


SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF URBAN
COLOURED AND ASIAN COMMUNITIES
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the socioeconomic position of two small racial groups, Coloureds and Asians, in the white-dominated Republic of South Africa. Heretofore, these two groups have received comparatively little attention from geographers. The bulk of the literature is directed at the white-African clash of interests. However, throughout the history of the white-imposed form of domestic colonialism in South Africa, Coloureds and Asians have performed valuable economic and administrative functions for the dominant whites, and earned for themselves a socioeconomic position midway between whites and Africans.

At the present time the South African government is engaged in a massive spatial redistribution of the four racial groups in an effort to maintain white economic and political supremacy. This program places Coloureds and Asians in an acute crisis, for in theory their close ties with the white economic structure, to which their relative prosperity is attributable, would be severed. They would be forced to develop their own economic structures.

This thesis poses the questions: Has there in fact been any change in Coloured and Asian socioeconomic status since the inception of apartheid? What characteristics of each group are associated with high socioeconomic standing? What is the extent and nature of competition for socioeconomic status between Coloureds and Asians?

A factor analysis test is employed for 1946 and 1960 Coloured and Asian socioeconomic variable data to bring out significant variable clusters which are statistically representative of Asian and Coloured socioeconomic position.

It is concluded that there has been no change in the position of Coloureds and Asians in the white economic structure. Apartheid has not been extended as yet to Coloureds and Asians. It is found that Moslem, Gujarati-speaking Asians in white collar positions in urban Asian communities of small size have the highest incomes. Further, it is concluded that this small Asian community is associated with poor, blue collar Coloureds. Thus it lends credence to the notion that Asians have displaced Coloureds in socioeconomic status.

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF URBAN COLOURED AND ASIAN COMMUNITIES
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

By

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The post World War II years have witnessed an upsurge in nationalistic activity in the Third World and there has been a parallel increase in popular and scholarly writings on the varying development problems of the newly independent states. The popular literature abounds with the themes of Westernization versus Traditionalism, industrialization versus subsistence activities, plural versus homogeneous societies, and so forth. Scholarly research has also been intimately involved with the developing states, particularly African, as is exemplified by the spread of African studies programs throughout the Western world. No less than other social scientists, geographers have played an important role in studying the interplay of human and physical forces in Africa. The names of William Hance, Harrison Church, Edward Soja, Peter Gould, and Harm de Blij, to mention a few, are as well-known to African specialists as they are to geographers.

However, scholarly interest in African studies, and particularly among geographers, has been concerned primarily with Africa north of the Zambezi River. The growth problems of West, Central, and East African states have been explored in depth by geographers, political scientists, anthropologists, historians, and sociologists alike to the virtual exclusion of Southern Africa. There is a dearth of modern English literature

on Portuguese Africa¹ and little more on Rhodesia and South West Africa. The Republic of South Africa has received considerably more attention, but hardly enough in relation to its actual and potential continental economic power and the controversial development process in which it is presently engaged.

In brief, since 1948, the ruling white minority of the Republic of South Africa has adopted a comprehensive development policy designed to maintain its political and economic control over the three non-white racial groups--the native black Africans, the peoples of mixed racial stock--Coloureds, and the Asians, who are largely from the Indian sub-continent. The program, initially called apartheid and now officially labelled as multinational development, was promulgated in response to the influx of all racial groups, but in particular the African, into the Republic's urban centers in the preceeding 30 years. The cities had formerly been the domain of the whites.

Apartheid called for a massive redistribution of the non-white groups to maintain a white numerical superiority in the cities. Africans were to be resettled in eight "historico-logical" homelands where they would be free to pursue traditional pastoral and agricultural activities in keeping with each group's cultural traditions. Although industrial development of each homeland is envisioned, the necessity for some Africans to temporarily reside in cities is acknowledged, but these Africans would have a primary allegiance to their respective homelands, to which they would return periodically. As is the case with other developing states, South Africa is

¹For a good account of the history of Portugal in Africa printed in English see James Duffy's Portuguese Africa. A similar and later version of the book is his paperback (Penguin) Portugal in Africa.

engaged in an aggregating process; the use and ownership of the means of production--land, labor, and capital, are becoming centralized in urban centers. Apartheid is a decentralizing scheme, and as such, it is reactionary (in the strictest sense of the word). The changes in the morphology of South African society and the spatial patterns of population settlement should be of continuing interest to social scientists.

In marked contrast to the lack of scholarly literature is the wealth of popular literature written concerning South Africa.² The revolutionary activity elsewhere in Africa as opposed to the reactionary white-controlled policies of Southern Africa are amply illustrated by the popular press.

The South African social scientific literature has largely been the preserve of non-geographers and South Africans, and has been characterized by its emphasis on structural topics--social stratification, cultural pluralism differential acculturation, etc.. Pierre van den Berghe has written extensively on social stratification in South Africa, but with particular reference to the Asian community.³ Leo and Hilda Kuper, the former a sociologist and the latter an anthropologist, have discussed within-group stratification for Africans and Asians, respectively.⁴ Leo Kuper has analyzed the life chances of an emerging African bourgeoisie under a white-imposed economic framework in An African Bourgeoisie. Sheila

²See the New York Times for the most authoritative and up-to-date reporting of South African events, and also see Peter Webb, "On a Collision Course," Newsweek, April 27, 1970, 40-49, for an in-depth summary of events in South Africa.

³Pierre van den Berghe, Caneville, the Social Structure of a South African Town (Middletown, Connecticut, 1964) and South Africa, A Study in Conflict (Middletown, Connecticut, 1965).

⁴Hilda Kuper, Indian People in Natal (Durban, 1960) and Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie (New Haven, 1965).

Patterson and W. P. Carstens have studied in depth the Coloured racial group, the former providing an overview of the position of Coloureds within the white economic, political, and social systems, and the latter studying the social structure of a rural Cape Coloured reserve.⁵

The historical and anthropological literature is voluminous and is marked by its emphasis on the confrontation between Europeans and Africans and the consequent juxtaposition of different cultural traditions. Philip Mayer, D. H. Reader and B. A. Pauw in studies of the East London hinterland point out the differential impact of Western culture upon African migratory labor.⁶ In a similar vein, Eric Walker, Leo Marquard, W. M. Macmillan, and C. W. de Kiewiet stress the clash of blacks and whites as the significant theme throughout South African history.⁷

Likewise, economists have focused on the various growth problems before and after the implementation of apartheid, and they include D. Hobart Houghton and Ralph Horwitz.⁸

Geographers have focused primarily upon studies of urban morphology and space relations and the broad spatial patterns of the races. In the first category, Peter Scott and D. Hywell Davies have studied Cape Town,

⁵Sheila Patterson, Colour and Culture in South Africa (London, 1953) and W. P. Carstens, The Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve (Cape Town, 1966).

⁶Philip Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen (Cape Town, 1961), B. A. Pauw, The Second Generation (Cape Town, 1963), and D. H. Reader, The Black Man's Portion (Cape Town, 1961).

⁷Eric Walker, A History of Southern Africa (New York, 1957), Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London, 1957), and C. W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, Social and Economic (London, 1946).

⁸Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy of South Africa (New York, 1967) and D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy (Cape Town, 1964).

Scott in terms of its complex multi-racial residential pattern,⁹ and Davies with respect to the dynamics of central business district growth.¹⁰ Kuper, Watts, and Davies¹¹ and Brookfield and Tatham¹² have written of the spatial pattern of the races in the city of Durban with respect to various socio-economic variables. Monica Cole,¹³ Donald Pettersen,¹⁴ and Fair and Green¹⁵ have stressed spatial patterns of mining and industrial development along the Witwatersrand with only passing reference to the racial pattern of settlement.

In the second category of South African human geographical literature are the overviews of the distribution of races across South African and studies of regional development. Carter, Karis, and Stultz¹⁶ emphasize the developmental problems of the Transkei, the first self-governing Bantustan, with reference to the dominant white political and economic ideologies. Fair and Green¹⁷ have studied the growth problems of the Transkei, but with

⁹Peter Scott, "Cape Town: A Multi-Racial City," Geographical Journal, Vol. 121, 149-57.

¹⁰D. Hywell Davies, Land Use in Central Cape Town: A Study in Urban Geography (Cape Town, 1965).

¹¹Leo Kuper, Hilstan Watts and Ronald Davies, The Racial Ecology of Durban (New York, 1958).

¹²H. C. Brookfield and A. Tatham, "Distribution of Racial Groups in Durban," The Geographical Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 44-65.


¹³Monica Cole, South Africa (London, 1966).

¹⁴Donald Pettersen, "The Witwatersrand: A Unique Gold Mining Community," Economic Geography, Vol. 27, 209-21.

¹⁵L. P. Green and T. J. D. Fair, Development in Africa: A Study in Regional Analysis with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Johannesburg, 1962).

¹⁶Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism (Evanston, 1967).

¹⁷Fair and Green, op. cit.



the most emphasis placed upon economic development. Fair and Shaffner¹⁸ have reviewed changes in the spatial distribution of the races from 1951-1960 and note that implications of differential racial fertility, mortality, and migration upon government development policy. Attention is devoted almost exclusively to areal relationships between Africans and whites and the implications for continued white domination.

The most recent of the South African geographical literature, M. E. Sabbagh's "Some Geographical Characteristics of a Plural Society: Apartheid in South Africa," reviews the conflicting aims of political ideology and economic desirability in their areal context.¹⁹ Primary emphasis, as in the Fair and Shaffner article, is placed on population movement and growth of Africans and whites since the inception of apartheid.

In sum, the dominant theme pervading both scholarly and popular writings of South Africa is race, and in particular, the confrontation between a dominant white minority and a powerless African majority. Government spokesmen and apartheid ideologists also stress the overwhelming importance of black-white structural and spatial relationships as crucial to the process of development in South Africa. What has been ignored by geographers and South Africans are the two other "racial" groups in South Africa--the Coloureds and Asians. Sabbagh perceptively notes:

A second issue is the surprising disregard of Asiatics--that is Indians--and Coloureds. . . . and one rarely finds reference to these groups in policy statements.

¹⁸T. J. D. Fair and N. Manfred Shaffer, "Population Patterns and Policies in South Africa, 1951-1960," Economic Geography, Vol. 40, 261-74.

¹⁹M. E. Sabbagh, "Some Geographical Characteristics of a Plural Society," The Geographical Review, Vol. 58, No. 1, 1-28.

The scheme of Separate Development is directed at the Bantu, and account is taken of Coloureds and Indians only in so far as they relate to the central objective.²⁰

Rhodie and Venter in their study of the socio-historical roots of apartheid philosophy state that Coloureds and Asians "do not constitute as great a threat to the establishment and maintenance of Western culture as do the Bantu," and therefore, "Like the Indians, the Coloured group constitutes only a minor aspect of the colour problem as a whole."²¹

Fortunately, as has been previously noted, other social scientists have studied these two "racial" groups. In the main, analysis has been a structural rather than spatial orientation. Non-geographers have been more interested in the history and internal relationships among members of the two groups, than they were in the areal extent and variation in characteristics of the two groups. Although some attention has been paid to the structural position vis-a-vis the dominant white man, the spatial implications of apartheid on Asians and Coloureds have yet to be examined.

Analysis from a spatial point of view provides insights to the dynamics of the apartheid scheme. Of the two components of apartheid, the spatial and the structural, the spatial redistribution is the most important to government planners. The privileged power position of whites will be left intact, but the planned spatial redistribution of peoples will attempt to counteract well-established patterns of population growth. Therefore, a spatial analysis seems well-suited to the phenomena at hand.

Moreover, a spatial analysis is applicable to the description and explanation of the South African cultural landscape, because while govern-


²⁰Ibid., 6.

²¹N. J. Rhodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid (Pretoria, 1959), 9.


ment spokesmen have labelled the Coloured and Asian groups as minor problems on a national level to be dealt with, their significance in numbers on a regional level is much greater. In 1960, Coloureds and Asians accounted for only 9.5% and 2.5%, respectively, of the total population, as compared with 19.4% for whites and 68.6% for Africans. It is this gross percentage breakdown of the population which has led the government to minimize the problems of apartheid implementation with respect to Coloureds and Asians.

Even on a provincial level of aggregation the numerical importance of Coloureds and Asians is masked by the preponderance of Africans and whites. Coloureds make up 24.8% of the Cape, 1.5% of Natal, 1.7% of the Transvaal, and 1.9% of the Orange Free State's population. The Asian proportions are .4%, 13.2%, 1%, and 0%, respectively (in 1960, there were only 7 Asians residing in the Orange Free State).

However, it is on a regional and urban level that Coloureds and Asians assume importance for the apartheid scheme. This is ironic, because government spokesmen have long stated that apartheid is directly primarily at Africans in urban centers--the very areas in which Coloureds and Asians are numerically significant. Yet, the government considers them as only minor aspects of the overall program. Coloureds are areally concentrated in the Western Cape, and, in particular, the Cape Town metropolitan area, where they account for slightly over 50% of the total population--up from 47% in 1951, and 44% in 1936. In Port Elizabeth, a manufacturing port in the Cape Midlands, Coloureds accounted for 23.5% of the city's population in 1960. In the numerous, small agricultural and service centers of the Western Cape, such as Paarl, Worcester, Stellenbosch,



MAP 2



MAP 3

and Oudtshoorn, Coloureds make up half of the total population.

A similar areal concentration is evident for Asians which is not discernible when viewed from a national or provincial level. In Durban, the Republic's third largest city, Asians, in 1960, constituted 34.7% of the population--the largest single racial segment, and up from 31.4% in 1946. In Pietermaritzburg, Natal's second largest city, Asians accounted for slightly more than 20% of the city's population.

Thus, in the Republic's second and third largest cities, the implementation of apartheid must consider a sizeable community of Coloureds and Asians, respectively. That the government has heretofore believed that they were insignificant to the overall development program is a serious theoretical and planning oversight.

Moreover, a cursory glance at the demographic structure of the South African population from 1904-1970 and the population projections for the year 2000 (See Table 1) reveals an increase in the percentage of the total population of the two groups from 11% in 1904 to 14.1% (Projection A) or 16.9% (Projection B) in 2000. Projection B is generally thought of as the more realistic of the two. The two widely disparate projections for the year 2000 reflects, on the one hand, a basic insecurity regarding the future of white domination in South Africa, and on the other hand, an acknowledgement of the fact that Coloureds and Asians will make up an increasing proportion of the total population.

Examination of crude birth and death rates for Asians and Coloureds for the years 1956-1965 and 1969 documents the rising Coloured and Asian proportion at the expense of whites and Africans. Since 1956, crude birth rates for Coloureds have varied between 41.0 and 48.8/1,000 with the 1969

TABLE 1

DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION, 1904-1970

Census of 1904			Census of 1911			
Group	Number	% of Total	Group	Number	% of Total	% Increase
White	1,116,806	21.6	White	1,276,242	21.4	2.04
African	3,491,056	67.4	African	4,019,006	67.3	2.16
Asian	122,734	2.4	Asian	152,203	2.5	3.43
Coloured	445,228	8.6	Coloured	525,943	8.8	2.59
Total non-White	4,059,018	78.4	Total non-White	4,697,152	78.6	2.25
Total Pop.	5,175,824		Total Pop.	5,973,394		2.20
Census of 1921			Census of 1936			
White	1,519,488	21.9	White	2,003,857	20.9	2.12
African	4,697,813	67.8	African	6,596,689	68.8	2.69
Asian	165,731	2.4	Asian	219,691	2.3	2.17
Coloured	545,548	7.9	Coloured	769,661	8.0	2.74
Total non-White	5,409,092	78.1	Total non-White	7,586,041	79.1	2.68
Total Pop.	6,928,580		Total Pop.	9,589,898		2.56
Census of 1946			Census of 1951			
White	2,372,690	20.8	White	2,641,689	20.9	2.26
African	7,805,515	68.5	African	8,560,083	67.7	1.93
Asian	285,260	2.5	Asian	336,596	2.7	3.60
Coloured	928,484	8.2	Coloured	1,103,016	8.7	3.75
Total non-White	9,019,259	79.2	Total non-White	9,999,695	79.1	2.17
Total Pop.	11,391,949		Total Pop.	12,641,384		2.19
Census of 1960			Estimated Population 1970			
White	3,088,492	19.4	White	3,779,000	17.7	
African	10,927,922	68.6	African	14,893,000	69.9	
Asian	403,868	2.5	Asian	614,000	2.8	
Coloured	1,509,258	9.5	Coloured	1,996,000	9.3	
Total non-White	12,841,048	80.6	Total non-White	16,200,000	82.0	
Total Pop.	15,929,540		Total Pop.	20,000,000		
Year 2000--Projection A			Year 2000--Projection B*			
White	6,150,000	23.5	White	4,588,000	14.7	1.21
African	16,337,000	62.4	African	21,361,000	68.4	2.30
Asian	1,120,000	4.3	Asian	1,382,000	4.4	6.05
Coloured	2,560,000	9.8	Coloured	3,917,000	12.5	3.99
Total non-White	20,017,000	76.5	Total non-White	26,660,000	85.3	2.69
Total Pop.	26,167,000		Total Pop.	31,248,000		2.40

*Projection B is generally regarded as the more realistic.

Source: 1970 estimate--M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1970, 24.
M. E. Sabbagh, 1904-1960, 2000, 4.

figure at 41.0/1,000. The crude death rate has steadily fallen from 20.3/1,000 in 1950 to 16.5/1,000 in 1956 to 14.6/1,000 in 1969. This demographic transition, characteristic of the populations of developing nations, is the main factor responsible for the steady increase in the Coloured percentage of the total population since inter-racial marriages have been declared illegal. The Asian demographic picture is unique among South African racial groups. The crude birth rate has actually increased from 30.6/1,000 in 1956 to 34.4/1,000 in 1965, and 37.8/1,000 in 1969. The crude death rate has varied between 7.2/1,000 and 8.7/1,000, and was at 7.2/1,000 in 1969.²² This combination of high fertility and abnormally low mortality has resulted in a high rate of natural increase, despite state controls on immigration of Asians and a government subsidized program to send Asians back to India.

Therefore, the future spatial and structural position of Coloureds and Asians in the apartheid development program would seem to warrant more attention than is presently devoted to them by geographers and government officials. They make up a considerable proportion of the population of certain cities, and, if demographic trends continue as before, the issue of Coloureds and Asians in urban centers promises to become a relevant problem for apartheid planners.

Purpose

This thesis envisions a three-fold examination of the socio-economic position of Coloureds and Asiatics in white-dominated South Africa. First, a conceptual framework will be presented outlining a variety of perspec-

²²South Africa Statistical Yearbook, 1966, C-5.

TABLE 2

COLOURED AND ASIATIC CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES--1956-65, 1969

Year	Coloureds		Asians	
	CBR	CDR	CBR	CDR
1956	44.7	16.5	30.6	8.2
1957	46.4	15.9	30.4	8.7
1958	45.7	16.4	30.8	8.2
1959	45.8	15.0	32.4	8.1
1960	46.6	15.6	29.7	7.6
1961	46.1	15.5	29.9	7.4
1962	46.5	15.1	30.0	7.6
1963	45.6	15.4	30.3	7.4
1964	46.6	14.8	33.3	7.4
1965	46.1	15.8	34.4	8.1
1969	41.1	14.6	37.8	7.2

Source: 1956-1965--South African Statistical Yearbook, 1966, C-5.
 1969--M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1970, 25.

tives on the nature of social stratification in South Africa. The ethnic stratification or pluralism perspective of M. G. Smith will be presented and compared with the more traditional caste and class stratification type. In a more basic sense, the white-non-white relationship is one of the dominant and the dominated, and, therefore, Ronald Horvath's definition and typology of colonialism and the general types of social groups found in a colonial society will be presented in an attempt to clarify South African group interaction and relate it to a specific social structural form. Particular attention will be paid to Asians and Coloureds as representatives of Horvath's intervening group.

Second, a historical chapter will outline the evolution of white South African paradigms or systems of control as they pertain to social structural forms and Horvath's colonialism definition. The thesis will

study the structuring by whites of status equality with Asians and Coloureds through the years. Social stratification in South Africa has never been as rigid as the present apartheid program of racial interaction implies. All social systems are dynamic entities, continually changing to meet inner-directed and outer-directed demands. The historical review, on the one hand, provides a background for the analytic section to follow, and on the other hand, will amplify the conceptual framework.

Third, a factor analytic approach to Asian and Coloured status will be used to determine the effect the apartheid ideology has had on Asian and Coloured status and to discern within and between-group spatial variation in socioeconomic standing. Census data for 1946 and 1960 will be used. There are three dimensions to the factor analysis: the structural, the spatial, and the temporal. Structurally, what is the group socioeconomic status of Asians and Coloureds? Has it changed during the period 1946-1960? Spatially, what variation is found in Asian and Coloured status? In other words, in which urban centers are Asians and Coloureds poor, and in which are they wealthy? The implications of change in status will be related to the caste and class model of social stratification and Horvath's typology of colonialism. Various hypotheses will be offered and tested for each of the three dimensions.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Social status, whether it be of an individual or a group as a whole, is both ascribed by the individual and the larger society of which one is a part. In Western, homogeneous, open-class societies, status has been envisioned primarily as a function of income, occupation, and education. As such, status is to a great degree self-assigned. In non-Western societies the societal component exerts a greater influence in status determination, although there is a recent body of literature which emphasizes the fluidity of social mobility in traditional societies.²³ In any event, full social stability, notes Sheila Patterson, is achieved only when the individual status approximates the larger societal assignment.²⁴ Characteristic of the imposition of Western control over Asian, Latin American, and African peoples was the lack of consensus of status determination. Culturally diverse peoples were imperfectly integrated under European economic and political control. Clearly, status consensus among subordinate societies and vis-a-vis the European rulers did not exist.

The Pluralism Literature

In the past 30 years a large body of sociological and anthropo-

²³See Arthur Tuden and Leonard Plotnicov, eds., Social Stratification in Africa (New York, 1970).

²⁴Sheila Patterson, Colour and Culture in South Africa (London, 1953), 171.

logical literature has been developed to define the phenomenon of Western colonialization as well as earlier instances of differential status determination as a structurally distinct form of social stratification. This body of theory²⁵ has been variously known as social pluralism, sociocultural pluralism, and ethnic stratification, or more simply, pluralism.

Its initial proponent, J. S. Furnivall, a British economist working in the Far East, perceived a discrete form of social stratification which came into existence as a result of European commercial and industrial expansion. His plural society--internally autonomous and inclusive political units ruled by an institutionally distinct numerical minority,²⁶ is the most extreme expression of pluralism. M. G. Smith, the foremost contemporary scholar favoring the utility of the concept of pluralism, defines it generally as a "condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice."²⁷ Smith agrees with Furnivall's model of the plural society, but states that the plural society is only a particular variant of the generic type. In particular, he notes four deficiencies of Furnivall's model: (1) its restriction to and identification with the modern colonial situation; (2) its correlated restriction to tropical latitudes; (3) its restriction to the era of European industrial expansion and

²⁵For a complete description of the pluralism concept see M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 83 (January 20, 1960), 763-87 and for a later reformulation see Leo Kuper and M.G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles, 1969).

²⁶M. G. Smith, "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism," Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles, 1969), 29.

²⁷Ibid., 27.

laissez-faire capitalism; and (4) its restriction to and identification with multiracial communities.²⁸ Pluralism, Smith declares, is confined neither to the Tropics nor to the last four centuries of human history.

Smith distinguishes two basic types of societies which are polar opposites--homogeneous societies and societies displaying pluralism. Homogeneous societies are characterized by all members sharing an identical system of institutions. Smith agrees with Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Nadel in defining an institution as a standardized mode of coactivity characteristic of social collectivities.²⁹ Such conditions of institutional homogeneity, intrinsic to simple societies, are in direct contrast to the systematic institutional diversity that constitutes pluralism.

Continuing, Smith notes that most industrial societies stand midway between Furnivall's plural society and the homogeneous society. In these so-called heterogeneous societies, the majority or almost all share a common system of basic institutions, but are differentiated at the secondary level of institutional organization "in which alternative occupation, political, religious, or ethnic institutions predominate."³⁰

At this juncture Smith discusses the analytical distinction between the cultural and social aspects of all institutions and its relevance for pluralism. Whereas all institutional organization involves collective norms, ideas, and symbols (culture), "all institutions have prominent

²⁸M. G. Smith, "Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism," Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles, 1969), 429.

²⁹Smith, Institutional and Political Conditions, 30.

³⁰Ibid., 35.

sociological aspects in the groups they constitute, and in the structures of status and role which they enjoin."³¹ Thus, institutional heterogeneity may involve both social and cultural heterogeneity, but not necessarily both.

In this context Smith distinguishes two modes of pluralism under predominant societal heterogeneity. In one instance an institutionally distinct minority compose territorially discrete enclaves. He cites the various Indian reservations scattered about the United States and the Indians of Chiapas in Mexico as examples of plural enclaves within heterogeneous societies. Alternatively, a heterogeneous society may contain plural communities such as are found in the southern United States. These plural communities satisfy the conditions necessary to distinguish plural societies, but lack political and cultural distinctiveness and autonomy. They are therefore subject to continuous influence by the larger society surrounding them.³²

In sum, Smith distinguishes heterogeneous societies with plural features from those without, and in the former category, those societies with plural enclaves from those with plural communities.

Numerous criticisms were directed at the initial conceptualization of pluralism. Basil Davidson in his analysis of pluralism in Northern Rhodesia raises the question of whether sufficient interaction between population components occurs to justify the use of the term "society." He states that in the early stages of white domination "Africans were no more members of Northern Rhodesian society, as recognized and constituted

³¹Ibid., 34.

³²Ibid., 35.

by duly enshrined authority, than the cattle and game for whom 'reserves' were also soon marked out."³³ The dominant European minority established no bonds, obligations, or rights with Africans, except those to their immediate advantage. Davidson, therefore, prefers to draw a distinction between a system of differential incorporation and a society, the latter involving common values.

On the other hand, there are those who object to the pluralism perspective because it tends to "minimize the coherence and integration of their social systems" while emphasizing the strength and permanence of their internal divisions. Pluralism exaggerates the unity and solidarity of the several sections and diverts attention from their many internal divisions.³⁴

In this respect, J. C. Mitchell, an advocate of pluralism, in a study of stratification in Rhodesia suggests that as minority domination continues, "the subordinate race becomes more and more dependent for its subsistence and welfare on the economic and administrative system manned by the dominant race and becomes less inclined to destroy that system by violent protests."³⁵

Pierre van den Berghe does not feel that institutional incompatibility based on differing cultural traditions is a necessary condition of pluralism. Nor does he feel that much is gained by distinguishing plural societies from societies with plural features and from heterogeneous

³³Basil Davidson, "Pluralism in Colonial African Societies: Zambia/Northern Rhodesia," Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles, 1969), 217.

³⁴Smith, Analytic Framework, 421.

³⁵J. C. Mitchell, "Race, Class, and Status in South Central Africa," Social Stratification in Africa (New York, 1970), 338.

societies. According to the Smith formulation, the difference between a plural society such as South Africa and a heterogeneous society with plural enclaves and communities like the United States boils down to demography, notes van den Berghe. "Surely whether the dominant is a majority or a minority does not so profoundly affect the structure of a society as to justify the use of a typology of a typology that implies important qualitative discontinuities."³⁶ van den Berghe prefers to regard pluralism as a variable and "to include cases of stratification based on race, caste, estate, or class as instances of pluralism, even though the constituent groups share the same general culture."³⁷

In response to this and other criticism, Smith reformulated the pluralism concept and considered two criteria as important in distinguishing pluralism as a distinct form. First, the system is maintained by a dominant group through its use of political force, and, related to the first, there is a lack of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the system. As such, the plural situation is inherently instable and requires the continuous application of political force by the dominant group to maintain its cohesiveness.³⁸ The writer has already mentioned Mitchell's contrasting thesis of plural system stability. Such disagreement between proponents of pluralism is indicative of the controversy surrounding the concept.

Tuden and Plotnicov, in Social Stratification in Africa, do not

³⁶Pierre van den Berghe, "Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," Pluralism in Africa (Los Angeles, 1969), 68-69.

³⁷Ibid., 68.

³⁸Tuden and Plotnicov, op. cit., 26.

regard pluralism as a structurally distinct enough form of social stratification to warrant a special term. First, they note that those societies that have been labelled as plural appear to differ from other stratified societies in that the dominant group which monopolizes political and economic power also is racially distinct from the rest of the population. Therefore, pluralism appears to be racial stratification, and, as such, it means that "pluralism, as a social type, has been based on a biological characteristic, a feature that is theoretically and methodologically unacceptable."³⁹ Smith, however, has made it clear that one of the defects of Furnivall's model was its racial characteristic and he prefers a cultural distinction between the dominated and dominator.

Second, Tuden and Plotnicov point out that those societal conditions which are described as pluralistic are invariably highly complex. It is their feeling that this complexity has influenced scholars to regard such conditions as pluralistic. "However, complexity, in and of itself, cannot be a criterion for distinguishing a type of stratification or any social form, for that matter," note Tuden and Plotnicov.⁴⁰

Third, advocates of pluralism point out that legal sanctions are not applied equally to all cultural sectors. However, this is not very different from what occurs in all stratified societies. In Western societies this is a covert characteristic, but still recognized as objective reality.⁴¹

Fourth, if one accepts Smith's notion concerning the inherent

³⁹Ibid., 25.

⁴⁰Ibid., 27.

⁴¹Ibid.

instability of the plural society and the consequent need for coercion to maintain the system, white-African conflict in Africa prior to independence would seem to typify pluralism. However, when independence is achieved, when the dominant whites are removed from political power, one finds that suddenly the societies are no longer good examples of pluralism. But, the whites have continued to occupy the stratum positions they held prior to independence. The system of social stratification has not changed.⁴² In fact, in a number of African countries the number of whites has increased, and they have not relinquished their metropolitan citizenship.

This writer, along with Tuden and Plotnicov and van den Berghe, does not feel that pluralism is a distinct enough structural form to warrant unique terminology or analysis techniques. Traditional perspectives for the study of social stratification, such as caste, class, and caste and class are applicable. Obviously, the recognized criteria of these stratification types may not appear full-blown at once. One must conceive of incipient caste and/or class systems, or, as Plotnicov puts it, "class conflict in the absence of a class system" in his study of the modern elite of Jos, Nigeria.⁴³

The analysis of racial interaction in South Africa will be structured around the caste and class perspective of social stratification. The caste and class concept will be amplified as the historical summary of white, Asian, and Coloured interaction is outlined in a later chapter.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Leonard Plotnicov, "The Modern African Elite of Jos, Nigeria," Social Stratification in Africa (New York, 1970), 299.

A Definition and Typology of Colonialism

Explicit throughout the preceeding discussion is Smith's notion of the lack of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the dominant group's monopoly of political power and the necessity for coercion to integrate the various subordinate groups within the political and economic structure of the ruling group. Ronald Horvath has developed a conceptual scheme by which one can systematically analyze the varieties and modes of imposition of control by one group over another. This definitional work is an integral part of a study of the nature of colonialism.

The single most important element, states Horvath, maintaining the European-non-European relationship was domination.⁴⁴ Horvath further states that this dominator-dominated relationship is a discrete sub-type of human relationships distinct from the technological determinant of social stratification proposed by Gideon Sjoberg for non-Western cities.⁴⁵

In short, Sjoberg, in a study of non-Western urban centers, which were largely examples of Islamic civilization, suggested that the key variable defining and implementing the emergence of an urban social structure was a different level of technology. Further, Sjoberg notes that the stratificational system of the "pre-industrial" city was patterned along class lines. Patterns of intra-societal relationships found in parts of the Third World, however, did not match the Sjoberg technological determinant model.

⁴⁴Ronald J. Horvath, A Definition of Colonialism (Unpublished paper), 6.

⁴⁵Ronald J. Horvath, "In Search of a Theory of Urbanization: Notes on the Colonial City," The East Lakes Geographer, Vol. 5 (December, 1969), 72.

Such a discrete system of classification, he notes, should be rooted in a theory of colonialism. Domination is the fundamental distinguishing mark behind the European imposition and development of urban centers in the Third World, and hence, the territorially defined entity of which it is a subsystem. Domination is closely related to the concept of power. Considerable debate among scholars as to the nature of power has always been prevalent. However, it is generally agreed that power refers to a human social relationship where an individual(s) is capable of exerting his will on another despite resistance. Domination, then, refers to the ability of an individual or a group of individuals to control the behavior and/or territory of another individual or groups of individuals.

Horvath further notes that a second distinguishing mark of colonialism is that it refers to group domination rather than domination by an individual "or among individuals at the family or subclan level." Widespread accord exists on this qualification.

A third variable differentiating colonialism from other forms of domination is cultural heterogeneity. The domination of a group of individuals in a culturally homogeneous society is not colonialism. Rather, colonialism is a domination process found in culturally heterogeneous societies. By cultural heterogeneity, Horvath means the presence of institutionally distinct collectivities and a social structure marked by fundamental cleavages as a result of different cultural traditions. This is not very different from Smith's notion of pluralism, and, indeed, Smith notes that colonialism is one variant of pluralism.

Fourth, colonialism is distinguished from imperialism by the presence of significant numbers of settlers from the colonizing power. Imperialism

is a form of group domination over culturally (institutionally) distinct peoples where few or no settlers migrate permanently from the colonizing power to the colony. The United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand are examples of colonialism, whereas most of the West African and South Asian states are examples of imperialism--few, if any, settlers migrate from the imperial land to the colony.

A fifth variable to be considered is the relationship the colonial and imperial groups have had with the people they have dominated. Horvath suggests three basic types: (1) extermination; (2) assimilation; and (3) neither extermination nor assimilation, for both colonialism and imperialism. Whereas the first two relationships may be viewed as at opposite ends of a continuum, the third relationship is characterized by its imprecision and is designed as a catchall category. Colonialism with an exterminative motif has occurred in varying degrees in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and South Africa, and colonialism with assimilation as the primary motivating concept has occurred in the Philippines and much of Hispanicized Latin America. Colonialism and Imperialism with the lack of extermination or assimilation by the colonizers or imperializers is characteristic of much of Subsaharan Africa. Wholesale acculturation or eradication of the colonized did not occur. Colonialism and imperialism without extermination or assimilation as a motif seems to be peculiar to the British. Their policy in South Africa, for example, oscillated between extermination of the native Africans and assimilation via the mission station. It was marked more by the lack of coherent policy with an emphasis on reaction to particular events, rather than an explicit development strategy with definite long term goals.

A sixth and final variable noted by Horvath is the stage of the political unit. Colonialism and imperialism have heretofore been regarded as restricted to the relationship between European states and the peoples of the Third World. However, he notes, this position is indefensible; "tribal peoples and city states have engaged in colonialism and imperialism." The assumption that a state may behave one way toward some of its subjects within its territorial confines and another way toward groups outside the state boundaries is inconsistent with the use of the term colonialism. Clearly, there can be no distinction between the suppression of the non-Moslem peoples of the Southern Sudan by Northern Moslems, the domination of East Pakistani Bengals by West Pakistanis, and the imperialization of much of Africa, including the Sudan, and Asia, including Pakistan, by Great Britain in the nineteenth century.

Therefore, it is useful to insert a dichotomous variable to differentiate international colonialism and imperialism--those forms of inter-group domination that transcend the boundaries of a recognized autonomous state, from domestic colonialism and imperialism--that form of inter-group domination occurring within the confines of a recognized autonomous state. The final domestic-international variable has particular reference to South Africa, where, within the confines of a state, whites are dominating the native black Africans, Asians, and Coloureds--a form of domestic colonialism.

Implicit throughout Horvath's conceptualization of colonialism is the element of process. The categorization proceeds from the very general to the specific, and, hence, is analogous to the increasing complexity of

the evolution of mankind's social relations. From the very general variable, domination, which he holds as an integral part of human instincts, he delineates the increasing complexity of domination as man's spatial accessibility is enhanced. At this juncture it is suggested that human relationships in South Africa have evolved to such an extent that a seventh dichotomous variable may be in order. An informal-formal variable, to be distinguished from the one Horvath advances, to explain the change from the British laissez-faire (the neither assimilation nor extermination category) colonial policy to the Afrikaner-dominated apartheid program, is suggested. This variable determines the explicitness of the dominating group's ideology and occurs at a later stage than the extermination, assimilation, and neither relationships. It may be inserted below the domestic-international variable to indicate how structured inter-group domination will be.

Because this last formal-informal variable is similar to variable number five--the relationship of the dominated to the dominator, it exposes apartheid as a reactionary program. It is an attempt to jump back to an earlier stage of the development of colonialism to forestall the sharing of economic and political decision-making by non-whites. Given the continuation of socio-economic trends prevalent up to and including World War II, the domination of whites over non-whites in South Africa would have conceptually jumped from inter-group domination to a form of intra-group domination stratified along racial lines. Apartheid may be viewed, therefore, as a mechanism to entrench inter-group domination. The rationale behind the favoring of inter-group domination as opposed to intra-group domination will be discussed later in the paper.

The Stratificational System of the Colonial Society

Horvath has posited that domination is a key characteristic distinguishing urbanization in a number of Third World areas in contrast to Sjoberg's technology determinant. A discussion of the stratification of the colonial society, and the city as its sub-system, will readily differentiate the colonial society as opposed to the Sjoberg, class-oriented, pre-industrial city. The example of South Africa will be offered to vindicate this distinction.⁴⁶

Horvath proposes that as many as three components of stratification are present in the colonial city, including the population from the colonial power, an intervening group, and the indigenous peoples from the surrounding countryside.

The resident colonial population constitutes the elite of the colonial society and manipulates the important economic and political power strings. In contrast to the example of industrial and pre-industrial city models, the elite of the colonial city depend on an outside source of authority for its legitimacy--their authority is not dependent upon the consent of the local inhabitants. Initially, the South African elite did depend on an outside source of authority, namely the Dutch East India Company officials in Holland, but by the nineteenth century the elite had assumed de facto control over internal affairs. Horvath notes that in many cases the elite differ racially from the other components of the city, but suggests that culture is perhaps the important element distinguishing the elite from all others. Tuden and Plotnicov, however, state that race

⁴⁶See R. R. Reed, "Hispanic Urbanism in the Philippines: A Study of the Impact of Church and State," University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Study, Vol. 11 (March, 1967), 143-63, for a discussion of the social structure of the Philippine colonial city.

is a necessary condition in inter-group domination.⁴⁷ To this writer the less restrictive cultural condition is more acceptable, although the South African case is clearly domination based upon race.

The South African elite are, of course, the whites who may be further subdivided on the basis of language and culture into Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers. Prior to the World Depression of the 1930's the Afrikaans-speakers--descendants of the first Dutch-speaking settlers, were largely a rural people engaged in agriculture and pastoralism. However, between the period 1910-1945, when South Africa experienced the Industrial Revolution, Afrikaners participated in the concomitant rural to urban migration. As a result of this phenomenon and the subsequent accession to national power of an Afrikaner-dominated party, the Afrikaners are now well represented in urban centers in industrial and governmental occupations, particularly the latter.

The second major component of the South African elite is English-speaking whites. In marked contrast to the Afrikaners, they have always been an urban group. Only in Natal are the majority of rural whites English-speakers, and even then, they are outnumbered by urban English-speaking whites. English-speakers are heavily represented in industry and commerce and rarely does one read of English-speakers in the employ of the government. Therefore, there is a bifurcation in decision-making within the white elite with the Afrikaners concentrated in the political arena and the English-speaking South Africans concentrated in the economic sphere.

⁴⁷Tuden and Plotnicov, op. cit., 357.

Some writers have further subdivided the white component by distinguishing a Jewish group composed of English-speaking, business-oriented South Africans.⁴⁸ This writer will consider only a two-fold stratification of whites and regard the Jews as part of the English-speaking group.

A second major component of the stratificational system of the colonial society is the indigenous peoples--the dominated. Typically, they form the bulk of the unskilled labor upon which the wealth of the elite is based. A few occupy intermediate positions in the colonial government bureaucracy, and, if and when, independence is attained, they move into the decision-making roles formerly held by the exogenous elite. But the large majority are unskilled industrial and agricultural laborers. The bulk of political legislation is aimed directly or indirectly at this group.

The various black African ethnic groups constitute the indigenous peoples in South Africa. There are no less than eight major ethnic groups represented, and white South Africans are quick to point out that whites are the largest single ethnic group in South Africa, although they conveniently ignore or are not aware that there are strong social and cultural barriers within the white group.⁴⁹

A third major component of the colonial society is what Horvath calls an intervening group. Two types of intervening groups are identified: one resulting from miscegenation and/or inter-marriage and another from the migration to the colony of a people from a country other than the colonial

⁴⁸van den Berghe, Race, Class, and Ethnicity, 357.

⁴⁹N. J. Rhodie, Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa (Pretoria, 1969), 9.

power. The first type commonly is the result of an unbalanced sex ratio within the elite. Typically, males of the elite will enter into unions with indigenous females, although inter-racial mixing among other groups is common. This group holds an economic and social status a niche above the indigenous peoples by virtue of their acceptance of the elite's culture, and, in many cases, a skin tone intermediate between the elite's and indigenous peoples.

The Coloureds of South Africa are a good example of an intervening group formed through inter-racial mixing. They were generated from white-Hottentot-Malay-Bushman unions with some African admixture, particularly in Natal and the Transvaal. Skin color ranges from a light tan, almost indiscernible from that of the white group, to dark brown. Physically, some have easily noticeable Caucasoid features, whereas others have pronounced Negroid features. Almost all Coloureds have adopted white culture, particularly the Afrikaner variant. The only exception is a small, endogamous, Malay Moslem community in Cape Town which has successfully resisted the Christian religion.

The second type of intervening group, those people who migrated to the colonized area from a country other than the colonial power, are a result of both external and internal stimuli. On the one hand, various internal political, economic, religious, and social pressures have stimulated international migration. Examples from Europe, China, and India abound in the literature. On the other hand, on occasion colonial powers have encouraged the immigration of other peoples. British colonial and imperial policy in Subsaharan Africa affords examples of the encouragement of such immigration.

Asiatics, almost entirely from the Indian subcontinent, are an example of this second type of intervening group present in South Africa. The impetus to their migration was provided by the need for cheap labor on white-owned sugar plantations in Natal. Beginning in 1860, and continuing until 1911, many thousands of Indians made the journey. Scholars have divided the flow into two periods: the first consisting of largely male, Tamil, Telugu, and Hindi-speaking Hindus, and the second comprising Gujarati and Urdu-speaking Moslems. The former group is known as the indentured flow, and the latter as passengers. Passenger Indians came in response to the commercial and financial needs of the former group. Also associated with each migrant flow was a secondary stream of dependents--the wives and children of each male laborer. To this day passenger Indians enjoy a somewhat higher status, although van den Berghe notes that this distinction is fading with the passing of the older generations and the incorporation of Asians into a Western polity and economy.⁵⁰ As stated above, an intervening group commonly holds an intermediate status between the elite and indigenous peoples. They occupy lower and middle level positions in the colonial bureaucracy, are semi-skilled and skilled artisans and laborers, and dominate, in many cases, the commerce of the colony. In the literature one rarely finds reference to a significant agricultural sector among intervening groups, although it is conceptually consistent with the colonialism model. The South African case affords an example of large agricultural segments among both Coloureds and Asians. Both, however, are disappearing with the industrialization of South Africa, despite

⁵⁰Pierre van den Berghe, Caneville, The Social Structure of A South African Town (Middletown, Connecticut, 1964), 172-73.

the best efforts of the ruling whites.

In the preceeding discussion the writer has delimited a basic pattern of human relationships found in much of the non-Western world. Domination has been suggested as the determinant of such a relationship, in contrast to the technology determinant of Gideon Sjoberg's pre-industrial society.

The preceeding discussion of the components of the colonial society implies, to some extent, the existence of a caste social structure, although Horvath is not concerned with types of social stratification, but broad inter-group relationships based on domination. However, particular social structural manifestations of domination, such as class, caste, and caste and class, may be fitted to subtypes of the colonialism model. For example, a class structure may be classified as a form of stratified, intra-group domination.

The use of the term caste in non-Indian (Asian) applications has been criticized by Cox, Leach, and Dumont who insist that it is a phenomenon linked exclusively to Pan-Indian civilization. On the other hand, another group of scholars finds cross-cultural utility for caste and insist that broad structural similarities are found among many societies. The problem, as van den Berghe notes, is essentially one of definition.⁵¹ As a minimum definition of caste in advance of the historical review, this writer accepts van den Berghe's conception of caste as an endogamous, ascribed group into which one is born and out of which one cannot pass, and which is ranked in relation to other groups. Alternatively, Tuden and

⁵¹van den Berghe, Race, Class, and Ethnicity, 351.

Plotnicov stress occupational specialization by endogamous groups in which membership is based on ascription and between which social distance is regulated by the concept of pollution as distinguishing marks of caste.⁵² By pollution one refers to inter-racial contacts on an egalitarian basis. It is suspected that the nature of social stratification in South Africa fits van den Berghe's definition of caste and probably Tuden and Plotnicov's.

From the analysis of colonialism and the case of South Africa it is argued that South Africa is an example of formal domestic colonialism--that form of inter-group domination where settlers from the colonial power are present, where initially neither assimilation nor extermination characterized the relationship between settlers and indigenes, and where at the present time a formal policy determines interaction between the dominant settlers and the dominated indigenes. The description of the colonial city connotes the presence of a caste social structural form.

⁵²Tuden and Plotnicov, op. cit., 16.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL REVIEW--THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIETAL PARADIGM

The historical chapter to follow will relate the specific ideologies through which Asiatic and Coloured status has been structured by whites. In other words, the domestic colonialism relationship will be outlined from the point of view of paradigms determining Coloured and Asian status equality with whites.

At the outset let us define two terms which are central to the theme of this paper. By status the writer refers to the position of an individual or group relative to other individuals or groups within a larger societal grouping or society. Status is evaluated both by the larger societal group and the individuals or groups concerned. Group status implies social stratification, which may range from an open-class system to a caste hierarchy.

The use of the term paradigm is virtually the same as that of a dictionary's--an accepted model or pattern, or method for replication. More precisely, it is an ideology governing the habitual interaction of the various groups of South African society. It provides method by which the dominant whites can deal with the status definition of Asians, Coloureds, and Africans. A paradigm may be rejected and a new paradigm accepted (one cannot exist without the other) by the dominant group when the latter is perceived to solve more status problems than the former. Status definition or determinant problems may arise from a variety of causes. For

example, changes in economy and/or government type may result in differential group access to the instruments of domination.

With respect to Horvath's colonialism terminology, his definitions refer to general relationships, whereas a paradigm denotes the criterion by which the dominant group implements domestic colonialism or whatever variant of colonialism is present.

Religious Paradigm

Under the white-dominated system of political and economic control where race is the paramount determinant of status, the Coloured group has always enjoyed a favored position among the state's non-white groups. But, throughout the history of white settlement in South Africa a profusion of status determinants in addition to race have governed white-Coloured interaction. They are, in part, a reflection on a laissez-faire British colonial policy which at times encouraged the assimilation of its subjects and at other times sought to eradicate troublesome ethnic groups, as with the case of the Zulu empire in Natal,⁵³ and in part a reflection of changing economic systems.

A key to the understanding of initial status relationships between whites and Coloureds can be found in the nature and purpose of the original white settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Settlement was initiated by the Dutch East India Company to provision company ships engaged in the East Indian trade. Transience and lack of permanence were key characteristics of the settlement and company personnel. Company officials in Holland continuously warned the first commander of the settlement, Jan van

⁵³For an excellent account of the rise and fall of the Zulu state see Donald Morris' The Washing of the Spears (New York, 1969).

Riebeeck, not to jeopardize trading relations with the native Hottentots and Bushmen and not to meddle in the internal affairs of either group.⁵⁴ In effect, the company held desirable the existence of two societies side by side. Contact would be on a purely utilitarian, non-affective level. This kind of social and economic setting was not conducive to rigid and all inclusive status definitions. The initial, non-codified paradigm structuring social mobility in the early Cape colony was religion. That is, a Christian-non-Christian determinant was imposed by the dominant whites as a prerequisite for legal entry to the highest status group. Eric Walker notes that as early as 1656, it was recognized that a black man (i.e., a non-white) who professed Christianity was the equal of a white man, and he could not be enslaved.⁵⁵ In other words, all other factors ignored, a Coloured's chances of acceptance by whites was considerably enhanced if he was a Christian. Christianity was the necessary, but by no means the sufficient, condition for equality of status.

The religious paradigm, however, soon began to be undermined with the release from service to the company of nine burghers in 1657 to provide a more adequate supply of provisions for ocean-going commerce. The new farmers refused to do manual labor and relied instead on the importation of slaves from Asia and Madagascar to handle the heavy work. A social structure based on slave and non-slave components was developing. This increased permanence of European settlement, and, hence, a constant close cultural and social relationship with early Coloureds forced the dominant whites to redefine status equality from a religious to a cultural criterion.

⁵⁴Eric Walker, A History of Southern Africa (New York, 1957), 36.

⁵⁵Ibid., 71.

This reconsideration of status equality was accelerated with the encouragement of colonialization by Governor Simon van der Stel in 1687. The colony began to change from an entrepot to an agricultural settlement. Rural communities sprung up to supply the basic necessities and a few luxuries to the European farms. In spite of the best European efforts to the contrary, the slave laborers gradually adopted the Christianity of their masters. In addition, Walker states that some urban slaves took up skilled trades in their spare time in hopes that they might make enough money to buy their freedom.⁵⁶ Faced with an increasingly Christian non-white group and a growing body of free skilled tradesmen in the few small urban centers, the whites attempted to clarify their continued dominance. Status equality with whites came to be associated with the essential Europeanness of the Coloured, as those in the lowest status group, the slaves, were clearly the least Europeanized.⁵⁷ In the author's opinion, this was not a conscious reevaluation of status by whites, but a reaction to events which they could not foresee.

This cultural bar did not at once take on the rigidity which it later developed in the nineteenth century. Sheila Patterson notes that the religious determinant retained sufficient vigor through the eighteenth century "to prevent slaveowners from making any great attempt to convert their slaves to Christianity, for fear of the latter claiming their freedom."⁵⁸

With the gradual change from a religious based status determinant

⁵⁶Ibid., 71.

⁵⁷Patterson, op. cit., 172.

⁵⁸Ibid., 172.

to a cultural based determinant came a decline in the number of inter-racial marriages, and to a lesser extent, miscegenation. Perhaps the most important factor accounting for this change was the accompanying increase in the number of European women in the colony. Women are not necessary to the maintenance of a supply station, but are part and parcel to a permanent agricultural colony. The inverse relationship between inter-racial miscegenation and the number of white women in a colony is a well established fact.⁵⁹ The descendants of most present day Coloureds trace their genesis to this initial period of white settlement.

The encouragement of colonization marked the end of an exclusively imperialistic era in South Africa. While the white settlers were still very much dependent on overseas markets for their welfare, the basis for self-sufficiency in political and economic terms was established. This period also marks the beginning of the formation of a caste and class structural form. No longer would interaction between whites and non-whites be restricted by company officials. The utilitarian bonds found under the religious paradigm were to be replaced by the more personal, affective white master-non-white servant relationship of rural farming areas.

Coloured-White Interaction Under a Cultural Paradigm

A convenient time with which to mark the effective demise of the religious paradigm is 1824 when the British government freed all the slaves throughout the empire. Coincident with the emancipation of slaves was also the beginnings of the inclusion of large numbers of black Africans under British rule. Continually recurring clashes between eastward moving whites

⁵⁹Ibid., 18.

and southward moving Africans over cattle and land rights precipitated the steady expansion of British control. The rationalization for a cultural paradigm governing status sprung from this period during which non-Western Africans were incorporated under British rule.

The inclusion of Africans had structural implications for British colonialism. Heretofore, Coloureds by and large occupied the lowest social and economic rung. Because of the virtual extermination of the original inhabitants of the Cape and the symbiotic master-slave relationship, increasing numbers of Coloureds acquired Western cultural traits. Therefore, Coloureds gravitated to an intermediate status position between the dominant whites and the recently included non-Western Africans. In and around the Cape peninsula, Coloureds began to be employed as artisans and laborers.⁶⁰

At this juncture it is important to note the limited spatial extent of the cultural paradigm. It held away only in the area around the original settlement of Cape Town. On the eastern frontier there were no such nuances in status definitions. A rigid racial paradigm was apparent from the outset. The movement by whites to the east was almost solely a movement of the Afrikaner component, who quickly established a simple status dichotomy of dominating whites and oppressed Africans.⁶¹ Miscegenation was not a behavioral norm (although it occurred) and religious, cultural, and racial determinants were completely linked. In the fight for land and cattle, only Africans were their enemies and it was only natural for such

⁶⁰Ibid., 66-67.

⁶¹Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London, 1957), 14.

a black and white distinction, with no gray in between, to be made. Because the British were farther removed from the exigencies of frontier life, they could afford to make various distinctions between Coloureds and Africans. On the frontier such distinctions may have been tantamount to absorption by the more numerous Africans.

With respect to Horvath's terminology, one may speak of a colonial relationship as characterizing Afrikaner-African contact, but British-African contact may be thought of as an imperial relationship. The Afrikaner component was expanding into and dominating African territory, whereas the British imperial agents in Cape Town were reacting to this expansion and incorporating Africans into the British Empire without ever actively encouraging settlement of the frontier as an expansionary policy. The British did settle approximately 5,000 veterans of the Napoleonic campaigns inland from East London in 1820, but this resettlement was aimed at stabilizing the frontier and separating the warring Afrikaners and Africans rather than expanding the white sphere of control. The history of British-African relations in the nineteenth century is largely one of arbitration and attempts at settlement stabilization.

The spatial variation in status definitions at this point in time will help to explain subsequent British and Afrikaner policies toward the other non-white groups. Indeed, the present stances of Afrikaners and English-speaking whites, as represented by the Nationalist Party and the United Party, respectively, can be traced directly to the initial period of race relations.

The British-imposed cultural paradigm of the nineteenth century came to be known as Cape Liberalism, although by twentieth century standards it

was an extremely conservative paradigm. The impetus to this policy, notes Patterson, was provided mainly by the British philanthropic movement working through missionary societies and their sympathizers in the colonial administration.⁶² Cape Liberalism established the legal and political equality of all non-whites with whites. Restrictions on the movement of Hottentots were erased and the principle of equality in the eyes of the law was made explicit in 1828. During the period 1834-1838, all slaves were emancipated. The Cape had a color blind franchise for males, which in 1854, elected a colonial parliament consisting of two chambers.⁶³

While Coloureds enjoyed political and legal equality with whites, a laissez-faire economic policy maintained and later intensified a distinction between whites and Coloureds. The British colonial authorities did not actively recruit Coloureds for better paying and more prestigious occupations. As a result, a rough division of labor based largely, but not entirely, on ethnic group developed. As noted previously, Coloureds in the Western Cape gravitated to artisanry and other semi-skilled and skilled work, initially as a means to escape slavery, and later on a quasi-hereditary basis. As the dominant whites abhorred all occupations, but commerce, the professions, and farming,⁶⁴ the movement of Coloureds into the skilled trades may be regarded as a movement along avenues of the least resistance. In other words, under the cultural paradigm of domestic colonialism the only work completely free of any racial restriction on advancement

⁶²Patterson, op. cit., 173.

⁶³Leonard Thompson, Politics in the Republic of South Africa (Boston, 1966), 24-25.

⁶⁴Patterson, op. cit., 174.

was in the skilled trades.

A markedly different economic picture prevailed outside the settled environs of the Cape peninsula. Here a racial stratification of labor was present with Coloureds forming the bulk of the unskilled agricultural labor and whites as the landowning farmers. Avenues to higher economic positions were limited by the fact that agriculture was the sole occupation. The dominant whites naturally monopolized the most prestigious occupation.

It is important to note that no Coloureds were legally barred from any occupations. The educational and/or monetary qualifications for most of the positions held by whites precluded major inroads by Coloureds.

Had the political and legal rights of Coloureds been carefully guarded, the social structure of the Western Cape may have evolved to approximate the caste and class structure found in the United States. That is, the social structural form would have been one of endogamous, ascribed groups which are ranked in relation to one another, and which are internally stratified into relatively permeable social classes. Given the high degree of cultural identity between whites and Coloureds and the considerable extent to which racial intermixing had occurred previously, a fluid situation may have arisen with most Coloureds remaining in the lower economic strata, while a few would have risen to economic, and perhaps social, equality with whites. While most whites would have been at the top of the economic ladder, some whites might have been represented in the lowest economic stratum.

However, the political and legal safeguards given the Coloureds were not exploited to the fullest extent. Conspicuously lacking throughout the

history of Coloured participation in colonial government has been a political party explicitly devoted to maintaining and expanding Coloured rights. Only in the last 10 years have numerous Coloured groups come forward representing various special interest groups. Patterson states that this lack of group consciousness was a function of their feeling that interests were one and the same as those of whites. She speculates that this may also account for their failure to improve their economic status.⁶⁵ The failure of Coloureds to guard their precarious position between whites and Africans is made all the more profound when it is realized that of the 55 Cape parliamentary constituencies, Coloured voters had substantial influence in 25, and were decisive in 7.⁶⁶ When late in the nineteenth century, voter qualifications in the Cape were raised as a result of the inclusion of a number of African Reserves, no Coloured opposition was heard. Although the franchise remained color blind, the economic requirement was raised slightly and so defined that occupation of land on communal tenure did not suffice, and a simple writing test in English was introduced.⁶⁷

Another factor which encouraged the decline of a cultural paradigm structuring domestic colonialism was the diminution of missionary efforts. Considerable dislike of mission work directed at the African among frontier whites was partially responsible, but probably more important was the weakening of the effort as the earlier mission zealots and supporters died out.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Marquard, op. cit., 80.

⁶⁷Thompson, op. cit., 25.

Three factors, then, worked to undermine the cultural determinant of status: a laissez-faire economic policy, the failure of Coloured voters to exploit the franchise, and a moderation in the educational and vocational efforts of Christian missions.

As with the decline of the religious paradigm and the emergence of a cultural paradigm, the point in time at which one can determine the preeminence of a racial determinant governing domestic colonialism relationships is difficult, if not impossible. It is more accurate to conceive of a slow decrease in acceptance of the cultural determinant by the dominant whites concomitant with a rise of a racist philosophy. This change in paradigms is undoubtedly related to successive advances in home rule by the settlers and a decline in metropolitan influence. Again, the areal variation of the evolution of white consciousness of race is an important element to consider in the emergence of the racial paradigm.

Industrialization and Urbanization--Catalysts to Change

The catalyst of the racial paradigm can be traced directly to the discovery of diamonds near Kimberley in 1867. Mining served as an impetus to the industrialization of South Africa and effectively transformed it from a static, agrarian colonial society to an industrial state with many of the characteristics of Western nations. Such a transformation implies profound social structural changes. Customary, traditional paradigms structuring status are easiest to rationalize given a no-change social and economic situation. The history of whites in South Africa prior to industrialization was one of a pastoral and agricultural people at a near subsistence level with a consequent stable social structural form and set of social relations. Industrialization demands a radical change in the scope

and content of institutions and sets of social relations. It knows no constraints based on race. Similarly, industrialization, and its corollary, urbanization, require a utilitarian, functional relationship among residential, commercial, and industrial sectors for optimal use of the factors of production--land, labor, and capital. If the white-imposed system of domestic colonialism was composed of only two culturally akin components, white and Coloured, differences in physical appearance could be reconciled with the requirements of an industrial society. The introduction of black African and Asiatic groups to the industrialization and urbanization process distinguishable from whites both on the basis of skin tone and culture precipitated a linkage between color and culture as a determinant of status. Agricultural devastation during and after the Boer War of 1899-1902, forced numbers of whites off the land and into urban centers. These were Afrikaans-speakers imbued with a racialist philosophy. As Leo Marquard and Eric Walker note, the prospect of Africans and Asians in competition for jobs with whites was perceived as a threat to continued white superiority. Marquard states:

South Africans see the small class of educated Africans against a background of ignorance and semi-barbarism, and they are afraid to distinguish between them lest the small trickle of friendly association becomes a swollen river of social amalgamation.⁶⁸

Such thinking demanded a racial paradigm to ensure a permanent white dominance of the polity and economy.

It is well to note that the Western Cape participated only indirectly in the growth of mining and urbanization. Cape Town was a port of entry for men and material headed for the mines, but was physically removed from

⁶⁸Marquard, op. cit., 138.

the heady urbanization and industrialization occurring on the frontier. Thus, a racial paradigm was already well-established in white minds by the time diamonds were discovered at Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand. During a period in which fortunes could be made overnight, white dominance would be threatened by modestly well-off, but non-Western and black Africans. In contrast, black Africans in the Western Cape were almost non-existent. Cape Town did not experience as rapid a growth as did the towns on the Witwatersrand. Traditional status arrangements were maintained (See Table 3).

The preceding discussion focuses on industrialization and urbanization as the catalysts in the shift in colonial paradigms. The movement of large numbers of Africans and Asians to the mining camps, and not the presence of Coloureds in urban centers, accounted for the emergence of a formal racial paradigm. A symbiotic economic relationship existed on farms in the cities in the Western Cape between whites and Coloureds. Longstanding, customary avenues of employment were open to Coloureds and whites.

Therefore, the long run logical consequences of a new paradigm were lost on Coloureds. They did not conceive of any social, political, and economic ramifications on themselves from the racial status determinant resulting from an African and Asian urban influx.

Neither, apparently did the dominant whites. The period from 1910-1948 witnessed a profusion of economic and political legislation designed to maintain white dominance of the polity and economy. The measures lacked coherent long term goals--a reflection on the fact that whites were in the process of changing paradigms. Most aimed at controlling urban African

TABLE 3

POPULATION GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICAN URBAN CENTERS, 1911-1960

	<u>1911</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asian</u>
Johannesburg	237,104	119,953	--	117,151--	
Cape Town	161,579	85,442	--	76,137--	
Durban	89,998	34,880	--	55,118--	
Pretoria	57,674	35,942	--	21,732--	
Port Elizabeth	37,063	20,007	--	17,056--	
Kimberley	44,433	17,507	--	26,926--	
Germiston	54,325	15,579	--	38,746--	
East London	24,606	14,899	--	9,707--	
Pietermaritzburg	30,555	14,737	--	15,818--	
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijlpark	n.a.				
East Rand	76,180	20,160	--	56,020--	
West Rand	87,722	20,789	--	66,933--	
	<u>1921</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asian</u>
Johannesburg	288,131	151,836	118,353	11,713	6,229
Cape Town	212,997	114,110	8,707	87,743	2,437
Durban	151,642	58,085	38,617	3,995	50,945
Pretoria	74,052	43,361	24,794	2,140	1,767
Port Elizabeth	52,298	26,303	11,472	13,203	1,320
Kimberley	39,702	18,288	13,048	7,446	920
Germiston	46,089	18,477	26,488	638	488
East London	34,673	20,374	11,601	2,006	692
Pietermaritzburg	36,023	17,998	9,992	1,089	6,944
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijlpark	5,433	1,843	3,242	171	177
East Rand	110,292	34,015	73,178	1,870	1,229
West Rand	66,598	20,579	43,895	1,513	611
	<u>1936</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asian</u>
Johannesburg	519,384	257,671	229,122	22,482	10,109
Cape Town	344,223	173,412	14,160	152,911	3,740
Durban	259,606	95,033	68,698	7,649	88,226
Pretoria	128,621	76,935	45,312	3,392	2,982
Port Elizabeth	109,841	53,461	28,290	25,631	2,459
Kimberley	40,231	15,741	14,499	9,014	977
Germiston	79,440	32,564	44,572	1,498	806
East London	60,563	31,311	24,388	4,011	853
Pietermaritzburg	49,539	22,446	15,671	2,334	9,088
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijlpark	18,867	4,718	13,414	344	391
East Rand	182,697	54,342	123,365	3,246	1,744
West Rand	125,145	33,991	88,477	2,054	623

TABLE 3
(continued)

	<u>1946</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asian</u>
Johannesburg	765,457	332,026	387,175	30,222	16,034
Cape Town	470,911	220,398	35,197	208,451	6,865
Durban	372,269	130,143	113,612	11,449	117,065
Pretoria	244,887	130,810	104,532	4,444	5,101
Port Elizabeth	147,907	65,271	47,419	31,851	3,366
Kimberley	55,909	19,067	25,047	10,820	975
Germiston	131,618	52,609	75,886	1,930	1,193
East London	79,205	40,118	32,656	5,193	1,238
Pietermaritzburg	63,333	27,751	20,613	3,138	11,831
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijlpark	40,490	11,742	27,723	500	525
East Rand	211,126	72,261	132,679	4,188	1,998
West Rand	176,639	57,154	115,210	3,278	997

	<u>1960</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>African</u>	<u>Coloured</u>	<u>Asian</u>
Johannesburg	1,152,525	413,153	650,912	59,467	28,993
Cape Town	807,211	305,155	75,200	417,881	8,975
Durban	681,492	196,398	221,535	27,082	236,477
Pretoria	422,590	207,202	199,890	7,452	8,046
Port Elizabeth	290,693	94,931	123,183	68,332	4,247
East London	116,056	49,295	56,603	8,431	1,727
Germiston	214,393	86,314	121,496	4,194	2,389
Pietermaritzburg	128,598	40,065	55,921	5,715	26,827
Kimberley	79,031	24,739	36,134	17,078	1,080
Vereeniging/ Vanderbijlpark	120,569	46,480	71,978	1,202	909
East Rand	504,513	159,083	329,537	9,349	6,544
West Rand	309,461	107,680	194,658	5,125	1,998

Source: 1960--South Africa Statistical Year Book, 1966, A-25.

1946--Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, 1948, 1001.

1936--Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, 1940, 1044.

1921--Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, 1929, 879.

1911--Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, 1915, 157.

and Asian activities, but were adopted in response to, rather than in anticipation of, a laissez-faire development policy.

Restrictive economic measures were first introduced shortly after Union (1910). By the Land Act of 1913, Africans were prohibited from owning land except in the Reserves. The legislation did not affect Coloureds, but was the precedent for the restricting of Coloured land ownership in 1950. In 1911, the Mines and Works Act was enacted. It empowered the government to regulate the issue of certificates of competency in skilled occupations in mining and engineering.⁶⁹ Again, the law was aimed at restricting the growth of a skilled black urban proletariat on the Witwatersrand, but was ultimately to affect Coloured workers in the Western Cape.

The economic consequences of World War I intensified the anomalies inherent within the cultural paradigm. The disruption of overseas trade patterns necessitated a program of import substitution. The Witwatersrand, with its established mining base and ancillary industries, an abundance of capital and technical skills, and a plentiful supply of cheap, black labor, was the primary industrial growth point. As the supply of white labor was insufficient, small numbers of Africans were drawn into skilled and semi-skilled positions. Their urban experience was breaking down ethnic peculiarities and forging common working class bonds. One of the stop gap measures designed to maintain white dominance was the Colour Bar Act of 1926 which made it illegal to perform a large number of skilled mining jobs.⁷⁰ The greatest clamor for the passage of the legislation was raised by white trade unionists--the individuals economically closest to the African proletariat, but

⁶⁹Ibid., 141.

⁷⁰Ibid., 141-42.

probably the farthest socially from the African.

The World Depression of the 1930's also contributed to the emergence of a racial paradigm. During this period, as was the case previously with the Boer War, large numbers of poor, illiterate, Afrikaans-speaking whites migrated to the Union's urban centers in search of jobs. In contrast to the impetus behind the urban influx associated with World War I, this movement was characterized by agricultural failure rather than the lure of urban industrial job expansion. The rural, Afrikaans-speaking, white component had always adhered to a rigid, racial paradigm, and once large numbers of poor whites migrated to the cities and a larger number of non-whites acquired a higher standard of living and traits of Western culture, a customary cultural criterion for status differentiation became difficult to rationalize. The poor whites regarded the non-whites, mainly Africans as an actual threat to white dominance. In 1936, Africans were removed from the common roll in the Cape and placed on a separate roll from which they elected four whites to represent them in the national parliament. More attempts were made to restrict the African urban influx and reserve skilled occupations for "civilized", i.e., white, labor.⁷¹

Concerted measures were, however, held in abeyance by World War II. The social and economic effects of the war were much the same as that of World War I and the Depression and proved to be the final series of events which ushered in a formal racial paradigm in 1948.

The preceeding discussion has traced the structure of white-imposed domestic colonialism toward the Coloured intervening group from a customary,

⁷¹Ibid., 138.

informal religious paradigm to a customary, cultural paradigm and has noted the factors of urbanization and industrialization which fostered the rise of a formal racial paradigm. In a spatial sense, the religious and cultural paradigms emanated from the Cape with the British Imperial agents in Cape Town formulating both policies. At the onset of mining and consequent industrialization, the center of white power shifted to the frontier where a strict racial paradigm governed status differentiation. Industrialization created a semi-urbanized African working class with economic interests and incomes which approximated that of some whites. The residential juxtaposition of urban whites and Africans forced a linkage of color and culture to preserve white domination. As Africans were already in the lowest status group by virtue of culture, would not race be a better criterion. as both were coexistent? Coloureds were not directly affected by the various economic measures, but the increasing racist texture of the legislation established precedents for their future extension to Coloureds.

Asian-White Interaction

The Asians, a second intervening group, have been alluded to only briefly. In addition to Africans, this group was a primary recipient of progressively restrictive legislation.

Horvath notes that the type of intervening group represented by Asians occupied intermediate positions in the colonial bureaucracy and economy. This was not the case with initial Asian immigration to Natal. The first migratory stream consisted of indentured agricultural labor. Although their legal status in South Africa was never made entirely clear, it was assumed that they would return to India once their period of service was completed. Most did not, but, rather, encouraged their

families and friends to join them; hence, the second wave of "passenger" Indians. The second group more accurately represented the second type of intervening group as many of these Asians were active in commerce.

Throughout their residence in South Africa, a complex of cultural and skin tone determinants have accounted for the Asian status within the domestic colonialism system. This mixture of criteria is a reflection on the period in which white evaluation was undergoing change. Asians were of a non-Western Indian culture, but racially were neither Negroid nor completely Caucasoid, or Mongoloid.

Legally, there was ambiguity surrounding their residence. For many years the Union government attempted to repatriate Indians, but without their support and the Indian colonial government's. Dr. Malan, prime minister of South Africa during the 1920's, succinctly described the majority of white opinion when he stated:

I must say that the Bill frankly starts from the general supposition that the Indian as a race in the country is an alien element in the population and that no solution of this question will be acceptable to the country unless it results in a very considerable reduction of the Indian population in this country.⁷²

Politically and economically, they were subject to erratic and sporadic attempts to restrict their settlement to Natal. Asians were forbidden to live in the Orange Free State and their residence and trading rights in the Transvaal were contained to certain areas through a series of laws passed between 1885 and 1919. Asians lost the franchise in Natal in 1896 even though the number of Asian voters was a small fraction of the white electorate. By Law 3 of 1885, Asians were disenfranchised in the Transvaal.

⁷²G. H. Calpin, Indians in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), 59.

Only in the relatively liberal Cape were the small group of Asians on an equal legal and political footing with whites. But the Cape was not where the labor and commercial skills were in demand. In Natal, their fortunes fluctuated with the prosperity of the white cane farmers. In prosperous times the demand for more labor was heard, but when there was a glut of sugar on the world market, a clamor was raised to halt immigration and ship the Asians home. It was not until late in the last decade that whites finally considered Asians as a permanent and "assimilable" element in South Africa and established the appropriate government machinery to administer them.

The second and numerically much smaller wave of Asiatic immigration, the passenger group, participated in the urbanization and industrialization of the Witwatersrand. Many served as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers in industry and the mines, but their greatest impact in terms of status definition was in their predisposition for commerce. In simplest terms, their rigid adherence to the tenets of the "Protestant Ethic" created resentment among white traders. If such qualities were found in whites they would be lauded, but it was perceived (and in fact it was) as a threat to white dominance of the economy. Any occupational undertaking above the level of unskilled agricultural or industrial laborer was viewed with alarm by whites. G. H. Calpin has catalogued a list of grievances compiled by Transvaal whites against Asiatic traders:

- (1) They send their money out of the country instead of spending it where they earn it.
- (2) They are a source of danger to the public health owing to their unclean habits, and require constant supervision to make them conform to sanitary and other by-laws.

- (3) They depreciate the value of property in their neighborhood, as well as of the premises which they occupy.
- (4) Their standard of living is inferior to that of the European.
- (5) Their standard of trading and methods of business are different to those of Europeans in the following respects:
 - a) They use inferior buildings as shop premises and pay less rent for them.
 - b) The owner of the business and his shop-assistants all usually reside on the premises.
 - c) They defraud their creditors by fraudulent insolvency more frequently than Europeans.
 - d) They pay lower wages to their assistants than Europeans.
 - e) They evade the laws regulating hours of trading.
 - f) They habitually give short weight and adulterate foodstuffs.
- (6) They carry on businesses which should be carried on by Europeans, and close avenues of employment which should be open to Europeans.
- (7) They produce nothing in the Transvaal, and do not consume the produce of the country, but import their requirements from India.
- (8) They form "rings" to keep out Europeans competitors.
- (9) Their presence has a bad influence on the natives, who are jealous of the rights and privileges enjoyed by them as Coloured people.
- (10) Their religion, language, colour, mode of thought, ideals, manners, and customs are entirely different to those of Europeans; they cannot be assimilated and their presence is a menace to European supremacy.
- (11) They are generally immoral and debauch the natives by inciting them to theft, and by readily receiving stolen property.
- (12) They become too familiar with Europeans, especially females, in the conduct of their business, and thus destroy the respect of natives for Europeans.⁷³

⁷³Calpin, op. cit., 42-43.

However, it should not be assumed that all Transvaal whites shared these feelings, as Calpin notes.⁷⁴

At the same time, the European stereotype of Asians as a shrewd, thrifty, intelligent people acquired for Asians a favored economic position within white-controlled business and industry.⁷⁵ Apparently, it was not so much the accumulation of wealth by Asians that was objected to by whites, but its accumulation outside or in spite of white controls.

As with the passing of legislation curtailing African residence and occupations in urban areas, anti-Indian economic legislation coincided with the rapid social and cultural change resulting from World War I, the Depression, and World War II. The Transvaal Asiatic Land and Trading Amendment Act of 1919 declared that no new trading licenses were to be issued to Indians in the Transvaal after May 1, 1919, except in the case of an already established Indian business changing hands from one Indian to another.⁷⁶ It also made it impossible for Indians to evade the law prohibiting them from owning fixed property in the Transvaal, either by forming a limited company or by becoming the mortgage of a nominal European owner. The Asiatic Land Tenure Act of 1932 gave the appropriate government agencies the right to restrict Witwatersrand Asian businesses and residences to certain predefined areas.⁷⁷ As such it was a form of apartheid on a sub-provincial scale. The Asiatics (Transvaal Land and Trading) Act of 1939 and its extensions in 1941 and 1943 was a standstill order; it

⁷⁴Ibid., 43.

⁷⁵van den Berghe, Caneville, 142.

⁷⁶Calpin, op. cit., 40.

⁷⁷Ibid., 220.

pegged the Indians to their abodes and businesses and forbade Europeans from allowing Asians to occupy or own their property.⁷⁸

Two features stand out in an analysis of anti-Indian legislation. First, is the lack of a comprehensive legislative package to effectively subordinate Asians under white economic domination. All the laws mentioned, and many the author did not, attempted to wipe out the Asian merchant class as an independent economic agent. Clearly, the laws did not succeed. Two possible explanations are offered. Either Asians were extraordinarily clever businessmen able to manipulate loopholes in the law to their advantage, or they had support from segments of the European community, or rather, enough whites were indifferent to the "Asiatic threat" to allow execution of the laws to lapse. A combination of the two alternative explanations seem plausible. Asian traders had a long history of occupational specialization within the caste social structural form of India, and it is inconceivable that legislation may go unenforced without the tacit support of many of the dominant whites.

The second feature of the legislation is much broader in scope. The laws were concerned only with Asians. No mention is made of restricting African or Coloured residence and business. The narrow scope reflects, again, a grouping for a viable paradigm with which to structure status. Measures were conceived on an ad hoc basis with apparently little thought to the wider theoretical implications of an emerging racial paradigm. There is a body of thought which holds that a society will rarely seek to

⁷⁸Ibid., 90.

rigorously articulate its societal design until that fact is accomplished.⁷⁹ Only once a particular arrangement of individual and aggregate activities is operating more or less smoothly will the society's sages rationalize these events in terms of theory. The fit between reality and theory is a measure of the society's stability. The years 1910-1945 exemplify a period of reevaluation, a search for alternative means to rationalize white dominance. A racial policy was incipient, but could be made manifest only after its adherents gained political power.

As might be expected, there were no such vagaries in white political legislation aimed at Asians. Revocation of the Indian franchise proceeded in sporadic, but steady steps in all provinces. In the nineteenth century, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, Afrikaner-dominated republics at the time, passed laws disenfranchising Asians--evidence of an early adoption of a formal racial paradigm.⁸⁰ In Natal, the process was much slower. The province had to contend with the opposition of the British colonial authorities who were still imbued with some of the notions of Cape Liberalism. Prior to 1896, Asians with the necessary qualifications were entitled to vote. Because the number of Asians with the proper economic and literacy requirements was infinitesimal, little white concern was expressed. However, the failure of most Indians to return to Asia as expected raised the specter in white minds of eventual Indian control. In 1896, the Indian's parliamentary franchise was abolished.⁸¹ The Indian municipal franchise

⁷⁹Edward Harper, "A Comparative Analysis of Caste: The United States and India," Structure and Change in Indian Society (Chicago, 1968), 72.

⁸⁰Calpin, op. cit., 23.

⁸¹Ibid., 50.

in Natal was, after three abortive attempts, revoked in 1924. Only in the Cape was the small Asiatic community on an equal footing with whites.⁸² This, however, was lost with the rise to power in 1948 of an Afrikaner-dominated party.

With the political legislation we see the struggle, if you will, between two paradigms, with the racial paradigm gradually gaining acceptance. Spatially, a shift in paradigm allegiance from the peripheral British-influenced provinces with their informal status paradigms to the interior, Afrikaner-dominated provinces with a formal racial paradigm.

Apartheid and the Racial Paradigm

Thus far, the writer has studied a succession of informal, white-imposed status paradigms with respect to Asians and Coloureds. The religious and cultural determinants, rather than being the result of a clear cut and systematic philosophy and complete regard for ramifications throughout the system, were innate reactions to threatening phenomena. Changes in the economic institution wrought changes in the white-imposed system of social relations. The evolution of the original Cape settlement from an entrepot to agricultural colony demanded a different paradigm to maintain white supremacy. The change in paradigms were not the result of a conscious evaluation of the shortcomings of the older paradigm and the corrective aspects of the new. Similarly, the emergence of a paradigm patterned on skin color was preceded by a series of ad hoc, uninclusive economic measures aimed at specific groups. Although not incompatible with a cultural paradigm, industrialization required a non-

⁸²Ibid., 56.

racial relationship between land, labor and capital which whites were not willing to allow. Such a non-discriminatory relationship would have threatened white control of the economy. The economic and political legislation in the early twentieth century presaged the rise of a color paradigm which would firmly entrench white privilege.

This new status determinant would cut across group lines and establish uniform relationships among all groups. Under the informal paradigms, Coloureds enjoyed a favored status among non-whites. In theory, this would disappear under a color determinant. Similarly, Asians would lose their trading rights, however, diminished, in white areas. An all-inclusive, formal paradigm would eradicate the different spatial and structural applications of the previous paradigms. The shift in white balance of power from the agricultural Cape to the industrial frontier of the Transvaal would be complete. The reaction of whites to power-threatening Africans, Asians, and Coloureds was to be replaced by an orderly, anticipated structuring of white-non-white interaction.

The conflicts within the cultural paradigm culminated in the election to power in 1948 of the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party on a platform of apartheid. Ostensibly, apartheid maintained that each racial (color) group had a unique culture and history worth maintaining. Amalgamation and acculturation of the races would dilute and corrupt the purity of each group's culture. Only through a structural and spatial separation of the races would each color group be able to fulfill its unique purpose on earth. Professor L. J. Du Plessis in Rhodie and Venter states:

We wish to separate ourselves from the Bantu not because we regard them as being inferior, but because they surround us and threaten to overwhelm us by their numerical

superiority, and are culturally different and less developed than we are.⁸³

Elsewhere, Rhodie and Venter note that "the three foundation stones of apartheid are Western culture, Christian morality, and a specific racial identity."⁸⁴ Note that the two previous customary paradigms are now linked with racial identity.

The origin of the frontier white racial mythology has been alluded to earlier. The three foundation stones mentioned by Rhodie and Venter as distinguishing marks between blacks and whites existed on the frontier. However, their analysis obscures a fundamental similarity in life styles. Both Afrikaners and Africans were semi-nomadic, subsistence pastoralists and farmers. Their lives were ones of a struggle for adequate land and water for cattle and crops. The most significant qualitative differences were Afrikaner possession of the fire arm which was compensated by a quantitative black numerical superiority. Therefore, the distinguishing characteristics of each group used to rationalize apartheid should not be allowed to mitigate the essential similarities in life style and should emphasize the act of domination. Apartheid cannot be viewed as being based on differentiation, but domination.

The discussion of apartheid has emphasized a cultural, racial, and religious differential between whites and Africans. But what of Asians and Coloureds? The linkage of the above criteria clearly places the Coloureds in structural limbo. They cannot be distinguished from whites except on the basis of color. The ideology of apartheid breaks down on this point and emphasizes the weaknesses of Du Plessis' position. Numerical superiority

⁸³Rhodie and Venter, op. cit., 37.

⁸⁴Ibid., 30.

does not necessarily imply cultural corruption and disappearance of a "race." In the South African case, quite the opposite occurred. The original inhabitants of the Cape (Hottentots and Bushmen) were physically and culturally eliminated by the culturally superiority, but numerically smaller, European.

It may be possible to establish for whites and blacks certain areas which each could call his own. The Western Cape for whites, and the Transkei and Zululand for Africans have long been occupied exclusively by each group. Indeed, a self-governing African homeland has been established in the Transkei and one is in the process of formation in Zululand. In contrast, Asians and Coloureds have long intermingled with whites, both in rural and urban areas. The Nationalist government has set aside for exclusive use by Coloureds a number of rural Cape areas, but the low and variable rainfall has precluded large-scale settlement on the land and has even forced male breadwinners to migrate to urban centers for part of the year to adequately support their families as W. P. Carstens has noted in his study of a Coloured reserve.⁸⁵ The present population of all Coloured reserves is 40,000 and it is doubtful that more could be supported, save for the introduction of irrigation and/or a major mineral discovery.⁸⁶ In Natal, where the bulk of Asians are resident, land has already been completely fragmented into a patchwork quilt of white agricultural holdings and African reserves. In the past whites have strongly resisted attempts to alienate land for Africans, so it is doubtful that a territorial basis

⁸⁵W. P. Carstens, The Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve, (Cape Town, 1966), 38-39.

⁸⁶Ibid., 50.

for Asian apartheid may be developed. Territorial considerations aside, no mention has been made here of the deep religious and linguistic cleavages within the Asian community. Van den Berghe perceptively remarks that Asians can only be thought of as a cohesive group with respect to the uniformity with which they are treated by whites.⁸⁷ Otherwise it may be more accurate to speak of Moslem or Urdu-speaking Asians rather than lumping them all together.

Given the realities of Asian, Coloured, and white spatial distribution, the practical result of apartheid is white domination. Coloureds are not culturally distinct from whites and to rigorously follow the tenets of apartheid for Asians would require a larger number of locations--one for each religious and/or linguistic grouping. Neither does each group have an area which each could call its own. In fairness to the African, the white-African relationship is one of domination also, but at least the theory, and, in some small way, the practice of apartheid allows for a substantial increase in popular decision-making.

Prior to 1948, a political outlet for Coloureds and Asians existed. Nationalist legislation removed Asiatic parliamentary representation in 1948 and eliminated Coloureds from the common voting roll in 1956 by the Separate Representation of Voters Act.⁸⁸ Coloureds were allowed until 1968 to elect four whites in the Cape to represent them in parliament. As of today (1971) they still possess the municipal franchise in the Cape, but the current trend in political thought is directed at disenfranchising

⁸⁷van den Berghe, op. cit., 165.

⁸⁸Marquard, op. cit., 80.

them.^{89*} The loss by Coloureds of any measure of political decision-making can only be rationalized in terms of sheer color domination. The removal of the franchise was not compensated for by economic or other benefits. As there are no concrete plans for territorial apartheid, whites apparently wished to eliminate, once and for all, any potential opposition to their rule.

Caste and Class Development Under Apartheid

Earlier in the paper under the conceptual framework, it was suggested that the four "racial groups" in South Africa constitute castes, and that within each group social classes are beginning to form. Van den Berghe's and Tuden and Plotnicov's definitions of caste were offered to narrow and channel the scope of analysis. The historical summary provided in this chapter appears to lend credence to the notion that the four "racial" groups in South Africa are castes. It is also apparent to the writer that the development of a Western class system, resulting from the urbanization and industrialization in the first part of the twentieth century, cuts against the thrust of apartheid ideology. If we accept a synthesis of Marxian and Weberian views on the definition of social class, then we can only speak of an incipient class system. As yet there is no sense of identity and style of life, characteristic of a social class, no common economic condition of the individuals, no political action along class lines, and no social mobility based on merit

⁸⁹Muriel Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1970 (Johannesburg, 1971), 174.

*The Cape Times reports that on November 3, 1971, the Coloured Municipal Franchise in the Cape was eliminated by government legislation.

to bind the four "racial" groups together. Diverse cultural traditions and ethnic loyalties, race, and religious and linguistic barriers have meant an imperfect, at best, class development. Among non-whites it appears that the upper classes are almost non-existent, whereas among whites the lower class appears to be absent. Among Asiatics and Coloureds, however, the relative lack of economic mobility barriers in the past has meant larger numbers of workers in semi-skilled and skilled jobs, and, hence, in a higher class than Africans.

The endogamy and ascription characteristics of caste have been evolving since inter-racial marriages declined following the introduction of the cultural paradigm and were formally established under the racial paradigm with the passage of the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950 and the Mixed Marriages Act and Population Registration Act of 1951.⁹⁰ These measures, among other things, prohibited intercourse and marriage across race lines, and empowered the government to issue to each South African an identity card stating race, date of birth, physical disabilities, criminal record, and other vital statistics.

Ranking is also present in South Africa. A caste system implies the existence of a superiority-inferiority scale which in South Africa is based on race. Whites have always monopolized political and economic decision-making, and there is an elaborate racial mythology establishing white intellectual superiority. In fact, as one paradigm has succeeded another the basis for ranking has become more precise and all-inclusive. Coloureds and Asians, in particular, have become increasingly powerless. Ranking, however, does not imply that all castes must be ranked in relation

⁹⁰Marquard, op. cit., 78-79.

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to one another. Edward Harper states that in a multicasite system any two castes may occupy levels of approximately equal rank. All that is necessary is for these castes to be rated between the superior and inferior castes.⁹¹ Thus, in the South African case, the lack of historical interaction between Coloureds and Asians, and consequently their relatively equal position vis a vis whites and Africans, does not militate against the use of the term caste to describe the overall societal structure.

It is clear, then, that the four racial groups of South Africa satisfy van den Berghe's minimum definition of caste. Tuden and Plotnicov offer a much more restrictive definition of caste by including occupational specialization and the concept of pollution in addition to van den Berghe's criteria.

Social distance regulated on the basis of pollution is well-established. Africans are held to be stupid, lazy, and ignorant, or if they are detribalized, arrogant, spoiled, and prone to violence and crime.⁹² Asians are held to be dishonest, rich, and prolific.⁹³ Coloureds are believed to be drunkards, lazy, and shiftless, and because they possess blood of the other racial groups, they are held as some how inferior to whites.⁹⁴ However, no distaste is expressed by whites at having non-white servants prepare and cook their food and wash and feed their children. Similarly, interracial dancing is regarded by whites with horror. Van den Berghe, in his study Caneville, The Social Structure of a South African

⁹¹Harper, op. cit., 54.

⁹²van den Berghe, Caneville, 231.

⁹³Ibid., 211.

⁹⁴Patterson, op. cit., 180.

Town, documents many other instances of the demeaning status assigned to non-whites by whites.

The occupational specialization qualification is crucial to a discussion of caste. Heretofore, caste has been applied to agrarian, non-industrial societies. Harper notes that while occupational specialization by castes is possible in rural India, it ceases to operate in a modern, complex, industrial economy. Further, in the case of the United States, where a caste and class form is present, occupation is related to social class, in addition to caste affiliation.⁹⁵ Thus, if it does not exist now, it would be a difficult task to implement occupational specialization in South Africa. Nevertheless, Harper states that in the United States and India the lowest castes tend to fill the most routine, degrading, and menial jobs.⁹⁶ In the past in South Africa this was certainly the case. Africans formed the bulk of the unskilled agricultural and industrial workers. In contrast, Coloureds and Asians were allowed by whites to enter certain occupations, because Afrikaans-speaking whites held the professions (medicine, law, etc.) and farming in high esteem. Coloureds in the Cape were well-represented among artisans and agricultural laborers. Asians in the Cape and the Transvaal were recruited largely into commercial circles. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 and subsequent amendments institutionalized occupational specialization. Its forerunners, the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and the Colour Bar Act of 1926, pertained only to mining positions, but now the Minister of Labor was given unlimited power to reserve any job or class of job for exclusive use by members of

⁹⁵Harper, op. cit., 57.

⁹⁶Ibid., 58.

any race.⁹⁷ In theory, the law applied equally to all races, but in practice the best paying positions were always reserved for whites and the least protection afforded to Africans. As intermediate groups, Coloureds and Asians were endangered from two directions. There are little upward mobility and they have received scant protection from upward moving Africans.

The following chapter will offer a statistical examination of occupations for Coloureds and Asians, but some idea of the operational thrust of government ideology is evident if one considers average monthly wages in South African Rands (1 Rand = \$1.40) and numbers employed in various work categories for 1969 (the statistical analysis uses 1960 data). The table below summarizes this data.

TABLE 4

AVERAGE MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE LEVELS FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES--1969

I. <u>All Manufacturing</u>			II.A. <u>Construction</u>		
	Employment	Wages		Employment	Wages
Whites	279,000	278	Whites	59,000	294
Coloureds	196,000	65	Coloureds	44,000	107
Asians	74,000	67	Asians	4,000	143
Africans	608,000	48	Africans	237,000	48
II.B. <u>Commerce</u>			II.C. <u>Finance</u>		
	Employment	Wages		Employment	Wages
Whites	189,600	182	Whites	46,660	219
Coloureds	46,200	60	Coloureds	1,225	61
Asians	23,600	90	Asians	182	83
Africans	182,300	44	Africans	5,965	55
II.D. <u>Electricity Undertakings</u>					
	Employment	Wages			
Whites	8,000	299			
Coloureds	1,000	47			
Asians	---	---			
Africans	14,000	51			

⁹⁷Marquard, op. cit., 142.



TABLE 4
(continued)

III. <u>Mining</u>						
A. <u>All Mines</u>			B. <u>Gold Mines Only</u>			
	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Wages</u>		<u>Employment</u>	<u>Wages</u>	
Whites	83,236	316	Whites	40,250	327	
Coloureds	6,345	62	Coloureds	355	82	
Asians	753	78	Asians	12	128	
Africans	591,726	18	Africans	369,734	16	
IV. <u>Government</u>						
	<u>Central Govt.</u>		<u>Provincial Govt.</u>		<u>Local Authorities</u>	
	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Wages</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Wages</u>	<u>Employment</u>	<u>Wages</u>
Whites	98,186	225	89,354	221	44,700	258
Coloureds	29,932	96	11,791	47	16,800	80
Asians	6,908	136	2,220	70	3,700	59
Africans	139,976	41	76,082	33	107,800	42
<u>Railways, Harbours and Airways Administration</u>						
	<u>Employment</u>		<u>Wages</u>			
Whites	115,142		241			
Coloureds	13,663		61			
Asians	1,001		47			
Africans	95,009		45			

Source: M. Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1970, 101-21.

A number of observations are in order. First, of the eleven aggregate and individual work categories, whites consistently make the most in monthly wages and Africans the least. Whites average as much as 20 times the African monthly wage (all mines), and the smallest differential, in commerce, is still over four times the African wage.

Second, equally as consistent are the intermediate wages paid Coloureds and Asians. With one exception in the Railways, Harbours, and Airways Administration, Coloured and Asian wage rates cluster together significantly above the African rate and just as significantly below the white rate. Coloured and Asian wages range from about 1/4 the white rate

to almost 1/2 the white rate.

Third, with two exceptions, Asian wage rates are higher than those of the Coloured. In commerce, they are 50% higher, in the Central Government almost 45%, and in construction 33% higher.

Fourth, Asians appear to be clustered in commerce-related activities. Of the individual work sectors listed, over 1/2 are in commerce.

The preceeding discussion is given to suggest a three-tiered income hierarchy. While one could not conclude that occupational specialization is evident, it is clear that wage rates are racially determined. A more rigorous analysis of income and occupation will follow in the next chapter.

Emerging Spatial and Structural Design

It is suspected that the emerging spatial and structural design for white domination will use Coloureds and Asians in much the same way they were used prior to apartheid. As much as possible, whites will rely on migratory African labor for unskilled and semi-skilled work. Most Africans will owe their allegiance to their particular ethnic reserve to which they will return weekly or monthly according to distance constraints. In areas where sufficient Africans and/or whites are lacking to sustain economic growth, such as the Western Cape and Natal, Coloureds and Asians will fill the void forming the majority of the lower and middle echelon positions in government, industry, and commerce. The lack of an ideological justification for a spatial and structural separation of the two, it is suggested will be ignored for the moment in the interest of maintaining white prosperity.

In addition to an obvious economic benefit from a continued close spatial relationship, by placing Coloureds and Asians between them and the

migratory Africans, whites will have a small, powerless buffer group to absorb any outbursts of African frustration and resentment. The Durban race riot of 1949 between Africans and Asians, in which symbols and intermediaries of white domination were attacked rather than whites themselves, is an example of the white deflection of African hatred. Coloureds and Asians are convenient scapegoats through which Africans may relieve pent-up frustrations and whites may maintain supremacy.

Several observations regarding the growth and change of social institutions in comparison with the evolution of white dominance paradigms are in order. The various African and Asian institutions have been steadily constricted in numerical and structural scope as the white status paradigms have become progressively exacting and all-inclusive. Apartheid is aimed at reestablishing the ethnic institutions. However, as status equality has evolved from informal requirements to a more rigid and formal criterion--race, the white economic institutions has grown less restrictive--more demanding of a loosening of the proscriptions and prohibitions of other white and non-white social institutions. The economy requires more freedom of movement and use of land, labor and capital at the same time that the white status paradigm forbids it.

This clash of ideology versus economics has received considerable attention from Ralph Horwitz in his book The Political Economy of South Africa. The gulf between the spatial and structural demands of an industrial economy and the requirements of apartheid ideology places all South African color castes in an acute crisis, particularly Asians and Coloureds. Africans have nothing to lose and everything to gain by a change in status paradigms. Whites firmly possess the power instruments and can only experi-

ence momentary psychic problems, i.e., how to explain differences in ideology and practice. On the other hand, Coloureds and Indians stand to gain or lose considerably through a redefinition of status, peaceful or violent.

CHAPTER IV

A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF ASIAN AND COLOURED SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

The foregoing description has revealed the spatial and structural complexity of the South African human scene over time. The number of dimensions studied demands a simplification and classification to facilitate understanding. Also several major hypotheses need to be tested. A factor analytic solution is well-suited for this purpose. A large number of population characteristics may be reduced to a statistically significant comprehensible pattern. In brief, factor analysis will define clusters of variables regularly interacting over space. In this way variation in cultural and economic characteristics within and between Coloureds and Asians will be determined and compared with the historical review of the growth of the apartheid paradigm within the broad framework of domestic colonialism. The existence of a caste and class structural form will also be tested by the factor analysis through the inclusion of variables representative of the above cited criteria for caste. Therefore, the inter-relatedness of domestic colonialism, the apartheid paradigm, and the caste and class social structure will be stressed.

R. J. Rummel in his article "Understanding Factor Analysis" lists ten uses for the factor analytic approach to problem-solving; interdependency and pattern delineation, data reduction, structure, classification, scaling, hypothesis testing, data transformation, exploration, map-

ping, and theory.⁹⁸ It is apparent that many of these uses overlap. Data reduction and exploration are important related concerns of this paper. The complexity of South African race relations demands at the very least some synthesis to facilitate understanding. Factor analysis will point out those variables which are useless to an understanding of the problem. Pattern delineation, classification, and structure are central to the purpose of this thesis. It has been intimated that white domination of Coloureds and Asians has operated from a number of rationales. Factor analysis can substantiate the operation of a paradigm, and given two factor analytic solutions for two different years, it can substantiate changes in white dominance paradigms. Finally, hypothesis testing and theory are concerns of this paper. A succession of white dominance paradigms within the framework of the colonial society is the paramount concern of this paper. Factor analysis will be used to test hypothesized relationships within and between Coloureds and Asians, and the results may then be used to accept or revise Horvath's typology of colonialism.

Two factor analysis problems will be examined. Data for the years 1946 and 1960 will be used to include a temporal dimension in the analysis. Data for 1946 should reflect the transition between a cultural and racial paradigm. If apartheid is a dynamic program, changes in clusters of variables may be expected between 1946 and 1960. Ideally data for the years preceeding and following should be included. The study of over 300 years of complex and varying phenomena cannot be understood given data for

⁹⁸R. J. Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XI, No. 4, 448-51.

two days of two years. However, extensive interpretation of temporal change is hindered by the multiplicity of variables to be studied. A large number of study dates plus a large number of characteristics renders an analysis of temporal changes difficult. Other equally formidable problems are the unavailability of data for 1970 and the years prior to 1911. Its usage would have furthered the understanding of the dynamics of domestic colonialism.

In a study of social stratification where a variety of racial, ethnic, and cultural groups are present, a multiplicity of criteria of status are evident. The attempt here is not at relating Asiatic and Coloured self-conceptualization of status within their respective groups, or of African perspectives on Asian and Coloured status. Having considered these group criteria of status, one could not possibly speak of an integrated system of status evaluation. Each group will have different interpretations of what constitutes high and low status. Status in this thesis will recognize the objective reality of white control of the policy and economy. Western status determinants, primarily occupation and income, are used as the basis of the determination of status in this chapter.

Variables for Analysis

Forty-eight variables have been selected for the spatial and structural analysis (See Table 5). Most are socioeconomic, a few are cultural or demographic indices. All variables are expressed as a percentage of the population of either Coloureds or Asians in each observation unit, except for two categories of variables (6 variables) measuring median income and urban community size. The median income variables: Coloured

TABLE 5

VARIABLES USED IN THE FACTOR ANALYSIS

Demographic (Expressed as a percentage of the total for each city)

1 - Coloureds under 14	COLUN14
2 - Coloureds over 64	COLOV64
3 - Asians under 15	ASIANUN14
4 - Asians over 64	ASIANOV64

Province of Birth (Expressed as a percentage of the total for each city)

5 - Coloureds born in the Cape	COLBC
6 - Asians born in Natal	ASIANBN

Religious (Expressed as a percentage of the total for each city)

7 - Moslem Coloureds	MOSLEMCO
8 - Moslem Asians	MOSLEMAS
9 - Hindu Asians	HINDUASI
10- Christian Asians	CHRISTASI

Linguistic (Expressed as a percentage of the total for each city)

11- English-speaking Coloureds	ENGLISHCO
12- Afrikaans-speaking Coloureds	AFRIKCOL
13- English-speaking Asians	ENGLISHAS
14- Afrikaans-speaking Asians	AFRIKASI
15- Gujarati-speaking Asians	GUJARATIA
16- Tamil-speaking Asians	TAMILAS
17- Urdu-speaking Asians	URDUASIAN
18- Hindi-speaking Asians	HINDIASI

Occupational (Expressed as a percentage of the total for each city)

19- Male, Coloured professional and administrative	COLMPRAD
20- Female, Coloured professional and administrative	COLFEPA
21- Male, Asian professional and administrative	ASIAMPRAD
22- Female, Asian professional and administrative	ASIAFPRAD
23- Male, Coloured sales and commerce	COLMSC
24- Female, Coloured sales and commerce	COLFSC
25- Male, Asian sales and commerce	ASIANMSC
26- Female, Asian sales and commerce	ASIANFSC
27- Male, Coloured services	COLMSER
28- Female, Coloured services	COLFSER
29- Male, Asian services	ASIANMSER
30- Female, Asian services	ASIANFSER
31- Male, Coloured artisan and laborer	COLMAL
32- Female, Coloured artisan and laborer	COLFAL
33- Male, Asian artisan and laborer	ASIANMAL
34- Female, Asian artisan and laborer	ASIANFAL

35- Male, Coloured unemployed	COLMUN
36- Female, Coloured unemployed	COLFUN
37- Male, Asian unemployed	ASIANMUN
38- Female, Asian unemployed	ASIANFUN
39- Male, Coloured not economically active	COLMNEA
40- Female, Coloured not economically active	COLFNEA
41- Male, Asian not economically active	ASIAMNEA
42- Female, Asian not economically active	ASIAFNEA

Income (Expressed as a percentage of the average median income for all cities)

43- Coloured male median income	COLMMI
44- Coloured female median income	COLFMI
45- Asian male median income	ASIANMMI
46- Asian female median income	ASIANFMI

Community Size (Expressed as a percentage of the total for all cities)

47- Coloured urban percentage	COLORBP
48- Asian urban percentage	ASIANURBP

male and female median income and Asian male and female median income, are expressed as percentages of the average median income for each sex in all observation units. Therefore, in many instances the percentage will be well in excess of 100%. Similarly, in the case of the two variables measuring Asian and Coloured urban community size, an observation's score was derived by dividing the community size by the total urban population of that racial group.

The socioeconomic variables are included to determine areal and structural variation in economic standing within and between each group. Four income variables, male and female median income for those in receipt of income of Asians and Coloureds, are included to determine the above mentioned within-group and between-group variation. These gross indices will be helpful in noting changes in economic standing as the apartheid program progresses. The six occupational categories: professional and

administrative workers, artisans and laborers, sales and commerce workers, service (e.g., domestics, hotel and restaurant personnel) workers, the unemployed, and the not economically active, are divided on the basis of sex to yield twenty four variables (twelve for each racial group) and determine the extent to which each urban racial group is committed to the industrialization process, and the position of each group (white collar or blue collar) or members of a group within the overall economic hierarchy.

The cultural variables will suggest the above noted within-group stratification according to home language spoken and religion. Linguistic indices for Asians include Tamil, Hindi, Gujarati, Urdu, English, and Afrikaans-speakers. Religious variables for Asians are the percentage who practice Islam, Hinduism, and Christianity. Linguistic variables for Coloureds include Afrikaans--and English-speakers. Because almost all Coloureds are Christian, only a Moslem Coloured variable is included in the analysis. It is remembered that Moslem Coloureds were present in the early years of the Cape colony.

Demographic indices for Coloureds and Asians include the percentage of each urban group under 14 and over 64. Population studies have found a direct relationship between an industrial economy and the bulk of the population between the ages of 15 and 64.⁹⁹ Also, as an economy progresses from a subsistence to a money economy, the proportion of the population under 15 first increases, but then decreases, and over 64, increases. The lessening importance of the family as an economic unit

⁹⁹See, for example, Wilbur Zelinsky, A Prologue to Population Geography (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966), and John Clarke, Population Geography (New York, 1965).

and improved health standards are corollaries of economic development which account for these changes in the age structure. Therefore, the demographic variables may be helpful in substantiating within-group and between-group economic status.

Educational variables, such as illiteracy rates, the percentage who have complete grade school, high school, and college, are essential to this study, as the number of years of education attained is an important, objective component of status in Western societies. However, South African census data does not include data on educational achievement for Asians and Coloureds. This is regretted, and it is hoped that future statistical manipulations may include such variables.

Socioeconomic variables for Africans and whites are not included in the factor analysis. By definition, there is no socioeconomic mobility within a caste social structural form. The boundaries between castes are rigid and immutable. The fact that an individual is white or African automatically establishes for him a certain legally sanctioned status. No measure of economic success or failure can change his legal status with whites. Thus, the only relevant question becomes what is the competition for socioeconomic status between and within the Coloured and Asian groups? Again, given the objective reality of white control of the polity and economy, the question of white and African status is irrelevant.

Hypotheses

The preceeding rationale for the variables to be studied implies an exploratory nature to the factor analysis problem. Pattern delineation and

hypothesis testing are, however, central to this thesis. Two general hypotheses are advanced.

First, concerning between-group differences, it is expected that there will be an inverse relationship between size of each Asian and Coloured urban community and economic standing. Where Coloureds and/or Asians are present in significant numbers, the proportion of blue collar workers (artisans and laborers, service workers, the unemployed) will be higher than those in white collar positions (professional and administrative workers and sales and commercial workers) because whites would prefer to use Asian and/or Coloured labor rather than encourage Africans to migrate to urban centers. The smaller the community size, the less they would be viewed as a threat to white dominance, and, hence, they would be allowed to put their talents to better use. If such a spatial and structural pattern is found, it is possible to speculate that if apartheid is implemented, the small communities of Coloureds and Asians will be economically devastated.

With respect to the conceptual framework presented earlier, the inverse relationship between Coloured and Asian community size and economic standing will reveal spatial variation in the caste and class social structural form. The smaller the urban Asian and Coloured population, the higher the economic standing and the more occupationally specialized it will be. The rationale is that in cities of small community size only those Asians and/or Coloureds with valuable white collar skills will be allowed to reside there. The blue collar supply of Africans would be sufficient to meet the city's needs. Similarly, the larger the population, the greater the diversification in incomes and occupations may be

expected, but with the bulk of the group in the unskilled, blue collar, low income category.

Horvath's typology of colonialism and description of the socio-economic components of the colonial city emphasizes the intervening group as insignificant in terms of population, but vital to its economic and administrative life. This hypothesis stresses the areal variation of these attributes. In South African urban centers where community size is small, Coloureds or Asians approximate Horvath's description of the role of an intervening group. However, in at least one urban center, Durban, it is expected that Asians will have assumed the role of Horvath's indigenous peoples--a large population most of which has migrated to the city from the surrounding area, and the bulk of its workers in unskilled positions. Such a situation is doubtless an extreme case not envisioned by Horvath in his original scheme, but a possible result given a monopoly of coercive powers by the dominant group is an aggregation of some members of an intervening group to serve in the role of indigenes in one area while maintaining an intervening group character in other cities. In this way the role of an intervening group as a buffer between the dominant elite and the indigenous peoples is maintained. Not only may an intervening group be used to defend the economic interests of the dominant group against the indigenous peoples, but where one intervening group is numerous and another is negligible, the latter may be used as a buffer against the former by the dominant group. Thus, a racial paradigm of domestic colonialism may entail a variety of modes of domination. Mitchell's previously mentioned plural societal stability thesis assumes increasing credibility, if this hypothesized relationship of small community size and high economic

status is held to be true.

The second general hypothesis refers to within-group stratification and proposes that a Moslem, Gujarati and Urdu-speaking Asian cluster of variables will be associated with the previously mentioned small Asian and/or Coloured community cluster. Coloured English-speakers and Moslems are also expected to be associated with this Asian group. From the historical summary it will be remembered that the hypothesized Asian variable cluster corresponds to the "passenger" group of Indians--the second wave of migration. Conversely, it is expected that Hindu, Tamil and Hindi-speaking Asians and Coloured Afrikaans-speakers and Christians will be associated with large community size. This cluster of Asian characteristics corresponds to the first migration stream of "indentured" group.

In other words, insofar as the temporal dimension of the problem is concerned, it is expected that there has been little spatial and structural change in the characteristics of Asian and Coloured communities between 1946 and 1960. As suggested earlier, apartheid ideologies have paid scant attention to policy implications for Coloureds and Asians, and prefer to direct the bulk of their energies at redistributing population.

This second general hypothesis, in addition to specifying within-group stratification, focuses upon internal differences and belies the notion of group solidarity against a dominant minority. It is remembered that one of the criticisms of M. G. Smith's plural society was that it minimized internal cleavages and maximized group cohesiveness. This hypothesis stresses internal stratification as a means to lay a foundation for the future study of the apparent societal stability of South

Africa under a racial paradigm. Most of the social scientific literature on South Africa connotes or denotes an impending catastrophic clash between the races,¹⁰⁰ but no upheavals have occurred since apartheid's inception. Apparently, scholars have paid little attention to the ability of the dominant minority to employ coercive powers to maintain social structural stability and to emphasize and exacerbate internal differences as a means for continued dominance. Differential access by members of a group to high economic status is one means of insuring minority domination. It is suspected that this is the case among South African Coloureds and Asians. Various linguistic and religious sub-groups of Asiatics and Coloureds will have a higher economic standing than others and these sub-groups are a factor in continued white control. Moreover, as the industrialization process continues, and more people of varying cultural and ethnic backgrounds are brought together, these internal religious and linguistic cleavages may become solidified along class lines and further compound the struggle to maintain non-white solidarity.

Observation Units

A possible source of error lies with the limited number of observations. Data for 1960 are limited to only 12 observations, and for 1946, only 11. As is often the case with human spatial variation, characteristics are not evenly distributed throughout space. Particularly with the case of South Africa, this writer has found that on many occasions conscious attempts at determining the spatial pattern of human settlement are the rule rather than the exception.

¹⁰⁰See, for example, Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie (New Haven, Connecticut, 1965).

The observation units available for factor analysis are cities from all provinces with the exception of the Orange Free State. At the turn of the century, Asians were barred from taking up residence in the Free State. In 1960, there were only seven Asians resident in the Orange Free State. Therefore, the Coloured urban communities there are not included in the study. In the Cape, Cape Town, East London, Kimberley, and Port Elizabeth are included. In Natal, Durban and Pietermaritzburg are included, and in the Transvaal, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Germiston, Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark, the East Rand, and the West Rand. The larger number of observations in the Transvaal reflects the cluster of activities and population in the Johannesburg metropolitan area. The observations, Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark, East Rand, and West Rand, represent observation units larger than a single city, in contrast to the other units. The Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark area is an iron and steel and coal-producing region. The West Rand is an aggregate unit representing Roodepoort, Randfontein, and Krugersdorp. The East Rand includes the cities of Boksburg, Benoni, and Brakpan. The East and West Rands represent groups of industrially related cities. The East Rand cities are based primarily on manufacturing, whereas the West Rand cities are engaged primarily in mining.¹⁰¹

The observation units selected for analysis account for a high proportion of each group's total provincial urban population. The percentages for each group by province for 1946 and 1960 are summarized in Table 6. It is clear that despite the small number of observations, most of the universe is included in the analysis.

¹⁰¹Green and Fair, op. cit., 136.

TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN ASIANS AND COLOUREDS ACCOUNTED FOR BY
OBSERVATION UNITS, BY PROVINCE

	<u>1946</u>		
	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>
Asians	75%	80	85
Coloureds	80	50	77
	<u>1960</u>		
	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>
Asians	77%	88	82
Coloureds	85	62	82
	<u>Percent Change, 1946-1960</u>		
	<u>Transvaal</u>	<u>Cape</u>	<u>Natal</u>
Asians	+2	+8	-3
Coloureds	+5	+12	+5

The small number of observations and their less than random dispersion precludes a mapping of factor scores. However, it is hypothesized that outside the provinces of initial settlement (Natal for Asians and the Cape for Coloureds) Asian and Coloured standards of living will be higher. This pattern is implied in the previously suggested inverse relationship between community size and economic status.

In summary, then, the factor analysis solution as developed thus far complements the previous historical description. On the one hand, the factor analysis approach will statistically define clusters of variables heretofore presupposed, and on the other hand, it will corroborate or refute structural changes in Coloured and Asian urban communities as a result of apartheid's implementation.

Factor Analysis--1946 Data

For 1946 data, a varimax rotation analysis yields nine factors with a cumulative proportion of variance explained of .98 (See Table 7). Communalities (the proportion of each variable entering into all nine factors) for all 48 variables are quite high. They range from a low of .83 for Asian males not economically active to a high of 1.0 for four variables--Asian male and female median income, Asian English-speakers, and male Coloured artisans and laborers. These exceptionally high values indicate the extent to which Asiatics and Coloureds are purposefully distributed in South Africa by the dominant whites.

The most important factor in terms of variance explained is factor 1--.29 of the total variation is accounted for by this variable cluster (See Table 8). The variable pattern may be labelled as a poor Coloured-wealth Asian trader complex. High positive variable loadings are associated with Asian male median income (.58), Coloured Afrikaans-speakers (.98), Asian Gujarati-speakers (.50), Asian males in sales and commerce (.87), and Coloured males and females in hotel and personal services, .69 and .71, respectively. Low negative loadings are found with Coloured male and female median income, -.77 and -.72, respectively, Hindu Asians (-.65), English-speaking Coloureds (-.98), Tamil-speaking Asians (-.57), Urdu-speaking Asians (-.63), Hindi-speaking Asians (-.78), Asian and Coloured female professional and administrative workers, -.75 and -.97, respectively, Asian females unemployed (-.94), Asians born in Natal (-.94), Asian urban percentage (-.69), and male Asian artisans and laborers (-.86).

TABLE 7

VARIMAX ROTATION ANALYSIS, ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 1946 DATA

Variables	Factors									Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
COLUNT4	.09	.15	.19	.91	.00	.07	.03	-.19	.07	.95
COLOV64	.14	.43	.09	.24	.21	-.07	.60	.51	.14	.97
ASIANUN14	-.03	-.79	-.49	-.15	.19	.13	.06	-.19	-.11	.99
ASIANOV64	.13	.76	.09	.17	.02	-.43	.14	-.05	.29	.94
COLMMI	-.78	-.15	.16	-.54	.01	.03	.15	-.09	.16	.99
COLFMI	-.72	-.27	.29	.16	-.29	.38	-.21	.05	.04	.95
ASIANMMI	.58	-.15	-.12	-.07	-.67	.09	.18	-.14	.33	1.00
ASIANFMI	.36	.59	-.10	.15	.21	.09	-.08	.65	.14	1.00
CHRISTASI	.00	.96	-.10	-.02	-.06	.15	.07	.01	-.16	.99
HINDUASI	-.65	-.25	-.45	-.15	.45	.11	.00	.15	-.22	.99
MOSLEMAS	.51	-.52	.49	.09	-.32	-.20	-.02	-.18	.22	.99
MOSLEMCO	.07	.01	.82	.29	-.12	.26	-.05	.32	.17	.98
ENGLISHCO	-.98	-.11	-.02	.13	.01	.06	.01	-.02	.02	.99
AFRIKCOL	.98	.11	.02	-.14	-.01	-.07	-.01	.02	-.03	.99
ENGLISHAS	.06	.96	.04	.02	-.14	.08	-.01	.01	-.21	1.00
AFRIKASI	.21	.32	.85	.18	.01	-.23	-.01	-.09	.20	.99
GUJARATIA	.50	-.59	-.28	.02	-.44	.09	.07	-.28	.08	.98
TAMILAS	-.57	-.33	-.30	-.18	.60	.01	.23	.16	.00	.99
URDUASIAN	-.63	-.51	-.06	.16	-.09	-.38	-.26	-.03	.29	.99
HINDIASI	-.78	-.45	-.11	-.07	.39	-.09	-.12	.05	-.01	.99
COLMPRAD	-.46	.48	.39	-.11	-.26	-.45	.23	-.09	.25	.99
COLFEPA	-.75	.24	.07	.40	-.41	-.10	.03	.27	-.09	.97
ASIAMPRAD	-.36	.11	.90	-.06	-.07	-.06	.07	-.03	-.15	.99
ASIAFPRAD	-.97	-.08	.01	.01	.17	-.02	.16	.04	.05	.99

TABLE 7
(continued)

COLMSC	.28	.32	.59	-.07	-.08	.09	.67	.04	.01	.99
COLFSC	-.37	-.22	.54	-.45	-.26	-.21	.45	.09	.04	.99
ASIANMSC	.87	-.13	.04	.17	-.33	-.12	.18	-.09	.19	.99
ASIANFSC	.15	.95	-.04	.06	-.18	.09	-.02	.03	.12	.98
COLMAL	-.40	-.14	.16	.13	.04	.86	.05	.03	.19	1.00
COLFAL	-.31	-.65	.09	.39	-.07	.52	-.16	.09	-.06	.99
ASIANMAL	-.86	-.03	-.09	-.28	-.01	.37	-.02	-.14	.05	.99
ASIANFAL	.15	.46	-.24	-.09	.01	.82	-.05	.05	-.11	.99
COLMSER	.69	-.15	-.23	-.05	.39	-.13	.34	.19	-.33	.99
COLFSER	.71	-.08	.09	-.29	.41	.07	.11	-.39	-.23	.99
ASIANMSER	.05	.55	-.09	-.16	.28	-.03	-.13	.15	-.72	.99
ASIANFSER	-.52	-.22	.27	.61	.05	.37	-.23	.09	.00	.97
COLMUN	.24	.22	-.39	.56	-.44	-.18	-.04	.04	-.41	.98
COLFUN	.09	.25	-.09	.13	-.23	-.18	-.14	-.82	.30	.96
ASIANMUN	-.05	-.25	-.29	-.01	.88	.06	-.07	.18	-.01	.96
ASIANFUN	-.95	.01	.01	-.28	.12	-.09	.02	.02	.00	.99
COLMNEA	.03	.08	.21	.87	-.12	-.09	.26	.16	.15	.94
COLFNEA	-.53	.57	-.02	-.03	.11	-.21	-.06	.58	.07	.99
ASIAMNEA	-.37	-.67	-.30	-.22	.11	.13	.16	.05	.23	.83
ASIAFNEA	-.22	-.50	-.29	.21	-.17	-.06	.70	-.07	.05	.96
COLBC	.09	.89	.39	.11	-.06	-.01	.00	-.09	-.12	.99
ASIANBN	-.94	-.25	-.09	-.08	.14	-.02	.08	-.06	-.05	.99
COLURBP	.03	.06	.99	.10	-.05	.05	-.02	-.04	-.05	.99
ASIANURBP	-.69	-.29	-.10	.58	.15	.14	-.12	-.02	-.11	.99

TABLE 7
(continued)

Proportion Variance Explained	.29	.20	.12	.09	.08	.07	.05	.05	.04
Cumulative Proportion of Variance Explained	.29	.49	.61	.70	.78	.85	.90	.95	.99

TABLE 8

EXTREME LOADINGS FOR 1946 FACTOR ANALYSIS

Factor 1 -- Poor Coloured (.29) Factor 2 -- Emerging Asian Western Class (.20)

AFRIKCOL	.98	ENGLISHCO	-.98	CHRISTASI	.96	ASIANUN14	-.79
ASIANMSC	.87	ASIAFPRAD	-.97	ENGLISHAS	.96	ASIANMNEA	-.67
COLFSER	.71	ASIANFUN	-.95	ASIANFSC	.95	COLFAL	-.65
COLMSER	.69	ASIANBN	-.94	COLBC	.89	GUJARATIA	-.59
ASIANMMI	.58	ASIANMAL	-.86	ASIANOV64	.76	MOSLEMAS	-.52
MOSLEMAS	.51	HINDIASI	-.78	ASIANFMI	.59	URDUASIAN	-.51
GUJARATIA	.50	COLMMI	-.78	COLFNEA	.57	ASIAFNEA	-.50
		COLFEPA	-.75	ASIANMSER	.55		
		COLFMI	-.72	COLMPRAD	.48		
		ASIANURBP	-.69				
		HINDUASI	-.65				
		URDUASIAN	-.63				
		TAMILAS	-.57				
		COLFNEA	-.53				
		ASIANFSER	-.52				

Factor 3 -- (.12)

COLURBP	.99
ASIANMPRAD	.90
AFRIKASI	.85
MOSLEMCO	.82
COLMSC	.59
COLFSC	.54

Factor 4 -- Poor Young Coloured (.09)

COLUMN14	.91	COLMMI	-.54
COLMNEA	.87		
ASIANFSER	.61		
COLMUN	.56		

Factor 5 -- Poor Asians (.08)

ASIANMUN	.88	ASIANMMI	-.67
TAMILAS	.60		

TABLE 8
(continued)

Factor 6 -- Working Class Intervening Groups (.07)				Factor 7 -- (.05)	
COLMAL	.86	COLMPRAD	-.45	ASIAFNEA	.70
ASIANFAL	.82			COLMSC	.67
COLFAL	.52			COLOV64	.60
Factor 8 -- (.05)				Factor 9 -- (.04)	
ASIANFMI	.65	COLFUN	-.82	ASIANMSER	-.73
COLFNEA	.58				
COLOV64	.51				

As such, this pattern of variables corresponds fairly closely with the hypothesized relationships. The Asian community is small, Moslem, and probably Gujarati-speaking. High male median income and males in sales and commerce are economic characteristics for Asians in this cluster. However, Urdu-speaking Asians are not related to this pattern as expected. In contrast, low income and Afrikaans-speaking Coloured characteristics are found in association with the Indian ones. However, English-speaking Coloureds are clearly unrelated to this pattern as is expected, and the hypothesized high positive Coloured urban percentage loading is not found.

This variable cluster corroborates the hypothesis that small Asian community size will be associated with relatively high economic standing and certain religious and linguistic characteristics, but the failure of the Coloured urban percentage variable to load high positive in connection with the other Coloured variables, and the failure of the Coloured-English-speaking variable to load high positive in connection with the Asian variables suggests that Coloured socioeconomic standing is universally lower

than the Asian. In other words, if there is an inverse relationship between Coloured income and community size, one would expect a low negative loading for Coloured urban percentage. Regardless of Coloured community size, high Asian male median income and small community size are associated with the low male and female Coloured median income. The failure of Coloured urban percentage to load significantly on this factor would seem to imply a lower economic standing for Coloureds in relation to Asians. One intervening group has clear economic superiority over the other.

With respect to the caste and class model, this factor brings out an occupationally specialized Coloured and Asian community. Both groups are strongly related to sales and commerce. Asian males are not at all related to artisanry and laboring jobs, and both Coloured males and females are strongly unrelated to professional and administrative positions.

Factor 2 accounts for .20 of the total variation and represents a distinct characteristic pattern not accounted for in the analysis. It had been expected that these variables would have been found under factor 1. In fact, a disaggregation has occurred. It may be described as an emerging Western Asian group. High positive loadings are found with Asians over 64 (.76), Christian Asians (.96), Asian female median income (.59), English-speaking Asians (.96), and Asian females in sales and commerce (.95). Low negative loadings are found with Asians under 14 (-.79), Moslem Asians (-.52), Gujarati-speaking Asians (-.59), and Asian males and females not economically active, -.67 and -.50, respectively.

This cluster stands in direct contrast to Asian variables found in the first factor pattern. Where before is found a conservative, Moslem

pattern, now a progressive, Western pattern is evident. The loadings on Asians under 14, Asian females in sales and commerce, and Asian females not economically active indicate this. Such a development is quite in contrast to the established goals of apartheid, which has emphasized the cultural exclusiveness of each group. The recognition of such characteristics by the Nationalist government may have been an impetus to apartheid.

Factor 3, explaining .12 of the total variance and characterized by positive loadings, represents both original hypothesized variable relationships, most of which are included under Factor 1. High positive loadings are found with Coloured urban percentage (.99), Coloured males and females in sales and commerce, .59 and .54, respectively, Asian males in professional and administrative jobs (.90), Afrikaans-speaking Asians (.85), and Moslem Coloureds (.82). It had been expected that Coloured community size, Asians in the professions and administrative jobs, and Moslem Coloureds would have loaded significantly in Factor 1.

Why this factor pattern emerges is unclear to the writer, but it is significant in terms of relative economic status that Asians in professional and administrative jobs are in juxtaposition with large Coloured urban communities. This factor does not reveal Coloured occupational specialization, and, therefore, is not unexpected. Although the appropriate low negative loadings for Asian variables are not found, the factor reinforces the notion that Coloureds have a lower socioeconomic standing than Asians and where two intervening groups are present the smaller community will have a higher economic status.

Factor 4 explains .09 of the total variation and may be simply described as a poor, young Coloured pattern. A negative loading is found

on Coloured male median income (-.54) and positive loadings are associated with Coloureds under 14 (.91), Asian females in services (.61), Coloured males unemployed (.56), and Coloured males not economically active (.87).

Again, the variable loadings would seem to indicate that Coloureds are lower in economic standing than Asiatics.

Factor 5 is the first of the factors to discern a poor Asian variable pattern. Tamil-speakers (.60), Asian males unemployed (.88), and Asian male median income (-.67) load significantly on this pattern. However, there are no corresponding high positive loadings associated with Coloured income and white collar occupational categories as originally hypothesized.

Factor 6 is a working class intervening group variable cluster. Coloured male and female artisans and laborers, .86 and .52, respectively, Asian female artisans and laborers (.82), and Coloured males in professional and administrative jobs (-.45) figure prominently in this factor. Its appearance is not expected, but because it accounts for only .07 of the total variation, little importance may be attached to it.

Factors 7 and 8, explaining .10 of the total variance, cannot be interpreted in light of the foregoing analysis. Factor 8 includes high loadings on Coloured females not economically active (.58), Asian female median income (.65), and Coloured females unemployed (-.82), but cannot be reconciled with the original hypotheses. Similarly, factor 7 variables loading high positive are Asian females not economically active (.70), Coloured males in sales and commerce (.67), and Coloureds over 64 (.60), and cannot be interpreted given the initial hypotheses and historical review.

Factor 9, explaining only .04 of the total variation, has only one extreme variable loading--Asian males in hotel and personal services (-.73), and is of no significance with respect to the original hypotheses.

As one of the major purposes for using factor analysis in this thesis is an exploratory one, the initial hypotheses are necessarily general and all-encompassing. Two general hypotheses of each group's total urban population and median income, and it was expected that there would be an inverse relationship between socioeconomic standing and community's breadwinners would be.

In fact, a considerable disaggregation of the original hypotheses occurred, but the cores remained. Factor 1, explaining over one-quarter of all variation, retains much of the substance of the original hypotheses. Moslem, Gujarati-speaking Asians in small numbers are concentrated in sales and commerce. As expected low Coloured median income and Coloureds in hotel and personal services--a blue collar work category, are associated with the Asiatic characteristics. However, the variable Coloured urban percentage does not load high positive on this cluster as hypothesized. In other words, size of Coloured urban community bears no relation to the pattern of Asiatic variables, nor to Coloured median income or occupation. Earlier in the chapter it was hypothesized that a small urban intervening group community would be regarded as less of a threat to white domination, and, therefore, be under less economic restrictions than a numerically large intervening or indigene group. Factor 1 appears to belie this notion with respect to Coloureds, and confirm it in the case of Asians.

The variables found in Factor 2 point to a Westernized Asian

pattern not envisioned in the original hypotheses. Traditional religious and linguistic characteristics were thought to be of far more importance in explaining Asian spatial variation than Western characteristics. It suggests that urban Indians in 1946 were not as culturally distinct from whites as supposed and that the apartheid program may have emanated from this realization. Whites not only wanted to reassert their specific racial and cultural identity, but were determined to prevent other racial and cultural groups from losing their "uniqueness."

Factors 3 and 4 substantiate the conclusion that Coloured socioeconomic status is lower than the Asian. Coloured urban percentage loads high positive on factor 3, but the Coloured income and professional and administrative variables do not appear to be related to this cluster. Similarly, factor 4 defines a poor, young Coloured cluster. Male Coloured median income is very much unrelated to this pattern and unemployed Coloured males load high positive on this variable cluster. The pattern of variable loadings implies that Coloureds are congregated in the low income and blue collar categories.

It is only with factor 4 that a poor Asiatic pattern appears. But because it accounts for only .08 of the total variance, little explanatory power may be attached to it.

Factors 6, 7, 8, and 9 account for less than 21% of the total variation. Given the historical and structural summary, it is difficult to explain the resulting patterns. They are probably a reflection on the low number of observations and extreme scores for variables in certain urban centers.

Factor Scores--1946 Data

For the above mentioned reasons interpretation and mapping of factor scores for 1946 data is difficult. Extremes in factor scores are more the rule than the exception (See Table 9). They range from a low of -4.22 for Durban on factor 1 to a high of 3.66 for Durban on factor 4. A large range in observation factor scores is to be expected for factors explaining a small percentage of the total variation, but the range in factor scores for factor 1, the most important,

TABLE 9
FACTOR SCORES FOR 1946 DATA

<u>Observations</u>	<u>Factors</u>								
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
Johannesburg	- .91	-1.92	- .05	.09	-1.09	1.57	- .25	.90	.89
Cape Town	- .50	- .55	2.23	- .49	- .84	1.16	.91	.63	-1.45
Durban	-4.22	-2.56	1.66	3.66	.06	-1.19	-1.28	-1.62	- .26
Pretoria	2.05	- .75	- .43	- .63	.27	-1.15	1.45	2.36	.18
Port Elizabeth	-1.14	3.01	-1.93	- .50	- .09	-2.34	- .17	- .16	.98
Germiston	1.39	- .33	.15	.17	2.74	.25	1.59	- .75	.13
East London	- .09	2.89	-1.39	- .12	- .24	.82	- .33	1.12	-2.46
Kimberley	2.26	3.35	- .07	.39	- .17	-1.61	- .26	.68	.84
Pietermaritzburg	-2.56	- .19	2.52	- .75	- .75	- .96	.48	- .87	.77
East Rand	.52	- .54	- .61	-1.11	1.39	- .78	-2.76	.02	.22
West Rand	3.20	-2.39	-2.07	- .71	-1.28	- .45	.62	-2.31	.15

but the range in factor scores for factor 1, the most important, is -4.22 to 3.20. Factor scores are standardized units, and most will be between -1 and +1. They are to be interpreted in much the same way correlations coefficients and variable loadings are.¹⁰²

The factor scores do not suggest any rigorous regionalization based

¹⁰²Rummel, op. cit., 469-70.

on any one variable cluster, because there has been no systematic or random sample of observation units. However, it is noted that the scores for the Natal urban centers, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, on factor 1 are very low. These are centers with large Asian and small Coloured populations. Thus, their scores are quite consistent with the initial hypotheses. The spatial pattern of factor scores for the Witwatersrand cities is confused, to say the least. On factor 1, for example, contiguous urban centers exhibit widely disparate factor scores. Over half the cities show high positive scores, however, and this is as expected. Many of the Witwatersrand towns were settled by Moslem and Gujarati-speaking Asians engaged in sales and commerce. Cape Town on factor 1 does not have a high positive score as initially expected. Cape Town is a city with a large Coloured and small Asian population and would seem to be an excellent example, as is Durban, of the inverse relationship between economic status and community size, but no such example is forthcoming.

The thesis that Coloured socioeconomic status is lower than the Asiatic cannot be confirmed by factor scores for factor 1, but some importance may be attached to it after comparing scores for Durban and Cape Town on factory 4--the poor, young Coloured cluster. Durban has an extreme score of 3.66, whereas Cape Town's is only -.49. It was expected that the small Coloured and large Asian population of Durban would score low negative on this factor. In other words, the Coloured community of Durban would be of working age and relatively well off in comparison to their Asian neighbors. The factor score indicates the opposite. In the case of Cape Town it was expected that it would score high high positive, but no significance may be attached to a score of -.49.

It may be that the observations, Cape Town, Durban, and possibly Pietermaritzburg, are extreme examples and should be eliminated from future statistical studies. The writer believes, with no justification, that they are representative of Asian-Coloured economic interactions. On the other hand, if one were to eliminate these cities from the analysis, the study would be robbed of much of its authenticity. It would not be meaningful to speak of important variable clusters if the sample from our universe was small, particularly in the case of South Africa where political and economic legislation is directed at certain groups in certain cities, and where Coloured and Asian population distribution is, relative to whites, rigidly controlled. To undertake a factor analysis, or for that matter, any quantitative technique, for 50,000 Asians instead of 300,000 Asians is to completely miss the urban centers at which apartheid is aimed.

Factor Analysis--1960 Data

For 1960, a varimax rotation analysis yields eight factors with a cumulative proportion of variance explained of .96 (See Table 10). Communalities for all 48 variables are exceptionally high. They range from a low of .86 for the percentage of Asian females in sales and commerce to a high of .99 for the percentage of Asians born in Natal. The range in communalities and proportion of variance explained compare favorably with the 1946 analysis.

The most important variable cluster in terms of proportion of total variance explained (.32) may be described as a wealthy Asian pattern. As there is no test to compare variable loadings and factor scores for two factor analysis tests, a visual comparison will be used. This

TABLE 10

VARIMAX ROTATION ANALYSIS, ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 1960 DATA

<u>Variables</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>Communalities</u>
COLUN14	-.78	-.13	-.21	-.73	-.09	.24	-.07	-.17	.98
COLOV64	.03	-.86	.23	.14	-.37	.13	-.09	.02	.98
ASIANUN14	-.26	.85	.20	-.25	-.24	-.07	-.03	-.04	.96
ASIANOV64	.03	-.86	.23	.14	-.37	.13	-.09	.02	.98
COLMMI	-.61	.09	-.54	.18	-.10	-.01	.01	-.54	.99
COLFMI	-.39	.14	-.89	-.01	-.05	.10	-.06	-.02	.99
ASIANMMI	.77	.19	-.09	.42	.23	.11	.15	-.28	.97
ASIANFMI	.19	-.52	-.21	-.73	-.08	.24	-.01	-.17	.98
CHRISTASI	.02	-.99	.03	-.09	.00	-.04	-.06	.03	.99
HINDUASI	-.81	.06	-.10	-.46	.33	-.07	.02	.03	.99
MOSLEMAS	.58	.62	.07	.44	-.29	.01	.01	-.03	.99
MOSLEMCO	.06	.05	-.77	.05	-.58	.06	-.14	-.08	.96
ENGLISHCO	-.93	.01	-.27	.11	.05	.21	.01	.05	.99
AFRIKCOL	.93	-.02	.27	-.12	-.05	-.22	.00	-.06	.99
ENGLISHAS	-.08	-.97	.02	-.14	-.06	-.16	-.03	-.09	.99
AFRIKASI	.29	-.05	.00	.03	-.93	.11	.03	-.03	.97
GUJARATIA	.61	.59	.13	.23	.41	.01	.01	.03	.95
TAMILAS	-.77	.39	-.04	-.33	.19	.10	.04	.13	.93
URDUASTIAN	-.53	.36	-.04	-.19	.04	.65	.05	.10	.89
HINDIASI	-.88	.31	-.15	.09	-.15	-.15	-.03	-.05	.96
COLMPRAD	.26	.38	.15	.04	.11	.68	-.51	.09	.98
COLFEPA	-.81	-.19	.05	.03	-.03	.49	.11	-.16	.98
ASIAMPRAD	.60	.12	.14	.40	.57	.20	.13	.15	.96
ASIAFPRAD	-.51	.19	.34	.12	.15	.69	.22	-.07	.97

TABLE 10
(continued)

COLMAL	-.65	-.46	-.32	-.07	-.08	-.19	.18	-.35	.94
COLFAL	-.23	-.02	-.86	-.39	.07	-.09	.02	.04	.95
ASIANMAL	-.92	.12	-.18	-.03	.19	-.04	.21	-.13	.99
ASIANFAL	.10	.13	-.15	-.88	.09	-.37	-.04	.09	.97
COLMSER	.34	.29	.54	-.13	.21	-.03	-.54	.14	.87
COLFSER	.51	.06	.67	.36	-.05	-.11	-.26	.18	.96
ASIANMSER	-.12	-.59	.08	-.47	-.12	-.35	-.38	.21	.90
ASIANFSER	-.87	-.07	-.21	.26	-.02	.06	.32	.16	.99
COLMUN	-.13	.37	.05	-.02	.24	.09	.82	.12	.91
COLFUN	.09	.15	.57	-.05	.06	.08	.63	-.46	.98
ASIANMUN	-.89	.32	-.02	-.23	.00	.10	-.09	-.09	.98
ASIANFUN	.18	.42	-.06	.83	-.19	-.13	.11	-.07	.97
COLMNEA	-.44	-.18	-.34	.07	-.19	.69	.29	.03	.96
COLFNEA	-.62	.03	.47	-.06	.27	.43	-.13	-.30	.97
ASIAMNEA	-.01	.44	-.11	-.72	-.03	.14	.39	-.08	.90
ASIAFNEA	-.23	.92	.09	.16	.11	.19	.01	-.01	.99
COLBC	.08	-.55	.04	.01	-.71	.01	-.15	.25	.89
ASIANBN	-.95	.13	-.12	.11	.13	.13	.05	.07	.99
COLURBP	.04	.06	-.34	.25	-.86	-.22	-.05	-.09	.97

TABLE 10
(continued)

Proportion Variance Explained	.32	.17	.13	.09	.08	.07	.06	.03
Cumulative Proportion of variance Explained	.32	.49	.62	.71	.79	.86	.92	.96

factor closely approximates factor 1 for 1946 data. In general, high positive and low negative loadings are found on the same variables for both 1946 and 1960.

TABLE 11

EXTREME LOADINGS FOR 1960 FACTOR ANALYSIS

Factor 1 -- Wealthy Asian (.32)				Factor 2 -- Conservative Asian (.17)			
AFRIKCOL	.93	ASIANBN	-.95	ASIAFNEA	.92	CHRISTASI	-.99
ASIANMSC	.91	ENGLISHCO	-.93	ASIANUN14	.85	ENGLISHAS	-.97
ASIANMMI	.77	ASTANMAL	-.92	MOSLEMAS	.62	ASIANOV64	-.86
GUJARATIA	.61	ASIANMUN	-.89	GUJARATIA	.59	ASIANFMI	-.52
ASIANMPRAD	.60	HINDIASI	-.88			ASIANMSER	-.59
MOSLEMAS	.58	ASIANFSER	-.87				
COLMSC	.56	COLFEP	-.81				
COLFSER	.51	HINDUASI	-.81				
		COLUN14	-.78				
		TAMILAS	-.77				
		COLFSC	-.67				
		COLMAL	-.65				
		COLFNEA	-.62				
		ASIANURBP	-.61				
		COLMMI	-.61				
Factor 3 -- Poor, Female Coloured (.13)				Factor 4 -- Poor Asian Females (.09)			
COLOV64	.79	COLFMI	-.89	ASIANFUN	.83	ASIANFAL	-.88
COLFSER	.67	COLFAL	-.86			ASIANFMI	-.73
COLFUN	.57	MOSLEMC	-.77			ASIANMNEA	-.72
		COLMMI	-.54				

TABLE 11
(continued)

Factor 5 -- (.08)				Factor 6 -- (.07)			
ASIAMPRAD	.57	AFRIKASI	-.93	COLMNEA	.69		
		COLURBP	-.86	ASIAFPRAD	.69		
		COLBC	-.71	COLMPRAD	.68		
				URDUASIAN	.65		
Factor 7 -- Poor Coloured (.06)				Factor 8 -- (.03)			
COLMUN	.82	COLMSER	-.54	ASIANURBP	.51	COLMMIP	-.54
COLFUN	.63	COLMPRAD	-.51				

In fact, factor 1 for 1960, even more so than factor 1-1946, resembles the hypothesized variable clusters. Small Asian community size, Gujarati-speakers, and white collar work categories are all strongly related to this cluster, which explains almost one-third of all variation. Coloured median income and blue collar work categories are all very much unrelated to this pattern as expected. However, as with 1946 data, Coloured community size bears no relationship to this variable cluster. Again, this suggests that Coloured socioeconomic status is uniformly lower than the Asian. Factor 1 also implies an occupationally specialized Asian community as does the 1946 analysis.

Factor 2 for 1960, explaining .17 of the total variation, contains variable loadings which are exactly the opposite of factor 2 for 1946. A conservative Asian category shows up, whereas in 1946 a culturally Western pattern was evident. Those variables which load low negative on factor 2 for 1946 load high positive on factor 2 for 1960. It had been expected that this variable cluster would have been a part of the first. High positive loadings on Asians under 14, Moslem Asians, Gujarati-speakers, and Asian females not economically active indicate a cultural-

ly conservative Asian pattern, in contrast to the economic character of factor 1. Equally as important are the negative loadings found on English-speaking Asians, Asian female median income, Christian Asians, Asian females and sales and commerce, and Asian males in personal services.

The maintenance of a culturally conservative group within South Africa is a goal of apartheid, but it is impossible to tell if the appearance of this cluster is a manifestation of apartheid or a chance occurrence, because of the small number of observations. An analysis of the 1970 census data will help resolve this problem.

Factor 3, explaining .13 of the total variance, is distinguished by three high positive loadings--Coloureds over 64 (.79), Coloured females in services (.67), and Coloured females unemployed (.57). Coloured male and female median income as well as Moslem Coloureds are very much unrelated to this cluster, $-.54$, $-.89$, and $-.77$, respectively. Thus, factor 3 may be characterized as a poor, Coloured, female domestic cluster. No corresponding factor is found with 1946 data, so the pattern may suggest a movement by Coloured females into the labor market between 1946 and 1960.

The remaining five factors account for 34% of all variance, and in light of the hypothesized variable clusters, interpretation of their appearance is difficult. Only one variable loads high positive on factor 4--unemployed Asian females (.83). Negative factor loadings are found with Asian female median income, those not economically active, and artisans and laborers. This factor, then, is roughly analogous to factor 3. Factor 3 deals with Coloured females; factor 4 defines an Asian female cluster. There is no corresponding pattern with 1946 data, so it may

again suggest that since the inception of apartheid there has been a movement of both Asian and Coloured females into the labor market. Both factors 3 and 4 denote an increasing commitment by intervening groups too the national economy, and perhaps ultimately to Westernization.

Factor 5, explaining 8% of the total variance, is distinguished by three low negative loadings--Asian Afrikaans-speakers (-.93), Coloureds born in the Cape (-.71), and urban Coloured percentage (-.86). The highest positive loading is found with Asian male professional and administrative workers (.57), but there is no high loading for male Asian median income as would be expected. It was initially suspected that the variable, urban Coloured percentage, would load high positive on factor 1. But as it is, the high loading on the Asians white collar job category in combinations with the low urban Coloured community size would seem to substantiate the supposition that Asians hold a higher economic standing than Coloureds.

Factor 6 is incomprehensible to the writer. Coloured males in the professions and administration positions (.68) and not economically active Coloured males (.69) seem to be contradictory loadings. It would be expected that there would be an inverse relationship between the number of professional and administrative workers and the number of not economically active, because a high percentage of the not economically active is an index of underdevelopment, whereas a high percentage of professional and administrative workers is an index of economic development. Similarly, Asian Urdu-speakers (.65), a postulated culturally conservative group, are in juxtaposition with Asian females in professional and administrative positions (.69) -- a loading which would

indicate a considerable degree of Westernization. No comparable factor is found for 1946 data. Therefore, this cluster may be a chance occurrence.

Factor 7 defines a poor Coloured pattern of variables and explains 6% of all variance. It is similar to factor 4 for 1946, but explains less of the total variation. Male and female Coloured unemployment, .82 and .63, respectively, load the highest on this factor. Coloured males in professional and administrative jobs load low negative, -.51.

Factor 8 contains two significant loadings--Coloured male median income (-.54) and Asian urban percentage (.51). This means that the larger the Asian community size, the lower the Coloured male median income is. If this relationship had been expressed in factor 1, one would have been able to conclude that in the South African case one intervening group had obtained a higher economic status than the other. This is an important distinction, because Horvath made no mention of competition between intervening groups. However, it should be stressed that this factor's explanatory power is negligible--only 3%.

Factor Scores--1960 Data

The problems cited in interpreting factor scores for 1946 data apply also to 1960 data. Extreme scores are as prevalent as those between -1 and +1 (See Table 12). The range of scores is from -5.1 for Cape Town on factor 5 to 4.1 for Vereeniging-Vanderbijlpark on factor 4.

On factor 1, the wealth Asian cluster, the cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg show up as low negative scores, which is as expected. But so also does Cape Town--an expected extreme score at the other end of the continuum. Among Witwatersrand cities all scores are positive, but only one, Pretoria, is extreme (2.38).

TABLE 12
FACTOR SCORES FOR 1960 DATA

Johannesburg	.58	1.87	-2.34	.99	1.46	.14	-.90	-1.86
Cape Town	-3.99	-2.32	-1.00	1.69	-5.08	-2.69	-.68	1.67
Durban	-2.51	.29	-1.43	-2.41	2.31	1.32	.34	2.92
Pretoria	2.38	2.17	.43	-.71	.65	.70	.79	-.83
Port Elizabeth	1.30	-2.07	-.99	-.15	1.06	.58	.75	-2.96
Germiston	.53	1.83	1.14	-1.69	-.05	-.59	1.46	-1.68
East London	.09	-4.97	-.39	-1.69	-.57	1.03	-.52	1.12
Kimberley	1.34	-2.74	-.13	-1.30	-1.11	2.91	.67	1.00
Pietermaritzburg	-2.45	-1.74	1.22	-1.06	.94	-1.13	.52	.85
Vereeniging/Vander- bijlpark	1.82	3.53	1.58	4.16	.18	-.40	-2.76	.44
East Rand	.69	1.63	1.29	-1.70	.29	-.99	-.38	-1.07
West Rand	.21	2.52	.63	3.86	-.08	-.87	.71	.40

Factor 2, the conservative Asian complex, also appears to have the Southern Transvaal industrial area as its core. All six observations in this region have scores in excess of 1.50. This indicates that these observations are all strongly related to this factor. Such a combination of a culturally conservative group with cities in the forefront of economic advance is incongruous. All other scores for this factor are negative with the exception of Durban (.3).

Otherwise, a factor regionalization would not reveal distinct spatial patterns. For example, the closely spaced cities on the Witwatersrand frequently reveal disparate scores on the same factor.

Summary

In sum, in both factor analyses the original hypotheses are corroborated by the variable clusters explaining the highest proportion of

variance. Because the solutions are in part exploratory, a considerable disaggregation of the initial hypotheses is evident, but the core of each remains. The greatest deviation from expectations for both 1946 and 1960 occurs with the failure of Coloured community size to be inversely related with Coloured median income, and to be directly related to Asian median income. In fact, Coloured community size shows no relationship with Coloured and Asian median income and Asian community size, thus suggesting that Coloured socioeconomic standing is uniformly lower than the Asian. For the rest of the variable patterns, interpretation is difficult. Seemingly contradictory variable patterns and loadings which were expected to be a part of factors 1 and 2 cannot be explained given the conceptual and historical review.

There is also no apparent spatial pattern to factor scores. This is especially evident with the factor scores for the Witwatersrand. Adjacent urban centers have dissimilar scores. This may exhibit the arbitrary and selective character of non-white legislation. The historical review has stressed that white legislation directed at Asians and Coloureds during the first part of the twentieth century was marked by its ad hoc nature and uninclusiveness. Problems were dealt with as they arose and there was no coordination of activities on a provincial or national level. The factor analysis for 1946, and even for 1960, is consistent with a lack of planning. For example, if on the Witwatersrand whites had adopted an economic policy with regard to Asians and Coloureds, there would have been some degree of uniformity in income and occupation. The emergence of particular factor scores and the extreme factor scores in some cases may have as their progenitor a unique set of cultural and economic characteristics which render a meaningful nationwide interpretation of Coloured and

and Asian attributes impossible.

Indeed, it is envisioned that if the apartheid program is successfully implemented, a factor analysis solution would only obscure what may simply be described as an apartheid factor. Asians and Coloureds of all linguistic, religious, and occupational groups would be aggregated in one area or a few urban centers. The operation of natural social, cultural, and economic forces would have established urban regional and national spatial patterns not very different from those found in Western nations. For each urban center, class distinctions would have established a certain spatial pattern, and on a regional and national level, economically advanced areas would account for socioeconomic variation. However, a brief examination of Witwatersrand scores for factors 1 and 2 for 1960 shows that natural forces are not operating. Factor analysis might discern statistically significant relationships, but in the process of distinguishing the trees, it might fail to recognize the forest.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Attention in this thesis has focused on two racial groups in South Africa heretofore neglected by scholars. Most of the South African literature concentrates on the struggle between a dominant white minority attempting to maintain its economic and political control over a long-oppressed and ethnically fragmented African majority. While this writer agrees that the most significant theme pervading South Africa since the beginning of white settlement is the white-African clash of interests, it obscures the reality of a complex of racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups in differential spatial and temporal interaction. In particular, two racial groups, Coloureds and Asiatics, distinguished from the Africans by whites on the basis of skin color, culture, and heredity, have received comparatively little attention from scholars, the popular press, the South African government. This has occurred inspite of the fact that Coloureds and Asians have performed essential commercial, financial, middle level bureaucratic, and other skilled services to both whites and Africans, are spatially concentrated, and make up an increasingly larger proportion of the total population. This paper, in part, draws attention to this lack of concern for the future study of their spatial and structural dimensions.

Second, this thesis establishes a conceptual perspective from which to view South African race relations. Fundamentally, the white-non-white relationship is one of domination. Such a relationship is intrinsic to a definition and typology of colonialism. A systematic definition of colonialism and other types of domination are offered. In this way the South African case study may be compared with the various modes of implementation of colonialism throughout the world. It is seen that the domestic colonialism as practiced in South Africa is not very different from the international colonialism practiced by Great Britain between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries.

At least three groups distinguished on the basis of culture are found in the colonial society: the elite, an intervening group(s), and the indigenous peoples. Much of the elite's energy is expended on controlling the horizontal and vertical movement of the indigenous peoples, and, therefore, most of the literature exposes this effort. Comparatively little attention is devoted to the intervening group, which typically occupies middle level positions in the colonial bureaucracy and economy. The intervening group is particularly active in the commerce of the colony, and in many cases they dominate it. In South Africa Coloureds and Asians are examples of two types of intervening groups which in the past were not subject to the same restrictions placed on Africans and did occupy intermediate economic positions.

Third, the thesis traces the evolution of the white-imposed form of domestic colonialism with particular reference to Coloureds and Asians. White dominance is viewed from the perspective of ideologies or paradigms structuring non-white socioeconomic standing. It is seen that Coloureds

were affected only indirectly by the religious and cultural paradigms. The religious paradigm established Christianity as the main criterion for legal equality of non-whites with whites. Later, as many non-whites adopted Christianity and as black Africans were brought under white domination, status equality with whites came to be associated with the essential Europeanness of non-whites. The primary recipients of the ideologies were the native-born Bushmen, Hottentots, and Africans, and not the Western, Afrikaans-speaking Coloureds and supposedly transient, Asian sugar laborers. Eventually the paradigms came to be associated with all non-whites, regardless of religion or culture. This is especially the case with non-white economic legislation which initially was aimed at upward moving Asian traders and African industrial workers, but later included all non-whites. Primary emphasis was placed on elite-indigenes socioeconomic relationships. Intervening groups as cohesive entities were ignored.

However, the profound economic changes undergone by South Africa during the twentieth century forced a reevaluation of non-white socioeconomic mobility by whites. During the industrialization and urbanization process, elite dominance was maintained by a series of ad hoc, limited measures. The rapidity of social and economic change was not anticipated by whites and demanded a coherent, long range growth policy to permit white dominance to continue indefinitely. Culture, institutions, and social relations are all complexly interwoven. A change in one will eventually lead to modifications in the others. The Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party realized this fact. There could never be any measure of social structural stability as long as the various cultural and economic groups of indigenous peoples and intervening groups were

dealt with separately. The apartheid program seeks to assert a definitive, all-encompassing policy of white-non-white interaction. Such a policy would eliminate the vagaries of the cultural paradigm and entrench white supremacy on the simple basis of skin color. The Asiatic and Coloured intervening groups, therefore, would stand to lose their relatively privileged economic position under apartheid. Their modest prosperity has been tied to the elite's willingness to allow them a part of the nation's strong economic structure. In contrast, apartheid envisions a spatial and structural separation of all racial groups.

Fourth, a factor analytic solution was undertaken to test the hypotheses that 1) between 1946 and 1960, there has been little or no change in the distribution and grouping of Asian and Coloured characteristics; 2) there is an inverse relationship between the size of an urban intervening group community and income; and 3) certain religious and linguistic characteristics will be associated with small and large community size. Therefore, one of the implications running throughout the factor analyses is that one intervening group will have displaced another in socioeconomic status in each South African urban center. Where one intervening group is numerous and another negligible, the former will assume the role of Horvath's indigenous peoples.

For both 1946 and 1960, the factor explaining the most variation (for 1960, almost one-third of all variation) was a small, high income, white collar, Moslem, and Gujarati-speaking Asian community and an Afrikaans-speaking, low income Coloured community. In other words, regardless of Coloured community size, the most frequent pattern of Asian and Coloured variables is a relatively poor Coloured and wealthy Asian

variable cluster. Thus, the first and third hypotheses were confirmed, and the second partially.

A considerable disaggregation of the original hypotheses occurred, because of the presence of eight further factors for 1946 data and seven more for 1960 data. A comparison of the two solutions is therefore difficult. Three additional 1960 factors (3, 7, and 8) are noted because they substantiate the notion of Asian socioeconomic superiority. As a group they explain 22% of all variance and all define a poor Coloured cluster of variables.

Factor scores for both years are characterized by values greater than +1 and less than -1. Such scores are clear indications of the lack of a coherent, long range plan for dealing with urban non-whites, because, given a normal distribution of population characteristics, over two-thirds of the urban centers should fall between -1 and +1. The fact that most scores are extreme indicates that local solutions were applied to what were thought to be local problems. Even on the Witwatersrand with its fundamental unity in economic origin and industrial bases, contiguous cities have different scores. Therefore, since the historical review has stressed the uninclusive nature of non-white legislation prior to apartheid's implementation, the factor analysis appears to indicate that, in fact, there has been no new paradigm with respect to Asians and Coloureds. True, discrimination based on race has been introduced, especially with respect to Coloureds, but Coloureds and Asians are still dealt with as part of the white economic infrastructure.

The existence of a caste and class social structure cannot be definitely verified. The South African racial groups satisfy the minimum

criteria of caste--endogamy, ascription, ranking, the concept of social pollution, but the occupational specialization criterion remains to be proven. In both 1946 and 1960, the most important variable cluster includes significant positive loadings on Asian white collar job categories and negative loadings on Asian blue collar categories, but no specific job category can be allocated to either group. As to the existence of social classes, the appearance of a culturally conservative Asian cluster implies the continued importance of traditional stratification criteria, primarily religion and language. Class consciousness can also not be verified, because the variables do not measure such intangibles as ideals and values, so characteristic of social class in Western nations.

Horvath's model of the colonial city and its socioeconomic components stresses the interaction of the elite, with its monopoly of economic and political power, and the subjugated indigenous peoples. The intervening group is regarded as passive and powerless. Without minimizing the ultimate importance of the elite-indigene struggle, this thesis, through the factor analysis, attempts to expose the interaction between and within intervening groups. The relative size of one group with respect to the other, and related income and occupational characteristics, may very well be exploited by both the elite and indigenes to their own advantage. Because of their spatial concentration, Coloureds and Asians will undoubtedly influence the course of domestic colonialism in South Africa.

What of the future? The succession of uninclusive paradigms, the lack of attention directed at Coloureds and Asians, and the failure of whites to limit African settlement to the Reserves strongly suggest that

future measures under the apartheid paradigm enforcing domestic colonialism will also have an uninclusive character. Although far-ranging in scope and intent, the apartheid program was fundamentally a reaction to events. The planning and implementation of the scheme with respect to Africans has not come to grips with the needs of an industrial economy. As mentioned earlier in this paper, this author subscribes to a philosophy which holds that "a society's philosophical justification for an explanation of its social institutions are more likely to be formulated as rationalizations of self-interest than to be developed first by pure philosophers and then to influence the form that the society's social institutions take."¹⁰³ Such a sequence of events denotes an inability to foresee and act upon potential societal malfunction until after that fact has occurred. The sporadic nature of white legislation against non-whites becomes understandable when such a pattern of cultural and societal evolution is accepted. As each paradigm has succeeded another, the rationale for white supremacy has been rearticulated and strengthened. No doubt the failure of the apartheid paradigm to account for the existence of Coloureds and Asians in South African urban centers will be rectified in the future as their proportion of the total population increases and as their relatively favored economic position places them better off than some whites. Thus, domestic colonialism in an industrial state is a relationship characterized by the constant reevaluation of dominance paradigms. It is this series of events which characterizes white dominance in South Africa. Whether it will lead to a cataclysmic upheaval by Africans as most observers suspect, or a never ending pattern of repression, ideological rearticulation, and subsequent paradigm change is an open question.

¹⁰³Ibid.

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