


CALIFORNIA'S ENDURING
POLITICAL REGIONALITY:
PATTERNS AND PROCESSES
IN VOTING BEHAVIOR

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
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CALIFORNIA'S ENDURING POLITICAL REGIONALITY:
PATTERNS AND PROCESSES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR

By

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THE COUNTIES OF CALIFORNIA



Dedication

A master's degree is but one rung up a ladder of what is anticipated to be a continuing struggle towards success. What advancement I have achieved has not been gained without the help and encouragement of some very special people, and it is hoped that the dedication of this thesis to them will in a small way reflect the genuine appreciation and thanks I owe them.

To Dr. Michael Kuhn of the University of California at Santa Barbara goes my thanks for his unceasing encouragement during those moments in undergraduate school when I was seriously questioning the value of my efforts. Without his support I may have never struggled past my first geography course. Dr. Stanley Brunn, as my academic advisor, has given endlessly of his time and his guidance has been instrumental in the completion of the degree. I look forward to continuing my education under his counsel. It is rare to encounter a man who is capable of stepping beyond the aura of his professional position and yet maintain the respect due that position. Dr. Gary Manson is such a man. I have never had the pleasure of working with a professor who so genuinely enjoys endeavors with his students. More than anything else Dr. Manson has given me the knowledge that my hopes of becoming a university professor will find fruition in a career that offers untold rewards both within the classroom and beyond.

To Dorothea must go my special thanks for her patience, understanding and generous help in typing this manuscript. But perhaps Dort really deserves my thanks for brightening those bleak days with her laughing smile and her biting humor which in its own way put my entire efforts in their proper perspective.

Michigan State University has been a tremendously rewarding experience for me in so many ways, and I have indeed been fortunate to attend graduate school at this university. But my experiences have been more than academic, and without question Michele has been the most beautiful part of my life in East Lansing. Any growth on my part academically and as a human being must especially be credited to her. I only hope that my efforts will continue to reflect her love, devotion and encouragement.

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CHAPTER I

THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF INTERSTATE RESIDENCE CHANGE UPON THE POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA

"The quest for orderliness (in California politics) has tempted many able scholars to undertake huge, solemn, and painstaking chronological recitations in the hope that the political symmetry somehow would appear out of the fog. It seldom does."
(Herbert Phillips, retired capital correspondent.)

Preliminary figures from the 1970 United States census indicate that the two basic trends in its population distribution--the movement towards the "sun" states and the movement to the suburbs--continue to gather momentum. The West and Florida were the big gainers in the decade of the 1960's and in many major metropolitan areas of the country, there was a net loss of population in the central city and a gain in the surrounding "bedroom" communities. That such distributional changes have political overtones is well known by political scientists and sociologists, but to what extent and in what directions these demographic alterations have brought about behavioral changes in a political context is still open to question.

In the early part of the 1960's the state of California became the most populous state in the union. Its phenomenal growth has been primarily due to in-migration of former residents of other states; some 1500 new Californians arrive every day.¹ As one of the fastest

¹Neil Morgan, The California Syndrome, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 310.

growing states in the country, and now the most populous, California should serve as an excellent "laboratory" for testing hypotheses regarding the role of residential change and political behavior. By investigating these topics some light may be shed on the seemingly unpredictable nature of California's politics.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the relationship between migration and political behavior on an individual and statewide level as reflected in regional voting patterns. Of special importance to this effort is an analysis of peer group influence on an individual's voting behavior. More specifically, what influence does a newly acquired neighborhood environment have upon a recent immigrant's political orientation?

The Literature of California Politics

Historians and political scientists have long noted the role of population change in California's politics, although few have explicitly suggested what that role is. Most analytical efforts have been of a chronological nature, but two recent works dealing with Golden State politics have offered possible explanations of its erratic political path. Royce D. Delmatier's The Rumble of California Politics, 1848-1970 suggests the state is growing conservative because of the influence of new Californians arriving from politically conservative sections of the United States--the Midwest, South and the Southwest. Delmatier thus submits that new residents of the state are bringing their political philosophies with them, and are turning the state in

a conservative direction. However, in his final assessment of the state's political history, Delmatier concludes, as have so many before him, "California's population and its moods are in such constant flux that its course can only be charted from the stern for it can only see where it has been and not where it is going." That is, the only apparent predictable characteristic of California's politics is its unpredictability.²

Wolfinger and Greenstein take note of a recurring theme in California's political history which will be examined in detail in later stages of this study: the state is marked by a distinct liberal-conservative regionality in its voting behavior.³ Wolfinger and Greenstein compared the San Francisco Bay Area, known for its liberal political leanings, with Los Angeles and San Diego, which usually support conservative candidates and issues. The authors cite the distinct regional support indicated in the 1964 and 1968 elections as prime examples of this electoral phenomenon.

In 1964 Lyndon Johnson, identified by Wolfinger and Greenstein as the "liberal" candidate, received sixty-six per cent of the presidential vote in the Bay Area, but only fifty-five per cent in Southern

²Royce D. Delmatier and Earl G. Waters, "California and National Politics," The Rumble of California Politics, 1848-1970, Royce D. Delmatier, Clarence F. McIntosh, Earl G. Waters, Editors, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 444.

³Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred S. Greenstein, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March 1969), pp. 74-85.

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California.⁴ Proposition 14, through which a "Yes" vote repealed open housing in California, was opposed by forty-two per cent of the San Francisco Bay Area voters, but by only thirty-one per cent in southern areas. Four years later the voting returns for the Republican Senatorial primary (liberal Thomas Kuchel vs. conservative Max Rafferty) and the Humphrey-Nixon presidential contest indicated the same regionality.

TABLE 1

VOTING RETURNS FOR SELECTED CALIFORNIA METROPOLITAN AREAS

	<u>Northern California</u>		<u>Southern California</u>	
	San Francisco Oakland	San Jose	Los Angeles Long Beach	San Diego
1964				
Per Cent for Johnson	67	63	56	50
Per Cent "No" on Proposition 14 ^a	41	47	31	30
Per Cent for Rockefeller	62	61	39	45
1968				
Per Cent for Humphrey	57	51	47	39
Per Cent for Kuchel	59	60	39	39

^a"No" on Proposition 14 was a vote for fair housing.

Source: Raymond Wolfinger and Fred Greenstein, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March 1969), p. 76.

⁴Wolfinger and Greenstein delimit Southern California on a county basis: Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, Riverside, San Diego and Imperial counties.

The importance of "region" as an independent variable was further demonstrated by Wolfinger and Greenstein in their analysis of Proposition 13 returns from all incorporated Bay Area and Southern California cities of more than 2,500 population. Assigning a numerical value of three to each Bay Area city and one to each in Southern California, simple and partial correlation coefficients were computed to measure the relationship between region and votes against Proposition 13. The simple correlation coefficient was .55 indicating a significant relationship between regional location and voting behavior in California.⁵

Perhaps the most important contribution made by these authors was their discussion of the political implications of this regionality within the context of population migration into California. Citing various hypotheses regarding the conservatism of Southern California--including the suggestion that migration source explains the region's philosophical leanings--they examined closely the role played by population migration in the state's politics on an aggregate basis.

In the past decade it has also been suggested by other writers that the explosive population growth of Southern California has driven new arrivals towards the right of the political spectrum. The 1964 data of Wolfinger and Greenstein does not completely support this conclusion. The presidential vote of "new residents" is counted separately. New residents are voters who have been in California

⁵Wolfinger and Greenstein, op. cit., p. 75.

less than a year and are registered to vote in another state. They can only vote for President and Vice President in their new state. In Southern California there was no difference in the support given Lyndon Johnson by new or "old" residents, and in the Bay Area sixty per cent of the new voters and sixty-six per cent of the other voters supported the Democratic nominee.

The hypothesis that in-migration is the primary force behind Southern California's political conservatism was further examined by comparing the population growth of the four cities in Table 2.

TABLE 2

POPULATION AND POPULATION GROWTH IN FOUR METROPOLITAN AREAS

	San Francisco Oakland	San Jose	Los Angeles Long Beach	San Diego
1960 population	2,783,359	642,315	6,742,696	1,033,011
Increase in population, 1950-1960	24%	121%	54%	86%

Source: Raymond Wolfinger and Fred Greenstein, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March 1969), p. 78.

In comparing growth rates and the voting differences between these four metropolitan areas, Wolfinger and Greenstein concluded there was little relationship between growth and conservatism, for while conservative Los Angeles and San Diego showed rapid population growth, so too did liberal San Jose.

These data suggest two alternative verdicts on the proposition that rapid regional growth produces conservatism. The stronger conclusion is that the proposition is just wrong, for . . . San Jose is last or next to last on all three indices of conservative voting; yet it is a strong first among the four metropolitan areas in rate of growth. A second interpretation is that, despite the fifty miles separating them, San Jose is really 'part of' San Francisco and its spectacular economic boom has not had the customary political consequences on its residents because of the moderating influence of the older metropolis. This line of explanation requires an important modification of the flat proposition that rapid growth produces ultra-conservative political behavior, by introducing the notion that 'older civilizations' can ameliorate the results of this growth. It is difficult to imagine this civilizing effect occurring at the mass level, although its effects would be felt there.⁶

The authors also dealt with the question of migration source as a potential explanation for California's political regionality. They noted, as have others in the past, that Northern California was originally settled by migrants from the northeast and Europe, while Los Angeles' first sizeable influx of population included a far greater Midwestern and Southern element--presumably more conservative than their neighbors in the Bay Area. This conceivably would explain the divergent political nature of the two areas. However, more recent population figures indicate that Southern California is now acquiring more new residents from all parts of the country than is the San Francisco Bay Area (Table 3).

A comparison of these figures, and those previously cited, would seem to discount the propositions that rapid population growth is associated with political conservatism or that the regional political

⁶Ibid., p. 79.

TABLE 3

SOURCES OF NEW ARRIVALS IN FOUR
METROPOLITAN AREAS--1955-1960

	San Francisco Oakland	San Jose	Los Angeles Long Beach	San Diego
1960 population	2,783,359	642,315	6,742,696	1,033,011
Total new arrivals, 1950-1960	416,647	203,066	1,048,175	326,699
% of new arrivals from the Midwest	15	12	28	23
% of new arrivals from southern and border states	19	11	22	25
% of new arrivals from Northeast	10	8	16	10
% of new arrivals from elsewhere in California	36	56	19	26

Source: Raymond Wolfinger and Fred Greenstein, "Comparing Political Regions," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63 (March 1969), p. 83.

differences are mainly due to their population characteristics. Wolfinger and Greenstein do not offer a definitive explanation of the state's political spectrum, but they do conclude with this interesting assertion: "These findings should reassure those who fear that illiberal political movements are the consequences of vertical and horizontal social mobility, economic growth, and suburbanization--trends which are likely to be with us for some time to come."⁷

Literature On Political Theories and Population Movement

While the literature dealing with the influence of population growth on California's politics has not been a matter of intensive study, the role of suburbanization and political behavior has been treated on a national level. And while the emphasis of this thesis is upon inter-state migration to California rather than intra-state movement and its consequences, much of the research by sociologists, political scientists and geographers is applicable to the study at hand.

Since the advent of population movement to the urban fringe in the early 1950's, the political process of suburbanization has been a matter of keen interest to politically-oriented academicians. Much of the early research concentrated upon the supposedly growing conservatism of the suburbs--supposed because this hypothesis has been disputed by more recent literature. At the basis of the hypothesis is

⁷Ibid., p. 85.

the argument that suburbs are bastions of socio-political homogeneity, and that new residents in America's suburban neighborhoods are subjected to pressures (subtle and otherwise) steering them toward conformity with prevailing norms.

Typically, the "conversion" process finds the inner city dweller, a Democrat, moving out to the suburbs and becoming a Republican. Pollster Louis Harris in 1945 was among the first to hypothesize this political conversion.⁸ For Harris America's suburbs were white collar melting pots of the new middle class. A desire to escape from his ethnic heritage merged with a new sense of property ownership and social standing to bring about a conservative change in the former city resident. Before World War II "The majority of these people were Democrats. But in the Republican suburbs, the lonely Democrats had no choice but to join the dominant."⁹ He concluded that the suburbs produced Republican majorities and that they would continue to do so as long as the suburbanization process endured.

Harris emphasized economic and socio-psychological variables in explaining the political conversion process taking place in America's suburbs. Other sociologists and political scientists were quick to explore these ideas. Sylvia Fleis Fava, investigating inter-personal communication differences between New York City proper and suburban

⁸Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Majority? (New York: Harper & Row, 1945).

⁹Scott Donaldson, The Suburban Myth, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 149.

Nassau county, found that people in the suburbs make friends with neighbors more easily than people who live elsewhere. Propinquity is important in deciding who makes friends with whom, but commonly shared values and problems are even more important. In the suburbs there is a higher percentage of married couples with children and the predominance of middle class status, leading to a homogeneity which, Fava concludes, yields more "neighboring" than is found in the inner city. Even when demographic and economic variables were held constant, Fava's research indicated that there was considerably more neighboring in suburban Nassau county than in the city of New York.¹⁰

A third alternative to the social pressure and interpersonal communication hypotheses of Harris and Fava is the association between social mobility and anxiety. The socially mobile are supposedly shedding major aspects of their personalities and adopting new ones. They suffer from guilt because they are to a degree renouncing the values of the status group in which they were raised. They also suffer from solitude because they have cut old social ties and have not yet established others in their newly acquired social status. This in turn leads to conformity because the upwardly mobile feel a need to be accepted in their new surroundings, and to do so they feel a necessity to adopt the social customs and predominant attitudes of the "better" social group."¹¹

¹⁰Ibid., p. 112.

¹¹James C. Davies, Human Nature in Politics, The Dynamics of Political Behavior, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 265.

This theme of group conformity has been a common one in the literature analyzing suburban migration and political behavior. The new suburbanite, according to these analysts, is escaping from big city politics and is a ready convert to the small town set of political values found in the suburbs. Most importantly, not finding his own kind in the suburban community, he eagerly seeks to be accepted by his new peers. Although he may have little equity in his new home, the new resident thinks of himself as a homeowner. The first property tax bill he receives reinforces the suburbanite's recognition that he is a home owner, and the first local association to which he is admitted enhances his desire to be accepted by the community in toto. In Harris' words, "Green grass, fresh air, and new social status work their magic; class and ethnic appeals lose their potency. Differences in nationality, religion and occupation become submerged by a predominant identification with locality."¹² Rabbi Albert I. Gordon, in his book Jews in Suburbia, concurs: ". . . [new suburbanites] fear criticism and seek to avoid controversy. They generally refrain from participation in any situation which makes one appear different. Acceptance by the larger group requires that one conform to its standards."¹³

The conservative conversion hypothesis of Harris and others still remains a subject of considerable attention and controversy among those

¹²Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 136.

¹³Donaldson, op. cit., p. 105.

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interested in political behavior. Samuel Lubell was among the first to notice that America's suburbs were not becoming the masses of Republican homogeneity that Harris predicted. Lubell observed that his analysis of some suburban returns in 1952 actually indicated a long run trend toward making certain suburbs Democratic. Cook county's suburbs outside Chicago voted eighty-four per cent Republican in 1920, and sixty-six per cent in 1952. Long Island and Westchester, on the fringe of New York City, were seventy-four per cent Republican in 1920, and seventy per cent in 1952.¹⁴ What had happened?

Scott Donaldson, citing earlier "post-Harris" research, provides one answer: most suburbs were Republican before the post war population boom, and most remained Republican in about the same proportion. However, there are other suburbs which appear to be Democratic in nature, and over time they have also strengthened their ideological position. The inescapable fact is, Donaldson suggests, that Republican suburbs attract Republican newcomers and vice versa. What is suggested then is another theory explaining political behavior in suburbia. The suburbs continue to be visualized as nuclei of political homogeneity, or at least moving in that direction. However, the causal process is not conversion, but rather transplantation. Individuals seek their own kind, and the transplantation theory implies that the suburban political differences noted by Lubell can be explained by a Republican and Democratic homogeneity created and maintained by the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 150.

movement of new residents into suburbs which for the most part contain residents who "fit" the newcomers' backgrounds.

Despite the spatial and regional implications of the inner city-suburban voting patterns found in the United States, few geographers have added to the literature dealing with the subject.¹⁵ One of the most significant exceptions to this statement has been Kevin R. Cox, whose article dealing with suburban voting behavior examined the application of the conversion and transplantation theories to London's urban fringe.¹⁶ Cox employed a factor analysis of his aggregate data and found that party preference as well as voter turnout are particularly related to suburbanism in London.¹⁷ Because he used aggregate data, Cox places certain constraints on the degree of conclusiveness of his study, but he makes these observations:

A firm conclusion that can be derived from this analysis is that suburbanism exercises effects on both party preference and participation independent of other social contexts. . . .

¹⁵Examples of voting studies by geographers on inner city-suburban voting patterns in the United States include: E. F. Van Duzer, "An Analysis of the Differences in Republican Presidential Vote in Cities and Their Suburbs," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, University of Iowa, 1962); P. J. Lewis, "Impact of Negro Migration on the Electoral Geography of Flint, Michigan, 1932-1962: A Cartographic Analysis," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 55 (1965), pp. 1-25; and Stanley D. Brunn and W. L. Hoffman, "The Spatial Response of Negroes and Whites Toward Open Housing," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 60 (1970), pp. 18-36.

¹⁶Kevin R. Cox, "Suburbia and Voting Behavior in the London Metropolitan Area," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 58 (March 1968), pp. 111-127. Cox has also recently examined geographical aspects of political behavior in an urban context. See Kevin R. Cox, "The Spatial Components of Urban Voting Response Surfaces," Economic Geography, Vol. 47 (1971), pp. 27-35.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 111.

It seems that there is evidence for both the transplantation and conversion theories. As far as the conversion hypothesis is concerned, the content of the suburban factor specifies both a stimulus (low proportion of homes shared as a surrogate for low proportion of homes rented) and a higher communication probability (high proportions of men and women are married and fewer of the women go to work). The additional data on the dynamic component of party preference suggest that the conversion effect is less likely to be political in character as compared with former periods of time. The transplantation hypothesis on the other hand is supported by the suburban-age-social rank relationships. . . .

There seems no good reason why one should choose one theory over the other in taking into account all the available evidence.¹⁸

Cox lends credence to both the transplantation and conversion theories, and indicates that the greater interpersonal communication within the suburbs is a variable leading to political homogeneity in London's outskirts. However, what may be of even greater importance is the fact that Cox's article, published in 1968, was written after a number of sociologists and political scientists had indicated that a "suburban voting myth" had been created by the conversion and transplantation theorists. Roger Kasperson cited such research in his criticism of Cox's article.¹⁹

Since 1960 there has been a general theory of voting--the 'funnel of causality' available to researchers. In this metaphorical construct, the voting decision takes place at the stem, psychological variables occur in intervening position, and ecological variables at the rim of the funnel . . . social environmental factors, because of their greater remoteness from the decision, tend to account for much less variance than do attitudinal materials drawn closer to the behavior.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁹Roger E. Kasperson, "On Suburbia and Voting Behavior," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 59 (June 1969), pp. 405-411.

²⁰Ibid., p. 407.

Kasperson argued that the higher communication in the suburbs may indeed exist, but that most of this is of a non-political nature. Those political conversations that do take place are likely to occur between individuals who share the same political philosophy.²¹

There were a number of investigations that Kasperson could draw upon to base his criticisms of Cox's article. Scott Greer's analysis of the proliferation of knowledge regarding a ballot issue in inner Saint Louis and its suburbs indicated that while suburbanites tended to discuss the issue more often than central city residents, the bulk of their conversation was held with family members, friends and work associates who for the most part were not residents of the same suburban neighborhoods.²²

In 1960 Bennett M. Berger published Working Class Suburb, a study of the San Jose suburb of Milpitas, California. The situation at Milpitas was particularly interesting because the town was largely populated by Ford Motor Company workers whose families had been transferred from the industrial city of Richmond, located on the eastern side of the San Francisco Bay. Thus Berger had the opportunity to test directly the supposed conversion effect of suburbia upon a large number of people with similar backgrounds and the same new suburban surrounding. If a suburban atmosphere did bring about a Republican

²¹Ibid., p. 409.

²²Scott Greer, Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 163.

conversion, then the normally Democratic Ford workers would in time start lending their support to the G.O.P. Berger conducted his interviews two and a half years after the Ford workers had moved to Milpitas, and from those interviews he discovered that eighty-one per cent of his subjects classified themselves as Democrats, eleven per cent as Republicans, six per cent as independents and two per cent specified no party. Eisenhower was supported by twenty-six per cent of those interviewed in 1952 and by eighteen per cent in 1956. Berger concluded that moving to Milpitas had no political impact whatsoever on the new residents.²³

A number of articles written in the latter part of the 1960's have placed more importance upon socio-economic-status variables than location or communication in explaining suburban political behavior. Frederick M. Wirt questioned the premise of monolithic Republicanism in America's suburbs by isolating a number of communities which showed very definite political composition differences when compared with one another. Wirt contended that these differences in suburban electoral behavior arose from the socio-economic bases of the suburbs. Suburbs having the characteristics of the upper middle class will be more Republican than those having lower middle class and working class characteristics. Those communities which are heterogeneous in their socio-economic makeup will show considerable variance in their

²³Donaldson, op. cit., p. 152.

political makeup. Using correlation and regression analysis to test this hypothesis, Wirt concluded, "The more extreme the (socio-economic) characteristics, the more likely the suburbs will have a complexion; especially strong is the relationship between high economic indices and Republicanism."²⁴

This brief review of the literature dealing with the effect of population migration and voting behavior indicates the direction of thought on the subject over the past three decades. Although Cox's article is an exception, the general consensus seems, at the minimum, to be moving away from the conversion hypothesis in explaining suburban voting behavior. Most observers do not see the suburbs as being monolithic in their political composition. Now as much importance has been placed upon some of the traditional socio-economic-status variables and the transplantation process in explaining differences in the political makeup of the various suburbs studied.

Rationale

. . . why flows over space assume the form they do . . . has to be explained in the decisions of men. An awareness of the need for the geographer to make certain assumptions of a behavioral character has long been apparent; it is only recently, however, that oversimplified assumptions have been challenged and the spatial interactional implications of alternative assumptions deduced.²⁵

²⁴Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 27 (1965), p. 661.

²⁵Kevin R. Cox, "Guest Editor's Comments," The East Lakes Geographer, Vol. 4 (December, 1968), p. 1.

Political geography, as other facets of the discipline, has become more spatially and behaviorally oriented. Concomitant with these changes in geography has come the rapidly increasing use of statistical techniques in spatial research.

An analysis of the political behavior of new residents in California and their cumulative impact upon the state's regionality would appear to be well in stride with the "revolution" that has overtaken geography. As political geography has become more spatially and behaviorally oriented, it has turned away from some of the more traditional foci of study, particularly those of the nation-state. As the review of recent literature has indicated, geographers have been slow to denote their attention to the spatial and behavioral aspects of the voting decision. The efforts of Cox, Kasperson and others would seem to indicate that electoral geography with a behavioral emphasis will become an important focus of study for political geographers.

This thesis will employ many of the spatial, behavioral and statistical techniques of the "new" geography, and it is hoped that the hypotheses to be tested will challenge and offer alternatives for assumptions regarding political behavior in California.

Statement of Hypotheses

While moving from New York City to Nassau county is one type of permanent migration in the United States, it is quite conceivable to argue that a move from New York to suburban San Francisco is another. Movement from the inner city to a nearby suburb, or from one suburb

to an adjacent one usually does not mean a cutting of ties with family and friends, and quite often does not even involve a job change. Thus it is conceivable that the family and work associations noted by Greer, Wirt, and others, may be of greater importance than the location theories of Harris and Cox.²⁶ But inter-state migration may be another story. The Michigan resident who leaves his home state to settle in California most likely is leaving his family and other political reference groups behind and encountering a new social and political environment in the Golden State. What effect will his former electoral preferences have upon his voting behavior in his new home? Do the conversion and transplantation theories, prominent in the suburban-political literature have any applications to inter-state and inter-regional migration where physical and socio-psychological distance may be of much greater importance in affecting an individual's voting behavior?

It is the primary goal of this paper to discern possible answers to these questions by examining electoral patterns and processes in California. To satisfy this objective four hypotheses are to be tested in this analysis of California politics:

1. That California does show a distinct regionality in its voting patterns;

²⁶Scott Greer, Metropolitics: A Study of Political Culture, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963); Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Politics, Vol. 27 (1965), pp. 647-666; Louis Harris, Is There a Republican Majority?, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Kevin R. Cox, "Suburbia and Voting Behavior in the London Metropolitan Area," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 58 (March, 1968), pp. 111-127. For a recent analysis of the political impact of suburbia in Los Angeles, see "A New Suburban Politics," by Charles G. Bell in Social Forces, Vol. 47 (March, 1969), pp. 280-287.



2. That California is growing increasingly conservative because of a conservative conversion process;
3. That California is growing increasingly conservative because of the transplantation of conservative Midwesterners and Southerners into the state; and
4. That community influences in California bring about a bi-directional change in state voting behavior--liberal or conservative, depending upon the location of the new Californian within the state.

For the purposes of this analysis the term conservative is defined as a vote for specific candidates and issues: Ronald Reagan, governor, 1966; George Murphy, U. S. Senate, 1964; and Max Rafferty, U. S. Senate, 1968. In addition other candidates and issues were used to define the conservative voter profile in California, and they are described in detail in Chapter Three. In all cases, the candidates and issues were recognized as conservative by the voters, political scientists and the contestants themselves.

The initial hypothesis to be tested is in essence a more detailed examination of the regional analysis of California's politics suggested by Wolfinger and Greenstein. It is felt that the work of these political scientists was a geographical simplification, and that if regionality is an important factor in California's politics, then the entire state should be considered as a point of study, rather than just the San Francisco Bay Area and Los Angeles. The other three hypotheses concern potential explanations for the regionality and have predictive qualities regarding the future of California politics and conceivably those of other states receiving similar large influxes of population.

Kevin Phillips, in his book The Emerging Republican Majority, cites California as the political wave of the future in the United States.

Noting a growing conservative trend in the state, particularly in the south, he concludes: "Not only is Southern California the fastest growing section of the Pacific and the nation, it is the hub of Western conservatism . . . and perhaps something of a future-capsule of political Americana."²⁷ California's political history, taken in the light of this rather potent statement, may offer an interesting insight into the possible effects of population growth upon political behavior, for the state's history is one of tremendous in-migration and turbulent politics. Chapter II will examine California's political past in detail in order to establish the regional nature of its politics and to test the validity of Phillips' thesis.

²⁷Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969), p. 414.



CHAPTER II

CALIFORNIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY - A CHRONICLE OF SECTIONAL CONFLICT

"I am a member of no organized political party,
I am a California Democrat." --Will Rogers Jr.

The Early Years, 1850-1900

In 1850 delegates to California's first constitutional convention met in Monterey to plan the new state's future. The prominent issue on the agenda was the question of slavery. It was the hope of the South that California would become a slave state and lead the West in support of the Southern cause, but this was not to be.

In 1850 as today, California was a state of migrants, with the majority of its residents coming from other states in the Union, most of which were anti-slavery. The larger number of Northerners dealt a death blow to the existence of slavery in the state. Former Northerners, drawn to the San Francisco Bay Area and the Sierra region of the state by the Gold Rush, outnumbered those Californians originally from slave states. In 1850 there were 92,579 Californians, and 34,000 of them lived in San Francisco. Los Angeles was a mere town of 1,610.²⁸ As a result of the predominance of Northerners, California rejected slavery at its first constitutional convention. But while the new state was loyal to the Federal Union, there were large pockets of Southern sympathizers,

²⁸Herbert L. Phillips, Big Wayward Girl, An Informal Political History of California, (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Co., Inc., 1968), p. 18.

particularly in Southern California. In the northern and central sections of the state sentiment was strongly in favor of the Washington government. Thus with the entrance of California into the Union in 1850 and its concurrent encounter with the slavery issue, regional differences began to play a prominent role in Golden State politics.

Despite their setback at the state constitutional convention, pro-slavery interests gained the support of Governor Milton S. Lathon shortly before the start of the Civil War to hold a special election in the six southernmost counties in California on the proposition that these counties should separate and form a new state. The issue passed, but the onset of the Civil War prevented final congressional action which would have created a separate state of Southern California. This was not to be the last attempt to split California into two or more states. Heated political campaigns led to increased sectional strife through the years, most recently in the bitter 1964 Republican Presidential primary pitting Nelson Rockefeller against Barry Goldwater. Northern California strongly supported the moderate Rockefeller, while the south backed the conservative Goldwater. During their campaign a bill was introduced in the state legislature that proposed dividing California in approximately the same way as had been proposed more than one hundred years earlier. As had attempts in the past, the 1964 effort failed. Just how serious was this proposal is debatable, but this recent attempt to divide California is indicative of the existing sectional conflict in the state. California's recent past is marked by strong political differences between Northern and Southern California; there is little likelihood these will diminish.

The issue of slavery, the first indicator of sharp regional political differences in California, was primarily a reflection of regional diversity in political leadership. Political opportunity and the lure of gold brought a considerable number of New York Democrats to San Francisco, and with them came their system of politics. At the same time Southern California was being provided with political leadership originating in the Southern states. The struggle for supremacy between northern and southern standard bearers has been the major theme of California's political history, particularly of the state Democratic Party. The bitter feud between former New Yorker David C. Broderick and ex-Tennessean William M. Gwinn over control of the Democratic Party in the 1850's eventually split the party and prepared the way for Republican control of California which was virtually unbroken for the next one hundred years.

On a national level, Abraham Lincoln was the first Republican to benefit from the sectional political strife in California. Carrying only nine counties in 1860, Lincoln nevertheless received the state's four electoral votes because his support was concentrated in California's then most populous counties - San Francisco, Marin, and Santa Clara. In Los Angeles county, center of secessionist talk, Lincoln received only twenty per cent of the vote. In neighboring Ventura County the local Republican organization had to meet behind bolted doors for fear of a hostile electorate.²⁹ In 1864 Lincoln's support for his reelection bid met with

²⁹Delmatier, op. cit., p. 52. Of the numerous analyses of California politics Delmatier's was found to be one of the most thorough, extensive and up-to-date.

greater success in California than in 1860, but as Figure 1 indicates, his backing still remained distinctly regional in nature. The central and particularly the southern portions of the state were notably lacking in their support of Republican Lincoln.

Hiram Johnson and the Progressive Era, 1900-1920

The turn of the century witnessed a continuation of regional conflict in California politics. However, the struggle was mostly within the confines of the Republican party's standard-bearers, who were consistently winning elections. In 1908 the passage of the direct primary and the subsequent introduction of cross-filing further served to lead the Democratic party into semi-oblivion until the second half of the twentieth century.

Perhaps the single greatest factor in the decline of Democratic strength in California was the rise of Hiram Johnson and the Progressives. His influence was strongest both within and beyond the structure of the Republican party in the second decade of this century. Traditional sources of Democratic support, namely rural voters of southern background and city workingmen, were attracted to the conservative wing of the Republican party and liberal Progressive candidates respectively. With the decline of the Progressive party as a third party power in California, Johnson, having left the Republican party in 1913, returned to run for the senate as a member of the G.O.P. in 1916. From that date forward California's politics has been a study of conflict between liberal and conservative forces within the state G.O.P. Between 1910 and 1958, Democrats would elect but one governor, and it would take an economic catastrophe to achieve that.




FIGURE 1

The transition of power into Republican hands did not mean a shift in the traditional political regionality within California. The reform movement led by Johnsonian Progressives began achieving impact shortly after 1900 with the introduction of the direct primary. This measure was approved by nearly seventy-seven per cent of the voters, but it is interesting that forty per cent of the negative vote came from the six southern counties, the balance coming from the sparsely populated rural counties near the Sierras. San Francisco Bay Area counties endorsed the reform measure by margins of up to ninety per cent.³⁰ Hiram Johnson's election to the California governorship in 1910 was indicative of statewide support but his greatest strength still remained in Northern California. By 1916, however, the conservative wing of the G.O.P. was able to run up impressive majorities in Southern California, an area which had become the center of growing anti-Johnson sentiment. This southern base of conservatism flourished primarily because of an increase in population. In 1860 Southern California contained but six per cent of the state's population. By 1900 that figure had risen to twenty percent, and by 1930 more than one-half of California's population was located in Southern California. Overcome by the avalanche of the liberal Johnson vote in the 1910's, the conservatives were back in power by 1923 under the leadership of Governor Friend W. Richardson. Between 1922 and 1942 the only liberal Republican to win the governorship was C. C. Young in 1926.

Third party candidates, representing liberal and conservative philosophies, met with varying degrees of success during the Johnson years.

³⁰Ibid., p. 155.

Prohibitionist candidates, not surprisingly, found their support greatest in Southern California, while Socialist candidates fared well in the San Francisco Bay Area. The Reverend J. Stitt Wilson, a Methodist minister and a Socialist, was elected mayor of Berkeley in 1911, and in 1912 he took forty per cent of the east Bay vote while running for Congress. In Los Angeles, Socialist Job Harriman was twice defeated in his bid for mayor. Prohibitionist Assembly candidates ran strongest in Southern California, particularly in Orange county, which even at that time was one of the most conservative counties in all of California.³¹

Kevin Phillips has characterized early political differences between Los Angeles and San Francisco:

In politics as in many things, San Francisco-oriented Northern California and Los Angeles-oriented Southern California are traditional opponents. During the 1920's and early thirties the cleavage was follows: San Francisco was substantially Catholic, pro-labor, anti-prohibitionist, and usually Democratic; while Los Angeles was predominantly Protestant, nativist, anti-labor, prohibitionist and usually Republican. The partisan division was not hard and fast because Northern California often supported progressive Republicans and Southern California would do the same for conservative Democrats.³²

While Phillips' comments were directed towards the post-Johnson years, he could have well been speaking of the turn of the century, for that matter, the 1970's.

Republican Sectional Conflict 1922-1953

In 1920 Hiram Johnson made a bid for the Republican nomination to the Presidency. The popular Progressive-Republican, who had relinquished

³¹Ibid., p. 179.

³²Kevin Phillips, op. cit., p. 425.

his position as governor for a senate seat in Washington, bested Herbert Hoover in the California presidential primary by some 161,000 votes, but lost Los Angeles county for the first time in his career. In previous elections Johnson had always received much stronger support from Northern California but he had also been able to maintain a plurality in the south. Johnson remained a senator until his death in 1945. In each bid for re-election his support became increasingly sectional in nature, as Southern California supported candidates espousing conservative philosophies.

In the twenty years following Johnson's election to the United States Senate in 1916, five consecutive one-term Republican governors were elected. By then the Democrats had become one of the most unsuccessful state parties in the country. During the decade of the twenties the Democrats held no U. S. Senate seat and were able to elect but two congressmen in California. During this same period only eight per cent of 703 national and state partisan elections were won by state Democrats. All of those elected were from northern and rural counties. Sonoma County elected Clarence F. Lea to sixteen consecutive congressional terms and Siskiyou and San Francisco counties were also consistent in their support of Democrats. No Democrat had been elected in Los Angeles county since the turn of the century and during the 1920's only three one-term Democrats were elected in California's ten southernmost counties.³³

As in the first part of the twentieth century, the Republican Party was the stage for sectional political conflict in California during the

³³Delmattier, op. cit., p. 204.

pre- and post-World War II years. The inability of any Republican governor until Earl Warren to win reelection is indicative of the bitter struggle between moderates and conservatives within the party. The first three governors, Stephens in 1922, Richardson in 1926 and Young in 1930 were not even able to win their own party primaries. During these years the philosophical differences between Northern and Southern California were strengthened and the Republican party was unable to find a candidate who could satisfy both regions of the state.

On a national level, only Franklin D. Roosevelt was a successful Democrat in California, as he consistently carried the state during his presidency. Figure 2 indicates the regional support given liberal Democrats Roosevelt and Al Smith in their three-way race with John Nance Garner for California's support in the presidential primary of 1932. It is interesting to compare the Roosevelt-Smith support with that of Abraham Lincoln. In 1932, as in 1864 Southern California and the Bay Area offered sharp contrasts in their political behavior.

In 1946 liberal Democrat Will Rogers Jr. was overwhelmingly defeated in his bid to succeed Hiram Johnson in the U.S. Senate. As shown in Figure 3, once again certain portions of Northern California followed previous patterns in California's electoral geography by supporting the liberal Democrat. Helen Gahagan Douglas was equally unsuccessful, as Figure 4 indicates in her race for the U.S. Senate in 1950 against a prominent name in California politics, Richard Nixon. The regional dichotomy so prominent in the Golden State's political history was an important factor in most state-wide elections.



FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3




FIGURE 4

With perhaps the exception of Hiram Johnson, no other individual achieved the success of Earl Warren in California politics. Three times elected governor, Warren was so masterful in garnering votes that he was able to win the nominations of both parties for reelection in 1946. He was the only governor in the state's history to achieve such a victory. From 1942 to 1953 California politics were dominated by the policies of moderate Republican Earl Warren. During these years the state's political battles were waged between progressive, or moderate as they preferred to be called, and conservative Republicans, with Democrats watching from the wings.

By the completion of his first term as governor, Warren was already beginning to draw criticism from conservative Republicans. In late 1945 Earl Lee Kelly, a leading spokesman for the conservative wing of the party, indicated that he was thinking of opposing Warren in the party primary. Kelly said of Warren's non-partisan and liberal stances:

If our party's chosen officials are too cagey or opportunistic to go into battle wearing our party's colors, then we must either get new leaders or get ready for receivership.

If Governor Warren intends to ride into battle with one leg astride the Republican elephant and the other clinging affectionately to the Democratic donkey, I can't help but wonder if either animal will recognize him as master.³⁴

It is noteworthy here that some twenty-two years later would find Max Rafferty using the same argument in purging liberal Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel from the ranks of the G.O.P. However, Kelly was not as

³⁴Ibid., p. 309.

fortunate, for Warren accomplished the unprecedented feat of winning the nominations of both parties through cross-filing in the June primary of 1946.

Conservative Republicans continued vying for power within the party and they were effective enough to give Warren some opposition in his bid for control of the California delegation to the Republican national convention in 1952. Warren was considered a dark horse for the nomination behind Eisenhower and Taft. He had met considerable conservative resistance from Bakersfield Congressman Thomas Werdel in the 1952 presidential primary in California. The contest was a bitter struggle, but the more popular Warren defeated the Werdel slate by a two-to-one margin. In the general election of that same year, Werdel was the only Republican congressman to go down to defeat, leading to speculation among G.O.P. conservatives that Warren had aided Werdel's opponent, Harlan Hagen.³⁵ True or not, neither the Kelly nor Werdel elections endeared Warren to the right wing of the Republican Party.

Post-Warren California - A Shift to the Right

The Warren era in California lasted nearly eleven years from January 4, 1943 to October 5, 1953, ending when the governor was appointed Chief Justice of the United States by President Dwight Eisenhower. As in the years prior to his ascendancy, the Republican Party of Earl Warren saw an almost continuous struggle between its liberal and conservative factions. Warren handled his conservative opposition with more ease than

³⁵Ibid., p. 314.

any Republican office-holder in the state's history. But by the time of his departure for Washington, like Hiram Johnson before him, Warren left a California Republican party that was heading in a conservative direction. In retrospect, the opposition Warren encountered in the latter years of his administration was but a foretaste of future political battles that would rock California in the 1960's and 1970's. The power struggle for Warren's position of preeminence within the Republican party and the state was almost inevitable, but the intensity of the liberal-conservative conflict among both Republicans and Democrats has been almost suicidal from a party-unity standpoint. In one way or another, the prominent names of recent California political history, Goodwin Knight, William Knowland, Richard Nixon, Thomas Kuchel, Pat Brown, Ronald Reagan and even John Tunney are connected with the culmination of intra-party conflict following the completion of the Warren era.

In 1952 while running for the Republican presidential nomination Warren spoke out for "social progress" and warned the party:

Our party has never had a radical wing, but we have our problems just the same, because we do have in it extremists of the Right--those who would freeze our nation to the status quo, with whatever inequalities go with it, and those who would have our country return to what they call the good old days It is my deep conviction that unless there is a forthright repudiation of this thinking by our party, we will suffer again at the hands of the voters I am convinced the American people are not Socialists and will not tolerate socialistic government, but they are definitely committed to social progress.³⁶

Warren spoke out more than six years before the founding of an organization which was to call for his impeachment as Chief Justice and

³⁶Herbert L. Phillips, op. cit., p. 146.

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support the election of Ronald Reagan as the most recent Republican governor of California--the John Birch Society.

Lieutenant Governor Goodwin J. Knight succeeded Earl Warren in Sacramento and also replaced the new Chief Justice as the leading spokesman for liberal causes within the Republican Party. Knight's early years in Republican politics had been devoted to Hiram Johnson and later his surprisingly close ties with organized labor gave him an excellent position from which to carry on Earl Warren's image as a bi-partisan governor. He handily won election as governor in his own right in 1954. Knight appeared to be enjoying the same rapport that the California electorate had previously reserved for Warren, but shortly after his victory this came to an end.

The Los Angeles Times, long the leading journalistic proponent of Republican conservatism, lambasted Knight in October 1955 for his close ties with labor. Soon the competing ambitions of Richard Nixon, William Knowland and Goodwin Knight, all Republicans, came to the fore.³⁷ Knight was cool towards the renomination of Nixon as Eisenhower's running mate while Knowland strongly supported the incumbent Vice-President. All this contributed to a divided California delegation to the Republican national convention of 1956. Knight remained the nominal head of his delegation, but he presided over a group equally divided between supporters of Nixon, Knowland and himself. This was an omen of the conflict that lay ahead.

The year 1958 must be viewed as one of the most prophetic in California's political history. It was a year that saw the end of fifty years

³⁷Delmatier, op. cit., p. 340.

of cross-filing in primary elections. This ended the possibility of anyone duplicating Warren's 1946 feat of winning the nominations of both parties. Furthermore, it insured that each party would have a candidate for office in the November elections. More importantly, 1958 saw the return of the Democratic Party as a force in California politics and the introduction what has now become a phenomenon common to the state in virtually every general election--candidates with philosophies at the opposite ends of the political spectrum. Prior to 1958 most statewide elections pitted moderate Republicans against weak, liberal Democrats. During the brief period of the 1920's when conservatives held sway in the Republican Party, there was a certain degree of philosophical difference in the gubernatorial and senatorial elections. But the opposition of the Democratic Party was so weak that liberal-conservative differences were not of great importance to the voters. William Knowland and the conservative wing of the party changed all of this through a power play that split the Republicans and handed the state house to Edmund G. Brown and the Democrats for only the second time in the twentieth century.

In splitting the Republican Party, Knowland prepared the way for a conservative takeover of the G.O.P., culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan as governor in 1966. After 1958 the California voter has consistently been given a choice between a conservative Republican candidate and a liberal Democrat in gubernatorial and senatorial races. Since 1958 only the 1962 U. S. Senate race between liberals Thomas Kuchel (R) and Richard Richards (D) did not present clear and concise philosophical differences between the candidates. In every other general election held in California in the last twelve years the voter has been given a choice

between obviously liberal and conservative candidates. Definitions of liberalism and conservatism are relative terms in any given election, but the philosophical differences in candidates have been particularly obvious in the last decade. This phenomenon, beginning with the Brown-Knowland gubernatorial contest in 1958 and continuing to the Murphy-Tunney senate election in 1970, is likely to be a dominant factor in the California political process as long as the conservative wing of the G.O.P. maintains its dominance and liberals remain the major spokesmen of California's Democratic Party.

This important aspect of current political life in the Golden State received its initial impetus when William Knowland challenged incumbent Goodwin Knight for the Republican nomination to the state house in 1958. Knowland had been one of California's U. S. Senators since he filled Hiram Johnson's unexpired term in 1945 and won election in his own right the following year. It had been assumed by most leaders within the Republican Party that the Oakland senator would again seek reelection in 1958. Thus it was with a good deal of surprise that most G.O.P.'ers reacted to Knowland's August 1957 announced gubernatorial candidacy. Acrimonious surprise might best describe Governor Knight's reaction. Knowland's decision to contest Knight for the governorship was the strongest bid for the G.O.P. leadership that the conservatives had made in over two decades. In a sense the Knowland-Knight conflict was an indication of the more reverberating clashes to follow. William Knowland was a conservative Republican of long standing, and his move obviously dismayed the moderate Knight who had already announced his candidacy for reelection when Knowland returned from Washington to enter the race. Of particular consternation to

Knight was Knowland's anti-union "right to work" proposal which was a direct challenge to the close ties the Republican governor had established with labor. The end result of this intra-party skirmish, with Richard Nixon playing the role of mediator, was a decision for Knight and Knowland to switch jobs - Goodwin Knight would run for Knowland's senate seat and Knowland would be the Republican nominee for governor. Knight grudgingly acceded to the proposal.

In 1958 the Republican Party threw away the script that had given it such overwhelming success in the twentieth century. The time-tested formula for Republican victory was a candidate who blurred party lines and monopolized the "middle-of-the-road," forcing his Democratic opponent into a position which appeared to be politically left of center. In 1958 it was the Democrat Pat Brown who was able to capture the center position mainly because of Knowland's outspoken conservatism. Badly divided into liberal and conservative camps, the Republicans suffered a disaster in 1958: Brown defeated Knowland by more than a million votes and the Democrats also swept other state offices with landslide victories, winning all major positions except Secretary of State.³⁸ They captured large majorities in both houses of the state legislature giving the party its first real victory in sixty years.

Edmund G. Brown's election to governor in 1958 was certainly of landslide proportions. The liberal Democrat carried all portions of the State by receiving nearly sixty-one per cent of the vote. However, his

³⁸Ibid., p. 340.

true strength, as indicated in Figure 5, was found in the traditionally liberal parts of the state--central and northern California. San Francisco county gave seventy-one per cent of its vote to Brown and Contra Costa and Alameda counties each gave sixty-five per cent. In contrast Orange county gave but forty-six per cent of its vote to the Democrat. As in Lincoln's day, California displayed its distinctive regional voting behavior. Only Ventura county in Southern California gave Brown a higher percentage of its vote than the Democrat received state wide. The Republicans, who for years had lived with a three-to-two Democratic margin in registration and yet had managed to consistently win election after election, now were to find the picture changed. Outspoken conservatism was to have its day in California's Republican Party, but not in 1958 or in 1962.

In the post-Warren years conservative elements of the Republican Party had become a steadily increasing factor in California Republicanism. Knowland's defeat may have been a temporary setback, but they were ready to start anew in 1962. However, they had to reckon with two of the more prominent names in California's political history, Richard Nixon and Thomas Kuchel. Richard Nixon returned to his home state to challenge Edmund G. Brown's bid for a second four-year term in 1962, while Thomas Kuchel was seeking reelection as California's senior United States Senator that same year. In both cases it was a foregone conclusion that Nixon and Kuchel would win their June primaries and go on to face their Democratic opponents in November. Nevertheless, right wing Republicans decided to take on these two formidable candidates, despite the fact that Nixon had given Knowland strong support in the ex-senator's gubernatorial bid. A greater target




FIGURE 5

of conservative wrath was Kuchel, the moderate Republican senator who was closely tied to the Warren-Knight element in the California G.O.P. Confident of winning the primary, Nixon concentrated his attack on Governor Brown, hoping not to offend conservatives who were supporting his primary opponent, Joseph C. Shell. While the former Vice-President won the Republican gubernatorial primary handily, Shell took one-third of the vote, indicating that the conservative wing of the Republican Party had considerable strength. Kuchel also won his primary by a solid margin but three-fourths of his opposition came from Southern California. Like Democrat Brown, Kuchel was an admirer of Warren, and among California's growing number of conservative Republicans, his philosophical leanings were looked upon as virtual heresy by the party's right wing. Six years later Southern California's opposition would be fatal to Kuchel's bid for reelection against conservative Republican Max Rafferty.

When November of 1962 came and the votes were counted, the Democrats had won again. The non-partisan images so successfully used by Warren, Knight and Kuchel excaped Richard Nixon. Partly because of his recognized leadership in the Republican Party, Nixon was not able to acheive a non-partisan image. Brown was reelected by 300,000 votes and, as in his first gubernatorial election, the distribution of his vote again showed the distinctive regionality that had become so characteristic of California elections. (See Figure 7.) Only Thomas Kuchel, defeating Richard Richards by over 700,000 votes, was able to withstand the onslaught of continued Democratic success.

The conservative impact in the Republican Party had been demonstrated by the impressive showings their candidates had made in the G.O.P. gubernatorial




FIGURE 6




FIGURE 7

and senatorial primaries in 1962. Not victorious, but displaying significant support in populous Southern California, the conservatives turned to another means of gaining a more prominent foothold in the party, the official and unofficial Republican Party organizations of California. Within two years of Nixon's defeat they gained control of the important California Republican Assembly (C.R.A.) and began guiding the party towards the right end of the political spectrum. In gaining control of the C.R.A. and other similar organizations, conservative Republicans also acquired a monopoly on party endorsements. In time endorsements were to be denied a number of moderate Republicans because they failed to meet the changing standards of the G.O.P. These measures of support went hand in hand with monetary support and the cost to moderate Republicans in subsequent primary and general elections was considerable. The attrition among moderate Republicans has led to their virtual extinction in California. Since 1964 not a single moderate Republican has received an endorsement for a senatorial or gubernatorial seat from the California Republican Assembly, nor has any Republican of liberal leanings been able to win a statewide Republican primary.

If 1958 was one of the more important years in California's political history, 1964 must rank almost as much so in more recent times. For while 1958 saw the beginnings of a profound liberal-conservative split within the Republican Party, 1964 presented the first conservative successes within and beyond the G.O.P. By the end of 1964 California had elected a conservative Republican U. S. Senator, had helped nominate a conservative Republican for president, and had become enamored with a former Hollywood actor whom the state would elect as its governor just

two years later. By 1964 control of the California Republican Party had passed into the hands of the conservative wing of the party.

At a national level both parties, as a rule, attempt to select presidential candidates who come from the political center rather than the extreme left or right, but in 1964 the Republican Party broke from that tradition by selecting a candidate who was identified with the conservative wing of the party. The June presidential primary of California handed the G.O.P. nomination to Arizona's conservative U.S. Senator, Barry Goldwater.

The California presidential primary in June 1964 was the last primary held before the Republican national convention in San Francisco. The bitter struggle between Senator Goldwater and New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller went far beyond a simple confrontation of presidential aspirants, for this primary was a "last stand" battle for the moderate wing of California's Republican Party. They were fighting for survival within the party against the growing force of conservatism. Goldwater carried only fourteen of California's fifty-eight counties, but in a pattern that had become increasingly familiar; his margin of victory came through his tremendous showing in conservative Southern California. Two-thirds of Orange county's Republicans voted for the Arizona senator, while a like percentage of San Francisco's Republicans cast their ballots for Nelson Rockefeller. The New York governor received a 172,000 plurality from Northern California only to see his margin disappear under the wake of the Los Angeles and Orange county vote, where in 1964 almost one-half of the state's Republicans lived. Out of more than 2,000,000 votes cast, Barry Goldwater had won the California Republican primary by 68,000 votes.

Southern California had demonstrated it had the weight to steer the politics of the Golden State in a conservative direction.

1964 was also a turning point in another political sense. George Murphy became the first candidate to be elected to a statewide office by conservative Republicans. November brought defeat for Barry Goldwater, but it also sent the conservative Murphy to Washington as the junior senator from California. From a cartographic standpoint, Murphy's victory over Pierre Salinger, a liberal Democrat, was almost classic in its electoral geography. As indicated in Figure 8, liberal Salinger's greatest support came from Northern California, which he carried by a fifty-three per cent margin. But like Rockefeller five months previously, Salinger's Northern California margin disappeared when he lost the eight southern counties by 366,000 votes.

A key issue in the elections of 1964 was Proposition Fourteen, a constitutional measure which proposed to void the Rumford Fair Housing Act. Pierre Salinger, Governor Brown and a number of other liberal Democrats strongly opposed the measure, decision that was to cost them dearly, for Proposition Fourteen passed in every county save Modoc in northernmost California.³⁹ Californians voted down Open Housing by a two-to-one margin and Salinger's opposition of Proposition Fourteen could not have helped his cause.

The use of absolute vote totals in Figure 9 and others can be very misleading in analyzing electoral behavior in aggregate form. This map

³⁹A negative note on Proposition 14 indicated support for Open Housing.




FIGURE 8




FIGURE 9

and others presents a "truer" picture of the regional nature of the Proposition Fourteen vote. As previously mentioned, the measure passed in all but one county; thus from a regional standpoint, a raw vote distribution is virtually meaningless. Mapping county deviations from the state support of liberal candidates or issues provides a better measure of the "grass roots" flavor of California's political regionality. When presented in this fashion, one can discern that portion of California which is more liberal or more conservative than the rest of the state in any given election. Thus while Open Housing lost in California by a two-to-one margin, the map presenting those counties which gave it greater support than it received across the state illustrates once again that Northern and Central California are those regions where liberal candidates and issues receive their greatest support. The Proposition Fourteen vote distribution bears a strong resemblance to those of Pierre Salinger in 1964 and of Edmund G. Brown in 1958 and 1962.

California's 1964 political behavior was distinctly regional in character. Among the lower income Democrats in 1964, a much larger proportion of Southern Californians deviated from the party position with respect to the presidential, senatorial, and Proposition Fourteen contests than did their colleagues in the north. Republicans likewise reflected regional political differences. This was particularly true in the June presidential primary where in every category--age, sex, income, class, education and religion--Republicans from Southern California favored conservative Goldwater over liberal Rockefeller. In Northern California the situation was just the opposite.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Harris, op. cit., p. 13.

In the one-hundred years since Abraham Lincoln's victory in California numerous candidates of various political strains have marked the Golden State scene, but one consistent fact remains in describing the chaotic nature of California's politics: when presented with candidates espousing opposing liberal-conservative philosophies, most of Northern California will support the liberal office-seeker, be he Republican or Democrat, while his conservative opponent will consistently find his greatest support in Southern California. Four November general elections have been held in California in the eight years since 1964, and nothing has occurred in their results to cause one to doubt the recurring regional nature of the state's electoral geography.

In 1966 Ronald Reagan led the conservative forces within the Republican party to a solid victory in the June primary over San Francisco's liberal Republican mayor George Christopher. His victory was assured by the nearly seventy-five per cent vote he received in the eight counties of Southern California. Sam Yorty, mayor of Los Angeles and a leading spokesman for Democratic conservatives opposed Pat Brown in his bid for the party's nomination to a third term as governor. Nearly sixty per cent of Yorty's 981,000 votes came from Southern California. In the general election Reagan overwhelmed Brown by winning sixty per cent of Southern California's vote. Two years later Thomas Kuchel, the last prominent liberal Republican in office, was defeated by conservative Max Rafferty in the Republican senatorial primary. In a bitter contest, Kuchel--a native of Orange county--lost his bid for renomination when he was defeated in Southern California by over 240,000 votes. Ironically Democrat Alan Cranston, who shared much of Kuchel's liberal philosophy, defeated Rafferty




FIGURE 10




FIGURE 11

in the general election of 1968. Rafferty still carried Southern California (though importantly not Los Angeles county) but not by a sufficient enough margin to overcome liberal Cranston's commanding lead in Northern California. In the same year a college bond issue lost by a solid margin but again the San Francisco Bay Area led most of Northern California in supporting the proposition. The issue received only forty-one per cent of Southern California's vote.

The need to capture the fancy of Southern California has increasingly become an accepted fact of political life in the Golden State by those seeking to win statewide elections. That Southern California is the conservative bedrock of the state is also a fact of political life, and it is for this reason that Kevin Phillips concluded that California is a "future-capsule of political Americana." Phillips, in noting the conservative upsurge in California led by southern voters, further stated that California's political future, as well as that of the rest of the nation would be a conservative one. There is much in the state's political history, particularly that of the 1960's, to lead one to agree with Phillips' conclusions. However, lest those of conservative political inclinations lean back with a sense of satisfaction that the future is theirs, it should be noted that the most recent electoral results in California do little to add to the predictive value of Kevin Phillips' analysis of California politics. Alan Cranston's victory over Max Rafferty for the U. S. Senate in 1968 and John Tunney's election to the state's other senate seat in 1970 can hardly be listed as conservative successes. Perhaps a safer conclusion would be that Californians find candidates occupying the right or left of center most attractive. It is apparent that through more




FIGURE 12




FIGURE 13




FIGURE 14




FIGURE 15

than 120 years of statehood, California's political pendulum has swung in varying degrees to the right and left of center, but invariably the voters have reacted to what they have considered excessive dissonance and swung their votes back towards the other side. Thus in 1964 Californians were reacting to liberal state politics which had been in vogue for a number of years and elected conservative George Murphy over liberal Pierre Salinger. It may well be that by 1968, with the defeat of Max Rafferty, and 1970, with Murphy's unsuccessful bid for reelection, that these candidates' philosophies were now considered too far to the right of the political spectrum. As a result, liberals Cranston and Tunney were perhaps elected because their stances were viewed as counterbalances to the "extreme" philosophies of their opponents. In California the northern and southern concepts of what is politically acceptable are horses of very different colors--no matter what the political year.

CHAPTER III

CALIFORNIA'S POLITICAL REGIONS--A NEW DELIMITATION

"In any area of science, classification is an important step in the ordering of knowledge and the deriving of generalizations."--
Leslie J. King

Traditional Delimitations

Traditional regional differences in California's political behavior have led most historians and political scientists to approach the state's political history from a north-south perspective with an emphasis upon the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas. California's two largest cities have long been represented as the focal points of the enduring regional nature of the state's political history. But to suggest that the Bay Area and Los Angeles are the only locales of political difference within California would be a misrepresentation of Golden State politics. While these are the two largest population centers in the state, other portions of Northern and Southern California are also very populous and politically important. It is the purpose of this chapter to attempt a comprehensive delimitation of California's political regions beyond Los Angeles and San Francisco and offer a spatial analysis of its political past and present as a means of providing insight into the future.

Southern California is the land "south of the Tehachapis," a transverse mountain range which cuts across to the ocean just north of the city

of Santa Barbara.⁴¹ The Tehachapis have been the traditional physical boundary between the two Californias and political analysts have usually demarcated "Southern California" as those counties south of the range: Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Orange, Riverside, San Diego and Imperial. (See Figure 16.) Wolfinger and Greenstein have been among the most recent to use this traditional demarcation in analyzing California's political regions.⁴²

According to Neil Morgan the political differences between the two Californias are sharp and distinct. Northern Californians have been longer established, urbanized, and politically more liberal than their southern counterparts. This political divergence is to an extent a reflection of the more urban (vs. suburban) life style that is particularly dominant in the San Francisco Bay Area where there is a much greater consciousness of religious and ethnic group identity than south of the Tehachapis. In the Bay Area there is a self-conscious intelligentsia that has close ties with prestigious centers of liberal arts education. This "elite" has had a considerable influence in steering the region away from the moralistic approach to political issues that characterizes Southern California.⁴³

The prospering Southern Californian has long approached politics as though he were shopping for competent property management. When he

⁴¹Carey McWilliams, Southern California Country, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946), p. 4.

⁴²Wolfinger and Greenstein, op. cit., footnote 3.

⁴³Neil Morgan, The California Syndrome, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 305.




FIGURE 16

has felt his economic advancement to be in jeopardy, as in matters of open housing, soaring welfare payments, or violence-in-the-streets, he has retreated into conservatism, a plea for orderliness, and old fashioned patriotism.⁴⁴

Methodology for New Delimitation--Data Selection

In examining the political behavior of Californians, this writer has chosen to work with only statewide non-presidential electoral data. In addition, an alternative to party registration as a measure of political behavior has also been sought. Emphasis has been placed upon voting results illustrative of a liberal-conservative dichotomy rather than the more traditional Republican-Democratic division used in some other studies previously cited. Registration has proven to be an unreliable measure of regional political strength and voter preference in California as election results over the years have clearly indicated. With the exception of the one-term Culbert Olsen administration in the late 1930's, Republicans controlled the Governor's Mansion from the turn of the century until 1958, and the state legislature from 1888 until the same year, despite an almost continuous Democratic margin in party registration. Party ties have been especially weak in state and local elections.

The California Democratic party had a registration margin of some 1,300,000 voters in 1966, a gubernatorial election year. Republican Ronald Reagan's margin of victory that year reemphasized the difficulty of using party registration as a means of measuring political behavior. Reagan

⁴⁴Ibid.

ran some 934,000 votes over his party's registration. Robert Finch, the lieutenant gubernatorial candidate, ran 1,026,000 over the Republican turnout, while Glenn Anderson, the weakest Democratic candidate, ran 1,051,000 votes under his party's total. These election results indicated that as of 1966, from a practical standpoint, the Republicans were California's majority party.

A further indication that party registration is an unreliable index of political behavior in California is the distinct ideological and philosophical differences found within the state's two major parties. These basic differences, as noted in the previous chapter, are more accurately reflected along liberal (or "moderate" in the Republican sense) and conservative lines. The intra-party differences between Republicans Paul J. McCloskey and Ronald Reagan and Democrats Alan Cranston and Sam Yorty would be obscured if the political behavior of Californians was approached from strictly a party standpoint. Consequently this study classifies votes into liberal and conservative categories rather than using party labels.

It has also been necessary to avoid the use of presidential elections in this analysis of California's political regions. Because the ultimate objective of this study is to discern what effect migration to California has on a new resident's voting behavior, it is felt that it would be best to avoid national contests where "non-California" influences conceivably might be more influential than otherwise.

The variables used in delineating California's political regions are:

- X_1 1958 gubernatorial election--Brown vote
- X_2 1962 gubernatorial election--Brown vote

- X₃ 1962 Republican senatorial primary--Kuchel vote
- X₄ 1964 "NO" vote on Proposition 14--Open Housing
- X₅ 1964 senate election--Salinger vote
- X₆ 1966 Democratic gubernatorial primary--Brown vote
- X₇ 1966 Republican gubernatorial primary--Christopher vote
- X₈ 1966 gubernatorial election--Brown vote
- X₉ 1968 Republican senatorial primary--Kuchel vote
- X₁₀ 1968 senate election--Cranston vote
- X₁₁ 1968 "YES" vote on Proposition 3--College Bond

Data were collected and analyzed by county for the support given the liberal candidate or issue, e.g., the percentage for the 1958 gubernatorial election is that received by liberal Edmund G. Brown, and for the 1968 senate election, the percentage received by liberal Alan Cranston. 1958 has been chosen as the base year for this analysis for reasons previously cited: (1) cross filing was eliminated that year, thus allowing an analysis of intra-party differences; and (2) only after 1958 has the California voter consistently been presented with a choice of candidates and issues who represent opposite ends of the political spectrum.

Regional Delimitation--Use of Discriminant Analysis

As stated above, the basic reason for selecting California for this study is to identify those ingredients that influence voting behavior where the population is in a state of political and social flux. A series of linear regression models and a factor analysis were used to test hypotheses regarding the political conversion and transplantation theories. Preliminary results of these analyses are presented in this section with a

detailed examination to follow. The present discussion is designed to test the initial hypothesis of the study: that California does show a distinct and consistent regionality in its voting patterns.

As Leslie J. King has indicated, classification is an important step in any geographical analysis. Grouping and classifying data and establishing meaningful boundaries are integral parts of one of the most traditional aspects of geography--regionalization. All too often the selection of regional boundaries has been highly subjective, sometimes based on only two or three characteristics.⁴⁵ This has been particularly true of past delimitation of California's political regions, where usually only one variable, location, has been considered in the drawing of boundaries. In reexamining the political regions of California, a more meaningful and objective delimitation is derived by focusing upon voting behavior rather than location north or south of the Tehachapi Mountains.

Multivariate discriminant analysis is a statistical tool concerned primarily with delimiting meaningful boundaries between classes or groups and is an excellent technique for regional analysis.⁴⁶ As used in this

⁴⁵Stanley D. Brunn, "A Cross-Sectional Analysis of Two Central Place Systems in Ohio," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, 1966), p. 136.

⁴⁶For examples of spatial studies utilizing discriminant analysis see: Brian J. L. Berry, "An Inductive Approach to the Regionalization of Economic Development," Essays in Geography and Economic Development in N. Ginsberg, ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper 62, 1960), pp. 78-107; L. J. King, "Discriminatory Analysis of Urban Growth Patterns in Ontario and Quebec, 1951-1961," Annals, Association of American Geographers, Vol. 57 (1967), pp. 566-578; S. D. Brunn, op. cit., footnote 45.

study, discriminant analysis tests the hypothesis that California's political regions can be discriminated by extracting significant intergroup dimensions and by measuring the distance between them. This model is designed to minimize the variations between the items within each region and maximize the differences between the regions themselves. Furthermore, this multivariate test presupposes the delimitation of regions before the actual computation and also assumes that the observations form overlapping regions.

The unit of analysis in all the statistical techniques performed is the county. California has fifty-eight counties which vary greatly in size and other characteristics, from Alpine's 306 registered voters in November 1968 to Los Angeles's 3,130,962 registered voters. In addition, there are vast social and political differences within several counties, particularly those of a suburban character. Perhaps the use of precinct data would more accurately reflect the political character of California on a micro-basis. However, the use of county figures allows a comparison between available population data and political data. Furthermore, the unchanging nature of the county boundaries facilitates an historical analysis.

To test whether the data met the assumptions of discriminant analysis, a factor analysis of the eleven political variables used was first conducted. Three factors combined to explain seventy-nine per cent of the variation in the data. They were labeled: (1) a Republican primary factor, (2) a general election factor, and (3) a proposition election factor. Figure 17 indicates one useful aspect of the factor analysis model in regional studies. Using a Cartesian coordinate system, factor scores for each county are used as coordinates in comparing the regional dimensions of

each factor. Rather than using 0.0 at the point of intercept between the X and Y axes, positive and negative values are given along each axis so that the three factors can be compared simultaneously. In an abstract mathematical sense, the graphing of factor scores very definitely indicated the regional nature of California's voting patterns. Five shades of political behavior are represented in Figure 17, and the clustering of the liberal counties in the "negative" mathematical space and of the conservative counties in the "positive" portions of the graph shows that the data do meet the a priori regional assumption of discriminant analysis. In addition, it is equally apparent that the groupings of counties overlap, thereby making discriminant analysis a useful tool in assigning counties in the intermediate range to either the liberal or conservative core regions.

Three discriminant analyses were made to check the accuracy and appropriateness of various delimitations of California's political regions. The initial demarcation tested was based upon location north or south of the Tehachapis, as used by Wolfinger and Greenstein in their analysis of California's political regionality. Because this demarcation is based on location rather than political behavior, it was not expected to be highly accurate in terms of properly classifying California's counties in the context of their political behavior. In essence, Southern California's conservatism extends beyond the Tehachapi Mountains. The classification matrix for this first discriminant analysis appears to confirm this observation.

An evaluation of the classification probabilities for each county in this first discriminant analysis indicates that there are a number of

RANGE of POLITICAL FACTOR SCORES




FIGURE 17

TABLE 4

CLASSIFICATION MATRIX FOR DISCRIMINANT
ANALYSIS BASED ON LOCATION

Function	Liberal N. California	Conservative S. California	Total
Group			
1	43	7	50
2	0	8	8

counties which, although they have been "properly" classified using the Tehachapi Mountains as a point of demarcation, have very high probabilities of belonging to the opposite category. For these reasons, it was concluded that while the Tehachapis may be an adequate boundary denoting the location of Southern California, they cannot be used for the political demarcation of "conservative" California. There is no doubt that Southern California's political behavior is conservative in comparison to the rest of the state, but to suggest or imply that the eight counties in the south are the only sources of conservative support in California would be an inaccurate description of the state's political geography.

A new delimitation of California's political regions was then constructed based upon a behavioral variable rather than location. To obtain a more accurate delimitation of "liberal" and "conservative" (vis-a-vis Northern and Southern) California the following criterion was established: those counties consistently deviating in a positive direction from the statewide percentage received by the liberal candidate in each of the elections used as variables were designated as liberal and

those deviating negatively were placed in the conservative category. Figure 18 represents the cartographic results of this analysis. This map of California's political regions is based on one behavioral variable, a cumulative deviation of the above-mentioned standard. A perusal of this map confirms that the traditional demarcation of Southern and Northern California is inadequate for purposes of delimiting the state's political regions. The boundaries of "conservative" California extend from the Mexican border north to the Sierra Nevada Mountains to include Mono county. Most interestingly, there is a conservative enclave in northern "liberal" California. The counties in the rice country of Northern California appear just as conservative as those in the south. While this map does not necessarily indicate which counties will be consistently carried by liberal candidates, it does show those which will consistently give greater support than the state average to these candidates and issues.

This second discriminant analysis indicates that the behavioral approach is a more realistic and efficient means of delimiting political regions. However, it also reveals certain problems. Three political regions were established in this particular analysis: liberal, conservative, and a transition zone in which counties lean in neither direction. Classification probabilities for each county falling into its assigned political region are much higher than in the previous analysis based on location. Only two counties have probabilities of less than .700 within the core regions as the majority of all counties have probabilities of greater than .900 within their assigned political regions. However, the classification results from this analysis also indicate a significant number of counties having a tendency to fall into the transition region (Table 5). Given the




FIGURE 18

TABLE 5

DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
BASED ON CUMULATIVE NOTING INDEX

Function	Liberal California	Conservative California	Transition	Total
Group				
1	27	0	5	32
2	0	16	2	18
3	0	0	8	8

tendency for observations to be classified in the transition political region, it was decided to widen the political spectrum by indicating degrees of "liberalness" and "conservativeness." A third discriminant analysis based upon five regions of political behavior and the eleven political variables revealed that a significant delimitation of California's political regions had been attained (Table 6).

TABLE 6

DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION MATRIX
CALIFORNIA'S POLITICAL REGIONS

Function	Liberal	Leaning Liberal	Transi- tion	Leaning Conservative	Conservative	Total
Group						
1	26	0	0	0	0	26
2	0	7	0	0	0	7
3	0	1	4	0	0	5
4	0	1	0	4	0	5
5	0	0	0	0	15	15

There are but two deviant cases in this classification, San Joaquin and Glenn counties. Despite the fact that San Joaquin county does not show liberal or conservative political characteristics, it nevertheless has a .886 probability of falling into the medium-liberal category and only a .061 probability of falling into what should be its assigned transition region. Glenn county's voting behavior has been generally conservative over the years, and yet it has only a .074 probability of leaning conservative and a .671 probability of leaning liberal in its voting behavior. In essence, the statistical classification of the voting behavior of these two counties does not mesh with the reality of their voting behavior.

A reexamination of Figure 17 does much to explain this problem. Discriminant analysis assumes that the designated regions overlap, as is the case in graphing counties in relation to their factor scores. In comparing the mathematical regions for the three factors (Republican primaries, general elections and proposition elections) it is noted that both San Joaquin and Glenn counties are on the peripheries of their respective political regions. They also occupy positions well within one or both of the liberal regions. Because of the positions of these two counties within the political regions of California, it is possible to understand that in terms of statistical probability and mathematical space, San Joaquin and Glenn counties would be "misclassified."

Figure 19 and Table 7 present California's political region in cartographic and tabular form. As in the second analysis, based on behavior rather than location, "conservative" California extends far beyond

TABLE 7

CLASSIFICATION PROBABILITIES OF CALIFORNIA'S POLITICAL REGIONS

Liberal California

Region One -- Consistently Liberal

<u>County</u>	<u>Classification Probability</u>
1. Alameda	.99931
2. Alpine	.95785
3. Amador	.59209 (1) .39541 (region 4)
4. Contra Costa	.99477
5. Fresno	.93667
6. Kings	.99165
7. Lassen	.97735
8. Madera	.99597
9. Marin	.99925
10. Merced	.99842
11. Monterey	.55185 (1) .35311 (region 4)
12. Napa	.99919
13. Placer	.99976
14. Plumas	1.00000
15. Sacramento	.99978
16. San Francisco	1.00000
17. San Mateo	.99996
18. Santa Clara	.99997
19. Shasta	.99580
20. Sierra	.99393
21. Siskiyou	.98784
22. Solano	1.00000
23. Sonoma	.91141
24. Stanislaus	.99977
25. Trinity	.96259

Region Two -- Leaning Liberal

<u>County</u>	<u>Classification Probability</u>
1. Colusa	.94197
2. Humboldt	.95881
3. Mendocino	.61346 (2) .38517 (region 3)
4. Tehama	.95814
5. Tuolumne	.90510
6. El Dorado	.68896 (2) .22312 (region 4)
7. San Benito	.93502

TABLE 7 (con't.)

Independent California

Region Three -- Middle, Transition

<u>County</u>	<u>Classification Probability</u>
1. Del Norte	.99953
2. Mariposa	.99017
3. Modoc	.75778 .23236 (region 2)
4. San Joaquin	.06121 .88666 (region 2)
5. San Luis Obispo	.50229 .45709 (region 4)

Conservative California

Region Four -- Leaning Conservative

<u>County</u>	<u>Classification Probability</u>
1. Glenn	.07402 . 67129 (region 2)
2. Santa Barbara	.99883
3. Butte	.98200
4. Santa Cruz	.97246
5. Tulare	.98786

Region Five -- Consistently Conservative

<u>County</u>	<u>Classification Probability</u>
1. Calaveras	.84789
2. Imperial	.99961
3. Inyo	.96720
4. Kern	.99918
5. Lake	.53075 .45693 (region 3)
6. Los Angeles	.99987
7. Mono	.98143
8. Nevada	.92931
9. Orange	1.00000
10. Riverside	.96392
11. San Bernardino	.99947
12. San Diego	.99334
13. Sutter	.99482
14. Ventura	.78683 .18192 (region 3)
15. Yuba	.98027




FIGURE 19

the limits of Southern California. Figure 20 is another indication that party registration is an inappropriate measure of political regionalism in California. There appears to be no regionalization in party registration, necessitating the use of behavioral variables to delimit political regions.

Discriminant analysis in addition to classifying observations also indicates those variables which are most important in discriminating one region from another. Table 8 indicates the linear discriminant coefficients for each of the eleven political variables in the analysis. In each of the five regions three variables proved to be most important in discriminating one political region from another: the 1958 gubernatorial election (liberal Brown vs. conservative Knowland), Proposition Fourteen in 1964 (Open Housing), and the 1966 Democratic gubernatorial primary (liberal Brown vs. conservative Yorty).

Discriminant analysis is basically a descriptive technique and is predictive only in the sense that its use would indicate a realistic way to classify new observations. While Figure 19 may technically not be a predictive map of future voting patterns in California, it is most interesting to compare this map with post-1968 voting patterns. If Californians have shown regionality in their voting behavior in the past, will they do so in the future? Figures 21 and 22, which present the voting patterns of the 1970 senatorial and gubernatorial elections, indicate that as of this writing, there remains a distinct and consistent geographic pattern of voting behavior in the Golden State that is best understood in behavioral rather than locational terms.



FIGURE 20

TABLE 8
LINEAR DISCRIMINANT COEFFICIENTS

Variables	Regions				
	1	2	3	4	5
1958 Governor	2.82607	3.99421	4.20297	2.72143	3.46787
1962 Governor	0.42788	-1.32874	-1.56536	-0.02944	-1.11322
1962 Repub. Senate Primary	1.99676	2.66883	2.23350	2.44669	1.95420
1964 Proposition 14	4.73673	4.45696	4.63050	4.51925	5.00131
1964 Senate	1.69529	1.57748	1.93708	1.77699	1.47861
1966 Demo. Gov. Primary	3.84997	3.78854	4.23966	3.71263	3.75693
1966 Repub. Gov. Primary	0.06991	-0.70656	-0.78555	-0.36355	-0.74017
1966 Governor	-0.58206	-0.02331	-0.41895	-0.26935	-0.01968
1968 Repub. Senate Primary	1.92310	1.93320	1.93500	1.89562	1.76962
1968 Senate	0.58078	0.50263	0.55145	0.12223	0.85927
1968 Propositon 3	1.82602	1.23580	1.08507	1.40415	1.18900




FIGURE 21




FIGURE 22

One may argue that particularly in the case of California the political analysis cannot generalize about statewide voting behavior because elections are won or lost on the basis of a candidate's personality and local issues. How does one explain, for example, the fact that some counties in November 1970 gave a considerable margin to conservative Ronald Reagan and did the same for liberal John Tunney? In any given election there is always some degree of uniqueness in voting behavior. Tunney for instance, most likely received a plurality in normally conservative Los Angeles county because of a high percentage of unemployment at that time, while nearby conservative Riverside county contained his congressional district. This certainly did not hurt his cause. If one concentrates only on the unique patterns, little headway will be made in explaining overall trends for the future. The patterns of political behavior cannot be denied and the regionalization method and pattern described above contribute to testing and explaining the various hypotheses enunciated, and more importantly in indicating future political patterns of the most populous state in the nation.

CHAPTER IV

MIGRATION AND COMMUNITY INFLUENCE-- THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA'S POLITICAL REGIONS

"Los Angeles wants no dudes, loafers and paupers, people who have no means and trust to luck, cheap politicians, failures, bummers, scrubs, impecunious clerks, bookkeepers, lawyers, doctors. We need workers! hustlers! Men of brains, braun and guts! Men who have a little capital and a great deal of energy - first class men!" --Harrison Gray Otis, ed., Los Angeles Times, 1957.

Changes in California's Population Distribution

One of the most significant contributory factors to the variability of the political winds in California has been the steady and massive migrations which have continued from statehood in 1850 to this day. The tremendous population growth throughout the state has defied efforts to bring about any significant degree of uniform party organization in California. In essence, these series of migrations have temporal and spatial differences which have considerable political importance. This latter aspect of interstate in-migration to California helps to explain the current geographical differences in voting behavior within the state, and it is this facet of population change which will be treated in this chapter.

Today California's population approaches 20,000,000; most of its tremendous increase since World War II has been due to in-migration.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Delmatier, op. cit., p. 422.

Movement into the state in the 1950's accounted for over sixty per cent of California's population increase. Today more than one-half of its residents are from elsewhere and such has been the demographic history of the state since its existence was first known.⁴⁸

From the first mention of its name in the fifteenth century Montalvo novel Las Sergas de Esplandian to the middle decades of the twentieth century, California has signified a land of golden opportunity to the peoples of the world. Wave after wave of migration has crossed the Rockies and the Sierra Nevada, rounded the Horn and crossed the Isthmus. They have come by sailing vessel, prairie schooner, and tin lizzie. And yet in the period since the great migration of the 'Okies' escaping the dust bowls of the 1930's, the flood of new arrivals has been greater and greater.⁴⁹

Migrants to California have moved West partially in response to economic opportunities, but more often in response to the "state of mind" that California has become. California in 1970, as some one hundred years earlier, is a mental as well as physical state. It is composed of a huge agglomeration of former residents of other states, many who have at least one trait in common: a desire to live in California. In the older eastern states, residence may be tied to birth, family, and employment, but in California the preconceived notions of year-round summer, well paying jobs, and expectation of the "good life" do much to explain one's residence in California. A nationwide survey in the 1960's concluded that climate had taken precedence over job opportunities as motivation for settlement in California. To many migrants the state's living conditions are the greatest

⁴⁸U. S. Department of Commerce/Bureau of the Census Report Number PC (VI)-6, February, 1971, 1970 Census of Population, California.

⁴⁹David W. Lantis, Rodney Steiner and Arthur Karinen, California, Land of Contrast, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1963), p. 464.

incentives for movement. California's amenities--real or imagined--have tended to compensate for such obstacles as distance, unfamiliarity, and disruption of social ties.⁵⁰

Regardless of why they have come, the fact is that Americans and residents of other nations have arrived in such remarkable numbers that today California is the most populous state in the United States. But of greater political consequence than the numbers have been changes in the distribution of the population. For it is a fact of political life in present-day California that the conservative regions are now the most populous in the state--particularly Southern California. The demographic situation of the state today is virtually the opposite of 1850 when California entered the Union, and an analysis of California's political happenings must include more than a casual reference to this fact.

On January 24, 1848 James Wilson Marshall became the unwitting cause of the first great population influx into what would become the state of California. The flakes of gold he found at John Sutter's mill in Coloma changed the history of California and western America overnight. As a result of the impact of Marshall's discovery, villages became cities, population mushroomed and statehood was awarded within two years. California had an estimated 6,000 residents in 1840. By statehood in 1850 the figure had reached 92,000; 380,000 ten years later and 560,000 in 1870.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 465

The first great influx of population into California was to the gold-bearing foothills of the Sierra Nevadas, bordering the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. Three-fourths of the state's population in 1850 was located in the gold rush counties of El Dorado, Calaveras, Mariposa, Tuolumne, Sacramento, Yuba, Butte, and Sutter. Within ten years the impact of the gold rush on California's population distribution had begun to wane, and by the 1860's these same counties contained less than a third of the population (Figure 23). A fifth was in the Sacramento Valley and another fifth had moved into what was becoming the first urban area of California, San Francisco. Southern California (as delimited by the Tehachapis) with slightly under 25,000 people, accounted for only six per cent of California's population in 1860.

In 1860 San Francisco was the metropolis of California with 57,000 people. In contrast Los Angeles was a community of but 4,000. During the next twenty years, San Francisco continued to grow rapidly, reaching a population of nearly a quarter-million. By contrast, in 1880 Los Angeles was home for only 11,000 Californians.

The year 1880 marked a turning point in California's demographic history. Prior to the decade of the 1880's population was concentrated in the central and northern portions of the state, with San Francisco the urban center. After 1880, the growth of population centered more and more on Los Angeles and the southern counties. By 1900 the eight counties of Southern California had acquired twenty per cent of the state's population and in 1930 more than half of California's residents lived south of the Tehachapis.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY STATE ECONOMIC AREAS




FIGURE 23

By the turn of the century two basic changes in the distribution of California's population had taken place: the southern portion of the state was drawing an increasingly larger percentage of the state's new migrants; and those areas eventually to become the metropolitan centers were growing more rapidly than the state as a whole. The population increase in the Los Angeles area was particularly striking. This area, which had less than one-tenth the population of San Francisco in 1880, by 1900 was one-third of the Bay Area city's size.

The demographic trend that began in 1880 has continued to this day. The urbanization process continued after the turn of the century, especially in areas of Southern California which have seen the greatest metropolitan expansion. Los Angeles and San Diego had fifteen per cent of the state's population in 1900. By 1950 this figure had risen to forty-six per cent. San Francisco's share concurrently began dropping. In 1900 the Bay area contained thirty-six per cent of California's population. By 1950 only twenty-one per cent of California's people lived in the Bay Area, and in 1970 the figure was but sixteen per cent. In contrast, Los Angeles and Orange counties together accounted for forty-two per cent of California's population according to the 1970 U.S. census. In effect, the present distribution pattern of California's population is the reverse of what it was some 120 years earlier. Figures 23 and 24 amply illustrate California's demographic changes throughout this period.




FIGURE 24

Migration Sources: Political Implications

The transplantation theory, as treated earlier in Chapter I, suggests that certain suburbs or segments of suburban communities attract Republicans and vice-versa. A version of this theory is applied here to California's migrants and their political behavior. It has been generally agreed that California's conservative trend can be explained by the sources of the state's new residents and that more new Californians are coming from politically conservative regions of the country, such as the South and the Midwest. This argument has been carried a step further with the suggestion that the conservative parts of California are drawing former residents of politically conservative regions of the United States. Thus Southern California, for instance, continues to draw new residents who share the area's conservative political philosophy. A perusal of California's demographic history provides some interesting insights into this question, as well as offering a plausible explanation for the evolution of the Golden State's political regions.

The early years of California witnessed a distinct dichotomy in migration to the various parts of the state. The gold rush brought a polyglot of fortune seekers, but Northern California was for the most part settled by migrants from the Northeast, the Atlantic Seaboard, and Europe. Until the 1880's the northern portion of the state received the greatest influx of new residents, and most came from the areas indicated.

With the westward movement of population in the United States, the points of origin for migrants to California gradually shifted. In

1850 more than one-half of California's residents had been born in the Middle-Atlantic, New England, and East North Central states (Ohio, Indiana and Illinois).⁵¹ By 1890 the Eastern Seaboard had given way to the East North Central states as the major source region. After forty years of statehood, the settlement pattern had changed from a northern focus to a southern one, as California south of the Tehachapis became the more rapidly growing portion. The second major migration wave experienced was of Midwesterners settling in Southern California. The Los Angeles Basin, Imperial Valley and San Diego all began growing quite rapidly after 1880, and have continued expanding in varying degrees throughout the present century. The immigrants who made up this influx were largely of a conservative persuasion, as they came mainly from the Midwest, South, and Southwest.⁵² Californians of Southern birth comprised twenty-five per cent of the state's population in 1850, with most settling in Southern California. By 1900 this figure had dwindled to five per cent, as new residents came from the Midwest in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Californians of Southern birth were outnumbered more than six to one by those of Northern origins in 1900, but as the center of California-bound migration moved southwestward, the proportion of Southerners increased with each succeeding decade. By 1930 ten per cent of California's population was made up of former Southerners. The Southern impact was further increased by the tremendous

⁵¹Commonwealth Club of California, The Population of California, (San Francisco: Parker Printing Co., 1946), p. 85.

⁵²Delmattier, op. cit., p. 125.

influx of people from the South and Southwest coming to California during the Great Depression of the 1930's. During this period California attracted a large number of migrants from such states as Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.⁵³ This influx of new residents from this region continued through World War II, when in the words of David Lantis, there seemingly took place a "Confederate invasion" of California.⁵⁴

In 1860 more than half of the residents of California who had been born in other states came from the Eastern Seaboard. In contrast, by 1950 sixty per cent had been born in the states west of the Mississippi.⁵⁵ Reasons for this trend, as previously mentioned, lie in the westward shift of the country's population. As the areas west of the Eastern Seaboard grew in population, they provided increasing numbers of potential migrants to California. Table 9 indicates these origins and changes in geographic composition of California's residents.

The 1930's and 1940's witnessed mass migrations of dispossessed farmers from the near-South and Southwest seeking employment on California's farms or unskilled industrial work in the cities. The industrial areas of California, particularly Los Angeles and San Diego, experienced spectacular growth after World War II. This expansion was more the result of "pull" factors than the "push" factors of the Great Depression of the 1930's. Many servicemen from around the country

⁵³Commonwealth Club of California, op. cit., p. 90.

⁵⁴Lantis, op. cit., p. XIII.

⁵⁵Robert W. Durrenberger, The Geography of California in Essays and Readings, (Los Angeles: Brewster Publications, 1959), p. 108.

TABLE 9

RANK ORDER OF U.S. REGIONS AS PLACES OF BIRTH OF
CALIFORNIA NATIVE POPULATION

Region of Birth	Census Year and Numerical Rank Order										
	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1962 ^a
New England	2	3	3	4	5	5	5	7	8	9	8
Middle Atlantic	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	5	6	5
East North Central	3	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	3	5	3
West North Central	7	5	5	5	4	3	3	3	2	2	4
South Atlantic	5	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	9	7	9
East South Central	4	6	6	6	6	6	7	8	7	8	7
West South Central	8	8	8	8	8	9	8	6	6	3	2
Mountain	9	9	9	9	9	8	6	5	4	4	6
Pacific	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

^aPlace of birth was not provided in censuses after 1950.

Source: Commonwealth Club of California, The Population of California, (San Francisco: Parkes Printing Co., 1946).

The information for 1962 was computed from a survey conducted by the California Department of Motor Vehicles in 1963.

returned to the state that had served as the point of departure for Pacific war operations. In the midst of the 1950's the burgeoning airplane and later aerospace industries drew a new type of migrant to California, the highly educated technician and specialist. As the professional mingled with those Californians of earlier migrations, the California of the 1960's and the 1970's had become in many ways a cross-section of the country.⁵⁶

⁵⁶Leroy C. Hardy, California Government, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 6.

By the 1960's new Californians were arriving from all parts of the country, and while they reflected the peculiarities of their original regional environments, they also helped to maintain the distinctive regionality in their adopted state.

In outlook, mores and even physical appearance, San Francisco and Los Angeles were poles apart, and had been almost from the beginning. (emphasis mine) Admirers of style and charm professed love at first sight for the City of the Golden Gate, yet Los Angeles, fascinated with its own forms of excellence, continued to attract literally millions, as evidenced by the fact that this constantly booming metropolis alone was able to claim forty per cent of the state's voters.⁵⁷

California's demographic history does indicate that migration may be a major explanatory factor in the evolution of the state's political regions. The San Francisco Bay Area and other parts of "liberal" California were first settled by Northeasterners and former residents of the Eastern Seaboard while "conservative" California, for the most part was originally settled by Southerners and Midwesterners. As noted above by political analyst Herbert Phillips, San Francisco and Los Angeles have been different in their appearance and political philosophies almost from the beginning, as evidenced by the distribution of Lincoln's support in 1860 and 1864 treated previously. The regional political differences then may be attributed to the first great influxes of population which helped to establish the regional political leanings within California. Without the presence of an established political philosophy in California, the early settlers initiated their own, based upon their political backgrounds. Thus it is plausible that most of

⁵⁷Herbert L. Phillips, op. cit., p. 200.

Northern California evolved in a liberal fashion because of the political environment brought to the region by its first great influx of residents. Likewise, the generally conservative nature of the Midwest and South may explain why Southern California evolved in a politically conservative manner.

However, while the transplantation theory may explain the establishment of liberal or conservative philosophies in certain parts of California, it is much more difficult to argue that this transplantation process operates today. That is, whether Southern California persists in attracting new conservative Californians and the Bay Area and other parts of "liberal" California continue to be the destination of liberal migrants is open to question. Recent census and voting data do not support the suggestion that a political transplantation process is taking place in California.

In order to empirically test the hypothesis that California is growing increasingly conservative because of the transplantation of conservative Southerners and Midwesterners into the state, four representative suburban counties were compared--two liberal, Sacramento and Santa Clara; and two conservative, Orange and San Diego. In terms of voting behavior, the differences between the counties as shown in Table 10 are apparent. Tables 11 through 13 compare the counties in terms of sheer growth, migration sources, and socio-economic status.

Most of California's population increase after World War II has been due to migration to suburban California. This is true of the north as well as the south. The 1970 U.S. census lists more than

ninety per cent of California's population as living in urban places (population greater than 2500). It is evident that the four counties are growing rapidly in a suburban fashion, as all were over ninety per cent urban in 1970.

TABLE 10

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN FOUR SUBURBAN COUNTIES

Election	Sacramento	Santa Clara	Orange	San Diego
'58 Gov.--Brown (L)	71%	59%	46%	52%
'62 Gov.--Brown (L)	60	51	39	42
'62 Rep. Sen. Pri.-- Kuchel(L)	83	82	61	73
'64 Prop. 14--NO(L)	38	47	22	30
'64 Sen.--Salinger (L)	52	51	35	43
'66 Dem. Gov. Pri.-- Brown (L)	53	59	42	56
'66 Rep. Gov. Pri.-- Christopher (L)	41	48	19	24
'66 Gov.--Brown (L)	49	45	28	36
'68 Rep. Sen. Pri.-- Kuchel (L)	55	60	37	39
'68 Sen.--Cranston (L)	59	62	38	42
'68 Prop. 3--Yes (L)	56	57	40	49

Source: Statement of the Vote, California Secretary of State, 1958-1968.

TABLE 11

POPULATION GROWTH IN FOUR SUBURBAN COUNTIES

	Sacramento	Santa Clara	Orange	San Diego
1970 Population	636,137	1,057,032	1,409,335	1,318,022
% increase, 1960-1970	26.5	64.6	100.2	27.6

Source: 1970 U. S. Census

TABLE 12
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES IN FOUR SUBURBAN COUNTIES--1960

	Sacramento	Santa Clara	Orange	San Diego
P er Capita Income	\$3246	\$3669	\$3280	\$3144
% Prof. Workers	14.7	18.6	14.7	14.9
M edian Schl Yrs.	12.2	12.2	12.2	12.1
% 65 or older	6.9	7.0	6.6	7.3
% Foreign Stock	21.1	27.3	19.2	19.9
% Negro	3.9	0.7	0.5	3.8

Source: City and County Data Book, 1967.

TABLE 13
SELECTED SOURCES OF IN-STATE MIGRATION

	Sacramento	Santa Clara	Orange	San Diego
% of State's in-migrants	2.5	5.4	9.0	8.5
% of N.Y. mig.	1.8	7.6	9.8	8.2
% of Ohio mig.	1.4	4.2	13.1	5.7
% of Texas mig.	2.2	5.6	9.1	6.0

Source: California Department of Motor Vehicles, Migration to California, March, 1963.

The theory of transplantation can be tested on two scales, one of ideological preference and the other concerning the state of origin of in-migrants. If the transplantation process were taking place in California, then socio-economic-status differences should begin to appear among the four counties. Political scientists have suggested that class status is linked with party preference and political attitude. Theoretically, the liberal counties should have lower per capita education and income figures, fewer professional workers, and

more members of ethnic minorities; that is, generally individuals who would favor a change in a status quo which is not particularly favorable to them.⁵⁸ The data do not appear to support this hypothesis.

Differences in socio-economic-status between the four counties are only minor. The per capita income is actually higher in the liberal counties, the opposite situation one would expect if transplantation were taking place. In essence, the growing differences in socioeconomic status that one would expect do not appear between liberal and conservative growth-counties; and at least from an empirical standpoint, one would have to reject the hypothesis that transplantation effectively explains the continued existence of California's political regions.

In addition, the data in Table 13 do not seem to support the hypothesis that the supposedly conservative states and regions are sending new residents to "conservative" California and vice-versa. What is apparent is that those regions or counties of California receiving the greatest share of the state's in-migration are receiving a proportionately higher percentage of migrants from each of the states supplying California's new residents. Texas, Ohio and New York represent different regions of the United States and conceivably differing political philosophies, but they do not appear to be sending their residents to any one part of California. Table 14 further

⁵⁸For analyses of the relationship between political behavior and socio-economic status see: R. R. Alford, "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 16 (March 1963), pp. 180-194; H. Eulau, "Perceptions of Class Party in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. 44 (June 1955), pp. 364-384; H. Eulau, "Identification with Class and Party Perspective," Journal of Politics, Vol. 18 (May 1956), pp. 232-253.

indicates that selective migration does not appear to be taking place in California. Texas, Washington, and Ohio are the leading sources of in-migration to the fastest growing counties in both liberal and conservative California. If migration sources conceivably explain the evolution of California's political regions, but no longer have a transplantation influence, how then does one explain the current political leanings of the Golden State? The answer in part remains with those millions who have made and will make California their new home.

TABLE 14

SOURCES OF IN-MIGRATION FOR SELECTED COUNTIES OF RESIDENCE
JANUARY-APRIL, 1962

Alameda	Contra Costa	Riverside	Los Angeles	Marin	Orange
Texas	Washington	Texas	Texas	Texas	Ohio
Washington	Texas	Arizona	Ohio	Washington	Texas
Illinois	Arizona	Ohio	Illinois	New York	Illinois
Virginia	Oregon	Illinois	New York	Utah	New York
New York	Utah	Washington	Michigan	Oregon	Michigan
Colorado	Illinois	Michigan	Arizona	Colorado	Arizona
Ohio	Ohio	Oklahoma	Pennsyl.	Arizona	Pennsyl.
Arizona	Michigan	Pennsyl.	Washington		Washington
Oregon	Colorado	Indiana	Colorado		Florida
Michigan	New Jersey				Indiana

Source: Migration to California, (Sacramento, California: California Division of Administration Research and Statistics Section, Report #13, March, 1963), pp. 15-16.

The Acquisition of Political Culture

To the sociologist, California is a selective migration to a region of opportunity and laissez-faire, resulting in an open, unstratified society made up of communities of strangers. The sociologists's aptest word for the California condition is anomie, a state of mind in which the human being finds himself uprooted, drifting and unfocused.⁵⁹

Migration naturally tends to weaken well-established family ties, social customs, and traditions of those who travel across the country to establish residence in California. For example, upon arrival the former Texan settles in a community which is most likely comprised of a goodly number of neighbors who have also recently migrated to California. The totality of differences within California has presented a novel environment to such a select population. If all the migrants to California came from a single place of origin, or if they all had a common cultural background, and if the physical environment of the Golden State was similar to that which they left, then perhaps more of the customs and traditions of the area of origin would have been transplanted to California. But this hardly has been the history of the state's in-migration, as the very diversity of this population movement has led to the abandonment of the old forms and traditions and the evolution and acceptance of new ones.⁶⁰ This striking willingness to abandon the "old" and accept the "new" is present in all facets of California's culture, of which not the least affected is the state's

⁵⁹Morgon, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶⁰Carey McWilliams, California: The Great Exception, (New York: A. A. Wyn, 1949), p. 87.

politics. It is this assimilation process which may explain the enduring nature of California's political regionalism and indicate the whys and wherefores of the state's political future. Unfamiliar with candidates and issues, and having left many political influences behind, the new Californian may be turning to the political norms of his new community as both a reference point and as an attempt to become "at home" in his new surroundings as soon as possible. It is this unique political and social culture of California which renders the state an excellent location to analyze the possible community and group influences upon a new resident's voting behavior. It is to this phenomenon that the remainder of this thesis is devoted.

Needless to say, data for testing the validity of this phenomenon are not as accessible or measurable as some of the more concrete political variables such as party registration. More often than not the individual is unaware of the group influences and behavioral changes under analysis. It is not easy to establish clear and reliable associations between personality and political behavior for these very reasons. It is difficult to measure personality as it is usually gauged by behavior. Such inferences additionally are complicated by a lack of clear correspondence between an individual's needs and his actions. Thus seemingly identical acts by different individuals may arise from different personality needs or vice-versa.⁶¹

⁶¹Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 72.

Nevertheless, research and observation clearly indicate that there is a strong association between certain group influences and political behavior. They indicate, for example, that members of the same primary groups characteristically vote alike, think alike on issues and follow the same political philosophy; that when voters are in doubt about whom to vote for, they usually resolve their indecision by embracing the political preferences of their friends. The more uniform a group's political outlook, the firmer the voting intentions of its members.⁶²

Group attributes not only account for stability in political behavior but also for change. For instance, children from a Republican family may become Democrats as a consequence of new associations; friends who join new social circles may follow differing political paths; and people long politically apathetic may become activated by group influences. These are all well known empirical observations indicating that a person's political behavior may well be influenced by his family, friends, neighbors, and other social groups.

If it is apparent that an individual's political behavior can be influenced by his social environment, then perhaps it is far more important to ask why this is so. At a relatively elementary level the answer lies in the basic needs of the human organism. Most individuals have a great deal at stake in the conditions of group life. People join groups to meet certain needs. These needs are varied, but for

⁶²Harold E. Dahlgreen, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," in Politics and Social Life, Nelson Polsby, Robert Dentler and Paul Smith, editors, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 255.

each individual they are critical to his or her mental welfare. If affection, power, economic reward or other important needs are involved, then the individual will adjust his behavior to the group norms in order to maximize his chances of having his greatest needs met. The amount an individual will alter his behavior and subsequently his values will depend upon the importance of the particular group with which he is involved. The more important a group is to the individual, the more likely he is to share some of its goals and values.⁶³ Over time almost any group acquires a political culture of its own, in the sense that its members share similar beliefs, norms, perceptions, and activities that are unique to the rest of an individual's social environment. As an individual identifies himself with the unit (whether it be his family, neighborhood, social club, union, etc.) he will begin to acquire the coloration of the institution's purposes and perceptions. In short, he is being socialized into the group's culture.⁶⁴

Emphasis upon the pervasiveness of the group influence, to the point where a political culture is formed, must not be considered indicative of cultural determinism. Since culture and its elements (structural patterns, functional actions, beliefs, norms) are really man-made, the individual is free to change them. Obviously, the importance of a group to a person's political behavior will depend

⁶³Don R. Bowen, Political Behavior of the American Public, (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Publishing Co., 1968), p. 48.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 104.

upon the quality of interaction between the individual and the group. Of primary importance in determining the amount a group influences individual behavior would be related to the size of the organization, its permanence, the degree of intimacy in intra-group relations, the degree to which members identify with each other or group symbols, the extent to which member attitudes are shared, and the degree of specialization among the members.⁶⁵

The individual is hardly controlled by group influence. On the other hand, his relationship with the group can be considered reciprocal or transactional. He may find political opinion or behavior a means to gain entrance and acceptance into a group, to find new friends, or to make himself "at home" in a new community. This may involve conscious or unconscious behavior, and it may or may not involve changes in political behavior. Whether or not the individual attempts to change his political behavior, especially in the way he votes, depends in part upon the degree to which his social environment satisfies his needs.

If the individual is primarily concerned with attaining a compatible social environment, then it is apparent that one of the results of group influence and interaction would be a strong desire on the part of the individual to reduce social conflict among members to those groups he belongs. To a great extent, an analysis of neighborhood influence on a new resident's political behavior can be explained

⁶⁵Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 49.

in the psychological concepts of consonance and dissonance. Cognitive dissonance and consonance are relations among such cognitions as one's own opinions, beliefs, knowledge of the environment, and knowledge of how one relates to that environment. Two opinions, beliefs, or items of knowledge are said to be dissonant with one another if they do not agree or are illogical. For example, two individuals are good friends, but they differ strongly as to the choice of political candidates. The fact that there is an important political disagreement is dissonant with each person's knowledge that his friendship has been built upon shared beliefs and ideals. Their continued friendship may indeed be jeopardized if the dissonance caused by this disagreement is so great that it outweighs items of knowledge that are consonant with the continuance of their relationship; i.e., common hobbies, mutual friends, similar likes and dislikes.

Dissonance produces discomfort, and as a result, there will arise pressures to reduce or eliminate that dissonance. Attempts by an individual to reduce the discomfort represent observable manifestations that the dissonance does exist. The person may try to reduce the discord by changing the opinions or beliefs that are causing the discomfort, or he may acquire new information that will add to the existing consonance of his mental well-being, thereby reducing the total dissonance. He may also try to forget or reduce the importance of the cognitions that are in a dissonant relationship. If any of these attempts are to be successful, they must meet with support from the individual's physical or social environment. Without such support, it is unlikely that the

dissonance of the situation will be reduced.⁶⁶ It is this consistency theory, introduced by Leon Festinger, which has been used by social psychologists and political scientists to analyze certain political behaviors.

Within any social environment or group situation, there are certain expected norms of attitudes and behavior. It is these norms or "roles" that are the basis of a group's existence, i.e., homogeneity. On a cultural level, role refers to those expectations that individuals entertain within a social environment concerning others' behavior. These are the expectations and duties that give form and context to a relationship. The relationship can be maintained only as long as the participants are in agreement as to how each must or must not perform.⁶⁷ If there is disagreement, such a situation would be dissonant and it is doubtful that the relationship could be continued in its current form. Because role expectations may be widely shared and relatively permanent, they give stability to a relationship. The expected norms within a community make for stable patterns of behavior and minimize what might be considered arbitrary behavior. Most crucial role relationships are well defined because the expectations of behavior are widely shared and transmitted through time. There is then, a broad cultural consensus

⁶⁶Leon Festinger, et. al., When Prophecy Fails, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), pp. 25-26.

⁶⁷Eulau, op. cit., p. 42.

concerning the rights and duties of an individual within his social environment. Within a community context, for instance, a new arrival within time would conceivably learn the proper forms of behavior or roles to pursue and then act accordingly. Most likely his past experience would have provided him with the prerequisites for most proper role behavior; but it is also possible that his new surroundings might yield differing norms that would temporarily provide him with a dissonant situation. He would then either adjust his behavior to the expected norms, try to avoid the situation (perhaps by moving) or find additional support for his own behavior to withstand further dissonance for not meeting community standards of behavior. In the study of political behavior within a social environment, it is thus possible to discern widely shared patterns of attitudes and behavior; some considered as constants that provide a basis for examining an individual's responses to particular political situations.

Given the rationale of cognitive dissonance theory, California's migration history, and recent figures from the 1970 U.S. census, it is highly plausible that there is a political conversion process taking place. However, this is not a one-way process as suggested earlier by Harris and others. If one can look to migration source as the prime evolutionary factor in the creation and continuity of California's political regions, he can then use cognitive dissonance to help explain the enduring nature of that dichotomy. In essence a two-way political conversion process exists and the ultimate influence upon a new resident's political behavior in California is the bias of the

community into which he moves--whether it be "liberal" or "conservative" California. Thus a new resident moving into San Jose in Santa Clara county is likely to acquire eventually the liberal voting philosophy of that region. Desiring to be accepted by his new community as soon as possible, the new resident will either avoid talking politics if his own standards differ from community norms, or he will take another action to reduce the dissonance caused by this situation--change his voting behavior. A new resident of Orange county might conceivably react in the same manner to the political conservatism of that Southern California county. Thus this political conversion, sometimes labeled the chameleon process, which is taking place in California, need not be only in a conservative direction.

By rejecting both the transplantation and conservative conversion theories as potential explanations for California's political regionalism, a new hypothesis is advanced which purports to explain the influence of residence change upon individual voting behavior. This is a bi-directional process. The next chapter will attempt to test and measure this process through the use of multiple correlation and regression analysis and factor analysis.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

"The mark of an educated man is the ability to make a reasoned guess on the basis of insufficient information." (unattributed)⁶⁸

It has been suggested that California is the scene of a bi-directional political conversion process which explains the continuing regional dichotomy in the state's voting behavior. It has also been inferred that this process of peer group influence provides insight into the state's present as well as its political future. If there is a liberal and conservative conversion among California's newer residents, then that portion of the state receiving the greatest influx of new residents holds the key to the Golden State's political future. This being the case, it would thus appear that while much of Northern California will continue to support liberal candidates, conservative Southern California, because of a more rapid increase in population, is likely to control the political destiny of California for some time to come.

It has been shown historically and quantitatively that a distinct liberal-conservative dichotomy exists in the regional electoral geography of California. Two previously stated hypotheses have been

⁶⁸John P. Cole and Cuchlaine A. M. King, Quantitative Geography, (London: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 1968), p. 98.

rejected as explanations for the enduring nature of that regionalism: conservative conversion and transplantation. If movement to California's suburbs brings about conservative voting behavior, then supposedly those counties experiencing rapid suburban expansion should be turning conservative. San Mateo, Marin, Sacramento and Santa Clara counties have all remained solidly liberal while undergoing recent rapid suburban growth. It has been further argued that migration source or socio-economic background are not major factors in a political transplantation that is supposedly taking place. Census figures indicate that those counties receiving the largest numbers of migrants--Los Angeles, Santa Clara, Orange, Marin and San Diego, are receiving the largest percentage of California's in-migrants. Los Angeles receives more Texans than any other county in the state, but it also receives more ex-New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians than any other California county.⁶⁹ While the major California migration source may have moved towards the supposedly more conservative portions of the country (the South and West), this does not appear to have affected liberal Santa Clara county, one of the fastest growing counties in California. It has been data of this nature which have led to an alternative explanation for California's continuing political regionalization. This chapter will examine the hypothesis that local or community influences in California bring about a bi-directional change in voting

⁶⁹R. S. Coppin and G. K. Oldenbeek, Migration to California, (Sacramento, California: State of California, Division of Administration, Research and Statistics Section, Report #13, March, 1963), pp. 15-16.

behavior--liberal or conservative, depending upon the location of the new Californian within the state.

Methodology

To test the various hypotheses regarding voting behavior in California, a number of variables were selected which would reflect the influences of migration as well as socio-economic-status:

- X_{13} Per cent of state's population in a county, 1960
- X_{14} Median number years of schooling in a county, 1960
- X_{15} Per cent professional workers in a county, 1960
- X_{16} County per capital income, 1960
- X_{17} Per cent of urban population in a county, 1960
- X_{18} Per cent population change in a county, 1960
- X_{19} Per cent of California's in-migrants settling in each county, 1960
- X_{20} Per cent New York migrants settling in county, 1960
- X_{21} Per cent Ohio migrants settling in county, 1960
- X_{22} Per cent of Texas migrants settling in county, 1960

Political variables one through twelve are listed in chapter III.

A factor analysis of the previously mentioned election variables and the above characteristics was conducted to seek patterns among the variables and to note the explanatory power of those derived clusters, or factors. Each pattern that appears represents a factor that delineates a distinct cluster of interrelated variables.

Because of the nature of political patterns and population growth in California, it was expected a "migration" factor would be extracted that would explain a significant proportion of the variance. Five separate factor analyses of various political regions in the state were conducted: the entire state of California, liberal California, conservative California, growth counties in liberal California, and the growth counties of conservative California. The last two analyses focused solely on those counties which were experiencing the greatest in-migration and population growth. Theoretically these counties should provide an indication of the influences of in-migration upon voting behavior in California.

The general results of these five factor analyses indicate that there is a distinctive migration cluster as well as two that are basically political: a general election factor, and a primary and proposition factor. The clustering of variables in these analyses are presented in Table 15. It is apparent from this table that there is a distinctive migration pattern among the variables. More importantly, this factor explained the greatest proportion of the variance in each of the analyses (Table 16).

The aforementioned political factors in each of the five factor analyses represent general descriptions of the patterns in the data. The factor analyses of the growth counties of liberal and conservative California not only provide a more refined focus of the proportion of variance explained by migration in California but they also furnish a more concentrated examination of the patterns of political behavior within both regions.

TABLE 15
VARIABLE CLUSTERINGS OF FIVE FACTOR ANALYSES

Variables	(1) California	(2) Liberal California	(3) Conservative California	(4) Growth Counties Liberal California	(5) Growth Counties Conservative California
1958 governor	2	2	2	2	2
1962 governor	2	2	2	2	2
'62 Rep. Sen. Pri.	3		3		3
'64 Prop. 14	3	3			3
1964 senate	2	2	2	2	2
'66 Dem. gov. Pri.	3		3		3
'66 Rep. gov. Pri.	3	3	3	3	3
1966 governor	2	2	2	2	2
'68 Rep. sen. Pri.	3	3	3	3	3
1968 senate	2		2	2	2
'68 Prop. 3		3			
Cum. Per. Dev.	3	2	3	3	2
Per. State Pop.	1	1	1	1	1
Med. Schl. Yrs.					
Witcol Emp.		1		3	2
Per Cap Inc.		1	1	3	1
Peren urban		1		1	1
Per Pop Change					
Per in-Mig.	1	1	1	1	1
Per N.Y. mig.	1	1	1	1	1
Per Ohio mig.	1	1	1	1	1
Per Texas mig.	1	1	1	1	1

Factor One: Migration
Factor Two: General Elections
Factor Three: Propositions and Primaries

TABLE 16
PROPORTION OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED BY FACTORS

Region	Migration	General Elections	Propositions and Primaries
<u>California</u>			
Proportion of Variance	.2393	.2130	.1754
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	.2393	.4523	.6277
<u>Liberal California</u>			
Proportion of Variance	.3171	.1762	.1037
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	.3171	.4934	.5971
<u>Conservative California</u>			
Proportion of Variance	.2593	.1908	.1387
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	.2593	.4501	.5887
<u>Growth counties in Liberal California</u>			
Proportion of Variance	.2961	.1588	.1428
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	.2961	.4550	.5978
<u>Growth counties in Conservative California</u>			
Proportion of Variance	.3230	.2929	.2078
Cumulative Proportion of Variance	.3230	.6158	.8237

In addition to a migration factor three basic patterns of political behavior were delineated through a factor analysis of the growth counties of liberal California: (1) a Liberal General Election factor; (2) a Conservative General Election factor; and (3) a Conservative Republican Primary factor. The factor loadings obtained through a varimax rotation analysis are presented in Table 17.

The clustering of certain voting variables reveals the political diversity in this region for there are rather distinct patterns. Two conservative voting factors are derived from these rapidly growing counties of liberal California. It should be remembered that all political variables are measures of liberal voting support and thus the negative loadings of such variables would indicate comparative conservative support within liberal California. Those elections loading highest on the Conservative General Election factor are the 1964 senate contest and the 1966 gubernatorial election. Both races were conservative successes, although the Murphy-Salinger senate race was much closer than Ronald Reagan's trouncing of Edmund G. Brown in 1966. This would explain the lower loading of the 1964 senate variable on this particular factor as well as its fairly high positive loading on the liberal general election factor. The Republican gubernatorial and senatorial primaries of 1966 and 1968 respectively were also conservative successes, with Ronald Reagan defeating George Christopher and Max Rafferty upsetting Thomas Kuchel. The negative loadings of these variables coincide with the conservative nature of this particular factor. What is of additional interest is the negative loadings of the

TABLE 17

ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS GROWTH COUNTIES LIBERAL CALIFORNIA

	Migration	Liberal General Elections	Conservative General Elections	Conservative Republican Primaries
1958 governor		.9336		
1962 governor		.9450		
1964 senate		.5610	-.5790	
1966 Rep. gov. pri.				-.8258
1966 governor			-.8411	
1968 Rep. sen. pri.				-.7022
1968 senate		.5771		
Cum. Per. Dev.		.4782	-.3457	-.4992
Per. St. Pop.	.9242			
Witcol. Emp.	.5277			-.6888
Per Cap. Inc.	.4410		-.4774	-.5655
Per Cen urban	.5984			
Per. in-mig.	.9560			
Per N.Y. mig.	.9459			
Per. Ohio mig.	.9712			
Per Texas mig.	.9559			

ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS GROWTH COUNTIES CONSERVATIVE CALIFORNIA

	Migration	General Elections	Propositions and Primaries
1958 governor		.9843	
1962 governor		.9282	
1962 Rep. sen. pri.			.6938
1964 Prop. 14			-.8511
1964 senate		.8461	
1966 Dem. gov. pri.			.7646
1966 Rep. gov. pri.			.8346
1966 governor		.8740	
1968 Rep. sen. pri.			.8797
1968 senate		.8668	
Cum. Per. Dev.		.7274	
Per. St. pop.	.9858		.6586
Med. schl. yrs.		-.6570	
Witcol emp.		-.5213	
Per cap. inc.	.7867		
Per cen urban	.7395		
per pop. change			
Per. in-mig.	.9908		
Per N.Y. Mig.	.9925		
Per Ohio mig.	.9836		
Per Texas mig.	.9942		

per cent professional worker and per capita income variables on this conservative factor. Their presence reemphasizes a point made above that in liberal California socioeconomic status is not necessarily associated with conservative voting behavior.

The second political pattern in these growth counties in liberal California is labeled the Liberal General Election factor. It is so labeled because those variables loading highest describe elections in which liberal candidates were successful. Liberal Pat Brown won the gubernatorial elections of 1958 and 1962 and Alan Cranston won the 1968 senate race against conservative Max Rafferty. As previously mentioned, Pierre Salinger narrowly lost his bid to the U.S. Senate in 1964.

The variables forming the Migration factor are those expected. The loadings of all variables dealing with some facet of population change due to in-migration, and the loadings of the white collar employment and per capita income indicate that these characteristics are tied to migration in both liberal and conservative California.

The factor analysis results for the growth counties in conservative California are perhaps best understood in terms of spatial variation through an examination of the factor score matrix in Table 18. Factor scores can be used to compare counties as to their differentiation in the extracted patterns. Because the analysis of the growth counties in conservative California yielded only three more generalized factors (in comparison to the four for the growth counties in liberal California), the factor scores indicate a not unexpected spatial differentiation among the counties on each factor.

TABLE 18

GROWTH COUNTIES LIBERAL CALIFORNIA FACTOR SCORES

County	Migration	Liberal General Elections	Conservative General Elections	Conservative Republican Elections
Alameda	1.6715	-.2502	0.7368	.2546
Alpine	-.0096	-1.5785	-1.3068	-.7070
Contra Costa	.5097	-.2177	-.1947	.0707
Marin	-.3131	-.7268	.1032	-2.0479
Monterey	-.7148	-1.3052	-.3293	.8635
Napa	-.4138	.5050	.3349	-.4220
Sacramento	.3740	.7498	-.1425	.3244
San Mateo	-.5090	-.1790	-.9275	-2.1035
Santa Clara	2.4127	-.8866	1.4306	.6284
Shasta	-.9426	1.9120	.1231	-.4164
Solano	-.5413	1.2542	.0016	.3332
Sonoma	-.1931	-1.0407	-.0909	.5973
Trinity	-.3282	1.6872	.6289	-.1373
Humboldt	-.6951	-.3695	-2.6786	1.4980
El Dorado	-.3072	.4461	1.1711	1.2641

GROWTH COUNTIES CONSERVATIVE CALIFORNIA FACTOR SCORES

County	Migration	General Elections	Propositions and Primaries
Santa Barbara	.5896	-2.6009	2.5791
Los Angeles	5.4563	1.8489	-4.6078
Orange	2.4249	-1.6909	3.2720
Riverside	-.5712	-1.6227	.3353
San Bernar- dino	-2.2743	1.2800	-.7185
San Diego	.2442	-1.6586	.2200
Ventura	-2.3036	2.8915	-1.0438
Yuba	-3.5659	1.5566	-.0363

While all these counties are expanding most rapidly in the conservative part of the state, the scores on the Migration factor indicate that Los Angeles and Orange counties are by far receiving the greatest impact of migration in conservative California. This is not surprising as in sheer numbers this area has been the most rapidly expanding portion of the state.

The General Election and Primary Election factor scores indicate differences in voting behavior in conservative California. While all the counties indicated generally will support conservative candidates, certain counties, as shown by their factor scores, are greater strongholds of conservatism. Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles and Orange counties exhibit the greatest deviance from the norm of conservative voting behavior in this region of California. Table 19 very clearly indicates the differences in their support of Edmund G. Brown.

TABLE 19
CONSERVATIVE SUPPORT FOR EDMUND G. BROWN

	Santa Barbara	Orange	Los Angeles	Ventura	State Percentage
1958 Governor	49%	46%	58%	62%	58%
1962 Governor	47	39	51	53	51
1966 Dem. gov. Pri.	58	42	52	52	52
1966 Governor	36	28	43	39	41

Both the above figures and the factor scores of this political region indicate the crucial importance of Los Angeles county in any California election. It is generally true that the most populous

county in the state will give less support than the state-wide average to a liberal candidate. However, if one were to look for a swing county to predict the outcome of almost any statewide election, he would look to Los Angeles, not only because of sheer numbers, but also because of the county's recent voting past. Rarely has a liberal candidate carried Los Angeles county, but when he does, he usually also carries the state. This was true of Pat Brown in 1958, Alan Cranston in 1968 and of John Tunney in 1970.

A perusal of the factor scores for the growth counties of liberal California also indicates those counties which sharply differ from the rest of the counties on each of the four extracted factors. Alameda and particularly Santa Clara county stand out as important points of in-migration in this part of the state. Alpine and Monterey counties did not support liberal candidates as strongly in elections won by Pat Brown and Alan Cranston, while these two office seekers received some of their strongest support in rural Trinity and Shasta counties.

The scores on the Conservative Republican factor for liberal California provide a striking illustration of intra-party philosophical differences. The high negative scores of Marin and San Mateo counties indicate that these two rapidly growing suburban counties of San Francisco are home for many of the most liberal Republicans in the state. Election returns verify this judgment based on factor scores. In the two elections which loaded most highly on this factor, the 1966 Republican gubernatorial primary and the 1968 Republican senatorial primary, San Mateo and Marin counties gave the liberal candidates

tremendous support. George Christopher received twice the backing that he earned across the state by carrying both Bay Area counties with more than sixty per cent of their vote. In 1968 Thomas Kuchel lost a bitter primary battle to Max Rafferty for the Republican nomination to the U.S. Senate when he received only forty-seven per cent of the vote. However, sixty-five per cent of the Republicans in Marin County cast their ballots for the leader of the liberal wing of the party as did sixty-three per cent of those in San Mateo.

A factor analytical approach to voting behavior in California's political regions does much to clarify and reemphasize empirical conclusions reached regarding patterns and influences upon this aspect of society. Of major concern are the actual and potential influences of in-migration upon aggregate voting patterns. The high proportion of variance explained by the migration factor in each of the regional analyses and the various positive and negative loadings of certain election variables seem to support the hypothesis that there is a bi-directional conversion process taking place in California's suburbs. However, factor analysis does not directly test the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses which are causal in nature. The importance of migration upon aggregate voting behavior can only be inferred from the proportion of variance explained by the Migration factor.

In order to directly test the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis that there is a bi-directional conversion process taking place, a simple linear regression model was used. The dependent variable was the voting behavior in given elections and the independent

variable was the population change due to in-migration. To correct for the highly skewed nature of California's in-migration, all data were ranked to obtain a more standardized distribution in both the factor analysis and the correlation-regression analysis. The resulting differences in the coefficients of correlation strikingly represent the regional associations between in-migration and voting behavior (Table 20). These differences are most clearly illustrated through an examination of the simple correlations between the various socio-economic status and migration independent variables, and especially the key behavioral dependent variable, liberal cumulative percentage deviation. This variable presents a cumulative index of liberal voting support for each county. As indicated in Tables 20 and 21, for growth areas in conservative California the coefficients for the migration variables are all highly negative, indicating that migration is negatively associated with liberal voting behavior in this part of the state. In growth areas of liberal California the simple correlations were highly positive, indicating the opposite association between in-migration and voting behavior.

A stepwise multiple regression analysis was also conducted for these two regions in order to further test the bi-directional conversion hypothesis. The results of the stepwise regression analyses are shown in Table 22. In both regions, either a single migration variable, the per cent of California's migrants entering a county, or a combination of migration variables explained a significant proportion of the variation in the dependent variable, the liberal cumulative index. In both regions, the source of migration and socio-economic-status were not of great significance.

TABLE 20
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS OF GROWTH COUNTIES LIBERAL CALIFORNIA

Per. St. Pop.	.11038	.08375	.27200	.10290	.4922	.19670	.42821	.77517*	-.12521	.49571	.51871*
Med. Schl Yrs.	.22857	.11801	.28805	.15590	.08241	-.04529	.11882	.36481	.24670	.40366	.42625
Witcol emp.	-.30474	-.30905	.50936	-.11542	-.41078	.24835	.80459*	.02817	.61481*	.40328	.42875
Per cap inc.	.04897	-.07711	.35705	.23874	.13331	.48071	.53813*	.63453*	.22562	.55974*	.63091*
Pop. change	-.18735	-.25125	.20809	-.04818	-.06069	.00682	.38406	-.16119	.28718	.15273	.31407
Per. in-mig.	.11210	.07525	.36046	.12933	.45902	.30587	.48776	.75156*	.09844	.57920*	.56434*
Per N.Y. mig.	-.02878	-.08338	.43580	.13903	.06932	.23419	.58469*	.46652	.04734	.47903	.55286*
Per Ohio mig.	.03857	.02763	.41920	.09788	.35926	.38933	.57668*	.73526*	-.08263	.58581*	.58247*
Per Tex. mig.	.09957	.07688	.31746	.20973	.29184	.39377	.46126	.68217*	-.03440	.56805*	.62412*
<hr/>											
	'58 Gov	'62 Gov	R62 Sen	Prop 14	'64 Sen	D66 Gov	R66 Gov	'66 Gov	'68 Sen	'68 Sen	Prop 3
Per St. Pop	.57623*	1.000									
Med. Schl Yrs.	.51655*	.60759*	1.000								
Witcol emp.	.37348	.23954	.21984	1.000							
Per cap inc.	.69007*	.82432*	.57629*	.46396	1.000						
Pop. change	.06355	.33045	.45322	.20570	.11462	1.000					
Per. in-mig.	.64304*	.97223*	.60539*	.26252	.82767*	.11462	1.000				
Per N.Y. mig.	.51532*	.83629*	.60020*	.53931*	.79576*	.82767*	.38556	1.000			
Per Ohio mig.	.64223*	.93449*	.52537*	.40448	.85563*	.26744	.96929*	.88988*	1.000		
Per Tex. mig.	.65716*	.89403*	.56316*	.37906	.91212*	.21406	.92791*	.87406*	.95039*	1.000	
<hr/>											
	Cum Per	Pop Per	Med Sch	Witcol	Cap Inc	Pop Ch	Per Mig	Per NY	Per Oh	Per Tex	

*Statistically significant at .05 level

TABLE 21
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS GROWTH COUNTIES CONSERVATIVE CALIFORNIA

Per. St. Pop.	-.36800	-.51414	-.61042	-.04652	-.80518*	-.46477	-.11968	-.29488	-.27369	-.34543	.37000
Med. Schl Yrs.	-.69054	-.69628	-.17616	.30760	-.83394*	-.00618	.18272	-.56806	.18216	-.50912	.54657
Witcol emp.	-.47300	-.55220	-.09871	.39794	-.82571*	-.13568	.26720	-.47023	.12771	-.48861	.53946
Per cap inc.	-.32914	-.17594	.00358	.14839	-.03636	.28686	.20271	-.10255	-.14397	-.13002	.08458
Pop. change	-.22025	-.25441	.39361	.00827	-.15627	.17773	-.13824	-.54456	.41062	-.42450	-.00010
Per. in-mig.	-.53290	-.58006	-.49399	.02211	-.82133*	-.28219	-.00922	-.39663	-.17938	-.43939	.40076
Per N.Y. mig.	-.56755	-.60591	-.42922	.10262	-.82667*	-.21703	.06276	-.42563	-.13998	-.46356	.44598
Per Ohio mig.	-.46787	-.52845	-.44212	.07741	-.79897*	-.31339	.02571	-.35648	-.06107	-.36372	.37918
Per Tex. mig.	-.62046	-.63785	-.46826	.02947	-.79459*	-.16096	.01863	-.43408	-.10414	-.43439	.44878
	'58 Gov	'62 Gov	R62 Sen	Prop 14	'64 Sen	D66 Gov	'66 Gov	'66 Gov	'68 Sen	'68 Sen	Prop 3
Per St. Pop.	-.68661	1.000									
Med. Schl yrs.	-.42474	.83375*	1.000								
Witcol emp.	-.34510	.80224*	.92238*	1.000							
Per cap inc.	-.08768	-.03177	.17696	.12101	1.000						
Pop. Change	.20919	-.29336	-.03127	-.0047	-.41162	1.000					
Per. in-mig.	-.68862	.94641*	.90048*	.82354*	.20543	-.35020	1.000				
Per N.Y. mig.	-.63699	.91901*	.92568*	.86531*	.29730	-.33050	.99047*	1.000			
Per Ohio mig.	-.63535	.96491*	.90668*	.83083*	-.02259	-.24155	.96650*	.94015*	1.000		
Per Tex. mig.	-.65883	.91797*	.91032*	.77687*	.20297	-.33313	.98600*	.97312*	.95919*	1.000	
	Cum Per Pop	Per	Med Sch	Witcol	Cap Inc	Pop Ch	Per Mig	Per NY	Per Oh	Per Tex	

*Statistically significant at .05 level

TABLE 22

STEPWISE REGRESSION LIBERAL CALIFORNIA GROWTH COUNTIES
(Dependent Variable: Cumulative Percentage Deviation)

Step	Variable	Increase		
1.	Per. in-migration			
1.	Per. State pop.			
1.	Population change			
1.	Per. Ohio mig.			
1.	White Collar emp.	.8765*	.7683*	.7683
2.	Med. Schl. Yrs.	.8843	.7819	.0136
3.	Per. N.Y. mig.	.8862	.7853	.0034
4.	Percen. urban	.8874	.7874	.0021
5.	Per cap. inc.	.8895	.7913	.0039
6.	Per. Texas mig.	.8896	.7915	.0002

STEPWISE REGRESSION CONSERVATIVE CALIFORNIA GROWTH COUNTIES
(Dependent Variable: Cumulative Percentage Deviation)

1.	Per. in-migration	.6887*	.4743*	.4743
2.	Per. N.Y. mig.	.7625	.5814	.1071
3.	Per. Ohio mig.	.8853	.7837	.2023
4.	Per. State pop.	.9149	.8370	.0533
5.	Med. schl. yrs.	.9594	.9205	.0835
6.	Per Texas mig.	.9980	.9959	.0754
7.	White Collar emp.	1.0000	1.0000	.0041

*Significant at .05 level

SUMMARY

These results fail to support conservative conversion and transplantation hypotheses as explanations for California's enduring political regionality. But they strongly support the alternative explanation for the state's regionality: that in-migrants to California can be, and are influenced by the philosophies of their new communities, whether they be liberal or conservative.

The conclusions obtained from this analysis of California's voting behavior must be guarded in nature, for they describe what is essentially individual behavior from an aggregate standpoint. There is also a problem in theoretically analyzing neighborhood influence upon individual political behavior and then expanding this theoretical analysis to a quantitative one based upon county data. At this point one can only suggest that because of California's unique population distribution (seventy per cent of the people occupy little more than one per cent of the land) much or even most of that population lives in suburbs. Many of the more populous counties are almost entirely suburban in character, with San Mateo in the Bay Area and Orange in Southern California being excellent examples of this phenomenon. Because of the nature of the state's population distribution, it is possible to expand the analysis from that of an individual community, to the suburb, and then to a series of suburbs making up much or most of a county's population. Kasperson has been prominent among those supporting the use of such ecological correlations as county data:

Despite the current preference for survey research and panel methods, the analysis of areal voting will, for a number of reasons, continue to provide a highly useful dimension of electoral research. First electoral studies distinguish the general distribution of support for candidates and parties among major population groups within any study area. Second, such studies are rich in historical perspective, delineating temporal continuity and fluctuations in turnout and partisan divisions. Third, since this approach focuses upon constituencies, results have immediate relevance to the distribution of other types of political phenomena and to the functioning of the political system.⁷⁰

Ultimate conclusions regarding the influence of migration on California's political regionality would best be accomplished on the basis of individual survey data where comparisons could be constructed between pre- and post-California voting behavior. Such an approach would allow the analyst to judge what kind of migrant is likely to conform to community standards as a means of removing dissonance; which migrant is likely to leave a community because of his dissonant political behavior; and what type of migrant will stand his ground and maintain his deviant political behavior by seeking supportive elements for that behavior.

However, from an aggregate point of view the evidence presented strongly indicates a regional relationship between migration, community influence and voting patterns in the Golden State. Given these conclusions and the current spatial nature of California's population growth, the future of the state politically would appear to lie in the hands of the growing numbers of new Californians moving to conservative California.

⁷⁰Kasperson, op. cit., p. 405.

EPILOGUE

The Future Politics of the Golden State

"What California is today, the rest of this country will be tomorrow." -- Richard Armour

As previously mentioned, those who envision the nation's political future in the state will watch California closely. It has been repeatedly noted that new settlers often develop a consciousness of the "destiny" of their new region. Migrants to regions which have little settled social or institutional life, and in which the steadying effect of custom and tradition is weak, tend to be extremely self-conscious. In such areas the spotlight of social acceptance or rejection focuses on the groups which are unable to join quickly with the developing amalgam. Not certain just who is who, the latest migrants will usually seek to identify with the socially dominant group.⁷¹ Conservatism is unquestionably dominant in popular Southern California.

The political culture of conservative California not only has future implications for the state as a whole but for the nation as well. For if the political culture of a region has strong influences upon the voting behavior of a new resident, then those states which are experiencing heavy in-migration might look to the Golden State for visions of their own political futures. The conservatism of Southern

⁷¹McWilliams, op. cit., p. 8.

California has come to dominate the political happenings in California and in other rapidly growing states similar kinds of candidates are being elected office. Liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas lost his 1970 bid for renomination to a conservative Democrat. Arizona is home for Barry Goldwater and conservative Peter Dominick represents Colorado in the senate, to name only a few elected officials representing the rapidly growing states in the country. It could well be that conservative successes in these states are also reflections of peer group influence upon new residents.

Constant population change makes party organization and political stability virtually impossible. But as a final point of consideration, the reader might ponder this. If the present rate of migration to California continues well into the twenty-first century, by the year 2085 all the people in the United States will be Californians. Obviously this is not going to happen. Presently the rate of immigration to California is slowing, and conceivably when the state begins to move away from the condition of a continuous population flux, one may find that some of the more traditional influences characteristically important in the east will have greater significance in California and other similar "migration" states.

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