SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGIST

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By

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warrants special mention for serving as my major professor
and for his assistance in the development of this thesis.
My indebtedness to Seymour Martin Lipset of the University
of California at Berkeley will soon be apparent to the
reader. Although I have not yet had the privilege of meeting
Dr. Lipset, it's possible his influence is greatest of all.

PREFACE

In their book, <u>Modern</u> <u>Social</u> <u>Theories</u>, Charles P. and
Zona Loomis took a first step prerequisite to the standardi-
zation of theoretical concepts within the discipline of
sociology. There they examined the theoretical contributions
of seven of the Twentieth Century's major social theorists.
They proceeded by utilizing a model called the Processually
Articulated Structural Model, or in briefer and more manage-
able form, the PAS Model. This model is the result of years
of endeavor on the part of Dr. Loomis. The PAS Model is a
taxonomic scheme which facilitates the organization of mul-
titudinous theoretical conceptualizations in order to allow
systematic point by point comparisons between them.

The underlying assumption upon which the model is
built is that the elements and processes specified are
requisite to the functioning of social systems. In other
words, a thorough analysis of the functioning of any and
all social systems would require the theorist to be cognizant
of these various elements and processes, <u>call</u> <u>them</u> <u>what</u> <u>he</u> <u>may</u>.

The model was designed to take into account both the
static and dynamic aspects of social systems. The specified
elements provide for the structural aspects while the ele-
mental and master or comprehensive processes provide for
the functional aspects of social systems. Elemental pro-
cesses are intended to account for or explain the operation

of individual elements, while the master or comprehensive processes are intended to explain the dynamic interrelationships between elements.

The model also takes into consideration three of the primary conditions of social action. These are elements which are never completely within society's control and, to the extent to which they are not controlled, therefore operate as conditions to social action.

The author of this paper has utilized the PAS Model to aid in the examination of some of the theoretical contributions of one of the world's most reputable and controversial sociologists. The author makes no claim to have examined all the writings of Seymour Martin Lipset, and a glance at his partial bibliography in the Appendix will go far in explaining why he didn't do so. He has, however, examined rather thoroughly and systematically the major books which Lipset has authored--either singly or jointly. Perhaps the most important reading not examined is his most recent monograph, The United States as a New Nation.

Because of his primary interest in political sociology, certain of the PAS Model categories have been emphasized by Lipset to the relative neglect of others. The categories of Ranking, Controlling, and Norming therefore will be given more attention than others.

Although this paper in itself holds value for students of sociology, it is probably the case that it holds most utility as a supplement to the chapters on the other seven

theorists considered in _Modern Social Theories_. The reader is also guided to Charles P. Loomis' _Social Systems_ for the initial development of the PAS Model.

Inasmuch as this is an intensive examination of Lipset's sociological writings, this author has felt obligated to allow Lipset to speak oftentimes (and occasionally at length) for himself. It should also be pointed out to the reader that the author has interpreted his primary role to to be that of placing Lipset's theory in terms of the PAS Model--not extensively criticizing that theory.

Now it remains only to explain the referent "we" found occasionally in the text. That is not merely an "editorial we." Dr. Loomis invited this author to examine Lipset's contributions to social theory with the thought of potential publication under joint authorship with the Loomises. Therefore the "we" is used in anticipation of a future, potential publication. Although Dr. Loomis has advised in the writing as it now stands, the author accepts full responsibility for all that follows.

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INTRODUCTION

In reading Lipset, one soon recognizes that the values and beliefs of Lipset, "the man in society," have established guidelines for Lipset, "the student of society." It is not our intent in noting this to cast doubt upon the objectivity of one of America's foremost sociologists, but it is necessary to recognize that all social scientists (and other scientists as well) are to some degree influenced as professionals by their values held as members of society. The rather obvious link between his avowed support of the "democratic socialist movement"[1] and the very topics he has chosen for study therefore warrants our mentioning. His first major publication focused upon a study of "the first electorally successful North American socialist movement,"[2] the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.)[3] of Saskatchewan, Canada. Union Democracy, written with co-authors Martin Trow and James Coleman, was specifically "aimed at identifying the factors which make for and sustain democracy in private organizations."[4] Political Man, wherein Lipset has set forth his "basic intellectual concerns and personal values more fully"[5] than in previous publications, centers about a study of

> democracy as a characteristic of social systems. The principal topics discussed are the conditions necessary for democracy in societies and organizations; the factors which affect men's participation in politics, particularly their behavior as voters; and the sources

of support for values and movements which sustain or
threaten democratic institutions.[6]

As can be seen, his studies have focused upon the operation

of democracy, especially as manifested in the English

speaking and Western European countries.

In Political Man, Lipset concludes by denying that the

end of ideology is at hand and by offering a perhaps over-

rationalistic justification for his sociological endeavors.

He contends that there will be no complete attenuation of

the ideological class struggle. Such struggles will continue

in the underdeveloped countries of the world and at the

international level.

> It is only the ideological class struggle within the
> West which is ending. Ideological conflicts linked to
> levels and problems of economic development and of
> appropriate political institutions among different
> nations will last far beyond our life-time, and men
> committed to democracy can abstain from them only at
> their peril. To aid men's actions in furthering demo-
> cracy in then absolutist Europe was in some measure
> Tocqueville's purpose in studying the operation of
> American society in 1830. To clarify the operation of
> Western democracy in the mid-twentieth century may con-
> tribute to the political battle in Asia and Africa.[7]

By now it should be abundantly clear that Lipset is

primarily a political sociologist. He may also be considered

to be among the ranking students of social stratification

and industrial sociology.

The difficulties inherent in a study of politics are

many and complex, a fact which has not been properly

appreciated--especially by political scientists. Lipset

has joined Talcott Parsons in criticizing the narrow theo-

retical approach of political scientists. He quotes the

following from Parsons in support of the argument that the
study of politics cannot be

> treated in terms of a specifically specialized con-
> ceptual scheme . . . precisely for the reason that the
> political problem of the social system is a focus for
> the integration of all of its analytically distinguished
> components, not of a specially differentiated class of
> these components.[8]

Parsons' emphasis upon the <u>integration</u> of "analytically
distinguished components" serves to introduce two important
matters at this time. First, it will not be possible for
the authors of this paper to consider a particular PAS Model
element (an "analytically distinguished component") in the
complete absence of references to other elements. It will
be necessary to occassionally refer to that presented in
preceding sections and/or to anticipate that which will be
stressed in subsequent sections. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, Parsons' emphasis upon integration serves to intro-
duce Lipset's concern with the securing and maintenance of
a proper balance between conflict and consensus within
society.

The necessity for the maintenance of a proper balance
between conflict and consensus within society is a central
theme in Lipset's writings. He has noted that "although
the central concern of the study of politics is the problem
of consensus and cleavage, sociologists until fairly
recently have been much more involved in studying the con-
ditions facilitating cleavage than studying the requisites
of political consensus."[9] As a rule, social theorists

have overemphasized one of the aspects to the relative
neglect of the other.

Karl Marx was of course most responsible for over-
emphasizing conflict or cleavage. For him, conflict and
consensus were entirely dissociated, as Lipset has observed:

> To Marx, conflict and consensus were alternatives
> rather than divergent tendencies that could be balanced
> within a society. On the one hand, he projected con-
> sensus, harmony, and integration into the communist
> future . . . ; on the other hand, in the span of history
> between the ancient primitive communism and the coming
> success of the proletarian revolution, conflict or
> absolutism prevails, and class struggle is the great
> fact of history.[10]

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first to stress the
balance between conflict and consensus within a democratic
social system, and Lipset is probably the most ardent con-
temporary supporter of this thesis.

> At first glance, Tocqueville's theory seems to be
> similar to Marx's on the formal level in that both men
> emphasized the solidarity of social units and the
> necessity for conflict among these units. (For Marx
> the units were classes; for Tocqueville, they were
> local communities and voluntary organizations.) How-
> ever, Tocqueville, unlike Marx, deliberately chose to
> emphasize the positive political aspects of social units
> which could maintain political cleavage and political
> consensus at the same time.[11]

Together with Marx and Tocqueville, two other classi-
cal social theorists have, in Lipset's view, "established
the basic concerns of modern political sociology."[12] Those
two are Max Weber and Robert Michels. Both were primarily
concerned with the relationships between bureaucracy and
democracy.

Weber saw bureaucratization as an inevitable element
of industrialized societies, rather capitalistic or

socialistic in character. He feared that the growth of the centralized bureaucratic state would lead to the decline of democracy.[13] Socialism, for Weber, was simply "the extension of bureaucratic authority to the entire society, resulting in a 'dictatorship of the bureaucrats' rather than of the proletariat."[14]

Michels saw oligarchy as inherent in large scale organization, even those founded on democratic principles.

> He pointed to the advantages of control over organizations for the incumbent leaders, to the political incapacity of rank-and-file members, to the causes of their apathy, and to the pressures on leaders to perpetuate themselves in office. And he saw the pattern of oligarchy within bureaucratic socialist parties extended to the society governed by such parties.[15]

Lipset traces his intellectual development primarily to three former teachers and colleagues at Columbia University: Paul Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, and Robert Merton. He admits major debts to his colleagues, Juan Linz and Reinhard Bendix. His writings reflect a thorough knowledge of the contributions of Tocqueville, Aristotle, and such classical sociological theorists as Marx, Weber, Michels, and Durkheim. In his own words, as reported early in his career,

> My own theoretical framework is derived largely from the sociologists who have been concerned with problems of power, influence, class, organization, social change, and functional analysis. . . . I have not integrated the various theoretical systems into one system. The task of developing and integrating a systematic sociology is one which the entire discipline faces and which few persons pretend to have resolved.[16]

It would appear that Lipset still subscribes to the same viewpoint. If it may be said however, that he has one

underlying theoretical orientation, then he is essentially

a functionalist--in Merton's sense of the term.

Gabriel A. Almond, in a review of <u>Political</u> <u>Man</u>, was

critical of Lipset's "haste in theoretical formulation and

in the interpretation of findings." In elaboration, Almond

continued that:

> Perhaps an explanation for Lipset's haste may be found
> in the cross pressures which his intellectual heritage
> imposes on him. Struggling within him is a Weber-
> Parsons-Merton theoretical impulse, a Lazarsfeld
> methodological impulse, and a Lynd impulse toward
> significance and relevance. An harmonious accomodation
> of these cross-pressures is difficult to attain, and it
> is to Lipset's credit that he constantly seeks to attain
> it, and so often succeeds.[17]

Lipset is not one to ignore the utility of historical

analysis, as many contemporary sociologists do. Historical

analysis assumes a position of vital importance in each of

his major works. In Lipset's opinion, sociological analysis

tends to present a static picture, "a description which

shows the process at work within the going system, but not

the process which enabled the system to reach more or less

stable equilibrium."[18] Further justifying the role of

historical analysis, he called attention to the interplay

between historical and sociological analyses.

> By thus viewing the system as being in an equilibrium
> which at any point in time has a certain stability,
> but which could have moved in different directions if
> some of the factors in the situation had occurred
> differently, we can see the need to deal with historical
> materials. It remains for the historical analysis of
> events which were unique to the ITU [the International
> Typographical Union, the subject of study in <u>Union</u>
> <u>Democracy</u>] to indicate which factors favored the emer-
> gence and stability of ITU democracy at different points
> in time, and to specify the crucial junction points at
> which new elements entered the situation.[19]

In recent years, Lipset has turned increasingly towards secondary analysis, "the study of specific problems through analysis of existing data which were originally collected for other purposes."[20] He has utilized IBM decks loaned him by individual scholars, governmental agencies, public opinion polling agencies, etc., to great advantage. Aside from the obvious pragmatic advantages--especially the economic--Lipset's qualitative and quantitative successes further testify to the virtues of secondary analysis.

ELEMENTS AND ELEMENTAL PROCESSES

KNOWING

Belief (knowledge) as an element. The element of belief seems to be implicitly incorporated within a number of central concepts utilized by Lipset. Such concepts as legitimacy, ideological equalitarianism, authoritarianism, and the conceptual ideologies of "left," "right," and "center"--as applied to both democratic and antidemocratic groups--are all concepts which to some degree incorporate the cognitive aspect. Yet most of these concepts may be more appropriately presented in sections following. Lipset especially utilizes the term "belief" in dealing with that which is part of the PAS Model evaluative processes of Norming and Ranking.

Cognitive mapping and validation as process. The genesis of many beliefs may be traced to a social reality of the historical past. Such beliefs are occassionally perpetuated even after the social realities have been altered.

Thus it is that beliefs contrary to reality exert their
influence upon social behavior.

> . . . American workers tend to vote for mildly reformist
> parties, while European workers normally vote socialist
> or Communist. Supposedly living in an open-class
> society, with a developing economy which continually
> creates new jobs above the manual-labor level, the
> American worker is presumably more likely to believe
> in individual opportunity. His European counterpart,
> accepting the image of a closed-class society which
> does not even pretend to offer the worker a chance to
> rise, is impelled to act collectively for social change.
> While these sterotypes of the relative degree of social
> mobility in Europe and America do not correspond to
> reality, their acceptance may well affect voting.[21]

Lipset sees the liberalism of intellectuals throughout
the world to be partially accounted for by the very concepts
utilized by the scientist[22] and the intellectual's greater
awareness of the power dimension of society.[23] Another
factor contributing to the American intellectual's liberalism
is his perceived status inferiority. What is particularly
interesting at this point is the fact that although numerous
polls reveal that he is accorded relatively high status by
his fellow citizens,[24] the American intellectual persists
in believing that he is deprived of status justly earned.
Other factors contributing especially to the liberalism of
American intellectuals will be examined below.

Lipset has noted that "each major social stratum has
both democratic and extremist political expressions."[25]
It may well be that Lipset has not adequately set forth the
factors which account for the differential response of
individuals or groups within the various strata. He has
emphasized, however, that "the specific propensity of given

social strata to support either extremist or democratic
political parties . . . cannot be predicted from a knowledge
of their psychological predispositions or from attitudes
inferred from survey data."[26] Elsewhere he has said that
"Extremist movements have much in common. They appeal to
the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the
personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically
insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian
persons at every level of the society."[27] In short, extremist
movements have their roots in crises experienced and shared
by individuals and collectivities, whatever their class
position.

FEELING

Sentiment as an element. It is primarily "the dif-
ference between liberal or radical and conservative orien-
tations, in the usual meaning of these terms,"[28] which
accounts for the historic ideological cleavage and its per-
sistence within the ITU. These dispositional differences
seem to stem from the unique backgrounds and experiences of
the individual union members--sources outside the union
itself. This goes far in explaining the differences in the
saliency of the dispositions among union members. The
authors of Union Democracy have called this saliency of the
liberal or conservative attitudes "ideological sensitivity."[29]
We will examine below the manner in which social context
exerts influence upon the individual's union vote independent
of his disposition toward liberalism or conservatism.

The printer's job satisfaction has been an important factor accounting for a high degree of both formal and informal association among printers. "If men like and are interested in their work, they will be more likely than those who dislike the work to associate with others in the occupation."[30] This high degree of intra-shop and intra-occupational association has played a major role in the persistence of the two-party system within the ITU.

Sentiments deriving from extreme hardships may easily persist long after the disappearance of the hardships, as the following quotation illustrates. Lipset was writing of his research experiences in the late 1940's, quite some time after the drought and depression years of the 1930's.

> Saskatchewan is riding the crest of the economic and climatic cycles, but it is still thinking in terms of the 'thirties. As one interviews the residents of rural Saskatchewan today, one cannot help being impressed by their ever-present fear that prosperity will not last, that a new drought or depression will set them back again. At farmers' conventions, at "bull sessions" in the local stores, the discussion always turns to the control of wheat prices, to crop insurance, and to the politicians who are believed to have power to prevent another catastrophe.[31]

In the section following on *Tension management*, we will note that extremist religion and authoritarian political attitudes both stem from the same social forces. Even more paradoxically, the same social forces may lead to apathy, which may be seen as a lack of sentiment and involvement.

> The same underlying factors which predispose individuals toward support of extremist movements under certain conditions may result in total withdrawal from political activity and concern under other conditions. In "normal" periods, apathy is most frequent among such individuals,

but they can be activated by a crisis, especially if it is accompanied by strong millennial appeals.[32]

Tocqueville long ago warned of the dangers of apathy. He was among the first to advocate a "pluralistic" political system, one which would allow an interplay of conflict and consensus. It was his fear that the continued rationalization of society and the centralization of governmental authority would destroy the social bases sustaining conflict and that the resultant apathy would undermine consensus. Drawing from Tocqueville, Lipset notes that

> . . . consensus as well would be undermined in the mass society. The atomized individual, left alone without membership in a politically significant social unit, would lack sufficient interest to participate in politics or even simply to accept the regime. Politics would be not only hopeless but meaningless. Apathy undermines consensus, and apathy was the attitude of the masses toward the state which Tocqueville saw as the outcome of an industrial bureaucratic society.[33]

Tension management as process. In his writings, Lipset has especially concerned himself with the concept of authoritarianism. This refers to the tendency of individuals[34]

> to view politics and personal relationships in black-and-white terms, a desire for immediate action, an impatience with talk and discussion, a lack of interest in organizations which have a long-range perspective, and a readiness to follow leaders who offer a demonological interpretation of the evil forces (either religious or political) which are conspiring against him.[35]

Lipset sees authoritarianism as an adaptive mechanism resorted to especially by those experiencing frustration as a result of their low position in the stratification system. The social base of authoritarianism rests primarily in

the lower classes and stems directly from the normal life
experiences of lower class individuals.

> . . . the lower-class individual is likely to have been
> exposed to punishment, lack of love, and a general
> atmosphere of tension and aggression since early child-
> hood--all experiences which tend to produce deep-rooted
> hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudice, political
> authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational
> religion. His educational attainment is less than
> that of men with higher socioeconomic status . . .
> Leaving school relatively early, he is surrounded on the
> job by others with a similarly restricted cultural,
> educational, and family background. Little external
> influence impinges on his limited environment. From
> early childhood, he has sought immediate gratifications,
> rather than engaged in activities which might have long-
> term rewards . . .[36]

The complex psychological basis of authoritarianism
is to be found in the components of an unsophisticated
perspective: "greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of
past and future (lack of a prolonged time perspective),
inability to take a complex view, greater difficulty in
abstracting from concrete experience, and lack of imagination
(inner 'reworking' of experience)."[37] Many students are
agreed that these components are characteristic of low
status individuals.

The social base of extremist religion also rests in
the lower classes. This suggests that both authoritarianism
and extremist religions are products of the same social
forces.[38] Lipset suggests that fundamentalist religious
sects, rather than operating as centers of political protest,

> drain off the discontent and frustration which would
> otherwise flow into channels of political extremism.
> The point here is that rigid fundamentalism and dogma-
> tism are linked to the same underlying characteristics,

attitudes, and predispositions which find another out-
let in allegiance to extremist political movements.[39]

Lipset draws from Sven Rydenfelt in support of this
position. Rydenfelt, after conducting social research in
Sweden, concluded that "The Communists and the religious
radicals, as for instance, the Pentecostal sects, seem to be
competing for the allegiance of the same groups."[40]

Communication of sentiment. The authors of Union
Democracy stressed three factors which operated to increase
both the formal and informal associations among printers.
All three factors are directly related to the process of
communication of sentiment.

Probably the most important factor is the status
marginality of printers. Historically, printers have been
accorded high status among manual workers, due primarily to
the necessary prerequisite of literacy among printers.[41]
Despite the status gains of other occupational groups,
printers still maintain a high status image of themselves.[42]
Thus printers perceive themselves as being on the margin--
not as members of the middle-class but among the most skilled
and prestigeful within the ranks of manual workers.

> Everything that we know about the operation of status
> distinctions indicates that these distinctions are in
> large measure maintained by persons with a claim to
> high status refusing to associate with persons who are
> defined as being lower. While the printers presumably
> will tend to reject other manual workers, middle-class
> persons may tend to reject printers as friends since
> they are manual workers. In addition, association
> with middle-class persons may be difficult for some
> printers since it may mean mingling with people whose
> educational and cultural level is higher than their own.

Consequently printers will tend to associate more with each other than will workers who do not possess this ambiguous status.[43]

The intraoccupational association among printers is also increased by the union's substitute system. The daily hiring of substitutes to meet the irregular and fluctuating work loads common throughout much of the printing industry is carried out through a lottery. Each substitute draws a numbered ball in order to determine who will work on any particular shift. Thus all substitutes are encouraged to be present for work every day and, if sufficiently pressed financially, for every shift. If, however, a printer is ill or decides to take a day off, he chooses his own replacement. Therefore "a substitute's chances for employment are directly related to the number of friends that he has among regular situation holders."[44]

Finally, the fact that a high proportion of printers work night hours decreases their opportunities to associate with individuals working more regular hours and at the same time forces printers to associate among themselves in their leisure-time activities.[45]

ACHIEVING

End, goal or objective as an element. Although it will be anticipating a subsequent section, it must here be noted that one consequence of the system of stratification is a differential definition of goals. Stratification studies suggest that "inherent in the very existence of a stratification order, of higher and lower valuations of

social positions, is the motivation to move up in the social structure if one's position is low, or to retain one's position if it is high."[46]

Thus it is that goal conflict is inherent in social organization. Democracy, to Lipset, is the best mechanism yet developed for resolving the conflicting goals of interest groups. In _Political Man_, Lipset expressed at least a partial value judgment when he stated that "A basic premise of this book is that democracy is not only or even primarily a means through which different groups can attain their ends or seek the good society; it is the good society itself in operation."[47]

It is only natural that a political sociologist such as Lipset would view political action as a major means of goal achieving. Throughout his writings, Lipset has dealt extensively with goal conflicts and the means by which such conflicts are transcended and resolved through consensus.

Goal _attaining_ _and_ _concomitant_ "_latent_" _activity_ _as_ _process_. One primary means by which conflict is overcome or lessened is through multiple group affiliation and the resultant "cross-pressures." Lipset has devoted much of his research time to a study of cross-pressures. The desirability of establishing and sustaining pluralistic societies lies in the fact that cross-pressures make more probable the proper balance between conflict and consensus.

> The available evidence suggests that the chances for
> stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups

and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict."[48]

Here also economic development plays a particularly important role in that it increases "the lower classes' exposure to cross-pressures which reduce their commitment to given ideologies and make them less receptive to extremist ones."[49]

The latent political functions of secondary organizations were especially stressed in Union Democracy. Those functions are essentially two in number: "the external power functions, by which they may oppose the power of the central body, and the internal functions of increasing the political involvement of their own members."[50] These two different functions may be performed by one and the same social organization or by different organizations, or one function may be fulfilled to the relative neglect of the other. In many respects, the urban society of the United States represents a type of mass society in which the first function is fulfilled but the second is not. Voluntary associations in the United States do indeed provide countervailing sources of power to fulfill the first function, but they operate as primary groups for only the small interested and active nucleus of the membership of most organizations. As Lipset, et al., have expressed it: "Social relations within the groups which exercise important pressure in politics are often attenuated."[51]

Due primarily to factors of size and the institution-
alized decentralization of power, the ITU is able to ade-
quately perform both functions whereas most unions and
voluntary associations fail to perform either one or the
other.[52]

Lipset has also devoted much study to "leftist"
movements, especially those taking place within democratic
societies and consequently through democratic means. Leftist
voting is seen to be a response to three primary "group
needs."

> 1. The need for security of income . . .
> 2. The need for satisfying work--work which provides
> the opportunity for self-control and self-expression
> and which is free from arbitrary authority.
> 3. The need for status, for social recognition of
> one's value and freedom from degrading discrimination
> in social relations.[53]

A review of North American agrarian protest movements
reveals that "it was the economic and climatically vulnerable
wheat belt that formed the backbone of all the protest
movements, from the Independent parties of the 1870's down
to the contemporary C.C.F. in Canada."[54] Economically, the
one crop wheat belt, which extends through western Canada
and the United States, is vulnerable in that it is dependent
upon a fluctuating international market and the monopolistic
business practices of the East. It is not absolute poverty
as such, but rather the "chronic alternation" between the
two extremes that brought about the leftist tendency.
Saskatchewan did not follow the normal pattern whereby
agrarian radicalism is followed in a few decades by political

and economic conservatism. "The oscillating character of the Saskatchewan economy went far toward preventing the emergence of an integrated, conservative rural society."[55]

It is to be noted that the Socialist Movement of the C.C.F. grew as a latent consequence of the political and cooperative efforts of Saskatchewan wheat farmers to achieve economic stability.

> To sum up, the first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed the creation of a powerful, organized, class-conscious agrarian movement in Saskatchewan. The wheat farmer, who was situated at the producing start and the consuming end of a highly organized and often monopolistic distribution system, became convinced that he, as the primary producer of wealth, was being exploited by "vested interests." He developed hostile class attitudes to big business, to the newspapers, which he believed served the "interests," and to merchants. As a result, a large proportion of the farming population supported an agrarian socialistic program designed to eliminate private profits by governmental or cooperative action before an explicitly socialist party appeared upon the scene.[56]

Contrary to general opinion, "democratic reform governments are more a result than a cause of social change."[57] Once in office, a democratic reform government is faced with the continual problems of maintaining electoral support and operating through a bureaucracy established by another government with other interests. Thus it is only natural that such reform governments gradually if not immediately give way to bureaucratic conservatism. The growing conservatism of reform movements seems to be characteristic of "trade-unions, cooperatives, and left-wing political parties" everywhere.[58] The necessity of maintaining electoral support is an especially effective deterrent to social change.

The need of a democratic government to retain the support of a majority of the electorate is a powerful weapon in the hands of groups that wish to prevent social change. Any drastic change in basic institutions may endanger the popular support of the government. Socialist governments, therefore, have followed the path of least resistance, instituting reforms that meet the least opposition from entrenched interests.[59]

In elaborating this important point Lipset drew heavily from both Weber and Michels, among others, concluding that

Organizations are always started as means of attaining certain value ends. However, organizations become ends in themselves, which often are obstacles in the achievement of the original goals. This does not mean that organized social effort does not secure many of the value ends that it was set up to achieve . . . Gradually, however, every large-scale social organization falls victim to the virus of bureaucratic conservatism, and to the fear that a further challenge to the _status quo_ will injure its power and status . . .[60]

NORMING

Norm as an element. Of all the PAS Model elements, that of norms is one of the most important for Lipset. The norms of legitimacy, tolerance, bureaucratic political neutrality, and conformity have been of special importance for him.

That norms constitute an important factor in the determination of behavior is reflected in the following:

One would expect that . . . trade unionists . . . would behave differently within the different value systems which characterize different social structures. An American trade-union operating within the American social structure, with its emphasis on individual achievement, the right of each individual to equality with others, and the norm of democracy, should behave differently from a German union working within the context of a more rigid status system, with greater acceptance of the leadership role, with less concern

for the right of the individual compared to the group,
and with presumed less emphasis on the norm of democratic
control. Similarly, the behavior of two American trade-
unions should vary with the composition of their member-
ships, in so far as the difference in membership is
reflected in different weights and distributions of
the crucial norms regarding authority and democracy.[61]

Lipset has never accepted Robert Michel's "iron law
of oligarchy" as a completely deterministic "law." Early
in his professional career, in a paragraph that anticipated
the writing of Union Democracy, he implied that such a rigid
formulation neglected normative alternatives.

> The justified concern with the dangers of oligarchic
> or bureaucratic domination has, however, led many per-
> sons to ignore the fact that it does make a difference
> to society which set of bureaucrats controls its destiny.
> There are bureaucracies and bureaucracies . . . Bureau-
> crats are human beings, not automatons. The desire to
> maintain a given bureaucratic organization is only one
> of the complex series of factors determining their
> actions . . . A deterministic theory of bureaucratic
> behavior, such as that advanced by Robert Michels or
> James Burnham, neglects the implications of an alter-
> native pattern of bureaucratic response.[62]

Within the ITU, the norm of opposition legitimacy
goes far in countering the "iron law." Opposition legitimacy
functions within the ITU in spite of the fact that the union
constitution specifically prohibits formation of opposition
parties.[63] The informal ascription of opposition legitimacy
has important consequences for the political system. The
acceptance of opposition "as right and proper both by the
men it is striving to dislodge and by some large proportion
of the membership"[64] of the ITU assures the opposition of
access to the membership through both formal and informal
channels of communication. Thus the party in power

exercises no absolute monopoly over channels of communica-
tion, as is the case in most trade-unions.

Contrary to the common belief that "internal party
democracy is incompatible with union strength,"[65] it is the
case that "discontent works to maintain the party system
by ensuring turnover in office, while at the same time
serving to strengthen rather than undermine the unity and
effectiveness of the union in its relations with management
and the state."[66]

Lipset notes that an organized internal opposition
must be ascribed legitimacy if it is to function as a
political party. "In the absence of this ascription of
legitimacy, an opposition group constitutes not a party but
a faction, with characteristics and functions very different
from those of a party."[67] He also emphasizes that legitimacy
of opposition does not assure survival of the opposition.

> If the legitimacy of opposition guarantees to opposi-
> tion elementary rights and freedom of action, it does
> not guarantee the opposition's survival. Legitimacy
> guarantees that the incumbents will not use any and all
> means at their disposal to crush or repress opposition;
> it does not guarantee that opposition may not wither
> away from its own weakness.[68]

Evaluation as a process. Lipset sees one of the most
important conditions for democracy to be legitimacy--"the
degree to which [the political system] is generally accepted
by its citizens."[69] Stable authority is seen to be the
resultant of power plus legitimacy.[70] Despite its importance
as a theoretical concept, "little work has been done using
the concept of legitimacy for the analysis of political

systems, except that Weber's three categories have been used freely for illustrative purposes."[71] Lipset has found it beneficial to differentiate between the legitimacy and the effectiveness of political systems. "While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative."[72]

Lipset, et al., in Union Democracy, stressed that legitimacy develops directly from and is sustained by diverse bases of support and power.

> The evidence . . . suggests that an internal opposition gains legitimacy only when it rests on independent and enduring bases of support and power which cannot be destroyed or repressed without seriously weakening the union itself.[73]

Perhaps they expressed their viewpoint even more emphatically in the following passage.

> But we believe it would be misleading to assign to the norms of legitimacy of opposition an independent and determinative role in the maintenance of the party system in the ITU. Without the diversity of power sources on which it rests, the norm of legitimacy of political opposition could not by itself maintain the party system as a living political process.[74]

Lipset argues that legitimacy is in large measure determined by "the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the society have been resolved."[75]

In modern societies,

> crises of legitimacy occur during a transition to a new social structure, if (1) the status of major con-servative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change; (2) all the major groups in the society do not have access to the political system in the transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands.[76]

It is significant that even though the political system may be reasonably effective, these two conditions still place the legitimacy of that system in question.[77]

The denial of opposition legitimacy by a party in power often leads the rank-and-file to deny the legitimacy of that party itself and consequently of the entire political system.

> The rejection of the democratic game by even a few leaders is a threat to democracy out of proportion to the number of leaders holding such views, even when such men are not able to implement their sentiments through repressive action against the opposition. It is not the direct attacks which such men may make on the political system that are most dangerous to it, but rather the fact that by openly repudiating the legitimacy of the opposition they invite the rejection of their own political legitimacy (and that of their party) on the part of their opponents.[78]

In an earlier section we commented on the explosive character of the apathetic sector of the population. It will now be necessary to qualify that somewhat. Although "those sections of the population that are normally apathetic tend to have authoritarian attitudes and values,"[79] analysis of the rise of the Nazi movement suggests "that the most outcast and apathetic sections of the population can be won to political action by extremist and authoritarian parties only _after_ such parties have become major movements, not while they are in their period of early rise."[80] This is largely due to the fact that the apathetic respond only to the more _simple_ extremist views of politics.[81]

Just as apathy poses problems for democratic systems, it also poses problems for totalitarian regimes. Totalitarian states (and autocratic organizations as well) have a special interest in securing a high level of political participation, for this assures them of "reaching" the populace.

But "David Reisman has perceptively noted that within a totalitarian society, political apathy may be a major barrier against the complete triumph of the system."[82]

Ever since Aristotle, men have argued that democracy as a political system is directly related to the state of economic development. Below in another section, we will review Lipset's test of that hypothesis. For our present purposes, it will suffice to note that (1) there is indeed such a relationship, and (2) economic development is accompanied by a change from predominantly authoritarian to predominantly democratic beliefs or ideologies among those of the lower classes.

> Economic development, producing increased income, greater economic security, and widespread higher education, largely determines the form of the "class struggle," by permitting those in the lower strata to develop longer time perspectives and more complex and gradualist views of politics. A belief in secular reformist gradualism can be the ideology of only a relatively well-to-do lower class.[83]

Public opinion surveys from thirteen different countries support Lipset's assertion that lower-class status is associated with authoritarianism. These surveys indicate that "the lower strata are less committed to democratic norms than the middle classes . . ."[84] Samuel Stouffer's data from a sample of 5,000 Americans demonstrate that "tolerance increases with moves up the social ladder."[85] Education is even a more important determinant of the tendency to hold democratic norms.

> . . . the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from the others has

been education. The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices. All the relevant studies [from numerous countries] indicate that education is more significant than either income or occupation.[86]

Differential degrees of conformity to dominant societal norms is seen to be related to variations in voting behavior between socioeconomic classes. Group pressures may be directed either toward voting or non-voting. Perhaps paradoxically, "the highest pressure to vote as a symbol of conformity is found where the objective significance of the vote is least: in totalitarian 'show' elections."[87] Certain ethnic and religious groups encourage voting, while "in parts of the American South today the norms laid down by the dominant white group for the behavior of Negroes include a prohibition on voting."[88]

Returning once again to the ideological committment of the social scientist, this time as regards the specific norm of bureaucratic political neutrality, Lipset states:

How different theoretical and ideological perspectives lead to differing concrete analysis is illustrated by the concept of bureaucratic political neutrality, the norm that a member of a bureaucracy is an impartial expert rather than an interested party. Those interested in furthering social change have viewed this norm as a conservative force, since it operates to force reformist administrations to retain in office civil servants whose social background and training disposes them to object to many reformist policies. The same norm, viewed from the perspective of the requisites of a democratic political system, operates to make possible the continuity of democratic government during a turnover in political offices . . . Inherent in bureaucratic structures is a tendency to reduce conflicts to administrative decisions by experts; and thus over time bureaucratization facilitates the removing of issues from the political arena . . . Thus in many ways the pressures to extend bureaucratic norms and practices constitute an important strength for democratic consensus.[89]

In a controversial interpretation, Lipset has argued
that

> antidemocratic ideologies as well as antidemocratic
> groups can be more fruitfully classified and analyzed
> if it is recognized that "left," "right," and "center"
> refer to ideologies, each of which has a moderate and
> an extremist version, the one parliamentary and the
> other extra-parliamentary in its orientation.[90]

The term "fascism" has been used at various points
in time to refer to all three types of extremism. However,
"fascism" is most often characterized as "basically a middle-
class movement representing a protest against both capitalism
and socialism, big business and big unions . . ."[91] Closer
scrutiny reveals, however, that there are three analytically
separate and distinct types of fascism which "resemble their
democratic parallels in both the compositions of their
social bases and the contents of their appeals."[92] Or in
other words, "A study of the social bases of different
modern mass movements suggests that each major social stratum
has both democratic and extremist political expressions."[93]
The diagram below has been abstracted from Lipset for the
sake of clarification.[94]

Gabriel Almond has harshly criticized this classifi-
cation by Lipset.

> . . . what Lipset intends here as a contribution to the
> theory of political movements actually is a contribution
> to terminological confusion. Right, center, and left,
> have meant different things in different countries and
> periods. . . . What he means when he speaks of right,
> center, and left extremism, is that the social formations
> which tend to support the right, left, and center in
> "normal" periods support different forms of extremism in
> crisis periods. To speak of a "center extremism" really
> strains the imagination.[95]

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FIGURE 1

CHARACTERISTIC IDEOLOGIES AND SOCIAL COMPOSITIONS
OF DEMOCRATIC AND EXTREMIST GROUP ORIENTATIONS

Political Orientation	Characteristic Ideologies		
	Left	Center	Right
Democratic (Moderate; parliamentary.)	Socialism	Democracy or Liberalism	Conservatism
Extremist (Extra-parliamentary.)	Communism or Peronism	Classic Fascism	Traditional Authoritarianism
Primary Composition of Social Base (for both Democratic and Extremist Orientations.)	Working Classes	Middle Classes	Upper Classes

As regards ideological orientations, Lipset has also
called attention to the necessity of distinguishing between
economic and noneconomic liberalism. The two separate
ideologies draw their support from different social strata.

> Contemporary studies of political attitudes indicate
> that it is necessary to distinguish between so-called
> economic liberalism (issues concerned with the distri-
> bution of wealth and power) and noneconomic liberalism
> (issues concerned with civil liberties, race relations
> and foreign affairs). The fundamental factor in non-
> economic liberalism is not actually class, but education,
> general sophistication, and probably to a certain extent
> psychic security. But since these factors are strongly
> correlated with class, noneconomic liberalism is posi-
> tively associated with social status (the wealthier
> are more tolerant), while economic liberalism is inver-
> sely correlated with social status (the poor are more
> leftist on such issues).[96]

DIVIDING THE FUNCTIONS

Status-role incorporating both element and process.
The concept "status-role" is not used by Lipset. His use
of the concept "status" implies both social position and the
prestige ascribed to the position. More often it is the
second implication that is intended, and thus his concept
"status" comes closer to the PAS Model element of rank than
that of status-role. He has defined status as "the honor
and deference accorded individuals by certain others . . ."[97]
Elsewhere he has noted that "status involves invidious
distinctions . . ."[98] Throughout Social Mobility in
Industrial Society, the term "stratification" generally
refers to a "hierarchy of prestige"[99] or a differential
ranking of individual actors. Although there is a close
relationship between the hierarchy of prestige and the

society's division of labor, it is necessary to distinguish between the two. This will be more closely examined in the next section.

Although he at no place sets forth a definition of role, every indication is that he accepts the formulation of Linton whereby role refers to the expected behavioral patterns of one occupying a particular position (status in Linton's terms) in relation to others in the social system.

Even though Lipset does not use the concept "status-role" and though his use of the concept "status" differs in important respects from the PAS Model concept, that which may be properly subsumed under the PAS Model element and process of status-role is surely of concern to Lipset. His concern with the PAS Model element of rank, however, is much more pronounced.

It has been noted above that Marx recognized societies as characterized by either conflict or consensus. The primary prerequisite for the harmonious society which he projected into the Communist future was the complete elimination of the division of labor. As Lipset has stated it:

> . . . He envisaged the harmony of an anarchist society in which there would be no cleavages, and therefore no need for an institutionalized system to arrive at social decisions. The political system which Marx projected was not institutionalized democracy, but anarchy. In order to have such a harmonious society, sources of differentiation and conflict must disappear. This means in particular the end of the division of labor, for elimination of the differentiation of roles in the economic spheres of life would eliminate the major source of social conflict.[100]

Lipset is only one of many to label this as utopianism.
He sees neither society envisaged by Marx as a possibility.
"The history of the Russian Revolution has already demon-
strated some of the dire consequences of operating with a
theory which deals only with nonexistent ideal types--that
is to say, with societies of absolute harmony and societies
of constant conflict."[101]

RANKING

Rank as an element. Beyond any doubt, rank is one
of the most important elements of social systems emphasized
by Lipset. His examination of all that may be subsumed
under the PAS Model category of Ranking is so extensive that
it will be necessary to be highly selective in our presen-
tation. Perhaps we could do no better than to begin by
quoting the opening remarks of Lipset and Bendix in Social
Mobility in Industrial Society.

> In every complex society there is a division of labor
> and a hierarchy of prestige. Positions of leadership
> and social responsibility are usually ranked at the
> top, and positions requiring long training and superior
> intelligence are ranked just below. The number of
> leaders and highly educated individuals constitutes
> everywhere a small minority. On the other hand, the
> great majority is made up of persons in the lower strata
> who perform manual and routine work of every sort and
> who command scant rewards and little prestige. In
> keeping with this division between "the few" and "the
> many" the stratification of society has often been
> pictured as a pyramid or a diamond; in the first ana-
> logy, society consists of a series of strata that become
> larger and more populous as we move down the hierarchy
> of reward and prestige, and in the second, it has small
> numbers at the top and bottom, with the mass of the
> population concentrated between. However it may be
> depicted, the point is that men grapple with the prob-
> lems of determining the number of people at each rank

in their society, and that through history various methods for doing this have been devised.[102]

In considering that indicated by the PAS Model element of rank, the concept "status" is the most important in Lipset's writings. We have observed that, for Lipset, this concept implies both position within a social structure and the prestige attached to the position and that generally it is the latter meaning that is intended. Lipset recognizes well, however, the relationship between position and prestige, as the following indicates. "Status--the honor and deference accorded individuals by certain others--has no meaning except as it locates an individual, group, or stratum relative to others in the same frame of reference."[103]

In speaking of "stratification systems," Lipset and Zetterberg together noted that "Every society may be thought of as comprising a number of separate hierarchies--e.g., social, economic, educational, ethnic, etc.--each of which has its own status structure, its own conditions for the attainment of a position of prestige within that structure."[104] At a later point, drawing heavily from Weber, Lipset and Bendix stated that "the stratification system must be thought of as containing a number of hierarchies which differ with each variation and combination of the basic stratification factors: status, class, and authority."[105] In as much as there are multiple components of "status," "status discrepancies" would seem to be inherent in stratification systems. The concept of status discrepancies is central to

the explanation of social mobility and the differential

consequences of social mobility as manifested in different

social systems.

The failure of social scientists to recognize the

many and various components of status has resulted in inade-

quate studies of social stratification. In particular,

there are many "neglected dimensions of the relationship

among occupational, economic, and power rank-orders and of

the social differentiation which arises from them."[106] Lipset

and Bendix have noted, for example, that:

> Amount of <u>income</u> is not necessarily a good indicator of
> <u>consumption status</u>, or style of life, although it ob-
> viously sets the limit of a person's consumption. The
> way in which a man spends his income, rather than the
> size of that income, most often affects the social
> status he is accorded by others.[107]

In order to facilitate comparative analysis of data

gathered in many different countries, Lipset and Bendix

made extensive use of the simple dichotomy between manual

and nonmanual occupations. Their rationale for doing so is

as follows:

> . . . we make the assumption that a move from manual
> to nonmanual employment constitutes upward mobility
> among <u>males</u>. This assumption may be defended on the
> following grounds:
>   1. Most male nonmanual occupations have more pres-
> tige than most manual occupations, even skilled ones.
>   2. Among males, white-collar positions generally
> lead to higher incomes than manual employment.
>   3. Nonmanual positions, in general, require more
> education than manual positions.
>   4. Holders of nonmanual positions, even low-paid
> white-collar jobs, are more likely than manual workers
> to think of themselves as members of the middle class
> and to act out middle-class roles in their consumption
> patterns.

     5. Low-level nonmanual workers are more likely to have political attitudes which resemble those of the upper middle class than those of the manual working class.[108]

Such a simple dichotomy as this naturally results in some error; yet it ameliorates difficulties inherent in the comparative and secondary analyses of data gathered in different social systems and Lipset and Bendix are convinced that the dichotomy is justified.[109]

Evaluation of actors and allocation of status-roles. Throughout his writings, social mobility has been of major concern to Lipset. For Lipset and Bendix, "The term 'social mobility' refers to the process by which individuals move from one position to another in society--positions which by general consent have been given specific hierarchical values."[110]

In their book, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, Lipset and Bendix have amassed considerable empirical evidence refuting the often-held generalization that there is substantially more mobility in the United States than in the Western European industrialized nations. Rather "the actual proportion of mobile persons is the same in both."[111] This finding carries considerable significance, for differences in political stability between industrialized nations have been explained by many on the basis of alleged differences in rates of social mobility.[112] It has been common to correlate a high rate of social mobility with political stability and a low rate of social mobility with political instability. The empirical findings of Lipset and Bendix cast serious doubt upon this generalization.

Yet belief in the "open" society persists among those
of the American working-class, while the French lower-
classes, for example, persist in adhering to the "dominant
historical image . . . of an unfair distribution of oppor-
tunities, in which little mobility occurs."[113] Thus it is
possible that ideological equalitarianism and not the rate
of social mobility per se is the variable which accounts
for the greater political stability of the United States as
opposed to many Western European countries.

Lipset is of the opinion that even though the study
of social mobility is merely of academic interest unless
emphasis is placed upon the consequences of mobility, we
know relatively little concerning those consequences.

Even though the rates of social mobility are essen-
tially equivalent, such data as is available suggests dif-
ferential consequences of upward mobility in Europe and in
the United States. Those moving from lower-class to middle-
class positions in the United States are likely to adopt
conservative political attitudes, while Europeans moving in
the same direction are more likely to adopt radical political
attitudes.[114] This is probably related to the more rigid
stratification system of most European countries. Those
moving up the status ladder in Europe experience more status
rejection and consequently experience more frustration than
do Americans in the same circumstances.[115] Contrasted to
the diverse consequences of upward mobility, "the downward
mobile, however, behave similarly in all countries: they

vote more conservatively than the stationary members of the class into which they have fallen."[116]

Two other consequences of social mobility noted by Lipset will be set forth in his own words without further elaboration.

> Durkheim . . . suggested that both upward and downward mobility result in increased suicide rates by increasing the number of persons who find themselves in an _anomic_ situation, one in which they do not know how to react to the norms involved.[117]

> . . . most of the studies dealing with mobility and politics indicate that the upward and downward mobile are more likely to be apathetic, to abstain from voting and to show low levels of political interest, than the stationary. This finding conforms to a general pattern revealed in many voting studies; that individuals subject to cross-pressures--pulls in different political directions resulting from exposure to varying appeals-- react to this conflict by withdrawal from involvement.[118]

Lipset and Bendix have pointed to the existence of structural-functional factors within all modern social systems which aid in explaining similarities in rates of social mobility despite divergent value orientations.

> Several different processes inherent in all modern social structures have a direct effect on the rate of social mobility, and help to account for the similarities in rates in different countries: (1) changes in the number of available vacancies; (2) different rates of fertility; (3) changes in the rank accorded to occupations; (4) changes in the number of inheritable status-positions; and (5) changes in the legal restrictions pertaining to potential opportunities.[119]

These factors do not of course account for individual motivation, and it is obvious that mobility would not occur in the absence of such motivation.[120] As Veblen has suggested,

> a system of stratification is a fundamental source of mobility motivation in and of itself. Apparently,

> there are imperatives which prompt men to resist and
> reject an inferior status and these imperatives persist
> regardless of the way in which any given society has
> legitimated inequality.[121]

This seems to be the case even in those traditionalized

societies where social stratification is most rigidly

enforced. Lipset draws from M. N. Srinivas, the Indian

anthropologist, for support of this view. Srinivas contends

that within the Indian society there has always been both

individual and group mobility (especially the latter),

despite the long history of a rigid caste system.[122]

It is especially difficult to imagine an industrialized

society characterized by a "closed" stratification system.

> Widespread social mobility has been a concomitant of
> industrialization and a basic characteristic of modern
> industrial society. In every industrial country, a
> large proportion of the population have had to find
> occupations considerably different from those of their
> parents . . .
>
> In the twentieth century the West has been character-
> ized by a rapid growth of trade and of service industries,
> as well as of bureaucracy in industry and government;
> more people have become employed in white-collar work,
> and the comparative size of the rural population has
> declined even more rapidly than before. These changes
> in the distribution of occupations from generation to
> generation mean that no industrial society can be viewed
> as closed or static.[123]

As regards intra-generational mobility, there is

actually little shifting between manual and nonmanual

occupations.[124] One's entry into the occupational hierarchy

upon securing his first job is especially prophetic of the

occupational future of the individual.

As the studies of Lipset and Bendix have shown, and

as Paul Lazarsfeld has said, there are but limited choices

of occupation open to those of the lower socioeconomic groups.

The more socially oppressed a group is, the more re-
stricted in advance is the range of occupational choice
of its children. . . . The effect of the material limi-
tations acts in part so as to narrow the perspective
of those faced with the occupational choice. The
socially underprivileged adolescent has seen less,
read less, heard about less, has experienced less
variety in his environment in general, and is simply
aware of fewer opportunities than the socially privileged
young person.[125]

Many social theorists have suggested that the leader-

ship for social movements is drawn disproportionately from

marginal groups.[126] Michels, for example, has suggested that

the leftist tendencies of German Jews stemmed primarily

from their inferior status.[127] Research data indicates that

the Jews "are politically the least conservative denomination"[128]

in most all English speaking and Western European countries.

Empirical data pertaining to the rise of the C.C.F. in

Saskatchewan indicate that although minority groups did

indeed participate disportionately in the movement, they

did not supply the movement's hard core of leadership.

"The local leaders of the party were not the marginal or

deviant members of the society, but rather the old class

leaders."[129] They were the individuals possessing economic

and social status and occupying the best positions from

which to perceive threats to their security.

It is necessary, therefore, to modify the assumptions
about the marginality of leaders of new social movements.
When a large social class or group is changing its
attitudes, the normal integrated leaders of the class
are the first to change. They are more exposed to the
social pressures on the class than are marginal, deviant,
or apathetic members. The relationship between marginal
social position and radical political behavior holds
true only for radicals who come from the upper classes.[130]

We have noted above that relative deprivation is seen

to be an important factor in the determination of leftist

tendencies. Expanding further upon this notion, Lipset

noted that:

> Minority religions, nationalities, and races are usually
> subjected to various forms of social discrimination,
> and the low-income member of a minority group conse-
> quently faces additional obstacles to economic and social
> achievement. The poor majority group member, on the
> other hand, may find substitute gratifications in his
> ethnic or religious "superiority." High-income members
> of a low-status ethnic or religious group are therefore,
> as we have noted, in a situation comparable to the upper
> level of the working class in those countries with
> "closed" status systems.[131]

The experiencing of status or economic deprivation by

a segment of society, however, does not of itself lead

directly to that segment's support of leftist political

parties. "Three conditions facilitate such a response:

effective channels of communication, low belief in the

possibility of individual social mobility, and the absence

of traditionalist ties to a conservative party."[132]

The first of those conditions may more appropriately

be discussed in a subsequent section. It will be recalled

that in a section above we have discussed the manner in

which a high belief in the possibility of individual social

mobility operated as a deterrent to leftist political action.

The effects of traditionalism will be briefly commented upon

in the next section.

Despite the varying extent to which different social

strata support leftist or conservative political parties,

Lipset generally argues that the lower-classes have a

definite propensity to support parties to the left. Once
again he argues that the leftist tendencies of the lower-
classes are in large measure inherent in the very relative-
ness of the stratification system.

> Since position in a stratification system is always
> relative and gratification or deprivation is experienced
> in terms of being better or worse off than other people,
> it is not surprising that the lower classes in all
> countries, regardless of the wealth of the country,
> show various signs of resentment against the existing
> distribution of rewards by supporting political parties
> and other organizations which advocate some form of
> redistribution.[133]

Should economic development result in a change in the
stratification structure of a society, there are important
consequences in the political behavior of the society's
members.

> Increased wealth also affects the political role of the
> middle class by changing the shape of the stratification
> structure from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower-
> class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class.
> A large middle class tempers conflict by rewarding
> moderate and democratic parties and penalizing extre-
> mist groups.[134]

Borrowing from Anderson and Davidson,[135] Lipset
views elections and the party struggle within democratic
states as "the expression of the democratic class struggle."[136]
Comparative studies suggest that

> more than anything else the party struggle is a con-
> flict among classes, and the most impressive single
> fact about political party support is that in virtually
> every economically developed country the lower-income
> groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the
> higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the
> right.[137]

The same is true in the United States despite the "class-
lessness" of American political ideology. "Polling studies

show that in every American election since 1936 . . . the proportion voting Democratic increases sharply as one moves down the occupational or income ladder."[138]

Lipset has observed that just as Aristotle and others have asserted, stable democracy exists only in the wealthier countries in which there is a large middle class. Applying Aristotle's "proposition to trade-union government, we would expect to find democracy in organizations whose members have a relatively high income and more than average security, and in which the gap between the organizational elite and the membership is not great."[139] These conditions have been met in the ITU and they go far in accounting for both the establishment and the persistence of institutionalized party opposition within the trade-union.

Stable democracy demands the tempering of conflict by political parties which appeal to all or most of the major segments of the population. "A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut as to rule out compromise."[140] Recent historical analysis reveals that it was Hamilton's failure to appeal to all strata that led to the eventual decline of the Federalist Party.[141]

We have had occassion at several points above to mention the importance accorded the concept of ideological equalitarianism. Lipset and Bendix have set forth six

factors which together account for the existence and per-

sistence of the belief in the United States. Those factors

are:

> (1) the absence of a feudal past, whose legacies could
> have been perpetuated under capitalism to strengthen
> the claim to legitimacy of the new class of capitalists;
> (2) the continuous high rate of social mobility in
> American society, which has tended to support the belief
> in the value of an "open class" society; (3) the increase
> in educational opportunities, which has been especially
> important in sustaining the belief in a continuing
> expansion of opportunity; (4) the patterns of business
> careers at the bottom and at the top, which seem to
> reflect and support the same belief; (5) the presence
> of immigrants and racial minorities on whose shoulders
> the children of previous generations of immigrants
> or more-or-less segregated ethnic groups could rise;
> and (6) the combination of relative wealth and mass
> production of consumer goods, which has had the effect
> of minimizing the differences between the standard of
> living of the working class and the middle class.[142]

There are two basic factors which play a role in

granting union leaders enough status security that they may

support opposition parties. These factors are (1) the

existence of independent sources of status within the ITU

and (2) the lack of great status differential between ITU

union leaders and the union rank-and-file.[143]

Due largely to the decentralization of the printing

industry and a lack of intra-occupational competition, ITU

union locals enjoy a great deal of autonomy in union

activities. The ITU union locals thus undermine the bureau-

cratization of the union administration and supply indepen-

dent sources of status and power for their members.

> . . . the existence of alternative sources of status
> in a union operates in similar and parallel fashion to
> the rough equality of status between working printer
> and union leader: Both work to reduce the status stake

that union activists have in holding union office,
and by reducing that stake reduce the dependency of
officials on the incumbent administration and increase
the chances of their supporting opposition groups.[144]

Turning directly to the status differential between

ITU leaders and workers, it must first be noted that the

ITU rank-and-file members enjoy relatively high incomes,

status and job satisfaction. In addition, the status dif-

ferential is kept small by means of the institutionalized

procedure whereby salary increases must be attained only

by means of a referendum of the entire membership.[145]

"Where return to the ranks, either voluntary or upon defeat

in an election, involves no great loss in style of life,

job rewards, or status, the union officer has very much

less of a material and psychological stake in his job."[146]

Conversely, in most labor unions, union leaders occupy

status positions considerably above those of the rank-and-

file members of the union. Consequently many union offi-

cials are driven to secure their positions, oftentimes by

means "directly contrary to the democratic values of the

trade-union movement."[147] This observation will serve as

an introduction to the next section.

CONTROLLING

Power as an element. Power is of course one of the

elements with which Lipset is most concerned. It is little

exaggeration to assert that a concern with power relations

permeates all his writings.

According to Bendix and Lipset, power "refers to all the means by which an individual or a group of individuals can exert a controlling influence over others."[148] Elsewhere Lipset has stated that "the problem of politics does not simply concern nation-states, since every group within a nation must also find mechanisms which make decisions for the group and distribute power within it."[149]

The tendency for the sociologist to emphasize either consensus or conflict to the relative neglect of the other is once again revealed in the differences between the fundamental theoretical conceptions of power.

> Parsons and Lynd have recently pointed out that there are two basically different ways of looking at power. One, which Parsons calls the "zero-sum" concept and Lynd the "scarcity theory," assumes that there is a limited or total sum of power, and that an increase in power for one group must occur at the expense of another. Both point out that this theory also assumes "power over others."[150] Although they differ sharply in their concrete analyses of American power relations, both prefer the alternative image of power "as a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the society as a system . . . [as] the capacity to mobilize the resources of the society for the attainment of goals for which a general 'public' commitment has been made or may be made."[151]

The "scarcity" model of power obviously stems from a conflict theory of society, while the "resource" model implies a concern with both consensus and conflict.[152] Thus Marx is to be associated with the former while Tocqueville, along with the contemporary theorists such as Lipset, Parsons, and Lynd, subscribe to the latter.

Lipset also notes that it is possible to differentiate between those theories of power "which emphasize the composition

of the power elite and those which stress _access_ to power."[153]

Concern with the composition of decision-making groups stems

from the assumption that men are responsive only to narrowly

defined self-interests. Concern with access to power rests

on quite a different assumption.

> The access approach assumes, rather, that the decisions
> of men in power, like those of men in any other role,
> are determined by a complex analytic calculus of the
> consequences of decisions. To the extent that the pre-
> dictable reaction of any group or individual to a
> decision will affect the results of that decision, the
> group or individual has _access_ to the decision-making
> process.[154]

The access approach to the study of power is well

illustrated by Lipset's study of the experiences of the

Saskatchewan C.C.F. after gaining power. It will be recalled

that prior to gaining power, the C.C.F. was responsive only

to the party. After gaining electoral office, however, it

found it increasingly necessary to be responsive to all

interest groups which could either grant or withhold their

support in future elections. In addition, their legislation

had to be administered through bureaucratic executive

agencies which were appointed by and consequently represented

other political interests. The civil service both modified

administrative goals and played a direct role in the drafting

of administrative policies.[155]

Decision making and its initiation into action as

process. Lipset's very definition of democracy stresses

the importance of decision making for a society.

> Democracy is a social mechanism for resolving the
> problem of societal decision-making among conflicting

interest groups with minimal force and maximal consensus.[156]

To return once again to the relationship between conflict and consensus in Western democratic countries, "conflict among different groups is," as we have noted above, "expressed through political parties which basically represent a 'democratic translation of the class struggle.' "[157] That is to say that institutionalized procedures exist through which conflict is resolved and consensus is achieved. Probably the most important of such institutionalized procedures is the voting process itself--"a key mechanism of consensus in democratic society."[158]

Many observers have commented on the seeming lack of differences between the ideologies and practices of the two American political parties. In large measure, this impression is a result of the fact that the executive and the legislature are responsive to different social bases.

> A Democratic President is invariably to the left of
> the Democratic congressional leadership, since he is
> basically elected by the large urban industrial states
> where trade-unions and minority groups constitute the
> backbone of the party, while the southerners continue
> to sway the congressional Democratic contingent.
> Similarly, a Republican President under current condi-
> tions must remain to the left of his congressional
> supporters, since he, too, must be oriented toward
> carrying or retaining the support of the industrial,
> urban, and therefore more liberal sections of the
> country, while most Republican Congressmen are elected
> in "safe" conservative districts. So when the Repub-
> licans hold the presidency, they move to the left as
> compared to their position in opposition, while the
> Democrats, shifting from presidential incumbency to
> congressional opposition, move to the right. This
> shift produces a situation in which the policies of the
> two parties often appear almost indistinguishable.[159]

Comparative analysis of voting studies from many
Western countries reveals marked similarities in voting
patterns. The relationship between social class and par-
ticipation has been discussed above. In addition, data from
Germany, Sweden, the United States, Norway, Finland, "and
many others" indicates that

> Men vote more than women; the better educated, more
> than the less educated; urban residents, more than
> rural; those between 35 and 55, more than younger or
> older voters; married persons, more than unmarried;
> higher-status persons, more than lower; members of
> organizations, more than nonmembers.[160]

The effects of differential voting participation are
many and diverse. Many defenders of democracy have argued
that a high level of participation is necessary for the
proper functioning of democratic political systems. Such
arguments generally rest upon the assumption that intense
conflict is good for society; that participation is to be
desired to apathy.[161]

Lipset, however, contends that such evidence as is
available seems to support Herbert Tingsten's thesis that

> a sudden increase in the size of the voting electorate
> probably reflects tension and serious governmental
> malfunctioning and also introduces as voters individuals
> whose social attitudes are unhealthy from the point of
> view of the requirements of the democratic system.[162]

Nonetheless many democratic societies have higher
rates of participation than the United States. Therefore
high or low participation in itself is neither good nor
bad for democracy. The evidence would seem to suggest that

> To the extent that the lower strata have been brought
> into the electoral process gradually . . . , increased

participation is undoubtedly a good thing for democracy. It is only when a major crisis or an effective authoritarian movement suddenly pulls the normally disaffected habitual nonvoters into the political area that the system is threatened.[163]

If one extends his vision beyond democratic societies and organizations to totalitarian societies and oligarchically controlled organizations, the alleged relationship between a high level of participation and a positive role in decision making practically disappears.

Participation by the members of an organization or the citizens of a society in political affairs is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rank-and-file influence on organizational or government policy. On the one hand, members may show a low level of political participation in an organization or society, but still affect policy by their ability to withdraw or contribute election support to one or another of the different bureaucracies competing for power. On the other hand, a membership or citizenry may regularly attend meetings, belong in large numbers to various political organizations, and even have a high rate of voting turnout, and yet have little or no influence on policy.[164]

The existence of cross-pressures is one factor which in part accounts for differential participation. "In general, the more pressures brought to bear on individuals or groups which operate in opposing directions, the more likely are prospective voters to withdraw from the situation by 'losing interest' and not making a choice."[165] The cross-pressures hypothesis may account for the differences in voting rates between the lower and the upper and middle classes.

These differences may be due in part to the fact that the lower strata in every society are influenced by their life experiences and their class organizations to favor those parties which advocate social and economic reforms, but at the same time they are exposed

to strong upper-class and conservative influences
through the press, radio, schools, churches, and
so forth.[166]

Ever since Robert Michels asserted over 50 years ago
that "Who says organization says oligarchy," social scientists
have been busy documenting that thesis. Lipset, Trow and
Coleman, the authors of Union Democracy, have performed a
greater service in analyzing the functional operation of a
major exception to the "iron law of oligarchy," the Inter-
national Typographical Union. Searching always for the
oligarchic mechanisms set forth by Michels and others, they
discovered either that they were not to be found in the ITU
or that there were factors mitigating their influence.
Thus their deviant case analysis played a positive role in
theory building, for, in their words

> . . . as we look for those attributes and patterns in
> the ITU which work to nullify the oligarchic tendencies
> present in large organizations, we are implicitly or
> explicitly setting forth the conditions necessary for
> the maintenance of democratic politics within private
> organizations. In this our purpose is not, of course,
> to "refute" Michels or other previous workers in this
> area, but rather to refine and build on their insights
> and findings . . .[167]

Students of large scale organizations have advanced
three major generalizations in attempting to account for
the existence of oligarchy in all large organizations,
regardless of their ideological orientation. Lipset, et al.,
specifically related these generalizations to labor unions.

1. "Large-scale organizations give union officials
a near monopoly of power."[168] Large-scale organization
seems to demand a bureaucratic structure. Especially within

labor unions, the incumbency exercises a near monopoly over formal channels of communication and over the development of political skills.[169]

2. "The leaders want to stay in office."[170] The status discrepancy between union leader and the rank-and-file motivates officials to secure their positions, oftentimes by prohibiting the exercise of democratic processes within the union. Thus, "there is a basic strain between the values inherent in society's stratification system and the democratic values of the trade-union movement."[171]

3. "The members do not participate in union politics."[172] The rewards for participation in union politics are generally few indeed. "Most union members, like other people, must spend most of their time at work or with their families. Their remaining free time is generally taken up by their friends, commercial entertainment, and other personally rewarding recreational activities."[173]

Yet the authors of Union Democracy found democracy to exist within the ITU! "It is obviously no temporary exception, for the party system of the union has lasted for half a century, and regular political conflict in North American printing unions can be dated back to 1815."[174] Those factors which in part account for the existence of democracy and the absence of oligarchy within the ITU are many. In their concluding chapter, the authors of Union Democracy have advanced 22 propositions "bearing on factors affecting the chances for democracy in trade unions."[175]

Therein lies a wealth of research potential. Either we have or we will soon comment in length on many of those factors which seem to account for the democratic political system of the ITU. Perhaps then it will here be appropriate to merely mention a number of the most important of such factors without elaboration.

The ITU came into existence through federation, without the presence of a strong, central bureaucracy. A lack of competition between printing shops and the decentralization of the industry have both operated to sustain the autonomy of the larger locals. In its early years, divergent power sources within the union led to the institutionalization of opposition legitimacy. The marginal status position of printers, the institutionalized substitute system and the prevalence of night working hours have all led to extensive secondary organizational participation among printers. Although such organizations have been and are still basically social in character, they serve important latent political functions. For example, they serve to provide opportunities for the learning of political skills independent of the incumbent administration. And they provide channels of communication independent of the union administration. The relatively high status of the occupation, together with efforts of the union to restrict the power and income of union leaders, accounts for less status differential between union leaders and the rank-and-file than exists in most labor unions. The status security of

ITU union leaders is high in view of the fact that they may maintain status as opposition leaders should they be defeated in union elections. Lastly, the institutionalization of democratic mechanisms itself operates to sustain democracy.

It is evident to Lipset that there is measureably less oligarchy in American political parties than in the German socialist labor parties investigated by Michels. Lamentably, American sociologists have had little or no interest in testing his "iron law" in the two major parties. Yet "It is clear that constant factionalism, fairly rapid turnover in leadership, and the absence of a central power structure characterize American parties in contrast to the Social Democratic party of pre-World War I Germany."[176]

We have noted above that opposition legitimacy within the ITU developed and was sustained by "independent and enduring bases of support."[177] Even in the larger society it is oftentimes the case that democracy develops as a consequence of group conflict.

> Democratic rights have developed in societies largely through the struggles of various groups--class, religious, sectional, economic, professional, and so on-- against one another and against the group which controls the state. Each interest group may desire to carry out its own will, but if no one group is strong enough to gain complete power, the result is the development of tolerance. In large measure the development of the concept of tolerance, of recognition of the rights of groups with whom one disagrees to compete for adherents or power, arose out of conflicts among strong and indestructible groups in different societies.[178]

Once a society has established certain democratic procedures, democracy is sustained through the multiple-group affiliations inherent in political pluralism. "For a

variety of groups lay claim to the allegiance of the popu-
lation, reinforcing diversity of belief and helping mobilize
such diversity in the political arena."[179]

Above it was noted that traditionalistic values--
"resignation to a traditional standard of living and loyalty
to the 'powers that be' "--operate as a deterrent to the
leftist political action of the impoverished workers and
peasants of backward areas.[180] Yet, it must here be noted
that "the two most drastic political transformations of
our time, the Russian and the Chinese Communist revolutions,
took place in countries with an almost wholly backward,
traditionalistic rural social structure."[181]

SANCTIONING

Sanction as an element. Lipset does not use the word
"sanction," but oftentimes speaks in terms of "rewards,"
"deprivations," etc. There is general recognition on his
part that sanctions complement and reinforce the normative
order within a social system. Such recognition is explicit
in the following statement quoted from Union Democracy in
which Lipset, et al., are speaking specifically of the norm
of opposition legitimacy and the (sanctioning) mechanism
of voting.

> The fact that there are relatively few breaches of the
> rules of the democratic game can be understood only
> in part as resulting from the moral binding power of
> the norm itself. In large part it can be seen as a
> practical recognition and accomodation to the political
> consequences--specifically, the loss of support of
> large numbers of members and relatively independent
> activists--that would follow from gross and repeated
> violations of the rules of the game.[182]

Application of sanctions as process. The operation
of sanctions within a social system is well illustrated in
the history of the ITU's secret societies. In the earliest
years of the ITU, management used job security to curtail
the advance of labor unionism. "Known and active unionists
were being fired, while betrayal of a fellow worker as a
member of the union often enabled a man to keep a steady
job."[183] This led to the creation of secret societies
within the ITU. These organizations functioned to protect
active unionists from discrimination at the hands of manage-
ment and to assure control of the union by the more militant
members. Then through the recruitment of foremen who exer-
cised control over hiring and firing, the secret societies
rewarded the conformity and punished the nonconformity of
their own members by the same means used by management against
them--the granting or withholding of "steady situations."[184]
Eventually the union's rank-and-file recognized a lack of
effective control over the secret societies and formally
made membership in such societies unlawful.

Mention was made above of the effect of differential
degrees of conformity to norms of voting among social
classes. This is the proper place at which to elaborate
that point.

> Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the
> electoral decision, they may still be induced to vote
> by social pressures and inner feelings of social obli-
> gation. The variations in voting behavior which cor-
> relate with socioeconomic class may also be related
> to different degrees of conformity to the dominant
> norms in various societies. Almost every study of

social behavior indicates that conformity to these
norms is related to social status. . . . In general,
middle-class people tend to conform more to the dominant
values of the society, and to accept the notion that
this conformity will be rewarded by attaining one's
personal goals.[185]

That variation in the degree of conformity to such

norms is related to the rewards accompanying conformity is

obvious (though often unrecognized).

The force of middle-class norms of behavior is notor-
iously less in groups that are deprived of middle-
class living standards and social acceptance. The
low voting rate of very low income groups that occurs
in the United States may be part of this general
pattern.[186]

Especially since 1900, the membership of the ITU has

exerted direct and considerable influence upon union policy

through the mechanism of the referendum.[187] The salaries

of the international officers has historically been con-

trolled by referenda, and this has played no small role in

sustaining democracy within the ITU.

The ability of the members to limit the gap between
their own salaries and that of their officers is prob-
ably a major factor sustaining the democratic system
in the ITU, for it reduces the strain on ITU officers
who return to the print shop following defeat.[188]

FACILITATING

Facility as an element. We have observed above that

Lipset prefers to view power itself as a facility enabling

the social system to mobilize its resources for the attain-

ment of societal goals. In other words, he favors the

resource theory of power as opposed to the zero-sum or

scarcity theory. It is also apparent that should the society

accept democracy as a societal goal to be either attained or

sustained, then the conditions necessary for democracy also operate as facilities. Many of the major conditions supporting or maintaining democracy at both the level of the nation-state and the level of the large-scale organization have been discussed throughout this paper. The reader will recall that social conflict, legitimacy, economic development, and education are among the most important of the social conditions favoring democracy at the societal level. Within the ITU, those conditions which were most important in accounting for the union's democratic political system were the high degree of secondary organization among its members, the existence of independent and indestructible sources of power within the union, the norm of opposition legitimacy, and the lack of great status differential between union leaders and the rank-and-file members.

Many social scientists have noted that there is not always a high correlation between democracy and the conditions for democracy set forth above. Lipset has offered two explanations for the lack of such correlations.

> . . . an extremely high correlation between such things as income, education, and religion, on the one hand, and democracy, on the other, in any given society should not be anticipated even on theoretical grounds because, to the extent that the political subsystem of the society operates autonomously, a political form may persist under conditions normally adverse to the emergence of that form. Or a political form may develop because of a syndrome of unique historical factors even though the society's major characteristics favor another form.[189]

Utilization of facilities as process. In attempting to account for either the emergence or the persistence of democracy, it is necessary to utilize both historical and

sociological analyses. The simultaneous utilization of both
types of analyses oftentimes reveals factors which exert
cumulative effects either increasing or decreasing the proba-
bility of democracy.

> Key historical events may account for either the per-
> sistence or the failure of democracy in any particular
> society by starting a process which increases (or
> decreases) the likelihood that at the next critical
> point in the country's history democracy will win out
> again. Once established, a democratic political system
> "gathers momentum" and creates social supports (insti-
> tutions) to ensure its continued existence. Thus a
> "premature" democracy which survives will do so by
> (among other things) facilitating the growth of other
> conditions conducive to democracy, such as universal
> literacy, or autonomous private organizations.[190]

In a methodological note, Lipset stressed the fact
that "it would be difficult to identify any one factor
crucially associated with, or 'causing,' any complex social
characteristic [e.g., democracy] . . . . Rather, all such
chacteristics . . . are considered to have multi-variate
causation, and consequences."[191] He goes on to elaborate
this point with the diagram below.[192] Further explaining
the diagram's utility as a methodological tool, he goes on
to say:

> The appearance of a factor on both sides of "democracy"
> implies that it is both an initial condition of demo-
> cracy, and that democracy, once established, sustains
> that characteristic of the society . . . On the other
> hand, some of the initial consequences of democracy,
> such as bureaucracy, may have the effect of undermining
> democracy, as the reversing arrows indicate. Appearance
> of a factor to the right of democracy does not mean that
> democracy "causes" its appearance, but merely that demo-
> cracy is an initial condition which favors its develop-
> ment. Similarly, the hypothesis that bureaucracy is
> one of the consequences of democracy does not imply
> that democracy is the sole cause, but rather that a
> democratic system has the effect of encouraging the

FIGURE 2

POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY,
THE INITIAL CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS EMERGENCE,
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXISTENT DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

Conditions	Initial Possible Consequences	Additional Consequences
open class system	democracy	open class system
economic wealth		equalitarian value system
equalitarian value system		political apathy
capitalist economy		bureaucracy
literacy		mass society
high participation in voluntary organizations		literacy

development of a certain type of bureaucracy under other conditions which have to be stated if bureaucracy is the focus of the research problem . . .

Thus, in a multi-variate system, the focus may be upon any element, and its conditions and consequences may be stated without the implication that we have arrived at a complete theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions of its emergence.[193]

COMPREHENSIVE OR MASTER PROCESSES

Communication. Those social theorists concerned with what has come to be known as the theories of mass society have exerted considerable influence upon Lipset. The most influential among such theorists have been Tocqueville, Lederer, Arendt, Kornhauser, Mannheim, and Selznik. Oftentimes he prefers to speak in terms of "political pluralism" rather than in terms of a "mass society." The theory of mass society, as formulated by Emil Lederer and others, states "that a society without a multitude of organizations independent of state power has a high dictatorial as well as revoluntionary potential."[194] Conversely, the potential for stable democracy is greatest within those social systems wherein there are many organizations mediating between the individual and the state. Communication is obviously enough a primary aspect of the theory. Tocqueville was among the first to recognize the latent political functions of voluntary organizations seemingly irrelevant to politics per se. According to Tocqueville, voluntary associations serve two primary functions in the maintenance of democratic political systems. "They are a source of new opinions independent of the state and a means of communicating these new suggestions

to a large section of the citizenry."[195] That participation in voluntary associations is class-linked has been noted by many sociologists.[196] Such differential participation in nonpolitical voluntary associations "intensifies the intra-class communications network of the higher strata and weakens in-group communications further down the class ladder."[197]

The newspapers, functioning as channels of communication independent of the state, play a vitally important role in democratic politics. In Tocqueville's words, "The effect of a newspaper is not only to suggest the same purpose to a great number of persons, but also to furnish means for the execution in common of the designs which they may have singly conceived."[198]

It was noted above that the institutionalized legitimacy of opposition within the ITU served to provide the opposition with access to the membership through both formal and informal channels of communication, thus preventing a monopoly by the administration.

This is also the proper point at which to note that the literacy prerequisite of printers in part enabled them to organize prior to other occupations and to spearhead the labor press in many unions and in many countries.[199]

Boundary maintenance. Lipset's central concern as a political sociologist appears to be the study of those conditions which enable a society to maintain a proper balance between consensus and/or social cohesion on the one

hand and cleavage and/or conflict on the other.[200] This

notion will be more thoroughly examined in the next section

on **systemic linkage.**

Lipset has stated that although all institutional

arrangements have both integrative and nonintegrative

elements, it may be possible to rank them according to their

integrative character.

> It is obvious that the distribution of wealth is the
> most important source of interest-conflict in complex
> societies. At the opposite pole is the institution
> of the family: the integrator par excellence. The
> second most powerful integrating force . . . is often
> considered to be religion, which presumably ameliorates
> the strains arising out of the stratification system
> by diverting attention from it and adjusting men to
> their lot in life. However, religion has also been
> the source of considerable tension in many societies.
> Institutions which are organized along class lines
> contribute to both cleavage and integration. In
> general, the system of stratification creates discon-
> tent among those who are lowly placed, and is hence a
> source of cleavage, but it is also the principal means
> for placing people in different positions and motivating
> them to fulfill their roles. The organization of
> working-class groups into trade-unions or a labor party,
> for example, creates a mechanism for the expression of
> conflict but, perhaps even more important, integrates
> the workers into the body politic by giving them a
> legitimate means of obtaining their wants.[201]

Oftentimes, as a response to external attack, the

boundary maintenance of a trade-union may be strengthened

to the extent that the continued maintenance of a democratic

political system is impossible. This suggests to Lipset the

necessity of a trade-union's security within its external

environment.

> It appears that a party system is a luxury that only
> a relatively secure union can afford. Under external
> attack the importance of internal unity is so great
> and so overriding as compared with the issues of inter-
> nal politics that the call for unity, coupled with

the definition of internal opposition as traitorous,
makes a loyal and legitimate internal opposition almost
impossible.[202]

The factors accounting for union local autonomy within

the ITU are both historical and structural in nature. In the

beginning the international was a loose confederation of

autonomous locals: there was no powerful central office.[203]

Through the years, union local autonomy was sustained by

the decentralization of the industry and the lack of compe-

tition between locals. In addition, local autonomy provided

bases of power for the emergence of a two-party system which,

in turn, sustained local autonomy.[204]

Systemic linkage. Although he uses neither term, it

is obvious from the above that Lipset sees an important link

between the processes of boundary maintenance and systemic

linkage. Not only must the conflict among groups be legiti-

mized and sustained: such conflict must be transcended through

institutionalized means in order that social cohesion exist

and the authority of the state itself be legitimized.

Systemic linkage is one sociological concept which aids

in explaining how societies persist by maintaining a proper

balance between consensus and cleavage. Lipset sees conflict

as a continuous phenomenon occurring within all societies.

Therefore, in order that democratic political systems per-

sist, conflict must be legitimized: there must be institu-

tionalized processes by which the opposition meets and com-

petes in the political arena with the administration in power.

Surprising as it may sound, a stable democracy requires
the manifestation of conflict or cleavage so that there

will be struggle over ruling positions, challenges to
parties in power, and shifts of parties in office; but
without consensus--a political system allowing the
peaceful "play" of power, the adherence by the "outs"
to decisions made by the "ins," and the recognition by
the "ins" of the rights of the "outs"--there can be no
democracy.[205]

He goes on then to state that, paradoxically, the

roots of "legitimate" cleavage are often to be found in

conflict itself. "Consensus on the norms of tolerance

which a society or organization accepts has often developed

only as a result of basic conflict, and requires the contin-

uation of conflict to sustain it."[206]

In their concluding chapter, the authors of Union

Democracy stated that their extensive study of the ITU

suggested "that the functional requirements for democracy

cannot be met most of the time in most unions or other

voluntary groups."[207] What then of the relationship between

oligarchically controlled voluntary associations and the

operation of democracy at the societal level? We now quote

extensively from Lipset in order that he might provide his

own illuminating answer to that question. (Note the

relationship between boundary maintenance and systemic

linkage implicit in this passage.)

> It is noteworthy that the conditions which seem most
> plausibly related to membership participation and hence
> to internal democracy in trade-unions and other volun-
> tary associations . . . are the same conditions which
> seemingly weaken democracy within the larger society.
> That is, to the extent that members of an association
> have a diffuse set of relationships with the organiza-
> tion, to the extent that a large part of their lives
> is lived within its influence, to the extent that its
> members interact with each other, to that degree are
> the chances for a high level of concern and participa-
> tion increased. But these same factors isolate the

members of the group from cross-pressures and exposure
to diverse values and influences, and . . . heighten
the intensity of their political beliefs. This again
poses a dilemma for us. Integration of members within
a trade-union, a political party, a farm organization,
a professional society, may increase the chances that
members of such organizations will be active in the
group and have more control over its policies. But
extending the functions of such organizations so as to
integrate their members may threaten the larger politi-
cal system because it reduces the forces making for
compromise and understanding among conflicting
groups . . .

It should be obvious that I do not advocate dictator-
ship in private organizations. But it is necessary to
recognize that many organizations may never fulfill the
conditions for a stable internal democracy and still
contribute in important ways to the democratic process
in the total society, by providing a secure base for
factionalism and real vested interests at the same time
that they limit individual freedom within the organi-
zation and allow a degree of autonomy of action for
both the leaders and the organization which may under-
mine other social values.[208]

Once again it will be necessary to stress the theory

of political pluralism (mass society) in both its negative

and positive aspects. Negatively, the potential rise of

totalitarianism poses a grave threat in those societies

lacking a multitude of crosscutting organizational affilia-

tions among individuals. Positively, the potential for

stable democracy is enhanced in those societies wherein

there exists a multitude of organizations independent of

the state and consequently mediating between individuals

and the state.

In as much as crosscutting bases of cleavage enhance

the potential for stable democracy, Lipset has chosen to

favor, "all other factors being constant," two-party systems

over multiple-party systems, territorial representation

over proportional representation, and federalism over the

unitary state.

It is most appropriate to follow these arguments,

point by point, allowing Lipset to speak for himself as

much as is possible.

> The argument for the two-party system rests on the
> assumption that in a complex society parties must
> necessarily be broad coalitions which do not serve
> the interests of one major group, and that they must
> not be parties of integration but must seek to win
> support among groups which are preponderantly allied
> to the opposition party.[209]

Proportional representation, Lipset argues, "increases

the chance for more rather than fewer parties [and thus]

serves democracy badly."[210]

> Besides, as the German sociologist Georg Simmel has
> pointed out, the system of electing members of parlia-
> ment to represent territorial constituencies rather
> than groups (as proportional representation encourages),
> forces the various groups to secure their ends within
> an electoral framework that involves concern with many
> interests and the need for compromise.[211]

Federalism is desirable over the unitary state in

that it "increases the opportunity for multiple sources of

cleavage by adding regional interests and values to the

others which crosscut the social structure."[212]

As can be seen, the goal is to institutionalize

procedures through which society must transcend personal

and collective interests at lower levels of organization in

order that social cohesion be maintained at the societal

level.

If it is desirable to "create" crosscutting lines of cleavage (e.g., through federalism), it is desirable that such lines of cleavage not merely be superimposed over lines of basic cleavage already existing within society. Thus, qualifying a statement above, federalism does not serve democracy well when it "divides a country across the lines of basic cleavage, e.g., between different ethnic, religious, or linguistic areas, as it does in India and Canada. Democracy needs cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them."[213]

Lipset has noted that one factor partially accounting for the leftist tendencies of American intellectuals was their "seeming isolation from other sections of the elite . . ."[214] The structural source of this perceived isolation is both simple and intriguing. "Quite simply . . . there are, in absolute as well as proportionate terms, more intellectuals in America and they are more widely dispersed geographically than in any other country."[215] Thus personal interaction and communication among intellectuals is greatly curtailed by the sheer number of intellectuals.

Institutionalization. Lipset's sociological perspective stems from many theorists for whom institutionalization was a central concept. In Lipset's own words:

> Weber saw bureaucratization as an institutional form
> inherent in all modern societies. To Michels, oli-
> garchy--government by a small group of persons who
> co-opt their successors--was a process common to all
> large organizations. Both men tried to demonstrate

that even socialist organizations and societies were or would necessarily be as bureaucratic and oligarchic as capitalist ones.[216]

We have seen that Tocqueville in particular stressed the latent political functions of the institutions of local government and voluntary associations.[217]

It is not surprising that institutionalization is as central a concept for Lipset as it was for these important social theorists. A basic premise of most of his writings is that "democracy requires institutions which support conflict and disagreement as well as those which sustain legitimacy and consensus."[218] The idea of institutionalization indeed constitutes an integral part of his definition of democracy.[219]

> Democracy in a complex society may be defined as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.[220]

Voting is undoubtedly one of the most important and fundamental of such democratic norms. Much of his writing is concerned with this "key mechanism of consensus in democratic society."[221]

Lipset has seen that the institutionalization of democratic norms is a factor which counters the authoritarian tendencies of certain groups.

> Once in existence . . . democratic norms become a part of the institutional system . . . But the fact that the movement's ideology is democratic does not mean that its supporters actually understand the implications. The evidence seems to indicate that understanding of and adherence to these norms are highest among leaders

and lowest among followers. The general opinions or
predispositions of the rank and file are relatively
unimportant in predicting behavior as long as the
organization to which they are loyal continues to act
democratically . . . Organized social democracy not only
defends civil liberties but influences its supporters
in the same direction.[222]

At one point Lipset notes that a simple measure of
the legitimacy functioning within a particular society may
be the extent to which national rituals and holidays have
become institutionalized as a part of a "secular political
culture."[223]

Socialization. In relative terms, socialization is
used less extensively by Lipset than most of the other PAS
Model concepts. This is not to suggest, however, that
Lipset is unaware of the significance of the concept as a
theoretical tool.

Speaking of differences in voting, for example, he
noted the effects of both "typical" and unique generational
experiences.

> Different ages imply variations in life experiences
> and affect left or right political behavior in at least
> two ways: through generational differences (with the
> crucial experiences of adolescence sometimes shaping
> the political outlook of an entire age group) and
> through differences in the typical patterns of social
> experience associated with different age groups:
> adolescence, maturity, and old age.[224]

That the family is largely responsible for the
political socialization of adolescents and young adults is
revealed in "hereditary" voting patterns, the tendency for
first-voters to vote as their fathers do.[225]

Socialization seems to be, as was noted above, a most
important element accounting for the authoritarian tendencies

of the lower classes. Lipset concurs with Bronfenbrenner, who reports that "the most consistent finding" in studies of child-rearing patterns is the "more frequent use of physical punishment by working-class parents . . ."[226] Such findings have been complemented "by the finding of two investigations in Boston and Detroit that physical punishments for aggression, characteristic of the working class, tend to increase rather than decrease aggressive behavior."[227]

Authoritarianism seems much less prevalent among the higher educated and, conversely, the norm of tolerance is more often adhered to among the higher educated. "The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices. All the relevant studies indicate that education is more significant than either income or occupation."[228]

Socialization was seen to play a particularly significant role within the ITU. Generally speaking, "in most unions one of the principal factors which operate to perpetuate incumbent power is the administration's almost complete monopoly of the chances for learning political and administrative skills."[229] Within the ITU, however, the status of the occupation, the relatively high educational level of its members, and the extensively developed network of secondary organizations within the union have all operated so as to supply the ITU membership with ample opportunities to learn administrative skills. Thus there is within the ITU a wide distribution of political skills

among its membership. Here again is another instance of institutionalized democracy furthering its own cause, for "In a system which provides for regular turnover in office, union office itself becomes a training ground for opposition activists and leaders."[230]

Social control. Lipset's concern with the maintenance of a proper balance between conflict and consensus seems to imply that the social system should, paradoxically, both counter deviancy and allow for it. Lipset subscribes to Merton's proposition that that which may be dysfunctional for one system may well be functional for another system.[231]

> . . . such phenomena as the Tory worker or the middle-class socialist are not merely deviants from class patterns, but basic requirements for the maintenance of the political system. A stable democracy requires a situation in which all the major political parties include supporters from many segments of the population. A system in which the support of different parties corresponds too closely to basic social divisions cannot continue on a democratic basis, for it reflects a state of conflict so intense and clear-cut as to rule out compromise.[232]

The deviance of individuals, in other words, operates so as to prevent the formation of "deviant" parties (which would tend to intensify group cleavage) and to temper emotions within the political realm of the society. It may well be that deviancy, paradoxical though it seems, contributes to consensus.

As has been indicated above, "cross-pressures resulting from multiple-group affiliations or loyalties account for much of the 'deviation' from the dominant pattern of a

given group. Individuals who are subject to pressures driving them in different political directions must either deviate or 'escape into apathy.' "[233] A high degree of multiple-group affiliation leads to a situation in which most individuals can neither concur wholeheartedly in the actions of "their" party nor disapprove entirely of the actions of the "opposing" party. In accordance with the differential saliency individuals ascribe their multiple-group affiliations, they are constantly deviating from "expected" patterns of behavior. In doing so, they assist in the maintenance of democracy.

CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL ACTION

Territoriality. Geographical isolation has been shown to be a major factor accounting for a high degree of leftist political participation. Communist and socialist parties generally receive strong support from miners, sailors, fishermen, lumbermen, sheepshearers, and long-shoremen.[234] These workers oftentimes live in communities in which the restraining effects of cross-pressures are at a minimum. In addition, the nature of their employment accounts for a high degree of economic insecurity, a factor which we have seen to be an independent source of leftist voting.[235]

Size. The condition of size was of course a crucial consideration of both Weber and Michels in their studies of bureaucracy. It would seem that the efficient operation of

large-scale organizations demands bureaucratization. And as we have seen, as regards labor unions, "The price of increased union bureaucracy is increased power at the top, decreased power among the ordinary members."[236]

Lipset has observed that the size of both industrial plants and of cities correlates with leftist voting.[237] Just as was the case with the "isolated" industries, large industrial plants make "for a higher degree of intra-class communication and less personal contact with people on higher economic levels."[238]

In Union Democracy, it was demonstrated not only that printers in the larger shops were more likely to participate in union politics than were printers in small shops but that this was the case "independently of whether they participate in the printers' occupational community."[239] A factor which goes far in explaining this is the greater degree of voluntariness of personal interrelationships in the larger shops. This voluntariness is largely a consequence of the simple fact that there are more men from which to choose one's companions.[240] In the large shops there is greater possibility of forming cliques character- ized by homogeniety of political views.

In the small shops, however, there is more necessity to de-emphasize union politics.

> . . . a small group, in order to preserve good inter-
> personal relations and solidarity on matters of
> importance to it, need not and cannot enforce con-
> sensus with regard to all values and attitudes held by
> its members. A group may much more easily exert

pressure on its members to <u>reduce</u> their interest or involvement in activities and attitudes which are peripheral to the group's own functioning and which may place a strain on solidarity if introduced into it. The value to the group of reducing the saliency of issues upon which group consensus does not exist is clear: what is a matter of relative indifference is not a source of internal cleavage.[241]

<u>Time</u>. The prevalence of night work within the print-ing industry is another factor in part accounting for a high degree of association among printers. Night work operates so as to break up normal leisure patterns.

There are a number of processes which underlie the propensity of night workers to associate with printers. First, we would suggest that the day worker is subject to the structured pulls of mass entertainment, of neighborhood organizations, and of nonprinter friends away from the printers' community, while night workers on all these counts are subject to a push toward the printers' community. Thus while night workers take <u>less</u> part in nonprinter organizations, they take <u>more</u> part in organizations associated with printing than do day workers.[242]

In addition, night employment removes the printer from normal family relationships.[243] Conflicting schedules tend to pull the printer toward his printer friends who also have difficulty conforming to normal patterns of family activities. Also of importance is the more leisurely pace of night work as compared to that of day work. The relaxed atmosphere accompanying night employment greatly facilitates socializing on the job.[244]

SOCIAL CHANGE

The subject of social change has been touched upon at numerous points above. It will be recalled that economic development was generally seen to have a liberalizing effect

upon social values, while bureaucratization generally was seen to operate as a deterrent to social change. At another point, Lipset stressed the desirability of the _gradual_ intro-duction of the lower classes into the electoral process.

In attempting to explain social change, Lipset occa-sionally places great emphasis upon the effects of histori-cally unique phenomena. Thus he interpreted the farmers' socialist movement in Saskatchewan to be the result of long years of subordination to eastern economic powers culminated by the drought and depression. Likewise the confederation movement of local unions in the early years of the ITU went far in accounting for the emergence of divergent and indes-tructible sources of power within the union.

At other times Lipset argues that complex social characteristics are best considered to have multi-variate causation and consequences. Thus the conditions leading to and resulting from democracy were many and the inter-relation between those conditions was ascribed a complexity which created many methodological difficulties for the social researcher.

Regardless of whether he stresses unique or multi-variate causation, however, he generally operates within the functionalist framework. He sees social systems opera-ting within a dynamic equilibrium possessing the potential of moving in numerous directions depending upon the influence of the causative factors.

In closing, we may note that Lipset argues that major social and political changes have led to either an ideological convergence or an end to ideology--within the Western democratic countries. (We noted above that Lipset sees the ideological cla⸱s struggle continuing in the under-developed countries and on the international level.)

> The characteristic pattern of stable Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century is that they are in a "post-politics" phase--that is, there is relatively little difference between the democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates, and the conservatives accept the welfare state. In large measure this situation reflects the fact that in these countries the workers have won their fight for full citizenship.[245]

NOTES

NOTES

1. Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. xiv. Hereafter designated as AS.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. The C.C.F. has in recent years formally joined forces with certain labor organizations in Canada and now is effective as a national political party known as the N.D.P., the New Democratic Party.

4. Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union Democracy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 464. Hereafter designated as UD.

5. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 10. Hereafter designated as PM.

6. Ibid., p. 9.   7. Ibid., p. 417.

8. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 126-127, as cited in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. (Eds.), Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), p. 83. This article hereafter designated as PS.

9. Ibid., pp. 83-84.   10. Ibid., p. 84.

11. Ibid., p. 87.   12. PM, p. 30.

13. Ibid., p. 36.   14. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

15. Ibid., p. 30.   16. AS, p. xiv.

17. Gabriel A. Almond, in a review of Political Man in American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, No. 5 (October, 1960), p. 753.

18. UD, p. 441.   19. Ibid.

20. Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), p. ix. Hereafter designated as SM.

21. PM, p. 253.   22. Ibid., pp. 319-320.

23. PM, p. 319.   24. Ibid., pp. 323 ff.

25. Ibid., p. 131.   26. Ibid., p. 101.

27. Ibid., p. 175.   28. UD, p. 354.

29. Ibid., p. 355.   30. Ibid., p. 136.

31. AS, p. 101.   32. PM, pp. 121-122.

33. Ibid., p. 27.   34. Ibid., p. 101.

35. Ibid., pp. 120-121.

36. Ibid., p. 120.   37. Ibid., p. 115.

38. Ibid., p. 106.   39. Ibid., p. 108.

40. As quoted in Ibid., p. 106. See Sven Rydenfelt, Kommunismen i Sverige. En Samhallsvetenskaplig Studie. (Kund: Gleerupska Universitetsbokhandeln, 1954). Or see W. Phillips Davison's extensive review of Sven Rydenfelt, which appeared in the Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1954-55), pp. 375-388. Quote is on p. 382.

41. UD, pp. 120-121. 42. Ibid., p. 123.

43. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

44. Ibid., p. 153.   45. Ibid., pp. 153-157.

46. SM, p. 203.   47. PM, p. 403.

48. Ibid., pp. 88-89. 49. Ibid., p. 65.

50. UD, p. 90.   51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 91.   53. PM, p. 232.

54. AS, p. 10.   55. Ibid., p. 29.

56. Ibid., p. 71.   57. Ibid., p. 221.

58. Ibid., p. 70.   59. Ibid., p. 251.

60. Ibid., p. 286.   61. PM, p. 389.

62. AS, p. 271.   63. UD, p. 290.

64. Ibid., p. 270.   65. Ibid., p. 304.

66. Ibid., p. 305.   67. Ibid., p. 270.

68. Ibid., p. 294.   69. PM, p. 39.

70. PM, p. 39.   71. PS, p. 103.

72. PM, p. 77.   73. UD, pp. 273-274.

74. Ibid., pp. 287-288.

75. PM, p. 77.   76. Ibid., p. 78.

77. Ibid., p. 80.   78. UD, p. 282.

79. PM, p. 151.   80. Ibid., p. 150.

81. Ibid., pp. 151-152.

82. Ibid., p. 216. See David Riesman, "Some Observations on the Limits of Totalitarian Power," in Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 414-425.

83. Ibid., p. 61.   84. Ibid., p. 104.

85. Ibid. See Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955), esp. p. 139.

86. PM, p. 56.   87. Ibid., p. 202.

88. Ibid., pp. 202-203.

89. PS, p. 102.   90. PM, p. 173.

91. Ibid., p. 134.   92. Ibid., p. 132.

93. Ibid., p. 131.   94. Ibid., chap. V.

95. Almond, op. cit., p. 753.

96. PM, p. 298.   97. Ibid., p. 368.

98. Ibid., p. 238.   99. SM, p. 1.

100. PS, p. 85.   101. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

102. SM, p. 1.   103. PM, p. 368.

104. SM, p. 64.   105. Ibid., pp. 265-266.

106. Ibid., p. 269.   107. Ibid., p. 273.

108. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

109. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

110. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

111. SM, p. 77.   112. Ibid., p. 76.

113. Ibid., p. 77.   114. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

115. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

116. Ibid., p. 74.   117. Ibid., p. 65.

118. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

119. Ibid., p. 57.   120. Ibid., p. 60.

121. Ibid., p. 63.   122. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

123. Ibid., p. 11.   124. Ibid., p. 165.

125. As quoted in SM, p. 199. See P. F. Lazarsfeld, Jugend und Beruf, Vol. 8 of Quellen und Studien zur Jugendkunde (Jena: G. Fischer, 1931).

126. AS, p. 179.

127. Ibid., pp. 192-193. See also Robert Michels, Political Parties (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 260-262.

128. PM, pp. 243-244.

129. AS, p. 196.   130. Ibid., p. 198.

131. PM, p. 242.   132. Ibid., p. 248.

133. Ibid., p. 64.   134. Ibid., p. 66.

135. See Dewey Anderson and Percy Davidson, Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1943).

136. PM, p. 220.   137. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

138. Ibid., p. 285.   139. UD, p. 14.

140. PM, p. 31.

141. Ibid., p. 34. See Manning Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1953).

142. SM, pp. 77-78.   143. UD, p. 239.

144. Ibid., pp. 246-247.

145. PM, pp. 232-236.

146. UD, p. 8.   147. Ibid., p. 240.

148. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Eds.), Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), p. 13.

149. PM, p. 357.

150. See Robert S. Lynd, "Power in American Society as Resource and Problem," in Arthur Kornhauser (ed.), Problems of Power in American Society (Wayne State University Press, 1957), pp. 9-10; and Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," World Politics, Vol. 10 (1957), p. 139.

151. PS, pp. 105-106. The internal quote is from Parsons, op. cit., p. 139.

152. Ibid., pp. 105-107.

153. Ibid., p. 106.   154. Ibid.

155. AS, p. 267.   156. PS, p. 92.

157. PM, p. 220.   158. PS, p. 92.

159. PM, pp. 306-307.

160. Ibid., p. 182.   161. PS, p. 95.

162. PM, p. 218.   163. Ibid., p. 219.

164. Ibid., p. 179.   165. Ibid., p. 203.

166. Ibid., p. 205.   167. UD, p. 13.

168. Ibid., p. 8.   169. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

170. Ibid., p. 9.   171. Ibid.

172. Ibid., p. 10.   173. Ibid.

174. Ibid., p. 12.   175. Ibid., p. 464.

176. PM, p. 38.   177. UD, p. 274.

178. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

179. Ibid., p. 16.

180. PM, p. 259.   181. Ibid., p. 260.

182. UD, p. 288.   183. Ibid., p. 38.

184. See especially fn. 6, pp. 40-41, UD.

185. PM, pp. 200-201.

186. Ibid., p. 201.   187. UD, pp. 60-69.

188. Ibid., p. 64.   189. PM, p. 46.

190. Ibid., pp. 46-47.

191. Ibid., p. 74.   192. Ibid., p. 74.

193. Ibid., p. 75.   194. UD, p. 82.

195. Ibid., p. 85.

196. See especially Bernard Barber, "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations," in A. W. Gouldner, (ed.), Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp. 493-494.

197. PM, p. 195.

198. As quoted in UD, p. 83. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), pp. 376-386.

199. UD, pp. 29-32.

200. See especially his article, "Political Sociology," in Sociology Today (PS).

201. PM, p. 40.   202. UD, p. 292.

203. Ibid., pp. 18 ff.

204. Ibid., p. 412.   205. PM, p. 21.

206. Ibid., p. 22.   207. UD, p. 452.

208. PM, pp. 396-397.

209. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

210. Ibid., p. 91.   211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.   213. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

214. Ibid., p. 330.   215. Ibid.

216. Ibid., p. 29.   217. Ibid., p. 27.

218. Ibid., p. 403.

219. Although Lipset advances many variously worded definitions of democracy, the ideas expressed are virtually the same.

220. PM, p. 45.

221. PS, p. 92. See also PS, pp. 92-93 and PM, Part II.

222. PM, p. 128.   223. Ibid., p. 80.

224. Ibid., p. 264.   225. Ibid., p. 212.

226. As quoted in Ibid., p. 114. See Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Time and Space," in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), p. 419.

227. PM, p. 114.   228. Ibid., p. 56.

229. UD, p. 260.   230. Ibid., p. 264.

231. See PM, p. 31, fn. 17.

232. Ibid., p. 31.   233. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

234. Ibid., p. 87.   235. Ibid., pp. 232-236.

236. UD, p. 8.   237. PM, pp. 249-252.

238. Ibid., p. 252.

239. UD, p. 171.   240. Ibid., p. 179.

241. Ibid., pp. 186-187.

242. Ibid., p. 155.

243. Ibid., pp. 155-157.

244. Ibid., p. 157.   245. PM, p. 92.

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APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

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