South. James should not be relied on whenever he uses the Dictionnaire Historique.

Of the biographies of Napoleon, the best single volume is that of Frederick Max Kircheisen, Napoleon, trans. Henry St. Lawrence, New York, 1932. This book is a digest of a nine volume work which Kircheisen has written on the life of Napoleon. It is a monumental one which cannot be overlooked by any student in the study of Bonaparte. Close behind Kircheisen are the volumes by John Holland Rose, The Life of Napoleon I (2 vols.), New York, 1924. Mr. Rose is a recognized authority of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era, and his book displays his outstanding familiarity with Napoleon. Another one of the better biographies of Napoleon is by August Fournier, Napoleon The First: A Biography, trans. Margaret Bacon Corwin and Arthur Dart Bissell,

ed. Edward Gaylord Bourne, New York, 1903. However, Fournier inserts uncomplimentary speculative views of Napoleon's behavior which detract from his undoubtedly thorough knowledge of the life of Bonaparte. Fournier's bibliography is the best one found and is a good beginning point for any phase of Napoleon's career. Another book concerning Napoleon is that of Louis Madelin, Histoire Du Consulat Et De L'Empire (13 vols.), Paris, 1937. Madelin does not deal exclusively with Napoleon but attempts to weave a history of France from the beginning of the French Revolution to its termination at the fall of the Empire. Madelin shows an informative grasp of the events of Toulon and 13 Vendémiaire; and his footnotes concerning them are extensive and interesting. A word of caution must be given about relying too heavily on Madelin since he is notoriously pro-Bonaparte. A. Aulard, The French Revolution: A Political History, trans. Bernard Miall (4 vols.), London, 1910, is used briefly but is worthy of note to those who have a flair for the political ramifications involved in the French Revolution. Aulard's work is a sober and consistent account which attempts to show the evolution of France from a monarchial state to one in which there is a constant growth of republican ideas. It is necessary to mention the book by General Sarrazin, Confession of General Bonaparte to the Abbé Maury, London, 1811, which is composed of the so-called confession of Napoleon of his wrongs to humanity. In essence, it is a book containing all the gossip possible concerning Napoleon up to the year 1810. It would be interesting to trace how many of these stories have been adopted as truth by the writers of the anti-Napoleon school.

A magazine article by Germain Bapst, "Captain Napoleon Bonaparte at Toulon", Harper's New Monthly Magazine, LXXXVII (January, 1894), presents the usual popular version of Napoleon at Toulon with no significant contributions being made. Such articles, slated for general and average reading audiences, must be read with scrutiny since they must have a hero or a villian even if errors are to be included. This article is no exception to the rule. On Barras' Memoirs, Henry Morse Stephens comments in "Recent Memoirs of the French Revolution", The American Historical Review, I (April, 1896), 473-489, that General Barras had an overwhelming desire to blacken the character of Napoleon and that his attempt to calumniate him is displayed by reckless and disgraceful mud-throwing. There has been a question of whether the Memoirs of Barras are, in actuality, authentic. It is the opinion of the writer that at least the portion of the first volume concerning 13 Vendémiaire is authentic since Barras relates the event in a manner that only an eyewitness could be capable of doing.