

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN VIET-NAM

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CHAPTER 1.

IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON VIET-NAM

INTRODUCTION

In past ages, the theory and practice of colonialism has been a significant factor in the rise and fall of the great empires. Early colonial administration satisfied urgent motives for colonies and their commercial advantages. Migration and expansion were two of the foremost tendencies of the empires of Greece and Rome.

Characteristic of these colonies was the rapid transition from military government to the policy of assimilation to the governmental regime of the expanding empire.

The fall of the Roman, Greek and Persian empires was probably due in the main to imperialism and the conquering of a great empire and vast colonial areas. These expanding ventures grew out of all proportion to the ability of the home countries to control, both economically and politically. Thus, they became inevitably the bane of life for the home land which had subdued the lands and peoples and were responsible for their future.

Except for infrequent travelers' tales from the Orient, the Far East remained a comparatively little known area to the Western World. The famous traveler Marco Polo brought home to Europe the most fantastic, interesting tales about the East as early as 1298. Europeans who read his surpris-

ingly accurate account were almost unable to comprehend the picture. To the circumscribed European at the end of the thirteenth century, the stories were unbelievable. Nevertheless, the Far East became from that time forth a rich region worth struggling to reach. For the next two hundred years, Europe sought to learn more about this most fascinating land.

The periods of the Renaissance and the commercial and industrial revolutions which followed, marked not only transitions, but also inevitable states in the growth of Western civilization.

Part of the enlarged point of view which was so evident at that time and which was responsible for the development of international trade with the Far East, was the result of the Crusades. Knights, on returning from the Holy Land, brought with them strange tales of stranger lands. They aroused interest and curiosity about what existed beyond the knowledge of those who stayed at home. Their awakened imagination demanded more information of the East.

The returning Crusaders brought with them things of even greater importance--spices, silks, perfumes and tapestries. All of these came to be indispensable to the Western culture.

But the value of spices was more obvious than any of the others to a Europe which had no refrigeration, and was

accustomed to food of uncertain age. With this Oriental luxury, dining became more enjoyable. In fact, so familiar did the noble and middle-class families become with these condiments that, lacking spices, the food formerly eaten without question became almost inedible. Spices from the East had become necessities.

Two centuries earlier this interest in the East and the demand for an Oriental product would have been ignored. Now, however, there were those ready to meet the challenge. This was the result of the great change coming over Europe, the Renaissance.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, all of Europe had changed its attitude toward trade and commerce. There was new interest in literature, arts, history and the humanities. There was an increased thirst for knowledge of things beyond the confines of the European world. The travelers and merchants returning from the East found a welcoming audience eager to hear of their visits to Oriental lands of China, India and Japan.

Because of the capture of the Middle East by the Turks, the European nations were forced to seek other routes to the Far east. It was also thought that shorter routes might be found whereby the distance could be traveled entirely by water. This period, better known as the age of the explorers, was marked by many changes in the economic and political thought of the entire civilized world.

New competition in markets, new reasons for the aggrandizement of new territories, new motives for large military and naval resources made it imperative that larger supplies of natural resources be made available to the competing Western nations. The natural reaction was to reach out for new lands to conquer which possessed the resources and the native population to bring them to the conquerors.

When at long last the enemy Turk was put to route in the Middle East, Europe's great powers rushed to gain as much of the coveted land and riches of the East as possible.

In the seventeenth century the French had already formed East India companies. England, Spain and Portugal as well as the Netherlands were seeking new areas to exploit. New products and new markets were being introduced upon the historic scene very rapidly. The stage was well set for the birth of world imperialism.

France, like other European countries, had early accepted the principles of mercantilism. This theory maintained that colonial possessions were valuable only in proportion to the amount of raw materials and markets they furnished. In other words, the mother-country must accumulate gold and silver bullion, particularly by keeping a favorable balance of trade--a favorable ratio of exports over imports.

Legislators in the various countries sought to accomplish this end by a series of navigation and trade laws. In general, these acts provided for the carrying of colonial exports in ships owned and manned by mother-country subjects. Certain colonial products could be exported only to the mother-country and to her possessions. The nations of Europe engaged in a titanic struggle for power during the entire eighteenth century.

Whereas the early economic theory of mercantilism had emphasized the importance of colonies as a source of raw materials, a protected market, and the accumulation of gold, the new policy of colonialism expansion, known as imperialism, a product of the Industrial Revolution, demanded larger amounts of raw materials, and wider and freer markets and investment fields for surplus manufactured goods and capital.

The doctrine of laissez-faire was eagerly adopted by the rising industrialists, who chafed under excessive governmental regulation. More extensive world or colonial markets had to be found to absorb the increasing surplus of goods and capital. Although it was not long until these same capitalists insisted on high tariff walls to protect their interests from foreign competitors.

From these various and conflicting economic motives, came the theory of modern imperialism, with all its implications of inflated national prestige, vicious trade rival-

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ries, enlarged military organizations, and dubious methods of acquisition and exploitation. As the industrialization process went on, this desire for economic expansion was closely allied with the emerging nationalism of the period.

An attempt was made to rationalize and justify the extension of European civilization to so-called "backward areas." Many imperialists were probably sincere in emphasizing the religious and moral responsibility of sharing the advantages of a superior culture with less fortunate people. In fact, these honest and earnest missionaries who followed the explorer and trader, were often unconsciously preparing the way for new empires.

Another excuse given for enlarging the boundaries of older nations was the surplus population argument. As modern science lengthened the life-span of the human race, the birth-rate exceeded the death-rate in a ratio of three to one. As portions of these surplus populations sought their fortunes in recently opened territories, it was natural that the parent nation should wish to place her protecting care over them.

Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of modern imperialism was on the foreign policy of the industrial nations. Previous to the World War, even the solution of domestic issues and the rise and fall of cabinets were dependent upon a popular foreign policy, subscribed to by shipping magnates, exporters, financial and banking interests and a patriotic working class.

The naval and military rivalries of the pre-war period may be largely laid to this world race for raw materials and wider markets. Naval bases, coaling stations and efficient merchant marines were necessary factors in modern economic imperialism. Political intervention and annexation were simply the next logical steps in the process.

In the past two hundred years, the development of colonial administration has become a major branch of government technique and a major factor in national and international policy.

The modern period of colonial government is marked by administration designed to bring the greatest possible wealth to the home government. Along with the elaboration of administrative machinery within the colonies themselves has occurred a massive extension of colonial governmental machinery in the home governments.

In each colony there is primarily a colonial bureau also referred to as the Ministry of Colonies. It is the duty of this bureau to coordinate the colonial policy of the entire country, supervise officials, direct finances and in general exercise the crown or parliamentary authority within the colonial territory.

There is a tendency in most colonies to displace local legislation with modern law based on European concepts. Twentieth century administration also emphasized the education of the native population of crown colonies. For the

most part the educational system stresses European literary curriculum and almost entirely ignores the values of native cultures. In some cases the forcible elimination of native procedures is practised to the detriment of the national cultures and ethnic relationships.

Many of the colonies of the Far East have witnessed a large increase in the amounts of alcohol and opium that are consumed by the populace.

The wage systems within the colonies have been sharply criticized as entirely inadequate and comparable only to the Middle Ages in Europe. The use of forced and slave labor is practised as a matter of course in some colonies.

The increased commercial importance of the colonial economy has led to close control of trade by the homeland. Custom duties have become an important source of revenue to the administrative authorities. They also affect the tariff policy of the entire empire.

Colonial administration within the colonies determines the laws of the land. Native law is usually applied exclusively to the native population while nationals of the mother-country are judged and governed by their own laws and courts. The criminal law of the home country is immediately introduced even though native civil law is usually respected.

Little or no provision is made for native intellectuals to take their natural places in governmental positions in their country. Favoritism to the alien nationals is shown in every phase of government, economic, pol-

itical and social administration.

In general, the welfare and future of the native population has been ignored in favor of ever increasing exploitation of natural and physical resources to the glory of the mother-country and its leading capitalists.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF VIET-NAM.

Viet-nam is one of the ancient empires of the East, rich in the culture of the Orient, abundant in its heritage of religion, philosophy and social customs.

Historically the country dates from the third century. B. C. Its record actually began with the destruction of the realm of the Viets in South China, at which time the nationals of that country emigrated further southward and west and settled along the Red River. In this fertile delta the new nation of Viet-nam (Land of the South,) was established in the second century, B.C.

The Vietnamese people were originally of Chinese extraction. They were descendants of tribes which inhabited the valley of the Yangtse River, south of Shanghai, in what is now the province of Chekiang.

In the fourth century, B.C., the Tsin, an aggressive Chinese tribe from the north of China forced the Vietnamese to move farther southward. They settled in the Cantonese region where they stayed for several years. They eventually emigrated to the area which is now Tonkin and North Annam.

The savage tribes which had occupied this territory were of Indonesian origin. The Viets proceeded to subjugate and to assimilate these primitive people through intermarriage and intermingling socially. (1)

The Vietnamese did not remain free for long. From 111 B.C. to 938 A.D. Viet-nam's history was marked by Chin-

ese domination which exerted a tremendous influence upon the social and cultural customs of the country.


The territory of Viet-nam was under Chinese domination and influence for ten centuries, and the Annamese (2) nation's characteristics were born from the intimate mixture of pre-Chinese and Chinese elements. The Annamese speak a language which is partly original. Their customs are not exclusively Chinese although their civilization shows the imprint of Chinese influence.

They have learned Chinese agricultural methods including procedures of intensive rice cultivation and the proper fertilization of the soil.

The Vietnamese have adopted the Chinese characters for their written language and made Chinese philosophical thoughts their own. Lastly, they took from the Chinese all the elements of administration and government.

Thanks to Chinese civilizing influence, the Annamese when they shook off the Celestial domination at the end of the tenth century A.D. found themselves provided with an ensemble of institutions which conferred upon them a real superiority over the other populations of Indo-China. Even the peoples who, like the Cham and the Khmer, had attained a brilliant development owing to Hindu influence, were inferior in stabilizing qualities.

India has never known how to create a stable and lasting political organization and the Indochinese states of Hindu influence were no more solid than their Hindu models.



VIETNAM

Area: 127,250 sq. mi.

Pop.: 22,600,000

Major cities:

Saigon: 1,200,000

Hanoi

Hue

Troops:

"French Union": 420,000

(145,000 French)

Vietminh: 320,000

Cost of War for 1952:

to France: US\$ 815 M.

to U.S. : 770 M.

There was in the Chinese institutions, and consequently in the Annamese institutions, more regularity in government and more continuity in politics. (3)

In spite of the various beneficial effects of Chinese influence, the peoples of Viet-nam longed to be free. The period of Chinese domination was punctuated by frequent and ephemeral revolutions and upheavals against Chinese authority.

One case in point is that of the sisters "Trung," better known as the Saints Joan of Arc of Viet-nam. They were instigators and leaders of a revolution later referred to as the "aspiration for independence of the race."

A successful revolution in 938 liberated the country from the Chinese and gave rise to a long period of independence. (938-1884) During this time the policy of the newly emerged nation was centred upon two main factors; first, resistance to Chinese attacks for the cause of imperialism in the north, and second, the expansion toward the south to seek "lebensraum."

A determined expansion in the south regions began in 1471 and continued well into 1740. Cham's empire, of Hindu extraction, was more or less absorbed through this long drive. This area was known as Cochinchina, under former French designation and includes the southernmost portion of the Indo-Chinese peninsula. (See attached map.)

The first Catholic missionaries from Spain and France appeared in Viet-nam about 1843. Christianity had an immediate and lasting attraction for the Vietnamese. To quote the Reverend John C. Rubba,

So fruitful have the Catholic missions been, that Indo-China today has more native clergy and Sisters than most mission countries in the world. Religious persecution often ravaged the land, but the natives proved among the staunchest Catholics in history.

However, the imperial government lashed out against the Catholics with fierce persecution:

Sporadic persecution for more than one hundred years brought dead to---but as martyrs fell, conversions multiplied.

The storm broke again when the newly-crowned King Minh Mang issued an edict on January 6, 1833, ordering all Tonkinese Christians to renounce the faith by publicly trampling upon the crucifix.

The accession of the pagan tyrant Tu Duc to the throne of Annam, which at the time included Tonkin as well as parts of Indo-China and Siam, was the signal for a vast persecution comparable to that of the Roman Emperor Nero. A special decree of 1856 marked the beginning of the atrocities. European priests were cast into the sea or rivers; native priests were cut in two. Prisons overflowed with Christians. Whole villages were burnt to the ground. More than 40,000 had perished for the faith, and the names of most of these generous victims are known to God alone. (4)

This persecution of the missionaries was used as a pretext for French intervention in Viet-nam in the 1840's. To quote Charles Gosselin on the subject,

Our compatriots, lacking information about history, suppose that France has been led to intervene in Annam only for the protection of missionaries or to take vengeance on the acts of hostility committed against them and the persecutions executed against the Catholic religion. Missionaries have been in actuality, only the pretext of our action against Annam.

The loss of the Indies in the eighteenth century, the extension more and more rapid in the Extreme-Orient of our perpetual rival, England, imposed upon us the obligation of having a foothold in the China seas, lest we would fall down or find ourselves in a humiliating state of inferiority.

Annam has given us the occasion for that, the massacre of Frenchmen who happened to be missionaries has furnished us with the pretext, which we have seized with a comprehensible hurry, and the control over Annam is complete at the present time. (5)

Later, France went on to conquer the whole country of Viet-nam. It was an unequal struggle. The Vietnamese not being equipped with modern arms had no real chance to overcome the invaders. But in spite of her handicaps, they continued to struggle militarily and politically for their independence, never relinquishing their hope for freedom. (6)

French domination in Viet-nam lasted from 1884 until March 1945, when the Japanese forces took over the country, captured the French army and abolished its administration.

FRENCH COLONIALISM IN VIET-NAM

Indo-China is an outstanding example of the type of pressure political, economic and social referred to as colonialism. A powerful country such as France is physically capable of overpowering a smaller less aggressive country such as Indo-China. A major exploitation of natural and human resources follows such a decisive conquest.

The amount of police pressure necessary to establish and maintain such a colony is only measurable in comparison with the amount of intelligent resistance which the native people present in the face of the extra-legal and foreign control.

Viet-nam is one of the three states of Indo-China, and the largest, having an area of 127,250 square miles or about twice the area of the State of Michigan. Geographically located south and west of China proper, it is adjacent to Burma and Thailand.

It stretches north and south from the Tropic of Cancer to the tenth degree of latitude. It has a climate ranging from temperate in the mountainous areas to semi-tropical in the south. Its sea-coast is hundreds of miles long on the South China Sea. The land is one of the monsoon countries of Southern Asia.

Viet-nam is rich in natural resources and her agricultural possibilities are almost unlimited. The climate is suited to the production of rubber, cotton, rice and other

products in great demand in today's industrial world.

The population of Viet-nam numbers nearly twenty-three millions of people. (7) Their intellectual history indicates that they have always been conscious of individual dignity and worth. Their written history records their consistent struggle against foreign invasion and to obtain their national sovereignty in the face of multitudinous difficulties, not the least of which is the continual conquest which France has visited upon the people of Viet-nam against their will and without their sanction.

Professor Julien, distinguished French authority in the theory and practise of colonial administration, has described French policy as follows:

The Empire in 1939, was an ill-assorted whole lacking common institutions and plans for the future. It had been built up by a minority and was of interest only to specialists, many of whom thought more of their profit than of the colonies.

Economically, power lay in the hands of business men who owned the chief newspapers and could put pressure on the politicians. Business profits were brought back to France instead of being invested on the spot.

The colonies, lacking credit, had to make financial efforts out of proportion to their resources, which meant that the standard of living of the masses was kept very low by indirect taxes, levies and forced labor. The government, faithful to the idea of mercantilism, continued to regard the colonies as reservoirs of raw materials. It was ungenerous with capital and the capital equipment of the colonies was incomplete and precarious. (8)

"The colonization of Viet-nam," said Gerald Lyon-Caen, "is national oppression resulting from the economic exploitation of the country by a monopoly consisting of several colonial companies." (9)

A. Economic Exploitation:

"The French colonial system made certain that the administration and development of the country were undertaken exclusively by Frenchmen, and that commerce, agricultural production for export and the scant industry remained in French hands." (10)

1. Monopoly of Natural Resources.

The French completely monopolized all the minerals in Viet-nam. Their activities included the exploitation of all ores such as coal, gold, zinc, tin and tungsten.

The colonialists exploited for their own benefit the abundant forests of the highlands. They extended their real estate holdings through government grants accorded them for the purpose of developing industrial crops, i.e. rubber trees, cotton, etc.

Two companies shared 92% of the total production of the Tonkin anthracite. These companies reported twenty-nine million francs in profit in 1937, forty-nine millions in 1938, and fifty-eight millions in 1939. These reported profits represented more than double the total paid in wages to the Vietnamese miners. (11)

2. Industrial Monopoly:

All extractive industries were concentrated in the hands

of the French. Raw materials were exported almost entotal and the acquired profits were sent back to France.

The industries of power production, water and electricity, of transportation, both land and sea, the few industries of transformation engaged in processing products of the soil such as cement factories, lime kilns, brick factories, tiles, glass, matches and paper mills were the exclusive propriety of French capitalists, whom the colonial regime guaranteed many economic and social privileges.

The agricultural production of the rice paddies, distilleries, sugar refineries, breweries, tobacco factories, spinningg and weaving mills and tanneries also fell into this category.

Investment, like trade, has been shaped by the policy of "assimilation." The land concessions on which the rubber plantations were established were made only to the citizens of France in Indo-China. Mining companies must have a three-quarter majority of French nationals on their boards of directors. In 1938, the total of foreign business investments in Indo-China was valued at 382,000,000 American dollars, and of this, 285,000,000 dollars were French owned. Of the remainder, Chinese owned 80,000,000. Nearly the whole of the foreign rentier investments were French. (12)

The Vietnamese bourgeoisie, few in number, whose fortune was made from proprietorship of rice-fields, undoubtedly had the ambition to engage in big business and modern industry. But the colonial monopolies did not permit this ambition to be realized. Each time that the latter foresaw or feared the menace, the venturesome ones (Vietnamese) were brutally pushed back to the only activity which the monopolies allowed them real estate in the rice fields. (13)

3. Viet-nam maintained in a state of under-development.

Colonialism opposed the industrial development of Vietnam. The profits therefrom, however, would accrue in a large

measure to French capitalists. It tolerated only the creation of rudimentary industries that should not compete with production of the metropolis.

The very summary electrification of Viet-nam was highly indicative of the state of underdevelopment. The natural resources of fuel and water falls in Viet-nam have been extremely abundant. There was complete absence of electricity in the rural areas. None of the various fields of the native artisanat or industry has ever used electrical energy in its workshops. Only in the most important urban centers was electricity used for its manufactures.

4. Monopoly of Foreign Trade.

Commercial enterprises were the first French enterprises to appear in Indo-China. As is characteristic of a colonial economy, their operations lead to the importation of manufactured goods, cotton, textiles, metlas and metal goods, and to the exportation of rice and maize. (14)

Exporting raw materials, including paddy-rice, was the almost exclusive privilege of French merchants, who thus reserved for themselves the lion's share in the profits accrued from rice-trade. Vietnamese cultivators did not share in the profits accrued from rice exportation. Their right to equitable revenue as producers was thereby violated.

The exportation of rice ;

yielded copious profits to those who carried it on. In 1936, for instance, according to an inquiry carried

out at the request of the Ministry of Colonies by the Syndicat des Exportateurs français de riz de Saigon, the money realized from the sale of exported rice was distributed as follows: 25 per cent to the producers, 33.6 per cent to commercial intermediaries, 21 per cent to the transporters, 5 per cent to processors, and 14.4 per cent in taxes.

At a selling price of 50 francs the quintal, the Viet-nam producers received only an average of 13 francs per quintal. In the same year the French growers, far from being overpaid, received 160 francs per quintal of wheat. For the total exports of 17,630,000 quintals, it turns out that transporters, factories and intermediaries gained over 525 millions. (15)

Imports were also reserved for French merchants who redistributed a part of their merchandise to Chinese and Indians. Foreigners thus had the most substantial share of profits and imported products were transferred to Vietnamese middlemen with an extremely reduced marginal profit.

When the French commercial houses which were masters of the import and export trade, needed Asiatic intermediaries between them and the local producers or consumers, they systematically called in Chinese aids, the "Compradores" fearing that a Vietnamese might try to become a competitor, after gaining a certain amount of experience in the service. It was certainly easier and less costly to get the French administration to expel a Chinese who was too enterprising than to curb a Vietnamese in his own country. (16)

French products imported were exempt from custom taxes whereas, foreign products were burdened with prohibitive custom tax rates.

As far back as 1892, five years after she (France) had established the Indochinese Union, she established a customs union with Indo-China which provided that the

products of France must be admitted free to the colony, while all imports from other countries were to be subject to the same duty as in France.

The main purpose of this law, of course, was to protect a market for French industries, especially for her new heavy industries. In return, the law provided that the products of Indo-China could generally enter France free. In practise there were notable exceptions to this provision. Coffee, tea and pepper from Indo-China were subject to import duties only slightly lower than imports from other countries. (17)

This practically closed the Vietnamese market to foreign products. Because of this lack of competition, manufactured products sold at prices 15% higher than those in other countries. Vietnamese customers right to reasonable prices was therefore non-existent.

In 1928, the customs union was radically amended in order to give the Indochinese government considerable tariff autonomy. This change seems to have been partly due to the recognition that the existing tariff law was hampering the healthy economic development of Indo-China and that such development was in the long-term interests of France, and partly due to the increased political influence resulting from the increased prosperity of French business men in the colony, who felt that their metropolitan rivals were spoiling their opportunities. Consequently since 1928, tariffs have been shaped mainly in the interests of French investors in Indo-China, though the industrialists of France still have much influence. (18)

In the 1930's France provided more than half of IndoChina's imports, and took nearly half of her exports. Indo-China was compelled to impose a tariff on many things which her East Asian neighbours alone could provide; and on others which could provide more cheaply than France. Moreover,

her neighbours reacted with tariff reprisals, and this was important because Asian countries were the markets for Indo-China's rice, her chief export. (19)

From 1934 to 1938, the commercial balance of Indo-China had an average annual deficit of 112 million francs.

In 1936 exports were:

Product	% of Total Exports
Rice	44.7
Coal	4.7
Cotton	13.7
Silk & Rayon	3.5
Mineral Oils	7.2
Chemical Prod.	6.0
Iron & Steel	3.9
Machinery & Metal Prod.	12.2

For the year of 1936 France and French overseas possessions furnished 56.1 per cent of the total value of imports and took 61.4 per cent of the exports. (20)

All these facts, surplus of commercial balance and deficit in the balance of payments, exportation of raw materials and importation of manufactured goods, relatively great importance of commerce with the metropolis and its dependencies, were sure indices of a colonial economy.

5. Financial Monopoly.

The French colonialists completed their economic control over Viet-nam through financial monopoly. Under the French, Viet-nam had no right to issue her national currency, organize her treasury and establish her budget.

The "Banque de l'Indochine" was the dominant force in Indochinese economy. Its aim was to obtain the privilege

of issuing money, and this was granted to the bank in the year 1875.

The principal French financial powers control the Banque. Its control extends over a large sector of Indo-Chinese economy. In the year 1944 six of its directors, two of its former presidents and four of its high officials occupied seventy-five director's seats in the Indo-Chinese corporations.

In addition, the financial and real estate branches of the bank controlled through their officials, an important number of other Indochinese enterprises.

As may be seen the "Banque de l'Indochine," through its exclusive issuing and lending power, directed and controlled all the financial and industrial activities of the country.

The French administration organized the treasury and controlled it exclusively, thereby making Vietnamese administration absolutely dependent upon it. The Indochinese budgets, general as well as local, were established by the Offices of the "Gouvernement general" and "Residences Superieures."

The cultural and civilizing mission of the French in Indo-China is measurable by a few notable statistics, all based on official French records. The Indo-China budget, for example, provided a sum of fifteen million piasters for some 30,000 Annamite employees and functionaries of the government. The same budget provided forty million piasters for 5,000 French functionaries.

In 1943 the colonial government spent 30,000 piasters for libraries, 71,000 piasters for hospitals, 748,000

piasters for schools and 4,473,000 piasters for the purchase of opium, distributed in the country through the official opium monopoly.

In their time, the French built thirty-one hospitals in the colony and eighty-one prisons, not including concentration camps. (21)

6. Monopoly of all important Social and Administrative Positions.

In every branch, civil service, army, police, security, economics, finances, customs, services of transmissions, forestry, railways, education, public health etc., the posts of authority were reserved for the French. The Vietnamese even possessed of the same academic degrees and competence as their French colleagues were systematically assigned only subordinate positions. French functionaries were much better paid than the Vietnamese.

In the pre-war years the manual laborer in the colony earned an average of fifty piasters a month. The rare Annamite able to go through the Polytechnical School and graduate as a modestly equipped engineer could earn four hundred piasters a month. The French concierge of the University of Hanoi, a slightly glorified sort of janitor, earned 1,404 piasters per month. (22)

7. Exploitation of Labor.

There has been no social legislation for the protection of the Vietnamese workers, except a decree of December 1936, which projected general rules as to working conditions "set up after having been discussed on the one hand by the employers and their representatives and on the other by the Labor Inspection Bureau, representing the wage earners. (23)

These inspectors of the Labor Inspection Bureau could only visit a plantation after giving due notice to the em-

ployer of their proposed visit. The inspectors had no special training in their work, were often moved from post to post, and were usually on such friendly terms with the managers of the plantations that they found it difficult to discipline those who failed to carry out the law. (24)

There have been no such things as unions, guaranteed minimum salary, limitation of the number of working hours, vacation, social insurance, unemployment insurance. Neither working nor housing conditions have been effectively regulated.

Workers earned so little that husbands, wives and even very young children were all obliged to work to be able to provide the family with the minimum necessities.

We know, wrote Professor Ball, That the average wage is extremely low. We know that in the past the working conditions in the mines and factories of the north and the plantations in the south usually put the workers at the mercy of rapacious labor recruiters and managers. (25)

The most unfortunate workers were the coolies employed in the mines or on plantations. They were sent away from their families to the malaria-infested mountainous regions where for the most exhausting labor they were underpaid, underhoused, and undernourished. They had no drinking water that was pure, no mosquito net, no medical care. The peaceful and intimate atmosphere of the villages they had been accustomed to, was replaced by the ruthlessness and

rapacity of the "tacherons," or foremen. The effects of yellow fever and malaria were so terrible that some whole groups of coolies have been entirely decimated after a period of a few years.

The regime of "tacheronnat" provided the French employers with commodities, but severely threatened the lot of the Vietnamese worker. Through this regime, the French bosses did not need to have any direct contact with the employees and delegated their power and authority to the "tacherons" who naturally took advantage of the situation to enrich themselves at the expense of the poor coolies under their domination. They even required a commission charge from the coolies in return for their jobs. This was paid through monthly deductions from the employee's salary. They also made money on their victims by granting loans at an exorbitant rate of interest.

In spite of conditions of unemployment and misery in which the rural population found itself, it was not easy for the French employers to recruit a sufficient labor force for their enterprises. Therefore, they were sometimes obliged to request support from administrative authorities and military forces for arbitrary drafts of coolies. These drafts involved so much contempt of human dignity and freedom that some French writers did not hesitate to compare them with the slave trade of the old times. (26)

In their pursuit of a systematic exploitation, the

French colonialists have extended their control over the most unexpected domains. For example, the Vietnamese peasant had for centuries prepared a native drink from the alcohol of rice, with which he celebrated the cult of his ancestors and the libations on days of feasts. This was prohibited by the French administration in favor of the "Societe des distilleries de l'Indochines."

This society founded in 1901, has had a very rapid development. The laws for the manufacture and the sale of distilled liquor, set up by the French administration in 1902, with a view to supporting the general budget by excise taxes, created what amounted to a monopoly in its favor. The general budget increased its receipts and the company its profits by instituting the compulsory consumption of strong liquor.

For Viet-nam, consumption went from 256,000 hectolitres of pure alcohol in 1923, to 484,000 in 1942. In addition the laws set up in 1902 destroyed the native distilling industry, which had been the livelihood of several specialized Tonkinese villages. (27)

The monopoly of salt resuscitated the salt tax of European Middle Ages. The Vietnamese salter was to sell all of the salt he produced to French companies which in turn resold it to the government at a price three or four times higher. The government then re-distributed salt to the popu-

lation at a price as high as from five to ten times as much as it had paid the French companies.

Opium was imported by the French authorities and sold to opium-smoking places officially recognized as real social institutions. Thus, they encouraged increase of dope addicts and the degradation of the populace.

Results of Colonialist Exploitation in Viet-nam.

Compared with the super-mechanized world of today, Viet-nam is a very backward country. After more than four decades under the French domination, she continues to offer visitors the unchanged spectacle of villages made of thatch-and-mud; houses lighted in the evening by peanut-oil lamps; of unshod peasants ploughing their muddy rice-fields with their most primitive ploughs drawn slowly forward by water buffaloes.

Of a population of twenty-three million people like that of Indo-China, one third does not have the ration of rice it needs for sustenance, and a majority sees meat appear on its tables only on the days of feast. However, the colony exports two million tons of rice abroad.

Soil in general is rich in natural resources. Labor is abundant, industrious and for a good part unemployed.

The above is a quotation from Mr. Paul Bernard, the French author of two enlightening economic surveys on Indo-China published in the pre-war period. He has made clear in this quotation the riches of the country and the poverty of its population. A sad yet striking contrast, the main cause of which lies obviously in the regime of colonialist exploitation.

Another extract from a study published in October 1949, by the Office of the High Commissariat of France in Indo-China, will offer a clearer picture of what becomes of the standard of living of the Viet-nam peasantry under colonial domination.

The different categories of wage-earners, tenants, very small landholders of a portion of the communal lands make up the majority of the rural population, about two-thirds. This working class, totally without capital, lives off its wages from day to day. It cannot satisfy its hunger completely except during the busy seasons, especially plowing and harvest times. (28)

In conclusion, it is safe to say in the words of Professor Mac Mahon Ball,

In the economic development of Indo-China, the interests of France or of Frenchmen were usually, if not always, the paramount aim. And economic progress, as measured in terms of production and trade, has not produced a corresponding social progress. It has often produced social disintegration and mental instability. (29)

Political Oppression.

The colonial regime of 1939 was characterized by bureaucratic government and an all-powerful administration. The colonies were subject to laws and regulations peculiar to them and were ruled up to 1946, by decrees of the President of the Republic of France. In the protectorates the sovereign retained the right to make laws, but in fact it was the French Resident who prepared and enforced legislation. The system allowed the central government to have complete control and gave full power to the civil servants who made the regulations. (30)

1. Colonialist Iron Curtain.

Under the French administration, Viet-nam has been isolated from the rest of the world by an impenetrable iron curtain. She has become a private fief of the French colonialists.

Arbitrary customs barriers have made Viet-nam inaccessible

ble to any international commercial transactions. The French capitalists had thus a free hand to organize an import-export monopoly in their own behalf.

Viet-nam did not have any diplomatic rights whatsoever. She could not have any direct relations even with France. Between the Vietnamese authorities and the French government and Parliament, there was a triple rampart made of the offices of the "Residences Superieures," "Gouvernement general," and the "Ministere des colonies." "The officials were masters in the colonies thanks to their wide powers which they did not always exercise in accordance with government regulations. " (31)

The colonialist iron curtain denied to the Vietnamese people the freedom of cultural exchange with other nations. The foreign press was refused admittance. Even French press and literature were severely censored. The only books and newspapers admitted to Viet-nam were those from writers who gave lip-service to the regime. Any ideas about national liberty, social justice and human rights were considered to be "subversive" and as such, denied expression and circulation among the public.

There has been no freedom of travel outside the borders of Viet-nam. Students, tourists and merchants found it most difficult to obtain visas from the "Surete Francaise."

2. Control of Armed Forces.

The French reserved for themselves the exclusive right

to organize army, navy and air forces. Colonial troops were composed of the French Legion, Senegalese, Moroccans, and "Gardes Indigenes," made up of Vietnamese militia commanded by French officers. Their chief occupation is described below by H. R. Isaacs.

French garrisons and their Foreign Legion units were engaged almost constantly in punitive expeditions against the dissident and the rebellious.

Long before the days of Hitler, they employed the method of wiping out whole villages and towns in reprisals for the acts of individuals.

In 1930, for example, more than a decade before Lidice, a group of fleeing Vietnamese nationalists took refuge in the village of Co-am in the province of Hai-Duong. Five French planes bombed the village and strafed it afterward at low altitude, pursuing the people who fled along the nearby roads.

A few days later the Resident Superior of the province circularized all local officials saying: 'The village of Co-am has been bombarded by the Hanoi Squadron. I request that you give utmost publicity to this, and add that any village which places itself in a similar situation will without pity meet the same fate. (32)

In this way, the most patriotic nationalists were eliminated from the political scene. The state prisons of Son-la Lao-Bao, and Poulo-Condore, ran red with the blood of Vietnamese patriots.

5. Divide and Rule.

Since the late 1800's, France has held the life of Vietnam in her hands. She has divided Viet-nam into three zones or Kys, as they are called, each being subjected to a particular political regime, thus making it easier to control by the "divide and rule" technique.

Cochinchina, or South Viet-nam, was given the status of a colony. As such, it had a direct French administration headed by a French governor. It also had the right to elect a Deputy to stand in the Chamber of Deputies in the French Parliament.

Annam, or Central Viet-nam, was given the status of Protectorate. Under this form of government, it had a native administration headed by the Emperor of Annam and a French indirect administration headed by a French Resident Superieur, who in fact, controlled everything.

Tonkin, or North Viet-nam, was given a status halfway between a colony and a protectorate. In the beginning, the region was placed under the symbolic protection of the Emperor of Annam who appointed a viceroy to represent him in the area. The French abolished the position of viceroy and placed the region under the direct control of the French "Resident Superieur," of Tonkin in 1897.

Although each region was given a special status, the colonialist regime applied in all of them was the same. This arbitrary division had been made for the unavowed purpose of destroying the unity of Viet-nam, making it easier for the French to reign over the country.

The unity of Viet-nam before the arrival of the French, was an incontestable fact. As Charles Gosselin, a French historian of the French Conquest in Indo-China has expressed it in his book, "Empire d'Annam,"

Nous nous sommes trouves en presence du peuple le plus uni que l'on puisse imaginer, depuis les montagnes du Haut Tonkin jusqu aux frontiere du Cambodge, au point de vue ethnique aussi bien qu au point de vue politique et social. (We have found ourselves in the presence of the most united people one can imagine ethnically as well as politically and socially, from the mountains of High Tonkin to the frontiers of Cambodia.)

6. Creation of the "Gouvernement general de l'Indochine," an all-powerful superstatic organization.

The three Kys of Viet-nam with Cambodia and Laos were called the five countries of the Indochinese Union. As such, they were under the control and supervision of the "gouvernement general de l'Indochine". (33) The supreme decisions of which in political, economic and financial matters of the union eradicated any remaining trace of unity of Viet-nam and worked steadfastly toward a complete domination of the colony by a group of a few French capitalists, most of whom were owners of stock in the Banque de l'Indochine. (34)

Footnotes

1. Phillipe Devillers, Histoire du Viet-nam de 1940 a 1952. Paris, Editions du Sevil, 1952 pp 11-12.
2. Annamese and Vietnamese designate the same people of the country of Viet-nam. For their different meaning see Claude Madrolles, "Annam and Viet-nam," Asia, (Saigon) March 1, 1951 pp43-44
3. Paul Gourou, L'Avenir de l'Indochine, Paris, Centre d Etudes de Politique Etrangere, Paul Hartmann. p 10
4. Reverend John C. Rubba, The Dominican Martyrs of Ton-kin. Providence College Press, 1951.
5. Charles Gosselin, l'Empire d'Annam, 1904.
6. 1886-1888: Revolt of King Ham-nghi.
 1888-1890: Revolt of Phan dinh Phung.
 1888-1910: Revolt of De Tham
 1906 Foundation of the "VIET-NAM QUANG PHUC HOI," a nationalist movement led by Prince Cuong De and patriot Phan Boi Chau.
 1916 Revolt of King Duy Tan
 1923 Unsuccessful assassination of French Governor General Martial Merlin by Pham Hong Thai.
 1926 Foundation of the "New Viet-nam Revolutionary League" (Tan Viet Cach Menh Dang)
 1930 Revolt at Yen-Bay led by Nguyen thai Hoc, a leader of the nationalist movement V.N.Q.D.D.
 1937 Movement of the "Indo-China Congress" asking for political reforms and liberation of political prisoners.
 1939 Creation of the "Viet-nam Doc-lap Dong-minh Hoi" (League for the Independence of Viet-nam)
 1940 Rebellion led by Le Hong Phong and his wife Minh-khai.
 1941 Revolt of Sergeant Doi Cung in Nghe-an.
 (See Pham Van Son, Viet-nam tranh-dau Su, Hanoi, 1949) pp 111-137
7. "Viet-nam" Focus, American Geographical Society, Vol.1 No 5, February 15, 1951.
8. C.A. Julien, From the French Empire to the French Union, International Affairs. Volume XXVI, No 4, Oct. 1950 p.491
9. Henri Lanoue, The Structure of Indo-China. Science and Society. Vol. XV, No 1 Winter 1950.51 p 1
10. J. R. Clementin, The Nationalist Dilemma in Viet-nam. PacificaAffairs, Vol XXXIII, Sept. 1950 pp 300-301
11. Henri Lanoue, Op Cit., p 6

12. Mac Mahon Ball. Nationalism and Communism in East Asia. Melbourne University Press. 1952 p 73
13. Henry Lanoue. Op Cit.
14. Ibid, p 4
15. Idem. p 12
16. Ibid p 12
17. Charles Robequain, Economic Development of French Indo-China. Oxford, 1944 ppl39-140
18. Mac Mahon Ball Op Cit, p 72
19. Idem
20. Henri Lanoue Op Cit p 9
21. H. R. Isaacs. No Peace for Asia N.Y. Mac Millan pl45.
22. Ibid p 146
23. Henri Lanoue Op Cit p 13
24. Virginia Thompson. French Indo-China p 207
25. Mac Mahon Ball. Ibid pp 69-70
26. See Andree Viollis. IndoChina S.O.S.
27. Henri Lanoue , Op Cit , p 7
28. H.C. Moreau, La Cooperation Agricole en Indochine. P. 17
29. Mac Mahon Ball Op Cit p 72
30. C. A. Julien. From the French Empire to the French Union International Affairs Oct. 1950
31. Idem.
32. H.R. Isaacs Op Cit, p 143
33. First conceived as a slight organism of coordination of the action of the local Governors and Residents, it quickly affirmed itself as the supreme authority in Indo-China. The relative autonomy the Protectorate had left to Viet-nam with the possibility of a direct contact with metropolitan France, faded very soon.

The Protectorate "Annam-Tonkin" had depended on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France (like Morocco and Tunisia today) since the decree of January 27, 1886.

The decrees of October 1887, which organized "French Indo-China" made it clear that all of the French possessions in Indo-China were under the authority of the Governor General, immediate representative of France in all annexed or protected territories responsible only to the Minister of Colonies.

From then on, there was erected a thick screen between Viet-nam and France, the Government General.

In 1897, new restrictions were imposed on Vietnamese sovereignty. by the creation by Governor General Paul Doumer, of the "Government General of the Indochinese Union, which had at its disposal an imposing apparatus of "services generaux" and the resources of a "budget general."

In 1898, the French administration reserved for itself the right to collect taxes in the whole territory.

On the other hand, in Annam, it was decided that the Resident Superior in Hue preside from then on, over the Co-Mat, (Secret Council of the Ministers) and that decisions of the Vietnamese Government be approved by the French authorities before they could be put into execution. From the Protectorate regime one has almost come to the regime of direct administration. Not only diplomacy and armed forces were taken away from the Vietnamese government of Ho, the latter also, had no more than the appearances of administrative power. See Philippe Devillers, Op Cit p 29

34. Among them, the present president, Paul Boudoin, former minister in the Vichy government, represented the Banque in the 'Societe des tramways de Shanghai,' as well as on the boards of nine Indochinese corporations. His colleague, Pierre Guesde, formerly Chief French Resident in Annam, and Colonel Francois Barnard, held thirteen and three seats respectively. The former president, ~~Bene~~ Thion de la Chaume, was on six boards, while his relative, Francois de la Motte-Ango, Marquis de Flers, Assistant General Director, held fourteen posts. Jean Laurent, General Director who later became Administrator of Civil Services in Indo-China, also six. Another director of the Banque, Ernest Roume, former Governor General of Indo-China, sat on the board of the Suez Canal. See Henri Lanoue Op Cit p 3

CHAPTER 11

IMPACT OF COMMUNISM ON VIET-NAM

A. Analysis of Communism in Southeast Asia:

The common people of Asia are the peasants. They comprise the vast majority of the population of Asia. Most of these people are hungry. They need food, clothing, houses, hospitalization and education. They are an overworked and severely exploited peasantry. A large part of the misery and hunger arises from the relationship between the peasants and the landowners; between the native and white population in some cases.

For centuries the Asiatic peasant has lived at the mercy of the local landlords. In some underdeveloped areas as many as three and one-half millions of people work for a single landowner. The share of the crop allotted to the peasant is so small that he could not live through the year's sowing without securing advanced from his proprietor-usurer. Interest on these loans cuts his share still further. In some provinces seventy per cent and more of the harvest goes to the landlords. In this way the peasant is kept in perpetual poverty and slavery. (1)

Although most peasants in Southeast Asia own the small portion of land that they till, they still find themselves under a heavy burden of debt. This is due to numerous factors such as low productivity. The fact that families are quite large and inclined to cleave together even after mar-

riage also adds to the difficulty of making the family plot suffice. (2)

Because of the lack of accurate studies, it is difficult to estimate adequately the percentage of the populace which may be classified as peasants. It is generally believed by students of the Orient that about two thirds or more of the total population in nearly every Asian country are to be found in agricultural pursuits and classed as peasants. This would seem to indicate that there are more than one-hundred millions of people in Southeast Asia who can be considered as peasants. (3)

Productivity is very low in this part of the world due primarily to lack of modern implements and methods. Production also hinges on distribution of population, a factor which is very uneven in Southeast Asia. The fact that traditional patterns are closely followed hampers the redistribution of the population into more favorable areas.

The superstitious peasants refuse to leave ancestral burial plots and break family ties. They are also intensely affected by superstitions about mountainous areas and swamplands. These areas, so abundant in Southeast Asia could be utilized if reclamation and conservation methods were to be employed and the peasants could rid themselves of their fantastic taboos. (4)

The peasants in Southeast Asia have fewer cultivation acres per capita than their counterparts in Western Europe. For instance, in the rich Tonkin Delta of Indo-China, as

many as 60% of the peasantry own holdings of less than nine-tenths of an acre per capita.

It has been estimated that individual family requirements will vary from two and one-half to five acres depending upon the number of persons in the family.

Fish production, which ordinarily is the principal source of animal protein in the diet of the peasants shows the same low ratio of productivity. (5)

The average income in Southeast Asia is extremely low due to the above-mentioned conditions and to the fact that the economy has a very low level of capital equipment in proportion to the abundant labor utilized in production. Wages are also dependent upon colonial management in the majority of cases. This source of income is notoriously low in return for work done. (6)

There can be no doubt that the life of the Southeast Asian peasant is one of extreme hardships. He lacks the common necessities of life and is kept in a life of bondage to debtors in addition to his poor living conditions.

In recent years groups of Chinese money lenders who took over the activity of middle-men have become a most significant feature in the economic and political life of the populace. They share a large proportion of the wholesale import trade and control the collection, storage and processing of the peasants' export products.

Acting in this capacity, they are in a position to finance the peasant by loans on his crops in advance of

harvest. They manage to enlarge their profits by giving the advances in goods rather than money. Through clever manipulation they have managed to skirt the boundaries of both the European and peasant society, thus keeping in close business contact with both.

Combined with these pressures of alien influence are the effects of Westernization. Together these factors have made a tremendous impact upon the peoples of Southeast Asia.

To quote again Professor Raymond Firth in his recent study on the peasantry of Southeast Asia;

The effects of Westernization are profound. But they do not lie in crude physical displacement of the peasant or degradation of his living conditions. They lie in the widening of the gap between his expanding range of wants and his level of productivity and in his inability to measure and in any way control the economic forces operating in his field.

Westernization has meant for the peasant an enlargement of the social horizon--more knowledge, through better communications and education, of other places, of other peoples, of kindred and dissimilar interests. It has created new ambitions; for different clothing, for new uses of leisure, for a better status for his children, for a position of power in the political scene.(7)

The poverty and inequality of the peasant in comparison with his white masters has bred a loathing for the white man and his rule unequalled in history. The insecurity of his position in the expanding economy leaves him uncertain and psychologically and emotionally unstable as he gropes for understanding of the situation.

In his book, "No Peace For Asia," H.R. Isaacs has adequately described the emotional tension which is common to

all the colonial countries, as he quotes the conversation between himself and a native Vietnamese:

Frenchmen here--we hate them with a hatred that must be inconceivable to you, for you have not known what it is to live under a foreign master as a slave.

He continues in his own words:

It was like a social disease of the subjected, this passionate loathing. Whole generations had been infected with it, by the vermin in French prisons or by the slower poison of an enforced inferiority haunting every step of their lives from the cradle to grave.

A hatred compounded of many things: dull and weary sense of unrepaid toil was part of it; and so was chronic injustice never articulately understood. There was also the nettle of racialism in it, for the masters were white and the least of them was greater than the greatest of the land's own sons. Racialism, where it does not impose dumb submission, outrages manhood and breeds violence. Freedom is not among the exports of any imperial nation. The great French libertarian tradition was never carried by Frenchmen west of Suez, because it is not a commodity from which profits can be made.

Only the small number of Annamites who were sent to France for higher schooling encountered it when they reached the homeland of their masters. The France of the great classic revolutionary tradition, of free thinkers and free livers, was a new France to them. In Paris they discovered at least the roots of the freedom they were denied in their own land.

The result, in most cases, was that their French schooling did not train them, as was intended, to become pliant adornments of the colonial regime but to become rebels against it and leaders of rebels when they came back home. This is a movement against France by intellectuals who were all educated in France. (8)

The Communists always adept at rationalizing, have taken advantage of the critical situation in Southeast Asia as often as possible. Their successes have been great. In theory, they advocate economic security, justice, racial

equality, redistribution of land and wealth.

They emphasize and aggravate the grievances of the people and cleverly manipulate politics of an area so that socialism appears more attractive to the people than their present form of government. The Communists ardently teach class hatred.

The Communist practise of the suppression of political and civil freedoms which has so antagonized the Western world, makes little impression upon these peoples, who have lived their lives so intimately with suffering and privation.

Civil rights do not seem as important as food to these hungry people. They are willing, even anxious to forgo rights for the promise of a full stomach.

Because of the close relationship of the family unit in these countries, there is more emphasis given to duty and responsibility than to human and civil rights in the mind of the peasant.

Government control and monopoly does not arouse antagonistic response in the East. It has long been the custom for the government to build roads, irrigate the soil, construct canals and railways and other projects of statewide nature. No private companies or individuals would be financially able to perform these activities. Basic consumer goods are more apt than not to be under governmental monopoly. (9)

Communism in itself is not important to the Asiatic peoples. Their primary concern is to get enough food for themselves and their children. For this, Communism offers

two basic tenets. First, is the promise of individual freedom from the oppression of the white masters. The second is the opportunity to own a piece of land free from excessive debt.

The Communists use the technique of rent reduction and land redistribution in their agrarian reform programs. Village liberation and class reorganization all are used as bait for the discouraged peasantry. Their method of fostering personal conversion and guidance by self-criticism has also been extensively used to further the aims of Communism in Asia.

One of the most effective ways in which the Communists have influenced the peoples of these lands is by indoctrinating the students. These students then go forth among the people and teach and guide as many of the peasants toward Communism as is possible for them to reach.

This has proven an aid to the spread of Communism inasmuch as the Communists preach nationalism so fervently within these colonial areas. The Communists within each country have tended to emphasize national patriotism in their tactics and propaganda. The reason for this has several aspects. First, the veto in the United Nations is the safeguard for the Soviets against adverse action and the veto rests on the old doctrine of sovereignty. The freedom of Soviet Russia from international control is therefore facilitated by insistence upon national sovereignty.

Secondly, the doctrine of sovereignty serves as a barrier to such projects as atomic-energy control. Thirdly, the slogans of sovereignty and patriotism have a strong appeal in drumming up opposition to the Marshall plan, on the ground that it represents American interference in the recipient countries.

Within each country that the Communists hope to control eventually, they pursue the tactics indicated for them by Lenin's Left-wing Communism. Under their ultrapatriotic slogans, they infiltrate, divide and insofar as possible, rule. This tactic applies from the level of the national legislature down to the neighborhood club.

The general Communist view on nationalism seems to be that in advanced countries, nationalism is a factor to be opposed at all costs, but in the smaller and backward countries, nationalist movements are to be used to the utmost. This use of patriotism and nationalism in the backward countries serves to both intensify efforts to disrupt the political and economic stability of the colonial empires and to mobilize popular forces which can in turn be played upon by Communist propaganda. (10)

Taken all in all, the Communists have much to gain and nothing to lose by preserving the anarchy of the old system of too many little states with no common organization. This especially applies in the colonial areas of Southeast Asia.

The Communists have taken full advantage of the Chinese victories to further their propaganda in the far-flung areas of Southeast Asia. One of the most realistic selling points of Communism is the ethnic and racial relationships among the peoples of this area. "Asia for the Asiatics," became an early slogan of the Communists in this part of the world. It has now reached the proportions of a phenomenal urge with the partisans of these parts.

Basically, Communism's concern with the welfare of the peasant of Southeast Asia or the division of the land among the hungry peasants is a cruel, tactical fraud. It is used simply as a device to gain power. Once the Communists are firmly seated in the government, the destruction of private ownership begins, for this is a prime requisite of Communist states. (11)

It may reasonably be assumed that Russia's main interest in the political movements in Asia is to manipulate these movements so that they will promote the greatest damage to her most potential enemies, the Western Democracies. In her long range foreign policy it would be infinitely more important to inflict mortal wounds upon America or France or England through this strategy than to aid the poverty stricken Asiatics in their struggles.

Russia's financial inability to give adequate economic aid toward the industrialization of Southeast Asia fosters

much discontent among the people who have been led to expect much more from the Communists with their extravagant promises.(12)

However, the Communists have managed to jostle the democratic world into co-operating with a bureaucratic feudalistic system until in at least a number of instances American dollars are backing oppression and corruption. America has loaned France, for instance, over three billion dollars, knowing full well that the money is being used to oppress the peasant and to suppress all opposition to the French in Indo-China.

It is this kind of feudal system, with its grip on the governments (French Colonialism) that is responsible for nine-tenths of the advances of the Communists around the world. Therefore, when American dollars are spent to uphold landlordism instead of breaking up these landed estates and liberating the masses of people in dependent areas, these dollars fan the flames of hate against America and are one of the greatest contributing causes of the growth of Communism in Asia. If Asia goes Red, Americans must take some of the blame to themselves. (13)

B. Communism in Viet-nam.

Communism was brought into Viet-nam in 1930 when Ho Chi Minh, alias Nguyen Ai Quoc, founded the Indochinese Communist Party on January 6, 1930. (14)

Born in the early 1890's, Ho Chi Minh spent a period of his youth in the French Merchant Marine, then settled in Paris toward the end of the first World War, and became a member of the Communist Party there. In 1923 he went to Moscow as a delegate of the French Communist Party to the International Labor Congress, and remained there as colonial representative of its permanent Committee.

From 1925 to 1927 he served in Canton as Staff Attache of Chiang Kai Shek's Soviet advisor. Following Chiang's split with the Communists in 1927, Ho Chi Minh fled Canton and returned to Moscow. In 1930 he founded the Communist Party of Indo-China in Hong Kong. Imprisoned by the British from 1931 to 1933, he disappeared after that date and reappeared in China in 1940.

In 1941 he formed the Viet-nam Independence League, (Viet Minh). Imprisoned by the Chinese Kuomintang in 1943, he was released in 1944 to carry on anti-Japanese activity. In November 1944, he crossed the frontier of Indo-China. (15)

Since its foundation the Communist Party of Indo-China has been operating true to the form of every Party in the Communist International. It organizes strikes and opposition groups for the aggravation of existent minority problems. It also entices new members with its propaganda and various promises of reward.

In 1939 the Party began to take advantage of the strife caused by the Japanese occupation forces. It set upon a movement of revolt against the French administration in Cochinchina.

In conformity with the directives of the Komintern, it

then decided to change its platform from "Democratic Front", to "Front of the anti-Imperialist Indochinese peoples." Its objective was "to fight with the support of the U.S.S.R, stronghold of the World Revolution, against the imperialist war to put down the French Imperialism and the native feudal classes to regain the independence of Indo-China, and to establish a Democratic Republican Indochinese Union."

In June 1940 another decision was taken to the effect of "preparing an armed insurrection in order to institute a republican government which would rally itself with the movement of resistance of the Chinese People, with the U.S.S.R. and with the World Revolution."

The appeal was made to the masses of the population to fight against "the French Imperialism and Japanese Fascism." Following this on November 22, an order was given by the Communist leaders to their followers to start the insurrection in Cochinchina in order to seize power and establish a "People's Government of the Indochinese Democratic Republic." The French succeeded in stifling the Communist insurrection. (16)

The failure of the Cochinchina insurrection taught the Indochinese Communists a lesson of prudence. They knew then how to avoid any premature action and prepare themselves for the day when the war reaching its climax, they could deal a mortal blow to the colonialist regime, already shaken to its foundations by the occurrence of the war and by the awakening of the masses.

The tactics adopted by the Indochinese Communists were in accord with the new directives of the Komintern which substantially prescribed that the Communist parties should assume the leadership of national movements of liberation and in the battle against Fascist imperialism, unite as far as feasible, all nationalist or social organizations. This tactic was revealed two months after the total integration of Indo-China in the Japanese military system, when Ho founded the Viet-nam Independence League or Viet-Minh whose first manifesto read as follows: "Union of all social classes, all revolutionary organizations, all ethnic minorities. Alliance with all other oppressed peoples of Indo-China. Collaboration with all French anti-Fascist elements. An objective: destruction of colonialism and Fascist imperialism."

The program of the Viet-Minh may be summarized as follows: (17)

1. Oust the French and Japanese Fascists. Make Viet-nam independent.

The Viet-Minh did not preach xenophobia. It simply declared that it wanted to have the independence of Viet-nam. "Doc-lap", independence, was the first objective of the Viet-Minh. It made allusion as often as possible to the "Immortal Principles" of Rousseau, Voltairs, the Great Revoltuion, and it cited in example the French people, Champion of Liberty in the world.

But France exerted her sovereignty over Viet-nam. It was therefore against her that Viet-nam must reconquer its independence, or rather against this minority of "colonialists" and Fascists that wanted to maintain at any cost its domination over Viet-nam in order to draw therefrom the maximum profit. But nothing stood in the way of friendship between Viet-nam and France, if the latter recognized Viet-nam's independence.

2. "Alliance with democracies that combat fascism and aggression."

This point has been made if not to identify the future international statute of independent Viet-nam, at least in the hope of securing foreign aid necessary to the achievement of its independence. It is conceivable that operating from Chinese territory and conforming to the directives of the Komintern, Ho Chi Minh could have hardly adopted a different position. But the very conditions in which Viet-nam found itself made it necessary for Ho to take up such a position.

In the struggle against Japan and the French administration in IndoChina, Ho needed the support of a great power. Russia was undoubtedly favorable. But she was too far away and she was busy resisting Hitler. The two other countries which might have been of great help were China and America.

China was at war with Japan and the French Administra-

tion in Indo-China had allied itself with Japan in 1939. The U.S.A. was not yet involved in war, but her anti-colonialist sentiments were well-known.

3. "Establish a Democratic Republic of Viet-nam."

The final objective of the Viet-Minh was to establish in Viet-nam a democratic regime with a large popular participation. The Viet-Minh proposed universal suffrage of all Vietnamese eighteen years of age and older. The members of ethnic minorities were to enjoy the same political rights as the Vietnamese, the democratic liberties such as freedom of press, assembly, circulation, and the equality of rights between men and women; a decentralized administration based upon an extensive participation of the people therein through the "Committees of People"; nationalism of all properties of fascists and traitors.

To the populace the Viet-Minh offered: "The suppression of all taxes instituted by the French and the Japanese," suppression of tenancy, the eight-hour day, and salary increases; a system of social insurance and workers pensions; the taking in charge of the indigent by the State; free and compulsory education; creation of theatres, clubs, etc."

The program was extremely prudent on the agrarian question. As its propaganda, based on the negation of the right of ownership, had met with a complete failure in the past, the Indochinese Communists took advantage of the foundation of the Viet-Minh to revise its position. It now advocated rather the generalization of individual ownership of real estate, thus satisfying one of the most cherished aspirations

of the mass of peasantry which makes up the majority of the Vietnamese people.

Relations between the Ho Chi Minh Government and France.

Immediately after Hiroshima and the Japanese capitulation, the Communist elements of the Viet-Minh which had organized an underground movement in Viet-nam during the Japanese occupation, took over the country. They instituted the so-called "Democratic Republic of Viet-nam" in Hanoi in September, 1945.

Ho Chi Minh was nominated President of the Republic by his henchmen. Bao-Dai, who had been Emperor of Viet-nam under the control of the Japanese abdicated the throne. Due to his favorable reaction to the Communist rise to power, and under pressure exercised by Ho, he was given the position of "Supreme Adviser" of the Republic.

As soon as the League Viet-Minh declared Viet-nam a Republic, the Communist Party dissolved officially. Three Communists, Tran Van Glau, Duong Bach Mai, Nguyen Van Tao, became cabinet ministers. Thus, men who had been leaders of the Communist Party became key figures of the Viet-nam administration, but the party itself no longer existed. On October 12, 1945, a so-called Parliamentary election gave Ho Chi Minh 330 out of 400 seats. (18)

Shortly after the Japanese capitulation, the British

and Chinese had been commissioned by Allied Command to disarm the Japanese in Viet-nam. British troops which occupied the south of Viet-nam, favored the return of the French troops. The French succeeded in taking over Saigon and some other nearby cities in the latter part of the year 1945.

It was in order to facilitate the movement of French troops back into the northern part of Viet-nam that France signed what was known as the Agreements of March 6, 1946, with the "Democratic Republic of Viet-nam."

According to this agreement, France recognized Viet-nam as "a free state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union". (The rice-rich part of Cochinchina was not included in this arrangement). In compensation for this, the Republic gave a friendly reception to the French troops. Ho Chi Minh, however, desired not only the union of Tonkin and Annam, which he had achieved, but also the incorporation of Cochinchina.

The French then prepared for a plebiscite in Cochinchina, which they hoped would choose independence within the Indochinese Federation itself, rather than incorporation by Viet-nam.

Thus, the March 6, 1946 agreement between France and the Ho Chi Minh government was, in actuality, a "marriage of convenience." Both parties have agreed to settle the matter by definite and more detailed treaties to be consummated at a later date.

Up to date two conferences have been held. The first one met in Dalat, Viet-nam in April 1946. The second, at the Palace Fontainebleau, near Paris was held in July, 1946. (19)

There was hope of arriving at some mutual understanding for conclusion of definite agreements. However, both conferences failed because of the lack of mutual concessions. France was not willing to concede to Viet-nam her independence and unity. The Democratic of Viet-nam, under obligation to the people whose instincts were extremely nationalistic, could accept nothing less than the complete independence and unity of Viet-nam.

Tension and dissatisfaction have been growing rapidly in Viet-nam between the French and the officials of Ho Chi Minh. In December 1946, under the pressure brought to bear upon the Government of Ho by the French High Commissioner's policy of progressive extension, war broke out. Hostilities began in northern Viet-nam. The armed conflict has continued ever since.

Because of this violence on the part of the French High Commissariat which the people felt was unjustified, Ho and the Communist elements in his government have been able to rally the entire nation against the alien and intruding French. The result has been that Communism has become entrenched in the leadership of a genuine nationalist movement.

The Ho Chi Minh Government and the Vietnamese People.

In its dealing with the people of Viet-nam since its rise to power in the fall of 1945, the communizing policy of Ho Chi Minh appears to have evolved from a period of ground-laying (1945-1948) to that of an overt communization (1948--).

As the author has lived in Viet-nam in the years 1945-6-7, when the government of Ho Chi Minh reigned officially over almost the entire country, he will be able to describe the policy of this government in its ground-laying phase as an eye-witness.

Immediately after their rise to power, the Vietnamese Communists dissolved the Indochinese Communist Party. This dissolution was motivated by the same reasons that caused the Soviet to dissolve the Komintern two years earlier in May, 1943.

First, the Communists wanted to camouflage the pursuance of their ideology under the facade of a nationalist movement, in order to efficiently exploit the nationalistic feeling of the Vietnamese people. Secondly, this camouflage the Communists used to impress foreign observers. Thirdly, the official dissolution of the Communist Party was believed to be a part of Ho Chi Minh's elaborate plan for gaining time. Extra time gained meant not only the possibility of enhanced military power, but also an end to international isolation. (20)

Ho Chi Minh made the following public statement concerning the establishment of the Commuhistic regime in Viet-nam, "Communism is not applicable immediately to the Vietnamese masses. It is therefore fit to envisage a provisional period of bourgeois democracy." (21)

However the Communists founded an association called "Association for the study of Marxism," whose main task was to publish Communist books and to propagate Marxist ideas and thoughts among the masses.

The system of government set up by the Communists was very similar to that of Soviet Russia, with the Tong Bo Viet-Minh, the Communist Party, given a different name--exercising control over and giving directives to the official government.

Every year the Ho Chi Minh government organized meetings and demonstrations against fascist Franco and Communist "deviationist" Tito. All this, in spite of the fact that the population of Viet-nam located at the southernmost point of Asia, does not even know who Franco and Tito are.

A systematic propaganda has been carried out in favor of Ho Chi Minh, the Communist leader in Viet-nam and Soviet Russia, the leader of World Revolution. In the Communist press Ho was called "The Father of the People," (cha gia cua dan toc) or "The Savior of the Land," (vi cuu tinh cua dat nuoc.)

A special song written in Ho's honor was titled, "A



Thousand Years to President Ho Chi Minh"; (Ho Chi Minh muôn nam.) This song was taught in schools, garrisons, and factories, and became the most popular song in the country. Ho Chi Minh's picture was required to be bought by every family and displayed in the place of honor in the home.

Quotations from Marx, Lenin, and Stalin appeared daily in the papers. Another song, "Dream of the Soviets," glorifying the Soviet society and regime has been given extensive publication and popular support.

Indoctrination along Marxist lines has been carried out systematically and given foremost priority in any kind of training, military as well as technical.

Schools for political administrative and military cadres were organized. Whatever the subjects taught, study of political problems and of Marxism received primary emphasis. The students emerged from their training convinced Marxists or nearly so. Since everyone in an official position--whether in the government, the army, a trade union or whatever--had to attend a course in one of these schools, a methodical propaganda and recruiting system resulted. (22)

In every unit of the army a Political Commissioner was given the task of politically educating the enlisted men and as such was regarded as more important than the commanding officer thereof.

Beside the regular and official police service, a network of secret police was set up which included young people whose ardor and enthusiasm were skillfully exploited by the Viet-Minh to ensure the Party's monopoly of power.

Schools of indoctrination are set up also in the mountains where integral Marxism is taught boys and girls who are sent later into their villages to work for pro

paganda and repression purposes. In a years time these young people have secretly created committees of resistance and assassination that has produced a reign of terror all over the country.

Their orders must be executed. Disobedience thereof is punishable by the death penalty. Meantime they have organized a service of information. Through this, they know of every word and every act of each person in the villages and each member of the families. The carrying out of the work of these Committees is supported by sections of armed soldiers, very mobile, and obeying blindly their chiefs.

From time to time, operations of reprisals executed by French armed forces, punish the villages, but very rarely do the French capture those who are really the culprits. The latter, well informed of the plans of French head-quarters, have had sufficient time to escape. (23)

This secret police organization amounted to a very thorough thought control policy. It was carried on everywhere even into the most remote areas. This eventually resulted in the entire population, urban as well as rural, being forcibly incorporated into Communist organizations. These organizations in turn were carefully augmented at all governmental levels, village, county, town, city and nationally.

Suspicion and fear poisoned the life of the populace. The spies themselves were debased as well as their prey. There was created an immoral atmosphere in which frankness and sincerity in social relations were replaced by deceit and dissimulation.

While the Viet-Minh was claiming it granted to the people of Viet-nam all democratic liberties, it practised, in actuality an absolute dictatorship. It pursued a policy of suppression and elimination vis-a-vis the non-Communist

nationalist or opponent elements which it called the "reactionaries". Thus it has assassinated a large number of Vietnamese patriots. The most well known among these were Ho Van Nga, a professor, Ta Thu Thau, Communist newspaperman accused of Trotskyist tendencies, Phan Van Hum, a philosopher of the Spiritual School, Huynh Phu So, a leader of Hoa-Hao, a political-religious movement.

In central Viet-nam, the province of Quang-ngai, thousands of followers of Caodaism were massacred. They were linked together by steel wires piercing their wrists and pushed into the deep waters of the river.

After the conclusion of the Agreements of March 6, 1946, between Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny, a representative of the French government, the Communists, gaining support from the French, openly attacked the V.N.Q.D.D. (Viet-nam Kuomintang) troops stationed in the mountainous regions of northern Viet-nam.

This elimination of nationalist elements was carried out on a national scale by sending them to the concentration camps or by continual purges and liquidations.

The following statement made by Buu Viem, an anti-Communist nationalist condemned to death for trying to evade the concentration camp where he had been interned, in the face of his Communist judges, will give an idea about Communist oppression;

There could be no question for me of waiting a few months more to be freed. It was my duty, considering the wretched state of the camp, to make a symbolic gesture that would oblige you to reflect on the fate of your victims. I regret nothing! I ask for nothing! I have no intention of

asking your pardon. (24)

The free press was censored. The activities of the nationalists and opponents to the regime were closely watched or severely repressed. The non-Communist political parties were reduced to a state of inertia. Religious worship was declared "reactionary" The churches and temples were profaned. The most influential priests were accused of being spies for the foreigners. They were thrown into jail or dishonored in the eyes of the population.

Communist agents made searches of private dwellings without notice or warrant. They made arrests and imprisoned the people without any recourse to legal procedure whatsoever. They often snatched up their political opponents while they were walking on the street by quickly covering their victims' faces with thick blankets. Then to suppress their captives, they put them in big bags of jute and threw them into the rivers. This method of kidnapping and suppressing political opponents spread terror among the population.

Many summary sentences for execution were pronounced before the so-called "People's Tribunals." These were composed of amorphous and fearful mobs. The Communists forced them to gather in these groups and made them approve the executions of their fellow country-men by the raising of hands. They were forced to accede in fear of their own lives. Thus religious and political objectors to Communism were liquidat-

ed, and the remainder of the population intimidated into fearful submission.

To satisfy the mass of the populace, the Viet-Minh has been trying to create a hatred of class-distinction in Vietnamese society. It divided the population systematically into three categories. First, the capitalists (tu-ban); second, the owners of little property, (tieu tu san); third, the propertyless (vo san). So much discrimination was practised against the two first categories that it was an honor to be classed in the last one.

Viet-nam however, has for generations enjoyed a nearly classless society. Native capitalist exploitation in the western sense of the word, charged by the Communists, does not really exist. The differences in the standards of living between the diverse factions of the population are insignificant. Social partitions have never been insurmountable obstacles to the mobility of the population. (25)

Not infrequently the sons of the poorest peasant families have been found to hold the highest public positions of government.

Among the peaceful functionaries, cultivators, artisans and merchants, the Viet-Minh has made earnest efforts to sow an artificial hatred of class. This class hatred was beneficial to Communist expansion, but harmful to the country, economically and socially. It paralyzed the economic activity and disunited the people at a time when unity and coopera-

tion were the most needed to resist French aggression.

Bound to its campaign program in 1941, the Viet-Minh did a very good job in its efforts to eliminate analphabetism. The rate of illiteracy in 1945 was still very high, as high as 80%. (26) The Viet-Minh organized a new branch of education, named Popular Education. The main purpose of this was to help the illiterate to learn to read and write the Vietnamese language. A delay of one year was given to all Vietnamese of over eight years to learn the national language.

Were the efforts of the Viet-Minh to propagate education among the masses exerted without any interested intent? J. R. Clementin seems to doubt it when he says,

The successful struggle of the Viet-Minh against illiteracy was impressive, but of course, its achievement afforded an incomparable political tool. Instruction in the alphabet provided the best possible channel for Communist propaganda as well as the surest means of recruiting the masses. (27)

In financial and fiscal matters, the Viet-Minh, in order to keep its promises, abolished all taxes created by the French. It accused the French of being "unjust and inhuman" in assessing such taxes as the personal and indirect taxes. Even the property tax was suppressed to please the peasantry. Circulation and sale of cereals was decreed to be exempt from any charge.

However the Viet-Minh created instead what they called contributions, such as the contribution to national defense,

which was in effect a tax but under a different name. They collect all sorts of contributions for the sake of "national salvation."

Thus for National Salvation, a "gold week" was organized during which the population was invited to give the government all articles made of gold which it would give as gifts of good will. Similarly a "copper week" was instituted whereby the Viet-Minh acquired a great amount of copper for nothing.

Along the same lines, a so-called "Pot of Rice" for national salvation was created. Each home must have a pot in which it puts a handful of rice every day. Once a month, when the pot is filled with rice, a representative of the government comes in and empties it.

Second Phase, Overt Communization.

This phase was marked by two outstanding facts. First, communization of the high command in domestic administration. Second, alliance more and more stressed with the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and the Red Peking government.

The ground-laying phase of communization ended when Mao-tse Tung's victory in China seemed assured. Early in 1949, began the phase of overt communization of Viet-nam by the Viet-Minh government.

By the end of 1948, most of the basic organizations, from the village councils to the most diverse cultural associations, were already held solidly by the Communists. In 1940

all control levers passed simultaneously into Communist hands so that the high command was at that time one hundred per cent Communist.

Pham Ngoc Thach, Ho's assistant in the cabinet and a man who has been mentioned as the first Vietnamese ambassador to Moscow, was sent to the south to reorganize the local administrative "Committee of the Resistance," Thach blamed the people for their individualist deviationism and assigned all key posts to Communist leaders.

A similar process occurred in the central part of Viet-nam where the mission of reorganization was entrusted to Pham Van Dong, Ho's heir apparent in the governing body of the Viet-Minh.

Speeches and addresses which had been given in the ground-laying phase since the dissolution of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in 1945, in the name of the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam were now given plainly in the name of the Vietnamese Communists. At the same time the press and radio redoubled their praise of Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China.

Ho's attitude with regard to France changed radically. Whereas in 1945, he had on many occasions expressed the desire to bring Viet-nam into the French Union, whereas in 1947-48 he had declared that Viet-nam wished to remain neutral in the cold war, from 1949 on, Ho loudly voiced

his intention of being the firm ally and friend of the great Democratic, Popular Republic of China. (28)

At the Asian and Australasian Trade Union Conference in Peking, November and December 1949, Liu Shao Chi, Vice-President of the All China Federation of Labor, in his opening speech, made allusion to Viet-nam in the following terms. "The war of national liberation in Viet-nam has liberated 90% of her territory."

Liu Shao Chi has indicated China as the best example for Viet-nam to follow:

The national liberation movement and the People's Democratic movement in the colonies and the semi-colonies will never stop short of complete victory. Their struggles are entirely righteous. They should and will, win victory. The great victory of the Chinese people to victory is expressed in the following formula.

This nation-wide united front must be led by and built around the working class, which opposes imperialism most resolutely, most courageously and most unselfishly, and its party, the Communist Party, with the latter as its center. It must not be led by the wavering and compromising national bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie and their parties.

It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible a national army which is led by the Communist Party, and is powerful and skillful in fighting the enemies.

Armed struggle is the main form of struggle for the national liberation struggles of many colonies and semi-colonies.

The existence and development of the organization of the working class and of the national united front are dependent upon the existence and development of such armed struggles. This is the inevitable course for the colonial and semi-colonial people in their struggle for independence and liberation. (29)

Luu Duc Pho, Secretary of the Viet-nam General Federa-

tion of Labor, stated that "the path of the 475 millions of Chinese people is the path to be taken--The essential principles--defined by Comrade Liu Shao Chi in his opening speech--must serve as the compass for all the workers of Southeast Asia." (30)

On December 20, 1949 on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday, the Viet-nam General Federation of Labor, which is the direct affiliate in Indo-China of the Peking Liaison Bureau, had conveyed "the respectful greetings of the Vietnamese working people" to the "Top Leader of the Soviet People and the workers and oppressed peoples of the world." (31)

Shortly thereafter, the first national conference of all Vietnamese trade unions was held, the decision of which was to "carry out the plans and decisions of the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania which met in Peking." (32) "To map out plans for consolidating the Vietnamese working masses and making them a vanguard in the fight for national liberation and in the rebuilding of a new national economy." (33)

Another interesting fact about the conference was that huge portraits of the great leaders of the working class, Marshal Stalin, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, President Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and Hoang quoc Viet of Viet -nam hung above the rostrum. (34)

Official speeches revealed close affinity to orthodox Communist ideology. Thus Labor Minister Nguyen Van Tao said: "The workers and people of Viet-nam will learn from the Soviet

Union and democratic countries of the world in carrying through the liberation of the working class and the people. (35)

A telegram was sent to the Soviet Trade Union Council in which Viet-nam Trade Union Federation pledged to follow the heroic example of Soviet workers by emulating still more actively "in boosting up our preparation for the general counter-offensive so as to restore our national independence and unity," and expressed "unreserved confidence in the leadership and support of the Workers of the Soviet Union. (36)

In February 1950, Vice-President Pham Van Dong told the Third National Military Administrative Congress, "Workers and peasants played an outstanding part in the revolution of August 1945 and are bearing the brunt of the present War of Resistance. They should therefore, be allowed to take a greater part in the administration of the country. Only then will the State power be really consolidated." (37)

On the occasion of the formation of the People's Republic of China, in late November 1949, Ho Chi Minh exchanged telegrams with Mao Tse-Tung. Ho said, "The fraternal relations between China and Viet-nam which have a history of centuries will grow closer so as to develop freedom and happiness for our nations and defend world democracy and lasting peace in common."

Mao replied on the same tone by stating that, "China and Viet-nam are meeting on the front line of an imperialist struggle. With the victorious development of our struggles for liberation of the two peoples, the friendship between

our two people s will surely become closer day by day." (38)

As the Chinese Red Army drove the defeated nationalist troops south, forcing them to cross the border into Viet-nam, Viet-Minh Radio in concert with Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai's warning statements to the French on December 7, 1949, protested against "underhand machinations of the Chinese Kuo-mingtang reactionaries and the French Imperialists aimed at violating Vietnamese national sovereignty." (39)

The possibility of joint action by Vietnamese troops and Chinese Communist armed forces against the French was also envisaged by the Ho Chi Minh government. The Vietnamese radio spokesman cautioned the French to "bear in mind the fact that democratic China never intended to send her army across the Viet-nam border and that Viet-nam never relied on the Chinese liberation Army for winning the war against the French landgrabbers," but "Should the French imperialists be boneheaded enough to harbor the enemies of New China and allow them to annoy the Viet-nam people, then they would be held responsible for all the ensuing consequences."

The late December issue of the Vietnamese Pravda, Su-That (truth), spoke more plainly. "The Viet-nam Army and the people would not only heartily welcome but also back up the Chinese Liberation Army should the latter deem it necessary to pursue the remnants of Kuomintang hordes into Viet-nam." (40)

A Union of Overseas Chinese New Democratic Youth was founded in Ho-controlled Vietnamese territory, the President of which, in a greeting telegram sent to Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai, denounced the atrocious crimes committed by the French against Chinese nationals in Viet-nam(41)

The official alliance of the Ho Chi Minh government with Red China and the U.S.S.R. was achieved by Chinese recognition of Ho's government on January 18, 1950, and by Russian recognition on January 31, 1950. The Russian satellites in Eastern Europe and the North Korean government also officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam. (42)

Following Mao's government recognition of Ho's government, a Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association was established, one purpose of which was to help the Vietnamese people to understand the factors that led to Chinese Communist success.(43)

Ho Tung Mau, a former member of the Chinese Communist Party and one of the original founder of the Indochinese Communist Party was appointed President of the Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association. He made the principal speech on February 18, 1950, designated as Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Day by the Ho government. (44)

That the struggle and program of the Ho Chi Minh government are tied to the orthodox Communist International can be seen in the following statement of Su-that in the January 25, 1950 issue:

The Democratic Republic of Viet-nam has consistently been standing in the international democratic camp led by the Soviet Union. This is an opportunity for us to contribute as much as we can to the world-wide struggle for peace and democracy under the leadership of the Soviet-Union. This is an opportunity for us to weld our legitimate patriotism with righteous internationalism. (45)

FOOTNOTES.

1. "Why Asia Turns to Communism", Life June 19, 1952.
2. Raymond Firth. "The Peasantry of Southeast Asia," International Affairs Vol XXVI October 1950. p505
3. Ibid. p 504
4. Ibid. p.505
5. Ibid. p.505-506
6. Ibid. p.506
7. Ibid. p.510
8. H.R. Isaacs. Op Cit pp 146-7
9. Mac Mahon Ball Op Cit p 11.
10. Communism: Its Plans and Tactics, Washington Infantry Journal Press 1948, p 28
11. Marx and Engels. Communist Manifesto.
12. Mac Mahan Ball. Op Cit p 14
13. John Collier. New York Times October 31, 1950.
14. To mark the sixth anniversary of the 1946 General Election, the "Voice of Viet-nam" (Viet Minh Radio) broadcast: "We should not forget that there would have been no 6 January 1945 General election Day-- if there had been no 6 January 1930, Day of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party."
15. Ambassade de France Service de Presse et d'Information, Document April, 1950.
For more information see S.R. Mohan Das, "Ho Chi Minh, Viet-nam Nationalist or Soviet Agent?" International Free Trade Union News, Vol 6 No 1. January, 1951.
16. Philippe Devillers Op Cit pp 78-80
17. Ibid. pp 98-100
18. Martin Ebon. World Communism Today. N.Y. Whittlesey, 1948 p 389
19. Philippe Devillers Op Cit pp256-258 & 289-308
20. J.R. Clementin Op Cit p 309
21. "Pretre et Missions," Bulletin de l'U.M.C. Quebec July-Sept. 1950 p338
22. J.R. Clementin Op Cit p 309
23. "Pretre et Missions" Op Cit pp341.-342

24. Nguyen-Tien-Lang "I Chose Love", Asia (Saigon) March 8, 1953
25. Philippe Devillers in his "Histoire du Viet-nam de 1940 a 1952", describes traditional Vietnamese society as follows: Political power was concentrated in the hands of the Emperor. Between him and the people there was nothing, no feudality, no nobility, no Parliament, nothing but the functionaries, pure instruments of the imperial power. All the Vietnamese were equal before the King and before the charges. There was no military caste, not even the separation between the civil and the military powers. These functionaries were recruited in all the classes of the people by means of competitive examination. This was a rule in Viet-nam since the 12th century. Public functions were attributed to merit, and merit was judged by literary contests. p 19
26. Ibid. p 179
27. J.R. Clementin Op Cit p 309
28. IBid p 310
29. New China News Agency (NCNA) Peking Radio English Morse to North America November 23, 1949 Ibid Nov. 29, 1949 pp 20-27
30. N.C.N.A. Peking Radio, English Morse to North America Nov. 19, 1949 Ibid Nov. 23, 1949 PP 24-27
31. Viet-nam News Agency V.N.A. English Morse Dec. 20, 1949 Daily Report Op Cit Dec. 21, 1949 EEE 6
32. Peking Radio, Mandarin Dec. 28, 1949, Ibid Dec. 29, 1949 EEE5.
33. English Morse to Southeast Asia Dec. 27, 1949 Ibid. Dec. 29, 1949 p 4
34. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 26, 1950. Daily report Cit. Feb. 27, 1950 P EEE 3
TRuong Chinh is a well-known Vietnamese Communist theoretician, who occupies the official post of Secretary General of the Association for the study of Marxism mentioned above.
Hoang Quoc Viet was an outstanding member of the Indochinese Communist Party and now occupies the influential post of Secretary General of the Viet-Minh. See J.R. Clementin, Op Cit. p 238
35. English Morse to Southeast Asia Mar. 2, 1950 Ibid Mar. 6, 1950 PP11-12
36. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 7, 1950 Ibid Feb 8, 1950
37. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia ~~XXX~~ Mar. 16, 1950 Ibid Mar. 17, 1950 P EEE3
38. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Nov. 28, 1949 Ibid Nov. 29, 1949 P EEE4.
39. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Dec. 8, 1949 Ibid Dec. 12, 1949 PPP11

- 40. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Jan. 3, 1950
Ibid Jan. 4, 1950 P EEE1
- 41 V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Dec. 11, 1949,
Ibid. Dec. 12, 1949 P EEE 3
- 42. New York Times, January 31, 1950
- 43. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 11, 1950
Daily Report Op Cit. Feb. 14, 1950. pp PPP 18-20
- 44. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 18, 1950
Ibid Feb. 21, 1950 pp PPP 1-2
- 45. V.N.A. English Morse to Southeast Asia Feb. 6, 1950
Ibid. Feb. 8, 1950, pp PPP 1-2

CHAPTER 111.

CONTEMPORARY VIET-NAM.

In the hectic years since the end of the war, Viet-nam has fallen victim to division between two destructive forms of government. The choice between the two is very slim. The difficulty of choosing the lesser of two evils impresses itself upon a troubled people.

Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai each work for the government he represents. The latter has been brought into power by the French when their attempt at a political settlement with Ho Chi Minh proved to be unsuccessful.

The nature of the Ho Chi Minh Government has been discussed in the preceeding chapter. The following is concerned with the nature of Bao Dai's Government.

In 1947 as the conflict spread and the military solution that France had undertaken in Viet-nam proved to be unsuccessful, France began to consider other ways out of the complicated situation. The French finally decided to use the prestige of Bao-Dai, who meantime had taken refuge in Hong Kong, to re-establish negotiations.

Bao-Dai was contacted by emissaries of the French High Commissioner in 1947. He consented to return as the French sponsored leader of Viet-nam. A "protocol" was negotiated which led to the conclusion of the March 8, 1949 Agreements between French President Vincent Auriol and Bao-Dai, wherein France recognized Viet-nam as an "associate country in the French Union."

It is on the basis of this Agreement that Bao-Dai is calling himself "Head of the State of Viet-nam" and the French are pretending that they are fighting an international anti-Communist war in Indo-China.

During Bao-Dai's tenure as leader of Viet-nam, the government of Nguyen Van Xuan had been formed under his patronage. However, when the agreements of March 1949, were solemnized secretly this government was not even consulted.

Neither had Bao-Dai been vested with any representative powers by any recognized group in authority in Viet-nam. Due to this unauthorized negotiation, there was general disapproval on the part of the Vietnamese people and other friendly Asiatic peoples.

On April 24, 1949 after several weeks of hesitation and under the pressure of the French government, Bao-Dai left Cannes (a city in the South of France) reluctantly. The plane which took him back to Viet-nam was given orders not to make any stops in Asiatic independent countries. It stopped only at Cyprus and Singapore to re-fuel before arriving in Viet-nam.

The return of the ex-Emperor to the country did not produce any psychological shock as had been expected by the French. The total indifference of the population was rather disappointing to them. The reason they had expected reverberations was the fact that these agreements made

with such care and secrecy afforded the Vietnamese only a purely verbal independence.

1. Nominal versus actual unity.

Bao-Dai has pledged himself to respect the regional particularism of the three "Kys", North, Center and South Viet-nam. He has agreed to provide for each of them a large measure of autonomy, thus giving support to separatism and disregarding Viet-nam's aspiration for unity.

To control the administration of each Ky, of Cambodia and of Laos, the French government delegates a Commissioner of the Republic, formerly "Resident Superieur," newly baptized with a novel name. Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina are still considered three distinct countries. The former division is strictly maintained behind the facade of a nominal unity.

The Home Ministry exercises no power. The three Governors, theoretically under the direct authority of Bao-Dai, reign in fact over their Kys as Viceroys in their fiefs. Each of them has his own administration and army and is, in effect, more dependent on the local French authorities than the central Vietnamese government whose role is rather that of a figurehead.

The regime of three Kys does not even represent a form of Federalism. It is the negation of Viet-nam's unity. In almost any federal country, the component states are multiple and of small proportions comparatively to the size of

the whole nation.

The United States is composed of forty-eight states; Switzerland has nineteen cantons and six semi-cantons; the Soviet, sixteen republics, subdivided into autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national districts. A country of so limited size as Viet-nam would be dismembered, ungovernable and denied its existence as a nation if it were to be divided into three separate sections.

Furthermore, the regime of the three Kys should be rejected under the present critical circumstances in Viet-nam where only a strong, decisive, united government would be able to provide any semblance of effective independence.

2. Racial particularism-Subtraction of Ethnic minorities from Vietnamese sovereignty.

The administration of ethnic minorities residing in Viet-nam "will be the subject of particular statutes determined by His Majesty, the Emperor in accordance with the government of the French Republic." Quote from "News From France," the French Embassy Press and Information Division September 15, 1950.

This clause regarding the administration of mountainous populations of Viet-nam has been considered as a private business deal to be settled later between Bao-Dai and France. This action on the part of the French tends to eliminate Vietnamese influence upon the high regions rich in mines, in Tonkin and the extremely fertile high plateaus of Annam.

This mal-intention of the French government has been testified to by the creation of the Federation of Thai countries in March 1948.

Under cover of fallacious ethnic particularism, the agreements of 1949 seek to reduce the national territory of Viet-nam in order to weaken it as far as it may be done, thereby making more illusory a unity already factitious in itself.

3. Grave Injuries to Internal Sovereignty.

In pledging himself to maintain a large autonomy of the three Kys and to attribute to ethnic minorities particular statutes, Bao-Dai gives little attention to the popular aspiration for unity. He even accepts at the same time the principle of French intervention in the domestic affairs of Viet-nam. He takes upon himself the determination and modification of statutes which should of legal requirement call for participation of the French government.

4. Limitation of Judiciary Sovereignty.

When Frenchmen and foreigners protected by special treaty with France are involved in civil law cases, they are tried under French law and before mixed courts in which Frenchmen would normally sit.

5. No Liberty in the Choice of Technicians.

The agreements of 1949, stipulate that Viet-nam should appeal "by priority to French Union Citizens," that is, practically to Frenchmen-- "whenever it needs advisers, technicians or experts," that, "This priority shall cease to be ob-

served only in case the French government is unable to provide for the requested personnel." This means practically never.

Moreover, "no French citizens, no French Union nationals shall be able to belong to the Vietnamese administration without having previously obtained authorization or agreement of the Representative of the French Union."

Thus, the use of any foreign technicians is carefully eliminated in conformity with the principle of the colonialist iron curtain that opposes the freedom of exchange of ideas and men.

Viet-nam does not even have the right to choose the French technicians she thinks would render her the best service. In fact, technicians, advisers and experts admitted to the Vietnamese government will be the French functionaries appointed purposely by the French High Commissioner to control and supervise the Vietnamese administration.

The clauses of the 1949 agreements above mentioned reflect a narrow-mindedness detrimental to the French ideas and spirit of liberalism and they are not acceptable by the Vietnamese people.

6. Inexistent External Sovereignty.

Viet-nam has been deprived of the right to determine her external policy, "the general directives" of which, shall be "decided upon after hearing from the High Council of the French Union, and transmitted by the government of the Repub-

lic to the government of Viet-nam."

Viet-nam's participation in the determination of her foreign policy consists only in sending delegates to the High Council of the French Union, an institution of advisory power and under the direction of the French government.

This blind and unconditional submission of Viet-nam to France with regard to Viet-nam's foreign policy without any general principles and their limitation being defined, this pure and simple abdication of her external sovereignty could lead Viet-nam to further mis-adventures. She would risk, for instance, dead-lock situation in case France happened to be under the dictatorship of an imperialist or Communist government.

Viet-nam will accept conformity of her foreign policy to that of France, provided that certain fundamental principles be previously defined, which may be summarized as follows: to collaborate with all the democratic nations and with the United Nations Organization, in order to destroy any iron curtains, racial and class prejudices, to oppose any form whatsoever, of imperialist or Communist aggression to promote a free, must and peaceful international cooperation. However, within the framework of these general principles duly defined, each part should remain free to determine sovereignly its foreign policy.

7. No Independent Diplomatic Representation.

The March 8, 1949 agreements limit the diplomatic representation of Viet-nam to the following countries:

The Holy See

China or India (to choose)

Thailand

Furthermore, the agreement of the government of the French Republic is required for the appointment of the Vietnamese diplomatic mission heads. Viet-nam can never subscribe to this caricature of Diplomacy that Bao-Dai in his own name has accepted from the French colonialists.

8. Permanent Military Occupation of Viet-nam.

The March 8, 1949 agreements do not have any provision regarding the withdrawal of French troops stationed in many bases and garrisons in Viet-nam within whose territory they are guaranteed free circulation.

Military occupation of Viet-nam by French troops for an indefinite period of time constitutes the negation of any idea of independence of Viet-nam.

9. Economic and Financial Subordination.

There is no provision for the statute of mines and real estate concessions hitherto exploited by the French colonialists for their own benefit.

Viet-nam will no doubt appeal to French bankers for her reconstruction and industrialization. These bankers will be accorded favorable treatment on a reciprocal basis. But Viet-nam's mineral resources and vast real estates that

the French have attributed to themselves through the system of gratuitous concessions are inalienable property of the Vietnamese people who must logically receive the principal benefit therefrom.

The 1949 agreements totally overlook this question which is of vital importance to the economic life of Viet-nam. It would be immensely unfair to implicitly recognize the right of the French colonialists to continue to exploit the mines and plantations for their own exclusive benefit without making any adequate compensation to the people of Viet-nam.

10. Re-appearance of the Ancient Offices of the
"Gouvernement General de l'Indochine" Under
a New Vocabule.

The acceptance by Bao-Dai of the principal of "Services Communs," (Common Services,) Common to Viet-nam, Laos and Cambodia, under the direction of the High Commissioner of France in Indo-China namely:

The Institute of Issuing Currencies.

The Exchange Office

The Office of Transmissions

The Office of Immigration Control

The Office of Foreign Trade and Customs

The Treasury

The Office of Equipment Planning

subjugates Vietnamese finances and economic activities to the French administration.

Thus in virtue of the 1949 agreements, the old, all-powerful offices of the "Gouvernement General de l'Indochine" are to re-appear only this time under a new vocable, to deprive Viet-nam of her legitimate rights to organize her own finances, her fiscal and economic policy, without which independence is only a word. (2)

To summarize the situation which has developed since the conclusion of the 1949 agreements, the following quotation from a report on Viet-nam published in the New York Times, March 6, 1950, seems to be most helpful. The newspaper article read:

His government (Bao-Dai's) was too unpopular and inefficient to make effective use of any aid it did receive. A few able men did rally to Bao-Dai, like Nguyen Huu Tri, the governor of North Viet-nam. They did so in the hope that they might yet transform the Elysee agreements. (March 8, 1949) into a more genuine independence.

The Vietnamese regard the March 8 agreements as only a stepping stone, Tri told a reporter. We want full, complete independence. He said that there had been a considerable transfer of administrative functions from France to the Vietnamese in the north, in education, public welfare, agriculture, public health, public works, and some police powers, but in everything, the French keep back something.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lawrence K. Rosinger. The State of Asia. N.Y. Knopf 1953 p.250
2. New York Times. March 6, 1950

CHAPTER 1V.

CONCLUSION.

Whatever we choose to believe in the present tense atmosphere of international relations, it would be impossible to deny that the civilized nations of the earth have allied themselves into two armed camps. Each opposes the other politically, economically, socially and philosophically.

This situation was brought about gradually through the evolution of inevitable change and through man-made revolution in the form of world wars.

Previous to 1914, the list of great World Powers numbered at least eight states. Of these, six were European nations. They were the most powerful and acted as arbiters of world affairs.

The United States and Japan at that time were comparative strangers to the diplomatic world. After the first World War, the powers were reduced to five and the United States in the West and Japan, in the Far East rose to new importance in the international scene.

The upheaval of the second World War was stupendous in its map-changing and status-making events. With Japan defeated in the East and Germany in the West, political power vacuums were created which had momentous effect on the future of all the nations of the world.

England and France also found themselves physically and financially exhausted. As a result of all these chan-

ges, the United States became the most powerful nation in the Western world and Soviet Russia emerged as a leader in Eastern Affairs.

From the resulting chaos, hunger and inflation of war, was born the rapid spread of collectivism and world revolution. Although Communism had its parties in every country of any importance prior even to World War I. Still, up to the beginning of World War II, no country in the world was ruled by Communists except Russia.

However since the close of the war, the Soviets have gained control over Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany, all of the Balkan countries except Greece, the Baltic countries, most of China and have gained substantial influence and power in several other Asian countries. Total dictatorship has devoured many politically helpless nations and has cast a forewarning shadow over every other country that has existed through the devastation of the war.

The reasons for disharmony between the East and West are multiple and in some cases ill-defined. One of the prime reasons for the cold war was the distrust which existed and still exists between Russia and the democratic world.

The difference lies fundamentally in the dogmatic beliefs of the Communists and the laissez-faire capitalism of the free peoples. Lenin, the prophet of Socialism has stated the situation thus:

We are living not only in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is un-

thinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable. (1)

The one principle of Communism which has remained constant through the years, is the advocacy of violent world revolution. Any attempt to explain or define Communism on any other basis or terms would be a farce and a failure. All Communist tactics, strategy and policy are aimed at this final achievement.

In the book "Communism: Its Plans and Tactics," published by the U.S. Infantry Press in 1948, one of its authors, all senators of the United States, remarks, "Soviet policy and Communist policy, and Soviet action and Communist action, are alike meant to serve this single end. Economic and political policy and action, collaboration on the surface and subversion underneath, a swing to the right in one period and a swing to the left in another are meant to serve this single end, the world revolution.(2)

Russia represents the main revolutionary force, all the other Communist Parties of the world are subordinate to it. The promotion of the revolutionary movement, is under the absolute leadership of the Soviet Union through the disciplined unity of all parties.

No plan of reform or revision is acceptable in the eyes of the Communists. They are willing to believe fanatically that only Communists are qualified to rule the world.

They also believe that every non-Communist government must be destroyed by violence and socialism set up in its place.

The Communists have always advocated the dictatorship of the "Proletariat." Noone has ever gone so far as to predict how long the dictatorship must last or when the "Withering away of the state," will begin to take place. In every nation where the Communists have taken over the government, the police state has taken over administration of the peoples and their government to the glory of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have exploited and robbed the countries under their jurisdiction. Hunger and starvation have been wolves at the door of the peoples in the Communist dominated states. Their economy has been systematically deflated and their factories robbed of machinery; their natural and physical resources have been depleted and the revenue taken back to the Soviet Union by the conquerors.

For all their promises of economic security, individual freedom and justice, the Communists have brought little of the fruits of victory of the 'proletarian revolution' to the invaded countries.

To the end of world revolution, the Communists have infiltrated the Nationalist movements in all the various countries of the world. Nationalism made definite gains in the chaotic confusion of the war, in both the West and the East. The movements functioned during the war as underground apparatus to defeat the invaders. They gave new hope and aspiration

to the peoples who dreamed of the day of liberation from the heel of the foreign conqueror. Nationalism in all of these cases bore a close resemblance to its democratic predecessor of the early 19th century. It was a truly liberating democratic movement rather than a purely idealistic dream of national power.

However nationalism itself has suffered a setback due to the immense growth of internationalist sentiment among the big powers of today's political world.

Several of the Colonial empires have sought and received their freedom from the dominating states. Among them the most notable is the country of India. The Asiatics look with hope and admiration to India as the future strength and influence of the Asiatic Political Bloc which will make a third and opposing bloc to both of the competing great nations now recognized in the balance of power relations.

The small nations which have not already made a strong bid for their independence are on the move. They look to the United Nations as a harbor in the time of storm in their struggle against imperialism. The liberalism of the United Nations is founded on the rights of the individual. It strongly advocates the truly indispensable means to human progress: wisdom, tolerance, and respect for the brotherhood and dignity of man.

FRENCH COLONIALISM:

The French have a favorite saying about Viet-nam, "France

brought order and security to Viet-nam, thus allowing its population to work and live peacefully over long decades." This is not totally untrue. Despite, in effect the many adverse effects of colonialism upon the country of Viet-nam, it is obvious that French culture has been accepted as a part of the lives of the Vietnamese people.

As C.A. Julien has put it in his "From the French Empire to the French Union," "The spread of egalitarian ideas and the way in which natives were accepted in France itself without any race prejudice made them appreciate "Frenchmen of France" in contrast to Frenchmen overseas. Above all, French culture won over an elite which remained strongly attached to it even though hostile to the colonial system."

The evidence of the industrialization which the French have introduced into the country although extremely limited is nevertheless plainly seen as a part of the economy. Hundreds of thousands of hectares have been added to the cultivated areas, through the protection against floods or droughts. This land has been transformed into fertile rice-fields.

"On the eve of the war, 365,000 hectares of land were irrigated by a French-built irrigation and drainage system that was being built and extended to another 150,000 hectares. The French had constructed a dike system covering more than 80,000 hectares." (3)

A network of highways and railways, though still very limited has helped travel and commercial exchange to take place between principal towns and cities.

Romanization of the Vietnamese language by the Reverend Father Alexandre de Rhodes has endowed Viet-nam with a precious instrument of expression and the diffusing of modern thought, thereby making it much easier to educate the mass of the population. Previously they had used the difficult Chinese characters.

Schools (4) although still insufficient in number, have nevertheless succeeded in arousing an increasing interest in sciences and Western culture.

Despite its deficiencies, the Health Service has helped combat successfully the most murderous epidemics such as smallpox, cholera, and lower the death-rate considerably especially the infantile mortality.

The Pasteur Institutes and the "Ecole Francaise d'Extreme Orient," have paid honor to French genius. They have rendered services of inestimable value to the Vietnamese people and enjoyed a great renown throughout the Far East.

For all of these social, cultural and scientific achievements the Vietnamese people are indebted to France. However one cannot help but feel that these same achievements would have been better accepted and more feeling of mutual felicity would have been due, had they not been accompanied with so much enforcement of the will of the French colonial-

ists. These same accomplishments could and would have been realized by free people with an independent pride in the advancements of their nation and peoples.

France had brought peace to Viet-nam, but this "peace" which was the result of a hateful war of aggression on the part of France upon a helpless people, which was imposed and maintained by force, in order that a few thousands of Frenchmen might freely exploit Viet-nam for their own benefit, this unjust peace bore in itself the "seeds of revolution." We are now witnessing the expected consequences in the tragic events that are taking place in Viet-nam.

In the beautiful city of Paris, in the heart of the Pantheon, there is inscribed a motto which reads, "Live Free or Die." For many years, it has been the inspiration of all the free peoples of the world. The Vietnamese people who have been in close touch with French history and concepts, admire and believe in this motto.

French history proves that its thought has been humane, diverse and generous in the defense of human dignity and liberty. It has inspired the belief of equality and fraternity among peoples.

Viet-nam now accepts with whole-hearted approval all of the French theory of freedom, equality and the rights of individuals. She struggles to become an independent, self-respecting nation, accepted by other nations of the world and creating for herself a reputation for being a strong sovereign

state ready to accept responsibility in the world federation of nations.

The colonial practices of France in Indo-China are thus in direct contradiction with the basic values of France herself. By denying Viet-nam her national aspirations. France denies her own historical and cultural values.

COMMUNISM IN VIET-NAM.

1. Favorable circumstances to Communism:

After the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, there existed a political vacuum in Viet-nam. The only really organized political group was the Communist faction. The weakness of the French as a result of their capture and political stagnation during and after World War II, led to a lessening of the control of the Colony of Indo-China. This added impetus to the movement being swept into power by the Nationalists and eventually infiltrated and taken over by the Communist elements.

The French have consistently refused to give the Indo-Chinese their independence even in the face of unsurmountable resistance. The result has been the inevitable strengthening of Communist forces to a peak hitherto unknown in this country.

The people of Viet-nam under French oppression for more than eighty years, but strongly nationalistic, flocked in large numbers to the Viet-minh Front whose program responded to their deepest aspiration; liberation of the land from the foreign yoke, independence for the country.

Due to the fact that the French had restricted any political activity in Viet-nam, the Communist Party which was accustomed to underground activity enjoyed an indisputable advantage over any other party. No other party could boast such wide experience, with its trained political workers and reliable troops toughened by fifteen years of persecution and imprisonment prior to World War II.

The French prohibition against all non-conformist Vietnamese political activities had served to prevent the establishment of important non-Communist political groups but not the existence and growth of the Communist Party, whose methods and long experience in clandestine strife enabled it to circumvent hostile legislation. (5)

French bad faith in granting independence to Viet-nam provoked great resentment throughout the country. By and large, the people submitted voluntarily to the Viet-minh leadership to resist the French attempt to reestablish domination.

The nationalist leaders believed that their best policy was to maintain unity with the Communists until victory had been won, and then to rid themselves of the Communists. That is, to prevent them from gaining absolute power, a cycle that had occurred in numerous countries in which resistance movements were active during the second World War.

The efficiency of Viet-minh propaganda, its police and military training furnished in the main by the allies, consolidated the Party's monopoly of power and helped it increase in strength.

The victories of Communism in China has had great eff

ect on the people of Viet-nam. They are racially and ethnically related to the people of China which provides a psychological tie. In addition to this the Viet-minh receives a large amount of military aid from Communist China.

Most of the response of the people of Viet-nam to the doctrine of Communism has been because of the Communist emphasis on economic security and justice in their program and propaganda. They are impressed by Russia's achievements under the Soviet system. They feel that comprehensive economic planning, controlled by their own government, in the interests of their own people, is the best way to economic security.

The suppression of political and civil freedoms; the ruthless destruction of class-enemies and deviationists does not repel the people of East Asia in the same way as it does in the West. They consider food much more important than ideology. The traditions of the East emphasize individual duties rather than the rights of the individual.

There is no full liberty in East Asia. Liberty of speech and association is granted when the government feels that its authority is built on firm and stable foundation. The Communists do likewise when they come into power.

East Asia is accustomed to state economic enterprise

of socialism. There is a primary hostility toward foreign capitalism, or more simply, toward capitalism.

The people respond enthusiastically to Soviet propaganda campaigns against imperialist exploitation.

2. Unfavorable Circumstances to Communism:

Primary among the disadvantages of Communism in East Asia are the strong religious ties of the people. Buddhism and Moslem teaching is in direct antipathy with the Communist doctrine.

The people embrace Communism not because they have studied the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, but for more tangible and immediate reasons. The present strategy of the Communists is to protect the religious freedom of the older people while educating the younger in materialism.

Their greatest difficulty is to try to persuade the people that the Communists work for the people not for the Soviet Union. If the nationals come to suspect that their own immediate interests are being subordinated to the long term interests of the Soviet Union, they will reject Communist leadership.

The people want freedom and independence. They voluntarily die for their own land, but not in the interests of foreign domination be it European, Russian or Chinese. If the people knew that Ho Chi Minh receives orders and directives from Moscow or Peking and that Viet-nam is used

by Russia as a pawn in her struggle against the Western countries, there is a possibility that the people would break away from Ho.

Russia's primary interest in the political movements in East Asia is to foster and direct them in ways that will inflict the maximum injury on the most formidable of her potential enemies. The direct Soviet influence is limited, moreover, by Russia's inability to give substantial economic aid in the industrialization of East Asia.

To assess the prospects of Communism, then it is important to distinguish three factors;

1. The Nationalist and Revolutionary forces, spontaneous and indigenous.
2. The local Communist leaders who seek to win the leadership of these Nationalist forces.
3. The Soviet leaders in Moscow, whose directives the East Asian Communists are prepared to follow.

The Asians want freedom from foreign domination; economic exploitation; the white man's contempt. The national aspiration for independence once satisfied, the nationalist elements, which constitute by far the majority of these fighting under Ho Chi Minh, will have no reason to continue fighting. They would withdraw. This disintegration of Communist forces would weaken their influence in Viet-nam. The local Communist militia would soon fall away.

Already the Communists tactics of "burned land" practiced for seven years has deprived the people of even bare living necessities. Life is full of hardships in the Communist controlled territory.

We have witnessed the stupendous rise in the influence of Communism in Asia since the war. This is due to complex factors. But most assuredly, one of the prime reasons, is that the people of Asia are not interested in Communism nor are they afraid of it. But they are most interested in food and in survival. These peoples have undergone the rigors of famine and flood, of oppressive colonialist monopolies and the loss of self-pride through subjugation to foreign pressure.

Their interest is aroused by the cries of the Communists and their slogans which read, "Doc lap hay chet!" (Independence or death,) and "Nuoc Viet-nam cua nguoi Viet-nam" (Vietnam to the Vietnamese,) and "Tha chet con hon tro lai no le!" (Death rather than return to slavery." (6)

Those are the promises of the Communists until they come into full power. Then their false gestures are exposed for what they really are and the true concept of Communism with its greater loss of independence comes into full play.

THE REGIME OF BAO DAI.

Viet-nam is admittedly very important strategically to the rest of the democratic world. It is one of the remaining strongholds of the Western powers. However the present

government of Viet-nam that of the French sponsored Bao Dai lacks popular support. That this is true is substantiated by the amount of military, police and civil control it has been necessary for the French to extend to this area.

The French phrase, "Independence within the French Union" is actually a contradiction in its terminology. Many Vietnamese are convinced that any concessions the French may have granted have been made because of the Commuhist victories in China.

Other victories are believed to have been granted because of the military might and victories of the Viet-minh in 1950. These military victories were a very real defeat for the French.

If any substantial degree of support is achieved by the Bao Dai regime, it will be necessary for the French to grant many more concessions.

The limited grants of portions of independence to the Vietnamese by the French have always been made when the French were forced against a wall. As an American Senator has put it, "Too little and too late." Most convincing evidence of this is offered by the continued popularity of the Viet-minh as opposed to the retarded growth of the popular support of the Bao Dai government.

Unless the people are shown and convinced that they are fighting for their own independence and not to help maintain the French in power when victory is imminent, all the foreign

aid and sacrifice of humanity will prove fruitless.

The French cannot succeed in Indo-China unless they grant concessions necessary to build and maintain a native army capable, reliable and with convincing military action.

Most western diplomats believe that promoting the independence of Viet-nam will substantially increase the prospects of victory and concretely advance the whole Western alliance in Asia.

The Vietnamese people continue to be discontented, as shown by the statement of Premier Tran Van Huu who stated upon returning from France in October 1950:

Many people are dying every day because Viet-nam is not given real independence. If we had independence the people would have no reason to fight, there would be no struggle between Viet-nam and the Vietminh. (7)

This statement is all the more forceful when you realize that the Premier was himself a French citizen.

In the Congressional record, June 30, 1953, is the recorded account of a discourse on Asiatic Communism made at a joint session of Congress and Senate. Some of the statements provide much food for thought. For instance the following:

For practical purposes, the Asiatics seem to be on the side of the Communists.. No matter what declarations are made to them about the wicked nature of Communist aggression, they are likely to answer that they are unacquainted with it, but that they are acquainted with European imperial aggression.

Communist slogans may be false and fraudulent, but to the native of Southeast Asia who has no political, economic, or military power in his own land and whose dignity as a man is even in question, there is an understandable willingness to look on the Russians not as future oppressors but as liberators.

Even the most conservative Asiatic businessman would

be likely to look with cold anger at an act such as the recent and sudden devaluation of the Indochinese monetary unit, the piaster, in which its value was arbitrarily reduced from seventeen to ten francs. The devaluation was announced by the Ministry of Finance in Paris on May the tenth this year. On May the eleventh it went into effect, and from that date forward, all of Indo-China's commercial and financial transactions must be based on the new exchange rate.

I think the Washington News put it plainly in its editorial on May seventh of this year, when it said that--'Instead of uniting the independent nations of Asia against Communist aggression, the United States has been playing second fiddle to French and British colonial policy, which operated to keep Asia divided. (8)

With the signing of the peace truce in Korea the nations of the world have reason to be especially concerned for Viet-nam. The war there between the Viet-minh and the French Union forces is already seven years old. The end of hostilities in Korea may mark the flow of Chinese Red soldiers southward into Viet-nam to aid Ho Chi Minh in his revolution. This would mean another international crisis.

So far in the war the French have turned down every proposal for conferences with Ho. In the entire hostilities no move has been made by either side to talk things out and neither side has scored any decisive military victory in spite of the loss of several thousands of men and billions of dollars worth of materiel.

The French have indicated they would be willing to accede that an international committee of the United Nations should act as go-between to explore possibilities of a truce. The French government has only recently announced that it will complete the limited independence begun in 1949 to the three

states of Indo-China.

Red China has been supplying the Viet-minh with more than 3,000 tons of war material each month for the last six months. The French have more than 276,000 troops in the area. The war has cost the democracies billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives. It can be truthfully said that the entire military action has not accomplished a single worthwhile purpose.

The French say they want to have done with Viet-nam as soon as her armies can be established and trained to defend themselves. This would serve the purpose of Viet-nam in her long search for independence and it would also free these French soldiers to help rearm metropolitan France.

An independent Viet-nam, needing help in various forms, would be more than happy to join France in a true partnership, freely contracted and mutually advantageous. The independence of Viet-nam, if it deprives the French of their colonialist rights, will protect French legitimate rights and proper ties by reserving for France the most favorable treatment as far as feasible.

The need of French assistance, French intelligence and the French spirit of resourcefulness for the reconstruction of the country is so acute that a suspicion as to the future divorce of Viet-nam from France could hardly be justified.

To end the conflict and give the country its chance to survive and develop as a friend of the West, moral suasion and political wisdom are the arms for success, not machine-guns and napalm bombs!

THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FREE WORLD OF VIET-NAM'S EXPERIENCE.

During the years when imperialism was still respectable and colonialism was favored by all the European nations, the French made it their business to conquer and divide and rule the peoples of Indo-China.

In the late nineteenth century, France controlled colonies more than forty times the area of metropolitan France. The natives of these countries under French domination numbered many times the population of the home country.

The French rationalized their claim on these countries and peoples by insisting that they were civilizing the backward natives, in spite of the fact that the races of Indo-China have a culture centuries older than France itself. They also emphasized the 'need' of these peoples to be protected by Frenchmen.

Harold Isaacs in his book "No Peace for Asia," puts it this way,

The truth of course, had nothing to do with civilization or culture, at least not in the same sense that Frenchmen in Indo-China were using the words. The French took Indo-China by force of arms. Their conquest began in the classic manner, with the first arrival of missionaries nearly three hundred years ago.

Being hard-headed folk even then, the French did not bother with the proprieties of divided labor as other expanding nations did. French priests did double and triple duty. They were also traders. They were also soldiers. They brought cargoes with them, and shipped cargoes back. They commanded military expeditions from time to time; whenever the native people balked at trading in the currency of man or the virtues of religion. (9)

Today eighty years after, the French still struggle to maintain superiority over Indo-China in spite of the rebellion of the people over whom they rule. They now claim to be protecting the country against the infiltration of Communism. Actually, Communism has been an aid to Colonialism and vice versa.

Communism aids Colonialism by exciting the sympathies of the democratic world and encouraging the spending of vast sums of money by the United States to maintain the defense against encroaching Communism. Thus, in a sense, the Communists are a very real help to the French who are in such financial straits that they could not possible maintain the colony of Viet-nam without help.

Colonialism likewise aids Communism by creating a cause for the Communists. The peoples of Indo-China fight for their independence and their unity. The Communists take advantage of this fundamental desire and manipulate it in such a way as to attract many patriotic nationalists to their side.

Viet-nam is suffering under the cruel phenomenon of the revolution of our age. Two rival foreign governments are perpetuating a ruthless war of persecution against each

other within the boundaries of the country.

Both the Communists and the French colonialists receive financial and military aid from foreign countries. In the case of the French, it is America which has poured more than three billions of American dollars into the conflict which is now more than seven years old.

The Communists receive nominal support from the Soviet Union plus military and financial aid from Red China, which is no doubt subsidized by the Soviet Union.

Both sides use native support in-so-far as possible in their military efforts to control each other.

Viet-nam is a particularly strategic country to both Communist and Capitalistic worlds. It represents the gateway to Burma and India to the Communists in the East. It is the last outpost of democracy in the encroaching sweep of Communism to the West.

Unquestionably Russia's desire to aid in the Far East in the struggle for national independence of Viet-nam is colored by selfish motives. She desires to deal a mortal blow upon the capitalistic world if possible. The colonies of the democracies are a most vulnerable point of attack. Russia also has a history of centuries of struggle for sea-ports and markets which is no doubt, another of the reasons why she is interested in the country of Viet-nam, with its vast sea-coast and Oriental products, its abundant natural and human resources.

French domination in Viet-nam may be considered as a most significant case of Western domination in Asia. It consists of a policy of economic exploitation. In this exploitation however, we witness a monetary return to a very small minority of the French people; namely the individual owners of stock in the Banque de l'Indochine, and the owners of rubber plantations and the mining industries

At the most about 40,000 Frenchmen stand to benefit by the colonial operation. In fact, for many years the government of France has expended much more in protection and development in the area than it has received back in revenue.

On the other hand, the largest single item in the total Indo-Chinese budget is the allowance for the French military and civilian salaries. The result of this employment of the French is a regime of political oppression whereby the native peoples are kept in submission by the civilian officials at the behest of the capitalist minority.

The colonial government of Viet-nam has educated a small minority of natives in the hope that they would aid in the operation of the colonial administration for the protectorate's interest. However, this has not always been the case. In a number of instances, the educated natives have gained a new insight which has taught them the values of individual and human rights. Their Western education was primarily responsi-

ble for this.

Their new outlook has led them to see that colonial practices are in direct antipathy to the great libertarian doctrines they learned in the citadels of the West. Then too, they have become more conscious that they are descended from an old nation whose sovereignty has been taken away by the invaders. The latter attempt to subjugate them in their own land, thus making injustice more flagrant and exploitation more revolting.

Their longing for their old independent statehood plus the indoctrination of the revolutionary thought of Europe, leads these men to become fanatic leaders of upheavals, revolts and rebellions against foreign domination. The more cruel the reprisals on the part of the rulers, the more resentful the subjugated people and every occasion is seized upon to shake off foreign control.

The last two World Wars have been golden opportunities for them to achieve their aim. The last one, in particular when metropolitan France was taken over by Nazi forces and underwent complete restriction of her political activities, gave the native leaders an exclusive opportunity to realize their objective; that of throwing off the foreign yoke and rebuilding the country in accordance with their own political ideas.

Those among them who embrace the Communist philosophy work toward founding a Communist regime founded on principles

similar to those of the Soviet Union. They receive the help of Russia as the acknowledged leader of the World Revolution.

The others look instead to the democratic West with its valuable political experience. They are willing to copy this example in their liberated country.

Because of the Protectorate's oppressive measures with regard to the political activity on the part of the native population, the Communists with their clever clandestine tactics, underground organization and the skill of its trained leaders gains strength and rises to exclusive power.

Thus, there has been set up a Communist government and under its rule the country has experienced a novel demonstration of a one-party leadership.

Unlike foreign domination, with the masters coming from a foreign land and a different race, Communist domination recruits its officials among the members of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party. The membership is very limited and selected on the basis of complete devotion to the Soviet Union even above life itself.

Slao unlike the foreign rule, it provides the people with a democratic sounding constitution and a seemingly democratic governmental set-up. In actual practice the Communist Party of Indo-China follows the international pattern in that it demands absolute fealty to the party and it is the Party that governs and dictates all rules under orders from Moscow. Under a democratic and liberal front, it is in fact, the most totalitarian and dictatorial regime.

Thus, like the foreign domination, Communists monopolize all important economic activities in the territory which they control. Of course, the profit therefrom accrues to the Communist Party.

Communism imitates colonialism in that it monopolizes all posts of command. It controls the army, the secret police, which organ is far more effective than the military system of the Protectorate because of its ruthlessness. It systematically works toward a complete elimination of all anti-Communist elements among the population.

Communism has an advantage over the foreign domination in that it exploits the nationalistic feeling of the people through an active propaganda service based upon two central themes, anti capitalist and anti-imperialist. The propaganda service is greatly aided by impressive efforts in educating the masses. Thus it provides the regime with the most efficacious means of mass-indoctrination.

As has been said before, Colonialism is the best ally of Communism and Communism likewise is the best ally of Colonialism. They profit from each other for the interest of a minority; a foreign minority in the case of Colonialism; a minority of the country's population in the case of Communism. Both operate at the expense of the majority of the people of Indo-China.

The result of all this conflicting activity is a complete material poverty. The people undergo tremendous hardships. They lack food, shelter and clothing for their bodies.

The economic disruption is stupendous. There is a lack of development in all fields. Industry, transportation, communications, electrification and modernization of the country are at a practical standstill to make way for warfare.

One sees a marked and forcible moving of the people from one area to another. The roads are filled at times with political refugees fleeing from one government to another in the hope of surcease.

Undernourishment is marked among the general population. Infant and general mortality is very high from all the privation and suffering.

The almost complete lack of adequate technical training has created a situation wherein the majority of young people of Viet-nam have no preparation for jobs with which to support themselves. Because of this lack of training most people are hardly able to provide the means of livelihood for themselves and their families.

To further aggravate the economic situation, industrialization cannot progress where there is continual upheaval and strife. There has been no modernization of either industry or agriculture. The Communists have completely isolated whole portions of the country which they occupy. These people are isolated not only from their friends and relatives but also from cultural influence of other nationalities, in particular Western culture to which they were formerly accustomed.

In the Communist dominated sections, the people are greatly oppressed. Families are displaced and divided. The police

state enforces druel punishments on any individual or group which does not comply with every edict of the government.

While on the one hand, the Communists have instituted a plan of agrarian reform, on the other there are uprisings and revolts because the Communists have taken away rice lands to utilize the needed food growing space for the industrial crops such as rubber.

Property roads, and buildings as well as bridges and dams are destroyed without regard to the conditions caused by such ruthless methods. Both the Communists and the French have been guilty of atrocities against property and human life.

Any society requires continual constructive rebuilding and revitalizing in order to survive and advance. In the continual state of war which exists in Indo-China, there is no possibility of any improvement of social conditions. Rather, these conditions worsen with time.

The mental strain upon the people shows in various ways. There is extensive poor health among the populace. There is also a vast increase in crime and immorality. There is a steady tendency to draw upon the false comfort of drugs and drink to forget the troubles of the day. Thievery and banditry flourish to the degradation of the nation.

Communities are unable to function in their normal capacity to tie members of society to traditional conventions and activites. The result is the eventual complete breakdown of a nation and its peoples.

If the West is to help the people of Indo-China it must

understand the workings of all these complex factors. The situation cannot be analyzed upon the basis of Western factors exclusively. It must be remembered that the people of Viet-nam have experienced an oppressive foreign domination for a very long time. They have not experienced Russian domination. All that they know about Communism is what the native Indo-Chinese Communists have told them about it. These Communists are of their own race; men who swear allegiance to the principles of independence and unity for Indo-China.

There can be no resistance to Communism where no knowledge or fear of it exists. There can be and there is resistance to Colonialism which is well known complete with all its many faults.

There is a great need for education in Indo-China. This education must be not only against Communism but it must be for the independence of Indo-China. It must be an education by example.

The people of Viet-nam and the rest of Indo-China cannot be further influenced toward democratic countries by more punishment of the same kind. They must experience the example of democracy and the elements of freedom of the individual and human rights of which democracy consists if they are to embrace Western philosophy.

If the West is to profit and learn from the experience of Indo-China, it must in effect, practice what it preaches, the worth of the individual and his rights to the sovereignty of

his own land, its resources and industries.

Good leadership is sorely needed, in this country today. The tortured people of Viet-nam must have the leadership of public spirited, paternalistic, honest men and women; men and women dedicated to the principle of good for all rather than profit of the few.

The West must revitalize the practice and teachings of real Christianity if it is to remain friendly with the rebellious countries of Asia.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Lenin. Collected Works, 1923 Edition, Vol. XVII, p.89.
2. Infantry Journal Press, Op Cit p. 37
3. Lawrence K. Rosinger Op Cit p. 221-222
4. With great generosity and effort, the French conferred the benefits of education on the people of their colony. Forty years after the conquest, there was elementary education of a crude kind available for two per cent of the population and secondary education for one-half of one per cent of the population. Three libraries and one so-called university were established in the country.
H.R. Isaacs Op Cit p147
5. J. R. Clementin Op Cit p. 305
6. H.R. Isaacs Op Cit p. 162
7. Congressional Record. Vol. 99, No 120. June 30, 1953.
8. Ibid ., p. 7921 p 7896
9. H.R. Isaacs Op Cit. p 147

APPENDIX

Suggestions for the Reconstruction of Viet-nam.

From this long past, the Vietnamese people have kept in mind-and all, rich and poor, young and old, know this- that Viet-nam has lived independent for a thousand years under a national and patriotic monarchy having under its rule an organized and strong state which has been able, even against China, to safeguard the independence of the country. They are conscious of being a people full of vitality and dynamism, superior-history seems to prove it to them,- to all other peoples of Indo-China. They are equally conscious of their belonging to a civilization that, save on the technic level, has nothing to envy the Western civilization. And from this past of sufferings, of arduous labor, but also of glory and liberty, they keep a profound nostalgia in which the picture of the Viet-nam of tomorrow appears indistinctly. (1)

To the author of this thesis, himself a Vietnamese, the picture of the Viet-nam of tomorrow is becoming quite clear. It is, and it should be, the picture of a Viet-nam built upon the permanent traditional values of the East on the one hand, and the techniques and ideas of liberty and democracy of the West on the other.

With this conviction in mind, he fervently dedicates the following suggestions to the reconstruction of his country.

1. Political Program:

The fundamental qualities of the future political policy of Viet-nam should be democracy, competence, stability, efficeousness based upon the principles of "government of the people, by the people and for the people."

A larger participation of the people in public affairs will develop their sense of general interest, of responsibility and of good citizenship. It will train them to consciously exercise their democratic freedoms, rights and duties, and

will interest them in the defense of national independence and democracy.

Participation also represents the best means of preventing arbitrary methods and abuse of power on the part of the leaders, thereby avoiding the establishment of dictatorship and efficiently contributing to world peace and security.

Government and all public institutions will emanate from the people and will be subjected to their effective control. Only capable men and women, distinguished by their aptitudes and competences and enjoying popular confidence, will be chosen to hold public office.

To ensure the regime's stability without which the success of any constructive undertaking would be impossible, it will be required that the people exercise their civic rights and duties. The leaders will be required to present at least the minimum amount of competence and qualification. From both leaders and followers will be desired a constant interest in the best possible administration for the good of all. Sequence of ideas and continuity of effort will then allow everyone to do his utmost for his own good in particular, and for the common good in general.

Democratic Policy:

- a. Democratic Constitution: Viet-nam will be provided with a democratic constitution along the lines of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, guaranteeing Vietnamese citizens the free exercise of their fundamental civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. This constitution will include in particular dispositions dealing favorably with all world cooperation movements.

- b. Democratic Freedoms: Viet-nam will see to it that basic democratic freedoms such as freedom of thought, of expression, of action, shall be promulgated and the exercise thereof duly guaranteed by law.
- c. Universal Suffrage: Viet-nam will establish universal suffrage regardless of race, sex, religion, political opinion or social conditions.
- d. Popular Representative Assemblies: Viet-nam will institute representative assemblies whereby the people through their representatives will take an active part in the administration of the country at all levels; village, county, town, city, provincial and national.
- e. Local Self-government: The system of local self-government shall be promoted with the province being taken as a basic unit.
- f. Defense of Ethnic Minorities: Provisions shall be made to the effect that ethnic minorities will enjoy their right of vote and be represented in the National Assembly of Viet-nam under the same conditions as the other fractions of the Vietnamese population.

Administrative Reforms.

- 1. Establishment of the unitary state of Viet-nam.

The federal system of the three Kys, incompatible with a real unity of Viet-nam shall be replaced by a unitary system, the administrative unit of which shall be the province.

2. Regrouping of Small Villages.

Small villages shall be regrouped into more important administrative units in order to facilitate reconstruction works, economic undertakings and social development.

3. Organization of a Competent Administration.

The old regime of Mandarins shall be replaced by a competent administrative organization in which holders of posts of direction shall be recruited by examinations and shall be given adequate training before assuming any function of responsibility. Administrative services shall be considered technical services; as such they should be provided with a specialized personnel whose responsibility and powers should be clearly defined.

4. Struggle against corruption.

Bribery, favoritism, nepotism and any practices leading to corruption will be rooted out. In the past under the influences of the colonialist regime, public functions have been considered by the mass of the population to be the privileged posts the holders of which have been supposedly given the right to oppress and

exploit the public.

Such a miserable conception of public functions is to be destroyed and replaced by the right one according to which, public institutions, financed by public funds and created to satisfy definite public needs, are to serve and help the public, not to oppress or exploit it.

The active collaboration of a population that is fully aware of its rights, will be the best help to eliminate corruption and inefficiency.

Judiciary Reforms.

1. Modern Legislation:

Viet-nam shall be provided with a modern legislature based upon appropriate legislative codes. Equality of all with regard to law shall be promulgated and thoroughly applied.

2. A Competent and Independent Judiciary Organization.

Judiciary power should be separated from executive and legislative powers. Personnel should be recruited upon the basis of competence, honesty and devotion to the public interest.

National Defense.

Viet-nam will have her own army commanded by Vietnamese officers. Navy and air forces are to be built up. Military training should be given extension. Qualified students must be encouraged to go abroad to learn about logistic and mod-

ern warfare from more developed countries.

Not only are the Vietnamese armed forces to defend Viet-nam territory and sovereignty, they will also take an active part, whenever necessary, in the defense of world peace and in the establishment of United Nations' security.

2. Economic Program.

The following are the main aims proposed for the economic development of Viet-nam.

Vietnamese labor force should be better utilized to put into production the abundant natural resources of Viet-nam, not in the interest of a few, but in the interest of the entire population.

The primitive economy of Viet-nam, almost exclusively agrarian, should be transformed into a modern polyvalent industrial economy. The problem of overpopulation, especially in the delta of the Red River, must be solved.

Unemployment which exists in a semi-permanent status among the peasantry is another pressing problem to which a solution must be found. To provide for full employment, to furnish everyone with an appropriate and remunerative occupation so as to raise the standard of living and contribute to the general prosperity of the world is the immediate problem of the nation of Viet-nam.

If the desire for profit is a powerful incentive to engage in economic enterprises, and hence, to contribute to progress, the sense of public interest and the satisfaction

which is derived from creative activity will undoubtedly play an increasingly important role in raising production standards.

The aim of production is to satisfy everybody's needs rather than enable a minority to accumulate wealth. In the light of this reasoning, Viet-nam will seek to increase her production and improve her techniques so as to provide the mass of the people with decent living conditions rather than to aid the minority to enjoy an idle and luxurious life, at the expense of the majority that works and suffers.

Private industry will be protected, in particular, small and medium-sized enterprises. As for undertakings of greater magnitude an important place will be reserved for public-owned enterprises, especially cooperative enterprises.

Agrarian Reform.

1. Main Features.

a. Low Level of Living.

The first thing to be said about the agriculture of Viet-nam is that 80% of the population live on the land and from the land. The other 20% also derive their living in part from agriculture.

The most striking fact about this is the appallingly low level of living standards of the population. Although the country used to export rice, living conditions there were in general, miserable in the extreme. Life became extremely precarious due to the poverty.

Statistics given in 1936 by Professor Gourou show that

in Tonkin, a family of five owning a hectare of rice-paddy and a water-buffalo, had an annual income of 1,300 francs. (2)

b. Inadequate Yield from the Soil.

The harvests are not large enough. The rice crops of Viet-nam are among the least productive in Asia. This low productivity is due principally to the rudimentary methods utilized by the peasants. All work is done by hand and the use of fertilizers is almost unknown to them.

Moreover, nothing has been done on the part of the French administration to help the peasants to modernize and improve their farming techniques based upon scientific discoveries and development.

c. Complete Absence of Technical Education.

Education too is so limited that it is regarded by the average man as a luxury that only wealthy people can afford. The percentage of young people going to school in 1942, was only 2% of the entire population. (3) Technical education relating to the field of agriculture is almost non-existent.

d. Layout and Size of Farms.

Farms in Viet-nam are inordinately small and very scattered. This is particularly true in the northern and central parts of the country where parcellation of land attains such a degree as to make the yield of the land appallingly negligible.

A study of the latest surveys of Viet-nam rice-land shows that small owners whose number represents 94.8 per

cent of all owners own only about 28.5 per cent of the total rice land. This makes an average of .017 hectare per proprietor. (4)

Thus the amount of rice grown hardly suffices to feed the family and leaves no surplus for sale. This inadequacy of the yield from the land is the cause of an insufficient income. This is further aggravated by the fact that when there is a rice surplus, as in the south, prices often are very low.

It can easily be seen that no improvement in the level of living is possible as long as they do not dispose of the surplus crops in a manner to keep the price at a level where it can be sold at a reasonable profit.

e. Lack of Capital and Currency.

Another reason for low levels of income is the lack of capital and currency, especially in the rural areas. Money has always been scarce and this explains the high interest rates and the growth of usury.

The cultivator is always short of money. This comes from the fact that the land does not produce enough for the market and so does not permit what money there is to circulate freely through the rural economy. Where there are surpluses of products money flows in too large a proportion into the pockets of the landowners or the owners of capital.

f. Excessive Preponderance of Rice Cultivation.

Viet-nam's economy is, in the main, a subsistence economy. The people grow rice because that is the cheapest way

of feeding the poverty stricken and growing population. But their poverty results also from the fact that, apart from rice culture, the sources of employment and livelihood are too few.

There exists, therefore, a vicious circle, with the result that the peasants always remain poor and become more poor in proportion to which the population increases in number.

g. An Intense Growth of Population Which Creates Additional Economic Problems.

Population grows so fast as to double every thirty-six years. Besides increasing the number of mouths that must be fed, the populations' growth has the further effect of adding to the already abundant labor supply. This serves to keep down wages, lowers the value of human labor, and thus of producing . Too many people on the land and the holdings are too small creates a shortage of jobs. (5)

h. Defective Tenancy System.

The proportion of tenants to the number of farmers is very high in Viet-nam. The seriousness of the problem lies not so much in the high proportion as in the unsatisfactory form of tenure where rents are exorbitant and where the security of tenure is not safeguarded by any legislation.

While rents take various forms; money, produce and labor, the most common one is the sharing of the gross crop between the landowner and the tenant. This form of rent pay-

ment gives the tenant little incentive to increase the productivity of the land.

Moreover, as a rule, custom rather than legal agreement define occupancy rights and obligations of the tenant. In many cases tenants can expect little legal protection and are subject to great insecurity. The tendency is naturally for the tenant to get the most out of his land regardless of the effect on the fertility of the soil.

To raise both the return from the land as a whole and the output of the individual worker, the following measures are to be taken: Peasants will have to be taught more modern methods of cultivation. The use of fertilizers will have to be more advanced. There will have to be more seed selection with a view to higher yields. Agricultural implements will have to be overhauled and mechanized.

Land improvements, such as drainage and irrigation will have to be undertaken. Flood control too, is to be given special attention. There will have to be introduced a greater variation of crops with administrative areas of suitable proportions.

Cooperative enterprise which is entirely in harmony with the traditions of Vietnamese village life should be organized and cover a variety of functions; production, purchase and marketing. Also storage and credit facilities should be managed so as to give each village or group of villages an economic unity at once well-balanced and alive.

There should be an extension of the area of arable land. The production should be diversified to include corn, potatoes

cotton, jute, rubber, sugar cane, and mulberry trees. This will raise the economy of the country from a subsistence level to an agrarian-industrial one. These should be included in any agricultural development plan for Viet-nam.

2. Increase in Farm Ownership.

To reduce injustice and inequality insofar as possible, limitation will be set upon the amount of land to be owned by each individual. Large landowners will be compelled therefore, to sell their excess land to propertyless tenants.

The government will see to it that prices and terms for purchase of excess land from landowners by tenants will be fixed reasonably and equitably to both parties. The government will also determine the means to be used in, and time period to be allowed for affecting transfer of excess land.

3. Improvement of Tenancy Conditions.

There will be required that land leases be written. That they set forth the obligations of both contracting parties equitably and specifically, and that they assure the tenant of greater security than he has hitherto enjoyed.

Requirements will be provided also that the amount and nature of rents paid by tenants should be equitably regulated by law.

4. Fiscal and Financial Aid to Farmers.

Credit facilities will be instituted through the government, and cooperative action so as to furnish farmers

with low cost credit in order for them to meet their future financial needs and to liquidate their present indebtedness. Usury in any form will be prohibited.

Tax laws should be revised in favor of the farmers. Reduction of land tax, with provision that such a reduction be passed on to persons tilling the land, and compensatory increase in taxes not affecting agricultural populations.

5. Reduction of Farm Operating Costs.

Material and equipment costs will be reduced through cooperative buying and through government control of raw material e.g. fertilizers, seed, etc.

Reduction of distributing costs will be obtained through cooperative action and government control.

6. Other economic activities such as cattle raising, animal husbandry, fishing, exploitation and conservation will have to be approached more rationally and scientifically.

Outworn methods of raising cattle are to be supplanted by scientific and modern ones. Milk production should be increased so as to improve the nutrition of the population.

Fishermen will be organized in cooperatives and equipped with motor-boats and modern fishing equipment, which will enable them to go farther than the nearby coastal zones. The industry of "fishsauce," product excessively rich in vitamins, will be given special attention and encouragement on the part of the government. An efficient canning industry should be created.

Industrial

1. Planning or Laissez-faire:

Since equitable distribution of income and industrialization for a higher standard of living should be the two chief immediate tasks of Viet-nam's economic reconstruction, between central planning and laissez-faire as well as between state ownership and private enterprise, Viet-nam will take a middle position.

The laissez-faire system is impossible, partly because it would aggravate the distribution problem and partly because it is not the proper means to achieve industrialization in a country like Viet-nam which is industrially less developed and has to face the competition of foreign producers.

In such a country the government should take an active part in the industrialization program. The private entrepreneurs, if left alone, may not be able to see the social advantages of certain important industrial developments. If they do, they would not be willing to put them into effect unless they are also advantageous from the viewpoint of private profit. Even if they are willing, they may not have the capital and resources to carry them out.

Furthermore, under a system of free enterprise, waste in the form of unemployment and economic depression and in other forms is a luxury that Viet-nam can ill afford.

In order to get sufficient resources, to direct the resources into the right channels and to minimize waste so that industrialization can proceed at a rapid rate, government plan-

ning is indispensable. It should be a type of planning which leaves sufficient room for private initiative and preserves as much freedom to the individual citizen as is consistent with a system of planning.

Under such a system of planning, not all enterprises, not even all important enterprises, are owned by the state. Only a part of the enterprises are state-owned. The economy will be divided into three sectors, namely; private, which includes, (a) cooperatives, (b) enterprises jointly owned by the state and private individuals, and (c) public, or state-owned enterprises.

The exact lines of demarcation of the three sectors will change according to circumstances and from time to time. In all likelihood, the most important branches of mining, heavy industries, and basic industries, communications, transportation, irrigation and water conservancy, forestation, public utilities and banking will belong to the public sector, leaving most of the rest in the private and semi-public sectors.

2. Traditional Industries;

Vietnamese traditional industries will be expanded. To improve their techniques of production, there will be created special schools and model workshops. Electric power will be adapted to the artisans' work. Modern tools and equipment will be provided them to eliminate wasted energy and increase their production.

Artisans will be advised to organize themselves in cooperatives of production and sale.

3. Modern Industries;

Resources in fuel and hydraulic energy will be better exploited to increase the production of electric power, making it available to urban and rural population as well.

Prospecting of minerals will be fostered. Those already discovered will be steadily exploited. Attempts will be made to engage in those processing industries for which raw materials exist in abundance in Viet-nam or can be procured at low price in neighboring countries.

Along this line, the production of fertilizers which the country needs so badly will be given special consideration.

4. Transportation and Communications:

Roads, highways, railways and waterways will have to be improved and much more extended. Ships of small and medium size will be built to carry freight inside the country and along the coast.

Improvements also will have to be made with regard to civil aviation, telegraph, telephone and radio networks.

Commerce

1. Domestic Trade:

So far, trade has been almost totally neglected by the Vietnamese to the advantage of Chinese emigrants. Such a situation will have to be remedied as soon as possible. The institution of credit facilities and the prohibition of usury will make it easier for merchants and businessmen to raise funds and engage in commerce.

2. Foreign Trade:

Trade relations will be established between Viêt-nam and other countries among which there should be, apart from France, the countries of southeastern Asia and the coastal countries of the Pacific Ocean.

In order to promote international understandign and world peace, the trade policy should be as liberal as is consistent with the policy of internal economic development. It should at least not be so restrictive as to lead to tarrif war and retaliation by foreign countries.

Administration:

The rate of future economic development is in direct proportion to the efficiency of administration as well asl to the degree that the government is free from control by the vested-interest groups and free from corruption. If administration is inefficient, it is difficult to translate an economic plan into the practical terms of production and distribution.

If the government is under the control of the vested-interest groups or if corruption is widespread, the economic plan for the welfare of all the people will result in financial return and benefit only to the minoority of the special privileged groups.

Viêt-nam must ~~thereofom~~ avail itself of an efficient and competent as well as an honest and representative government.

1. Finance:

Since of course, financing of any government program is a primary requisite, it is necessary for a Vietnamese bank to be founded to issue Vietnamese currency and to facilitate the interchange of outside currencies.

The bank, incorporated as the Vietnamese Treasury Department, should be free of foreign dictatorship and foreign influence.

Taxes will be levied on a rational and equitable basis. The personal tax plan known as "corvees," will be abolished. The tax upon salt and opium should also be abolished.

The sale of opium and the smoking of same must be prohibited by law and opium-smoking establishments closed permanently.

A graduated income tax and an inheritance tax should be instituted.

2. Social and Cultural Program

No less important than the economic development of the country, is the planning for a comprehensive social and cultural program. It should include intensive health education and vocational training. These we believe, are important factors for success and happiness.

Among the numerous tasks that need to be done in the social-cultural fields, two stand out as the most urgent: The improvement of public health methods and the development of public education.

a. Public Health

In the field of curative medicine, medical and surgical care should be made available to the population at large. To do this, many more hospitals and health centers are needed. Both cities and rural areas are very underequipped to give adequate care to the ill.

Since any medical program would be ineffective without attention to preventive medicine, care should be taken to include a thorough training in this field. Contagious diseases have always taken heavy toll among the nations whose populations are so heavy. It will be necessary to instigate a well-regulated program making it compulsory to receive inoculations for the prevention of smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, etc.

Pre-marital blood tests should be compulsory and medical advice and training given during and after pregnancy.

Special measure will be taken for prevention and treatment of the venereal diseases as well as such social plagues as tuberculosis, cancer, trachoma, leprosy etc.

More study and laboratory research will be devoted to combating malaria and typhoid fever.

It is imperative that a better program of training for doctors and nurses be put into effect in Viet-nam. Such training will be provided through local educational institutions as well as through the exchange student plan so effective in the interchange of modern medical knowledge.

Promising students must be given the opportunity of serv-

ing mankind as physicians and surgeons as well as nurses and medical and dental technicians.

Toward this end, it will be necessary to set up a method of financing and encouraging students who show aptitudes for scientific work.

In the general administration of preventive medicine, the new social programs providing better housing, nutrition and physical activity for the populace will be integrated and correlated to accomplish the maximum results leading to better health and a stronger nation.

b. Education and Cultural Activities

The department of public education of Viet-nam will endeavor to stamp out illiteracy among the populace. All citizens will be required to have a minimum amount of education.

High school and college will be made accessible to the largest possible number of the population. More technical and professional schools will be established.

A program of student exchange will be established with other countries so as to facilitate the exchange of modern ideas between the peoples of various countries.

There will be created much needed adult education facilities as well as the regular channels of student training. These will include such features as cultural clubs, evening classes, summer short courses, correspondence and extension courses, libraries, et.

In the fields of agriculture, as well as industry, special training facilities should be made available to everyone. A special program of advertisement will be needed to impress upon the general populace the need for continuing education in the methods of modern production and distribution.

In the cultural arts, special prizes, awards and scholarships will be instituted to encourage writers, poets and artists to develop Vietnamese literature, poetry and the arts.

A Vietnamese Academy will be founded by the government which will facilitate the establishment of an official dictionary of the Vietnamese language. This will determine the exact meaning of Vietnamese vocables and fix grammar rules, thus making the language more precise and uniform. This dictionary will enable the accurate translation of ideas into words.

The Department of Public Education will be responsible for the financing of these educational programs and will receive its revenue from special grants of the public tax funds of the Central government.

3. Legislation for Social Security.

The government should guarantee the worker the right to choose his occupation. It should also enforce reasonable working conditions and safety rules and regulations.

Right of employees to organize unions and associations

will be recognized by the Central government.

Negotiation of workable contracts between labor and management should be guaranteed by law. This will include such details as rates of pay, hours a day to be worked, the enforcement of safety rules and the use of safety devices as well as the various employee benefit programs available at this time in most of the industrial world.

A system of social security will be instituted to provide workers insurance against unemployment, sickness, injury and old age.

The social legislation will have sections to provide for the handicapped and helpless citizens. Those who are blind, deaf, mentally or physically handicapped must be cared for and in such cases where possible trained to take their places in the world in such capacities as is possible for them to attain.

Any adequate program of social legislation will provide for housing units built to specifications for comfort and utilitarian purposes for the general populace. These units will be sold or leased to working families at a price range within their budgets.

Along with the housing programs, there must be given better training in nutrition, and more efficient infant and child care. Home economics training will be made available to all who have need of it as well as child training programs, etc.

The social program will certainly encourage the formation of such moral youth movements as Boy and Girl Scouts, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., etc. etc. National participation in sports of all kinds will be encouraged and provided for.

Along with the improvement of the individual's lot in Viet-nam there will be an extending program to improve and expand public buildings, communications, transportation and utilities as well as parks and recreation areas which all together will make life entirely more worthwhile and interesting to the population at large.

4. The Foreign Policy of Viet-nam

An independent Viet-nam will adopt the following the basic principles of her foreign policy: To cooperate with all the democratic nations on the basis of equality and reciprocity, to work toward the "rapprochement" of all peoples, to aim at abolishing all iron curtains, racial, class and any other social prejudices to support the United Nations Organization in its efforts to build up a free, just and peace ful world.

While the above briefly states the minimum considered to be a reasonable foreign policy, Viet-nam's attitude, no doubt will vary with regard to each of them considered separately.

The feeling runs very high with regard to France. Viet-nam in general feels that the March 8, 1949 agreements should be rejected. A real independence should be granted Viet-nam.

while an independent country, Viet-nam will maintain close economic and cultural relations with France.

This friendly relationship will be expressed in the form of the most favored nation treatment. Viet-nam will continue to export to France raw materials and products needed by French industries at a special and reasonable price.

A special rate of custom duties will be set up for French products to be imported in Viet-nam. Viet-nam will welcome French capital and industrial techniques.

French professors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, to be sure, will be called upon by the Vietnamese people to help them carry out their social and cultural development program.

As for diplomacy in regard to other nations, as far as France will stand in the democratic camp and not take any international action against the interests of Viet-nam, there is no reason why Viet-nam should get away from France or act against France's interests.

Viet-nam desires to take part in the consolidation of the Asiatic peoples.

What is called the Far East is represented largely by China, Japan and Viet-nam, three countries of common geographic factors and remarkably distinguishable from the rest of Asia by a common civilization, the glorious cradle of which was in China.

Great men in antique China such as Lao-Tseu with his somewhat corrupted yet so deep and so wise a philosophy;

Confucius whose teachings are imbued with so much humanism, fraternity and moderation; Mencius, an exponent of democratic ideas, have exerted a profound influence upon the culture, civilization and temperament of Oriental peoples.

More recently, the San-Min-Chu 1, of Sun Yat Sen has played an important role in the formation of liberation movements throughout Asia, particularly in Viet-nam1

These multiple cultural interconnections together with economic bonds should make peoples of the three countries feel friendly toward each other1

Viet-nam will establish friendly relations with her next door neighbors, Laos and Cambodia as well as with the other countries of southeast Asia namely, Thailand, Burma the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Pakistan.

The formation of a Federation of the southeastern Asiatic countries, including all countries located between China and India was proposed by Asiatic statesmen several years ago and appears to have many good points in its favor.

India and Indonesia foreign policy has set forth a very good example to be followed. In a world divided into two opposite blocs, a middle ground should exist to conciliate the two extremes in order to safeguard world peace. The more the third force grows, the more chance the world will have to be stable.

Viet-nam will develop her economic and cultural relations with America, in particular with the United States

of America whose traditions of democracy and liberalism as well as economic and military might make her role in the world's affairs definitely a predominant one in the future.

American financial aid which has already made a fairly good impression on the Vietnamese people will be sought in a greater amount for Vietnam's rehabilitation and industrialization.

Above all, Viet-nam will look to the U.S.A. as the defender of freedom, human dignity and an unfailing supporter of the principle of self-determination according to which no people in the world should be deprived of their inalienable right to rule themselves.

Viet-nam will support the policy of conciliation of countries such as the Scandinavian nations and Switzerland in the interest of finding a solution to the world crises.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Philippe Devillers, Op Cit p 30
2. P. Gourou. Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Francaise.
3. Paris, Paul Hartmann, 1940. pp 403-415
3. Philippe Devillers. Op Cit p 53
4. Henri Lanoue. Op Cit p 11
5. Charles Robequain. Op Cit. pp 219-242

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