"I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"
ATATÜRK AS ENTREPRENEUR

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
DAVID J. MINDERHOUT
1970

"I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"

ATATÜRK AS ENTREPRENEUR

By

David J. Minderhout

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Anthropology

1970

PREFACE

Whenever the analyst attempts to study a personality of the stature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk he is confronted by the problem of separating the real man from the legend. This becomes increasingly more difficult in this case where a vast body of literature has grown up around both the man and the legend, some of it contradictory. In the case of Atatürk there has been little or no serious scholarly effort on the part of biographers in recounting his career. Much of the literature is blatantly hero-worship, such as Shah (1934) or Webster (1939). In other cases, the accounts are largely anecdotal or fictionalized, as in the case of Brock (1954). The best biographical account appears to be that of Kinross (1964). This paper will attempt to analyze Atatürk by means of a concept from anthropology and economics: the role of the entrepreneur in innovation as developed by Fredrik Barth. Because of this intention, though much of the material is historical, there has been no attempt to duplicate all the historical details of Atatürk's career or of the background of the Turks; no strict chronological order of events is reproduced. Those interested in Turkish history might be referred to Davison (1968), Robinson (1963), Elaine Smith (1958), or G. L. Lewis (1955). Both Bernard Lewis (1966) and Heyd (1950) have excellent accounts of the philosophical history of Turkey. Similarly certain aspects of Atatürk's career that do not directly impinge upon the analysis of Atatürk as entrepreneur have been left to other sources,

as for example, the study of Atatürk's foreign policy. The paper is obviously limited in that it utilizes only materials that are published in English.

A difficulty arises over the spelling of many Turkish words. In some cases, there are nearly as many spellings as there are sources in the literature. Atatürk is known as Mustapha Kemal, Mustafa Kemal, Kamal, Kemal, and Atatürk; I have chosen to use the last form only. In other cases I have chosen to use the spelling of a term as it is used by a majority in the literature; hence, Caliphate, Seriat, Muslim, pasha, and so on. Another difficulty arises from the fact that Atatürk had the names of geographical locations changed to "purely" Turkish terms during his regime. This paper will use the most recent form; thus, Istanbul for Constantinople, Izmir for Smyrna, and Ankara for Angora. Similarly, Atatürk required in 1935 that each Turk take a Turkish surname. However, in most cases, the literature uses the pre-1935 names alone or with the surnames added, rather than a wholesale replacement by the 1935 surname, i.e., Ismet or Ismet Inonu is used rather than Inonu. The former system will be adopted in this paper.

No matter how his name is spelled, I have come in the course of this paper to admire Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. It is hoped that the analysis in this paper will further the study of the "Father of the Turks".

I wish to thank Dr. David M. Smith, Dr. Leonard Kasdan, and Dr. Ralph Nicholas for their help in the preparation of this paper.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

"I SHALL BE SOMEBODY"[1]

ATATÜRK AS ENTREPRENEUR

INTRODUCTION

All activity halts in Turkey at 9:05 A.M. each November 10. It was at that moment in 1938 that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, died. Many of those who observe the five minutes of silence know of Atatürk only through tradition, yet this act is symbolic of the influence he continues to have upon his country. Not only are his pictures or statues everywhere to be seen, but also his policies continue to pervade the Turkish state. It was Atatürk who oversaw and engineered the transition from the Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of Europe", to the vigorous Turkish Republic. It was Atatürk who accomplished the secularization of Turkey, effectively separating church and state. His pursuit of peaceful foreign relations; his devotion to the aims of eduction; his insistence on pride in being Turkish--all produce images, as Stirling has said, of ". . . the Western phoenix springing from the ashes of oriental defeat." (Stirling; 1965:2). It is true that Atatürk was able to accomplish what he did only because of the spadework of a century of reformers before him. Realistically it is also true that he did not bring about reform alone, but through the actions of his followers. But as Davison notes, "He was, nevertheless, the chief driving force in the creation of

modern Turkey, and some of the...aims--especially the nation-state, the secularization, and the republic--were peculiarly his." (Davison; 1968:1). Atatürk was more, however, than a political reformer. Lord Kinross suggests that: "Atatürk above all created a legend. In a land needing heroes his mystique was such that a child, blessed by his handshake, would for weeks leave his hand unwashed, lest the virtue depart from it: that an old peasant woman, once asked what her age was, replied 'Seventeen', for her life had begun only when she first saw him with her eyes during the War of Independence. For the youth of his country his words were to become a gospel and his deeds a mythology, destined to point and illuminate the national ideal for perhaps generations to come. Meanwhile both inspired youth with the sense of a new challenging life in the present and new foundations on which to build for the future." (Kinross; 1964:474). For the Turks, Mustafa Kemal was both the Gazi, the conqueror, and Atatürk, the father of the Turks, a name chosen by him in 1935 to symbolize his role as he and others saw it. A vast body of material has grown up concerning both Atatürk and his policies. Unfortunately Atatürk's biographers have contented themselves with sensationalist, anecdotal, or chronological treatments of his career. Bernard Lewis, for one, laments the lack of a "serious scholarly monograph" on Atatürk. (B. Lewis; 1966:237). It will be suggested in this paper that a fruitful way in which to analyze Atatürk's accomplishments would be through an application of Fredrik Barth's concept of the role of the entrepreneur in bringing about innovation. This contention will be examined from a number of viewpoints. In this particular case it will be interesting not only to

examine the applicability of Barth's model, but also to question the means by which Atatürk accomplished his ends and the effects, or lack of them, on the bulk of the populace, the Turkish peasantry.

THE CONCEPT OF ENTREPRENEUR

The Entrepreneur in Economics

The concept of the entrepreneur originally was and primarily still is an economic one. In classical economics Cantillon was the first to use the term in Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, published in 1755. Adam Smith spoke occasionally of the undertaker, the master, the merchant, who, as his essential function, accumulated capital with which he hired industrious people to do the rest. J. B. Say, in 1803, was the first to assign to the entrepreneur a definite position in the schema of the economic process as one who functioned to combine the factors of production into a producing organism. Though the term does not appear in the works of such economists as Ricardo, Marx, or Mill, it takes a more central position in neo-classical economies. Entrepreneurs were the people who took the ruling decisions of economic life. (Schumpeter; 1954:555,895). More recently, in a standard economics text, that of George Leland Bach, an entrepreneur is given the function of making fundamental policy decisions in a firm. "The entrepreneur decides when to establish a firm, what goods to produce, how the concern will be financed, what price policies to follow, when to expand or contract, and so on." (Bach; 1968:260).

In essence, the entrepreneur was the risk-taker, the one who invested his capital in search of profit, and who subsequently had a major role in the management of the concern.

The Entrepreneur in Anthropology

In 1955, the anthropologist Cyril Belshaw listed four major characteristics of an entrepreneur: (1) the management of a business unit; (2) profit taking; (3) business innovation; and (4) uncertainty bearing. (Belshaw; 1955). In 1965, Belshaw stated that: "In one sense, an entrepreneur is simply a combiner of resources, that is, a production manager whose task it is to decide how much of what kinds of capital, labor, and raw materials are to be combined and in what way they are to be organized. This is the act of making economizing decisions... Indeed, wherever there is an organization, there is an entrepreneurial-management function, even though it may be vested in a committee or a bureaucrat." (Belshaw; 1965:115). It is in this sense that Barth discusses the role of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is the one who brings about innovation. In doing so, a corporate group grows up around the entrepreneur. His success comes to be measured in his profit or loss. Barth argures that in order to study an entrepreneur one must develop a different mode of analysis than that normally employed by social anthropologists or sociologists. "A conventional structural analysis of the community...will fail to provide this frame...Likewise I would argue that a typical sociological role analysis in terms of norms and deviances sidesteps the most important and interesting issues." (Barth; 1963:6). This is because Barth is

interested in analyzing the articulation between the activities of the entrepreneur and the social organization he is exploiting. While the above analyses would describe the status, in Firth's terms, of the entrepreneur or "the pattern of localization of entrepreneurial activity in sets or types of statuses within the social structure", Barth is interested in the interaction of the entrepreneur and the community, in the strategic choices on both sides. "The central theme to which we have chosen to address ourselves is the entrepreneurial career as a process, as a chain of transactions between the entrepreneur and his environment." (Ibid.:7). This transactional analysis, as seen in the work of Barth (1966) or Homans (1958) or in the more stringent articulation of the Theory of Games (Stone; 1948) rests on the assumption that interaction between persons is an exchange of goods, material and non-material. It rests on definitions of economics such as Lionel Robbins' allocation of scarce means to alternative ends. (Robbins; 1932). It assumes that the items for exchange are believed to be equivalent and that each party is seeking to maximize his return, that is, to return a profit. Exchanges are dependent upon strategic choices, which in turn are limited by the values of the community, expectations of return, and the likelihood of certain responses by the parties involved. Hence Barth's entrepreneur has a "more single-minded concentration" on profit taking. This plus the less institutionalized activities of the entrepreneur and his greater willingness to take risks sets him apart from the encumbents of more traditional statues. (Barth; 1963:7-8).

Barth describes the point at which an entrepreneur chooses to exploit the environment as his "niche", and what the entrepreneur brings to the task as his "assets", "the sum total of capital, skill, and social claims he may employ in the enterprise." (Ibid.:9). Together, the assets and the niche determine the restrictions to be placed on any particular enterprise. Another concept which is central to the analysis is that of spheres of exchange. A sphere of exchange is one in which goods and services circulate freely. However, goods and services in one sphere cannot be freely exchanged for those in another; a few restricted channels of conversion may exist between disparate spheres. To take a familiar example from anthropology, in the Trobriand Islands, yams cannot be exchanged for Kula objects. Similarly, in modern American society, money should not be exchanged for political action, though a restricted channels of conversion exist, such as an investment in a particular political party. What an entrepreneur does essentially is to discover new channels of conversion and to exploit them. Barriers of cost are imposed on the conversions through available modes of trade and production or through sanctions of shame of punishment. (Barth; 1966:18). Hence, by establishing a new channel of conversion, an entrepreneur assumes a risk. Profit is made through the exploitation of the lack of established value on the new conversion. The entrepreneur can make whatever the traffic will bear until adjusting mechanisms allow for "correction" of evaluations. The innovation, of course, is the opening of the new channel. Barth suggests that someone from outside the community might best function as

an entrepreneur in that he will not be as encumbered by traditional restraints or intervening ties, such as those of kinship, with those with whom he is interacting. In other words, ideally the entrepreneur is a "marginal man."

In "Economic Spheres in Darfur" Barth describes how an entrepreneur works in primarily economic terms. (Barth; 1968). In Fur economy, there are two spheres. One embraces a large variety of material items, including a monetary medium, associated with market place facilities. In the other there was the exchange of labor for beer. The spheres were separated by the sanction of moral reprobation on conversions from either beer or labor into cash. Most participants in the economy chose to maximize their return through a progressive increase in the range of crops cultivated. Barth describes an Arab merchant who settled in the community. The Arab asked for land to raise tomatoes, then bought millet to make beer and exchanged the beer for labor to work his fields. Without a significant labor input of his own, he produced a large crop which he sold on the market at a great profit. Through his entrepreneurial activity beer and labor had been channeled into the cash sphere. It should be noted that the merchant was originally from outside the Fur community. However, as has been implied, the goods obtained through entrepreneurial activity are clearly not restricted to purely monetary, or even material, forms. Power, rank, or experience might be the goal of the entrepreneur, and thus the concept may be applied to political power in a Lapp community in Northern Norway. (Eidheim; 1963). The

Lapps have tended to be economically impoverished and politically unorganized. In general, they have been on the periphery of Norwegian society and politics; in turn the Lapps have developed a strong personal attachment to their ethnic identity. One entrepreneur, a politician, attempted to bridge the spheres of Norwegian politics and of the Lapps with a welfare state program. His program envisioned a "modern life" for the Lapps in a modern state with the resultant loss of Lapp language and culture. A rival emerged campaigning as well for material welfare, but calling for the maintenance of ethnic identity at the same time. Both entrepreneurs were seeking the profit of political power, social recognition, and economic sustenance. To obtain these profits the population needed to be brought into the sphere of organized politics and convinced to vote for a particular candidate. Eidheim describes the strategies and counter-strategies of the rivals throughout the nineteen-fifties. The significance of this example should be obvious. It should be possible to describe a political entrepreneur in terms of cost, choice, strategy, and spheres of exchange.

Preliminary Argument

There is something that sets a discussion of Atatürk as entrepreneur aside from Barth's and Eidheim's examples. This is the position of Atatürk's niche. Barth writes that "a niche may be novel, and activity in it produce a new flow of goods and thereby create resource bases for new niches, or the enterprise may be purely competitive, entering an occupied, but perhaps not fully exploited niche." (Barth; 1963:9). Each of Atatürk's innovations resulted in the creation of new

niches; he did not have to compete for a niche, or an aspect of a niche, such as votes. This sets him off from an Arab merchant in Darfur or the type of political middlement that Friedrich describes in Local-Level Politics. Such individuals have become a focus for study because of their position between the encapsulated society and the nation-state; they are the "village and tribal leaders." (Friedrich; 1968:199). Eidheim's political entrepreneurs would also fit into this category. While these entrepreneurs opened up a new niche, the niche existed between the Lapp community and the Norwegian state; furthermore, these entrepreneurs had to compete within the niche. Neither of these factors was true in the case of Atatürk. His niche was at the top of the political system. He did not have to compete for votes or power. Atatürk was, after all, a dictator. He minimized his opposition by outlawing it. The innovations he chose to make, he could impose from above. Given these conditions, it is still believed that an interesting study can be made of Atatürk, the entrepreneur.

The argument to be elaborated upon will be briefly as follows. Atatürk fulfills all the characteristics of an entrepreneur outlined by Barth. First of all, a corporate enterprise grew up around Atatürk. As forceful a personality and reformer as he was, it is doubtful that he would have been able to proceed with his reforms if he had not had followers. A loosely knit group at first, the enterprise later took form as the Republican People's Party. Eventually Atatürk identified himself with all of Turkey. Secondly, Atatürk made innovations in his environment. Innovation in itself was a difficult task in a Muslim

state. Bernard Lewis writes that: "In traditional Muslim useage the word 'Bid'a', 'innovation', was the converse of 'Sunna', the accepted practice of the orthodox, and it came to be in effect a synonym for heresy." (B. Lewis; 1966:106). Previous reformers had assured the people that their reforms were not innovations, but a return to an older way of doing things. Atatürk broke with this tradition. The basic innovation came in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic. This change, in Max Weber's terms, might be seen as a shift from legitimacy based on traditional-patrimonial grounds to legitimacy based on legalistic-rational grounds. In the former case, legitimacy rests on an "established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them." In the latter case, legitimacy based on rational grounds rests "on a belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands." (Weber; 1947:328)[2]. Atatürk, when he secularized the Turkish state, abolished the Sultanate/Caliphate and the allegiance that was attached to it through its Islamic heritage. In its place, a Republic appeared, dependent upon elected officials and a constitution. Many of the other innovations of Atatürk will be discussed including those fundamental to the lives of the Turkish people. Atatürk did not adhere to Sumner's statement that "stateways cannot change folkways." (in Lerner; 1958:112). Thirdly, it will be shown that Atatürk received a profit from these innovations and his enterprise. This was in the form of political power, social recognition, and presumably, economic

sustenance. Finally, Atatürk was willing to take a risk. After all, the Sultanate/Caliphate had existed for 600 years. To abolish it required a risk for the innovator. It will be shown, however, that the risks that Atatürk took were minimized by his position as dictator.

Perhaps most importantly in terms of this analysis, Atatürk discovered and exploited a previously non-existent channel of conversion between two separate spheres, that of the Turkish government and that of the governed. Parker and Smith note that: "The payment of taxation and the onerous military service were all the contact the Anatolian peasant had with the (Ottoman) government, whose purpose he could no more influence than he could the weather." (Parker & Smith; 1940:221). But Atatürk proclaimed: "At the just demand of the noble and oppressed nation to which my life and person belong, my most sacred duty was to regard compliance with the will of the people as paramount." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:70). Hence, a foremost tenet of both the 1921 and 1924 constitutions is: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation." (Ibid.:114). Through the Republic, the Turkish people were for the first time given a role in government. They were able to elect officials to a National Assembly which in turn elected Atatürk president. Thus, Atatürk, as the head of a constitutional Republic, brought together the spheres of government and of the people of Turkey. Finally, this paper will examine the elements that contributed to Atatürk's strategy as an entrepreneur. Remember that to Barth the "central theme" is the "entrepreneurial career as a process, as a chain of transactions between the entrepreneur and his environment." In the case of Atatürk,

the sequence of events that were his innovations is well documented. What is less available in the literature is information on the nature of the transactions. Biographers seem to be more interested in what Atatürk did than in how he did it. What will be attempted here is to examine the supports, to use Swartz's term (Swartz; 1968:19), and the strategy that contributed to the maintenance of Atatürk's regime, the way in which he maximized his investment through the manipulation of his assets and his niche. The response of the Turkish peasantry will also be analyzed. This thenis a preliminary sketch of the arguments supporting the contention that Atatürk can be viewed as a political entrepreneur. In the following sections these arguments will be amplified.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66), when the Ottoman Empire stretched from the gates of Vienna to the Yemen and from Persia to Gibralter. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:24). Bernard Lewis marks the decline of the Empire with the defeat of the Ottomans by the Austrians in 1687 and 1697. The peace treaty of Carlowitz (1699) marked the first time that the Empire signed a peace as the defeated power in a clearly decided war and was compelled to cede extensive territories, long under Ottoman rule and regarded as part of the House of the House of Islam, to the infidel enemy. (B. Lewis; 1966:36). Attempts at reform were begun in the 18th century,

but convinced of their ideological superiority over the non-Muslims of Europe, the Ottomans largely confined such advances to military equipment. Davison describes this as a: "technological, intellectual, and psychological gulf, measured by the distance between Western scientific and economic progress and rational attitudes and the relative stagnation of the East." (Davison; 1968:68). Reform was accelerated during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-39), called by some the Peter the Great of Turkey. Mahmud and the Tanzimat reformers attempted to Westernize the Empire without the recognition that Western technology and the society that accompanied it were wrapped up with and based on older Western notions such as secular legislation and justice. Hence the reforms were applied from the top downward by order of the centralized authority to a society whose social structure and ideology were fundamentally different from those of Western Europe. (Stirling; 1965:4). Thus, reforms such as the 1878 Constitution had little or no effect and the Parliament it called into being was abolished during the reactionary regime of Abdul Hamid (1878-1908). Robinson gives five principle reasons for the weakness of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century: (1) failure to keep pace with the West in technology; (2) weakness of national loyalties above and beyond regional, religious, and ethnic ties; (3) continued identity of church and state; (4) popular disinterest in economic pursuits other than agriculture; and (5) administrative and political corruption. (Robinson; 1963:3). The Ottoman Empire was the "sick man of Europe" to use the phrase coined by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and was maintained

primarily by the intrigues of the European powers who wished to use her as a buffer state, principally against Russia.

The Committee of Union and Progress

Ironically the Ottoman Empire set in motion the process that was to lead to its own demise. With the emphasis of reform on the military, it developed that the best modern education the Empire had to offer was in the military schools. The instructors were Europeans; often young officers were sent to Europe for further training. Acquainted with the concepts of the French revolution and of nationalism, these officers plus other intellectuals who were forced to flee the Empire because of their radical notions formed the core of what is now called the "Young Turks." With the center of the movement in Paris, this body began to agitate for the overthrow of the Empire. By 1907 the various groups were united under the banner of the Committee of Union and Progress. Their activities led to successive revolutions in 1908 and 1909 which restored the 1876 Constitution and placed the CUP in power. Once in power, however, the CUP hesitated in its aims to lay the foundations to a new state. Some lesser reforms were announced, but noteably the Young Turks continued to cling to the idea of an empire. (Robinson; 1963:6-12). Stirling describes the movement as a "Splendid confusion of ideas" which embraced "pan-Ottoman parliamentarianism, rights for minorities, pan-Islamism and pan-Turanism (a movement to unite politically all the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, then under Tsarist rule), together with a flavouring of Liberty, Equality,

Fraternity, and Prussian absolutism." (Stirling; 1965:5). The CUP was given little time to consolidate its gains. Italy attacked Tripoli in 1911. In 1912, the Balkan League was formed; later that same year Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia attacked and drove the Empire out of Macedonia and Thrace. In 1913, a coup d'etat in the CUP brought Enver Pasha a professional soldier, and two others, Talat and Cemal, into power. Enver was the central figure; he soon succeeded in elevating himself to virtual dictator. Enver has been described as "surely one of the most unfortunate generals in history." (Robinson; 1963:12). He oversaw a series of military disasters, foremost among them being his choice to commit the Ottoman Empire to the cause of the Central Powers in World War I. The Ottoman forces were routed on every front, save one. The end of World War I found the Young Turks having fled the country, a new Sultan, and supine, defeated country about to be divided among the victorious powers. Istanbul and the Bosporus were occupied; all Ottoman possessions in Arabia and Africa were placed under European protectorates; and an independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan were set up in eastern Anatolia. The remainder of Anatolia was divided up into French and Italian spheres of influence. Turkish finances were placed under Allied control. The Greeks were given the region of Izmir to administer. Under the encouragement of the British, the Greeks had also decided to invade Turkey. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:53). This was the situation when a young army officer named Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun in Anatolia on May 19, 1919.

Atatürk Until 1919

Mustafa Kemal, henceforth called Atatürk, the name he took in 1935, was the sole Turkish officer to emerge with increased stature at the end of World War I. A Macedonian, he had been born in Salonika in 1881. When he was nine, his father, a minor official in the Ottoman Debt Administration and a merchant, died leaving little money and a hard childhood relieved by the charity of an aunt who sent him to school. At twelve, he succeeded against the will of his mother in entering an Officers Training School in Salonika. From there he moved on to a Senior School at Monastir and then to the General Staff College in Istanbul. By now he had begun the raucous personal life which continued throughout his life and which "left nothing to be desired by the most sensational biographers." (Parker & Smith; 1940:40). While at the Staff College, Atatürk became acquainted with a wide variety of European ideas, in particular, the works of Voltaire and Rousseau. With the abundance of like-minded young men at the College he formed a revolutionary organization with the aim of overthrowing the Empire. After graduation at age 24, he was arrested and imprisoned for his political activities, but his excellence in his work at the College secured him a pardon. After two years at the command of a cavalry regiment in Damascus fighting a perpetual rear-guard action against the Druses, Atatürk returned to Salonika where he found himself at the center of political activity aimed against the Sultan. Though he disagreed with the leaders of the movement, headed by the CUP, Atatürk

played a major role in the 1908 revolution. However, his abrasive manner in dealing with his political superiors found him on the outside of the movement. After commands in Tripoli and in the Balkans, Atatürk spent three years as military attaché to Bulgaria, a virtual exile for his outspoken criticism of the Enver regime. In February, 1915, he was assigned to a command at Gallipoli under the German general, Liman von Sanders. The Allied forces landed at the section of beach commanded by Atatürk. In this campaign he first won real distinction as a commander. In particular he received credit for his initiative in risking an attack on the Australians after their landing at Anzac Bay on April 25, 1915. For months he commanded the troops holding the ridge and prevented the Allied forces from moving towards Istanbul. When in December, 1915, the Allies withdrew from Gallipoli Atatürk was publicly hailed as the Victor of the Dardenelles and the Savior of Istanbul. This made him a political liability to Enver; thus Atatürk was posted to the army fighting the Russians in Armenia. A hopeless command, this had originally been a grand scheme of Enver's to restore some the Empire's lost territory. Instead the campaign had floundered and of the 100,000 Turkish soldiers originally sent to fight, only 13,000 remained to Atatürk, the rest decimated by cold and disease. Nevertheless he managed to bring his troops into shape and with the aid of the collapse of the Russian government in 1917 was able to secure a satisfactory strategic position. After joining the Crown Prince on a military mission to Berlin in 1917, Atatürk was given another hopeless

command in Syria. Even here, however, he was able to organize an orderly retreat and to halt the British advance, By then,the Ottoman Empire had signed the Armistice of Mudros in October, 1918. Thus it is that Atatürk never lost a command in World War I, the only Turkish general to be able to make that claim. This, plus his obvious lack of affiliation with either the Enver regime or the Germans (Atatürk had protested the Empire's entry into the the war and had always viewed his German allies with disdain) allowed him to emerge unsullied from the war. Returning to Istanbul, he was able to secure a position through some political maneuvering and intrigue as Inspector-General in the interior. Atatürk was now convinced that the fabric of the Empire, now headed by the Crown Prince, now Sultan Mahmet VI Vahideddin, was rotten beyond repair. In the interior a nationalist association, The Anatolian Defense Rights Association, had already been formed. When the Sultan's government learned of Atatürk's intention of joining the nationalists it attempted to stop him, but not before he was able to slip through to the port of Samsun. As he landed he received word that the Greeks were landing at Izmir, intent upon invasion.

Atatürk and Turkey: 1919-1924

The various accounts of Atatürk's career tell that his intention at this point was to unite the nationalists and as their head to establish a new Turkish state based upon Anatolia. He had already offered himself to the Sultan as the head of a nationalist Turkey. If this was his intention he was faced with a formidable task. The

Empire was defeated; thousands of Turks had died. Though nationalist guerilla bands had formed in the interior, only one Turkish army on the Eastern front remained. There was no real nationalist feeling on the part of the bulk of the populace. If questioned as to his identity, a villager might answer that he was a Muslim or an inhabitant of a certain location, never a Turk or rarely an Ottoman. (B. Lewis; 1966:327). The Ottomans, after all, as already noted, were the exploiters of the peasant. The Empire was a legitimate robber, whose legitimacy rested on religious authority. (Stirling; 1965:267). Even Muslims were divided into Sunni and Shi'ite followers.[3] Villagers were distrustful of the inhabitants of towns. As Ward notes: "For it must not be thought that when Mustafa Kemal turned his back on Istanbul, a frenzied people were waiting to claim him as leader and to throw off the foreign yoke. Quite the contrary. Even among nationalist circles he had yet to make his way. An 'Anatolian Defense Rights Association' already existed in the interior. He had to prove himself to this body. But more difficult than the suspecions of the patriots was the dull apathy of the country at large." (Ward; 1942:42). For these various reasons Robinson suggests that Atatürk might even have been glad that the Greeks had invaded. (Robinson; 1963:63). After all, the infidels were attacking the heartland of Muslim Turkey. It appears that this proved to be the catalyst in uniting the people into a War of Independence. As Allen points out: "This invasion of Turkey's own homelands by the nation's deadliest foe was enough to restore a heroic spirit of resistance and to unite the people in the accomplishment of a great

patriotic endeavor. The thought of their territories being violated, their homes invaded, and their religion insulted by the hated infidels was enough to awaken a tremendous burst of hidden energy and the upheaval caused a favorable condition for the dissociation and reintegration of Turkish social patterns." (Allen; 1935:42).

Atatürk launched his program to accomplish an independent Turkey through a number of clearly defined steps. (Robinson; 1963:65). His first move was to gain the personal allegiance of the top military commanders and key civilian administrators in Anatolia for a renewed national struggle. Key among these was Kazim Karabekir, commander of the sole remaining Turkish army, Rauf, a naval hero of World War I, Refet, and Ismet. Atatürk, assured of the support of the military, secured control of the telegraph system, thereby breaking the Sultan's link with the interior and assuring his own ability to communicate with the country. The political leadership for the nationalist movement was forged in part by two congresses called by Atatürk and his supporters. The first, held in Erzurum in July, 1919, had representatives from the eastern provinces only. The second, held in September at Sivas, was more broadly representative. Each congress set up a Representative Committee of which in each case Atatürk was elected president. A de facto government in Anatolia was formed from the Representative Committee of the Union for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. This committee issued a National Pact, worked out in the two Congresses. In essence the Pact called for the integrity

of all Ottoman-Muslim territory within the lines of the Mudros armistice and complete independence with no legal or financial servitudes. Throughout this period, Atatürk insisted upon national and popular sovereignty. There was a strong Islamic cast to this nationalist movement. It was intended that a free Sultanate should be the head of the new government. (Davison; 1968:122-3).

The Sultan's government residing in occupied Istanbul did not greet these developments favorably. At first it recalled Atatürk. When he refused to return, the Sultan ordered Kazim Karabekir to arrest the rebel. Atatürk convinced Kazim that this was not in the interests of Turkey. In the fall of 1919, the Sultanate, responding to pressure from the nationalists, called for new parliamentary elections under the 1876 Constitution. A large nationalists majority was returned. Despite Atatürk's protests that the city was under Allied control, the delegates insisted upon being seated in Istanbul. Atatürk remained at his headquarters in Ankara. The new chamber in Istanbul voted in the National Pact in January, 1920, as the non-negotiable minimum on which the nationalists would accept peace. The Allies were alarmed and on March 16, 1920, the British arrested and deported to Malta some two score deputies. This plus tightened British control in Istanbul proved to be an important spur to the nationalists. Those deputies who were able to escape went to Ankara. There, on April 23, 1920, they voted to create the government of the Grand National Assembly. They did not declare the Sultan deposed, but maintained that while he was an Allied captive, they alone represented the nation. Atatürk was the next day

elected president of the Assembly and presided over a council of ministers. This organization was elaborated on in a constitutional law of January, 1921, which stated that sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation. The country was also now officially for the first time called "Turkey" (Turkiye). The Sultan's reply was decisive. His Sheik-ul-Islam issued a fetva, a Muslim juridicial ruling, encouraging the killing of rebels as a religious duty. A court martial in Istanbul condemned Atatürk and the other nationalist leaders to death in absentia. Irregular troops, the "Army of the Caliphate," were organized to fight the nationalists. Such moves made reconciliation between the two governments impossible. This was exacerbated in August, 1920, when the Sultan's government signed the humiliating treaty of Sevres, which confirmed the conditions mentioned earlier. The Ankara government refused to sign. The Sultan's government had cut the last link between itself and the nationalists. Allen notes that the traditional government "might have held on to their positions in Turkish life had it not been for the apparent collusion of the Sultan's government with Turkey's foes..." (Allen; 1935:42).

Even with these incentives towards nationalist government, Atatürk's own position was anything but automatically assured. Smith contends that: "Many influential military and civilian leaders expressed skepticism and indecision, mainly because many believed that Mustafa Kemal was a great general but doubted his ability as a statesman." (E. Smith; 1958:13). Davison adds that: "The task confronting Kemal and his associates was extraordinarily difficult. Even to maintain internal cohesion was hard. Kemal was no dictator, no all-powerful

leader, despite his energy and magnetism. He was confronted with dissident personalities and groups within the Assembly, the armed forces, and the movement as a whole. He had to reason, argue, cajole, threaten. There were many Turks who held back at first from committing themselves to the cause. There were also dissident guerilla bands to be curbed or absorbed; at least one had strong communist tendencies. Supplied for the armed forces had to be scrounged, stolen, captured, or brought from abroad...Improvisation was the order of the day." (Davison; 1968:123-4). The key to Atatürk's strategy in this period appears to be his prowess as a military leader and the continuing support of the regular military. After all, this period of Turkish history was more than a political crisis; there were Greeks to fight as well. The Greeks had expanded their area of control from Izmir in a series of attacks, starting in the summer of 1920. In that year and the next they drove the Turks back. Twice in early 1921 the improvised Turkish army under the command of Ismet stopped the Greeks at Inonu. But in July of that year a renewed offensive forced the Turks to retreat once more. The Assembly berated Atatürk for the setbacks. Armstrong describes Atatürk's response this way: "Once again he faced (the Assembly). This time he demanded to be made commander-in-chief with full powers of a dictator. The Assembly hesitated, afraid of him. He refused to haggle; if he was to save Turkey, he must have absolute control. The Assembly, with certain conditions to protect their ultimate sovereignty, agreed. At once Mustafa Kemal took full control." (Armstrong; 1933:146). In a three week battle in the late summer of

1921 Atatürk threw back the Greeks. In a renewed effort on August 26, 1922, the Greeks broke and fled to the sea. On September 9, the Turkish nationalists entered Izmir in triumph. The Assembly, overjoyed, bestowed on Atatürk the title of Gazi, warrior and victor for the faith, a title once borne by the earliest Ottoman Sultans. (Davison; 1968:124).

When Atatürk's forces approached the Bosporus, in order to reach the Greek forces in Thrace, the British agreed to negotiate. By the armistice of Nudanya, signed on October 11, the Allied powers agreed to restore Turkish control in Istanbul, Thrace and the Straits. The new peace conference was called at Lausanne, Switzerland. This time the Ankara government was the only representative of Turkey; Atatürk succeeded in having the Sultanate abolished on November 1, 1922. The intransigence of the Turkish delegation, headed by Ismet, won it virtually all of its demands. Under the terms of the Treay of Lauanne, the boundaries of the Turkish state were essentially those as demanded by the Turks. There was to be no Armenia or Kurdistan in the east and no Greek zone in the west. There were to be no spheres of great power influence. There were to be no reparations from World War I. The Straits were demilitarized, and though Turkey's sovereignty in the area was to be recognized, an international commission was established to supervise the freedom of transit. A population exchange was arranged between the Greeks and the Turks; only the Greeks of Istanbul and the Turks and Greek-held western Thrace were excepted.

Though the transfers caused a great deal of human misery, the exchange was to ease relations between Greece and Turkey in the years to follow. In short, the Turks were the only defeated power of World War I to receive a negotiated peace. Lausanne was negotiated among equals, not imposed. (Davison; 1968:126).

THE REPUBLIC OF ATATÜRK: THE REFORMS

Atatürk then turned to another War of Independence, that to enable Turkey to enter the fold of "modern" nations. Such a step was to require a great many internal reforms, each to be imposed on a war-weary populace. As the account in the Turkish version of the Encyclopedia of Islam puts it: "After the expulsion of the enemy armies from Anatolia, many people believed that they would start to live in comfort and prosperity according to the old fashion and old rules. Atatürk considered such a belief dangerous. It was necessary to perpetuate the enthusiasm aroused during the national struggle for liberation and fight against the backward mentality that was having as destructive an effect on the nation as the enemy armies." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:204). Smith contends that the subsequent reforms of Atatürk can be seen in two phases: "the first was the establishment of a politically independent state by the military and diplomatic triumphs during 1919-1923 culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic in 1923; the second phase is often known as the Kemalist Reformation or Modernization period during which drastic changes were

made in the Turkish political, economic, social, and cultural structure which aimed to develop Turkey into a modern nation. (E. Smith; 1958:92). Smith goes on to suggest that both of these phases were made possible by the dynamism of Atatürk. "Turkish political and intellectual leaders had talked about reforms for nearly a century, but it took the strong and often authoritarian leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his followers to change this talk into action." (Ibid.:92). Each of Atatürk's major reforms will be discussed in the following sections. It will be suggested that a useful framework for discussion is the six arrows which are found on the banner of Atatürk's Republican People' Party. The arrows symbolize Atatürk's aims of nationalism, republicanism, laicism, populism, etatism, and reformism. These principles were set forth in a speech by Atatürk on April 20, 1931; they were subsequently adopted as part of the Statues of the RPP. They are also found in the 1924 Constitution of Turkey through an amendment of February 5, 1937. Taken together the Six Principles are Kemalism. No attempt is made to present historical events in a strict chronological order; historical details are also missing. However, this is not a paper on the history of the Turkish Republic. Rather it is hoped that this discussion will begin to reveal the strategies of Atatürk as entrepreneur.

Nationalism

The term "nationalist" has been used frequently to this point. The National Assembly was said to be nationalist; the Sultan's government was not. It has been implied that there was not a nationalistic fervor among the Turkish people as a whole. Davison says: "For want

of a better term, we describe as modern nationalism an exaggerated consciousness of organic unity and uniqueness based on common cultural traits and the concept of a territorially delimitable state." (Davison; 1953:326). Such an awareness did not exist among the inhabitants of Ottoman Turkey. Bernard Lewis notes that "loyalty to a place was known, but it was to a village or quarter, at most to a province, not a country; loyalty to one's kin was ancient and potent, but it was to the family or tribe, not to the nation. The ultimate loyalty, the measure by which a man distinguished between brother and stranger, was religion. For the Muslim, his fellow believer, of whatever country, race or language, was a brother; his Christian neighbor, his own infidel ancestors, were strangers." (B. Lewis; 1966:323). The word "Turk" was a pejorative one referring to the ignorant country bumpkins of Anatolia. Halet Efendi, on arriving in Paris in 1802, was shocked to be referred to as the "Turkish ambassador." (Ibid.:323). The stirrings of a national consciousness beyond a religious identity are found in the 19th century as the intellegentsia discovered the writings of European philosophers. The early Western ideal with which they became acquainted was utilitarian, practical, and liberal; it dealt with nations defined by visible and objective criteria such as territory and sovereignty. The focus of attention of the 19th century Ottoman intellectuals was on an Ottoman father land or a vaguely defined Ottoman nation. However, the Ottoman Empire spanned too many local identities in its vastness to make any such scheme a reality. The Young Turk movement also focused

on a nationalism of sorts, but as already noted, the Enver regime was not about to abandon the ideas of empire. Hence, emphasis was placed on movements such as pan-Ottomanism or pan-Turanism. However, when Atatürk came into power, the groundwork for Turkish nationalism had already been laid, at least among the elite. Intellectually this was seen in the works of such writers as Ziya Gokalp, a major philosophical influence under both the CUP and the Republic. (Heyd; 1950). Gokalp believed that the political revolution of 1909 had to be supplemented by a social and cultural revolution which would make every man conscious of belonging to a Turkish nation. Under the Republic, his slogan of "Turkification" became a rallying cry of nationalists, including Atatürk. Besides the intellectual influences it would seem that the war solidified the opinion of many. Former subjects in the Balkans, Armenia, and in the Muslim Arab territories had turned against the Empire; there was the victorious opposition of the Allies and the invasion by the Greeks. The inhabitants of Turkey became Turks, and not Ottomans, as over against their enemies. Atatürk encouraged such tendencies. It is said that he, a Macedonian, looked to Anatolia as the true heartland of Turkey; as a soldier he recognized the advantages of and had argued as a cadet for pulling back the borders of the Ottoman Empire to defensible positions. In the foreign policy of the Republic, Atatürk made it clear that his country wanted no more than the territory within its own borders. He rejected the role of emperor and of Caliph of all of the Muslims when these were offered to him.

But if the elite were nationalistic, there was a real question about the rest of the population. Deutsch, a political scientist, says that the strength of a nationalist process depends upon two major elements. "First, it may depend on the extent to which the ruling class itself promotes this process, not merely with its outward trappings but in its social substance; the extent, therefore, also to which the ruling class remains accessible to the members of other classes for communication, entry, alliance, or alignment. Second, it may depend on the extent to which the masses of the people become mobilized with or without the cooperation of their rulers, for realignment with the new nationalist movement and the new changes in their old way of life." (Deutsch; 1953: 104). Atatürk's Republic certainly embodied the first element. It was nationalistic and as shall be seen, it actively encouraged the growth of nationalistic tendencies. It is the second element that was in doubt. Atatürk had to take steps to make the peasant a nationalist.

For the bulk of the populace, allegiance was still primarily religious. Indeed, Atatürk had used this when attempting to stir up the people to fight against the Greeks. The Greeks were not only the invaders of the Turkish homeland, but also were the infidels who were destroying Muslim villages and killing Muslim women and children. Also, when the Sultan's fetva was issued branding the nationalists the enemies of Islam, Atatürk used his supporters among the muftis, cadis, and ulemas of Anatolia to issue counter-fetvas condemning the Sultan. Indeed much of Atatürk's support among the peasantry was based on the

fact that he was the Gazi, the slayer of the infidel. But Atatürk wished to lead a "civilized" nation; to him civilization meant Western civilization--and European civilizations were nationalistic. Hence, his people needed to be nationalists. To achieve this took two steps: (1) secularization and (2) Turkification. Secularization will be discussed below. It should be pointed out, however, that Atatürk attempted to wrench the primacy of the peasant's allegiance to Islam from him through the secularizing of the state, the closing of the religious schools, and the attacking of symbols of Islam such as the fez.

The second step was Turkification, the glorification of the Turkish heritage and the shedding of Arabic and Persian influences on the culture. As Webster so nicely puts it: "In general (Turkification) is an attempt to separate the original streams of Turkish culture from the waters in which it became diluted and muddied in the sea of other Anatolian civilization." (Webster; 1939:240). The most dramatic of these reforms was the change in the Turkish script from Arabic to a Latin script. In August, 1928, Atatürk took the platform at a People's Party fete at the Sarayburnu Park in Istanbul and announced in his fashion that "Our rich and harmonious language will now be able to display itself with new Turkish letters. We must free ourselves from the incomprehensible signs that for centuries have held our minds in an iron vice. You must learn the new Turkish letters quickly. Teach them to your compatriots, to women and to men, to porters and to boatmen. Regard it as a patriotic and national duty." (Kinross; 1964: 443). The Arabic script was to be replaced. The consensus in the

literature is that this was a wise decision. Arabic characters are ill-suited to the writing of Turkish, particularly because Turkish has eight short vowels while Arabic distinguishes only three. Nor are their consonant systems alike; the Arabic letter kaf, for example, was used by the Turks to represent k, g, ng, y, and v. At no period was there a universally recognized rule about the spelling of Turkish words. In addition, the twenty-eight letters of Arabic script change their form according to whether they are initial, medial, final, or isolated; the beginner has thus to learn over one hundred characters and orthographic signs. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:97). Reforms in the script had been proposed since the time of Mahmud II; the Young Turks similarly had suggested such a change, but nothing was done. Impetus to Atatürk's decision was given by the proclamation of the Soviet Union in 1925 that a Latin script should replace the Arabic one in Turkish-speaking Azerbayjan, a Soviet province on the eastern Turkish border. In 1926, a similar decree was issued for the rest of the Turkish-speaking people in the Soviet Union (B. Lewis; 1966:271). This in 1928, Atatürk had appointed an Alphabet Commision. In only six weeks, working on the Soviet example, a Latin script was ready. After his dramatic announcement Atatürk toured the country explaining his script to the people. In November, 1928, the script became law. Civil servants were required to learn it and to sit for exams on it. The Latin script was to be the sole script taught in schools and used in government literature. As for the abruptness of the move, an anecdote goes that Atatürk

asked a member of the Alphabet Commission how long the transition would take from one script to the other. The consensus of opinion, said the member, was five years. This would allow for a period in which both scripts would be taught by the schools and printed side by side in the newspapers. In that case, said the Gazi, people would continue to read the old and disregard the new. "The change will happen in three months or it will not happen at all." (Kinross; 1964:442). Robinson gives three reasons for the implementation of the new script: "In the first place, the new nationalist tendencies tended to favor a distinctly Turkish system of writing. The move was in part a nationalistic one. Secondly, the old script was of religious significance. Arabic was the language of the Holy Quoran. So the move was also part of the sustained effort to deemphasize everything religious. Thirdly, the leadership wanted to cut the youth off from the traditional literature, which was overwhelmingly religious and force the new Turks to read the new national literature of history, science, and technology." (Robinson; 1963:85). A fourth reason might be added as well. In a nation dedicated to educating its people as Turkey was and with only between 10 to 20 percent of its people literate, the new script was felt to facilitate the learning process. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:97).

A second major reform was the purging of Arabic and Persian words from the language. Sir Harry Luke writes that: "When the (Turk) changed his status from that of a Siberian nomad to that of a member of an Empire partly European, he found it necessary to make large additions

to his vocabulary partly of abstract terms, for which purpose he borrowed widely from Arabic and Persian. It is true that when these Arabic and Persian words passed into the Turkish language they came under the rules of Turkish grammar and were governed by Turkish inflexions, Turkish declensions, Turkish suffixes, and Turkish pronunciation. But, even when enclosed within a Turkish frame, most of them remained unintelligible to Turks..." (Luke; 1936:185). Atatürk declared that these foreign words were to be stricken from the native language and that Turks should look into their past for substitutions. The Turkish Linguistic Society was formed to facilitate this process. Newspapers were required to use the new Turkish derivations. Glossaries were compiled both to ease the transition and to allow even the most learned to read books or magazines. A protest arose that this time Atatürk was expecting too much in too little time. Indeed this movement threatened to make the Turkish language a mandarin language as artificial and incomprehensible to the ordinary Turk as that of the old Ottoman ruling class. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:99). Thus the official policy of purification was abandoned; instead substitutions were encouraged rather than required. The process continued at a slower pace. It is seen today in the changeover of place names for it was during this period that Constantinople became Istanbul, Angora became Ankara, and so on. Kinross says that: "This, more perhaps than any of Kemal's other reforms made (the people) conscious of their 'Turkishness'." (Kinross; 1964:467). It is interesting that many European words were introduced into the Turkish language and allowed to remain without protest.

Atatürk in his attempts to produce new nationalist symbols for his people produced xenophobia. His Turkish Historical Society searched the past for signs of Turkish greatness. Characters from the founders of Sumer to Attila the Hun were claimed as Turkish. Particularly appealing to Atatürk was a "sun language" theory of a Viennese philologist. According to this theory, primitive man uttered his first sounds, which evolved into words, in response to the awe induced in him by the sun. The philologist felt that he had found a link between his improvised sun language and Turkish. Thus the first language was Turkish. This is symbolic of the excesses in which Atatürk's scholars indulged. The nationalist symbols were communicated to the people through the schools, by government propaganda, and through the culture houses. The Ocaks or Turkish Hearths had been established in 1911 by the CUP as a means of awakening cultural consciousness and a feeling of cultural unity. Their activities included lectures on rural improvement, hygiene, and the cultural heritage. The Ocaks were replaced in 1932 by the People's Houses which operated on essentially the same grounds. In this manner Atatürk hoped to educate new generations of Turks, brimming with nationalistic fervor, who would then bring their nation into the foremost in the civilized world.

Republicanism

On October 13, 1923 Turkey was proclaimed a Republic and Atatürk was elected by the National Assembly as its first president. This reform had its precursors, primarily in the assemblies under the

1876 Constitution and in the restoration of that Constitution by the Young Turks. But in neither the Ottoman Empire nor in the government of the CUP was there any intention of transferring sovereignty to the people. In the Ottoman Empire the Sultan/Caliph was something of a combination of a Tudor king and a Roman pope. His authority was paramount in both secular and religious affairs. The CUP produced a dictator, Enver, and a new elite. Thus it was a startling departure from precedent when the Grand National Assembly published a Populist Declaration on December 18, 1920 which asserted that national sovereignty, the sovereignty of the people, was the foundation of constitutional government in Turkey. Thus Turkey claimed that Turkish government derived its power from the "consent of the governed." While Ziya Gokalp may once again be considered the philosophical mentor of such a move, it was Atatürk who was especially dedicated to such a principle. It is difficult to assess the origins of Atatürk's belief in democratic principles. He was, after all, a military man and in his personal mien more given to authoritarianism and action than to such concepts as free debate, checks and balances, and votes. Though undoubtedly he read certain European writers (Rousseau and Voltaire are the only two ever mentioned) while in school, perhaps Ward is nearer to being correct when she writes that: "At the same time, the behavior, the dogged endurance, the patience, the heroism, of the ordinary soldiers did more for the democratic temper of Kemal's mind than years of reading the scholarly source-books of French liberalism. It filled

him with an angry devotion for the rough sons of Anatolia, who for centuries had borne, either in the taxes on their fields or the guns on their shoulders, the full burden of the imperialist follies of the Sultanate." (Ward; 1942:40). Those who have read of the merciless way Atatürk threw those troops into certain death might reply more cynically. Nevertheless, following the Populist Declaration, when debate broke down in the National Assembly as to a constitution and other aspects of government, it was Atatürk who "by force of his influence, personality, and steamroller tactics ended the debate and the Fundamental Articles of the Constitutional Act of the Government of the Grand National Assembly were adopted." (E. Smith; 1958:86). This document came into force on January 20, 1921. Its first provision reads: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation." In subsequent sections the Constitution of 1921 provides for free elections of delegates to a National Assembly every two years, details the rights of the assembly, such as the election of ministers, and explains the rights of the President of the Assembly. Atatürk was chosen to that post.

There were difficulties with this first constitution. For instance it included little about political parties, established only a unicameral Assembly, and failed to provide for a Supreme Court. In short, it allowed for the sort of authoritarian leadership that Atatürk was to give. But Atatürk was dissatisfied with it for another reason: it did not provide for the separation of church and state. This became

a crisis in October of 1922 when the Allies, at the opening of the Lausanne Conference, sent invitations to both the National Assembly and to the Sultan. The initial response of the Assembly was to call for the deposition of the current Sultan, Mahmet VI. Atatürk had another proposal: the abolition of the Sultanate. He argued that under the Constitution, sovereignty belonged to the nation, not to an individual. Hence, while the position of Caliph could be retained the Sultanate should go. A debate was called during which various scholars and theologians discussed whether it was feasible to separate the position of Sultan from that of Caliph. Atatürk listened to the debate for several hours. Finally he asked for the floor and stated: "Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone because scholarship says so; because of debate or discussion. They are taken by strength, by power, by force. By force, the Ottoman dynasty seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six hundred years. The Turkish nation has called a halt; it has rebelled and taken the sovereignty into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The question is not whether or not we are going to leave the sovereignty to the nation; the question is merely how to give expression to the accomplished reality." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961: 169). Several sources report that the delegates politely thanked Atatürk for his views, that they had not been looking at the question from that perspective. Obviously intimidated, the Assembly proceeded to vote for the abolition of the Sultanate. On November 17, 1922

Vahideddin escaped from Turkey, and on November 18, by a vote of the Grand National Assembly, Abdulmecit, his cousin, became Caliph.

One step remained in Atatürk's aim to achieve a Republic: the name itself. The Constitution of 1921 provided within it the means by which Atatürk was to accomplish his end. The National Assembly appointed its ministers; the ministers were responsible to the Assembly and could be replaced by it. Thus, "the Ministers became the victims of constant criticism both by persons who sincerely disagreed with their ideas and by those who for personal reasons wanted to replace them as Minister. This resulted in a condition of general anarchy and confusion." (E. Smith; 1958:57). Atatürk, using this to his advantage, provoked a governmental crisis by convincing all the ministers to turn in their resignations simultaneously. A stalemate on the choice of a new Cabinet was quickly reached in the Assembly. The deputies sent for Atatürk and asked his advice. Not surprisingly he suggested that: "The form of government of the Turkish state is a Republic." He called for a vote; the motion passed unanimously, that is to say, 158 of the 287 members present voted for the motion. The rest abstained. G. L. Lewis reports that: "The decision to make Turkey into a Republic, though hotly contested, did not come as a surprise." (G. L. Lewis; 1955: 78). One member of the Assembly said realistically: "Once you've said 'Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation' you can ask anyone you like; its a Republic." (in E. Smith; 1958:58). Brock reports that there was "dancing in the villages" at the news. (Brock; 1954:333).

On April 20, 1924, a new Constitution was ratified by the Assembly which names Turkey as a Republic and reaffirms national sovereignty. Legislative and executive power were given to a popularly elected Assembly; executive power was exercised only indirectly through the President of the Republic and his ministers, chosen by him. The Assembly was given the option of overthrowing the government of the President. Atatürk was chosen the first President. He in turn named Ismet his prime minister.

An important aspect of the Republic came to be the Republican People's party. In the spring of 1923, Atatürk, to strengthen his own hand domestically and to strengthen Ismet's bargaining position at Lausanne, formed the party that became the RPP. The Party was to serve as a vehicle for social reform. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:129). Atatürk was its permanent President-General. The Party was highly organized; the Party Program of 1935 details the organization from the Presidency-General to the local official. Since it was the only party allowed to exist in Turkey, it was closely affiliated with the workings of the government as a whole. Government and RPP hierarchies tended to coincide. Atatürk saw the RPP as having two primary functions. The first, of course, was to provide candidates for election. Second, Article 5 of the Program reads: "It is a function of Party members and organizations unremittingly to carry on propaganda for and explanation of Party principles among all fellow citizens." (in Webster; 1939:111). The Party's principles were the same as those of the government's: nationalism, republicanism, laicism, populism, etatism, and reformism. To this end the Party owned and operated the People's Houses and the

People's Rooms. The RPP was an important link in Atatürk's republicanism.

In this manner Atatürk officially brought the people of Turkey into its government. The peasant was given a vote and a party for which to vote. Both the government and the RPP were intent on educating the peasant as to his role in the new sphere. An interesting paradox developed, however, as Atatürk's regime evolved. That government, as Yale suggests, was "a dictatorship under constitutional representative government." (Yale; 1958:295). A party was established by Atatürk; it was the only party allowed to exist.[4] The press was censored. Atatürk was very much the military commander; his commands were to be obeyed. Opposition was tolerated only insofar as it did not threaten Atatürk's program of reform. An opposition developed in November, 1924, in the form of the Progressive Party. Its leadership was composed of many of the army leaders who had supported Atatürk in 1919, noteably Rauf and Kazim Karabekir. The Progressive Party, while agreeing with the republican ideals of Atatürk's government, disagreed with Atatürk's assumption of absolute authority and with Ismet's economic policies and authoritarian methods. A more fundamental difference appeared in the divergent approaches of the two parties to modernization. Atatürk and his followers wanted social revolution; Rauf preferred social evolution, that is, he did not wish to impose reforms upon an unwilling people. Rather, he proposed to make the necessary changes in law while letting the people adapt to them over time. Such a program was too slow for Atatürk's designs. (Kinross; 1964; 392). At first Atatürk tolerated his opposition and even made

concessions to them, among them being the removal of Ismet from the Cabinet and his replacement by Fethi, who had more liberal views of dissension. For several months the Progressives played an active and not wholly ineffective part in the Assembly. However, in June, 1926, a conspiracy to assassinate Atatürk was uncovered. It developed that Rauf had been informed of the plot, but he had underrated the source and had failed to inform Atatürk. Atatürk, in turn, used the incident to rid himself of the bothersome opposition. Kiazim, Rauf, Refet, Ali Fuad, and a number of other prominent Turks were arrested. Their trial was turned over to the improvised Tribunal of Independence, specially called into being to deal with the matter. Rauf and seven others were exiled. Kiazim, Refet, Ali Faud and two others were found innocent. The rest were hanged; Atatürk signed the execution orders before the trial had begun. (Armstrong; 1933).

In 1930 Atatürk decided to form his own opposition, a loyal opposition in the model of the English system, but one which was under his immediate control. His loyal supporter, Fethi, was chosen as the head of this opposition, and several of Atatürk's close associates were encouraged to join the party, the Free Republican Party. Censorship of the press was raised, and dissent was suddenly encouraged. Atatürk was experimenting with democracy in action. It is possible that he underestimated the fervor of his opposition in Turkey. By this time the major steps in the secularization program had been carried out; the economy, under the double burden of development and world depression, was going badly. Of course, opposition up to this point had been

minimal, except for a Kurd revolt that had been brutally extinguished and the assassination attempt; but then opposition was not allowed. Bahrampour notes that: "The leaders of the RPP believed that their reforms were widely welcomed by the Turkish people. Actually the lack of a formal oppostion prevented the traditionalists from publicly expressing their views on the Westernization program." (Bahrampour; 1967:17). An undercurrent of opposition existed, primarily among the clerics. Fethi's party became a rallying point for the silenced "traditionalists." At first Fethi made public appearances. Enthusiastic crowds turned out to cheer him and to denounce the government of Atatürk and Ismet, now restored to the premiership. When, in Izmir the RPP organized a counter-rally, few supporters turned out. Rather, a demonstration calling for Fethi formed in front of the RPP's headquarters. The police fired on the crowd, killing a boy of fourteen. Fethi decided to curtail his public appearances and to concentrate on political debate in the Assembly. Here, under Atatürk's orders, he attached the government. The reaction was electric; fist fights broke out on the Assembly floor. Sadly Atatürk cancelled his grand experiment in democracy at the age of three months. Fethi was exiled. Six weeks later, when another Kurdish revolt broke out, Atatürk took the opportunity to deal with his harshest opponents in the defunct Free Party. The Kurds, whose revolt centered on secularization, were again defeated, but subsequent arrests included many who were not Kurds. Over one hundred persons were tried for inciting the population to sedition in an attempt to "alter the Constitution by force." Some

were hanged; others were imprisoned. An opposition party did not reappear in Turkey until after World War II. (Kinross; 1964).

Several authors are quick to pass over Atatürk, the dictator, most suggesting that the times required strong leadership. Webster points out that while Atatürk was a dictator, he intended to make Turkey a democracy. "No one expects an opposition party to arise before Atatürk is ready to permit its existence. However, this must not be interpreted as an indication of either a party or a personal dictatorship. What it does mean is that Atatürk is relying on his judgement--and many citizens are depending on it--to determine when the Turkish people are sufficiently advanced in their political thinking and ability to work together rather than misuse the unlimited forms of democracy for anarchistic self-expression and behavior...The average Turk and the 'Father of the Turks' are both democrats at heart." (Webster; 1939:286). Though this quotation is obviously overstated, it probably contains something of the truth. Kinross reports that Atatürk sought to justify the liquidation of his opponents and his assumption of dictatorial powers by saying that: "It was the people that I was afraid of." (Kinross; 1964:435). It was Atatürk's conclusion, and that of most writers, that because of the lack of a democratic heritage, the Turkish people were politically unsophisticated and unable to handle the powers of democracy. Armstrong quotes Atatürk as saying in 1932: "...let the people leave politics alone for the present. Let them interest themselves in agriculture and commerce. For ten or fifteen

years more I must rule. After that perhaps I may be able to let them speak openly." (Armstrong; 1933:268). Thus the paradox exists that Turkey was at once a Republic, whose sovereignty belonged to the people and a dictatorship. Perhaps the best appraisal is that compared to the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk's regime was liberal and democratic. Compared to the West's conception of democracy, the regime was a dictatorship. This dictatorship should also be compared to its contemporaries in Italy and Germany. Though Atatürk dealt ruthlessly with his foes and made a travesty of justice at times through the Tribunals of Independence, there was none of the widespread persecution of minority groups such as that found in Nazi Germany. Neither was there a secret police; criticism of the regime, within bounds, was tolerated. However, Atatürk did not have a large urban proletrariat or a large educated class to contend with. Nevertheless, Bernard Lewis writes that: "His was a dictatorship without the uneasy over-the-shoulder glance, the terror of the door-bell, the dark menace of the concentration camp. Force and repression were certainly used to establish and maintain the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes, but no longer; and after the executions of 1926, there was little danger to life and to personal liberty." (B. Lewis; 1966:285). This is not an attempt to excuse dictatorship; it is difficult to compare regimes by weighing the number of persons killed. But Atatürk's regime should be placed in perspective. It was a highly authoritarian Republic.

Laicism

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was not a Muslim. There is no comment in the literature as his ever having any religious affiliation of any kind. He did not see, as his Ottoman precursors had, the world divided up into Muslims and infidels. Rather he saw it divided into civilized and uncivilized nations. It was his aim to make Turkey a civilized nation based not on a religious order, but on science, education, and technology. To accomplish this required the secularization of the Turkish state. In 1925, Atatürk stated in a speech at Kastamonu that: "...the Turkish Republic cannot be a country of sheikhs, dervishes, and acstatics. The truest religious order is the order of civilization. It is a condition of humanity to fulfill the commands and demands of civilization." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:225). The first step in this process had been to formally hand sovereignty to the people: the abolition of the Sultanate. The next step was to do away with the Caliphate. Berkes speculates that Atatürk would have allowed the Caliphate to remain if the new Caliph, Abdulmecit, hadn't overstepped his instructions as to his powers given him by Atatürk. (Berkes; 1964: 457). This is doubtful. There appears to have been more to the question than this including the very real possiblity that the Caliph would become the rallying point of Atatürk's opposition. And, as has been already been seen, the Caliphate would have been inconsistent with Atatürk's designs for the state. Indeed he stated that "Following the abolition of the Sultanate, I accepted the abolition of the Caliphate, as it was nothing but the same personal sovereignty under

another name." (Berkes; 1954:454). The new Caliph was given the role of a nominal figurehead by Atatürk, with no powers or positions. Abdulmecid, however, the Shadow of God on earth, took his high office as a supreme duty. He chose to revive the traditions of the great Sultan-Caliphs. Instead of using a carriage like his predecessor, he rode gallantly like Muhammed the Conqueror on a white charger across the Golden Horn to Santa Sophia to say the prayers each Friday, with an escort of hussars behind him. When he prayed in the great mosque of Skutari, he was rowed across the Bosporus in the imperial barge with fourteen oarsmen dressed in his splendid livery. Wherever he went, crowds gathered to cheer him. He received visitors, ambassadors, and delegates in his palace, conscious as he was of being the spiritual head of one hundred million Muslims. Such moves displeased Atatürk, but he sensed that no counter move could be made without a great outcry. His opportunity arose when the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali, two distinguished Indian Muslims, wrote Ismet on November 24, 1923 urging the "imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Calioh-Imamate on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations..." (in G. L. Lewis; 1955: 84). Atatürk and his followers spread the story that the Agha Khan was a pawn of the British; obviously the hated British, who had encouraged the Greek campaigns of 1919-1923, were still trying to undermine the Turkish state, by questioning the sovereignty of the people. Their propaganda was effective. On March 3, 1924, the National

Assembly voted for the deposition of Abdulmecid, the abolition of the Caliphate, and the banishment from Turkey of all members of the Imperial family. At the same sitting two more blows were struck at Islam. The Law of Unification of Instruction gave into the charge of the Ministry of Public Instruction all educational institutions within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic. This placed the medresses, the Islamic schools, under the direct control of the government, which shortly thereafter closed them. The other blow entailed replacing the Ministry of Seriat and Evkaf by a new department of the Prime Minister's office, the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The Seriat branch had controlled the religious courts; these were closed on April 8. The Evkaf oversaw the pious endowments,[5] many of which were confiscated and redistributed. The tombs and shrines of saints were also closed; religious functionaries were permitted to wear clerical garb only while performing their duties.

As his next step Atatürk proposed the abolition of the Seriat as the Civil Code. The Seriat was the holy law of Islam, composed of the Quoran, the Sunna, the recognized corpus of tradition or practice of the prophet, and the interpretations of the four great doctors of Islam, all of whom lived in the 8th or 9th centuries A.D. (Luke; 1936:174). The Ottomans had made the Seriat the effective law of the state; they gave full recognition and authority to the courts and judiciary that administered it. Some portions of Western law had been introduced in the Tanzimat and in the Young Turk periods, but essentially the Seriat remained the law of the Republic. In 1926 Atatürk introduced a penal

code based on the Italian Code, a commercial code modeled on German and Italian examples, and the Swiss Civil Code. While the commercial and penal codes were not of concern to the opponents of secularization, the civil code was, as it regulated practices in family relationships. Polygamy was now illegal; marriage became a civil contract. The husband's advantage under Islamic law in securing divorce was swept away. The new civil code also did away with the millets, the last vestiges of an Ottoman practice of allowing non-Muslim minorities the right to their own communal law. Thus both sexes and all sects were made equal under the law.

It is interesting that Atatürk received very little opposition to these moves even considering the official policy towards opposition. There was little outcry. Webster naively interprets this to mean that religion had no hold on the deepest interests of the people. (Webster; 1939:278). G. L. Lewis offers a more plausible explanation: "Islam in Turkey has always existed on two different planes. There was the Islam of the state, with its salaried hierarchy speaking with the voice of orthodoxy and there was the heterodox Islam of the people (and not only of the common people) embodied in the great dervish order." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:91). The loss of the Caliphate and of the Ministry of Seriat and Evkaf were of interest primarily to politicians and the Islamic hierarchy. The faith and the life of the peasant were untouched. As for the new Civil Code, Stirling reports that even in 1949, "the effect of those parts of the Civil Code that govern marriage and the family have at present almost no bearing on the village." (Stirling; 1965:271).

But Atatürk was to take a step that was to shake the core of the citizenry: the abolition of the fez.

In 1829 Mahumud II had decreed the fez as mandatory clothing for civilians. Mode of dress is very closely attached to a Muslim's belief. Certain clothing was appropriate to an infidel. To adopt the dress of an infidel was to a Muslim more than a change of style; it was an act of treason and apostasy. Previous to Mahmud's reign the turban was appropriate to a Muslim. Supposedly the Prophet had said that: "The turban is the barrier separating belief and disbelief." Thus when Mahmud introduced the fez there was great opposition. (B. Lewis; 1966: 99-100). But by 1926 the fez was firmly entrenched in Islamic identity. In fact in the Turkish idiom of the time, sapka giymek, "to put on a hat," meant to apostasize from Islam. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:92). A hat with a brim was part of the clothing of the infidel; with the brimless fez, the believer could touch his forehead to the ground in prayer. For Atatürk the fez was an appropriate symbol. To get at the mind of the Muslim, he must first wrench away his headgear. In typical dramatic fashion, Atatürk chose to begin his campaign in the remote, conservative town of Kastamonu. Crowds turned out to see the Gazi for the first time; the Gazi appeared waring a Panama hat. Brock compares the situation to the Prince of Wales appearing in Trafalgar Square in his underwear. (Brock; 1954:359). The reaction to the hat was stunned silence. Atatürk toured through Turkey attempting to persuade by example. When example failed, he turned to law. Turks were required

to wear headgear with a brim, a hat. The response was quick in coming. Muslims all over Turkey railed aginst the accursed hats. Riots broke out in Erzurum, in Menemen, and in Sivas. Local officials and police were attacked and stoned. Both the clerics and the people recognized that this was a frontal attack on their religion and its place in Turkish society. Atatürk responded decisively. He reinvoked the Tribunals of Independence. He prescribed prison and the bastinado for first offenders in the crime of wearing a fez, shooting or hanging for irreconcilables. When the fez became fatal, it disappeared. Turkish Muslims wore hats. A Kurdish revolt led by members of a dervish brotherhoods. Opposition was undoubtedly great, but then, opposition was not to be tolerated.

Other moves in the secularization reform included the replacing of the Muslim calendar by the Gregorian calendar. The call to prayer was translated into Turkish and was required to be spoken in that language. In 1935 the weekly day of rest, itself an innovation in 1924, was changed from the Muslim sabbath of Friday to a European-Style weekend of Saturday noon to Monday morning. The phrase "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam" was struck from the Constitution. Atatürk renounced his title of Gazi. Combined with the reforms in script and in language, with their religious denotations, the sum total of the secularization process was the separation at the official level of church and state. Its effect on the populace was more uncertain. Smith writes that "of all of Atatürk's reforms, secularization is the one which has been least thoroughly absorbed by the Turkish

people..." (E. Smith; 1958:102). Robinson suggests that the efforts of the police had a great deal to do with the disappearance of practices such as the fez rather than any real allegiance to the aims of secularization. (Robinson; 1963:84). The implications of this will be discussed below. It should be noted that, despite appearances, Atatürk did not attempt to eradicate Islam as a belief system. Indeed many of his followers, including Ismet, were said to be men of personal piety. Kinross notes that "though he might, by a single act of his Grand National Assembly, abolish the political power of the Islamic religion, he could not neutralize its spiritual and social influences and indeed did not pretend to interfere with freedom of religious conscious." (Kinross; 1964:387). His intention instead was to deprive the people through a series of abrupt shocks of such influences as might rival that of the state in allegiance. In fact, Atatürk claimed to be purifying Islam. In 1924, when he was advocating the abolition of the Caliphate, he said: "We also recognize that it is indispensable in order to secure the revival of the Islamic faith, to disengage it from being a political instrument, which it has been through habit." (in Stirling; 1958:398). It was here undoubtedly that Atatürk, the entrepreneur, took his greatest risks.

Populism

Populism as a principle was construed by Atatürk and his followers to refer to the democratic rights given to the Turkish people. Webster says that: "Populism, at its current stage, secures to Turkish citizens

equal social, economic, and juridicial rights, and provides for a democratic exercise of the suffrage in local elections." (Webster; 1939: 166). Atatürk himself stated that: "We are populists, and populism means that power, authority, sovereignty, administration, should be given directly to the people and kept in the hands of the people." (in Eren; 1963:20). It should be remembered, however, that Atatürk felt that his people were insufficiently educated in the principles of democracy. Thus it is not surprising that the Atatürk regime placed a major emphasis on education. When asked at the end of the War of Independence as to his future plans, Atatürk replied that: "My greatest ambition is to try to raise the standard of national enlightenment as Minister of Education." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:204). Educational reforms leading towards universal primary education had been attempted during both the Tanzimat and the Young Turks eras. Kazamias reports that: "the Constitution of 1876 provided that all schools should be under government supervision and that the first stage of education should be compulsory. Although these principles were discarded along with the Constitution, the idea of educational reform survived. Indeed as in the period of the Tanzimat, education was considered the cornerstone of any and all improvements in the juridicial, legal, administrative, and military advancement of the state." (Kazamias; 1966:80). The Young Turks attempted reforms in 1913 that would have secularized the schools and made the first six years of education compulsory. However, World War I interferred with such plans. The medresses trained exclusively for ecclesiastical careers. Emphasis was on learning Arabic and the

Quoran. As religious education was a means of social mobility and the medresses were free, it is not surprising that they continued to flourish in the Republic. For most of the people, education represented greater piety and greater knowledge of religious matters. Allen, however, charges that: "One of the worst faults with the instruction in the old mosque schools was its emphasis on memorizing and repetition--features which made the students tend to be purely imitative and lacking in mental initiative." (Allen; 1935:104). The best education was still to be had in the military schools, with their limited enrollment. A second problem with both the medresses and the military schools was that education was still not compulsory, either functionally or legally in the Republic. That 80 to 90 percent of the population was illiterate shows that this was an important failure of the school system. (Kazamias; 1966:272). Finally, the medresses were religious schools and thus had no place in Atatürk's scheme of education. As noted, the medresses were closed soon after their administration was placed under the Ministry of the Public Instruction in 1924.

The Constitution of 1924 places all education under the supervision and control of the state. It reaffirms the previous principle that "primary education is obligatory for all Turks and shall be gratuitous in the government schools." (Ibid.:117). To provide an education the Turkish Republic needed school buildings, teachers, students, and a curriculum. The buildings existed in the towns; villages were required to build schools by the Village Code of 1924. Webster writes that: "School buildings more than anything else that meets

the eye are both the most obvious and most significant symbols of Turkey's reformation...In thousands of communities there is at least one modern, new structure which attracts the attention and which in all probability has been erected under the new regime--and if it be the only good building in the village or neighborhood--it is almost certainly the schoolhouse." (Webster; 1939:210). Teachers are more difficult to manufacture. Parker and Smith note that the progress of primary education was held up by the lack of teachers. (Parker & Smith; 1940:163). One major problem was that the teaching profession had to compete with the government's need for a trained civil service and an expanding industry's need for technicians. One way of handling this was to decrease the mandatory six years of primary education to three years. This, in turn, affected the quality of education; it is one reason why Turkish government figures on literacy have to be read very carefully. As for the students, despite what Webster seems to imply, many communities did not have educational facilities; many students could not afford to move to another area to go to school. Thus, though primary school education was compulsory, it was far from universal. In 1934-35 only about 40 percent of all children between the ages of seven and twelve were in primary school and only 28 percent of village children.[6] Even this, however, represents a remarkable growth. In 1924, 336,061 were enrolled in primary schools; in 1935 the figure was 688,100. Literacy was judged to have jumped from 10.6 percent in 1924 to 19.2 percent in 1935. (Kazamias; 1966:271-2). The Atatürk regime did make some

remarkable strides in the direction of educating the Turkish people. As for the curriculum, its form is presented in detail in both Webster and Kazamias and need not be reproduced here. It should be mentioned that the change in script from Arabic to Latin allowed for increased access to education and facilitated the learning process.

Besides the compulsory primary school education, lycees, or secondary schools were established on a French model, though these were found primarily in urban areas. Only 120,000 were enrolled in lycees in 1935. (Ibid.:272). In addition, the Istanbul University was reorganized, and the construction of other universities was begun. The education of adults was not neglected. Through the Ocaks and later the People's Houses and People's Rooms an education of sorts was offered in the form of lectures on hygiene, rural improvement, and cultural heritage as well as classes on language, typing, accounting, and home economics. The Ocaks were a creation of the Young Turks; the People's Houses were instituted in 1932. Karpat writes that: "The People's Houses embody the principle of populism, one of the six principles in the Turkish Constitution of 1924. Their purpose was to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and the people by teaching the first of these the national culture which lay among the Anatolian masses and the second, the rudiments of civilization and an indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime." (Karpat; 1963:55). The People's Houses and the People's Rooms, which were smaller organizations more suited to villages, were a response to the public reaction to the Free Party of 1930; they were to be the means

by which the people were educated in democratic ideals. Thus, their program tended to be one of government propaganda rather than of instruction. At any rate, they were few in number and sparsely attended. Nevertheless, this and the other elements of education in the Republic were an important part of Atatürk's plan to bring the people into the sphere of government.

Etatism

Davison writes that Atatürk was generally more concerned with political, social, and cultural questions then with economic ones. (Davison; 1968:140). However, in 1924, Atatürk observed that: "Without economic (development) a weak state cannot be saved from poverty; it cannot be saved from social and economic disease...There is no civilized state which does not think of its economy before its army and its fleet." (in Robinson; 1963:63). Obviously Atatürk recognized the importance of economic concerns in his overall program of transformation. At the end of the War of Independence the economic state of Turkey was deplorable. To begin with, the Ottoman Empire had allowed non-Muslim foreigners a wide range of privileges in trade in Turkey; these are known as the Capitulations. Groups of foreigners engaged in trade in Turkey were subject only to the laws of their own country. Foreign concerns were almost entirely free of any Turkish control and were quite free of taxes. The Ottomans had established the Capitulations to encourage trade, but instead the tax advantages made competition

by Turkish enterprises unprofitable. Such economic activity as there was came to be concentrated in the hands of aliens. Similarly under the millets non-Muslim Turkish inhabitants gained economic privileges and concentrated most of the rest of the economy in their hands. World War I deprived Turkey of both her capital and her merchants. For instance, in the exchange of populations after the Treaty of Lausanne over one million Greeks were deported to Greece; most of them were merchants and small businessmen. Robinson notes that: "Economically the country seemed in hopeless condition. There was, in 1919, virtually no modern industry, except a very few foreign-owned plants and utilities in the Istanbul and Izmir areas...In agriculture almost no machinery was used and farming practices followed the same cycle that had prevailed for centuries." (Robinson; 1963:63). To make matters worse, neither Atatürk nor Ismet understood much about economics or finance. Seemingly politically advantageous moves such as discouraging Allied investment, given the conditions of the Treaty of Sevres, were economic failures; capital became unavailable. When local private industry and enterprise not surprisingly failed to provide economic growth, Atatürk announced a policy of etatism or state capitalism. Bahrampour writes that: "During the period 1923-1933 the Turkish experience showed, however, that reliance solely on private capital did not result in economic development to as rapid a degree as required by the emerging new Republic. The dearth of trained personnel and enlightened private management also retarded economic growth." (Bahrampour; 1967:72). Thus, under etatism, private initiative was

still to be encouraged, but the major economic role was to be taken by the state.

In a speech on March 1, 1922, Ataturk described the main economic problems to be faced including the modernizing of agriculture, the conservation of forests, and the growth of industry. There was also to be the nationalization of "Institutions and enterprises directly affecting the public interests..." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:246). Hence banks were established by the government to develop certain economic sectors such as mining. Railroads were nationalized as were air, postal, telegraph, telephone, and maritime passenger services. Industries were encouraged through the offer of free state-owned land. Through a Five-Year Plan begun in 1934 a number of modern factories were constructed, and the economy creaked into motion. Much criticism has been offered of this portion of Atatürk's program either on the grounds that it was akin to communism[7] or that it was a failure. As for the former point, it should be noted that the Turkish government continued to encourage private enterprise; indeed in 1938 private enterprise covered more than half the industrial field in Turkey. (Parker & Smith; 1940:129). But private enterprise, with its lack of capital, was unable to move quickly enough to provide a strong economic base for Atatürk's social reforms. Robinson refers to the "...compelling need for accelerated economic development, the failure of private enterprise to maintain the desired pace, the non-availability of foreign capital, and the ambition of empire-building bureaucrats..." as reasons

behind the initiation of etatism. (Robinson; 1963:111). As for the second point, once again the lack of foreign capital as well as the depression of the 1930's worked to slow the progress of state capitalism. But growth did occur. Davison notes that though development measures were often inefficient, tangled in bureaucratic regulations, without proper attention to distribution and marketing of what was produced, there was "without question" progress under Atatürk's etatism. (Davison; 1968:141).

Atatürk used etatism as a means of furthering his social reforms. It was his deliberate policy to use industry not only for production, but also as an educational device and a lever for regional development. Industries were placed in Anatolia and in eastern Turkey in order to offset the imbalance that existed between the urbanized western portions of Turkey and the rural eastern sections. Attempts were made to discourage the growth of cities around industries; these in turn were placed within easy reach of towns and villages. Peasants were encouraged to migrate seasonally in order to boost their earnings from agriculture; industries provided dormitories for these transients. Such endeavors partially broke the peasant away from his physical and psychological isolation. On the other hand, says Robinson, these policies discouraged the growth of a new urban, landless proletariat. (Robinson; 1963:117). "With the Soviet Union so close at hand there was occassion for concern." (Robinson; 1963:117). The Labor Code of June, 1936, provided welfare legislation for the workers. Regulations

were placed on women and child labor and on the payment of wages. A 48-hour work week was made the maximum regularly permitted. The effect of the Code was that "...welfare rather than production was the prime consideration..." (Webster; 1939:251); Robinson calls it "paternalistic." (Robinson; 1963:109). A controversial section of the Labor Code prohibited strikes by the workers; hence it is said that the Code did more to protect the state than the workers. (Webster; 1939:258).

It has been estimated that in the first days of the Republic that 85 percent of the population were agriculturalists. Atatürk stated on March 1, 1922, that "The real lord and master of Turkey is the peasant, who is a producer. This being so, the peasant deserves the more prosperity, happiness, and wealth." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:243). Despite this, however, the overwhelming bulk of Turkey's non-military investment during Atatürk's regime went into industry and communications. Aside from certain highly specialized crops and some agriculture-based industry, little was done to improve agriculture under etatism. As an example, as recently as 1948 there were only 1700 tractors in the country. (Robinson; 1963:120). Ward explains this as follows: "In all rapidly industrializing countries it is the peasantry that bears the weight of their country...Turkey is no exception to what seems to be a general rule of industrial development." (Ward; 1942:73). Perhaps a more logical explanation is that offered by Robinson: "Nothing could have changed village farm practices until a core of literate and mechanically knowledgeable farmers had been created." (Robinson; 1963:113). It must be remembered that Atatürk

made the reforms he did not by reason of any compelling popular pressure. The entrepreneur had to create his channels of conversion forcibly. Reforms were carried through by deliberate planning and pushing on the part of the leadership of the country. While Atatürk could create social revolution in abolishing the Caliphate or in nationalizing railroads, he had to settle for Rauf's social evolution when it came to bettering the lot of the peasantry. The Village Code of 1924 was a prescription for certain behavior in the village. It specified the election and conduct of village officials and gave two lists of improvements to be made in each village, the one obligatory and the other optional. Those in the former list had to do with public sanitary measures and the building of a schoolhouse. The voluntary improvements envisioned aesthetic and material factors looking to a higher standard of living. (Webster; 1939:236). For other agricultural improvements the Atatürk regime had to provide example and education. As to the example, Webster writes that: "Conservative as have been many of the influences in the life of the Turkish peasant, he is quick to learn with his eyes--if the lesson be written in objects rather than Arabic or Latin characters." (Ibid.:268). The government provided, among other services, seed, stud animals of excellent quality, and some mechanical equipment. It was hoped that when a villager saw the advantages to certain procedures, he or a group of villagers might pool their resources to secure the goods on a more permanent basis. As for the education, the primary schools and lycees were to be made available to the peasant, as well as the Higher Agricultural School, an institution of university rank

in Ankara. There was also the world-view expanding opportunities of migrant labor and military service. It should be mentioned that in 1939, after Atatürk's death, the Village Institutes were opened. At the Village Institutes children who had completed their course at a village primary school were trained as teachers. The period of instruction was five years. The boys were also taught a craft such as building or carpentry; all girls learned such things as midwifery and the care of children. (Stirling; 1965:110). All in all, this was an expansion of the ideals of Atatürk in the hopes of creating an "enlightened peasanty" that would develop its agricultural promise.

Reformism

Ziya Gökalp once said that his people were: "In head, European; in heart, Turkish." (in Webster; 1939:138). Such a statement seems to embody the overall goals of the Atatürk revolution. It has been implied throughout the above discussion that Atatürk instituted his reforms in the image of an ideal which he held about civilization. For Atatürk, civilization meant Westernization. In 1924 he stated that: "We cannot shut our eyes and suppose that we live alone. We cannot put a fence around our country and live without a connection with the world. On the contrary, as a progressive, reforming nation, we shall live in the field of civilization. Which nation that desires to enter civilization has not turned to the West?" (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961: 193). There were plenty of precedents in Turkey. Reformers of the Ottoman Empire had looked to Europe for examples. In 1911 Abdullah

Cevdet wrote that: "Civilization means European civilization." (In B. Lewis; 1966:231). The complete ramifications of these previous reforming attempts had been blocked, however, by the fact that the Europeans were also infidels. Thus, in the reforms of Mahmud II and the Tanzimat, Westernization consisted mainly of the introduction of European military hardware; one could accept aid from the infidel if it was to be turned against him. Many of the reforms were superficial changes in form only to appease foreign creditors. Atatürk instead stated that: "The nation has finally decided to achieve, in essence and in form, exactly and completely, the life and means that contemporary civilization assures to all nations." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:262) Gentizon has said: "The French Revolution was limited to the domain of political institutions; the Russian Revolution has brought about disorder in social relations; but only the Turkish Revolution has concerned itself all at one time with political institutions, social relations, religion, the family, economic life, the customs and even the moral bases of society." (in Allen; 1935:85). This is an exaggeration, but yet this quotation illustrates the thoroughgoing scope of the Atatürk innovations. The Principle of reformism, or revolutionism as it is also translated, committed the Republic to continous and on-going reform.

Among Atatürk's Westernization reforms was the attempt to better the status of women in Turkey. Islamic custom placed women in a position of inferiority to men,"... a female animal deficient in morality and

self-respect, who required protection by the male against her own weaker instincts." (Kinross; 1964:418). When she did venture out into public she was to be completely covered by clothing, with a veil across her face. In Istanbul no woman could be seen walking in the street or driving in a carriage with a man even if he were her husband. On trams and boats there was a curtain to divide women from men. These characteristics were more true of women living in the cities or towns. Women among the peasantry had to work in the fields and perform other outdoor tasks; they often went unveiled before all, but strangers. World War I had begun the breakdown of the woman's institutionalized inferior status. To replace the men who were fighting, women became clerks, civil servants, and nurses for the first time, under the Young Turks. Atatürk, however, intended to go beyond such token reforms. In 1925 he stated that a society could not advance unless both sexes worked together as equals and partners; "... together they must accomplish the various stages of the journey into the land of progress and renovation." (Kinross; 1964:420). Thus under the Civil Code, as mentioned, women were given equal rights with men. Later they were granted suffrage. Atatürk did not legislate against the veil as he did against the fez. Instead he perhaps wisely left its demise to fashion. When his own wife and the wives of other prominent officials took up the reforms, the veils disappeared, at least in the major cities. It is significant that when Turkish troops entered Antioch when they took over the Hatay from the French in July, 1939, they were greeted by a deputation of women who symbolically removed

their veils to welcome the arrival of "European" Turks. (Parker & Smith; 1940:157). The amazing growth of literacy among women is an example of the success of Atatürk's reforms. (Lerner; 1958:124). Atatürk adopted several girls in his lifetime; one of them became Turkey's first woman pilot. Ironically, Atatürk's wife was one of the first turkish women to enjoy a civil ceremony in marriage and one of the last to be divorced by the Seriat laws.

All the reforms stated above can be explained in terms of Westernization. For instance, Deutsch describes Atatürk's nationalism as "a rapid process of Westernization." (Deutsch; 1953:103). The Republic was modeled on European examples. Secularization was consistent with Atatürk's belief that the religion of civilization was science and objective thought. The penal, commercial, and civil codes were lifted almost directly from European sources. Atatürk removed the fez and encouraged the wearing of European-style clothing. Compulsory primary education was an extension of Atatürk's belief that "the most important real guide to life, success, and civilization is science and knowledge (Kazamias; 1966:159). As for etatism, Atatürk had the examples of Western philosophies and Western examples, noteably Germany and Italy. In summary, Bernard Lewis stated that:

> "For many Turks, the great transformation which has taken place in their country is to be defined, not merely in terms of economy or government, but of civilization. The essential change attempted by the Turks in their Revolution was one of Westernization, another step in the westward march of the Turkish people that began 1000 years ago, when they renounced China and turned to Islam. Now, renouncing a large part, though

> not the whole of their Islamic heritage, they have turned to Europe and made a sustained and determined effort to adopt and apply the European way of life in government, society, and culture. Opinion differs as to the measure of success achieved in this attempt; there can, however, be no doubt that in large and important areas of the public life of Turkey, the Westernizing revolution is accomplished and irreversible." (B. Lewis; 1966:479).

The innovations of the entrepreneur had widescale ramifications for the entire Turkish society and culture.

ATATÜRK AS ENTREPRENEUR

The Corporate Enterprise

The above discussion gives a brief description of the major reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk, the entrepreneur can be seen more clearly in the light of this analysis. It will be remembered that Belshaw's four characteristics of an entrepreneur, as used by Barth, are: (1) management of a business enterprise; (2) business innovation; (3) profit taking; and (4) risk-bearing. As for the first point, it can be seen that a corporate organization grew up around Atatürk. In the War of Independence, this organization was composed of a loose-knit core of loyal followers, many of whom were army officers. Later Atatürk created the Republican People's Party, the formal organization that supported his regime in office. Furthermore, to this list can be added the ephermeral something called Turkey. Atatürk identified strongly with his nation. "I am Turkey," he said, "To destroy me is to destroy Turkey." (in Armstrong; 1933:227). On another occasion he

stated that: "There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is that sitting before you, the Mustafa Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call 'Me'. It is not I that this Mustafa Kemal personifies; it is you--all of you present here, who go into the furthermost parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal, a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's work is to make them come true."[8] (in Parker & Smith; 1940:38). That Atatürk glimpsed something of his own destiny can be seen in the impact his policies still have on contemporary Turkey. At his death, the Republican People's Party, under the leadership of Ismet, continued to hold power until 1950, the first year that an opposition party was allowed to compete for office. The new party, the Democratic Party, swept into office basing its platform on a claim to represent the real Kemalist policies. When on May 27, 1960, a military junta ousted the Democratic Party from office, its leader, General Celal Gursel, claimed that "We are animated by the spirit and the deeds of Mustafa Kemal." (in Lengyel; 1961:306). Today, Atatürk's policy, party, and Republic still exist. In retrospect, Atatürk, his followers, and his party fulfill all seven of M. G. Smith's conditions of a corporate group. (M. G. Smith; 1960). The RPP possessed a single legal personality, Weber's corporate "oneness." A reading of the Party Program of May, 1935, assures one that the Party possessed closure, internal autonomy, and internal organization; the Program provides for organization down to the village headman. The Party had an identity, obviously; it was

identifiable as a unit to people within and those with whom it came into contact. In the form of its offices, the People's Houses, and other materials, the RPP possessed a common estate. It exists in perpetuity; it survived its founder. Given Atatürk's attitude and the close identification of the RPP with the organization of the Republic during his regime, all of these characteristics could be extended to the Constitution of 1924 and the Turkish state. A corporate group did form around Atatürk, the entrepreneur.

The Innovator

That Atatürk undertook innovations is undeniable. Their various forms have been discussed in the previous sections. Barth's criterion was that an entrepreneur would be more experimental and speculative than the encumbents of institutionalized statuses. The entrepreneur must work on the basis of a deductive prognosis of results rather than by accumulated experience. Even relative to the reforms of the Tanzimat and the Young Turks, Atatürk can be seen to meet these criteria. The accumulated experience of the Ottoman Empire had grown up over six hundred years. Such reforms as had been carried out by the Tanzimat and the CUP had established a precedent of only limited success; accumulated experience had nullified their effects. Though some of Atatürk's reforms had been foreshadowed in nationalist literature, they were largely speculative when proposed. Particulary striking is the fact that Atatürk, the innovator, did not choose to work within the confines of the Sultanate/Caliphate form of government as had his predecessors; perhaps this made his greater success possible. Finally, as will be

seen, a strategy existed for the implementation of reform; Atatürk was working on the deductive prognosis of results.

The Profit of the Entrepreneur

That Atatürk derived profit, that he underwent a risk to do so, is again undeniable. Besides his more altruistic visions for a Westernized nation and people, Atatürk sought power and position as a personal goal. The title of this paper an alledged quotation of Atatürk's was taken from Brock (1954:6, 118); though it is undocumented there and hence suspect, it is found again in Kinross (1964:474). As a statement of personal ambition, it is supported by Atatürk's early attempts at political intrigue, both before and during World War I. As an example, his involvement in the Vatan movement at the Staff College for which he was imprisoned in 1905 can be seen as an example. Atatürk both organized and led this early organization. Again, in 1917, Atatürk attempted to persuade the Crown Prince to demand a personal army of which Atatürk would be Chief of Staff. On several occasions Atatürk demanded to be included in the CUP cabinet as Minister of War. This culminated in his demand to be made War Minister in 1919 just prior to his posting in the interior. There, in Anatolia, he placed himself quickly at the head of the nationalist organization and of the army. He remained as head of the Turkish state in one form or another until his death in 1938. An anecdote goes that after he was named President of the Republic, thus making himself head of the state, the cabinet, and the only party, an admirer compared him to the Holy Trinity, "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Atatürk admitted with a gleam

in his eye, "It is true, but don't tell anyone." (Kinross; 1964: 387). Atatürk believed that he was the only man capable of reforming Turkey; he consistently sought political power to achieve his ends. Thus Atatürk received the profit of personal power, social recognition, and presumeably economic sustenance. Though this is not mentioned in the literature, Atatürk, the son of a poor merchant, was not a wealthy man by birth, and probably his career as a soldier opened few, if any, opportunities for economic endeavors which would have built up an individual fortune.

The Risk-Taker

Atatürk's position as a risk-taker, it has been seen, was minimized by the uniqueness of his niche. Each of Atatürk's innovations entailed the creation of a new niche; he did not have to compete for or in his niche. The fact that there was a dictator in the niche also reduced opposition and minimized risk. Risk was not non-existent, however. Robinson writes that: "... he had many enemies--ambitious politicians, conservative religious groups, and a substantial share of the landed class." (Robinson; 1963:32). G. L. Lewis notes that: "There was a good deal of opposition to Mustafa Kemal's personal and patriotic ambitions, and if he succeeded almost invariably in carrying the Assembly with him, it was due to the deputies' knowledge that most of the people and army had confidence in the Ghazi Pasha and were not prepared to follow anyone else." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:77). One threat in the assembly in 1920 arose when a bill was proposed that no one who had not lived in their constituencies for five years could sit in

the Assembly. Atatürk was a Macedonian; Macedonia belonged to the Greeks. Furthermore, as an army officer he had not stayed anywhere for five years in consecutive order. The move would have removed him from the Assembly. Atatürk, however, reminded the Assembly of his role in the War of Independence; no doubt his position as head of the army helped him. The bill was not passed. There was always the risk of political opposition, especially from Rauf or the clerics. There were also assassination attempts. Indeed Atatürk, the entrepreneur, took risks, though these risks were minimized by the uniqueness of his niche. Ataturk, the innovator, did not have to compete for votes or power. Atatürk, the dictator, did not tolerate an opposition that would threaten his regime.

The Channels of Conversion

To Barth, an important variable in his discussion of the entrepreneur is the opening of channels of conversion between two spheres of exchange that were previously unconnected. It has already been suggested that Atatürk organized the people of Turkey politically for the first time, thus opening a channel of conversion between the people and the government. The Party provided for local leadership in organization. The People's Houses gave direction. The people voted for candidates who were in turn to represent the people's interests. Politicans campaigned for the people's support. This support was translated into votes in the National Assembly which then elected Atatürk as President of the Republic. Atatürk always claimed

to be working in the interests of the Turkish people. In response to a telegram from the War Minister recalling him from the interior in July, 1919, Atatürk wrote that: "In our homeland today there is a national force; it springs from the heart and brain of the nation watchful for disaster. Your humble servant is subject to that force." (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:70). Again, as noted, he stated that his "most sacred duty" was to the will of the people. (Ibid.:70). On several occasions Atatürk made extensive tours of Turkey, talking to the people and learning of their complaints. One such tour preceded the Peace Conference at Lausanne when Atatürk attempted to win popular support for the coming reforms. Another tour came after the disturbances over the Free Party in 1930. Again, after the initiation of the Latin script, Atatürk toured the country with a blackboard stopping in the villages to lecture the peasantry on the advantages of his plan. Atatürk relished the role of teacher; often he viewed the Turkish people as recalcitrant students to be instructed. (Armstrong; 1933:260). Furthermore, as Smith and Davison have already noted, Atatürk, despite his dictatorship, was never quite able to ignore the demands of the Assembly, which was elected by the people. It is impossible, of course, to judge Atatürk's sincereity as an altruist from this distance. The literature, however, is unanimous in its belief that Atatürk was genuinely concerned about the position of the people under his regime. Whether he was arguing for compulsory education or welfare legislation or women's rights, his aim was to improve the lot of the people and to bring Turkey into the community of modern nations. It has been shown,

therefore, that Atatürk did create a channel of conversion between the sphere of the governed and that of the government. The Turkish people had no political role under the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk organized them politically, and through a change in government to a Republic, gave them a vote and a role in the Turkish state. This argument is supported by Atatürk's claims to be acting in the interests of the people. It can also be shown that Atatürk received the profit of political support through the opening of this channel. Up until the creation of the RPP in 1924 there were several political groups vying for power in Turkey, the largest being that of Atatürk's supporters. Thus Smith sees the overwhelming victory at the polls of the Kemalists in 1923 as a strong indication of the public support for Atatürk. (E. Smith; 1958:74). G. L. Lewis has also been cited to show that the Assembly hesitated to contravene Atatürk's policies because of his popular support. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:77). After 1924 the people continued to vote for the RPP and to turn out in large numbers when Atatürk made a public appearance. Atatürk, the Gazi, was a legend to the people, and whether they supported him because of nationalistic fervor or because he fit the mold of an Islamic conqueror, he nevertheless received the profit of their support through the new channel of conversion.

The Marginal Man

Barth makes the point that the most successful entrepreneurs are frequently from outside the community wherein they create their

enterprise. Thus ties of kinship, friendship, or community do not impinge as greatly upon the entrepreneur's activities. Though this is a tenuous suggestion, Atatürk can be seen to fit this characteristic in certain respects. For instance, Atatürk was not an Anatolian, a "true" Turk. He was a Macedonian. Furthermore, his education was a military one. He thus became acquainted with ideals, particularly Western ones, that were not available to the uneducated peasant or the graduates of the medresses. Atatürk was not a Muslim, though he came from a predominantly Muslim society. Furthermore, he chose to operate outside the traditional Turkish form of government, the Sultanate/Caliphate. In these ways, Atatürk was somewhat tangential to the Turkish community, and even to the intellectual elite that was largely Muslim. The lack of strong religious ties may very well have made it possible to see reforms that were not considered by members of the community. It is known that Atatürk's personal core of followers, including Ismet, were Muslims, and that this group saw certain reforms, such as the abolition of the fez, as quite impossible. (Armstrong; 1933). Thus, Atatürk, the entrepreneur, was something of the marginal man.

The Strategy of Transaction

On purely descriptive grounds, it can be seen, therefore, that Atatürk can be analyzed as an entrepreneur. He was an innovator. A corporate enterprise existed. He took risks and received a profit. He opened a channel of conversion between two previously disparate spheres and derived a profit from the conversion. He was marginal to the community in certain ways. However, it soon becomes apparent upon

reading the literature that the more interesting questions rest not on how many characteristics Atatürk fulfills in his role as an entrepreneur, but on his strategy and his success. As noted, Barth finds the strategy, the transactions between the entrepreneur and his environment, to be the most interesting aspect of the analysis. It is for this reason that Barth prefers a transactional analysis of the entrepreneurial role. For the study of Atatürk this presents two immediate problems. First of all much of the literature is frankly and openly hero-worship. Atatürk was able to accomplish his innovations because he was Atatürk. One has the feeling that Kinross' anecdote about the Holy Trinity is more substance than symbol for Atatürk's biographers. Little mention is made of the strategy, behind the innovations; they simply were accomplished. Little mention is made of Atatürk's followers beyond Ismet and Fethi. Yet if reforms were to be made, there must have been supporters of the reforms or of the regime to implement them. Finally, little mention is made of the receptivity of the Turkish people to the reforms. To simply accept the proposition that the reforms could not have been carried out if the people were not willing to change is unacceptable. The second difficulty arises from the fact that once Atatürk succeeded in making himself dictator, there was little in the nature of exchange between himself and the environment. Innovations were imposed from the top of the political system; response was forbidden or at least controlled. For this reason, though Atatürk can be successfully analyzed as an

entrepreneur, the analysis does little to advance Barth's conception. Nevertheless, despite these problems in the following section an attempt will be made to piece together the elements of Atatürk's strategy, his assets and his supports. Five such elements will be discussed: (1) Atatürk as a personality; (2) Atatürk as a calculator; (3) Atatürk as a military man; (4) Atatürk as an exploiter of communications; and (5) Atatürk as dictator.

As for the first point, it becomes impossible to discuss Atatürk without noting his undoubtedly dynamic personality. The writers on Turkey are unanimous in recounting Atatürk's infectious and forceful dynamism. Robinson describes Atatürk as "a man of decisive action, of provoking single-mindedness and possessing a sort of intuitive understanding of what was required." (Robinson; 1963:33). Davison has already been cited to the effect that Atatürk was the "chief driving force" behind the creation of a modern Turkey. (Davison; 1968:1). Smith describes Atatürk as an "igniting spark" and concludes that the reforms might never have been carried out without him. (E. Smith; 1958: 92). Furthermore it is apparent that Atatürk was a man of vision, that he foresaw in advance the changes that would need to be made in Turkey. Robinson argues that: "Kemal must have seen very clearly that technology, be it military or civilian, was but one part of a whole socio-political-economic complex. To adopt modern technology meant social and political revolutions as well--total revolution." (Robinson; 1963: 33). The German general Kannengeiser said of his World War I ally that Atatürk was "clear-thinking and active." "He decides everything

for himself. He knows exactly what he wants." (in Armstrong; 1933: 52). Given these descriptions, it becomes difficult to ignore Atatürk as a personality. While this paper will not attempt to psycho-analyze this personality at this great distance,[9] it is clear that Atatürk's personal qualities were among his important assets. The consensus among the writers is that Atatürk would not have achieved what he did if it had not been for that "igniting spark." During World War I Atatürk's personal bravery and active participation in the front-line was an inspiration to his troops. As President of the Assembly and later of the Republic, Atatürk participated just as actively and dynamically in the affairs of state. Kinross, Brock, and Armstrong agree that Atatürk was tireless debator, choosing often to wear potential opponents down by a surfeit of persuasive rhetoric. On other occasions, Atatürk's personality became a key factor in shaping votes on the floor of the Assembly. Examples which have already been cited include his role in determining debate on the abolition of the Sultanate and in the proclamation of the Republic. Standing by itself, such an asset might not have been very important, but when combined with Atatürk's other assets, i.e., the dictatorship, such an asset can be a prominent factor in the success of reforms.

That Atatürk was a man of vision is supported by his carefully calculated strategy. Early in his career as an army officer Atatürk was singularly ineffective as a politician. His abrasive manner and his open contempt of his superiors, especially the German High Command and Enver, resulted in his being kept from wielding effective political

power. Atatürk played a major role in the revolutions of 1908 and 1909. In fact in 1909, Atatürk worked closely with Enver to place Enver's triumvirate into power, yet Atatürk failed to receive a position in the Enver regime. Robinson speculates that only with experience did Atatürk become the skillful politician and diplomat who was the first President of the Republic. (Robinson; 1963:30). Indeed by 1919 Atatürk was a careful strategist. In that year Atatürk took six steps to secure a nationalist government and his position as its leader. The first step was to assure himself of the support of the top military commanders and of the key civilian administrators in Anatolia. With that allegiance gained, he argued for the consolidation of the various nationalist groups into one organization. The third step was to control the telegraph system which both broke the Sultan's communications with Anatolia, making it difficult for him to maintain his allegiances, and assured Atatürk's own ability to communicate with the country. His nationalist organization made a dramatic declaration of national aims to attract national support. While this was being done, Atatürk exploited the growing national concern by recruiting, reorganizing, and rearming his troops from the remnants of the CUP's defeated army. The final step was to win victory over the Greeks. In doing so he was able to convince the Assembly to grant him dictatorial powers to make that victory. He then retained those powers in order to exact his reforms. Each step was initiated in response to the success of the last. As Robinson writes: "The record leads one to believe that Kemal was quite conscious of these (steps) and moved

deliberately toward their fulfillment." (Robinson; 1963:65). In his famous Six Day Speech Atatürk described his plans for Turkey as "Successive stages, a series of national secrets" which would be revealed when opportune. "I may say that is was "incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organization, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and in the future of the nation; which I kept in my consciousness as a national secret." (Six Day Speech; 1929). Each secret was to be revealed only after the preceding one was implemented; each would be known only at the proper time. A Theory of Games analysis might be employed here as Atatürk revealed his secrets to take maximum advantage of the probable reaction. A less cautious man might have attempted, for instance to abolish the Sultanate/Caliphate simultaneously. Atatürk preferred to wait for the proper opportunity. In 1922 the body of opinion in the Assembly was against the Sultan; thus the Sultanate disappeared. When the occasion arose in 1924, the Caliphate also was abolished. The specific steps and Atatürk's stated intention to do away with both forms have already been cited. Atatürk's sense of timing can be seen in this exchange with Ahmed Emin Yalman, a prominent journalist:

> "When the Khalifate was a thing of the past, this incongruity of a state religion was discussed in a press conference. I asked Mustafa Kemal, 'Why have you left recognition of a state religion in the constitution so long after a regime based on free reason and full tolerance seems so well established?'
>
> 'Why don't you attack me in your paper for not being radical and consistent in my acts?' he challenged me.

> 'I don't feel that it is a proper subject for discussion in a newspaper.'
> 'The moment that you feel it is proper to make this a subject of public discussion, you may rest assured that the provision to which you rightly object will be taken out of our constitution.'" (Yalman; 1956: 142-3).

By revealing his secrets one at a time, Atatürk was also able to allow for dissension to dissipate between each act. To go back to Barth's discussion, it is easy to see the "entrepreneurial career as a process," the "deductive prognosis of results" in Atatürk's strategic moves. Each step was taken so as to maximize results in accordance with an overall scheme of Westernizing and hence civilizing Turks. The response of the opposition was calculated and minimized. When Atatürk chose to name the Republic, he struck at the Assembly's weakest point, the selection of ministers, created a governmental crisis and maneuvered the Assembly into accepting the only alternative to chaos, the Republic. When opposition turned to violence, as in the Kurdish Revolts, Atatürk countered with violence to crush the revolts and to suppress incidental political opposition. The steps taken against Rauf and other political foes have already been noted. This is not to say that Atatürk's strategy was infallible; the popular response to the Free Party of 1930 is evidence to the contrary. But Atatürk as entrepreneur undoubtedly employed the asset of the careful and calculated strategist.

It seems that the key to much of Atatürk's success in 1919 was his position as a military leader. Smith has already been cited to show that in the War of Independence several nationalists doubted Atatürk's ability as a diplomat. (E. Smith; 1958:13). At another point Smith

notes that "although there was some opposition in the ranks to Kemal, the Congress supported him as the only man the army and common people might follow." (Ibid.:21). Atatürk had a brilliant war record. As noted, he had emerged from the war untainted by defeat, the CUP, or the Germans. The "Hero of Gallipoli" thus had the admiration of the army and of the Congress. This no doubt enhanced his status with the people as well. To them, suggests Armstrong, Atatürk was cast in the mold of the traditional military leader of Islam. (Armstrong; 1933: 254). He was to become the Gazi. In 1919 one of Atatürk's first moves was to gain the allegiance of the highest ranking officers in the military. Subsequently he toured the country, convincing discharged soldiers and officers of the CUP's defeated army to follow him. Such support solifified his position as head of the nationalist movement. His military victory over the Greeks assured him of political power. However, once his position as President of the Republic was secured, there is only one passage in the literature that documents his use of the army in political strategy. G. L. Lewis notes that Atatürk took th crucial step of abolishing the Caliphate only after assuring himself of the support of the army. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:85). It is not to be suggested that Atatürk's regime was a military regime, such as that which assumed power in Turkey in 1960. Robinson points out that Atatürk was very careful to sever connections between the army and the government after the proclamation of the Republic. (Robinson; 1963:236). While he and Ismet were fighting in the War of Independence, they

resigned their positions in the party. At the war's end, he and his followers resigned their military commissions to assume roles once again in the party and the state. He exchanged his uniform for a business suit. Military officers were not allowed to sit in the Assembly.[10] The military and the gendarmery were placed under the direct control of the Assembly. The point to be made is that Atatürk undoubtedly made use of his position as a military officer to gain the position of head of the nationalist movement. This was a response to the suspicions of those nationalists who would have preferred a politician in office. After securing his position in 1924, as Robinson says, "In retrospect, it becomes evident that Kemal deliberately attempted to fence the military off from active political life as soon as its political support was no longer essential to his power." (Robinson; 1963:238). However, Atatürk's military training should not be ignored in the discussion of any aspect of his career. After all, it was in the military schools that Atatürk became aware of Western and nationalist ideals and literature. The carefully planned strategy, the respect for communications, and the officer-subordinate role he assumed with his followers as President of the Republic all can be traced to Atatürk, the general of the army. Atatürk's military career was an important asset.

As for the fourth point, Lerner describes Atatürk's regime as a "communications revolution." (Lerner; 1958:120). Atatürk apparently developed his appreciation for intelligence techniques and communications out of his military training. As noted, one of his steps in 1919 was to take control of the telegraph lines. In subsequent years, Atatürk

made use of the newspapers, the RPP organization, education, and the People's houses as a means of spreading his policies and deriving support. Atatürk used the newspapers to foreshadow both the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate. Yalman describes how prior to the latter event, Atatürk called several prominent newspapermen to him and announced his plans for the abolition. When they protested, Atatürk turned to persuasion, gradually wearing down their arguments. "Mustafa Kemal did not wish to dictate; he wanted to persuade. The tactics we finally agreed to use were unique. We, in our newspapers, were to attack the government for not realizing the danger to the unity and stability of the country which the continuation of the Khalifate constituted...The plan was carried out in a marvelous spirit. We were astonished when we did not encounter the opposition and resistance anticipated. Following this concerted preparation by the press, the law to abolish the Khalifate was passed on March 1, 1924." (Yalman; 1956:141). Despite the power of a controlled press, the newspapers in Turkey reached only a small portion of the population. After all, only 10 to 20 percent of the population was literate. This caveat applies to books as well. To reach the peasantry, the Party organization was used to describe and explain the activities of Atatürk to the villagers. The schools also provided a means for the spreading of propaganda, if only by more subtle means such as the images of the state produced in a civics text, for instance. The People's Houses and People's Rooms would have been an ideal way of heeding or creating public opinion, particularly after radios were placed in each of them.

In fact, despite their educational goals, the Houses, which were owned and operated by the RPP, relied for their program on an almost exclusive fare of party propaganda. However, they were sparsely attended and were located primarily in the cities and larger towns. The peasantry received or took little advantage of them. (Karpat; 1963). Despite these limitations Atatürk did use communications media as an important building block in his strategy. Railways, roads, and the postal service were also improved as a means of facilitating communications.

It cannot be forgotten, finally, that Atatürk was a dictator. Though he resigned his commission in the army, he expected his orders to be carried out by his political followers with the unquestioning response of the military subordinate. (Encyclopedia of Islam; 1961:69). As noted, Atatürk's dictatorship is justified in the literature on the basis that the people were not able to handle democracy; they needed to be educated. It also has been pointed out that compared to the policies of Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany, which were being implemented at the same time, there was relatively little intimidation or human suffering brought about by the government. Robinson notes, after stating the need for reform in Turkey in 1919 that: "The necessity for authoritarian leadership thus became clear for many of these changes would be at first exceedingly unpopular." (Robinson; 1963:33). Atatürk made his position as dictator an asset in instituting reform. Political opposition, unless it was under his direct supervision, was not to be allowed. The press was censored. Opponents of the Kemalist reforms were dealt with harshly. Atatürk was willing to attempt to persuade

through debate, but as a man of action he was ready to cut debate short when it pleased him to do so. Thus when he failed to persuade Ethem, a guerilla leader, to join the nationalist forces in 1919, Atatürk unleashed his army on the guerillas, effectively destroying them. By the Tribunals of Independence of 1925 and 1930 he managed to liquidate or neutralize the most prominent members of his political opposition. Supposedly when Rauf was urging an opposition party in 1923, one delegate to the Assembly said to him, "This road you are setting us on leads straight to the gallows. Will you be there with us?" (in G. L. Lewis; 1955:77). G. L. Lewis describes the situation this way: "He was not a man to trifle with. Though not cruel by nature, he had no compunction whatever about putting out of the way those he regarded as obstacles to the achievement of his plans for Turkey." (Ibid.:77). That the Assembly voted him dictatorial powers in 1922 and again in 1930 for a two year period to deal with national emergencies only solidified his position. As dictator, Atatürk could impose his reforms from above without cognizance of opposition or popular demands. It is difficult to say whether dictatorship is a strategy; at any rate it facilitates transactions through minimizing the options of the opposition.

There are other factors that have to be accounted for in determining the success of Atatürk's entrepreneurial career. It has already been noted that the assets described above were augmented by some degree of popular support, particularly before 1924. Atatürk also had loyal supporters who ran for office on the RPP ticket, who served in his cabinet, and who, on the local level, carried out his reforms;

contrary to the impression created, Atatürk did not modernize Turkey singlehandedly. Bahrampour refers to a Kemalist elite which consisted essentially of military officers, members of the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals, that is, the people who had received not only an education, but a Western education and who were familiar with nationalist literature. (Bahrampour; 1967:18). Webster, with his usual enthusiasm, describes one local official as he traveled from village to village attempting to mobilize the populace into facilitating the Kemalist reforms. (Webster; 1939:268). In other words, there were Turks of a similar intellectual background to Atatürk's who were willing to support his ideals and reforms. The size of this group is unknown. That Atatürk became the first President of the Republic, and that someone such as Rauf did not, can be attributed to the assets described above. Atatürk was not only a military leader, but a successful one. He was able to translate this success into support both from the army and from the people, support by force and by election. As a careful strategist he was able to time the emergence of his reforms in order to maximize their impact. His dynamic personality no doubt played a part in both his military success and his entrepreneurial career. Because he appreciated the importance of communications, he was able to gather information from the entire country and to create support for his reforms. Finally, as these assets culminated in the niche of president/dictator, he was able to impose and oversee his reforms and to minimize the risk to his enterprise. His followers supported his regime and his reforms and carried them to the people. Smith states

that: "By steam roller tactics, by means of great vision, by sheer dictatorship, Mustafa Kemal, with the help of his co-workers but as the igniting spark, wrestled a relatively modern state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire." (E. Smith; 1958:86). Thus, an argument can be made for studying Atatürk as an entrepreneur on several grounds. His career meets all the criteria listed by Belshaw and Barth for distinguishing an entrepreneur from the encumbents of institutionalized statuses. He managed an enterprise, he innovated, he took risks, and he achieved a profit. In some ways he was marginal to the community. He created a channel of conversion between two spheres that previously had been unconnected. That he employed a strategy working from a deductive prognosis of results has been described in several stages. His assets as an entrepreneur include his forceful personality, his careful calculations, his military career, and his appreciation of communication. These assets culminated in a unique niche at the head of the Turkish government from which he could impose his innovations and minimize the risks and restrictions on his activities. Throughout his career he had the support of the corporate group, his followers, that grew up around him. In this way, the analysis of Atatürk has been fruitful.

THE EFFECT OF THE INNOVATIONS ON THE POPULATION

The analysis should not end here, however, It would seem that when a contention has been made that Atatürk created a channel of conversion between the people and the government, that some attempt

should be made to describe the effects of that move. In particular, it is felt that such an analysis would be interesting in light of anthropology's increasing interest in the problems of peasantry. Various statements have been made in this paper about the alleged response of the people of Turkey to the policies of Atatürk. Similarly it has been seen that the government took a great many steps in attempting to change the lives of the peasantry, especially in trying to wrench away their focal allegiance to Islam.

It has been stated that during Atatürk's regime up to 85 percent of the Turkish people were agriculturalists. Most of these conformed to Redfield's defining characteristic of peasantry: "...their agriculture is a livelihood and a way of life, not a business for profit." (Redfield; 1956:18). Wolf distinguished peasants from primitives on the basis that peasants are "rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm, but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn." (Wolf; 1966:3-4). In other words, as Kroeber put it, peasant societies and cultures are only half-societies and half-cultures; they are tied to the larger state of which they are a part. (in Redfield; 1956:8). It is this fact that makes this aspect of this study particularly interesting. However, little serious work has been done on Turkish peasantry. Webster, for instance, writes of the "ragged, dispirited populace" that made up the peasantry and

contends that the most impressive reforms "are the clean, well-mended clothes which have replaced ragged, dirty attire and the smiles which have crowded frowns of dispair from the faces of the wearers." (Webster; 1939:267). Lengyels writes that the watchword of the Turkish peasantry has changed from "Kismet" (It is Fate) to "We Work!" (Lengyel; 1961:XVI). Such shallow views are easily found; apparently they gloss over the truth. Mahmut Makal's Our Village, which became a Turkish bestseller in 1954 outlined in novel form the failings of the Atatürk program for the peasants. (in Lerner; 1958:122). The serious works have been published by Stirling, an anthropologist, Szyliowicz, a political scientist, and Kolars, a geographer. None of these works are based on fieldwork done before 1949. Thus, extrapolations backwards to the regime of Atatürk must be made with care. Only Stirling deals with the daily lives of the peasants; the other two are primarily concerned with voting patterns and crop rotations. A problem of typicality arises in that the three authors between them studies only eight villages; yet Kolars maintains that individual villages vary widely within short distances of each other. (Kolars; 1963:1). Such difficulties preclude a study in depth of peasant reactions to Atatürk, but enough material can be pieced together to provide a rather interesting account.

Earlier it was noted that the Ottoman Empire existed only as the exploiter of the peasantry; agents of the Sultan would descend on the village to collect taxes or recruits, but for the most part, villagers were allowed to develop independently of outside influence.

Allegiance was not to the Empire or to a Turkish state, but to Islam and the village. Then the Republic of Atatürk appeared determined to create a modern, democratic populace. Local government was made universal; party officials arrived to explain the policies of the new government; the peasant was expected to vote. He was told to build a school and to send his children to it; moreover, the school was not a religious school. The secularization of the state was occuring; his fez was made illegal and his dervish brotherhoods were outlawed. He was told that the Seriat was replaced by a new Civil Code that forbade polygamy and gave his wife equal rights in the courts. The government made certain economic goods available to the peasant. It called for his allegiance to a Turkish state and to Atatürk, whose picture or bust appeared now in the village in direct defiance of the Islamic custom that proscribed images. The peasant made the necessary changes in form, but in essence, little changed. As Ward notes, the peasant did not choose reform; it was forced upon him. (Ward; 1942:58).

The same framework of the Six Principles can be used to describe the peasants' reaction to reform. As for laicism, it is doubtful that Atatürk ever touched the belief system of the peasantry; indeed this was not officially intended. This is in opposition to the popular view of, for instance, W. C. Smith (1957) or Reed (1954) that the Kemalist reforms largely eradicated Islam during the 1920's and 1930's, only to have it appear reified in the 1950's. It is true that the governments following the death of Atatürk took a more liberal view of Islam. In 1949 religious instruction was restored to the public

schools. In 1950 the call to prayer was once again allowed in Arabic. Other measures such as the building of new mosques are cited as to the revival. What is more likely is that Islam sent underground in the presence of Atatürk's officials; it is unlikely that it was eradicated. As G. L. Lewis notes, Islam is more than a belief, it is a way of life: "Islam dictates not merely the time and place and manner of your praying, but also the way you decorate your house and treat your wife; what you say when you sneeze, how your butcher kills sheep, how much of your property your son will inherit, how you trim your beard and seal your letters, and where you carry your handkerchief and the color of your shroud." (G. L. Lewis; 1955:81-2). As mentioned earlier, the loss of the Caliphate meant little to the peasantry, and the institution of the Civil Code was largely ignored. The loss of the fez was troublesome, but it could still be worn in the safety of one's home. For streetwear, a cap with a visor became popular in that it could be turned with the visor to the back when the believer knelt to pray. The dervish orders were outlawed, but the dervishes had always been a secret order. Stirling maintains that the dervishes continued to flourish despite the official ban. (Stirling; 1958:405). The case of the call to prayer is illustrative as to this point. Stirling says that: "In particular, in 1928, the Arabic form of the call to prayer was legally prohibited and a Turkish translation of it made obligatory. The law was observed within earshot of police and officials. This law was abolished in 1950, and the whole country immediately reverted to the Arabic form. The law had not formed any new habits." (Ibid.:400).

Stirling also says that the single major deprivation of the Atatürk period was the cutting off of almost all religious training and the resultant lack of religious functionaries. (Ibid.:402). In general, however, the Islam of the villager was unaffected as a belief system.

Atatürk had intended, of course, to secularize and to shock the people into giving their allegiance to the state. He provided a new set of nationalist myths and dogmas, often inconsistent with the Islamic set, in the shape of historical and quasi-historical theories about the Turks of Central Asia and the importance and value of Turkish culture. Also the state prescribed a new set of rites in the form of military and national ceremonies, such as saluting the flag or singing the national anthem. Stirling states that the people "did not consciously reject all the nationalist slogans and ideas. Human beings can readily hold to and operate on inconsistent beliefs and principles, not least when a society is rapidly absorbing ideas from outside itself." (Stirling; 1958:405). But even with this nominal absorption of nationalist slogans, the primary allegiance and frame of reference remained that of Islam. New events were placed within a traditional framework. To the villagers the War of Independence was not a nationalist victory, but a victory of the Muslims over the infidels. (Ibid:400). Atatürk was the Gazi, the conqueror of the infidel. Luke writes that: "In 1922 a Turkish friend of mine asked one such peasant what he thought of Mustafa Kemal. The peasant answered with genuine approval: 'He is a faithful servant of the Sultan.'" (Luke; 1936:216). Stirling again writes that: "If the villagers evaded and ignored, perhaps even failed

to hear about many of the specific orders from the centers, they were even less likely to understand, let alone accept, the new ideology of secularism and a modernized Islam. For the villagers, Islam is an all-embracing and unalterable system of detailed explanations and rules of ritual and moral conduct on which the whole physical and social order rests. When I asked villagers to explain a customary rule or to justify some statement about the physical world, the answer was always 'it is in our Book.': (Stirling; 1958:404). There is some reason to believe that even as Islam remained a primary allegiance, nationalism failed to be a secondary influence. That position belongs to the village. The territory that belongs to a village brought out in 1949 an outward solidarity and an inward intensity of interaction; there was little changeover in its membership. The villagers were more than willing to join to fight an encroachment on their territory. Such a feeling for the Republic was lacking. (Stirling; 1965:30).

Szyliowicz found in 1960 that memories of the Atatürk regime were mostly hostile. Such hostility was not directed towards Atatürk, but towards the RPP. Villagers complained of administrative inefficiency and bureaucratic oppression. "In those days life was usually a constant struggle for the villager. Most peasants were leading a hard, isolated life with minimal contact with the administrators and bureaucrats of the central government. They were usually self-sufficient, weaving their clothes, raising their food, and making their tools. Except for an occasional trip to market the villagers lived a traditional existence. Life was harsh and unrewarding, and the government

made few efforts to help the villagers. Most peasants suspected any strangers who wandered in their village of being tax collectors or a similar evil species. Their apathy towards government contacts was increased by the efforts of the (RPP) to bring about basic changes in the social and religious life of the Turkish people." (Szyliowicz; 1962: 436-7). Szyliowicz further contends that the Republic played little part in the political lives of the peasantry until 1946 when opposition parties were finally allowed. (Ibid.:431). Then, with the establishment of a multi-party system, politicians began to appear in remote villages, campaigning for votes. Even in 1960, however, Atatürk's aim of educating the people in the ideals of democracy was not totally fulfilled. Ideology played only a minor role in determining party affiliation. "Local events were of much greater significance in shaping an individual's allegiance...Kinship and family background were the decisive factors in village politics." (Ibid.:432). In another passage Szyliowicz contends that: "Most of the villagers had little conception of what democracy or freedom means. For them, a 'good government is a government that does good works.' The definition of good works, of course, was roads, schools, and similar items which would benefit the local populace." (Ibid.:439). All in all, as Stirling notes, "... to the roles of maintainer of law and order, legitimate robber and arbitrary universal provider, the government added that of vote catcher." (Stirling; 1965:269).

As already noted, primary education reached only 28 percent of the village children in 1935. (Webster; 1939:211). To the technical

difficulties of providing schools the government of Atatürk found itself confronted with the fact that to the villagers, education meant greater piety and knowledge of religious affairs. With the closing of the medresses and the secularization of the public school curriculum the peasantry became suspicious of the government attempts to educate; hence many such attempts misfired. When the compulsory curriculum was cut from six to three years the overall quality of the education suffered. Lerner says that: "Many of these people learn to read painfully, but not to write. They acquire bare literacy but not the literate way of thought. They can sign their names and decipher tax notices, but they remain on the periphery of participation..." (Lerner; 1958:123). The People's Houses did little to further adult education; instead they were an instrument of propaganda. At any rate, there were only 55 such establishments in 1933, all of which were in the cities or large towns. In that same year, only 6 percent of the membership were classified as farmers. The rest were doctors, lawyers, teachers, and civil servants, many of whom were required to join. (Karpat; 1963:61,65).

The state of the peasant economy has already been implied. The government was able to make few innovations until an "enlightened peasantry" was achieved. Some mechanical innovations, such as tractors, would not have been economical. Turkish peasants practice what Wolf describes as partible inheritance. (Wolf; 1966:73). Upon the death of the landowner, the property is divided among all the children. As a result, agricultural holdings are seldom large enough to make large machinery practicable. The government, of course, discouraged other

than seasonal migration to industrial centers. There was, furthermore, a real inducement to stay on the land. Turkey is underpopulated; there is always the opportunity to increase one's profits by working more land. (Robinson; 1963:118). The peasants did take advantage of such government aid as seed and loans at low interest from the Agricultural Bank. But in general the level of economic development in the villages remains low. This became apparent when the earthquakes of 1940 opened the village to the world (Ward; 1942:80). a similar situation appeared in the earthquakes of 1970. (Time, July 27, 1970, pg. 21).

In general the peasantry rejects the concepts of Westernization. The foreigner is still the infidel whether he be an Armenian doctor, a British anthropologist, or a Westernized Turk. As noted, reforms in women's rights have had little effect in the villages where the Civil Code is largely ignored. Stirling records this story:

> "On one occasion a man of Sakaltutan brought his wife to town. I met him and offered him and two companions tea, and embarrassed everyone by offering tea to his wife also. She turned away into the corner to drink in order to uncover her mouth without being seen. I pointed to two educated Turkish women in Western dress and cosmetics who were passing. "They are not Turks', she said, 'They are foreigners.': (Stirling; 1965:289).

In general, reformism has little impact on the lives or ideology of the peasantry. They did not ask for reform.

There are some obvious answers as to why this is ture. To begin with it seems apparent that the peasantry was not ready for reform. For one thing, Atatürk's revolution came up against the physical and psychological isolation of the villager. Robinson records visiting one Turkish village only after transversing an extremely difficult

approach to it. When he asked why the road had not been improved, the reply was that it discouraged tax-collectors. "The sheer fact of isolation had important consequences, for isolation meant that this community lived outside of the stream of national consciousness. Communication from village to village was slow and uncertain. Communications from region to region was exceedingly difficult. Word of mouth was, of course, the most important means of communication. There was no radio in the village, no postal service." (Robinson; 1963:40-1). This isolation made contacting and convincing the people about Atatürk's reforms very difficult. Isolation can be psychological as well as the research of the Sherifs in Turkey seems to indicate. They found that villagers were incapable of role-playing beyond the confines of their village; they refused to speculate as to what would happen if they were President or lived in another country. In the most isolated villages, there was no concept of internationally standardized units of distance, space, or time; rather the periodicity of natural events or of work activities were used as such scales. The summary of their findings was that actual and psychological mobility decreased with decreasing exposure to modernity. (Sherif & Sherif; 1948:699). To these findings must be added the world view of Islam which was previously described. Given these factors, peasants become a rather tenuous base for a revolutionary movement. Atatürk in attempting to base a nationalist reform on the peasantry found, as Wolf puts it, "the strong tendency to form coalitions on a more or less unstable basis for

short-range ends." (Wolf; 1966:91). Marx wrote of the peasants of France that:

> "The small peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolated them from mutual intercourse...In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form...In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants and the identity of their interests begets no unit, no national union, and no political organization, they do not form a class." (Marx; 1869:109).

Other revolutionaries such as Lenin have recognized the potentialities of peasant support in an overthrow of the social order, but have also seen the limitations of the approach. Lenin realized that the Russian peasantry might rise up to fight for land, but once that land was obtained, the revolution would be over for the peasant. He wrote: "The peasantry will be victorious in the bourgeois-democratic revolution and then cease to be revolutionary as a peasantry." (in Wolf; 1966:92). Szyliowicz has already been cited to show that the most important issues to the Turkish peasantry were not national issues, but local ones. What Atatürk's government experienced was essentially the same phenomenon as that described above. The peasantry could be mobilized for a short-term end, such as throwing the infidels out of the country, but with that end accomplished, they preferred to return to their familiar existence.

Another part of the problem lay in the manner in which Atatürk's reforms were carried out. As mentioned earlier, the peasants did not

ask for change; it was forced on them. Atatürk was pledged to social revolution. He wanted his changes as rapidly as possible. As a result, the reforms occurred formally and were accepted among the intelligentsia. If Allen is correct that the Turkish population was ready for change, then this must have been true of only the elite. (Allen; 1935:40). Bahrampour writes that: "The Kemalist reforms were carried out by the Kemalist elite, who consisted mainly of those who had participated in the War of Liberation, including the military officers, members of the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals. The business community was too small and not too active in public affairs. The largest segment of the population, the peasantry, remained virtually unaffected by the new changes." (Bahrampour; 1967:18). Lord Kinross puts it more simply: "(Atatürk) had thus formed a new elite, with new values. But it must take longer to form a new Turkish people; the mass of the Anatolian Turks still remained as of old." (Kinross; 1964; 474). If anything the reforms succeeded in exaberating the differences that always existed between the cities and the villages. Under the Ottoman Empire, the upper class was part of the same theocratic society, observing the same customs and etiquette. But now the upper class was educated, secular, and modern. "The gap between educated urbanites and uneducated villagers inherited from the Ottoman Empire had not been much narrowed--in fact, in some ways it had increased." (Davison; 1968: 143). As for the local government and party organization, Stirling indicates that these officials, drawn as they were from the elite, did

not understand the peasantry, dismissing their intransigence as bigotry and ignorance. Like the Ottomans before them, these officials tended to see the people as a shapeless mass to be molded into something, not a body to be taken into thoughtful consideration. (Stirling; 1958: 407). Bahrampour states that: "The leaders of the RPP were convinced that they had an excellent program, and in a paternalistic manner, tried to develop a new society which they sincerely believed would benefit the whole Turkish nation. To a large measure the program of the Kemalist leaders was excellent, but they failed to sell it to all of the people at this time. Turkish officialdom did not have a tradition of winning popular support for a program, but merely imposed it from on top." (Bahrampour; 1967:17). Szyliowicz says that: "In its hurry to modernize Turkey, the government was often ruthless, paying little attention to popular feelings and opinions." (Szyliowicz; 1962: 437). Local officials and even school teachers resented their tour of duties in the rural areas and waited only to be returned to the cities. Governmental efficiency decreased in the country as one moved from west to east. The local headmen sidestepped the demanded reforms. Stirling says that: "The headmen never thought in terms of carrying through a program of efficiently. He was concerned only to avoid trouble for himself, both with his neighbors, who were temporarily his subjects, and with his superiors in the hierarchy." (Stirling; 1958:404). The people were suspicious of the reformers and resented the officials who took away their fez and the school teacher who provided the secular education.

It is no wonder that even with All Atatürk's dynamism, the peasantry remained essentially unchanged.

As a caveat, it should be mentioned that a social evolution is going on in Turkey. Despite the supposed resurgence of religion, the secularization movement continues as a slow, overall process. The schools are still secular; religious instruction has been part of the curriculum since 1951, but it is not compulsory. Formal justice has nothing to do with religion. Church and state are still separated. With a multi-party system there is much more campaigning among the peasantry; presumeably this will lead to improvements for them. Stirling and Lerner both write that a transition is occurring. Urban ways are increasingly looked to as reference points, if only to show that "our ways are better." (Stirling; 1958:406; Lerner; 1958:141). It seems as though there is an excellent change that Atatürk's reforms will eventually carried throughout the populace.

CONCLUSION

Despite these considerations it must still be said that Atatürk can be viewed as an example of Barth's entrepreneur. That he innovated, took risks, and made a profit is undeniable. The channel of conversion he opened between the people and the government was there formally, even if it was not really utilized until 1946. The description of his strategy remains essentially unchanged, though it is apparent that his carefully timed "secrets" may have seemed like jackhammer blows to a

large protion of the population. What is also apparent is that Atatürk's place in contemporary Turkish society is still prominent. Whatever his officials might have done, the legend of Atatürk remains; he is still the Gazi and the "Father of the Turks" to the people. In this paper it has been contended that his activities and reforms could be interpreted in terms of Fredrik Barth's entrepreneur. A brief historical background and analysis was given to make clear the predecessors to the Atatürk revolution and the steps that were taken in the innovations. These steps were analyzed in the light of Barth's criteria; Atatürk's key strategies were discussed. Finally, the effect, or lack of effect, of the reforms on the Turkish peasantry was discussed, with the conclusion being that the reforms are underway, though at a much slower pace than Atatürk might have wished. All in all, it can be seen that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is truly the Father of the Turks, as well as a political entrepreneur.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This quotation is taken from Brock (1954:6,118). Because of the unreliability of the source, there is some question as to its authenticity; it is not documented. However, it does appear again in Kinross (1964:474). It seems complementary to the dynamic personality of Atatürk and hence an appropriate title.

[2]Weber notes that none of his ideal types of legitimacy, traditional, charismatic, or rational, is ever found in "pure" form in historical cases. (Weber; 1947:329). Atatürk's own regime can perhaps best analyzed as a combination of all three forms, though rational legitimacy is predominant.

[3]The Sunnite-Shi'ite split is a basic one in Islam. The schism began soon after the death of Myhammed (A.D. 632). The Sunnites believe that the office of Caliph belongs to the man most capable of fulfilling its duties. The Shi'ites are partisans of Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, and have always held that the Caliphate belonged exclusively to his line. Though the majority of Muslim Turks were Sunnites, a large Shi'ite minority existed. (G. L. Lewis; 1955:90).

[4]The official government explanation for the existence of only one party was that there were no class differences in Turkey to be represented by multiple parties. All the people were united towards the one cause of modernizing the state. (Yalman; 1956:149).

[5]The evkaf was an old Islamic institution. Originally it was a dedication of land or other revenue-producing property to pious purposes. Over time, however, the practice evolved of listing certain pieces of property as evkaf in order to safeguard against the general insecurity of property rights under the Ottoman Empire. (B. Lewis; 1966: 91).

[6]Villages were defined of consisting of fewer than 10,000 persons (Webster; 1939:211).

[7]The primary evidence given for communism was that the first foreign aid ever preferred by the Soviet Union was given to Turkey's first Five-Year Plan. However, Atatürk was highly suspicious of the Soviet Union and banned the Communist Party in Turkey. (Lengyel; 1961: 296).

[8]Atatürk was not known for his modesty.

[9]Robinson does attempt to do this. He concludes that Atatürk had a strong motivation for achievement and that he had to see reform being carried out. (Robinson; 1963:32).

[10]Another reason for not permitting military officers to hold seats in the Assembly was to undercut the power of his opposition, many of whom, like Rauf, Kiazim Karabekir, and Ali Fuad, were military officers. (Robinson; 1963:236).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, H. E., The Turkish Transformation, (Chicago; U. of Chicago Press), 1935.

Armstrong, H. C., Gray Wolf, (New York; Capricorn Books), 1933, 1961.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, Speech, (Leipzig; Koehler Press), 1929.

Bach, George Leland, Economics: An Introduction to Analysis and and Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall), 1954, 1968.

Bahrampour, Firouz, Turkey: Political and Social Transformation, (New York; Thos. Gaus, Inc.), 1967.

Barth, Fredrik, "Economic Spheres in Darfur" in Themes in Economic Anthropology, Raymond Firth, ed. (New York; Tavistock Publications), 1967.

Barth, Fredrik, "Introduction" in The Role of the Entrepreneur in Social Change in Northern Norway, F. Barth, ed., (Oslo; Norwegian Universities Press), 1963.

Barth, Fredrik, Models of Social Organization, Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper #23, 1966.

Belshaw, Cyril, In Search of Wealth, American Anthropological Association Memoirs No. 80, 1955.

Belshaw, Cyril, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall), 1965.

Berkes, Niyazi, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal; McGill U. Press), 1964.

Brock, Ray, Ghost on Horseback, (New York; Duell, Sloan, and Pearce), 1954.

Davison, Roderic, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After," Middle East Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3. Summer, 1953, pgs. 325-348.

Davison, Roderic, Turkey, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall), 1968.

Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press), 1953, 1966.

Encyclopedia of Islam, Turkish edition, "The Life of Atatürk" (Ankara; Turkish Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism), 1961.

Eren, Nuri, Turkey Today and Tomorrow, (New York; Frederick Praeger), 1963.

Friedrich, Paul, "The Political Middleman" in Local-Level Politics, M. Swartz, ed., (Chicago; Aldin), 1968.

Heyd, Uriel, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, (London; Oxford U. Press), 1950.

Homans, George, "Social Behavior as Exchange", American Journal of Sociology Vol. LXIII 1958, pgs. 597-606.

Karpat, Kemal, "The People's Houses in Turkey," Middle East Journal, Vol. 17, no. 1-2 Winter-Spring, 1963 pgs. 55-67.

Kazamias, Andreas, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey, (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd.), 1966.

Kinross, Lord, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1964.

Kolars, John F., Tradition, Season and Change in a Turkish Village, Department of Geography Research Paper #82, (Chicago; U. of Chicago Press), 1963.

Lengyel, Emil, "Introduction" and "Epilogue" to H. C. Armstrong, Gray Wolf (New York; Capricorn Books), 1961 edition.

Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society, (New York; The Free Press), 1958.

Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York; Oxford U. Press), 1961, 1966.

Lewis, Geoffrey L., Turkey, (New York; Frederick Praeger), 1955, 1965.

Luke, Sir Harry, The Old Turkey and the New, (London; Geoffrey Bles) 1936, 1955.

Marx, Karl, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Marx and Engels, Lewis S. Feuer, ed. (Garden City, N. Y.; Anchor Books), 1959.

"Never Mind the Noise," Time, Vol. 96 No. 4, July 27, 1970, pgs. 20-21.

Parker, John, and Charles Smith, Modern Turkey, (London; George Routledge & Sons), 1940.

Redfield, Robert, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago; U. of Chicago Press), 1956.

Reed, Howard A., "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey," Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, No.3, Summer, 1954, pgs. 267-282.

Robbins, Lionel, "The Subject Matter of Economics," in Economic Anthropology Edward LeClair and Harold Schneider, ed. (New York; Holt, Rinehart & Winston), 1968.

Schumpeter, Joseph A., History of Economic Analysis, (New York; Oxford U. Press), 1954.

Shah, Ikbah Ali, Kamal: Maker of Modern Turkey (London; Herbert Joseph), 1934.

Sherif, Muzafer, and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology, (New York; Harper and Bros.), 1948.

Smith, Elaine D., Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement (1919-1923) (Washington, D. C.; Judd and Detweiler), 1958.

Smith, M. G., Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950, (London; Oxford U. Press) 1960.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, Islam in Modern History, (New York; Mentor Books), 1957.

Stirling, Paul, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey," Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 4, Autumn, 58 pgs. 395-408.

Stirling, Paul, Turkish Village, (New York; John Wiley & Sons), 1965.

Stone, Richard, "The Theory of Games," The Economic Journal, Vol. LVIII June, 1948, pgs. 185-201.

Swartz, Marc, "Introduction" in Local-Level Politics, M. Swartz, ed., (Chicago; Aldine), 1968.

Szyliowicz, Joseph S., Political Change in Rural Turkey, Columbia U. Publications in Near and Middle East Studies, 1966.

Szyliowicz, Joseph S., "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey" Middle East Journal Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn, 1962, pgs. 430-442.

Ward, Barbara, Turkey, (London; Oxford U. Press), 1942.

Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York; The Free Press), translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 1947.

Webster, Donald, The Turkey of Atatürk, (Philadelphia; The American Academy of Political and Social Science), 1939.

Wolf, Eric, Peasants, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall), 1966.

Yale, William, The Near East: A Modern History, (Ann Arbor; U. of Michigan Press), 1958.

Yalman, Ahmed Emin, Turkey in my Time (Norman, Oklahoma; U. of Oklahoma Press), 1956.