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THESIS

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

A MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

By

George M. Small Jr.

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

NMSTER OF SCIENCE

School of Police Administration
and Public Safety

1964

APPROVED

 

 

}
;7b6\1 /Z7L/ (: 4;«Jki~/L,//

(Member)

i
{4/ (/f'. .I/4
l» 47” 3 1:1; ;c(14( ’
!"'/ /_

" Member)

The purpose of this study is to: (1) develop a
'model system to identify employees working at national
defense industries, and (2) determine whether the model
system could be utilized at three selected defense
industries of varying size and function, and whether
such utilization would result in.more positive security
compliance.

Information and relevant data were then obtained
by: (l) reviewing the Department of Defense contractual
requirements for national defense industries, (2) re-
viewing other applicable literature, (3) interviewing
authorities in the field, and (4) examining several
representative identification systems. Aumodel system
was then deveIOped on the basis of the controlling
' governmental regulations and on the additional criteria
for identification systems.

The systems and procedures for employee identifi-
cation at three selected defense industries were then
reviewed to provide a basis for comparative tests of the
model and the three companies. The same frame of refer-
ence was utilized in describing the three companies as
was used in the model presentation. These comparative
tests determined that: (l) the model system has the ca-
pability of performing all of the primary functional and
procedural requirements of the three companies, and (2)

the model system is in more complete compliance with the

Department of Defense regulations and with the addition-
al criteria for identification systems. It was also de-
termined that a need exists for improving the quality of
the Department of Defense regulations that govern identi-
fication systems.

As this thesis prOgressed, the importance of em-
ployee identification as a basis for the security pro-
gram became more evident. The study's results supported
the view that establishing and maintaining an effective
security identification system is a vital necessity in
preventing the compromise of our military, industrial,
and technological secrets; that realization of effective
personnel identification is an essential prerequisite
toward accomplishing the objective of sound security

programs in our national defense industries.

A MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

BY x.

at
”1.“

George M. Small Jr.

A.THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Police Administration
and Public Safety

1964

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
I. NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY . .
History of Espionage Against the

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Threat of Soviet Industrial Espionage

Importance of the Industrial Security
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lead-Time Concept . . . . . . . . . . . .

Identification as Basis for Effective
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY . . . . . . . . . . .
DevelOpment of a Model System . . . . . .
Testing the Model System . . . . . . . .
Limitations of This Study . . . . . . . .
III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS . . . . .
Industrial Security Manual . . . . . . .
Air Materiel Command Manual . . . . . . .

IV. ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS AND
EXEMPLARY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . .
Review of Authoritative Information . . .
Exchange Identification System . . . . .
Electronic Devices . . . . . . . . . . .
Key-Card System . . . . . . . . . . .
Badge System with Changeable Codes . .

ii

PAGE

, ll

12
12
12
12
l4
14
18

22
22
29
3O
31
34

CHAPTER PAGE
V. MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM . . . . 38
Perimeter Identification . . . . . . . . . 38
Identification Device . . . . . . . . . 39
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

8

Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . .
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 47
Closed Area and Clearance Identification . 49
Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 50
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 61
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 61
VI. EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS AT THREE
SELECTED COMPANIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A Company Perimeter Identification . . . . 64
Identification Devices . . . . . . . . . 64
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7O
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . 75
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . 77
A Company Closed Area and Clearance
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Identification Devices . . . . . . . . . 81

Issuance O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 84

iii

CHAPTER PAGE
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 92
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 93

B Company Perimeter Identification . . . . . 98
Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 98
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 103
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 104»

B Company Closed Area and Clearance
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . 106
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 108
Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 109

C Company Perimeter Identification . . . . . 110

C Company Closed Area and Clearance
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Identification Device . . . . . . . . . . lll
Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Entry/Exit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . 112

Temporary Identification . . . . . . . . . 113

iv

CHAPTER PAGE
VII. C(MPARATIVE TESTS OF THE MODEL AND
THREECQIPANIES.....‘.........ll_4
Model Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Compliance with Requirements and Standards 118
VIII.CONCLUSION 124
BIBLICBRAPHY ...................l32

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE
I. Comparison of Perimeter Identification
Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
II. Comparison of Closed Area and Clearance _
Identification Functions . . . . . . . . 117
III. System's Degree of Compliance with
Department of Defense Requirements . . . 121
IV. System's Degree of Compliance with
Additional Identification Standards . . . 122
V. Percentage Comparison of Compliance

Findings of Tables III and IV . . . . . . 123

vi

FIGURE
1. Industrial Security LeadsTime . . . . . .
2. Key-Card Identification . . . . . . . . .
3. Electronically Coded Badge . . . . . . .
4. Fraposed Identification Badge . . . . . .
5. PrOposed Identification Badge File Forms
6. PrOposed Temporary Identification Badge .
7. Fraposed Clearance and Admittance
Authorization Card . . . . . . . . .
8. Proposed Request for Clearance and
Admittance to Area(s) Form . . . . .
9. PrOposed Request for Clearance and
Admittance to Area(s) Form . . . . .
10. PrOposed Clearance and.Admittance
Authorization Card File Forms . . . .
11. Identification Card . . . . . . . . . .
12. Salaried Badge . . . . . . . . . . . .
13. Hourly Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14. Early Admittance and Odd-Shift/Odd-
Lunch Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15. Pass and Badge Receipt Card . . . . . .
16. Temporary Identification Pass . . . . .
17. Clearance and Admittance Authorization
Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18. Register Form . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES

vii

PAGE

33
36
41
45

52

55

56

60

66

67

68

69

74

78

83
88

FIGURE PAGE
19. Receipt for Key-Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
20. Temporary Admittance Authorization . . . . . . 95
21. Identification Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
22. Security File Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
23. "I FORGOT” Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

viii

CHAPTER I
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

This chapter will review the area of espionage
and the resulting need for positive and effective indus-

trial security-identification practices.
I. HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The threat of foreign eSpionage to the United
States is as old as the country itself. Since the days
of the American.Revolution, our country has been the
object of espionage efforts by practically every major
world power. Great Britain, Mexico, Spain, Germany,
Italy, Japan, China, and the Soviet union, have all, at
one time or another, engaged in extensive eSpionage pro-
grams with the intent of subverting our national secur-
ity. Only a few short years ago, the major threat was
coming from.Genmany and Japan.1 Today, eSpionage efforts
against the United States are primarily being originated
by the Soviet Union.2

 

1

Colonel Allison Ind, A M fifiginpage
(New York: David McKay Company, Inc. , , pp. 3 5.

2J. Edgar’sHoover, "Do You.Reall IUnderstand
Communism?” 1m Vol. No. II (April,

1962). pp. 4-5, 2 -

II. THE THREAT 0F SOVIET INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

Throughout this country's history, our nation's
industries have consistently played a vital role in main-
taining national security. The importance of the job
that industry performs in the areas of production, main-
tenance, construction, and research is also recognized

by the Soviets.3

American industry has been one of the primary tar-
gets of Soviet cepionage for many years, dating back to
the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution when the Rus-
sians established a Soviet government trading agency in
1924, called the Amtorg Corporation. This agency was
successful in stealing formulas for industrial products
such as petroleum and chemicals.

Since this early start, the communists have ex-
panded their efforts to the point today where every in-

dustrial company in the country is a potential target.5

 

3
John R. Davis, W313“;
(Sprin field: Charles C. Thomas Publi her;

pp. 45 -55.

4J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of ecei (New York:
Pocket Books, 8Inc., 1958)), pp. -87; and United States
Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Un-American Activities, 1h; Shagefgl Ygags - m

atmmmmelrflnit 5%?“
'Washington: Government Printing 0 fice, 2 : pp. 5-21.
5J. Edgar Hoover, “Do You Really Understand

Communism?” Lgdg%§;%%1 Se ,V01.VI,No. II (April,
1962), pp. 4- 3- and O fice of Defense Mobilization,
Standards form msi a1 S urit of Industrial and Govern-

‘ggggg; Fggil§ties,1 ‘Washington: Government Printing
ffice, 1958 , p.

Authorities on Soviet espionage have, on numerous occa-
sions, cited that our national defense industries, parti-
cularly those involved in classified contracts, are prime
targets of Soviet espionage. General Trudeau, United
State Army Chief of Research and Development and former
head of Army Intelligence, has stated that Soviet espio-
nage poses a serious threat to our industrial base, and
that any industry which is even remotely connected with
our defense efforts can expect to be subjected to Soviet
espionage efforts.6 Companies engaged in classified
work, i.e., work involving information which requires
protection in the interest of national defense,7 are of
special interest to the communists. Industries such as
aircraft, electronics, missiles, chemical, steel, communi-
cations, and shipping are particularly subject to their
efforts.8
Much information suitable for subsequent develOp-

ment into vital intelligence is gathered by the Soviets

through open means, such as subscribing to our technical

 

6General Arthur Trudeau, U. S. Army Chief of Re-
search and Development and former head of Army Intelli-
ence, Speech to the American Society for Industrial
ecurity, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1958.

7United mStates Department of Defense,m

%e gggiggm MSafieggggd §§g glassifigg Informggio n,
ashington: Government int g ice, Novem er,

1961). p. 2.

8Hoover, 1.39,. m; and William C. Sullivan. "The
Continued Threat of Espionage and Sabotage in the U. 8.,"

Indgsgrigl Seggxi t1, Vol. Vi. No. IV (October, 1962),
PD 0 “‘45.

4

journals, purchasing government patents, attending scien-
tific lectures, and monitoring exhibits. However, the
communists are also operating in the area of clandestine
spy operations to obtain information relative to our na-
tional security.9 Hoover states that this continuing
espionage and intelligence attack is being conducted on
a scale unequaled in history.10 Their intelligence ser-
vice has been deveIOped to the point where it is now the
largest and most effective espionage agency the world
has ever known.11 Their spy sytem is well organized

12 Their

and is composed of highly trained personnel.
industrial espionage apparatus, in particular, is rated
as superior by our own intelligence professionals. Gen-
eral Trudeau has stated:

The advanced state of Soviet technology today is
due more to Soviet success in e8pionage and subver-
sio? thanlit is to their scientific apparatus, good
eats.

Hoover says that Soviet block diplomats now form

 

9.1m.

10U.S. News and‘World Report, Testimony by J.
Edgar Hoover before the House ApprOpriations Committee,

June 5. 1963. 31......3 Bass mums Beasts. LIV (June 17.
1963), p. 10.

”Major Andrew J. Kukucka, United States Army
Department of Counterintelligence, Speech to the Ameri-
can Society for Industrial Security, Washington, D.C.,
September 18, 1958, (Printed COpy).

12J. Edgar Hoover, ”Do You Really understand
Communism?” Industrial Segurity, V01. VI, No. II (April,
1962), pp. 4-5, 23-24.

13Trudeau, £25.- gli__.

the backbone of eSpionage Operations in the United
States, and that their embassies are being used as

bases of Operation for conducting intelligence activi-
ties.14 He also states that 75 per cent of Soviet offi-
cials in this country have some type of intelligence
assignment,15 and that there are 761 Soviet block diplo-
mats assigned in this country who have been given ex-
tensive training in espionage. In addition, there are
1,066 dependents of Soviet block personnel, some of

whom are also trained intelligence agents. He states
that in the year ending June 30, 1962, Russian officials
made fourteen trips through this country for the purpose
of intelligence and reconnaissance. These officials
visited numerous areas of strategic importance to our
defense effort and closely studied manmeilitary instal-
lations and industrial facilities. During the same year,
sixty-five scientific, industrial, and military exhibits,
conferences, and symposia were attended by some ninety-
five Soviet block personnel. Masses of information were
collected, and numerous contacts were made with persons

having potential value for future intelligence recruitment.16

 

1“U.S. News and World Report, 1,23. 31,5.

15.1. Edgar Hoover m g; m (New York:
Pocket Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 271-87. '

16U.S. News and World Report, Testimony by J.
Edgar Hoover before,the House ApprOpriations Committee,

June 5, 1963, n.5, m m World Re ort, LIV (June 17,
1963), p. 10.

Hoover states that there are many first-hand
examples of instances where the Soviets have succeeded
or tried to steal vital industrial secrets in the United
States. He Specifically cites the Harry Gold, Klaus
Fuchs, Julius Rosenberg eSpionage apparatus which.was
primarily concerned with obtaining industrial informa-
tion and eventually stole secret atomic energy data.

He also refers to the case of Ivan A. Bubchikov, Assist-
ant Soviet Military Attache assigned to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, who used the services of a nat-
uralized American Citizen in 1955 and 1956, for the
purpose of securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic

submarines, and aeronautical deveIOpments.17
III. IMPORTANCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Industries where classified work is being per-

formed often represent the most vulnerable phase in

develOping and evolving secret weapons and techniques.18

 

17.1. Edgar Hoover, "Do You Really understand

Communism?" Industrial Security, V01 VI, No. II (April,
1962), pp. 4-5, 23-24.

18United States Air Force, guide fo; Segggity

{afloatringtion' AFM 205-5 (Washington: Government Print-
3 C3, 5 ’ pp. 3-360

7

Industries allowing weaknesses in their industrial plant
protection systems, such as: (l) leaving classified doc-
uments unprotected, (2) performing perfunctory plant
security checks, and (3) permitting conditions that are
conducive to clandestinely removing materials from the
plant, become vulnerable targets for eSpionage efforts.
The first line of defense against conditions that make
industries vulnerable to eSpionage is the industrial
security program as implemented through the various plant
protection and security systems.

Although the Department of Defense Industrial
Security Program is designed to safeguard classified
information in the possession of Industrial firms, this
prOgram, in itself, is not sufficient to prevent
valuable intelligence information from falling into the
hands of a potential enemy.21 The directives and regu-
lations which have been established for use at indus-

trial defense installations establish only the minimum

 

19Hoover, 10;. gig.

ZQLQLQ; and Trudeau, log. git.

21United States Air Force, Industrial Sggggigy
Newslegge; (Headquarters, Central Contracts Management

RegiiniSWright Patterson AFB, Ohio, December, 1961),
pp. - o .

8
standards of security.22 It is necessary that management
be constantly alert to vulnerable points within their
facilities, particularly in the area of plant security
protection.23 Only through.imagination and a full know-
ledge of the meaning and intent of applicable regulations
by those re5ponsible for implementing the security pro-

gram can real security effectiveness be achieved.
IV. LEAD-TIME CONCEPT

The primary objectives of the industrial security
program are: (l) to safeguard classified information by
entrusting it only to trustworthy persons, and (2) to
establish procedures to prevent its compromise. Accom-
plishing these objectives becomes meaningless unless the
security prOgram is sufficiently effective to protect the
25

scientific and technical advantages that we achieve.

Maintaining an advantage or lead-time is one of the

 

22United States Air Force, figigghj2;,§§§§£1E1

W.

23United States Air Force, W W
Nggsleggeg.

24United States Air Force, Quid; £21 W
W ’

25A. Tyler Port, Director, Office of Security
Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Speech to
the American Society for Industrial Security Washing-
ton, D.C., September 18, 1958, (Printed COpy).

TECHNOLOGICAL
LEAD T IME

FIGURE 1

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY LEAD-TIME
(FROM UNITED STATES ARMY
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL MANUAL)

10

basic concepts of the security program. AS illustrated
in Figure 1, the aim of an effective security program is
to provide enough security protection so that by the
time a foreign adversary is able to obtain one of our
ideas, we have already proceeded well into the research
and deve10pment phase. Continuing security protection
is provided throughout the life of the weapon system to
maintain this lead-time advantage.26

The Department of Defense Industrial Security
Program is designed to insure that lead-times vital to
our national security are protected. Various security
systems and procedures have been established by the
Department of Defense to provide this protection. These
systems and procedures basically: (1) provide for
apprOpriate classification of information, and (2) pro-
vide that classified information is disclosed only to
authorized perSons, i.e., persons with apprOpriate

security clearance who have a need for the information.27

 

26United States Army. meagre; semen
Managgmgg§,Manual, (United States Army Intelligence
School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, May, 1959), No Page
Numbers.

27United States Department of Defense, Indgstgial
Sggurity Manual for Safeguarding Classified Iggggmggigg,

Washington: Government Printing Office, November,
1961), pp. 1-80

11
V. IDENTIFICATION AS BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE SECURITY

Assuring that only authorized persons have access
to classified information becomes a complex problem.
Systems for document control, material control, physical
security, subcontractors and consultants, visitor control,
and personnel clearances are required for every contractor
who engages in classified defense work with the govern-
‘ment. Some requirements are relatively simple to imple-
ment while others are very complex. Requirements also
vary greatly, depending on the size of the defense con-
tractor's facility, the number of employees, the volume
and size of classified documents and hardware, the type
of work being done, and the sensitivity of the projects.

However, all Of these variables have a common
factor, for they all depend on personnel identification
systems as one Of the foundations for their effective
Operation. ‘Without establishing and enforcing rigid
identification procedures, none of the above systems

could function effectively.28

 

281mg” pp. 1-37.

"rfi

CHAPTER II
PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

I. DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL SYSTEM
The first purpose of this study is to develop a
model system of employee identification based on appli-
cable governmental regulations and on accepted security

standards.

II. TESTING THE MODEL SYSTEM

The second purpose of this study is to determine
whether the model system could be utilized at three
selected defense industries Of varying size and func-
tions by analyzing the three systems in reference to
the model, and, if so, whether such utilization would

result in more positive security compliance.
III. LIMITATICNS OF THIS STUDY

This study will be limited to the area Of
employee identification. NO consideration will be
given to the areas of identification of visitors, sub-
contractors, resident contractors, military personnel,
civil service personnel, suppliers or vendors. The area
of pre-employment screening and identification will not

be considered, and the processing of the contractor's

12

13
government security clearances is also not considered.
Other closely related security subjects such as fencing,
lighting, alarm systems, guard patrols, employee theft,
vehicle parking, vehicle searches, material control, and
document control are not included in this thesis. Only
those specific practices and procedures directly pertain-
ing to employee identification systems will be studied.

The field of industrial espionage between com-

panies is also not covered in this study.

CHAPTER III
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REGULATIONS

When civilian industries perform work for the
United States Government, they enter into a contract
covering various phases of the work to be accomplished.
The contractual requirements pertaining to the national
security program and the United States Air Force Air

Materiel COmmand's Security Guide will be reviewed.
1. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MANUAL

Civilian industrial work involving classified
information necessitates a contract between the indus-
try and the government for the safeguarding of the clas-
sified information. The contractor industry agrees to
abide by certain rules and regulations, as specified in
the contract known as the Department Of Defense Security
Agreement (DD Form 441) and the Industrial Security
Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information (Attach-
ment to DD Form 441). The rules and regulations set
forth in this agreement are for the specific purpose of
establishing uniform security practices within indus-
trial facilities which have classified information of

the military departments (Army, Navy, or Air Force) in

14

1 15
their custody.

Prior to the release of classified information to
the contractor's facility, it is necessary that a Facil-
ity Security Clearance be granted to the contractor by
the Department of Defense. Whether or not a Facility
Security Clearance is granted is based on the results of
a security survey conducted by Department of Defense
inSpectors. If it is determined that the contractor has
the ability to adequately safeguard and protect the
classified information needed in the performance of his
contract, the Facility Security Clearance is granted.2

The "General Requirements" section of the Indus-
trial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified In-
fonmation.makes the contractor directly reSponsible for
safeguarding all classified information under his con-
trol and prohibits the contractor from allowing un-
authorized persons to have access to such information.
The contractor company is further required to provide
adequate protective measures within his facility to

safeguard all classified information under his control.

 

1United States Department of Defense,

Savanna fatSed 89W.
Washington: Government tinting Office, November,
1961), p. iii. '

2United States Department of Defense, ,
Eggges IDQHEEELEL S R. l t , (Washington:
Government Printing ffice, Novem er, 1961), pp. 13-20.

16

The contractor must also establish a system to control
access of employees and visitors to closed and restrict-
ed areas within his facility, i.e., areas where classi-
fied information is accessible during working and/or
homeworking hours.3 Examples Of such areas would in-
clude assembly rooms where large classified pieces of
equipment or classified charts are in the Open and sub-
ject to visual access .

The section of the Industrial Security Manual
which states the requirements governing employee badges
and identification cards is quoted below:

a. Employee Badges. Provided the contractor
deems it necessary, he may use identification cards
or badges to assist in identifying the degree of
security clearance of the holder and/or to indicate
that the holder is authorized to enter closed or
restricted areas. If identification cards or badges

" are used for such purposes, the following shall

apply:

(1) The minimum identifying information to be
shown on employees' identification badges or cards
shall be the name and photograph of the holder.

Other descriptive information to identify the author-
ized holder may be included on badges and/or cards
at the‘Option of the contractor.

(2) The identification badge or card may include
color or symbol coding to indicate the degree of
security clearance of the holder and/or that he is
authorized to enter a closed or restricted area, or
a separate coded badge or card may be used for such
purposes. When the combination of badges and/or'
cards are used, both must bear correlating data such
'fislghe same registration number or the name of the

0 er.

 

3W W m. pp. 5-7.

17

(3) The words "TOP SECRET,” "SECRET" or “CONFIDEN-
TIAL," or abbreviations thereof shall not appear on
the badges or identification cards.

(4) The makeup and construction of badges and
identification cards shall be designed to minimize
the possibility of tampering or unauthorized use.

(5) Badges and identification cards indicating the
degree of security clearance or access to closed or
restricted areas shall be rigidly controlled and
accounted for by the contractor by use of a number-
ing system. Such badges and identification cards
shall be surrendered by the holder upon termination
of employment, termination of security clearances,
or for other apprOpriate reasons.

(6) Coded badges and cards shall be considered
only as an aid in determining the current degree of
personnel security clearance of the holder or the
areas to which the holder may have access. The
clearance status of a person who holds such a badge
or identification card shall be verified when there
is doubt as to the validity of the badge or card.

c. Reporting. The procedures for the use of
badges or identification cards as authorized in 'a'
. . . above shall b2 incorporated in the Standard
Practice Procedure.

Failure on the part of the contractor to maintain
the standards for physical security as specified in the
Industrial Security Manual may result in: (1) cancella-
tion of all government contracts involving classified
information, and (2) permanent revocation of the con-

tractor's Facility Security Clearance.5

 

4Industrigl Sggurigy Manual, p. 8.
ségmgg Forges Industgial Seggritg Re 1 ti , p. 23.

18

Close adherence by the contractor to the provi-
sions and requirements of the Industrial Security Manual
is vital. As a means of monitoring the degree of com-
pliance by the contractor with thesepprovisions, securi-
ty inspections are periodically conducted by the Depart-
ment of Defense. If the results of one of these inepec-
tions reveals that the contractor's facility is no
longer adequately safeguarding classified information,
the Department of Defense may prohibit additional clas-
sified information from being furnished to the contrac-
tor and may withdraw all classified information previ-
ously furnished to the contractor until such time as the
facility meets the standards Of the Industrial Security
Manual.6

II. AIR MATERIEL CQMAND MANUAL

‘When the three Companies viewed in this study be-
came involved in classified defense contracts, the Depart-
ment of Defense assigned security cognizance to the United
States Air Force. The major air command within the.Air
Force having reaponsibility for overseeing the security
of all industries under their jurisdiction is the Air

 

51am.

l9

'Materiel Command.7 Although the Air Force reorganiza-
tion of July 1, 1961, officially changed the name of the
Air Materiel Command to the Air Force Logistics Command,
its reSponsibilities and functions relating to security
cognizance over industrial security remained unchanged.8
As an aid to the various companies under their
cognizance, Air Materiel Command Manual 205-9 is furnish‘
ed to the companies as a guide for maintaining a satis-
factory degree of security compliance.9 .Although the
information in the manual is provided only as a guide,
and is not an official part of the contractor's con-
tractual obligations, the Air Force security inSpectors
also use it as a guide when conducting their periodic
security inspections. Thus, the willingness and ability
of the contractor to heed the suggestions of the manual

is often directly reflected in the inepection results.10

 

7Un1ted States Army Industrial Sm: Mandra-
mgn; (United States Army Intelligence School,
Fort Ho abird, Maryland, May, 1959), No Page Numbers.

8United States Air Force, W W
,flullggin, (Headquarters, ‘Western Contracts Mane ement
Region,‘Mira-Loma, California, July, 1961), p.

9
United States Air Force, Air, Magegie;
Manual 2.9.5.22 WPIadsamm Quisiem- far 0 3%-
es

WflEfETM mmmw
ter ‘Washington: Government Printing
fice, August, 5, p. Apl.

10David Grand, united States Air Force Industrial
Security InSpector,‘Western Contracts Management Region
Mira-Lama, Calif., Personal Interview, November 14,1961.

20

The section of the manual which pertains to
personnel identification suggests that whenever employ-
ees can not be admitted to the plant on personnel recog-
nition, employee identification badges or cards should
be used. The manual further states that badges should
be tamper-proof and should contain sufficient descrip-
tive information, including photograph, to identify the
bearer. Badges should be worn in a visible, uniform
place at all times. Persons without badges should be
challenged, and anyone without prOper credentials claim-
ing to be an employee should not be admitted to the
plant. Periodic checks of badges should be_conducted to
assure possession by persons to whom the badges are
issued. The manual suggests that badges should be ser-
ialized and rigidly controlled. 'Whenever more than five
per cent of the total badges issued are lost, new badges
should be issued. Positive means should also be taken
to assure the return of badges and identification cards
upon separation of employment. The manual further states
that the contractor should establish a program to con-
trol admittance of employees to the plant outside of
their normal working hours to assure that entry is
authorized and necessary. Contractors should also make
provisions for positive identification and determination

of "need-to-know”‘before employees are admitted to

restricted and closed areas within the plant.”

 

”an Material. Samara m1. pp. A-l. A-a.

21

CHAPTER IV

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS
AND EXEMPLARY SYSTEMS

I. REVIEW OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION

The type Of identification and pass system suit-
able for use at a given company will depend greatly on
the size of the company and the sc0pe Of security work
in which it is engaged. Quite Often in small plants,
employees are identified by personal recognition, and
badges or passes are not used. Larger companies find it
necessary to utilize an identification system of badges
and passes as an essential means of maintaining good
security and control Of personnel.1 It is generally
felt that organizations with more than thirty persons
should use some type Of pass or badge system.

A review of applicable literature, in addition
to those Air Force and Department of Defense publica-

'tions previously cited, indicates certain basic require-

 

1National Industrial Conference Board, Indggggigl
Sggugigy, Combating Subversion gag S bota e (Studies in
Business Policy NO. 60. New York: NationaI Industrial
Conference Board, 1957), p. 76.

2B. W. Gocke, Praggigal Plgnt onteggiog and
{31%ging,(S8ringfie1d: Charles C. Thomas Publisher,
5 , pp. -17; and United States Atomic Energy Commis-

sion, Physigal Segugity Standards, (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1950), p. 12.

22

23

ments in establishing a pass and badge system of person-
nel identification. These criteria are as follows:

1. Badges Should be of a tamper-resistant de-
sign. A plastic laminated pass or badge is generally
considered the most tamper-resistant type available.
Such badges usually consist of ordinary paper or card
material laminated between two pieces of slow-burning
acetate or vinyl plastic. Using a plastic insert lami-
nated between two tranSparent pieces of plastic makes a
much more secure badge, as the three pieces of plastic,
when laminated together, are fused into one tamper-
resistant piece. Metal rimmed or plastic envelope de-
vices are not considered as tamper-proof. i

2. Badges should be of sturdy construction,
waterproof, and resistant to abuse and hard wear.

3. Badge design should be such that rapid em-
ployee entrance and egress during peak traffic periods
at the gates is facilitated.

4. A clear photograph of the bearer should be
laminated into the front of the badge. The picture
should be at least one inch in its smallest dimension,
and the bearer should be re-photographed at least every
five years or when necessary to reflect any significant
physical change in facial appearance.

5. The name of the company and plant is entered

in order that a badge used at one plant is invalid at

24

any other plant.

6. Identifying information such as the name and
signature of the person to whom the badge is issued,
together with his social security number, date of birth,
color of eyes and hair, height, and weight is normally
included.

7. Passes and badges should be numbered serially
in a prominent manner, and the same number of a lost
badge should never be used again.

8. Cross file records by name and badge number
should be kept to aid in checking on lost or cancelled
passes or badges.

9. Color or number codes are recommended to
identify work shifts and/or work areas authorized.

10. The date of issuance and the expiration date
should be entered on the pass or badge.

11. The badges should be signed by a representa-
tive of management or stamped with his facsimile signa-
ture .

12. Badge make-up and issuance should be care-
fully controlled.

13. A close check of terminated employees is
recommended to ensure return of badges.

l4. Returned badges should be destroyed periodi-
cally along with mutilated and defective badges.

25
15. Badges should have an intricate design

which is difficult to reproduce by normal photOCOpying.

16. An ink or dye which is noticeably affected
by erasure, or by heat required to alter or laminate the
badge or pass, is recommended.

17. Strict enforcement of badge rules should be
maintained. Employees must be aware of identification
procedures applicable to them and must know what to do
if they lose or damage their badges. Badges and passes
should be prominently diaplayed on the employees' outer
garments in a uniform position at all times within the
plant. Violators should be reported immediately, irre-

spective of official rank, to a member of the plant

guard force. Support from supervision in enforcing regu-
lations is required, and penalties are often inflicted
on violators who lose badges or otherwise disregard iden-
tification rules. Procedures for the plant guard force
and the identification unit must be thoroughly under-

stood and complied with.3

 

3National Industrial Conference Board, pp. 74-82;
Gocke, 193, gig; Atomic Energy Commission, pp. 12-17;
National Industrial Conference Board, 13dg§§§1§1,§g§g;i-
31, Plant Qu ggd Hgndbook (Studies in Business Policy
No. 64 New York: National Industrial Conference Board,
1953), p.S 24; United States Departments of the Army,

Physiggl Sggu 15y of Militagy angllg_§g11g-
giOgs, l - ,(Washington: Government inting
Office, , pp. 41- 50; United States Atomic Energy

Commission, Se u 1 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1960), Chapter 2401, No Page Numbers; Office of
Defense Mobilization, Sggngards _F_‘O_1; W W 9;
Industrial and Governmental Facilities ‘Washington:
Government Pfinting Office, I958), p. 22; and Committee
on Identification, "Report of the Committee on Identifi-

cation, " Sggggigy, Vol. 1, No. 4, (December
1956), 17m. ’

26

Authorities in the security field acknowledge
that no system is absolutely foolproof, and that practi-
cally all badges or passes can be reproduced or altered
by persons sufficiently skilled in the arts of photo-
graphy, engraving, and printing.4 Passes and badges
produced in accordance with the previously listed speci-
fications are, however, sufficiently difficult to repro-
duce or alter to be acceptable for use at the vast
majority of plants, provided they are used in conjunc-
tion with systems of rigid control and accountability.
The previously listed requirements are particularly
adequate when utilized in the exchange badge systems.5

At a plant or area where it is necessary to use
credentials which are extremely difficult to alter or
duplicate, the following specifications are suggested

as methods to be considered:

 

4Edward Brosnan, Chief of Physical Security for
the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., Personal
Interview3‘March 22, 1962; David Grand, united States
Air Force Industrial Security Inspector3‘western
Contracts Management Region,‘Mira-Loma, California,
Personal Interview, November 14, 1961; Robert'Meader,
Director of Security, Varian Associates, Palo Alto,
California, Personal Interview, October, 1961; Harry
L. Shaw, Plant Protection Manager, Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company, Sunnyvale, California, Personal Inter-
view, November, 1961.

5Edward Brosnan, Personal Interview; and David
Grand, Personal Interview.

27

1. Insert paper with a distinctive watermark.

2. Insert paper that will lose its fibrous
strength during the laminating process so that attempts
to separate the paper or to peel off the outer plastic
will result in a physical breakdown of the insert paper.

3. Cross threads or wires that are readily vis-
ible and laminated within the plastic cover sheets of
the badge or pass. Alterations such as superimposing a
photograph, changing a signature or badge number, or any
attempts to re-laminate the badge are usually obvious
with such badge systems.

4. Printing the photograph on sensitized plastic
material made according to the same chemical formula of
the plastic covers so that the front and back tranSpar-
ent plastic sheets and the plastic photOgraph are 1am-
inated to form a solid piece of plastic.

5. Ink which may or may not be normally visible
but which is visible under ultraviolet light.

6. Ink which will bleed and/or change color when

it is exposed to solvents which dissolve plastic covers.

 

6Department of the Army, Physical Segurity g;

MLLLE§£¥.§B§ Industrial Installations, pp. 41-50; Atomic
Energy Commission, Physical Security Standards, pp. 12-17;

Atomic Energy Commission, S curit , Chapter 2401, No Page
Numbers; and Office of Defense Mobilization, Standards For

Phy;%gal Segurity of Industrial and Governmental Facilities,
p. O

28

John R. Davis states that in checking the iden-
tification of incoming personnel during peak periods of
shift change, the gate guard has time to only distinguish
the color and design of the employee's badge. He says
that performing a proper comparison of the individual
with his badge picture would soon result in chaos, and
that both the delayed employees and their supervisors
would create a storm of protest because of the resulting
delay in starting production. He also states that iden-
tification cards and badges will not keep subversives
out of a plant, and that such devices have never been and
should never be construed to accomplish such a measure.
He feels that subversives will gain admittance to a plant
by obtaining a position.within the plant instead of re-
sorting to such.amateurish measures.

However, according to Davis, badges are of signif-
icant value in detecting attempts of unauthorized persons
to enter the plant premises. He states that badges and
cards are also a help in such things as payroll distribu-
tion, tool check-out, and restricted area control. He
re-emphasizes that identification systems are not fool-
proof and are only an aid in accomplishing the over-all

7
security program.

 

7

John R. Davis M 2.1m W)
(Sprgg fégld: Charles’C. Thomas Publisher, l 7 ,
pp. " o

29
II. EXCHANGE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

One of the most secure identification systems is
undoubtedly one which incorporates the above listed
features into an exchange system. An exchange system
requires that two identical badges are constructed, each
one usually of a different color. One badge is issued to
the bearer, and the other is kept on file at the secur-
ity control point. The bearer presents his badge to the
control point guard who then carefully makes a threedway
comparison of the bearer's badge, the file badge, and
the individual. The bearer may or may not then be given
the file badge to wear while he is within the controlled
area, the badges again being exchanged when he departs
through the control point. This system prevents dupli-
cation or alteration, since it would be necessary in some
'way to have a duplicate badge in the guard's file.

The final control point in an exchange system
rests with how carefully the guard performs his three-
way comparison. This aSpect is, of course, one of the
major controlling factors in any identification Operation,
since no system can be any better than its enforce-
ment. Close supervision and follow-up of personnel
responsible for checking identification media are
necessary to insure the successful Operation of any

identification system and to keep it from becoming

30

ineffective and perfunctory.

One disadvantage of the exchange system is that
the bearer must enter and exit through the same control
point unless additional file badges are made for use at
other points. Making additional file badges increases
the cost factor and requires elaborate standardization
of the control point files to ensure exact duplicity of
the records at each point. Another disadvantage is that
ingress and egress at the control point is impeded due
to the time required for the guard to obtain the file
badge from the file and to make the three-way compari-

8011.
III. ELECTRONIC DEVICES

In the past several years the industrial security
field has witnessed the introduction of a variety of
electronic security devices. Ultra-sonic alarms which
detect movement within an area, closed circuit televi-
sion for monitoring sensitive areas, and electronically
coded identification cards for gaining access to secure

areas are but a few of these unique systems.9 A major

 

8Edward Brosnan, Personal Interview; David
Grand, Personal Interview; Robert Meader, Personal
Interview; and Harry Shaw, Personal Interview.

9Business Week, "Tightening Up Industrial Secur-
ity," Business Week, (October 15, 1960), 181-85.

31

disadvantage of electronic methods is the added cost
which, in many security budgets, is found to be prohibi-
tive. However, if the budget will provide, they are

very worthy of consideration.10

Keg-9g; m. One of the 1...“: widely used
devices for personnel identification is the Key-Card
system. This system consists of an electronically coded
identification card used either by itself or in conjunc-
tion with a push button combination. The method which
uses only the card requires the bearer of the card to
insert the card into a small slot next to the entrance
door or turnstile. Electronic wiring laminated inside
the card triggers circuitry within the locking mechanism
and releases the latch. The bearer then removes his card
and enters through the door or turnstile. This system
allows any person possessing the card to enter and
thereby does not allow suitable protection against un-
authorized use of lost or stolen cards. The more secure
method incorporates a series of push buttons similar to
the keys on an adding machine. The bearer must, in addi-
tion to inserting the card, know‘which keys to press and

in what order to press them. Inserting a

 

10John R. Davis, Industrial Plant Protect
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 19575,

pp. 265-67.

 

32
forged card or pressing the keys out of sequence will
cause an alarm to sound.11 Another variation of this
system is to require the individual to enter a small
cubicle which is built into the perimeter structure of
the area being entered. Once inside the cubicle, the
bearer inserts the key-card and presses the keys, caus-
ing an inner door to open. The doors are inter-locking
so that only One can be Opened at a time, thereby pre-
venting more than one person from entering at a time.
The cubicle also provides complete privacy and prevents
unauthorized observation of the key pressing Operation.
Whenever an employee who knows the key punch combina-
tion terminates or is transferred, or in the event of a
compromise of the combination, the keys to press and
the sequence can be readily changed.

Use of the Key-Card cubicle system has generally
been restricted to controlling access to Confidential
security areas,13 because Department of Defense regula-
tions require that admittance to Secret areas must be
controlled by guards or by an employee inside the area

who unlocks and locks the entrance. Entrance to a TOp

 

11;Q;d.; and Identification Brochure from Card
Key Systems, Inc., Burbank, California.

12Identification Brochure from Card Key Systems.

13David Grand, Personal Interview.

 

 

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TO THE EMPLOYEE:

 

 

 

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othch ‘an-h The"? For- whtch :1'

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BACK
FIGURE 2
KEY-CARD IDENTIFICATION

(SAMPLE CARD FROM CARD
KEY SYSTEMS, INC.)

33

34

Secret area must always be controlled by a guard. How-
ever, the Contracting Officer may, at his discretion,
approve the use Of electronic identification systems and

14
waive the guard requirement on Secret areas.

Badge System.with Changeable Codes. Another ex-
cellent identification system which incorporates practi-

cally all of the previously listed criteria for badges
and passes is the one-piece badge made by Whitehead and
Company. This badge also has the added feature of an
electronic coding system.

The Whitehead badge consists of a stainless
steel plate laminated between sheets of vinyl base plas-
tic. A l%' by 2“ full-face photograph of the bearer is
laminated into the front of the badge. Vertical black
and gold threads are woven in and out of slits cut into
the plastic overlay sheet prior to lamination. This
feature prevents superimposing a fraudulent picture over
the tOp of an Original photograph or altering the badge
serial number. Inks and photographic materials of the
same chemical base as the vinyl plastic are used, so that

immersing the badge in solutions such as 100 per cent

 

14United States Department of Defense, Inggstgial

Se it Magual f2; Safeguarding Classified Information,
Washington: Government Printing Office, November,

1961»), pp. 31-32e

acetone will result in dissolving everything but the
metal badge core. Lamination with a steel insert makes
the badge exceptionally strong and durable. Attempts

to alter the badge by relamination causes the detailed
engraving of the badge to distort and the electronic
coding in the steel core to be erased. Additional in-
formation on the front or back of the badge such as
color codes and a description of the bearer can be added,
if desired.

The stainless steel badge core is designed to
allow each badge to be coded by magnetic fluxes to form
up to 1,000,000 six digit codes, any one of which can be
erased and recoded at will simply by changing the mag-
netic polarity. Coding is accomplished when the badge
is issued and may be changed any time the badge is used.
Multiple codes may be entered in each badge for use at
different places. Using this magnetic coding feature
consists of having the bearer insert his badge in the
slot of an electronic "switch-recorder.” If the badge
is properly coded for that particular entrance, the
"switch-recorder” will open the gate or door and allow
entry. If the card's coding is not valid, the device
locks the card in the slot and sounds an alarm. The
additional protective measure of punching a key code
combination such as previoust described with the Key-

 

 

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BACK
FIGURE 3

ELECI‘RONI CALLY CODED BADGE
(SAMPLE FROM WHITEHEAD AND co.)

86

37
Card system may also be utilized.

Periodically, or whenever the security officer
deems’it necessary due to lost or stolen badges, all
badges can be double-checked by the guards and recoded
at the time the bearer inserts his card into the slot.
The "switch-recorder" can be set to read or change one
or more of any of the possible 1,000,000 codes.15

Incorporating this system encounters a major
obstacle, since its use in controlling entry to Secret
or Confidential areas is limited, as was the Key-Card
system, by the Department of Defense regulations. Spe-
cific approval of the electronic system and a waiver of
the guard requirement would have to be given by the
Contracting Officer before this method could be used to
control access to Secret or Confidential areas.l6 Such
waivers are often difficult, if not impossible, to

obtain.17

 

15Ned Whitehead, President of Whitehead and Compa-

ny, Inc., Personal Interview, August, 1960; and Identifi-
cation Brochure from‘Whitehead and Company, Inc., Washing-
ton, D. C., January, 1960.

16I IHEEHJ 13 IE“ E3 Eid!
Q1 as sified Info Egatiog, pp. 31-11%.1'fi22$
17

David Grand, Personal Interview.

CHAPTER V
MODEL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

The model system for employee identification pre-
sented in this chapter will be in two separate categories.
One badge system will apply to perimeter identification
and control and will be primarily used for identifying
employees who are authorized ingress and egress through
a perimeter control point. The other badge system will
be for the identification of employees who are authoriz-
ed admittance to classified closed areas and to provide
a means of identifying the bearer's degree of security
clearance. Regulations and criteria presented in the

preceding two chapters have been used where applicable.
I. PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION

The device recommended for identifying employees
who are authorized ingress and egress through a peri-
meter control point is not designed to identify the de-
gree of security clearance of the holder or to indicate
that the holder is authorized to enter closed areas.

The device, therefore, would not normally' come under the
regulations provided in the Department of Defense Indus-

trial Security Manual previously outlined in Chapter III.1

 

1David Grand, United States Air Force Industrial
Security.InSpector, Western Contracts Management Region,

Mira-Lama, California, Personal Interview, November 14,
1961.

38

39
However, since the device presented here will be used
in conjunction with another identification card to be
presented later in this chapter and designed to identi-
fy clearance and closed area access, the Department of
Defense regulations will apply.2 The device will also
be based on the seventeen criteria for identification

systems listed on pages 23-25.

a v e
The recommended device for perimeter control
would be a laminated, photo-type badge. Semi-rigid,
vinyl-base plastic pre-printed with identifying infor-
mation would be hot-laminated, along with a poloroid
photograph of the bearer, between two pieces of clear,
semi-rigid, vinyl-base plastic. The front of the badge
would include the employee's name in 3/8" type, employee
number, badge number, company name, and employee full-
face poloroid photograph measuring l"x 1%". An addi-
tional line would be available to enter information such
as odd-shift times or early admittance authorizations.
The tap and bottom borders of the badge would have an
intricate design and all pre-printing would be of vinyl-

base inks.

 

2United States Department of Defense, Ingugggig;

%§§g;1;yl l §QI,S d 1 33 ie 0
Washington: Government Printing Office, November,
1961), p. 8.

40
The back of the badge would include the employee's

social security number, height, weight, birthdate, color
of hair, color of eyes, and signature. In addition, the
back-of the badge would have the date the badge was
issued and the facsimile signature of the security man-
ager. Postal instructions for returning the badge would
also be included at the bottom.

If the company wished to differentiate between
salaried and hourly employees, salaried employees would
all wear badges of the same color and hourly employees
would wear varying colored badges, depending on the
shift they work. As an example, salaried employees
could wear brown badges, hourly day shift employees
could wear blue badges, swing shift could use yellow,
and graveyard shift could use red. Letter prefixes
would be used with the badge number to designate a vari-
ety of information such as "L” for a medical lifting
limitation, "T” for tool crib checkout, "E” for inter-

departmental parts expiditer, ”M" for mail carrier, etc.

33 e
Newly hired employees would be instructed to re-

port to the Identification Unit by the Employment Depart-

ment. Each new employee would be instructed to present

his employment paper work, such as an Employment Certifi-

 

 

THE MODEL COMPANY "'7‘

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BACK

FIGURE 4
PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION BADGE

42
cate or Payroll Addition form to the Identification
Clerk.

The Identification Clerk would then check the
information on the employee's paper work to determine
that the person is a bona-fide employee, check his ef-
fective date of employment, whether he is a salaried
or an hourly employee, and if he is hourly, what shift
he will be working. Whether the new employee has any
medical limitations would also be checked on the form,
as well as any status as an expediter, mail carrier,
odd-lunch time, etc.

The Identification Clerk.would then type the
apprOpriate information on an apprOpriate colored plas-
tic badge core, using a typewriter with Special 3/8”
type for the information on the front of the badge and a
standard typewriter for the back of the badge. The
Identification Clerk would then have the employee sign
the back of the badge, stamp the badge with the facsimi-
le signature of the Security Manager, take a double
poloroid photograph of the employee, and hot laminate
the badge core and one photograph between two sheets of
clear vinyl plastic. During the few minutes required
to hot laminate the badge, the new employee would be
given cepies of any pertinent security instructions

such as badge regulations and procedures, clearance

43

processing procedures, etc. After completion of the
lamination process, an alligator or flat clip would be
affixed to the tOp-center of the badge. The Identifi-
cation Clerk would then tell the employee when and
where to wear the badge and hand the completed badge
to the employee.

‘Whenever an employee would require a duplicate
badge because of loss, he would first be instructed to
pay a fine at the payroll or cashier's office. The
employee would then present the receipt of payment to
the Identification Clerk who would make a new badge in
accordance with the information obtained from the Iden-
tification Unit's records. No fine would be charged for
replacing damaged or broken badges. The Identification
Clerk.would compare the appearance of the employee
against the duplicate photograph maintained in the Unit's
records before issuing new badges. The Identification
Unit would report all instances of badge loss to the
Security Office's Investigation Section for their
follow-through.

Hourly employees assigned to another shift, pro-
moted to salaried status, or given some other status
change would have their badges changed on the effective
date of the status change. The employee would present

the Change of Status paperwork to the Identification

44

Clerk who would then construct a new badge for the em-

ployee and keep the old badge for subsequent destruction.

W
The plastic badge core described in the first

part of this chapter would be the first part of a tripli-
cate form. The duplicate and triplicate carbon cOpies of
this form would be used for record purposes at the Iden-
tification Unit.

The duplicate capy would be filed by employee num-
ber in the Unit's employee number file. The extra polo-
roid photo of the employee would be stapled to this c0py.
This file would provide a check on all terminating em-
ployees who would be required to process through the
Identification Unit prior to receiving their final pay
checks. When the badge is returned and destroyed by the
unit, this cepy would also be removed and destroyed.

The triplicate cOpy would be a hard backed perman-
ent record and would be filed by badge number in the ap-
prOpriate colored file, i.e., brown for salaried, blue
for hourly day shift, etc. The dates of badge return and
destruction would be entered on this record card.

The forms would all be serially numbered when
printed to ensure that no number was ever used twice.

Employees would be instructed to immediately ad-

vise their Security Office regarding instances of lost

45

 

F
JOHN J. JDHNDSKDWSKI

W

 

H

— LE 21431
LU 10:30-11:30

FILE DY EMPLOYEE NUMBER.
REMOVE A") DESTROY WHEN.

BADGE as RETURNED MID

. turnover.
DUPLICATE

 

 

A -

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JOHN J. ‘IJoHN-usxawsm

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av cub NUMBER in Autumn: coma ms.

 

 

 

 

 

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‘ 9 AUG 1964' I‘ 12 AUG 19b4
, have nirvana r nAte Desrngvtb
TRIPLICATE
FIGURE 5

PROPOSED IDENTIFICATION BADGE
FILE FORRB .

46
or stolen badges. If subsequent follow-up by the Inves-
tigation Section did not satisfactorily determine the
di5position of the missing badge, a complete descrip-
tion of the badge would be provided to applicable guard
posts. Lists of unresolved badges would be maintained

at the posts.

W

Employees desiring to enter the plant would be
required to have their badges in their possession. While
inside the plant, each employee would diSplay his badge
at or above the waist on his left side. To gain admit-
tance, the employee would hand his badge to the gate
guard who would then:

I. Check the badge for authenticity.

2. Cross-check the employee's facial appearance
with the photograph on the badge.

3. Verify that the badge color correSponds to
the apprOpriate work shift.

4. Check the back of the badge for the Security
Manager's facsimile signature.

5. Return the card to the employee and allow him
to enter the plant.

An employee exiting the plant during shift change
would be visually checked to verify that he is wearing

the badge. Exiting the plant at any other time would

47

require the guard to verify that the employee is either
salaried or, if hourly, has been authorized to depart
the plant early as indicated by the odd-lunch time en-
tered on his badge. Hourly employees exiting at any
other time would be personally escorted to the gate by
their supervisor.

All employees would wear either their permanent
badges or temporary badges on their outer garments at
or above the waist on their left sides at all times while
inside the plant. All guards, employees, and supervi-
sors would be instructed to challenge anyone not dis-
playing his badge and to escort anyone who does not have

a badge to the Security Office.

W

Employees who forget their badges would be issued
temporary identification badges at the Identification
Unit. These badges would be made of heavy paper stock
in varying colors correSponding to the different employee
status color codes, i.em,brown for salaried, blue for
hourly day shift, etc. The badges would be used only
within the confines of the plant and would be good for
one entry and exit only. When the bearer would leave
the plant, the badge would be turned in to the perimeter

post guard who would then destroy it. No record of

 

   

11m 219 M. -31: 9; I115:

TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION

 

THE MODEL COMPANY _
L “Stems humans, “was“, mum J

 

 

 

FIGURE 6
PROPOSED TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION BADGE

48

49
issuance or destruction would be maintained.

An employee requiring a temporary badge would
report to the outside perimeter entrance of the Identi-
fication Unit. The Identification Clerk would have the
employee print his name and number on an apprOpriate
colored temporary identification badge form. The Iden-
tification Clerk would check the information and photo-
graph on the employee's badge receipt in the Employee
Number File to verify the employee's identity. The
Identification Clerk would then enter any other status
information such as medical limitations, mail clerk,
expediter, etc., and give the temporary badge to the
employee along with verbal instructions on how to wear
it and when and where to turn it in. The employee would
then be admitted to the plant through the Identification

unit's outside perimeter entrance.
II. CLOSED AREA AND CLEARANCE IDENTIFICATION

The badge system described in this section is
designed to identify employees who are authorized admit-
tance to closed areas and/or to provide a means of iden-
tifying their degree of security clearance. As previous-
ly stated on page 16, badges used for such purposes are
governed by the Department of Defense regulations quoted

on pages 16 and 17. The badge system presented in this

50

section is, therefore, based on these regulations and
on the additional criteria for identification systems
previously presented in Chapter IV.

The prOposed system would identify closed areas
by letter designators, i.e., "A", "B", “C", "D", etc.
Access to all areas would utilize guards to verify

authorized admittance.

Identification Device

The identification device presented here is based
on a snap out carbon triplicate form somewhat similar to
the badge forms used for perimeter identification. Howe
ever, there are several basic differences, since this
badge is constructed of a soft paper core, is cold-
laminated between two pieces of sticky-backed, pressure
sensitive plastic, and does not have a photOgraph of the
bearer.

The original copy of this three part form would
become the core for the Clearance and Admittance Authori-
zation Card and would be made of the same type of bleed-
ing safety paper used in bank checks. The writer tested

several of these safety papers from two paper companies3

 

38amp1es from the Zellerbach Paper Company, South
San Francisco, California; and from Blake, qufitt &
Towne, San Jose, California.

51
and found them all to be similar in that the colored
inks used in the distinctive background patterns were
extremely sensitive to solvents such as acetone and
ink eradicator. Immersing the paper in either of these
solutions for a fraction of a second resulted in wash-
ing away the colored inks. One of the paper samples
also has the added feature that results in the hidden
words "STOP" appearing whenever the ink is washed off.
Attempts to erase information on the paper also result-
ed in removing the colored background inks.

All pre-printed information on the form would
also be in vinyl base inks as an added deterent against
tampering.

Information on the form would be entered by the
Identification Unit as authorized by the Security Office,
including the employee's name, employee number, card ex-
piration date, areas to which admittance is authorized,
and the facsimile signature of the Security Manager.
Those areas to which the employee is authorized admit-
tance would be typed on the clearance card as in the

following examples:

 

I - - - A.C D F J K N O S T - - -

 

 

 

[ ALL AREAS

 

 

 

FIGURE 7

PROPOSED CLEARANCE AND ADMITTANCE
AUTHORIZATION CARD

52

53

The core would be cold laminated between two
pieces of sticky-backed, pressure sensitive, clear vinyl
base plastic. Peeling this sticky-backed plastic from
the core is virtually impossible due to the soft-grade,
light-weight paper of which the core is made. However,
if the plastic should ever be removed, any typing strike-
overs or erasures would be readily apparent to the guard
checking the card.

Printing of the Clearance and Admittance Authori-
zation forms should be handled by the same cleared
graphic arts and printing facilities which print the
company's classified documents. The forms should be
treated in the same manner as Confidential documents
from the time of final design to delivery to the Identi-
fication Unit. By following this rigid control proce-
dure, chance of an unauthorized person obtaining a sup-
ply of the forms would be reduced to a minimum.

Determining an employee's degree of security
clearance would be accomplished by viewing the red
number designator printed on the lower left corner of
his Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card. The

following code would be used for this purpose:

I = Confidential
2 = Secret
25 = TOp Secret

54
lemma

Although the governmental regulations listed on
pages 16 and 17 refer only to "rigid control and account-
ability," some method of requesting and authorizing the
issuance of Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards
is necessary as indicated in the criteria in item 12,
page 24.

As a means of establishing a controlled and stand-
ardized request procedure, a "Request for Clearance and
Admittance to Area(s)" form weuld be utilized. These
request forms would be initiated by Department Managers
or their delegates in accordance with instructions given
on the back of the request form.

Upon receiving a completed request form, the
Security Office would check the employee's security
clearance in the office clearance records, and verify
the signature of the requesting Manager or delegate.

If the request form was not hand-carried to the Security
Office by the Manager or delegate signing the card, a
telephone call would be made by the Security Office to
the requesting manager's office to verify that the re-
quest was prOperly initiated. A signature list of those
Managers and delegates who are authorized to sign the
request forms would also be maintained at the Security

Office. The request form would then be countersigned

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PROPOSED REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE AND
ADMI'ITANCE IO AREA(S) FORM

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FIGURE 9

PROPOSED REQUEST FOR CEBARANCB AND
ADMITTANCE TO AREA(S) FORM

57

by an authorized security official in the block "FOR
SECURITY USE ONLY” and routed to the Identification Unit
via some type of secure plant mail service such as a
guard mail service or classified mail service.

The Identification Unit would, upon receiving the
request form, verify the authenticity of the security
official's signature against a signature list of all
authorized signers. After determining the validity of
the signature, the Identification Unit would prepare a
.Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card in accord-
ance with the information on the request form. The
Unit would also note the card numbers of all outstand-
ing Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards pre-
viously issued to the employee on the back of the re-
quest form. Both the completed card and the request
fonm would be returned to the Security Office via the
next day's mail pickpup.

The Security Offici would compare the completed
Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card against the
request form to double check the card's accuracy and
then notify the requesting organization by telephone
that the card was ready to be picked-up by the employee.
Before the employee could obtain the card, he would
first have to turn in all previously issued cards which

were noted on the back of the request form. The em-

...l

58
ployee would then sign the back of the request form to
acknowledge his receipt of the new card. The Security
Office; would file the request form for one year as a
record of issuance.

Request forms would be handled as a controlled
security form. Department Managers and their delegates
using the forms would be given explicit instructions
about the use of the request form and the necessity for
restricting its distribution.

The most inexpensive material at most companies
for printing such a form consists of blank computor
cards. Blank cards which are normally thrown out by the
Data Processing Departments after repeated use could be
readily used for printing the request forms. Printing
of the forms could be accomplished at most companies by

their in-plant printing department at negligible cost.4

0 ab 1
The duplicate c0py of the three part form would
be filed at the Identification Unit by employee number.
The file would thereby identify any employee to whom one

or more Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards had

 

4Charles Daubert, Forms Control Department Super-
visor, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale,
California, Personal Interview, November, 1961.

59
been issued. Upon the return of clearance cards to the
Identification Unit for destruction, the correSponding
file card would also be removed and destroyed, insuring
that this file would indicate issued, non-returned Clear-
ance and Admittance Authorization Cards only. The file
would also be used as a control over clearance cards
assigned to terminating employees. The form would be
made of mediumdweight card material. Since the form
would remain at the Identification Unit, there would be
no need to use the sensitized material recommended for
the Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card.

The triplicate cOpy of the form would be a "hard-
back” of heavier grade material, and would be a perma-
nent record of all issuances. Filing would be by Clear-
ance and Admittance Authorization Card number in the
apprOpriate clearance level file, i.e., Confidential,
Secret, or TOp Secret. Upon return of the clearance
card to the Identification Unit, the return date and

diaposition.would be entered on the file form. As with
the duplicate c0py, there would be no requirement to
use sensitized material for this form.

Procedures for reporting instances of lost or
stolen cards to the Investigation Section of the Security
Office would be identical to that described for the
Identification Badge on pages 44 and 46.

 

EMPLOYEE NO. EXPIRES CARD NO.

123321 APR 14, 1964 69735
EMPLOYEE NAME

JOHN J. JONES 2
AREAS AUTHORIZED
---BCDFHKLM---

FILE BY EMPLOYEE NUMBER IN THE EMPLOYEE
CLEARANCE CARD FILE. REMOVE AND DESTROY
WHEN CARD IS RETURNED TO THE I.D. UNIT.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DLEHIHLNTE
MEYER “5- mass 391111;— NUT“
123321 APR 14, 1964 69735
.L...____...‘

 

 

EMPLOYEE NAME

JOHN J. JONES 2
AREAS AUTHORIZED
---BCDFHKLM---

DO NOT DESTROY
THIS CARD IS A PERMANENT RECORD. FILE BY

 

 

CARD NUMBER IN APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE FILE.

 

DATE RETURNED DATE DESTROYED

 

 

 

 

 

 

TRIPLICATE
FIGURE 10

PROPOSED CLEARANCE AND ADMITTANCE
IHTTEKNRIEHUPICDI'CAEU).FJJHE FTEUMS

6O

61

W

TO gain admittance to a closed area, the employee
would be required to present his Clearance and Admit-
tance Authorization Card to a guard stationed at the
closed area entrance. The guard would then:

1. Check the card for authenticity and validity.

2. Verify that the card has the apprOpriate let-
tered area designator.

3. Cross-check the name on the card with the name
on the employee's Identification Badge.

4. Cross-check the photograph on the employee's
Identification Badge with the employee's appearance.

5. Return the card to the employee and let him
enter the area. .

NO special procedure would be required for an
employee to leave a closed area other then to verify

that he is wearing an Identification Badge.

W223

The Department Of Defense regulations outlined on
pages 16 and 17 make no provisions for utilizing tempor-
ary identification devices to authorize admittance to
closed areas. An employee who presents a valid Clear-
ance and Admittance Authorization Card to a closed area

guard, but is wearing a Temporary Identification Badge,

62
would have to be personally identified by supervisory
personnel from within the closed area before admittance
would be authorized.

Closed Area supervisors would also be allowed to
authorize the admittance of employees tO the area who
require access on a short-time, limited basis. Such
employees would be personally identified by the super-
visor at the entrance tO the area prior to being allow-

ed to enter.

CHAPTER VI

EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
AT THREE SELECTED COMPANIES

This chapter will describe the employee identifi-
cation systems being used by three selected companies,
hereafter referred to as Companies A, B, and C.1 All
three companies are primarily engaged in defense con-
tracts. However, their sizes vary greatly with A Com-
pany employing approximately 16,000 peOple; B Company,
2,000; and C Company, 75.

In order to establish a frame Of reference which
will lend itself to later comparison Of the model with
the three systems described in this chapter, the same
format used to present the model system will be used in
describing the systems Of A, B, and C Companies. Accord-
ingly, the systems and proceduressfor each company will
be presented under the two basic categories of: (1) Per-
imeter Identification and (2) Closed Area and Clearance
Identification. Each Of these categories will be dis-
cussed according to: (1) Identification Device(s),

(2) Issuance, (3) Accountability, (4) Entry/Exit Proce-

dures, and (5) Temporary Identification.

 

1Since some Of the material presented in this
study may be critical Of the companies studied, the
writer feels that, as a matter Of prOpriety, the actual
names Of the companies should not be used. Instead, the
three companies will be fictitiously referred to as Com-
pany A, Company B, and Company C.

63

64
I. A COMPANY PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION

Approximately 16,000 employees at A Company are
classified as either salaried or hourly workers.2 Sal-
aried employees consist Of managerial, supervisory,
staff, and engineering personnel and comprise approxi-
mately one-third Of the company's work force. The other
two-thirds Of the employees are paid by the hour and
work as technicians, Shop foremen, production line per-
sonnel, secretaries, clerks, and general laborers. All
employees are issued an identification card and a badge
when they are hired. The same type Of identification
card is issued tO everyone. However, different badges
are issued tO distinguish the salaried employees from

the hourly employees and to identify work Shifts.3

Wises.
One Of the employee identification devices used

by,A 60mpany is a laminated, photo-type Identification
Card which is issued to all employees. Paper stock

which is pre-printed with a variety Of information is

 

2Since A Company has no identification manual for
use by its Identification Unit, it was necessary tO Ob-
tain most Of the following data by personally Observing
and studying the company's practices and procedures.

3Personal Observation and study conducted by the
writer at Company A, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

65
hot laminated, along with a poloroid photograph Of the

bearer, between two pieces of semi-rigid, vinyl base
clear plastic. Information on the front of the card
includes the employee's typed identification number,
typed name, and signature. The front of the card also
contains the name of the company and the authenticating
facsimile signature of the company's Industrial Security
manager. The front of the card has an intricate en-
graved border design to make duplication difficult. The
back of the card contains a 1%" by 1%" full-face photo-
graph of the bearer along with typed information in-
cluding the employee's age, height, weight, color of
hair, color of eyes, and the date the card was issued.
The back of the card also has a statement that the card
is the property of the company and that it is valid.
only for the person to whom it is issued. The back of
the card also contains a statement of postal instruc-

tions for returning the badge to the company. Identi-‘
fication Cards are normally carried in the employee's

billfold or purse except when required for plant entry
or for some special in-plant requirement such as cash-

ing checks at the cashier's office.zA

 

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66

 

 

 

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EMPLOYEE No.

     

 

 

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BACK
FIGURE 11
IDENTIFICATION CARD
(SAMPLE FROM THE "A" COMPANY)

 

 

 

67

The salaried employee badge is a metal clip-on
badge with a paper and plastic insert. The badge is
constructed by typing the employee's name on to a col-
ored, pre-printed paper insert, and then placing the
paper insert along with a vinyl plastic overlay into
the oval shaped metal casing. The assembled badge is
placed in a manually Operated badge press where the
edges Of the metal casing are crimped over to hold the
paper and plastic inserts in place. A clip is built
into the back of the metal casing and can be used as a
pin-on badge or can be affixed with a clamp or alligator

clip to avoid tearing the employee's clothing.S

 

FIGURE 12

SALARIED BADGE
(SAMPLE FROM A COMPANY)

 

5Personal Observation and Study conducted by the
writer at Company A, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

68
The badge which is issued to hourly employees is
similar to the salaried badges in materials and con-
struction, the distinction being that it is round and
Of different colors. The border Of the hourly badge
is color-coded to distinguish which shift the employee
works and whether he is a shOp foreman. Medical limita-
tions, if applicable, are entered as "M" below the em-

ployee's name.

JOHN J. JONES

 

FIGURE 13

HOURLY BADGE
(SAMPLE FROM A COMPANY)

 

69
Early Admittance and Odd-Shift/Odd-Lunch cards
are also issued to authorized hourly employees tO allow
entering the plant prior to their normal shift entry
time and to allow entry and exit due to working a non-
standard Shift. Both cards are composed of heavy paper
stock.which is cold laminated between two pieces Of

pressure sensitive, sticky-backed vinyl plastic.7

 

, ‘_ ..K’, . ff... ‘_ \_‘ 'l'f‘ .‘ b ,‘-;’-,‘ll'_(.’~’_‘ t" Wyak“i"":iz .
’~~' (N '12,,1-"iph
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‘3‘" V? _ g :5 mm -s‘v-‘§:
2' J EARL! AMTTANGE CARD . .. -
”NAME JOHN 3 q‘ JOINOSKW SR?» 3342113330,.

DEPT NO. 55491.7“

 

 

a O‘étober .1964

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T' “:3; .yu r. r“ w

 

 

1x;-

    

sn'r

 

 

 

 

 

 

EARLY ADMITTANCE CARD

 

.A COMPANY
QDD-SHIFT/ODD-LUNCH CARD‘

NAME. JOHN J. JOHNOSKCMSKEMPLOY.NO..813762

 

DEPT. NO" . 55-10 mm 23 Sept 1964

% ODD-SHIFT" FROMGzls AM TO 2:45 PM
ODD—LUNCH: FROMIO: 15 AM TO 10: 45 AM

IQEPT. MANAGER JéDUSTRIAL SECURITY

ODD-SHIFT/ODD-LUNCH CARD

FIGURE 14

EARLY ADMTTTANCE AND ODD-SHIFT/ODD-LUNCH CARDS
(SAMPLE FROM THE A COMPANY)

____.7.___
Eng.

 

 

 

70

We

The Employment Department Of the A Company in-
structs newly hired employees when to report to the
Identification Unit for badging. Since the Employment
Department is located outside the main plant, and the
Identification Unit has a Special admittance door
directly from outside the plant perimeter, no type Of
temporary badge is necessary for new hires. Each new
employee reporting to the Identification Unit will
have in his possession:

1. Notice of Payroll Addition Form.

2. Acknowledgment of Employment Conditions Form.

3. Permanent Identification Card Core and an
attached Pass and Badge Receipt Form.8

By checking the information on the first two
forms, the Identification Clerk determines that the
person is a bona-fide employee, verifies his effective
date Of employment, whether he is a salaried or hourly
employee, and, if he is hourly, what shift he will be
working and whether he is a shOp foreman. The Identifi-
cation Clerk then takes a double poloroid photograph Of
the employee, stamps the Identification Card core with
the facsimile signature Of the Industrial Security

Manager, and laminates one picture and the card core be-

 

8Personal Observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

7l
tween.two pieces Of clear vinyl plastic. NO typing is
done On the card core by the Identification Unit, as all
typed information is entered on the card by the Employ-
ment Department. While the card is being laminated, the
Identification Clerk constructs an apprOpriate hourly or
salaried badge, based on the information given On the
employment forms. The laminated Identification Card
and the badge are then handed to the employee. The
Identification Clerk tells the employee when and where
to wear the badge, when to use the Identification Card,
and hands him a booklet On security rules and regula-
tions.9

Whenever an employee requires a duplicate card
or badge due to loss or mutilation, he must first pay
one dollar per card or badge to the Payroll Department.
Upon presenting the receipt Of payment to the Identifi-
cation Unit, a new card or badge is made up for the em-
ployee based on the information contained in the unit's
records.lo

Hourly employees who have been promoted to shOp

foreman or to salaried status, or who have been assigned

to another Shift, must have their badges changed on the

 

9Personal Observation and Study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

lolbid.

72

effective date of the status change. Changing badges
is accomplished upon the employee presenting a valid
Change Of Status Form to the Identification Unit. Upon
receipt Of this form, the Identification Clerk issues a
new badge and retains the Old one for subsequent de-
struction.

Early Admittance and Odd-Shift/Odd-Lunch Cards
are issued by the Identification Unit upon receipt Of
an inter-Office memo request from a Department Manager
or Supervisor. The Identification Clerk then completes
a card with the employee's name and number, the expira-
tiOn date Of the card, and the authorized entry and/or
exit times. The card is stamped with the facsimile
signature Of the Industrial Security Manager and signed
by the employee's supervisor. Requests may be received
by the Identification Unit through the intra-plant mail
System, and completed cards may be sent out the same
way. There is no requirement for the employee to per-
sonally come to the Identification Unit fOr either card
to be issued. Cards may be issued for a Specific number
of days or may be issued for an indefinite period at the

discretion Of the requesting Manager or Supervisor.12

 

11Personal Observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

121b;g.

73

Assesstatilitx

The Identification Card core which was filled
out by the Employment Department and hand-carried by
the new employee to the Identification Unit is the
first part of a two part form. The second part is a
hard-backed Pass and Badge Receipt Card which becomes
the employee's permanent identification record at the
Identification Unit. Prior to lamination, the Pass and
Badge Receipt Card is detached from the card core. The
Identification Clerk staples the extra poloroid photo-
graph tO the Pass and Badge Receipt Card, enters the
word salaried or hourly, shift number, and whether the
employee is a ShOp foreman. An "M” is entered for those
employees having medical limitations. The Pass and Badge
Receipt Card is then filed in the employee file by em-
ployee number. Notation of any subsequent change in
status such as a change Of shift, promotion tO salaried
status, etc., is also noted On the Pass and Badge Receipt
Card.13

Employees terminating their employment with the
Company must process through the Identification Unit
to turn in all outstanding badges. This procedure
enables the Identification Unit tO determine whether

the employee has turned in all badges and cards which

 

13Ibid.

71+

 

 

PASS & BADGE 123321
RECEIPT employee no.

JOHN J. JONES
name

 

HOURLY
FOREMAN
SALARIED

 

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the above prOperty.

I will wear my badge in plain sight and carry my iden-
tification card on my person at all times when on the
premises Of the A Company. I authorize the company to

deduct $1.00 for each item that I may

Date Issued

 

. , .,,q 4
’5}. ’14 g/;.I-;Signature M414

 

2 6/105
shift date
55-10 5

 

orgn. fac.

X

lose.

 

/ ,/
L2; "/JL/fjlz/LL;
’ I

11

 

FIGURE 15

v

PASS AND BADGE RECEIPT CARD
(SAMPLE FROM THE A COMPANY)

75
have been issued to him. However, the company is mak-
ing no attempt to follow through on instances of badge
loss, theft, non-accountability, etc., to determine

diSposition.14

W

Salaried employees are allowed to enter and exit
the plant at any time and are not required to punch
time clocks. Hourly employees must enter the plant and
clock-in within the period thirty minutes prior to their
shift start time. Hourly employees must clock-out‘with-
in the thirty minutes after their work shift ends. Both
salaried and hourly employees follow the same procedure
to enter the plant with the exception that approximately
thirty of the company's top management personnel are
allowed "visual recognition" by the gate guards and do
not have to follow the normal gate procedure. All em-
ployees must wear their badges when entering or leaving
the plant and at all times inside the plant. To gain
admittance, the employee presents his Identification
Card to the gate guard who then:

1. Checks the card for authenticity.

2. Cross-checks the name on the employee's badge

with the name on the Identification Card.

 

14Personal observation and study conducted by the

writer at A Company, July 1959 to December, 1961.

76

3. Cross-checks the employee's facial appearance
with the photograph on the back of the Identification
Card.

4. Checks hourly badges to make sure they have
the apprOpriate shift color code.

5. Returns the Identification Card to the em-
ployee and allows him to enter the plant.15

Hourly employees who are authorized early admit-
tance or odd-shift/odd-lunch entry also must present
the apprOpriate admittance card to the guard. Exit from
the plant is allowed for any employee who is wearing
either a salaried badge or an hourly badge with the
correct shift color code. Hourly employees leaving the
plant due to odd-shift/odd-lunch must also show their
cards to the guard.16

Employees of A Company are required to wear their
badges on their outer garments at or above the waist on
their left sides at all times while inside the plant.
All employees, supervisors, and the roving security
guards are instructed to challenge anyone not displaying
his badge. If the person does not have a badge, he is

escorted to the Security Office for further checking.17

 

15Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, l959, to December, 1961.

16 & 17lbjd.

77

Igmporary Identification

Whenever an employee forgets or loses his Iden-
tification Card and/or Badge, he is issued a Temporary
Identification Pass to be used until such time as he
retrieves the Identification Card and/or Badge or is
issued duplicate identification by the Identification
Unit.18

If the employee forgets his Badge but has his
Identification Card, he must present his Identification
Card to the gate guard. After the employee is compared
against the card photograph, he is handed a Temporary
Identification Pass and instructed to complete the in-
formation required. This includes his name, employee
number, organization number, type of badge lost, and
his signature. The guard then visually checks the in-
formation and enters the "Valid Only On" date and his
guard badge number in the "Issued By" blank. The guard
has no way of knowing whether the employee is salaried
or hourly and can only take the employee's word for it.
If the employee does not have his Identification Card
with him, the employee must call his salaried super-
visor on the gate phone and have him come to the gate

and personally vouch for him, after which a temporary

 

18Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959 to December, 1961.

 

/ w- \

UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THIS CARD TO ' '

OBTAIN NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMATION
CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL ESPIONAGE ACT. '

I, the undersigned, request that a
temporary identification card be
issued to me, and acknowledge hav-
ing read the warning above. '

Signature {31 M ,

£09.02 liaeiAEtecE 312113292092

0
Employee

Name Jo A” J Jams

Employee

Number [3 3 23¢ Org.No. 5’: f—m
Type of .
Badge Lost 52A”?!

Issued by #267]

N? 43210

 

Valid Only On 59¢ 44 (a: _

 

 

FIGURE 16

TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION PASS
(SAMPLE FROM THE A COMPANY)

78

79
pass is completed. Temporary passes are attached to
the employee's outer garment with a paper clip when be-
ing used in place of a badge. When taking the place of
an Identification Card, they are kept in the Employee's
pocket or purse.19

The temporary passes are valid for one day only
and are turned in to the gate guard when the employee
leaves the plant. The passes are also serially number-
ed. However, the only record kept of their issuance is
the total number issued per month. The number on the
pass is primarily used as a psychological deterrent to
make the employee think that a record is kept and there-
fore motivate him to turn the pass in at the gate when
he leaves.20

Use of a florescent colored pass was initiated
as a measure to reduce the high number of passes being
issued under a prior system which used a pass made of
plain white paper. It was thought that by using an
obnoxiously bright florescent colored badge, employees
would dislike it so much that they would remember to
bring their regular Identification Cards and Badges.
During the six month period prior to changing to the

florescent color, monthly statistics kept by the guard

 

19Personal observation and study conducted b the
writer at the A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1 61.

ZOijd.

80

force and Identification Unit showed an average of
2,536 Temporary Identification Passes issued per month.
After using the florescent pass for three months and
distributing a letter to all supervisory personnel
about the problem, statistics showed an average issue
rate of 2,385 per month, an average decline of 151

passes.21

 

21:11:.

81
II. A COMPANY CLOSED AREA
AND CLEARANCE IDENTIFICATION

The A Company has approximately seventeen closed
areas, both Confidential and Secret. Areas are identi-
fied by a lettering system, i.e., A, B, C, D, etc.
Access to all of the Secret areas and to the larger
Confidential areas is controlled by guards. Access to
the smaller Confidential areas is controlled by the Key-
Card cabicle system previously described.22

The identification materials used by the A Com-
pany for controlling admittance to closed areas and in
identifying employees' levels of clearance are all pur-
chased from outside suppliers and vendors.23 A check
of the facility security clearance records revealed that
none of these subcontractors has ever been processed

for or granted a Facility Security Clearance.24

W

In those areas controlled by guards located at
the entrances, two methods are used to identify those
employees authorized to enter. In Secret areas of an

extremely sensitive nature, access lists of authorized

W

ersonal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

24Composite listing of contractor Facility Secur-
ity Clearances maintained by A Company's Security Office.

82
employees are positioned at the guard posts. Confiden-
tial and Secret closed areas conducting operations of a
less sensitive nature and requiring a large volume of
employee ingress and egress, utilize a Clearance and
Admittance Authorization Card as a means of identifying
those employees who are authorized access.25

Clearance and.Admittance Authorization Cards
are constructed of a heavy paper stock which is cold
laminated between.two pieces of pressure sensitive,
sticky-backed clear vinyl plastic. Information typed
on the card includes the employee's name, employee num-
ber, expiration date of the card (no more than six
months), Industrial Security Manager's facsimile signa-
ture, and serialized card number. Areas to which the
employee may be authorized admittance are identified
by letters which have been pre-printed on the card.
Areas not authorized are punched out with a hand
Operated hole puncher, thereby leaving only authorized
areas exposed on the card.26

Employees' clearance levels are identified on
the Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards by

a large red number code in the center of card. The

 

25Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

25mm.

83

 

A COMPANY

CLEARANCE and HDHITTMICE AUTHORlIAUON CAR)

 

JOHN J.

smwv A? Mme
FEB 10, 1964 It 456654
summon ans ‘ summits NUMEE
EMPLOYEE :5 CLEAR!) To Tu: LEVEL can «mean.
ADMITTANCE Is amomzn To THOSE AREAS
has-GMATED M m expose} LETTER.

ABCDEFGHJKLMNOPRSTUV

27351 {gag—6% K k?
W mo TRIM. sacumrv

FRONI‘

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 17

CLEARANCE AND ADMITTANCE AUTHORIZATION CARD
(SAMPLE FROM "A" COMPANY)

84
number 1 = Confidential, 2 = Secret, and 3 a Top Secret.
A Company is also allowing another method of identifying
security clearance to exist that is not authorized by
the Company's management or Security Office. All em-
ployees are granted a Confidential clearance and an
employee salaried or hourly badge on their effective
date of employment. It is therefore being assumed that
any person inside the plant perimeter who is wearing an
employee badge also has at least a Confidential clear-
ance; i.e., the employee badge, which is not an author-
ized device to identify level of clearance, is being
used for this purpose.27

Key-Card cubicles are installed in the perimeter
walls of several Confidential closed areas that do not
have a high volume of personnel traffic. Different
cards are issued for each closed area so that the cards
for one area will not work the cubicle entrances at
another area. Key-cards were previously described and

illustrated on pages 30 to 33.

lemme
Access lists of authorized employees are compiled
by the Department Manager(s) who controls the area's

Operations. Lists are then hand-carried to the Security

 

27mm.

85

Office for verification of the employees' security
clearances. After the lists are signed by both the re-
questing Department Manager and an authorized represen-
tative of the Security Office, the lists are placed at
the appropriate closed area guard posts by the Guard
Captain. Additions or deletions to the lists are pro-
cessed in the samemanner.28

Requests for Clearance and Admittance Authoriza-
tion Cards are initiated by the apprOpriate Department
Manager and routed to the Security Office for verifica-
tion of clearance. These requests, in the form of inter-
office memos, vary in size from standard typing paper
to 5” by 9“ short forms. The wording is usually dif-
ferent on each request, required information is often
omitted, and the authorization signatures are often
written sideways in the margins, upside down, and across
the face of the request. After being signed by both
the requesting manager and the Security Office repre-
sentative, the memo request is routed to the Identifica-
tion Unit. Upon receipt of the memo, the Identifica-
tion Clerk types in the required information and punches

out those areas not authorized. The card is then cold

 

28Personal observation and study conducted by the
‘writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

86
laminated and routed back to the Security Office for
issuance to the employee.29

The typical Clearance and Admittance Authoriza-
tion request is for admittance to four areas. Since
the card has a possible total of eighteen letters ex-
posed, the Identification Clerk making the card aver-
ages fourteen punches per card. At the average issue
rate of 1300 cards per month, the Identification Unit
is making approximately 18,200 holes with a hand Oper-
ated paper punch every month.30

Key-Cards are issued by the Security Office upon
receipt of an inter-office memo request from the Depart-
‘ment‘Manager of the closed area. At the time the em-
ployee is issued his Key-Card, he is also told the cur-
rent key combination being used for the cubicle. The
key punch sequence is periodically changed by the Secur-
ity Office or at any other time it may be deemed neces-
sary. ‘Whenever the sequence is changed, those employees
having need of the new sequence are advised of it

through the Department Manager of the area involved.31

 

29Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A.Company, July, 1959 to December, 1961.

301m.
311m.

87
Assssntsbilitx

No records of access lists are maintained.
Superceded or obsolete lists are destroyed by the Secur-
ity Office.32

Records of Clearance and Admittance Authoriza-
tion Card issuances are maintained at the Identifica-
tion Unit. A register form is maintained which lists
the number of each badge issued in numerical order.

The employee's last name and initials, employee number,
and expiration date are also entered, and the areas to
which the employee is authorized admittance are cir-
cled. .All entries are made in ink, When badges are
returned to the Identification Unit for destruction,
the date returned is entered on the register form.33
Figure 18 shows the register form with several sample
entries. '

.Accountability of Clearance and Admittance
Authorization Cards is further maintained by entering
the number of the issued card on the employee's Pass
and Badge Receipt Card as a means of checking to see
that the Clearance and Admittance Authorization Card is

returned when the employee terminates. 'Whenever a card

 

32Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at.A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

33;bid.

CLEARANCE & ADMITTANCE AUTHORIZATION CARDS

8.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

a
C
E
A +
a 1; A E
E s x w
a w .1 3...
e ‘ \ & j
9 SJ c3 3, a
' w E <1, \1‘3
5 \L d \L at
hBWB @wgwewewHwawewewewawewewe
|
mmmmgmimmmymmmmmmmmmmmmuzmmmmmmmmm
mF‘mpmwafiomwmwmomwmomwmwmwmumom
ma. gma.@mme.me.me.me.mmmmmmmmmmmmn.
2 9mm lofiomomotflofiomomomopfloMOMOMO
Q2] 'z'mliamzmzmzmzmzmzmzmzmzmzmz
o oz_:pzozozozozozozozozozozoz
l.
s—‘Imqimflmfm—imqmqmqmqmqmqmqmqmqmqmq
<r:MdmefJ§m<dm<m<dm<1mmamasmxmsadm<m<zm<tm
L, V5-
5 N
0 CIA N‘s \O ‘4
z .- u
£11?) R3 M
‘ P‘ w \9 (g
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a :r
d m a
g :5
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l\ this D a)
'3
Z \J (5 V L
XL .5: S \3
5.3.3 E
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FIGURE 18

REGISTER FORM
,( SAMPLE FROM A COMPANY)

 

89

is turned back into the Identification Unit, the card
number which was entered on the Pass and Badge Receipt
Card is crossed-out.34
The control and accountability system for the
Clearance and Admittance Authorization Cards has been
firmly established at the A Company. Records maintain-
ed at the Identification Unit provide a positive means
of accountability. A check of Identification unit
records indicated that less than one per cent of all
cards issued have been lost or not turned back in upon
termination of employment. The Identification Unit
immediately notifies the Investigation Section of the
Security Office whenever a Clearance and Admittance
Authorization Card is reported lost or is not turned in
at the apprOpriate time. However, no notification is
provided to the guards so that they can check for un-
authorized use of lost or terminated cards.35
Use of Key-Card cubicles for controlling admit-
tance to Confidential Closed Areas was approved by.A
Company's-Contracting Officer. The requirement for
using names and photographs on the Key-Cards was waived,

providing the requirements for rigid accountability

 

90
were strictly adhered to and the key punch sequence was
changed periodically.36

Whenever a Key-Card is issued by the Security
Office, a receipt form, illustrated in Figure 19, is
signed at the Security Office by the receiving employee
and is maintained in the Security Office's files. The
memo requests are filed by requesting organization num-
ber. Both the receipt form and memo request are des-
troyed when the card is returned.37

No control is being maintained over the return

of Key-Cards when an employee transfers or terminates.
The Identification Unit is not advised of Key-Card
issuance by the Security Office, and therefore has no
way of knowing whether a transferring or terminating
employee should turn in a Key-Card. This lack of con-
trol is also negating any positive enforcement in chang-
ing the Key-Card punch sequence whenever an employee
terminates or transfers, since the clerk in the Security
Office who handles the Key-Card records is not being

informed of employee transfers and terminations.38

 

36Letter to the A Company from the Air Force
Contracting Officer, October 13, 1959.

37Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A.Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

3811 H.

91

RECEIPT FOR KEY CARD

This is to certify that I, the undersigned, have been issued Key
Card number /' Q3 4 5—6 "" on A," f:,,--f" ,’f7 :5? .
This card is for my personal use only and will not be loaned to
anyone else, and I agree not to misuse this card in any way.
I understand that to do so will be a violation of security and may be
cause for disciplinary action as prescribed by company policy.
Further, the loss of this card, and circumstances surrounding the

loss, must be reported in writing immediately to the Area Security

 

Office.
.1 4
‘1 ,/ /.‘ /V a, l l
Lif’lLII ma i gf/V’zw
,Recipient
I '2 3 5’ :2. I

 

Employee Number

Q J “/51

Department

'\ I x .I .
T/ 7 , 1; V U.“ ‘
A; 4%1}11;n x P j (a —
5 Issuing Authority
Security Office

FIGURE 19

RECEIPT FOR KEY-CARD
(SAMPLE FROM THE A comm)

92

£ntrz£§sit.§r2&sdsrss

An employee whose name appears on an Access List
may be allowed to enter the area by presenting either
his Identification Card or a Temporary Identification
Pass to the guard. The guard cross-checks the name and
the employee number on the card or pass with that on
his access list. He then cross-checks the photograph
on the Identification Card with the appearance of the
employee. This photo check is not possible, however,
with the Temporary Identification Pass, since it has no
photograph. If the checks are satisfactory, the card
or pass is returned to the employee, and he is allowed
to enter the area. No Special checks are performed to
leave the area.39

Employee admittance to those areas controlled by
Clearance and Admittance and Authorization Cards is
accomplished by presenting both a valid Clearance and
Admittance Authorization Card and an Identification Card
(or Temporary Identification Pass) to the guard at the
closed area entrance. The guard then:

1. Checks both cards for authenticity and vali-
dity.

2. Verifies that the Clearance and Admittance

Authorization Card has the apprOpriate area listed.

 

39Ibid.

93

3. Cross-checks the names on both cards with
the badge he is wearing.

4. Cross-checks the photograph on the Identifi-
cation Card with the employee's appearance.

5. Returns the Cards to the employee and lets
him.enter the area.
No special procedure is accomplished for the employee
to leave the area.40

No guards are used at Key-Card entrances. Ad-
‘mittance is gained by entering the outer door of the
cubicle, inserting the Key-Card in the slot, pressing
the correct button combination, and then entering
through the inside door. Only one door Opens at a time,
and a weight sensitive floor is connected to the door-
locking mechanism, so that excessive weight on the floor
‘will lock both doors and sound an alarm. Removing
power from the cubicle or any attempt to force entry
also results in sounding the alarm and locking both

doors.“1

0 Id 1 at on
Temporary Admittance Authorization Passes are
used at all Confidential and Secret closed areas to

authorize entry up to one week. Employees who will

 

40Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1961.

“mm.

94
only require short term access are issued this pass so
that permanent cards need not be issued. Booklets of
the paper passes are issued to those Department Managers
and their delegates who have jurisdiction over the
closed area for use in authorizing employees to enter
the area.42

The pass is filled out in duplicate by the
authorizing official, the original going to the employ-
ee and the duplicate staying in the book. Upon pre-
senting the pass to the guard at the area entrance,
the employee signs in on a guard register form and en-
ters the area. .A list of those managers and their
delegates who are authorized to sign the temporary
passes for that particular area is maintained at the
guard post. The authorizing official is reSponsible
for verifying and certifying to the employee's clear-
ance and need to be in the area before he issues the
pass.“3

Initial issuance of the books of temporary
passes must be approved by the Security Office. Re-
newal of used-up books is accomplished by exchanging
the old book for a new one at the Security Office. A

secretary in the Security Office maintains a list of

 

42mm.
431bgg.

 

9S

 

DATE -——- A COMPANY ._WER

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADMITT AN CE AUTHORIZATION

T0 CLOSED AREAS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

,4 , » INPIOYEE ,
NAME Lift»! 7", I,» I"): 7; 5;- NUMBER / '33 331/ i
[,7 (f (,7
ORGANIZATION 661/11 PHONE X 34632» g
AUTHORIZED ENTRY T0 CLOSED AREA(s) f} ,1, C, e ‘
FROM A/Itg’epr” 53 THROUGH ,13 $2102” 533
K/ A / u
/ ‘ ” ‘ it, ‘74 ,
PURPOSEMMW r21. 5‘ Mm 4341,;an
Z/ Z"
AUTHORIZING DEPARTMENT MANAGER OR DEIEGAIE
«"7 7 0
C156}? CL '21. (57/?“46 77/ ”/4? 2.. Q 7'32.
.' (fl 5,;

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 20

TEMPORARY ADMITTANCE AUTHORIZATION
(SAMPLE FROM THE A COMPANY)

 

96

each person who has been issued a book.44

Many of the several dozen managers and their del-
egates authorized to issue Temporary Admittance Authori-
zation Passes are making it a common practice to leave
the books of blank passes unprotected. The writer,
on numerous occasions, found blank books of passes in
unlocked desks, on tap of desks, on tap of bookcases,
and in one instance, in a wastebasket.45

Each closed area guard post is provided with a
list of those managers and delegates who are authorized
to sign passes for that area. However, no correspond-
ing list of sample signatures is provided to the guard
so he can verify that the signature appears to be authen-
tic.46

No control is being maintained over books assign-
ed to employees who are transferred or terminated. Man-
agers and delegates who transfer from or terminate their
positions are not required to process through the Secur-
ity Office. Although terminating employees process
through the Identification Unit, the unit does not have
a record of pass book issuances and is therefore unable
to check on this problem. This deficiency makes it im-

possible; (1) to assure that books of unused passes are

 

44Personal observation and study conducted b
the writer at A Company, July, 1959, to December, 1 61.

45Ibid.
46Ibid.

97

are returned when they should be and (2) to keep the
guard post authorization lists up to date.

Managers in charge of Confidential areas that
are controlled by Key-Cards are allowed to authorize
the admittance of employees who require entry on a lim-
ited basis. In these instances, the Manager Opens a
door to the area that is normally secured with a com-
bination security lock to allow temporary admittance.

Leaving the area is via the Key-Card cubicle.“7

 

47m.

98
III. 8 COMPANY PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION

B Company makes no distinction between hourly
and salaried employees. Each of the approximately
2,000 employees are issued a clip-on badge when they
are hired.48

Idsntifisstisn_2exiss
The badge used to identify employees is a lami-

nated, photo-type badge, Paper stock which has been
pre-printed with a variety of information on both sides
is hot laminated, along with a photOgraph of the bearer,
between two pieces of clear vinyl plastic. The front of
the badge has the employee's name and a 1" by 1&1/8" full
face poloroid photograph, along with the company name and
address. The front of the badge also has an intricate
design. The back of the badge has the employee's number,
badge number, date issued, date of birth, color of hair,
color of eyes, weight, height, employee signature, and
Security Manager facsimile signature. An alligator clip
is affixed to the top of the badge for attaching to the
employee's outer garment. Postal instructions for re-

turning the badge are also included.49

 

488 Company Division Procedure Manual; Personnel
Identification Section. Procedure 3.101. section 3; and
Personal observation and study conducted b the writer
at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1 62.

491big.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 21

IDENTIFICATION BADGE
(SAMPLE FROM'THE "B" COMPANY)

99

100

Issuance

New employees report to the Security Office as
part of their processing procedure. In addition to
other security processing, the Security Clerk handles
identification matters. Each new employee is instruct-
ed by the Personnel Department to present his employ-
ment papers to the Security Clerk.50

The Security Clerk checks the paper work to veri-
fy that the person is a bona-fide employee and to deter-
mine the effective date Of employment. The clerk then
types the apprOpriate information on a badge core, has
the employee sign the back of the badge, stamps the
badge with the Security Manager's facsimile signature,
takes a poloroid photograph of the employee, hot Immi-
nates the photograph and badge core between two pieces
of clear vinyl plastic, and attaches an alligator clip
to the tap of the badge. The clerk then gives the badge
to the employee and tells him when and where to wear it.51

The Security Office charges a one dollar fee to
replace a lost badge. Broken or;damaged badges are re-

placed without fee.52

 

50Personal observation and study conducted by
the writer at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1962.

Slsbal.

528 Company Division Procedure Manual; Personnel
Identification Section. Procedure 3.101, section 3.

101
Employees requiring changes in the information
on the badge such as a marriage name change are able to
accomplish this by presenting change of status paper-
work from the Personnel Department to the Security
Clerk. The Security Clerk then issues a new badge and

retains the employee's old badge for destruction.53

Assesntstilitz

The badge core is a one-piece form. The only
record of badge issuance is maintained by the Security
Office Clerk on 5” by 7” file cards that are filed
alphabetically by employee last name. Whenever a badge
is issued, the Security Clerk types in the name of the
employee, employee's number, badge number, and date of
issuance on the file card. This card is also utilized
for other security information such as level of clear-
ance, date clearance was granted, etc. Whenever a
badge is returned, this is also noted on the card.
When an employee terminates, the card is removed and
filed alphabetically in an inactive file.54

There is no file maintained by badge number.

Badge numbers are assigned numerically by the Security

 

53Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at B Company, December 1961, to August, 1962.

541b1d.

102

 

Seamusemaae .meOo

Home awe Sm Emmomm

+3 em: 0
mummm

emsama amuse seam

.e egos .mmzoe

 

 

 

IFIGiflUS 22

SECURITY FILE CARD
(SAMPLE FROM THE "B” COMRANY)

103

Clerk who makes a temporary notation of the badge num-
ber on a Sheet of paper at the time she issues the
badge. In this way, the Clerk knows which number to
use for the next issuance.

B Company is making no attempt to follow through
on instances of badge loss, theft, or unaccountability.
Guards are not being provided with descriptions of un-

resolved badges.56

EntryZExit Procedures

Employees entering the plant are required to
wear their badges above the waist on their outer
garments. Guards permit employees to enter the plant
after verifying that:

l. The badge being diSplayed appears to be a
valid company badge.

2. The photograph on the badge correSponds
with the appearance of the employee.

Employees are permitted to leave the plant at anytime,
provided they are wearing badges.57

Employees are required to wear their badges

above the waist on the outer garments at all times

 

55B Company Division Procedure Manual; Personnel
Identification Section. Procedure 3.101, section 3; and
Personal observation and study conducted by the writer
at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1962.

56Ibid.

57Ibid.

 

104

while inside the plant. Guards are instructed to chal-
lenge anyone inside the plant who is not wearing a
badge.58

Igmpgzggy IdentifigatIOp

Employees who have forgotten their badges are
issued "I FORGOT” badges by the perimeter guard posts.
These badges are constructed of the same materials as
the company's Identification Badge described on page 98,
i.e., paper stock that is hot laminated between two
pieces of clear vinyl plastic. The badges are turned
backfiinto the gate guards when the employees leave the
plant. Since the badges are of a permanent nature and
do not have any personal identifying information, such as
employee name or number, they are re-issued until worn
out . 59

An employee needing an "I FORGOT” badge is re-
quired to sign his name on a register at the guard post.
The guard then issues an ”I FORGOT” badge if he person-
ally knows the employee, along with instructions on
wearing the badge and when and where to turn it in. If
the employee is not known by the guard, the employee
must identify himself by some type of identification

 

581big.

59IEIE.

105
such as driver's license, social security card, etc.
The guard then calls the Security Office Clerk to veri-
fy that the person is on record as being a company em-
ployee. An "I FORGOT” badge is then issued along with

apprOpriate instructions for its use.60

 

 

.FIGURE 23

~”I FORGOT” BADGE
.(SAMPLE FROM THE “B” COMPANY)

 

60Personal observation and study conducted b the
writer at B Company, December. 1961, to August, 196 ; and
B Company Division Procedure Manual; Personnel Identifi-
éation Section. Procedure 3.101, section 3.

106
Iv. B COMPANY CLOSED AREA
AND CLEARANCE IDENTIFICATION

B Company has several cloSed areas, both Confi-
dential and Secret. Areas are identified by title suCh
as "Classified Library,” "Reproduction," "Document Con-
trol," etc. Access to these areas is controlled by
guards or by employee personnel who work within the
areas.61

Badge core materials are being purchased from
outside suppliers who have not been granted Facility
Security Clearances.62

An employee's degree of security clearance is
identified by the color of the Identification Badge or
“I FORGOT” Badge that he is wearing. A red badge de-
notes a TOp Secret Clearance, blue means Secret, and

green means Confidential.63

t o evi e
Two methods are used to identify employees au-
thorized to enter closed areas. In those areas where

the volume of traffic is relatively high, guards use

 

61Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1962.

62 Inga.

638 Company Division Procedure Manual; Personnel
Identification Section. Procedure 3.101, section 3.

107
access lists as a means of controlling access. In
smaller areas where the traffic is light, designated
employees who work within the area identify those who

are authorized to enter by visual recognition.64

Issuange

Access lists of authorized employees are com-
piled by the Manager or Supervisor who is in charge of
the area. The lists are then given to the guard at the
entrance to the area. Additions or deletions to the
lists may also be made by the Manager or Supervisor who
originated the list. It is the responsibility of the
individual originating the list to determine that all
employees on the list have the required level of securi-
ty clearance and a legitimate need to be in the area.
The Security Office is not involved in the processing

or validating of access lists.65

W

No records of access lists are maintained.
Superceded or obsolete lists are picked up and destroy-
ed by the Manager or Supervisor who originated the
lists.66

 

64Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1962.

65%.
“ms.

108

o e es

An employee whose name appears on an access list
is permitted to enter the area after being identified
by the guard. The guard is reaponsible for verifying
that the name on the employee's badge is listed on the
access list prior to allowing admittance. No special
checks are made for employees leaving the area.67

Those areas controlled by designated employees
'within the area rely entirely on visual recognition to
identify employees authorized to enter. The largest
closed area utilizing this method of identification
has approximately forty employees working there, and
identification is performed by a secretary positioned
at the entrance. She is responsible for determining
that employees entering the area are-wearing either.an
employee Identification Badge or an “I FORGOT” Badge,
and that the employee has a legitimate need to be in
the area. In instances where she is not sure that the
employee should be authorized admittance, she contacts
her supervisor for his decision On allowing admittance
to the area. In those smaller areas that utilize
visual recognition to identify employees coming into

the area, the same methods are used. However, the

 

67Personal observation and study conducted b the
writer at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 1963.

109
identifying process is performed by whoever happens to
be by the entrance at the time, and not specifically by

one secretary.68

W

Since access to closed areas is accomplished by
access lists and visual recognition, no temporary iden-
tification device is utilized. However, before an em-
ployee who is wearing an ”I FORGOT" Badge can be admit-
ted to an area that is controlled by an access list, he
must be visually identified by some authorized employee
from.within the area. This is required since the "I
FORGOT" Badges do not have the employees' names on them,
and the guard would have no way of identifying the em~

ployee.69

 

68Personal observation and study conducted by the
writer at B Company, December, 1961, to August, 196 .

69111:.

110

V. C COMPANY PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION

Since the total number of employees working at
this company is approximately 75, the company's manage-
ment has decided that no type of hedging system needs
to be utilized. All employees work in a one floor
building and enter and leave through the front door.70

All Of the C Company employees work on the same
day shift. Entry to the plant during non-working hours
is restricted to the managerial personnel of the com-
pany who have keys to the front door of the plant.71

Employees entering the building are visually
identified by a Secretary-Receptionist who monitors
and controls the entrance to the building. Each new
employee is personally introduced to the Secretary-
Receptionist by the new employee's supervisor, so that
the Secretary-Receptionist will be able to identify
the employee whenever he enters the building. In any
instance where the Secretary-Receptionist is not able
to identify a person as an employee of the company,
she contacts the company's Personnel and Security

Supervisor for his action.72

 

70Personal interview with C Company's Personnel
and Security Supervisor, October 17, 1961.

711bid.
721bid.

111
VI. C COMRANY CLOSED AREA
AND CLEARANCE IDENTIFICATION

The company has two closed areas, one for docu-
ment reproduction, mailing, etc., and one for chart
drafting. Both are controlled by personnel working
within the areas.73

An employee's degree of security clearance is
determined by personal knowledge of the individual's
clearance. In those instances where an employee is not
sure of a co-worker's degree of clearance, it is his
responsibility to determine this from his supervisor

before divulging any classified information.74

W
Both closed areas are controlled by access lists,
that are provided to secretaries who monitor the en-

trances to the areas.75

as e
The Supervisor of each area is responsible for
preparing an access list of those employees who are

authorized to work in his area. It is his responsi-

 

73Personal interview with C Company's Personnel
and Security Supervisor, October 17, 1961.

112
bility to determine that those employees on the list
are prOperly cleared and have legitimate business in the
area. The list is provided to the secretary whose re-
Sponsibility it is to monitor the entrance to the area.
Additions and deletions to the list are also made by

the supervisor.7

Aggogntabiligy

No records of access lists are maintained. Out-
dated lists are picked up and destroyed by the supervi-

sor who originated the list.77

EgtrXZExit Procedures

Before an employee may enter a closed area, the
secretary at the entrance to the area verifies that
the employee's name is on the access list. If there is
any doubt as to the identity of the individual, admit-
tance is not allowed until the employee is personally
identified by the supervisor of the area. However,
this is rarely a problem, since the largest list has
only approximately fifteen employees' names. No check

is made of employees leaving the area.

 

76Personal interview with C Company's Personnel
and Security Supervisor, October 17, 1961.

77Ip1g.
78Lbid.

113
MW
Those employees who are not on an access list,
but who require admittance to a closed area On a short-
time, temporary basis, must be personally identified
and authorized to enter the area by the supervisor in

charge of the area.79

 

79
ms.

CHAPTER VII

COMPARATIVE TESTS OF THE MODEL
AND THREE COMPANIES

The second purpose of this thesis, as stated in
Chapter II, is to determine whether the prOposed model
system could be utilized at the three selected companies,
and, if so, whether such utilization would result in
more positive security compliance.

Determining whether the model system could be
used at the three companies requires that the model sys-
tem be-compared against each of the three companies in
relation to their various functions and purposes.

Determining whether using the model system would
result in more positive security compliance requires
that the model and three companies be analyzed and com-
pared with reSpect to the applicable security regula-
tions and standards.

Therefore, this chapter will:

1. Compare the model system against the systems
used by the three companies to determine adaptability
of the model.

2. Compare the model and the three companies
against the Department of Defense security regulations
where applicable and against the seventeen criteria for
identification systems outlined on pages 23 to 25 to de-
termine whether using the model would result in more
positive security compliance.

114

115
I. MODEL ADAPTABILITY

Tables I and II on pages 116 and 117 provide a
comparison of the functions of the model and the three
companies. The various functions listed across the tape
of these two charts represent a composite view of the
primary functions of the systems presented in Chapters
V and VI. The methods and devices for identification
listed in the left columns of the tables were also ob-
tained from Chapters V and VI. Page references to other
sections of the thesis have been included for each item
in the table.

In analyzing the data contained in these two
tables, it is seen that the prOposed model methods for
employee identification provide the capability of accom-
plishing the various functions and purposes for which
the several A, B, and C Company identification methods
and devices are utilized. The tables also indicate
that the prOposed identification procedures, controls,
and accountability methods more than fulfill the methods
and standards being used by the three companies. Thus,
the model system has the adaptability necessary for its
being utilized at the three companies.

 

 

116
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF PERIMETER IDENTIFICATION FUNCTIONS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

T _ . _ fl , ITY p,. A TEMPORARY
DEVI CE . . ISSUANCE. ACCOUNT AB]: L ENI‘RY/EXIT IDENTIFICATION
I Identifies Forms From ‘ Employeesd Provides Means
{p_ . __ .f . . Personnel _ d Identifie 0f Authorizin
Authorizes Authorises Identifies YOther Status Or Other Recor 8 Records 'By Guards 0p _ g
Admittance Admittance Hourly Such As , . . Maintained Maintained g uthorized Temporary
. Authorization _ t A ld tta
,ro Plant To Plant Or. Medical Procedures By Name By « Employees } mil go:
During At Salaried Limitations Used AS Basis Or Badge {According TO In-PIgnt
IDENTIFICATION Normal Non—Standard Status & For Issuance Employee Number EstablishedId ntification
DpVICE Shift Time Times In81de Plant ShOp Foreman & Changes Number I Procedures e
, ‘ X
M 3 Identification x x x x x . x X _
8 ‘ Badge pp- 39-40 pp. 59-40 p. 40 pp. 39-41 pp.40, 42-44 pp. 44-46 pp. 44-46 pp. 46 47
' X X
E Tem orar X X X _ 3 _
L gadgey pp. 47—49 pp. 47-49 pp. 47-49 I pp. 47 49 1p- 47 49
.Identification X X X 2 7§_75 S pp. §5-76 /\
, Card pp. 64465 pp. 64-65 pp. 70-7 pp. x _
‘ Salaried X X X X . X ~ ' 75-76
‘ Badge pp. 75-76 pp. 75-76 pp.67, 75-76 pp. 70-72 pp. 73-73 i pp x
X
Hourl X X , X _ X X . 75-76
A ‘ Badgz pp. 75-76 pp. 75n76 pp.68, 70—76 p. 68 pp. 70-72 pp. 73—75 g PP X
. - X .
CO. Odd-Shlft/ 4 . . , pp. 75-76
Odd-Lunch Card pp. 69, 76 p. 73 y x
Early Admit- X 7 . pp. 75-76
tance Card pp. 69, 76 p. 7d ; X X
. X X
2 orar . 77—79 p. 77-79
Teggss y pp. 77-79 pp. 77—79 PP X P
. x X , .
Identification X _X _ . 101_103 pp. 103_104
B Badge pp.98, 103—4 pp.98, 103-4 pp. 100 101 pp , X X
CO. "1 FORGOT" pp.10§_105 pp. 104-105 pp. 104-105
Badge X X
C Visual X l ‘ p. 110 p. 110
CO. i ReCOgnition p. 110 i 4
i

 

 

 

117
TABLE II

COMPARISON OF CLOSED AREAS AND CLEARANCE
IDENTIFICATION FUNCTIONS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DEVICE ISSUANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ENTRY/EXIT IDggngIéEIION
W
Issuance Employees Provides
Authorizes Identifies Authorized “giggggfied Mgifigggied Identified Temporary
Admittance Degree By Delegated B Name B By Guards Or Means 0f
To Of Officials yOr Bag e Authorized Authorizing
Specified Employee According To Em lo ee Numbgr Employees Admittance To
1 Closed Security Established p y According To Areas And/Or
IDENTIFICAIION Number . . .
METHODS & DEVICES Areas Clearance Control Established Identifying
*' Procedures Procedures Clearance
M ECIear. & Admit. x x x X X x
g g Author. Card pp. 50-55 pp. 52-55 pp. 54-58 pp. 58-60 pp. 58-60 p. 61
E g Identified By x X x
L prea Supervisor pp. 61-62 pp. 61-62 pp. 61-62
geiear. & Admit. x x x X X X
3‘ Author. Card pp. 81-83 pp. 82-84 pp. 84-86 pp- 87-89 pp. 87-89 pp. 92-93
E Access X X X ‘
1 List pp. 81-82 pp. 84-85 p. 92
A ‘ x X X X
00.} KeY"Card pp. 81-84 p. 86 pp. 89-91 p. 93
'Pemp. Admit. X X X X X
Author. Pass pp. 93-95 PPo 94-97 PP- 94-96 Po 94 PP- 95794
Identified By x X . X
Area Supervisor p. 97 P- 97 P- 97
Identification X X X
Access X X X
B List pp. 106—107 Po 107 P0 108
CO. "I FORGOT H X X X X
. . X X
Identified By X
Area Supervisor p. 108 __ P. 108 P° 108
. r X
Access X k ,
C List p. 111 pp. lll-llZ__ p. 112
CO. . . X X
Identified By X _ . _
Area Supervisor p. 113 ;: pp. 112 113 pp. 112 113

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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118
II. COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIRMNTS AND STANDARDS

Tables III and IV provide a comparison of the
systems in question against the Department of Defense
regulations and the additional seventeen identifica-
tion standards. Each identification device utilized
by the model and the three companies is viewed in re-
lation to each security requirement and standard.

The data in Tables III and IV pertaining to tem-
pering at the three companies was obtained as the re-
sult of tests conducted by the writer.1 These tests
revealed that every identification device being used by
the three companies can be successfully altered. All
of the plastic overlays or laminations are made of vinyl
base plastic which readily dissolved when immersed in a
solution of 100 per cent acetone. The hot laminated
identification devices required approximately six min-
utes of immersion before the plastic was soft enough to
peel off the device. Immersion time for other cards
and badges varied from two to four minutes. Plastic
on the hot laminations had completely dissolved in fif-
teen minutes.2

These tests also revealed that all information

on the cards, badges, and lists could be erased. How-

 

1Tests conducted by the writer at A Company on
December 15, 1960; at B Company in June, 1962; and at
C Company on October 17, 1961.

2Ibid.

ll9
ever, some of the signatures required an application or
two of ink eradicator to remove them. Depending on the
type of device, fictitious information was typed and
written in, different photographs applied, and new
plastic laminated on badges and cards. These devices
were then used on several authorized test cases to
accomplish the various purposes for which they were de-
signed, such as normal plant entry and departure, early
admittance, clearance verification, and closed area
admittance.3
All that was required for even the most diffi-
cult alterations was some 100 per cent acetone, ink
erasure, ink eradicator, pen, typewriter, poloroid
photograph, vinyl base plastic, and a lamination press.4
Whether the identification devices at the three
companies meet the Department of Defense requirement of
being "designed to minimize the possibility of tamper-
ing and unauthorized use"5 becomes a rather abstract
subject for discussion. The systems certainly are not
tamper-proof as was revealed by the writer's tests.

Whether the systems minimize tampering would depend on

who is defining the term "minimize." Does it mean be-

 

3 & AIb'l-
5United States Department of Defense, Industrial
' Manual £2;,§§£§guaggigg Classified Information,

Washington: Government Printing Office, November,
1961) , pp 5-7.

120

ing able to significantly alter a badge in five minutes
or five hours? Does it imply that all cards and badges
should be completely tamperproof?

The writer discussed this area with an Air Force
Industrial Security InSpector in an attempt to arrive
at a more positive meaning of the requirement. The
Inspector stated that the term "minimize" was very neb-
ulous, and that this was one of the gray areas which
was usually concluded by a mutual agreement between the
company and the inSpector involved. He also mentioned
the restriction on their offices against imposing any
requirement that would favor one commercial contractor
or product over another.6

The standard used to determine whether a device
minimized tampering was therefore based on the result
of the writer's tests. If the device could be altered
to allow unauthorized use, it was judged as not meet-
ing the Department of Defense requirement.

Security compliance in Tables III and IV is in-
dicated as "Yes,” "No,” or "N/A” (not applicable).
Page references to other sections of the thesis have

also been included for each item.

 

6David Grand, United States Air Force Industrial
Security InSpector, Western Contracts Management Region,
Mira-Lama, Calif., Personal Interview, November 14, 1961.

 

 

 

 

SYSTEMS'

TABLE

III

lflflflUflEOF COMPLIANCE WITH

i)EPARTI\-IENT OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

121

 

 

DEPAhWNmmW OF DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS**

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[ Coded Words Designed To Rigid Badges
Clearance Correlating 'Top Secret, Minimize Control Returned
Name E And Data When Secret, 01‘ Tampering And When Written
ZIDENTIFICATICMJ IUNI ’Closed Area Used With. Confidential gnd , Accounta- Employee Procedures
DEVICE Photograph iAccess Info. Other Badge NOt Used Unauuggrlzed bility Terminates Utilized
M Eldentification Yes i Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0 5 Badge p- 39 l p. 39 . 39-41 . 39-41 . 40-47 .43 44-46 . 42
D Clear. & Admit. Yes‘ ; Yes Yes ,pp Yes ppp Yes pp Yes pp yés pYes
E Autho Card pp. 51-52 :pp. 51-53 pp. 51-52 p. 5:5 pp. 50-55 pp. 54-61 p. 59 p. 42
L 'Temporary Regulations not applicable since this badge is not utilized for
Badge Clearance oriClosed Area Identificatipp Iflh 15, 47a49
Identification Yes ' Yes* Yes Yes No No No No
Card pp. 64-66 3 pp. 64—6§__ pp. 64-66 pp. 118-120 p. 75 p. 75 p. 64
SalariedziHourly No ' No No Yes No No No No
Badges pp. 67-68 pp. 67-68 pp. 67-68_ pp. 67-68 pp. 118-120 p. 75 p. 75 p. 64
Odd-Shift &Ear1y Regulations mot applicable since these cards are no used for
Admit. Cards Clearance or Closed Area Identificatigg Iflh 16, 68
A Temporary No No Yes Yes No No N/A No
co Pass pp. ’77-'79 pp. 77-79 pp. 77-79___ pp. 77-79 pp. 118-120 pp. 77-79 p. 64
' Clear. & Admit. Yes* Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Auth. Card pp. 82-83 pp- 82-84 pp. 82-85__ pp. 82-84 pp. 118-120 pp.85-9,92-5 p. 89 p. 64
Access No No Yes Yes No Yes N/A No.
List pp. 81-82. pp. 81-82 D. 92 pp. 81—82 pp. 118-129 pp.84-5,87,92 p. 64
No Yes N/A Yes No No No No
Key‘card p.51-34,84 pp.31-54,84 __ pp.31-4,84 pp. 118-120 pp.84,89-91 p. 90 p. 64
’Femp. Admit. No I Yes N/A Yes No No No No
Auth. Pass p. 95 pp. 94—95 __ p. 95 pp. 118-120 pp. 93—97 p. 96 p! 64
Identification Yes Yes N/A Yes No NO NO Yes
B Badge p.98-99,lO6 p. 106 ' _._pp.98-9,106 pp. 118-120 pp. 100-3 p. 103 p. 98
"I FORGOT“: No Yes N/A Yes No No N/A Yes
CO. Badge p. 105 p. 106 __. p. 104-6 pp. 118-120 pp. 104—5 p. 98
Access No No Yes Yes No Yes N/A No
List p. 106-107 >p- 106*107 pp. 106-1Q? pu 106-8 pp. 118-120 pp. 107-8 pp. 107-8
Visual Regulations not applicable since there s.no restriction
C Recognition in the regulations on usin‘ visual re "nition. pp. 16-17
Access No . No No Yes No Yes N/A No
CO’ List mp. 111-112 pp. Ill—112 pp. Ill—Lgipp. 111-12 pp. 118-120 pp. 111-112 pp. 111-12

 

 

 

*Since the Clearance and Ad:

Cards do not have photographs, .
the photo device to satisfactorily comp

requirement.

PPO

16 & 17.

 

ly with

nittance Authorization
they are used together With

this

**Pages 16 & 17.

 

 

 

   

TABLE IV

SYSTEMS' DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION STANDARDS*
Tamper ' “.110ws ‘ Photo :Employee jNumbered Records 7 Color ’ f ,Intricate Inks 0r
Resistant Asa id On Vrout ‘Company Name,Sig.gSerially Cross- ‘ Codes ' Date , Manage- Make-Up 1 Close ' Design Dyes
‘Design, sturdy Wntgance Of Dadie Name D.O.B., i& Lost Filed To 3 Of ‘ ment And Check Destroyed To Sensitive Iden.
IDENTIFICATION iua,fused Construc~ “ & & E & Soc.Sec.No Numbers By Name Identify Issuance Signature Issuance On When make To Heat Rules
DEVICE Plastic, tion Exit Min l" Plant Color Hats Not And Work And Or Carefully Term. Returned Cepying Eragure Enforced
et 0 . ' ‘ Eyes. Ht .Wt. Re-Used Badge No. Shifts ' Expir . Facsimile Controlled Returns Difficult
M Identification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes: i Yes Yes Yes ' Yes , Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes. Yes!
b Badge pp.39-4l pp.39-41‘ ifi¥41357 p.39 gpp.59-4l pp.39-4li p.44 pp.44-45 p.40 pp.40-4l pp.40-41 pp.40-44 pp.48-46 p.44 pp.39-41 4p.39 pp.44,46$
D . Clear. & Admit. Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 3 Yes Yes Yes _ Yes Yes YES F Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
E Auth. Card p.50—53 pp.50-53 p.61 p.52 p.52 pp.5l-52; p.59 pp.58—61 pp.52-53 pp.51-52 pp.51-52 pp.54—08. p.59 p.59 pp.50—52 4pp.50-53 p.59-61
L Temporary No No N/A No Yes No ; No No Yes No No Yes j N/A Yes 1 No , No Yes
Badge Jpp.47-49 pp.47-49 _pp.47-49 [p.47-49 gpp.47-49jpp.47-49 pp.47—49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49 pp.47-49' pp.47-49 pp.47-494pp.47—49 pp.47-49 p.47-49
Identification No Yes Yes No Yes No 3 No No No Yes . Yes Yes No Yes : Yes No Yes
Card p.118-20 pp.64—66 pp.75-6 pp.65-66 pp.65—66 pp.65-66 pp.64-66 pp373—75 pp.64-66 pp.65-66 pp.65—66 pp.70-72 pp.73-75 pp.75-75 pp.65-66 pp.64-66 pp.75-76
Salariedafiourly No Yes Yes No Yes , No No _ No Yes No ‘ No Yes ‘ No Yes No ‘ No Yes
Badges p.118-20<pp.67-68 pp.75-6 pp.67-68 p.67-68 pp.67—68§pP.67-68 pp.73-75 pp,67-68 pp.67-68 pp.67-68 pp.70-72‘ pp.73-75 pp.73—754pp.67-68 _pp.67-68 pp.75-76
Odd-ShiftScEarhr No No Yes No Yes No f N0 N0 No Yes , Yes Yes No Yes 5 Now No Yes
Admit. Cards p.118-20 p.69 pp.75-6 4_p.69 p.69 p.69 % 4p.69 pp.73-75 p.69 p.69 p.69 p.72 pp.73-75 pp.73-75§ p.69 p.69 4pp.75—76
A Temporary No No No No ‘ Yes No i No No No Yes ~ No Yes N/A Yes i No No Yes \\\
Pass p.118—20 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 p.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 ‘pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79;pp.77-79 pp.77-79 pp.77-79
CO. Clear. & Admit. No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No» Yes; Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 No No Yes
Auth. Card p.118-20 pp.82-85 pp.92-93 pp.82-83 p.82—83 pp.82-83 pp.87-89 pp.87—89 pp.82—84 pp.82-83 pp.8&-83 pp.85-86 pp.87-89 pp.87-89:pp.82—83 pp.82—83 pp.92-93
Access No No Yes No No No No No No No 1 Yes Yes N/A Yes No No Yes
List p.118-2O pp384-85 pp.92-93 pp.84-85 p.84—85 _pp.84-85 pp.84-85 pp.84-85 4pp.84-85 pp.84-85 pp.84-85 ypp.84-85 pp.84-85 pp.84-85 pp.84-85 pp.92-93
No Yes Yes No No No No No No No 3 , No Yes No No . ‘No No Yes
Key-Card R-118‘2 pp.83,31—4 p.93 pp.84,31-4 p.84_,31-4 pp.84,31—-4 pp.89-—91 pp.89-91 p.84,31-4 pp.84,31—4 pp.84,31—4J p.86 pp.89-91 pp.89-91 pp.84,31-4 pp.8rél,31—4 p.95
Temp. Admit. No No Yes No Yes BN0 Yes 'No No Yes Yes No No Yes 5 No No No
Auth. Pass p.118-20 pp.94-95 pp.9l p.95 p.95 p.95 p.95 pp.94-97 p.95 p.95 pp.94-95 _pp.94-97 pp.94-97 pp.94-97' p.95 p.94—95 pp.94-97
Identification No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes ‘ Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Bad e p.118-20 pp.98-99 pp.103-4 pp.98-99 p.98-99 pp.98—99 .pp.lOl-3 pp.10l-8 pp.98-99 pp.98-99 pp.98-99 pp.100-l pp.101-3 pp.lOl-5 pp.98-99 App.98~994pp.103-4
B “I FégfifiTflw No Yes No No Yes No No No No No % No Yes N/A No Yes No Yes
CO. Badge p.118-20 ipxpgunas pp.lO4-5 pp.104-5 pp.104—5 pp.104-5 pp.104—5 pp.104-5 pp.104—5 pp.lO4—S,pp.lO4-5 ‘pp.lO4-5 _‘ pp.lO4~5 pp.104-5 pp.104-5 pp.104-5
Access No No Yes No No ’N0 9N0 No No No Yes Yes N/A Yes No" Noii Yes .
List p.118-20 pp.106—7 pp.108-9 pp.106-7 pp.106-7 pp.106-7 pp.106-7 pp.106-7 pp.106—7 pp.106-7 pp.106-7 _pp.106—7 pp.106-7pp.lO6-7 pp.106-7 pp.%08-9.
Visual N/A N/A Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/ A N/A N/A N/A pp 1:?) 12
r ' ' . 1.1.0 r ° - -
C Re:2%2;:10n No No Yes No *No No No , No No No Yes ‘ 5”Yes N/A Yes‘ No No Yes
CO' List ‘p.118—20, p.111 - p3112 p.111 p.111 p.111 p.111 p.112 . p.111 A p.111 pp.lll-2 Lpp.lll-l p.112 p.111 p.111 n.11g__
*Pages 23-25.

 

 

 

123

In viewing the data in Tables III and IV on pages
121 and 122, some relevant factors become apparent.
Comparing the "Yes" and "No" findings of Table III for
those devices falling within the scape of the Department
of Defense regulations shows that the Model system has
much higher percentages of "Yes" answers than any of the
three companies. Higher percentages for the Model sys-
tem are also found in comparing "Yes” and ”No” items in
Table IV and when comparing all ”Yes“ and "No” items in
both Tables III and IV. These comparison percentages

of Tables III and IV are illustrated in Table V.

TABLE V

PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF COMPLIANCE
FINDINGS OF TABLES III AND IV

 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE ADDITIONAL ALL
REQUIRmaNTs STANDARDS CRITERIA

 

 

 

Ygs NO airs YEs__u_0_°Es _Y_E_§__1\19__°ES
mile—.42.. 1m 7 _1._2_ 4.4.32.1.
A co. 20 32 38% 54 80 40% 74 112 40%
B CO. 10 10 50% 21 28 43% 31 38 45%
c co. 2 5 29% 7 11 39% 9 16 36%

”mm-“Wm...“

 

F
F

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thus, tables III, Iv, and v indicate that incor-
porating the Model system at the three companies would
provide more positive and complete compliance with the
Department of Defense regulations and with accepted

security standards.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The first portion of this thesis reviewed the
area of eSpionage with Special emphasis on the present
day threat to the nation's industrial complexes as
posed by the Soviet eSpionage apparatus. A definition
of the threat and its relation to employee identifica-
tion systems was obtained by correlating the state-
ments of noted authorities on the subject. This infor-
mation was then developed into a realization of the
need for establishing and maintaining sound security
Systems, with emphasis upon effective measures for pos-
itively identifying employees who work at the nation's
defense industries.

Purposes were then develOped on She basis of
the needs and requirements for effective identifica-
tion. The first purpose was to develop a model sys-
tem of identification based on applicable governmental
regulations and on accepted security standards. The
second purpose was to determine whether the model sys-
tem could be utilized at three selected defense indus-
tries of varying size and functions by analyzing the
three systems in reference to the model, and, if so,
whether such utilization would result in more positive

security compliance.

124

125

A review of the applicable governmental regula-
tions was then presented, followed by a presentation of
additional identification standards and exemplary sys-
tems. This information was used as the basis for de-
veloping the model identification system presented in
Chapter V.

In determining what type of model system to de-
veIOp, several factors in addition to the regulations
and standards were considered:

1. It was the writer's view that the proposed
model system should have a minimum number of identifi-
cation devices. Although the writer considers the one
piece electronic badge system described on pages 34-87
to be superior, its use as a prOposed model system was
precluded by the requirement to procure the often un-
obtainable waivers from the contracting officer. Con-
sideration of the Key-Card system was also overruled
as a model because of this waiver requirement and the
fact that Key-Cards are never authorized for control-
ling closed areas higher than Confidential and do not
indicate the bearer*s levellof security clearance.

2. Use of the exchange badge system was also
precluded due to its inadaptability at closed areas
with a high volume of personnel traffic. The proce-
dure of having the guard locate a duplicate badge for

each employee as he enters and leaves the area would

126

be very cumbersome in areas having hundreds of employ-
ees. To use such a method for perimeter control at
large plants would also be unworkable. The cost of pro-
ducing duplicate badges for each control point was also
a prime factor in not prOposing this as a model system
of identification.

3. The Department of Defense requirement for
having at least one of the devices used for closed area
identification to have a photograph was also a major
factor in determining the type of model system. To
take a new employee photograph every time there was a
change in closed areas or whenever the employee was re-
assigned to other work would be very costly, particu-
larly in employee time. By identifying closed area
authorization on a non-photo badge and using it along
with a photo-type permanent badge, this cost factor
would be greatly reduced.

4. Requiring employees to personally travel to
the Identification Unit to affect changes in their
closed area cards would also greatly increase system
costs. By establishing request and issuance proce-
dures that could be handled through branch office lo-
cations such as area security offices, the loss of
employee time would also be reduced.

These factors, along with the Department of

Defense regulations and the additional standards for

127

identification systems were the bases for formulating
and devising the prOposed model system.

The existing identification systems being used
at three defense industries were then presented, using
the same framework and format that was used in pre-
senting the model system. Selection of the three in-
dustries was primarily based on their size, so that a
representative view would be shown for large, medium,
and small industry.

‘Whether the model system could be used at the
three companies was then considered through a compari-
son of the functions and purposes of each type of
identification device being used by the model and by
the three companies. This comparative test indicated
that all primary functions of the three companies
were included in the model system.

The model and three company identification sys-
tems were then viewed in their degrees of conformity
with the Department of Defense regulations and with
additional standards for identification systems. This
test revealed that those devices used by the model
system for identifying clearance and access to closed
areas were in 100 per cent compliance with the Depart-
ment of Defense regulations as compared to a range of

29 to 50 per cent for the three companies. When con-

128
sidering all devices used for identification by the
model System, a compliance factor of 76 per cent with
the additional standards was realized, as compared
to a range of 39 to 40 per cent for the three compan-
ies. A comparison of all identification devices with
all criteria for identification indicated 82 per cent
compliance by the model system and a variance of 36
to 40 per cent by the three companies. Although there
is no way of determining the relative importance of
the Department of Defense requirements and the 17
additional standards for identification systems, it
is apparent from these results that a real need exists
for improving the degree of security compliance at the
three companies, and that incorporating the model sys-
tem.wou1d greatly correct these deficiencies.

The writer feels there is further need for a de-
tailed consideration of cost factors involved in the
various systems and procedures described in this the-
sis. Selling any proposal to a company's management
would appear to be greatly simplified if a cost analy-
sis indicated that a significant savings would be
realized by adapting the system being prOposed. Such
data, when coupled with the vital reasons for security
compliance, would present a convincing argument for
adOpting the model system. However, the primary moti-

vation should not involve cost, but should be found in

129
the realization that the goal of complete and fool-
proof effectiveness in the area of personnel identifi-
cation is a necessary objective and of vital importance
in establishing and maintaining a sound and effective
security posture.

The writer's final conclusion is that this study
has revealed serious deficiencies in the Department of
Defense Industrial Security Regulations. As previously
stated on page 119, the requirement that badges be "de-
signed to minimize the possibility of tampering and un-
authorized use“ leaves much room for interpretation.
The writer sees no logical reason why this vague word-
ing should not be improved to provide stronger and more
Specific requirements. As indicated in the Review of
Authoritative Information section of this study, the
seventeen standards and criteria for identification
systems are being adhered to by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. The writer, therefore, sees no logical reason
why these standards or even more stringent requirements
should not be adOpted by the Department of Defense as
a minimum requisite. The argument that the restriction
on favoring commercial contractors and products does
not allow broadening the regulation is invalid, since
the Atomic Energy Commission is subject to the same re-

strictions as the Department of Defense, in this area.

130

Re-wording the section to Specifically include such
features as all plastic badges, bleeding inks, and/or
changeable electronic codes, etc., could certainly have
a profound effect in improving the degree of resistance
to tampering and alteration.

The Department of Defense regulations do not
even mention the problem area of duplication and cOpy-
ing of badges and cards. By requiring the use of elec-
tronic badges with changeable codes in highly restricted
areas and possibly in all closed areas, the identifica-
tion media utilized at our nation's defense industries
could well approach the concept of being "fool-proof.”

As stated in Chapter VI, many of the badging
materials used by the companies studied are purchased
from various outside suppliers, none of whom have ever
been granted a Facility Security Clearance. This pro-
cedure is perfectly legitimate, since the Department of
Defense regulations do not include this area of security.
The writer contends that the Department of Defense regu-
lations should insist that any identification media be-
ing utilized for controlling access to classified infor-
mation should be obtained through sources cleared to
the highest level of classified information being pro-
tected. Printing and production of badge core materi-

als should be rigidly controlled. The printing plates

131
and over-runs should either be destroyed by' the print-
ing company or sent to the company purchasing the
badges.

It is unrealistic to eXpect whole-hearted com-
pliance to such vague and deficient regulations. The
need for ensuring that effective security measures
are maintained at our national defense industries
requires that the regulations establishing the stand-
ards for the industrial security program Specify
sound and precise practices. Only in this way can
a foundation for 100 per cent security effectiveness

be established.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. BOOKS

Davis, John R. Industrial Plant Prgtection. Spring-
field: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1957.

Gocke, B. W. Pragtigal Plant Protecrior and Poliging.
Springfield: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1957.

Hoover, J. Edgar. Masrers g§,2egei§. New York:
Pocket Books Inc., 1958.

Ind, Colonel AlliSon. A_Short Hrstory gr ESpionagg.
New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963.

B. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES,
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

National Industrial Conference Board. Industrial

§§£§£l£l3 Combating Subgersior and Sabotage.
Studies in Business Policy No. 60. New York:

National Industrial Conference Board, 1957.

National Industrial Conference Board. Indgsrrial
; Plagt gggrg,Handbogk. Studies in Busi-
ness Policy No. 64. New York: National Industrial
Conference Board, 1953.

Office of Defense Mobilization. Srandards for Physigal

Sggurity gr Irdgstrial and,§overrmental Fagilities.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958.

united States Air Force. ,Air_M§teria1 ggmmgrg,ugrggr
295-2, Ingggrrial_§gid§ for Preparation 2; Standard
Pragrige Progedures for Egg Handling and Proteg-

£122 2i Classified Martgr. ‘Washington: Government
Printing Office, August, 1957.

United States Air Force. Lngugrrrg;,8eggr;ty Bgllerin.

Headquarters, Western Contracts Management Region,
Mira-Loma, California, July, 1961.

United States Air Force, Indgsrrial Seggriry New -
L§§§_r. Headquarters, Central Contracts Manage-

TSEI Region, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, December,

132

133

United States Air Force, gurgg_§gr_8gguriry IQQOQtrin-
éElQDj A¥§_§Q§;§, ‘Washington: Government Printing
Office, 55.

United States Army. W 5.2% News
Magyar. United States Army Intelligence School,
Fort Holabird, Maryland, May, 1959.

United States Army. Zhysigal Se r 9_f_ Mary and

Ingrgrrr__ Insrallations, 1 - 0. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1952.

United States Atomic Energy Commission. {hygigal
figggriry a s. Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1950.

United States Atomic Energy Commission. §§ggri§ys
Washington: Government Printing Office, 0.

United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities. The S

12.nas.1mmxs.e.z_s2§_.xl_o em on lathe

upgggg Sfafie s. Washington: Government Printing
Ofice,

United States Department of Defense. Armed,£2rg§§

Inds_tzi_l Sgguriry Regularron. Washington:
Government Printing Office, June, 1960.

United States Department of Defense. lfldflfiillfilm
mmmeamum ssi e

matign, ‘Washington: Government Printing Office,r
NOvember, 1961.

C. PERIODICALS

Business Week. "Tightening up Industrial Security,

ngingggfflggk, October 15,1960), 181-185.
Committee on Identification. ”Report of the Committee
on Identification," §_gur;ry, Vol. 1,

No. 4(December, 1956 17- 8.

Hoover, J. Edgar. ”Do You Really Understand Commu-

nism?" Eggrsrrial Segurity Vol. VI No. II
(April , ’ " , -2 o ’ ’

134

Sullivan, William C. ”The Continual Threat of Espion-
age and Sabotage in the United States," §£é%££i%§L
Sgggrrry, Vol. VI, No. IV (October, 1962 , - .

U. S. News and World Report. Testimony by J. Edgar
Hoover Before the House Appropriations Committee,

June 5, 1963, %, §, Nggs arg_Wor1d Rgpgrr, LIV
(June 17, 1963 , 10.

U. 8. News and World Report. ”The'World's Big Spy Game,”
%g_%. Eggs gag Wgrlg Reporr, VIIIL (May 2 , 1960),
-90

D. OTHER SOURCES

Brosnan, Edward. Chief of Physical Security for the
Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.
Personal Interview, March 22, 19 2.

Daubert, Charles. Forms Control Department Supervisor,
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale,
California. Personal Interview, November, 1961.

Division Procedure Manual from B Compan , Personnel
Identification Section. Procedure .101, Section 3.

Grand, David. United States Air Force Industrial
Security InsPector, Western Contracts Management
Region, MiraéLoma, California. Personal Interview,
November 14, 1961.

Identification Brochure from the Card Key System, Inc.,
Burbank, California.

Identification Brochure from Whitehead and Company,
Inc., Washington, D. C., January, 1960.

Kukucka, Major Andrew J. U. S. Army Department of
Counterintelligence. Speech to the American
Society for Industrial Security, Washington, D. C.,
September 18, 1958. (Printed COpy).

Meador, Robert. Director of Security, Varian Asso-
ciates, Palo Alto, California. ’Personal Interview,
October, 1961. '

Observations, Studies, and Tests conducted by the writer
at the A, B, and C Companies, July 1959, to
August, 1962.

135

Port, Tyler A. Director, Office of Security Policy,
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Speech to the
American Society for Industrial Security, Washing-
ton, D. C., September 18, 1958. (Printed COPY).

Shaw, Harry L. Plant Protection Manager, Lockheed
Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, California.
Persona1,Interview, November, 1961.

Paper Samples from the Zellerbach Paper Company, South
San Francisco, California; and from Blake, Moffitt
and Towne, San Jose, California.

Trudeau, General Arthur G. United States Army Chief of
Research and Development and Former Head of Army
Intelligence. Speech to the American Society for
Industrial Security, Washington, D. C., September
16, 1958.(Printed COpy).

Whitehead, Ned. President of Whitehead and Company,

Inc., Washington, D. C., Personal Interview,
August, 1960.

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