SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
POLlTiCAL SOCSOLOGEST

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Lee Sloan

1963

 

 

 

 

THESIS

   
     

  

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGIST

ERne d" Leena:

I
(Lee) Sloan

A THESIS

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Apolied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthr0pology
1963

ACKZJLV‘J JED-.31 IEIITS

My first debt of gratitude is owed my parents whose
best interests were seemingly always transcended in my behalf.

Two other primary social groups have been instrumental
in sustaining me in all my endeavors as a graduate student,
and my indebtedness to them must also be acknowledged. My
present family provides the basic core of motivation which
keeps me moving towards unattainable gOals. My wife, Mary
Lou, has supplied constant and unfaltering encouragement and
support. My daughters, Terry, Kelly and Romi, will probably
have to wait until they have children of their own to ade-
quately realize their role in their dad's educational
eXperience. My peers and fellow students, and eSpecially
those future sociologists who make quonset 81 their ”home
away from home," have provided the vital informal sociali-
zation which makes graduate training the rewarding experience
it is.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude
to those professional sociologists in whose footsteps it
will not be easy to follow. C. Wilson Record and Shared
Malelu of Sacramento State College introduced me to the
discipline and encouraged me on to graduate school. Men
like William Form, David Gottlieb, Charles P. Loomis, and
James McKee have contributed immeasurably to my graduate

training here at Michigan State University. Dr. Loomis

iii
warrants special mention for serving as my major professor
and for his assistance in the development of this thesis.

My indebtedness to Seymour Martin Lipset of the University
of California at Berkeley will soon be apparent to the
reader. Although I have not yet had the privilege of meeting

Dr. Lipset, it's possible his influence is greatest of all.

PREFACE

In their book, Modern Social Theories, Charles P. and
Zena Loomis took a first step prerequisite to the standardi-
zation of theoretical concepts within the discipline of
sociolog . There they examined the theoretical contributions
of seven of the Twentieth Century's major social theorists.
They proceeded by utilizing a model called the Processually
Articulated Structural Model, or in briefer and more manage-
able form, the PAS Model. This model is the result of years
of endeavor on the part of Dr. Loomis. The PAS Model is a
taxonomic scheme which facilitates the organization of mul-
titudinous theoretical conceptualizations in order to allow
systematic point by point comparisons between them.

The underlying assumption upon which the model is
built is that the elements and processes Specified are
requisite to the functioning of social systems. In other
words, a thorough analysis of the functioning of any and
all social systems would require the theorist to be cognizant
of these various elements and processes, call them what fig may.

The model was designed to take into account both the
static and dynamic asaects of social systems. The specified
elements provide for the structural aspects while the ele-
mental and master or comprehensive processes provide for
the functional aSpects of social systems. Elemental pro—

cesses are intended to account for or eXplain the Operation

of individual elements, while the master or comprehensive
processes are intended to eXplain the dynamic interrelation-
ships between elements.

The model also takes into consideration three of the
primary conditions of social action. These are elements
which are never completely within society's control and, to
the extent to which they are not controlled, therefore operate
as conditions to social action.

The author of this paper has utilized the PAS Model
to aid in the examination of some of the theoretical con-
tributions of one of the world's most reputable and contro-
versial sociologists. The author makes no claim to have
examined all the writings of Seymour Martin Lipset, and a
glance at his partial bibliography in the Appendix will go
far in eXplaining why he didn't do so. He has, however,
examined rather thoroughly and systematically the major
books which Lipset has authored--either singly or jointly.
Perhaps the most important reading not examined is his most
recent monograph, The United States gg §_fl§g Nation.

Because of his primary interest in political sociology,
certain of the PAS Model categories have been emphasized
by Lipset to the relative neglect of others. The categories
of Ranking, Controlling, and Norming therefore will be given
more attention than others.

Although this paper in itself holds value for students
of sociology, it is probably the case that it holds most

utility as a supplement to the chapters on the other seven

vi

theorists considered in Modern Social Theories. The reader

 

is also guided to Charles F. Loomis' Sggigl Systems for the
initial deveIOpment of the PAS Model.

Inasmuch as this is an intensive examination of
Lipset's sociological writings, this author has felt obli-
gated to allow Lipset to Speak oftentimes (and occasionally
at length) for himself. It should also be pointed out to

the reader that the author has interpreted 115 primary role
to to be that of placing Lipset's theory in terms of the
PAS Model--not extensively criticizing that theory.

Now it remains only to eXplain the referent "we"
found occasionally in the text. That is not merely an
"editorial we." Dr. Loomis invited this author to xamine
Lipset's contributions to social theory with the thought of
potential publication under joint authorship with the
Loomises. Therefore the "we" is used in anticipation of a
future, potential publication. Although Dr. Loomis has

advised in the writing as it now stands, the author accepts

full reSponsibility for all that follows.

TABLE OF CONTESTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ELEMENTS AND EL IENTAL PROCESSES . . . . . . .

Knowing . . . . . . . . .
Belief (knowledge) as an element . . . . .
Cognitive mapping and validation as process

Feeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sentiment as an element . . . . . . . . . .
Tension management as process . . . . . . .
Communication of sentiment . . . . . . . .

Achieving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
End, goal, or objective as an element . .
Goal attaining and concomitant "latent"

activity as process . . . . . . . . . . .

Norming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norm as an element . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluation as a process . . . . . . . . . .

Dividing the functions . . . . . . . . . .
Status- role incorporating both
element and process . . . . . . . . . . .

Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rank as an element . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluation of actors and allocation

of status-roles . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Controlling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Power as an element . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decision making and its initiation

into action as process . . . . . . . . .

sanctioning O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O
Sanction as an element . . . . . . . . . .
Application of sanctions as process . . . .

FaCilitating O O O O O I O O O C O O O O I 0
Facility as an element . . . . . . . . . .
Utilization of facilities as process . . .

viii
COMPREHENSIVE OR MASTER PROCESSES . . . . . . . . . . 58

Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Boundary maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Systemic linkage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Institutionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Social control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Territoriality . . . . . . . ._. . . . . . . . . . 70
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Time 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O 72

SOCIAL CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

NOTES 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O O C C O O O O 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET . . 85

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. CharacteriStic Ideologies and Social Compo-
sitions of Democratic and Extremist Group
Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2. Possible Connections Between Democracy, the
Initial Conditions Associated with its
Emergence, and the Consequences of an
Existent Democratic System . . . . . . . . . . 57

INTRODUCTION

In reading Lipset, one soon recognizes that the values
and beliefs of Lipset, "the man in society," have established
guidelines for Lipset, "the student of society." It is not
our intent in noting this to cast doubt upon the objectivity
of one of America's foremost sociologists, but it is neces-
sary to recognize that all social scientists (and other
scientists as well) are to some degree influenced as pro-
fessionals by their values held as members of society. The
rather obvious link between his avowed support of the
"democratic socialist movement"1 and the very topics he has
chosen for study therefore warrants our mentioning. His
first major publication focused upon a study of "the first
electorally successful North American socialist movement,"2
the Cooperative Commgnwealth Federation (C.C.F.)3 of Sas-
katchewan, Canada. Union Democragy, written with co-authors
Martin Trow and James Coleman, was Specifically "aimed at
identifying the factors which make for and sustain democracy
in private organizations."4 Political Man, wherein Lipset
has set forth his "basic intellectual concerns and personal
values more fully"5 than in previous publications, centers
about a study of

democracy as a characteristic of social systems. The
principal tOpics discussed are the conditions necessary
for democracy in societies and organizations; the

factors which affect men's participation in politics,
particularly their behavior as voters; and the sources

of support for values and movemengs which sustain or
threaten democratic institutions.

As can be seen, his studies have focused upon the operation
of democracy, eSpecially as manifested in the English
Speaking and Western EurOpean countries.

In Political Man, Lipset concludes by denying that the
end of ideology is at hand and by offering a perhaps over-
rationalistic justification for his sociological endeavors.
He contends that there will be no complete attenuation of
the ideological class struggle. Such struggles will continue
in the underdeveIOped countries of the world and at the
international level.

It is only the ideological class struggle within the
West which is ending. Ideological conflicts linked to
levels and problems of economic deveIOpment and of
appropriate political institutions among different
nations will last far beyond our life-time, and men
committed to democracy can abstain from them only at
their peril. To aid men's actions in furthering demo-
cracy in then absolutist EurOpe was in some measure
Tocqueville's purpose in studying the Operation of
American society in 1830. To clarify the operation of
Western democracy in the mid-twentieth century may gon-
tribute to the political battle in Asia and Africa.

By now it should be abundantly clear that Lipset is
primarily a political sociologist. He may also be considered
to be among the ranking students of social stratification
and industrial sociology.

The difficulties inherent in a study of politics are
many and complex, a fact which has not been prOperly
appreciated--especially by political scientists. Lipset

has joined Talcott Parsons in criticizing the narrow theo-

retical approach of political scientists. He quotes the

3
following from Parsons in support of the argument that the
study of politics cannot be

treated in terms of a Specifically Specialized con-
ceptual scheme . . . precisely for the reason that the
political problem of the social system is a focus for
the integration of all of its analytically distinguished
components, not of a specially differentiated class of
these components.8

Parsons' emphasis upon the integration of "analytically
distinguished components" serves to introduce two important
matters at this time. First, it will not be possible for
the authors of this paper to consider a particular PAS Model
element (an "analytically distinguished component") in the
complete absence of references to other elements. It will
be necessary to occassionally refer to that presented in
preceding sections and/or to anticipate that which will be
stressed in subsequent sections. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, Parsons' emphasis upon integration serves to intro-
duce Lipset's concern with the securing and maintenance of
a proper balance between conflict and consensus within
society.

The necessity for the maintenance of a prOper balance
between conflict and consensus within society is a central
theme in Lipset's writings. He has noted that "although
the central concern of the study of politics is the problem
of consensus and cleavage, sociologists until fairly
recently have been much more involved in studying the con-

ditions facilitating cleavage than studying the requisites

of political consensus."9 As a rule, social theorists

have overemphasized one of the aspects to the relative
neglect of the other.

Karl Marx was of course most reSponsible for over-
emphasizing conflict or cleavage. For him, conflict and
consensus were entirely dissociated, as Lipset has observed:

To Marx, conflict and consensus were alternatives

rather than divergent tendencies that could be balanced
within a society. 0n the one hand, he projected con-
sensus, harmony, and integration into the communist
future . . . ; on the other hand, in the Span of history
between the ancient primitive communism and the coming
success of the proletarian revolution, conflict or
absolutism prevails, and class struggle is the great
fact of history.

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to stress the
balance between conflict and consensus within a democratic
social system, and Lipset is probably the most ardent con-
temporary supporter of this thesis.

At first glance, Tocqueville's theory seems to be
similar to Marx's on the formal level in that both men
emphasized the solidarity of social units and the
necessity for conflict among these units. (For Marx
the units were classes; for Tocqueville, they were

local communities and voluntary organizations.) How-
ever, Tocqueville, unlike Marx, deliberately chose to
emphasize the positive political aSpects of social units
which could maintain political cleavage and political
consensus at the same time.

Together with Marx and Tocqueville, two other classi-
cal social theorists have, in Lipset's view, "established
the basic concerns of modern political sociology."12 Those
two are Max Weber and Robert Michels. Both were primarily
concerned with the relationships between bureaucracy and
democracy.

Weber saw bureaucratization as an inevitable element

of industrialized societies, rather capitalistic or

5
socialistic in character. He feared that the growth of the
centralized bureaucratic state would lead to the decline of
democracy.13 Socialism, for Weber, was simply "the exten-
sion of bureaucratic authority to the entire society,
resulting in a 'dictatorship of the bureaucrats' rather than
of the proletariat."14

Michels Saw oligarchy as inherent in large scale
organization, even those founded on democratic principles.
He pointed to the advantages of control over organiza-
tions for the incumbent leaders, to the political
incapacity of rank-and-file members, to the causes of
their apathy, and to the pressures on leaders to per-
petuate themselves in office. And he saw the pattern
of oligarchy within bureaucratic Socialist partiep
extended to the society governed by such parties. 5
Lipset traces his intellectual deve10pment primarily
to three former teachers and colleagues at Columbia
University: Paul Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, and Robert
Merton. He admits major debts to his colleagues, Juan Linz
and Reinhard Bendix. His writings reflect a thorough know-
ledge of the contributions of Tocqueville, Aristotle, and
such classical sociological theorists as Marx, Weber,
Michels, and Durkheim. In his own words, as reported early
in his career,
My own theoretical framework is derived largely from
the sociologists who have been concerned with problems
of power, influence, class, organization, social change,
and functional analysis. . . . I have not integrated
the various theoretical systems into one system. The
task of deveIOping and integrating a systematic sociology
is one which the entire disciplinf faces and which few
persons pretend to have resolved. 6

It would appear that Lipset still subscribes to the same

vieWpoint. If it may be said however, that he has one

6
underlying theoretical orientation, then he is essentially
a functionalist-~in Merton's sense of the term.

Gabriel A. Almond, in a review of Political Man, was

 

critical of Lipset's "haste in theoretical formulation and
in the interpretation of findings." In elaboration, Almond
continued that:

Perhaps an eXplanation for Lipset's haste may be found
in the cross pressures which his intellectual heritage
imposes on him. Struggling within him is a Weber—
Parsons-Merton theoretical impulse, a Lazarsfeld
methodological impulse, and a Lynd impulse toward
significance and relevance. An harmonious accomodation
of these cross-pressures is difficult to attain, and it
is to Lipset's credit that he constantly seeks to attain
it, and so often succeeds.1

Lipset is not one to ignore the utility of historical
analysis, as many contemporary sociologists do. Historical
analysis assumes a position of vital importance in each of
his major works. In Lipset's opinion, sociological analysis
tends to present a static picture, "a description which
shows the process at work within the going system, but not
the process which enabled the system to reach more or less
stable equilibrium."18 Further justifying the role of
historical analysis, he called attention to the interplay
between historical and sociological analyses.

By thus viewing the system as being in an equilibrium
which at any point in time has a certain stability,

but which could have moved in different directions if
some of the factors in the situation had occurred
differently, we can see the need to deal with historical
materials. It remains for the historical analysis of
events which were unique to the ITU’ Ehe International
Typographical Union, the subject of study in Union
Democracy] to indicate which factors favored the emer-
gence and stability of ITU democracy at different points

in time, and to Specify the crucial junctign points at
which new elements entered the situation.1

In recent years, Lipset has turned increasingly
towards secondary analysis, "the study of Specific problems
through analysis of existing data which were originally
collected for other purposes."20 He has utilized IBM decks
loaned him by individual scholars, governmental agencies,
public opinion polling agencies, etc., to great advantage.
Aside from the obvious pragmatic advantages--e3pecially the
economic--Lipset's qualitative and quantitative successes

further testify to the virtues of secondary analysis.

ELEMENTS AND ELEMENTAL PROCESSES

KNOWIN G

Belief (knowledge) gg g3 element. The element of
belief seems to be implicitly incorporated within a number
of central concepts utilized by Lipset. Such concepts as
legitimacy, ideological equalitarianism, authoritarianism,
and the conceptual ideologies of "left," "right," and
"center"--as applied to both democratig and antidemocratic
groups--are all concepts which to some degree incorporate
the cognitive aSpect. Yet most of these concepts may be
more apprOpriately presented in sections following. Lipset
eSpecially utilizes the term "belief" in dealing with that
which is part of the PAS Model evaluative processes of
Norming and Ranking.

Cognitive mapping and validation gg proces . The
genesis of many beliefs may be traced to a social reality

of the historical past. Such beliefs are occassionally

perpetuated even after the social realities have been altered.

Thus it is that beliefs contrary to reality exert their

influence upon social behavior.
. . . American workers tend to vote for mildly reformist
parties, while European workers normally vote socialist
or Communist. Supposedly living in an open-class
society, with a deve10ping economy which continually
creates new jobs above the manual-labor level, the
American worker is presumably more likely to believe
in individual opportunity. His EurOpean counterpart,
accepting the image of a closed-class society which
does not even pretend to offer the worker a chance to
rise, is impelled to act collectively for social change.
While these sterotypes of the relative degree of social
mobility in EurOpe and America do not correSpond Eo
reality, their acceptance may well affect voting. 1
Lipset sees the liberalism of intellectuals throughout
the world to be partially accounted for by the very concepts
utilized by the scientist22 and the intellectual's greater
awareness of the power dimension of society.23 Another
factor contributing to the American intellectual's liberalism
is his perceived status inferiority. What is particularly
interesting at this point is the fact that although numerous
polls reveal that he is accorded relatively high status by
his fellow citizens,24 the American intellectual persists
in believing that he is deprived of status justly earned.
Other factors contributing eSpecially to the liberalism of
American intellectuals will be examined below.
Lipset has noted that "each major social stratum has
both democratic and extremist political eXpressions."25
It may well be that Lipset has not adequately set forth the
factors which account for the differential response of

individuals or groups within the various strata. He has

emphasized, however, that “the Specific prOpensity of given

social strata to support either extremist or democratic
political parties . . . cannot be predicted from a knowledge
of their psychological predispositions or from attitudes
inferred from survey data."26 Elsewhere he has said that
"Extremist movements have much in common. They appeal to
the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the
personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically
insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian
persons at every level of the society."27 In short, extremist
movements have their roots in crises eXperienced and shared
by individuals and collectivities, whatever their class

position.

FEELING

Sentiment gg an element. It is primarily "the dif-

 

ference between liberal or radical and conservative orien-
tations, in the usual meaning of these terms,"28 which
accounts for the historic ideological cleavage and its per-
sistence within the ITU. These dispositional differences
seem to stem from the unique backgrounds and experiences of
the individual union members--sources outside the union
itself. This goes far in eXplaining the differences in the
saliency of the dispositions among union members. The
authors of Union Democracy have called this saliency of the
liberal or conservative attitudes "ideological sensitivity."29
We will examine below the manner in which social context
exerts influence upon the individual's union vote independent

of his diSposition toward liberalism or conservatism.

10
The printer's job satisfaction has been an important
factor accounting for a high degree of both formal and
informal association among printers. "If men like and are
interested in their work, they will be more likely than those
who dislike the work to associate with others in the occu-
pation."3O This high degree of intra-shop and intra-
occupational association has played a major role in the
persistence of the two-party system within the ITU.
Sentiments deriving from extreme hardships may easily
persist long after the disappearance of the hardships, as
the following quotation illustrates. Lipset was writing of
his research eXperiences in the late 1940's, quite some time
after the drought and depression years of the 1930's.
Saskatchewan is riding the crest of the economic and
climatic cycles, but it is still thinking in terms of
the 'thirties. As one interviews the residents of rural
Saskatchewan today, one cannot help being impressed by
their ever-present fear that prOSperity will not last,
that a new drought or depression will set them back
again. At farmers' conventions, at "bull sessions" in
the local stores, the discussion always turns to the
control of wheat prices, to crOp insurance, and to the
politicians who are Relieved to have power to prevent
another catastrOphe.--1
In the section following on Tension management, we
will note that extremist religion and authoritarian political
attitudes both stem from the same social forces. Even more
paradoxically, the same social forces may lead to apathy,
which may be seen as a lack of sentiment and involvement.
The same underlying factors which prediSpose individuals
toward support of extremist movements under certain con-
ditions may result in total withdrawal from political

activity and concern under other conditions. In "normal"
periods, apathy is most frequent among such individuals,

11

but they can be activated by a crisis, eSp ecially if it
is accompanied by strong millennial appeals. 32

Tocqueville long ago warned of the dangers of apathy.
He was among the first to advocate a "pluralistic" political
system, one which would allow an interplay of conflict and
consensus. It was his fear that the continued rationaliza-
tion of society and the centralization of governmental
authority would destroy the social bases sustaining conflict
and that the resultant apathy would undermine consensus.
Drawing from Tocqueville, Lipset notes that
. . . consensus as well would be undermined in the mass
society. The atomized individual, left alone without
membership in a politically significant social unit,
would lack sufficient interest to participate in poli-
tics or even simply to accept the regime. Politics
would be not only hOpeless but meaningless. Apathy
undermines consensus, and apathy was the attitude of the
masses toward the state which Tocqueville saw 1% the
outcome of an industrial bureaucratic society.
Tension management gg process. In his writings,
Lipset has eSpecially concerned himself with the concept of
authoritarianism. This refers to the tendency of individuals34
to view politics and personal relationships in black-
and-white terms, a desire for immediate action, an
impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest
in organizations which have a long-range perSpective,
and a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demono-
logical interpretation of the evil forces (either
religious or political) which are conSpiring against
him.35
Lipset sees authoritarianism as an adaptive mechanism
resorted to especially by those experiencing frustration as
a result of their low position in the stratification system.

The social base of authoritarianism rests primarily in

12
the lower classes and stems directly from the normal life
experiences of lower class individuals.

. . . the lower-class individual is likely to have been
eXposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general
atmOSphere of tension and aggression since early child-
hood--all experiences which tend to produce deep-rooted
hostilities eXpressed by ethnic prejudice, political
authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational
religion. His educational attainment is less than

that of men with higher socioeconomic status . . .
Leaving school relatively early, he is surrounded on the
job by others with a similarly restricted cultural,
educational, and family background. Little external
influence impinges on his limited environment. From
early childhood, he has sought immediate gratifications,
rather than engaged in activities which might have long-
term rewards . 36

The complex psychological basis of authoritarianism
is to be found in the components of an unSOphisticated
perSpective: "greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of
past and future (lack of a prolonged time perSpective),
inability to take a complex view, greater difficulty in
abstracting from concrete eXperience, and lack of imagination
(inner 'reworking' of experience)."37 Many students are
agreed that these components are characteristic of low
status individuals.

The social base of extremist religion also rests in
the lower classes. This suggests that both authoritarianism
and extremist religions are products of the same social
forces.38 Lipset suggests that fundamentalist religious
sects, rather than Operating as centers of political protest,

drain off the discontent and frustration which would
otherwise flow into channels of political extremism.

The point here is that rigid fundamentalism and dogma-
tism are linked to the same underlying characteristics,

l3

attitudes, and prediSpositions which find another ogt-
let in allegiance to extremist political movements.

Lipset draws from Sven Rydenfelt in support of this
position. Rydenfelt, after conducting social research in
Sweden, concluded that "The Communists and the religious
radicals, as for instance, the Pentecostal sects, seem to be
competing for the allegiance of the same groups."40

Communication g; sentiment. The authors of Union
Democracy stressed three factors which operated to increase
both the formal and informal associations among printers.
All three factors are directly related to the process of
communication of sentiment.

Probably the most important factor is the status
marginality of printers. Historically, printers have been
accorded high status among manual workers, due primarily to
the necessary prerequisite of literacy among printers.41
DeSpite the status gains of other occupational groups,
printers still maintain a high status image of themselves.42
Thus printers perceive themselves as being on the margin--
not as members of the middle-class but among the most skilled
and prestigeful within the ranks of manual workers.

Everything that we know about the Operation of status
distinctions indicates that these distinctions are in
large measure maintained by persons with a claim to
high status refusing to associate with persons who are
defined as being lower. While the printers presumably
will tend to reject other manual workers, middle-class
persons may tend to reject printers as friends since
they are manual workers. In addition, association
with middle-class persons may be difficult for some

printers since it may mean mingling with people whose
educational and cultural level is higher than their own.

14
Consequently printers will tend to associate more with
each other than will workers who do not possess this
ambiguous status.

The intraoccupational association among printers is
also increased by the union‘s substitute system. The daily
hiring of substitutes to meet the irregular and fluctuating
work loads common throughout much of the printing industry
is carried out through a lottery. Each substitute draws a
numbered ball in order to determine who will work on any
particular shift. Thus all substitutes are encouraged to be
present for work every day and, if sufficiently pressed
financially, for every shift. If, however, a printer is
ill or decides to take a day off, he chooses his own replace-
ment. Therefore "a substitute's chances for employment are
directly related to the number of friends that he has among
regular situation holders."44

Finally, the fact that a high prOportion of printers
work night hours decreases their opportunities to associate
with individuals working more regular hours and at the same
time forces printers to associate among themselves in their

C O O C O /
leisure-time actiVLties.45

ACHIEVING

End,_goal g; objective gélgglelement. Although it
will be anticipating a subsequent section, it must here be
noted that one consequence of the system of stratification
is a differential definition of goals. Stratification
studies suggest that "inherent in the very existence of a

stratification order, of higher and lower valuations of

15
social positions, is the motivation to move up in the social
structure if one's position is low, or to retain one's
position if it is high."46

Thus it is that goal conflict is inherent in social
organization. Democracy, to Lipset, is the best mechanism
yet develOped for resolving the conflicting goals of interest
groups. In Political Man, Lipset eXpressed at least a
partial value judgment when he stated that "A basic premise
of this book is that democracy is not only or even primarily
a means through which different groups can attain their ends
or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in
Operation."47

It is only natural that a political sociologist such
as Lipset would view political action as a major means of
goal achieving. Throughout his writings, Lipset has dealt
extensively with goal conflicts and the means by which such
conflicts are transcended and resolved through consensus.

Goal attaining and concomitant Flaggng" activity ag
process. One primary means by which conflict is overcome
or lessened is through multiple group affiliation and the
resultant "cross-pressures." Lipset has devoted much of
his research time to a study of cross-pressures. The desir-
ability of establishing and sustaining pluralistic societies
lies in the fact that cross-pressures make more probable
the proper balance between conflict and consensus.

The available evidence suggests that the chances for
stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups

16

and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politi-

cally relevant affiliations. To the degree that a

significant proportion of the pepilation is pulled

among conflicting forces, its members have an inyerest

in reduCLng the intenSity of political conflict.+8

Here also economic development plays a particularly
important role in that it increases "the lower classes'
exposure.to cross-pressures which reduce their commitment to
given ideologies and make them less receptive to extremist
ones."49
The latent political functions of secondary organi—

zations were eSpecially stressea in Union Democracy. Those
functions are essentially two in number: "the external
power functions, by which they may Oppose the power of the
central body, and the internal functions of increasing the
political involvement of their own members."50 These two
different functions may be performed by one and the same
social organization or by different organizations, or one
function may be fulfilled to the relative neglect of the
other. In many reSpects, the urban society of the United
States represents a type of mass society in which the first
function is fulfilled but the second is not. Voluntary
associations in the United States do indeed provide counter-
vailing sources of power to fulfill the first function, but
they operate as primary groups for ggly the small interested
and active nucleus of the membership of most organizations.
As Lipset, §£,gl., have eXpressed it: "Social relations

within the groups which exercise important pressure in

politics are often attenuated."51

17
Due primarily to factors of size and the institution-
alized decentralization of power, the ITU is able to ade-
quately perform both functions whereas most unions and
voluntary associations fail to perform either one or the
other.52
Lipset has also devoted much study to "leftist"
movements, eSpecially those taking place within democratic
societies and consequently through democratic means. Leftist
voting is seen to be a reSponse to three primary "group
needs."
1. The need for security of income . . .
2. The need for satisfying work--work which provides
the Opportunity for self-control and self-expression
and which is free from arbitrary authority.
3. The need for status, for social recognition of
one's value and freedom from degrading discrimination
in social relations.53
A review of North American agrarian protest movements
reveals that "it was the economic and climatically vulnerable
wheat belt that formed the backbone of all the protest
movements, from the Independent parties of the 1870's down
to the contemporary C.C.F. in Canada."54 Economically, the
one crOp wheat belt, which extends through western Canada
and the United States, is vulnerable in that it is dependent
upon a fluctuating international market and the monOpolistic
business practices of the East. It is not absolute poverty
as such, but rather the "chronic alternation" between the
two extremes that brought about the leftist tendency.

Saskatchewan did not follow the normal pattern whereby

agrarian radicalism is followed in a few decades by political

18
and economic conservatism. "The oscillating character of
the Saskatchewan economy went far toward preventing the
emergence of an integrated, conservative rural society."55

It is to be noted that the Socialist Movement of the
C.C.F. grew as a latent consequence of the political and
COOperative efforts of Saskatchewan wheat farmers to achieve
economic stability.
To sum up, the first three decades of the twentieth
century witnessed the creation of a powerful, organized,
class-conscious agrarian movement in Saskatchewan. The
wheat farmer, who was situated at the producing start
and the consuming end of a highly organized and often
monOpolistic distribution system, became convinced that
he, as the primary producer of wealth, was being ex-
ploited by "vested interests." He deveIOped hostile
class attitudes to big business, to the neWSpapers,
which he believed served the "interests," and to mer-
chants. As a result, a large proportion Of the farming
pOpulation supported an agrarian socialistic program
designed to eliminate private profits by governmental
or COOperative action before an eXplicitly socialist
party appeared upon the scene.5
Contrary to general opinion, "democratic reform
governments are more a result than a cause of social change."‘7
Once in office, a democratic reform government is faced with
the continual problems of maintaining electoral support and
Operating through a bureaucracy established by another
government with other interests. Thus it is only natural
that such reform governments gradually if not immediately
give way to bureaucratic conservatism. The growing conser-
vatism of reform movements seems to be characteristic of
"trade-unions, COOperatives, and left-wing political parties"

everywhere.58 The necessity of maintaining electoral support

is an eSpecially effective deterrent to social change.

19

The need of a democratic government to retain the sup-
port of a majority of the electorate is a powerful weapon
in the hands of groups that wish to prevent social change.
Any drastic change in basic institutions may endanger

the pOpular support of the government. Socialist
governments, therefore, have followed the path of least
resistance, instituting reforms that meet the least
opposition from entrenched interests.5

In elaborating this important point Lipset drew

heavily from both Weber and Michels, among others, concluding

that

Organizations are always started as means of attaining
certain value ends. However, organizations become ends
in themselves, which often are obstacles in the achieve-
ment of the original goals. This does not mean that
organized social effort does not secure many of the
value ends that it was set up to achieve . . . Gradually,
however, every large-scale social organization falls
victim to the virus of bureaucratic conservatism, and

to the fear th at a further challenge tgo the status quo
will injure its power and status

NORMING

Norm _§ g3 element. Of all the PAS Model elements,

 

that of norms is one of the most important for Lipset. The
norms of legitimacy, tolerance, bureaucratic political
neutrality, and conformity have been of Special importance

for him.
That norms constitute an important factor in the
determination of behavior is reflected in the following:

One would eXpect that . . . trade unionists . .

would behave differently within the different value
systems which char.cterize different social structures.
An American trade-union Operating within the American
social structure, with its emphasis on individual
achievement, the right of each individual to equality
with others, and the norm of democracy, should behave
differently from a German union working within the
context of a more rigid status system, with greater
acceptance of the leadership role, with less concern

20

for the right of the individual compared to the group,
and with presumed less emphasis on the norm of democratic
control. Similarly, the behavior of two American trade—
unions should vary with the composition of their member-
ships, in so far as the difference in membership is
reflected in different weights and distributions of

the crucial norms regarding authority and democracy.61

Iipset has never accepted Robert Michel's "iron law
of oligarchy" as a completely deterministic "law." Early
in his professional career, in a paragraph that anticipated

the writing Of Uniog Democracy, he implied that such a rigid

 

formulation neglected normative alternatives.

The justified concern with the dangers of oligarchic

or bureaucratic domination has, however, led many per-
sons to ignwre the fact that it docs make a difference
to society which set of bureaucrats controls its destiny.
There are bureaucracies and bureaucracies . . . Bureau-
crats are human beings, not automatons. The desire to
maintain a given bureaucratic organization is only one
of the complex series OF factors determining their
actions . . . A deterministic theory of bureaucratic
behavior, such as that advanced by Robert Michels or
James Burnham, neglects the implications pf an alter-
native pattern of bureaucratic reSponse.6

Within the ITU, the norm of Opposition legitimacy
goes far in countering the "iron law.” Opposition legitimacy
functions within the ITU in Spite of the fact that the union
constitution Specifically prohibits formation of Opposition
parties.63 The informal ascription of Opposition legitimacy
has important consequences for the political system. The
acceptance of Opposition "as right and prOper both by the
men it is striving to dislodge and by some large prOportion
of the membership"64 of the ITU assures the Ooposition of

access to the membership through both formal and informal

channels of communication. Thus the party in power

21
exercises no absolute monopoly over channels of communica-
tion, as is the case in most trade-unions.

Contrary to the common belief that "internal party
democracy is incompatible with union strength,“65 it is the
case that "discontent works to maintain the party system
by ensuring turnover in office, while at the same time
serving to strengthen rather than undermine the unity and
effectiveness of the union in its relations with management
and the state."66

Lipset notes that an organized internal Opposition
must be ascribed legitimacy if it is to function as a
political party. "In the absence of this ascription of
legitimacy, an Opposition group constitutes not a party but
a faction, with characteristics and functions very different
from those of a party."57 He also emphasizes that legitimacy
Of Opposition does not assure survival Of the Opposition.

If the legitimacy Of opposition guarantees to Opposi-
tion elementary rights and freedom Of action, it does
n2; guarantee the opposition's survival. Legitimacy
guarantees that the incumbents will not use any and all
means at their diSposal to crush or repress Opposition;
it does not guarantee that ggposition may not wither
away from its own weakness.

Evaluation ag g process. Lipset sees one of the most
important conditions for democracy to be legitimacy--"the
degree to which [the political system] is generally accepted
by its citizens."69 Stable authority is seen to be the
resultant of power plus legitimacy.70 DeSpite its importance

as a theoretical concept, "little work has been done using

the concept of legitimacy for the analysis of political

systems, except that Weber's three categories have been

used freely for illustrative purposes."71 Lipset has found

it beneficial to differentiate between the legitimacy and

the effectiveness of political systems. "While effectiveness

is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative.”2
Lipset, gg gl., in Union Democracy, stressed that

legitimacy develoas directly from and is sustained by diverse

bases of support and power.

The evidence . . . sugeests that a3 internal Opposition
gains legitimacy only when i; rests 9g independent and
enduring bases 9; support and power which cannot bg
destroyed gg repreSQed without seriously weakening the
ggion itself.73

Perhaps they eXpressed their viewpoint even more emphatically
in the following passage.

But we believe it would be misleading to assign to the
norms of legitimacy of Opposition an independent and
determinative role in the maintenance of the party
system in the ITU. Without the diversity of power
sources on which it rests, the norm of legitimacy of
political Opposition could not by itself maintain the
party system as a living political process.

Lipset argues that legitimacy is in large measure
determined by "the ways in which the key issues which have
historically divided the society have been resolved."75
In modern societies,
crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a
new social structure, if (1) the status of major con-
servative institutions is threatened during the period
of structural change; (2) all the major groups in the
society do not have access to the political system in
the transitional period, 0; at least as soon as they
develop political demands. 6

It is significant that even though the political system may

be reasonably effective, these two conditions still place

the legitimacy of that system in question.77

23

The denial of Opposition legitimacy by a party in
power often leads the rank-and-file to deny the legitimacy
of that party itself and consequently of the entire political
system.

The rejection of the democratic game by even a few
leaders is a threat to democracy out Of prOportion to
the number Of leaders holding such views, even when such
men are not able to implement their sentiments through
repressive action against the Opposition. It is not
the direct attacks which such men may make on the
political system that are most dangerous to it, but
rather the fact that by Openly repudiating the legiti-
macy of the Opposition they invite the rejection of
their own political legitimacy (and thgg Of their
party) on the part of their Opponents.

In an earlier section we commented on the explosive
character of the apathetic sector Of the population. It
will now be necessary to qualify that somewhat. Although
"those sections of the pOpulation that are normally apathetic
tend to have authoritarian attitudes and values,"79 analysis
of the rise of the Nazi movement suggests "that the most
outcast and apathetic sections of the population can be won
to political action by extremist and authoritarian parties
only after such parties have become major movements, not
while they are in their period of early rise."80 This is
largely due to the fact that the apathetic reSpond only to
the more simple extremist views of politics.81

Just as apathy poses problems for democratic systems,
it also poses problems for totalitarian regimes. Totali-
tarian states (and autocratic organizations as well) have a

Special interest in securing a high level of political

participation, for this assures them of "reaching" the pOpulace.

24
But "David Reisman has percentively noted that within a
totalitarian society, political apathy may be a major
barrier against the complete triumph of the system."82

Ever since Aristotle, men have argued that democracy
as a political system is directly related to the state of
economic develOpment. Below in another section, we will
review Lipset's test of that hypothesis. For Our present
purposes, it will suffice to note that (1) there is indeed
such a relationship, and (2) economic develOpment is accom-
panied by a change from predominantly authoritarian to pre-
dominantly democratic beliefs or ideologies among those Of
the lower classes.

Economic develOpment, producing increased income,
greater economic security, and widCSpread higher
education, largely determines the form of the "class
struggle," by permitting those in the lower strata to
develop longer time perSpectives and more complex and
gradualist views of politics. A belief in secular
reformist gradualism can be the ide logy Of only a
relatively well-to-do lower class.

Public Opinion surveys from thirteen different
countries support Lipset's assertion that lower-class status
is associated with authoritarianism. These surveys indicate
that "the lower strata are less committed to democratic
norms than the middle classes . . ."84 Samuel Stouffer's
data from a sample of 5,000 Americans demonstrate that
"tolerance increases with moves up the social ladder."8S
Education is even a more important determinant of the

tendency to hold democratic norms.

. . . the most important single factor differentiating
those giving democratic reSponses from the others has

been education. The higher one's educatifin, the more
likely one is to believe in democratic values and sup-
port democratic practices. All the relevant studies
[from nimerous countries] indicate that education is
more significant than either income or occupation.86

Differential degrees Of conformity to dominant
societal norms is seen to be related to variations in voting
behavior between socioeconomic classes. Group pressures
may be directed either toward voting or non-voting. Perhaps
paradoxically, "the highest pressure to vote as a symbol of
conformity is found where the Objective significance Of the
vote is least: in totalitarian 'show' elections."87 Certain
ethnic and religious groups encourage voting, while "in
parts Of the American South today the norms laid down by the

dominant white group for the behavior Of Negroes include a

. . . a ’5
prohibition on voting."53

Returning once again to the ideological committment
Of the social scientist, this time as regards the Specific
norm of bureaucratic political neutrality, Lipset states:

How different theoretical and ideological perSpectives
lead to differing concrete analysis is illustrated by

the concept Of bureaucratic political neutrality, the
norm that a member of a bureaucracy is an impartial
expert rather than an interested party. Those interested
in furthering social change have viewed this norm as a
conservative force, since it Operates to force reformist
administrations to retain in Office civil servants whose
social background and training disposes them to Object

to many reformist policies. The same norm, viewed

from the perspective of the requisites of a democratic
political system, operates to make possible the con-
tinuity of democratic government during a turnover in
political Offices . . . Inherent in bureaucratic struc-
tures is a tendency to reduce conflicts to administrative
decisions by eXperts; and thus over time bureaucratiza-
tion facilitates the removing of issues from the political
arena . . . Thus in many ways the pressures to extend
bureaucratic norms and practices constitute an important
strength for democratic consensus.89

26
In a controversial interpretation, Lipset has argued
that
antidemocratic ideologies as well as antidemocratic
groups can be more fruitfully classified and analyzed
if it is recognized that "left," "right," and "center"
refer to ideologies, each of which has a moderate and
an extremist version, the one parliamentary and the
other extra-parliamentary in its orientation.90
The term "fascism" has been used at various points
in time to refer to all three types of extremism. However,
"fascism" is most often characterized as "basically a middle-
class movement representing a protest against both capitalism
and socialism, big business and big unions . . ."91 Closer
scrutiny reveals, however, that there are three analytically
seoarate and distinct types of fascism which "resemble their
democratic parallels in both the compositions of their
social bases and the contents of their appeals."92 Or in
other words, "A study of the social bases of different
modern mass movements suggests that each major social stratum
has both democratic and extremist political eXpressions."93
The diagram below has been abstracted from Lipset for the
sake of clarification.94
Gabriel Almond has harshly criticized this classifi-
cation by Lipset.
. . . what Lipset intends here as a contribution to the
theory of political movements actually is a contribution
to terminological confusion. Right, center, and left,
have meant different things in different countries and
periods. . . . What he means when he Speaks of right,
center, and left extremism, is that the social formations
which tend to support the right, left, and center in
"normal" periods support different forms of extremism in

crisis periods. To Speak of a "center extremism" really
strains the imagination.

27

 

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28
As regards ideological orientations, Lipset has also
called attention to the necessity of distinguishing between
economic and noncconomic liberalism. The two separate
ideologies draw their support from different social strata.
Contemporary studies of political attitudes indicate
that it is necessary to distinguish between so-called
economic liberalism (issues concerned with the distri-
bution of wealth and power) and noneconomic liberalism
(issues concerned with civil liberties, race relations
and foreign affairs). The fundamental factor in non-
economic liberalism is not actually class, but education,
general sophistication, and probably to a certain extent
psychic security. But since these factors are strongly
correlated with class, noneconomic liberalism is posi-
tively associated with social status (the wealthier
are more tolerant), while economic liberalism is inver-
sely correlated with social status (the poor are more
leftist on such issues).
DIVIDTNG THE FUNCTIONS
Status—role incorporating both element and process.
The concept "status-role" is not used by Lipset. His use
of the concept "status" implies both social position and the
prestige ascribed to the position. More often it is the
second implication that is intended, and thus his concept
"status" comes closer to the PAS Model element of rank than
that of status-role. He has defined status as "the honor
and deference accorded individuals by certain others . . ."97
Elsewhere he has noted that "status involves invidious

distinctions ."98

Throughout Social Mobility in
Industrial Society, the term "stratification" generally
refers to a "hierarchy of prestige"99 or a differential

ranking of individual actors. Although there is a close

relationship between the hierarchy of prestige and the

r,

Lt
society's division of labor, it is necessary to distinguish
between the two. This will be more closely examined in the
next section.

Although he at no place sets forth a definition of
role, every indication is that he accepts the formulation of
Linton whereby role refers to the eXpected behavioral pat-
terns of one occupying a particular position (status in
Linton's terms) in relation to others in the social system.

Even though Lipset does not use the concept "status-
role" and though his use of the concept "status" differs in
important reapects from the PAS Model concept, that which may
be preperly subsumed under the PAS Model element and process
of status—role is surely of concern to Lipset. His concern
with the PAS Model element of rank, however, is much more
pronounced.

It has been noted above that Marx recognized societies
as characterized by either conflict 2; consensus. The primary
prerequisite for the harmonious society which he projected
into the Communist future was the complete elimination of
the division of labor. As Lipset has stated it:

. . . He envisaged the harmony of an anarchist society
in which there would be no cleavages, and therefore no
need for an institutionalized system to arrive at social
decisions. The political system which Marx projected
was not institutionalized democracy, but anarchy. In
order to have such a harmonious society, sources of
differentiation and conflict must disappear. This means
in particular the end of the division of labor, for
elimination of the differentiation of roles in the

economic Spheres of life would eliminate the major
source of social conflict.100

3O

Lipset is only one of many to label this as utOpianism.

He sees neither society envisaged by Marx as a possibility.

"The history of the Russian Revolution has already demon-
strated some of the dire consequences of Operating with a
theory which deals only with nonexistent ideal types--that
is to say, with societies of absolute harmony and societies

of constant conflict."101

RANKING

Eggg,g§ gg element. Beyond any doubt, rank is one
of the most important elements of social systems emphasized
by Lipset. His examination of all that may be subsumed
under the PAS Model category of Ranking is so extensive that
it will be necessary to be highly selective in our presen-
tation. Perhaps we could do no better than to begin by
quoting the Opening remarks of Lipset and Bendix in Social
Mobility lg Industrial Society.

In every complex society there is a division of labor
and a hierarchy of prestige. Positions of leadership
and social reaponsibility are usually ranked at the

tep, and positions requiring long training and superior
intelligence are ranked just below. The number of
leaders and highly educated individuals constitutes
everywhere a small minority. On the other hand, the
great majority is made up of persons in the lower strata
who perform manual and routine work of every sort and
who command scant rewards and little prestige. In
keeping with this division between "the few" and "the
many" the stratification of society has often been
pictured as a pyramid or a diamond; in the first ana-
logy, society consists of a series of strata that become
larger and more pepulous as we move down the hierarchy
of reward and prestige, and in the second, it has small
numbers at the top and bottom, with the mass of the
population concentrated between. However it may be
depicted, the point is that men grapple with the prob-
lems of determining the number of people at each rank

31

in their society, and that through history various
methods for doing this have been devised.10Z

In considering that indicated by the PAS Model element
of rank, the concept "status" is the most important in
Lipset's writings. We have observed that, for Lipset, this
concept implies both position within a social structure and
the prestige attached to the position and that generally it
is the latter meaning that is intended. Lipset recognizes
well, however, the relationship between position and pres-
tige, as the following indicates. "Status--the honor and
deference accorded individuals by certain others--has no
men ing except as it locates an individual, group, or stratum
relative to others in the same frame of reference."103

In Speaking of "stratification systems," Lipset and
Zetterberg together noted that "Every society may be thought
of as comprising a number of separate hierarchies--e.g.,
social, economic, educational, ethnic, etc.--each of which
has its own status structure, its own conditions for the
attainment of a position of prestige within that structure."104
At a later point, drawing heavily from Weber, Lipset and
Bendix stated that "the stratification system must be thought
of as containing a number of hierarchies which differ with
each variation and combination of the basic stratification
factors: status, class, and authority."105 In as much as
there are multiple components of "status," "status discre-
pancies" would seem to be inherent in stratification

systems. The concept of status discrepancies is central to

32
the eXplanation of social mobility and the differential
consequences of social mobility as manifested in different
social systems.

The failure of social scientists to recognize the
many and various components of status has resulted in inade-
quate studies of social stratification. In particular,
there are many "neglected dimensions of the relationship
among occupational, economic, and power rank-orders and of
the social differentiation which arises from them."106 Lipset
and Bendix have noted, for example, that:

Amount of income is not necessarily a good indicator of
consumption status, or style of life, although it ob-
viously sets the limit of a person's consumption. The
way in which a man Spends his income, rather than the
size of that income, most often af acts the social
status he is accorded by others.1

In order to facilitate comparative analysis of data
gathered in many different countries, Lipset and Bendix
made extensive use of the simple dichotomy between manual
and nonmanual occupations. Their rationale for doing so is
as follows:

. . . we make the assumption that a move from manual
to nonmanual employment constitutes upward mobility
among males. This assumption may be defended on the
following grounds:

1. Most male nonmanual occupations have more pres-
tige than most manual occupations, even skilled ones.

2. Among males, white-collar positions generally
lead to higher incomes than manual employment.

3. Nonmanual positions, in general, require more
education than manual positions.

4. Holders of nonmanual positions, even low-paid
white-collar jobs, are more likely than manual workers
to think of themselves as members of the middle class
and to act out middle-class roles in their consumption
patterns.

33

S. Low-level nonmanual workers are more likely to
have political attitudes which resemble those of the
upper Tégdle class than those of the manual working
class.

Such a simple dichotomy as this naturally results in
some error; yet it ameliorates difficulties inherent in the
comparative and secondary analyses of data gathered in
different social systems and Lipset and Bendix are convinced
that the dichotomy is justified.109

Evaluation gf actors and allocation gf status-gglgg.
Throughout his writings, social mobility has been of major
concern to Lipset. For Lipset and Bendix, "The term 'social
mobility' refers to the process by which individuals move
from one position to another in society--positions which by
general consent have been given Specific hierarchical
values."110

In their book, Social Mobility lgpindustrigl Society,
Lipset and Bendix have amassed considerable empirical evi-
dence refuting the often-held generalization that there is
substantially more mobility in the United States than in the
Western EurOpean industrialized nations. Rather "Egg actual
Eggportion 9; mobile persons lg Eh; ggm§,i§ £252."111 This
finding carries considerable Significance, for differences
in political stability between industrialized nations have
been eXplained by many on the basis of alleged differences
in rates of social mobility.112 It has been common to
correlate a high rate of social mobility with political
stability and a low rate of social mobility with political

instability. The empirical findings of Lipset and Bendix

cast serious doubt upon this generalization.

34

Yet belief in the "open" society persists among those
of the American working-class, while the French lower-
classes, for example, persist in adhering to the "dominant
historical image . . . of an unfair distribution of Oppor-
tunities, in which little mobility occurs."113 Thus it is
possible that ideological equalitarianism and not the rate
of social mobility pg; gs is the variable which accounts
for the greater political stability of the United States as
Opposed to many Western EurOpean countries.

Lipset is of the Opinion that even though the study
of social mobility is merely of academic interest unless
emphasis is placed upon the consequences of mobility, we
know relatively little concerning those consequences.

Even though the rates of social mobility are essen-
tially equivalent, such data as is available suggests dif-
ferential consequences of upward mobility in Europe and in
the United States. Those moving from lower-class to middle-
class positions in the United States are likely to adopt
conservative political attitudes, while EurOpeans moving in
the same direction are more likely to adopt radical political
attitudes.114 This is probably related to the more rigid
stratification system of most European countries. Those
moving up the status ladder in Europe eXperience more status
rejection and consequently eXperience more frustration than
do Americans in the same circumstances.115 Contrasted to
the diverse consequences of upward mobility, "the downward

mobile, however, behave similarly in all countries: they

35
vote more conservatively than the stationary members of the
class into which they have fallen."116

Two other consequences of social mobility noted by
Lipset will be set forth in his own words without further
elaboration.

Durkheim . . . suggested that both upward and downward
mobility result in increased suicide rates by increasing
the number of persons who find themselves in an anomic
situation, one in which 1ghey do not know how to react

to the norms involved.

. . . most of the studies dealing with mobility and
politics indicate that the upward and downward mobile

are more likely to be apathetic, to abstain from voting
and to show low levels of political interest, than the
stationary. This finding conforms to a general pattern
revealed in many voting studies; that individuals

subject to cross-pressures--pulls in different political
directions resulting from eXposure to varying appeals--
react to this conflict by withdrawal from involvement. 18

Lipset and Bendix have pointed to the existence of
structural-functional factors within all modern social
systems which aid in eXplaining similarities in rates of
social mobility deSpite divergent value orientations.

Several different processes inherent in all modern

social structures have a direct effect on the rate of
social mobility, and help to account for the similarities
in rates in different countries: (1) changes in the
number of available vacancies, (2) different rates of
fertility; (3) changes in the rank accorded to occupa-
tions; (4) chan es in the number of inheritable status-
positions; and %5) changes in the legal restrictions
pertaining to potential opportunities.

These factors do not of course account for individual
motivation, and it is obvious that mobility would not occur
in the absence of such motivation.120 As Veblen has
suggested,

a system of stratification is a fundamental source
of mobility motivation in and of itself. Apparently,

36

there are imperatives which prompt men to resist and
reject an inferior status and these imperatives persist
regardless of the way in which any given society has
legitimated inequality.
This seems to be the case even in those traditionalized
societies where social stratification is most rigidly
enforced. Lipset draws from M. N. Srinivas, the Indian
anthrOpologist, for support of this view. Srinivas contends
that within the Indian society there has always been both
individual and group mobility (eSpecially the latter),
despite the long history of a rigid caste system.122

It is especially difficult to imagine an industrialized

society characterized by a "closed" stratification system.
WideSpread social mobility has been a concomitant of
industrialization and a basic characteristic of modern
industrial society. In every industrial country, a
large pronortion of the population have had to find
occupations considerably different from those of their
parents . . .

In the twentieth century the West has been character-
ized by a rapid growth of trade and of service industries,
as well as of bureaucracy in industry and government;
more peOple have become employed in white-collar work,
and the comparative size of the rural population has
declined even more rapidly than before. These changes
in the distribution of occupations from generation to
generation mean that 33 industrial society can be viewed
as closed or static.1

As regards intra-generational mobility, there is

actually little shifting between manual and nonmanual
occupations.124 One's entry into the occupational hierarchy
upon securing his first job is eSpecially prOphetic of the
occupational future of the individual.

As the studies of Lipset and Bendix have shown, and

as Paul Lazarsfeld has said, there are but limited choices

of occupation open to those of the lower socioeconomic groups.

37

The more socially Oppressed a group is, the more re-
stricted in advance is the range of occupational choice
of its children. . . . The effect of the material limi-
tations acts in part so as to narrow the perspective

of those faced with the occupational choice. The
socially underprivileged adolescent has seen less,

read less, heard about less, has eXperienced less

variety in his environment in general, and is simply
aware of fewer Opportunities than the socially privileged
young person.

Many social theorists have suggested that the leader-
ship for social movements is drawn diSprOportionately from
marginal groups.126 Michels, for example, has suggested that
the leftist tendencies of German Jews stemmed primarily
from their inferior status.127 Research data indicates that
the Jews "are politically the least conservative denomination"129
in most all English Speaking and Western EurOpean countries.
Empirical data pertaining to the rise of the C.C.F. in
Saskatchewan indicate that although minority groups did
indeed participate diSportionately in the movement, they
did not supply the movement's hard core of leadership.

"The local leaders of the party were not the marginal or
deviant members of the society, but rather the old class
leaders."129 They were the individuals possessing economic
and social status and occupying the best positions from
which to perceive threats to their security.
It is necessary, therefore, to modify the assumptions
about the marginality of leaders of new social movements.
When a large social class or group is changing its
attitudes, the normal integrated leaders of the class
are the first to change.; They are more eXposed to the
social pressures on the class than are marginal, deviant,
or apathetic members. The relationship between marginal

social position and radical political behavior holds
true only for radicals who come from the upper classes.130

3

C0

We have noted above that relative deprivation is seen
to be an important factor in the determination of leftist
tendencies. EXpanding further upon this notion, Lipset
noted that:

Minority religions, nationalities, and races are usually
subjected to various forms of social discrimination,

and the low-income member of a minority group conse—
quently faces additional obstacles to economic and social
achievement. The poor majority group member, on the
other hand, may find substitute gratifications in his
ethnic or religious "superiority." High-income members
of a low-status ethnic or religious group are therefore,
as we have noted, in a situation comparable to the upper
level of the working class in those countries with
"closed" status systems.

The eXperiencing of status or economic deprivation by
a segment of society, however, does not of itself lead
directly to that segment's support of leftist political
parties. "Three conditions facilitate such a reSponse:
effective channels of communication, low belief in the
possibility of individual social mobility, and the absence
of traditionalist ties to a conservative party."132

The first of those conditions may more apprOpriately
be discussed in a subsequent section. It will be recalled
that in a section above we have discussed the manner in
which a high belief in the possibility of individual social
mobility operated as a deterrent to leftist political action.
The effects of traditionalism will be briefly commented upon
in the next section.

DeSpite the varying extent to which different social

strata support leftist or conservative political parties,

Lipset generally argues that the lower-classes have a

39

definite prOpensity to support parties to the left. Once
again he argues that the leftist tendencies of the lower-
classes are in large measure inherent in the very relative-
ness of the stratification system.

Since position in a stratification system is always
relative and gratification or deprivation is eXperienced
in terms of being better or worse off than other pe0ple,
it is not surprising that the lower classes in all
countries, regardless of the wealth of the country,

show various signs of resentment against the existing
distribution of rewards by supporting political parties
and other organizations which advocate some form of
redistribution.

Should economic develOpmcnt result in a change in the
stratification structure of a society, there are important
consequences in the political behavior of the society's
members.
Increased wealth also affects the political role of the
middle class by changing the shape of the stratification
structure from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-
class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class.
A large middle class tempers conflict by rewarding
moderate and democratic parties and penalizing extre-
mist groups.
Borrowing from Anderson and Davidson,135 Lipset
views elections and the party struggle within democratic
states as "the eXpression of the democratic class struggle."136
Comparative studies suggest that
more than anything else the party struggle is a con-
flict among classes, and the most impressive single
fact about political party support is that in virtually
every economically developed country the lower-income
groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the
higher-ipcome groups vote mainly for parties of the
right.13

The same is true in the United States deSpite the "class-

lessness" of American political ideology. "Polling studies

40
show that in every American election since 1936 . . . the
proportion voting Democratic increases sharply as one moves
down the occupational or income ladder."138

Lipset has observed that just as Aristotle and others
have asserted, stable democracy exists only in the wealthier
countries in which there is a large middle class. Applying
Aristotle's "preposition to trade-union government, we would
eXpect to find democracy in organizations whose members have
a relatively high income and more than average security, and
in which the gap between the organizational elite and the
membership is not great.“139 These conditions have been
met in the ITU and they go far in accounting for both the
establishment and the persistence of institutionalized
party opposition within the trade-union.

Stable democracy demands the tempering of conflict
by political parties which appeal to all or most of the
major segments of the population. "A system in which the
support of different parties corresponds too closely to
basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis,
for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut
as to rule out compromise."140 Recent historical analysis
reveals that it was Hamilton's failure to appeal to all
strata that led to the eventual decline of the Federalist
Party.141

We have had occassion at several points above to
mention the importance accorded the concept of ideological

equalitarianism. Lipset and Bendix have set forth six

41

factors which together account for the existence and per-

sistence of the belief in the United States. Those factors

are:

(1) the absence of a feudal past, whose legacies could
have been perpetuated under capitalism to strengthen

the claim to legitimacy of the new class of capitalists;
(2) the continuous high rate of social mobility in
American society, which has tended to support the belief
in the value of an "Open class" society; (3) the increase
in educational Opportunities, which has been eSpecially
important in sustaining the belief in a continuing
eXpansion of Opportunity; (4) the patterns of business
careers at the bottom and at the top, which seem to
reflect and support the same belief; (5) the presence

of immigrants and racial minorities on whose shoulders
the children of previous generations of immigrants

or more-or-less segregated ethnic groups could rise;

and (6) the combination of relative wealth and mass
production of consumer goods, which has had the effect
Of minimizing the differences between the standard 3f
living of the working class and the middle class.14

There are two basic factors which play a role in
granting union leaders enough status security that they may
support Opposition parties. These factors are (1) the
existence of independent sources of status within the ITU
and (2) the lack of great status differential between ITU
union leaders and the union rank-and-file.143

Due largely to the decentralization of the printing
industry and a lack of intra-occupational competition, ITU
union locals enjoy a great deal of autonomy in union
activities. The ITU union locals thus undermine the bureau-
cratization of the union administration and supply indepen-
dent sources Of status and power for their members.

. . . the existence of alternative sources of status
in a union Operates in similar and parallel fashion to

the rough equality of status between working printer
and union leader: Both work £2 reduce the status stake

42
that union activists have in holding union office,
and by reducing that stake reduce the dependency of
Officials on the incumbent administration and increase
the chances of their supporting Opposition groups.144
Turning directly to the status differential between
ITU leaders and workers, it must first be noted that the
ITU rank-and-file members enjoy relatively high incomes,
status and job satisfaction. In addition, the status dif-
ferential is kept small by means of the institutionalized
procedure whereby salary increases must be attained ggly
by means of a referendum of the entire membership.145
"Where return to the ranks, either voluntary or upon defeat
in an election, involves no great loss in style of life,
job rewards, Or status, the union officer has very much
less of a material and psychological stake in his job."146
Conversely, in most labor unions, union leaders occupy
status positions considerably above those of the rank-and-
file members of the union. Consequently many union offi-
cials are driven to secure their positions, oftentimes by
means "directly contrary to the democratic values of the

trade-union movement."147 This Observation will serve as

an introduction to the next section.

CONTROLLING

g2§§£,g§ fig element. Power is of course one of the
elements with which Lipset is most concerned. It is little
exaggeration to assert that a concern with power relations

permeates all his writings.

43

According to Bendix and Lipset, power "refers to all
the means by which an individual or a group Of individuals
can exert a controlling influence over others."148 Else-
where Lipset has stated that "the problem of politics does
not simply concern nation-states, since every group within
a nation must also find mechanisms which make decisions for
the group and distribute power within it."149

The tendency for the sociologist to emphasize either
consensus g; conflict to the relative neglect of the other
is once again revealed in the differences between the funda-
mental theoretical conceptions of power.

Parsons and Lynd have recently pointed out that there
are two basically different ways of looking at power.
One, which Parsons calls the "zero-sum" concept and
Lynd the "scarcity theory," assumes that there is a
limited or total sum of power, and that an increase in
power for one group must occur at the expense of another.
Both point out that this theory also assumes “power
over others."150 Although they differ sharply in their
concrete analyses of American power relations, both
prefer the alternative image of power "as a facility
for the performance of function in and on behalf of

the society as a system . . . [as] the capacity to
mobilize the resources of the society for the attain-
ment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment
has been made or may be made."

The "scarcity" model of power obviously stems from a
conflict theory Of society, while the "resource" model
implies a concern with both consensus and conflict.152
Thus Marx is to be associated with the former while Toc-
queville, along with the contemporary theorists such as
Lipset, Parsons, and Lynd, subscribe to the latter.

Lipset also notes that it is possible to differentiate

between those theories of power "which emphasize the composition

44
of the power elite and those which stress access to power."153
Concern with the composition of decision-making groups stems
from the assumption that men are reSponsive only to narrowly
defined self-interests. Concern with access to power rests
on quite a different assumption.
The access approach assumes, rather, that the decisions
of men in power, like those of men in any other role,
are determined by a complex analytic calculus of the
consequences of decisions. To the extent that the pre-
dictable reaction of any group or individual to a
decision will affect the results of that decision, the
group or individual has access to the decision-making
process.

The access approach to the study of power is well
illustrated by Lipset's study of the eXperiences Of the
Saskatchewan C.C.F. after gaining power. It will be recalled
that prior to gaining power, the C.C.F. was reaponsive only
to the party. After gaining electoral office, however, it
found it increasingly necessary to be reaponsive to all
interest groups which could either grant or withhold their
support in future elections. In addition, their legislation
had to be administered through bureaucratic executive
agencies which were appointed by and consequently represented
other political interests. The civil service both modified
administrative goals and played a direct role in the drafting
of administrative policies.155

Decision making and its initiation into action gg
process. Lipset's very definition of democracy stresses

the importance of decision making for a society.

Democracy is a social mechanism for resolving the
problem of societal decision-making among conflicting

45

interest groups with minimal force and maximal
consensus.l50

To return once again to the relationship between
conflict and consensus in Western democratic countries,
"conflict among different groups is," as we have noted
above, "eXpressed through political parties which basically
represent a 'democratic translation of the class struggle.’ "137
That is to say that institutionalized procedures exist
through which conflict is resolved and consensus is achieved.
Probably the most important of such institutionalized pro-
cedures is the voting process itself-~"a key mechanism of
consensus in democratic society."158

Many observers have commented on the seeming lack of
differences between the ideologies and practices of the two
American political parties. In large measure, this impres-
sion is a result Of the fact that the executive and the
legislature are reSponsive to different social bases.

A Democratic President is invariably to the left of
the Democratic congressional leadership, since he is
basically elected by the large urban industrial states
where trade-unions and minority groups constitute the
backbone of the party, while the southerners continue
to sway the congressional Democratic contingent.
Similarly, a Republican President under current condi-
tions must remain to the left of his congressional
supporters, since he, too, must be oriented toward
carrying or retaining the support of the industrial,
urban, and therefore more liberal sections of the
country, while most Republican Congressmen are elected
in "safe" conservative districts. So when the Repub-
licans hold the presidency, they move to the left as
compared to their position in Opposition, while the
Democrats, shifting from presidential incumbency to
congressional opposition, move to the right. This
shift produces a situation in which the policies of the
two parties often appear almost indistinguishable.159

46

Comparative analysis of voting studies from many
Western countries reveals marked similarities in voting
patterns. The relationship between social class and par-
ticipation has been discussed above. In addition, data from
Germany, Sweden, the United States, Norway, Finland, "and
many others" indicates that

Men vote more than women; the better educated, more
than the less educated; urban residents, more than
rural; those between 35 and 55, more than younger or
older voters; married persons, more than unmarried;
higher-status persons, more than lowpgé members of
organizations, more than nonmembers.

The effects of differential voting participation are
many and diverse. Many defenders of democracy have argued
that a high level of participation is necessary for the
prOper functioning of democratic political systems. Such
arguments generally rest upon the assumption that intense
conflict is good for society; that participation is to be
desired to apathy.161

Lipset, however, contends that such evidence as is
available seems to support Herbert Tingsten's thesis that

a sudden increase in the size of the voting electorate
probably reflects tension and serious governmental
malfunctioning and also introduces as voters individuals
whose social attitudes are unhealthy from the point Sf
view of the requirements of the democratic system.16

Nonetheless many democratic societies have higher
rates of participation than the United States. Therefore
high or low participation in itself is neither good nor

bad for democracy. The evidence would seem to suggest that

To the extent that the lower strata have been brought
into the electoral process graduall . . . , increased

 

47

participation is undoubtedly a good thing for democracy.
It is only when a major crisis or an effective authori-
tarian movement suddenly pulls the normally disaffected
habitual nonvoters ingg the political area that the
system is threatened. 3

If one extends his vision beyond democratic societies
and organizations to totalitarian societies and oligarchi-
cally controlled organizations, the alleged relationship
between a high level of participation and a positive role
in decision making practically disappears.

Participation by the members of an organization or the
citizens of a society in political affairs is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rank—and-
file influence on organizational or government policy.
On the one hand, members may show a low level of polit-
ical participation in an organization or society, but
still affect policy by their ability to withdraw or
contribute election support to one or another of the
different bureaucracies competing for power. On the
other hand, a membership or citizenry may regularly
attend meetings, belong in large numbers to various
political organizations, and even have a high rate of
voting turnozt, and yet have little or no influence

on policy.16

The existence of cross-pressures is one factor which
in part accounts for differential participation. "In general,
the more pressures brought to bear on individuals or groups
which operate in Opposing directions, the more likely are
prospective voters to withdraw from the situation by 'losing
interest' and not making a choice."165 The cross-pressures
hypothesis may account for the differences in voting rates
between the lower and the upper and middle classes.

These differences may be due in part to the fact that
the lower strata in every society are influenced by
their life eXperiences and their class organizations

to favor those parties which advocate social and eco-
nomic reforms, but at the same time they are exposed

48

to strong upper-class and conservative influences
through the press, radio, schools, churches, and
so forth.166

Ever since Robert Michels asserted over 50 years ago
that "Who says organization says oligarchy," social scientists
have been busy documenting that thesis. Lipset, Trow and
Coleman, the authors Of Union Democragy, have performed a
greater service in analyzing the functional Operation of a
major exception tO the "iron law of oligarchy," the Inter-
national Typographical Union. Searching always for the
oligarchic mechanisms set forth by Michels and others, they
discovered either that they were not tO be found in the ITU
or that there were factors mitigating their influence.

Thus their deviant case analysis played a positive role in

theory building, for, in their words

. . as we look for those attributes and patterns in

the ITU which work tO nullify the oligarchic tendencies
present in large organizations, we are implicitly or
explicitly setting forth the conditions necessary for
the maintenance O democratic politics within private
organizations. In this our purpose is not, Of course,
to ”refute" Michels or other previous workers in this
area, but rather .tp6 yefine and build on their insights
and findings .

Students Of large scale organizations have advanced
three major generalizations in attempting to account for
the existence of oligarchy in all large organizations,
regardless of their ideological orientation. Lipset, g5 gl.,
Specifically related these generalizations to labor unions.

1. "Large-scale organizations give union Officials
g near monopoly pf powe ."168 Large-scale organization

 

seems to demand a bureaucratic structure. ESpecially within

49

labor unions, the incumbency exercises a near monOpoly
over formal channels Of communication and over the develOp-
ment of political skills.169

2. "The lgaders want 59 gggy ig_office."170 The
status discrepancy between union leader and the rank-and-
file motivates officials to secure their positions, Often-
times by prohibiting the exercise Of democratic processes
within the union. Thus, "there is a basic strain between
the values inherent in society's stratification system and
the democratic values Of the trade-union movement."171

3. "The members g9 not pargigipate i§,ggign politics."172
The rewards for participation in union politics are generally
few indeed. "Most union members, like other peOple, must
Spend most of their time at work or with their families.
Their remaining free time is generally taken up by their
friends, commercial entertainment, and other personally
rewarding recreational activities."173

Yet the authors Of Qgigg Democracy found democracy
tO exist within the ITU! "It is obviously no temporary
exception, for the party system of the union has lasted
for half a century, and regular political conflict in North
American printing unions can be dated back to 1815."174
Those factors which in part account for the existence of
democracy and the absence Of oligarchy within the ITU are
many. In their concluding chapter, the authors Of Ugigg
Democragy have advanced 22 propositions "bearing on factors

affecting the chances for democracy in trade unions."175

SO
Therein lies a wealth of research potential. Either we have
or we will soon comment in length on many of those factors
which seem to account for the democratic political system
Of the ITU. Perhaps then it will here be apprOpriate to
merely mention a number Of the most important Of such factors
without elaboration.

The ITU came into existence through federation,
without the presence of a strong, central bureaucracy. A
lack of competition between printing shOps and the decen-
tralization Of the industry have both Operated to sustain
the autonomy Of the larger locals. In its early years,
divergent power sources within the union led to the institu-
tionalization Of Opposition legitimacy. The marginal status
position of printers, the institutionalized substitute
system and the prevalence of night working hours have all
led to extensive secondary organizational participation among
printers. Although such organizations have been and are
still basically social in character, they serve important
latent political functions. For example, they serve to
provide Opportunities for the learning Of political skills
independent Of the incumbent administration. And they pro-
vide channels of communication independent Of the union
administration. The relatively high status Of the occupa-
tion, together with efforts of the union to restrict the
power and income Of union leaders, accounts for less status
differential between union leaders and the rank-and-file

than exists in most labor unions. The status security Of

Sl
ITU union leaders is high in view of the fact that they may
maintain status as opposition leaders should they be defeated
in union elections. Lastly, the institutionalization Of
democratic mechanisms itself Operates to sustain democracy.
It is evident to Lipset that there is measureably
less oligarchy in American political parties than in the
German socialist labor parties investigated by Michels.
Lamentably, American sociologists have had little or no
interest in testing his "iron law" in the two major parties.
Yet "It is clear that constant factionalism, fairly rapid
turnover in leadership, and the absence of a central power
structure characterize American parties in contrast to the
Social Democratic party of pre-World War I Germany."176
We have noted above that Opposition legitimacy within
the ITU develOped and was sustained by "independent and
enduring bases 9f support."177 Even in the larger society
it is oftentimes the case that democracy develOps as a
consequence of group conflict.
Democratic rights have develOped in societies largely
through the struggles of various groups--class, reli-
gious, sectional, economic, professional, and so on--
against one another and against the group which controls
the state. Each interest group may desire to carry
out its own will, but if no one group is strong enough
tO gain complete power, the result is the development
of tolerance. In large measure the develOpment Of the
concept Of tolerance, of recognition Of the rights Of
groups with whom one disagrees to compete for adherents
or power, arose out Of conflicts among strgng and indes-
tructible groups in different societies.17
Once a society has established certain democratic

procedures, democracy is sustained through the multiple-

group affiliations inherent in political pluralism. “For a

52
variety of groups lay claim to the allegiance Of the pOpu—
lation, reinforcing diversity of belief and helping mobilize
such diversity in the political arena."179

Above it was noted that traditionalistic values--
“resignation to a traditional standard of living and loyalty
to the 'powers that be' "--Operate as a deterrent to the
leftist political action of the impoverished workers and
peasants Of backward areas.180 Yet, it must here be noted
that "the two most drastic political transformations Of
our time, the Russian and the Chinese Communist revolutions,
took place in countries with an almost wholly backward,

traditionalistic rural social structure."181

SANCTIONING
Sanction gg,gg element. Lipset does not use the word
"sanction," but oftentimes Speaks in terms of "rewards,"
"deprivations," etc. There is general recognition on his
part that sanctions complement and reinforce the normative
order within a social system. Such recognition is explicit
in the following statement quoted from Union Democracy in
which Lipset, g£_gl., are speaking Specifically of the norm
of Opposition legitimacy and the (sanctioning) mechanism
Of voting.
The fact that there are relatively few breaches of the
rules of the democratic game can be understood only
in part as resulting from the moral binding power Of
the norm itself. In large part it can be Seen as a
practical recognition and accomodation to the political
consequences--Specifically, the loss of support Of
large numbers of members and relatively independent

activists--that would follow from gross and repeated
violations Of the rules Of the game.1

53

Application gf sanctions gg process. The Operation

‘

 

of sanctions within a social system is well illustrated in
the history Of the ITU's secret societies. In the earliest
years of the ITU, management used job security to curtail
the advance of labor unionism. "Known and active unionists
were being fired, while betrayal of a fellow worker as a
member of the union Often enabled a man to keep a steady
job."183 This led to the creation of secret societies
within the ITU. These organizations functioned to protect
active unionists from discrimination at the hands of manage-
ment and to assure control of the union by the more militant
members. Then through the recruitment of foremen who exer-
cised control over hiring and firing, the secret societies
rewarded the conformity and punished the nonconformity of
their own members by the same means used by management against
them--the granting or withholding of "steady situations."184
Eventually the union's rank-and-file recognized a lack Of
effective control over the secret societies and formally
made membership in such societies unlawful.

Mention was made above Of the effect Of differential
degrees of conformity to norms of voting among social
classes. This is the prOper place at which to elaborate
that point.

Even if peOple are not aware of a personal stake in the
electoral decision, they may still be induced to vote
by social pressures and inner feelings Of social Obli-
gation. The variations in voting behavior which cor-
relate with socioeconomic class may also be related

tO different degrees Of conformity to the dominant
norms in various societies. Almost every study of

54

social behavior indicates that conformity to these
norms is related to social status. . . . In general,
middle-class people tend to conform more to the dominant
values Of the society, and to accept the notion that
this conformity will be rewarded by attaining one's
personal goals.

That variation in the degree of conformity to such
norms is related to the rewards accompanying conformity is
Obvious (though often unrecognized).

The force of middle-class norms of behavior is notor-
iously less in groups that are deprived Of middle-
class living standards and social acceptance. The
low voting rate of very low income groups that occurs
in the Unéged States may be part Of this general
pattern.

ESpecially since 1900, the membership of the ITU has
exerted direct and considerable influence upon union policy
through the mechanism Of the referendum.187 The salaries
of the international Officers has historically been con-
trolled by referenda, and this has played no small role in
sustaining democracy within the ITU.

The ability 9f the members to limit the ga 2 between
their Own salaries and that of their officers is prob-

ably a maior factor sustaining the democratic system
in the ITU, for it reduces the strain on ITU officers

wwo return £9 the_print shO following— defeat.

 

FACILITATING

Facility gg‘gg element. We have Observed above that
Lipset prefers to view power itself as a facility enabling
the social system to mobilize its resources for the attain-
ment Of societal goals. In other words, he favors the
resource theory Of power as Opposed to the zero-sum or
scarcity theory. It is also apparent that should the society

accept democracy as a societal goal tO be either attained or

55
sustained, then the conditions necessary for democracy also
Operate as facilities. Many Of the major conditions suppor-
ting Or maintaining democracy at both the level of the nation-
state and the level Of the large-scale organization have
been discussed throughout this paper. The reader will
recall that social conflict, legitimacy, economic develOpment,
and education are among the most important of the social
conditions favoring democracy at the societal level. Within
the ITU, those conditions which were most important in
accounting for the union's democratic political system were
the high degree of secondary organization among its members,
the existence of independent and indestructible sources Of
power within the union, the norm Of Opposition legitimacy,
and the lack Of great status differential between union
leaders and the rank-and-file members.

Many social scientists have noted that there is not
always a high correlation between democracy and the conditions
for democracy set forth above. Lipset has Offered two
explanations for the lack of such correlations.

. . . an extremely high correlation between such things
as income, education, and religion, on the one hand,

and democracy, on the other, in any given society should
not be anticipated even on theoretical grounds because,
to the extent that the political subsystem of the society
Operates autonomously, a political form may persist under
conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that
form. Or a political form may develop because of a
syndrome Of unique historical factors even though the
society's major characteristics favor another form.189

Utilization 9g facilities gg process. In attempting

to account for either the emergence or the persistence Of

democracy, it is necessary to utilize both historical and

56
sociolOgical analyses. The simultaneous utilization of both
types of analyses oftentimes rcveals factors which exert
cumulative effects either increasing or decreasing the proba-
bility of democracy.

Key historical events may account for either the per-
sistence g£_the failure of democracy in any particular
society by starting a process which increases (or
decreases) the likelihood that at the next critical
point in the country's history democracy will win out
again. Once established, a democratic political system
"gathers momentum" and creates social supports (insti-
tutions) tO ensure its continued existence. Thus a
"premature" democracy which survives will do so by
(among other things) facilitating the growth Of other
conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal
literacy, or autonomous private organizations.190

In a methodological note, Lipset stressed the fact
that "it would be difficult to identify any gag factor
crucially associated with, or 'causing,‘ any complex social
characteristic E.g., democracy] . . . . Rather, all such
chacteristics . . . are considered to have multi-variate
causation, and consequences."191 He goes on to elaborate
this point with the diagram below.192 Further explaining
the diagram's utility as a methodological tool, he goes on
to say:

The appearance Of a factor on both sides of "democracy"
implies that it is both an initial condition Of demo-
cracy, and that democracy, once established, sustains
that characteristic of the society . . . On the other
hand, some of the initial consequences of democracy,
such as bureaucracy, may have the effect Of undermining
democracy, as the reversing arrows indicate. Appearance
of a factor to the right Of democracy does not mean that
democracy "causes" its appearance, but merely that demo-
cracy is an initial condition which favors its develOp-
ment. Similarly, the hypothesis that bureaucracy is

one Of the consequences of democracy does not imply

that democracy is the sole cause, but rather that a
democratic system has the effect Of encouraging the

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58
develOpment of a certain type of bureaucracy under other
conditions which have to be stated if bureaucracy is
the focus of the research problem . . .

Thus, in a multi-variate system, the focus may be
upon any element, and its conditions and consequences
may be stated without the implication that we have
arrived at a complete theory of the necessary and
sufficient conditions of its emergence.193

COMPREHENSIVE OR MASTER PROCESSES

Communication. Those social theorists concerned with
what has come to be known as the theories of mass society
have exerted considerable influence upon Lipset. The most
influential among such theorists have been Tocqueville,
Lederer, Arendt, Kornhauser, Mannheim, and Selznik. Often-
times he prefers to Speak in terms of "political pluralism"
rather than in terms of a "mass society." The theory of
mass society, as formulated by Emil Lederer and others, states
"that a society without a multitude of organizations inde-
pendent of state power has a high dictatorial as well as
revoluntionary potentialfl"194 Conversely, the potential for
stable democracy is greatest within those social systems
wherein there are many organizations mediating between the
individual and the state. Communication is obviously enough
a primary aSpect of the theory. Tocqueville was among the
first to recognize the latent political functions of volun-
tary organizations seemingly irrelevant to politics pg; 52.
According to Tocqueville, voluntary associations serve two
primary functions in the maintenance of democratic political

systems. "They are a source of new opinions independent of

the state and a means of communicating these new suggestions

59
to a large section of the citizenry."19q That participa-
tion in voluntary associations is class-linked has been
noted by many sociologists.196 Such differential partici-
pation in nonpolitical voluntary associations "intensifies
the intra-class communications network of the higher strata
and weakens in-group communications further down the class
ladder."197

The neWSpapers, functioning as channels of communi-
cation independent of the state, play a vitally important
role in democratic politics. In Tocqueville's words, "The
effect of a newsnaner is not only to suggest the same pur-
pose to a great number of persons, but also to furnish
means for the execution in common of the designs which they
may have Cingly conceived."198

It was noted above that the institutionalized
legitimacy of Opposition within the ITU served to provide
the Opposition with access to the membership through both
formal and informal channels of communication, thus prevent-
ing a monopoly by the administration.

This is also the proper point at which to note that
the literacy prerequisite of printers in part enabled them
to organize prior to other occupations and to Spearhead the
labor press in many unions and in many countries.199

Boundary maintenance. Lipset's central concern as a
political sociologist appears to be the study of those
conditions which enable a society to maintain a prOper

balance between consensus and/or social cohesion on the one

60
hand and cleavage and/or conflict on the other.200 This

notion will be more thoroughly examined in the next section

on systemic linkage.
Lipset has stated that although all institutional

arrangements have both integrative and nonintegrative
elements, it may be possible to rank them according to their
integrative character.

It is obvious that the distribution of wealth is the
most important source of interest-conflict in complex
societies. At the opposite pole is the institution

of the family: the integrator par excellence. The
second most powerful integrating force . . . is often
considered to be religion, which presumably ameliorates
the strains arising out of the stratification system

by diverting attention from it and adjusting men to
their lot in life. However, religion has also been

the source of considerable tension in many societies.
Institutions which are organized along class lines
contribute to both cleavage and integration. In
general, the system of stratification creates discon-
tent among those who are lowly placed, and is hence a
source of cleavage, but it is also the principal means
for placing peOple in different positions and motivating
them to fulfill their roles. The organization of
working-class groups into trade-unions or a labor party,
for example, creates a mechanism for the exnression of
conflict but, perhaps even more important, integrates
the workers into the body politic by giving them a
legitimate means of obtaining their wants. 01

Oftentimes, as a response to external attack, the

boundary maintenance of a trade-union may be strengthened
to the extent that the continued maintenance of a democratic
political system is impossible. This suggests to Lipset the
necessity of a trade-union's security within its external
environment.

It appears that a party system is a luxury that only

a relatively secure union can afford. Under external

attack the importance of internal unity is so great

and so overriding as compared with the issues of inter-
nal politics that the call for unity, coupled with

61
the definition of internal opposition as traitorous,
makes a loyal and legitimate internal Opposition almost
impossible.2

The factors accounting for union local autonomy within
the ITU are both historical and structural in nature. In the
beginning the international was a loose confederation of
autonomous locals: there was no powerful central office.203
Through the years, union local autonomy was sustained by
the decentralization of the industry and the lack of compe-
tition between locals. In addition, local autonomy provided
bases of power for the emergence of a two-party system which,
in turn, sustained local autonomy.204

Systemic linkage. Although he uses neither term, it
is obvious from the above that Lipset sees an important link
between the processes of boundary maintenance and systemic
linkage. Not only must the conflict among groups be legiti-
mized and sustained: such conflict must be transcended through
institutionalized means in order that social cohesion exist
and the authority of the state itself be legitimized.

Systemic linkage is one sociological concept which aids
in explaining how societies persist by maintaining a proper
balance between consensus and cleavage. Lipset sees conflict
as a continuous phenomenon occurring within all societies.
Therefore, in order that democratic political systems per-
sist, conflict must be legitimized: there must be institu-
tionalized processes by which the Opposition meets and com-
petes in the political arena with the administration in power.

Surprising as it may sound, a stable democracy requires
the manifestation of conflict or cleavage so that there

62

will be struggle over ruling Dositions, challenges to
parties in power, and shifts Of parties in office, but
without consensus--a political system allowing the
peaceful "play" Of power, the adherence by the "outs“
to decisions made by the "ins," and the recognition by
the "ins" 8f the rights of the "outs"--there can be no
democracy.

He goes on then to state that, paradoxically, the
roots of "legitimate" cleavage are often to be found in
conflict itself. "Consensus on the norms of tolerance
which a society or organization accepts has often develOped
only as a result of basic conflict, and requires the contin-
uation of conflict to sustain it."206

In their concluding chapter, the authors of Union

Democragy stated that their extensive study of the ITU

 

suggested "that the functional requirements for democracy

cannot be met most of the time in most unions or other

2 . .
voluntary groups.“ 07 What then of the relationship between

oligarchically controlled voluntary associations and the
Operation Of democracy at the societal level? We now quote
extensively from Lipset in order tha t he might provide his
own illuminating answer to that question. (Note the
relationship between boundary maintenance and systemic
linkage implicit in this passage.)

It is noteworthy that the conditions which seem most
plausibly related to membership participation and hence
to internal democracy in trade-unions and other volun-
tary associations . . . are the same conditions which
seemingly weaken democracy within the larger society.
That is, to the extent that members of an association
have a diffuse set of relationships with the organiza-
tion, to the extent that a large part of their lives
is lived within its influence, to the extent that its
members interact with each other, to that degree are
the chances for a high level of concern and participa-
tion increased. But these same factors isolate the

63

members of the group from cross-pressures add exposure
to diverse values and influences, and . . . heighten
the intensity of their political beliefs. This again
poses a dilemma for us. Integration of members within
a trade-union, a political party, a farm organization,
a professional society, may increase the chances that
members of such organizations will be active in the
group and have more control over its policies. But
extending the functions of such organizations so as to
integrate their members may threaten the larger politi-
cal system because it reduces the forces making for
compromise and understanding among conflicting

groups 0 o o

It should be obvious that I do not advocate dictator-
ship in private organizations. But it is necessary to
recognize that many organizations may never fulfill the
conditions for a stable internal democracy and still
contribute in important ways to the democratic process
in the total society, by providing a secure base for
factionalism and real vested interests at the same time
that they limit individual freedom within the organi-
zation and allow a degree of autonomy of action for
both the leaders and the Srganization which may under-
mine other social values. 0“

Once again it will be necessary to stress the theory
of political pluralism (mass society) in both its negative
and positive asoects. Negatively, the potential rise of
totalitarianism poses a grave threat in those societies
lacking a multitude of crosscutting organizational affilia-
tions among individuals. Positively, the potential for
stable democracy is enhanced in those societies wherein
there exists a multitude of organizations independent of
the state and consequently mediating between individuals
and the state.

In as much as crosscutting bases of cleavage enhance

the potential for stable democracy, Lipset has chosen to

favor, "all other factors being constant," two-party systems

64
over multiple-party systems, territorial representation
over proportional representation, and federalism over the
unitary state.

It is most appropriate to follow these arguments,
point by point, allowing Lipset to sneak for himself as
much as is possible.

The argument for the two-party system rests on the
assumption that in a complex society parties must
necessarily be broad coalitions which do not serve
the interests of one major group, and that they must
not be parties of integration but must seek to win
support among groups whigh are preponderantly allied
to the opposition party. 09

PrOportional representation, Lipset argues, “increases

the chance for more rather than fewer parties and thus]

2

serves democracy badly." 10
Besides, as the German sociologist Georg Simmel has
pointed out, the system of electing members of parlia-
ment to represent territorial constituencies rather
than groups (as proportional representation encourages),
forces the various groups to secure their ends within
an electoral framework that involves cappern with many
interests and the need for compromise.

Federalism is desirable over the unitary state in
that it "increases the opportunity for multiple sources of
cleavage by adding regional interests and values to the
others which crosscut the social structure."212

As can be seen, the goal is to institutionalize

A I I o -
procedures througa which soc1ety must transcend personal
and collective interests at lower levels of organization in

order that social cohesion be maintained at the societal

level.

65
If it is desirable to "create" crosscutting lines of
cleavage (e.g., through federalism), it is desirable that
such lines of cleavage not merely be superimposed over lines
of basic cleavage already existing within society. Thus,

qualifying a statement above, federalism does not serve

 

democracy well when it "divides a country across the lines

of basic cleavage, e.g., between different ethnic, religious,
or linguistic areas, as it does in India and Canada.
Democracy needs cleavage within linguistic or religious
groups, not between them."213

Lipset has noted that one factor partially accounting
for the leftist tendencies of American intellectuals was
their "seeming isolation from other sections of the
elite . . ."214 The structural source of this perceived
isolation is both simple and intriguing. "Quite simply
. . . there are, in absolute as well as proportionate terms,
more intellectuals in America and they are more widely
diSpersed geograwhically than in any other country."215
Thus personal interaction and communication among intellec-
tuals is greatly curtailed by the sheer number of
intellectuals.

Institutionalization. Lipset's sociological
perSpective stems from many theorists for whom institu-
tionalization was a central concept. In Lipset's own words:

Weber saw bureaucratization as an institutional form
inherent in all modern societies. To Michels, oli-
garchy--government by a small group of persons who

co-Opt their successors--was a process common to all
large organizations.. Both men tried to demonstrate

66

that even socialist organizations and societies were
or would necessarily 2e as bureaucratic and oligarchic
as capitalist ones. 1

We have seen that Tocqueville in particular stressed the
latent political Functions of the institutions of local
government and voluntary associations.217

It is not surprising that institutionalization is
as central a concept for Lipset as it was for these impor-
tant social theorists. A basic premise of most of his
writings is that "democracy requires institutions which

support conflict and disagreement as well as those which

"218

sustain legitimacy and consensus. The idea of institu-

tionalization indeed constitutes an integral part of his

definition of democracy.219

Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a
political system which supplies regular constitutional
opportunities for changing the governing officials,
and a social mechanism which permits the largest
possible part of the oopulation to influence major
decisiogi by choosing among contenders for political
office. 0

Voting is undoubtedly one of the most important and
fundamental of such democratic norms. Much of his writing
is concerned with this "key mechanism of consensus in
. . 2
democratic soc1ety." 21

Lipset has seen that the institutionalization of
democratic norms is a factor which counters the authoritarian
tendencies of certain groups.

Once in existence . . . democratic norms become a part
of the institutional system . . . But the fact that the
movement's ideology is democratic does not mean that
its supporters actually understand the implications.

The evidence seems to indicate that understanding of
and adherence to these norms are highest among leaders

67

and lowest among followers. The general Opinions or
predisoositions of the rank and file are relatively
unimportant in predicting behavior as long as the
organization to which they are loyal continues to act
democratically . . . Organized social democracy not only
defends civil libertiei gut influences its supporters

in the same direction. 2

At one point Lipset notes that a simple measure of
the legitimacy functioning within a particular society may
be the extent to which national rituals and holidays have
become institutionalized as a part of a "secular political
culture."223

Socialization. In relative terms, socialization is
used less extensively by Lipset than most of the other PAS
Model concepts. This is not to suggest, however, that
Lipset is unaware of the significance of the concept as a
theoretical tool.

Speaking of differences in voting, for example, he
noted the effects of both "typical" and unique generational
exoeriences.

Different ages imply variations in life eXperiences

and affect left or right political behavior in at least
two ways: through generational differences (with the
crucial exoeriences of adolescence sometimes shaping
the political outlook of an entire age group) and
through differences in the typical patterns of social
experience associated with differenfizige grouos:
adolescence, maturity, and old age.

That the family is largely resoonsible for the
political socialization of adolescents and young adults is
revealed in "hereditary" voting patterns, the tendency for
first-voters to vote as their fathers do.225

Socialization seems to be, as was noted above, a most

important element accounting for the authoritrrian tendencies

68

of the lower classes. Lipset concurs with Bronfenbrenner,
who reports that "the most consistent finding" in studies of
child-rearing patterns is the "more frequent use of physical
punishment by working-class parents . . ."226 Such find-
ings have been complemented "by the 'inding of two investi-
gations in Boston and Detroit that physical punishments for
aggression, characteristic of the working class, tend to
increase rather than decrease aggressive behavior."227
Authoritarianism seems much less prevalent among the
higher educated and, conversely, the norm of tolerance is
more often adhered to among the higher educated. "The
higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe
in democratic values and support democratic practices. All
the relevant studies indicate that education is more sig-
nificant than either income or occupation."228
Socialization was seen to play a particularly
significant role within the ITU. Geqerally speaking, "in
most unions one of the principal factors which Operate to
perpetuate incumbent power is the administration's almost
complete monOpoly of the chances For learning political

229 Within the ITU, however,

and administrative skills."
the status of the occupation, the relatively high educa-
tional level of its members, and the extensively developed
network 0“ secondary organizations within the union have
all Operated so as to supply the ITU membership with ample

Opportunities to learn administrative skills. Thus there

is within the ITU a wide distribution of political skills

69

among its membership. Here again is another instance of
institutionalized democracy furthering its own cause, for
"In a system which provides for regular turnover in office,
union office itself becomes a training ground for opposition
activists and leaders."230

Social control. Lipset's concern with the maintenance
of a proper balance between conflict and consensus seems to
imply that the social system should, paradoxically, both
counter deviancy and allow for it. Lipset subscribes to
Merton's proposition that that which may be dysfunctional
for one system may well be functional for another system.231

. . such phenomena as the Tory worker or the middle-

class socialist are not merely deviants from class
patterns, but basic requirements for the maintenance

of the political system. A stable democracy requires

a situation in which all the major political parties
include supporters from many segments of the pOpulation.
A system in which the support of different parties
correSponds too closely to basic social divisions

cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects
a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut as to rule
out compromise.

The deviance of individuals, in other words, Operates
so as to prevent the formation of "deviant" parties (which
would tend to intensify group cleavage) and to temper
emotions within the political realm of the society. It may
well be that deviancy, paradoxical though it seems, con-
tributes to consensus.

As has been indicated above, "cross-pressures result-

ing from multiple-group affiliations or loyalties account

for much of the 'deviation' from the dominant pattern of a

7O
given group. Individuals who are subject to pressures
driving them in different political directions must either

“233 A high degree of

deviate or 'escaoe into apathy.‘
multiple-group affiliation leads to a situation in which
most individuals can neither concur wholeheartedly in the
actions of "their" party nor disapprove entirely of the

actions of the "opposing" party. In accordance with the
differential saliency individuals ascribe their multiple-
group affiliations, they are constantly deviating from

"exnected" patterns of behavior. In doing so, they assist

in the maintenance of democracy.

CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL ACTION

Igrritoriality. Geographical isolation has been
shown to be a major factor accounting for a high degree of
leftist political participation. Communist and socialist
parties generally receive strong support from miners,
sailors, fishermen, lumbermen, steeoshearers, and long-
shoremen.234 These workers oftentimes live in communities
in which the restraining effects of cross-pressures are at
a minimum. In addition, the nature of their employment
accounts for a high degree of economic insecurity, a factor
which we have seen to be an independent source of leftist
voting.235

§igg. The condition of size was of course a crucial

consideration of both Weber and Michels in their studies of

bureaucracy. It would seem that the efficient operation of

71
large-scale organizations demands bureaucratization. And
as we have seen, as regards labor unions, "The price of
increased union bureaucracy is increased power at the top,
decreased power among the ordinary members."236

Lipset has observed that the size of both industrial
plants and of cities correlates with leftist voting.237
Just as was the case with the "isolated" industries, large
industrial plants make "for a higher degree of intra-class
communication and less person 1 contact with people on
higher economic levels."238

In Union Democracy, it was demonstrated not only
that printers in the larger shOps were more likcly to
participate in union politics than were printers in small
shops but that this was the case "independently of whether
they participate in the printers' occupational community."239
A factor which goes far in eXplaining this is the greater
degree of voluntariness of personal interrelationships in
the larger shoos. This voluntariness is largely a conse-
quence of the simple fact that there are more men from
which to choose one's companions.240' In the large shOps
there is greater possibility of forming cliques character-
ized by homogeniety of political views.

In the small sheps, however, there is more necessity
to de-emphasize union politics.

. . . a small group, in order to preserve good inter-
personal relations and solidarity on matters of
importance to it, need not and cannot enforce con-

sensus with regard to all values and attitudes held by
its members. A group may much more easily exert

72

pressure on its members to reduce their interest or
involvement in activities and attitudes which are
peripheral to the group's own functioning and which
may pl.“ ce a strain on solidarity if introduced into it.
The value to the group of reducing the saliency of
issues upon which group consensus does not exist is
clear: what is a matter of relatigg indifference is
not a source of internal cleavage.

Time. The prevalence of night work within the print-
ing industry is another factor in part accounting for a high
degree of association among printers. Night work Operates
so as to brea R up normal leisure patterns.

There are a number of processes which underlie the
prOpensity of night workers to associate with printers.
First, we would suggest that the day worker is subject
to the structured pulls of mass entertainment, of
neighborhood org nizations, and of nonprinter friends
away from the printers' community, while night workers
on all these counts are subject to a push toward the
printers' community. Thus while night workers take
less part in nonprinter organizations, they take more
part in organizgzions associated 2.ith printing than

do day workers.

In addition, night employment removes the printer
from normal family relationships.243 Conflicting schedules
tend to pull the printer toward his printer friends who also
have difficulty conforming to normal patterns of family
activities. Also of importance is the more leisurely pace
of night work as compared to that of day work. The relaxed
atmOSphere accompanying night employment greatly facilitates

socializing on the job.244

SOCIAL CHANGE
The subject of social change has been touched upon
at numerous points above. It will be recalled that economic

development was generally seen to have a liberalizing effect

73
upon social values, while bureaucratization generally was
seen to operate as a deterrent to social change. At another
point, Lipset stressed the desirability of the gradual intro-
duction of the lower classes into the electoral process.

In attempting to eXplain social change, Lipset occa-
sionally places great emphasis upon the effects of histori-
cally unique phenomena. Thus he interpreted the farmers'
socialist movement in Saskatchewan to be the result of long
years of subordination to eastern economic powers culminated
by the drought and depression. Likewise the confederation
movement of local unions in the early years of the ITU went
far in accounting for the emergence of divergent and indes-
tructible sources of power within the union.

At other times Lipset argues that complex social
characteristics are best considered to have multi-variate
causation and consequences. Thus the conditions leading
to and resulting from democracy were many and the inter—
relation between taose conditions was ascribed a complexity
which created many methodological difficulties for the
social researcher.

Regardless of whether he stresses unique or multi—
variate causation, however, he generally Operates within
the functionalist framework. He sees social systems opera-
ting within a dynamic equilibrium possessing the potential
of moving in numerous directions depending upon the influence

of the causative factors.

74

In closing, we may note that Lipset argues that
major social and political changes have led to either an
ideological convergence or an end to ideology--within the
Western democratic countries. (We noted above that Lipset
sees the ideological class struggle continuing in the under-

developed countries and on the international level.)

The characteristic pattern of stable Western democracies
in the mid-twentieth century is that they are in a "post-
politics" phase--that is, there is relatively little
difference between the democratic left and right, the
socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept
the welfare state. In large measure this situation
reflects the fact that in these countries he workers
have won their fight for full citizenship.

NOTES

7S

76

NOTES

1. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. xiv.
Hereafter designated as AS.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. The C.C.F. has in recent years formally joined
forces with certain labor organizations in Canada and now
is effective as a national political party known as the
N.D.P., the New Democratic Party.

4. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James
Coleman, Union Democrac (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
and Co., Inc. , 1962), p. 464. Hereafter designated as UD.

5. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social
Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday _and Co.,
Inc. , 1960), p. 10. Hereafter designated as PM.

6. Ibid., p. 9. 7. Ibid., p. 417.

8. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1951), pp. 126- 127:; as cited in Seymour Martin
Lipset, "Political Sociology," in Robert K. Merton, Leonard
Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (Eds. ), Sociology Toda :
Problems and Prospects (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959),
p. 33. This articlefifiereafter designated as PS.

9. Ibid., pp. 83-84. 10. Ibid., p. 84.

11. Ibid., p. 87. 12. PM, p. 30.
13. Ibid., p. 36. 14. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
15. Ibid., p. 30. 16. AS, p. xiv.

 

17. Gabriel A. Almond, in a review of Political Man
in6American Sociolo ical Review, Vol. 25, No. 5 (October,
19 O , p. 53

18. up, p. 441. 19. Ibid.

20. Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix,
Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), p. ix.
Hereafter designated as SM.

21. PM, p. 253. 22. Ibid., pp. 319-320.

23.
25.
27.
29.
31.
33.
35.
36.
38.
40.

Kommunismen

 

PM, o. 319. 24.
Ibid., p. 131. 26.
Ibid , p. 175. 28.
Ibid., p. 355. 30.
AS, p. 101. 32.
Ibid , p. 27. 34.
Ibid , pp. 120-121.

Ibid., p. 120. 37.
Ibid., p. 106. 39.

 

Ibid.,

 

Ibid.,

 

UD, p.
Ibid.,

PM. 99-

Ibid.,

Ibid.,

 

 

As quoted in Ibid., p. 106.

i Sverige.

77

pp. 323 ff.
p. 101.
354.
p. 136.
121-122.
p. 101.
115.
108.

p.
p.

See Sven Rydenfelt,

_ fig Samhallsvetenskaplig Studie.
(Kund3 Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1954).

Or see w.

Phillips Davison's extensive review of Sven Rydenfelt,

which appeared in the Public Opinion
(1954-55), pp. 375-388.

41.
43.
44.
46.
48.
50.
52.
54.
56.
58.
60.
62.
64.
66.
68.

UD, pp. 120-121.

.1219..
121s..
SM, p.
UD, p.
LEiQ-.
AS, p.

 

42.
pp. 121-122.
p. 158. 45.
203. 47.
pp. 88-89. 49.
90. 51.
p. 91. 53.
10. 55.
p. 71 57.
p. 70. 59.
p. 286. 61.
271. 63.
p. 270. 65.
p. 305. 67.
p 294. 69.

Ibid.,

 

 

 

 

uarterl ,
Quote is on p.

Vol. 18

p. 123.

pp. 153-157.

403.

p. 65.

. 232.

29.
221.

p.
p.
p. 251.
389.

290.

304.
270.

p.
p.
39.

70.
72.
74.
75.
77.
79.
81.
82.

78

PM, p 39. 71. PS, p. 108.

PM, o. 77. 73. UD, pp. 273-274.

Ibid., pp. 287-288.

PM, p. 77. 76. Ibid., p. 78.

‘IQLQ., p. 80. 78. UD, p. 282.

PM, p. 151. 80. .1p;g., p. 150.

Ibid., pp. 151-152.

Ibid., p. 216. See David Riesman, "Some Obser-

vations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power, " in Individualism

Reconsidered (Glencoe: The Free Press,

83.
85.
formit
1 55 , eSp.
86.
88.
89.
91.
93.
95.
96.
98.
100.
102.
104.
106.
108.
109.

110.

and

Ibid., p. 61.

Ibid. See Samuel
Civil Liberties (N
p. 9.

PM, p. 56.

 

 

1954), pp. 1 ‘ 5-

84. Ibid., p. 104.
A. Stouffer, Communism, Con-

ew York: Doubleday and Co. ,

87. Ibid., p. 202.

Ibid., pp. 202-203.

PS, p. 102. 90. PM, p. 173.
Ibid., p. 134. 92. Ibid., p. 132.
Ibid., p. 131. 94. ,Lgid., chap. V.
Almond, 22. 915., p. 753.
PM, p. 298. 97. Ibid., p. 368.
.121g., p. 238. 99. SM, p. 1.
PS, p. 85. 101. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
SM, p. 1 103. PM, p. 368.
SM, p. 64. 105. Ibid., pp. 265-266.
Ibid., p. 269. 107. .19;g., p. 273.
Ibid , pp. 14-16.
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
Ibid , pp. 1-2.

79
111. SM, 9. 77. 112. Ibid., p. 76.
113. Ibid., p. 77. 114. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

 

115. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
116. Ibid., p. 74. 117. Ibid., p. 65.

 

118. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

 

119. Ibid., p. 57. 120. Ibid., p. 60.
121. Ibid., p. 63. 122. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

 

 

 

123. Ibid., p. 11. 124. Ibid., p. 165.

 

 

125. As quoted in SM, p. 199. See P. F. Lazarsfeld,
Ju and und Beruf, Vol. 8 of uellen und Studien zur Jugend-
kunde (Jena: G. Fischer, 19 1 .

126. AS, p. 179.

127. Ibid., pp. 192-193. See also Robert Michels,
Political Parties (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 260-
262.

128. PM, pp. 243-244.
129. AS, p. 196. 130. Ibid., p. 198.
131. PM, p. 242. 132. Ibid., p. 248.

 

 

D.

133. Ibid., p. 64. 134. Ibi ., p. 66.

 

135. See Dewey Anderson and Percy Davidson, Ballots
d the Democratic Class Struggle (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
ersity Press, 19437.

136. pm, p. 220. 137. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

<

138. Ibid., p. 285. 139. UD, p. 14.

140. PM, p. 31.

141. Ibid., p. 34. See Manning Dauer, The Adams
Federalists (Baltimore: The Johns HOpkins Press, 19535.

142. SM, pp. 77-78. 143. UD, p. 239.
144. Ibid., pp. 246-247.

145. PM, pp. 232-236.

146. UD, p. 8. 147. .LQ;§., p. 240.

80

148. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Eds.),

Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1953), p. 13.

149. PM, p. 357.

150. See Robert S. Lynd, "Power in American Society
as Resource and Problem," in Arthur Kornhauser (ed.),
Problems 9; Power lfl American Society (Wayne State Univer-
sity Press, 19575, pp. 9-10; and Talcott Parsons, "The
Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics,
Vol. 10 (1957), p. 139.

151. PS, pp. 105-106. The internal quote is from
Parsons, _p. cit., p. 139.

152. Ibid., pp. 105-107.
153. Ibid., p. 106. 154. Ibid.

 

155. AS, p. 267. 156. PS, p. 92.
157. PM, p. 220. 158. PS, p. 92.
159. PM, pp. 306-307.

160. I;Qid., p. 182. 161. PS, p. 95.
162. PM, p. 218. 163. Ibid., p. 219.
164. Ibid., p. 179. 165. Ibid., p. 203.
166. ,1p;g., p. 205. 167. UD, p. 13.

 

168. Ibid., p. 8. 169. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
170. Ibid., p. 9. 171. Ibid.

 

172. Ibid., p. 10. 173. Ibid.

 

 

174. Ibid., p. 12. 175. Ibid., p. 464.

 

 

176. PM, p. 38. 177. UD, p. 274.
178. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

179. Ibid., p. 16.

180. PM, p. 259. 181. Ibid., p. 260.
182. UD, p. 288. 183. Ibid., p. 38.

 

 

184. See eSpecially fn. 6, pp. 40-41, UD.

193.
195.
196.

81
PM, pp. 230-201.
Ibid., p. 201. 187. UD, pp. 60-69.
Ibid., p. 64. 189. PM, p. 46.

 

Ibid., pp. 46-47.

 

Ibid., p. 74. 192. Ibid., p. 74.

 

 

Ibid., p. 75. 194. UD, p. 82.

 

Ibid., p. 85.

See eSpecially Bernard Barber, "Participation

and Mass Apathy in Associations," in A. W. Gouldner, (ed.),
Studies ig_Leadership (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp.

197.
198.

PM, p. 195.

As quoted in UD, p. 83. See Alexis de Tocque-

ville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. KnOpf, Inc.
1945), pp. 376-386? ' '

199.
200.

UD, pp. 29-32.

See eSpecially his article, "Political Socio-

logy," in Sociology Today (PS).

201.
203.
204.
206.
208.
209.
210.
212.
214.
216.
218.
219.

definitions
the same.

PM, p. 40. 202. UD, p. 292.
Ibid., pp. 18 ff.

 

H

bid., p. 412. 205. PM, p. 21.

 

Ibid., p. 22. 207. UD, p. 452.
PM, pp. 396-397.
Ibid., pp. 90-91.

 

Ibid., p. 91. 211. Ibid.

 

Ibid. * 213. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

 

 

Ibid., p. 330. 215. Ibid.

 

Ibid., p. 29. 217. Ibid., p. 27.
Ibid., p. 403.

Although Lipset advances many variously worded
of democracy, the ideas eXpressed are virtually

220.

221.
Part II.

222.
224.
226.

PM, p. 45.
PS, p. 92.
PM, p 128 223.
Ibid , p. 264. 225.

As quoted in Ibid., p. 114.

See also PS, pp. 92-98 and PM,

Ibid., p. 80.
Ibid., p. 212.

 

See Urie Bronfen-

brenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and
E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley

83:8,
Holt,
227.
229.
231.
232.
234.
236.
238.
239.
241.
242.
243.
244.

" in E.

Readin s in Social Psychology (New York:

1958), p. 419.

PM, p. 114. 228.

UD, p. 260. 230.

See PM, p. 31, fn. 17.

Ibid., p. 31. 233.
Ibid., p. 87. 235.
UD, p. 8. 237.
Ibid., p. 252.

UD, p. 171. 240.

,Lbig., pp. 186-187.
.191Q., p. 155.

Ibid., pp. 155-157.
245.

Ibid., p. 157.

 

Henry

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., p. 264.
Ibid., pp. 31-320

Ibid., pp. 232-236.
PM, pp. 249-252.

179.

 

PM, p. 92.

B IBL I OGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRA H

Almond, Gabriel A. A review of Political Man in American
Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 5 (October, 1960),
pp. 753-7540

Bendix, Reinhard and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.). Class,
Status and Power. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Agrarian Socialism. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1950.

. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.
Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960.

. "Political Sociology," in Robert K. Merton, 2; al.,
(eds.). Sociology Today: Problems and PrOSpects. New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959, pp. 81-114.

, and Reinhard Bendix. Social Mobility 1g Industrial
Societ . Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1960.

, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman. Union Democracy.
Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962.

Loomis, Charles P. Social Systems. Princeton, New Jersey:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960.

, and Zona K. Loomis. Modern Social Theories.
Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, Co., Inc., 1961.

APPENDIX

85

86

APPENDIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS:

Agrarian Socialism. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1950.

Class, Status and Power. (With Reinhard Bendix, eds.)
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.

Culture and Social Character. With Leo Lowenthal, eds.)
New York: The Free Press, 1961.

Labor and Trade Unions. (With Walter Galenson, eds.)
New York: John Wiley, 1960.

Pre'udice and Society. (With Earl Raab) New York: Anti-
Defamation League, 1959.

Political Man: The §pcial Bases of Politics. New York:
Doubleday, 1960.

Social Mobilit 1Q Industrial Society. (With Reinhard
Ben ix Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.

Sociolo : The Progress 9f1§ Decade. (With Neil Smelser,
eds.§ Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961.

Union Democrac . (With Martin Trow and James S. Coleman)
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953.

The United States gglg New Nation. Berkeley: Research Group
in Comparative Development, Institute of Industrial
Relations, University of California, 1962.

ARTICLES:

"An Aging POpulation in an Industrial Society: Sociological
ASpects," in Harold E. Jones, ed., Research 9p Aging
(Pacific Coast Committee on Old Age Research, Social

Science Research Council, 1950), pp. 63-66.

"American Intellectuals: Their Politic and Status," Daedalus,
88 (Summer 1959), pp. 460-486.

"The American Voter," Encounter (August 1956), pp. 55-62.

"Aristocracy in America," Commentary (December 1958), pp.
534-37.

"The British Voter," I, II, III, The New Leader (November
7 and 21, 1960; February 6, 1961).

"Bureaucracy and Social Reform," Proceedings of the Pacific
Coast Sociological Society, in Research Studies, State
College of Washington, 17 (1949), pp. 11-17.

(with Neil Smelser), "Change and Controversy in Recent
American Sociology," British Journal 2: Sociology, 12
(1961), pp. 41-51.

"A Changing American Character?" in S. M. Lipset and Leo
Lowenthal, eds., Culture and Social Character (New
York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 136-171.

(with Natalie Rogoff), "Class and Opportunity in EurOpe
and the U. 8.," Commentary (December 1954), pp. 562- 568.

"Comments on 'The Impact of Income Security Upon Individual
Freedom' by Barbara Wootton, " in James E. Russell, ed.,
National Poligies for Education, Health and Social
Services Gar en City: Doubleday and Co. 195 5), p .
ms. 04. ’

(with Hans Zetterberg), "A Comparative Study of Social
Mobility, Its Causes and Consequences, " PROD, Political
Research: Organization Design, 2 (September 1 5

pp. 7-11.

"Democracy and the Social System, " in Harry Eckstein and
Klaus Knorr, eds., Asgects Lf Internal War (tentative
title) (New York: The Free Press, forthcoming).

"Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism," American
Sociological Review, 24 (1959), pp. 482- 502.

"Democracy in Alberta," The Canadian Forum (November and
December 1954), pp. 175-177, 196-198.

"Democracy in Private Government " British Journal g;
Sociology (March 1952), pp. 47-

"Democracy in the International Typographical Union, " in
Yearbook of the American Philoso hical Societ , 1955,
(Philadelphia: 195 , pp. 211-218.

"The Department of Sociology," in R. Gordon Hoxie, 25 al.,
History Lf the Faculty Lf Political Science, Columbia

University+(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955),
pp. 284- 303.

88

"The Egghead Looks at Himself," New York Times Magazine
(November 17, 1957), pp. 22, 104-107.

"Equal or Better in America, " Columbia University Forum,
4 (Spring 1961), pp. 17- 21 (earlier version published
as "A Conflict of American Ideals, " The Listener,
November 10, 1960, pp. 821- 823.

"Estratificacao e Politica nos Estadoes 4Unidos, " Revista de
Direito Publicae Ciencia Politica,4 (1961), pp. 83—_
104}

"European Traditions and American Sociology," Commentary
(December 1955), pp. 568-570.

(with F. T. Malm), “First Jobs and Career Patterns," American
Journal of Economics and Sociology (April 1955), pp.

"The Fuss About the Eggheads," Encounter (April 1957), pp.
17-21.

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Ideological Equalitarianism and
Social Mobility in the United States, " in Transactions
9; the Second World Congress Lf Sociology, II (London:
Izternational Sociological Association, 1954), pp. 34-
5

"Harriet Martineau's America: An Introductory Essay,"
Introduction to Societ in America by Harriet Martineau,
ed. by S. M. Lipset (Neww York: Doubleday- Anchor, 1962).

(with R. Bendix and F. T. Malm), "Job Plans and Entry into
She Labor Market, " Social Forces (March 1955), pp. 224-
33.

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Karl Marx’ Theory of Social Classes,"
in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., Class, Staggg and
2.9.1132: pp. 26‘45 o

"The Law and Trade Union Democracy, " Virginia Law Review,
47 (1961), pp. 1- 50.

"Leadership and New Social Movements, " in Alvin w. Gouldner,
ed., Studies in Leadershi (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1950), pp. 34? 362.

"Michels' Theory of Political Parties," Introduction to
Political Parties by Robert Michels (New York: Collier
Paperbacks, 1962).

(with Joan Gordon), "Mobility and Trade Union Membership,“
in Class, Status and Power, pp. 491-500.

89

"Opinion Formation in a Crisis Situation," Public QQinigB
Qparterly (Spring 1953), pp. 20-46,

 

"Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups,"
European Journal 9; Sociolo , 1 (1960), pp. 50-85.

"The Political Animal: Genus Americanus " Public Opinion
Quarterlz, 23 0959-30), pp. 575 SE. """"‘

"Political Participation and the Organization of the COOpera-
tive Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan," Canadian
Journal 9; Economics and Political Science (May 1§58$,
pp. 191-208.

"The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical
Statement," in Morroe Berger, 2; al., eds., Freedom and
Control 3Q Modern Societ (New York: D. Van Nostrand
Company, 19555, pp. 8 -1 4.

 

"Political Sociology," in Robert K. Merton, et al.& Sgciolggy

Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 81-11

 

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Political Sociology - A Trend Report
and Bibliography," Egrrent Sociology, (1957), pp. 79-
169.

"Political Sociology 1945-1955," in Hans Zetterberg, ed.,
Sociolo in The U.S.A. (Paris: UNESCO, 1956), pp.
33-55.

"Polling and Science," Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science (May lgzg), pp. 237:250.

"Polling and Science II," Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science (August 1950), pp. 323:429.

(with Nathan Glazer), "The Polls on Communism and Conformity,"
in Daniel Bell, ed., The New Ameriggg Right (New York:
Criterion Books, 1955;, pp. 141-165.

(with Paul Lazarsfeld, A. Barton and J. Linz), "The Psychology
of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in
Gardner Lindzey, ed., Handbook 9: Social Ps cholo , II
(Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 15555, pp. 112%-
11 5.

"The Radical Right," British Journal 2; Sociologz (June
1955), pp. 176-209.

(with Martin Trow), "Reference Group Analysis and Trade
Union Wage Policy," in Mirra Komarovsky and Paul Lazars-
feld, eds., Common Frontiers in Social Sciences
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 19577, pp. 391-511.

90

"Religion in America," Columbia University Forum (Winter
1958—1959), pp. 17-210

"The Rural Community and Political Leadership in Saskatchewan,"
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science

(August 1947), ppt‘h1o-428.

"Socialism - Left and Riiht - East and West," Confluence
(Summer 1958), pp. 1 3-192.

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Social Mobility and Occupational
Career Patterns: I, Stability of Job Holdin 3," American
Journal 9; Sociology (January 1952), pp. 36 -374.

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Social Mobility and Occupational
Career Patterns: II, Social Mobility," American Journal
2: Sociology (March 1952), pp. 494-503.

"Social Mobility and Urbanization," Rural Sociology (Sept.-
Dec. 1955), pp. 220-228.

(with R. Bendix and F. T. Malm), "Social Origins and Occu-
pational Career Patterns," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (January 1954), pp. 255-251.

"Social Status and Prejudice," Commentary (May 1950), pp.
475-479.

(with Reinhard Bendix), "Social Status and Social Structure:
A Re-Examination of Data and Interpretation, I,"

British Journal 2; Sociolo (June 1951) pp. 150-168;
Ibid. (September 19515, II, pp. 230-254.,

"Social Stratification and Ri ht-Wing Extremism " British
Journal gg‘ggciology, 10 1959), pp. 346-38 .

"Social Stratification and the Analysis of American Society,"
The Voice of America Forum Lectures, Behavioral Science

Series 13 (washington: 19515, pp. 1-10 (separate
pamphlefy.

"A Sociologist Looks at History," Pacific Sociological
Review (Spring 1958), pp. 13-17.

“Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Political
Science Review (March 1959), pp. 69-105.

"Some Statistics on Bigotry in Voting," Commentary, 30
(1960), pp. 286-290.

"The Sources of the 'Radical Right'," in Daniel Bell, ed.,
The New American Right (New York: Criterion Books,
19557, pp. 165-234.

91

"Stability in the Midst of Change," in The Social Welfare

Forum&-T1959 (:{ew York: Columbia University Press, 1959),
pp. 1

 

"The Surprising Effect of McCarthyism on 'The Academic
Mind'," Columbia University Forum (Fall 1958), pp.
25-29.

"Le syndicalisme americaine et les valeurs de la societe
americaine," Sociologie g2 Travail, 2 (1961), pp. 161-
181.

(with Hans Zetterberg), "A Theory of Social Mobility," in
Transactions of The Third World Congress of Sociology,

Vol. III (London: International Sociological Association,
1956), op. 155-177.

(with Martin Trow and James S. Coleman), "Trade Union
Democracy and Secondary Organization," in William
Petersen, ed., American Social Patterns: Five Studies
(New York: Anchor Books, 1955), pp. 171- 218.

(with Daniel Bell) issue editor and co-author of introductory
and concluding essays, "Trade Unions and Minority
Problems, " Journal of Social Issues, Vol. IX, No. l

1953)

"Trade Unions and Social Structure: A Comparative Analysis,"
Industrial Relations, 1 (1961), pp. 75-09.

"Trends in American Society," in An Outline of Man's Knowledge

of the Modern World, Lyman Bryson, ed. (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1950), pp. 389-417.

"The Two Party System in the I.T.U.," Labor and Nation
(Fall 1950), pp. 33-45.

‘“$T" 3
‘J'Ix

$1117.