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MIGHiGAN'SST'ATEHCOuEOl
'Pham-‘Dgh‘g Tai- -
1953' ' .-

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0-169

Date

This is to certify that the

' thesis entitled

ANALYSIS Ol' POLITICAL AND
30011000 CONDITIONS II VIM-lull

presented by

Pm DAHG 1“]:

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Masters h: Political Science

degree

Wesley R. Iishel

Major professor

 

Amt 19 s 1953

 

 

 

“e"l|‘ _ .- , ..

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL
AND
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN VIET—NAM.

BY
PHAM DANG TAI

A THESIS
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
M.A.

Department of Political Science

Year 1953

67-2-

L's
Lu

#53

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to
Dr. Wesley R. Fishel and Dr. George M. Belknap for their

kind guidance and helpful suggestions.

303L315?!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS

l.

11.

111.

IV.

IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON VIET-NAM

Introduction
The Historical Background of Viet-nam
French Colonialism in Viet-nam

IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON VIET-NAM

Analysis of Communism in Southeast Asia.

Communism in Viet-nam

CONTEMPORARY VIET—NAM

CONCLUSION

French Colonialism

Communism in Viet-nam

The Regime of Bao-Dai

The Significance for the Free World of
Viet-nam's EXperience

APPENDIX

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page

CHAPTER 1.
IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON VIET-NAM
INTRODUCTION

In past ages, the theory and practice of colonialism
has been a significant factor in the rise and fall of the
great empires. Early colonial administration satisfied
urgent motives for colonies and their commercial advan-
tages. Migration and eXpansion were two of the foremost
tendencies of the empires of Greece and Rome.

Characteristic of these colonies was the rapid transi-
tion from_military government to the policy of assimilation
to the governmental regime of the eXpanding empire.

The fall of the Roman, Greek and Persian empires was
probably due in the main to imperialism and the conquering
of a great empire and vast colonial areas. These expanding
ventures grew out of all proportion to the ability of the
home countries to control, both economically and politi-
cally. Thus, they became inevitably the bane of life for
the home land.which had subdued the lands and peoples and
were responsible for their future.

Except for infrequent travelers' tales from the Orient,
the Far East remained a comparatively little known area to
the western werld. The famous traveler Marco Polo brought
home to Europe the most fantastic, interesting tales about

the East as early as 1298. Europeans who read his surpris-

ingly accurate account were almost unable to comprehend
the picture. To the circumscribed European at the end
of the thirteenth century, the stories were unbelievable.
Nevertheless, the Far East became from that time forth a
rich region worth struggling to reach. For the next two
hundred years, EurOpe sought to learn more about this
most fascinating land.

The periods of the Renaissance and the commercial
and industrial revolutions which followed, marked not
only transitions, but also inevitable states in the
growth of Western civilization.

Part of the enlarged point of view which was so evi-
dent at that time and which was responsible for the dev-
elopment of international trade with the Far East, was
the result of the Crusades. Knights, on returning from
the Holy Land, brought with them strange tales of strang-
er lands. They aroused interest and curiosity about what
existed beyond the knowledge of those who stayed at home.
Their awakened imagination demanded.more information of
the East.

The returning Crusaders brought with them things of
even greater importance--spices, silks, perfumes and
tapestries. All of these came to be indispensible to the
Western culture.

But the value of spices was more obvious than any of

the others to a EurOpe which had no refrigeration, and was

accustomed to food of uncertain age. With this Oriental
luxury, dining became more enjoyable. In fact, so fami-
liar did the noble and middle-class families become with
these condiments that, lacking spices, the food formerly
eaten without question became almost inedible. spices
frmm the East had become necessities.

Two centuries earlier this interest in the East and
the demand for an Oriental product would have been ignored.
Now, however, there were those ready to meet the challenge.
This was the result of the great change coming over Europe,
the Renaissance.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, all of Europe
had changed its attitude toward trade and commerce. There
was new interest in literature, arts, history and.the humani-
ties. Thers was an increased thirst for knowledge of things
beyond the confines of the European world. The travelers
and.merchants returning from the East found a welcoming
audience eager to hear of their visits to Oriental lands of
China, India and Japan.

Because of the capture of the Middle East by the Turks,
the EurOpean nations were forced to seek other routes to
the Ear east. It was also thought that shorter routes might
be found whereby the distance could be traveled entirely by
water. This period, better known as the age of the explor-
ers, was marked.by many changes in the economic and politi-

cal thought of the entire civilized world.

New competition in markets, new reasons for the
aggrandizment of new territories, new motives for large
military and naval resources made it imperative that
larger supplies of natural resources be made available
to the competing Western nations. The natural reaction
was to reach out for new lands to conquer which poss-
essed the resources and the native population to bring
them to the conquerors.

When at long last the enemy Turk was put to route
in the Middle East, Europe's great powers rushed to
gain as much of the coveted land and riches of the East
as possible.

In the seventeenth century the French had already
formed East India companies. England, Spain and Portu-
gal as well as the Netherlands were seeking new areas
to exploit. New products and new markets were being
introduced upon the historic scene very rapidly. The
stage was well set for the birth of world imperialism.

France, like other EurOpean countries, had early

accepted the principles of mercantilism. This theory
-maintained that colonial possessions were valuable only
in proportion to the amount of raw materials and markets
they furnished. In other words, the mother—country must
accumulate gold and silver bullion, particularly by keep-
ing a favorable balance of trade—-a favorable ratio of

exports over imports.

Legislators in the various countries sought to accomp-
lish this end by a series of navigation and trade laws. In
general, these acts provided for the carrying of colonial
exports in ships owned and.manned by motherbcountry subjects.
Certain colonial products could be eXported only to the mother—
country and to her possessions. The nations of Europe engag-
ed in a titanic struggle for power during the entire eigh-
teenth century.

Whereas the early economic theory of mercantilism had
emphasized the importance of colonies as a source of raw
materials, a protected market, and the accumulation of gold,
the new policy of colonialism expansion, known as imperial-
ism, a product of the Industrial Revolution, demanded larg-
er'amounts of raw materials, and wider and freer markets
and.investment fields for surplus manufactured goods and
capital.

The doctrine of laissez-faire was eagerly adopted by
the rising industrialists, who chafed under excessive gov-
ernmental regulation. More extensive world or colonial
markets had to be found to absorb the increasing surplus
of goods and capital. Although it was not long until
these same capitalists insisted on high tariff walls to
protect their interests from foreign competitors.

From these various and conflicting economic motives,
came the theory of modern imperialism, with all its impli-

cations of inflated national prestige, vicious trade rival—

ries, enlarged.military organizations, and dubious methods
of acquisition and exploitation. As the industrialization
process went on, this desire for economic expansion was
closely allied with the emerging nationalism of the period.

An attempt was made to rationalize and Justify the ex-
tension of European civilization to so-called “backward
areas.“ Many imperialists were probably sincere in em-
phasizing the religious and moral responsibility of shar-
ing the advantages of a superior culture with less fortun-
ate people. In fact, these honest and earnest missionarb
ies who followed the explorer and trader, were often un-
consciously preparing the way for new empires.

Another excuse given for enlarging the boundaries of
older nations was the surplus pOpulation argument. As mod—
ern science lengthened the life-span of the human race, the
birth-rate exceeded the death-rate in a ratio of three to
one. As portions of these surplus p0pulations sought their
fortunes in recently Opened territories, it was natural that
the parent nation should wish to place her protecting care
over them.

Perhaps the most farbreaching effect of modern imperb
ialism was on the foreign policy of the industrial nations.
Previous to the World War, enen the solution of domestic
issues and the rise and fall of cabinets were dependent
upon a popular foreign policy, subscribed to by shipping
magnates, exporters, financial and banking interests and

a patriotic working class.

The naval and military rivalries of the pre-war period
may be largely laid to this world race for raw materials and
wider markets. Naval bases, coaling stations and efficient
merchant marines were necessary factors in modern economic
imperialism. Political intervention and annexation were
simply the next logical steps in the process.

In the past two hundred years, the develOpment of col-
onial administration has become a major branch of government
technique and a major factor in national and international
policy.

The modern period of colonial government is marked by
administration designed to bring the greatest possible wealth
to the home government. Along with the elaboration of ad-
ministrative machinery within the colonies themselves has
occurred a massive extension of colonial governmental mach-
inery in the home governments.

In each colony there is primarily a colonial bureau
also referred to as the Ministry of Colonies. It is the
duty of this bureau to coordinate the colonial policy of
the entire country, supervize officials, direct finances
and in general exercise the crown or parliamentary authori-
ty within the colonial territory.

There is a tendency in most colonies to displace local
legislation with modern law based on European concepts.
Twentieth century administration also emphasized the educa-

tion of the native population of crown colonies. For the

most part the educational system stresses EurOpean literary
curriculum and almost entirely ignores the values of native
cultures. In some cases the forcible elimination of native
procedures is practised to the detriment of the national
cultures and ethnic relationships.

Many of the colonies of the Far East have witnessed
a large increase in the amounts of alcohol and opium that
are consumed by the pOpulace.

The wage systems within the colonies have been sharp-
ly criticized as entirely inadequate and comparable only
to the Middle Ages in Europe. The use of forced and slave
labor is practised as a matter of course in some colonies.

The increased commercial importance of the colonial
economy has led to class control of trade by the homeland.
Custom duties have become an important source of revenue
to the administrative authorities. They also affect the
tariff policy of the entire empire.

. Colonial administration within the colonies determines
the laws of the land. Native law is usually applied ex-
clusively to the native papulation while nationals of the
mother—country are judged and governed by their own laws
and courts. The criminal law of the home country is im-
mediately introduced even though native civil law is usu-
ally respected.

Little or no provision is made for native intellec-
tuals to take their natural places in governmental posi-
tions in their country. Favoritism to the alien nation-

als is shown in every phase of government, economic, pol-

itical and social administration.

In general, the welfare and future of the native
population has been ignored in favor of ever increas-
ing exploitation of natural and physical resources to

the glory of the motherbcountry and its leading capita—
lists.

10

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VIET-NAM.

Viet-nam is one of the ancient empires of the East,
rich in the culture of the Orient, abundant in its heri-
tage of religion, philosOphy and social customs.

Historically the country dates from the third cen-
tury, B. C. Its record actually began with the destruc-
tion of the realmaof the Vista in South China, at which
time the nationals of that country emigrated further
southward and.west and settled along the Red River. In
this fertile delta the new nation of Viet-nam (Land of
the South,) was established in the second century, 3.0.

The Vietnamese peOple were originally of Chinese
extraction. They were descendants of tribes which in-
habited the valley of the Yangtse River, south of Shang—
hai, in what is now the province of Chekiang.

In the fourth century, B.C., the Tsin, an aggressive
Chinese tribe from the north of China forced the Vietnamese
to move farther southward. They settled in the Cantonese
region where they stayed for several years. They eventually
emigrated to the area which is now Tonkin and North Annam.

The savage tribes which had occupied this territory
were of Indonesian origin. The Vista proceeded to subjugate
and to assimilate these primitive people through inter»
marriage and intermingling socially. (l)

The Vietnamese did not remain free for long. From

111 B-C- ‘to 938 A.D. Viet-nam's history was marked by Chin-

11

see domination which exerted a tremendous influence upon
the social and cultural customs of the country.

The territory of Viet—nam was under Chinese domina-
tion and influence for ten centuries, and the Annamese (2)
nation's characteristics were born from the intimate
mixture of pro-Chinese and Chinese elements. The Anna-
mess speak a language which is partly original. Their
customs are not exclusively Chinese although their civili-
zation shows the imprint of Chinese influence.

They have learned Chinese agricultural methods in-
cluding procedures of intensive rice cultivation and the
prOper fertilization of the soil.

The Vietnamese have adopted the Chinese characters
for their written language and made Chinese philosOphical
thoughts their own. Lastly, they took from the Chinese
all the elements of administration and government.

Thanks to Chinese civilizing influence, the Annamese
when they shook off the Celestial domination at the end
of the tenth century A.D. found themselves provided with
an ensemble of institutions which conferred upon them a
real superiority over the other populations of Indo-China.
Even the peoples who, like the Chem and the Khmer, had
attained a brilliant deve10pment owing to Hindu influence,
were inferior in stabilizing qualities.

India has never known how to create a stable and last-
ing political organization and the Indochinese states of

Hindu influence were no more solid than their Hindu models.

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There was in the Chinese institutions, and consequently
in the Annamese institutions, more regularity in govern-
ment and more continuity in politics. (3)

In spite of the various beneficial effects of Chin-
ese influence, the peoples of Viet-nam longed to be free.
The period of Chinese domination was punctuated by fre-
quent and ephemeral revolutions and upheavals against
Chinese authority.

One case in point is that of the sisters "Trung,"
better known as the Saints Joan of Arc of Viet-nam.

They were instigators and leaders of a revolution later
referred to as the "aspiration for independence of the
race.“

A successful revolution in 938 liberated the coun-
try from the Chinese and gave rise to a long period of
independence. (938-188u) During this time the policy
of the newly emerged nation was centred.upon two main
factors; first, resistance to Chinese attacks for the
cause of imperialism in the north, and second, the ex-
pansion toward the south to seek 'lebensraum."

A determined expansion in the south regions began
in 1471 and continued well into l7h0. Cham's empire,
6f Hindu extraction, was more or less absorbed through
this long drive. This area was known as Cochinchina,
under former French designation and includes the south-
ernmost portion of the Indo-Chiheae peninsula. (See

attached map.)

13

The first Catholic missionaries from Spain and France
appeared in Viet-nam about 18h3. Christianity had an im—
mediate and lasting attraction for the Vietnamese. To
quote the Reverend John C. Rubba,

So fruitful have the Catholic missions been, that Indo-
China today has more native clergy and Sisters than most
mission countries in the world. Religious persecution
often ravaged the land, but the natives proved among the
staunchest Catholics in history.

However, the imperial government lashed out against the

Catholics with fierce persecution:
Sporadic persecution for more than one hundred years
brought dead to——-but as martyrs fell, conversions multi-
plied.

The storm broke again when the newly-crowned King Minh
Mang issued an edict on January 6, 1833, ordering all
Tonkinese Christians to renounce the faith by publicly
trampling upon the crucifix.

The accession of the pagan tyrant Tu Due to the throne
of Annam, which at the time included Tonkin as well as
parts of Indo-China and Siam, was the signal for a vast
persecution comparable to that of the Roman Emperor
Nero. A special decree of 1856 marked the beginning of
the atrocities. EurOpean priests were cast into the sea
or rivers; native priests were cut in two. Prisons
overflowed.with Christians. Whole villages were burnt
to the ground. More than 40, 000 had perished for the
faith, and the names of most of these generous victims
are known to God alone. (A)

This persecution of the missionaries was used as a pre-
text for French intervention in Viet-nam in the 18u0's. To
quote Charles Gosselin on the subject,

Our compatriots, lacking information about history,
suppose that France has been led to intervene in Annam
only for the protection of missionaries or to take van.
geance on the acts of hostility committed against them
and the persecutions executed against the Catholic re-
ligion. Missionaries have been in actuality, only the
pretext of our action against Annam.

The loss of the Indies in the eighteenth century,
the extension more and.more rapid in the Extreme-
Orient of our perpetual rival, England, imposed
upon us the obligation of haying a foothold in the
China seas, lest we would fall down or find our-
selves in a humiliating state of inferiority.

Annam has given us the occasion for that, the
massacre of Frenchmen who happened to be mission-
aries has furnished us with the pretext, which we
have seized with a comprehensible hurry, and the
control over Annam is complete at the present
time. (5)

Later, France went on to conquer the whole coun-
try of Viet-nam. It was an unequal struggle. The
Vietnamese not being equipped with modern arms had no
real chance to overcome the invaders. But in spite of
her handicaps, they continued to struggle militarily and
politically for their independence, never relinquishing
their hope for freedom. (6)

French domination in Viet-nam lasted from 188h until
March 1945, when the Japanese forces took over the coun-
try, captured the French army and abolished its administra-

tion.

15

FRENCH COLONIALISM IN VIET-NAM

Indo-China is an outstanding example of the type of
pressure political, economic and social referred to as
colonialism. A powerful country such as France is physi-
cally capable of overpowering a smaller less aggressive
country such as Indo-China. A major exploitation of nat-
ural and human resources follows such a decisive conquest.

The amount of police pressure necessary to establish
and maintain such a colony is only measurable in compari-
son with the amount of intelligent resistance which the
native peeple present in the face of the extra-legal and
foreign control.

Viet-nam is one of the three states of Indo-China,
and the largest, having an area of 127,250 square miles
or about twice the area of the State of Michigan. Geo-
graphically located south and.west of China prOper, it
is adjacent to Burma and Thailand.

It stretches north and south from the TrOpic of
Cancer to the tenth degree of latitude. It has a climate
ranging from temperate in the mountainous areas to semi-
trepical in the south. Its sea-coast is hundreds of miles
long on the South China Sea. The land is one of the mon-
soon countries of Southern Asia.

Viet-nam is rich in natural resources and her agricul-
tural possibilities are almost unlimited. The climate is

suited to the production of rubber, cotton, rice and other

16

products in great demand in today's industrial world.

The pOpulation of Viet-nam numbers nearly twenty-
three millions of peOple. (7) Their intellectual his-
tory indicates that they have always been conscious of
individual dignity and worth. Their written history
records their consistent struggle against foreign in-
vasion and to obtain their national sovereignty in the
face of multitudinous difficulties, not the least of
which is the continual conquest which France has visit-
ed upon the people of Viet—nam against their will and
without their sanction.

Professor Julien, distinguished French authority
in the theory and practise of colonial administration,
has described French policy as follows: I

The Empire in 1939, was an ill-assorted whole lack-
ing common institutions and plans for the future.

It had been built up by a minority and.was of inter-
est only to specialists, many of whom thought more
of their profit than of the colonies.

Economically, power lay in the hands of business
men who owned the chief newspapers and could put
pressure on the politicians. Business profits were
brought back to France instead of being invested on
the spot.

The colonies, lacking credit, had to make financial
efforts out of proportion to their resources,‘which
meant that the standard of living of the masses was
kept very low by indirect taxes, levies and forced
labor. The government, faithful to the idea of mer-
cantilism, continued to regard the colonies as res-
ervoirs of raw materials. It was ungenerous with
capital and.the capital equipment of the colonies
was incomplete and precarious. (8)

17

“The colonization of Viet-nam,' said Gerald Lyon-
Caen, Iiswnational Oppression resulting from the economic ex—
ploitation of the country by a monopoly consisting of several
colonial companies.I (9)

A. Economic Exploitation:

“The French colonial system made certain that the adminis-
tration and deve10pment of the country were undertaken exclu-
sively by Frenchmen, and that commerce, agricultural produc-
tion for export and the scant industry remained in French
hands.“ (10)

l. Monopoly of Natural Resources.

The French completely monOpolized all the minerals in
Viet-nam. Their activities included the exploitation of all
ores such as coal, gold, zinc, tin and tungsten.

The colonialists exploited for their own benefit the abun-
dant forests of the highlands. They extended their real estate
holdings through government grants accorded them for the purpose
of develOping industrial crops, i.e. rubber trees, cotton, etc.

Two companies shared 92% of the total production of the
Tonkin anthracite. These companies reported twenty-nine mill-
ion francs in profit in 1937, forty-nine millions in 1938, and
fifty-eight millions in 1939. These reported profits represent-
ed more than double the total paid in wages to the Vietnamese
miners. (ll)

2. Industrial Monopoly:

All extractive industries were concentrated in the hands

18

of the French. Raw materials were exported almost entotal
and the acquired profits were sent back to France.

The industries of power production, water and elec-
tricity, of transportation, both land and sea, the few in-
dustries of transformation engaged in processing products
of the soil such as cement factories, lime kilns, brick
factories, tiles, glass, matches and paper mills were the
exclusive propriety of French capitalists, whom the col-
onial regime guaranteed many economic and social privileges.

The agricultural production of the rice paddies, dis-
tilleries, sugar refineries, breweries, tobacco factories,
spinnigg and weaving mills and tanneries also fell into this
category.

Investment, like trade, has been shaped by the policy of
“assimilation.“ The land concessions on which the rubber
plantations were established were made only to the citi-
zens of France in Indo-China. Mining companies must have
a three-quarter majority of French nationals on their
boards of directors. In 1938, the total of foreign busi-
aess investments in Indo-China was valued at 382,000,000
American dollars, and of this, 285,000,000 dollars were
French owned. Of the remainder, Chinese owned 80,000,000
Nearly the whole of the foreign rentier investments were
French. (12)

The Vietnamese bourgeoisie, few in number, whose fortune
was made from proprietorship of rice-fields, undoubtedly
had the ambition to engage in big business and.modern in-
dustry. But the colonial monOpolies did not permit this
ambition to be realized. Each time that the latter fore-
saw or feared the menace, the venturesome ones(Vietnamese)
were brutally pushed back to the only activity which the ,
monopolies allowed them real estate in the rice fields.(13)

3. Viet-nam maintained in a state of under-devel

cpment.
Colonialism apposed the industrial development of Viet-

nam. The profits therefrom, however, would accrue in a large

19

measure to French capitalists. It tolerated only the
creation of rudimentary industries that should not com-
pete with production of the metrOpolis.

The very summary electrification of Viet-nam was
highly indicative of the state of underdevelopment. The
natural resources of fuel and water falls in Viet—nam
have been extremely abundant. There was complete ab-
sence of electricity in the rural areas. None of the
various fields of the native artisanat or industry has
ever used electrical energy in its workshops. Only in
the most important urban centers was electricity used
for its manufactures.

#. MonOpoly of Foreign Trade.

Commercial enterprises were the first French enter-
prises to appear in Indo-China. As is characteristic
of a colonial economy, their operations lead to the
importation of manufactured goods, cotton, textiles,
mgtlassand metal goods, and to the exportation of
rice and maize. (1h)

Exporting raw materials, including paddy-rice, was
the almost exclusive privilege of French merchants, who
thus reserved for themselves the lion's share in the pro-
fits accrued from rice—trade. Vietnamese cultivators did
not share in the profits accrued from rice exportation.
Their right to equitable revenue as producers was thereby
violated.

The eXportation of rice ;

yielded cOpious profits to those who carried it on.
In 1936, for instance, according to an inquiry carried

20

out at the request of the Ministry of Colonies by
the Syndicat des EXportateurs francais de riz de
Saigon, the money realized from the sale of eXport-
ned rice was distributed as follows: 25 per cent

to the producers, 33.6 per cent to commercial inter-
mediaries, 21 per cent to the transporters, 5 per
cent to processors, and lh.4 per cent in taxes.

At a selling price of 50 francs the quintal, the
Viet—nam producers received only an average of 13
francs per quintal. In the same year the French
growers, far from being overpaid, received 160
francs per quintal of wheat. For the total eXports
of 17,630,000 quintals, it turns out that transport-
ers, factories and intermediaries gained over 525
millions. (15)

Imports were also reserved for French merchants who
redistributed.a part of their merchandise to Chinese and
Indians. Foreigners thus had the most substantial share
of profits and imported products were transferred to
Vietnamese middlemen with an extremely reduced marginal
profit.

When the French commercial houses which were masters
of the import and eXport trade, needed Asiatic inter-
mediaries between them and the local producers or con-
sumers, they systematically called in Chinese aids,
the "Compradores" fearing that a Vietnamese might try
to become a competitor, after gaining a certain amount
of experience in the service. It was certainly easier
and less costly to get the French administration to
OXpel a Chinese who was too enterprising than to curb
a Vietnamese in his own country. (16)

French products imported were exempt from custom taxes
whereas, foreign products were burdened with prohibitive
custom tax rates.

As far back as 1892, five years after she (France)
had established the Indochinese Union, she established

a customs union with Indo—China which provided that the

21

products of France must be admitted free to the colony,
while all imports from other countries were to be sub-
ject to the same duty as in France.

The main purpose of this law, of course, was to pro-
tect a market for French industries, especially for her
new heavy industries. In return, the law provided that
the products of Indo—China could generally enter France
free. In practise there were notable exceptions to this
provision. Coffee, tea and pepper from Indo-China were
subject to import duties only slightly lower than im-
ports from other countries. (17)

This practically closed the Vietnamese market to
foreign products. Because of this lack of competition,
manufactured.products sold at prices 15% higher than
those in other countries. Vietnamese customers right
to reasonable prices was therefore nonpexistent.

In 1928, the customs union was radically amended
in order to give the Indochinese government con-
siderable tariff autonomy. This change seems to
have been partly due to the recognition that the
existing tariff law was hampering the healthy ec-
onomic deve10pment of Indo-China and that such de-
velopment was in the long-term interests of France,
and partly due to the increased political influence
resulting from the increased prosperity of French
business men in the colony, who felt that their
metrOpolitan rivals were spoiling their opportuni-
ties. Consequently since 1928, tariffs have been
shaped mainly in the interests of French investors
in Indo-China, though the industrialists of France
still have much influence. (18)

In the 1930's France provided more than half of
IndoChina's imports, and took nearly half of her
exports. Indo-China was compelled to impose a
tariff on many things which her East Asian neigh-
bours alone could provide; and on others which
could provide more cheaply than France. Moreover,

22

her neighbours reacted with tariff reprisals, and
this was important because Asian countries were the
markets for Indo-China's rice, her chief eXport. (19)
From l93b to 1938, the commercial balance of Indo-
China had an average annual deficit of 112 million francs.

In 1936 exports were:

 

 

mallet 1 of Total Exports
Rice hh.!
Coal #.7
Cotton 13.7
Silk & Rayon 3.5
Mineral Oils 7.2
Chemical Prod. 6.0
Iron & Steel 3.9
Machinery & Metal Prod. 12.2

 

For the year of 1936 France and.French overseas poss-
essions furnished 56.1 per cent of the total value of im-
ports and took 61.4 per cent of the exports. (20)

All these facts, surplus of commercial balance and de—
ficit in the balance of payments, eXportation of raw materb
ials and importation of manufactured goods, relatively great
importance of commerce with the metropolis and its dependen-
cies, were sure indices of a colonial economy.

5. Financial Monopoly.

The French colonialists completed.their economic control
over Viet-nam through financial monopoly. Under the French,
Viet-nam had no right to issue her national currency, organ-
ize her treasury and establish her budget.

The "Banque de l'Indochine' was the dominant force in

Indochinese economy. Its aim was to obtain the privilege

23

of issuing money, and this was granted to the bank in the
year 1875.

The principal French financial powers control the
Banque. Its control extends over a large sector of Indo-
Chinese economy. In the year l9hh six of its directors,
two of its former presidents and four of its high offi-
cials occupied seventy-five director's seats in the Indo-
Chinese corporations.

In addition, the financial and real estate branches
of the bank controlled through their officials, an impor-
tant number of other Indochinese enterprises.

As may be seen the ”Banque de l'Indochine,“ through
its exclusive issuing and lending power, directed and con-
trolled all the financial and industrial activities of the
country.

The French administration organized the treasury and
controlled it exclusively, thereby making Vietnamese admini—
stration absolutely dependent upon it. The Ipdochinese budew-
gets, general as well as local, were established.by the Offi-
ces of the 'Gouvernement general" and “Residences Superieures."

The cultural and civilizing mission of the French in

Indo—China is measurable by a few notable statistics, all
based on official French records. The Indo-China budget,
for example, provided a sum of fifteen million piasters
for some 30,000 Annamite employees and functionaries of
the government. The same budget provided forty million

piasters for 5,000 French functionaries.

In 1943 the colonial government spent 30,000 piasters
for libraries, 71,000 piasters for hospitals, 7N8,000

piasters for schools and #,473,000 piasters for the
purchase of opium, distributed in the country through
the official opium monOpoly.

In their time, the French built thirty-one heapitals
in the colony and eighty—one prisons, not including
concentration campsl (21)

6. Monopoly of all important Social and Administra-

tive Positions.

In every branch, civil service, army, police, securi-
ty, economics, finances, customs, services of transmiss-
ions, forestry, railways, education, public health etc.,
the posts of authority were reserved for the French. The
Vietnamese even possessed of the same academic degrees and
competence as their French colleagues were systematically
assigned only subordinate positions. French functionaries
were much better paid than the Vietnamese.

In the pre-war years the manual laborer in the colony
earned an average of fifty piasters a month. The rare
Annamite able to go through the Polytechnical School
and graduate as a modestly equipped engineer could earn
four hundred piasters a month. The French concierge of
the University of Hanoi, a slightly glorified sort of
janitor, earned l,h04 piasters per'month. (22)

7. Exploitation of Labor.

There has been no social legislation for the protection

of the Vietnamese workers, except a decree of December 1936,
which projected general rules as to working conditions 'set
up after having been discussed on the one hand by the employ-
ers and their representatives and on the other by the Labor
Inspection Bureau, representing the wage earners. (23)

These inspectors of the Labor Inspection Bureau cculd

only visit a plantation after giving due notice to the em-

25

ployer of their proposed visit. The inspectors had no
special training in their work, were often moved from
post to post, and were usually on such friendly terms
with the managers of the plantations that they found
it difficult to discipline those who failed to carry
out the law. (24))

There have been no such things as unions, guaran-
teed minimum salary, limitation of the number of work-
ing hours, vacation, social insurance, unemployment in-
surance. Neither working nor housing conditions have
been effectively regulated.

Workers earned so little that husbands, wives and
even very young children were all obliged to work to be
able to provide the family with the minimum necessities.

we know, wrote Professor Ball, That the average wage

is extremely low. We know that in the past the work-
ing conditions in the mines and factories of the north
and the plantations in the south usually put the work-
ers at the mercy of rapacious labor recruiters and
managers. (25) '

The most unfortunate workers were the coolies employ-
ed in the mines or on plantations. They were sent away
from their tamilies to the malaria-infested mountainous
regions where for the most exhausting labor they were under-
paid, underhoused, and undernourished. They had no drink-
ing water that was pure, no mosquito net, no medical care.

The peaceful and intimate atmosphere of the villages they

had been accustomed to, was replaced by the ruthlessness and

26

rapacity of the l'tacherons,“ or foremen. The effects of
yellow fever and malaria were so terrible that some whole
groups of collies have been entirely decimated after a
period of a few years.

The regime of “tacheronnat” provided the French em-
ployers with commodities, but severely threatened the lot
of the Vietnamese worker. Through this regime, the French
bosses did not need to have any direct contact with the
employees and delegated their power and authority to the
'tacherons' who naturally took advantage of the situation
to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor occlies unp
der their domination. They even required a commission
charge from the coolies in return for their jobs. This was
paid through monthly deductions from the employee's salary.
They also made money on their victims by granting loans at
an exorbitant rate of interest.

In spite of conditions of unemployment and.misery in
which the rural papulation found itself, it was not easy
for the French employers to recruit a sufficient labor
force for their enterprises. Therefore, they were some—
times obliged to request support from administrative authori-
ties and military forces for arbitrary drafts of coolies.
These drafts involved so much contempt of human dignity and
freedom that some French writers did not hesitate to compare
them with the slave trade of the old times. (26)

In their pursuit of a systematic exploitation, the

27

French colonialists have extended their control over the
most unexpected domains. For example, the Vietnamese peas-
ant had for centuries prepared a native drink from the
alcohol of rice, with which he celebrated the cult of his
ancestors and the libations on days of feasts. This was
prohibited.by the French administration in favor of the
'Societe des distilleries de l'Indochines.'

This society founded in 1901, has had a very rapid
deve10pment. The laws for the manufacture and the sale
of distilled liquor, set up by the French administration
in 1902, with a view to supporting the general budget by
excise taxes, created what amounted to a monopoly in its
favor. The general budget increased its receipts and the
company its profits by instituting the compulsory consump-
tion of strong liquor.

For Viet—nam, consumption went from 256,000 hectoli-
tree of pure alcohol in 1923, to h8h,000 in 19h2. In addi—
tion the laws set up in 1902 destroyed the native distill-
ing industry, which had been the livelihood of several spec-
ialized Tonkinese villages. (27)

The monOpoly of salt resuscitated the salt tax of Euro-
pean Middle Ages. The Vietnamese salter was to sell all of
the salt he produced to French companies which in turn re-
sold it to the government at a price three or four times

higher. The government then re-distributed salt to the pOpu—

28

lation at a price as high as from five to ten times as much
as it had paid the French companies.
Opium was imported by the French authorities and sold
to Opium-smoking places officially recognized as real social
institutions. Thus, they encouraged increase of depe addicts
and the degradation of the pOpulace.
Results of Colonialist Exploitation in Viet—nam.
Compared.with the superbmechanized.world of today, Viet-
nam is a very backward country. After more than four decades
under the French domination, she continues to offer visitors
the unchanged spectacle of villages made of thatch—and-mud;
houses lighted in the evening by peanut-oil lamps; of unshod
peasants ploughing their muddy rice-fields with their most
primitive ploughs drawn slowly forward'by water buffaloes.
Of a population of twentyOthree million peOple like
that of Indo-China, one third does not have the ration
of rice it needs for sustenance, and a majority sees
meat appear on its tables only on the days of feast.
However, the colony exports two million tons of rice

abroad.

Soil in general is rich in natural resources. Labor
is abundant, industrious and for a good part unemployed.

The above is a quotation from Mr. Paul Bernard, the
French author of two enlightening economic surveys on Indo—
China published in the pre-war period. He has made clear
in this quotation the riches of the country and the poverty
of its population. A sad yet striking contrast, the main
cause of which lies obviously in the regime of colonialist

eXploitation.

29

Another extract from a study published in October
1949, by the Office of the High Commissariat of France in
Iédc-China, will offer a clearer picture of what becomes
of the standard of living of the Viet-nam peasantry under
colonial domination.

The different categories of wage-earners, tenants,
very small landholders of a portion of the communal
lands make up the majority of the rural population,
about two-thirds. This working class, totally with-
out capital, lives off its wages from day to day.

It cannot satisfy its hunger completely except dur-
ing the busy seasons, especially plowing and harvest
times. (28)

In conclusion, it is safe to say in the words of
Professor Mac Mahon Ball,

In the economic deve10pment of Indo-China, the inter
sets of France or of Frenchmen were usually, if not
always, the paramount aim. And economic progress, as
measured in terms of production and trade, has not pro-
duced a corresponding social progress. It has often
produced social disintegration and mental instability.(29)

Political Oppression.

The colonial regime of 1939 was characterized by bura
eaucratic government and an all-powerful administration.
The colonies were subject to laws and regulations pecul-
iar to them and were ruled.up to 19h6, by decrees of the
President of the Republic of France. In the protector-
ates the sovereign retained the right to make laws, but
in fact it was the French Resident who prepared.and en-
forced legislation. The system allowed the central gov-
ernment to have complete control and gave full power to
the civil servants who made the regulations. (30)

1. Colonialist Iron Curtain.

Under the French administration, Viet—nam has been iso-
lated from the rest of the world by an impenetrable iron cur-
tain. She has become a private fief of the French colonial-
ists.

Arbitrary customs barriers have made Viet-nam.inaccessi-

30'

ble to any international commercial transactions. The
French capitalists had thus a free hand to organize an
import-eXport monopoly in their own behalf.

Viet-nam did not have any diplomatic rights whatso—
ever. She could not have any direct relations even whth
France. Between the Vietnamese authorities and the French
government and Parliament, there was a triple rampart made
of the offices of the "Residences Superieures," ”Gouverne—
ment general,“ and the “Ministers des coloniesl' "The
officials were masters in the colonies thanks to their wide
powers which they did not always exercise in accordance with
government regulations. " (31)

The colonialist iron curtain denied to the Vietnamese
peOple the freedom of cultural exchange with other nations.
The foreign press was refused admittance. Even French press
and literature were severely censored. The only books and
newspapers admitted to Viet-nam were those from writers who
gave lip-sertice to the regime. Any ideas about national
liberty, social justice and human rights were considered to
be “subversive“ and as such, denied expression and circula-
tion among the public.

There has been no freedom of travel outside the borders
of Viet-nam, Students, tourists and merchants found it most
difficult to obtain visas from the "Surete Francaise."

2. Control of Armed Forces.

The French reserved for themselves the exclusive right

31

to organize army, navy and air forces. Colonial tr00ps
were composed of the French Legion, Senegalese, Moroccans,
and 'Gardes Indigenes," made up of Vietnamese militia comm-
anded'by French officers. Their chief occupation is des-
cribed below by H. R. Isaacs.

French garrisons and.their Foreign Legion units were
engaged almost constantly in punitive eXpeditions
against the dissident and the rebellious.

Long before the days of Hitler, they employed the meth-
od of wiping out whole villages and towns in reprisals
for the acts of individuals.

In 1930, for example, more than a decade before Lidice,
a group of fleeing Vietnamese nationalists took refuge
in the village of Co-am in the province of Hai-Duong.
Five French planes bombed the village and strafed it
afterward at low altitude, pursuing the people who fled
along the nearby roads.

A few days later the Resident Superior of the province
circularized all local officials saying: 'The village of
Co-am has been bombarded by the Hanoi Squadron. I re-
quest that you give utmost publicity to this, and add
that any village which places itself in a similar situa—
tion will without pity meet the same fate. (32)

In this way, the most patriotic nationalists were elim-
inated from the political scene. The state prisons of Son-la
Lao-Bao, and.Poulo-Condore, ran red with the blood of Vietnam-
ese patriots.

5. Divide and Rule.

Since the late 1800's, France has held the life of Viet-
nam in her hands. She has divided Viet-nam into three zones
or Kys, as they are called, each being subjected to a particu-
lar political regime, thus making it easier to control by the

"divide and rule' technique.

Cochinchina, or South Viet-nam, was given the status
of a colony. As such, it had a direct French administra-
tion headed.by a French governor. It also had the right
to elect a Deputy to stand in the Chamber of Deputies in
the French Parliament.

Annam, or Central Viet-nam, was given the stqtus of
Protectorate. Under this form of government, it had a
native administration headed by the Emperor of Annam and
a French indirect administration headed by a French Resrd
dent Superieur, who in fact, controlled everything.

Tonkin, or North Viet-nam, was given a status halfway
between a colony and a protectorate. In the beginning, the
region was placed under the symbolic protection of the Emper-
or of Annam who appointed a viceroy to represent him in the
area. The French abolished the position of viceroy and placed
the region under the direct control of the French "Resident
Superieur,“ of Tonkin in 1897.

Although each region was given a special status, the
colonialist regime applied in all of them was the same. This
arbitrary division had been made for the unavowed.purpose of
destroying the unity of Viet-nam, making it easier for the
French to reign over the country.

The unity of Viet-nam before the arrival of the French,
was an incontestable fact. As Charles Gosselin, a French
historian of the French Conquest in Indo-China has eXpressed
it in his book, “Empire dfiAnnam,”

33

Nous nous sommes trouves en presence du peuple le
plus uni que l'on puisse imaginer, depuis les mon-
tagnes du Haut Tonkin jusqu aux frontiere du Cambodge,
au point de vue ethnique aussi bien qu au point de
vue politique et social. (We have found oursdlves
in the presence of the most united people one can
imagine ethnically as well as politically and soc-
ially, from the mountains of High Tonkin to the fron-
tiers of Cambodia.)

6. Creation of the "Gouvernement general de
l'Indochine," an all—powerful superstatic or-
ganization.

The three Kys of Viet-nam with Cambodia and Laos
were called the five countries of the Indochinese Union.
A: such, they were under the control and supervision of
the "governement general de l'Indochine: (33) The supreme
decisions of which in political, economic and financial
matters of the union eradicated any remaining trace of
unity of Viet-nam and worked steadfastly toward a com-
plete domination of the colony by a group of a few French
capitalists, most of whom were owners of stock in the

Banque de l'Indochine. (34)

1.

10.

11.

34

Footnotes

Phillipe Devillers, Histoire du Viet—nam de 1940 a
1252. Paris, Editions du Sevil, 1952 pp 11—12.

 

Annamese and Vietnamese designate the same peOple of
the country of Viet-nam. For their different meaning
see Claude Madrolles, ”Annam and Viet-nam," AsiaI
(Saigon) March 1, 1951 pp43—44

Paul Gourou, L'Avenir de l'Indochine, Paris, Centre
d Etudes de Politique Etrangere, Paul Hartmann. p 10

 

Reverend John C. Rubba, The Dominican Martyrs of Ton-
kin. Providence College Press, 1951.

Charles Gosselin, l'Empire d'AnnamL_19O4.

 

1886-1888: Revolt of King Ham-nghi.

1888-1890: Revolt of Phan dinh Phung.

1888-1910: Revolt of De Tham

1906 Foundation of the “VIET—NAM QUANG PHUC HOI,"
a nationalist movement led by Prince Cuong
De and patriot Phan Boi Chau.

1916 Revolt of King Duy Tan

1923 Unsuccessful assassination of French Gover-
nor General Martial Merlin by Pham Hong Thai.

1926 Foundation of the “New Viet-nam Revolutionary

League" (Tan Viet Cach Menh Dang)

1930 Revolt at Yen-Bay led.by Nguyen thai Hoc, a
leader of the nationalist movement V.N.Q.D.D.

1937 Movement of the “Indo-China Congress" asking

for political reforms and liberation of politi-
cal prisoners.

1939 Creation of the "Viet-nam Doc-lap Dong—minh
Hoi" (League for the Independence of Viet-nam)

1940 Rebellion led by Le Hofig Phong and his wife
Minh-khai.

1941 Revolt of Sergeant Doi Cung iriNghe-an.

(See Pham Van Son, VieE:§§E tranh-dau gu,
Hanoi, 1949) pp 111413?

I'Viet-nam" Focus American Geographical Society, Vol.1
No 5, February 15, 1951.

C.A. Julien, From the French Empire to the French Union,
International Affairs. Volume XXVl, No 4, Oct. 1950 p.491

Henri Lanoue, The Structure of Indo-China. Science and
Society. Vol. XV, No 1 Winter 1950.51 p 1

J. R. Clementin, The Nationalist Dilemma in Viet-nam.
chificaAffairs, Vol XXXlll, Sept. 1950 pp 300-301

Henri Lanoue, Op Cit., p‘6

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.

l7.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
3o.

31.
32.
33-

Mac Mahon Ball. Nationalism and Communism in East
A§;§_, Melbourne University Press. 1952 p 73

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Henry Lanoue. Op Cit.
.1219. p 4

Idem.‘p.12
42.1.9 p 12

Charles Robequain, Economic Develooment of French
Indo-China. Oxford, 1944 pp139—14O II I

Mac Mahon Ball Op Cit, p 72
idea

Henri Lanoue Op Cit p 9

H. R. Isaacs. No Peace for Asia N.Y. Mac Millan p145.
Ibid p 146

Henri Lanoue Mt p 13

Virginia Thompson. French Indo-China p 207

Mac Mahon Ball.;2ig_pp 69-70

See Andree Viollis. IndoChina S.O.S.

Henri Lanoue ,Op Cit) p 7

H.C. Moreau, _La Cooperation Agricola en Indochine. P. 17
Mac Mahon Ball 02 Citl p 72

C. A. JUlien. Egon the French Empire to the French Union
International Affairg Oct. 1950 c:

Idem.

H.R. Isaacs Op Cit, p 143

First conceived as a slight organism of coordinationof

the action of the local deernors and Residents, it
quickly affirmed itself as the supreme authority in In-
do-China. The relative autonomy the Protectorate had
left to Viet-nam with the possibility of a direct con-
tact with metropolitan France, fainted very soon.

The Protectorate "Annam-Tonkin" had depended on the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France (like Morocco and
Tunisia today) since the decree of January 27, 1886.

34.

36

The decrees of October 1887, which organized "French
Indo-China” made it clear that all of the French poss—
essions in Indo-China were under the authority of the
Governor General, immediate representative of France
in all annexed or protected territories responsible
only to the Minister of Colonies.

From then on, there was erected a thick screen between
Viet—nam and France, the Government General.

In 1897, new restrictions were imposed on Vietnamese
sovereignty. by the creation by Governor General Paul
Doumer, of the "Government General of the Indochinese
Union, which had at its disposal an imposing apparatus
of "services generaux" and the resources of a “budget
gflne ral e N

In 1898, the French administration reserved for itself
the right to collect taxes in the whole territory.

On the other hand, in Annam, it was decided.that the
Resident Superior in Hue preside from then on, over the
Co-Mat, (Secret Council of the Ministers) and that de-
cisions of the Vietnamese Government be approved by the
French authorities before they could be put into execu-
tion. From the Protectorate regime one has almost come
to the regime of direct administration. Not only dip-
lomacy and armed forces were taken away from the Viet-
namese government of Ho, the latter also, had no more
than the appearances of administrative power.

See Philippe Devillers, Op Cit p 29

Among them, the present president, Paul Boudoin, former
minister in the Vichy government, represented the Banque
in the 'Societe des tramways de Shanghai,‘ as well as on
the boards of nine Indochinese corporations. His coll-

eague, Pierre Guesde, formerly Chief French Resident
in Annam, and Colonel Francois Barnard, held thirteen
and three seats respectively. The former president,
lens Thion de la Chaume, was on six boards, while his
relative, Francois de la Motte-Ango, Marquis de Flers,
Assistant General Director, held fourteen posts. Jean
Laurent, General Director who later became Administrator
of Civil Services in Indo-China, also six. Another dir-
ector of the Banque, Ernest Roume, former Governor Gener-
al of Indo-China, sat on the board of the Suez Canal.
See Henri Lanoue Op Cit p 3

CHAPTER 11

IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON VIET-NAM
A. Analysis of Communism in Southeast Asia:

The common peOple of Asia are the peasants. They
comprise the vast majority of the population of Asia.

Most of these peOple are hungry. They need food, cloth-
ing, houses, hospitalization and education. They are an
overworked and severely exploited peasantry. A large
part of the misery and hunger arises from the relation-
ship between the peasants and the landowners; between
the native and white population in some cases.

For centuries the Asiatic peasant has lived at the
mercy of the local landlords. In some underdevelOped areas
as many as three and one-half millions of peOple work for a
single landowner. The share of the crOp allotted to the pea-
sant is so small that he could not live through the year's
sowing without securing advanced from his prOprietor-usurer.
Interest on these loans cuts his share still further. In
some provinces seventy per cent and more of the harvest goes
to the landlords. In this way the peasant is kept in per-
petual poverty and slavery. (1)

Although most peasants in Southeast Asia own the small
portion of land that they till, they still find themselves
under a heavy burden of debt. This is due to numerous fac—
tors such as low productivity. The fact that families are

quite large and inclined to cleave together even after mare

riage also adds to the difficulty of making the family
plot suffice. (2)

Because of the lack of accurate studies, it is diffi-
cult to estimate adequately the percentage of the populace
which may be classified as peasants. It is generally be-
lieved by students of the Orient that about two thirds or
more of the total population in nearly every Asian country
are to be found in agricultural pursuits and classed as pea—
sants. This would seem to indicate that there are more than
one-hundred.millions of people in Southeast Asia who can be
considered as peasants. (3)

Productivity is very low in this part of the world due
primarily to lack of modern implements and methods. Produc—
tion also hinges on distribution of population, a factor which
is very uneven in Southeast Asia. The fact that traditional
patterns are closely followed hampers the redistribution of
the papulation into more favorable areas.

The superstition peasants refuse to leave ancestral
burial plots and break family ties. They are also intensely
affected by superstitions about mountainous areas and swamp-
1ands. These areas, so abundant in Southeast Asia could be
utilized if reclamation and conservation methods were to be
employed and the peasants could rid themselves of their fan-
tastic taboos. (4)

The peasants in Southeast Asia have fewer cultivation
acres per capita than their counterparts in Western Europe.

For instance, in the rich Tonkin Delta of Indo-China, as

many as 60% of the peasantry own holdings of less than
nine-tenths of an acre per capita.

It has been estimated that individual family re-
quirements will vary from two and one-half to five acres
depending upon the number of persons in the family.

Fish production, which ordinarily is the principal
source of animal protein in the diet of the peasants shows
the same low ratio of productivity. (5)

The average income in Southeast Asia is extremely low
due to the above-mentioned conditions and to the fact that
the economy has a very low level of capital equipment in
proportion to the abundant labor utilized in production.
wages are also dependent upon colonial management in the
majority of cases. This source of income is notoriously
low in return for work done. (6)

There can be no doubt that the life of the Southeast
Asian peasant is one of extreme hardships. He lacks the
common necessities of life and is kept in a life of bon-
dage to debtors in addition to his poor living conditions.

In recent years groups of Chinese money lenders who
took over the activity of middle-men have become a most
significant feature in the economic and political life of
the populace. They share a large preportion of the whole-
sale import trade and control the collection, storage and
processing of the peasants' eXport products.

Acting in this capacity, they are in a position to

finance the peasant by loans on his crops in advance of

harvest. They manage to enlarge their profits by giving
the advances in goods rather than money. Through clever
manipulation they have managed to skirt the boundaries of
both the EurOpean and peasant society, thus keeping in
close business contact with both.

Combined.with these pressures of alien influence are
the effects of Westernisation. Together these factors have
made a tremendous impact upon the peoples of Southeast Asia.

To quote again Professor Raymond Firth in his recent
study on the peasantry of Southeast Asia;

The effects of Westernization are profound. But they
do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peas-
ant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie
in the widening of the gap between his expanding range
of wants and his level of productivity and in his in-
ability to measure and in any way control the economic
forces operating in his field.

Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlarge-
ment of the social horizon--more knowledge, through bet-
ter communications and education, of other places, of
other peoples, of kindred and dissimilar interests. It
has created new ambitions; for different clothing, for
new uses of leisure, for a better status for his child-
ren, for a position of power in the political scene.(7)

The poverty and inequality of the peasant in comparison
with his white masters has bred a loathing for the white man
and his rule unequaled in history. The insecurity of his
position in the eXpanding economy leaves him uncertain and
psychologically and emotionally unstable as he gropes for
understanding of the situation.

In his book, 'No Peace For Asia," H.R. Isaacs has ade-

quately described the emotional tension which is common to

41

all the colonial countries, as he quotes the conversation be-
tween himself and a native Vietnamese:

Frenchmen here--we hate them with a hatred that must be
inconceivable to you, for you have not known what it is
to live under a foreign master as a slave.

He continues in his own words:

It was like a social disease of the subjected, this
passionate loathing. Whole generatmons had been infect-
ed with it, by the vermin in French prisons or by the
slower poison of an enforced inferiority haunting every
step of their lives from the cradle to grave.

A hatred compounded of many things: dull and weary
sense of unrepaid toil was part of it; and so was
chronic injustice never articulately understood. There
was also the nettle of racialism in it, for the masters
were white and the least of them was greater than the
greatest of the land's own sons. Racialism, where it
does not impose dumb submission, outrages manhood and
breeds violence. Freedom is not among the eXports of
any imperial nation. The great French libertarian tradi-
tion was never carried by Frenchmen west of Suez, be
cause it is not a commodity from which profits can be
made.

Only the small number of Annamites who were sent to
France for higher schooling encountered it when they
reached the homeland of their masters. The France of
the great classic revolutionary tradition, of free
thinkers and free livers, was a new France to them.

In Paris they discovered at leaet the roots of the free-
dom they were denied in their own land.

The result, in most cases, was that their French school-
ing did not train them, as was intended, to become pliant
adornments of the colonial regime but to become rebels
against it and leaders of rebels when they came back

h home. This is a movement against France by intellec-
tuals who were all educated in France. (87

The Communists always adept at rationalizing, have

taken advantage of the critical situation in Southeast
Asia as often as possible. Their successes have been great.

In theory, they advocate economic security, justice, racial

equality, redistribution of land and wealth.

They emphasize and aggravate the grievances of the
people and cleverly manipulate politics of an area so that
socialism appears more attractive to the peOple than their
present form of government. The Communists ardently teach
class hatred.

The Communist practise of the suppression of political
and civil freedoms which has so antagonized the Western
world, makes little impression upon these peoples, who have
lived their lives so intimately with suffering and privation.

Civil rights do not seem as important as food to these
hungry peOple. They are willing, even anxious to forgo rights
for the promiSe of a full stomach.

Because of the close relationship of the family unit in
these countries, there is more emphasis given to duty and re-
sponsibility than to human and civil rights in the mind of
the peasant.

Government control and.monopoly does not arouse antag—
onistic response in the East. It has long been the custom
for the government to build roads, irrigate the soil, con-
struct canals and railways and other projects of statewide
nature. No private companies or individuals would be fin-
ancially able to perform these activities. Basic consumer
goods are more apt than not to be under governmental monopoly.(9)

Communism in itself is not important to the Asiatic
peoples. Their primary concern is to get enough food for
themselves and their children. For this, Communism offers

43

two basic tenets. First, is the promise of individual
freedom from the Oppression of the white masters. The
second is the Opportunity to own a piece Of land free

from excessive debt.

The Communists use the technique Of rent reduction
and land redistribution in their agrarian reform programs.
Village liberation and class reorganization all are used
as bait for the discouraged peasantry. Their method of
fostering personal conversion and guidance by self—critic-
ism has also been extensively used to further the aims of
Communism in Asia.

One of the most effective ways in which the Communists
have influenced the peoples Of these lands is by indoctrina-
ting the students. These students then go forth among the
peOple and teach and guide as many of the peasants toward
Communism as is possible for them to reach.

This has proven an aid to the spread of Communism in-
asmuch as the Communists preach nationalism so fervently
within these colonialareas. The Communists within each
country have tended to emphasize national patriotism in
their tactics and propaganda. The reason for this has
several aspects. First, the veto in the United Nations
is the safeguard for the Soviets against adverse action
and the veto rests on the old doctrine Of sovereignty. The
freedom of Soviet Russia from international control is
therefore facilitated by insistence upon hational sovereign-

ty.

Secondly, the doctrine of sovereignty serves as a
barrier to such projects as atomic—energy control. Third—
ly, the slogans of sovereignty and patriotism have a strong
appeal in drumming up opposition to the Marshall plan, on
the ground that it represents American interference in the
recipient countries.

Within each country that the Communists hOpe to control
eventually, they pursue the tactics indicated for them by
Lenin's Left-wing Communism. Under their ultrapatriotic
slogans, they infiltrate, divide and insofar as possible,
rule. This tactic applies from the level of the national
legislature down to the neighborhood club.

The general Communist view on nationalism seems to be
that in advanced countries, nationalism is a factor to be
Opposed at all costs, but in the smaller and backward coun-
tries, nationalist movements are to be used to the utmost.
This use of patriotism and nationalism in the backward coun-
tries serves to both intensify efforts to disrupt the politi-
cal and economic stability of the colonial empires and to
mobilize pOpular forces which can in turn be played upon
by Communist propaganda. (10)

Taken all in all, the Communists have much to gain and
nothing to lose by preserving the anarchy Of the Old system
of too many little states with no common organization. This

especially applies in the colonial areas of Southeast Asia.

The Communists have taken full advantage of the Chinese
victories to further their propaganda in the faraflung areas
of Southeast Asia. One of the most realistic selling points
of Communism is the ethnic and racial relationships among
the pe0ples of this area. "Asia for the Asiatics,’l became
an early slogan of the Communists in this part of the world.
It has now reached the prOportions of a phenomenal urge with
the partisans of these parts.

Basically, Communism's concern with the welfare of the
peasant of Southeast Asia or the division of the land among
the hungry peasants is a cruel, tactical fraud. It is used
simply as a device to gain power. Once the Communists are
firmly seated in the government, the destruction of private
ownership begins, for this is a prime requisite of Communis-
tic states. (11)

It may reasonably be assumed that Russia's main inter-
est in the political movements in Asia is to manipulate these
movements so that they will promote the greatest damage to
her most potential enemies, the Western Democracies. In her
long range foreign policy it would be infinitely more impor-
tant to inflict mortal wounds upon America or France or Eng-
land through this strategy than to aid the poverty stricken
Asiatics in their struggles.

Russia's financial inability to give adequate economic
aid toward the industrialization of Southeast Asia fosters

1+0

much discontent among the peOple who have been led to eXpect

much more from the Communists with their extravagant promises.(12)
However, the Communists have managed to jestle the demo-

cratic world into cO-Operating with a bureaucratic feudalistic

system until in at least a number of instances American dollars

are backing Oppression and corruption. America has loaned

France, for instance, over three billion dollars, knowing full

well that the money is being used to oppress the peasant and

to suppress all Opposition to the French in Indo-China.

It is this kind of feudal system, with its grip on the
governments (French Colonialism) that is responsible
for nine—tenths of the advances of the Communists around
the world. Therefore, when American dollars are spent
to uphold landlordism instead of breaking up these land-
ed estates and liberating the masses of people in de-
pendent areas, these dollars fan the flames of hate
against America and are one Of the greatest contributing
causes of the growth of Communism in Asia. If Asia goes
Red, Americans must take some of the blame to themselves. (13)

47

B. Communism in Viet-nam.

Communism was brought into Viet—nam in 1930 when HO
Chi Minh, alias Nguyen Ai Quoc, founded the Indochinese
Communist Party on January 6, 1930. (14)

Born in the early 1890's, Ho Chi Minh spent a period
of his youth in the French Merchant Marine, then settl-
ed in Paris toward the end of the first World War, and
became a member of the Communist Party there. In 1923 he
went to Moscow as a delegate of the French Communist Party.
to the International Labor Congress, and remained there
as colonial representative of its permanent Committee.

From 1925 to 1927 he served in Canton as Staff Attache
of Chiang Kai Shek's Soviet advisor. Following Chiang's
split with the Communists in 1927, Ho Chi Minh fled Can-
ton and returned to Moscow. In 1930 he founded the Comm-
unist Party Of IndO-China in Hong Kong. Imprisoned by
the British from 1931 to 1933, he disappeared after that
date and reappeared in Chinalin 1940.

In 1941 he formed the Viet-nam Independence League,
_(Viet Minh). Imprisoned by the Chinese Kuomingtang in
1943, he was released in 1944 to carry on anti—Japanese

activity. In November 1944, he crossed the frontier of
Indo-flhina. (15)

Since its foundation the Communist Party of Indo-China
has been operating true to the form of every Party in the
Communist International. It organizes strikes and Opposi-
tion groups for the aggravation of existent minority pro-
blems. It also entices new members with its propaganda
and various promises of reward.

In 1939 the Party began to take advantage Of the strife
caused by the Japanese occupation forces. It set upon a move-
ment of revolt against the French administration in Cochin-
China.

In conformity with the directives of the Komintern, it

48

then decided to change its platform from "Democratic Front",
to “Front of the anti-Imperialist Indochinese peoples." Its
Objective was "to fight with the support of the U.S.S.R,
stronghold of the World Revolution, against the imperialist
war to put down the French Imperialism and the native feudal
classes to regain the independence of Indo-China, and to est—
ablish a Democratic Republican Indochinese Union."

In June 1940 another decision was taken to the effect of
"preparing an armed insurrection in order to institute a re-
publican government which would rally itself with the movement
of resistance of the Chinese People, with the U.S.S.R. and.with
the World Revolution.“

The appeal was made to the masses of the population to
fight against "the French Imperialism and Japanese Fascism."
Following this on November 22, an order was given by the Comm-
unist leaders to their followers to start the insurrection in
Cochinchina in order to seize power and establish a "People's
Government of the Indochinese Democratic Republic.“ The French
succeeded in stifling the Communist insurrection. (16)

The failure Of the Cochinchina insurrection taught the
Indochinese Communists a lesson of prudence. They knew then
how to avoid any premature action and prepare themselves for
the day when the war reaching its climax, they could deal a
mortal blow to the colonialist regime, already shaken to its
foundations by the occurrence of the war and by the awakening

of the masses.

49

The tactics adopted by the Indochinese Communists were
in accord with the new directives of the Komintern which
substantially prescribed that the Communist parties should
assume the leadership of national movements of liberation
and in the battle against Fascist imperialism, unite as far
as feasible, all nationalist or social organizations. This
tactic was revealed two months after the total integration
of IndO-China in the Japanese military system, when HO found-
ed the Viet-nam Independence League or Viet-Minh whose first
manifesto read as follows: "Union of all social classes, all
revolutionary organizations, all ethnic minorities. Alliance
with all other oppressed peoples of Indo-China. Collaboration
with all French anti-Fascist elements. An objective: des-
truction of colonialism and Fascist imperialism."

The program of the Viet—Minh may be summarized as foll-
ows: (17)

1. Oust the French and Japanese Fascists. Make Viet-
nam independent.

The Viet-Minh did not preach xenophobia. It simply de-
clared that it wanted to have the independence of Viet—nam.
"Doc-lap", independence, was the first objective of the Viet-
Minh. It made allusion as Often as possible to the "Immortal
Principles” of Rousseau, Voltairs, the Great Revoltuion, and
it cited in example the French pOOple, Champion of Liberty in
the world.

50

But France exerted her sovereignty over Viet-nam. It
was therefore against her that Viet-nam must reconquer its
independence, or rather against this minority of “colonial-
ists' and Fascists that wanted to maintain at any cost its
domination over Viet-nam in order to draw therefrom the
maximum profit. But nothing stood in the way of friendship
between Viet-nam and France, if the latter recognized Viet-
nam's independence.

2. ”Alliance with democracies that combat fascism and
aggression.”

This point has been made if not to identify the future
international statute of independent Viet-nam, at least in
the hope of securing foreign aid necessary to the achieve-
ment of its indpeendence. It is conceivable that Operating
from Chinese territory and conforming to the directives of
the Komintern, HO Chi Minh could have hardly adOpted a diff-
erent position. But the very conditions in which Viet-nam
found itself made it necessary for Ho to take up such a
position.

In the struggle against Japan and the French administra-
tion in IndOChina, HO needed the support of a great power.
Russia was undoubtedly favorable. But she was too far away
and she was busy resisting Hitler. The two other countries
which might have been of great help were China and America.

China was at war with Japan and the French Administra-

51

tion in IndO-China had allied itself with Japan in 1939.
The U.S.A. was not yet involved in war, but her anti—
colonialist sentiments were well-known.

3. "Establish a Democratic Republic of Viet-nam."

The final Objective of the Viet—Minh wa=s to estab—
lish in Viet-nam a democratic regime with a large pOpular
participation. The Viet-Minh prOposed universal suffrage
of all Vietnamese eighteen years of age and older. The
members of ethnic minorities were to enjoy the same politic-
al rights as the Vietnamese, the democratic liberties such
as freedom of press, assembly, circulation, and the equali-
ty Of rights between men and women: a decentralized admini—
stration based upon an extensive participation of the pOOple
therein through thh "Committees of Peeple": nationalism of
all prOperties of fascists and traitors.

To the populace the Viet-Minh offered: "The suppress-
ion of all taxes instituted by the French and the Japanese,”
suppression of tenancy, the eight-hour day, and salary in-
creases; a system of social insurance and workers pensions;
the taking in charge of the indigent by the State; free and
compulsory education; creation of theatres, clubs, etc."

The program was extremely prudent on the agrarian ques-
tion. As its propaganda, based on the negation Of the right
of ownership, had met with a complete failure in the past,
the Indochinese Communists took advantage of the foundation
of the Viet-Minh to revise its position. It now advocated
rather the generalization of individual ownership of real

estate, thus satisfying one of the most cherished aspirations

52

of the mass of peasantry which makes up the majority of

the Vietnamese peOple.

Relations between the Ho Chi Minh Government and
France.

Immediately after Hiroshima and the Japanese zapit
ulation, the Communist elements of the Viet-Minh which
had organized an underground movement in Viet—nam dur-
ing the Japanese occupation, took over the country. They
instituted the so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-nam"
in Hanoi in September, 1945.

Ho Chi Minh was nominated President of the Republic
by his henchmen. Bao-Dai, who had been Emperor of Viet-nam
under the control of the Japanese abdicated the throne. Due
to his favorable reaction to the Communist rise to power,
and under pressure exercised by Ho, he was given the posi—
tion of "Supreme AdviSer' of the Republic.

As soon as the League Viet-Minh declared Viet-nam a
Républic, the Communist Party dissolved officiadly. Three
Communists, Tran Van Giau, Duong Bach Mai, Nguyen Van Tao,
became cabinet ministers. Thus, men who had been leaders
of the Communist Party became key figures of the Viet—nam
administration, but the party itself no longer existed.

On October 12, 19u5, a so-called Parliamentary election
gave Ho Chi Minh 330 out of #00 seats. (18)
Shortly after the Japanese capitulation, the British

53

and Chinese had been commissioned byAllied Command to dis-
arm the Japanese in Viet-nam. British troops which occu—
pied the south of Viet-nam, favored the return of the French
troops. The French succeeded in taking over Saigon and some
other nearby cities in the latter part of the year l9b5.

It was in order to facilitate the movement of French
trOOps back into the northern part of Viet-nam that France
signed.what was known as the Agreements of March 6, l9h6,
with the "Democratic Republic of Viet-nam.I

According to this agreement, France recognized Viet-
nam as "a free state within the Indochinese Federation and
the French Union". (The rice-rich part of Cochinchina was
_not included in this arrangement). In compensation for this,
the Republic gave a friendly reception to the French tr00ps.
Ho Chi Minh, however, desired not only the union of Tonkin
and Annam, which he had achieved, but also the incorporation
of Cochinchina.

The French then prepared for a plebiscite in Cochinchina,
which they hoped would.choose independence within the Indo-
Chinese Federation itself, rather than incorporation by Viet-
nam.

Thus the March 6, l9h6 agreement between France and the
Ho Chi Minh government was, in actuality, a "marriage of con-
venience." Both parties have agreed to settle the matter by
definite and.more detailed treaties to be consumated at a

later date.

54

Up to date two conferences have been held. The first
one met in Dalat, Viet-nam in April 1946. The second, at
the Palace Fonteinebleau, near Paris was held in July, 19h6.(l9)

There was hope of arriving at some mutual understand-
ing for conclusion of definite agreements. However, both
conferences failed because of the lack of mutual concess-
ions. France was not willing to concede to Viet-nam her
independence and unityl The Democratic of Viet-nam, under
obligation to the peOple whose instincts were extremely
nationalistic, could accept nothing less than the complete
independence and unity of Viet-nam.

Tension and dissatisfaction have been growing rapidly
in Viet-nam between the French and the officials of Ho Chi
Minh. In December 1946, under the pressure brought to bear
upon the Government of Ho by the French High Commissioner's
policy of progressive extension, war broke out. Hostilities
began in northern Viet-nam. The armed conflict has contin-
ued ever since.

Because of this violence on the part of the French High
Commissariat which the peOple felt was unjustified, Ho and
the Communist elements in his government have been able to
rally the entire nation against the alien and intruding
French. The result has been that Communism has become en-

trenched in the leadership of a genuine nationalist movement.

55

The Ho Chi Minh Government and the Vietnamese PeOple.

In its dealing with the people of Viet—nam since its
rise to power in the fall of 1945, the communizing policy
of Ho Chi Minh appears to have evolved from a period of
ground-laying (1945-1998) to that of an overt communiza-
tion (1948--).

A: the author has lived in Viet—nam in the years
1945-647, when the government of Ho Chi Minh reigned offim
cially over almost the entire country, he will be able to
describe the policy of this government in its ground-lay-
ing phase as an eye-witness.

Immediately after their rise to power, the Vietnamese
Communists dissolved the Indochinese Communist Party. Thin
dissolution was motivated by the same reasons that caused
the Soviet to dissolve the Komintern two years earlier in
May, 1943.

First, the Communists wanted to camouflage the pursuance
of their ideology under the facade of a nationalist movement,
in order to efficiently eXploit the nationalistic feeling of
the Vietnamese pe0ple. Secondly, this camouflage the Comm-
unists used to impress foreign observers. Thirdly, the offi-
cial dissolution of the Communist Party was believed to be
a part of Ho Chi Minh's elaborate plan for gaining time. Extra
time gained meant not only the possibility of enhanced military

power, but also an end to international isolation. (20)

56

Ho Chi Minh made the following public statement con-
cerning the establishment of the Commuhistic regime in
Viet-nam, "Communism is not applicable immediately to the
Vietnamese masses. It is therefore fit to envisage a pro-
visional period of bourgeois democracy." (21)

However the Communists founded an association called
“Association for the study of Marxism,“ whose main task
was to publish Communist books and to prOpagate Marxist
ideas and thoughts among the masses.

The system of government set up by the Communists was
very similar to that of Soviet Russia, with the Tong Bo
Viet-Minh, the Communist Party, given a different name--
exercising control over and giving directives to the offi-
cial government.

Every year the Ho Chi Minh government organized meet-
ings and demonstrations against fascist Franco and Comm—
unist ”deviationist“ Tito. All this, in spite of the fact
that the pOpulation of Viet-nam located at the southernmost
point of Asia, does not even know who Franco and Tito are.

A systematic propaganda has been carried out in favor
of Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader in Viet-nam and Soviet
Russia, the leader of World Revolution. In the Communist I
press Ho was called "The Father of the PeOple,“ (cha gia cua
dan toc) or ”The Savior of the Land,“ (vi cuu tinh cua dat
nuoc.)

A special song written in Ho's honor was titled, ”A

 

57

Thousand Years to President Ho Chi Minhfl (Ho Chi Minh muon
nam.) This song was taught in schools, garrisons, and fac-
tories, and became the most popular song in the country.

Ho chi Minh's picture was required to be bought by every
family and displayed in the place of honor in the home.

Quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin appeared daily
in the papers. Another song, "Dream of the Soviets," glori-
fying the Soviet society and regime has been given extensive
publication and pOpular support.

Indoctrination along Marxist lines has been carried out
systemically and given foremost priority in any kind of train?
ing, military as well as technical.

Schools for political administrative and military cadres
were organized. Whatever the subjects taught, study of
political problems and of Marxism received primary em—
phasis. The students emerged from their training con
vinced Marxists or nearly so. Since everyone in an offi-
cial position--whether in the government, the army, a
trade union or whatever-~had to attend a course in one

of these schools, a methodical propaganda and recruiting
system resulted. (22)

In every unit of the army a Political Commissioner was
given the task of politically educating the enlisted men and
as such was regarded as more important than the commanding
officer thereof.

Beside the regular and official police service, a net-
work of secret police was set up which included young peOple
whose ardor and enthusiasm were skillfully eXploited by the
Viet-Minh to ensure the Party's monOpoly of power.

Schools of indoctrination are set up also in the moun-

tains where integral Marxism is taught boys and girls
who are sent later into their villages to work for pro

58

paganda and repression purposes. In a years time these
young peOple have secretly created committees of resis-
tance and assassination that has produced a reign of
terror all over the country.

Their orders must be executed. Disobedience there-
of is punishable by the death penalty. Meantime they
have orpanized a service of information. Through this,
they know of every word and every act of each person
in the villages and each member of the families. The
carrying out of the work of these Committees is sppport-
ed by sections of armed soldiers, very mobile, and obey-
ing blindly their chiefs.

From time to time, operations of reprisals executed
by French armed forces, punish the villages, but very
rarely do the French capture thsoe who are really the
culprits. The latter, well informed of the plans of
French headequarters, have had sufficient time to escape.(23)

This secret police organization amounted to a very
thorough thought control policy. It was carried on every-
where even into the most remote areas. This eventually re—
sulted in the entire population, urban as well as rural,
being forcibly incorporated into Communist organizations.
These organizations in turn were carefully augmented at all
governmental levels, village, county, town, city and nation-
ally.

Suspicion and fear poisoned the life of the pOpulace.
The spies themselves were debased as well as their prey.
There was created an immoral atmosphere in which frankness
and sincerely in social relations were replaced by deceit
and fliesimulation.

While the Viet-Minh was claiming it granted to the
people of Viet-nam all democratic liberties, it practised,
in actuality an absolute dictatroship. It pursued a policy

of suppression and elimination vis-a-vis the non-Communist

59

nationalist or opponent elements which it called the
|'reactionaries“. Thus it has assassinated a large number
of Vietnamese patriots. The most well known among these
were Ho Van Nga, a professor, Ta Thu Thau, Communist news-
paperman accused of Trotskyist tendencies, Phan Van Hum,

a philosopner of the Spiritual School, Huynh Phu So, a
leader of Hoa-Hao, a political-religious movement.

In central Viet-nam, the province of Quang-ngai, thous—
ands of followers of Caodaism were massacredl They were
linked together by steel wires piercing their wrists and
pushed into the deep waters of the river.

After the conclusion of the Agreements of March 6,1946,
between Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny, a representative of the
French government, the Communists, gaining support from the
French, Openly attacked the V.N.Q.D.D. (Viet—nam Kuomintang)
troops stationed in the mountainous regions of northern Viet-
nam. ‘

This elimination of nationalist elements was carried out
on a national scale by sending them to the concentration camps
or by continual purges and liquidations.

The following statement made by Buu Viem, an anti-Comm-
unist nationalist condemned to death for trying to evade the
concentration camp where he had been interned, in the face of
his Communist judges, will give an idea about Communist Opp-
ression;

There could be no question for me of waiting a few months

more to be freed. It was my duty, considering the wretched
state of the camp, to make a symbolic gesture that would

oblige you to reflect on the fate of your victims. I re—
gret nothing! I ask for nothing! I have no intention of

60

asking your pardon.(24)

. The free press was censored. The activities of the
nationalists and Opponentsto the regime were closely
watched or severely repressed. The non-Communist politi-
cal parties were reduced to a state of inertia. Religious
worship was declared “reactionary" The churches and temples
were profaned. The most influential priests were accused
of being spies for the foreigners. They were thrown into
jail or dishonored in the eyes of the pOpulation.

Communist agents made searches of private dwellings
without notice or warrant. They made arrests and imprison-
ed the people without any recourse to legal procedure what-
soever. They often snatched up their political opponents
while they were walking on the street by quickly covering
their victims' faces with thick blankets. Then to suppress
their captives, they put them in big bags of jute and threw
them into the rivers. This method of kidnapping and supp-
ressing political opponents spread terror among the popula—
tion.

Many summary sentences for execution were pronounced
before the so—called "PeOple's Tribunals.” These were com-
posed of amorphous and fearful mobs. The Communists forced
them to gather in these groups and made them approve the ex-
ecutions of their fellow country-men by the raising of hands.
They were forced to accede in fear of their own lives. Thus

religious and political objectors to Communism were liquidat-

61

ed, and the remainder of the pOpulation intimidated into
fearful submission.

To satisfy the mass of the populace, the Viet-Minh has
been trying to create a hatred of class—distinction in Viet-
namese society. It divided the population systematically
into three categories. First, the capitalists (tu-ban);
Second, the owners of little prOperty, (tieu tu sani; third,
the prOpertyless (vo san). So much discrimination was prac—
tised against the two first aategories that it was an honor
to be classed in the last one.

Viet-nam however, has for generations enjoyed a nearly
classless society. Native capitalist exploitation in the
western sense of the word, charged by the Communists, does
not really exist. The differences in the standards of liv-
ing between the diverse factions of the pOpulation are in—
significant. Social partitions have never been insurmount-
able obstacles to the mobility of the population. (25)

Not infrewuently the sons of the poorest peasant fami-
lies have been found to hold the highest public positions
of government.

Among the peaceful functionaries, cultivators, artisans
and merchants, the Viet-Minh has made earnest efforts to sow
an artificial hatred of class. This class hatred was benefi—
cial to Communist expansion, but harmful to the country,
economically and socially. It paralyzed the economic activi-

ty and disunited the peOple at a time when unity and coopera-

62

tion were the most needed to resist French aggression.

Bound to its campaign program in 1941, the Viet-Minh
did a very good job in its efforts to eliminate analpha-
betism. The rate of illiteracy in 1945 was still very
high, as high as 80%. (26) The Viet-Minh organized a new
branch of education, named POpular Education. The main
purpose of this was to help the illerate to learn to read
and.write the Vietnamese language. A delay of one year
was given to all Vietnamese of over eight years to learn
the national language.

Were the efforts of the Viet-Minh to prOpagate edu-
cation among the masses exerted without any interested in-
tent? J. R. Clementin seems to doubt it when he says,

The successful struggle of the Viet-Minh against 111-
iteracy was impressive, but of course, its achievement
afforded an incomparable political tool. Instruction
in the alphabet provided the best possible channel for
Communist prOpaganda as well as the surest means of re-
cruiting the masses. (27)

In financial and fiscal matters, the Viet-Minh, in or-
der to keep its promises, abolisned all taxes created by
the French. It accused the French of being llunjust and in-
human" in assessing such taxes as the personal and indirect
taxes. Even the prOperty tax was suppressed to please the
peasantry. Circulation and sale of cereals was decreed to
be exempt from any charge.

However the Viet-Minh created instead what they called

contributions, such as the contribution to national defense,

VJ

which was in effect a tax but under a different name.
They collect all sorts of contributions for the sake of
"national salvation."

Thus for National Salvation, a "gold week" was or-
ganized during which the pOpulation was invited to give
the government all articles made of gold which it would
give as gifts of good will. Similarly a "copper week"
was instituted.whereby the Viet-Minh acquired a great
amount of copper for nothing.

Along the same lines, a so-called."Pot of Rice“ for
national salvation was created. Each home must have a pot
in which it puts a handful of rice every day. Once a month,
when the pot is filled with rice, a representative of the

government comes in and empties it.

Second Phase, Overt Communization.

This phase was marked.by two outstanding facts. First,
communization of the high command in domestic administration.
Second, alliance more and more stressed with the U.S.S.R. and
its satellites and the Red.Peking government.

The ground-laying phase of communization ended.when
Mao-tee Tung's victory in China seemed.assured. Early in
1949, began the phase of overt communization of Viet-nam by
the Viet-Minh government. '

By the end of 1948, most of the basic organizations,
from the village councils to the most diverse cultural associa-

tions, were already held solidly by the Communists. In 1940

all control levers passed simultaneously into Communist
hands so that the high command was at that time one hun-
. dred per cent Communist.

Pham Ngoc Thach, Hots assistant in the cabinet and
a man who has been mentioned as the first Vietnamese am-
bassador to Moscow, was sent to the south to reorganize
the local administrative "Committee of the Resistance,"
Thach blamed the peeple for their individualist devia-
tionism and assigned all key posts to Communist leaders.

A similar process occurred in the central part of-
Viet-nam where the mission of reorganization was entrust-
ed to Pham Van Dong, Ho's heir apparent in the governing
body of the Viet-Minh.

Speeches and addresses which had.been given in the
ground-laying phase since the dissolution of the Indo-
Chinese Communist Party in 1945, in the name of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-nam were now given plainly in the
name of the Vietnamese Communists. At the same time the
press and radio redoubled their praise of Soviet Russia
and the PeOple's Republic of China.

Ho's attitude with regard to France changed radical-
ly. Whereas in 1945, he had on many occasions expressed
the desire to bring Viet-nam into the French Union, where-
as in 1947-48 he had declared that Viet-nam wished to re-

main neutral in the cold.war, from 1949 on, Ho loudly voiced

65

his intention of being the firm ally and friend of the
great Democratic, POpular Republic of China. (28)

At the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference
in Peking, November and December 1949, Liu Shao Chi, Vice-
President of the All China Federation of Labor, in his Open-
ing speech, made allusion to Viet-nam in the following terms.
“The war of national liberation in Viet—nam has liberated
90% of her territory.“

Liu Shao Chi has indicated China as the best example
for Viet-nam to follow:

The national liberation movement and the People's“
Democratic movement in the colonies and the semi-
colonies will never stop short of complete victory.
Their struggles are entirely righteous. They should
and will, win victory. The great victory of the
Chinese people to victory is eXpressed in the follow-

formula.

This nation-wide united front must be led by and
built around the working class, which opposes imper-
ialism most resolutely, most courageously and most un-
selfishly, and its party, the Communist Party, with
the latter as its center. It must not be led by the
wavering and compromising national bourgeoisie or the
petty bourgeoisie and their parties.

It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible
a national army which is led by the Communist Party, and
is powerful and skillful in fighting the enemies.

Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for the
national liberation struggles of many colonies and semi-
colonies.

The existence and development of the organization of

the working class and of the national united front are
dependent upon the existence and deve10pment of such armed
struggles. This is the inevitable course for the colon—
ial and semi—colonial peo le in their struggle for indep-
dence and liberation. (29

Luu Duo Pho, Secretary of the Viet-nam General Federa—

66

tion of Labor, stated that "the path of the 475 millions
of Chinese people is the path to be taken--The essential
principles--defined by Comrade Liu Shao Chi in his Open-
ing speech-~must serve as the compass for all the workers
of Southeast Asia." (30)

On December 20, 1949 on the occasion of Stalin's
seventieth birthday, the Viet-nam General Federation of
Labor, which is the direct affiliate in Indo-China of the
Peking Liaison Bureau, had conveyed "the respectful greet-
ings of the Vietnamese working peOple" to the ''Top Leader
of the Soviet PeOple and the workers and oppressed peOples
of the world." (31)

Shortly thereafter, the first national conference of
all Vietnamese trade unions was held, the decision of which
was to I'carry out the plans and decisions of the Conference
of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania which met in Peking."(32)
"To map out plans for consolidating the Vietnamese working
masses and making them a vanguard in the fight for national
liberation and in the rebuilding of a new national economy.“(33)

Another interesting fact about the conference was that
huge portraits of the great leaders of the working class,
Marshal Stalin, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, President Ho Chi M;nh,
Truong Chinh, and Hoang quoc Viet of Viet -nam hung above the
rostrum. (34)

Official speeches revealed close affinity to orthodox
Communist ideology. Thus Labor Minister Nguyen Van Tao said:

I'The workers and people of Viet-nam will learn from the Soviet

67

Union and democratic countries of the world in carrying
through the liberation of the working class and the peOple. (35)

A telegram was sent to the Soviet Trade Union Council
in which Viet-nam Trade Union Federation pledged to follow
the heroic example of Soviet workers by emulating still more
actively “in boosting up our preparation for the general
counter-offensive so as to restore our national independ-
ence and unity,” and eXpressed "unreserved confidence in the
leaderslip and support of the Workers of the Soviet Union.(36)

In February 1950, Vice-President Pham Van Dong told the
Third National Military Administrative Congress, "Workers
and peasants played an outstanding part in the revolution of
August 1945 and are bearing the brunt of the present War of
Resistance. They should therefore, be allowed to take a
greater part in the administration of the country. Only then
will the State power be really consolidated.” (37)

On the occasion of the formation of the People's Republic
of China, in late November 1949, Ho Chi Minh exchanged tele-
grams with Mao Tse-Tung. Ho said, "The fraternal relations
between China and Viet—nam which have a history of centuries
will grow closer so as to develop freedom and happiness for
our nations and defend world democracy and lasting peace in
common."

Mao replied on the same tone by stating that, "China and
Viet-nam are meeting on the front line of an imperialist
struggle. With the victorious development of our struggles

for liberation of the two peoples, the friendship between

our two pe0ple s will surely become closer day by day." (38)

As the Chinese Red Army drove the defeated nationalist
troops south, forcing them to cross the border into Viet-nam,_
Viet-Minh Radio in concert with Foreign Minister Chou En—Lai's
warning statements to the French on December 7, 1949, pro-
tested against "underhand machinations of the Chinese Kuo—
mingtang reactionaries and the French Imperialists aimed at
violating Vietnamese national sovereignty.“ (39)

The possibility of joint action by Vietnamese troops
and Chinese Communist armed forces against the French was
also envisaged.by the Ho Chi Minh government. The Viet—
namese radio spokesman cautioned the French to "bear in
mind the fact that democratic China never intended to send
her army across the Viet-nam border Ind.that Viet—nam never
relied on the Chinese liberation Army for winning the war
against the French landgrabgers," but "Should the French
imperialists be boneheaded enough to harbor the enemies of
New China and allow them to annoy the Viet-nam peeple, then
they would be held responsible for all the ensuing consequen-
ces.”

The late December issue of the Vietnamese Pravda, Su-That
(truth), spoke more plainly. "The Viet—nam Army and the peOple
would not only heartily welcome but also back up the Chinese
liberation Army should the latter deem it necessary to pur-

sue the remnants of Kuomintang hordes into Viet-nam." (40)

69

A Union of Overseas Chinese New Democratic Youth was
founded in Ho—controlled Vietnamese territory, the Presi—
dent of which, in a greeting telegram sent to Foreign
Minister Chou En-Lai, denounced the atrocious crimes comm-
itted by the French against Chinese nationals in Viet-nam(4l)

The official alliance of the Ho Chi Minh government with
Red China and.the U.S.S.R. was achieved by Chinese recogni-
tion of Ho's government on January 18, 1950, and by Russian
recognition on January 31, 1950. The Russian satellites in
Eastern Europe and the North Korean government also offic-
ially recognized the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam. (42)

Following Mao's government recognition of Ho's govern-
ment, a Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association was establish-
ed, one purpose of which was to help the Vietnamese people
to understand.the factors that led to Chinese Communist
success.(43)

Ho Tung Mau, a former member of the Chinese Communist
Party and one of the original founder of the INdochinese
Communist Party was appointed President of the Sino-Viet-
namese Friendship Association. He made the principal sppech
on February 18, 1950, designated as Sino-Vietnamese Friend-
ship Day by the Ho government. (44)

That the struggle and program of the Ho Chi Minh gov-
ernment are tied to the orthodox Communist International can
be seen in the following statement of Su—that in the January

25, 1950 issue:

70

The Democratic Republic of Viet-nam has consistently
been standing in the international democratic camp led
by the Soviet Union. This is an opportunity for us to
contribute as much as we can to the world—wide struggle
for peace and democracy under the leadership of the
Soviet-Union. This is an opportunity for us to weld
our legitimate patriotism with righteous internation-
alism. (45)

FOOTNOTES.

“Why A ia Turns to Communism", Life June 19, 1952.
Reymon Firth. "The Peasantry of Southeast Asia,"
International Affairs Vol XXVI October 1950. p505
Z'Ibid. p 504

1515. p.505

151d. p.505-506

Ibid. p.506

bid. p.510

. H.R. Isaacs. 9p Cit pp 146—7

9. Mac Mahon Ball Op Cit p 11.

10. gppmunism: Its Plans and Tactics, Washington Infantry
Pournal Press I948, 5'28

11. Marx and Engels. Communist Manifesto.

12. Mac Mahan Ball. Op dit p 14

l . John Collier. New York Timgp October 1, 1950.

l . To mark the sixth anniversary of the 19 6 General
Election, the “Voice of Viet-nam" (Viet M‘nh Radio)
broadcast: ”We should not forget that there would
have been no 6 January 1945 General election Day--
if there had.been no 6 January 1930, Day of the
Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party."

15. Ambassade de France Servie6de Presse et d'Informa-
tion, Document April, 1950.

For more information see S.R. Mohan Das, “HO Chi Minh,
Viet-nam Nationalist or Soviet Agent?“ Internationgl
Free Trade Union News, Vol 6 No 1. January, 1951.

16. Philippe Devillers Op Cit pp 78-80

17. Ibid. pp 98-100

18. Martin Ebon. World Communism Today. N.Y. Whittlesey,
1948 p 389

19. Philippe Devillers Op Cit pp256—258 & 289-308

20. J.R. Clementin Op Cit p 309

21."Pretre et Missions, 'Bulletin de 1'U.M.C. Quebec

22 July-Sept. 1950 p338

. J.R. Clementin Op Cit 309
23. "Pretre et Missions' OppCit pp34l.-342

 

 

O
H

 

(Dflmkn-F'b) NH

 

 

 

‘/

K;

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.
29.
3o.
31.
32.
33-
34.

71

Nguyeinien-Lang "I Chose Love? Asia (Saigon)
March 8, 1953
Philippe Devillers in his “Histoire du Viet-nam de
1940 a 1952", describes traditional Vietnamese society
as folIOws? Political power was concentrated in the
hands of the Emperor. Between him and the peOple
there was nothing, no feudality, no nobility, no
Parliament, nothing but the functionaries, pure in-
struments of the imperial power. All the Vietnamese
were equal before the King and.before the charges.
There was no military caste, not even the separation
between the civil and the military powers. These
functionaries were recruited in all the classes of the
peOple by means of competitive examination. This was
a rule in Viet-nam since the 12th century. Public
functions were attributed to merit, and merit was
judged by literary contests. p 19

 

 

Ibid. p 179

J.R. Clementin Op Cit p 309

IBid p 310 '

New China News Agency (NCNA) Peking Radio English

Morse to North Americafi November 23, 1949 Ibid Nov.

29. 1949 pp 20-2?

N.C.N.A. Peking Radio, English Morse to North America
Nov. 19, 1949 Ibid Nov. 23, 1949 PP 24'27

Viet-nam News Agency V.N.A. English Norse Dec. 20, 1949
Daily Report Op Cit Dec. 21, 1949 EEE 6

Peking Radio, Mandarin Dec. 28, 1949, Ibid Dec. 29, 1949

EEE5.

English Morse to Southeast Asia Dec. 27, 1949 Ibid.
Dec. 29, 1949 P 4

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 26, 1950.

Daily report Cit. Feb. 27, 1950 P EEE 3

TRuonnghinh is a well—known Vietnamese Communist
theoritician, who occupies the official post of Sec-
retary General of the Association for the study of

Marxism mentioned above.

.flpang3Quoc Viet was an outstanding member Of the Inde—
chinese Communist Party and now occupies the influen—

tial post of Secretary General of the Viet-Minh. See J.R.
Clementin, Op Citpp 238

English Morse to Southease Asia Mar. 2, 1950 Ibid

Mar. 6, 1950 PPllelz

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 7, 1950 Ibid
Feb 8, 1950,

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia I!M.Mar. 16, 1950
Ibid Mar. 17, 1950 P EEE3

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Nov. 28, 1949 Ibid
Nov. 29, 1949 P E334.

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Dec. 8, 194 Ibid
Dec. 12, 1949 (PPPll -

 

 

40.
41

42.
43.

45.

72

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Jan. 3, 1950
Ibid Jan. 4, 1950 P EEEl

V.N.A. English Marse to Southeast Asia Dec. 11, 1949,
Ibid. Dec. 13, 1949 P EEE 3

New York Times, January 31, 1950

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 11, 1950
Daily Report Op Cit. Feb. 14, 1950. pp PPP 18-20
V.N.A. English Mnrse to Southeast Asia Feb. 18, 1950
Ibid Feb. 21, 1950 pp PPP 1-2

V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 6, 1950
Ibid. Feb. 8, 1950, pp PPP 1—2

CHAPTER 111.
CONTEMPORARY VIET—NAM.

In the hectic years since the end of the war, Viet—nam
has fallen victim to division between two destructive forms
of government. The choice between the two is very slim.
The difficulty of choosing the lesser of two evils impress-
es itself upon a troubled peOple._

Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai each work for the government
he represents. The latter has been brought into power by
the French when their attempt at a political settlement
with HO Chi Minh proved to be unsuccessful.

The nature of the HO Chi Minh Government has been
discussed in the preceeding chapter. The following is con-
cerned with the nature of BaO Dai's Government.

In 1947 as the conflict spread and the military solu-
tion that France had undertaken in Viet-nam proved to be
unsuccessful, France began to consider other ways out of
the complicated situation. The French finally decided to
use the prestige of BaO-Dai, who meantime had taken refuge
in Hong Kong, to re-establish negotiations.

BaO-Dai was contacted.by emissaries of the French High
Commissioner in 1947. He consented to return as the French
sponsored leader of Viet—nam. A "protocol” was negotiated
which led to the conclusion of the March 8, 1949 Agreements
between French President Vincent Auriol and Bao-Dai, wherein
France recognized Viet-nam as an "associate country in the

French Union."

smell? , . .L -

74

It is on the basis of this Agreement that BaO-Dai
is calling himself "Head of the State of Viet-nam" and
the French are pretending that they are fighting an in~
ternational anti—Communist war in IndO—China.

During Bao—Dai's tenure as leader of Viet-nam, the
government of Nguyen Van Xuan had been formed under his
patronage. However, when the agreements of March 1949,
were solemnized secretly this government was not even
consulted.

Neither had Bao-Dai been vested.with any representa—
tive powers by any recognized group in authority in Viet-
nam. Due to this unauthorized negotiation, there was
general disapproval on the part of the Vietnamese peonle
and other friendly Asiatic peoples.

On April 24, 1949 after several weeks of hesitation
and under the pressure of the French government, BaO-Dai
left Cannes (a city in the South of France) reluctantly.
The plane which took him back to Viet-nam was given or-
ders not to make any stOps in Asiatic independent coun-
tries. It stopped only at Cyprus and Singapore to re-
fuel before arriving in Viet—nam.

The return of the ex-Emperor to the country did not
produce any psychological shock as had.bedn expected.by
the French. The total indifference of the pOpulation was
rather disappointing to them. The reason they had expect-

ed reverberations was the fact that these agreements made

75

with such care and secrecy afforded the Vietnamese only a
purely verbal independence.

1. Nominal versus actual unity.

BaO-Dai has p1edged.himself to respect the regional
particularism of the three "Kys", North, Center and South
Viet-nam. He has agreed to portide for each Of them a
large measure of autonomy, thus giving support to separa-
tism and disregarding Viet-nam's aspiration for unity.

TO control the administration of each Ky, of Cambodia
and of Laos, the French government delegates a Commissioner
of the Republic, formerly "Resident Superieur," newly bap—
tized with a novel name. Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina are
still considered three distinct countries. The former divi
sion is strictly maintained behind the facade of a nominal
unity.

The Home Ministry exercises no power. The three Govern-
ors, theoretically under the direct authority of Bao-Dai,
reign in fact over their Kys as Viceroys in their fiefs. Each
Of them has his own administration and army and is, in effect,
more dependent on the local Franch authorities than the cen-
tral Vietnamese government whose role is rather that of a
figurehead.

The regime of three Kys does not even represent a form
of Federalism. It is the negation of Viet-nam's unity. In
almost any federal country, the component states are multi-

ple and of small proportions comparatively to the size of

 

76

the whole nation.

The United States is composed of forty-eight states;
Switzerland has ninteen cantons and six semi-cantons; the
Soviet, sixteen republics, subdivided into autonomous re-
publics, autonomous regions and national districts. A
country of so limited size as Viet-nam would be dismembered,
ungovernable and denied its existence as a nation if it were
to be divided into three separate sections.

Furthermore, the regime of the three Kys should be re-
jected under the present critical circumstances in Viet-nam
where only a strong, decisive, united government would be able
to provide any semblance of effective independence.

2. Racial particularism-Subtraction of Ethnic

minorities from Vietnamese sovereignty.

The administration of ethnic minorities residing in
Viet-nam "will be the subject of particular statutes de-
termined by His Majesty, the Emperor in accordance with the
government of the French Republic." Quote from "News From
France," the French Embassy Press and Information Division
September 15, 1950.

This clause regarding the administration of mountainous
pOpulations of Viet—nam has been considered as a private busi-
ness deal to be settled later between BaO-Dai and France.
This action on the part of the French tends to eliminate
Vietnamese influence upon the high regions rich in mines, in

Tonkin and the extremely fertile high plateaus of Annam.

77

This mal—intention of the French government has been
testified to by the creation of the Federation of Thai
countries in March 1948.

Under cover of fallacious ethnic particularism, the
agreements of 1949 seek to reduce the national territory
Of Viet-nam in order to weaken it as far as it may be done,
thereby making more illusory a unity already factitious in
itself.

3. Grave Injuries to Internal Sovereignty.

In pledging himself to maintain a large autonomy Of
the three Kys and to attribute to ethnic minorities particu—
lar statutes, BaO-Dai gives little attention to the pOpular
aspiration for unity. He even accepts at the same time the
principle of French intervention in the domestic affairs of
Viet-nam. He takes upon himself the determination and modi-
fication of statutes which should of legal requirement call
for participation of the French government.

4. Limitation of Judiciary Sovereignty.

When Frenchmen and foreigners protected by Special
treaty with France are involved in civil law cases, they
are tried under French law and before mixed courts in which
Frenchmen would normally sit.

5. No Liberty in the Choice of Technicians.

The agreements of 1949, stipulate that Viet-nam should
appeal "by priority to French Union Citizens," that is, prac-
tically to Frenchmen-— “whenever it needs advisers, techni-

cians or experts,“ that, "This priority shall cease to be ob-

78

served only in case the French government is unable to pro-
vide for the requested personnel." This means practically
never.

Moreover, "no French citizens, no French Union nation—
als shall be able to bel'ong to the Vietnamese administration
without having previously Obtained authorization or agree
ment of the Representative of the French Union."

Thus, the use of any foreign technicians is carefully
eliminated in conformity with the principle of the colonial-
ist iron curtain that opposes the freedom of exchange of
ideas and men.

Viet-nam does not even have the right to choose the
French technicians she thinks would render her the best ser-
vice. In fact, technicians, advisers and eXperts admitted
to the Vietnamese government will be the French functionar-
ies appointed purposely by the French High Commissioner to
control and supervise the Vietnamese administration.

The clauses of the 1949 agreements above mentioned re-
flect a narrow-mindedness detrimental to the French ideas
and spirit of liberalism and they are not acceptable by the
Vietnamese people.

6. Inexistent External Sovereignty.

Viet-nam has been deprived of the right to determine
her external policy, "the general directives" of which, shall
be "decided upon after hearing from the High Council of the

French Union, and transmitted by the government of the Repub-

79

lie to the government of Viet-nam.“

Viet-nam's participation in the determination of her
foreign policy consists only in sending delegates to the
High Council of the French Union, an institution of ad-
visory power and under the direction of the French governm
ment.

This blind and unconditional submission of Viet—nam
to France with regard to Viet-nam's foreign policy with—
out any general principles and their limitation being de-
fined, this pure and simple ahdication of her external sov—
ereignty could lead Viet-nam to further mis-adventures. She.
would risk, for instance, dead-lock situation in case Francd
happened to be under the dictatorship of an imperialist or
Communist government.

Viet-nam will accept conformity of her foreign policy
to that of France, provided that certain fundamental prin—
ciples be previously defined, which may be summarized as
follows: to collaborate with all the democratic nations
and with the United Nations Organization, in order to des
troy any iron curtains, racial and class prejudices, to
oppose any form whatsoever, of imperialist or Communist
aggression to promote a free, must and peaceful internation-
al cooperation. However, within the framework of these
general principles duly defined, each part should remain

free to determine sovereignly its foreign policy.

7. No Independent Diplomatic Representation.

The March 8, 1949 agreements limit the diplomatic
representation of Viet-nam to the following countries:

The Holy See

China or India (to choose)

Thailand

Furthermore, the agreement of the government of the
French Republic is required for the appointment of the
Vietnamese diplomatic mission heads. Viet—nam can never
Subscribento this caricature of Diplomacy that BaO-Dai
in his own name has accepted from the French colonialists.

8. Permanent Military Occupation of Viet-nam.

The March 8, 1949 agreements do not have any provis-
ion regarding the withdrawal Of French trOOps stationed
in many bases and garrisons in Viet-nam within whose terri-
tory they are guaranteed free circulation.

Military occupation of Viet-nam by French troops for
an indefinite period of time constitutes the negation of
any idea of independence of Viet-nam.

9. Economic and Financial Subordination.

There is no provision for the statute of mines and
real estate concessions hitherto exploited by the French
colonialists for their own benefit.

Viet-nam will no doubt appeal to French bankers for
her reconstruction and industrialization. These bankers
will be accorded favorable treatment on a reciprocal basis.

But Viet-nam's mineral resources and vast real estates that

81

the French have attributed to themselves through the sys-

tem of gratuitous concessions are inalienable property Of
the Vietnamese peOple who must logically receive the prin-
cipal benefit therefrom.

The 1949 agreements totally overlook this question
which is of vital importance to the economic life of Viet—
nam. It would be immensely unfair to implicitly recognize
the right of the French colonialists to continue to exploit
the mines and plantations for their own exclusive benefit
without making any adequate compensation to the people of
Viet-nam.

10. Rp-apparition of the Ancient Offices of the

"Governement General de l'Indochine" Under
a New Vocable.

The acceptance by BaO-Dai of the principal of "Ser
vices Commune," (Common Services,) Common to Viet-nam,
Laos and Cambodia, under the direction Of the High Comm—
issioner of France in Indo-China namely:

The Institute of Issuing Currencies.
The Exchange Office

The Office of Transmissions

The Office of Immigration Control

'The Office of Foreign Trade and Customs
The Treasury

The Office of Equipment Planning

82

subjugates Vietnamese finances and economic activities
to the French administration.

Thus in virtue of the 1949 agreements, the old,
all-powerful offices of the "Gouvernement General de
l'Indochine" are to re—appear only this time under a
new vocable, to deprive Viet-nam of her legitimate rights
to organize her own finances, her fiscal and economic poli-
. cy, without which independende is only a word. (2)

To summarize the situation which.has develOped since
the conclusion of the 1949 agreements, the following quota-
tion from a report on Viet-nam published in the New York
Times, March 6, 1950, seems to be most helpful. The news-
'paper article read:

His government (Bao-Dai's) was too unpopular and in-
efficient to make effective use of any aid it did re-
ceive. A few able men did rally to Bao-Dai, like
Nguyen Huu Tri, the governor Of North Viet—nam. They
did so in the hOpe that they might yet transform the
Elysee agreements. (March 8, 1949) into a more genuine
independence.

The Vietnamese regard the March 8 agreements as only
a stepping stone, Tri told a reporter. We want full,
complete independence. He said that there had been a
considerable transfer of administrative functions from
France to the Vietnamese in the nortn, in education,

public welfare, agriculture, public health, public

works, and some police powers, but in everything, the
French keep back something.

 

FOOTNOTES
1. Lawrence K. Rosinger. The State of Asia. N.Y. KnOpf
1953 p-
2. New York Times. March 6, 1950

CHAPTER 1V.

CONCLUSION.

Whatever we choose to believe in the present tense
atmosphere of international relations, it would be im-
possible to deny that the civilized nations Of the earth
have allied themselves into two armed camps. Each Oppe-
ses the other politically, economically, socially and
philosophically.

This situation was brought about gradually through
the evolution of inevitable change and through man-made
revolution in the form Of world wars.

Previous to 1914, the list of great World Powers
numbered at least eight states. Of these, six were Euro—
pean nations. They were the most powerful and acted as
arbiters of world affairs.

The United States and Japan at that time were com-
parative strangers to the diplomatic world. After the
first World war, the powers were reduced to five and the
United States in the West and Japan, in the Far East rose
to new importance in the international scene.

The upheaval of the second World War was stupendous
in its map-changing and status-making events. With Japan
defeated in the East and Germany in the West, political
power vacuums were created which had.momentous effect on
the future of all the nations of the world.

England and France also found themselves physically

and financially exhausted. AS a result of all these chan-

ges, the United States became the most powerful nation in
the Western world and Soviet Russia emerged as a leader in
Eastern Affairs.

From the resulting chaos, hunger and inflation of war,
was born the rapid spread of collectivism and world revolu-
tion. Although Communism had its parties in every country
of any importance prior even to World War 1. still, up to
the beginning of World War 11, no country in the world was
ruled by Communists except Russia.

However since the close of the war, the Soviets have
gained control over Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, east—
ern Germany, all of the Balkan countries except Greece, the
Baltic countries, most of China and.bave gained substantial
influence and power in several other Asian countries. Total
dictatorship has devoured many politically helpless nations
and has cast a forewarning shadow over every other country
that has existed through the devastation of the war.

The reasons for disharmony between the East and West
are multiple and in some cases ill-defined. One of the prime
reasons for the cold war was the distrust which existed and
still exists between Russia and the democratic world.

The difference lies fundamentally in the dogmatic: be
liefs of the Communists and the laissez-faire capitalism of
the free peoples. Lenin, the prOphet Of Socialism has stated
the situation thus:

We are living not only in a state, but in a system of

states, and the existence Of the Soviet Republic side
by side with imperialist states for a long time is un-

CD

thinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end.
And before that end comes, a series of frightful clash—
es between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states
is inevitable. (1)

The one principle of Communism which has remained con-
stant through the years, is the advocacy of violent world
revolution. Any attempt to explain or define Communism on
any other basis or terms would.be a farce and a failure.
All Communist tactics, strategy and policy are aimed at
this final achievement.

In the book "Communism: Its Plans and Tactics,“ pub-
lished by the U.S. Infantry Press in 1948, one of its auth-
ors, all senators of the United States, remarks, "Soviet
policy and Communist policy, and Soviet action and Comm-
unist action, are alike meant to serve this single end.
Economic and political policy and action, collaboration on
the surface and subversion underneath, a swing to the right
in one period and a swing to the left in another are meant
to serve this single end, the world revOlution.(2)

Russia represents the main revolutionary force, all the
other Communist Parties of the world are subordinate to it.
The promotion of the revolutionary movement, is under the
absolute leadership of the Soviet Union through the dis-
ciplined unity of all parties.

No plan of reform'or revision is acceptable in the

eyes of the Communists. They are willing to believe fanatic-
ally that only Com*unists are qualified to rule the world.

UV

They also believe that every non—Communist government must
be destroyed.by violence and socialism set up in its place.

The Communists have always advocated the dictatorship
of the "Proletariat." Noone has ever gone so far as to
predict how long the dictatorship must last or when the
WWithering away of the state," will begin to take place. In
every nation where the Communists have taken over the govern-
ment, the police state has taken over administration of the
peOples and their government to the glory of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have eXploited and robbed the countries un-
§Qrvtheir jurisdiction. Hunger and starvation have been
wolves at the door of the peOples in the Communist dominated
states. Their economy has been systematically deflated and
their factories robbed of machinery; their natural and physi-
cal resources have been depleted and the revenue taken back
to the Soviet Union by the conquerors.

For all their promises of economic security, indivi-
dual freedom and justice, the Communists have brought little
of the fruits of victory of the 'proletarian revolution' to
the invaded countries.

To the end of world revolution, the Communists have in-
filtrated the Nationalist movements in all the various coun-
tries of the world. Nationalism made definite gains in the
chaotic confusion of the war, in both the West and the East.
The movements functioned during the war as underground appara-

ti to defeat the invaders. They gave new hope and sapiration

to the peOples who dreamed of the day of liberation from the
heel of the foreign conqueror. Nationalism in all of these
cases bore a close resemblance to its democratic predecessor
of the early 19th century. It was a truly liberating demo-
cratic movement rather than a purely idealistic dream of
national power.

However nationalism itself has suffered a setback due
to the immense growth of internationalist sentiment among
the big powers of today's political world.

Several of the Colonial empires have sought and re-
ceived their freedom from the dominating states. Among them
the most notable is the country of India. The Asiatics look
with hope and admiration to India as the future strength and
influence of the Asiatic Political Bloc which will make a
thid and opposing bloc to both Of the competing great nations
now recognized in the balance of power relations.

The small natiOns which have not already made a strong
bid for their independence are on the move. They ldok to the
United Nations as a harbor in the time 08 storm in their
struggle against imperialism. The liberalism of the United
nations is founded on the rights Of the individual. It strong-
ly advocates the truly indiSpensable means to human progress:
wisdom, tolerance, and respect for the brotherhodd and dignity
of man.

FRENCH COLONIALISM:

The French have a favorite saying about Viet-nam, "France

88

brought order and security to Viet—nam, thus allowing
its pOpulation to work and live peacefully over long
decades." This is not totally untrue. Despite, in
effect the many adverse effects of colonialism upon
the country Of Viet-nam, it is obvious that French
culture has been accepted as a part of the lives of
the Vietnamese peOple.

As C.A. Julien has put it in his "From the French
Empire to the French Union," "The spread of egalitarian
ideas and the way in which natives were accepted in France
itself without any race prejudice made them appreciate
“Frenchmen Of France" in contrast to Frenchmen overseas.

Above all, French culture won over an elite which remain—
ed strongly attached to it even though hostile to the col-
onial system.”

The evidence of the industrialization which the French
have introduced into the country although extremely limited
is nevertheless plainly seen as a part of the economy. Hun-
dreds of thousands of hectares have been added to the culti—
vated areas, through the protection against floods or droughts.
This land has been transformed into fertile rice-field.s.

"On the eve of the war, 365,000 hectares of land were irri-
gated by a French-built irrigation and drainage system that was
being built and extended to another 150,000 hectares. The
French had constructed a dike system covering more than 80,000

hectares." (3)

89

A network of highways and railways, though still
very limited has helped travel and commercial exchange
to take place between principal towns and cities.

Romanization Of the Vietnamese language by the Rev-
erend Father Alexandre de Rhodes has endowed Viet-nam with
a precious instrument of eXpression and the diffusing of
modern thought, thereby making it much easier to educate
the mass of the population. Previously they had used the
difficult Chinese characters.

Schools (4) although still insufficient in number,
imam nevertheless succeeded in arousing an increasihg
interest in sciences and Western culture.

Despite its deficiencies, the Health Service has help-
ed combat successfully the most murderous epidemics such
as smallpox, cholera, and lower the death-rate considerably
especially the infantile mortality.

The Pasteur Institutes and the "Ecole Francaise d'Ex-
treme Orient," have paid honor to French genius. They have
rendered services of inestimable value to the Vietnamese
peOple and enjoyed a great renown throughout the Far East.

For all of these social, cultural and scientific ach-
ievements the Vietnamese people are indebted to France. How-
ever one cannot help but feel that these same achievements
would have been better accepted and more feeling of mutual
felicity would have been due, had they not been accompanied

with so much enforcement of the will of the French colonial-

9O

ists. These same accomplishments could and would have
been realized by free people with an independent pride
in the advancements of their nation and peOples.

France had.brought peace to Viet-nam, but this
"peace" which was the result of a hateful war of aggress-
ion on the part of France upon a helpless peOple, which
was imposed and.maintained by force, in order that a few
thousands Of Frenchmen might freely exploit Viet-nam for
their Own benefit, this unjust peace bore in itself the
'seeds of revolution." We are now witnessing the expected
consequences in the tragic events that are taking place in
Viet—nam.

In the beautiful city of Paris, in the heart of the
Pantheon, there is inscribed a motto which reads, "Live
Free or Die.“ For many years, it has been the inspiration
of all the free peOples of the world. The Vietnamese peOp-
le who have been in close touch with French history and con-
cepte, admire and believe in this motto.

French history proves that its thought has been humane,
diverse and generous in the defense of human dignity and 11-
berty. It has inspired the belief of equality and fraterni—
ty among peOples.

. Viet-nam now accepts with whole-hearted approval all of
the French theory of freedome, equality and the rights of
individuals. She struggles to become an independent, self-
respecting nation, accepted.by other nations of the world and

creating for herself a reputation for being a strong sovereign

91

state ready to accept responsibility in the world federation
of nations.

The colonial practices Of France in Indo—China are thus
in direct contradiction with the basic values of France her-
self. By denying Viet-nam her national aspirations. France
denies her own historical and cultural values.

COMMUNISM IN VIET-NAM.

l. Favorable circumstances to Communism:

After the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, there ex-
isted a political vacuum in Viet-nam. The only really or-
ganized political group was the Communist faction. The weak-
ness of the French as a result of their capture and politi-
cal stagnation during and after World War 11, led to a less-
ening of the control of the Colony of Indo-Ghina. This add.
ed impetus to the movement being swept into power by the Na-
tionalists and eventually infiltrated and taken over by the
Communist elements.

The French have consistently refused to give the Indo-
Chinese their independence even in the face of unsurmountable
resistance. The result has been the inevitable strengthening
of Communist forces to a peak hitherto unknown in this country.

The peOple of Viet-nam under French oppression for more
than eighty years, but strongly nationalistic, flocked in
large numbers to the Viet—minh Front whose program responded
to their deepest aspiration; liberation of the land from the

foreign yoke, independence for the country.

)6

Due to the fact that the French had restricted any politi-
cal activity in Viet—nam, the Communist Party which was accus-
tomed to underground activity enjoyed an indisputable advan-
tage over any other party. No other party could.boast such
wide experience, with its trained political workers and re-
liable troops toughened by fifteen years Of persecution and
imprisonment prior to World War 11.

The French prohibition against all non-conformist Viet—
namese political activities had served to prevent the est—
ablishment of important non-Communist political groups but
not the existence and growth Of the Communist Party, whose
methods and long experience in clandestine strife enabled
it to circumvent hostile legislation. (5)

French bad faith in granting independence to Viet-nam
provoked great resentment throughout the country. By and
large, the peOple submitted voluntarily to the Viet-minh
leadership to resist the French attempt to reestablish
domination.

The nationalist leaders believed that their best poli-
cy was to maintain unity with the Communists until victory
had.been won, and then to rid themselves of the Communists.
That is, to prevent them from gaining absolute power, a
cycle that had occurred in numerous countries in which re-
sistance movements were active during the second.World War.

The efficiency of Viet-minh propaganda, its police and
military training furnished in the main by the allies, con—
solidated the Party's monopoly of power and helped it in-

crease in strength.

The victories of Communism in China has had great eff

93

act on the people of Viet-nam. They are racially and
ethnically related to the people of China which provides
a psychological tie. In addition to this the Viet-minh
receives a large amount of military aid from Communist
China.

Most of the response of the peOple of Viet—nam to
the doctrine of Communism has been because of the Comm-
unist emphasis on economic security and justice in their
program.and propaganda. They are impressed by Russia's
achievements under the Soviet system. They feel that
comprehensive economic planning, controlled by their own
government, in the interests of their own peOple, is the
best way to economic security.

The suppression of political and civil freedoms; the
ruthless destruction of class-enemies and deviationists
does not repel the peOple of East Asia in the same way
as it does in the Wgstl They consider food much more im-
portant than ideology. The traditions Of the East emphas
size individual duties rather than the rights of the in-
dividual.

There is no full liberty in East Asia. Liberty Of
speech and association is granted when the government feels
that its authority is built on firm and stable foundation.
The Communist do likewise when they come into power.

East Asia is accustomed to state economic enterprise

9L» "

Of socialism. There is a primary hostility teward for-
eign capitalism, or more simply, toward capitalism.

The peOple respond enthusiastically to Soviet pro—
paganda campaigns against imperialist eXploitation.

2.Unfavorable Circumstances to Communism:

Primary among the disadvantages of Communism in
EAst Asia are the strong religious ties of the people.
Buddhism and Moslem teaching is in direct antipathy with
the Communist doctrine.

The peOple embrace Communism not because they have
studied the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, but for more
tangible and immediate reasons. The present strategy of
the Communists is to protect the religious freedom Of the
older people while educating the younger in materialism.

Their greatest difficulty is to try to persuade the
peOple that the Communists work for the peOple not for the
Soviet Union. If the nationals come to suspect that their
own immediate interests are being subordinated to the long
term interests of the Soviet Union, they will reject Comm-
unist leadership.

The people want freedom and independence. They vol-
untarily die for their own land, but not in the interests
of foreign domination be it European, Russian or Chinese.
If the peOple knew that Ho Chi Minh receives orders and

directives from Moscow or Peking and that Viet-nam is used

95

by Russia as a pawn in her struggle against the Western
countries, there is a possibility that the peOple would
break away from Ho. I

Russia's primary interest in the political movements
in East Asia is to foster and direct them in ways that will
inflict the maximum injury on the most formidable of her
potential enemies. The direct Soviet influence is limited,
moreover, by Russia's inability to give substantial economic
aid in the industrialization of East Asia.

To assess the prospects of Communism, then it is im-
portant to distinguish three factors;

1. The Nationalist andRevolutionary forces, spontan-

eous and indigenous.

2. The local Communist leaders who seek to win the

leadership of these Nationalist forces.

3. The Soviet leaders in Moscow, whose directives the

East Apian Communists are prepared to follow.

The Asians want freedom from foreign domination; ec-
onomic OXploitation; the white man's contempt. The nation-
al aspiration for independence once satisfied, the national—
ist elements, which constitute by far the majority Of these
fighting under HO Chi Minh, will have no reason to continue
fighting. They would withdraw. This disintegration of Comm-
unist forces would weaken their influence in Viet-nam. The

local Communist militia would soon fall away.

Already the Communists tactics of "burned land" prac-
ticed for seven years has deprived the people of even bare
living necessities. Life is full of hardships in the Comm-
unist controlled territory.

We have witnessed the stupendous rise in the influence
of Communism in Asia since the war. This is due to complex
factors. But most assuredly, one of the prime reasons, is
that the peOple of Asia are not interested in Communism nor
are they afraid of it. But they are most interested in food
and in survival. These peoples have undergone the rigors
of famine and flood, of oppressive colonialist monOpolies
and the loss of self—pride through subjugation to foreign
pressure.

Their interest is aroused by the cries of the Communists
and their slogans which read, 'Doc lap hay chet!" (Independ—
ence or death,) and "Nuoc Viet-nam cua nguoi Viet-nam" (Viet—
nam to the Vietnamese,) and I'Tha chet con hon tro lai no le?
(Death rather than return to slavery.” (6)

Those are the promises of the Communists until they come
into full power. Then their false gestures are eXposed for
what they really are and the true concept of Communism with
its greater loss of independence comes into full play.

THE REGIME OF BAO DAI.

Viet-nam is admittedly very important strategically to

the rest of the democratic world. It is one of the remain—

ing strongholds of the Western powers. ibwever the present

97

government of Viet-nam that of the French sponsored Bao Dai
lacks pOpular support. That this is true is substantiated

by the amount of military, police and civil control it has

been necessary for the French to extend to this area.

The French phrase, "Independence within the French
Union" is actually a contradiction in its terminology.

Many Vietnamese are convinced that any concessions the French
may have granted have been made because of the Commuhist vic-
tories in China.

Other victories are believed to have been granted be-
cause of the military might and victories of the Viet—minh
in 1950. These military victories were a very real defeat
for the French.

If any substantial degree of support is achieved by the
Bao Dai regime, it will be necessary for the French to grant
many more concessions.

The limited grants of portions of independence to the
Vietnamese by the French have always been made when the
French were forced against a wall. As an American Senator
has put it, "Too little and too late." Most convincing evid—
ence of this is offered by the continued popularity of the
Viet-minh as opposed to the retarded growth of the pOpular
support of the Bao Dai government.

Unless the peOple are shown and convinced that they are
fighting for their own independence and not to help maintain

the French in power when victory is imminent, all the foreign

70

aid and sacrifice of humanity will prove fruitless.

The French cannot succeed in Indo-China unless they
grant concessions necessary to build and.maintain a native
army capable, reliable and with convincing military action.

Most western diplomats believe that promoting the in—
dependence of Viet-nam will substantially increase the pro-
spects of victory and concretely advance the whole Western
alliance in Asia.

The Vietnamese people continue to be discontented, as
shown by the statement of Premier Tran Van Huu who stated
upon returning from France in October 1950:

Many peOpleaare dying every day because Viet-nam is

not given real independence. If we had independence
the peOple would have no reason to fight, there would
be no struggle between Viet-nam and the Vietminh. (7)

This statement is all the more forceful when you reale
ize that the Premier was himself a French citizen.

In the Congressional record, June 30, 1953, is the re—
corded account of a discourse on Asiatic Communism made at
a Joint session of Congress and Senate. 'Some of the state-
ments provide much food for thought. For instance the foll-
owing:

For practical purposes, the Asiatics seem to be on the

side of the Communists.. No matter what declarations are

*;d=made to them about the wicked nature of Communist aggress-
ion, they are likely to answer that they are unacquaint-
ed with it, but that they are acquainted with EurOpean
imperial aggression.

Communist slogans may be false and fraudulent, but to
the native of Southeast Asia who has no political, ec-
onomic, or military power in his own land and.whose dig-
nity as a man is even in question, there is an under-
standable willingness to look on the Russians not as

future oppressors but as liberators.

Even the most conservative Asiatic businessman would

99

be likely to look with cold anger at an act such as
the recent and sudden devaluation of the Indochinese
monetary uhit, the piaster, in which its value was
arbitrarily reduced from seventeen to ten francs.
The devaluation was announced by the Ministry of
Finance in Paris on May the tenth this year. On
May the eleventh it went into effect, and from that
date forward, all of Indo-Chinds commercial and fin-
.ancial transactions must be based on the new exchange
rate.

I think the Washington News put it plainly in its
editorial on May seventh of this year, when it said
that-~‘Instead of uniting the independent nations of
Asia against Communist aggression, the United States
has been playing second fiddle to French and British
colonial policy, which operated to keep Asia divided. (8)

With the signing of the peace truce in Korea the nations
of the world.have reason to be especially concerned for Viet—
nam. The war there between the Viet-minh and the French Union
forces is already seven years old. The end of hostilities in
Korea may mark the flow of Chinese Red soldiers southward into
Viet-nam to aid Ho Chi Minh in his revolution. This would
mean another international crisis.

So far in the war the French have turned down every pro-
posal for conferences with Ho. In the entire hostilities no
move has been made by either side to talk things out and neith—
er side has scored any decisive military victory in spite of
the loss of several thousands of men and billions of dollars
worth of materiel.

The French have indicated they would be willing to accede
that an international committee of the United Nations should
act as go-between to explore possibilities of a truce. The ‘
French government has only recently announced that it will

complete the limited independence begun in l9h9 to the three

100

states of Indo-China.

Red China has been supplying the Viet-minh with more
than 3,000 tons of war materiel each month for the last
six months. The French have more than 276,000 troops in
the area. The war has cost the democracies billions of
dollars and tens of thousands of lives. It can be truth-
fully said that the entire military action has not accom-
plished a single worthwhile purpose.

The French say they want to have done with Viet-nam
as soon as her armies can be established and trained to
defend themselves. This would serve the purpose of Viet—
nam in her long search for independence and it would also
free these French soldiers to help rearm metropolitan
France.

An independent Viet-nam, needing help in various forms,
would be more than happy to noin France in a true partner-
ship, freelyccontracted and.mutually advantageous. The
independence of Viet-nam, if it deprives theFrench of their
colonialist rights, will protect French legitimate rights
and proper ties by reserving for France the most favorable
treatment as far as feasible.

The need of French assistance, French intelligence and
the French spirit of resourcefulness for the reconstuetion
of the country is so acute that a suspicion as to the future

divorce of Viet-nam from France could hardly be Justified.

101

To end the conflict and give the country its chance
to survive and develOp as a friend of the West, moral
suasion and political wisdom are the arms for success,
not machine-guns and napalm bombs!

THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FREE WORLD OF VIET-NAM'S EXPERIENCE.

During the years when imperialism was still respect-
able and colonialism was favored by all the European na-
tions, the French made it their business to conquer and
divide and rule the peoples of Indo-China.

In the late nineteenth century, France controdled
colonies more than forty times the area of metropolitan
France. The natives of these countries under French dom-
ination numbered many times the population of the home
country.

The French rationalized their claim on these countries
and peoples by insisting that they I ere civilizing the
backward natives, in spite of the fact that the races of
Indo-China have a culture centuries older than France it-
self. They also emphasized the 'need' of these peOples to
be protected.by Frenchmen.

Harold Isaacs in his book "No Peace for Asia," puts it
this way,

The truth of course, had nothing to do with civiliza-
tion or culture, at least not in the same sense that
Frenchmen in Indo-China were using the words. The French
took Indo-China by force of arms. Their conquest began

in the classic manner, with the first arrival of miss-
ionaries nearly three hundred years ago.

102

Being hard-headed folk even then, the French did not
bother with the proprieties of divided labor as other
expanding nations did. French priests did double and
triple duty. They were also traders. They were also

soldiers. They brought cargoes with them, and shipped
cargoes back. They commanded military expeditions
from time to time; whenever the native peOple balked
at trading in the currency of man or the virtues of
religion. (9)

Today eighty years after, the French still struggle
to maintain superiority over Indo-China in spite of the
rebellion of the people over whom they rule. They now
claim to be protecting the country against the infiltra-
tion of Communism. Actually, Communism has been an aid
to Colenialism and vice versa.

Communism aids Colonialism by exciting the sympath-
ies of the democratic world and encouraging the spending
of vast sums of money by the United States to maintain the
defense against encroaching Communism. Thus, in a sense,
the Communists are a very real help to the French who are
in such financial straits that they could not possible
maintain the colony of Viet-nam without help.

Colonialism likewise aids Communism by creating a
cause for the Communists. The peoples of Indo-China
fight for their independence and their unity. The Comm-
unists take advantage of this fundamental desire and mani—
pulate it in such a way as to attract many patriotic nation-
alists to their side.

Viet-nam is suffering under the cruel phenomenen of the

revolution of our age. Two rival foreign governments are

perpetuating a ruthless war of persecution against each

J.U_)

other within the boundaries of the country.

Both the Communists and the French colonialists re—
ceive financial and military aid from foreign countries.

In the case of the French, it is America which has poured
more than three billions of American dollars into the con-
flict which is now more than seven years old.

The Communists receive nominal support from the Soviet
Union plus military and financial aid from Red China, which
is no doubt subsidized by the Soviet Union.

Both sides use native support in-so-far as possible in
their military efforts to control each other.

Viet-nam is a particularly strategic country to both
Communist and Capitalistic worlds. It represents the gate-
way to Burma and India to the Communists in the East. It is
the last outpost of democracy in the encroaching sweep of
Communism to the West.

Unquestionably Russia's desire to aid in the Far East in
the struggle for national independence of Viet-nam is colored
by selfish motives. She desires to deal a mortal blow upon i
the capitalistic world if possible. The colonies of the demo-
cracies are a most vulnerable point of attack. Russia also
has a history of centuries of struggle for sea-ports and
markets which is no doubt, another of the reasons why she is
interested in the country of Vieténam, with its vast sea-
coast and Oriental products, its abundant natural and human

re source S o

104

French domination in Viet-nam may be considered as a
most significant case of Western domination in Asia. It
consists of a policy of economic eXploitation. In this
exploitation however, we witness a monetary return to a
very small minority of the French people; namely the in-
dividual owners of stock in the Banque de l'Indochine,
and the owners of rubber plantations and the mining ind-
ustries

At the most about £0,000 Frenchmen stand to benefit
by the colonial operation. In fact, for many years the
government of France has eXpended much more in protection
and develOpment in the area than it has received back in
revenue.

On the other hand, the largest single item in the tot-
al Indo-Chinese budget is the allowance for the French mili-
tary and civilian salaries. The result of this employment
of the French is a regime of_political Oppression whereby
the native peOples are kept in submission by the civilian
officials at the behest of the capitalist minority.

The colonial government of Viet-nam has educated a small
minority of natives in the hOpe that they would aid in the
Operation of the colonial administration for the protectoraté's
interest. However, this has not always been the case. In a
number of instances, the educated natives have gained a new
insight which has taught them the values of individual and

human rights. Their Western education was primarily respnnsi-

105

ble for this.

Their new outlook has led them to see that colonial
practices are in direct antipathy to the great libertar—
ian doctrines they learned in the citadels of the West.
Then too, they have become more conscious that they are
descended from an old nation whose sovereignty has been
taken away by the invaders. The latter attempt to sub-
jugate them in their own land, thus making injustice more
flagrant and eXploitation more revolting.

Their longing for their old independent statehood plus
the indoctrination of the revolutionary thought of EurOpe,
leads these men to become fanatic leaders of upheavals, re-
volts and rebellions against foreign domination. The more
cruel the reprisals on the part of the rulers, the more re-
sentful the subjugated people and every occasion is seized
upon to shake off foreign control.

The last two World Wars have been golden opportunities
for them to achieve their aim. The last one, in particular
when metropolitan France was taken over by Nazi forces and
underwent complete restriction of her political activitiel,
gave the native leaders an exclusive opportunity to realize
their objective; that of throwing off the foreign yoke and
rebuilding the country in accordance with their own politi—
cal ideas.

Those among them who embrace the Communist philos0phy

work toward founding a Communist regime founded on principles

similar to those of the Soviet Union. They receive the help
of Russia as the acknowledged leader of the World Revolution.

The others look instead to the democratic West with its
valuable political experience. They are willing to cOpy this
example in their liberated country.

Because of the Protectorate's oppressive measures with
regard to the political activity on the part of the native
population, the Communists with their clever clandestine
tactics, underground organization and.the skill of its train-
ed leaders gains strength and rises to exclusive power.

Thus, there has been set up a Communist government and
under its rule the country has experienced a novel demonstra-
tion of a one—party leadershipfl.

Unlike foreign domination, with the masters coming from
a foreign land and a different race, Communist domination
recruits its officials among the members of the Indo-Chinese
Communist Party. The membership is very limited and selected
on the basis of complete devotion to the Soviet Uion even
above life itself.

Slao unlike the foreign rule, it provides the people
with a democratic sounding constitution and a seemingly
democratic governmental set-up. In actual practice the
Communist Party of Indo-China follows the international
pattern in that it demands absolute fealty to the party

and it is the Party that governs and dictates all rules un-

der orders from Moscow. Under a democratic and liberal front,

it is in aact, the.most totalitarian and dictatorial regime.

106

107

Thus, like the foreign domination, Communists monOpolize
all important economic activities in the territory which they
control. Of course, the profit therefrom accrues to the Comm-
unist Party.

Communism imitates colonialism in that it monopolizes
all posts of command. It controls the army, the secret police,
which organ is far more effective than the military system of
the Protectorate because of its ruthlessness. It Iystematic-
ally works toward a complete elimination of all anti—Communist
elements among the population.

Communism has an advantage over the foreign domination in
that it exploits the nationalistic feeling of the people through
an active propaganda service based upon two central themes, anti
capitalist and anti-imperialist. The prOpaganda service is
greatly aided.by impressive efforts in educating the masses.
Thus it provides the regime with the most efficacious means of
mass-indoctrination.

As has been said before, Colenialism is the best ally of
Communism and Communism likewise is the best ally of Colonial-
ism. They profit from each other for the interest of a minori-
ty; a foreign minority in the case of Colonialism; a minority
of the country's population in the case of Communism. Both 0p—
erate at the eXpense of the majority of the peOple of Indo—China

The result of all this conflicting activity is a complete
material poverty. The peOple undergo tremendous hardships.

They lack food, shelter and clothing for their bodies.

108

The economic disruption is stupendous.' There is a lack
of deve10pment in all fields. Industry, transportation, com-
munications, electrification and modernization of the country
are at a practical standstill to make way for warfare.

One sees a marked and forcible muving of the people from
one area to another. The roads are filled at times with politi-
cal refugees fleeing from one government to another in the hope
of surcease.

Undernourishment is marked among the general population.
Infant and general mortality is very high from all the priva—
tion and suffering.

The almost complete lack of adequate technical training
has created a situation wherein the majority of young people
of Viet—nam have no preparation for jobs with which to support
themselves. Because of this lack of training most people are
hardly able to provide the means of livelihood for themselves
and their families.

To further aggravate the economic situation, industrializa-
tion cannot progress where there is continual upheaval and
strife. There has been no modernization of either industry
or agriculture. The Communists have completely isolated whole
portions of the country which they occupy. These peOple are
isolated not only from their friends and relatives but also
from cultural influence of other nationalities, in particular
Western culture to which they were formerly accustomed.

In the Communist dominated sections, the people are great-

ly oppressed. Families are displaced and divided. The police

109

state enforces druel punishments on any individual or group
which does not comply with every edict of the government.

While on the one hand, the Communists have instituted
a plan of agrarian reform, on the other there are uprisings
and revolts because the Communists have taken away rice lands
to utilize the needed food growing space for the industrial
crops such as rubber.

Property roads, and buildings as well as bridges and
dams are destroyed without regard to the conditions caused
by such ruthless methods. Both the Communists and the French
have been guilty of atrocities against prOperty and human life.

Any society requires continual constructive rebuilding
and revitalizing in order to survive and advance. In the
continual state of war which exists in Indo-China, there is
no possibility of any improvement of social conditions.
Rather, these conditions worsen with time.

The mental strain upon the people shows in various ways.
There is extensive poor health among the pOpulace. There is
also a vast increase in crime and immorality. There is a
steady tendency to draw upon the false comfort of drugs and
drink to forget the troubles of the day. Thievery and bandi-
try flourish to the degradation of the nation.

Communities are unable to function in their normal capa—
city to tie members of society to traditional conventions and
activites. The result is the eventual complete breakdown of
a nation and its peoples.

If the West is to help the people of Indo-China it must

110

understand the workings of all these complex factors. The
situation cannot be analyzed upon the basis of Western fac-
tors exclusively. It must be remembered that the peOple of
Viet-nam have eXperienced an Oppressive foreign domination
for a very lohg time. They have not experienced Russian
domination. All that they know about Communism is what

the native Indo-Chinese Communists have told them about it.
These Communists are of their own race; men who swear alleg—
iance to the principles of independence and unity for Indo-
China.

There can be no resistance to Communism where no know-
ledge or fear of it exists. There can be and there is resis-
tance to Colonialism which is well known complete with all
its many faults.

There is a great need for education in Indo-China. This
education must be not only against Communism but it must be
for the independence of Indo-China. It must be an education
by example.

The people of Viet-nam and the rest of Indo-China cannot
be further influenced toward democratic countries by more
punishment of the same kind. They must eXperience the example
of democracy and the elements of freedom of the individual and
human rights of which democrady consists if they are to embrace
Western philosophy.

If the West is to profit and learn from the eXperience of
Indo-China, it must in effect, practice what it preaches, the
worth of the individual and his rights to the sovereignty of

111

his own land, its resources and industries.

Good leadership is sorely needed, in this country today.
The tortured people of Viet-nam must have the leadership of
public spirited, paternalistic, honest men and women; men
and women dedicated to the principle of good for all rather
than profit of the few.

The West must revitalize the practice and teachings of
real Christianity if it is to remain friendly with the re—

bellious countries of Asia.

 

FOOTNOTES.

Lenin. Collected Works, 1923 Edition, Vol. XVll, p.89.
Infantry Journal Press, Op Cit p. 37

Lawrence K. Rosinger Op Cit p. 221-222

With great generosity and effort, the French confereed
the benefits of education on the people of their colony.
Forty years after the conquest, there was elementary edu
cation of a crude kind available for two per cent of the
pOpulation and secondary education for one-half of one
per cent of the pOpulation. Three libraries and one sop
called university were established in the country.

H.R. Isaacs Op Cit p107

J. R. Clementin Em'czt p. 305

H.R. Isaacs Op Cit p. 162

Congressional Record. Vol. 99. No 120. June 30, 1953.
Ibid ., p. 7921 p 7896

H.R. Isaacs Op Cit. p 147

WNH

\O 03$ O\U'\
. O O 0

APPENDIX

112

Suggestions for the Reconstruction of Viet-nam.

From this long past, the Vietnamese peOple have kept
in mindpand all, rich and poor, young and old, know
this- that Viet-nam has lived independent for a thous-
and years under a national and patriotic monarchy hav—
ing under its rule an organized and strong state which
has been able, even against China, to Safeguard the in-
dependence of the country. They are conscious of being
a peoWIe full of vitality and dynamism, superior-his-
tory seems to prove it to them,- to all other peOples
of Indo-China. They are equally conscious of their be-
longing to a civilization that, save on the technic
level, has nothing to envy the Western civilization.
And from this past of sufferings, of ardous labor, but
also of glory and liberty, they keep a profound nost-
algy in which the picture of the Viet-nam of tomorrow
appears indistinctly. (1)

To the author of this thesis, himself a Vietnamese,
the picture of the Viet-nam of tomorrow is becoming quite
clear. It is, and it should.be, the picture of a Viet-nam
built upon the permanent traditional values of the East on
the one hand, and the techniques and ideas of liberty and

democracy of the West on the other.
With this conviction in mind, he fervently dedicates

the following suggestions to the reconstruction of his coun-

try.

1. Political Program:

The fundamental qualities of the future political policy
of Viet-nam should.be democracy, competence, stability, effi-
caceousness based upon the principles of "government of the
people, by the people and for the people."

A larger participation of the people in public affairs
will develoo their sense of general interestk of responsibili-
ty and of good citizenship. It will train them to consciousfi

1y exercise their democratic freedoms, rights and duties, and

113

will interest them in the defense of national independence
and democracy.

Participation also represents the best means of pre-
venting arbitrary methods and abuse of power on the part
of the leaders, thereby avoiding the establishment of die-
tatorship and efficiently contributing to world peace and
security.

Government and all public institutions will emanate
from the people and.will be subjected to their effective
control. Only capable men and women, distinguished by
their aptitudes and competences and enjoying popular con-
fidence, will be chosen to hold public office.

To ensure the regime's stability without which the
success of any constructive undertaking would be impossi-
ble, it will be required that the peOple exercise their
civic rights and duties. The leaders will be required to
present at least the minimum amount of competence and quali-
fication. From both leaders and followers will be desired
a constant interest in the best possible administration for
the good of all. Sequence of ideas and continuity of effort
will then allow everyone to do his utmost for his own good
in particular, and for the common good in general.
Democratic Policy:

a. Democratic Constitution: Viet-nam will be provided
with a democratic constitution along the lines of

the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

114

Declaration of Human Rights, guaranteeing Vietnamese
citizens the free exercise of their fundamental civil,
political, economic, social and.cultural rights. This
constitution will include in particular dispositions
dealing favorably with all world cooperation movements.

b. Democratic Freedoms: Viet—nam will see to it that basic
democratic freedoms such as freedom of thought, of ex—
pression, of action, shall be promulgated and the exer-
cise thereof duly guaranteed by law.

c. Universal Suffrage: Viet-nam will establish universal
suffrage regardless of race, sex, religion, political
opinion or social conditions.

d. POpular Representative Assemblies: Viet-nam will in-
stitute representative assemblies whereby the peOple
through their representatives will take an active part
in the administration of the country at all levels;
village, county,town, city, provincial and national.

e. Incal Self-government: The system of local self-gov-
ernment shall be promoted with the province being taken
as a basic unit.

f. Defense of Ethnic Minorities: Provisions shall be made
to the effect that ethnic minorities will enjoy their
right 6f vote and be represented in the National Assembly
of Viet-nam under the same conditions as the other frac-
tions of the Vietnamese.p0pulation.

Administrative Reforms.
1. Establishment of the unitary state of Viet-nam.

., . we:

115

The federal system of the three Kys, incompatible
with a real unity of Viet-nam shall be replaced by
a unitary system, the administrative unit of which
siall be the province.
Regrouping of Small Villages.
Small villages shall be regrouped into more impor-
tant administrative units in order to facilitate
reconstruction works, economic undertakings and

social deve10pment.
Organization of a Competent Administration.
The old regime of Mandarins shall be replaced by a
competent administrative organization in which holders
of posts of direction shall be recruited by examinations
and shall be given adequate training before assuming
any function of responsibility. Administrative ser-
vices shall be considered technical services; as such
they should be provided with a specialized personnel
whose responsibility and powers should be clearly de-
fined.
Struggle against corruption.
Bribery, favoritism, nepotism and any practices lead-
ing to corruption will be rooted out. In the past un-
der the influences of the colonialist regime, public
functions have been considered by the mass of the popu-
lation to be the privileged posts the holders of which

have been supposedly given the right to oppress and

116

exploit the public.

Such a miserable conception of public functions is

to be destroyed and replaced by the right one accord-
ing to which, public institutions, financed by public
funds and created to satisfy definite public needs,
are to serve and help the public, not to oppress or
exploit it.

The active collaboration of a pOpulation that is
fully aware of its rights, will be the best help to

eliminate corruption and inefficiency.

Judiciary Reforms.

l.

2.

Modern Legislation:

Viet-nam shall be provided with a modern legislature

based upon appropriate_legislative codesl Equality
of all with regard to law shall be promulgated and
thoroughly applied.

A Competent and Independent Judiciary Organization.
Judiciary power should be separated from executive

and legislative powers. Personnel should be recruit-

ed upon the basis of competence, honesty and devotion

to the public interest.

National Defense.

Viet-nam will have her own army commanded by Vietnamese

officers. Navy and air forces are to be built up. Military

training should be given extension. Qualified students must

be encouraged to go abroad to learn about logistic and mod—

117

ern warfare from more develOped countries.

Not only are the Vietnamese armed forces to defend
Viet-nam territory and sovereignty, they will also take
an active part, whenever necessary, in the defense of
world peace and in the establishment of United Nations‘
security.

2. Economic Program.

The following are the main aims proposed for the ec-
onomic development of Viet-nam.

Vietnamese labor force should be better utilized to
put into production the abundant natural resources of Viet—0
nam, not in the interest of a few, but in the interest of
the entire pOpulation.

The primitive economy of Viet-nam, almost exclusively
agrarian, should be transformed into a modern polyvalent
industrial economy. The problem of overpopulation, especial—
ly in the delta of the Red River, must be solved.

Unemployment which exists in a semi-permanent status
among the peasantry is another pressing problem to which a
solution must be found. To provide for full employment, to
furnish everyone with an appropriate and remunerative occu-
pation so as to raise the standard of living and contribute
to the general prosperity of the world is the immediate pro-
lem of the nation of Viet-nam.

If the desire for profit is a powerful incentive to en-
gage in economic enterprises, and hence, to contribute to

progress, the sense of public interest and the satisfaction

d-J-U

which is derived from creative activity will undoubtedly play
an increasingly important role in raising production standards.

The aim of production is to satisfy everybody's needs
rather than enable a minority to accumulate wealth. In the
light of this reasoning, Viet-nam will seek to increase her
production and improve her techniques so as to provide the
mass of the peOple with decent living conditions rather than
to aid the minority to enjoy an idle and luxurious life, at
the eXpense of the majority that works and suffers.

Private industry will be protected, in particular, small
and medium-sized enterprises. As for undertakings of greater
magnitude an importnat place will be reserved for public—ow
ned enterprises, especially cooperative enterprises.

Agrarian Reform.

1. Main Fea tures.

a. Low Level of Living.

The first thing to be said about the agriculture of Viet-
nam is that 80% of the pOpulation live on the land and from
the land. The other 20% also derive their living in part from
agriculture.

The most striking fact about this is the appallingly low
level of hiving standards of the population. Although the
country used to export rice, living conditions there were in
general, miserable in the extreme. Life became extremely pre-
carious due to the poverty.

Statistics given in 1936 by Professor Gourou show that

.' lags

119

in Tonkin, a family of five owning a hectare of rice—paddy
and a water—buffalo, had an annual income of 1,300 francs. (2)
b. Inadequate Yield from the Soil.

The harvests are not large enough. The rice crOps of
Viet-nam are among the least productive in Asia. This low
productivity is due principally to the rudimentary methods
utilized by the peasants. All work is done by hand and the
use of fertilizers is almost unknown to them.

Moreover, nothing has been done on the part of the French
administration to help the peasants to modernize and improve
their farming techniques based upon scientific discoveries
and deve10pment.

c. Complete Absence of Technical Education.

Education too is so limited that it is regarded by the
average man as a luxury that only wealthy peOple can afford.
The percentage of young peOple going to school in 1942, was
only 2% of the entire population. (3) Technical education
relating to the field of agriculture is almost non-existent.

d. Layout and Size of Farms.

Farms in Viet-nam are inordinately small and very scat-
tered. This is particularly true in the northern and central
parts of the country where parcellation of land attains such
a degree as to make the yield of the land appallingly neg—
ligible.

A study of the latest surveys of Viet-nam rice-land

shows that small owners whose number represents 94.8 per

120

cent of all owners own only about 28.5 per cent of the total
rice land. This mades an average of .017 hectare per proprie-
tor. (4)

Thus the amount of rice grown hardly suffices to feed
the family and leaves no surplus for sale. This inadequacy
of the yield from the land is the cause of an insufficient
income. This is further aggravated by the fact that when
there is a rice surplus, as in the south, prices often are
very low. ‘

It can easily be seen that no improvement in the level
of living is possible as long as they do not dispose of the
surplus crops in a manner to deep the price at a level where
it can be sold at a reasonable profit.

e. Lack of Capital and Currency.

Another reason for low levels of income is the lack of
capital and currency, especially in the rural areasl Money
has always been scarce and this explains the high interest
rates and the growth of usury.

The cultivator is always short of money. This comes
from the fact thatthe land does not produce enoughtfor the
market and so does not permit what money there is to circu-
late freely through the rural economy. Where there are sur-
pluses of products money flows in too large a prOportion into
the pockets of the landowners or the owners of capital.

f. Excessive Preponderance of Rice Cultivation.

Viet-nam's economy is, in the main, a subsistence ec-

onomy. The people grow rice because that is the cheapest way

121

of feeding the poverty stricken and.growing pOpulation.

But their poverty results also from the fact that, apart
from rice culture, the sources of employment and livelihood
are too few.

There exists, therefore, a vicious circle, with the
result that the peasants always remain poor and become more
poor in proportion to which the population increases in num-
ber.

g. An Intense Growth of POpulation Which Creates
Additional Economic Problems.

Population grows so fast as to double every thirty-six
years. Besides increasing the number of mouths that must be
fed, the populations' growth has the further effect of adding
to the already abundant labor supply. This serves to keep
down wages, lowers the value of human labor, and thus of
producing . Too many peOple on the land and the holdings are
too small creates a shortage of jobs. (5)

h. Defective Tenancy System.

The prOportion of tenants to the number of farmers is
very high in Viet-nam. The seriousness of the problem lies
not so much in the high prOportion as in the unsatisfactory
form of tenure where rents are exorbitant and where the sec-
urity of tenure is not safeguarded by any legislation.

While rents take various forms; money, produce and
labor, the most common one is the sharing of the gross crop

between the landowner and the tenant. This form of rent pay-

4.6L

ment gives the tenant little incentive to increase the pro-
ductivity of the land.

Moreover, as a rule, custom rather than legal agreement
define occupancy rights and obligations of the tenant. In
many cases tenants can expect little legal protection and
are subject to great insecurity. The tendency is naturally
for the tenant to get the most out of his land regardless of
the effect on the fertility of the soil.

To raise both the return from the land as awhole and
the output of the individual worker, the following measures
are to be taken: Peasants will have to be taught more mod,
ern methods of cultivation. The use of fertilizers will
have to be more advnaced. There will have to be more seed
selection with a view to higher yields. Agricultural imple-
ments will have to be overhauled and mechanized.

Land improvements, such as drainage and irrigation will
have to be undertaken. Flood control tto, is to be given
special attention. There will have to be introduced a great-
er variation of crops with administrative areas of sizabel
prOportions.

Cooperative enterprise whihh is entirely in harmony with
the traditions of Vietnamese village life should.be organized
.and cover a variety of functions; production, purchase and
marketing.l Also storage and credit facilities should be man—
aged so as to give each village or group of villages an ec-
onomic unity at once well-balanced and alive.

There should be an extension of the area of arable land.

The production should be diversified to include corn, potatoes

123

cotton, jute, rubber, sugar cane, and mulberry trees. This
will raise the economy of the country from a subsistence level
to an agrarian-industrial one. These should be included in any
agricultural development plan for Viet—nam.

2. Increase in Farm Ownership.

To reduce injustice and inequality insofar as.possible,
limitation will be set upon the amount of land to be owned by
each individual. Large landowners will be compelled therefore,
to sell their excess land to propertyless tenants.

The government will see to it that prices and terms for
purchase of excess land from landowners by tenants will be
fixed reasonably and equitably to both parties. The govern
ment will also determine the means to be used in, and time
period to be allowed for affecting transfer of excess land.

3. Improvement of Tenancy Conditions.

There will be required that land leases be written.

That they set forth the obligations of both contracting
parties dquitably and specifically, and that they assure
the tenant of greater security than he has hitherto en-
joyed.

Requirements will be provided also that the amount
and nature of rents paid by tenants should be equitably
regulated by law.

4. Fiscal and Financial Aid to Farmers.
Credit facilities will be instituted through the gov—

ernment, and cooperative action so as to furnish farmers

124

with low cost credit in order for them to meet their future
financial needs and to liquidate their present indebtedness.
Usury in any form will be prohibited.

Tax laws should be revised in favor of the farmers.
Reduction of land tax, with provision that such a deduction
be passed on to persons tilling the land, and compensatory
increase in taxes not affecting agricultural populations.

5. Reduction of Farm Operating Costs.

Material and equipment costs will be reduced through
cooperative buying and through government control of raw
material e.g. fertilizers, seed, etc.

Reduction of distributing costs will be obtained through
cooperative action and government control.

6. Other economic activities such as cattle raising,
animal husbandry, fishing, exploitation and conservation will
have to be approached more rationally and scientifically.

Outworn methods of raising cattle are to be supplanted
by scientific and modern ones. Milk production should be
increased so as to improve the nutrition of the population.

Fishermen will be organized in c00peratives and equipped
with motor—boats and modern fishing equipment, which will en-
able them to go farther than the nearby coastal zones. The
industry of "fishsauce," product excessively rich in vitamins,
will be given special attention and ecouragement on the part
of the government. An efficient canning industry should be

created.

125

Industries
1. Planning or Laissez-faire;

Since equitable distribution of income and industriali—
zation for a higher standard of living should be the two
chief im ediate tasks of Viet-nam's economic reconstruction,
betweenccentral planning and laissez-faire as well as between
state ownership and private enterprise, Viet—nam will take a
middle position.

The laissez-faire system is impossible, partly because
it would aggravate the distribution problem and partly because
it is not the prOper means to achieve industrialization in a
country like Viet-nam which is industrially less develOped
and.bas to face the competition of foreign producers.

In such a countryk the government should take an active
part in the industrialization program. The private entr-
preneurs, if left alone, may not be able to see the social
advantages of certain important industrial deve10pments. If
they do, they would not be willing to put them into eff-
ect unless they are also advantageous from the vieWpoint of
private profit. Even if they are willing, they may not have
the capital and resources to carry them out.

Furthermore, under a system of free enterprise, waste in
the form of unemployment and economic depression and in other
forms is a luxury that Viet-nam can ill afford.

In order to get sufficient resources, to direct the re—
sources into the ri ht channels and to minimize waste so that

industrializatiwn can proceed at a rapid rate, government plan-

126

ning is indispensable. It should be a type of planning which
leaves sufficient room for private initiative and preserves as
much freedom to the individual citizen as is consistent with
a system of planning.

Under such a system of planning, not all enterprises,
not even all important enterprises, are owned by the state.
Only a part of the enterprises are state-owned. The economy
will be divided into three sectors, namely; private, which
includes, (a) cooperatiges, (b) enterprises jointay owned by
the state and private individuals, and (0) public, or state—
owned enterprises.

The exact lines of demarcation of the three sectors will
change according to circumstances and from time to time. In
all likelihood, the most important branches of mining, heaty
industries, and basic industries, communications, transporta—
tion, irrigation and water conservancy, forestation, public
utilities and banking will belong to the public sector, leav-
ing most of the rest in the private and semi-public sectors.

2. Traditional Industries;

Vietnamese traditional industries will be eXpanded. To
improve their techniques of production, there will be created
especial schools and model workshOps. Electric power will be
'adapted to the artisans' work. Modern tools and equipment
will be provided them to eliminate wasted energy and increase
their production.

Artisans will be advised to organize themselves in coop-
eratives of production and sale.

3. Modern Industries;

127

Resources in fuel and hydraulic energy will be better
exploited to increase the production of electric power, makO
ing it available to urban and rural pOpulation as well.

Prospecting of minerals will be fostered. Those already
discovered will be steadily eXpolited. Attempts will be made
to engage in those processing industries for whihh raw mater-
ials exist in abundance in Viet-nam or can be procured at low
price in neighboring countries.

Along this line, the production of fertilizers which the
country needs so badly will be given special consideration.

4. Transportation and Communications:

Roads, highways, railways and Waterways will have to be
improved and much more extended. Ships of small and medium size
will be built to carry freight inside the country and along the
coast.

Improvements also will have to be made with regard to civil
aviation, telegraph, telepnone and radio networks.

Commerce

1. Domestic Trade:

So far, trade has been almost totally neglected by the
Vietnamese to the advantage of Chinese emigrants. Such a
situation will have to be remedied as soon as possible.

The institution of credit facilities and the prohibition of
usury will make it easier for merchants and businessmen to
raise funds and.engage in commerce.

2. Foreign Trade:

Trade relations will be established.between Viet—nam
and other countries among which there should be, apart
from France, the countries of southeastern Asia and the
coastal countries of the Pacific Ocean.

In order to promote international understandign and
world peace, the trade policy should be as liberal as is
consistent with the policy of internal economic develop-
ment. It should at least not be so restrictive as to lead
to tarrif war and retaliation by foreign countries.
Administration:

The rate of future economic development is in direct
prOportion to the efficiency of administration as well asl
to the degree that the government is free from control by
the vested—interest groups and free from corruption. If
administration is inefficient, it is difficult to trans-
late an economic plan into the practical terms of production
and distribution.

If the government is under the control of the vested,
interest groups or if corruption is widespread, the economic
plan for the welfare of all the peonle will result in finan-
cial return and benefit only to the minoority of the special
privileged groups.

vest-nam must thereofnue avail itself of an efficient
and competent as well as an honest and representative gov-

ernment .

129

1. Finance:

Since of course, financing of any government program is
a primary requisite, it is necessary for a Vietnamese bank
to be founded to issue Vietnamese currency and to cacilitate
the interchange of outside currencies.

The bank, incorporated as the Vietnamese Treasury Depart-
ment, anould be free of foreign dictatorship and foreign in-
fluence. '

Taxes will be levied on a rational and equitable basis
The personal tax plan known as "corvees," will be abolished.
The tax upon salt and Opium should also be abolished.

The sale of opium and the smoking of same must be pro-
hibited by law and opium-smoking establishments closed per-
manently.

A graduated income tax and an inheritance tax should be
instituted.

2. Social and Cultural Program

No less important than the economic development of the
country, is the planning for a comprehensive social and cul—
tural program. It should include intensive health education
and vocational training. These we believe, are important
factors for success and happiness.

Among the numerous tasks that need to be done in the
social—cultural fields, two stand out as the most urgent:
The improvement of public health methods and the development

of public education.

LJU

a. Public Eealth

In the field of curative medicine, medical and surgical
care should be made available to the population at large. To
do this, many more hospitals and health centers are needed.
Both cities and rural areas are very underequipped to give
adequate care to the ill.

Since any medical program would be ineffective without
attention to preventive medicine, care should be taken to in-
clude a thorough training in this field. Contagious diseases
have always taken heavy toll among the nations whose pOpula
tions are so heavy. It will be necessary to instigate a well-
regulated program making it compulsory to receive inoculatiwns
for the prevention of smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, etc.

Pre-marital blood tests should be compulsory and medical
advice and training given during and after pregnancy.

Special measure will be taken for prevention and treatment
of the venereal diseases as well as such social plagues as
tuberculosis, cancer, trachoma, leprosy etc.

More study and laboratory reseaach will be devoted to
combating malaria and typhoid fever.

It is imperative that a better program of training for
doctors and nurses be put into effect in Viet-nam. Such train-
ing will be provided through local educational institutions as
well as through the exchange student plan so effective in the
interchange of modern medical knowledge.

Promising studeats must be given the opportunity of serv-

131

ing mankind as physicians and surgeons as well as nurses
and medical and dental technicians.

Toward this end, it will be necessary to set up a
method offinancing and encouraging students who show
aptitudes for scientific work.

In the general administration of preventive medicine,
the new social programs providing better housing, nutrition
and physical activity for the populace will be integrated and
correlated to accomplish the maximum results leading to better
health and a stronger nation.

b. Education and Cultural Activities

The department of public education of Viet-nam will
endeavor to stamp out illiteracy among the pooulace. All
citizens will be required to have a minimum amount of ed—
ucation.

High school and college will be made accessible to the
largest possible number of the pOpulation. More technical
and professional schools will be established.

A program of student exchange will be established with
other countries so as to facilitate the exchange of modern
ideas between the peOples of various countries.

There will be created much needed adult education faci-
litiies as well as the regular channels of student training.
These will include such features as cultural clubs, evening
classes, summer short courses, correspondence and extension

courses, libraries, et.

132

In the fields of agriculture, as well as industry, spe—
cial training facilities should be made available to every—
one. A Special program of advertisement will be needed to
impress upon the general populace the need for continuing
education in the methods of modern production and distribu—
tion.

In the cultural arts, Special prized, awards and schol-
arships will be instituted to encourage writers, poets and
artists to develOp Vietnamese literature, poetry and the
arts.

A Vietnamese Academy will be founded by the government
which will facilitate the establishment of an official dic-
tionary of the Vietnamese language. This will determine the
exact meaning of Vietnamese vocables and fix grammar rules,
thu 8 making the language more precise and uniform. This
dictionary will enable the accurate translation on ideas
into words.

The Department of Public Education will be reaponsible
for the financing of these educational programs and will re—
ceive its revenue from special grants of the public tax funds
of the Central government.

3. Legislation for Social Security.

The government should guarantee the worker the right
to choose his occupation. It should also enforce reason
able working conditions and safety rules and regulations.

Right of emp107ees to organize unions and associations

43).)

will be recognized by the Central government.

Negotiation of workable contracts between labor and
management should be guaranteed by law. This will include
such details as rates of pay, hours a day to be worked, the
enforcement of safety rules and the use of safety devices
as well as the various employee benefit programs available
at this time in most of the industrial world.

Asystem 08 social security will be instituted to pro -
vide workers insurance against unemployment, sickness, in-
jury and old age.

The social legislation will have sections to provide
for the handicapped and helpless citizens. Those who are
blind, deaf, mentally or physically handicapped must be
cared for and in such cases where possible trained to take
their places in the world in such capacities as is possible
for them to attaih.

Any adequate program of social legislation will provide
for housing units built to specifications fo comfort and ut-
ilitarian purposes for the general pOpulace. These units
will be sold or leased to working families at a price range
within their budgets.

Along with the housing programs, there must be given
better training in nutrition, and more efficient infant and
child care. Home economics training will be made availabie
to all who have need of it as well as child training pro-

grams, etc.

13#

The social program will certainly encourage the forma-
tion of such moral youth movements as Boy and Girl Scouts,
Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., etc. etc. National participation in
sports of all kinds will be encouraged and provided forl

Along with the improvement of the individual's lot in
Viet—nam there will be an extending program to improve and
eXpand public buildings, communications, transportation and
utilities as well as parks and recreation areas which alO
together will make life entirely more worthwhile and inter-
esting to the pOpulation at large.

#. The Foreign Policy of Viet-nam

An independent Viet-nam will adopt the following the
basic principles of her foreign policy: To cooperate with
all the democratic nations on the basis of equality and re—
ciprocity, to work toward the "rapprochement" of all peoples,
to aim at abolishing all iron curtains, racial, class and
any other social prejudices to support the United Nations
Organization in its efforts to build up a free, just and
peace ful world.

.While the above briefly states the minimum considered
to be a reasonable foreign policy, Viet-nam's attitude, no
doubt will vary with regard to each of them considered
separately. '

The feeling runs very high with regard to France. Viet—
nam in general feels that the March 8, 1949 agreements should

be rejected. A real independence should be grantedd Viet-nam.

135

While an independent country, Viet-nam will maintain close
economic and cultural relations with France.

This friendly relationship will be expressed in the form
of the most favored nation treatment. Viet-nam will continue
to export to France raw materials and products needed by French
industries at a special and reasonable price.

A special rate of custom duties will be set up for French
products to be imported in Viet-nam. Viet—nam will welcome
French capital and industrial techniques.

French porfessors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, to be
sure, will be called upon by the Vietnamese people to help
them carry out their social and cultural deve10pment program.

As for diplomacy in regard to other nations, as far as
France will stand in the democratic camp and not take any
international action against the interests of Viet-nam, there
is no reason why Viet-nam should get away from France of act
against France's interests.

Viet-nam desires to take part in the consolidation of
the Asiatic peOples.

What is called the Far East is represented largely by
China, Japan and Viet-nam, three countries of common geograph—
ic factors and remarkably distinguishable from the rest of
Asia by a common civilization, the glorious cradle of which
was in China.

Great men in antique China such as Lao-Tseu with his

somewhat corrupted yet so deep and so wise a phiIOSOphy;

Confucius whose teachings are imbued with so much humanism,
fraternity and moderation; Mencius, an exponent of demo-
cratic ideas, have exerted a profound influence upon the
culture, civilization and temperament of Oriental peOples.

More redently, the San-Min-Chu l, of Sun Yat Sen has
played an important role in the formation of liberation
movements throughout Asia, particularly in Viet-naml

These multiple cultural interconnections together with
economic bonds should make peoples of the three countries
feel friendly toward each otherl

Viet-nam will establish friendly relations with her
next door neighbors, Laos and Cambodia as well as with the
other countries of southeast Asiam namely, Thailand, Burma
the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Pakistan.

The formation of a Federation of the southeastern
Asiatic countries, including all countries located between
China and India was prOposed by Asiatic statesmen several
years ago and appears to have mnay ggod points in its favor.

India and Indonesia foreign policy has set forth a
very good example to be followed. In a world divided into
two opposite blocs, a middle ground should exist to con-
ciliate the two extremes in order to safeguard world peace.
The more the third force grows, the more chance the world
will have to be stable.

Viet-nam will develOp her economic and cultural re—

ations with America, in particular with the United States

137

of America whose traditions of democracy and liberalism as
well as economic and military might make her role in the
world's affairs definitely a predominant one in the future.

American financial aid.which has already made a fairly
good impression on the Vietnamese people will be sought in
a greater amount for Vietnam's rehabilitation and industrial-
ization.

Above all, Viet-nam will look to the U.S.A. as the de-
fender of freedom, human dignity and an unfailing supporter
of the principle of self-determination according to which
no people in the world snould be deprived of their inalien-
able right to rule themselves.

Viet—nam will support the policy of conciliation of
countries such as the Scandinavian nations and Switzerland

in the interest of finding a solution to the world crises.

 

FOOTNOTES.

Philippe Devillers, Op Cit p 30

P. Gourou. Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Francaise.
Paris, Paul Hartmann, 1946:* pp 403-515
Philippe Devillers. O Cit p 53

Henri Lanoue. Op Cit p ll

Charles Robequain. Op Cit. pp 219—2h2

“NHNH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Bernard, Paul. Le Probleme Economique Indochinois.

Devillers, Philippe. Histoire du Viet-nam de l9fi0 a 1952.
(Paris Editions an Seuil, 19527

Ebon, Martin. World Communism Todag.
Gosselin, Charles. L'Emoire d'Annam.

Gourou, Pierre. Utilisation du sol en Indochine. (Paris,
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Gourou, Pierre. L'Avenir de l'Indochine. (Paris, Paul
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Infantry Journal Press. Communism: Its Plans and Tactics.
Washington, l9h8'

 

Isaacs, H.R. No Peace for Asia. (New York, Macmillan, 19h?)
Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, Communist Manifesto.
Moreau, H.A. La Cooperation Agricole en Indochine

Robequain, Charles. The Economic Development of French Indo-China.
(Oxford University Press, l9fl5f

Rosinger, Lawrence K. The State of Asia. (New York: Knoff, 1953)

Rubba, John C. The Dominican Martyrs of Tonkin. (Providence
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Son, Pham Van. Viet-nam tranh-dau suI (Hanoi: 19h9)
Thompson, Virginia. French Indo—Chinag
Viollis, Andree. Igdochine 8.0.8.

MAGAZINES

Clementin, J. R. "The Nationalist Dilemma in Viet-nam? Pacific
Affairs Vol. XXXlll, September 1950

Firth, Raymond. "The Peasantry of Southeast Asia! International
Affairs, October 1950

Continued:
Julien, C.A. "From the French Empire to the French Union."
International Affairs, October, 1950.

 

Lang, Nguyen Tien. "I Chose Love." Asia (Saigon) March 8, 1953

Lanoue, Henri. "The Structure of I do-China.“ Science and
Society. Vol. XV, No. 1, Winter 1950—1951.

Madrolles, Claude. "Annam and Viet-nam" Asia (Saigon)
March 1, 1951.

Sacks, Milton. "The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia."
International Affairs. September 1950.

S.R. Mohan Das, "Ho-Chi Minh, Viet—nam Nationalist or Soviet
Agent?" International Free Trade Union News. Vol. 6,
No l, Hanuary 1931.

"Communism in Asia." Colliers , June 1951.

 

"Viet-nam“, Focus The American Geographical Society, Vol. 1,
No 5, February 15, 1951.

"Why Asia Turns To Communism." Life. June 19, 1952

- "Pretre et Missions." pplletin de L'U.M.C. Quebec. JU1Y-
September 1950. '

New York Times.. January 31, 1950
Ibid., March 6, 1950.
Ibid., October 31, I950.

MISCELLANEOUS

Ambassade de France. Service de Presse et d'Information, Docu-
ment April 1950

Congressional Record. Washington, Vol. 99, No. 120, June 30, 1953
Conventions d'gpplication. (Saigon, published by the High Comm-
issariat of France in Inde-China.

New China News Agency (NCNA), English Morse to North America, Nov
ember 19, 1949.

Ibid., November 23, l9h9.
Ibi§., November 29, l9#9.

News From France, The French Embassy, Press and Information
Division September 15, 1949.

Peking Radio. Mandarin, December 28, l9fi9.

 

Continued:
Peki g Radio Op Cit December 29, 1949

Viet-nam News Agency (VNA), English Morse to Southeast Asia,
November 28, 1949

£2£§°: November 29, l9h9.
pp;g., December 8, 1949.

‘gpgg., December 12, l9h9.

gp;g., December 20, 1949.

lElS-: December 27, 19h9.
pp;p., December 29, 1949.
,gp;g., January 3, 1950.

gppg., January 4, 1950.

;p;g., February 6, 7, a 8, 1950

Ibid., February 14, 1950.
Ibid., February 18 & 21, 1950.
Ibid., February 26 & 27, 1950.

Ibid., March 2, 1950.
Ibid., March 6, 1950.
Ibid., March 16 a 17, 1950.

 

 

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