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I o A? _ I. .r . . . .. ...(l .-.._\ .. . . I .... I. .I . . f - I I‘ ‘ : I 'I .I4.. — . ..» J) ..b’ l. .. I a \pII_ aluNL . \w0 w. I o. ~..~ “I .I .nva.II s\\I . .....(Jo . .\ I - . u . u . n . II . . u. I" II... {I . .-.. .... I... ...c. . .....IIKI .-....Ilr IL. ... -. I. ol“. ’ _ 9.1 .' o..i\.:l t£.00’0'b0" I i! I l. I THESIS LIBRARY Michigan State University A MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES By George M. Small Jr. AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of NMSTER OF SCIENCE School of Police Administration and Public Safety 1964 APPROVED } ;7b6\1 /Z7L/ (: 4;«Jki~/L,// (Member) i {4/ (/f'. .I/4 l» 47” 3 1:1; ;c(14( ’ !"'/ /_ " Member) The purpose of this study is to: (1) develop a 'model system to identify employees working at national defense industries, and (2) determine whether the model system could be utilized at three selected defense industries of varying size and function, and whether such utilization would result in.more positive security compliance. Information and relevant data were then obtained by: (l) reviewing the Department of Defense contractual requirements for national defense industries, (2) re- viewing other applicable literature, (3) interviewing authorities in the field, and (4) examining several representative identification systems. Aumodel system was then deveIOped on the basis of the controlling ' governmental regulations and on the additional criteria for identification systems. The systems and procedures for employee identifi- cation at three selected defense industries were then reviewed to provide a basis for comparative tests of the model and the three companies. The same frame of refer- ence was utilized in describing the three companies as was used in the model presentation. These comparative tests determined that: (l) the model system has the ca- pability of performing all of the primary functional and procedural requirements of the three companies, and (2) the model system is in more complete compliance with the Department of Defense regulations and with the addition- al criteria for identification systems. It was also de- termined that a need exists for improving the quality of the Department of Defense regulations that govern identi- fication systems. As this thesis prOgressed, the importance of em- ployee identification as a basis for the security pro- gram became more evident. The study's results supported the view that establishing and maintaining an effective security identification system is a vital necessity in preventing the compromise of our military, industrial, and technological secrets; that realization of effective personnel identification is an essential prerequisite toward accomplishing the objective of sound security programs in our national defense industries. A MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES BY x. at ”1.“ George M. Small Jr. A.THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE School of Police Administration and Public Safety 1964 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY . . History of Espionage Against the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Threat of Soviet Industrial Espionage Importance of the Industrial Security Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lead-Time Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . Identification as Basis for Effective Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . DevelOpment of a Model System . . . . . . Testing the Model System . . . . . . . . Limitations of This Study . . . . . . . . III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS . . . . . Industrial Security Manual . . . . . . . Air Materiel Command Manual . . . . . . . IV. ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS AND EXEMPLARY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . Review of Authoritative Information . . . Exchange Identification System . . . . . Electronic Devices . . . . . . . . . . . Key-Card System . . . . . . . . . . . Badge System with Changeable Codes . . ii PAGE , ll 12 12 12 12 l4 14 18 22 22 29 3O 31 34 CHAPTER PAGE V. MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM . . . . 38 Perimeter Identification . . . . . . . . . 38 Identification Device . . . . . . . . . 39 Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 8 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 47 Closed Area and Clearance Identification . 49 Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 50 Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 61 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 61 VI. EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS AT THREE SELECTED COMPANIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 A Company Perimeter Identification . . . . 64 Identification Devices . . . . . . . . . 64 Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7O Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . 75 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 77 A Company Closed Area and Clearance Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Identification Devices . . . . . . . . . 81 Issuance O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 84 iii CHAPTER PAGE Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 92 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 93 B Company Perimeter Identification . . . . . 98 Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 98 Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 103 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 104» B Company Closed Area and Clearance Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 106 Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 108 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 109 C Company Perimeter Identification . . . . . 110 C Company Closed Area and Clearance Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . lll Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 112 Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 113 iv CHAPTER PAGE VII. C(MPARATIVE TESTS OF THE MODEL AND THREECQIPANIES.....‘.........ll_4 Model Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Compliance with Requirements and Standards 118 VIII.CONCLUSION 124 BIBLICBRAPHY ...................l32 LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I. Comparison of Perimeter Identification Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 II. Comparison of Closed Area and Clearance _ Identification Functions . . . . . . . . 117 III. System's Degree of Compliance with Department of Defense Requirements . . . 121 IV. System's Degree of Compliance with Additional Identification Standards . . . 122 V. Percentage Comparison of Compliance Findings of Tables III and IV . . . . . . 123 vi FIGURE 1. Industrial Security LeadsTime . . . . . . 2. Key-Card Identification . . . . . . . . . 3. Electronically Coded Badge . . . . . . . 4. Fraposed Identification Badge . . . . . . 5. PrOposed Identification Badge File Forms 6. PrOposed Temporary Identification Badge . 7. Fraposed Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card . . . . . . . . . 8. Proposed Request for Clearance and Admittance to Area(s) Form . . . . . 9. PrOposed Request for Clearance and Admittance to Area(s) Form . . . . . 10. PrOposed Clearance and.Admittance Authorization Card File Forms . . . . 11. Identification Card . . . . . . . . . . 12. Salaried Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . 13. Hourly Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. Early Admittance and Odd-Shift/Odd- Lunch Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. Pass and Badge Receipt Card . . . . . . 16. Temporary Identification Pass . . . . . 17. Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18. Register Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIST OF FIGURES vii PAGE 33 36 41 45 52 55 56 60 66 67 68 69 74 78 83 88 FIGURE PAGE 19. Receipt for Key-Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 20. Temporary Admittance Authorization . . . . . . 95 21. Identification Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 22. Security File Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 23. "I FORGOT” Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 viii CHAPTER I NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY This chapter will review the area of espionage and the resulting need for positive and effective indus- trial security-identification practices. I. HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES The threat of foreign eSpionage to the United States is as old as the country itself. Since the days of the American.Revolution, our country has been the object of espionage efforts by practically every major world power. Great Britain, Mexico, Spain, Germany, Italy, Japan, China, and the Soviet union, have all, at one time or another, engaged in extensive eSpionage pro- grams with the intent of subverting our national secur- ity. Only a few short years ago, the major threat was coming from.Genmany and Japan.1 Today, eSpionage efforts against the United States are primarily being originated by the Soviet Union.2 1 Colonel Allison Ind, A M fifiginpage (New York: David McKay Company, Inc. , , pp. 3 5. 2J. Edgar’sHoover, "Do You.Reall IUnderstand Communism?” 1m Vol. No. II (April, 1962). pp. 4-5, 2 - II. THE THREAT 0F SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE Throughout this country's history, our nation's industries have consistently played a vital role in main- taining national security. The importance of the job that industry performs in the areas of production, main- tenance, construction, and research is also recognized by the Soviets.3 American industry has been one of the primary tar- gets of Soviet cepionage for many years, dating back to the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution when the Rus- sians established a Soviet government trading agency in 1924, called the Amtorg Corporation. This agency was successful in stealing formulas for industrial products such as petroleum and chemicals. Since this early start, the communists have ex- panded their efforts to the point today where every in- dustrial company in the country is a potential target.5 3 John R. Davis, W313“; (Sprin field: Charles C. Thomas Publi her; pp. 45 -55. 4J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of ecei (New York: Pocket Books, 8Inc., 1958)), pp. -87; and United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, 1h; Shagefgl Ygags - m atmmmmelrflnit 5%?“ 'Washington: Government Printing 0 fice, 2 : pp. 5-21. 5J. Edgar Hoover, “Do You Really Understand Communism?” Lgdg%§;%%1 Se ,V01.VI,No. II (April, 1962), pp. 4- 3- and O fice of Defense Mobilization, Standards form msi a1 S urit of Industrial and Govern- ‘ggggg; Fggil§ties,1 ‘Washington: Government Printing ffice, 1958 , p. Authorities on Soviet espionage have, on numerous occa- sions, cited that our national defense industries, parti- cularly those involved in classified contracts, are prime targets of Soviet espionage. General Trudeau, United State Army Chief of Research and Development and former head of Army Intelligence, has stated that Soviet espio- nage poses a serious threat to our industrial base, and that any industry which is even remotely connected with our defense efforts can expect to be subjected to Soviet espionage efforts.6 Companies engaged in classified work, i.e., work involving information which requires protection in the interest of national defense,7 are of special interest to the communists. Industries such as aircraft, electronics, missiles, chemical, steel, communi- cations, and shipping are particularly subject to their efforts.8 Much information suitable for subsequent develOp- ment into vital intelligence is gathered by the Soviets through open means, such as subscribing to our technical 6General Arthur Trudeau, U. S. Army Chief of Re- search and Development and former head of Army Intelli- ence, Speech to the American Society for Industrial ecurity, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1958. 7United mStates Department of Defense,m %e gggiggm MSafieggggd §§g glassifigg Informggio n, ashington: Government int g ice, Novem er, 1961). p. 2. 8Hoover, 1.39,. m; and William C. Sullivan. "The Continued Threat of Espionage and Sabotage in the U. 8.," Indgsgrigl Seggxi t1, Vol. Vi. No. IV (October, 1962), PD 0 “‘45. 4 journals, purchasing government patents, attending scien- tific lectures, and monitoring exhibits. However, the communists are also operating in the area of clandestine spy operations to obtain information relative to our na- tional security.9 Hoover states that this continuing espionage and intelligence attack is being conducted on a scale unequaled in history.10 Their intelligence ser- vice has been deveIOped to the point where it is now the largest and most effective espionage agency the world has ever known.11 Their spy sytem is well organized 12 Their and is composed of highly trained personnel. industrial espionage apparatus, in particular, is rated as superior by our own intelligence professionals. Gen- eral Trudeau has stated: The advanced state of Soviet technology today is due more to Soviet success in e8pionage and subver- sio? thanlit is to their scientific apparatus, good eats. Hoover says that Soviet block diplomats now form 9.1m. 10U.S. News and‘World Report, Testimony by J. Edgar Hoover before the House ApprOpriations Committee, June 5. 1963. 31......3 Bass mums Beasts. LIV (June 17. 1963), p. 10. ”Major Andrew J. Kukucka, United States Army Department of Counterintelligence, Speech to the Ameri- can Society for Industrial Security, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1958, (Printed COpy). 12J. Edgar Hoover, ”Do You Really understand Communism?” Industrial Segurity, V01. VI, No. II (April, 1962), pp. 4-5, 23-24. 13Trudeau, £25.- gli__. the backbone of eSpionage Operations in the United States, and that their embassies are being used as bases of Operation for conducting intelligence activi- ties.14 He also states that 75 per cent of Soviet offi- cials in this country have some type of intelligence assignment,15 and that there are 761 Soviet block diplo- mats assigned in this country who have been given ex- tensive training in espionage. In addition, there are 1,066 dependents of Soviet block personnel, some of whom are also trained intelligence agents. He states that in the year ending June 30, 1962, Russian officials made fourteen trips through this country for the purpose of intelligence and reconnaissance. These officials visited numerous areas of strategic importance to our defense effort and closely studied manmeilitary instal- lations and industrial facilities. During the same year, sixty-five scientific, industrial, and military exhibits, conferences, and symposia were attended by some ninety- five Soviet block personnel. Masses of information were collected, and numerous contacts were made with persons having potential value for future intelligence recruitment.16 1“U.S. News and World Report, 1,23. 31,5. 15.1. Edgar Hoover m g; m (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 271-87. ' 16U.S. News and World Report, Testimony by J. Edgar Hoover before,the House ApprOpriations Committee, June 5, 1963, n.5, m m World Re ort, LIV (June 17, 1963), p. 10. Hoover states that there are many first-hand examples of instances where the Soviets have succeeded or tried to steal vital industrial secrets in the United States. He Specifically cites the Harry Gold, Klaus Fuchs, Julius Rosenberg eSpionage apparatus which.was primarily concerned with obtaining industrial informa- tion and eventually stole secret atomic energy data. He also refers to the case of Ivan A. Bubchikov, Assist- ant Soviet Military Attache assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who used the services of a nat- uralized American Citizen in 1955 and 1956, for the purpose of securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical deveIOpments.17 III. IMPORTANCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM Industries where classified work is being per- formed often represent the most vulnerable phase in develOping and evolving secret weapons and techniques.18 17.1. Edgar Hoover, "Do You Really understand Communism?" Industrial Security, V01 VI, No. II (April, 1962), pp. 4-5, 23-24. 18United States Air Force, guide fo; Segggity {afloatringtion' AFM 205-5 (Washington: Government Print- 3 C3, 5 ’ pp. 3-360 7 Industries allowing weaknesses in their industrial plant protection systems, such as: (l) leaving classified doc- uments unprotected, (2) performing perfunctory plant security checks, and (3) permitting conditions that are conducive to clandestinely removing materials from the plant, become vulnerable targets for eSpionage efforts. The first line of defense against conditions that make industries vulnerable to eSpionage is the industrial security program as implemented through the various plant protection and security systems. Although the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program is designed to safeguard classified information in the possession of Industrial firms, this prOgram, in itself, is not sufficient to prevent valuable intelligence information from falling into the hands of a potential enemy.21 The directives and regu- lations which have been established for use at indus- trial defense installations establish only the minimum 19Hoover, 10;. gig. ZQLQLQ; and Trudeau, log. git. 21United States Air Force, Industrial Sggggigy Newslegge; (Headquarters, Central Contracts Management RegiiniSWright Patterson AFB, Ohio, December, 1961), pp. - o . 8 standards of security.22 It is necessary that management be constantly alert to vulnerable points within their facilities, particularly in the area of plant security protection.23 Only through.imagination and a full know- ledge of the meaning and intent of applicable regulations by those re5ponsible for implementing the security pro- gram can real security effectiveness be achieved. IV. LEAD-TIME CONCEPT The primary objectives of the industrial security program are: (l) to safeguard classified information by entrusting it only to trustworthy persons, and (2) to establish procedures to prevent its compromise. Accom- plishing these objectives becomes meaningless unless the security prOgram is sufficiently effective to protect the 25 scientific and technical advantages that we achieve. Maintaining an advantage or lead-time is one of the 22United States Air Force, figigghj2;,§§§§£1E1 W. 23United States Air Force, W W Nggsleggeg. 24United States Air Force, Quid; £21 W W ’ 25A. Tyler Port, Director, Office of Security Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Speech to the American Society for Industrial Security Washing- ton, D.C., September 18, 1958, (Printed COpy). TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD T IME FIGURE 1 INDUSTRIAL SECURITY LEAD-TIME (FROM UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL MANUAL) 10 basic concepts of the security program. AS illustrated in Figure 1, the aim of an effective security program is to provide enough security protection so that by the time a foreign adversary is able to obtain one of our ideas, we have already proceeded well into the research and deve10pment phase. Continuing security protection is provided throughout the life of the weapon system to maintain this lead-time advantage.26 The Department of Defense Industrial Security Program is designed to insure that lead-times vital to our national security are protected. Various security systems and procedures have been established by the Department of Defense to provide this protection. These systems and procedures basically: (1) provide for apprOpriate classification of information, and (2) pro- vide that classified information is disclosed only to authorized perSons, i.e., persons with apprOpriate security clearance who have a need for the information.27 26United States Army. meagre; semen Managgmgg§,Manual, (United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, May, 1959), No Page Numbers. 27United States Department of Defense, Indgstgial Sggurity Manual for Safeguarding Classified Iggggmggigg, Washington: Government Printing Office, November, 1961), pp. 1-80 11 V. IDENTIFICATION AS BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE SECURITY Assuring that only authorized persons have access to classified information becomes a complex problem. Systems for document control, material control, physical security, subcontractors and consultants, visitor control, and personnel clearances are required for every contractor who engages in classified defense work with the govern- ‘ment. Some requirements are relatively simple to imple- ment while others are very complex. Requirements also vary greatly, depending on the size of the defense con- tractor's facility, the number of employees, the volume and size of classified documents and hardware, the type of work being done, and the sensitivity of the projects. However, all Of these variables have a common factor, for they all depend on personnel identification systems as one Of the foundations for their effective Operation. ‘Without establishing and enforcing rigid identification procedures, none of the above systems could function effectively.28 281mg” pp. 1-37. "rfi CHAPTER II PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY I. DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL SYSTEM The first purpose of this study is to develop a model system of employee identification based on appli- cable governmental regulations and on accepted security standards. II. TESTING THE MODEL SYSTEM The second purpose of this study is to determine whether the model system could be utilized at three selected defense industries Of varying size and func- tions by analyzing the three systems in reference to the model, and, if so, whether such utilization would result in more positive security compliance. III. LIMITATICNS OF THIS STUDY This study will be limited to the area Of employee identification. NO consideration will be given to the areas of identification of visitors, sub- contractors, resident contractors, military personnel, civil service personnel, suppliers or vendors. The area of pre-employment screening and identification will not be considered, and the processing of the contractor's 12 13 government security clearances is also not considered. Other closely related security subjects such as fencing, lighting, alarm systems, guard patrols, employee theft, vehicle parking, vehicle searches, material control, and document control are not included in this thesis. Only those specific practices and procedures directly pertain- ing to employee identification systems will be studied. The field of industrial espionage between com- panies is also not covered in this study. CHAPTER III DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS When civilian industries perform work for the United States Government, they enter into a contract covering various phases of the work to be accomplished. The contractual requirements pertaining to the national security program and the United States Air Force Air Materiel COmmand's Security Guide will be reviewed. 1. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL Civilian industrial work involving classified information necessitates a contract between the indus- try and the government for the safeguarding of the clas- sified information. The contractor industry agrees to abide by certain rules and regulations, as specified in the contract known as the Department Of Defense Security Agreement (DD Form 441) and the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information (Attach- ment to DD Form 441). The rules and regulations set forth in this agreement are for the specific purpose of establishing uniform security practices within indus- trial facilities which have classified information of the military departments (Army, Navy, or Air Force) in 14 1 15 their custody. Prior to the release of classified information to the contractor's facility, it is necessary that a Facil- ity Security Clearance be granted to the contractor by the Department of Defense. Whether or not a Facility Security Clearance is granted is based on the results of a security survey conducted by Department of Defense inSpectors. If it is determined that the contractor has the ability to adequately safeguard and protect the classified information needed in the performance of his contract, the Facility Security Clearance is granted.2 The "General Requirements" section of the Indus- trial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified In- fonmation.makes the contractor directly reSponsible for safeguarding all classified information under his con- trol and prohibits the contractor from allowing un- authorized persons to have access to such information. The contractor company is further required to provide adequate protective measures within his facility to safeguard all classified information under his control. 1United States Department of Defense, Savanna fatSed 89W. Washington: Government tinting Office, November, 1961), p. iii. ' 2United States Department of Defense, , Eggges IDQHEEELEL S R. l t , (Washington: Government Printing ffice, Novem er, 1961), pp. 13-20. 16 The contractor must also establish a system to control access of employees and visitors to closed and restrict- ed areas within his facility, i.e., areas where classi- fied information is accessible during working and/or homeworking hours.3 Examples Of such areas would in- clude assembly rooms where large classified pieces of equipment or classified charts are in the Open and sub- ject to visual access . The section of the Industrial Security Manual which states the requirements governing employee badges and identification cards is quoted below: a. Employee Badges. Provided the contractor deems it necessary, he may use identification cards or badges to assist in identifying the degree of security clearance of the holder and/or to indicate that the holder is authorized to enter closed or restricted areas. If identification cards or badges " are used for such purposes, the following shall apply: (1) The minimum identifying information to be shown on employees' identification badges or cards shall be the name and photograph of the holder. Other descriptive information to identify the author- ized holder may be included on badges and/or cards at the‘Option of the contractor. (2) The identification badge or card may include color or symbol coding to indicate the degree of security clearance of the holder and/or that he is authorized to enter a closed or restricted area, or a separate coded badge or card may be used for such purposes. When the combination of badges and/or' cards are used, both must bear correlating data such 'fislghe same registration number or the name of the 0 er. 3W W m. pp. 5-7. 17 (3) The words "TOP SECRET,” "SECRET" or “CONFIDEN- TIAL," or abbreviations thereof shall not appear on the badges or identification cards. (4) The makeup and construction of badges and identification cards shall be designed to minimize the possibility of tampering or unauthorized use. (5) Badges and identification cards indicating the degree of security clearance or access to closed or restricted areas shall be rigidly controlled and accounted for by the contractor by use of a number- ing system. Such badges and identification cards shall be surrendered by the holder upon termination of employment, termination of security clearances, or for other apprOpriate reasons. (6) Coded badges and cards shall be considered only as an aid in determining the current degree of personnel security clearance of the holder or the areas to which the holder may have access. The clearance status of a person who holds such a badge or identification card shall be verified when there is doubt as to the validity of the badge or card. c. Reporting. The procedures for the use of badges or identification cards as authorized in 'a' . . . above shall b2 incorporated in the Standard Practice Procedure. Failure on the part of the contractor to maintain the standards for physical security as specified in the Industrial Security Manual may result in: (1) cancella- tion of all government contracts involving classified information, and (2) permanent revocation of the con- tractor's Facility Security Clearance.5 4Industrigl Sggurigy Manual, p. 8. ségmgg Forges Industgial Seggritg Re 1 ti , p. 23. 18 Close adherence by the contractor to the provi- sions and requirements of the Industrial Security Manual is vital. As a means of monitoring the degree of com- pliance by the contractor with thesepprovisions, securi- ty inspections are periodically conducted by the Depart- ment of Defense. If the results of one of these inepec- tions reveals that the contractor's facility is no longer adequately safeguarding classified information, the Department of Defense may prohibit additional clas- sified information from being furnished to the contrac- tor and may withdraw all classified information previ- ously furnished to the contractor until such time as the facility meets the standards Of the Industrial Security Manual.6 II. AIR MATERIEL CQMAND MANUAL ‘When the three Companies viewed in this study be- came involved in classified defense contracts, the Depart- ment of Defense assigned security cognizance to the United States Air Force. The major air command within the.Air Force having reaponsibility for overseeing the security of all industries under their jurisdiction is the Air 51am. l9 'Materiel Command.7 Although the Air Force reorganiza- tion of July 1, 1961, officially changed the name of the Air Materiel Command to the Air Force Logistics Command, its reSponsibilities and functions relating to security cognizance over industrial security remained unchanged.8 As an aid to the various companies under their cognizance, Air Materiel Command Manual 205-9 is furnish‘ ed to the companies as a guide for maintaining a satis- factory degree of security compliance.9 .Although the information in the manual is provided only as a guide, and is not an official part of the contractor's con- tractual obligations, the Air Force security inSpectors also use it as a guide when conducting their periodic security inspections. Thus, the willingness and ability of the contractor to heed the suggestions of the manual is often directly reflected in the inepection results.10 7Un1ted States Army Industrial Sm: Mandra- mgn; (United States Army Intelligence School, Fort Ho abird, Maryland, May, 1959), No Page Numbers. 8United States Air Force, W W ,flullggin, (Headquarters, ‘Western Contracts Mane ement Region,‘Mira-Loma, California, July, 1961), p. 9 United States Air Force, Air, Magegie; Manual 2.9.5.22 WPIadsamm Quisiem- far 0 3%- es WflEfETM mmmw ter ‘Washington: Government Printing fice, August, 5, p. Apl. 10David Grand, united States Air Force Industrial Security InSpector,‘Western Contracts Management Region Mira-Lama, Calif., Personal Interview, November 14,1961. 20 The section of the manual which pertains to personnel identification suggests that whenever employ- ees can not be admitted to the plant on personnel recog- nition, employee identification badges or cards should be used. The manual further states that badges should be tamper-proof and should contain sufficient descrip- tive information, including photograph, to identify the bearer. Badges should be worn in a visible, uniform place at all times. Persons without badges should be challenged, and anyone without prOper credentials claim- ing to be an employee should not be admitted to the plant. Periodic checks of badges should be_conducted to assure possession by persons to whom the badges are issued. The manual suggests that badges should be ser- ialized and rigidly controlled. 'Whenever more than five per cent of the total badges issued are lost, new badges should be issued. Positive means should also be taken to assure the return of badges and identification cards upon separation of employment. The manual further states that the contractor should establish a program to con- trol admittance of employees to the plant outside of their normal working hours to assure that entry is authorized and necessary. Contractors should also make provisions for positive identification and determination of "need-to-know”‘before employees are admitted to restricted and closed areas within the plant.” ”an Material. Samara m1. pp. A-l. A-a. 21 CHAPTER IV ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS AND EXEMPLARY SYSTEMS I. REVIEW OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION The type Of identification and pass system suit- able for use at a given company will depend greatly on the size of the company and the sc0pe Of security work in which it is engaged. Quite Often in small plants, employees are identified by personal recognition, and badges or passes are not used. Larger companies find it necessary to utilize an identification system of badges and passes as an essential means of maintaining good security and control Of personnel.1 It is generally felt that organizations with more than thirty persons should use some type Of pass or badge system. A review of applicable literature, in addition to those Air Force and Department of Defense publica- 'tions previously cited, indicates certain basic require- 1National Industrial Conference Board, Indggggigl Sggugigy, Combating Subversion gag S bota e (Studies in Business Policy NO. 60. New York: NationaI Industrial Conference Board, 1957), p. 76. 2B. W. Gocke, Praggigal Plgnt onteggiog and {31%ging,(S8ringfie1d: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 5 , pp. -17; and United States Atomic Energy Commis- sion, Physigal Segugity Standards, (Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1950), p. 12. 22 23 ments in establishing a pass and badge system of person- nel identification. These criteria are as follows: 1. Badges Should be of a tamper-resistant de- sign. A plastic laminated pass or badge is generally considered the most tamper-resistant type available. Such badges usually consist of ordinary paper or card material laminated between two pieces of slow-burning acetate or vinyl plastic. Using a plastic insert lami- nated between two tranSparent pieces of plastic makes a much more secure badge, as the three pieces of plastic, when laminated together, are fused into one tamper- resistant piece. Metal rimmed or plastic envelope de- vices are not considered as tamper-proof. i 2. Badges should be of sturdy construction, waterproof, and resistant to abuse and hard wear. 3. Badge design should be such that rapid em- ployee entrance and egress during peak traffic periods at the gates is facilitated. 4. A clear photograph of the bearer should be laminated into the front of the badge. The picture should be at least one inch in its smallest dimension, and the bearer should be re-photographed at least every five years or when necessary to reflect any significant physical change in facial appearance. 5. The name of the company and plant is entered in order that a badge used at one plant is invalid at 24 any other plant. 6. Identifying information such as the name and signature of the person to whom the badge is issued, together with his social security number, date of birth, color of eyes and hair, height, and weight is normally included. 7. Passes and badges should be numbered serially in a prominent manner, and the same number of a lost badge should never be used again. 8. Cross file records by name and badge number should be kept to aid in checking on lost or cancelled passes or badges. 9. Color or number codes are recommended to identify work shifts and/or work areas authorized. 10. The date of issuance and the expiration date should be entered on the pass or badge. 11. The badges should be signed by a representa- tive of management or stamped with his facsimile signa- ture . 12. Badge make-up and issuance should be care- fully controlled. 13. A close check of terminated employees is recommended to ensure return of badges. l4. Returned badges should be destroyed periodi- cally along with mutilated and defective badges. 25 15. Badges should have an intricate design which is difficult to reproduce by normal photOCOpying. 16. An ink or dye which is noticeably affected by erasure, or by heat required to alter or laminate the badge or pass, is recommended. 17. Strict enforcement of badge rules should be maintained. Employees must be aware of identification procedures applicable to them and must know what to do if they lose or damage their badges. Badges and passes should be prominently diaplayed on the employees' outer garments in a uniform position at all times within the plant. Violators should be reported immediately, irre- spective of official rank, to a member of the plant guard force. Support from supervision in enforcing regu- lations is required, and penalties are often inflicted on violators who lose badges or otherwise disregard iden- tification rules. Procedures for the plant guard force and the identification unit must be thoroughly under- stood and complied with.3 3National Industrial Conference Board, pp. 74-82; Gocke, 193, gig; Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 12-17; National Industrial Conference Board, 13dg§§§1§1,§g§g;i- 31, Plant Qu ggd Hgndbook (Studies in Business Policy No. 64 New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1953), p.S 24; United States Departments of the Army, Physiggl Sggu 15y of Militagy angllg_§g11g- giOgs, l - ,(Washington: Government inting Office, , pp. 41- 50; United States Atomic Energy Commission, Se u 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), Chapter 2401, No Page Numbers; Office of Defense Mobilization, Sggngards _F_‘O_1; W W 9; Industrial and Governmental Facilities ‘Washington: Government Pfinting Office, I958), p. 22; and Committee on Identification, "Report of the Committee on Identifi- cation, " Sggggigy, Vol. 1, No. 4, (December 1956), 17m. ’ 26 Authorities in the security field acknowledge that no system is absolutely foolproof, and that practi- cally all badges or passes can be reproduced or altered by persons sufficiently skilled in the arts of photo- graphy, engraving, and printing.4 Passes and badges produced in accordance with the previously listed speci- fications are, however, sufficiently difficult to repro- duce or alter to be acceptable for use at the vast majority of plants, provided they are used in conjunc- tion with systems of rigid control and accountability. The previously listed requirements are particularly adequate when utilized in the exchange badge systems.5 At a plant or area where it is necessary to use credentials which are extremely difficult to alter or duplicate, the following specifications are suggested as methods to be considered: 4Edward Brosnan, Chief of Physical Security for the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., Personal Interview3‘March 22, 1962; David Grand, united States Air Force Industrial Security Inspector3‘western Contracts Management Region,‘Mira-Loma, California, Personal Interview, November 14, 1961; Robert'Meader, Director of Security, Varian Associates, Palo Alto, California, Personal Interview, October, 1961; Harry L. Shaw, Plant Protection Manager, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, California, Personal Inter- view, November, 1961. 5Edward Brosnan, Personal Interview; and David Grand, Personal Interview. 27 1. Insert paper with a distinctive watermark. 2. Insert paper that will lose its fibrous strength during the laminating process so that attempts to separate the paper or to peel off the outer plastic will result in a physical breakdown of the insert paper. 3. Cross threads or wires that are readily vis- ible and laminated within the plastic cover sheets of the badge or pass. Alterations such as superimposing a photograph, changing a signature or badge number, or any attempts to re-laminate the badge are usually obvious with such badge systems. 4. Printing the photograph on sensitized plastic material made according to the same chemical formula of the plastic covers so that the front and back tranSpar- ent plastic sheets and the plastic photOgraph are 1am- inated to form a solid piece of plastic. 5. Ink which may or may not be normally visible but which is visible under ultraviolet light. 6. Ink which will bleed and/or change color when it is exposed to solvents which dissolve plastic covers. 6Department of the Army, Physical Segurity g; MLLLE§£¥.§B§ Industrial Installations, pp. 41-50; Atomic Energy Commission, Physical Security Standards, pp. 12-17; Atomic Energy Commission, S curit , Chapter 2401, No Page Numbers; and Office of Defense Mobilization, Standards For Phy;%gal Segurity of Industrial and Governmental Facilities, p. O 28 John R. Davis states that in checking the iden- tification of incoming personnel during peak periods of shift change, the gate guard has time to only distinguish the color and design of the employee's badge. He says that performing a proper comparison of the individual with his badge picture would soon result in chaos, and that both the delayed employees and their supervisors would create a storm of protest because of the resulting delay in starting production. He also states that iden- tification cards and badges will not keep subversives out of a plant, and that such devices have never been and should never be construed to accomplish such a measure. He feels that subversives will gain admittance to a plant by obtaining a position.within the plant instead of re- sorting to such.amateurish measures. However, according to Davis, badges are of signif- icant value in detecting attempts of unauthorized persons to enter the plant premises. He states that badges and cards are also a help in such things as payroll distribu- tion, tool check-out, and restricted area control. He re-emphasizes that identification systems are not fool- proof and are only an aid in accomplishing the over-all 7 security program. 7 John R. Davis M 2.1m W) (Sprgg fégld: Charles’C. Thomas Publisher, l 7 , pp. " o 29 II. EXCHANGE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM One of the most secure identification systems is undoubtedly one which incorporates the above listed features into an exchange system. An exchange system requires that two identical badges are constructed, each one usually of a different color. One badge is issued to the bearer, and the other is kept on file at the secur- ity control point. The bearer presents his badge to the control point guard who then carefully makes a threedway comparison of the bearer's badge, the file badge, and the individual. The bearer may or may not then be given the file badge to wear while he is within the controlled area, the badges again being exchanged when he departs through the control point. This system prevents dupli- cation or alteration, since it would be necessary in some 'way to have a duplicate badge in the guard's file. The final control point in an exchange system rests with how carefully the guard performs his three- way comparison. This aSpect is, of course, one of the major controlling factors in any identification Operation, since no system can be any better than its enforce- ment. Close supervision and follow-up of personnel responsible for checking identification media are necessary to insure the successful Operation of any identification system and to keep it from becoming 30 ineffective and perfunctory. One disadvantage of the exchange system is that the bearer must enter and exit through the same control point unless additional file badges are made for use at other points. Making additional file badges increases the cost factor and requires elaborate standardization of the control point files to ensure exact duplicity of the records at each point. Another disadvantage is that ingress and egress at the control point is impeded due to the time required for the guard to obtain the file badge from the file and to make the three-way compari- 8011. III. ELECTRONIC DEVICES In the past several years the industrial security field has witnessed the introduction of a variety of electronic security devices. Ultra-sonic alarms which detect movement within an area, closed circuit televi- sion for monitoring sensitive areas, and electronically coded identification cards for gaining access to secure areas are but a few of these unique systems.9 A major 8Edward Brosnan, Personal Interview; David Grand, Personal Interview; Robert Meader, Personal Interview; and Harry Shaw, Personal Interview. 9Business Week, "Tightening Up Industrial Secur- ity," Business Week, (October 15, 1960), 181-85. 31 disadvantage of electronic methods is the added cost which, in many security budgets, is found to be prohibi- tive. However, if the budget will provide, they are very worthy of consideration.10 Keg-9g; m. One of the 1...“: widely used devices for personnel identification is the Key-Card system. This system consists of an electronically coded identification card used either by itself or in conjunc- tion with a push button combination. The method which uses only the card requires the bearer of the card to insert the card into a small slot next to the entrance door or turnstile. Electronic wiring laminated inside the card triggers circuitry within the locking mechanism and releases the latch. The bearer then removes his card and enters through the door or turnstile. This system allows any person possessing the card to enter and thereby does not allow suitable protection against un- authorized use of lost or stolen cards. The more secure method incorporates a series of push buttons similar to the keys on an adding machine. The bearer must, in addi- tion to inserting the card, know‘which keys to press and in what order to press them. Inserting a 10John R. Davis, Industrial Plant Protect (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 19575, pp. 265-67. 32 forged card or pressing the keys out of sequence will cause an alarm to sound.11 Another variation of this system is to require the individual to enter a small cubicle which is built into the perimeter structure of the area being entered. Once inside the cubicle, the bearer inserts the key-card and presses the keys, caus- ing an inner door to open. The doors are inter-locking so that only One can be Opened at a time, thereby pre- venting more than one person from entering at a time. The cubicle also provides complete privacy and prevents unauthorized observation of the key pressing Operation. Whenever an employee who knows the key punch combina- tion terminates or is transferred, or in the event of a compromise of the combination, the keys to press and the sequence can be readily changed. Use of the Key-Card cubicle system has generally been restricted to controlling access to Confidential security areas,13 because Department of Defense regula- tions require that admittance to Secret areas must be controlled by guards or by an employee inside the area who unlocks and locks the entrance. Entrance to a TOp 11;Q;d.; and Identification Brochure from Card Key Systems, Inc., Burbank, California. 12Identification Brochure from Card Key Systems. 13David Grand, Personal Interview. N? ‘ 1234567 u: mum PLEASE 1mm) in ANY MAIL. Box pdsIaje chiran Eddd ‘bj CARD KEY SYSTEM K'THlS SlDE UP BURBAMK CALIF ‘ , 1' 1y FRONT TO THE EMPLOYEE: Use 0"- HMS L‘Md FOr any poi-pose.- othch ‘an-h The"? For- whtch :1' , was issued" 3:; .Ps-o'mbsfed. BACK FIGURE 2 KEY-CARD IDENTIFICATION (SAMPLE CARD FROM CARD KEY SYSTEMS, INC.) 33 34 Secret area must always be controlled by a guard. How- ever, the Contracting Officer may, at his discretion, approve the use Of electronic identification systems and 14 waive the guard requirement on Secret areas. Badge System.with Changeable Codes. Another ex- cellent identification system which incorporates practi- cally all of the previously listed criteria for badges and passes is the one-piece badge made by Whitehead and Company. This badge also has the added feature of an electronic coding system. The Whitehead badge consists of a stainless steel plate laminated between sheets of vinyl base plas- tic. A l%' by 2“ full-face photograph of the bearer is laminated into the front of the badge. Vertical black and gold threads are woven in and out of slits cut into the plastic overlay sheet prior to lamination. This feature prevents superimposing a fraudulent picture over the tOp of an Original photograph or altering the badge serial number. Inks and photographic materials of the same chemical base as the vinyl plastic are used, so that immersing the badge in solutions such as 100 per cent 14United States Department of Defense, Inggstgial Se it Magual f2; Safeguarding Classified Information, Washington: Government Printing Office, November, 1961»), pp. 31-32e acetone will result in dissolving everything but the metal badge core. Lamination with a steel insert makes the badge exceptionally strong and durable. Attempts to alter the badge by relamination causes the detailed engraving of the badge to distort and the electronic coding in the steel core to be erased. Additional in- formation on the front or back of the badge such as color codes and a description of the bearer can be added, if desired. The stainless steel badge core is designed to allow each badge to be coded by magnetic fluxes to form up to 1,000,000 six digit codes, any one of which can be erased and recoded at will simply by changing the mag- netic polarity. Coding is accomplished when the badge is issued and may be changed any time the badge is used. Multiple codes may be entered in each badge for use at different places. Using this magnetic coding feature consists of having the bearer insert his badge in the slot of an electronic "switch-recorder.” If the badge is properly coded for that particular entrance, the "switch-recorder” will open the gate or door and allow entry. If the card's coding is not valid, the device locks the card in the slot and sounds an alarm. The additional protective measure of punching a key code combination such as previoust described with the Key- ..rrr W" kwEAE ; l. ' ”A a. rfi‘“"§"" " " (m: "* err-1"- Wt‘qv " ‘-’ ‘ . ...: ~ :11”... ‘5 : w. .‘j‘ I. .. at .- 1 : 3“. '.'. . — 5"" 8—.- .t- .A‘o- I '.",, .u‘éaul--.." . I) ‘ '."G~PI ' - “37“..” , ABC ”Co. :E monument ”fa. FRONT f j IF FOUND PLEASE DROP IN 0.5. MAIL RETU RN POSTAGE GUARANTEED EGNATU RE 0? BEARER I . A? 9A, SIGNATURE‘ VALIDATING . , k- OFFICER - A) BACK FIGURE 3 ELECI‘RONI CALLY CODED BADGE (SAMPLE FROM WHITEHEAD AND co.) 86 37 Card system may also be utilized. Periodically, or whenever the security officer deems’it necessary due to lost or stolen badges, all badges can be double-checked by the guards and recoded at the time the bearer inserts his card into the slot. The "switch-recorder" can be set to read or change one or more of any of the possible 1,000,000 codes.15 Incorporating this system encounters a major obstacle, since its use in controlling entry to Secret or Confidential areas is limited, as was the Key-Card system, by the Department of Defense regulations. Spe- cific approval of the electronic system and a waiver of the guard requirement would have to be given by the Contracting Officer before this method could be used to control access to Secret or Confidential areas.l6 Such waivers are often difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.17 15Ned Whitehead, President of Whitehead and Compa- ny, Inc., Personal Interview, August, 1960; and Identifi- cation Brochure from‘Whitehead and Company, Inc., Washing- ton, D. C., January, 1960. 16I IHEEHJ 13 IE“ E3 Eid! Q1 as sified Info Egatiog, pp. 31-11%.1'fi22$ 17 David Grand, Personal Interview. CHAPTER V MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM The model system for employee identification pre- sented in this chapter will be in two separate categories. One badge system will apply to perimeter identification and control and will be primarily used for identifying employees who are authorized ingress and egress through a perimeter control point. The other badge system will be for the identification of employees who are authoriz- ed admittance to classified closed areas and to provide a means of identifying the bearer's degree of security clearance. Regulations and criteria presented in the preceding two chapters have been used where applicable. I. PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION The device recommended for identifying employees who are authorized ingress and egress through a peri- meter control point is not designed to identify the de- gree of security clearance of the holder or to indicate that the holder is authorized to enter closed areas. The device, therefore, would not normally' come under the regulations provided in the Department of Defense Indus- trial Security Manual previously outlined in Chapter III.1 1David Grand, United States Air Force Industrial Security.InSpector, Western Contracts Management Region, Mira-Lama, California, Personal Interview, November 14, 1961. 38 39 However, since the device presented here will be used in conjunction with another identification card to be presented later in this chapter and designed to identi- fy clearance and closed area access, the Department of Defense regulations will apply.2 The device will also be based on the seventeen criteria for identification systems listed on pages 23-25. a v e The recommended device for perimeter control would be a laminated, photo-type badge. Semi-rigid, vinyl-base plastic pre-printed with identifying infor- mation would be hot-laminated, along with a poloroid photograph of the bearer, between two pieces of clear, semi-rigid, vinyl-base plastic. The front of the badge would include the employee's name in 3/8" type, employee number, badge number, company name, and employee full- face poloroid photograph measuring l"x 1%". An addi- tional line would be available to enter information such as odd-shift times or early admittance authorizations. The tap and bottom borders of the badge would have an intricate design and all pre-printing would be of vinyl- base inks. 2United States Department of Defense, Ingugggig; %§§g;1;yl l §QI,S d 1 33 ie 0 Washington: Government Printing Office, November, 1961), p. 8. 40 The back of the badge would include the employee's social security number, height, weight, birthdate, color of hair, color of eyes, and signature. In addition, the back-of the badge would have the date the badge was issued and the facsimile signature of the security man- ager. Postal instructions for returning the badge would also be included at the bottom. If the company wished to differentiate between salaried and hourly employees, salaried employees would all wear badges of the same color and hourly employees would wear varying colored badges, depending on the shift they work. As an example, salaried employees could wear brown badges, hourly day shift employees could wear blue badges, swing shift could use yellow, and graveyard shift could use red. Letter prefixes would be used with the badge number to designate a vari- ety of information such as "L” for a medical lifting limitation, "T” for tool crib checkout, "E” for inter- departmental parts expiditer, ”M" for mail carrier, etc. 33 e Newly hired employees would be instructed to re- port to the Identification Unit by the Employment Depart- ment. Each new employee would be instructed to present his employment paper work, such as an Employment Certifi- THE MODEL COMPANY "'7‘ / ///"\\\ - ' __‘ .. :’¢/’ ‘41: ‘_ 1.: 30cm. secumry no. DATE usual) fl 317-80-10834 23 Sept 1968 amour wanes? 5'11" 174 BmTHDATE HAIR eyes 17 June 1924 Brown Blue Eisner”; sasAA'rURE ;1‘ A4] //L Mflx‘f/Z, Wj’J/A/y/o 1/ “cur?” MAMAUER 3? nij/iE" 3+9”, DROP m MAIL, ETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED. THE MODEL COMPANY PODXJNK, AmzonA BACK FIGURE 4 PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION BADGE 42 cate or Payroll Addition form to the Identification Clerk. The Identification Clerk would then check the information on the employee's paper work to determine that the person is a bona-fide employee, check his ef- fective date of employment, whether he is a salaried or an hourly employee, and if he is hourly, what shift he will be working. Whether the new employee has any medical limitations would also be checked on the form, as well as any status as an expediter, mail carrier, odd-lunch time, etc. The Identification Clerk.would then type the apprOpriate information on an apprOpriate colored plas- tic badge core, using a typewriter with Special 3/8” type for the information on the front of the badge and a standard typewriter for the back of the badge. The Identification Clerk would then have the employee sign the back of the badge, stamp the badge with the facsimi- le signature of the Security Manager, take a double poloroid photograph of the employee, and hot laminate the badge core and one photograph between two sheets of clear vinyl plastic. During the few minutes required to hot laminate the badge, the new employee would be given cepies of any pertinent security instructions such as badge regulations and procedures, clearance 43 processing procedures, etc. After completion of the lamination process, an alligator or flat clip would be affixed to the tOp-center of the badge. The Identifi- cation Clerk would then tell the employee when and where to wear the badge and hand the completed badge to the employee. ‘Whenever an employee would require a duplicate badge because of loss, he would first be instructed to pay a fine at the payroll or cashier's office. The employee would then present the receipt of payment to the Identification Clerk who would make a new badge in accordance with the information obtained from the Iden- tification Unit's records. No fine would be charged for replacing damaged or broken badges. The Identification Clerk.would compare the appearance of the employee against the duplicate photograph maintained in the Unit's records before issuing new badges. The Identification Unit would report all instances of badge loss to the Security Office's Investigation Section for their follow-through. Hourly employees assigned to another shift, pro- moted to salaried status, or given some other status change would have their badges changed on the effective date of the status change. The employee would present the Change of Status paperwork to the Identification 44 Clerk who would then construct a new badge for the em- ployee and keep the old badge for subsequent destruction. W The plastic badge core described in the first part of this chapter would be the first part of a tripli- cate form. The duplicate and triplicate carbon cOpies of this form would be used for record purposes at the Iden- tification Unit. The duplicate capy would be filed by employee num- ber in the Unit's employee number file. The extra polo- roid photo of the employee would be stapled to this c0py. This file would provide a check on all terminating em- ployees who would be required to process through the Identification Unit prior to receiving their final pay checks. When the badge is returned and destroyed by the unit, this cepy would also be removed and destroyed. The triplicate cOpy would be a hard backed perman- ent record and would be filed by badge number in the ap- prOpriate colored file, i.e., brown for salaried, blue for hourly day shift, etc. The dates of badge return and destruction would be entered on this record card. The forms would all be serially numbered when printed to ensure that no number was ever used twice. Employees would be instructed to immediately ad- vise their Security Office regarding instances of lost 45 F JOHN J. JDHNDSKDWSKI W H — LE 21431 LU 10:30-11:30 FILE DY EMPLOYEE NUMBER. REMOVE A") DESTROY WHEN. BADGE as RETURNED MID . turnover. DUPLICATE A - (”I _b0 #07 mesvnov JOHN J. ‘IJoHN-usxawsm 313752 "flu: 214.31}! L-U10:30~11:30 _ Tuls CARD .ISA PsRMmEN-T Recon. Fug av cub NUMBER in Autumn: coma ms. v“ I ‘ 9 AUG 1964' I‘ 12 AUG 19b4 , have nirvana r nAte Desrngvtb TRIPLICATE FIGURE 5 PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION BADGE FILE FORRB . 46 or stolen badges. If subsequent follow-up by the Inves- tigation Section did not satisfactorily determine the di5position of the missing badge, a complete descrip- tion of the badge would be provided to applicable guard posts. Lists of unresolved badges would be maintained at the posts. W Employees desiring to enter the plant would be required to have their badges in their possession. While inside the plant, each employee would diSplay his badge at or above the waist on his left side. To gain admit- tance, the employee would hand his badge to the gate guard who would then: I. Check the badge for authenticity. 2. Cross-check the employee's facial appearance with the photograph on the badge. 3. Verify that the badge color correSponds to the apprOpriate work shift. 4. Check the back of the badge for the Security Manager's facsimile signature. 5. Return the card to the employee and allow him to enter the plant. An employee exiting the plant during shift change would be visually checked to verify that he is wearing the badge. Exiting the plant at any other time would 47 require the guard to verify that the employee is either salaried or, if hourly, has been authorized to depart the plant early as indicated by the odd-lunch time en- tered on his badge. Hourly employees exiting at any other time would be personally escorted to the gate by their supervisor. All employees would wear either their permanent badges or temporary badges on their outer garments at or above the waist on their left sides at all times while inside the plant. All guards, employees, and supervi- sors would be instructed to challenge anyone not dis- playing his badge and to escort anyone who does not have a badge to the Security Office. W Employees who forget their badges would be issued temporary identification badges at the Identification Unit. These badges would be made of heavy paper stock in varying colors correSponding to the different employee status color codes, i.em,brown for salaried, blue for hourly day shift, etc. The badges would be used only within the confines of the plant and would be good for one entry and exit only. When the bearer would leave the plant, the badge would be turned in to the perimeter post guard who would then destroy it. No record of 11m 219 M. -31: 9; I115: TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION THE MODEL COMPANY _ L “Stems humans, “was“, mum J FIGURE 6 PROPOSED TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION BADGE 48 49 issuance or destruction would be maintained. An employee requiring a temporary badge would report to the outside perimeter entrance of the Identi- fication Unit. The Identification Clerk would have the employee print his name and number on an apprOpriate colored temporary identification badge form. The Iden- tification Clerk would check the information and photo- graph on the employee's badge receipt in the Employee Number File to verify the employee's identity. The Identification Clerk would then enter any other status information such as medical limitations, mail clerk, expediter, etc., and give the temporary badge to the employee along with verbal instructions on how to wear it and when and where to turn it in. The employee would then be admitted to the plant through the Identification unit's outside perimeter entrance. II. CLOSED AREA AND CLEARANCE IDENTIFICATION The badge system described in this section is designed to identify employees who are authorized admit- tance to closed areas and/or to provide a means of iden- tifying their degree of security clearance. As previous- ly stated on page 16, badges used for such purposes are governed by the Department of Defense regulations quoted on pages 16 and 17. The badge system presented in this 50 section is, therefore, based on these regulations and on the additional criteria for identification systems previously presented in Chapter IV. The prOposed system would identify closed areas by letter designators, i.e., "A", "B", “C", "D", etc. Access to all areas would utilize guards to verify authorized admittance. Identification Device The identification device presented here is based on a snap out carbon triplicate form somewhat similar to the badge forms used for perimeter identification. Howe ever, there are several basic differences, since this badge is constructed of a soft paper core, is cold- laminated between two pieces of sticky-backed, pressure sensitive plastic, and does not have a photOgraph of the bearer. The original copy of this three part form would become the core for the Clearance and Admittance Authori- zation Card and would be made of the same type of bleed- ing safety paper used in bank checks. The writer tested several of these safety papers from two paper companies3 38amp1es from the Zellerbach Paper Company, South San Francisco, California; and from Blake, qufitt & Towne, San Jose, California. 51 and found them all to be similar in that the colored inks used in the distinctive background patterns were extremely sensitive to solvents such as acetone and ink eradicator. Immersing the paper in either of these solutions for a fraction of a second resulted in wash- ing away the colored inks. One of the paper samples also has the added feature that results in the hidden words "STOP" appearing whenever the ink is washed off. Attempts to erase information on the paper also result- ed in removing the colored background inks. All pre-printed information on the form would also be in vinyl base inks as an added deterent against tampering. Information on the form would be entered by the Identification Unit as authorized by the Security Office, including the employee's name, employee number, card ex- piration date, areas to which admittance is authorized, and the facsimile signature of the Security Manager. Those areas to which the employee is authorized admit- tance would be typed on the clearance card as in the following examples: I - - - A.C D F J K N O S T - - - [ ALL AREAS FIGURE 7 PROPOSED CLEARANCE AND ADMITTANCE AUTHORIZATION CARD 52 53 The core would be cold laminated between two pieces of sticky-backed, pressure sensitive, clear vinyl base plastic. Peeling this sticky-backed plastic from the core is virtually impossible due to the soft-grade, light-weight paper of which the core is made. However, if the plastic should ever be removed, any typing strike- overs or erasures would be readily apparent to the guard checking the card. Printing of the Clearance and Admittance Authori- zation forms should be handled by the same cleared graphic arts and printing facilities which print the company's classified documents. The forms should be treated in the same manner as Confidential documents from the time of final design to delivery to the Identi- fication Unit. By following this rigid control proce- dure, chance of an unauthorized person obtaining a sup- ply of the forms would be reduced to a minimum. Determining an employee's degree of security clearance would be accomplished by viewing the red number designator printed on the lower left corner of his Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card. The following code would be used for this purpose: I = Confidential 2 = Secret 25 = TOp Secret 54 lemma Although the governmental regulations listed on pages 16 and 17 refer only to "rigid control and account- ability," some method of requesting and authorizing the issuance of Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards is necessary as indicated in the criteria in item 12, page 24. As a means of establishing a controlled and stand- ardized request procedure, a "Request for Clearance and Admittance to Area(s)" form weuld be utilized. These request forms would be initiated by Department Managers or their delegates in accordance with instructions given on the back of the request form. Upon receiving a completed request form, the Security Office would check the employee's security clearance in the office clearance records, and verify the signature of the requesting Manager or delegate. If the request form was not hand-carried to the Security Office by the Manager or delegate signing the card, a telephone call would be made by the Security Office to the requesting manager's office to verify that the re- quest was prOperly initiated. A signature list of those Managers and delegates who are authorized to sign the request forms would also be maintained at the Security Office. The request form would then be countersigned 55 p2 m m Wm/ H S (If m m U m .xLSWWi 3 e3 E333 m MP 5003.3 05 5.; S u m ”83303 00.30.3030 no an 3.33 3 @2533 soon mom m 7/ 7 O A338,: and e33 03 "aoapeodaeuae m . 33333 82... B 8:335. eflflofifi Dogma: 383% «>an 3» page. e333?" 3.. DH 3 . gnome 9mg .34 ES 1 $13 ea Eugene a gas mom game m mmam Ema «mam 33% 07mm 4. each. munch. ammmma M849 .MHMB Hugo .Oz .80 .BHZH 3.22 ammHh g2 93 .02 EGGS FRONT FIGURE 8 PROPOSED REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE AND ADMI'ITANCE IO AREA(S) FORM 56 .oz demo I mean) a . a \mewme we? SCREW %\ OWEN a. $554 swam 1930 Ron on» you dowoquxo dam noudon one he Deanne hnfinsoom don< CAP Op umensuou on pose evade noweunanoaea< ooouppfiad<.£ Ooadndoao eczema hamsow>onm Add auoauapoo nos: .ooamno 59Hn500m oon< cup 09 newsman dopoameoO penance . .dOmenuon coed node now qumH>nomzm dons domoao opofinmoummu song mondpdnwam deufinonvsu naappo . .MCH CH qum peas opowoaod no homoeuxanapmonuom . .dOpmoadOA moved on» on mamdn.haxom3 wafisuapqoo a no moCdeHEdo douanonvdw on Pena omhoamau men an: mnomdon mo peoampeea “Date a ho Defiance gauche eoaeaoauaeaae .eoeeauon have“ Han epeaeeeo . .dnuo Rom oomoamav moo when .hano novanwomhp on: . monaaquecmc ezHemmaamm mom monaoamamzH onaemammmm FIGURE 9 PROPOSED REQUEST FOR CEBARANCB AND ADMITTANCE TO AREA(S) FORM 57 by an authorized security official in the block "FOR SECURITY USE ONLY” and routed to the Identification Unit via some type of secure plant mail service such as a guard mail service or classified mail service. The Identification Unit would, upon receiving the request form, verify the authenticity of the security official's signature against a signature list of all authorized signers. After determining the validity of the signature, the Identification Unit would prepare a .Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card in accord- ance with the information on the request form. The Unit would also note the card numbers of all outstand- ing Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards pre- viously issued to the employee on the back of the re- quest form. Both the completed card and the request fonm would be returned to the Security Office via the next day's mail pickpup. The Security Offici would compare the completed Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card against the request form to double check the card's accuracy and then notify the requesting organization by telephone that the card was ready to be picked-up by the employee. Before the employee could obtain the card, he would first have to turn in all previously issued cards which were noted on the back of the request form. The em- ...l 58 ployee would then sign the back of the request form to acknowledge his receipt of the new card. The Security Office; would file the request form for one year as a record of issuance. Request forms would be handled as a controlled security form. Department Managers and their delegates using the forms would be given explicit instructions about the use of the request form and the necessity for restricting its distribution. The most inexpensive material at most companies for printing such a form consists of blank computor cards. Blank cards which are normally thrown out by the Data Processing Departments after repeated use could be readily used for printing the request forms. Printing of the forms could be accomplished at most companies by their in-plant printing department at negligible cost.4 0 ab 1 The duplicate c0py of the three part form would be filed at the Identification Unit by employee number. The file would thereby identify any employee to whom one or more Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards had 4Charles Daubert, Forms Control Department Super- visor, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, California, Personal Interview, November, 1961. 59 been issued. Upon the return of clearance cards to the Identification Unit for destruction, the correSponding file card would also be removed and destroyed, insuring that this file would indicate issued, non-returned Clear- ance and Admittance Authorization Cards only. The file would also be used as a control over clearance cards assigned to terminating employees. The form would be made of mediumdweight card material. Since the form would remain at the Identification Unit, there would be no need to use the sensitized material recommended for the Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card. The triplicate cOpy of the form would be a "hard- back” of heavier grade material, and would be a perma- nent record of all issuances. Filing would be by Clear- ance and Admittance Authorization Card number in the apprOpriate clearance level file, i.e., Confidential, Secret, or TOp Secret. Upon return of the clearance card to the Identification Unit, the return date and diaposition.would be entered on the file form. As with the duplicate c0py, there would be no requirement to use sensitized material for this form. Procedures for reporting instances of lost or stolen cards to the Investigation Section of the Security Office would be identical to that described for the Identification Badge on pages 44 and 46. EMPLOYEE NO. EXPIRES CARD NO. 123321 APR 14, 1964 69735 EMPLOYEE NAME JOHN J. JONES 2 AREAS AUTHORIZED ---BCDFHKLM--- FILE BY EMPLOYEE NUMBER IN THE EMPLOYEE CLEARANCE CARD FILE. REMOVE AND DESTROY WHEN CARD IS RETURNED TO THE I.D. UNIT. DLEHIHLNTE MEYER “5- mass 391111;— NUT“ 123321 APR 14, 1964 69735 .L...____...‘ EMPLOYEE NAME JOHN J. JONES 2 AREAS AUTHORIZED ---BCDFHKLM--- DO NOT DESTROY THIS CARD IS A PERMANENT RECORD. FILE BY CARD NUMBER IN APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE FILE. DATE RETURNED DATE DESTROYED TRIPLICATE FIGURE 10 PROPOSED CLEARANCE AND ADMITTANCE IHTTEKNRIEHUPICDI'CAEU).FJJHE FTEUMS 6O 61 W TO gain admittance to a closed area, the employee would be required to present his Clearance and Admit- tance Authorization Card to a guard stationed at the closed area entrance. The guard would then: 1. Check the card for authenticity and validity. 2. Verify that the card has the apprOpriate let- tered area designator. 3. Cross-check the name on the card with the name on the employee's Identification Badge. 4. Cross-check the photograph on the employee's Identification Badge with the employee's appearance. 5. Return the card to the employee and let him enter the area. . NO special procedure would be required for an employee to leave a closed area other then to verify that he is wearing an Identification Badge. W223 The Department Of Defense regulations outlined on pages 16 and 17 make no provisions for utilizing tempor- ary identification devices to authorize admittance to closed areas. An employee who presents a valid Clear- ance and Admittance Authorization Card to a closed area guard, but is wearing a Temporary Identification Badge, 62 would have to be personally identified by supervisory personnel from within the closed area before admittance would be authorized. Closed Area supervisors would also be allowed to authorize the admittance of employees tO the area who require access on a short-time, limited basis. Such employees would be personally identified by the super- visor at the entrance tO the area prior to being allow- ed to enter. CHAPTER VI EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS AT THREE SELECTED COMPANIES This chapter will describe the employee identifi- cation systems being used by three selected companies, hereafter referred to as Companies A, B, and C.1 All three companies are primarily engaged in defense con- tracts. However, their sizes vary greatly with A Com- pany employing approximately 16,000 peOple; B Company, 2,000; and C Company, 75. In order to establish a frame Of reference which will lend itself to later comparison Of the model with the three systems described in this chapter, the same format used to present the model system will be used in describing the systems Of A, B, and C Companies. Accord- ingly, the systems and proceduressfor each company will be presented under the two basic categories of: (1) Per- imeter Identification and (2) Closed Area and Clearance Identification. Each Of these categories will be dis- cussed according to: (1) Identification Device(s), (2) Issuance, (3) Accountability, (4) Entry/Exit Proce- dures, and (5) Temporary Identification. 1Since some Of the material presented in this study may be critical Of the companies studied, the writer feels that, as a matter Of prOpriety, the actual names Of the companies should not be used. Instead, the three companies will be fictitiously referred to as Com- pany A, Company B, and Company C. 63 64 I. A COMPANY PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION Approximately 16,000 employees at A Company are classified as either salaried or hourly workers.2 Sal- aried employees consist Of managerial, supervisory, staff, and engineering personnel and comprise approxi- mately one-third Of the company's work force. The other two-thirds Of the employees are paid by the hour and work as technicians, Shop foremen, production line per- sonnel, secretaries, clerks, and general laborers. All employees are issued an identification card and a badge when they are hired. The same type Of identification card is issued tO everyone. However, different badges are issued tO distinguish the salaried employees from the hourly employees and to identify work Shifts.3 Wises. One Of the employee identification devices used by,A 60mpany is a laminated, photo-type Identification Card which is issued to all employees. Paper stock which is pre-printed with a variety Of information is 2Since A Company has no identification manual for use by its Identification Unit, it was necessary tO Ob- tain most Of the following data by personally Observing and studying the company's practices and procedures. 3Personal Observation and study conducted by the writer at Company A, July, 1959, to December, 1961. 65 hot laminated, along with a poloroid photograph Of the bearer, between two pieces of semi-rigid, vinyl base clear plastic. Information on the front of the card includes the employee's typed identification number, typed name, and signature. The front of the card also contains the name of the company and the authenticating facsimile signature of the company's Industrial Security manager. The front of the card has an intricate en- graved border design to make duplication difficult. The back of the card contains a 1%" by 1%" full-face photo- graph of the bearer along with typed information in- cluding the employee's age, height, weight, color of hair, color of eyes, and the date the card was issued. The back of the card also has a statement that the card is the property of the company and that it is valid. only for the person to whom it is issued. The back of the card also contains a statement of postal instruc- tions for returning the badge to the company. Identi-‘ fication Cards are normally carried in the employee's billfold or purse except when required for plant entry or for some special in-plant requirement such as cash- ing checks at the cashier's office.zA dgbid, 66 1 .. J..... («141... memw. .54....h in N an" 3‘. I.” L 5‘- 7 n. .J .a .". ‘ ‘ rw~..qo- fa ' ‘ .4 A|d IF. v. , .. -- ‘ MPLOYEE .m " 'I‘f‘f‘ I v , t‘sllt -- 3",; FRONI‘ 9'!“ COMPANY as 12.»: .a " . '41. ....m. 1, v“ .3' 1.1..5 - JOHN J. JONES IS EM PLOYED BY (9’5 4.... A ‘ ' 3 Lu. .. ." s.“ .5: EMPLOYEE No. . gametes mefian . ...:wfimm SE .32 It. 3 mode 0.230“. n: 925». m. .... 13.3 8. zomxun Us». do“. 520 new «— n24 >2p- 106*107 pp. 106-1Q? pu 106-8 pp. 118-120 pp. 107-8 pp. 107-8 Visual Regulations not applicable since there s.no restriction C Recognition in the regulations on usin‘ visual re "nition. pp. 16-17 Access No . No No Yes No Yes N/A No CO’ List mp. 111-112 pp. Ill—112 pp. Ill—Lgipp. 111-12 pp. 118-120 pp. 111-112 pp. 111-12 *Since the Clearance and Ad: Cards do not have photographs, . the photo device to satisfactorily comp requirement. PPO 16 & 17. ly with nittance Authorization they are used together With this **Pages 16 & 17. TABLE IV SYSTEMS' DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS* Tamper ' “.110ws ‘ Photo :Employee jNumbered Records 7 Color ’ f ,Intricate Inks 0r Resistant Asa id On Vrout ‘Company Name,Sig.gSerially Cross- ‘ Codes ' Date , Manage- Make-Up 1 Close ' Design Dyes ‘Design, sturdy Wntgance Of Dadie Name D.O.B., i& Lost Filed To 3 Of ‘ ment And Check Destroyed To Sensitive Iden. IDENTIFICATION iua,fused Construc~ “ & & E & Soc.Sec.No Numbers By Name Identify Issuance Signature Issuance On When make To Heat Rules DEVICE Plastic, tion Exit Min l" Plant Color Hats Not And Work And Or Carefully Term. Returned Cepying Eragure Enforced et 0 . ' ‘ Eyes. Ht .Wt. Re-Used Badge No. Shifts ' Expir . Facsimile Controlled Returns Difficult M Identification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes: i Yes Yes Yes ' Yes , Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes! b Badge pp.39-4l pp.39-41‘ ifi¥41357 p.39 gpp.59-4l pp.39-4li p.44 pp.44-45 p.40 pp.40-4l pp.40-41 pp.40-44 pp.48-46 p.44 pp.39-41 4p.39 pp.44,46$ D . Clear. & Admit. Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 3 Yes Yes Yes _ Yes Yes YES F Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes E Auth. Card p.50—53 pp.50-53 p.61 p.52 p.52 pp.5l-52; p.59 pp.58—61 pp.52-53 pp.51-52 pp.51-52 pp.54—08. p.59 p.59 pp.50—52 4pp.50-53 p.59-61 L Temporary No No N/A No Yes No ; No No Yes No No Yes j N/A Yes 1 No , No Yes Badge Jpp.47-49 pp.47-49 _pp.47-49 [p.47-49 gpp.47-49jpp.47-49 pp.47—49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49' pp.47-49 pp.47-494pp.47—49 pp.47-49 p.47-49 Identification No Yes Yes No Yes No 3 No No No Yes . Yes Yes No Yes : Yes No Yes Card p.118-20 pp.64—66 pp.75-6 pp.65-66 pp.65—66 pp.65-66 pp.64-66 pp373—75 pp.64-66 pp.65-66 pp.65—66 pp.70-72 pp.73-75 pp.75-75 pp.65-66 pp.64-66 pp.75-76 Salariedafiourly No Yes Yes No Yes , No No _ No Yes No ‘ No Yes ‘ No Yes No ‘ No Yes Badges p.118-20