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THE RED CROSS DISASTER RELIEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE:
A STUDY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICE OF A BUREAUCRATIC

ORGANIZATION.

by

M. Joseph Smncler

AN ABSTRACT
Submitted to the College of Science and Arts
of Michigan State Universitv of Agriculture

and AppliedAScience in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology
1961

Approved

 

AN ABSTRACT
THE: RED CROSS DISASTER RLLIth ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

A STUDY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICE OF A BUREAUCILATIC ORG ANIZATION

by M. JOSEPH SMUCKER

Concern for the maintainance of viability results in various
mechanisms employed.hy an.organization to gain.legitimation for its
existence in its social environment. This thesis presents a particular
case study of one device used by a bureaucraticalxy structured
voluntary organization. This device, an ad hoc group known as the
Disaster Relief Advisory Committee, is formally intended to perform
certain functions in aiding the American National Red Cross in its
disaster relief operations. Five officially stated goals are ostensibly
intended to be achieved by the committee. These goals are designed to
adhieve instrumental, expressive, and evaluative functions for the Red
Cross. This study contains four major concerns: (1) factors which
account.for the.creation of this type of administrative device; (2)
the extent to which the_committee achieved its formally stated goals;
(3) the behavior.of organizational personnel in view of the purposes
of the-committee;.and.(b) the major unstated but intended functions
of the committee.

Research.uas carried out during Red Cross relief operations
in three areas.in.E1arida.- Data_was collected from, (1) interviews
with each.of.the.three.disaster.area.operatiens directors; (2)
intervieus'with,caseunnrkera.and_caaennrk supervisors in.each of the
three areas; and (3) interview with.each of the committee members.

These interviews-uere designed.to elicit iniormation regarding the

 

comittoe and its functions and the orientations of the interviewees
toward the comittee. Besides this information, data regarding class
occupancy and cmunity involvement of co-aittee members was gathered.
Also, observations were made of connittee meetings. Observed was the
manner in which meetings were conducted and the pattern of involvement
of both comittesmbers and field staff. personnel. Because the
research was conic-don dimingths finalstages of Red Cross activity,
counittoe meetings not observed were reconstructed from information
elicited by the area directors. Observations of the social patterns
in the three areas were also carried out. These observations were
based upon L1) official. sources of information. (2) published statistical
infomtion, (3) interviews with comittee members, (b) interviews

with Red Cross workers and (5) information from informal sources.

in interpretation of the findings reveals that effective means of
achieving integration in the local community are especially crucial
for a national voluntary organization. It is shown that the Red Cross
is forced to depend upon local support for its existence mile conforming
to the dmands of the larger society. The Disaster Relief Advisory
Camittee represents a means to effect this end. However, of the five
stated functions of the committee, all were only minimally achieved.
Throo. factors. appear to influence the degree of achievement of the
instnmcmal functions: (1) the size and complexity of the local
calamity; (2) the availability of official sources of information;
and ( 3) the professional experience and orientation of the Red Cross
staff.

Factors contributing to the lack of achievement of the expressive

goals are found to be (1) lack of motivation of ‘comittee members and

(2) social distance of committee members from community sectors

affected by Red Cross operations. Factors contributing to the low level
of achievement-of.the evaluative functions are found to be based upon (1)
criteria.used.in.the.selection of committee members; (2) the limited
training.and_abiiity of committee members; and (3) effective means of
control.emplcyed.by the Red Cross.

Because the stated functions were only minimally achieved, the
significance of the committee is found to lie in its intended but
unstated functions. It is posited that these functions are (1) to
coopt neutral or potentially hostile environmental elements into the
policybdeciding body of the Red Cross in an effort to change or mitigate
their potential threat; and (2) a means to defend the administrative
body against environmental attacks at both the local and extra-local

levels.

THE RED CROSS DISASTER RELIEF ADVISORI COMMITTEE:
A STUDY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICE OF A BUREAUCRATIC

ORGANIZATION.

by

M. Joseph Smucker

A THESIS

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts

of Michigan State University of Agriculture

and Applied Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

1961

 

pl f and

9 ’3 '
‘- /.-.:’ S) j;-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Dr. Frank C. Nall, II, I.extend my sincere thanks for his
guidance in both the field work and the writing of this study.
Gratitude is also extended to Dr. Charles R. Hoffer for his encouragement
in undertaking this project and to Dr. Charles P. Loomis for his
understanding and encouragement during the course of the study. To many
fellow graduate students my thanks are offered for their suggestions and
counsel. 1

I also wish to thank the many persons of the American National
Red Cross who were associated with the relief operations in Florida
during the period of research. ‘Without their kind c00peration, this
study would have been impossible. To the members of the Disaster Relief
Advisory Committees I owe my thanks for their cOOperation and for their
friendly hospitality. ‘

Thanks are due to Bruce Morrison for his assistance; particularly in
keeping ”the coffee pot going". To Mary Rogers goes the last word of

appreciation for her patience and encouragement in getting "it" completed.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERI-INTRODUCTION.. .. . .. . .
ThoProbloIi.............
deneral Perspectives of the Problem .

Bureaucracy...........
Organization...... . ...
Integratienof the NationaZLRed Cross
Attheflemnity.Level........

The problemof. Integation .. . .

Organisation

Memo: Integration Other than the.

AbumCMtu.oeooooo

The Disaster Relief Advisory Conittee. . . . . . .

Selection of the Cmittoe . . .

Fomally Intended Function .r the Advisory

.mgeeeoooooooe

Restatement .r the Problem . . . '

Mammy. O O O O O O O O 0 O

ThoDisastor.............
Descflption of theArea Studied . . .
Are; I, Fort Myers, Lee County .
AreaJl, Upper. Keys Area . . . .
Area 111,1“ Keys Area. . . .

Sim..eereeoooooeeo

O O O O O O O

CHAPTERII-THEMIRICANNATIONALREDCORSS......

Inufiwtm...ee.......

Devolomentalfhases of the American
Natmmcrw o o o o o o o o o

111

O O O O O O O

.16

.16

.18

.20

.23
.25
.26
.29
.30
.30
.32
.33
.35

.39

.39

.110

Phase I (186b-1905). . . . . . . 0.. . . . . . . . . .ho
Phase II (1905-1918) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h2
Phase III (1918-19h5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .he
Phase IV (19hS-Prssent). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .h9
Present Structure of the American National Red Cross. . . .52

Operational Goals of Disaster Relief Activity. . . . .58
Woooooooooooooooooooooooooo62

CHAPTER III - THE ACCOMPLISHMENT B! 1115 ADVISORY COMMITTEE
or me FIRST FOUR PRESCRIBED OPERATIONAL GOALS . .614
InterUCt1CHooooooooooooooooooooeooa‘

Seloction of Committoe Members and Composition
0f the ths O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O obj-t

m‘ I o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 065
Area 11o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o72
”8.. III . o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o7h

The Levels of Achievement of the First Four
Prescribed Cunitue Functions o o o o o o o o o o o o o o7S

Function Ono . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
Function Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
Function Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82
Function.Four. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

SMoooooooooooooooooooooooooo86

CHAPTER IV - THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DISASTER.RELIEF ADVISOR!
COMMITTEE ACHIEVED THE FIFTH PRESCRIBED OPERATIONAL

GOA-Loooooooooooooooooooooooo9o

Introduction........................90

iv

The Process of Accomodation of the Committee into
the Red Cross Organizational Structure. . . . . . . . .

Description of the Committee Meetings . . . . . . . . .
Area I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Area II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Area III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Perception of the Committee Members Regarding
FunctionFive.....................

Evalu ation of the Advisory Committee by Red Cross
AdMiDiStration Personnel. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

Summary o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

CHAPTER V - UNSTATLD FUNCTIONS OF THE LISASTEN RLLIEF
ALVISORI COMMITTEE . o o o o o o o o o o . . . .
InterUCtiono o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

Factors Accounting for the Low Level of Achievememt
of the Lisaster Relief Advisory Committee . . . . . . .

Attitudes of Red Cross Disaster Service Personnel
Toward the Inclusion of the Disaster Relief Advisory
Committee in Operational Procedures . . . . . . . . . .

Factors Accounting for the Defense of the Disaster
Relief Advisory Committee by Disaster Service Personnel

Principal Latent Functions of the Disaster Relief
AdViscry Committee. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o e o o

Summary o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

CHAPTER- VI ' mNCLpSIONS o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Implications Of the StUdy o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
The R013 Of Sentiment. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

Manifest and Latent Functions. . . . . .-. . . . .

COOptatiQn . o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

.91
.93
.93
.98

101

106

108

112

110

11b

11!

13h
1J8
1&8
1&0

ms

 

BIBLIWMY o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o O o o o 1&9
APPENDICES o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 1514'
APPENDIX A -" T813103 o O o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0. 0 155

APPENDIX B "'" IntOrY1eV SOheduleI o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 160

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE I. Organization of the.American.Natienal Red Cross. .
FIGURE II. Area Organisation Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FIGURE III. local Chapter Organizational Chart . . . . . . .
FIGURE IV. Organization.of Disaster Relief Field Operations.
FIGURE V. Paradigm.of Merton's Definition. . . . . . . . . .
FIGURE VI. Paradigm of Gouldner‘s Definition . . . . . . . .
FIGURE VII. Paradigm of Officially Stated Goals. . . . . . .

FIGURE VIII. Paradigm.of Goals Not Officially Stated . . . .

vii

. 53
. 55
. 56
. S?
.1140
.1h1

.1h3

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. Occupation of Committee Mmbers. . . . . . . .
TABIEII.SexComposition................
TABLEIII.IncmeDistrihntion...e . .. .
TABLE.II.I-eng,the£Residence in.theConm1nity, . . . .
TABLEV.EducationalLevol... ... ..... .. ..

TABLE VI. Colununity Organization Representation on the
committee-eeoooooooooooooooo

TABLE VII. Social Class Occupancy of Committee Medaers.

TABLE VIII. Associationnf Comnfltee Members with the Red Cross

TABLE II. Extent to which Cormittee Members were Consulted

by Red Cross Casmrkers. o o o o o o o o o o o o

TABLE 1. Activities of Comittee Members with Respect to
Interpreting RedCross Activities to the Local

Cummnity.....................

TABLE II. Estimtes of Community Knowledge of Membership on

the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee. . . . . .

TABLE III. Tabulation of Cases Handled by the Red Cross

Dnut‘rFieldUnj-t'oooooooooooooo

TABLE XIII. Camittoe Numbers Evaluation of the Effectiveness

of the Committee in Advising the Red Cross in

theGrantingofCaseAwards...........

TABLE XIV . Comittoe Embers ' Attitude Toward the Red

CNBSOTECDiZ‘ti.noooooooooooooooo

viii

.68

.69

.70

.100

.106

.127

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This study deals with several aspects of the process by whidh
a large-scale national organization attempts to solve problems arising
from the nature and multiplicity of its goals and from its relations
with the larger society. The organization which was the principle
object of investigation was the American National Red Cross. The
research was undertaken as one of the initial steps in developing a
series of studies of the internal structure of the Red Cross and its
relations with, and impact upon.American society. It is hoped that
this general research interest will eventually include studies of
other large-scale voluntary associations, few of which have been
subjected to searching sociological description and analysis.

The American Red Cross is a highly complex formal organization
encompassing more than thirteen thousand full-time employees and two
million volunteer workers. The volunteer workers are organized into
approximately 3,700 local chapters, plus numerous emergeney disaster
committees distributed throughout the United States. At the national
level the organization exhibits an elaborate bureaucratic structure,
while at the local level it comprehends thousands of units which
are neither bureaucratically structured internally nor thoroughly
subject to the bureaucratic regime of the national organization.

In this respect the American National Red Cross exhibits great
structural similarity with various other national voluntary associations,
although it is by far the largest in terms of the number of participants.
It has been observed, moreover, that the structure of the American Red

Cross has served as a prototype from which numerous other voluntary

2
associations in the health and welfare field have attempted to model

themselves.1

The Problem

The general problem of this study is to describe and analyse the
process by which a large-scale, bureaucratically’structured national
organization attempts to integrate its operations at the local community
level. It is in effect, a study of an organizational device for achieving
a systemic linkage between the organization and the local community
social systems in which it carries on certain kinds of operations. The
study, however, does not attempt to explore the whole range of
mechanisms, techniques, and structures through which the American
National Red Cross seeks to integrate its operations at the local
community level, for such an undertaking would be beyond the scope
of any single empirical study. The focus selected for the study of this
problem is a relatively narrow one, but one which, hopefully, will cast
considerable light on the complex and not infrequently contradictory
actions which emerge in the process of integrating the operations of a
large-scale organization at the local level.

The immediate focus of the study is an administrative device called
the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee. This committee, an §§_hgg_group
selected from among the citizenry of localities stricken‘by disaster, is
a creation of the.kmerican National Red Cross. The formal regulations
of the organisation require that such committees be established in all
areas where the national organization undervtakes relief and rehabili-

tation operations. These committees are formally intended to perform

 

TCarter, Richard, The Gentle Legions, (Garden City, 11.1.; Doubleday

and 00., Inc., 1961) p.-§7.

3

several recognised functions related to the integration of Red Cross
disaster relief operations at the local community level. This study
attempts to evaluate the extent to which three such committees
performed the functions for which they were ostensibly created. While
an accurate assessment of the extent to which an administrative device
achieves its purpose is of legitimate and important concern to the
sociology of organisational administration, an equally central concern}
here is with the explication of the factors which account for (1) the
creation of this type of administrative device, (2) the behavior of

the organisational personnel in view of the purposes of the committees,
and (3) the latent functions of these committees for organisational
personnel, the committee members themselves and the organisation as a
whole. In order to explicate the factors which account for the observed
data the study will explore various features of the social system of

the American Rational.Red.Cross, the localities in which the relief
operations were carried on, and the structure of the situations involving
intmmmmion between Red Cross personnel and the Disaster Relief Advisory
Committees.

General Perspectives of the Problem

Since the American National Red Cross is constituted as a large-
-scale complex, bureaucratically structured organisation and the
explication of its attempts to integrate its operations at the local
cc-unity level derive in large measure from its structural features,
it is appropriate at this point to review some of the salient features of
bureaucracy, large-scale organisations, and organisational relationships

with certain aspects of community environments. ‘We shall discuss first

)4

some observations pertaining to bureaucracy, followed by certain
considerations regarding large-scale organisationsuparticularly
organisational goals and goal-setting, and finally consideration of

some features of American communities.

Bureaucracy
For Weber, one of the peculiar and unique characteristics of the

integration of the social order of modern Western civilisation was the
wide-spread and progressive substitution of rational-legal standards for
traditional standards and charismatic leadership. Weber's amlysis of
economic institutions focused, in part, on explicating how the principles
of bureaucracy allow to a high degree the integration of rationality
into a system of social action which is goal directed. The main elements
in his conception of bureaucracy are as follows: (1) The regular
activities required for the purposes of an organisation are distributed
in a fixed way as official duties; (2) The organisation of offices
follows the principle of hierarchyuthat is each lower office is under
the control and supervision of a higher one; (3) Operations are governed
by a consistent system of abstract rules and consist of the application
of these rules to particular cases; (’4) The ideal official conducts his
office in a spirit of formalistic impersonality, without hatred or
passion and hence, without affection or enthusiasm; (5) hployment in
the bureaucratic- organisation is based on technical qualifications and '
is protected against arbitrary dismissal. kpl‘oyment constitutes a
career, and there is a system of prancticns acording to seniority, or
achievement, or both. Weber further noted that as a social organisation,

bureaucracy appears to be the most efficient form, as viewed from a

purely technical standpoint.1 -

No small amount of confusion has resulted from the frequent
failure to lay adequate emphasis on the distinction between the notion
of ”bureaucracy” and that of the more generic term ”organisation”. The
confusion results partly from Weber's manner of treating the analysis
of‘bureaueratic organisations and constitutes an error of misplaced
concretness. The significance of the notion of bureaucracy, as formulated
by Haber, is that it denotes certain principles of social organisation
which, when operative in a social system, result in a relatively higher
probability of adzieving certain system-relevant conditions than do
other given principles of social organisation. Subsequent to Weber's
analysis and isolation of the elements of bureaucracy the term has
tended to take on a concreteness and served as a aynormu for the complex
organisation or association. Organisations, particularly large-scale,
complex ones have come to be viewed as bureaucracies not only in the
parlance of an un-analytically oriented general public, but also in the

discourse of many social,scientists.2

 

1Blau, Peter 11., Bureaucragy a Modern Society, (New York: Random
“01180, 1956) Pp. 28‘31e

2The almost automatic assumption by many social scientists that
large organisations are in fact bureaucracies may be a result of the
influence of Hichels‘ “iron law of oligarcby". Hichels maintained that
in the development of my organisation there comes to be an almost
automatic centralization of power which results in absolute rule by a
minority, thus leading to a bureaucratic structure. Michele, Robert,
Political Parties (Glencoe: The Free Press, 19119) See especially p. 11.

fithough SeIsnick does not subscribe to this extreme position, he
does posit that there are tendencies fa' organisations, once extant, to
develop a bureaucratic struCture. See Selsnick, Philip, "An Approach to
a Theory of Bureaucracy”, ASR, 191:3, vol. 8, p. 117.

Bendix however, states that “the power of any organised minority
is circumscribed by the internal and external setting of the organisation
which it seeks to control". "Bureaucracy; The Problem and It‘s Setting“,
ASH vale 12‘ Me 15, 19.47. p. 1495

upset a study of the International Typographical Union presumably
provides empirical proof against the position of Michele. British Journal
of Sociology, vol. 3, 1952. pp. h7-63.

b

The principal criticism we wish to raise here is that the notion
of bureaucracy as elaborated by Weber is not intended to apply to the
full range of social behaviours, cultural artifacts, and social
relations which arise in the context of peoples' associations in
organisations, but refers only to a particular form of social organisation.
Studies of bureaucratically structured organisations subsequent to
Weber‘s analyses have tended to assme that his statements were meant
to be essentially exhaustive of the social-relational and cultural
features of organisations in which bureaucratic regimes are institution-
alised. Thus, a number of criticisms of Weber‘s position with respect
to bureaucracy have merged, especially in quite recent years. Blau
observes that Heber‘s ideal-type model fails to take note of possible
dysfunctions which may occur in bureaucratically structured organisations
if all of Weber‘s elements are rigidly institutionalised.1 Merton states
that there must be a certain amount of leeway between organisation
W and the allowance of informal group characteristics, else
overconformity to bureaucratic prescriptions become dysfunctional .2
Along the same vein, Gouldner asserts that Weber over—emphasised the role
of impersonality as a necessary outgrowth of bureaucratisation. He
cites empirical evidence based on a study of an industrial complex to
refute this. Goulthter further notes that Weber failed to see that there

are irrational forces which may be necessary for the maintenance of a

 

‘7

1Elam, op cit, p. 33, See also pages 314-36 for a lucid treatment of the
ramifications of Weber's ideal construct of a bureaucracy.

2Merton, Robert L, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe
Ill, The Free Press, 1957fpp71§'7-20§.

7

bureaucratically structured organisation.1 The position implied by
Weber that the bureaucratic organisation is like a self-perpetuating
machine which will continue to operate in essentially the same way even
in the face of a changing environment is presumably refuted by Burin's
study of the forceful changes worked on existing organisations by
Nasiism.2

It becomes clear that the notion of bureaucracy does not account for
the total cultural and social structural features of any empirically
extant organisation. A wealth of empirical studies have indicated the
extent to which primary groups and organisational culture, e.g. value
standards, arise in the context of bureaucratically structured
organisations and not infrequently in clear conflict with the bureaucratic
order of the organisation.3 Nor does the notion of bureaucracy posit the
theoretically possible subjective orientations vhich participants in

organisations may come to hold as a result of being involved in a

 

1Gouldner, Alvin 1L, ”Organisational Analysis", in Merton, Broom and
Cottrell, Sociolog M (New York:Basic Books, 1959) pp. boo-1.28
‘l

2Burin, Fredric 8., ”Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A
Reconsideration of Weberian Theory”, in Merton, Robert K., et al, Reader
in. Bureaucracy, (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1952) p. 143.

3 See for example, Turner, Ralph H., ”The Navy Disbursing Officer as
a Bureaucrat", in Merton, et al, Reader -i_n_ Bureaucracy, (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1952) pp. 372-379.

Barnard was perhaps the first to point out the existence of informal
groups in bureaucratic organisations. See The Functions o_f_ the Executive.
(Cmbridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 19514) p. 1T3:

Roethlisberger and Dickson have provided the classic emirical
stuchr of the importance of informal relationships in a work group.
Han scent and _th_e Worker, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 191:1).

See also Page ,mes Hunt “Bureaucracy's Other Face“, Social
Forces, Vol. 25, (191:6) pp. 88-9 .

 

8

bureaucratic regime. Merton, especially, has drawn attention to some of
the theoretiCally possible and empirically evident orientations which
participants in organisations may take on. He has further proposed a
theoretical framework in which to interpret different types of deviant
orientations .1

In Weber's view, bureaucracy constituted a highly efficient
organising principal applicable to the achievement of organisational
ends. When fully instututionaiised in a system of social action,
bureaucracy created the conditions internal to an organisation which
permit the fullest integration of rationality into the processes of
goal achievement. He viewed bureaucratic organisational features as
bringing into systems of social action the highest degree of precision,
stability, discipline, and reliability.2

Bureaucracy, then, refers to an abstract system of organisational
principles. More specifically, the term refers .to principles related
to the attainnent of a high degree of integration of rationality in a

 

1mil-ton, op cit. Social cm- and Social Structure p. 11.0-1 57.
Although the listed 535.3 of a p t'i'Sn" apply spec cally to the
economic activity associated with the larger American society, Merton
makes clear that his typology can be extended to any situation
involizing culturally given goals and institutionalised means of attainment.
p. 1 .

See also thte, William H., Jr., The Or action 113, (Garden City:
Doubleday and Comparw, Inc. , 1957) pp.-59-35.

2"EXperience tends universally to show that the purely brueaucratic
type of administrative organisation--that is , the aonocratic variety of
bureaucracy-- is from a pruely technical point of view, capable of
attaining the highest known means of carrying out imperative control
over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in
stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability.
It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of
results for the heads of the organisation and for those acting in relation
to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the
scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all
kinds of administrative tasks.“ Weber, Max, “The Essentials of Bureaucratic
Organisation, An Ideal-Type Construction", in Merton, et al, Reader
in Bureaucracy, op cit. , p. 21:.

system of social action and a high degree of imperative control over

the participants in the system. Viewed as a set of principles or a

system of ideas, bureaucracy stands as a cultural artifact. Fundamentally,
it is a system which may be institutionalised in relation to an evidently
wide. if not universal, range of goal oriented system of social action.
l‘imlly, bureaucracy, when viewed as an abstract set of organisational

principles, has no substantive and»:1

simula-
The organisation, in contrast to the principles of bureaucracy,

constitutes a concrete system of social action. Orpnisations are
empirical entities. They may be complex or slaple in terms of the extent
of differentiation and segregation of statue-roles contained in their
structure. Departmentalisation of function may be non-existent or very
extensive. Power may be articulated through highly authoritarian: or
relatively duooratic procedures. The totality of the internal system
my be subject to a bureaucratic regime or important sub-sectors of the
orgnisation may be largely or completely free from such a regime. The
substantive goals of organisations exhibit almost infinite variety.
Here we shall discuss several aspects of orwiaations which bear upon
the problem of this thesis.

Inds or goals of orwisations serve a multitude of purposes. They

offer the scientific observer a basis for differentiating organisations

 

2"Garth, H. H. and Mills, 6. Unfit, mg; ngg: m in
Mpg, (New York: Galaxy Book, 1958) p. 231.

See also, Gouldner, metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of
Bureaucracy“ in Itsioni, Amatai, mm; W. (New York: Holt
Rinehart and Iinston, Inc., 1961) pp. 71-82.

 

'10

into different functional types.1 From the point of view of the
general public they serve as foci for comparative evaluation and loom
importantly as criteria for decision-making pertaining to the acceptance
or rejection of organisations' outputs.2 Symbolically, they provide an
important base for identification with and development of a sense of
community of endeavor. Their direct significance lies most crucially,
perhaps, in the circumstance that a too low level of achievement threatens
the continued existence of the organisation and thereby the association
of the participant with it. On the other hand, the possibility that
the stated general goals may be achieved and, thus, lead to the demise of
the organisation requires that these goals be broad enough to insure
continued organizational existence.

In the analysis of the goals of organizations it is important to
make clear the frame of reference in which statements pertaining to
them are made. It is thus necessary to differentiate between analytical
and factual statements pertaining to orpnizational pals. At the
factual or substantive level, reference generally pertains to formal
statements of purpose3 (either written or spoken) which are conveyed to

a public by representatives of the given organisation.h

 

1
Parsons, Tslcott, Structure and Process in Mod__e__rn Soci cietz, (Glencoe
Ill, The Free Press, 1965) pp. EFL-7.“ ,

2Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive, (Canbridge, Mass. :
Harvard Univ. Press, ”SET-p. 32.

33am, E. Wright, ”Concept of the Social Organization”, in "
W Ed- bb' “non Heirs. (New York; Filer. 1959 pp. 6-75.
The author lays particular emphasis upon the importance of the organisation
Charters

hOr, lacking this degree of formalization, the goals of an
organisation are to be found in the cannon uncerstanding of purpose
shared by participants and non-participants. Under certain circumstances
the goals of an organization are kept secret from the general public and
from participants who have not attained full authorship status.

11

At the analytic level, statements pertaining to organisational goals
refer to abstract generalisations from specific cases. The analytically
defined goals of orgmisations seldom are to be found in the
organisation's formal means of declaring its goals. The substantive
goals.of.the.totality of organisations in American Society exhibit
almost.infinite variety. Those of the AmericantRed Cross will be
discussedinsome detaiLin Chapter II. Regardless, however, of the
substantive goals of an organization one of the most important goals
from an analytic point of view is the maintenance of the organisation,
per ea. While the statusent that a major goal of an organisation is the
maintenance.of.its independent.integrity--its viability--constitutes an
analyticaLproposition which is. not necessarily to be found at the
empirical.levelwas.a conscious conception of organizational goals, such
conscious-conceptions are.enconntered with some frequency among '
organisational participants. The maintenance of the (r ganisation as a
viable system is frequently, if not universally, in complex bureaucratic-
-type organizations, a fundamental and consciously held goal, as well as
a recognised responsibility of that sector of the organization.referred
to as management. Depending, of course, upon the extent of differentiation
within the ranks of management this analytic goal will be found either
generally diffused in the conscious conceptions of all participants or
limited to those of ”top” management. Situations of organisational
crisis tend.to bring this goal into the conscious conceptions of wider
ranges of participants. The present study, while recognising that the
positing of viability or organizational.maintenance per se as an
organisational goal implies the acceptance of a homeostatic model of

organisational processes, finds this view to be logically necessary

12
and of utility in defining the dimensions of the problem.

If we accept the notion of the maintenance of the organisation per
so as an organizational goal, we may then conceive of it as a long-run
goal, the substantive content of which may change over time and in response
to various. circumstances. But, in addition to this long-run goal,
organizational behavior is also oriented to short-run or operational
goals.1 Operational goals differ from long-run substantive goals of an
organisation in terms of proximity and degree of specificity. As the
term implies, they serve to structure or orient sub-systems of behavior
within the total social system of the organization. Their achievement
is more subject to demonstrable. empirical proof and evaluation owing to
their. more-restricted-and specific scope. Depending on the complexity
of behaviours requireing coordination, operational goals may or may
not be sub-divided into lesser goals. These lesser goals, then, may be
referred to as sub-operational goals. Clearly, such a process of
sub-division may be carried to very great lengths, including the
subdivision of succeeding steps involved in the completion of individual
tasks, and represents a strain toward the integration of rationality into

such social systans. In analyzing the problem of this thesis we shall
be concerned with both the long-run goals of the mdntenance of the
organisation per as as well as with the immediate goals involved in a
disaster rehabilitation operation. It is only in the mntext of the
long-range goals of the organization and those of the disaster operation
that the functional significance of the sub-operational goals of the

Disaster Relief Advisory Comittee become apparent.

 

1Msmh, James S. msmflabut A., Or nations, (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959) pp. 155-158.; The ant ors mks a similar
distinction by mat they term ”non-Operational“ and ”Operational" goals.

13
Two further aspects of organizational goals need to be discussed

here. First, there is ‘the question of the extent to which organizational

goals may be freely arrived at without reference to the environment in
which the organisation operates. 'Second, there is the question of who
in the organisation determines the goals which in fact do become set.
With respect to the first question, a considerable amount of theoretical
and empirical work indicates that the substantive goals of large-scale,
complex organisations rarely if ever can be set without reference to I
the value system ani other forces extant in their enviroments. Thompson
and McEwen present a particularly lucid analysis of the interplay between '
the organisation and it's social environnent in the structuring of
organisational goals.1

The degree to mich the existence of an. organisation is dependent

upon the integration ofits goals- with the value system of its
enviroment is determinedhy the organisation's control over the
acquisition of needed resources. (The term “resources" refers to those
elements essential for the effective operation of the organisation,
namely, physical facilities, labor, capital, and organisational
structure.2) Although no organisation can exist without some degree of
amenable environmental conditions, it is possible, following Thompson
and HcEwen to plot a continuum of types of organisations based upon the
degree of dependency upon the environnent. Thus, an exaaple of one polar

type of organisation would be the almost. completely self-sustained

 

‘Thompsan, James 1)., and McEwen, William J., “Organisational Goals
and Environment; Goal-setting as an Interaction Process”, ASR, vol. 23,
1958, “Os 1, We 23-31

2Parsons, op cit, p. 1:14-56

 

1h
”subversive" political party bent upon altering the existing environmental
conditions, or, as the authors suggest, the Japanese Zaibatsu, a type
of economic organisation controlling almost completely all aspects of
'production. An example at the other extreme would be the voluntary
organisation which must seek amicable relations with its environment
'which represents its sole source of support. In regard to the latter
case, Selsnick, in his analysis.of.a government agency demonstrates
how a conscious effort to minimise potential threat to the organisation's
substantive goals resulted in almost complete modification of these

goals.1

The vulnerability of substantive organisational goals is linked to
the dynamic character of the environment. Changes in the environment
prompt changes in organizational goals, but the latter are not automatically
modified as a.result of environmental changes. To assume that they are
is to accept a simplistic mechanical model of organisational dynamics.
The vulnerability of the substantive organisational goals to modification
appears to be based in.and dependent upon the extent to which a high
degree ofrationality2 is coupled.with a conscious recognition of the
long-run.analytic goal of viability.

The question of who in the organsation deta'mines its goals is of

praticular relevance to an understanding of the data of this study.

 

15.1mm, Philip, The in; g the Grass Boots: 5 3mg; of 1113
Sociology g£_Fcrnal Egggfiisations, (fiEerlys UEIv. of C . Press, 19h9).

2Following Simon, “rationality” is defined as the selection of
preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system of values
whereby the consequences of behavior can be evaluated. Simon, Herbert A.,
Administrative Behavior, (New York: The Mac Millan 00., 19h?) p. 75

15

Clearly, in the case of large-scale, bureaucratically structured
organisations not all participating members are equally involved in
decisions pertaining to goal setting. In this general type-of organis-
ation, decisions of this character constitute policy decisions. The making
of policy. decisions is a prerogative reserved exclusively to certain
specificaectors of the organisationo-generally top management and the
board of directors. This reservation of policy-making as a prerogative
of management and the “board” is, of course, one of the principal
characteristics of.-the bureaucratic form of organisational structure.
It permits the integration of high demos of rationality into the
organisation. While of unquestionably high efficiency with respect to
this function, the differentiation of policy-making functions from the
activities of the general menbership in the organisation is accompanied
by various liabilities.

Our concern here is with the problem which the segration of this
function poses with respect to the integration of policy into the
other relevant sectors of the organisation. Once promulgated, policy
needs to be disseminated. But the lack of participation in policy-
-making so far as the majority of organisational menbers is cncerned
tends to produce difficulties with respect to (1) their understanding of
the policy, (2) their commitment to the policy, and (3) their mode of

orientation to the policy.1

 

1Bakke, op cit. pp. b8-73. Bakke addresses himself to this
problem in his formulation of the ”bonds of organisations” considered
necessary for its. continued existence.

16
Integ'ation of the National Red Cross Organisation at the
Local Casuunity Level

The Problem of Integration

The wide range of value orientations existing in American society
produces considerable strain for the American National Red Cross in
attempting .to integrate its gosls--particularly its operational goals--
with .the value orientations of its environment. American society is
characterized by diversity and change in values. Value differences,
for sample are to be found in the existence of complex division of
labor, the proliferation of specialised institutions, regional variations
and ethnic. heterogeniety. Williams has butlined four principal values
extant in Anerican society. These are: (1) values of gratification, (2)
instrmental interests or means-values, (3) fomal universalistic
values of Western tradition, and (h) particularistic, segnental,
or localistic values.1

Whereas the typical organization, in maintaining its viability need
concern itself only with the problems of integrating its goals with
the local environment in thich it is located, large scale voluntary
organizations, particularly the American National Red Cross must
concern itself with integration in relation to the values of both the
society at large as well as the local community, with its possibilities
of various unique traits. Thus, with regard to the larger society-- the
American Society-- the American Red Cross must adapt itself to an

universalis tic value orientation. For example, it mint hold itself

 

1
Williams, Robin 14., Jr. , American Society, (New Yorszlfred A.
Knapf, 1956) pp. 372-hh1

17

to strict accountability in.regard to donated funds entrusted to it.
Further, the Red Cross must maintain unimpeachable casework standards
consistent with.the expectancies of the larger society. The conduct of
the personnel involved in the organization must be mach as to uphold

the values of equality, and.nonpfavoritisnu_ (As will be seen later,

the very nature of the bureaucratic structure of the.national organisation
further reinforces these.unirersalisticevalue.orientations in.relation

to the conduct of its personnel.)

0n the other hand, particularly with regard to disaster operations,
the Red Cross must integrate its.aotivities_at the local level. At this
Level, the organisation is likely to be faced.with a particularistic
value orientation. Integration of goals--both operational and long-range
with the value orientation at this level is of considerable consequence
in the mainenance of the organisation. It is at the local community
level that the national organization.must depend on.donated funds which
support the entire operation of the Red Cross. Further, it is at this
level that volunteers are recruited. Volunteers are of no small consequence
to the national organization, particularly in regard to the maintenance of
a supportive public sentiment.

It is clear that the dilemma involved in attempts to integrate its
activities at the levels of the local community and the larger society,
demands that some means be adapted to reduce the impact of this
source of strain. That the Red Cross is fully cognizant of this dilemma
is' apparent by its appointment of the Disaster Relief Advisory Gomittee

as a prescribed integral part of its disaster rehabilitation program.1

 

1Selsnick, Philip, op cit., See pp. 259-26h for a.dscussion of
“cooptation”.

18

The committee then, is viewed as a means of bridging the gap between the
two different value orientations.1 How the co-ittos is utilised for

this purpose is of direct importance for this stow.

loan of Integration Other than the Advisory Consittee

Besides utilidng the c.1ttoe, other means of integrating
organisational goals are used by the Red Cross organisation. We will
note these means, having direct boning upon the local cousunity context,
before discussing the comaittee.

Upon initial contact in the disaster-stricken area, the field
director andhiaataffararequirsd, by organisational prescription, to
undertake certain actions by which an assessment of organisational
resource requirements are nde and through which contacts with community
business, professional, and interest groups are establidzed. The
commity contacts are intended to serve a two-directional function.
First they are intended to provide the Red Cross staff with ounces of
information and aid in the Red Cross cganisation's assessment of need
requirements in the unity. Secondly, these contacts are intended
to provide a means by which the Red Cross orgmisation and its activities
are interpreted to the oo-unity for the purpose of fostering consunity
support for me, orpnisstien‘s activities and continued existence.

Specifically, the groups which the director is required to contact
are: (1) Social welfare agencies, (2) finmcial institutions 'including
the Small Business Administration", (3) merchants associations, (1;)
insurance agencies, (5) form agencies, "including the Faners Homo

 

1'lhis is demonstrated by the statement of an assistant field
director, “The Consittee gives a humane, subjective aspect to the cases,
while the Red Cross may tend to treat cases in too such of a machine-like
merrier”.

19

Administration", (6) funeral directors, (7) building and contractors
associations, and (8) ”appropriate agencies of local, state, md federal
govsr-ent“.1

The director is instructed in the initial contacts with the above
mtointerpnet (.1) the aithority, scope, and objectives of the
mmmrelistroaam, (2.) the role of the local Red Cross
chapter in thedisastor relief program, and (3) the relationship 92 the
operational staff to the local chapter.

mo director is further instructed to sunusrise the pest Red Cross
relief activities in the local area and to explain the rehabilitation
phase of the operation to these pews. Staff members who accompany
the director in this procedure are instructed to ”interpret the particular
points related to their units of work, arranging procodm‘es for file
exchange of. infernatien and the referral of applicants, ad establishing
procedures for staff and applicants to utilise the appropriate professional
technical, and financial services".2

In addition to the above contacts, the director is instructed to
naintain contact with "influential groups" and to seek to gain opportunities
for explaining the 'wlw' and ”how” of Red Cross activities. A special
check is to be nde by the disaster field director, of local chapter
relationshipa with. civic, veterans, labor, professional, racial, and
religious grows, with- school; and churches, and vith welfare and social
organisations. The field director is to enlist the support of these

groups and to encouragmtlnir 'l‘participation” inRed Cross rehabilitation

 

‘Sec. 2, p. norm American Red Cross, Disasta- Relief Wk.

ZIbid, sec. 2, p. ho.

20

activities, as well as in local M Cross chapter activities.1 It is
significant to note that these community contacts are to be made prior
to the selection of the committee and represent prescribed means for

facilitating linkage with the local comunity.

The Disaster Relief Advisory Cosnittee

Selection of the Committee.

Since the disaster relief advisory cuittee is formally intended
to carry out a lumber of important functions in the disaster rehabilitation
operation, it is particularly Qpropriate to gain an understanding of the
sanctioned: itenmbsrs andvarious aspects of its composition. is
for-ml]: stated, mubers of the comsittee are to be selected Jointly by
the field director of the Red Cross disaster unit and the local Red
Cross chapter chairsan. The field director is instructed by organisational
prescription to. acqmint the chapter chairman with “the problems and
functions of the committee and provide him with sufficient information
and guidance to insure the best possible selection of representative
comunity leadership".2 The size reed-tended for the comittee is
not less than five, nor more than fifteen ”others. The Delberdlip is
to include Qpropriate representation from .local Red Cross chapter
board with no fewer than two board members on the disaster advisory
coauuittee.

The factors that are to be consiMd in choosing the members of the

1Ibid, p. 6, section 5.-

2Ibid, sec. 2, p. M

21

committee are outlined by organisational prescription as follows :
'(1) Special skills and knowledge of the comunity patterns
and practices and of the living standards of the affected
families. (2 Representation from tr: locality of the section in
uhlch the disaster occurred. (3) Representation from other local
welfare agencies hauling special interest or activities in the
locality. 0*) Representation from leaders in education, the
professions, bupinsss, labor, and religious and service
organisations'.
It is further sdrisedthat the director avoid choosing members that are
likely to exploit their mnbership on the comittee or whose membership
might be construedby the rest of the cox-unity as being inconsistent
with the disaster rehabilitation progrm- Further, if a ce-aittee
m-ber should apply to the organisation for assistance, his resignation
from the calamities is antontically effected.

That the conittee menbers are to be selected jointly by the
disaster unit field director and the chairman of the local Red Cross
chapter may be interpreted ass. prescription intended to insure at least
two goals: First, that the chapter not be isolated from the disaster
operation and hence pose a potential source for substantive problems of
rapport and cooperativeness on the part of the local chapter. Secondly,
that the composition of the couittee not represent a unilateral
decision on the part of the representatires of the national organisation
who are. strangers to the canmniiy and. hence relatively unknowledgeful
concerning his potential symbolic- significance mich certain persons
plncadenthe cc-itteenighthare inthe context of local values.

The stimulation that the composition of the adrisory comittee include

 

1Ibid, sac. 2,.p. 142.

22

at least two chapter board-m.bers may. he taken asyet further indication
of insuring that relations between the national ergnization and the
local unit are closely maintained.

In noting the factors that are to be considered in the selection of
the mittee members from the local conununity, we may deduce that those
persons chosen to serve on the committee on the basis of their knowledge
of ”cmnity patterns and practises" and as representative from those
areas stricken by disaster, are so chosen to serve two functions. The
most obvious function which they are to serve is that of providing the
Red Cross organization with a source of information regarding those
characteristics of the cmnity and the disaster area which are unique
for the specific relevant areas. 'The second and less obvious function
which these prescriptions serve is that of the precuationary device by
which the organisation seeks to avoid any potentially hostile reactions
to its rehabilitation program, arising from charges of not calming on its
program within the context of local values and local needs.

Choosing representatives from “other local welfare agencies having
special interest or activities in the locality” serves the function of
‘ providing ready access for the Red Cross to professional knowledge of
local welfare conditions. These representatives also provide a means
by which anicable relations with the Red Cross are insured, thus
preventing hostile reactions thet may arise on the basis of disagreement
over role definition and organisational Jurisdiction.

By incorporating representatives of education, the professions,
business, labor and religious and service organizations, the Red Cross
organizatiomthcrehy hasa neanshy which it may .adrance its organisational
aims to esteemednenhersof the local, community and thus assure itself

of covesunity organisational acceptance and support in terms of both the

23

inediate disaster rehabilitation prograand the longer range goal of
comnity support for the organisation per oe.

Wm Functions of the WMtteo.

Infernal]: mtemednmnemorépaatumlgalsd meDisaster
Relief Advisory Ce-ittee are prescribed by the national organisation of
the W Cross as follows:

(1) ‘foinfonthadirscter and the appropriate staff of
comnity ocenenic conditions ad other pertinent
calamity patterns and practices.

(2) ‘fo infers the director ad appropriate staff cacerning
the reactions of the community to Red Cross disaster
relief activities and advise on nethods to bring about
better enmity malerstanding.

(3) To assist the director in the solution of problem

encoantered in the co-unity during the course of the
relief operation.

(h) to participataaetirel: in interpreting the Red Cross
disaster relief progra- to individuals and connunity groups.

(5) To review facts concerning individual fanilios to assist
thodirectoradstafftonakecertainthstthekindam
amount of assistance .reco‘euendod utilises all resources
available to the fails, represents a sound rehabilitation
plan, and is in keeping with coasunity and family standards
0: 11V1fl8o

It is clear frea noting the fer-all: intended goals of the advisory

co-ittee that it is meted to engage in a considerable rage of
activities and to perform what would appear to be sono crucial function
inrolation to the carrying out of a successful disaster relief
operation by the Red Cross field staff.

The five stated purposes listed above nay be classified into three

najor types of functions which are considered essential for the viability

 

1Ib1d, lace 2’ po h1o

2b

of an organisation. These three major functions are instruental, expressive
an! evaluative.

In regard to the instruental function, it would appear that the
couittoe is to provide an inportant neans for aiding in the actual
mundane apocationLofihe W- Thus, it ia to aid in facilitating
acMmW.W e tahelping in the rehabilitation
of disaster victiu.- he inetrn-ental function encosnpasses the first and
third lisiIeILintended functions. This includes providing the Red Cross
field staff with inforaation deaed essential for case work processing,
and other WWW associated with tin dispeming of
organinfdnnalrmto disaster victims.

The second and fourth purposes of the advisory committee stated
above appear to be an attempt to fulfill an expressive function. These
purposes serve as a logitination device by which the Red Cross operations
are node acceptable to the local con-eunity. Involved here is the
utilisation of the comittee as a cauunications channel by which the
organisation seeks to naintain a scans for establiaing effective
contact with the local cc-unnity. These two stated moses are
interdependent. Taking note of the. reactions of the community in regards
to Red Cross operations, serves to help structure the anner in which the
Red Cross operation is to be interpreted to the calamity.

lbs fifth stated purpose serveaan evaluative function. Involved
here is an effort to insure that Red Cross operations adhere to the value
system that exists in the local community. More specifically it is
desimd to aid in detemining the actual needs of disaster victims
' and to advise on adequate resonn'ce allocations to meet such needs in
the contest of the local-connunity.

25

It becones apparent that a nunber of difficulties m be involved
in "citing a conuittee which is on the one hand capable 'of carrying
out at an adequate level the above enunerated activities, ad on the
other hand is adequately activated to do so. In addition to the factors
ofnanbershipaspacitioaaninoiiutienr certain.other.factors clearly
enter into the situation to deternine the extent to ninich a connittee
can be expected to achieve the intended goals as organisationally
prescribed.

One factor which we should expect to be of considerable inportance
in this regard is that of the unique characteristics involving sise
and social structure of the local ens-unity in which Red Cross relief
operations are being carried out. Likewise we should expect interactional
factors involving relationships among comittoe anchors on the one hand,
and between co-nittee anchors and the Red Cross staff on the other
hand, to has an important bearing upon the omittee's success in
fulfilling its intended functions.

In regard to the relationship between co—ittee nenbers and the
Red Cross personal, it would appear that the high degree of professional
training of Red Cross personnel in their role functions of assessing
disaster-caused need an! the fact that contacts are to be maintained with
conunity influentials beyond the confines of the oosaittoe, would
ninisiso the necessity of utilising the coaittee according to its
intended functions.

Restataent of tin Prole
The problem which this thesis proposes to analyse consists of
threeparte. First, thisthesiewillanalysethe extenttowhichthe
connitteee studied fulfilled each of the stated functions. The seconsi

26

aspect .1 the precise is to describe and account 1.: the observed
doparturu free the achievement of the intended purposes. It is here
that we shall have recourse to explore the ramifications of the structure
of the social system of the Red Cross, the calamities, and sons values
of m-mm_mimmmm.m.amiutnm policy.
finally, we shall explore seas of the sore salient unstated functions

of the advisory emittee I

Methodoloy

no research for this stuck was conducted during October and
Rm, 1960 in the State of Florida. ‘l'en dqs were spent in the
rat Myers area, six due in the Islanorada area, and seven days in
the Marathon area. These three cmnitios represented those anong
the lost severely stricken by Hurricane Donna. They will be referred as
Areas 1,. II- and III respectively.

In each of. the three areas, research activities centered around
intarviawing ancLobserration. Interviews were conducted with Red
Cross field directors, casework supervisors, case workers, and
individual omittee washers. (beervatiens were anode of cmittoe
noetings, the Red Cross field operation as a whole, and the general
social characteristics in each area. The research was conducted
duringthafinel stages of the. Red Cross relief operations.

Inirea I (Fort Myers), all but one committee number was interviewed
In Area II (Islnorada) all. active heaters were interviewed (two additional
nae-bore never took part in co-ittoe functions). In Area III (Marathon)
all counittoe labors were interrupted. Co-ittee nestings that were
observed included tlao inireal, one intros. 11 ad two in Area III.

27

The cenittee noetings in each of the three areas were held on a weekly
basis with between five and seven meetings being held in each area.
Meetings prior to those observed were reconstructed by talks with the
area directors. This reconstruction enabled the researchers to gain

a better “Wot thetypicslity of patterns observed in the'
neetings actually attended.

The research in each area was conducted in the following nanner.
First, each of the field directors were interviewed extensively. Il‘ho
interview with each director was designed to elicit intonation on key
points regarding the node of operations of the field staff, their
conceptions of the role of the disaster relief advisory canittee and
their orientations toward the cos-ittee. 1n sad: instance, interviews
were held on the basis of a ”discussion”. where it seened apparent that
the director was merely providing perfunctory response reflecting a
defens ivo attitude, probing was utilised in order to dotomine how
much of this response was actually a result of internalised orgsniutienal
norns, and how such was a facade which could be renewed in order to
reveal the 'truo feelings” of the director. In the act of probing, the
researchers were careful to avoid producing feelings of hostility on
the part of the interviewee. Following the interviews with the directors.
the conversations were recorded. Nuaerous sessions of this character
were held in each area.

Casemrk supervisors were interviewed in such the one way as the
directors, although considerably nore elphasis was placed upon determining
their conceptions of the instruental utility of the comittees in
relation to the casework process. We were individually

interviewed, with epscieieapnuie upon the role mien tha cn-eitteo

28

played in aiding the caseworker in the develop-out of the case as well
as the caseworkor's evaluation and interpretation of the ceuittee‘s
intended functions.

Individual c anittse asnhera were interviewed in physical locations

separate fru that of the Red'Cross unit. Generally these took
place in their house or places of business. lbs principal focus in
these interviews was on their overt actions while on the co—itteo,
the extent of their involvuent in the situation, their feelings toward
the cmittee and their feelings toward the Red Cross organisation as
a mole, arising as a result of their association with it through the
couittse. The couittoe‘ neabor's conceptions of the purpose of the
co-ittee aid their conceptions of its effective influence upon case
decisions were also explored.

Observations of ca-ittee meetings focused on 1) the node of
operation during the co-ittoe sootings, ‘2) tin degree of involve-tent
in the canittee nesting proceedings on the part of co-ittes more,
and3) thsnannsr inthida the RedCross staffhandled the cases
resented to the co—ittee for review. Observations also were nade
of each Red Cross field unit in terns of its general orientation to the
surrounding enviroment, as well as internal relationships. To this
end, infernal interviews were conducted with other staff nesbers
besides those dealing solely with case developaent. These included
”intake“ aid ‘disbursaeent' supervisors and building inspectors.

Infomtion on the general connunity characteristics was gathered
froa co-ittes nabsrs, Red Cross csSeworkers, chanbers of source,
local welfare markers, and infernal contacts in the con-mnity at large,
as well as froapuhnshedatatiatiulm A ’w’arner approach“ of

29

assesnent was used inthese areas and in judging class occupancy of

cmittoo members.1
The Disaster

Originating southof Purertn Rico, “Hurricane Donna“ struck the
Floridaxeyeonjept-hmilo, 1960 with winds reaching a velocity
of 135 silos per hour in parts of the area from south of Marathon in the
lower Keys to Tavernisr in the Upper Keys area. As a result of the
stern, some eighty per cent of the buildings in Harathon were dsnaged.
Further, the Keys water nain burst and parts of the overseas highway
were destroyed. Early reports declared that scene 1:0,000 people were
evacuated from the area to Red Cross usrgency dzelters. ‘Hurricane
Donna" was the worst store to hit the Keys Area since 1935.

The next day, September 11, the hurricane swung in a north-easterly
direction across the Flmida Peninsula and continued along the eastern o
coast ofthe ration. As a result of the. large-scale dasngs in Florida,

the Red Cross inediately dispatched ninety-five disaster workers to
Florida for its largest hurricane nobilisation effort ever mdsrtaksn.

Hardest hit on the Florida peninsula were the coastal city aid -

- adjacent areas of Fort Myers and, to a lesser extent, the coauunities
of Naples, Hauchula, Butow, Lakoland, Arcadia and Orlando.

Eight persons were killed in Florida as a result of the disaster.
Total destruction was estiaated at nearly one billion dollars. Twenty-
seven counties in Florida were declared disaster areas.

General Gruenther, head of the Aserican Red Cross reported to
President Eisenhower that, immediately after the non, 16,000 persons
were housed and fed by the Red Crossinagency centers in Florida, It

1Warner, Meeker, and tells, Seeial Class in America, New York:
Anerican' Book-Stratford Press, Inc. , {91497 pp. 1-hL.

 

 

30

was further reported that 7M houses and trailers were completely
destroyed. Further, 12, 323 dwellings were «imaged of which 3,200 were
left uninhabitabls.

As previously stated, the location of. the. research for this stun
was inthe three areas nostbadly danagedby the store. These were;
1) the Bahama) the Upper Ksyearea, particularly the
WWW.@3) the lower Keys area
which- mm community of Marathon.

Descriptions of the ‘Areas Studied

Area I, Port livers, Lee County:

Fort more, the county seat of Leo county is located on the west
side of the later half of the Florida Peninsula near the south of tho
Caloosahatche River. The population of Fort Myers is 23,000, with a
nrkedincrease of this figure in the winter soothe, due to the influx
of tourists and winter residents.

The aain source of incme in this area is from the tourist trade
androlated industries, as well as fnos the sale of real estate and
sons comerdinl fishing- New land and housing development projects
exist in Lee County, and there is; a plethora of trailer courts and
notela.

There are no aigle large industries in the Lee County area. Of a
list of aim-sash industries compiled by the local chatter of cusses-cs,
fifty industfles has less than twenty snployees, of which forty-two
indnstries employ. less than ten persons. Ten industries employ
between twenty-ens and forty persons. Three industries uploy between
fortyé‘one and sixty persons» The nature of the industries is widely

31

diversified. The top five industries listed in rank order of frequency

are: construction and related industries, fishing and related industries,
agricultural-related industries, counercial printing establishments,
and boat and swine equipment establishments.

Socially, the dominant power within the continuity appears to
be centered among a few old established southern families. However,
their position is being threatened by the growing number of residents
from northern states. As a result of this inflmt, some antipathy
eon ists between the long. term residents or ”Creators” and the more
recently arrived northern Flames'. In the min, the focus of this
antipathy is upon the traditionally based conservatism of the south
versus the so-called liberalism represented by the faction from the
north. Politically it represents a challenge to the dominance of
the powerful local Democratic Party by northern businessmen and
professionals sligneiwiththe Republican Party.

Although the originally economic dominant groups in the area
achieved their position as land owners, new means of achieving wealth
appear to be based mainly upon the professions, construction, real
estate and related industries. It is in these areas of endeavor that
the comparatively short-tern residents are successfully challenging the
traditionally based community leadership.

According to informants, the coununity as a whole has been quite
anti-labor in the past. Only at present are labor union beginning to
becom successfully established, particularly in construction,
electrical, and communications industries. Having representatives of
organized labor on a community representative group, such as was
intended in choosing disaster relief advisory committee members was

32

unprecedented in the Fat more area.

A high degree of social isolation exists between Negroes and
Puerto Rioans who live on the southern outskirts of Fort Myers and the
white inhabitants of the city. The fornar groups are outplayed mainly
in construction, in ayioulturs, anLas domestic servants by private
faliliss- These groups wield little or no influence in the comnity
at large- mere was -no representation of these groups on the advisory
connittee. .-

513; 1.11 Qppar figs Aron.

Althoughthe jurisdiction cf the Red Cross field staff extended
froltheJiiaILsuhurh of Cocoanut Grove, south along the Keys to Craig
on Longlq, thanin4reao£ Red Cross activity was centered upon the
has frsnlsy Largo, south of Craig. Prior to the inpact of the
hurricane, mousse had been sent to Homestead, 13 niles south to
Cocoanut Grove. its base of Red Cross operations under study was
located in Islsnorada ad also included the cmnity of Tavernier
in the Upper Keys area.

the peraanent population of the Upper Keys area is 3,770 according
to the Mini office of the census bureau. This figure is nore than
doubled during the tourist season which extends from Decenber 1 to
April 1.

has principal scans of livelihood in the area includes tourist -
related industries such as motels, trailer courts and deep sea fishing.
Real estate, the building industry, and to a lesser extent, retail
businesses also exist in this area. Some commercial fishing is also
done.

Length of residues- in this area determines to a large degree the

33

social statuaene occupies. Long-tern residents occupy the prestigeful
positions in the coununity. Social influence appears to be wielded
principally in descendents of four long-established families. Sale

of the original families, known as ”Conchs" settled in this area during
and after the Civil War on newly established pineapple plantations.
Main lines of social cleavage appear to be between those the gain a
livelihood by fishing as opposed to those gaining a livelihood by other
nuns, with the fisher folk occupying the lowest strata. leadership

in the area eppears to be held by only a few individuals. There is no
Negro settlement as such in the area.

Social intercourse is on an extremely infernal md apparently
intimte basis with the. more prestigeful individuals taking a somewhat
patronising attitude toward the rest of the population. Acquaintances
are on a first name basis, md apparently, no one escapes the scrutiny of
his neighbor.

Politically, the min tightly controlled by a Donncratic
Party machine, amLalthongh therewere expressions of dissatisfaction
byaone oLtheeinfornantsrthereappearedto be no real threat to
its continusdgexistences Labor is still unorgmiaed, nor is there
apparently any sorenent toward this end.

Damage left by the hurricane was considerably more severe in this
area, as compared to Ana 1. During the research period the papulace
was concerned with repairing notels, resturants, boats, piers and

other structures before the tourist season was to open.

Area 1111, Lower Keys Are .
Ianediatsly prior to the impact of. theerricane, Red Cross
headquarters hadbeen.set_up_at-xsy.. West ancLhacLoontixmed..there for

3b

a brief period. However, since little of no danage occurred south of
Key Yacas, Sb miles to the north of Key West, the field headquarters was
moved to me cmunity of Harathon, located on Key Vacas. The total
area of Jurisdiction extended from Craig on Long Key to Key West. The
sain damage and subsequent Red Cross activity was centered on Key Vacas.
Grassy Key and the lower part of Long Key to the north of Key West.

Marathon, with a per-snout population of h,296 is the main center
of social and oceanic activity in this area. As in the communities in
Area II, the population sore than doubles during the tourist season.

The dietinctirsnessof this area as countered to that of Areas I
and Area Ilia the_conparative new derelopaent of the area. Host
of the present stage of. derelopnant of the comnunity of Marathon is the
result of a resurgence of a land boon beginning in 1951‘. Economic
activity is conpletely oriented toward the tourist trade, except for a
comparatively small mount of corsaercial fishing.

Social statue appears to be based upon organisational seahorship
and length of residency in the area, although there are extreme few
long established families. In this regard, the res appears to bear
all the traits of a typical American suburb but without an orientation
toward a larger urban area. Prostigeful indivihals appear to have
gained their status by affluence and sesbsrship in the snore exclusive
of the new social organisations that arist_in the area.‘ Social
cleavage is further naintainsd by geograghic location, with the sore
affluent persons living in select snd.exclusive areas.

At the bottom of the socialsscale aea- the in hahitants i): ”The
Rock”, a Negro ghetto onthe ”m side?! of. the ooaaaunity of Marathon.

These persons asks a litingas domesticssrunte,

35

construction markers and related occupations. THO Negro employees
of a prominent household were members of the Red Cross advisory committee.
Politically, this area, like the whole Keys area, is douinated by
a Denecratic party machine. Republicans are only nominally represented
in the area. A faction of the local Democratic party, which is getting
in strength, appears to pose a considerable threat to the ruling
political clique. is in Area II, there is no active movement of labor
unions in the area. Also there is a typical absence of lower class
representation inthe civic functions in this area.
Evidence of the hurricane‘s damge was much more in existence
in this- area than in the first two areas. Although most of the damage
done to. structurea belonging to the more affluent classes was
covered by insurance, comparatively large resource allocations were
required by the Red Cross to nest the needs of those not as fortunately

OndWQdo

mm

In this chapter we hue sought to clarify the distinction between
the social organization and the. bureaucracy as a specific form of
social organisation. We have noted that bureaucracies as such have
no substantite goals but- rather- are a means by which an orpnization
nay lore effeciently accomplish its goals. we have pointed out that
although organisations are formed for the achievement of a variety
of goals, the analytic Md.mm1mg the-viahility of the organis-
ation appears to gain particular.-pmaaimnnce.~ Although the concern for the
organisationis viability appearsltoehe anresulteof the perceived necessity to

36

accusplish tin- «We-substmgoalsru will be shown later.
mintance of tin u-ganisationlm. hence- Lprinary goal for which
substantive goals are structured.

The problen of goal-setting is particularly crucial for the organis-
ation if it is to ruin extant. Because the miution can exist only
to the degree that it is permitted to do so by its social enviromnt,
goal-stuctming must be constantly altered according to the demands of
the society. On the other had the orgmisation will use its own scans
to gain acceptance of its goals by its environaent. Hence goal-
structuring in not a- passive unconscious. nodification of
enviromental demands, .but rather is a continuous conscious effort on
the part of policy-nakers of the organization to insure that the
organisation is made acceptable to its enviroment.

To be acceptable to the enriroment reg: ires that the orgnisation
successfully. integrate its acflrities into the external social qsteu.
For the Red Cross, successful naintainance of its existence requires
that it successfully integrate its operations at tvm levels. At the
national level of Aaerican Society, the ca‘ganisation must adhere to a
universalistic value orientation in its operational goals. However,
since the organisation aust rely almost totally upon locally dominated
funds and volunteer labor for its very existence, it eust successfulh
integrate its Operations at the local level, which on be. oriented to
more particularistic values. That the Red Cross is aware of the
coeplications involved in this bi-level integration is apparent by the
elaborate orpnisational prescriptions that gavern its disaster relief
operations. Included in these prescriptions is the establishnent of
a Disaster Relief Advisory Cmittee. This calaittee is- ostensibly

37

appointed to assist the Red Cross field unit in assessing disaster-
-caused need, interpreting the mumnity standards to the unit.
Interpreting Red Cross operations to the coal-unity, aiding in the
solving of problems that may arise during the course of the relief
operations and aiding in the decisions affecting awards granted by tin
Red Cross to disaster victims.

It inthe Disastenflelietidaisory C-itteo that is the primary
focus ofeunstudy.-. We wilLbe interestadimthe degree to mich the
conittee-ahciexed.its_proscrihed goelaaawell as in explicating
those factors thich liaitod, its achievement. In this regard it was
felt necessary to explain in sane detail the characteristics of the
three areas under stuck in which Hurricane Dome struck.

Became this study is largely exploratory in nature, no specific
hypotheses were outlined prior to the field research. Instead, general
interests guided the etuw. These interests were focused upon (1) the
degree to which the couittee accomplished its prescribed goals (2)
factors accounting for departures from the achieve-ant of these goals
and (3) ilportent latent functions which the msnittee served for
Red Cross organization. Toward these interests the field research was
centered upon those elements of disaster relief activity having direct
bearing upon the activities of the committee in each of the three areas
studied. For a better understanding of the functions of the co—ittee,
we will want to first consider those factors in the history cf the
Red Cross mich led to the complexity of problus attendant to the
integration of the organisation to its enviroment. In this regard,
the following chapter will be devoted to tracing the evolvenent of

38
the Red Cross from.a loosely organised voluntary association to a highly
complex, bureaucratically structured organisation which is dependent

for its existence upon donated funds.

Chapter II

THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

Introduction

In this chapter, we are principally concerned with an analysis
of the over-all structure of the American Netiomal- Red Cross organisation.
We will be mainly interested in (1) how the analytic goal of viability
has been exemplified in the history of crises of the American Red Cross
and (2) the extent to which substantive orgnisational goals have been
modified in the course of adjusting to changes in the external enviromnent
and in keeping with the analytic goal of viability. We will also note
(3) the evolvement of the national organisation fron a small scale,
simple, non-bureaucratically structured organisation, characterised
by the rule of a charisnatic leader, to a large-scale, complex,
bureaucratically-structured organi cation, characterised by the dominmce
of rational-legal standards of authority, and (h) how the probluns of
integration of the organisation's operations at the local level have
increased with the increasing conplexity of. the internal structure
of the national organisation, with the multiplication of local chapters,
and with instances of a growing md widespread hostility toward the
organisation.

An analysis of the American National Red Cross organisation can
best be presented by noting four main stages of its historical
development. These stages may be delineated by three periods of crisis
for the organisation. In this chapter we will consider each phase
in the evolvment of the Red Cross, bearing in mind the four previously

mentioned primary interests. Following -the consideration of these four

ho

phases, uphasiawilLthenJie given-te ananalysis of the present
organisational structure. Finally the operational goals of disaster
relief activity will be pointed out.

Developmental Phasesof the American

National Red Cross

Mhebh-WOS)

The original group- which fostered the movement le ading te the
imeptiomef the American Red Cross was made up of women volunteers whose
main purpose was to achinister aid and relief to the wounded of the
AnericanCiwil warn Following the War, Clara Barton, the main organiser
among thiagreup was profoundly influenced by the international Red
Cress movement and sought to establish an erganisation along similar
lines in Anerica. As a result of Miss Barton‘s efforts, the American
Red Cross Society was officially founded in 1881. In 1882, the American
Red Cross became a recognized member of the international body.
Originally organised for the relief of war victims, the American
organisation seen expanied its goals to include the relief of victims
of peace-tine disaster.

During its fornative years, the Red Cross organization
was completely deninated by Clare Barten.’ It was upon her that the
total operation of the Red Cress depended. As a result of the
charismatic quality of her leadership, the organization was kept
infernally structured en a more or less Gemeinschaft-like basis, with
little concern for standardization and reutinisatien of functions
or the delegation efautherity. Amheadef. the merging welfare

organisation, Barton was little concernad with public sentiment, as long

In
as there were fmds available to carry outthe functions entrusted to
it. In this regard she appeared to reflect the then current attitude
of the so—called economic ”empire builders” who tended to maintain an
attitude of ”the public be damned:

In June, 1900, the ermintionwas. incorporated by an Act of
Congess. The federal charter granted to the Red Cross fully authorised
activities which it had in actuality been carrying on for the
review twenty years. The granting of this charter was an especially
significant event in that it not only broadened the scope of Red Cross
activities and defined its purposes more ‘clearly, but it also gave the
organisation an official status, which it had previously lacked. In the
charter, three “obligations” were placed upon the Red Cross. These
were: (1) to furnish volunteer aid to sick and wounded of the armies in
time of war; (2) to serve as a medium of communication between the
people of the United States and their arms and navy; and (3) ”to carry
on a peacetime program of national and international relief to mitigate
the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other
great calamities and to devise and carry on measures for preventing
such suffering”: In addition to these stated goals of the orgnisation,
the Red Cross was required to submit annual reports of receipts and
expenditures to the federal governnent. Due to the ergmisation‘s
status as a federally chartered organization, and the specific purposes
incerpcrated in its charter, the Red Cross! developed a close association
with the federal governnent over the course of time. Indeed, the
President of the United States and his Cabinet served as an honorary
“Board of Consultation” for the Red Cross organisation.

In whathas beendeacribecLas the ”Progressive Era”, beginning with

 

1
Dulles Foster Rhea The American Red Cross A Histog, New York:
Harper and 3‘3“, 1950) p.’1. * * J (

h2
the turnofthe century, the Americampublic evinced_a growing hummitarian
feeling, coupled with a concern fer greater public responsibility
of relief and welfare agencies. Reflective of these general concerns,
the contributing constituency of the American Red Cross sought to
initiate more respomihle policiemof the orgmiaatien, particularly
iningard to itmhandlingof contrihntadlundan The mounting threat
to the personal_di.reciion_by Miss Barton of the national organisation
was culminated by charges of incompetence in the direction of relief
activities in the Galveston, Texas tidal-wave and hurricane disaster
of September 8, 1900. An intra-organizational conflict of considerable
magnitude developed as a direct result of the pressure for policy
changes. Under the leadership of Mabel Bordman, a woman of considerable
wealth and influence, an attack was launched against the personalistic
direction of-Clara Barton which was particularly directed at her fiscal
policies- The success of the Beardman forces in June, 1901;, initiated
a new phase of the history of the Red Cross.

Phase II (19054918).

is a result of loss of support (which included the President of
the United States, Theodore Roosevelt) for her methods of operation,
Clara Barton, the original leader of the Red Cross movenent in America,
'gracefully" resigned in 1901;. In January, 1905, the Red Cross was
reincerperated with a new charter which naintained the three original
purposes of the organisation. However, its structure was considerably
changed. The major changes specified in the new charter required that
there be a governing body consisting of a Central Couittee of eighteen
manbers, of whom six were to be elected by the incorporators of the

113

organisation, six chosen by state and territorial societies, and six
appointed by the President of the United States. The last six were
to consist of the chairman of the Central oe—ittae and five Cabinet
members, representing the Deparhents of State, War, Navy, Treasury and
Justice. In addition, it was provided that the War Depuhent annually
audit the accounts of the Red Cross. Since 19011, the Presidents of the
United States have served as Honorary Presidents or Honorary Chairmen
of the National orgnisation.

Although Mabel Boardman never aspired to the visible office of
authority in the organisation, itwas her influence that determined
the character or the Red Cross from 1905 until her death in 19kt. Under

Beardman's direction, efforts were made to develop the American

NatiomlRed Cross intoamefficient arganiiatien.- This encoaipasaed a
program of maintaining contributing members throughout the nation by
which reliable means of enviromental support could be assured. To
these ends, delegation of authority and decentralisation of organisational
function was initiated, while maintaining a strong governing body.
In order to maintain assm'ance of enviromental support, Beardlnn felt
the organisation should be controlled and led by influential leaders
of American society, with primary emphasis upon wealth and prestige.
She further sought to expand the number of local diapters throudieut
the country in order to attract a large supportive base made up mainly
of the wealthy and local influentials. Originally, these local chapters
were viewed principally as sources for eliciting financial support to the
1"?de organisation. Substantive operational goals for these clmptera
were: (1) to incrmmubsrshiuinthsoranisation, (2) to participate
in ”general Red Cross actiritiaafl, and(3) to be prepared for action

hh

when needed. As can be seen, these_goals- were sufficiently broad to
allow for considerable flexibility in interpretation. This was in
keeping with the general conception of the local chapter as a means
for eliciting support for the national organisation, both in terms of
funds received and in terms of favorable pubilicty at the local
level.

'me enrollment of contributing members to the local units of the
national organization mcmparatively shall. In 1908, there was a
total enrollment throughout the nation of only 11,000. Further, there
was considerable disappointment with the inactivity of the existing
local chapters. It soon became apparent therefore, that to maintain
interest on a broad scope, new substantive pals would be needed to
contribute to the organisation‘s viability if it was to remain effective
in carrying out emergency relief. To this end, the operational program
of the national organisation became increasingly diversified. In 1909
a nursing service was begun, headed by the National Co-Iittee on Red
Cross Nursing Service. Besidesproviding a pool of nurses in the event
of a disaster, this service also promoted classes for women in home
nursing, hygiene and first aid. First aid work was particularly
successful and in 1909 there was an establishmcnt of a First Aid
Department. This Department Later came to include a successful program
'of water safety and life-saving classes. Also during this same period
a public health program was instituted which encomassed propane of
municipal sanitation, preventite medicine, and dietetice.

In regard to the atmotrme of themiional organisation durim this
period, mthority waadelegated to three mainbodies. These were: (1)

the Central Committee, (2) anexemitiae W~(3) the departments

145

of Civilian Reliefandfiilitary Relief. . Various subsidiary units
complemented the above bodies. I

With the entrance of the United States into the First World War,
the size and importance of the Red Cross grew to the extent that it was
a recognised integral part of the war. effort. Besides carrying out its
traditional role of nursing and furnishing entertaiment to theallied
troops, it also concerned itself with the care of nary civilian war
refugees. It was during this time, however, that the am took over the

field medical units of the Red Cross and incorporated them into its
own medical corps.

Following the First World War, the problems of reconvers ion to
peacetime operation resulted in new tensions upon the organisation.

An" issue of contention within the organisation was the extent to which
the Red Cross should maintain peacetime operations on as huge a scale

as those it had supported during the War. Nther, there was pressure
brought to bear for increased professionalisation of Red Cross personnel.
The resulting issue of salaried versus volunteer workers in the national
organization caused further dis sension within the organisation. With

the substantive goals of a peace-time operation less salient than those
during the war, chapter apathy becaxae a seriom problem to the national
organization. Various means were instituted by the national organization
for apparently no other purpose than to keep the local chapters active
as a means to sustain membership interest.

The developing crisis that brought the second phase of Red Cross
organisational policies to an and was climaxed by a critical public
charging it wiihextrasagence endemismanagement of funds during and
inediately after the war. 0f far greater importance for the internal

1:6

structure of the crganisation during this period was the issue of
policy change regarding the ~‘expanding of peacetime “activities and
subsequent hireing of professional markers.

Further ramifications were involved in the issues facing the Red
Cross after the war. Chief of these was the loss of arbitrary policy
decisions made by the national organisation during the war. Instead,
if the organisation was to maintain active support, it was recognised

that chapters would have to gain more importance in policy decisions.

Phase III (1918-19h1).
To meet the threats posed as a result of envirouaental pressures

upon the Red. Cross, structural reorganisation was undertaken. The focus

of attention was shifted to the local chapters, and efforts were made
to change the somewhat autonmous nature of the chapters to more integral
parts of the WW. Under the stated goal of “streamlining
that wouldnske both for efficiency and lower operating costs”, reorgani-
gation was based upon more centralisation of authority and simplification
in the structure of the Red Cross. There was a creation of a lino-and-
-staff form of organisation, accompanied by an emphasis upon utmost
economy in Red Cross operations. Further, there was an emphasis upon
increased professionalisation of Red Cross services. As a result of
the need for a new, main substantive goal by which the activities of the
Red Cross could be maintained, it was declared in an official
announcement from national headqqu “that public health in the
United States was to becaae a major concern of the American Red Cross
in the days of peace".1

 

1Ibid, p. 219.

h?

Concurrently, with the development of the public health program,
attempts were ads to facilitate better working relationships with
the gowing number of salaried professional writers and the Red Cross
volunteers. In this regard, efforts were made to achieve a clearer
delineation- of volunteer and professional roles. The result of these
efforts, was and still is only partially successful.1 In regard to the
public health program, in an era of isolationism and individualism the
importance of such a program was only minimally recognised by the
general contributing public.

To supplment the mere diffuse substantive goals of maintaining
readiness ft: disaster relief and promoting the public health program,
additional activities were promoted to increase local chapter involvement
in the larger orynisatione Initiated during this time were the Motor
Services, the. Gray Law Service and the Volunteer Nurse's Aide
Service. In addition there was a Braille Corps which promoted Braille
transcription. Volunteers in the clerical field were included in the
Administration Service, the Social Welfare Aide Service and the Staff

Aide Service.

 

1The crux of the probl. appears to be based upon different
interpretations as to the primacy of goals. Among professional workers
there is apt to be a process of sanctification of the instrumental mean
of operation. Horton notes, in this regard that "through sentiment-
formation, emotional dependence upon bureaucratic symbols and status,
and affective involvement in spheres of competence and authority, there
develop perogativos involving attitudes of moral legitimacy which are
established as values in their own right, and are no longer viewed as
nearly technical means for expediting administration“. Social They
and Social Structure, op cit. p. 202. ‘

Contrasted to this orientation is the volunteer who is concerned only
with the accomplishment of immediate goals and resents the intrusion of
what appears to be the callous and officious unner of the professional.
Particularly is thistrue in disaster work where local volunteer workers
may be prone to resent the dominance of professionals who are strangers
to the comunity and hence appear. to the volunteer tobe relatively
unknowledgoable of the local situation.

1:8

The character of the organization was further modified by increased
professionalisation of its workers and a shift from reliance upon the
wealthy to a broader base of public support. During the depression the
functions of the Red Cross were considerably expanded, particularly with

respect for caringfor the_desti.tuie.- Hauler, with increasing
govermental services, the public health program becane almost non-
-existont as a ssin substantive goal. A continual effort was exerted
to present a favorable image to the public as a result of accusations
against the Red Cross‘ alleged anti-labor policies and racial
discrimination. Pressure was thereupon brought to bear by the National
organisation to pronote greater adherence 'of local chapters to the
organisation‘s announced policies.

With the outbreak of. the Second World War, the Red Cross assumed
much the sane rob-«except for- its- nursing serviceso-as it had in World
War I. In additianto these services an extensive blood bank prograe
was developed. With the cessation of the war effort a major crisis
again threateded the viability of the. Red Cross organisation. The
Red Cross was .again charged. with irresponsibility and misuse of donated
funds and supplies. The heightened semitivity over democratic principles
caused by the ideological conflict inherent in the war brought charges
that the American National Red Cross was not democratically organised,

’ particularly with respect to adeQuate chapter representation in
decision making bodies. A final and perhaps more serious threat to
the organisation' s existence was the increasing govermental services
that were being made availabletnthe general.public in the years

after the Secondhorld War.

149

Phase N (WM-Present).

Tb fourth phasn commute: Red Cross brought
about considerable avenge mummm goals, both
long-range and operational. The vast increase of goveruaental services
both on the international scene and within the national boundaries
formd the Red. Cross to drastically alter its past functions. For
example, on the international scene the activity of United Nations
missions has alsost completely taken over programs of relief to war
refugees.- Further, the initiative of the American Red Cross in
independently undertaking international operations has been sharply
curtailed by the United States involvement in international political
and economic rivalries. As a result of the implications of international
relief and rehabilitation work, the international activities of the
Americanfied Cross appear to have baconenore restricted and to have
cone sore and more to depend uponUnitsd States foreign policy
considerations. ‘ ‘

On the nationaLscans, ihoreasinggovermsntal services, as for
ample the Civil Defense program, and its involvement in disaster
relief activities has posed very real threats to the continued identity
of the Red Cross organisation. Social security measures and the
maintenance of government welfare services for the unemployed have

drastically reduced the involvement of the Red Cross in these areas in

' which it once was active. The seriousness of these threats to the

organisation was exemplified during the national convention in 1910. In
a speech entitled “Can the Red Cross Survive”, the problu was posed

as being notonly moire-evaluating the mission of the Red Cross,

but also whether ”the m.mwmw.m_cmm still had

50

any place is the vastly altered world of the 20th century".

Conconitant with the problem of staving off environmental . threats to its
existence by govermnental bodies, the national organization was under
considerable pressure after the Second World War from local chapters
danandingnore adequate chapter representation in the decision-making
bodies.

In response to the problems. facing it during this most recent
phase of the evolution of the Red Cross, two innovations were eusployed
to maintain its; continued existence. In regard to goal-structuring,
the Red Cross for-ed, as its paramount substantive goal, a national
blood donor program. This is currently an ongoing program, carried on .
mainly at the local camunity level, and involving the accessability
of a supply of blood for the needs of local hospitals and for emergency
situations.

with reference to the demands for more adequate chapter representation
in the policy—making bodies of the Red Cross, an Advisory Committee an
Organisation was set up in 19b6 which subsequently made recommendations
for the reorganization of the national organization. As a result of these
recommendations, Congress, while maintaining the original charter
"obligations”, adopted as law, the cosmittee' s recomcndatiens in a
new charter. The recamendations consisted mainly of three structural
goals; (1) that the Red Cross become more representative of the nation
it serves, (2) that the governing organization truly represent and
be responsive to the entire membership of the Red Cross, and finally
(3) that the organizational structure lend itself to the most
effective handlingof theactivities of the. Red Cross.‘

ML“

1h’urd, Charles, The C$Historyn ofthe Anericanhdfiross,
(New York, Hawthorn , c., , 9 p. 253-251.

 

52

:Present Structure of the American National Red Cross.

In order to gain a better understanding of the American National
Red Cross as it now exists, we shall present an overview of its bureau-
cratic structure. After presenting the organizational structure, we
will give special attention to the organization of the disaster relief
Operation.

is can be seen on page 53, at the top of the organisational structure,
there are honorary offices. These are filled by the President, the
Attorney General and the Treasurer of the United States. These offices
are largely non-functional to the organization except to lend it a
more “official” status.

The Board of Gave nors, having powers of “government, direction and
management'. appears to serve as a deciding body for organizational policy.
Recommendations for policy changes frequently emerge from the managerial
level of the vice presidents and may be acted upon by the Board. In
addition, the Board has the power to appoint and remove all officers and
employees of the Red Cross with the exception of the president.

The office of the president is a salaried position and is filled by
election by Board members. Actual administrative duties are handled
by this office. This involves delegating responsibility and insuring
that actual policy decisions are carried out. The delegation of
responsibility is divided among the vice presidents who are in charge of
specific departments within the organisation. The office of the
chairman is elected by the Board. This office appears to serve largely

a coordinating function among Board members.

51

The resulting modification of the structure of the national
organization consisted of the following: the President of the United
States became the honorary chairman of the organization with the right
to name the chairman.and eight members of the new fifty member Board
of Bovernors. Of the remaining forty-two members of the Board thirty
members were to be chosen by chapter elections at the annual conventions
in successive blocks of ten, for three year terms. Further, each slate
of candidates was to represent various geographical areas. The
remaining twelve members of the fifty man body were to be chosen by
the thirty-eight previously mentioned members from among persons of
”national stature". These appointees, serving as members-ac-large
were to be representative of labor, the sciences, arts, and the
professions.1 The chairmanship was eliminated and principal administrative
duties were placed in the office of the president. Administrative
officers became vice-presidents headed by an executive vice-president
and general manager. An additional change was made in 195k when
presidential duties were made separate from the position of chairman
and "principal officer". A chairmanship was again created and a full-
time president was installed, elected by the Board of Governors.

In the history of the American Red Cross, continual efforts on the
part of the organization have resulted in the achievement of the analytic
goal of viability. The organization as it now exists evinces a complex
bureaucratic structure which has been a result of the concern for
continued existence. The present structure of the Red Cross and its

relationship to disaster relief activity will be considered next.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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A direct line relationship, headed hy the Senior Vice President
connects the domestic areas and the local chapters with the national
organization. The national organization is divided into four domestic
areas; the Pacific Area, the Midwestern Area, the Southeastern Area and
the Eastern Area. Figure II shows the organisation 3*ructure of a
do-ootic area. In the area organisation structure, each regional
‘nanager is assigned jurisdiction over specific states in the total
area. The area organisation serves to coordinate the activities of
the local chapters.

Figure III on page 56 shows the structure of the chapter. The
chapter director is responsible both for the local progrma and for
maintaining organisational functions consistent Iith the larger
organisation. The board of directors at the local level acts in such
the sane role as the Board of Governors at the national level. The
role of the chapter director then becomes one of familiarizing the
local board with national policies as well as obtaining their approval
for carrying out local operations. The chapter chairman nay be a
volunteer or a salaried worker, depending upon the size of the chapter
and the scope of its operations. Meabers on.the board typically are
influential citizens in the local community.

Disaster relief operations are directly under the jurisdiction of
the area organisation. The figure on page 57 shows this relationship.
Notice that the field director is in a direct subordinate relationship
to the area office. It is upon his, typically acting in close
coeperation.with.the casework supervisor, that direct responsibility
for disaster operation policies is centered. His authority is limited

by a fixed sun of allocation of organisational resources. Need

AREA ORGANIZATION CHART

 

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58

requests that are proven to be valid, which exceed this sum are submitted
to the area office for a final decision. Notice in the figure that the
local chapter is relegated to a mere staff function in the disaster
operations. In addition to the local chapter serving a staff function

to the Red Cross field director '15. the coordinator of volunteers in

the local community and the Disaster Helief Advisory Committee. A
liaison link is further established with governmental bodies represented
in the area of disaster. The disaster relief operation is completely
dominated by a professional corps of trained workers mobilized into the
stridken site by the area headquarters. This staff is subordinate

only to the area office.

Operational Goals of Disaster Relief Activity

In disaster relief activity, two sources formally outlining the
duties or operational goals of the Red Cross may be cited. The
organizational charter states the American Red Cross is to ”continue
and carry on a system of national and international relief in time
of war and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by
pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities,
and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same".1 The
Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook further states:

"Hence, in the field of disaster relief the Red Cross

has both a legal and moral mandate that it has neither the

power nor right to surrender. It cannot abdicate the

responsibilities placed upon it by the federal government.
The Red Cross may establish the scope of its program, its

m . ~-—.I- "«—--A-Q""‘ap--~-O -

1 Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook, sec. 1, p. 1.

59

policies, and.methodsdwithin.theeframewnrk,established

by the Congressional Charter, but it must comply with the

charge to mitigate the sufferings caused.by disaster".'

Disaster relief has been one of the prime reasons for the
existence of the Red Cross organization. The ends involved in disaster
relief are two-fold: (1) the mitigation of human suffering, and (2)
the conduction of relief activities in.such a way as to insure
continued commmnity support of the Red Cross as a permanent national
organization.

With increasing governmental services being given in terms of
welfare and the insolrement of government and other agencies in disaster
relief, it basebeconesimperative that the Red Cross clearly define the
explicit.duties which it is to perform at a disaster site. A whole
section in the Hed.Cross Disaster Relief Handbook is devoted to the
enunciationuof the duties of the fled Cross as contrasted to the federal
government during a disaster. In the main, division of duties is based
upon a protective function of property and personnel assumed by the
government while the Red Cross assumes responsibility for "the relief
of persons in need as a result of disaster“. In the following discussion
of the operational goals of the disaster relief operation we will
briefly consider three aspects of the Operation, namely operational
goals in the predisaster period, the “emergency“ period and the
rehabilitation period.

In regard to the operational goals in the predisaster period,
prior to the impact of the disaster, a basic problem exists in keeping

the organisation at the chapter level in a constant state of preparedness.

 

‘Ibid, sec. 1, p. 2.

60

Thus, steps are taken, via training progrms to develop capable personnel,
able to act ins meaningful way toward the alleviation of suffering

in the event of a disaster. In this respect, new local communities

have a Red Cross disaster comitteo which is trained and oriented solely
for disaster relief activity.

Since there will be lax periods between disasters, continuous
projects are derisedto keep interest in the locaLunits as well as the
national organisation on an active level. As previously described,
the blood bank program is the main organisational activity serving this
function.1 There are also new less broad functions carried out by the
local chapters.

With reference to the operational goals during the emergency
phase, The Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook states that emergency
assistance by the Red Cross is ”dos igned to mitigate the suffering
caused by the disaster immsdiately upon its occuronce through the
provision of food, clothing, shelter, and medical nursing or hospital
care on the basis of evident need”.2 To this end, aid is given to
disaster vi‘ctins during this period without question. The Red Cross
further acts in assisting evacuations of persons and in providing
services such as food and coffee canteens to personnel engaged in

preparatory activity in the imed iate period previous to the impact of

 

1In regard to the Blood Program, Dulles writes “such a project
represented an opportunity for service which would not conflict with
govermwtal welfare work, would be of great value in the event of war
as well as meeting the immediate needs of civilians, and was conspicuously
in line with Red Cross idealism and uperionco”. Dulles, op cit, p. 527

2Disaster Relief. Handbook, op cit. sec. 1, p. 7.

61

disaster. It furnishes sisilar services in the period immediately
following the impact of the disaster.

The transition framenergency aid given on the basis of evident
need, to the rehabilitation period where aid is given on the basis of
evident need, to the rehabilitation period where aid is given on the
basis of “actual" need, is termed by the organisation as a “tender
period”. Involved here is the likelihood.of misunderstanding, by
elements of environment,'of.the.change.of.emphasis in assessing need.
Assessment of need entails minute evaluation of the resources of the
disaster victim and his ability to provide help for himself. In order
to insure oontimied environnental support for disaster rehabilitation
activities, stress is laid.upon the necessity of providing effective
interpretation to the “unnamed.yet powerful leadership that exists
within the affected area".1

Organisational goals during the rehabilitation phase are stated
in the Red Gross Disaster Relief Handbook as follows;

“The objective of Red Cross disaster rehabilitation is to
assist an individual or a family in re-establiahing its capacity
to provide these basic needs required to reach and maintain
its predisaster stamiard of living. In fulfilling this objective,
the Red Cross nests needs by giving the assistance determined
necessary by the family and the Red Cross. The Red Cross is
primarily concerned with the adequacy or inadequacy of a family's
resources to meet disaster-caused problems . . . The Red Cross
deals directly and positively with the naterial losses and the
injury and illness that follow disaster by giving assistance

when it is determined that the appligant has disaster-caused
needs he is unable to meet hiaself.“

 

‘Ima, sec. 5, p. 13.

211214, sec. 1, p. 8

62

It is upon the rehabilitation period that the remainder of our stuck
will be centered.

Summary

In this chapter we have traced the develop-est of the national
organisation of the Red Cross from its beginnings as a novenent based
niniy'on charismatic leadership, to what is at present a highly
developed bureaucracy. He have seen how, with each period of crisis,
the analytic conic: continued existence gained primary importance.
The-result dtbaconc‘ermfonthisanslytic goal was a reecurring change
ef substantive goals. Thiachsnge in substantive goals was shown to
demarcate four distinct phases in the development of the Red Cross.
Probl-a-of integrating the national organization at the local level
increased, particularly withregard to (1) greater professionalisatien
of services, (2) the increasing importance of local chapters in the
nationalorganisation, and (3) the necessity to foster amicable
enviromental relations for the continued support of the organisation.

It is apparent that the Red Cross has been successful in adjusting
its substantive goals to counter threats from the enviroment and thus
maintain its goal of viability. In seeking to account for the continued
existence. of sale organisations and the duise of others, Blau suggests
two contributing factors. These are (1) the deuce of identification
of personnel with the orgmisatien and the resulting concern for the
defense of the organisatienJgainstemliror-iental threats, and (2) the
degree of acceptance of theorganintienby its environment.1 The

 

1Blau, op cit. pp. 914-96

63

high degree of achievement - in relation- to these two factors appear to
be a basic cause for the continued existence of the organisation.

In regard to disaster relief activity it was shown how substantive
goals were structured in the predisaster stage, the emergency stage and
rehabilitation stage of disaster. The success of maintaining organisational
readiness and the actual carrying out of disaster relief also appears to
depend upon the identity of functionaries with the Red Cross and the degree
of acceptance by the local comunity. In subsequent chapters, we will
continue to be interested in the means used by the Red Cross in
gaining acceptance in its- emiroment, particularly with respect to
its disaster relief activities.

CHAPTER III

THE ACCOMPLISHMENT B! THE ADVISORY COMIITTEES ON THE

FIRST FOUR PRESCRIBED OPERATIONAL GOALS
Introduction

This chapter will be concerned with the degree to which the
disaster relief advisory canittees fulfilled the. first four functions
for which they were formally created. Since the fifth stated function
of the emittees was the one around which the activities and efforts
of both Red Cross staff and committee members centered primarily, it will.
be considered separately in Chapter IV. Before presenting the analysis
of the effectiveness of the committees with respect to the first four
stated functions, the manner in which the committee members were
selected will be considered. Second, in order to provide a better
perspective of the degree to which the various sectors of the consuunities
were represented on the’ committees, an examination of the socie-economic
backgrounds of committee members will be presented. Third, the extent
of involvement of committee members in the Red Cross prior to their _

installment of the cmittees will be considered.
Selection of Comittee Members and Composition of the Committees

In the following analysis of the committees, each area in which
Red Cross disaster operations were centered will be considered separately.
This will be done incorderto show both the important similarities and

selection process andcommittee composition.

t

65

Area I.

The procedure for the selection ofadvisorycommittee members in
Area I differed somewhat in substance, but not in form, from that
prescribed by the Red Cross organisation. While the chapter chairman
was involved by the area director in the formal selection of committee
members, the chairman in this case did not actually serve as an important
resource in establishing a roster of prospective committee members.
In the area director's estimation, the chairman of the local chapter
was not sufficiently knowledgeable concerning the requirements of the
relief oper ation nor sufficiently acquainted with the capacities of
local citizens to. allow him to function as a resource person. The
chapter chairman's social. status in the community was not, in the field
director's opinion, of such a character as to allow the chairman to have
very such personal influence in the comunity. Therefore, the establith

of a roster of prospective comittee members was arrived at through the

help of two other persons with considerable status and influence in the

comunity. The names of persons compiled in this manner were then
discussed with the chapter chairman by the director. The chapter
chairman subsequently contacted the persons suggested by the director,
indicating to them that the area director desired to have a meeting
with them for purposes of discussing the possibliity of their participation
on a disaster advisory committee. The area director, then, undertook to
contact each of the persons who had indicated their interest and probable
availability for service.

The committee, as finally consituted in Area I, was composed of
fourteen indivm Five were professionals, twa were labor union

officials, two were retired persons of which onewas a former machinist

66

and the other a fermer lumber dealer, three were housewives representing
their spouses occupation of law, real estate, and "undetermined”.

One member was a local.businessman, and one was co-operator of a fishing supply
center. Table I shows the rank order of these occupations. As duown

in Table II, nine members were men and five were women. Table III

shows the range of incomes of the committee. With respect to length of
residence in the community, the majority of the members were relatively
short-term residents, as shown in Table IV. Eight out of the total

of thirteen respondents had resided in.the area less than ten years.

Six members had completed a college or university education, while

‘ two others had.attended college. Three committee members held poet-graduate
degrees. This is shown in Table V. is indicated in Table VI, committee
.membera'were involved to some extent in a variety of local organisational
‘ affiliations. Business and professional organizations were among those
Lwith which committee members were most frequently affiliated. Table VII
Vshows the social class ranking of the committee members. As can be seen,
t the majority of committee members were ranked in the upper-middle
:class.

‘ It.uey be observed from Table VIII that half of the disaster
iadvieery committee members had been associated at one time or another,
:with the local Red Cross, either as chapter members or as members of

ithe local disaster committee. In addition, two members had also been
active in soliciting for funds for the Red Cross and one had had
'previous contact with the Red.Cross through a training program. Thus,

of the fourteen.members, two had.been.aasociated.with the Red Cross in
some capacity.prioneto.their.appointment.to_the committee. Only four

‘Vcommittee members in.Area I hadihad_no.previousuassoeiation.with the Red Cross.

67

Table I

Occupations of committee Members

 

ti a Area I Area 11 Area I IL

Local Government
Clergy

Physician

Lawyer

Building Industry
Education
Social‘Velfare

Local Retail Business
HonPLocal Business
Insurance

Real Estate

Skilled Worker
Fishing related occupation
Service Occupations
Organized Labor

Qndetermined __i 7 g, -A - ______
.Isielee gly' .gll, l!t_

 

 

HNHPN H
H H» PHHHUH
NH PH UN N

rm HHH
H

‘Occupations are based upon rank order given.by the National
Opinion Research Center, in “Jobs and Occupations:.i Pepular Evaluation“,
in m. M, mzoggr, ed. Bendix and Lipset, Glencoe, 1:11,; The
free Press, 1953, pp. #lZ-hlh. ihere members were retired, their former
occupations were listed. Banking was based.upon the occupation of the
head of the household in cases where members were not gainfully employed.

68

Table II

Sex Composition

-_ A

Area III

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sex Area I Area II
Male 9 12 10
Female 5 1 h
Totals _#- ____ _ "1h,” 13,_ .1h
Table III
Income Distribution
Income Area I Area II Area III
BeIE; 5,000 1— ‘T
h,000 but less than
6,000 b 1 3
6,000 but less than
8,000~ 2 1 2
8,000 but less than
10,000 2 3 1
10,000 but less than
15,000 3 1 h
.‘15,000 and over 2 2
Totals 11 9 13
Table IV
Length of Residence in the (Immunity
Number of Tears ' Area.I Area II Area III
Less than S 3 2 5
5 to 10 S 2 7
11 to 15 1 1 1
16 to 20 1 1
21 and.over. 3 5
Totals 13 10 1h

 

69

Table V
Educational Level

 

 

W Are 1 Are 11 111
No For-a1 Education 1

Grade School Only

 

 

Some High School . 2 1 1
Conpleted High School 1 3 3
Sale College 2 1 7
Completed College 3 2

Sm. Post-Grad, Schooling 1

Advanced Deg-co 3 2 2
Totals 1.17 10 11:

Table VI

Canmnity Orgmization Representation 0n the Conittee"

 

 

 

Type of Organization Area I Area II Area III
Service Clubs 14 h 3
Fraternal Clubs 6 h
Veterans organisations 11 3
Conunity Interest

organisations 8 b 5
Business and Professional '

groups h 3 8
Non-vocational interest

clubs 1 5 11
Community voluntary units 5 1;
Miscellaneous 1;
Unspecified 1
None 2
Total Membership 18 31 37

 

*This table is based upon 12 respondents in Area I, 10 respondents in
Area II and 114 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses. For a
detailed listing of organizations, see Table I, Appendix A.

70

Table VII

Social Class Occupancy of Committee Membersi

 

 

 

Occupancy Area I Area II Area III
Upper 1 2 1
Upper-Middle 9 6 J 9
Lower-Hiddle 1 3 2
Upper-Lower 1 211*
Lower—Lower

TotaleH-If 12 11 1h

 

iClaaaranking was‘based upona nodificationof Warner‘s ”Index of
Status Characteristica‘l. A seven point scale was used in evaluating
occupation, source .ofincome, type of drelling and dwelling area.
These were then weighted as follows: Occupation: 11, Source of Income:
3 House. type 3, hweningrarea: 2. The resulting scores were then ranked
in social chsseaeacoonding to Warner's table of “Social-Class Equivalents”.
This scale waaslightly altered to eliminate the "indeterminate“
rankings. Where informationbn house type was unavailable, mount of
income was substituted.- Where information on dwelling area was unavailable,
education was substituted. Additional“ weight of 2 points was given to
long-term residents in Area II where the importance of relationships
with long established families contributed to local camaunity evaluation.
(See Warner, Hooker and Eells, Social Class in America, pp. 121 -159

“This figure represents a Negro married couple. Class occupancy
was .sonethat difficult to evaluate as they appeared to represent
upper-middle class ranking of the local sag-agated Negro community
which was a distinct and separate social system.

mInfomation was imossihle to collect for two counittee members in
Area I and in Area II.

71

Table VIII

Association_o£ Committee Members with the Red Cross

 

 

Type of Association. . Area I Area II Area III

Local Red Cross Chapter

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Boaranenber.
’Pist Member 1
Present MeMber 1 '
Egca1.Red Cross Chapter Member.
Past Hafiber 2
Present Member 1
Localeiaaster Committee Member.
Faitfflember 2 2
Present Member 1 3 1
Association through Red.qggss
training programs. 1 1
Participant in fund-drives and
similar nonqmenber activitz. 2 2 3
Total.nunher having:gssociation. 1O 7 6

 

 

Members having had no association. h 3 7

 

 

72

Area II.

In Area II, circumstances prevented the field director from working
with the Local Red Cross chapter chairman. The chapter headquarters
was located seventy miles from the site of the disaster and subsequent
Red Cross activity. Hence the field director, in consultation with
the local emergency Red Cross disaster committee chairman, sought out
those individuals whom he deemed most suitable for serving on the
advisory coxamittee. Since the community was small, with local interaction
being on a comparatively intimate level, the director‘s choices were
structured largely in terms of the more salient positions of authority
of the comittee members in the calamity. The role played by the
disaster comsittee chairman was that of suggesting individuals to serve
on the advisory committee. This was done. after the director had
explained!» thclocal disaster committee chairman the criteria for choosing
committee members. The director of the field unit thereupon evaluated
the suggestions and finally, personally contacted the prospective members.

The total number of members on the advisory comittee was thirteen
The director followed the organisational prescription that at least two
members from the Red Cross chapter board be placed on the committee.
However, the fact that the chapter was located at a considerable distance
from the disaster site, prevented these members from being active in
the comittee. One of the two Red Cross board members (a non-local
businessman) never attended any committee meetings, while the remaining
one (a lawyer) attended only the first committee nesting. These two
committee members were never contacted by Red Cross .caseworkers.

A Catholic priest. ancLa Heihodistminiater. represented the clergy
on the co-aittee. Homer, a considerablLammmLoLconflictdeveleped

73

between the Methodist minister and the Red Cross field unit, and
the minister subsequently was askedto resign on the basis of the
organisation's allegation that he had applied for aid for himself.
The final number of active members on the comittee, totaled ten.

Occupations of members are shown in Table 1. 'Five mubers on the
comittee were professionals, six were in business or related fields, one
was in the local county gorernuent, and one was a housewife who's spouse
was a minister.

Sax composition of the comittee in Area II, shown in Table II,
was twelve men and one woman. Of the nine consittee members who
provided information on income, it may be seen in Table III that,

a wide range of income levels was represented although six sewers were
of the higher income range.

Length of residencein theoomunity in Area II was about evenly
divided between short and longer term residents, with six members
living in the area only fifteen or less years and five of the eleven
respondents living in the comunity twenty-one years or more. Five
members completed college or its equivalent, with three of the five
having had some additional education. All members except one, had
completed high school. (See Tables IV and V.)

Table VII shows the raking of the members of the emittee in
Area II. No numbers were ranked as upper class, six were raked as
upper-middle class, and 3 were ranked in the lower-middle class. Table
VIII shows that five membethacihad an active association with the Red
Cross prior to becoming a comittee lumber, while tw had participated
in non-membmactisitimsr a Only three members had never been associated

in any way with the Red Cross orpnisation.

7h

Area III.

The choosing of disaster advisory comittee members in area III

was somewhat complicated by problms similar to those in Area II.
Again the Red Cross chapter headquarters was quite far removed from the
site of the disaster. Further, the field-director had considerable
difficulty eliciting the support and cooperation of. the chapter chairman.
Thus, in a manner similar to Area II, the director. relied upon the local
Red Cross disaster canaittee chairman, a locally well-known businessman,
for aid in selecting comittee numbers. The basis of selection was
largely in terms of their occupying the more obviously prominent
social and. economic positions in the community. Committee members were
contacted individually and asked to participate on the committee by the
director, who was accompanied by the disaster couittee chairman.

The disaster relief advisory comittee in Area III, totaled
fourteen members. Included in the membership were a Negro man lld his
wife. Only in this area were Negroes represented on the advisory
committee. As shown on Table I, the occupational composition of the
committee was four professionals, eight persons involved in some type
of business, and two in service occupations. Ten members were men
and four were women. Table III, shows the income distribution of the
members.

Length of residence of the colmnittee members in Area III was
comparatively short. Table IV shows that twelve of the fourteen members
resided in the area ten years or less. Only turns-hers had lived in
the area more than ten years» Although. most of_the comittee members
had not complstsicellegemr unisersit; training, two members did have
advanced degrees. Seven memberehadattsimsone formal education

75

above the high school level. Three members graduated from high school
while two members had never, attained a high school education. This is
shown on Table V.

Table VI shows that the largest goup of organisations represented
on the committee was business auLprofessienal groups. The remaining
types of organisationdwerejairly evenly- represented. Two coneittee
membersbelongedto no. 11mm» Ranking of the committee
numbers as shownon TahleVII resulted in one member in the upper class,
nine members in. the upper-middle strata, two. at... in the lower-middle
class, and two inhthe upper-lower class.

Over halLof the oomittee membershadneser had my previous
association with the Red Cross. .As shown in Table VIII, four masher.
had only a nominal association while only tam had at some time been
an active participant in the local Red Cross organization.

The Dense of Achievement of the First Four Prescribed
Cmmaittee Functions.
Function One.

The statment of function one is as follows :

To inform the directorand-the appropriate staff of
community economic conditions and other pertinent
cosmmity patterns and practises .

In the initial stages of the relief operations, the committee
served no mnction with respect to orienting the Red Cross staff to local .
community Teconemic conditions”, and “comnity patterns and practices”.
The omittees could perform no function in.thie respect because in all

the areas studied the amberswere notaelsctndand installed until
ten to fourteen WWW,W. Byathis time

76

the Red Cross staff had already established contacts with agencies,
associations and persons in the comnities.

The frequency of use of the comittee members as resource persons
by the Red Cross caseworkers is shown on Table II. As can be seen, only
two c.1ttee where were consulted in Area I. In Area II, the utilis-
ation of the couittee by the Red Cross staff was considerably more
extensire than inAreaI. Of eleven consittes sewers interviewed,
six were consultedmerathan ten times, three were consulted between
four and ten times, while twa were never contacted. In Area III, only
three members were consulted with any great frequency, one masher being
consulted more than ten times. Six members were consulted three tins

or" loss, while five were never consulted.
Table II

Extent. .to Hhich Corsaittee flashers Were Consulted by

Red Cross Caseworkers.

 

 

 

Frequency of consultation Area I Area II Area III
10 or more tines 6 1
h to 9 times 1 3 2
3 times or less 1 6
Never 10 2 5
Total 12 11 1h

 

An examination of Table IX shows distinct differences in areal
patterns with respect to the use of- advisory committee members as
resource persons for the caseworders. It will be recalled that the

three areas studied, Area I includes a comparatively large commnity.

77
Fort hyers, Red Cross field headquarters in Area I is the county seat
and the center of social and economic activity of the surrounding rural
area. Thus, readily available to the Red Cross staff were county
governmental services and other formal means by which the community and
family standards of the area could be ascertained. It was from these
formal sources that most of the information pertaining to community
characteristics and subsequent casework development was obtained.
In Area I the two committee members that were consulted by the cases
workers were affiliated with such formal organizations in the community.
The member consulted most frequently was an official of the state
social welfare department, who also made his staff available for
consultation with Med Cross staff members. The second member, who was
consulted only once, was an attendance officer for the local county
schools.

Responses of cannittee members in Area II shown in Table IX
reflect the more intimate and widespread knowledge shared by residents
of the small community. Because formal sources of information.were
almost nonexistent and because the means of livlihood were somewhat
alien to the Red Cross staff's eXperience, committee members were
utilized comparatively more often as sources of information with respect
to individual applicants and interpretations of community patterns and
characteristics. Further, the Red Cross field staff was made up of a
large proportion of ”reserve workers” (part-time workers who remain
"on call" until.needed by the organization for emergency service).
Hence, the director strongly encouraged those less orperienced
personnel to use every opportunity to substantiate their findings and

recommendations by consulting with individual committee members.

78

The degree to wich individual ccnittee members were involved in
consultation with Red Cross workers is reflected by the fact that may
members indicated that they were aware of the case recs-mendatiens
prior to the formal committee meetings at which the recounendations
were presented.1

In Area III, response patterns were different from those of the
first twa areas. It will be remembered that compared to Area 11,

Area III exhibited a more cosmopolitan atmosphere due to its diverse
and comparatively short-term inhabitants . This was reflected in the
degree to which cumittee members were intimately familiar with the
individual cases. However, the main factor responsible for the pattern
of responses is the fact that during the field operations the one
person most utilised as a source of information was not a masher of the
committee, but was a generally recognized knowledgeable person in the
coasmnity. As a result of his services, he was proclaimed by the
director, an ”ex-officio' member of the cmittee. The field staff

as a whole was encouraged by the director to make use of contacts with
committee members.

It is apparent that although the canittoe did not provide an
initial general orientation to the Red Cross field staff of the local
co-mnity, once established, it did. perform to some degree a useful
function in the conduct of the disaster relief operations. In each
area, at least a few members provided useful information in the

development of some cases. However, from the data, it is apparent

IThis proved to be potentially dysfunctional in one instance where

an applicant had been led by a comitue member to believe that she would
receive a certain type of aid. In the meantime, the modifications of the
caseworker' s reconnendatiens served to create some hostility between the
comittee member and the applicant on the one hand and the Red Cross
staff on the other.

 

79

that the degree to which the ccasaittees were utilised as resource bodies
varied according to the sise and complexity of the different conunities,

and the availability of formal sources of information. In Area I, a
larger and more complex coamunity, where formal sources of intonation
regarding applicants for aid and general coinsnity patterns were more
readily available, these sources were used more frequently by Red Cross
caseworkers than were the co-ittee members. In Areas II and III where
the cmities were smaller, less economically diversified, and
socially more homogeneous, and where the means of livliheod of
applicants for aid were foreign to the caseworkcrs, the camittees
were utilised more often by Red Cross caseworkers. Further, the
relative absence of official sources of information in Area II, and
the slightly more amorous fowl sources in Area IIIcontributed to
differences in the utilisation of the conittee.

The orientation of the Red Cross field staff personnel toward
the committees also was somewhat influential in determining the degree
to which the comittoes were utilised as sources of information. The
larger number of eXperienced caseworkers on the field staff in Area I
served to minimise the use of the ccnittee in that area. The majority
of the staff there were full-time welfare workers either on loan from
other welfare agencies or were regular employees of the Red Cross. As
a result, the staff, in Area I using resources readily available,
relied more upon their own professional training and experience in
ascertaining case requirements. In Area II and III the larger newer
of comparatively inexperienced caseworkers were encouraged by the field
directors to u'sc the connittee members and they did so with much

greater frequency.

80

Function Two.
The second stated function is as follows:
To inform the director and appropriate staff concerning
the reactions of the cmnity to Red Cross disaster relief -
activities and advise on methods to bring about better
cemnity understanding.

In no me was it observed that cmittee members initiated
actions intended to convey to the Red Cross reactions of the conmunity
to the Red Cross disaster relief program or to advise on methods of
fostering better enmity understanding. It was the Red Cross
personnel who initiated such activities -- and these were on a
superficial level. In Area I, the director asked the committee at the
last meeting for suggestions in bettering Red Cross operations in the
future. Responses were based upon a better program of publicity. In
Area II, the director prodded committee members to offer opinions or
suggestions in an effort to keep members' interest aroused. In Area
III, where applicants for aid were not coming to the Red Cross in the
volume anticipated, the comittee was consulted by the director who was
thereupon informed that I'everywone knew about the presence of the Red
Cross and that those needing help had received it”. Voluntary opinions
of the ca-ittee members regarding Red Cross activity were also solicited
'by‘the Area III director to be sent to the regional headquarters

Factors contributing to the low level of achievement were both
motivational and social in nature. With respect to motivational
factors, the majority of co-ittee members in all the areas simply did
not view this function as central to their roles. The fact that the
Rcd_Cross field unit had established lines of comunication with the

cc-uunity outside the context of the cosmittee reduced the need to

81

motivate the committee to act in this capacity. Further, the operation
worked against the probability that they could be centers of a flow
of favorable and unfavorable public opinion. There was thus little
pressure on the part of the Red Cross organisation and on the part of the
comunity to motivate the committee members to carry out this role.
Social factors also contributed to the low level of anhievement
with respect to the second function. As previously shown, almost
all of the committee members were middle or upper-middle class whites.
With American communities stratified into ethnic and social status
groups and with communication and social interaction between persons of
different status levels and ethnic identities tending to be limited to
formal, institutionalised social contests, it is highly questionable
whether the average committee member would be likely to be acutely
aware of the reactions of those in the community outside his own
social sphere. In the case of Area III, there was no evidence that
the committee members who assured the director that all victims were
aware of the Red Cross Services, employed any accurate means of
assessment. Host of the information passed on by connittee members
was based upon informal relationships within their own social groupings.
As p'eviously stated most of the victims were of the lower social
strata so that full knowledge of their condition, because of limited
commmication with comittee members would be tenuous at best. The
very criteria upon which the selection of the committee members is
based strongly tends to preclude the formation of a group which is
representative. It may be posited moreover, that the greater the extent
of ethnic diversity and social differentiation within the comunity, the

less probability that the committees will effectively perform this function.

82

Emotion Three.

‘Ihe statuent of function three reads as follows :

To assist the director in the solution of problems
encountered in the comunity during the course of the
relief operation.

During the period of research there were no problems of
sufficient magnitude to evaluate the performance of the couittee
with respect to the third function. Two factors may account for this.
On the one hand there appeared to be no significant descriptive
problems involving the coamunity and the Red Cross field unit. However,
on the other hand it should be noted that the director and aministrative
staff are expressly directed to maintain contact with “influential
groups“ and to take advantage of opportunities to explain the “why"
and “how“ of Red Cross activities with these groups. Part of the
director's Job is to seek out potential disruptions to disaster
relief operations. Examples of this may be cited for each area.

In Area I, minor problems involving organisational conflict with the
local Civil Defense Unit over their respective functions and
responsibilities were handled and minimized entirely by the director.
In Area II, problems attendant to the recalcitrant ccamittee member
were handled by the director and his staff with the concurrence of
the remaining committee members. In Area III, the only problem was
that existing between the field unit and the local Red Cross chapter
chairman. This problem was resolved by Red Cross staff without ary
involvement of the advisory camoittee.

function Four.

Table I shows the breakdown of activities of counittee members

83

with respect to function four. This fumtion is stated as follows:

To participate actively in interpreting the Red Cross
disaster relief program to individuals and commity

groups.
As can be seen in the table, activity of the committee members

in all three areas centered mainly upon contacts with friends and

acquaintances .

Table I
Activities of Coamtittee Members With Respect to Interpreting
Red Cross Activities to the Local omnity‘

L

 

 

 

Contacts Area I Area II Area III
Spoke to close friends

or acquaintance. . 7 6 9
Spoke to disaster victims. 3 2 5
Spoke to business associates. 2 1

Spoke to a your). 2 5

Did not speak to anyone. 2 3 1
Total Responses 16 12 20

 

*This table is based upon 13 respondents in Area I, 9 respondents in
Area II and 13 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses.

Contacts with disaster victims were restricted mainly to
acquaintances who had suffered loss. (”As a result of our efforts, our
colored girl got a roof on her house'.) Contact with disasta‘ victims
was alsoha partial result of general occupation orientations, such as
ministers and social workers. Three members in Area I, two members in
Area II and five members in Area III included disaster victims in

the persons whom they contacted.

81:

It is impossible to ascertain accurately how effective these
contacts were in interpreting Red Cross activity in the community as
a whole. To ascertain this, one would have to trace the communication
pattern beyond the cosmittee mulbers ' contacts. Further complications
in tracing such a pattern would result from the fact that intensive
efforts were made by all three field directors to insure adequate
publicity of Red Cross operations by maintaining close contact with
local-newspapers and other forms of mass media.

Although it would appear that this function would be most importmt
to the success of the operational goals of the Red Cross in the local
comunity, extrmely few committee mothers viewed this function as
important. Only We persons in Areas I and III and three persons in
Area II mentioned this function as an important part of the couittoe's
duties. Hence, again there was little motivation to carry out this
function. Furthermore, the stress placed upon secrecy of newership by
all three area directors appears to have contributed to the low level
of activity in interpreting the disaster relief program to individuals
and community groups. No committee member made an attempt to publicise
his membership. Table II shows the extent to which the comittoe
members believed it was known that they were on the committee.

85
Table x1

Estimates of Colmaunity knowledge of Members) ip in the
Disaster Relief Advisory omittee"

 

 

 

To Whom Membership is Known Area I Area II Area III
No one, or intimates only. 6 3 6
Close friends. h 1 1
Business associates. 1:
A few disaster vistims. 1 1
Generally known throughout

the continuity. S 6
Total Responses 1h 10 1h

 

*This table is based upon 13 respondents in Area I, 9 respondents in
Area II and 111 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses.

Comunity characteristics appear to influence the degree to which
it was generally known that mashers “were serving on the conmnittees. In
Area I knowledge of membership on the committee was mainly confined
to intimates or close friends. In Area II, five out of the nine
respondents felt that their membership was generally known throughout
the comunity. In Area III half of the committee members believed that
knowledge of their membership did not extend beyond their close friends.

511 of the fourteen members however, felt their membership was generally
known throughout the community.

Although secrecy of membership was strongly encouraged by the area
directors in order to protect committee members from exposure to
individual demands for special consideration in the granting of awards,

it. would appear that general knowledge within the community of precisely

86

who is on the advisory camaittee would result in greater success in
fulfilling function four. Not only does secrecy of manbership

diminish the probability of establishing a com-mications network between
the oomunity and the Red Cross unit, but it also obviates the emergence
of a strong motivation to carry out his function. So long as there is

no public identification with the Red Cross, the couaittee numbers are

not exposed to cmunity pressures which, with a high degree of
probability, could be expected to evoke strong motivations to actively
articulate their roles1 .

SUMARI

In all three areas, cosmittoe mubers were selected mainly on the
basis of criteria established by the field directors. Although each
director worked in cooperation with a selected local Red Cross
functionary, decisions regarding who should serve on the advisory
comittee were made by the director. Most of the committee mulbers in
all of the areas had had some previous association with the Red Cross.
Thus, they were somewhat familiar with the organisation. Although the
members of the cosnittees in each area were drawn fun a variety of
occupations, the vast majority of choices for the committee were in
all areas occupants of upper-middle or middle class. Moreover, they
had suffered little deprivation in comparison to occupants of the
lower strata who were less able to absorb the losses inflicted by

1One cosmittee menber--a representative of a labor organisation--

related the following: ”After I was on the committee, I talked to the
men in the organization, but I quit when Mr. ___(the field director) said
that if anyone knows who was on the committee, we had told them: so I
thought maybe we weren't supposed to tell mono“.

8?

Hurricane Donna. This, plus the fact that so cial intercourse was
restricted mainly to persons of similar social status served to
minimize communication with those requiring relief assistance. In
Area I and III the majority of committee members were relatively
short-term residents of these areas. Although these committee members
were active in coununity or ganizations , their comparatively recent
arrival into the local comunities may have served to further attenuate
their knowledge regarding disaster victims ' conditions.

Although labor was represented in Area I and Negroes were represented
in Area III the importance of these groups was minimized by the complete
dominance of the other mubers. Especially does this appear to be
so in Area III. The Negro man and his wife on the committee in this
area represented the upper-middle strata of the local Negro community.
However, they did not feel an integral part of the committee. They
attended only two comittee meetings, and were never contacted by
field staff members outside of the formal meeting. The fact that they
were both egaloyees of an influential person also on the oomaittoe
further served to diminish the importance of their representation.

The couitteea were largely ineffective ‘in carrying out the first
four stated functions. The cousittee members on the whole did not
serve to provide a. general orientation to the Red Cross field staff
regarding pertinent comunity patterns and practises or the economic
conditions of the community, simply because other sources of information
were used for these purposes prior to the selection of the conittees.
However, the cosmittees did provide helpful assistance to caseworkers
in the development of cases in two of the areas studied. It was noted

however, that the degree to which the committee serves this instrumental

88

function appears to be dependent upon the sise and complexity of the
cumunity and the availability of formal sources of infomtion.

The committees further were not active in keeping the director
and field staffs informed as to the reactions of the. oomunity to the
Red Cross disaster relief program. Twa principal factors appear
to account for this. On the one hand, the comittee members lacked the
motivation to carry out this function because of its lack of saliency
to them and the fact that their anorwmity reduced the forces of
expectanby from the comunity. 0n the other hand, the committee
meters were not capable of carrying out this function because of their
social distance from representative areas stricken by the disaster and
the lack of training in assessing need requirements. There was no
evidence that the committees were helpful in assisting the director
to solve problems that arose in the course of the Red Cross operation.
This may have been due to either (1) the actual absence of any
problems, or (2) the adequate handling of such problems by the director
and his staff. ‘ I

The committee motors did not actively interpret the Red Cross
disaster relief program to individuals and comunity groups. Several
factors contributed to the low level of activity in this regard.
Cousittee members did not view this function as particularly central
to their role mectancies. Further, although it is impossible to
trace the final effects, oomittee meabers generally restricted their
activities in interpreting the disaster relief program to informal
contacts mainly within their own meial group which was predulinantely
from the middle and upper-middle class strata. Finally the stress
placed upon secrecy of, mhership in all three areas eliminated a -

89

public identification with the Red Cross, which in turn reduced the
exposure of the cemittee members to comunity pressures which would
have forced them to articulate their roles in this regard.

The comitteos then appeared to serve to some deg-es an instrumental
function in carrying out the actual development of cases. However, the
expressive functions of providing an effective systemic linkage between
the Red Cross and the local comaunity appears to have been minimally
achieved.

CHAPTERIV

The Extent to which .the Disaster Relief Advisory Calmittee
Achieved the Fifth Prescribed Operational Goal

Introduction

The importance of the Disaster Relief Advisory Coasuittee is defined
mainly in terms of its advisory role in disaster relief operations
of the Red Cross. Thus, an analysis of the fifth stated function
merits separate and detailed treatment. This function is stated as
follows:

To review facts concerning individual families, to
assist the director and staff to make certain that
the kind and amount of assistance recommended utilises
all resources available to the family, represents a
sound rehabilitation plan, and is in keeping with
conunity and family standards of living.

The weekly meetings of the comittee constituted the principal
social context in which the fifth stated function was intended to be
carried out. These meetings were the main locus around which advisory
oo—ittees' were centered. That the Red Cross also viewed these
meetings as extremely important is apparent in the following policy
statement:

”The bringing together of the knowledge and resources
of the local community and the experience and
resources of the Red Cross in an advisory comitteo
meeting is one of the most.I important phases of a
disaster relief operation.”
In this chapter we shall analyse the extent to which the cos-ittoes

performed effectively with respect to function five. In regard to

 

‘V'

1 American National Red Cross, op cit., sec. 2, p. 51

91

this concern, we shall note first the process of accomodation of the
committee into the decision-making processes of the Red Cross disaster
relief unit. Second, we shall note how actual comittee meetings were
conducted. Finally, we shall present our findings in regard to the

achievement of function five.

The Process of Accomodation of the Committee into the

Red Cross Organisational Structure

The activity of ooamittee members and Red Cross staff in relation
to the fifth stated function of the comittees centers around the
committee meetings. At these meetings caseworkers present their
recesmendations with respect to the disposition of applications for
Red Cross assistance. The advisory comittee is formally vested with
”financial authority“ equal to that held by the field operations
director. Thus, formally, no awards can be granted to applicants
for aid without the concurrence of the counittee. It is evident that
in order to insure a smooth operation, the comittee must be rapidly
oriented to an attitude of acceptance or neutrality towards these
standards. As noted in the previous chapter, the process of selection
of the comittees is intended to insure that radically hostile persons
or persons with a vested interest are not incorporated into the
committee.

In accuodating the disaster relief advisory committee into the
Red Cross organisational frmework, certain procedures are undertaken
by the director to insure that the cosmxittee members are made aware
of Red Cross standards and procedures. As formally stated, the first

cousittee meeting is held for the purpose of familiarizing the committee

92
members with the policies and mode of operations of the Red Cross.
Prior to the meeting the local chapter chairman is to be instructed by
the director on how to conduct the meeting. At the time of’the meeting
the chapter chairman or, as in areas II and III, his equivalent, introdudes
the director and staff members to the committee members. A committee
chairman is later elected from among the assemled committee members.
Also at the first meeting, the director outlines in4detail the policies
of the Red Cross, the rationale underlying these policies and a
description of the functions expected of the committee members. At this
thee, a few ”typical” cases may be presented to illustrate what is
expected of the committee in the way of deliberating upon the cases.

In subsequent committee meetings, the casework supervisor functions
as an.intermediary between the committee and the caseworkers. It is her
responsibility to reinforce the caseworkers‘ presentation of their
cases when needed, and to explicate the details of the case. It is an
organisational prescription that the assistant director in charge of
family service-~a function served by the casework supervisors during the
period of resoarch--carefully observe the committee proceedings and be
prepared to make follow-up contacts ” with members of the committee who
seem not to accept or to understand the answers given them at the
meeting”.1

Organisation directives instruct the director and his staff to
anticipate any disruption in the process of case presentation to the
advisory committee and to plan the presentation of cases accordingly.

As stated in.the Disaster Relief Handbook, "They (the field director and

assistant director, Family Service) should be aware of any case to

 

—1Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook, Sec. 8, p. 3b.

93

be presented in which there is an indication that serious controversy
may arise and should be prepared to take prompt action if the controversy
develops ".‘

Should a disagreement arise between the advisory comittee and
the field directorrelative to cases that are within the delegated
authority of the field diredtor, such cases are, by organisational
prescription, to be referred to the area manager for a decision. Should
this decision prove to be unacceptable to the committee, the case is
referred back to the national headquarters with comittee reconnendations.
In case of further disagreement between the advisory comittee and the
higher authority, ”final decisions rest at national headquarters, with
full consideration being given to the opinions and recamaendations
expressed by the advisory comittee". As stated by the Red Cross,
"All financial authority is exercised in accordance with established

policies of the American National Red Cross“.2

Description of the Committee Meetings

In the analysis of the degree to which the fifth stated function
was fulfilled by the comittees, it will be useful to describe how
the meetings proceeded. Although, all committee meetings were not
observed, those which were observed appear to have been typical ones.
Reconstruction of the nature of the unobserved meetings was accusplished
principally through interviews with the field directors and other Red
Cross staff.

Area I.

The format that was followed in the con-ittee meetings in Area I

 

1Ibid, sec. 2, p. 53.

2Ibid, sec. 2, 13. 1:2.

9h '
was as follows. The meeting‘was called to order and chaired by the
committee chairman. The chairman first gave the field director an
opportunity to summarise past Red Cross activities. At this time the
director announced the number of cases handled and the mount of Red
Cross expenditures incurred to the date of the meeting. Following the
field director's presentation, the dominant role was played by the case-
work supervisor who introduced each caseworker. The caseworker, in
turn, presented data bearing on the cases under consideration, including
the recommendation with respect to the allocation of Red Cross assistance.
In the presentation of the cases, the caseworker either initiated

the presentation by indicating the nature of the recommendation, followed
by the presentation.of'the details of the case, or presented the details
of the case first and stated the recommendation last. Details of each
case typically included and were limited to the following;

(1) reference to the case by number,

(2) place of residence,

(3) number and age of family members,

(’4) occupations of family masbers,

(5) family income,

(6) recent work history,

(7) health features in the family situation,

(8) kind and extent of loss from the disaster,

(9) expressed needs of the family to recover its
predisaster state,

(10) the ability of the family to participate in its
rehabilitation, (This was expressed in terms of
economic resource accessibility plus other non-
econcmic factors).

95

(11) the caseworker typically stated that in view of the
various factors considered above, “we are recomnding“
that a given amount of money be disbursed to the family
for its rehabilitation.

Following the caseworker‘s presentation of the case, the chairman
would call for questions from committee members concerning the case. At
times the conmittee members would interrupt the caseworker's presentation
to pose questions regarding the case. Although there were significant
exceptions, most questions tended to be perfunctory. Questions that
were posed were answered directly by the caseworker. Where further
explanations were required, the casework supervisor became involved.

Not infrequently the field director would also take part in explicating
the details or the general Red Cross policies involved in the case.

Following the questions, if there were ary, the chairman would ask
for a motion. A motion to approve the recomnendation would be made
subsequently. With a second to the motion forthcoming, the chairman
would ask for a vote either by voice or show of hands. Upon completion
of the vote, the caseworker either would begin the presentation of her
next case or if she had completed the presentation of her cases, she '
would withdraw by thanking the comittee and leaving the meeting room.

Two meetings were observed in Area I. During the first meeting
all cases presented were approved by the committee, with only a few
questions asked. However, there was lively discussion over two different
cases which was finally resolved by the field director stating the
Red Cross policies involved in evaluating case needs. When the two
cases were each brought to a vote, one member was opposed to the majority
vote of approval of the recomendations for both cases.

Ninteen cases were presented at this meeting. Three cases

96

represented recommendations for denial of Red Cross assistance to the
applicants. Following the presentation of the cases, the director
asked for an evaluation of the committee experience. The question
posed by the director was with respect to how the committee process
might be improved. Indicative of the committee members‘ evaluations is
the following discussion which followed the director‘s questions:

Member “A” - ”All.we're doing is approving what you have done.
We‘re merely accepting come responsibility in case something back-fires“.

Member '8' - "I feel this connittee was a good thing. It was
wonderful to see how the Red Cross operates“. .

Member “C“ - “This helps the community to know what‘s going on ~-
what is really happening”. 2

Director - "We‘re anxious in making this a really interacting
process. Do you feel this is Just a rubber stamp?”

Member'flf - “I think it is a rubber stamp“.

Member "D" - “I place full confidence in the workers . . . I felt
the decision of the workers was the same as mine. I feel I served more
to give a stamp of approval”.

Member “A' - “That's Just what I said -- a stamp, a rubber stamp
or stamp of approval, whatever it is. I'm.not criticising, but all we
could do was to accept the decisions“.

Member “E'l - ”John, you were no rubber stamp. You voted twice

in opposition”.

The above discussion was. followed by the director asking for
advice or suggestions. Two members responded with suggestions for better

publicity of the Red Cross activity.

97

Six days after the last formal.meeting, an effort was made by
the casework supervisor and the director to call the committee together
to review the last four cases of the operation. About half of the
members were assembled. Conspicuously absent were the two most active
members. Three of the cases presented involved recommendations for
denial of assistance. All cases were almost automatically approved by
the connittee. One masher stated, ”If you folks have investigated,
we might as well approve it".

.A copy of the Red Cross operations records were turned over to
the local chapter chaiman. Expressions of appreciation and gratitude
were made by both the Red Cross field director and the casework
supervisor. These sentiments were reciprocated by the committee members.

Table XII mews the breakdown of the mmber of cases handled
according to type of case. As can be seen,o§tietotal number of cases
considered by the Red Cross in Area I, 608 cases received assistance.
Twenty~six applicants withdrew their applications upon being so advised
by the Red Cross or through discovering resources thay were previously
unaware had existed. These cases receiving no assistance, (denials)
after having been completely processed, numbered nineteen. At first
only cases involving more than.“ ,000 were brought before the advisory
committee for consideration. However, when cases were not as large
as anticipated, this standard was reduced to3500. Only forty-six cases
out of a toatl of 653 were brought before the committee. Although
figures were incomplete at the time of the research, total case
disbursements for both the emergency and rehabilitation phases was
expected to reach 1‘110,000 to’150,000.

Control of the committee process always resided with the Red Cross

98

field director. The director was extremely sensitive to any signs of
dissension or missunderstanding of Red Cross operations on the part
of comaittee members and was effective in coping with such instances

in a quiet and capable manner.

Area II.

The format followed in the committee meeting observed in Area II
was similar to Area I. There were a few minor exceptions however.
In Area II, the meeting that was observed was opened by the field
director with a few introductory remarks. Mention was made of the past
week's activities with a statement that the meeting was to be the last
one of the Red Cross operations. The meeting was chaired by the elected
comittee member in a manner similar _to that in Area 1.

Present at the meeting were three casework supervisors who were
in charge of the presentations of the cassworkers. Thus, each supervisor
introduced the caseworkers, under her supervision, who, thereupon,
presented their findings in a manner similar to Area I. Cases were
referred to by number. However, most of the family involved in each
case was immediately identified by the committee members. Names of the
cases were furnished by the caseworkers upon request. Characteristic
during the presentation of the cases was the discussion anong the
committee members of the person involved as an applicant for aid. Almost
all committee mentors were acquainted to some extent with the applicants.

Of a total of twenty-six cases presented at the meeting, of which
four were recommendations of denial for aid, all but five cases were
immediately approved. These five cases were also approved but only

after considerable discussion and some signs of discontent. By way of

illustration in which we may notice the msnnerin which the feelings
of discontent were handled by the Red Cross Staff, we cite the following
brief exhanges:

Committee member: ”He doesn‘t need that much to replace the
trailer”.

Caseworker: "Well, we've had three separate appraisals on it so
we feel the figure is accurate".

In another instance:

Committee member: "They have Joint ownership. He doesn't own the
boat himself“.

Casework supervisor: "Well he says he does but we could investigate
more".

Further exanple:

Committee member: “This guy gets nothing while the fishermen
get everything. Those guys (fishermenfare bums. Why not help one
of these boys. They work hard".

I Casework Supervisor: “we have to consider each case on its own
merits rather than compare them with other cases".

Caseworker: "we will see that he gets help in applying for a
S B A (Small Business Administration) loan".

As can'be seen in the above illustrations, each potentially
disruptive situation was met by a show of competent, though not
antagonistic, rebuttal.

The place of the meeting was a conference room, with the committee
members seated around a large table and the Red Cross caseworker
and the casework supervisor at one end of the table. The field

director sat to the side of the group. Caseworkers waiting to p'esent

100

their cases sat at one end of the room. Committee members present at
this meeting were seven men and one woman. The committee meeting was
closed.by the field director with a brief summary of the Red Cross
operations in Area 11 and an announcement that the Red Cross would soon
close operations in the area.

In Area II, all cases involving sums ovor'5 500 were brought before
the comittoo. As can be soon in Table XII the proportion of cases
presented to the committee in.Area II was considerably larger (110
cases out of a total of 535) than that in Area I. Only seven cases in
Area'II were denied aid. Four cases were not.yet completed at the time
of the research. Of the total number of cases, 511 received assistance.
There were thirteen withdrawals of applications for aid. Total Red
Cross expenditures for case awards in this area came to‘i30,000 during
the rehabilitation phase and.#310,280 was allocated for emergency

assistance.

Table XII

Tabulation of Cases Handled by the Red Cross Disaster

 

 

Field Units

Breakdown Area I Area II Area III
Total Number of Cases 653 535 51h
Number of cases receiving

assistance 608 S11 h68
Number of voluntary

'withdrawals 26 13 h2
Number of denials 19 7 h

Number of cases brought before

the advisory committee b6 110 83
Percentage of cases brought

before the advisory committee 7% 20.5% 1&1

 

101

Area 111.

Two meetings held during the last part of the Red Cross operations
were observed in Area III. Again, the general format was similar to
that followed by the meetings in Area I. In the meetings observed, the
conittoe chairman took charge, calling the meeting to order, asking for

aw announcements and, finally, turning the meeting proceedings ever
to the casemrk supervisor. Prior to the presentation of the cases,

the field director gave a sumary of Red Cross operations and future

plans for the field staff's withdrawal.

Cases were presented by number and name in a manner similar to that

in the other areas. In the first meeting observed, recomendations were
passed in a more or less mechanical fashion, with only a minimum of
discussion. At least one committee member was familiar with each case
presented. One case was presented which had been considered at an earlier
meeting but had been ro-investigatod by the Red Cross after considerable
committee opposition had be expressed. Although the recommendation
had not been changed at the time of the second presentation, the comittoe
was satisfied with the recomendatiens after being told that the case
had been reinvestigated.

At this meeting, 21 award, and three denial recomuendations were
presented to and approved by the coumittee. Only those cases involving
sums above"i000 were considered in detail by the comittee. In addition
to the 21: cases so considered, those involving sums between, 500 and
31(00 were merely road off by the casework supervisor. The name of the
family involved in the case, the sum involved, and the recon-endation
were indicated. In the meetings observed, unless questions on specific

cases were raised by the committee, these cases were approved en masse.

102

This meeting was closed by the area director. He cited the number
of cases handled and the amount of aid disbursed. He also amounced the
time and place of the last ”clean-up” meeting of the advisory committee.

As in the other areas, the committee members were seated around
a large table, with the casework supervisor and her subordinate
caseworker at one end of the table. The field director sat at a
separate desk to the side of the group. The casem) rk supervisor
played the main role in representing the Red Cross to the co-ittee
members.

The final cmmaittee meeting in Area III again followed the general
format of the others. All cases were quite rapidly approved. However,
there was one notable exception. One case, presented a second time
because of a readjustment in the recommendation for the use of tho
granted ward, provoked considerable discussion. Although the
discussion became quite lively, the casework supervisor and the
caseworker defended each aspect of the re comendation by citing facts,
figures, couunity ordinances and sources of their information. A
vote of acceptance was finally completed, but not without some
dissatisfaction exhibited by several individuals on the col-ittee.
During this last session, twelve cases were presented, of which one
was a recommendation for denial of aid. A list of recomendations
involving sums between $500 and #1000 was read by the casework
supervisor and all were approved by the committee members. The meeting
was closed by the director who cited the total number of cases handled,
types of cases, and financial expenditures of the Red Cross in the
field operation. Expenditures amounted to ‘51,}50 spent during the

emergency phase and i l30,0h7 during the rehabilitation phase of operations.

103
Again, noting Table III, it can be seen that of the total of 510
. cases considered by the Red Cross unit, only 83 were brought before
the committee. Families receiving assistance numbered #68. Four
families were refused assistance and he applicants withdrew their
requests before processing had been completed.

is a result of the observations of committee meetings in the three
areas, certain generalizations with respect to the mode of operations
may be cited. First. the manner in which the committee meetings were
conducted remained consistently the same in.all the areas. Details of
cases were presented in routine order, explication followed when needed.
'and recommendations of the Red Cross caseworkers were subsequently
approved.

Second, of the total number of cases which the Red Cross relief
unit acted upon, the percentage brought before the committees was
extremely low. The number of cases presented to the committees was
arrived.at arbitrarily. Inuirea I when it was apparent that case
awards above $1,000 were not numerous enough to warrant a weekly committee
meeting, the level of consideration was dropped to $500. .111 cases
above $500 were presented before the committee in.trea II. In area
III, cases were individually considered where recommendations were in
excess of $1.000. They were approved on mass where awards totaled between
$500 and $1,000.

Third, in no committee meeting were the recommendations of case
awards not approved by the committee members. In instances where the Red
Cross reinvestigated questionable cases, the initial recommendations
were_not changed and were subsequently approved by the committee.
Questions that were raised in regard to specific cases by committee

members were mostly perfunctory in nature and did not exhibit much

10h

insight into the intricacies of casework procedure.

Fourth, in all areas' the casework supervisor played the dominant
role in esplicating case details. Policy interpretations were handled
by the area directors. The elected couittee chairman functioned only
to call the meeting to order, call for votes of approval and call for
a motion to adjourn.

Fifth, in all areas, signs of disruption to committee meeting
proceedings were not. allowed to mature to outright hostility. The
administrative staffs made every effort to insure that .icablo
relations prevailed.

From the above findings it appears that the countess were made
dependencies of the Red Cross disaster units, and as such could
exercise little power in influencing Red Cross disaster operations.

In no instance did the elected comittee chairman exercise his
authority during the meeting except in the maintenance of parliamentary
procedure. In all areas, signs of disruption to meeting proceedings

or disagreement with organisational policies were effectively harmed
by the Red Cross staff. The following methods of control were
employed by the Red Cross field staffs to insure that the locus of
power remained with the Red Cross organisation.

first, upon initial contact with the cuaittee teachers, elaborate
proceedures- were taken to carefully indoctrinate them with or; nisatienal
policies and mode of operations of the Red Cross disaster relief
program. Further, continued efforts were maintained by the administrative
staff to discover aw potential disruptions on the part of the co-Iittee
to organisational pro cedtnres. '

A second method of control was the manner in which the cases were

105

presented to the cassittee. Generally, case presentations were highly
developed and were repidly presented with impressive citations of
facts and sources of information. Cemented with such a presentation,
committee members could hardly attempt more than an occasional colmnent.1
A third, and perhaps the most igurtant, method of control was the

role played by the area director during the meetings. The director
helped maintain control by explaining precisely why methods of Red Cross
relief operations as dictated the case recommendations. Case presentations
were protected from potentially disruptive attacks by Joining forces with
the supervisor in either explaining the details of the case or in
announcing that the case would be considered for further review. In
support of the director was the ”buffer role” played by the casework
supervisor. In this regard, the supervisor often played a role of
arbitration between the committee and the caseworker, either defending

the caseworker‘ s presentation or stating that the committee 's suggestions
would be further considered in reviewing the case a second time. The
combined efforts of the director md the casework supervisor provided

an effective means of deflecting implications from the cos-ittoe that

the caseworker may not have presented a sound rehabilitation program

for the case under consideration.

Because the cornittoes were so carefully controlled by the Red

Cross field staffs it was virtually impossible for them to carry out
their prescribed function of assisting the director and staff 'to make

 

1Although all comittee members were given paper and pencil to
record needed information as an aid in their assesment of recomendations
almost none of the members bothered to use them. Those who made an
effort to do so soon discovered that it was (pits imassible to keep up
with the delivery of the cases. Attempts by the researcher to note all
of the significant aspects of cases were similarly frustrated.

106

certain that the kirk! and amount of assistance reccsmended utilises all
resources available to the fnily and represents a sound rehabilitation
plan”. Such planning was done solely by the Red Cross, and the con-ittee
was effectively prevented from altering am part of it.

Perceptions of the Committee Members Regarding Function Five

In support of _enr conclusions regarding the degree of achievement
of the fifth stated function we shall note the degree to which the
conittee members were aware that they were effectively prevented from
carrying out this function. Canittee mefiers were asked whether or
not they felt the c-aittse was effective in advising the Red Cross
in the granting of awards to applicants for aid. Table XIII presents

the responses.

Table XIII

Ceanittee Hembers Evaluations of the Effectiveness of the Ce-ittee
in Advising the Red Cross in the Granting of Case Awards

 

Evaluation‘ Area I in. II Area III

 

 

Highly effective 1 1 1
Somewhat effective ‘I 1 1
0m slightly effective .. 3 h t
No effect 8 3 8
Undetermined 1

Totals 13 10 1h

*Tho categories of evaluatisnarangafncmtheenthusiastic response
regarding the highly effective role of the comittee, to a belief that
the couittee was effective but uncertainty- in what way, to some
reservations about the committee effects, to absoutely no effect.

107

Notice that only one committee member in each area felt the
conittee was highly effective in influencing Red Cross decisions.
Although two of these three respondents felt the Red Cross could
operate without the committee, one felt it was highly effective in
giving a ”psychological effect“ to the caseworkers, while the second
resporaient felt the canittee helped to expedite casework procedures.
Those who felt the comaittee was somewhat effective cited a few instances
when they felt the committee was able to force the Red Cross to
reconsider a few cases.

In Area I , eight of the thirteen respondents felt the couittee
had no effect on the granting of case awards. In Area II, six out of
the total of 10 respondents felt the couittee exercised their influence
in forcing the Red Cross to reconsider a few cases. One respondent
did not comit himself on the issue. In Area III, eight of fourteen
felt the committee had no effect on the Red Cross award decisions. Four

mabers felt the committee was only slightly effective.

The reasons accounting for the members ' evaluation of cosnittoo
effectiveness are based on both positive and negative orientations to the
managuent of the relief operations. Although most conittee mqsbers
felt the conittee was not very effective in advising the Red Cross,
they viewed this only as a result of the Red Cross organisation
being so capable that there was little the committee could do to improve
upon the operations of the organisation. To illustrate, notice the
following response as to the effectiveness of the col-ittee: “I don't
think so. They had the training for this sort of thing. Our only
value was as moral support. Actually we didn't know what was going on.
It was beautifully handled though”.

108

To a much lesser extent, ce-ittee nonbers were negatively
oriented tourd the Red Cross, only seven of the total of thirty-eight
collittoe nabors exhibited negative orientations. In this respect,
the co—ittoe members felt the organization conpleteiy ignored the
potential value of the col-ittee . The follo wing was typical of this
attitude. "After I 1 gene to the first three or four meetings, I felt
it was Just routine. A question would be raised, and bang: - they start
out with Red Cross policy, starliuds and all that. Take the crawfish
traps. We tried to tell then that nobody strung out that new am aere.
But they cane right back and quoted licenses, regulations and every-
thing . . '.

It is apparent that eonittee members the-selves did not view the
cmittees as performing very effectively the function of advising the
Red Cross staff concerning case recon-endation. However, on the whole
this did not result in antagonistic feelings on the part of the members
toward the Red Cross. is will be seen in the next chapter the Red
Cross, as an organisation, and the comittee experience were quite
favorably evaluated by committee nesbers. The extent to which the Red
Cross staff viewed the effectiveness of the comittee with respect to
function five will next be considered. .

Evaluation of the Advisory Committee by Red Cross idninistrative

Personnel on the Local Disaster Relief Operation

In the three areas studied, when asked what factors contributed to
a “good cemittoe", the directors replied in terms of proper selection
of embers and adequ its orientation to organizational policies. In all

areas the need for adequate control of the oouittee was either explicitly

109

mentioned or alluded to. In Area I, the director stressed the need for
“patience in accepting an opposing view, followed by carefully

explaining of the case in terns meaningful to the disendent's background”.

The Area II director expressed his views a bit more bluntly, “If I can't
control the comittee, I might as well quit“. The director of Area III
stressed the importance of adequately interpreting Red Cross policies

to the conittee as a means for gaining their cooperation.

All the area directors stressed the importance of keeping the
cemittee actively involved in case deliberation. The director of Area I
stated that it took at least three meetings before interest on the part
of the committee was ”activated”. He stressed that he did not want the
ceuittee to becene a “rubber-stump” but that the committee members
should be made to feel that ”they, as members of the consunity, had
a share in casework deliberations“. The director of Area II stated
that once the committee feels it serves only a “rubber-stamp" function
"there is danger of 'couhittee members fe sling that they have somehow
been tricked into merely approving Red Cross activities “.

In contrast to the Area I director, the Area III director
reported. that during the early meetings, the col-littee is ten-11y quite
active in casework proceedings. He noted however, that there later
develops a tendency to merely acquiesce in Red Cross decisions. He
attributed this tendency to the “trust built up in Red Cross operations.”
Nevertheless, this director felt that the comittee should be kept as
active as possible, for the benefit of the Red Cross fielo' unit.

Evaluation of the specific comittees in each area were, in the
main, favorable. The Area I director expressed satisfaction with the

comittee except for one member who did not know or seen to understand

110

the policies of Red Cross. The Area 11 director held a favorable
evaluation of the committee in his area in terms of his conception of the
purpose of the committee. In Area III, the director stated that he
didn't have nuch need for the comittee in term of gathering information
about the overall colnunity, but he felt it functioned favorably in
fostering good relations with the community.
In Area II, the casework supervisor felt the connittee was sonewhat
difficult to deal with because of the intinate nature of interpersonal
association within the con-unity. As she stated, "Down here, these
people know everyone and their business. It's hard to nuke then under-
stand our standards. They tend to be too subjective”. She further stated
that too nuch familiarity with the applicants too frequently led to
invidicus conparisons of the applicants. The casework supervisor in
Area III felt that the connittee was "better than.sone'. Her evaluation
was based on the uount of interest shown by the ccanittce nonbers
toward.Red Cross activities during the rehabilitation period.
The degree to which the connittee exercised power was discussed

with each of the directors and casework supervisors. The director

of Area I was asked whether he knew of any case in which the connitteo
changed or over-ruled the decisions of the Red Cross regarding a case.
He could thinfi'of none, except in a different disaster in which he had
been.an.area director. It was stated by the Area I director that too
nary instances of disagreement over case decisions between the conittee
and the Red Cross reflects unfavorably on (1) the competence of the
director and his staff, (2) the selection of connittee nonbers, or (3)
the orienting of the committee members.

The director of Area II cited specific instances in other disasters

111

where chaos developed as a result of a director having lost control of
a connittoe, either by asserting his control in too authoritarian a
manner or by not having exercised enough control in the beginning
stages of the cenittee's orientation. In no case in Area 11 did the
cmittee‘s deliberations change the Red Cross staff's reconuendations.

The director of Area III stressed the importance of the committee's
potential power. The committee was viewed by him as a representative
body of the community Upon which the success of Red Cross operations
was dependent. Success was viewed in tom of acceptance of Red Cross
goals and the means of achieving its goals.

One casework supervisor felt the coonuittee in her area didn‘t
actually realise its power potential. insofar as helping to decide the
cases. However, later in the interview, she stated the follewi rg;
'Well, if you want w own personal opinion, it doesn't actually have
or share equal responsibility with the director. I would say that if
it did have that nuch power, the director would be on very shalq ground.
I suppose, in the end, Red Cross has the final authority". The
casework supervisor in Area III questioned whether the cessaittee ever
realised just what it scans to I‘share financial responsibility“. As
she stated, ”the couittee has no recourge, but the Red Cross does”.

It is apparent that the evaluation of a ”good" canittee is,
according to Red Cross administrative staff personnel, one which is
active, but in the context of organisational controls. Active support
of organizational policies appeared to administrative staff members to
be a result of successful orientation of the committee to orgardsational
policies. An apathetic comittee was considered hard to assess and

thus was viewed with cone anxiety.

112

It is further apparent that the Red Cross personnel were well aware that
the comittees were in fact controlled by the Red Cross. The possibility
of a conittee existing without adequate controls was viewed as
threatening to the entire administrative structure of the Red Cross
field staff.

Sunnry

In assessing the degree to which the committees were effective
in assisting. the Red Cross director and staff in formulating adequate
rehabilitation plans for disaster victims , it is concluded that they
generally were not effective. They alnost completely failed to perform
function five. In no imtance, was the connittee responsible for
significant changes in case recomendations nor did the comittees
exert sufficient influence to change organisational standards of
evaluation in the development of the case, or in the execution of
organisational policies. Case development and recemencations were
done solely upon criteria established by organisational prescription and
in no instance were these criteria modified.

In the main, two factors appear to have contributed to the low
level of achievement with respect to function five. . These were (1) the
limited abilities of the conittee members to accurately assess the
rehabilitation plan required for an applicant for aid, and (2) the
methods of control employed by the Red Cross to restrict the influence
or power of the cemnittee members.

With respect to the first factor, the organisational criteria for

the selection of comittee nelnbers resulted in choices of persons who

113

were not antagonistic to the Red Cross, who had no vested interests at
stake or who were not thenselves applicants for aid. These criteria
contributed to make the cosmittees virtual dependencies of the Red
Cross relief organisation. As such, they were relatively powerless
in decision-making activities. Further, the social distance between
victims an! co—ittee members prevented an intimate knowledge of the need
requirements of disaster victims. This was in spite of the fact that in
the sneller co-ities, the mes and reputations of fmeilies were
frequently known to one or more couittee members. As one Idler states
”In several cases we thought we knew the cases but the caseworkers
turned up facts we knew nothing about.” In the larger cemnity studied
cellaitteo member ' lack of knowledge concerning available family resources

was even more evident. In contrast to the cosmittee members, the Red
Cross staff, through its casework investigation and fornal agency contacts,
did have a clear understanding of the resources available to families.
From the evidence gathered, it is apparent that both Red Cross personnel
and couittee members, generally, recognised this situation.

Since the cc-ittee members were not trained in social casework,
they could scarcely be presumed to know if the recommendations of the
Red Cross caseworkers represented a sound rehabilitation plan. Only
under conditions of grossest error on the part of the caseworker and
the supervisory staff could it be expected that the advisory cos-ittee
numbers might serve a significant function in this respect. Both Red
Cross personnel and cmittoe members, in general, recognised this also.

Besides the factor of the limited capabilities of ce—ittoe
mabers, organisational controls further prevented their achieving

the fifth stated function. local standards of evaluation were not

11h

per-titted in the process of allocating or (lowing awards, whenever
these local standards were at varience with those of the Red Cross.
A period of orientation and indoctrination of the cc-ittee melbers
to the organisational standards of evaluation and mode of operation
was initiated by the field staff prior to any actual presentation of
cases receuendati one to the couittees. These standards, aore univer-
salistic in nature, were clearly in opposition to local particularistic
means of evlauation.1

During comittee meetings the Red Cross administrative staff
actively engaged in defending its recounendations whenever these were
questioned by comittee members. Often, where instances of disagreemnt
developed, the Red Cross was able to counter attacks upon its node of
operations by either citing sources of mutually recognised authority
in support of its position or by withdrawing the controversial case
and announcing it would seek more facts regarding it. The arousal of
controversy over a particular case was viewed by administrative staff
personnel as being mainly this to faulty casework procedure and presentation.
Control of the comaittee, then, was also effected by a show of competence
en the part of staff personnel. This minimised ary cause for question
of casework procedure .

That the Red Cross field personnel were cognizant that the co-itteo
in fact was rigidly controlled was apparent from the data. Among the

administrative staffs, all held the effective control of the ccsnittee

 

1One comittee member was cognizant of the differences in the
standards of evaluation. When asked how he evaluated his cemittee
experience he stated, ”Well, if you can adjust you thinking to Red
Cross it was 0.1:. It takes time though. Seventy-five percent of the
applicants wouldn‘t be able to get help from any one else3”

115

to be tantamount to a “good” comittee. In the main, the cosmittee

members were also aware of the limits of their influence. This was

viewed as a result of the complete competence of the staff which did
not require the services of the committee, and as a result of overt

means of control imposed upon the committee by the field staff.

It is apparent then that the committee exercised little or no
power over the process of deciding case allocations or the withholding
of allocation. The formal statement that the conunittees held authority
equal to that of the area director simply did not hold in the real
situation. The assumption of authority by the comittee equal to
that of the area director would certainly pose grave threats to
successfully carrying out a disaster relief operation by the Red Cross.
is has been previously shown, the Red Cross is aware of this fact
and as a result, organisational directives instruct the administrative
staff to be aware of any signs of dissident and unaccepting attitudes of
comittee numbers. The administrative staffs were quite aware of such
possible problems and took precautionary steps to maintain control

over the committees.

Chapter V
Unstated Functiom of the Dis aster Relief Advisory Committee

Introduction

It has previously been shown that in each of the three areas under
consideration, the Disaster Relief Advisory Omittee was comparatively
unsuccessful in achieving the functiom for which it was ostensibly
created. Further, the Red Cross field staff and the cannittee where
were aware that the connittee failed to perforn its stated functions.
However, as will be seen, the existence of the comittee was firmly
defended by the Red Cross field staff. It is apparent that the comittee
served, or was intended to serve functions other than those forully
stated. These appear to be latent functions. Latent functions have
been defined as actual consequences of a social pattern not culturally
prescribed. In the context of organizational analysis, the use of the
torn "latent” may be considered to include those functions which are
not officially stated. For the following analysis the scope of the
concept has been broadened to include those functions that may be
either intended or are unintended. These functions may be recognised
or unrecognized. It is the absence of formal statement of these
functions that defines then as latent.1

Two levels -of analysis are appropriate in considering the latent

functions of the advisory conittee. 0n the level of the Red Cross

 

1Geuldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, op cit., p. 25.
As Gouldner states, ”it is often difficult to determine whether the
actor recognizes or intends certain consequences. . .". Hence in
organisational analysis, the delineation between manifest and latent
functions must rest upon official statements of policy.

117
Disaster Service, certain factors directly related to its position in

the organizational hierarcty appear to contribute to an umerstanding
of the defense for the existence of the committee. On the level of the
total organisation of the Red Cross certain factors appear to contribute
to the continued existence of the committee as part of the general
operational policy. The concern in this chapter is centered upon

these two levels of functional analysis. After reviewing the

factors contributing to the committee's failure to perform its stated
functions, the extent to which it's existence was defended will be
noted. This will be followed by an analysis of the latent functions

of the disaster relief advisory committee.

Factors Accounting for the Low Level of Achievement of

the Disaster Relief Advisory Cmittee

As previously shown the success of the comittee in carrying out
its prescribed functiom in each of the three areas was minimal. With
respect to the stated expressive functions, the comittee failed to
keep the Red Cross field staff informed of cannunity reactions because
there were no comunity or organisational demands prompting such
activity. Social distance of the committee members from other relevant
sectors of the community further prevented a realistic assessment of
community reactions. The comittee also failed to interpret significantly
the Red Cross operation to nembers of the cousunity. This function was
not viewed as central to their role expectations. The mulbers'
corsaunity contacts did not extend beyond their immediate friends and
acquaintances. ' ‘

The evaluative functions of the cousittee were similarly

118

inconsequential in the Red Rose relief operations. These functions were
to advise the Red Cross field staff in the granting of awards so that
an adeq: ate rehabilitation program consistent with local cmnity

and may standards was administered. The limited abilities of the
cmitteo aubers to assess the actual needs of the applicants for

aid and the controls exerted upon the coaunittee by the a-ganisation
prevented the couittee fnm carrying out these functions.

In regard to the stated instrumental functions, there was no
evidence that the comitteILhelpod to solve problems that were expected
to arise during the course of the relief operations. Further, the
co-ittee did not serve to orient the field staff to local community
conditions. This was simply because other sources were mod for this
purpose prior to the selection of the committee members.

There was some evidence, however, that the comittee did provide
some assistance to caseworkers in the development of the cases. This
was truein two of the three areas studied. It was posited that the
extent to which the advisory cemittee is used for this purpose is
dependent upon the sise and complexity of the local comunity and the
availability of local official sources of information.

It was pointed out in Chapter IV that both the Red Cross staff
and the canittee members were aware that the cemittee was not
effective in adiieving the stated functions. Especially was this true
with respect to carryingout the evaluative functions. Despite this
fact, however, the mstancs of the cemittee as part of Red Cross
operational procedure was favorably viewed by the field staff and the
canittee members.

 

 

119

Attitudes of Red Cross Disaster .t’ersonnel Toward the
Inclusion of the Disaster Relief Advisory Cmittoe
in Operational Procedures.

All of the three disaster area directors viewed the existence
of the advisory cosmittee as an added masure of insuring that the Red
Cross achieved logitimation in the local community. Although the Area I
director believed that the co-Iittee was not influential in deciding the
outcome of disaster relief cases, he felt its inclusion in Red Cross
operations was necessary. Re viewed the cmittee as a means of
fulfilling an obligation of the RedCross to its supporting constituency.
Byallowingmembers oftbelocalcomuumityte observe themannerin
which the Red Cross handled and disbursed its donated funds, the
c-itteo was regarded as providing assm'once to the community that the
Red Cross was an organisation of responsibility and integrity.

The director of Area II felt that the cosmittee was to some eatent
an encumbrance upon the disaster relief activities. Although he felt
the co-ittee served to foster favorable opinions in the local co-sunity,
he questioned its effectiveness in actually accomplishing this purpose.
He suspected that there was little continuation of identification wl th
the Red Cross or active support of it after the Disaster Service unit
had left the community.

The director of Area III vimd the inclusion of the coming.
as an effective means of promoting a good Red Cross "image'f. He
further felt that the oomittee provided assurance that Red Cross

relief operations were acceptable to the local cons-unity.

120

The casework supervisors expressed many of the some notions,
regarding the policy that there be a committee, as the area directors.
In addition to these notions, the supervisors felt the committee was
necessary to insure proper adherence to case development procedures.
Approval by the comittee of case recommendations was viewed as lending
support to the supervisors' own decisions. Caseworkers viewed the
comittee as an important part of the relief operations because it
provided confirmation for the adequacy of their case development. The
success of organisational operations was viewed as contingent upon '
comittee acceptance. Also, the committee represented an accessible

means of gaining information when other sources were lacking.

Factors Accounting for the Defense of the Disaster
Relief Adsisery Committee by Dis aster Service
Personnel
In order to understand the facts rs contributing to the defense of

the committee on the part of Disaster Service personnel, it is necessary

to. examine the ramifications involved in the roles of these persons in
the Red Cross' bureaucratic structure. At the Disaster Service level,
two main role functions were extant; the managerial role of the disaster
area directors and the professional roles of the casemrkers, caswork
supervisors and other specialized functionaries. At the managerial
level the main job orientation was directed toward keeping the relief
program consistent with organisational. policy. Disaster area directors
were expected to adhere to the prescription that there be a comittee.
It was their responsibility to maintain the disaster relief prognm on

a basis defined by Red Cross policy and Red Cross values. At the

 

121

professional caseworker level, concern was directed toward carrying out
proper casevmrk procedures. The comittee was considered a necessary
means to insure comer): procedures. The comttee was considered a
necessary seams to insure that professionally developed case recmuend-
ations were acceptable to perceived represent ives of the loo al cor-unity.
It represented an additioml organisational prescription of particular
imortance in the development of cases involving large sums of
financial aid.

As bureaucratic functionaries, the directors and the casework
personnel were concerned with adequ ate role fullfillment. Job
security in the context of the larger organisation of the Red Cross
demanded that they conform to established policy. Thus, the cumittee
was included in the role definitions of mabers of the Red Cross field
staff. Involved in successful role fulfillment was the internalisation
of organisational values. The degree to which Red Cross values were
internalised by the field staff was reflected in the strong defense
of the committee's existence. In this regard, the attitudes of area
directors and casework personnel converged. The dgnificance of the
connittee to these field personnel reached mach proportions that it was
viewed as an end in itself, rather than as a means to better facilitate
relief operations.1 AOceptance of operational procedures by the comittee
represented almost automatic proof to the field staff of successful
role fulfillment.

 

‘ms degree. to which this prescription was internalised as a value
in itself was exhibited in. almost every interview with Disaster Service
personnel. In the initial stages of the interviews, Red Cross personnel
defended the cmiiteesolely in terms of the stated functions. It was
only after considerable probing that they permitted themselves to
respond according to their. own personal perceptions.

 

122

The defense of the cosmitteo thus appears to be a direct outgrowth
of the bureaucratic structure of the Red Cross. An effective bureaucracy
duends that there benliability of response and strict devotion to
regulations. lHowovor, such devotion.to rules may'lead to their
transformation into absolutes.1 The resulting sentiments foster an
undue importance upon procedure to the extent that they gain tremendous
symbolic importance to bureaucratic functionaries. The advisory
co-aittee, because it was a part of organisational policy thus gained
this importance. Internalisation of organisational values and sentiments
of devotiomreaulted in an almost complete identification with the
goals.of the.Red.C¢wsa.. Not onxy‘was this.expressed.in the concern for
the success of operational goals, but also in.the concern for the
longerange goal of viability. Organisational prescriptions, because
they were part of organisational policy; were seen as beneficial. The
committee's existence was defended not on the basis of the functions it
perfonmed for the individual.Red Cross worker, but rather upon its
contributions to the fatherance of organisational goals. Because the
committee was viewed as an accurate representation of the local.commnnity
acco ptanoe of operational procedures by the comaittee members was viewed
as necessary for the maintenance of envirormental support for the Red
Cross.

In silvery it can be seen that factors contributing to the, defense
of the committee were directly related to the inherent nature of the
bureaucratic fans of organisation. Concern for adequate role performance
by'Disaster Service personnel resulted in a transformation of means
into absoluter. The committee was viewed as beneficial largely because

|l‘lerton, op cit, pp. 200-202

 

 

123

it was prescribed by organisational policy. What Merton terns
“santification” of rules by bureaucratic personnel may further result
in failure to initiate needed innovations for the organisation.

In the case of the field staff the santification of the rule that there
be a connittee prevented them from considering alternatives to it.
These factors. however, do- not explain the existence of the organisation
prescription itself. For understanding of this the unstated but

intended functions of the emittee for the total organization must

b0 Wide

Principal Latent Functions of the Disaster
Relief Advisory Comittee

It is apparent that certain unststed functions must account for the
organisational. prescription that there be created advisory canittoes.
In view of therelative ineffectiveness of camittee performance with
respect to their stated functions, the whole idea of the omittee
device makes very little socialogical sense without considering these
unstated‘functionsi he principal latent functions are posited here
as the principal reasons for creating such comittees. These functions
are as follows:

(1) To serve as a device for the cooptation of
potentially powerful and disruptive opposition
to organization or to its manner of carrying
out the relief operation. ’

(2) To serve as a device for meeting criticism
or attacks on the organisation or on its

. manner. of carrying out the relief operations.
Since theaafunctLons are-not incorporated in formal policy

statuenta pertaining to the committee, it comet be assumed that they

 

12h
are consciously held or shared by all personnel in the Disaster
Service or by those working is the disaster areas which were studied.
The staff interviewed did not have a clear conception of these functions
and, in fact, rather strongly tneded to reject such notions. Although
the fact thathmost of the staff members interviewed agreed that the
committee was intended to serve a ”public relations” function, this
conception, although comprehending the two unstated functions indicated
above, is too broad and unanalytic to be of great utility in understanding
the committee. Hy analyzing the additional unstated functions, it is
hoped that what appears to be an area of confusion resulting from
unstated policy may be clarified. If in fact, these unstated functions
are among the primary purposes of the coneittee then its relative
ineffectiveness with respect to the stated purposes takes on different
significance.

The positing of the first principal.latent function of the committee,
that of coopting potentially powerful and disruptive opposition, is‘based
upon the Red Cross extreme concern for establishing legitimacy in
local cornmnities. Cooptation represents .a summer designed to mitigate
threats tenths organisations existence.. Since the.formal authority of
an organisationpaparticularly'a voluntary organisation-~may fail to
reflect the true balance of power in the community, ceeptation.provides
to obviate the potentiality of obstruction arising from enwironmental
forces. By incorporating neutral or hostile elements into the
administrative structure, the organisation is able to maintain
contact with these elaaents and, thus, is better able either to reduce
‘their potentially disruptive effects or to win these elements over to

the ends of the organisatiozt The actual sharing of power by the

 

 

 
  
       
    
 
  
    
  
  
  
    
 
  
 
  
    
 
  
    
      
  
   
   
    
   
  
  
 
   
  

are consciously held or m V -e " . mere
Service or by those mil-

on. staff inter-violet! as .t he j
and, in fact, rather M“ ‘2
the fact that-est of the our
committee was interned In “if“- _’
conception, althoudl M
above, is too broad all . _

ion may
only

and conse-

- tive power.
. With the

, it becomes

e that the

the committee. m mfi
hoped that what am" “fig!
unstated policy up he .1 ... ,s "-.
ineffectiveness with m ' -j

control and thus

‘ : masking. The
mg the device is under
; ceepted elements with

.. e tine controlling the
significance.

Th0 poem-ed u .
,‘ that of m .
( upontheBedm_.-“
5 local We '
I threats to the. 5'.“ nts cannot be identified easily
! an organism: fix;-

} reflect the, .

ership and organisational

ity with the loci of power in
faces unique problems as a voluntary

1..

comunity on a comparatively short

ty, and hence, may not be incorporated

t from the early stages of its activities.

 

to “moon- 4» «on-

  
    
     
  
 

.. ttee is based on what the organization
forcosr no 01320 no

me --~ oaonc --~ 40-

influential elements in the comunity. The
the canmittee appears to provide a

sea as» m as --

the problem of defining its effective envoroment.

--- -000- -3- -009- '

disaster relief advisory cmittee, thus, elicits

N 01310 m 013” °° “3L3 toidentify effective enviromental

ooh—«coma-

:n «:20 no or“

 

 

125

the organisation with tho coopted ole-eats is not necessary. The more
inclusion of these elements into the structure of the organisation may
suffice. The 111th goal of such a device, then, is to share only

the public synbols and administrative burdens of authority, and conse-
quently public responsibility, without any transfer of substantive power.

The device of cooptation is not without its dangers. With the
decision making bow exposed to enviromental elements, it becomes
necessary in the interests of the organisation to insure that the
coopted elenents do not get beyond organisational control and thus
jeopardise the organisation's prerogative to decision-raking. 'lhe
administrative body of an organisation uploying the device is under
constant tnesion as a result of providing the coopted elements with
. apparently ilportant chuties while at the sane tins controlling the
potential threat to the continuity of le adership and organisational
policy.

Because of the relative unfamiliarity with the loci of power in
the local calamity, the Red Cross faces unique problems as a voluntary
relief organisation residing in the community on a comparatively short
term basis. Specific hostile elements cannot be identified easily
prior to their “show of hostility, and hence, may not be incorporated
into the disaster relief unit from the early stages of its activities.
The appointment of the ccanittee is based on what the organisation
perceives as potentially influential eleuents in the col-unity. The
act of selecting and installing the canittee appears to provide a
neasure of closure to the problem of; defining its effective envoroment.
‘lhe creation of theedisaater relief advisory canittee, thus, elicits
an erganisatianaLtendenq toidenztify effective envirormental

 

126

hostility in the conittee itself. Comittee approval of casework
procedures and general organisational operations is viewed by Red
Cross personnel as tentamount to community-wide legitiaation of these
actions. The organisation, then, strives to gain the committee's
approval of its actions.

As previously pointed out, cooptation is not without its dangers.
However, the persistent threat to the organisation which the comittee
represents, serves an additional although not necessarily intended
function that is an indirect result of this continual threat. This
function is the utilisation of the comittee as an external control
device by the field administration to insure that proper casework
standards are maintained by individual caseworkers. To this end,
the comittoe represents a final and significant step in obtaining
approval for ease recomendations. Evidence of non-approval of these
recommendations by the coasnittee is viewed by the field staff not as
a valid cause for changing the recomendatien, but rather as faulty
case development or poor case presentation by the caseworker. Presenta-
tion of a case before the comittee approaches in inpctance the
actual develoment of the case. i

That the organisation was successful in its endeavors to minimise
potential threats, at least from those specific elements identified
with the cmittee, is apparent by the favorable attitudes toward the
Red Cross exhibited by alnost all the committee neabers. However, it is
difficult to assess from the data at hand whether the favorable attitudes
of the committee members filtered through the rest of the comunity. The
accuracy of the assmptions upon which the field staff based their

definition of the condttee as true representation of the comunity is

 

127

open to serious question. It has already been shown that the comittee
umbers were predominately from the middle or upper-middle social strata
and that m were favorably oriented toward the Red Cross organisation
prior to their selection. Further, it was apparent that the comittee
members made little effort to convey their favorable ortientation
toward the Red Cross beyond the circle of their own inediate friends
and acquaintances . It would appear, then, that favorable attitudes
toward the Red Cross by the committee members does not necessarily
ilply like attitudes on the part of the rest of the eonsmnity or
complete acceptanceof organisational policies by the general calamity.1
There is also efldsmthai the conmittee was not the only means by which
favorable attitudes- 01¢st toward the Red Cross were
fostered. The daiLfrmaTahls XIV suggests that other factors also

played an important part.

Table XIV
Contittoe Members“ Attitudes Toward the Red Cross Organisation

 

 

 

 

Attitude Due To:
General Red Cross ictivit Servin on the Conittee
Area I Area II fies In Total Area Area It Bea Ifi Tota
More Favorable ' i h 7 11 g h 3 5 12
Favorable views
reinforced. 1 1 8 1 1 10
Neutral Attitude. 1 1 ' 1 1 2
Less Favorable. 1 1 .
Torso ‘ 3 I4 L /3 _.._:‘.'--~_ k” ”(v _ 24

 

 

‘Fon and Noeow‘s study of disaster in flint, Michigan and Moore's
study of disaster activity in Texas both provide evidence that along
disaster victims, the Red Cross organisation was evaluated unfavorably in
couparison to other relief organisations. See Fomfili ilian H. , Nosow,
Sigmund, Community in Disastefir (New York, Harper Bros, 1958) p. 209-210.
and Moore, Harry, 15., Tornadoes Over Texas, (Austin, Texas; Univ. of Texas
Press, 1956) pp. 100.165?

 

 

128

For eleven nenbers, favorable opinions toward the Red Cross were
structured by general Red Cross activity. Twelve labors viewed the
couuittee experience as structuring more favorable attitudes while for
ten nonbers their favorable attitudes were merely reinforced by the
co-ittee. It is significant to note that the characteristics of the
local commnity appear to play an inportmt role in the degree to which
the comittee changes or reinforces attitudes. In Area I, where oo-ittec
members were less fsniliar with the actual relief operations of the Red
Cross following the disaster, favorable opinions were structured or
reinforced solely by the cosmittee. As one member from this area stated,
"I alleys hadihignregard for it (the Red Cross). However, I do feel
none closely relatedto Red Cross through the co-nittee".

In Are-e11 ancilll, the committee net-hers were nere familiar
with actualfield activity. A significant umber of comittee
nonbera structured their opinions by general activity of the Red Cross.
As anarticulate nenber stated, ”1w attitude has changed . . . Roll, the

damn couittee had nothing to do with it. I was on the chow line right
after 'Donna'. I worked in the kitchen and I saw how they worked.
Next time the Red Cross won‘t have trouble getting funds.”

It appears that the assimptions upon which cooptatien was based
nay have been quite, unrealistic in the disaster operations of the Red
Cross.

In one some, the device of cooptation was successful. Whereas
nest analyseeof this- device have noted that there is an altering
of organisational goals or policy as a result of having coopted hostile
elsnenta into the craniutionai structure, the- field units were ‘able
to naintainthein operational. male without aw modifications due to

 

129

the influence of the comittee.’ In this regard, organisational controls
were successful in keeping the comittee relatively powerless. Also,
the relatively short duration of the disaster operations nay have
prevented arw growth of an awareness of power potential by cessnittee
members.1 .

The second principal latent function indicated above, appears to
have been designed to serve both in the interests of the organisation
within the particular ccmunity in which relief activities are centered
and in the interests of the enviroment beyond the local community.
On both these levels this function serves to protect the organization
fron attacks on its administrative structure. Although this function
is directly related to the function of cooptation, it serves as a
defensive device to ward off enviromental attacks.

0n the extra-local level, the organisation is concerned with
protecting itself from two main types of attack. 0n the one hand,
it is concerned with protecting itself from charges of favoritisn and
sinilar attacks based upon a conflict with the universalistic values of
the larger Anerican Society. On the other hand, it is concerned with
protecting itsdlf from charges of acting in a high-handed ”bureaucratic"

manner, unresponsive to local conditions.

A

1Once installed, the comittee never ceases to become a potentially
disruptive sector of the organization structure. It's creation initiates
an organizational need to exercise control over it. However, the committee
never completely identifies itself as an integral part of the organisation.
nor do the Red Cross personnel identify it as such. The organizational
control over the oomittee is thus somewhat limited. In response to
this dilemma, the disaster field unit strives to end its disaster
operations as quickly as possible in order to eliminate any tendencies
of the comittee to gain additional power and to prevent unwanted
effects from possible additional environmental demands.

 

130

With respect to the first type of attack, the comittee serves as
"proof" that the Red Cross operates in a manner consistent with the
values of the larger society. Charges that the organisation is guilty
of Ame erna4a-y practises er of malfeasance may be effectively
countered by citing the policy of the organisation to allow coununity
representatives to observe the operations of the Red Cross. The
legitimacy of the organisation‘s node of operations say be supported
by citing the approval of. the coornittee. Sinilarly, the potential
charges of theRedCrosshaxing actedinatotally unilateral manner
may be effectively rehuttod by reference to the comittoe. It‘s stated
function as an advisory comittee designed to insure the adequacy of
Red Cross operations in the local oommity m be cited.

At the locaLlevel, the comittee appears to be ddsigned to protect
the organizationagainst unfavorable reactions to its doc isions involved
in disaster relief operations.- By sharing the symbols of authority,
decisions. bearingupon the disaster operations appear to be based upon
Joint responsibility of both the Red Cross and representatives of the
local community. Regardless of that the courittee actually does --
whether it engages in decisions bearing upon the allocation of
assistance or not -- the organisation can defend itself against
accusations that it fails to consider local circumstances and local
values, by referring to the comitteo.

On both the- local and aura-local levels, the eomittee serves as
an effective escape mechanisn for the ministration of the organisation.
This is based upon a circular. type- of relationship with the conittee by
allowing it to share the symbols of authority. Environmental challenges
nay thusbe countered by citing the body of ”cu-unity representatives”

 

131

who ostensibly Minthednmimmgms. This renders the
administration at both the Disaster Service level and at the national
organisational level relatively impervious to environmental attacks.
Further, attacks directed toward the comitteo based upon non-loyalty
to coronunity interests can similarly be not by members“ citing the
operational imperatives of the Red Cross. In effect, then, the
co-ittee is utilised as an organizational weapon designed to protect
Red Cross interests. .-

Sumnery

Althougnthe -sdliseu .conithe faileito achieve its stated
functionaineach ofthethree areas studied, this fact did not result
in unfavorable attitudes toward its existence. Disaster area
directors viewed the. emittee as valuable in fostering environmental
support for the Red Cross. One director however, did question its
effectiveness: in this regard. Casework personal viewed the cousittoe
as a some of legitinising case dicisions.

lhe factors- accounting for the defense of the committee were found
to be implicit in the very nature of a bureaucracy. With the concern
for proving theirreliability in carrying out their bureaucratic roles,
the Held staff defended the comittee's existence as beneficial
simply because it was prescribed. The development of a strong
sentiment in support of the existing rules further supported the field
staffs' evaluationof the coastline. ‘me committee, fornally intended
to be a means tofacilitate more effective disaster operations, became
an satin itself- Hush of the disaster relief pregn- was directed
toward gainingamrosallby thecosnittse.- Acceptance of organisational

'

 

132

operations was viewed as proof of successful role achievaent by
organisational personnel. At the managerial level, the disaster area
directors viewed cuittee acceptance as a result of successful
adherence to organisational rules of administration. At the
professional casework level, cousittee approval was viewed as obtaining
acceptabchaeewmdsveloment.

For the national organisation, on principal latent functions
directly related to the viability of the Red Cross were found to be
served by the eo-aittee. Those functions appeared to be designed as
devices for (1) coopting powerful and disruptive opposition into the
relief operation, and (2) meeting criticises or attacks on the organisation
emanating from local and extra-local sources.

The first function -- oooptation -- represents an offensive
derice by which the organisation is better able to control potentially
disruptive eluents in the enviroment by incorporating these eluents
into the policy-aking bow of the organisation. Although the Red
Cross- appeared to be successful in this regard, it was posited that so
far as_ mmpnrml elaaents being incorporated in the conittee
wae concerned the assumptions of the Disaster Service personnel were
quite unrealistic. Believer, it cannot be denied that the favorable
attitudes of cmittee members toward the Red Cross was not without
significance. Membership on the eomittees was fun relatively high
statue groups. Mary of these persons were well known and some were
influential in business, social, anireligieuespheres. Among these
persons, the WWW a relatively high
personal identity mmerganiaatiomsndnheiends of the disaster

relief operation.

 

133

In another respect, the Red Cross was successful in this ceeptation
device. Contrary to nest instances of ceoptatien the advisory ce-aittee
did not interfere with the ergani sation's established procedures for
deter-ining needs of disaster victins and allocating assistance to
victins. It was posited that effective control of the mittee and the
short duration of its existence, kept it from becoming aware of its
potential power. The only obstruction which the co-ittee posed to the
relief. operations was in toms of reducing the speed with which
applicants for large- resource awards were handled.

file W latentfnnctien was that of protecting the
decisionsnokinghody. oLthe RedCro so. By employing this defensive
nechani- the organisation was able to protect itself both at the
local and the extra-local levels. In the for-er case, the conittee,
by sharing the symbols of responsibility protected the Red Cross,
decisions regarding specific cases. it the extra-local level the
comittee served to provide ”proof“ that the organisation was operating
in a nanner consistent with the values of the larger society. At both
of these levels, the coulittee served to couplets a circular

authority structure by which the locus of authority was never clearly
defined. is a result, both the orgnisation and the committee were

protected from external attacks.

CHAPTER W
CONCLUSIONS

Selsnick has stand that analysis of organisations nust follow
a selective principle.1 Fsnowing this suggestion, this study has
concentrated upon the relationship of one aspect of an organisation to
iusuuemdm hnpmdun,wnhubunasmwctu.
adninistrative device -- the Disaster Relief Advisory Canittoe --
intended to accolplish certain goals in response to the needs inherent
in the continued existence of the Red Cross.

It is apparent that for an organisation to exist in a changing
envirement there nuet be a chemo in euphasis from substantive
goals, which are attainable, to the analytic goal of viability. As a
result of this displacement, concern of the organisation for both its
internal structure and its acceptance by the enviroment beconc paramount.
In regard to the internal structure of the Red Cross, concern for
viability has led to a sore efficient fern of organisation bmd upon
bureaucratic principles.2 The problem of acceptance by the envirement
has led to a continual succession of substantive goals. These goals
have arisen in response to threats upon the viability of the organisation.
They have- subsequently provided a rationale for the existence of the

1counter, Philip, ”Foundations of the Theory of Organisation,

AnerinonSociolegical Review, vol. 13 (19138) pp. 25-26.
~71

This haessnpportetLWeher's- statement: “For bureaucratic edninistra-
tion is, other things being equal, always, for a fer-al, technical point
of view, the more rational type. F or the needs of ms administration
today, it is coupletely indispensable. The choice is only that between
bureaucracy and dilletantisn in the field of adninictration.” Weber, Max,

The The of Social and Economic Or anisatio trans. by A. 1!. Henderson
33 Elect? Parsons, (New britmord UnvIers¥ty Press, 191;?) p. 337.

 

135

Red Cross.

The structuring of substantive goals is exceedingly complex. These
goals cannot. be structured independently from the envirmment. Rather,
integration mist be achieved with the social systan. The Red Cross,
being a voluntary organisation dependent upon local support and national
acceptance for its existence, nust successfully integrate its activities
at the level of the local cemunity as well as at the level of the
larger American Society. Certain methods nust therefore be adopted to
bridge the gap between the particularistic value orientation of the
community and the universolistic demands of the larger society. The
Disaster Relief- Advisory Comitteo represents one means intended to
accomplishjhispurpose. While adhering to the universalistic values
of the larger society, the Red Cross has to utilise the connittee for
successful integration at the local level. The cemittee's stated
substantive goals are designed to legitinatc the existence of the
Red Cross in the disaster area as well as to provide certain instrunsntal
functions for actual disaster relief operations. The focus of .this
study has been upon (1) the degreete which the canittee accomplished
its officiallxstated goals, (2) factors accounting for its level of
achieve-ant of these goals, and (3) inportant intended but unstated
functions of the cenittee.

It was sbwn that with respect to the five stated functions of the
committee all were only nininally achieved. only an instrumental
function appeared to be more successfully acconplished. In regard to the
instrunental functions, factors accounting for the degree of achievement
appeared to bedirectly related to.-(1) the sise and conplcxity of the
healnmunityruj .thLarailahility of efficialaenrces of inforntion,

 

136

and (3) the professional experience and orientation of the Red Cross
field staff.

The espressive functions were not significantly performed. This
was shown to be due to a lack of netivatien of counittec nonbers based
upon (1) a lack of central importance in their perceptions, and (2) a
lack nLtheMof expectancy fren both the Red Cross and the
environment. A second contributing factor was slown to be based upon
the social status of con-ittce nenbers. Conittee members were almost
entirely niddle and upper-middle class whites. This resulted in (1)
limited socialintercourse with principal recipients of aid, who were
predominately of the lower class, . (2) linitation of aasessnent of
comunity reactions due to selective contact, and (3) linitatien of
effective interpretation of relief activities to all sectors of the
conunity due to the nenbers' restricted social intercorse. Finally,
stress placed upon secrecy of nenbership further reduced the achievement
of the expressive functions.

The nest salient function for both the Red Cross staff and committee
nenhers was shown to be the co-ittee's prescribed evaluation functions.
Factore accounting for the low level of achievencnt in this regard were
shown to; be. (1) the criteria used in selecting the committee nqsbers,
(2) the limited ability and training of motors to acctrately assess
disaster victins' need requests, ('3) an intensive progran of orientation
to Red Cross operational imperatives resulting in a pedal loss of
concern for imposing local standards upon the Bod Cress, (h) evidences
of efficient, responsible planning_presented by Red Cross workers to the

conittee, and (5) overt neaneelaployedby thefield staff to retain
the lecuenfpewer.with the organisation.

 

137

It was apparent that because the. officially stated purposes of the
co-ittee were achieved,- its nain significance ceased to be upon its
latent or unstated functions. Two levels of analysis were presented. At
thelowerlerel,faetora centrihui'ingtethe defense ofthe cemittee
by them analysed... Atthehigmr. level of the national
organisation, underlying latent functions apparently intended by policy
makers were presented. Factors contributing to this defense of the
committee by fieldetaffawere shown to be due to a sanctificatien of
organisational rules. Related to this role of continents was the
perceptienof culittee approval as "proof" that role functions were
successfully carrieiLeut. -Eerthe. disastereperationa directors, a
complaint .cemittee. waa_interpreted intros of successful adherence
to organisationaLprcscroptions. For the professional caseworker staff,

cenittee approval neant that casework procedures were acceptable to
the local community. ‘

At the higher level of the national organisation, it was posited
that two nain unlorlying intentions were responsible for the prescription
that there be Leo-lithe. First was the principle of cooptatien
whereby hostile or neutral elements were brought into the decision-
nakingbedy of the local Red Cross disaster relief unit. By so doing
the organisation was better able either: to reinforce iii-easy favorable
attitudes or to change the attitudes of these elements into a favorable
orientation to the .Red Cross.

The. second principal unstated function was the use of the caittec

as a defensive dericc. By shoringthe synbols of mthcrity, the
organisation sought to shield its adainntratire structure free direct
ommm.- Alttnugh. thicc-nitteeidid not in fact share

 

138

authority, the shared synbols protected the organisation from direct
responsibility for actions which may not be wholly acceptable to the

local conunity and to the larger environment.

Implications of the Study

This being a case study, it does not warrant drawing conclusions
regarding all voluntary organisations which are bureaucratically-
structured. A purpose of a case study is to point out certain
inplicatione that may provide a meaningful contribution to the
general fund of knowledge. Implications to sociological knowledge
that have arisen from this study are based upon three principal
concerns. These are: (1) the role of sentiments among bureaucratic
personnel, (2) the use of the concepts manifest md latent functions
in organisational melysis, and (3) 'a nore precise definition of
”cooptatien“.

The Role of Sentiments

The study has- supported these analyses which have mted the
importance of sentiments among bureaucratic functionaries. Although
the study of sentiments in regard to internal infernal relationships are
of importance, our concern is upon the role of attachmcnt toward the .
organisation based upon sentiment and the resulting orientation of the
functionaries toward the environment.

The structuring of positive sentiments toward the cganisatien
seem to be particularly important for the voluntary organisation. This
type of organisation, forced to rely upon voluntary contributions for

its support, presentea particularlyunreliable none of assurance for

 

139

continuance of office to the functionary. It is thus to the
bureaucratic ineunbent's benefiLthat he promote organizational goals
and adhere to organizational rules, thereby helping to insure that the
existence of the organisation, and his office will continue. Strong
. sentiments of attachment tend to develop toward the organization. These
are oftenexhibited in a defensive manner toward the environment.
The concerns. of the organisation become concerns of the personnel.1 It
appears thaLtha bureaucratically—structured voluntary organisation
exhibits the characteristics of what Gouldner has teraed "representative
bum”. Comrary to the imposition of rules and enforced
compliancy .r a "Wham bureaucracy”, this fare is based
upenrulesestablishedjay agreement... Thaseare ”rules whichare
technically Justified and administered by specially qualified personnel
to which conunLis given voluntarily” .2 Concern for the continuance
.1 .mah thenresults in agrw t. organisational rules which
fosters the internalization of organisational values. This internalization
is exhibited by strong sentiments of attachment to the orgnisation.

The sentiments of attaclnent toward the organization may
frequently lead to irrational behavior with respect to rules and
the earrying out of these rules. During the disaster operation,
adherence to the prescription that there be a comittee resulted in

its existence. However, concern for the organisation and the continued

 

1This is not to sq that office occupancy per se structures these
attitudes- These offices may- attract. certain individuals having a
propensity for. such role cemitaenta- Homer, .once installed, their
concern for~ aohierment. Med with the continued existence of
their office..andhence the organisation.

zGeuldner, Pattemof IndustziaLBureaucracy, .p um, p. 21:.

1110

existence of office resulted in effective controls, employed to

minimise the potential disruptions of the committee to Red Cross
Operations. This suggests that where organisational rules tend to come
into conflict with respect to the functionary‘s office, concern for those
rules. Who will take precedence over those rules which

nay.poseas.a.threat to the office.

WMtions

The attupts to Qply a functional analysis to an organisation are
exceedingly complex. It is generally recognized that organisational
analyses based only upon stated goals or, nanifest functions fail to
note the inpontant consequences of the unstated or latent functions.
However, attuapts to account for both nanifest and latent functions of
an ergnisation nust ascertain the following: (1) For when are the
stated functions intended? Are they intended for bureaucratic function-
aries. at-specific- levels. inthe organisational hierarchy or for the
total organisation?. (2) For whaa is the recognition of the intended
function crucial in the analysis? Is prinary inportance to be placed
upon recognition by the enviruaeent; by the bureaucratic functionaries;
or by the policy-eaters? (3) To when is it crucial for the recognition
of the consequences of the intended functions? .

In answer to the first question, this stuck has focused upon the
functions intended to benefit the total organisation at both the local
comnity level and the larger societal level. With respect to the second
question, we have identified as substantive goals those functions whose
intentions are recognised by the social environment via official statements.
Analytic- goals have. been implicitly defined as those intentions not

m

not recognised by the social environment. With respect to the
consequences of these goals we have left then unclassified. For the
heuristic purposes at hand, manifest functions were considered to refer
to man goals- publicly statedwhich result in recognised consequences
by the swim- Wrens considered to be. those
goals not publicly stated whose consequences may or nay not be
receguiudh Further is it possible for these consequences to be
intended.» unintended.

Horton has defined manifest functions as “objective consequences
fora specifisunit (person, subgroup, social or cultural systen) which
contri.bute_ta_its_ui3nstment on Its adaptation or were so intended“.
Latent functions refer to “unintended and unrecognised consequences of
the some order".1 These definitions may be illustrated by the

following paradign.

Figure V
Paradip of Horton‘s Definitions

Cultural Patterns

 

 

 

 

Consequences Intmded ' Unintended
_ T

Recognised [Manifest *

Unrecognised ‘ é . Latent

 

 

Gouldner has modified these definitions in organisational analysis.
He defines nanifest functionsas those ”consequences of a social pattern,
o.g. bureaucracy, whichare culturally prescribed for it. Latent functions

 

1HM-WW, op cit., p. 63.

1112

are referred to as a ”pattern's actual consequences but in this case,

these are not culturally. prucrihedn preferred”. The following
paradig illustrated these difinitions:

Figure VI

ParadigLaLGmldner‘s Definition

Cultural . Prescription

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consequences Intended ’ Unintended
Recognised Manifest Latent
Unrecognized Latent

 

Notice that Gouldner regards latent functions as being unintended, but
they may. be either recognised or unrecognised.

It isapparenLthat two aspects of analysis should center upon
latentandeestfunctiom in organisational analysis. One aspect of
analysis should center upon latent and manifest functions .r policy
not officially smdfani the other upon latent and manifest functions
ofpolicy offically stated.2 It appears then that for this purpose, the

possibilities appearing inthe following paradigm would be fruitful.
mass are basedupon be different levels in organisational analysis.
it the level of officially stated goals, the significance of the

consequences lies in whether or not they are recognised by the social

|Gouldner,. PMstBureaucracz, op. cit., p. 25.

2Another approach to this problem is presented by Cicourel is what
he terms “Rent” andf'baok'? oforganisational policy. Cicourel, Aaron V.,
”The Front and BacLoLDrganisatianaLLeadership” in The Pacific

Weaklrno. 2 (1958) pp. Sit-58.

 

 

 

1&3

enviroment. With respect to- geflsthat-are1mofficially stated,
the significance of the recognition of consequences lies with

organizational personnel.

Figure VII
Paradign.aLOfficially Stated Goals

Officially Stated Goals

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consequencos’ Intended Unintended

Recognised : Manifest . J
I fin i

Unrecognized i Latent }

J , i
*Of' importancd to- the effective social enviroment

 

Figure VIII

Paradiu of Goals Not Officially Stated
__ 'Oeals Not Officially Stated

 

 

 

Consequences * I Intended ! Unintended ‘

Recognised. Manifest i

Unrecognised ., ; Latent 4
. I l

 

 

*0: ilpertanco.to organisational personnel

Espiricallennplaseof these cell entries nu be cited by first
notinglths officially statedfunctians, and secondly noting the goals
mt 031611.11: stat“.

Officially Stated Goals

(1) WWW by the effective.
social—entiroment.-. Formofthdco-aittee embers of Area II

(2)

(3)

(h)

 

1th

the function of proddingmeedadinfomtion toAthe Red Cross
regarding comnity patterns and practices was intended. The
consequences, in some cases, were recognised as an actual
achieve-out of the formally stated intention.
Offiflanyiuniniandfigoalpconsequences recognised by the effective
social environment. Some committee meubers felt the comittee
served.“ a meandta footed continued support of the fled Cross
after. the disaster operations.-. Although this was not fonaally
stated by the. organisational: its functionaries. The consequences
were seen._as fostering greater participation in fund drives.
Officially intended goals; consequences unrecognised by the
effective social enviroment. Although some committee members
perceived their prinary role as providing infornation to the

Red Cross, most of then were not aware of the final consequences
of this activity. _

Officially unintended goals; unrecognised by the effective social
environment..- The- conittoe. was not intended to slow down the
processing of cases. However, this did appear to happen, contrary

to the belief of new nonbers that the counittee helped eXpedite
the handling of cases.

Goals Not Officially Stated

(1)

Intended goals,- conseqnences recognised by organisational personnel.
Although the Red Cross personnel were not sure in what manner the
the comittec served to foster improved "public relations” they
viewed the comittee as serving this purpose and attributed the
favorahmattitudedofcommittee'mhers toward the Red Cross as

consequences of this goal.

1145

(2) Unintended goals 3 consequences recognised by organisational

(3)

4- (h)

personnel. Host Red Cross personnel recognised that the cemeittee
slowed down the actual handling of case development however, this
was not so intended.

Intended goalsgioonneqixencedunrecogniaedhy organizational personnel.
MWWWWaLd relief operations
meant_ai.milsr_apprcral_hy thc_totaL comnity. was shown to be open
to doubts.._ EvidenceJrothher operations seems to point to
WWBL the Red Cross by certain sectors of the
local calamity.” Hence, theconscqnences of this assumption were
not known to the organisational personnel.
Unintended_goals.;-conseqmnces-unrecognisedfby organisational
personnel.- It was..the intention of the organisation to foster
favorable attitudes toward the organisation by comittee members
exhibited resentment toward the Red Cross. This occurred as a
result- of the organisations ' efforts to prevent actual functioning
of the committee- This fact was unrecognised by the Red Cross
personnelf nor. was. it an intended goal.

COQtCt ion.

Fren this study it has become apparent that a limitation of the

concept of "cooptatien“ is of value in analysing one means of an

organisation's adaptation to its environment. The use of the ten: has

arisen from Selsnick‘s definition: “ . . . the process of absorbing

new elements into the leadership- or policy-determining structure of an

organisation as a means of averting threats- to its stability or

existence”)

 

TSelsnicLATYA andtheGrassjeuotsJ op cit., p. 13.

1146

The need to «ploy this device arises out of the intrusion of
envirornental values upon the organisation. The primacy of the goal
of viability of the organisation forces it to devise methods to foster
legitination in its environnent and to protect it from ostemal attacks.
Ianerianociet; thevalneenf‘dmecraey force a variety of demands

upon the WW These values, involving the ideal of
mm mm suspinion island centralised control,
requires that the organisation maintain at least a semblance of
democratic orientation. cooptatien is one neens of serving this end.

no typoa or adaptation have been defined by Selsnick; formal and
informal.. Formal cooptatien is likely. to occur when the legitinacy of
authority- of theorganisation is. questioned. By incorporating elements
of themirennnt into theorganisation, an effort is made to establish
order]; andnliahlenechanine for reaching a ”client public or
citizenry“. This is accomplished in a formally declared manner.

In-foraal cooptatien arises in response to the pressure of
specific centers of power within the emimnuent. Although legitination
may well be establisheiin the community, there may be forces which are
ableio- threaten the organisation's formal authority and effectively
shape matmntm mmpmcy, By coopting these elements into
the organisation, the dmande oLtheee forces tend to be mitigated.
thhonghtheorganisationnstsLtecontrol these forces the sharing
of actual power on. actually occur- Because a formal announcenent of
the cooptatien of. theseelmntewould undermine public confidence
in the strength and legitimacy.o£th.e_onganisation, these elements are
brought into the organisation mt public statement.

With the organisatinnalencernonn itsaviahility, it would appear

 

 

1h?

that two functions are in not operative. For analytic purposes, we would
propose liniting the torn cooptatien to the act of bringing into the
organisational policy-deciding bow, neutral or hostile ole-onto in an
effort either to change then to a favorable orientation to the organisation
or tonitignammmstanmmmey represent- By coopting these
elasents into the conflneaof thexganiutmwthey are more easily
influencedsnd nreeffectivoly handled according to the purposes of
the organisation. However, once installed, these elements pose grave
dangers tethe organisation since they are never under complete
jurisdiction. oLtheaduiniatration. The degree to which these dangers
are nininised is dependent upon the scans and degree of control employed
by the organisation.

whereas in cooptatien, active efforts are employed by the
organisation—tonnage or mitigate the hostility of enviromental .
el-ents, a second function is that of the defense of the organisation‘s
adninistrative body. Selsnick includes this function in the concept
of. cooptatien. However, its importance warrlnts more explicit treatment.
The defeneireflmciionxhich inserted by a body like the Disaster
ReliefAdJinnry. (Densitiesr ia of.ne null importance to potential
challenges aimed at operational methods of an organisation. Once in
existence, coopted. eleoents become identified by the rest of the
enviromentae part of the organisation. If they are not so identified
formally, the organisation has recourse to make such references public.
The coopted elenentenay or-nsylnoi. share, actual power. The importance
of the defensive function rests upon the identity of the coopted
ole-onto with the organisation's policy-deciding body. The result is
thediffusenssLoLtheauthsritnstructure smiths resulting protection

 

148

of the ormintion from attacks from these exterml elements not
coopted into its structure. This defense is affected because of the
impossibility of accurately locating the center of authority.

Evidence supporting the above differentiation of functions is
shown in this study. Continual efforts were made by the Bed Cross to
foster amicable relations with the advisory comittoe members. This as
intended to insure support for the ormisation. It was further posited
that having acquired favorable attitudes tonrd the organisation. the
comittee served a defensive role for the ormisation, shielding it

from attacks arising from both local and extra-local sources.

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Carter, Richard, The Gentle Le iong. Garden City, New York: Doubleday
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“A".

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APPENDI 03”:-

151+

APPENDIX A

TAKES

15"

 

156

TABLE I

Religious Affiliation of Committee Members

 

 

Domination Area I Area 11 Area III
Episcopal 2 3
Presbyterian 2 3
Methodist 3 7

Lutheran 1

Catholic 1 1 h
Baptist 2 1

Jewish 1

None 1 1 3
Total 1 2 10 1h

 

15?
Table II

List of Represented Organisation
on the Comitteo

 

 

Service_§;g§g Business and Professional.0rogps
Lions Business and Professional
Rotary 'Hemen
Kiwanis Chamber of Commerce
Lady K 's Ministerial Association
Rotary Ann!s _ Bar Association

Labor Organisations

Fraternal Clubs
Nonyvocational‘Intorest.Groupo

Elks

 

Moose. Garden Club

Masons Iacht Club

Eastern Star Conservation League
Veterans Organizations. Voluntgaz Units

American.LegionH. Fire Department

Veterans of foreign‘wars Rescue Squad

Ambulance Corps
Columnigz Organisations

PTA and other.achool related

organisations. Little Theatre
Voluntary nnltare organisations Sheriff‘s Association
Civic Club- Citizen of the Iear

 

Miscellaneous

Table III
Reasons Given for Favorable Attitudes Regarding the Committee

By Committee Members

Response Area I Area 11 Area IIl Total

 

.-

Learned how the Red Cross
operates. 8 3 11 22

was a means for representing
the community. h 1 1 6

Was able to give the Red Cross
information. 3 3

Helped the Red Cross make
decisions on the cases. 2 2

Learned more about the local
community. 1 1

No Special reasons 1 2 3

 

Total 13 10 1h 37

 

TABLE IV

159

Members' Conceptions of the Main.Purposes of the Committee‘

 

 

 

Regan” Area L Area_;[_; Area ICU
To verify the recommendations. 1 2
To approve or disapprove the
recommendations. 1 2
To provide a means to gain
community acceptance. 5 l 5
As an advisory body. 2
To provide the Red Cross with
information for specific
cases. 2 h 3
To provide a means for pub-
licizing Red Cross
activities. 2 2 2
To provide a “cover for Red
Cross in the event of adverse
community reactions. 2 2 1
To approve what has already
been decided by the Red Cross. 2 1
To act as a "check” on Red Cross
activities. 1 l 9
To act for the Red Cross as a
”sounding board" for community
reaction. 2 2
To provide moral support for the
Red Cross workers. 1
Total 16 23

19

 

I"This table is based on 10 respondents in Area I, 10 respondents in
Area II, and 1“ respondents in.Area III.

Multiple responses.

 

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

160

1.
2.
3.
h.

5.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

161

SQiEDUIE OF QUESTIONS USED IN STUDY OF
DISASTER RELIEF ADVISORY COMTTEES IN
HURRICANE DONNA
(for Casittoe Members) 9
Hon do you evaluate your experience as a cemeittee member? (probe)
Have you spoken before amt groups regarding Red Cross activity?
Who also hora youtalkoito concerning Red Cross rehabilitation?

Who knonihaLyou seasoning on the cmittee?
clam-embers: -. businssaasaociates? - other associates?

Haayour. attitude toward R.C. changed?
What was minimum that changed your attitude? (probe)

Do you thinktha committee was of proper size to deal with the
problems presented to it?

Do you think the members of the oomittee were good representation
of the enormity.

Are there an other persons in the commity or county who you
feelnhmfldhare been on the comittee?

Why do you think you were chosen to be on the committee?

Do you think the committee was effective in advising the R,C. in the
granting of wards? Was it essential? Useful? (probe)

What do you feel was the. main purpose of the oomittee? (probe)
Apart from the canittee meetings, Invo you been consulted by case

workers for information on any particular- cases? Did you know what
thanorker. mulecmnihefore the committee meeting?

Do you haste. anyothsr opinionsor thoughts regarding your activity
asan advisory committee member? '

Backgound material:

1.
2.
3.
11.

Salary (of Nanject not employed) 5. Age

Education 6. Membership in other
Length of residence in the community organisations.
Occupation 7. Church affiliation

8. Arm previous assoc.
with R.C.

1.
2.
3.
h.

S.

7.

 

162

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CASEIJRKRRS
Hos nary cases have you worked on in this area in this disaster?
How many voluntary withdrawals were there?
How many denials were there?

What, if arnrthing, do you tellyour. families about the advisory
committee? a.

b. Do you toll all of them this?

c. What doyou tell_.those for sham you recomsended denial?

Have you sought the advice or counsel of an advisory comdttee
member in this disaster?

How has this advisory committee effected your casework so as to keep
it in line with family and local community standards?

What function for you, as a cane worker, does the advisory committee
serve?

What do you-think is the mainpurpose of the comittee?