“I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"
ATATURK AS ENTREPRENEUR

Thesis. for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
DAVID J. MINDERHOUT
1970

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L I B R A R Y
Michigan State
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"I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"

ATATfiRK AS ENTREPRENEUR

By

X
David JDLMinderhout

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Anthr0pology

1970

, HA

PREFACE

Whenever the analyst attempts to study a personality of the
stature of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk he is confronted by the problem of
separating the real man from the legend. This becomes increasingly more
difficult in this case where a vast body of literature has grown up
around both the man and the legend, some of it contradictory. In the
case of Ataturk there has been little or no serious scholarly effort on
the part of biographers in recounting his career. Much of the literature
is blatantly hero-worship, such as Shah (193M) or Webster (1939). In
other cases, the accounts are largely anecdotal or fictionalized, as in
the case of Brock (1954). The best biographical account appears to be
that of Kinross (l96u). This paper will attempt to analyze Ataturk by
means of a concept from anthropology and economics: the role of the
entrepreneur in innovation as developed by Fredrik Barth. Because of
this intention, though much of the material is historical, there has
been no attempt to duplicate all the historical details of Atatflrk's
career or of the background of the Turks; no strict chronological order
of events is reproduced. Those interested in Turkish history might be
referred to Davison (1968), Robinson (1963), Elaine Smith (1958), or
G. L. Lewis (1955). Both Bernard Lewis (1966) and Heyd (1950) have
excellent accounts of the philosophical history of Turkey. Similarly
certain aspects of Ataturk's career that do not directly impinge upon

the analysis of Ataturk as entrepreneur have been left to other sources,

ii

as for example, the study of Atatflrk's foreign policy. The paper is
obviously limited in that it utilizes only materials that are published
in English.

A difficulty arises over the spelling of many Turkish words. In
some cases, there are nearly as many spellings as there are sources in
the literature. Ataturk is known as Mustapha Kemal, Mustafa Kemal,
Kamal, Kemal, and Ataturk; I have chosen to use the last form only. In
other cases I have chosen to use the spelling of a term as it is used by
a majority in the literature; hence, Caliphate, Seriat, Muslim,
pasha, and so on. Another difficulty arises from the fact that Atatflrk
had the names of geographical locations changed to "purely" Turkish
terms during his regime. This paper will use the most recent form; thus,
Istanbul for Constantinople, Izmir for Smyrna, and Ankara for Angora.
Similarly, Ataturk required in 1935 that each Turk take a Turkish
surname. However, in most cases, the literature uses the pre-l935
names alone or with the surnames added, rather than a wholesale
replacement by the 1935 surname, i.e., Ismet or Ismet Inonu is used
rather than Inonu. The former system will be adopted in this paper.

No matter how his name is spelled, I have come in the course of
this paper to admire Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. It is
hoped that the analysis in this paper will further the study of the
"Father of the Turks".

I wish to thank Dr. David M. Smith, Dr. Leonard Kasdan, and

Dr. Ralph Nicholas for their help in the preparation of this paper.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O 0

THE CONCEPT OF ENTREPRENEUR . . . . .

The Entrepreneur in Economics . .

The Entrepreneur in AnthrOpology

Preliminary Argument . . . . .

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . .

The

The Committee of Union and Progress .

Ottoman Empire . . . . . .

Atatflrk until 1919 . . . . . .
Ataturk and Turkey: 1919—1924

THE REPUBLIC OF ATATURK: THE REFORMS

Nationalism . . . . . . . . . .
Republicanism . . . . . . . . .
Laicism . . . . . . . . . . . .
Populism . . . . . . . . . . .
Etatism . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reformism . . .'. . . . . . . .

ATATURK AS

The
The
The
The
The
The
The

THE EFFECT
CONCLUSION

FOOTNOTES

ENTREPRENEUR . . . . . . .

Corporate Enterprise . . .
Innovator . . . . . . . . .
Profit of the Entrepreneu

Risk-Taker . . . . . . . .
Channels of Conversion .

Marginal Man . . . . . . .
Strategy of Transaction . .

OF THE INNOVATIONS ON THE POPULATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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"I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"1

ATATURK AS ENTREPRENEUR

INTRODUCTION

A11 activity halts in Turkey at 9:05 A.M. each November 10. It
was at that moment in 1938 that Mustafa Kemal AtatUrk, founder and first
president of the Republic of Turkey, died. Many of those who observe
the five minutes of silence know of Atatflrk only through tradition, yet
this act is symbolic of the influence he continues to have upon his
country. Not only are his pictures or statues everywhere to be seen,
but also his policies continue to pervade the Turkish state. It was
Atatflrk who oversaw and engineered the transition from the Ottoman
Empire, the "sick man of Europe", to the vigorous Turkish Republic. It
was Ataturk who accomplished the secularization of Turkey, effectively
separating church and state. His pursuit of peaceful foreign relations;
his devotion to the aims of eduction; his insistence on pride in being
Turkish—-all produce images, as Stirling has said, of ". . . the
Western phoenix springing from the ashes of oriental defeat."
(Stirling; 1965:2). It is true that Atatflrk was able to accomplish what
he did only because of the spadework of a century of reformers before
him. Realistically it is also true that he did not bring about reform
alone, but through the actions of his followers. But as Davison notes,

"He was, nevertheless, the chief driving force in the creation of

modern Turkey, and some of the...aims—-especially the nation-state,

the secularization, and the republic-~were peculiarly his." (Davison;
1968:l). Ataturk was more, however, than a political reformer. Lord
Kinross suggests that: "AtatUrk above all created a legend. In a land
needing heroes his mystique was such that a child, blessed by his
handshake, would for weeks leave his hand unwashed, lest the virtue
depart from it: that an old peasant woman, once asked what her age was,
replied 'Seventeen', for her life had begun only when she first saw him
with her eyes during the War of Independence. For the youth of his
country his words were to become a gospel and his deeds a mythology,
destined to point and illuminate the national ideal for perhaps
generations to come. Meanwhile both inspired youth with the sense of a
new challenging life in the present and new foundations on which to
build for the future." (Kinross; 196u:u7u). For the Turks, Mustafa
Kemal was both the Gazi, the conqueror, and Ataturk, the father of the
Turks, a name chosen by him in 1935 to symbolize his role as he and
others saw it. A vast body of material has grown up concerning both
Atatflrk and his policies. Unfortunately Ataturk's biographers have
contented themselves with sensationalist, anecdotal, or chronological
treatments of his career. Bernard Lewis, for one, laments the lack of
a "serious scholarly monograph" on Atatflrk. (B. Lewis; 1966:237). It
will be suggested in this paper that a fruitful way in which to analyze
Ataturk's accomplishments would be through an application of Predrik
Barth's concept of the role of the entrepreneur in bringing about
innovation. This contention will be examined from a number of view-

points. In this particular case it will be interesting not only to

examine the applicability of Earth's model, but also to question the
means by which Atatfirk accomplished his ends and the effects, or lack

of them, on the bulk of the populace, the Turkish peasantry.

THE CONCEPT OF ENTREPRENEUR

The Entrepreneur in Economics

 

The concept of the entrepreneur originally was and primarily
still is an economic one. In classical economics Cantillon was the
published in 1755. Adam Smith spoke occasionally of the undertaker,
the master, the merchant, who, as his essential function, accumulated
capital with which he hired industrious people to do the rest. J. B.
Say, in 1803, was the first to assign to the entrepreneur a definite
position in the schema of the economic process as one who functioned to
combine the factors of production into a producing organism. Though
the term does not appear in the works of such economists as Ricardo,
Marx, or Mill, it takes a more central position in neo-classical
economies. Entrepreneurs were the peOple who took the ruling decisions
of economic life. (Schumpeter; 195u:555,895). More recently, in a
standard economics text, that of George Leland Bach, an entrepreneur is
given the function of making fundamental policy decisions in a firm.
"The entrepreneur decides when to establish a firm, what goods to
produce, how the concern will be financed, what price policies to

follow, when to expand or contract, and so on." (Bach; 1968:260).

In essence, the entrepreneur was the risk-taker, the one who invested
his capital in search of profit, and who subsequently had a major role

in the management of the concern.

The Entrepreneur in AnthrOpology

 

In 1955, the anthropologist Cyril Belshaw listed four major
characteristics of an entrepreneur: (l) the management of a business
unit; (2) profit taking; (3) business innovation; and (H) uncertainty
bearing. (Belshaw; 1955). In 1965, Belshaw stated that: "In one
sense, an entrepreneur is simply a combiner of resources, that is, a
production manager whose task it is to decide how much of what kinds of
capital, labor, and raw materials are to be combined and in what way
they are to be organized. This is the act of making economizing
decisions... Indeed, wherever there is an organization, there is an
entrepreneurial-management function, even though it may be vested in a
committee or a bureaucrat." (Belshaw; 1965:115). It is in this sense
that Barth discusses the role of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is
the one who brings about innovation. In doing so, a corporate group
grows up around the entrepreneur. His success comes to be measured in
his profit or loss. Barth argures that in order to study an entrepre-
neur one must develop a different mode of analysis than that normally
employed by social anthropologists or sociologists. "A conventional
structural analysis of the community...will fail to provide this
frame...Likewise I would argue that a typical sociological role analysis
in terms of norms and deviances sidesteps the most important and

interesting issues." (Barth; 1963:6). This is because Barth is

interested in analyzing the articulation between the activities of the
entrepreneur and the social organization he is exploiting. While the
above analyses would describe the status, in Firth's terms, of the
entrepreneur or "the pattern of localization of entrepreneurial
activity in sets or types of statuses within the social structure",
Barth is interested in the interaction of the entrepreneur and the
community, in the strategic choices on both sides. "The central theme
to which we have chosen to address ourselves is the entrepreneurial
career as a process, as a chain of transactions between the entrepreneur
and his environment." (Ibid.:7). This transactional analysis, as

seen in the work of Barth (1966) or Homans (1958) or in the more
stringent articulation of the Theory of Games (Stone; 19MB) rests on
the assumption that interaction between persons is an exchange of goods,
material and non-material. It rests on definitions of economics such
as Lionel Robbins' allocation of scarce means to alternative ends.
(Robbins; 1932). It assumes that the items for exchange are believed
to be equivalent and that each party is seeking to maximize his return,
that is, to return a profit. Exchanges are dependent upon strategic
choices, which in turn are limited by the values of the community,
expectations of return, and the likelihood of certain responses by the
parties involved. Hence Barth's entrepreneur has a "more single-minded
concentration" on profit taking. This plus the less institutionalized
activities of the entrepreneur and his greater willingness to take
risks sets him apart from the encumbents of more traditional statues.

(Barth; 1963:7-8).

Barth describes the point at which an entrepreneur chooses to
exploit the environment as his "niche", and what the entrepreneur
brings to the task as his "assets", "the sum total of capital, skill,
and social claims he may employ in the enterprise." (Ibid.:9).
Together, the assets and the niche determine the restrictions to be
placed on any particular enterprise. Another concept which is central
to the analysis is that of spheres of exchange. A sphere of exchange
is one in which goods and services circulate freely. However, goods and
services in one sphere cannot be freely exchanged for those in another;
a few restricted channels of conversion may exist between disparate
spheres. To take a familiar example from anthropology, in the
Trobriand Islands, yams cannot be exchanged for Kula objects. Simi-
larly, in modern American society, money should not be exchanged for
political action, though a restricted channels of conversion exist,
such as an investment in a particular political party. What an
entrepreneur does essentially is to discover new channels of conversion
and to exploit them. Barriers of cost are imposed on the conversions
through available modes of trade and production or through sanctions of
shame of punishment. (Barth; 1966:18). Hence, by establishing a new
channel of conversion, an entrepreneur assumes a risk. Profit is made
through the exploitation of the lack of established value on the new
conversion. The entrepreneur can make whatever the traffic will bear
until adjusting mechanisms allow for "correction" of evaluations. The
innovation, of course, is the Opening of the new channel. Barth

suggests that someone from outside the community might best function as

an entrepreneur in that he will not be as encumbered by traditional
restraints or intervening ties, such as those of kinship, with those
with Whom he is interacting. In other words, ideally the entrepreneur
is a "marginal man."

In "Economic Spheres in Darfur" Barth describes how an entrepre~
neur works in primarily economic terms. (Barth; 1968). In Fur economy,
there are two spheres. One embraces a large variety of material items,
including a monetary medium, associated with market place facilities.

In the other there was the exchange of labor for beer. The spheres
were separated by the sanction of moral reprobation on conversions from
either beer or labor into cash. Most participants in the economy chose
to maximize their return through a progressive increase in the range of
cr0ps cultivated. Barth describes an Arab merchant who settled in the
community. The Arab asked for land to raise tomatoes, then bought
millet to make beer and exchanged the beer for labor to work his fields.
Without a significant labor input of his own, he produced a large crop
which he sold on the market at a great profit. Through his entrepre-
neurial activity beer and labor had been channeled into the cash sphere.
It should be noted that the merchant was originally from outside the Fur
community. However, as has been implied, the goods obtained through
entrepreneurial activity are clearly not restricted to purely monetary,
or even material, forms. Power, rank, or experience might be the goal
of the entrepreneur, and thus the concept may be applied to political

power in a Lapp community in Northern Norway. (Eidheim; 1963). The

Lapps have tended to be economically impoverished and politically
unorganized. In general, they have been on the periphery of Norwegian
society and politics; in turn the Lapps have developed a strong personal
attachment to their ethnic identity. One entrepreneur, a politician,
attempted to bridge the spheres of Norwegian politics and of the Lapps
with a welfare state program. His program envisioned a "modern life"
for the Lapps in a modern state with the resultant loss of Lapp language
and culture. A rival emerged campaigning as well for material welfare,
but calling for the maintenance of ethnic identity at the same time.
Both entrepreneurs were seeking the profit of political power, social
recognition, and economic sustenance. To obtain these profits the
population needed to be brought into the sphere of organized politics
and convinced to vote for a particular candidate. Eidheim describes the
strategies and counter—strategies of the rivals throughout the nineteen—
fifties. The significance of this example should be obvious. It

should be possible to describe a political entrepreneur in terms of

cost, choice, strategy, and spheres of exchange.

PreliminaryfiArgument

 

There is something that sets a discussion of Atatflrk as entre-
preneur aside from Barth's and Eidheim's examples. This is the position
of Atatflrk's niche. Barth writes that "a niche may be novel, and
activity in it produce a new flow of goods and thereby create resource
bases for new niches, or the enterprise may be purely competitive,
entering an occupied, but perhaps not fully exploited niche." (Barth;

1963:9). Each of Atatflrkis innovations resulted in the creation of new

niches; he did not have to compete for a niche, or an aspect of a
niche, such as votes. This sets him off from an Arab merchant in
Darfur or the type of political middlement that Friedrich describes in

Local-Level Politics. Such individuals have become a focus for study

 

because of their position between the encapsulated society and the
nation-state; they are the "village and tribal leaders." (Friedrich;
1968:199). Eidheim's political entrepreneurs would also fit into this
category. While these entrepreneurs Opened up a new niche, the niche
existed between the Lapp community and the Norwegian state; furthermore,
these entrepreneurs had to compete within the niche. Neither of these
factors was true in the case of Ataturk. His niche was at the top of
the political system. He did not have to compete for votes or power.
Atatflrk was, after all, a dictator. He minimized his opposition by
outlawing it. The innovations he chose to make, he could impose from
above. Given these conditions, it is still believed that an interesting
study can be made of Ataturk, the entrepreneur.

The argument to be elaborated Upon will be briefly as follows.
Ataturk fulfills all the characteristics of an entrepreneur outlined by
Barth. First of all, a corporate enterprise grew up around Atatfirk.

As forceful a personality and reformer as he was, it is dOUbthI that
he would have been able to proceed with his reforms if he had not had
followers. A loosely knit group at first, the enterprise later took
form as the Republican PeOple's Party. Eventually Atatflrk identified
himself with all of Turkey. Secondly, Atatflrk made innovations in his

environment. Innovation in itself was a difficult task in a Muslim

10

state. Bernard Lewis writes that: "In traditional Muslim useage the
word 'Bigiaf, 'innovation', was the converse of 'Sunnaf, the accepted
practice of the orthodox, and it came to be in effect a synonym for
heresy." (B. Lewis; 1966:106). Previous reformers had assured the
peOple that their reforms were not innovations, but a return to an
older way of doing things. AtatUrk broke with this tradition. The
basic innovation came in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the
Turkish Republic. This change, in Max Weber's terms, might be seen as
a shift from legitimacy based on traditional-patrimonial grounds to
legitimacy based on legalistic-rational grounds. In the former case,
legitimacy rests on an "established belief in the sanctity of immemorial
traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising
authority under them." In the latter case, legitimacy based on rational
grounds rests "on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative
rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands." (Weber; 19u7z328)2. Atatflrk, when he secularized the
Turkish state, abolished the Sultanate/Caliphate and the allegiance
that was attached to it through its Islamic heritage. In its place, a
Republic appeared, dependent upon elected officials and a constitution.
Many of the other innovations of Ataturk will be discussed including
those fundamental to the lives of the Turkish people. Atatfirk did not
adhere to Summer's statement that "stateways cannot change folkways."
(in Lerner; 1958:112). Thirdly, it will be shown that Ataturk received
a profit from these innovations and his enterprise. This was in the

form of political power, social recognition, and presumably, economic

11

sustenance. Finally, Atatfirk was willing to take a risk. After all,
the Sultanate/Caliphate had existed for 600 years. To abolish it
required a risk for the innovator. It will be shown, however, that
the risks that Atatflrk took were minimized by his position as dictator.
Perhaps most importantly in terms of this analysis, Ataturk
discovered and exploited a previously non-existent channel of conversion
between two separate spheres, that of the Turkish government and that of
the governed. Parker and Smith note that: "The payment of taxation
and the onerous military service were all the contact the Anatolian
peasant had with the (Ottoman) government, whose purpose he could no
more influence than he could the weather." (Parker 8 Smith; 1940:221).
But Atatfirk proclaimed: "At the just demand of the noble and oppressed
nation to which my life and person belong, my most sacred duty was to
regard compliance with the will of the pe0ple as paramount." (Encyclo-
pedia of Islam; 1961:70). Hence, a foremost tenet of both the 1921 and
192a constitutions is: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the
nation." (Ibid.:llu). Through the Republic, the Turkish people were
for the first time given a role in government. They were able to elect
officials to a National Assembly which in turn elected Ataturk president.
Thus, Atatfirk, as the head of a constitutional Republic, brought
together the spheres of government and of the people of Turkey. Finally,
this paper will examine the elements that contributed to Atatflrk's
strategy as an entrepreneur. Remember that to Barth the "central theme"
is the "entrepreneurial career as a process, as a chain of transactions

between the entrepreneur and his environment." In the case of Atatflrk,

12

the sequence of events that were his innovations is well documented.
What is less available in the literature is information on the nature
of the transactions. Biographers seem to be more interested in what
Ataturk did than in how he did it. What will be attempted here is to
examine the supports, to use Swartz's term (Swartz; 1968:19), and the
strategy that contributed to the maintenance of Atatflrk's regime, the
way in which he maximized his investment through the manipulation of
his assets and his niche. The response of the Turkish peasantry will
also be analyzed. This thenis a preliminary sketch of the arguments
supporting the contention that Atatflrk can be viewed as a political
entrepreneur. In the following sections these arguments will be

amplified.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ottoman Empire

 

The Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the reign of Suleiman
the Magnificent (1520-66), when the Ottoman Empire stretched from the
gates of Vienna to the Yemen and from Persia to Gibralter. (G. L. Lewis;
1955:24). Bernard Lewis marks the decline of the Empire with the defeat
of the Ottomans by the Austrians in 1687 and 1697. The peace treaty of
Carlowitz (1699) marked the first time that the Empire signed a peace
as the defeated power in a clearly decided war and was compelled to
cede extensive territories, long under Ottoman rule and regarded as
part of the House of the House of Islam, to the infidel enemy.

(B. Lewis; 1966:36). Attempts at reform were begun in the 18th century,

13

but convinced of their ideological superiority over the non-Muslims

of Europe, the Ottomans largely confined such advances to military
equipment. Davison describes this as a: "technological, intellectual,
and psychological gulf, measured by the distance between Western
scientific and economic progress and rational attitudes and the
relative stagnation of the East." (Davison; 1968:68). Reform was
accelerated during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-39), called by some the
Peter the Great of Turkey. Mahmud and the Tanzimat reformers

attempted to Westernize the Empire without the recognition that Western
technology and the society that accompanied it were wrapped up with

and based on older Western notions such as secular legislation and
justice. Hence the reforms were applied from the top downward by order
of the centralized authority to a society whose social structure and
ideology were fundamentally different from those of Western Europe.
(Stirling; 1965:”). Thus, reforms such as the 1878 Constitution had
little or no effect and the Parliament it called into being was
abolished during the reactionary regime of Abdul Hamid (1878-1908).
Robinson gives five principle reasons for the weakness of the Ottoman
Empire at the beginning of the 20th century: (1) failure to keep pace
with the West in technology; (2) weakness of national loyalties above
and beyond regional, religious, and ethnic ties; (3) continued identity
of church and state; (4) popular disinterest in economic pursuits

other than agriculture; and (5) administrative and political corruption.
(Robinson; l963:3). The Ottoman Empire was the "sick man of Europe" to

use the phrase coined by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and was maintained

1H

primarily by the intrigues of the European powers who wished to use

her as a buffer state, principally against Russia.

The Committee of Union and Progress

 

Ironically the Ottoman Empire set in motion the process that was
to lead to its own demise. With the emphasis of reform on the military,
it develOped that the best modern education the Empire had to offer was
in the military schools. The instructors were Europeans; often young
officers were sent to EurOpe for further training. Acquainted with
the concepts of the French revolution and of nationalism, these officers
plus other intellectuals who were forced to flee the Empire because
of their radical notions formed the core of what is now called the
"Young Turks." With the center of the movement in Paris, this body
began to agitate for the overthrow of the Empire. By 1907 the various
groups were united under the banner of the Committee of Union and
Progress. Their activities led to successive revolutions in 1908 and
1909 which restored the 1876 Constitution and placed the CUP in power.
Once in power, however, the CUP hesitated in its aims to lay the founda—
tions to a new state. Some lesser reforms were announced, but noteably
the Young Turks continued to cling to the idea of an empire. (Robinson;
1963:6-12). Stirling describes the movement as a "Splendid confusion
of ideas" which embraced "pan-Ottoman parliamentarianism, rights for
minorities, pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism (a movement to unite
politically all the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, then

under Tsarist rule), together with a flavouring of Liberty, Equality,

15

Fraternity, and Prussian absolutism." (Stirling; l965:5). The CUP

was given little time to consolidate its gains. Italy attacked
Tripoli in 1911. In 1912, the Balkan League was formed; later that
same year Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia attacked and drove
the Empire out of Macedonia and Thrace. In 1913, a coup d'etat in the
CUP brought Enver Pasha a professional soldier, and two others, Talat
and Cemal, into power. Enver was the central figure; he soon succeeded
in elevating himself to virtual dictator. Enver has been described

as "surely one of the most unfortunate generals in history." (Robinson;
1963:12). He oversaw a series of military disasters, foremost among
them being his choice to commit the Ottoman Empire to the cause of

the Central Powers in World War I. The Ottoman forces were routed on
every front, save one. The end of World War I found the Young Turks
having fled the country, a new Sultan, and SUpine, defeated country
about to be divided among the victorious powers. Istanbul and the
Bosporus were occupied; all Ottoman possessions in Arabia and Africa
were placed under EurOpean protectorates; and an independent Armenia
and an autonomous Kurdistan were set up in eastern Anatolia. The
remainder of Anatolia was divided up into French and Italian spheres
of influence. Turkish finances were placed under Allied control. The
Greeks were given the region of Izmir to administer. Under the
encouragement of the British, the Greeks had also decided to invade
Turkey. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:53). This was the situation when a young
army officer named Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun in Anatolia on

May 19 , 1919.

16

Atatfirk Until 1919

Mustafa Kemal, henceforth called Ataturk, the name he took in
1935, was the sole Turkish officer to emerge with increased stature at
the end of World War I. A Macedonian, he had been born in Salonika in
1881. When he was nine, his father, a minor official in the Ottoman
Debt Administration and a merchant, died leaving little money and a
hard childhood relieved by the charity of an aunt who sent him to school.
At twelve, he succeeded against the will of his mother in entering an
Officers Training School in Salonika. From there he moved on to a
Senior School at Monastir and then to the General Staff College in
Istanbul. By now he had begun the raucous personal life which
continued throughout his life and which "left nothing to be desired
by the most sensational biographers." (Parker 8 Smith; 19uo:uo). While
at the Staff College, Atatfirk became acquainted with a wide variety of
EurOpean ideas, in particular, the works of Voltaire and Rousseau.
With the abundance of like-minded young men at the College he formed a
revolutionary organization with the aim of overthrowing the Empire.
After graduation at age 24, he was arrested and imprisoned for his
political activities, but his excellence in his work at the College
secured him a pardon. After two years at the command of a cavalry
regiment in Damascus fighting a perpetual rear-guard action against
the Druses, Atatflrk returned to Salonika where he found himself at the
center of political activity aimed against the Sultan. Though he

disagreed with the leaders of the movement, headed by the CUP, AtatUrk

17

played a major role in the 1908 revolution. However, his abrasive
manner in dealing with his political SUperiors found him on the outside
of the movement. After commands in Tripoli and in the Balkans,

Atatfirk Spent three years as military attaché to Bulgaria, a virtual
exile for his outspoken criticism of the Enver regime. In February,
1915, he was assigned to a command at Gallipoli under the German
general, Liman von Sanders. The Allied forces landed at the section of
beach commanded by Atatfirk. In this campaign he first won real
distinction as a commander. In particular he received credit for his
initiative in risking an attack on the Australians after their landing
at Anzac Bay on April 25, 1915. For months he commanded the tr00ps
holding the ridge and prevented the Allied forces from moving towards
Istanbul. When in December, 1915, the Allies withdrew from Gallipoli
Atatflrk was publicly hailed as the Victor of the Dardenelles and the
Savior of Istanbul. This made him a political liability to Enver; thus
Atatfirk was posted to the army fighting the Russians in Armenia. A
hOpeless command, this had originally been a grand scheme of Enver's to
restore some the Empire's lost territory. Instead the campaign had
floundered and of the 100,000 Turkish soldiers originally sent to fight,
only 13,000 remained to Atatfirk, the rest decimated by cold and disease.
Nevertheless he managed to bring his troOps into shape and with the aid
of the collapse of the Russian government in 1917 was able to secure

a satisfactory strategic position. After joining the Crown Prince on

a military mission to Berlin in 1917, AtatUrk was given another hOpeless

18

command in Syria. Even here, however, he was able to organize an
orderly retreat and to halt the British advance, By then,the Ottoman
Empire had signed the Armistice of Mudros in October, 1918. Thus it is
that Atatflrk never lost a command in World War I, the only Turkish
general to be able to make that claim. This, plus his obvious lack of
affiliation with either the Enver regime or the Germans (Atatfirk had
protested the Empire's entry into the the war and had always viewed

his German allies with disdain) allowed him to emerge unsullied from the
war. Returning to Istanbul, he was able to secure a position through
some political maneuvering and intrigue as Inspector-General in the
interior. Atatfirk was now convinced that the fabric of the Empire, now
headed by the Crown Prince, now Sultan Mahmet VI Vahideddin, was

rotten beyond repair. In the interior a nationalist association, The
Anatolian Defense Rights Association, had already been formed. When
the Sultan's government learned of Atatflrk's intention of joining the
nationalists it attempted to stop him, but not before he was able to
slip through to the port of Samsun. As he landed he received word that

the Greeks were landing at Izmir, intent upon invasion.

Atatfirk and Turkey: 1919-192H

 

The various accounts of Atatfirk's career tell that his intention
at this point was to unite the nationalists and as their head to
establish a new Turkish state based upon Anatolia. He had already
offered himself to the Sultan as the head of a nationalist Turkey.

If this was his intention he was faced with a formidable task. The

19

Empire was defeated; thousands of Turks had died. Though nationalist
guerilla bands had formed in the interior, only one Turkish army on

the Eastern front remained. There was no real nationalist feeling on
the part of the bulk of the populace. If questioned as to his identity,
a villager might answer that he was a Muslim or an inhabitant of a
certain location, never a Turk or rarely an Ottoman. (B. Lewis; 1966:327).
The Ottomans, after all, as already noted, were the exploiters of the
peasant. The Empire was a legitimate robber, whose legitimacy rested

on religious authority. (Stirling; 1965:267). Even Muslims were
divided into Sunni and Shi'ite followers.3 Villagers were distrustful
of the inhabitants of towns. As Ward notes: "For it must not be
thought that when Mustafa Kemal turned his back on Istanbul, a frenzied
people were waiting to claim him as leader and to throw off the foreign
yoke. Quite the contrary. Even among nationalist circles he had yet

to make his way. An 'Anatolian Defense Rights Association' already
existed in the interior. He had to prove himself to this body. But
more difficult than the suspecions of the patriots was the dull apathy
of the country at large." (Ward; 1942:42). For these various reasons
Robinson suggests that Atatfirk might even have been glad that the Greeks
had invaded. (Robinson; 1963:63). After all, the infidels were
attacking the heartland of Muslim Turkey. It appears that this proved
to be the catalyst in uniting the people into a War of Independence. As
Allen points out: "This invasion of Turkey's own homelands by the
nation's deadliest foe was enough to restore a heroic spirit of

resistance and to unite the people in the accomplishment of a great

20

patriotic endeavor. The thought of their territories being violated,
their homes invaded, and their religion insulted by the hated infidels
was enough to awaken a tremendous burst of hidden energy and the
upheaval caused a favorable condition for the dissociation and rein-
tegration of Turkish social patterns." (Allen; 1935:H2).

AtatUrk launched his program to accomplish an independent Turkey
through a number of clearly defined steps. (Robinson; 1963:65). His
first move was to gain the personal allegiance of the top military
commanders and key civilian administrators in Anatolia for a renewed
national struggle. Key among these was Kazim Karabekir, commander of
the sole remaining Turkish army, Rauf, a naval hero of World War I,
Refet, and Ismet. Atatfirk, assured of the support of the military,
secured control of the telegraph system, thereby breaking the Sultan's
link with the interior and assuring his own ability to communicate
with the country. The political leadership for the nationalist move-
ment was forged in part by two congresses called by AtatUrk and his
supporters. The first, held in Erzurum in July, 1919, had representa-
tives from the eastern provinces only. The second, held in September
at Sivas, was more broadly representative. Each congress set up a
Representative Committee of which in each case Atatflrk was elected
president. A de facto government in Anatolia was formed from the
Representative Committee of the Union for the Defense of Rights of
Anatolia and Rumelia. This committee issued a National Pact, worked

out in the two Congresses. In essence the Pact called for the integrity

21

of all Ottoman-Muslim territory within the lines of the Mudros armistice
and complete independence with no legal or financial servitudes.
Throughout this period, Atatfirk insisted upon national and popular
sovereignty. There was a strong Islamic cast to this nationalist
movement. It was intended that a free Sultanate should be the head of
the new government. (Davison; 1968:122-3).

The Sultan's government residing in occupied Istanbul did not
greet these developments favorably. At first it recalled Atatfirk. When
he refused to return, the Sultan ordered Kazim Karabekir to arrest the
rebel. Atatfirk convinced Kazim that this was not in the interests of
Turkey. In the fall of 1919, the Sultanate, responding to pressure
from the nationalists, called for new parliamentary elections under
the 1876 Constitution. A large nationalists majority was returned.
Despite Ataturk's protests that the city was under Allied control, the
delegates insisted upon being seated in Istanbul. Atatfirk remained at
his headquarters in Ankara. The new chamber in Istanbul voted in the
National Pact in January, 1920, as the non-negotiable minimum on which
the nationalists would accept peace. The Allies were alarmed and on
March 16, 1920, the British arrested and deported to Malta some two
score deputies. This plus tightened British control in Istanbul proved
to be an important spur to the nationalists. Those deputies who were
able to escape went to Ankara. There, on April 23, 1920, they voted
to create the government of the Grand National Assembly. They did not
declare the Sultan deposed, but maintained that while he was an Allied

captive, they alone represented the nation. Atatflrk was the next day

22

elected president of the Assembly and presided over a council of
ministers. This organization was elaborated on in a constitutional

law of January, 1921, which stated that sovereignty belonged
unconditionally to the nation. The country was also now officially for
the first time called "Turkey" (Turkiye). The Sultan's reply was
decisive. His Sheik-ul-Islam issued a £3223, a Muslim juridicial
ruling, encouraging the killing of rebels as a religious duty. A

court martial in Istanbul condemned Atatfirk and the other nationalist
leaders to death in_absentia. Irregular troops, the "Army of the
Caliphate," were organized to fight the nationalists. Such moves

made reconciliation between the two governments impossible. This was
exacerbated in August, 1920, when the Sultan's government signed the
humiliating treaty of Sevres, which confirmed the conditions mentioned
earlier. The Ankara government refused to sign. The Sultan's
government had cut the last link between itself and the nationalists.
Allen notes that the traditional government "might have held on to their
positions in Turkish life had it not been for the apparent collusion of
the Sultan's government with Turkey's foes..." (Allen; 1935:H2).

Even with these incentives towards nationalist government,
Ataturk's own position was anything but automatically assured. Smith
contends that: "Many influential military and civilian leaders eXpressed
skepticism and indecision, mainly because many believed that Mustafa
Kemal was a great general but doubted his ability as a statesman."

(E. Smith; 1958:13). Davison adds that: "The task confronting Kemal
and his associates was extraordinarily difficult. Even to maintain

internal cohesion was hard. Kemal was no dictator, no all-powerful

23

leader, despite his energy and magnetism. He was confronted with
dissidentpersonalities and grOUps within the Assembly, the armed
forces, and the movement as a Whole. He had to reason, argue, cajole,
threaten. There were many Turks who held back at first from committing
themselves to the cause. There were also dissident guerilla bands to
be curbed or absorbed; at least one had strong communist tendencies.
Supplied for the armed forces had to be scrounged, stolen, captured,

or brought from abroad...Improvisation was the order of the day."
(Davison; 1968:123-u). The key to AtatUrk's strategy in this period
appears to be his prowess as a military leader and the continuing
support of the regular military. After all, this period of Turkish
history was more than a political crisis; there were Greeks to fight

as well. The Greeks had expanded their area of control from Izmir in
a series of attacks, starting in the summer of 1920. In that year and
the next they drove the Turks back. Twice in early 1921 the improvised
Turkish army under the command of Ismet stOpped the Greeks at Inonu.
But in July of that year a renewed offensive forced the Turks to
retreat once more. The Assembly berated Atatflrk for the setbacks.
Armstrong describes Atatfirk's response this way: "Once again he faced
(the Assembly). This time he demanded to be made commander—in-chief
with full powers of a dictator. The Assembly hesitated, afraid of him.
He refused to haggle; if he was to save Turkey, he must have absolute
control. The Assembly, with certain conditions to protect their
ultimate sovereignty, agreed. At once Mustafa Kemal took full control."

(Armstrong; 1933:1u6). In a three week battle in the late summer of

2Q

1921 AtatUrk threw back the Greeks. In a renewed effort on August 26,
1922, the Greeks broke and fled to the sea. On September 9, the
Turkish nationalists entered Izmir in triumph. The Assembly, over-
joyed, bestowed on Atatfirk the titkeof Gazi, warrior and victor for
the faith, a title once borne by the earliest Ottoman Sultans.
(Davison; 1968:12u).

When AtatUrk's forces approached the Bosporus, in order to reach
the Greek forces in Thrace, the British agreed to negotiate. By the
armistice of Nudanya, signed on October 11, the Allied powers agreed
to restore Turkish control in Istanbul, Thrace and the Straits. The
new peace conference was called at Lausanne, Switzerland. This time the
Ankara government was the only representative of Turkey; Atatflrk
succeeded in having the Sultanate abolished on November 1, 1922. The
intransigence of the Turkish delegation, headed by Ismet, won it
virtually all of its demands. Under the terms of the Treay of Lauanne,
the boundaries of the Turkish state were essentially those as demanded
by the Turks. There was to be no Armenia or Kurdistan in the east
and no Greek zone in the west. There were to be no spheres of great
power influence. There were to be no reparations from World War I.

The Straits were demilitarized, and though Turkey's sovereignty in

the area was to be recognized, an international commission was
established to supervise the freedom of transit. A population exchange
was arranged between the Greeks and the Turks; only the Greeks of

Istanbul and the Turks and Greek-held western Thrace were excepted.

25

Though the transfers caused a great deal of human misery, the exchange
was to ease relations between Greece and Turkey in the years to follow.
In short, the Turks were the only defeated power of World War I to
receive a negotiated peace. Lausanne was negotiated among equals,

not imposed. (Davison; 1968:126).

THE REPUBLIC OF ATATURK: THE REFORMS

Atatflrk then turned to another War of Independence, that to
enable Turkey to enter the fold of "modern" nations. Such a step was
to require a great many internal reforms, each to be imposed on a war-
weary populace. As the account in the Turkish version of the Encyclo-
pedia of Islam puts it: "After the eXpulsion of the enemy armies from
Anatolia, many people believed that they would start to live in comfort
and prosperity according to the old fashion and old rules. Atatflrk
considered such a belief dangerous. It was necessary to perpetuate
the enthusiasm aroused during the national struggle for liberation and
fight against the backward mentality that was having as destructive an
effect on the nation as the enemy armies." (Encyclopedia of Islam;
1961:204). Smith contends that the subsequent reforms of Atatfirk can
be seen in two phases: "the first was the establishment of a politi—
cally independent state by the military and diplomatic triumphs during
1919-1923 culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment
of the Republic in 1923; the second phase is often known as the Kemalist

Reformation or Modernization period during which drastic changes were

26

made in the Turkish political, economic, social, and cultural structure
which aimed to develop Turkey into a modern nation. (E. Smith; 1958:92).
Smith goes on to suggest that both of these phases were made possible
by the dynamism of Atatfirk. "Turkish political and intellectual leaders
had talked about reforms for nearly a century, but it took the strong
and often authoritarian leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his followers

to change this talk into action." (Ibid.:92). Each of Atatfirk's major
reforms will be discussed in the following sections. It will be
suggested that a useful framework for discussion is the six arrows

which are found on the banner of Atatfirk's Republican People' Party.

The arrows symbolize AtatUrk's aims of nationalism, republicanism,
laicism, populism, etatism, and reformism. These principles were set
forth in a speech by Ataturk on April 20, 1931; they were subsequently
adOpted as part of the Statues of the RPP. They are also found in the
192“ Constitution of Turkey through an amendment of February 5, 1937.
Taken together the Six Principles are Kemalism. No attempt is made to
present historical events in a strict chronological order; historical
details are also missing. However, this is not a paper on the history
of the Turkish Republic. Rather it is hOped that this discussion will

begin to reveal the strategies of AtatUrk as entrepreneur.

Nationalism

 

The term "nationalist" has been used frequently to this point.
The National Assembly was said to be nationalist; the Sultan's govern—
ment was not. It has been implied that there was not a nationalistic

fervor among the Turkish peOple as a whole. Davison says: "For want

27

of a better term, we describe as modern nationalism an exaggerated
consciousness of organic unity and uniqueness based on common cultural
traits and the concept of a territorialhrdelimitable state." (Davison;
1953:326). Such an awareness did not exist among the inhabitants of
Ottoman Turkey. Bernard Lewis notes that "loyalty to a place was

known, but it was to a village or quarter, at most to a province, not

a country; loyalty to one's kin was ancient and potent, but it was to
the family or tribe, not to the nation. The ultimate loyalty, the
measure by which a man distinguished between brother and stranger, was
religion. For the Muslim, his fellow believer, of whatever country,
race or language, was a brother; his Christian neighbor, his own infidel
ancestors, were strangers." (B. Lewis; 1966:323). The word "Turk"

was a pejorative one referring to the ignorant country bumpkins of
Anatolia. Halet Efendi, on arriving in Paris in 1802, was shocked to

be referred to as the "Turkish ambassador." (Ibid.:323). The stirrings
of a national consciousness beyond a religious identity are found in the
19th century as the intellegentsia discovered the writings of EurOpean
philosophers. The early Western ideal with which they became acquainted
was utilitarian, practical, and liberal; it dealt with nations defined
by visible and objective criteria such as territory and sovereignty.

The focus of attention of the 19th century Ottoman intellectuals was on
an Ottoman father land or a vaguely defined Ottoman nation. However,
the Ottoman Empire spanned too many local identities in its vastness to

make any such scheme a reality. The Young Turk movement also focused

28

on a nationalism of sorts, but as already noted, the Enver regime was
not about to abandon the ideas of empire. Hence, emphasis was placed
on movements such as pan-Ottomanism or pan-Turanism. However, when
Atatfirk came into power, the groundwork for Turkish nationalism had
already been laid, at least among the elite. Intellectually this was
seen in the works of such writers as Ziya Gokalp, a major philos0phical
influence under both the CUP and the Republic. (Heyd; 1950). Gokalp
believed that the political revolution of 1909 had to be supplemented
by a social and cultural revolution which would make every man conscious
of belonging to a Turkish nation. Under the Republic, his slogan of
"Turkification" became a rallying cry of nationalists, including
AtatUrk. Besides the intellectual influences it would seem that the
war solidified the opinion of many. Former subjects in the Balkans,
Armenia, and in the Muslim Arab territories had turned against the
Empire; there was the victorious opposition of the Allies and the
invasion by the Greeks. The inhabitants of Turkey became Turks, and
not Ottomans, as over against their enemies. Atatfirk encouraged such
tendencies. It is said that he, a Macedonian, looked to Anatolia as
the true heartland of Turkey; as a soldier he recognized the advantages
of and had argued as a cadet for pulling back the borders of the Otto-
man Empire to defensible positions. In the foreign policy of the
Republic, Atatfirk made it clear that his country wanted no more than
the territory within its own borders. He rejected the role of emperor

and of Caliph of all of the Muslims when these were offered to him.

29

But if the elite were nationalistic, there was a real question about
the rest of the population. Deutsch, a political scientist, says that
the strength of a nationalist process depends Upon two major elements.
"First, it may depend on the extent to which the ruling class itself
promotes this process, not merely with its outward trappings but in its
social substance; the extent, therefore, also to which the ruling class
remains accessible to the members of other classes for communication,
entry, alliance, or alignment. Second, it may depend on the extent
to which the masses of the peOple become mobilized with or without the
cooperation of their rulers, fOr realignment with the new nationalist
movement and the new changes in their old way of life." (Deutsch; 1953:
10M). Ataturk's Republic certainly embodied the first element. It was
nationalistic and as shall be seen, it actively encouraged the growth
of nationalistic tendencies. It is the second element that was in
doubt. Ataturk had to take steps to make the peasant a nationalist.
For the bulk of the pOpulace, allegiance was still primarily
religious. Indeed, Ataturk had used this when attempting to stir up
the peOple to fight against the Greeks. The Greeks were not only the
invaders of the Turkish homeland, but also were the infidels who were
destroying Muslim villages and killing Muslim women and children. Also,
when the Sultan's fgtzg_was issued branding the nationalists the

enemies of Islam, Atatflrk used his supporters among the muftis, cadis,

 

and ulemas of Anatolia to issue counter—fetvas condemning the Sultan.

Indeed much of Atatflrk's support among the peasantry was based on the

 

30

fact that he was the Gazi, the slayer of the infidel. But AtatUrk
wished to lead a "civilized" nation; to him civilization meant Western
civilization--and EurOpean civilizations were nationalistic. Hence,
his people needed to be nationalists. To achieve this took two steps:
(1) secularization and (2) Turkification. Secularization will be
discussed below. It should be pointed out, however, that Atatflrk
attempted to wrench the primacy of the peasant's allegiance to Islam
from him through the secularizing of the state, the closing of the
religious schools, and the attacking of symbols of Islam such as the
fez.

The second step was Turkification, the glorification of the
Turkish heritage and the shedding of Arabic and Persian influences on
the culture. As Webster so nicely puts it: "In general (Turkification)
is an attempt to separate the original streams of Turkish culture from
the waters in which it became diluted and muddied in the sea of other
Anatolian civilization." (Webster; 1939:290). The most dramatic of
these reforms was the change in the Turkish script from Arabic to a
Latin script. In August, 1928, Ataturk took the platform at a People's
Party fete at the Sarayburnu Park in Istanbul and announced in his
fashion that "Our rich and harmonious language will now be able to
display itself with new Turkish letters. We must free ourselves from
the incomprehensible signs that for centuries have held our minds in
an iron vice. You must learn the new Turkish letters quickly. Teach
them to your compatriots, to women and to men, to porters and to
boatmen. Regard it as a patriotic and national duty." (Kinross; l96u:

nus). The Arabic script was to be replaced. The consensus in the

31

literature is that this was a wise decision. Arabic characters are
illrsuited to the writing of Turkish, particularly because Turkish has
eight short vowels while Arabic distinguishes only three. Nor are
their consonant systems alike; the Arabic letter 52:) for example, was
used by the Turks to represent k, g, ng, y, and v. At no period was
there a universally recognized rule about the spelling of Turkish words.
In addition, the twenty-eight letters of Arabic script change their
form according to whether they are initial, medial, final, or isolated;
the beginner has thus to learn over one hundred characters and ortho—
graphic signs. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:97). Reforms in the script had been
proposed since the time of Mahmud II; the Young Turks similarly had
suggested such a change, but nothing was done. Impetus to Ataturk's
decision was given by the proclamation of the Soviet Union in 1925 that
a Latin script should replace the Arabic one in Turkish-speaking
Azerbayjan, a Soviet province on the eastern Turkish border. In 1926,
a similar decree was issued for the rest of the Turkish-speaking peOple
in the Soviet Union (B. Lewis; 1966:271). This in 1928, AtatUrk had
appointed an Alphabet Commision. In only six weeks, working on the
Soviet example, a Latin script was ready. After his dramatic announce-
mentAtatfirk toured the country explaining his script to the people. In
November, 1928, the script became law. Civil servants were required

to learn it and to sit for exams on it. The Latin script was to be the
sole script taught in schools and used in government literature. As

for the abruptness of the move, an anecdote goes that Atatflrk

32

asked a member of the Alphabet Commission how long the transition would
take from one script to the other. The consensus of Opinion, said
the member, was five years. This would allow for a period in which
both scripts would be taught by the schools and printed side by side
in the newspapers. In that case, said the Gazi, people would continue
to read the old and disregard the new; "The change will happen in
three months or it will not happen at all." (Kinross; 1964:942).
Robinson gives three reasons for the implementation of the new script:
"In the first place, the new nationalist tendencies tended to favor a
distinctly Turkish system of writing. The move was in part a national-
istic one. Secondly, the old script was of religious significance.
Arabic was the language of the Holy Quoran. So the move was also part
of the sustained effort to deemphasize everything religious. Thirdly,
the leadership wanted to cut the youth Off from the traditional
literature, which was overwhelmingly religious and force the new Turks
to read the new national literature of history, science, and technology."
(Robinson; 1963:85). A fourth reason might be added as well. In a
nation dedicated to educating its people as Turkey was and with only
between 10 to 20 percent of its people literate, the new script was felt
to facilitate the learning process. (6. L. Lewis; 1955:97).

A second major reform was the purging of Arabic and Persian words
from the language. Sir Harry Luke writes that: "When the (Turk)
changed his status from that of a Siberian nomad to that of a member of

an Empire partly EurOpean, he found it necessary to make large additions

33

to his vocabulary partly of abstract terms, for which purpose he
borrowed widely from Arabic and Persian. It is true that when these
Arabic and Persian words passed into the Turkish language they came
under the rules of Turkish grammar and were governed by Turkish
inflexions, Turkish declensions, Turkish suffixes, and Turkish pro-
nunciation. But, even when enclosed within a Turkish frame, most of
them remained unintelligible to Turks..." (Luke; 1936:185). Ataturk
declared that these foreign words were to be stricken from the native
language and that Turks should look into their past for substitutions.
The Turkish Linguistic Society was formed to facilitate this process.
Newspapers were required to use the new Turkish derivations. Glossaries
were compiled both to ease the transition and to allow even the most
learned to read books or magazines. A protest arose that this time
Atatfirk was expecting too much in too little time. Indeed this move-
ment threatened to make the Turkish language a mandarin language as
artificial and incomprehensible to the ordinary Turk as that of the Old
Ottoman ruling class. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:99). Thus the Official policy
of purification was abandoned; instead substitutions were encouraged
rather than required. The process continued at a slower pace. It is
seen today in the changeover Of place names for it was during this
period that Constantinople became Istanbul, Angora became Ankara, and
so on. Kinross says that: "This, more perhaps than any of Kemal's
other reforms made (the peOple) conscious of their 'Turkishness'."
(Kinross; l96n:u67). It is interesting that many EurOpean words were
introduced into the Turkish language and allowed to remain without

protest.

3'4

AtatUrk in his attempts to produce new nationalist symbols for
his peOple produced xenophobia. His Turkish Historical Society searched
the past for signs of Turkish greatness. Characters from the founders
of Sumer to Attila the Hun were claimed as Turkish. Particularly
appealing to Ataturk was a "sun language" theory of a Viennese philo-
logist. According to this theory, primitive man uttered his first
sounds, which evolved into words, in response to the awe induced in him
by the sun. The philologist felt that he had found a link between his
improvised sun language and Turkish. Thus the first language was
Turkish. This is symbolic of the excesses in which Ataturk's scholars
indulged. The nationalist symbols were communicated to the people
through the schools, by government propaganda, and through the culture
houses. The 93§k§_or Turkish Hearths had been established in 1911 by
the CUP as a means of awakening cultural consciousness and a feeling
of cultural unity. Their activities included lectures on rural
improvement, hygiene, and the cultural heritage. The Osak§_were
replaced in 1932 by the PeOple's Houses which operated on essentially
the same grounds. In this manner Atatfirk hOped to educate new genera—
tions of Turks, brimming with nationalistic fervor, who would then

bring their nation into the foremost in the civilized world.

Republicanism
On October 13, 1923 Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and
Atatflrk was elected by the National Assembly as its first president.

This reform had its precursors, primarily in the assemblies under the

35

1876 Constitution and in the restoration of that Constitution by the
Young Turks. But in neither the Ottoman Empire nor in the government
of the CUP was there any intention of transferring sovereignty to the
people. In the Ottoman Empire the Sultan/Caliph was something of a
combination of a Tudor king and a Roman pOpe. His authority was
paramount in both secular and religious affairs. The CUP produced

a dictator, Enver, and a new elite. Thus it was a startling departure
from precedent when the Grand National Assembly published a POpulist
Declaration on December 18, 1920 which asserted that national sover-
eignty, the sovereignty of the peOple, was the foundation of constitu-
tional government in Turkey. Thus Turkey claimed that Turkish govern-
ment derived its power from the "consent of the governed." While

Ziya Gokalp may once again be considered the philosophical mentor of
such a move, it was Ataturk who was especially dedicated to such a
principle. It is difficult to assess the origins of Ataturk's belief
in democratic principles. He was, after all, a military man and in
his personal mien more given to authoritarianism and action than to
such concepts as free debate, checks and balances, and votes. Though
undoubtedly he read certain EurOpean writers (Rousseau and Voltaire
are the only two ever mentioned) while in school, perhaps Ward is nearer
to being correct when she writes that: "At the same time, the behavior,
the dogged endurance, the patience, the heroism, of the ordinary
soldiers did more for the demOcratic temper of Kemal's mind than years

of reading the scholarly source-books of French liberalism. It filled

36

him with an angry devotion for the rough sons of Anatolia, who for
centuries had borne, either in the taxes on their fields or the guns on
their shoulders, the full burden of the imperialist follies of the
Sultanate." (Ward; 19u2:u0). Those who have read of the merciless

way Ataturk threw those troops into certain death might reply more
cynically. Nevertheless, following the POpulist Declaration, when
debate broke down in the National Assembly as to a constitution and
other aspects of government, it was AtatUrk who "by fOrce of his in-
fluence, personality, and steamroller tactics ended the debate and the
Fundamental Articles of the Constitutional Act of the Government of
the Grand National Assembly were adopted." (E. Smith; 1958:86).

This document came into force on January 20, 1921. Its first provision
reads: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation." In
subsequent sections the Constitution of 1921 provides for free
elections of delegates to a National Assembly every two years, details
the rights of the assembly, such as the election of ministers, and
explains the rights of the President of the Assembly. Atatflrk was
chosen to that post.

There were difficulties with this first constitution. For
instance it included little about political parties, established only
a unicameral Assembly, and failed to provide for a Supreme Court. In
short, it allowed for the sort of authoritarian leadership that Atatfirk
was to give. But Ataturk was dissatisfied with it for another reason:

it did not provide for the separation of church and state. This became

37

a crisis in October of 1922 when the Allies, at the Opening of the
Lausanne Conference, sent invitations to both the National Assembly

and to the Sultan. The initial response of the Assembly was to call
for the deposition of the current Sultan, Mahmet VI. Atatfirk had
another proposal: the abolition of the Sultanate. He argued that
under the Constitution, sovereignty belonged to the nation, not to an
individual. Hence, while the position of Caliph could be retained the
Sultanate should go. A debate was called during which various scholars
and theologians discussed whether it was feasible to separate the posi-
tion of Sultan from that of Caliph. Ataturk listened to the debate

for several hours. Finally he asked for the floor and stated:
"Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone because scholarship
says so; because of debate or discussion. They are taken by strength,
by power, by force. By force, the Ottoman dynasty seized the sovereignty
and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation
for six hundred years. The Turkish nation has called a halt; it has
rebelled and taken the sovereignty into its own hands. This is an
accomplished fact. The question is not whether or not we are going to
leave the sovereignty to the nation; the question is merely how to give
éXpression to the accomplished reality." (EncyCIOpedia of Islam; 1961:
169). Several sources report that the delegates politely thanked
Atatflrk for his views, that they had not been looking at the question
from that perspective. Obviously intimidated, the Assembly proceeded

to vote for the abolition of the Sultanate. On November 17, 1922

38

Vahideddin escaped from Turkey, and on November 18, by a vote of the
Grand National Assembly, Abdulmecit, his cousin, became Caliph.

One step remained in Ataturk's aim to achieve a Republic: the
name itself. The Constitution of 1921 provided within it the means by
which Ataturk was to accomplish his end. The National Assembly
appointed its ministers; the ministers were responsible to the Assembly
and could be replaced by it. Thus, "the Ministers became the victims
of constant criticism both by persons who sincerely disagreed with their
ideas and by those who for personal reasons wanted to replace them as
Minister. This resulted in a condition of general anarchy and
confusion." (E. Smith; 1958:57). Atatfirk, using this to his advantage,
provoked a governmental crisis by convincing all the ministers to turn
in their resignations simultaneously. A stalemate on the choice of a
new Cabinet was quickly reached in the Assembly. The deputies sent for
Ataturk and asked his advice. Not surprisingly he suggested that:

”The form of government of the Turkish state is a Republic." He called
for a vote; the motion passed unanimously, that is to say, 158 of the
287 members present voted for the motion. The rest abstained. G. L.
Lewis reports that: "The decision to make Turkey into a Republic,
though hotly contested, did not come as a surprise." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:
78). One member of the Assembly said realistically: "Once you've said
iSovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation' you can ask anyone
you like; its a Republic." (in E. Smith; 1958:58). Brock reports that

there was "dancing in the villages" at the news. (Brock; 195uz333).

39

On April 20, 192R, a new Constitution was ratified by the Assembly
which names Turkey as a Republic and reaffirms national sovereignty.
Legislative and executive power were given to a popularly elected
Assembly; executive power was exercised only indirectly through the
President Of the Republic and his ministers, chosen by him. The
Assembly was given the Option of overthrowing the government of the
President. Atatflrk was chosen the first President. He in turn named
Ismet his prime minister.

An important aspect of the Republic came to be the Republican
People's party. In the spring of 1923, Atatflrk, to strengthen his
own hand domestically and to strengthen Ismet's bargaining position at
Lausanne, formed the party that became the RPP. The Party was to serve
as a vehicle for social reform. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:129). Atatfirk
was its permanent President-General. The Party was highly organized;
the Party Program of 1935 details the organization from the Presidency-
General to the local Official. Since it was the only party allowed to
exist in Turkey, it was closely affiliated with the workings of the
government as a whole. Government and RPP hierarchies tended to coincide.
Atatfirk saw the RPP as having two primary fUnctions. The first, of
course, was to provide candidates for election. Second, Article 5
of the Program reads: "It is a fUnction of Party members and organiza—
tions unremittingly to carry on propaganda for and explanation of Party
principles among all fellow citizens." (in Webster; 1939:111). The
Party's principles were the same as those of the government's: nation-
alism, republicanism, laicism, populism, etatism, and reformism. To

this end the Party owned and Operated the People's Houses and the

no

People's Rooms. The RPP was an important link in Ataturk's
republicanism.

In this manner Atatfirk Officially brought the people of Turkey
into its government. The peasant was given a vote and a party for
which to vote. Both the government and the RPP were intent on educa-
ting the peasant as to his role in the new sphere. An interesting
paradox developed, however, as Atatfirk's regime evolved. That govern-
ment, as Yale suggests, was "a dictatorship under constitutional
representative government." (Yale; 1958:295). A party was established
by Atatfirk; it was the only party allowed to exist.u The press was
censored. Atatflrk was very much the military commander; his commands
were to be obeyed. Opposition was tolerated only insofar as it did not
threaten AtatUrk's program of reform. An opposition deveIOped in
November, 192”, in the fOrm of the Progressive Party. Its leadership
was composed of many of the army leaders who had supported Atatfirk in
1919, noteably Rauf and Kazim Karabekir. The Progressive Party, while
agreeing with the republican ideals of AtatUrk's government, disagreed
with Atatflrk's assumption of absolute authority and with Ismet's
economic policies and authoritarian methods. A more fundamental
difference appeared in the divergent approaches of the two parties to
modernization. Ataturk and his followers wanted social revolution;
Rauf preferred social evolution, that is, he did not wish to impose
reforms upon an unwilling peOple. Rather, he proposed to make the
necessary changes in law while letting the peOple adapt to them over
time. Such aprogram was too slow for Atattlrk's designs. (Kinross; 196A;

392). At first AtatUrk tolerated his Opposition and even made

ul

concessions to them, among them being the removal of Ismet from the
Cabinet and his replacement by Fethi, who had more liberal views of
dissension. For several months the Progressives played an active and
not wholly ineffective part in the Assembly. However, in June, 1926,
a conspiracy to assassinate Atatfirk was uncovered. It developed that
Rauf had been informed of the plot, but he had underrated the source
and had failed to inform Atatfirk. Atatfirk, in turn, used the incident
to rid himself of the bothersome Opposition. Kiazim, Rauf, Refet,
Ali Fuad, and a number of other prominent Turks were arrested. Their
trial was turned over to the improvised Tribunal of Independence,
specially called into being to deal with the matter. Rauf and seven
others were exiled. Kiazim, Refet, Ali Faud and two others were fOund
innocent. The rest were hanged; Atatfirk signed the execution orders
before the trial had begun. (Armstrong; 1933).

In 1930 Atatfirk decided to form his own Opposition, a loyal
opposition in the model of the English system, but one which was under
his immediate control. His loyal supporter, Fethi, was chosen as the
head of this Opposition, and several of Ataturk's close associates were
encouraged to join the party, the Free Republican Party. Censorship of
the press was raised, and dissent was suddenly encouraged. Ataturk
was eXperimenting with democracy in action. It is possible that he
underestimated the fervor of his opposition in Turkey. By this time the
major steps in the secularization program had been carried out; the
economy, under the double burden of development and world depression,

was going badly. Of course, Opposition up to this point had been

”2

minimal, except for a Kurd revolt that had been brutally extinguished
and the assassination attempt; but then opposition was not allowed.
Bahrampour notes that: "The leaders of the RPP believed that their
reforms were widely welcomed by the Turkish people. Actually the lack
of a formal Oppostion prevented the traditionalists from publicly
expressing their views on the Westernization program." (Bahrampour;
1967:17). An undercurrent of Opposition existed, primarily among the
clerics. Fethi's party became a rallying point for the silenced
"traditionalists." At first Fethi made public appearances. Enthusi-
astic crowds turned out to cheer him and to denounce the government of
Ataturk and Ismet, now restored to the premiership. When, in Izmir
theRPP organized a counter-rally, few supporters turned out. Rather,
a demonstration calling for Fethi formed in front of the RPP's
headquarters. The police fired on the crowd, killing a boy of fourteen.
Fethi decided to curtail his public appearances and to concentrate on
political debate in the Assembly. Here, under Ataturk's orders, he
attached the government. The reaction was electric; fist fights

broke out on the Assembly floor. Sadly Atatflrk cancelled his grand
experiment in democracy at the age of three months. Fethi was exiled.
Six weeks later, when another Kurdish revolt broke out, Atatflrk took
the Opportunity to deal with his harshest Opponents in the defunct
Free Party. The Kurds, whoaarevolt centered on secularization, were
again defeated, but subsequent arrests included many who were not
Kurds. Over one hundred persons were tried for inciting the population

to sedition in an attempt to "alter the Constitution by force." Some

#3

were hanged; others were imprisoned. An opposition party did not
reappear in Turkey until after World War II. (Kinross; 196”).

Several authors are quick to pass over Atatfirk, the dictator,
most suggesting that the times required strong leadership. Webster
points out that while Atatfirk was a dictator, he intended to make
Turkey a democracy. "NO one expects an Opposition party to arise before
Atatfirk is ready to permit its existence. However, this must not be
interpreted as an indication of either a party or a personal dictator-
ship. What it does mean is that Atatfirk is relying on his judgement--
and many citizens are depending on it--to determine when the Turkish
people are sufficiently advanced in their political thinking and
ability to work together rather than misuse the unlimited forms of
democracy for anarchistic self-expression and behavior...The average
Turk and the 'Father of the Turks' are both democrats at heart."
(Webster; 1939:286). Though this quotation is Obviously overstated,
it probably contains something of the truth. Kinross reports that
Atatfirk sought to justify the liquidation of his opponents and his
assumption of dictatorial powers by saying that: "It was the people that
I was afraid of." (Kinross; 195u:u35). It was Atatfirk's conclusion, and
that of most writers, that because of the lack of a democratic heritage,
the Turkish peOple were politically unsophisticated and unable to handle
the powers of democracy. Armstrong quotes Ataturk as saying in 1932:
"...let the peOple leave politics alone for the present. Let them

interest themselves in agriculture and commerce. For ten or fifteen

nu,

years more I must rule. After that perhaps I may be able to let them
speak Openly." (Armstrong; 1933:268). Thus the paradox exists that
Turkey was at once a Republic, whose sovereignty belonged to the people
and a dictatorship. Perhaps the best appraisal is that compared to

the Ottoman Empire, Atatfirk's regime was liberal and democratic.
Compared to the West's conception of democracy, the regime was a
dictatorship. This dictatorship should also be compared to its contemp-
oraries in Italy and Germany. Though Atatfirk dealt ruthlessly with his
foes and made a travesty of justice at times through the Tribunals of
Independence, there was none of the widespread persecution of minority
groups such as that found in Nazi Germany. Neither was there a secret
police; criticism of the regime, within bounds, was tolerated. However,
Atatfirk did not have a large urban proletrariat or a large educated
class to contend with. Nevertheless, Bernard Lewis writes that: "His
was a dictatorship without the uneasy over-the-shoulder glance, the
terror of the door-bell, the dark menace of the concentration camp.
Force and repression were certainly used to establish and maintain

the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes, but no longer;
and after the executions of 1926, there was little danger to life and
to personal liberty." (B. Lewis; 1966:285). This is not an attempt

to excuse dictatorship; it is difficult to compare regimes by weighing
the number of persons killed. But AtatUrk's regime should be placed in

perspective. It was a highly authoritarian Republic.

#5

Laicism _

Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk was not a Muslim. There is no comment in
the literature as his ever having any religious affiliation of any kind.
He did not see, as his Ottoman precursors had, the world divided up into
Muslims and infidels. Rather~he saw it divided into civilized and
uncivilized nations. It was his aim to make Turkey a civilized nation
based not on a religious order, but on science, education, and tech-
nology. To accomplish this required the secularization of the Turkish
state. In 1925, Ataturk stated in a speech at Kastamonu that: "...the
Turkish Republic cannot be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, and
acstatics. The truest religious order is the order of civilization.

It is a condition of humanity to fulfill the commands and demands of
civilization." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:225). The first step in
this process had been to formally hand sovereignty to the people: the
abolition of the Sultanate. The next step was to do away with the
Caliphate. Berkes speculates that Ataturk would have allowed the
Caliphate to remain if the new Caliph, Abdulmecit, hadn't overstepped
his instructions as to his powers given him by Atatfirk. (Berkes; 1964:
#57). This is doubtful. There appears to have been more to the question
than this including the very real possiblity that the Caliph would
become the rallying point of Atatfirk's opposition. And, as has been
already been seen, the Caliphate would have been inconsistent with
Ataturk's designs for the state. Indeed he stated that "Following

the abolition Of the Sultanate, I accepted the abolition of the

Caliphate, as it was nothing but the same personal sovereignty under

45

another name." (Berkes; 1954:454). The new Caliph was given the

role of a nominal figurehead by Atatfirk, with no powers or positions.
Abdulmecid, however, the Shadow of God on earth, took his high office

as a supreme duty. He chose to revive the traditions of the great
Sultan-Caliphs. Instead of using a carriage like his predecessor, he
rode gallantly like Muhammed the Conqueror on a white charger across the
Golden Horn to Santa Sophia to say the prayers each Friday, with an
escort of hussars behind him. When he prayed in the great mosque of
Skutari, he was rowed across the Bosporus in the imperial barge with
fourteen oarsmen dressed in his splendid livery. Wherever he went,
crowds gathered to cheer him. He received visitors, ambassadors, and
delegates in his palace, conscious as he was of being the spiritual
head Of one hundred million Muslims. Such moves displeased Ataturk,

but he sensed that no counter move could be made without a great outcry.
His opportunity arose when the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali, two distinguished
'Indian Muslims, wrote Ismet on November 24, 1923 urging the "imminent
necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam
by placing the Calioh-Imamate on a basis which would command the
confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations..." (in G. L. Lewis; 1955:
84). Atatflrk and his followers spread the story that the Agha Khan

was a pawn of the British; obviously the hated British, who had
encouraged the Greek campaigns of 1919-1923, were still trying to
undermine the Turkish state, by questioning the sovereignty of the

people. Their propaganda was effective. On March 3, 1924, the National

47

Assembly voted for the deposition of Abdulmecid, the abolition of

the Caliphate, and the banishment from Turkey of all members of the
Imperial family. At the same sitting two more blows were struck at
Islam. The Law of Unification of Instruction gave into the charge of
the Ministry of Public Instruction all educational institutions within
the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. This placed the medresses,
the Islamic schools, under the direct control of the government, which
shortly thereafter closed them. The other blow entailed replacing

the Ministry of Seriat and Evkaf by a new department of the Prime
Minister's office, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Seriat
branch had controlled the religious courts; these were closed on
April 8. The Evkaf oversaw the pious endowments,5 many of which were
confiscated and redistributed. The tombs and shrines of saints were
also closed; religious fflnctionaries were permitted to wear clerical
garb only while performing their duties.

As his next step AtatUrk proposed the abolition of the Seriat as
the Civil Code. The Seriat was the holy law of Islam, composed of the
Quoran, the Sunna, Umerecognized corpus of tradition or practice of
the prophet, and the interpretations of the four great doctors of Islam,
all of whom lived in the 8th or 9th centuries A.D. (Luke; 1936:174).
The Ottomans had made the Seriat the effective law of the state; they
gave full recognition and authority to the courts and judiciary that
administered it. Some portions Of Western law had been introduced in
the Tanzimat and in the Young Turk periods, but essentially the Seriat

remained the law of the Republic. In 1926 AtatUrk introduced a penal

48

code based on the Italian Code, a commercial code modeled on German
and Italian examples, and the Swiss Civil Code. While the commercial
and penal codes were not of concern to the Opponents of secularization,
the civil code was, as it regulated practices in family relationships.
Polygamy was now illegal; marriage became a civil contract. The
husband's advantage under Islamic law in securing divorce was swept
away. The new civil code also did away with the millets, the last
vestiges of an Ottoman practice of allowing non—Muslim minorities the
right to their own communal law. Thus both sexes and all sects were
made equal under the law.

It is interesting that Ataturk received very little Opposition
to these moves even considering the official policy towards Opposition.
There was little outcry. Webster naively interprets this to mean that
religion had no hold on the deepest interests of the people. (Webster;
1939:278). G. L. Lewis offers a more plausible explanation: "Islam in
Turkey has always existed on two different planes. There was the Islam
of the state, with its salaried hierarchy speaking with the voice of
orthodoxy and there was the heterodox Islam of the peOple T(and not only
of the common people) embodied in the great dervish order." (G. L. Lewis;
1955:91). The loss of the Caliphate and of the Ministry of Seriat and
Evkaf were of interest primarily to politicians and the Islamic
hierarchy. The faith and the life of the peasant were untouched. As
for the new Civil Code, Stirling reports that even in 1949, "the effect
of those parts of the Civil Code that govern marriage and the family

have at present almost no bearing on the village." (Stirling; 1965:271).

49

But Atatfirk was to take a step that was to shake the core of the
citizenry: the abolition of the fez.

In 1829 Mahumud II had decreed the fez as mandatory clothing for
civilians. Mode of dress is very closely attached to a Muslim's belief.
Certain clothing was appropriate to an infidel. To adopt the dress of
an infidel was to a Muslim more than a change of style; it was an act
of treason and apostasy. Previous to Mahmud's reign the turban was
appropriate to a Muslim. Supposedly the Prophet had said that: "The
turban is the barrier separating belief and disbelief." Thus when
Mahmud introduced the fez there was great Opposition. (B. Lewis; 1966:
99-100). But by 1926 the fez was firmly entrenched in Islamic identity.

In fact in the Turkish idiom of the time, sapka giymek, "to put on a

 

hat," meant to apostasize from Islam. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:92). A hat
with a brim was part of the clothing Of the infidel; with the brimless
fez, the believer could touch his forehead to the ground in prayer.

For Atatfirk the fez was an apprOpriate symbol. To get at the mind of
the Muslim, he must first wrench away his headgear. In typical dramatic
fashion, Atatfirk chose to begin his campaign in the remote, conservative
town of Kastamonu. Crowds turned out to see the Gazi for the first
time; the Gazi appeared waring a Panama hat. Brock compares the
situation to the Prince of Wales appearing in Trafalgar Square in his
underwear. (Brock; 1954:359). The reaction to the hat was stunned
silence. Atatfirk toured through Turkey attempting to persuade by

example. When example failed, he turned to law. Turks were required

50

to wear headgear with a brim, a hat. The response was quick in coming.
Muslims all over Turkey railed aginst the accursed hats. Riots broke
out in Erzurum, in Menemen, and in Sivas. Local officials and police
were attacked and stoned. Both the clerics and the peOple recognized
that this was a frontal attack on their religion and its place in
Turkish society. Ataturk responded decisively. He reinvoked the
Tribunals of Independence. He prescribed prison and the bastinado for
first offenders in the crime of wearing a fez, shooting or hanging for
irreconcilables. When the fez became fatal, it disappeared. Turkish
Muslims wore hats. A Kurdish revolt led by members of a dervish
brotherhoods. Opposition was undoubtedly great, but then, opposition
was not to be tolerated.

Other moves in the secularization reform included the replacing
of the Muslim calendar by the Gregorian calendar. The call to prayer
was translated into Turkish and was required to be spoken in that
language. In 1935 the weekly day of rest, itself an innovation in 1924,
was changed from the Muslim sabbath of Friday to a European-Style
weekend of Saturday noon to Monday morning. The phrase "the religion
of the Turkish state is Islam" was struck from the Constitution.
Atatflrk renounced his title of Gazi. Combined with the reforms in
script and in language, with their religious denotations, the sum total
of the secularization process was the separation at the official
level of church and state. Its effect on the pOpulace was more
uncertain. Smith writes that "of all of Atatfirk's reforms, seculariza—

tion is the one which has been least thoroughly absorbed by the Turkish

51

people..." (E. Smith; 1958:102). Robinson suggests that the efforts

Of the police had a great deal to do with the disappearance of practices
such as the fez rather than any real allegiance to the aims of secu—
larization. (Robinson; 1963:84). The implications of this will be
discussed below. It should be noted that, despite appearances, Atatfirk
did not attempt to eradicate Islam as a belief system. Indeed many

of his followers, including Ismet, were said to be men of personal piety.
Kinross notes that "though he might, by a single act of his Grand
National Assembly, abolish the political power of the Islamic religion,
he could not neutralize its spiritual and social influences and indeed
did not pretend to interfere with freedom of religious conscious."
(Kinross; 1964:387). His intention instead was to deprive the people
through a series of abrupt shocks of such influences as might rival that
of the state in allegiance. In fact, Atatfirk claimed to be purifying
Islam. In 1924, when he was advocating the abolition of the Caliphate,
he said: "We also recognize that it is indispensable in order to secure
the revival of the Islamic faith, to disengage it from being a political
instrument, which it has been through habit." (in Stirling; 1958:398).
It was here undoubtedly that Atatfirk, the entrepreneur, took his great—

est risks.

Populism

POpulism as a principle was construed by AtatUrk and his followers

to refer to the democratic rights given to the Turkish people. Webster

says that: "Populism, at its current stage, secures to Turkish citizens

52

equal social, economic, and juridicial rights, and provides for a
democratic exercise of the suffrage in local elections." (Webster; 1939:
166). Atatfirk himself stated that: "We are populists, and pOpulism
means that power, authority, sovereignty, administration, should be
given directly to the peOple and kept in the hands of the people."

(in Eren; 1963:20). It should be remembered, however, that Atatfirk
felt that his peOple were insufficiently educated in the principles of
democracy. Thus it is not surprising that the Atatfirk regime placed a
major emphasis on education. When asked at the end of the War of
Independence as to his future plans, Ataturk replied that: "My
greatest ambition is to try to raise the standard of national enlight—
enment as Minister of Education." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:204).
Educational reforms leading towards universal primary education had been
attempted during both the Tanzimat and the Young Turks eras. Kazamias
reports that: "the Constitution of 1876 provided that all schools
should be under government supervision and that the first stage of
education should be compulsory. Although these principles were dis—
carded along with the Constitution, the idea of educational reform
survived. Indeed as in the period of the Tanzimat, education was
considered the cornerstone of any and all improvements in the juridi—
cial, legal, administrative, and military advancement of the state."
(Kazamias; 1966:80). The Young Turks attempted reforms in 1913 that
would have secularized the schools and made the first six years of
education compulsory. However, World War I interferred with such
plans. The medresses trained exclusively for ecclesiastical careers.

Emphasis was on learning Arabic and the

53

Quoran. As religious education was a means of social mobility and the
medresses were free, it is not surprising that they continued to

flourish in the Republic. For most of the people, education represented
greater piety and greater knowledge of religious matters. Allen,
however, charges that: "One Of the worst faults with the instruction

in the old mosque schools was its emphasis on memorizing and repetition--
features which made the students tend to be purely imitative and lacking
in mental initiative." (Allen; 1935:104). The best education was still
to be had in the military schools, with their limited enrollment. A
second problem with both the medresses and the military schools was

that education was still not compulsory, either functionally or legally
in the Republic. That 80 to 90 percent of the population was illiterate
shows that this was an important failure of the school system. (Kazamias;
1966:272). Finally, the medresses were religious schools and thus had
no place in AtatUrk's scheme of education. As noted, the medresses

were closed soon after their administration was placed under the Ministry
of the Public Instruction in 1924.

The Constitution of 1924 places all education under the super-
vision and control of the state. It reaffirms the previous principle
that "primary education is obligatory for all Turks and shall be
gratuitous in the government schools." (Ibid.:ll7). To provide an
education the Turkish Republic needed school buildings, teachers,
students, and a curriculum. The buildings existed in the towns; villages
were required to build schools by the Village Code of 1924. Webster

writes that: "School buildings more than anything else that meets

54

the eye are both the most Obvious and most significant symbols of
Turkey's reformation...In thousands Of communities there is at least

one modern, new structure which attracts the attention and which in all
probability has been erected under the new regime--and if it be the only
good building in the village or neighborhood-~it is almost certainly the
schoolhouse." (Webster; 1939:210). Teachers are more difficult to
manufacture. Parker and Smith note that the progress of primary educa-
tion was held up by the lack of teachers. (Parker 8 Smith; 1940:163).
One major problem was that the teaching profession had to compete with
the government's need for a trained civil service and an expanding
industry's need for technicians. One way of handling this was to
decrease the mandatory six years of primary education to three years.
This, in turn, affected the quality of education; it is one reason why
Turkish government figures on literacy have to be read very carefully.
As for the students, despite what Webster seems to imply, many communi—
ties did not have educational facilities; many students could not afford
to move to another area to go to school. Thus, though primary school
education was compulsory, it was far from universal. In 1934-35 only
about 40 percent of all children between the ages of seven and twelve
were in primary school and only 28 percent of village children.6 Even
this, however, represents a remarkable growth. In 1924, 336,061 were
enrolled in primary schools; in 1935 the figure was 688,100. Literacy
was judged to have jumped from 10.6 percent in 1924 to 19.2 percent in

1935. (Kazamias; 1966:271-2). The Atatfirk regime did make some

55

remarkable strides in the direction of educating the Turkish people.
As for the curriculum, its form is presented in detail in both Webster
and Kazamias and need not be reproduced here. It should be mentioned
that the change in script from Arabic to Latin allowed for increased
access to education and facilitated the learning process.

Besides the compulsory primary school education, lycees, or
secondary schools were established on a French model, though these
were found primarily in urban areas. Only 120,000 were enrolled in
lycees in 1935. (Ibid.:272). In addition, the Istanbul University was
reorganized, and the construction of other universities was begun.

The education of adults was not neglected. Through the ank§_and later
the People's Houses and People's Rooms an education Of sorts was
offered in the form of lectures on hygiene, rural improvement, and
cultural heritage as well as classes on language, typing, accounting,
and home economics. The Qg§k§_were a creation of the Young Turks;

the People's Houses were instituted in 1932. Karpat writes that: "The
PeOple's Houses embody the principle of populism, one of the six
principles in the Turkish Constitution of 1924. Their purpose was to
bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and the people by teaching
the first of these the national culture which lay among the Anatolian
masses and the second, the rudiments of civilization and an indoctri-
nation Of the nationalist secular ideas Of the Republican regime."
(Karpat; 1963:55). The People's Houses and the People's Rooms, which
were smaller organizations more suited to villages, were a response to

the public reaction to the Free Party of 1930; they were to be the means

56

by which the peOple were educated in democratic ideals. Thus, their
program tended to be one of government propaganda rather than of
instruction. At any rate, they were few in number and sparsely attended.
Nevertheless, this and the other elements of education in the Republic
were an important part of Ataturk's plan to bring the people into the

sphere of government.

Etatism

Davison writes that Ataturk was generally more concerned with
political, social, and cultural questions then with economic ones.
(Davison; 1968:140). However, in 1924, Atatflrk Observed that: "With-
out economic (deveIOpment) a weak state cannot be saved from poverty;
it cannot be saved from social and-economic disease...There is no civil—
ized state which does not think of its economy before its army and its
fleet." (in Robinson; 1963:63). Obviously AtatUrk recognized the
importance of economic concerns in his overall program of transforma-
tion. At the end of the War of Independence the economic state of
Turkey was deplOrable. To begin with, the Ottoman Empire had allowed
non-Muslim foreigners a wide range Of privileges in trade in Turkey;
these are known as the Capitulations. Groups Of foreigners engaged
in trade in Turkey were subject only to the laws Of their own country.
Foreign concerns were almost entirely free of any Turkish control and
were quite free of taxes. The Ottomans had established the Capitula-

tions to encourage trade, but instead the tax advantages made competition

57'

by Turkish enterprises unprofitable. Such economic activity as there
was came to be concentrated in the hands of aliens. Similarly under
the millets non-Muslim Turkish inhabitants gained economic privileges
and concentrated most of the rest of the economy in their hands. World
War I deprived Turkey of both her capital and her merchants. For
instance, in the exchange of populations after the Treaty of Lausanne
over one million Greeks were deported to Greece; most of them were
merchants and small businessmen. RObinson notes that: "Economically
the country seemed in hopeless condition. There was, in 1919, virtually
no modern industry, except a very few foreign—owned plants and utilities
in the Istanbul and Izmir areas...In agriculture almost no machinery
was used and farming practices followed the same cycle that had
prevailed for centuries." (Robinson; 1963:63). To make matters worse,
neither Atatflrk nor Ismet understood much about economics or finance.
Seemingly politically advantageous moves such as discouraging Allied
investment, given the conditions of the Treaty of Sevres, were

economic failures; capital became unavailable. When local private
industry and enterprise not surprisingly failed to provide economic
growth, AtatUrk announced a policy of etatism or state capitalism.
Bahrampour writes that: "During the period 1923-1933 the Turkish
experience showed, however, that reliance solely on private capital

did not result in economic develOpment to as rapid a degree as required
by the emerging new Republic. The dearth of trained personnel and
enlightened private management also retarded economic growth."

(Bahrampour; 1967:72). Thus, under etatism, private initiative was

58

still to be encouraged, but the major economic role was to be taken
by the state.

In a speech on March 1, 1922, Ataturk described the main economic
problems to be faced including the modernizing of agriculture, the
conservation of forests, and the growth of industry. There was also
to be the nationalization of "Institutions and enterprises directly
affecting the public interests..." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:246).
Hence banks were established by the government to develop certain
economic sectors such as mining. Railroads were nationalized as were
air, postal, telegraph, telephone, and maritime passenger services.
Industries were encouraged through the offer of free state-owned land.
Through a Five-Year Plan begun in 1934 a number of modern factories
were constructed, and the economy creaked into motion. Much
criticism has been Offered of this portion of Ataturk's program either

7 or that it was a failure.

on the grounds that it was akin to communism
As for the former point, it should be noted that the Turkish govern-

ment continued to encourage private enterprise; indeed in 1938 private
enterprise covered more than half the industrial field in Turkey.

(Parker 8 Smith; 1940:129). But private enterprise, with its lack of
capital, was unable to move quickly enough to provide a strong economic
base for Ataturk's social reforms. Robinson refers to the "...compelling
need for accelerated economic development, the failure of private

enterprise to maintain the desired pace, the non-availability of foreign

Capital, and the ambition of empire-building bureaucrats..." as reasons

59

behind the initiation of etatism. (Robinson; 1963:111). As for the
second point, once again the lack of foreign capital as well as the
depression of the 1930's worked to slow the progress of state capitalism.
But growth did occur. Davison notes that though develOpment measures
were often inefficient, tangled in bureaucratic regulations, without
proper attention to distribution and marketing of what was produced,
there was "without question" progress under AtatUrk's etatism.
(Davison; 1968:141).

AtatUrk used etatism as a means of furthering his social reforms.
It was his deliberate policy to use industry not only for production,
but also as an educational device and a lever for regional development.
Industries were placed in Anatolia and in eastern Turkey in order to
Offset the imbalance that existed between the urbanized western portions
of Turkey and the rural eastern sections. Attempts were made to
discourage the growth of cities around industries; these in turn were
placed within easy reach of towns and villages. Peasants were
encouraged to migrate seasonally in order to boost their earnings from
agriculture; industries provided dormitories for these transients.
Such endeavors partially broke the peasant away from his physical and
psychological isolation. On the other hand, says Robinson, these
policies discouraged the growth of a new urban, landless proletariat.
(Robinson; 1963:117). "With the Soviet Union so close at hand there
was occassion for concern." (Robinson; 1963:117). The Labor Code of

June, 1936, provided welfare legislation for the workers. Regulations

60

were placed on women and child labor and on the payment of wages. A
48-hour work week was made the maximum regularly permitted. The effect
of the Code was that "...welfare rather than production was the prime
consideration..." (Webster; 1939:251); Robinson calls it "paternalistic."
(Robinson; 1963:109). A controversial section of the Labor Code
prohibited strikes by the workers; hence it is said that the Code did
more to protect the state than the workers. (Webster; 1939:258).

It has been estimated that in the first days of the Republic
that 85 percent of the pOpulation were agriculturalists. Ataturk
stated on March 1, 1922, that "The real lord and master of Turkey is
the peasant, who is a producer. This being so, the peasant deserves
the more prosperity, happiness, and wealth." (Encyclopedia of Islam;
1961:243). Despite this, however, the overwhelming bulk of Turkey's
non-military investment during AtatUrk's regime went into industry and
communications. Aside from certain highly specialized crOps and some
agriculture-based industry, little was done to improve agriculture
under etatism. As an example, as recently as 1948 there were only
1700 tractors in the country. (Robinson; 1963:120). Ward explains
this as follows: "In all rapidly industrializing countries it is the
peasantry that bears the weight of their country...Turkey is no excep-
tion to what seems to be a general rule of industrial development."
(Ward; 1942:73). Perhaps a more logical explanation is that Offered by
Robinson: "Nothing could have changed village farm practices until a
core of literate and mechanically knowledgeable farmers had been

created." (Robinson; 1963:113). It must be remembered that AtatUrk

61

made the reforms he did not by reason of any compelling pOpular pressure.
The entrepreneur had to create his channels of conversion forcibly.
Reforms were carried through by deliberate planning and pushing on the
part of the leadership of the country. While Ataturk could create social
revolution in abolishing the Caliphate or in nationalizing railroads,

he had to settle for Rauf's social evolution when it came to bettering
the lot of the peasantry. The Village Code of 1924 was a prescription
for certain behavior in the village. It specified the election and
conduct of village officials and gave two lists of improvements to be
made in each village, the one obligatory and the other optional.

Those in the former list had to do with public sanitary measures and the
building of a schoolhouse. The voluntary improvements envisioned
aesthetic and material factors looking to a higher standard of living.
(Webster; 1939:236). For other agricultural improvements the Atatflrk
regime had to provide example and education. As to the example,

Webster writes that: "Conservative as have been many of the influences
in the life of the Turkish peasant, he is quick to learn with his eyes--
if the lesson be written in Objects rather than Arabic or Latin charac-
ters." (Ibid.:268). The government provided, among other services, seed,
stud animals of excellent quality, and some mechanical equipment. It
was hoped that when a villager saw the advantages to certain procedures,
he or a group of villagers might pool their resources to secure the

goods on a more permanent basis. As for the education, the primary
schools and lycees were to be made available to the peasant, as well

as the Higher Agricultural School, an institution of university rank

62

in Ankara. There was also the world-view expanding Opportunities of
migrant labor and military service. It should be mentioned that in
1939, after Atatfirk's death, the Village Institutes were Opened.

At the Village Institutes children who had completed their course at a
village primary school were trained as teachers. The period of
instruction was five years. The boys were also taught a craft such as
building or carpentry; all girls learned such things as midwifery and
the care of children. (Stirling; 1965:110). All in all, this was an
expansion of the ideals of Ataturk in the hopes of creating an "enlight-

ened peasanty" that would develop its agricultural promise.

Reformism

Ziya Gbkalp once said that his peOple were: "In head, EurOpean;
in heart, Turkish." (in Webster; 1939:138). Such a statement seems
to embody the overall goals of the AtatUrk revolution. It has been
implied throughout the above discussion that AtatUrk instituted his
reforms in the image of an ideal which he held about civilization. For
Atatfirk, civilization meant Westernization. In 1924 he stated that:
"We cannot shut our eyes and suppose that we live alone. We cannot
put a fence around our country and live without a connection with the
world. On the contrary, as a progressive, reforming nation, we shall
live in the field of civilization. Which nation that desires to enter
civilization has not turned to the West?" (Encyc10pedia of Islam; 1961:
193). There were plenty of precedents in Turkey. Reformers of the

Ottoman Empire had looked to Europe for examples. In 1911 Abdullah

63

Cevdet wrote that: "Civilization means European civilization."
(In B. Lewis; 1966:231). The complete ramifications of these previous
reforming attempts had been blocked, however, by the fact that the
EurOpeans were also infidels. Thus, in the reforms of Mahmud II and
the Tanzimat, Westernization consisted mainly of the introduction of
EurOpean military hardware; one could accept aid from the infidel if
it was to be turned against him. Many of the reforms were superficial
changes in form only to appease foreign creditors. Ataturk instead
stated that: "The nation has finally decided to achieve, in essence
and in form, exactly and completely, the life and means that contem-
porary civilization assures to all nations." (Encyclopedia of Islam;
1961:262) Gentizon has said: "The French Revolution was limited to
the domain of political institutions; the Russian Revolution has
brought about disorder in social relations; but only the Turkish
Revolution has concerned itself all at one time with political insti-
tutions, social relations, religion, the family, economic life, the
customs and even the moral bases of society." (in Allen; 1935:85).
This is an exaggeration, but yet this quotation illustrates the thorough-
going scope of the Atatfirk innovations. The Principle of reformism, or
revolutionism as it is also translated, committed the Republic to con—
tinous and on-going reform.

Among Ataturk's Westernization reforms was the attempt to better
the status of women in Turkey. Islamic custom placed women in a position

of inferiority to men,"... a female animal deficient in morality and

64

self-respect, who required protection by the male against her own
weaker instincts." (Kinross; 1964:418). When she did venture out into
public she was to be completely covered by clothing, with a veil

across her face. In Istanbul no woman could be seen walking in the
street or driving in a carriage with a man even if he were her husband.
On trams and boats there was a curtain to divide women from men.

These characteristics were more true of women living in the cities or
towns. Women among the peasantry had to work in the fields and perform
other outdoor tasks; they often went unveiled before all, but
strangers. World War I had begun the breakdown of the woman's institu—
tionalized inferior status. To replace the men who were fighting,
women became clerks, civil servants, and nurses for the first time,
under the Young Turks. Ataturk, however, intended to go beyond such
token reforms. In 1925 he stated that a society could not advance
unless both sexes worked together as equals and partners; "... together
they must accomplish the various stages of the journey into the land of
progress and renovation." (Kinross; 1964:420). Thus under the Civil
Code, as mentioned, women were given equal rights with men. Later

they were granted suffrage. Atatfirk did not legislate against the

veil as he did against the fez. Instead he perhaps wisely left its
demise to fashion. When his own wife and the wives Of other prominent
officials took up the reforms, the veils disappeared, at least in the
major cities. It is significant that when Turkish trOOps entered
Antioch when they took over the Hatay from the French in July, 1939,

they were greeted by a deputation of women who symbolically removed

65

their veils to welcome the arrival of "EurOpean" Turks. (Parker 8
Smith; 1940:157). The amazing growth of literacy among women is an
example of the success of Atatfirk's reforms. (Lerner; 1958:124).
Atatfirk adopted several girls in his lifetime; one of them became
Turkey's first woman pilot. Ironically, Atatfirk's wife was one of the
first turkish women to enjoy a civil ceremony in marriage and one of
the last to be divorced by the Seriat laws.

All the reforms stated above can be eXplained in terms of
Westernization. For instance, Deutsch describes Atatfirk's nationalism
as "a rapid process of Westernization." (Deutsch; 1953:103). The
Republic was modeled on EurOpean examples. Secularization was consis-
tent with Atatfirk's belief that the religion of civilization was
science and objective thought. The penal, commercial, and civil codes
were lifted almost directly from European sources. Atatfirk removed
the fez and encouraged the wearing of EurOpean-style clothing.
Compulsory primary education was an extension of Atatfirk's belief that
"the most important real guide to life, success, and civilization is
science and knowledge (Kazamias; 1966:159). As for etatism, Atatfirk
had the examples of Western philosophies and Western examples, noteably
Germany and Italy. In summary, Bernard Lewis stated that:

"For many Turks, the greattransformation which

has taken place in their country is to be defined, not

merely in terms of economy or government, but Of civil-

ization. The essential change attempted by the Turks

in their Revolution was one of Westernization, another

step in the westward march of the Turkish people that

began 1000 years ago, when they renounced China and
turned to Islam. Now, renouncing a large part, though

66

not the whole of their Islamic heritage, they have turned
to Europe and made a sustained and determined effort to
adopt and apply the European way of life in government,
society, and culture. Opinion differs as to the measure

of success achieved in this attempt; there can, however,

be no doubt that in large and important areas of the public
life of Turkey, the Westernizing revolution is accomplished
and irreversible." (B. Lewis; 1966:479).

The innovations of the entrepreneur had widescale ramifications for the

entire Turkish society and culture.

ATATO‘RK AS ENTREPRENEUR

The Corporate Enterprise

 

The above discussion givesa brief description of the major
reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Ataturk, the entrepreneur can be seen
more clearly in the light of this analysis. It will be remembered that
Belshaw's four characteristics of an entrepreneur, as used by Barth,
are: (1) management of a business enterprise; (2) business innovation;
(3) profit taking; and (4) risksbearing. As for the first point, it
can be seen that a corporate organization grew up around Atatflrk. In
the War of Independence, this organization was composed of a loose-knit
core of loyal followers, many of whom were army Officers. Later
Ataturk created the Republican PeOple's Party, the formal organization
that supported his regime in Office. Furthermore, to this list can be
added the ephermeral something called Turkey. Ataturk identified
strongly with his nation. "I am Turkey," he said, "To destroy me is to

destroy Turkey." (in Armstrong; 1933:227). On another occasion he

67

stated that: "There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is that sitting
before you, the Mustafa Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away.
There is another whom I cannot call 'Me'. It is not I that this Mustafa
Kemal personifies; it is you-—all of you present here, who go into the
furthermost parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal,

a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's
work is to make them come true."8 (in Parker 8 Smith; 1940:38). That
Atatfirk glimpsed something Of his own destiny can be seen in the

impact his policies still have on contemporary Turkey. At his death,
the Republican People's Party, under the leadership of Ismet, continued
to hold power until 1950, the first year that an Opposition party was
allowed to compete for Office. The new party, the Democratic Party,
swept into office basing its platform on a claim to represent the real
Kemalist policies. When on May 27, 1960, a military junta ousted the
Democratic Party from Office, its leader, General Celal Gursel, claimed
that "We are animated by the spirit and the deeds of Mustafa Kemal."
(in Lengyel; 1961:306). Today, Atatfirk's policy, party, and Republic
still exist. In retrospect, Atatfirk, his followers, and his party ful-
fill all seven Of M. G. Smith's conditions of a corporate group.

(M. G. Smith; 1960). The RPP possessed a single legal personality,
Weber's corporate "oneness." A reading of the Party Program of May,
1935, assures one that the Party possessed closure, internal autonomy,
and internal organization; the Program provides for organization down

to the village headman. The Party had an identity, obviously; it was

68

identifiable as a unit to people within and those with whom it came into
contact. In the form of its offices, the PeOple's Houses, and other
materials, the RPP possessed a common estate. It exists in perpetuity;
it survived its founder. Given Atatfirk's attitude and the close identi—
fication of the RPP with the organization of the Republic during his
regime, all of these characteristics could be extended to the Consti-
tution of 1924 and the Turkish state. A corporate group did form

around Atatfirk, the entrepreneur.

The Innovator

 

That Atatfirk undertook innovations is undeniable. Their various
forms have been discussed in the previous sections. Barth's criterion
was that an entrepreneur would be more exPerimental and speculative
than the encumbents Of institutionalized statuses. The entrepreneur
must work on the basis of a deductive prognosis of results rather than
by accumulated experience. Even relative to the reforms of the
Tanzimat and the Young Turks, AtatUrk can be seen to meet these criteria.
The accumulated experience of the Ottoman Empire had grown up over six
hundred years. Such reforms as had been carried out by the Tanzimat and
the CUP had established a precedent of only limited success; accumulated
exPerience had nullified their effects. Though some of Atatfirk's reforms
had been foreshadowed in nationalist literature, they were largely
speculative when pr0posed. Particulary striking is the fact that
Atatfirk, the innovator, did not choose to work within the confines
of the Sultanate/Caliphate form of government as had his predecessors;

perhaps this made his greater success possible. Finally, as will be

69

seen, a strategy existed for the implementation of reform; Atatfirk was

working on the deductive prognosis of results.

The Profit of the Entrepreneur

 

That Atatfirk derived profit, that he underwent a risk to do
so, is again undeniable. Besides his more altruistic visions for a
Westernized nation and people, Ataturk sought power and position as a
personal goal. The title of this paper an alledged quotation Of
Ataturk's was taken from Brock (1954:6, 118); though it is undocumented
there and hence suspect, it is found again in Kinross (1964:474).
As a statement of personal ambition, it is supported by Ataturk's
early attempts at political intrigue, both before and during World
War I. As an example, his involvement in the V§£§n_movement at the
Staff College for which he was imprisoned in 1905 can be seen as an
example. AtatUrk both organized and led this early organization.
Again, in 1917, Atatflrk attempted to persuade the Crown Prince to demand
a personal army Of which AtatUrk would be Chief of Staff. On several
occasions Ataturk demanded to be included in the CUP cabinet as
Minister of War. This culminated in his demand to be made War Minister
in 1919 just prior to his posting in the interior. There, in Anatolia,
he placed himself quickly at the head of the nationalist organization
and of the army. He remained as head of the Turkish state in one form
or another until his death in 1938. An anecdote goes that after he was
named President of the Republic, thus making himself head of the state,
the cabinet, and the only party, an admirer compared him to the Holy

Trinity, "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Ataturk admitted with a gleam

70

in his eye, "It is true, but don't tell anyone." (Kinross; 1964:

387). Atatfirk believed that he was the only man capable of reforming
Turkey; he consistently sought political power to achieve his ends.
Thus Atatfirk received the profit of personal power, social recognition,
and presumeably economic sustenance. Though this is not mentioned in
the literature, Atatfirk, the son of a poor merchant, was not a wealthy
man by birth, and probably his career as a soldier Opened few, if any,
Opportunities for economic endeavors which would have built up an

individual fortune.

The Risk-Taker

 

Ataturk's position as a risk-taker, it has been seen, was
minimized by the uniqueness of his niche. Each of Ataturk's innovations
entailed the creation of a new niche; he did not have to compete for
or in his niche. The fact that there was a dictator in the niche
also reduced opposition and minimized risk. Risk was not non—existent,
however. Robinson writes that: "... he had many enemies--ambitious
politicians, conservative religious groups, and a substantial share of
the landed class." (Robinson; 1963:32). G. L. Lewis notes that: "There
was a good deal of opposition to Mustafa Kemal's personal and patriotic
ambitions, and if he succeeded almost invariably in carrying the
Assembly with him, it was due to the deputies' knowledge that most of
the people and army had confidence in the Ghazi Pasha and were not
prepared to follow anyone else." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:77). One threat
in the assembly in 1920 arose when a bill was proposed that no one who

had not lived in their constituencies for five years could sit in

71

the Assembly. Atatfirk was a Macedonian; Macedonia belonged to the
Greeks. Furthermore, as an army Officer he had not stayed anywhere for
five years in consecutive order. The move would have removed him from
the Assembly. Atatfirk, however, reminded the Assembly of his role in
the War of Independence; no doubt his position as head of the army
helped him. The bill was not passed. There was always the risk of
political opposition, especially from Rauf or the clerics. There were
also assassination attempts. Indeed Ataturk, the entrepreneur, took
risks, though these risks were minimized by the uniqueness of his niche.
Ataturk, the innovator, did not have to compete for votes or power.
Ataturk, the dictator, did not tolerate an Opposition that would

threaten his regime.

The Channels of Conversion

 

To Barth, an important variable in his discussion of the
entrepreneur is the Opening of channels Of conversion between two
spheres of exchange that were previously unconnected. It has already
been suggested that Atatfirk organized the peOple of Turkey politically
for the first time, thus Opening a channel of conversion between the
people and the government. The Party provided for local leadership
in organization. The People's Houses gave direction. The peOple
voted for candidates who were in turn to represent the peOple's
interests. Politicans campaigned for the peOple's support. This
support was translated into votes in the National Assembly which then

elected AtatUrk as President of the Republic. AtatUrk always claimed

72

to be working in the interests of the Turkish people. In response

to a telegram from the War Minister recalling him from the interior

in July, 1919, AtatUrk wrote that: "In our homeland today there is a
national force; it springs from the heart and brain of the nation watch-
ful for disaster. Your humble servant is subject to that force."
(Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:70). Again, as noted, he stated that his
"most sacred duty" was to the will of the peOple. (Ibid.:70). On
several occasions Atatfirk made extensive tours of Turkey, talking to the
people and learning of their complaints. One such tour preceded the
Peace Conference at Lausanne when Atatfirk attempted to win pOpular
support for the coming reforms. Another tour came after the disturbances
over the Free Party in 1930. Again, after the initiation of the Latin
script, Ataturk toured the country with a blackboard stopping in the
villages to lecture the peasantry on the advantages of his plan.

Ataturk relished the role of teacher; Often he viewed the Turkish

peOple as recalcitrant students to be instructed. (Armstrong; 1933:260).
Furthermore, as Smith and Davison have already noted, Ataturk, despite
his dictatorship, was never quite able to ignore the demands of the
Assembly, which was elected by the peOple. It is impossible, of

course, to judge Atatfirk's sincereity as an altruist from this distance.
The literature, however, is unanimous in its belief that Atatfirk was
genuinely concerned about the position of the peOple under his regime.
Whether he was arguing for compulsory education or welfare legislation
or women's rights, his aim was to improve the lot of the peOple and to

bring Turkey into the community Of modern nations. It has been shown,

73

therefore, that Atatfirk did create a channel of conversion between

the sphere of the governed and that of the government. The Turkish
people had no political role under the Ottoman Empire. Atatfirk organized
them politically, and through a change in government to a Republic,
gave them a vote and a role in the Turkish state. This argument is
supported by Atatfirk's claims to be acting in the interests of the
people. It can also be shown that Atatfirk received the profit Of
political support through the Opening of this channel. Up until the
creation of the RPP in 1924 there were several political groups vying
for power in Turkey, the largest being that of Atatfirk's supporters.
Thus Smith sees the overwhelming victory at the polls of the Kemalists
in 1923 as a strong indication of the public support for Atatfirk.

(E. Smith; 1958:74). G. L. Lewis has also been cited to Show that the
Assembly hesitated to contravene Ataturk's policies because of his
pOpular support. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:77). After 1924 the people
continued to vote fOr the RPP and to turn out in large numbers when
Ataturk made a public appearance. Atatfirk, the Gazi, was a legend to
the people, and whether they supported him because Of nationalistic
fervor or because he fit the mold of an Islamic conqueror, he neverthe-
less received the profit of their support through the new channel of

conversion.

The Marginal Man

 

Barth makes the point that the most successful entrepreneurs are

frequently from outside the community wherein they create their

74

enterprise. Thus ties of kinship, friendship, or community do not
impinge as greatly upon the entrepreneur's activities. Though this

is a tenuous suggestion, Atatfirk can be seen to fit this charac-
teristic in certain respects. For instance, Ataturk was not an
Anatolian, a "true" Turk. He was a Macedonian. Furthermore, his
education was a military one. He thus became acquainted with ideals,
particularly Western ones, that were not available to the uneducated
peasant or the graduates of the medresses. Atatdrk was not a Muslim,
though he came from a predominantly Muslim society. Furthermore,

he chose to Operate outside the traditional Turkish form of government,
the Sultanate/Caliphate. In these ways, Ataturk was somewhat tangential
to the Turkish community, and even to the intellectual elite that was
largely Muslim. The lack of strong religious ties may very well have
made it possible to see reforms that were not considered by members of
the community. It is known that Atatflrk's personal core of followers,
including Ismet, were Muslims, and that this group saw certain reforms,
such as the abolition of the fez, as quite impossible. (Armstrong; 1933).

Thus, Atatfirk, the entrepreneur, was something of the marginal man.

The Strategy of Transaction

 

On purely descriptive grounds, it can be seen, therefore, that
Atatfirk can be analyzedas an entrepreneur. He was an innovator. A
corporate enterprise existed. He took risks and received a profit. He
opened a channel of conversion between two previously disparate spheres
and derived a profit from the conversion. He was marginal to the

community in certain ways. However, it soon becomes apparent upon

75‘

reading the literature that the more interesting questions rest not

on how many characteristics Ataturk fulfills in his role as an
entrepreneur, but on his strategy and his success. As noted, Barth
finds the strategy, the transactions between the entrepreneur and his
environment, to be the most interesting aspect of the analysis. It is
for this reason that Barth prefers a transactional analysis of the
entrepreneurial role. For the study of Ataturk this presents two
immediate problems. First of all much of the literature is frankly

and Openly hero-worship. Ataturk was able to accomplish his innova-
tions because he was Ataturk. One has the feeling that Kinross' anecdote
about the Holy Trinity is more substance than symbol for Ataturk's
biographers. Little mention is made of the strategy, behind

the innovations; they simply were accomplished. Little mention is made
of Ataturk's followers beyond Ismet and Fethi. Yet if reforms were

to be made, there must have been supporters of the reforms or of the
regime to implement them. Finally, little mention is made of the
receptivity of the Turkish peOple to the reforms. To simply accept

the proposition that the reforms could not have been carried out if the
people were not willing to change is unacceptable. The second diffi—
culty arises from the fact that once Atatfirk succeeded in making himself
dictator, there was little in the nature of exchange between himself
and the environment. Innovations were imposed from the top Of the
political system; response was forbidden or at least controlled. For

this reason, though Ataturk can be successfully analyzed as an

76

entrepreneur, the analysis does little to advance Barth's conception.
Nevertheless, despite these problems in the following section an attempt
will be made to piece together the elements Of Atatfirk's strategy, his
assets and his supports. Five such elements will be discussed: (1)
Atatfirk as a personality; (2) Atatfirk as a calculator; (3) Ataturk as

a military man; (4) Atatfirk as an exploiter of communications; and

(5) Atatflrk as dictator.

As for the first point, it becomes impossible to discuss Ataturk
without noting his undoubtedly dynamic personality. The writers on
Turkey are unanimous in recounting Ataturk's infectious and forceful
dynamism. Robinson describes Ataturk as "a man of decisive action,

Of provoking single-mindedness and possessing a sort of intuitive
understanding of what was required." (Robinson; 1963:33). Davison has
already been cited to the effect that Ataturk was the "chief driving
force" behind the creation of a modern Turkey. (Davison; 1968:l). Smith
describes Ataturk as an "igniting spark" and concludes that the

reforms might never have been carried out without him. (E. Smith; 1958:
92). Furthermore it is apparent that Atatfirk was a man of vision, that
he foresaw in advance the changes that would need to be made in Turkey.
Robinson argues that: "Kemal must have seen very clearly that techno—
logy, be it military or civilian, was but one part of a whole socio-
political-economic complex. To adopt modern technology meant social
and political revolutions as well--tota1 revolution." (Robinson; 1963:
33). The German general Kannengeiser said Of his World War I ally

that Atatfirk was "clear-thinking and active." "He decides everything

77

for himself. He knows exactly what he wants." (in Armstrong; 1933:
52). Given these descriptions, it becomes difficult to ignore Atathrk
as a personality. While this paper will not attempt to psycho-analyze

g 0 O I.
this personality at this great distance, 1t 18 clear that Ataturk's

personal qualities were among his important assets. The consensus
among the writers is that Atatfirk would not have achieved what he did
if it had not been for that "igniting spark." During World War I
Atatfirk's personal bravery and active participation in the front—line
was an inSpiration to his troops. As President of the Assembly and
later of the Republic, Atatfirk participated just as actively and
dynamically in the affairs of state. Kinross, Brook, and Armstrong
agree that Ataturk was tireless debator, choosing Often to wear
potential Opponents down by a surfeit of persuasive rhetoric. On
other occasions, Ataturk's personality became a key factor in shaping
votes on the floor of the Assembly. Examples which have already been
cited include his role in determining debate on the abolition of the
Sultanate and in the proclamation of the Republic. Standing by itself,
such an asset might not have been very important, but when combined
with Atatfirk's other assets, i.e., the dictatorship, such an asset
can be a prominent factor in the success of reforms.

That Atatfirk was a man of vision is supported by his carefully
calculated strategy. Early in his career as an army officer Ataturk
was singularly ineffective as a politician. His abrasive manner and
his Open contempt of his superiors, especially the German High Command

and Enver, resulted in his being kept from wielding effective political

78

power. Atatfirk played a major role in the revolutions of 1908 and 1909.
In fact in 1909, AtatUrk worked closely with Enver to place Enver's
triumvirate into power, yet Ataturk failed to receive a position in
the Enver regime. Robinson speculates that only with experience

did AtatUrk become the skillful politician and diplomat who was the
first President of the Republic. (RObinson; 1963:30). Indeed by 1919
Atatfirk was a careful strategist. In that year Atatfirk took six steps
to secure a nationalist government and his position as its leader.

The first step was to assure himself of the support of the tOp military
commanders and of the key civilian administrators in Anatolia. With
that allegiance gained, he argued for the consolidation of the various
nationalist grOUps into one organization. The third step was to
control the telegraph system which both broke the Sultan's communica—
tions with Anatolia, making it difficult for him to maintain his
allegiances, and assured AtatUrk's own ability to communicate with the
country. His nationalist organization made a dramatic declaration Of
national aims to attract national support. While this was being done,
Atatfirk exploited the growing national concern by recruiting, reorgan—
izing, and rearming his troops from the remnants of the CUP's defeated
army. The final step was to win victory over the Greeks. In doing

so he was able to convince the Assembly to grant him dictatorial
powers to make that victory. He then retained those powers in order
to exact his reforms. Each step was initiated in response to the
success of the last. As Robinson writes: "The record leads one to

believe that Kemal was quite conscious of these (steps) and moved

79

deliberately toward their fulfillment." (Robinson; 1963:65). In his
famous Six Day Speech Ataturk described his plans for Turkey as
"Successive stages, a series of national secrets" which would be
revealed when Opportune. "I may say that is was "incumbent upon me to
develop our entire social organization, step by step, until it
corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in
the soul and in the future of the nation; which I kept in my conscious—
ness as a national secret." (Six Day Speech; 1929). Each secret was

to be revealed only after the preceding one was implemented; each
would be known only at the prOper time. A Theory of Games analysis
might be employed here as Ataturk revealed his secrets to take

maximum advantage of the probable reaction. A less cautious man might
have attempted, for instance to abolish the Sultanate/Caliphate simul-
taneously. Ataturk preferred to wait for the proper Opportunity. In
1922 the body of Opinion in the Assembly was against the Sultan; thus
the Sultanate disappeared. When the occasion arose in 1924, the
Caliphate also was abolished. The specific steps and Atatfirk's stated
intention to do away with both forms have already been cited. Atatfirk's
sense of timing can be seen in this exchange with Ahmed Emin Yalman, a
prominent journalist:

"When the Khalifate was a thing of the past, this
incongruity of a state religion was discussed in a press
conference. I asked Mustafa Kemal, 'Why have you left
recognition of a state religion in the constitution so
long after a regime based on free reason and fu11
tolerance seems so well established?‘

'Why don't you attack me in your paper for not

being radical and consistent in my acts?' he
challenged me.

80

'I don't feel that it is a proper subject for
discussion in a newspaper.‘
'The moment that you feel it is prOper to make

this a subject of public discussion, you may rest

assured that the provision to which you rightly Object

will be taken out of our constitution.'" (Yalman; 1956:

142-3).
By revealing his secrets one at a time, AtatUrk was also able to allow
for dissension to dissipate between each act. To go back to Barth's
discussion, it is easy to see the "entrepreneurial career as a process,"
the "deductive prognosis of results" in Atatfirk's strategic moves. Each
step was taken so as to maximize results in accordance with an overall
scheme of Westernizing and hence civilizing Turks. The response of the
Opposition was calculated and minimized. When Atatfirk chose to name
the Republic, he struck at the Assembly's weakest point, the selection
of ministers, created a governmental crisis and maneuvered the Assembly
into accepting the only alternative to chaos, the Republic. When opposi—
tion turned to violence, as in the Kurdish Revolts, Atatfirk countered
with violence to crush the revolts and to suppress incidental political
Opposition. The steps taken against Rauf and other political foes
have already been noted. This is not to say that Atatfirk's strategy
was infallible; the pOpular response to the Free Party of 1930 is
evidence to the contrary. But Atatfirk as entrepreneur undoubtedly
employed the asset of the careful and calculated strategist.

It seems that the key to much of Atatfirk's success in 1919 was
his position as a military leader. Smith has already been cited to show

that in the War of Independence several nationalists doubted Atatfirk's

ability as a diplomat. (E. Smith; 1958:13). At another point Smith

81

notes that "although there was some Opposition in the ranks to Kemal,
the Congress supported him as the only man the army and common peOple
might follow." (Ibid.:2l). Ataturk had a brilliant war record. As
noted, he had emerged from the war untainted by defeat, the CUP, or the
Germans. The "Hero of Gallipoli" thus had the admiration of the army
and of the Congress. This no doubt enhanced his status with the people
as well. To them, suggests Armstrong, Ataturk was cast in the mold of
the traditional military leader Of Islam. (Armstrong; 1933: 254). He
was to become the Gazi. In 1919 one of Ataturk's first moves was to
gain the allegiance of the highest ranking Officers in the military.
Subsequently he toured the country, convincing discharged soldiers and
officers of the CUP's defeated army to follow him. Such support
solifified his position as head of the nationalist movement. His
military victory over the Greeks assured him of political power.
However, once his position as President of the Republic was secured,
there is only one passage in the literature that documents his use of
the army in political strategy. G. L. Lewis notes that Atatflrk took

th crucial step of abolishing the Caliphate only after assuring himself
of the support of the army. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:85). It is not to be
suggested that Ataturk's regime was a military regime, such as that
which assumed power in Turkey in 1960. Robinson points out that Atatfirk
was very careful to sever connections between the army and the govern-
ment after the proclamation of the Republic. (Robinson; 1963:236).

While he and Ismet were fighting in the War of Independence, they

82

resigned their positions in the party. At the war's end, he and his
followers resigned their military commissions to assume roles once
again in the party and the state. He exchanged his uniform for a busi-

ness suit. Military Officers were not allowed to sit in the Assembly.10

The military and the gendarmery were placed under the direct control of
the Assembly. The point to be made is that Atatfirk undoubtedly made
use of his position as a military Officer to gain the position of head
of the nationalist movement. This was a response to the suspicions of
those nationalists who would have preferred a politician in office.
After securing his position in 1924, as Robinson says, "In retrospect,
it becomes evident that Kemal deliberately attempted to fence the
military off from active political life as soon as its political
support was no longer essential to his power." (Robinson; 1963:238).
However, Ataturk's military training should not be ignored in the
discussion Of any aspect of his career. After all, it was in the mili-
tary schools that Ataturk became aware of Western and nationalist ideals
and literature. The carefully planned strategy, the respect for communi-
cations, and the officer-subordinate role he assumed with his followers
as President of the Republic all can be traced to Atatfirk, the general
of the army. Atatfirk's military career was an important asset.

As for the fourth point, Lerner describes Atatfirk's regime
as a "communications revolution." (Lerner; 1958:120). Atatfirk apparently
developed his appreciation for intelligence techniques and communications
out of his military training. As noted, one of his steps in 1919 was

to take control of the telegraph lines. In subsequent years, Ataturk

83

made use of the newspapers, the RPP organization, education, and the
People's houses as a means of spreading his policies and deriving
support. Atatfirk used the newspapers to foreshadow both the proclama-
tion of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate. Yalman
describes how prior to the latter event, AtatUrk called several
prominent newspapermen to him and announced his plans for the abolition.
When they protested, AtatUrk turned to persuasion, gradually wearing
down their arguments. "Mustafa Kemal did not wish to dictate; he
wanted to persuade. The tactics we finally agreed to use were unique.
We, in our newspapers, were to attack the government for not realizing
the danger to the unity and stability of the country which the continua-
tion of the Khalifate constituted...The plan was carried out in a marve-
lous spirit. We were astonished when we did not encounter the Opposi-
tion and resistance anticipated. Following this concerted preparation
by the press, the law to abolish the Khalifate was passed on March 1,
1924." (Yalman; 1956:141). Despite the power of a controlled press,

the newspapers in Turkey reached only a small portion of the pOpulation.
After all, only 10 to 20 percent of the pOpulation was literate. This
caveat applies to books as well. To reach the peasantry, the Party
organization was used to describe and explain the activities of Atatfirk
to the villagers. The schools also provided a means for the spreading
of propaganda, if only by more subtle means such as the images of the
state produced in a civics text, for instance. The PeOple's Houses

and PeOple's Rooms would have been an ideal way of heeding or creating

public Opinion, particularly after radios were placed in each of them.

84

In fact, despite their educational goals, the Houses, which were owned
and Operated by the RPP, relied for their program on an almost
exclusive fare of party propaganda. However, they were sparsely attended
and were located primarily in the cities and larger towns. The peasantry
received or took little advantage of them. (Karpat; 1963). Despite
these limitations Ataturk did use communications media as an important
building block in his strategy. Railways, roads, and the postal service
were also improved as a means of facilitating communications.

It cannot be forgotten, finally, that Atatfirk was a dictator.
Though he resigned his commission in the army, he expected his orders
to be carried out by his political followers with the unquestioning
response of the military subordinate. (Encyc10pedia of Islam; 1961:69).
As noted, Ataturk's dictatorship is justified in the literature on the
basis that the people were not able to handle democracy; they needed
to be educated. It also has been pointed out that compared to the
policies of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, which were being implemented
at the same time, there was relatively little intimidation or human
suffering brought about by the government. Robinson notes, after
stating the need for reform in Turkey in 1919 that: "The necessity
for authoritarian leadership thus became clear for many of these changes
would be at first exceedingly unp0pular." (Robinson; 1963:33). Atatfirk
made his position as dictator an asset in instituting reform. Political
opposition, unless it was under his direct supervision, was not to be
allowed. The press was censored. Opponents of the Kemalist reforms

were dealt with harshly. Atatfirk was willing to attempt to persuade

85

through debate, but as a man of action he was ready to cut debate

short when it pleased him to do so. Thus when he failed to persuade
Ethem, a guerilla leader, to join the nationalist forces in 1919,
Ataturk unleashed his army on the guerillas, effectively destroying
them. By the Tribunals of Independence of 1925 and 1930 he managed

to liquidate or neutralize the most prominent members of his political
opposition. Supposedly when Rauf was urging an Opposition party in 1923,
one delegate to the Assembly said to him, "This road you are setting us
on leads straight to the gallows. Will you be there with us?" (in G. L.
Lewis; 1955:77). G. L. Lewis describes the situation this way: "He

was not a man to trifle with. Though not cruel by nature, he had no
compunction whatever about putting out of the way those he regarded as
Obstacles to the achievement of his plans for Turkey." (Ibid.:77). That
the Assembly voted him dictatorial powers in 1922 and again in 1930 for
a two year period to deal with national emergencies only solidified

his position. As dictator, Atatfirk could impose his reforms from above
without cognizance of Opposition or pOpular demands. It is difficult
to say whether dictatorship is a strategy; at any rate it facilitates
transactions through minimizing the options of the Opposition.

There are other factors that have to be accounted for in
determining the success of Atatfirk's entrepreneurial career. It has
already been noted that the assets described above were augmented by
some degree of pOpular support, particularly before 1924. Atatfirk also
had loyal supporters who ran for Office on the RPP ticket, who served in

his cabinet, and who, on the local level, carried out his reforms;

86

contrary to the impression created, Ataturk did not modernize Turkey
singlehandedly. Bahrampour refers to a Kemalist elite which consisted
essentially of military officers, members of the bureaucracy, and the
intellectuals, that is, the people who had received not only an
education, but a Western education and who were familiar with nationalist
literature. (Bahrampour; 1967:18). Webster, with his usual enthusiasm,
describes one local official as he traveled from village to village
attempting to mobilize the populace into facilitating the Kemalist
reforms. (Webster; 1939:268). In other words, there were Turks of a
similar intellectual background to Ataturk's who were willing to

support his ideals and reforms. The size of this group is unknown.

That Ataturk became the first President of the Republic, and that
someone such as Rauf did not, can be attributed to the assets

described above. AtatUrk was not only a military leader, but a success-
ful one. He was able to translate this success into support both from
the army and from the people, support by force and by election. As a
careful strategist he was able to time the emergence of his reforms in
order to maximize their impact. His dynamic personality no doubt played
a part in both his military success and his entrepreneurial career.
Because he appreciated the importance of communications, he was able

to gather information from the entire country and to create support

for his reforms. Finally, as these assets culminated in the niche of
president/dictator, he was able to impose and oversee his reforms and
to minimize the risk to his enterprise. His followers supported his

regime and his reforms and carried them to the people. Smith states

87'

that: "By steam roller tactics, by means of great vision, by sheer
dictatorship, Mustafa Kemal, with the help of his co-workers but as

the igniting spark, wrestled a relatively modern state from the ruins
of the Ottoman Empire." (E. Smith; 1958:86). Thus, an argument can

be made for studying Ataturk as an entrepreneur on several grounds. His
career meets all the criteria listed by Belshaw and Earth for disting—
uishing an entrepreneur from the encumbents of institutionalized
statuses. He managed an enterprise, he innovated, he took risks, and
he achieved a profit. In some ways he was marginal to the community.
He created a channel of conversion between two spheres that previously
had been unconnected. That he employed a strategy working from a
deductive prognosis of results has been described in several stages.
His assets as an entrepreneur include his forceful personality, his
careful calculations, his military career, and his appreciation of
communication. These assets culminated in a unique niche at the head
of the Turkish government from which he could impose his innovations
and minimize the risks and restrictions on his activities. Throughout
his career he had the support of the corporate group, his followers,
that grew up around him. In this way, the analysis of Atatfirk has been

fruitful.

THE EFFECT OF THE INNOVATIONS ON THE POPULATION

The analysis should not end here, however, It would seem that

when a contention has been made that Ataturk created a channel of

conversion between the people and the government, that some attempt

88

should be made to describe the effects Of that move. In particular,

it is felt that such an analysis would be interesting in light of
anthropology's increasing interest in the problems of peasantry.
Various statements have been made in this paper about the alleged
response of the people of Turkey to the policies Of Atatflrk. Similarly
it has been seen that the government took a great many steps in
attempting to change the lives Of the peasantry, especially in trying
to wrench away their focal allegiance to Islam.

It has been stated that during Ataturk's regime up to 85 percent
of the Turkish people were agriculturalists. Most of these conformed
to Redfield%;defining characteristic of peasantry: "...their agricul—
ture is a livelihood and a way of life, not a business for profit."
(Redfield; 1956:18). Wolf distinguished peasants from primitives on
the basis that peasants are "rural cultivators whose surpluses are
transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses
both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the
remainder to groups in society that do not farm, but must be fed for
their specific goods and services in turn." (Wolf; 1966:3-4). In other
words, as Kroeber put it, peasant societies and cultures are only half-
societies and half-cultures; they are tied to the larger state of which
they are a part. (in Redfield; l956:8). It is this fact that makes this
aspect of this study particularly interesting. However, little serious
work has been done on Turkish peasantry. Webster, for instance, writes

of the "ragged, dispirited pOpulace" that made up the peasantry and

89

contends that the most impressive reforms "are the clean, well-mended
clothes which have replaced ragged, dirty attire and the smiles which
have crowded frowns of dispair from the faces of the wearers."
(Webster; 1939:267). Lengyels writes that the watchword of the Turkish
peasantry has changed from "Kismet" (It is Fate) to "We Work!"
(Lengyel; 1961:XVI). Such shallow views are easily found; apparently

they gloss over the truth. Mahmut Makal's Our Village, which became

 

a Turkish bestseller in 1954 outlined in novel form the failings of
the Ataturk program for the peasants. (in Lerner; 1958:122). The
serious works have been published by Stirling, an anthropologist,
Szyliowicz, a political scientist, and Kolars, a geographer. None of
these works are based on fieldwork done before 1949. Thus, extrapola-
tions backwards to the regime of Atatfirk must be made with care. Only
Stirling deals with the daily lives of the peasants; the other two are
primarily concerned with voting patterns and crop rotations. A problem
of typicality arises in that the three authors between them studies
only eight villages; yet Kolars maintains that individual villages
vary widely within short distances of each other. (Kolars; l963:l).
Such difficulties preclude a study in depth of peasant reactions to
Ataturk, but enough material can be pieced together to provide a
rather interesting account.

Earlier it was noted that the Ottoman Empire existed only as
the exploiter of the peasantry; agents of the Sultan would descend on
the village to collect taxes or recruits, but for the most part,

villagers were allowed to develOp independently of outside influence.

90

Allegiance was not to the Empire or to a Turkish state, but to Islam
and the village. Then the Republic of Ataturk appeared determined to
create a modern, democratic populace. Local government was made
universal; party officials arrived to explain the policies of the new
government; the peasant was expected to vote. He was told to build a
school and to send his children to it; moreover, the school was not a
religious school. The secularization of the state was occuring;
his fez was made illegal and his dervish brotherhoods were outlawed.
He was told that the Seriat was replaced by a new Civil Code that
forbade polygamy and gave his wife equal rights in the courts. The
government made certain economic goods available to the peasant. It
called for his allegiance to a Turkish state and to Ataturk, whose
picture or bust appeared now in the village in direct defiance of the
Islamic custom that proscribed images. The peasant made the necessary
changes in form, but in essence, little changed. As Ward notes, the
peasant did not choose reform; it was forced upon him. (Ward; 1942:58).
The same framework of the Six Principles can be used to describe
the peasants' reaction to reform. As for laicism, it is doubtful that
Ataturk ever touched the belief system of the peasantry; indeed this
was not Officially intended. This is in Opposition to the popular
view of, for instance, W. C. Smith (1957) or Reed (1954) that the
Kemalist reforms largely eradicated Islam during the 1920's and 1930's,
only to have it appear reified in the 1950's. It is true that the
governments following the death of Atatfirk took a more liberal view

of Islam. In 1949 religious instruction was restored to the public

91

schools. In 1950 the call to prayer was once again allowed in Arabic.
Other measures such as the building of new mosques are cited as to the
revival. What is more likely is that Islam sent underground in the
presence of Ataturk's Officials; it is unlikely that it was eradicated.
As G. L. Lewis notes, Islam is more than a belief, it is a way of life:
"Islam dictates not merely the time and place and manner of your
praying, but also the way you decorate your house and treat your wife;
what you say when you sneeze, how your butcher kills sheep, how much

of your prOperty your son will inherit, how you trim your beard and
seal your letters, and where you carry your handkerchief and the color
of your shroud." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:81-2). As mentioned earlier, the
loss of the Caliphate meant little to the peasantry, and the institution
of the Civil Code was largely ignored. The loss of the fez was trouble—
some, but it could still be worn in the safety of one's home. For
streetwear, a cap with a visor became popular in that it could be
turned with the visor to the back when the believer knelt to pray. The
dervish ordenswere outlawed, but the dervishes had always been a secret
order. Stirling maintains that the dervishes continued to flourish
despite the Official ban. (Stirling; 1958:405). The case of the call
to prayer is illustrative as to this point. Stirling says that: "In
particular, in 1928, the Arabic form of the call to prayer was legally
prohibited and a Turkish translation of it made Obligatory. The law
was Observed within earshot of police and officials. This law was
abolished in 1950, and the whole country immediately reverted to the

Arabic form. The law had not formed any new habits." (Ibid.:400).

92

Stirling also says that the single major deprivation of the Atatfirk
period was the cutting off of almost all religious training and the
resultant lack of religious fUnctionaries. (Ibid.:402). In general,
however, the Islam Of the villager was unaffected as a belief system.
Atatfirk had intended, of course, to secularize and to shock the
people into giving their allegiance to the state. He provided a new
set of nationalist myths and dogmas, Often inconsistent with the
Islamic set, in the shape of historical and quasi-historical theories
about the Turks of Central Asia and the importance and value of Turkish
culture. Also the state prescribed a new set of rites in the form of
military and national ceremonies, such as saluting the flag or singing
the national anthem. Stirling states that the peOple "did not
consciously reject all the nationalist slogans and ideas. Human beings
can readily hold to and operate on inconsistent beliefs and principles,
not least when a society is rapidly absorbing ideas from outside itself."
(Stirling; 1958:405). But even with this nominal absorption of nation—
alist slogans, the primary allegiance and frame of reference remained
that of Islam. New events were placed within a traditional framework.
To the villagers the War of Independence was not a nationalist victory,
but a victory of the Muslims over the infidels. (Ibid:400). Ataturk
was the Gazi, the Conqueror of the infidel. Luke writes that: "In
1922 a Turkish friend Of mine asked one such peasant what he thought
of Mustafa Kemal. The peasant answered with genuine approval: 'He is
a faithfu1 servant of the Sultan.'" (Luke; 1936:216). Stirling again

writes that: "If the villagers evaded and ignored, perhaps even failed

93

to hear about many of the specific orders from the centers, they were
even less likely to understand, let alone accept, the new ideology of
secularism and a modernized Islam. For the villagers, Islam is an
all-embracing and unalterable system of detailed explanations and rules
of ritual and moral conduct on which the whole physical and social
order rests. When I asked villagers to explain a customary rule or to
justify some statement about the physical world, the answer was always
'it is in our Book.': (Stirling; 1958:404). There is some reason to
believe that even as Islam remained a primary allegiance, nationalism
failed to be a secondary influence. That position belongs to the
village. The territory that belongs to a village brought out in 1949
an outward solidarity and an inward intensity of interaction; there
was little changeover in its membership. The villagers were more than
willing to join to fight an encroachment on their territory. Such a
feeling for the Republic was lacking. (Stirling; 1965:30).

Szyliowicz found in 1960 that memories of the Atatfirk regime
were mostly hostile. Such hostility was not directed towards Ataturk,
but towards the RPP. Villagers complained of administrative ineffi—
ciency and bureaucratic oppression. "In those days life was usually a
constant struggle for the villager. Most peasants were leading a hard,
isolated life with minimal contact with the administrators and bureau-
crats of the central government. They were usually self-sufficient,
weaving their clothes, raising their food, and making their tools.
Except for an occasional trip to market the villagers lived a tradi—

tional existence. Life was harsh and unrewarding, and the government

94

made few efforts to help the villagers. Most peasants suspected any
strangers who wandered in their village of being tax collectors or a
similar evil species. Their apathy towards government contacts was
increased by the efforts of the (RPP) to bring about basic changes in
the social and religious life of the Turkish peOple." (Szyliowicz; 1962:
436-7). Szyliowicz further contends that the Republic played little
part in the political lives of the peasantry until 1946 when opposi-
tion parties were finally allowed. (Ibid.:43l). Then, with the
establishment of a multi-party system, politicians began to appear in
remote villages, campaigning for votes. Even in 1960, however, Atathrk's
aim of educating the people in the ideals of democracy was not totally
fulfilled. Ideology played only a minor role in determining party
affiliation. "Local events were of much greater significance in shaping
an individual's allegiance...Kinship and family background were the
decisive factors in village politics." (Ibid.:432). In another'passage
Szyliowicz contends that: "Most of the villagers had little conception
of what democracy or freedom means. For them, a 'good government is a
government that does good works.’ The definition of good works, Of
course, was roads, schools, and similar items which would benefit the
local populace." (Ibid.:439). All in all, as Stirling notes, "... to
the roles of maintainer of law and order, legitimate robber and
arbitrary universal provider, the government added that of vote catcher."
(Stirling; 1965:269).

As already noted, primary education reached only 28 percent of

the village children in 1935. (Webster; 1939:211). To the technical

95

difficulties of providing schools the government of Ataturk found itself
confronted with the fact that to the villagers, education meant greater
piety and knowledge Of religious affairs. With the closing of the
medresses and the secularization of the public school curriculum the
peasantry became suspicious of the government attempts to educate;
hence many such attempts misfired. When the compulsory curriculum was
cut from six to three years the overall quality of the education
suffered. Lerner says that: "Many of these peOple learn to read
painfully, but not to write. They acquire bare literacy but not the
literate way of thought. They can sign their names and decipher tax
notices, but they remain on the periphery of participation..." (Lerner;
1958:123). The People's Houses did little to further adult education;
instead they were an instrument of IrOpaganda. At any rate, there were
only 55 such establishments in 1933, all of which were in the cities or
large towns. In that same year, only 6 percent of the membership were
classified as farmers. The rest were doctors, lawyers, teachers, and
civil servants, many of whom were required to join. (Karpat; 1963:61,65).
The state of the peasant economy has already been implied. The
government was able to make few innovations until an "enlightened
peasantry" was achieved. Some mechanical innovations, such as tractors,
would not have been economical. Turkish peasants practice what Wolf
describes as partible inheritance. (Wolf; 1966:73). Upon the death of
the landowner, the property is divided among all the children. As a
result, agricultural holdings are Seldom large enough to make large

machinery practicable. The government, of course, discouraged other

96

than seasonal migration to industrial centers. There was, furthermore,
a real inducement to stay on the land. Turkey is underpOpulated; there
is always the Opportunity to increaSe one's profits by working more
land. (Robinson; 1963:118). The peasants did take advantage of such
government aid as seed and loans at low interest from the Agricultural
Bank. But in general the level of economic development in the villages
remains low. This became apparent when the earthquakes of 1940 Opened
the village to the world (Ward; 1942:80). a similar situation appeared
in the earthquakes of 1970. (Time, July 27, 1970, pg. 21).

In general the peasantry rejects the concepts of Westernization.
The fOreigner~ is still the infidel whether he be an Armenian doctor,
a British anthropologist, or a Westernized Turk. As noted, reforms in
women's rights have had little effect in the villages where the Civil
Code is largely ignored. Stirling records this story:

"On one occasion a man of Sakaltutan brought

his wife to town. I met him and Offered him and

two companions tea, and embarrassed everyone by

Offering tea to his wife also. She turned away

into the corner to drink in order to uncover her

mouth without being seen. I pointed to two educated

Turkish women in Western dress and cosmetics who

were passing. "They are not Turks', she said,

'They are foreigners.': (Stirling; 1965:289).
In general, reformism has little impact on the lives or ideology of the
peasantry. They did not ask for reform.

There are some Obvious answers as to why this is ture. To begin
with it seems apparent that the peasantry was not ready for reform. For
one thing, Atatflrk's revolution came up against the physical and

psychological isolation of the villager. Robinson records visiting

one Turkish village only after transversing an extremely difficult

97

approach to it. When he asked why the road had not been improved,

the reply was that it discouraged tax-collectors. "The sheer fact

of isolation had important consequences, for isolation meant that

this community lived outside of the stream of national consciousness.
Communication from village to village was slow and uncertain.
Communications from region to region was exceedingly difficult.

Word of mouth was, of course, the most important means of communication.
There was no radio in the village, no postal service." (Robinson;
1963:40-1). This isolation made contacting and convincing the peOple
about Ataturk's reforms very difficult. Isolation can be psychological
as well as the research of the Sherifs in Turkey seems to indicate.
They found that villagers were incapable of role-playing beyond the
confines of their village; they refused to speculate as to what would
happen if they were President or lived in another country. In the most
isolated villages, there was no concept of internationally standardized
units of distance, space, or time; rather the periodicity of natural
events or of work activities were used as such scales. The summary Of
their findings was that actual and psychological mobility decreased
with decreasing exposure to modernity. (Sherif 8 Sherif; 1948:699). To
these findings must be added the world View of Islam which was previously
described. Given these factors, peasants become a rather tenuous base
for a revolutionary movement. Atatfirk in attempting to base a nation-
alist reform on the peasantry found, as Wolf puts it, "the strong

tendency to form coalitions on a more or less unstable basis for

98

short-range ends." (Wolf; 1966:91). Marx wrote of the peasants of

France that:
"The small peasants form a vast mass, the

members of which live in similar conditions, but

without entering into manifold relations with one

another. Their mode of production isolated them from

mutual intercourse...In this way, the great mass of

the French nation is formed by simple addition of

homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack

form...In so far as there is merely a local inter-

connection among these small peasants and the identity

of their interests begets no unit, no national

union, and no political organization, they do not

form a class." (Marx; 1869:109).
Other revolutionaries such as Lenin have recognized the potentialities
of peasant support in an overthrow of the social order, but have also
seen the limitations of the approach. Lenin realized that the Russian
peasantry might rise up to fight for land, but once that land was
Obtained, the revolution would be over for the peasant. He wrote:
"The peasantry will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolu-
tion and then cease to be revolutionary as a peasantry." (in Wolf;
1966:92). Szyliowicz has already been cited to show that the most
important issues to the Turkish peasantry were not national issues, but
local ones. What Atatfirk's government experienced was essentially the
same phenomenon as that described above. The peasantry could be
mobilized for a short—term end, such as throwing the infidels out of
the country, but with that end accomplished, they preferred to return
to their familiar existence.

Another part of the problem lay in the manner in which Atatfirk's

reforms were carried out. As mentioned earlier, the peasants did not

99

ask for change; it was forced on them. Ataturk was pledged to social
revolution. He wanted his changes as rapidly as possible. As a
result, the reforms occurred formally and were accepted among the
intelligentsia. If Allen is correct that the Turkish population was
ready for change, then this must have been true Of only the elite.
(Allen; 1935:40). Bahrampour writes that: "The Kemalist reforms were
carried out by the Kemalist elite, who consisted mainly of those who
had participated in the War of Liberation, including the military
Officers, members of the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals. The
business community was too small and not too active in public affairs.
The largest segment of the population, the peasantry, remained virtually
unaffected by the new changes." (Bahrampour; 1967:18). Lord Kinross
puts it more simply: "(Ataturk) had thus formed a new elite, with new
values. But it must take longer to form a new Turkish people; the

mass of the Anatolian Turks still remained as of old." (Kinross; 1964;
474). If anything the reforms succeeded in exaberating the differences
that always existed between the cities and the villages. Under the
Ottoman Empire, the upper class was part of the same theocratic society,
observing the same customs and etiquette. But now the upper class was
educated, secular, and modern. "The gap between educated urbanites

and uneducated villagers inherited from the Ottoman Empire had not been
much narrowed--in fact, in some ways it had increased." (Davison; 1968:
143). As for the local government and party organization, Stirling

indicates that these Officials, drawn as they were from the elite, did

100

not understand the peasantry, dismissing their intransigence as
bigotry and ignorance. Like the Ottomans before them, these Officials
tended to see the people as a shapeless mass to be molded into something,
not a body to be taken into thoughtful consideration. (Stirling; 1958:
407). Bahrampour states that: "The leaders Of the RPP were convinced
that they had an excellent program, and in a paternalistic manner,
tried to develOp a new society which they sincerely believed would
benefit the whole Turkish nation. To a large measure the program of
the Kemalist leaders was excellent, but they failed to sell it to all
of the peOple at this time. Turkish Officialdom did not have a tradi-
tion of winning pOpular support for a program, but merely imposed it
from on top.” (Bahrampour; 1967:17). Szyliowicz says that: "In its
hurry to modernize Turkey, the government was often ruthless, paying
little attention to popular feelings and Opinions." (Szyliowicz; 1962:
437). Local officials and even school teachers resented their tour of
duties in the rural areas and waited only to be returned to the cities.
Governmental efficiency decreased in the country as one moved from west
to east. The local headmen sidestepped the demanded reforms. Stirling
says that: "The headmen never thought in terms of carrying through a
program of efficiently. He was concerned only to avoid trouble for
himself, both with his neighbors, who were temporarily his subjects, and
with his superiors in the hierarchy." (Stirling; 1958:404). The peOple
were suspicious of the reformers and resented the officials who took

away their fez and the school teacher who provided the secular education.

101

It is no wonder that even with All Ataturk's dynamism, the peasantry
remained essentially unchanged.

As a caveat, it should be mentioned that a social evolution is
going on in Turkey. Despite the supposed resurgence of religion,
the secularization movement continues as a slow, overall process. The
schools are still secular; religious instruction has been part of the
curriculum since 1951, but it is not compulsory. Formal justice has
nothing to do with religion. Church and state are still separated.
With a multi-party system there is much more campaigning among the
peasantry; presumeably this will lead to improvements for them. Stirling
and Lerner both write that a transition is occurring. Urban ways are
increasingly looked to as reference points, if only to show that "our
ways are better." (Stirling; 1958:406; Lerner; 1958:141). It seems as
though there is an excellent change that Ataturk's reforms will

eventually carried throughout the pOpulace.
CONCLUSION

Despite these considerations it must still be said that Atatfirk
can be viewed as an example of Barth's entrepreneur. That he innovated,
took risks, and made a profit is undeniable. The channel of conversion
he opened between the peOple and the government was there formally, even
if it was not really utilized until 1946. The description of his
strategy remains essentially unchanged, though it is apparent that his

carefully timed "secrets" may have seemed like jackhammer blows to a

102

large protion of the pOpulation. What is also apparent is that
Ataturk's place in contemporary Turkish society is still prominent.
Whatever his officials might have done, the legend of Atatfirk remains;
he is still the Gazi and the "Father of the Turks" to the peOple. In
this paper it has been contended that his activities and reforms could
be interpreted in terms of Fredrik Barth's entrepreneur. A brief
historical background and analysis was given to make clear the prede-
cessors to the Atatfirk revolution and the steps that were taken in the
innovations. These steps were analyzed in the light of Barth's criteria;
Atatfirk's key strategies were discussed. Finally, the effect, or lack
of effect, of the reforms on the Turkish peasantry was discussed, with
the conclusion being that the reforms are underway, though at a much
slower pace than Atatfirk might have wished. All in all, it can be seen
that Mustafa Kemal Atatflrk is truly the Father of the Turks, as well as

a political entrepreneur.

FOOTNOTES

1This quotation is taken from Brock (1954:6,118). Because of the
unreliability of the source, there is some question as to its authen-
ticity; it is not documented. However, it does appear again in Kinross
(1964:474). It seems complementary to the dynamic personality of
Ataturk and hence an apprOpriate title.

2Weber notes that none of his ideal types of legitimacy, tradi-
tional, charismatic, or rational, is ever found in "pure" form in
historical cases. (Weber; 1947:329). Atatfirk's own regime can perhaps
best analyzed as a combination of all three forms, though rational
legitimacy is predominant.

3The Sunnite-Shi'ite split is a basic one in Islam. The schism
began soon after the death of Myhammed (A.D. 632). The Sunnites believe
that the Office of Caliph belongs to the man most capable of fulfilling
its duties. The Shi'ites are partisans of Ali, the PrOphet's son-in—law,
and have always held that the Caliphate belonged exclusively to his
line. Though the majority of Muslim Turks were Sunnites, a large
Shi'ite minority existed. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:90).

4The official government explanation for the existence of only
one party was that there were no class differences in Turkey to be
represented by multiple parties. All the people were united towards
the one cause of modernizing the state. (Yalman; 1956:149).

5The evkaf was an old Islamic institution. Originally it was a
dedication of land or other revenue-producing property to pious
purposes. Over time, however, the practice evolved of listing certain
pieces of property as evkaf in order to safeguard against the general
insecurity of property rights under the Ottoman Empire. (B. Lewis; 1966:
91).

6Villages were defined of consisting of fewer than 10,000 persons
(Webster; 1939:211).

7The primary evidence given for communism was that the first
foreign aid ever preferred by the Soviet Union was given to Turkey's
first Five-Year Plan. However, Ataturk was highly suspicious of the
Soviet Union and banned the Communist Party in Turkey. (Lengyel; 1961:
296 .

103

104

8AtatIlrk was not known for his modesty.

9Robinson does attempt to do this. He concludes that AtatUrk
had a strong motivation for achievement and that he had to see reform
being carried out. (Robinson; 1963:32).

10Another reason for not permitting military officers to hold

seats in the Assembly was to undercut the power of his Opposition,
many of whom, like Rauf, Kiazim Karabekir, and Ali Fuad, were military
Officers. (Robinson; 1963:236).

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