

THE RED CROSS DISASTER RELIEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

A STUDY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE DEVICE OF AN
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

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M. Joseph Smucker

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by

M. Joseph Smucker

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Science and Arts
of Michigan State University of Agriculture
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Concern for the maintainance of viability results in various mechanisms employed by an organization to gain legitimation for its existence in its social environment. This thesis presents a particular case study of one device used by a bureaucratically structured voluntary organization. This device, an ad hoc group known as the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee, is formally intended to perform certain functions in aiding the American National Red Cross in its disaster relief operations. Five officially stated goals are ostensibly intended to be achieved by the committee. These goals are designed to achieve instrumental, expressive, and evaluative functions for the Red Cross. This study contains four major concerns: (1) factors which account for the creation of this type of administrative device; (2) the extent to which the committee achieved its formally stated goals; (3) the behavior of organizational personnel in view of the purposes of the committee; and (4) the major unstated but intended functions of the committee.

Research was carried out during Red Cross relief operations in three areas in Florida. Data was collected from, (1) interviews with each of the three disaster area operations directors; (2) interviews with case workers and casework supervisors in each of the three areas; and (3) interview with each of the committee members. These interviews were designed to elicit information regarding the

committee and its functions and the orientations of the interviewees toward the committee. Besides this information, data regarding class occupancy and community involvement of committee members was gathered. Also, observations were made of committee meetings. Observed was the manner in which meetings were conducted and the pattern of involvement of both committee members and field staff personnel. Because the research was carried on during the final stages of Red Cross activity, committee meetings not observed were reconstructed from information elicited by the area directors. Observations of the social patterns in the three areas were also carried out. These observations were based upon (1) official sources of information, (2) published statistical information, (3) interviews with committee members, (4) interviews with Red Cross workers and (5) information from informal sources.

An interpretation of the findings reveals that effective means of achieving integration in the local community are especially crucial for a national voluntary organization. It is shown that the Red Cross is forced to depend upon local support for its existence while conforming to the demands of the larger society. The Disaster Relief Advisory Committee represents a means to effect this end. However, of the five stated functions of the committee, all were only minimally achieved. Three factors appear to influence the degree of achievement of the instrumental functions: (1) the size and complexity of the local community; (2) the availability of official sources of information; and (3) the professional experience and orientation of the Red Cross staff.

Factors contributing to the lack of achievement of the expressive goals are found to be (1) lack of motivation of committee members and

(2) social distance of committee members from community sectors affected by Red Cross operations. Factors contributing to the low level of achievement of the evaluative functions are found to be based upon (1) criteria used in the selection of committee members; (2) the limited training and ability of committee members; and (3) effective means of control employed by the Red Cross.

Because the stated functions were only minimally achieved, the significance of the committee is found to lie in its intended but unstated functions. It is posited that these functions are (1) to coopt neutral or potentially hostile environmental elements into the policy-deciding body of the Red Cross in an effort to change or mitigate their potential threat; and (2) a means to defend the administrative body against environmental attacks at both the local and extra-local levels.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study deals with several aspects of the process by which a large-scale national organization attempts to solve problems arising from the nature and multiplicity of its goals and from its relations with the larger society. The organization which was the principle object of investigation was the American National Red Cross. The research was undertaken as one of the initial steps in developing a series of studies of the internal structure of the Red Cross and its relations with, and impact upon American society. It is hoped that this general research interest will eventually include studies of other large-scale voluntary associations, few of which have been subjected to searching sociological description and analysis.

The American Red Cross is a highly complex formal organization encompassing more than thirteen thousand full-time employees and two million volunteer workers. The volunteer workers are organized into approximately 3,700 local chapters, plus numerous emergency disaster committees distributed throughout the United States. At the national level the organization exhibits an elaborate bureaucratic structure, while at the local level it comprehends thousands of units which are neither bureaucratically structured internally nor thoroughly subject to the bureaucratic regime of the national organization. In this respect the American National Red Cross exhibits great structural similarity with various other national voluntary associations, although it is by far the largest in terms of the number of participants. It has been observed, moreover, that the structure of the American Red Cross has served as a prototype from which numerous other voluntary

associations in the health and welfare field have attempted to model themselves.¹

The Problem

The general problem of this study is to describe and analyze the process by which a large-scale, bureaucratically structured national organization attempts to integrate its operations at the local community level. It is in effect, a study of an organizational device for achieving a systemic linkage between the organization and the local community social systems in which it carries on certain kinds of operations. The study, however, does not attempt to explore the whole range of mechanisms, techniques, and structures through which the American National Red Cross seeks to integrate its operations at the local community level, for such an undertaking would be beyond the scope of any single empirical study. The focus selected for the study of this problem is a relatively narrow one, but one which, hopefully, will cast considerable light on the complex and not infrequently contradictory actions which emerge in the process of integrating the operations of a large-scale organization at the local level.

The immediate focus of the study is an administrative device called the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee. This committee, an ad hoc group selected from among the citizenry of localities stricken by disaster, is a creation of the American National Red Cross. The formal regulations of the organization require that such committees be established in all areas where the national organization under-takes relief and rehabilitation operations. These committees are formally intended to perform

¹ Carter, Richard, The Gentle Legions, (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961) p. 37.

several recognized functions related to the integration of Red Cross disaster relief operations at the local community level. This study attempts to evaluate the extent to which three such committees performed the functions for which they were ostensibly created. While an accurate assessment of the extent to which an administrative device achieves its purpose is of legitimate and important concern to the sociology of organizational administration, an equally central concern here is with the explication of the factors which account for (1) the creation of this type of administrative device, (2) the behavior of the organizational personnel in view of the purposes of the committees, and (3) the latent functions of these committees for organizational personnel, the committee members themselves and the organization as a whole. In order to explicate the factors which account for the observed data the study will explore various features of the social system of the American National Red Cross, the localities in which the relief operations were carried on, and the structure of the situations involving interaction between Red Cross personnel and the Disaster Relief Advisory Committees.

General Perspectives of the Problem

Since the American National Red Cross is constituted as a large-scale complex, bureaucratically structured organization and the explication of its attempts to integrate its operations at the local community level derive in large measure from its structural features, it is appropriate at this point to review some of the salient features of bureaucracy, large-scale organizations, and organizational relationships with certain aspects of community environments. We shall discuss first

some observations pertaining to bureaucracy, followed by certain considerations regarding large-scale organizations--particularly organizational goals and goal-setting, and finally consideration of some features of American communities.

Bureaucracy

For Weber, one of the peculiar and unique characteristics of the integration of the social order of modern Western civilization was the wide-spread and progressive substitution of rational-legal standards for traditional standards and charismatic leadership. Weber's analysis of economic institutions focused, in part, on explicating how the principles of bureaucracy allow to a high degree the integration of rationality into a system of social action which is goal directed. The main elements in his conception of bureaucracy are as follows: (1) The regular activities required for the purposes of an organization are distributed in a fixed way as official duties; (2) The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy--that is each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one; (3) Operations are governed by a consistent system of abstract rules and consist of the application of these rules to particular cases; (4) The ideal official conducts his office in a spirit of formalistic impersonality, without hatred or passion and hence, without affection or enthusiasm; (5) Employment in the bureaucratic organization is based on technical qualifications and is protected against arbitrary dismissal. Employment constitutes a career, and there is a system of promotions according to seniority, or achievement, or both. Weber further noted that as a social organization, bureaucracy appears to be the most efficient form, as viewed from a

purely technical standpoint.¹

No small amount of confusion has resulted from the frequent failure to lay adequate emphasis on the distinction between the notion of "bureaucracy" and that of the more generic term "organization". The confusion results partly from Weber's manner of treating the analysis of bureaucratic organizations and constitutes an error of misplaced concreteness. The significance of the notion of bureaucracy, as formulated by Weber, is that it denotes certain principles of social organization which, when operative in a social system, result in a relatively higher probability of achieving certain system-relevant conditions than do other given principles of social organization. Subsequent to Weber's analysis and isolation of the elements of bureaucracy the term has tended to take on a concreteness and served as a synonym for the complex organization or association. Organizations, particularly large-scale, complex ones have come to be viewed as bureaucracies not only in the parlance of an un-analytically oriented general public, but also in the discourse of many social scientists.²

¹Blau, Peter M., Bureaucracy in Modern Society, (New York: Random House, 1956) pp. 28-31.

²The almost automatic assumption by many social scientists that large organizations are in fact bureaucracies may be a result of the influence of Michels' "iron law of oligarchy". Michels maintained that in the development of any organization there comes to be an almost automatic centralization of power which results in absolute rule by a minority, thus leading to a bureaucratic structure. Michels, Robert, Political Parties (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949) See especially p. 11.

Although Selznick does not subscribe to this extreme position, he does posit that there are tendencies for organizations, once extant, to develop a bureaucratic structure. See Selznick, Philip, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy", ASR, 1943, vol. 8, p. 47.

Bendix however, states that "the power of any organized minority is circumscribed by the internal and external setting of the organization which it seeks to control". "Bureaucracy; The Problem and It's Setting", ASR vol. 12, no. 15, 1947. p. 495

Lipset's study of the International Typographical Union presumably provides empirical proof against the position of Michels. British Journal of Sociology, vol. 3, 1952. pp. 47-63.

The principal criticism we wish to raise here is that the notion of bureaucracy as elaborated by Weber is not intended to apply to the full range of social behaviours, cultural artifacts, and social relations which arise in the context of peoples' associations in organizations, but refers only to a particular form of social organization.

Studies of bureaucratically structured organizations subsequent to Weber's analyses have tended to assume that his statements were meant to be essentially exhaustive of the social-relational and cultural features of organizations in which bureaucratic regimes are institutionalized. Thus, a number of criticisms of Weber's position with respect to bureaucracy have emerged, especially in quite recent years. Blau observes that Weber's ideal-type model fails to take note of possible dysfunctions which may occur in bureaucratically structured organizations if all of Weber's elements are rigidly institutionalized.¹ Merton states that there must be a certain amount of leeway between organization demands and the allowance of informal group characteristics, else overconformity to bureaucratic prescriptions become dysfunctional.² Along the same vein, Gouldner asserts that Weber over-emphasized the role of impersonality as a necessary outgrowth of bureaucratization. He cites empirical evidence based on a study of an industrial complex to refute this. Gouldner further notes that Weber failed to see that there are irrational forces which may be necessary for the maintenance of a

¹Blau, op cit, p. 33, See also pages 34-36 for a lucid treatment of the ramifications of Weber's ideal construct of a bureaucracy.

²Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe Ill, The Free Press, 1957) pp. 197-205.

bureaucratically structured organization.¹ The position implied by Weber that the bureaucratic organization is like a self-perpetuating machine which will continue to operate in essentially the same way even in the face of a changing environment is presumably refuted by Burin's study of the forceful changes worked on existing organizations by Nazism.²

It becomes clear that the notion of bureaucracy does not account for the total cultural and social structural features of any empirically extant organization. A wealth of empirical studies have indicated the extent to which primary groups and organizational culture, e.g. value standards, arise in the context of bureaucratically structured organizations and not infrequently in clear conflict with the bureaucratic order of the organization.³ Nor does the notion of bureaucracy posit the theoretically possible subjective orientations which participants in organizations may come to hold as a result of being involved in a

¹Gouldner, Alvin W., "Organizational Analysis", in Merton, Broom and Cottrell, Sociology Today, (New York:Basic Books, 1959) pp. 400-428

²Burin, Fredric S., "Bureaucracy and National Socialism: A Reconsideration of Weberian Theory", in Merton, Robert K., et al, Reader in Bureaucracy, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952) p. 43.

³See for example, Turner, Ralph H., "The Navy Disbursing Officer as a Bureaucrat", in Merton, et al, Reader in Bureaucracy, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952) pp. 372-379.

Barnard was perhaps the first to point out the existence of informal groups in bureaucratic organizations. See The Functions of the Executive. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954) p. 113.

Roethlisberger and Dickson have provided the classic empirical study of the importance of informal relationships in a work group. Management and the Worker, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1941).

See also Page, Charles Hunt, "Bureaucracy's Other Face", Social Forces, Vol. 25, (1946) pp. 88-94.

bureaucratic regime. Merton, especially, has drawn attention to some of the theoretically possible and empirically evident orientations which participants in organizations may take on. He has further proposed a theoretical framework in which to interpret different types of deviant orientations.¹

In Weber's view, bureaucracy constituted a highly efficient organizing principal applicable to the achievement of organizational ends. When fully institutionalized in a system of social action, bureaucracy created the conditions internal to an organization which permit the fullest integration of rationality into the processes of goal achievement. He viewed bureaucratic organizational features as bringing into systems of social action the highest degree of precision, stability, discipline, and reliability.²

Bureaucracy, then, refers to an abstract system of organizational principles. More specifically, the term refers to principles related to the attainment of a high degree of integration of rationality in a

¹Merton, op cit. Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 140-157. Although the listed "modes of adaptation" apply specifically to the economic activity associated with the larger American society, Merton makes clear that his typology can be extended to any situation involving culturally given goals and institutionalized means of attainment. p. 184.

See also Whyte, William H., Jr., The Organization Man, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957) pp. 69-85.

²"Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization--that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy-- is from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks." Weber, Max, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organization, An Ideal-Type Construction", in Merton, et al, Reader in Bureaucracy, op cit., p. 24.

system of social action and a high degree of imperative control over the participants in the system. Viewed as a set of principles or a system of ideas, bureaucracy stands as a cultural artifact. Fundamentally, it is a system which may be institutionalized in relation to an evidently wide, if not universal, range of goal oriented system of social action. Finally, bureaucracy, when viewed as an abstract set of organizational principles, has no substantive ends.¹

Organisation.

The organization, in contrast to the principles of bureaucracy, constitutes a concrete system of social action. Organizations are empirical entities. They may be complex or simple in terms of the extent of differentiation and segregation of status-roles contained in their structure. Departmentalization of function may be non-existent or very extensive. Power may be articulated through highly authoritarian or relatively democratic procedures. The totality of the internal system may be subject to a bureaucratic regime or important sub-sectors of the organization may be largely or completely free from such a regime. The substantive goals of organizations exhibit almost infinite variety. Here we shall discuss several aspects of organizations which bear upon the problem of this thesis.

Ends or goals of organizations serve a multitude of purposes. They offer the scientific observer a basis for differentiating organizations

¹ Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (New York: Galaxy Book, 1958) p. 231.

See also, Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy" in Etzioni, Amitai, Complex Organizations, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961) pp. 71-82.

into different functional types.¹ From the point of view of the general public they serve as foci for comparative evaluation and loom importantly as criteria for decision-making pertaining to the acceptance or rejection of organizations' outputs.² Symbolically, they provide an important base for identification with and development of a sense of community of endeavor. Their direct significance lies most crucially, perhaps, in the circumstance that a too low level of achievement threatens the continued existence of the organization and thereby the association of the participant with it. On the other hand, the possibility that the stated general goals may be achieved and, thus, lead to the demise of the organization requires that these goals be broad enough to insure continued organizational existence.

In the analysis of the goals of organizations it is important to make clear the frame of reference in which statements pertaining to them are made. It is thus necessary to differentiate between analytical and factual statements pertaining to organizational goals. At the factual or substantive level, reference generally pertains to formal statements of purpose³ (either written or spoken) which are conveyed to a public by representatives of the given organization.⁴

¹Parsons, Talcott, Structure and Process in Modern Society, (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960) pp. 44-47.

²Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954) p. 82.

³Bakke, E. Wright, "Concept of the Social Organization", in Modern Organizational Theory, Ed. by Mason Haire, (New York; Wiley, 1959) pp. 16-75. The author lays particular emphasis upon the importance of the organization charter.

⁴Or, lacking this degree of formalization, the goals of an organization are to be found in the common understanding of purpose shared by participants and non-participants. Under certain circumstances the goals of an organization are kept secret from the general public and from participants who have not attained full membership status.

At the analytic level, statements pertaining to organizational goals refer to abstract generalizations from specific cases. The analytically defined goals of organizations seldom are to be found in the organization's formal means of declaring its goals. The substantive goals of the totality of organizations in American Society exhibit almost infinite variety. Those of the American Red Cross will be discussed in some detail in Chapter II. Regardless, however, of the substantive goals of an organization one of the most important goals from an analytic point of view is the maintenance of the organization, per se. While the statement that a major goal of an organization is the maintenance of its independent integrity--its viability--constitutes an analytical proposition which is not necessarily to be found at the empirical level as a conscious conception of organizational goals, such conscious conceptions are encountered with some frequency among organizational participants. The maintenance of the organization as a viable system is frequently, if not universally, in complex bureaucratic-type organizations, a fundamental and consciously held goal, as well as a recognized responsibility of that sector of the organization referred to as management. Depending, of course, upon the extent of differentiation within the ranks of management this analytic goal will be found either generally diffused in the conscious conceptions of all participants or limited to those of "top" management. Situations of organizational crisis tend to bring this goal into the conscious conceptions of wider ranges of participants. The present study, while recognizing that the positing of viability or organizational maintenance per se as an organizational goal implies the acceptance of a homeostatic model of organizational processes, finds this view to be logically necessary

and of utility in defining the dimensions of the problem.

If we accept the notion of the maintenance of the organization per se as an organizational goal, we may then conceive of it as a long-run goal, the substantive content of which may change over time and in response to various circumstances. But, in addition to this long-run goal, organizational behavior is also oriented to short-run or operational goals.¹ Operational goals differ from long-run substantive goals of an organization in terms of proximity and degree of specificity. As the term implies, they serve to structure or orient sub-systems of behavior within the total social system of the organization. Their achievement is more subject to demonstrable empirical proof and evaluation owing to their more restricted and specific scope. Depending on the complexity of behaviours requiring coordination, operational goals may or may not be sub-divided into lesser goals. These lesser goals, then, may be referred to as sub-operational goals. Clearly, such a process of sub-division may be carried to very great lengths, including the subdivision of succeeding steps involved in the completion of individual tasks, and represents a strain toward the integration of rationality into such social systems. In analyzing the problem of this thesis we shall be concerned with both the long-run goals of the maintenance of the organization per se as well as with the immediate goals involved in a disaster rehabilitation operation. It is only in the context of the long-range goals of the organization and those of the disaster operation that the functional significance of the sub-operational goals of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee become apparent.

¹ March, James S. and Simon, Herbert A., Organizations, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959) pp. 155-158. The authors make a similar distinction by what they term "non-operational" and "operational" goals.

Two further aspects of organizational goals need to be discussed here. First, there is the question of the extent to which organizational goals may be freely arrived at without reference to the environment in which the organization operates. Second, there is the question of who in the organization determines the goals which in fact do become set. With respect to the first question, a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical work indicates that the substantive goals of large-scale, complex organizations rarely if ever can be set without reference to the value system and other forces extant in their environments. Thompson and McEwen present a particularly lucid analysis of the interplay between the organization and its social environment in the structuring of organizational goals.¹

The degree to which the existence of an organization is dependent upon the integration of its goals with the value system of its environment is determined by the organization's control over the acquisition of needed resources. (The term "resources" refers to those elements essential for the effective operation of the organization, namely, physical facilities, labor, capital, and organizational structure.²) Although no organization can exist without some degree of amenable environmental conditions, it is possible, following Thompson and McEwen to plot a continuum of types of organizations based upon the degree of dependency upon the environment. Thus, an example of one polar type of organization would be the almost completely self-sustained

¹Thompson, James D., and McEwen, William J., "Organizational Goals and Environment; Goal-setting as an Interaction Process", ASR, vol. 23, 1958, no. 1, pp. 23-31

²Parsons, op cit, p. 44-56

"subversive" political party bent upon altering the existing environmental conditions, or, as the authors suggest, the Japanese Zaibatsu, a type of economic organization controlling almost completely all aspects of production. An example at the other extreme would be the voluntary organization which must seek amicable relations with its environment which represents its sole source of support. In regard to the latter case, Selznick, in his analysis of a government agency demonstrates how a conscious effort to minimize potential threat to the organization's substantive goals resulted in almost complete modification of these goals.¹

The vulnerability of substantive organizational goals is linked to the dynamic character of the environment. Changes in the environment prompt changes in organizational goals, but the latter are not automatically modified as a result of environmental changes. To assume that they are is to accept a simplistic mechanical model of organizational dynamics. The vulnerability of the substantive organizational goals to modification appears to be based in and dependent upon the extent to which a high degree of rationality² is coupled with a conscious recognition of the long-run analytic goal of viability.

The question of who in the organization determines its goals is of particular relevance to an understanding of the data of this study.

¹Selznick, Philip, The TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of the Sociology of Formal Organizations, (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1949).

²Following Simon, "rationality" is defined as the selection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behavior can be evaluated. Simon, Herbert A., Administrative Behavior, (New York: The Mac Millan Co., 1947) p. 75

Clearly, in the case of large-scale, bureaucratically structured organizations not all participating members are equally involved in decisions pertaining to goal setting. In this general type of organization, decisions of this character constitute policy decisions. The making of policy decisions is a prerogative reserved exclusively to certain specific sectors of the organization--generally top management and the board of directors. This reservation of policy-making as a prerogative of management and the "board" is, of course, one of the principal characteristics of the bureaucratic form of organizational structure. It permits the integration of high degrees of rationality into the organization. While of unquestionably high efficiency with respect to this function, the differentiation of policy-making functions from the activities of the general membership in the organization is accompanied by various liabilities.

Our concern here is with the problem which the segregation of this function poses with respect to the integration of policy into the other relevant sectors of the organization. Once promulgated, policy needs to be disseminated. But the lack of participation in policy-making so far as the majority of organizational members is concerned tends to produce difficulties with respect to (1) their understanding of the policy, (2) their commitment to the policy, and (3) their mode of orientation to the policy.¹

¹Bakke, op cit. pp. 68-73. Bakke addresses himself to this problem in his formulation of the "bonds of organizations" considered necessary for its continued existence.

Integration of the National Red Cross Organization at the
Local Community Level

The Problem of Integration

The wide range of value orientations existing in American society produces considerable strain for the American National Red Cross in attempting to integrate its goals--particularly its operational goals--with the value orientations of its environment. American society is characterized by diversity and change in values. Value differences, for example are to be found in the existence of complex division of labor, the proliferation of specialized institutions, regional variations and ethnic heterogeneity. Williams has outlined four principal values extant in American society. These are: (1) values of gratification, (2) instrumental interests or means-values, (3) formal universalistic values of Western tradition, and (4) particularistic, segmental, or localistic values.¹

Whereas the typical organization, in maintaining its viability need concern itself only with the problems of integrating its goals with the local environment in which it is located, large scale voluntary organizations, particularly the American National Red Cross must concern itself with integration in relation to the values of both the society at large as well as the local community, with its possibilities of various unique traits. Thus, with regard to the larger society-- the American Society-- the American Red Cross must adapt itself to an universalistic value orientation. For example, it must hold itself

¹Williams, Robin M., Jr., American Society, (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1956) pp. 372-441

to strict accountability in regard to donated funds entrusted to it. Further, the Red Cross must maintain unimpeachable casework standards consistent with the expectancies of the larger society. The conduct of the personnel involved in the organization must be such as to uphold the values of equality, and non-favoritism. (As will be seen later, the very nature of the bureaucratic structure of the national organization further reinforces these universalistic value orientations in relation to the conduct of its personnel.)

On the other hand, particularly with regard to disaster operations, the Red Cross must integrate its activities at the local level. At this level, the organization is likely to be faced with a particularistic value orientation. Integration of goals--both operational and long-range with the value orientation at this level is of considerable consequence in the maintenance of the organization. It is at the local community level that the national organization must depend on donated funds which support the entire operation of the Red Cross. Further, it is at this level that volunteers are recruited. Volunteers are of no small consequence to the national organization, particularly in regard to the maintenance of a supportive public sentiment.

It is clear that the dilemma involved in attempts to integrate its activities at the levels of the local community and the larger society, demands that some means be adapted to reduce the impact of this source of strain. That the Red Cross is fully cognizant of this dilemma is apparent by its appointment of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee as a prescribed integral part of its disaster rehabilitation program.¹

¹Selznick, Philip, op cit., See pp. 259-264 for a discussion of "cooptation".

The committee then, is viewed as a means of bridging the gap between the two different value orientations.¹ How the committee is utilized for this purpose is of direct importance for this study.

Means of Integration Other than the Advisory Committee

Besides utilizing the committee, other means of integrating organizational goals are used by the Red Cross organization. We will note these means, having direct bearing upon the local community context, before discussing the committee.

Upon initial contact in the disaster-stricken area, the field director and his staff are required, by organizational prescription, to undertake certain actions by which an assessment of organizational resource requirements are made and through which contacts with community business, professional, and interest groups are established. The community contacts are intended to serve a two-directional function. First they are intended to provide the Red Cross staff with sources of information and aid in the Red Cross organization's assessment of need requirements in the community. Secondly, these contacts are intended to provide a means by which the Red Cross organization and its activities are interpreted to the community for the purpose of fostering community support for the organization's activities and continued existence.

Specifically, the groups which the director is required to contact are: (1) Social welfare agencies, (2) financial institutions "including the Small Business Administration", (3) merchants associations, (4) insurance agencies, (5) farm agencies, "including the Farmers Home

¹ This is demonstrated by the statement of an assistant field director, "The Committee gives a humane, subjective aspect to the cases, while the Red Cross may tend to treat cases in too much of a machine-like manner".

Administration", (6) funeral directors, (7) building and contractors associations, and (8) "appropriate agencies of local, state, and federal government".¹

The director is instructed in the initial contacts with the above groups to interpret (1) the authority, scope, and objectives of the Red Cross disaster relief program, (2) the role of the local Red Cross chapter in the disaster relief program, and (3) the relationship of the operational staff to the local chapter.

The director is further instructed to summarize the past Red Cross relief activities in the local area and to explain the rehabilitation phase of the operation to these groups. Staff members who accompany the director in this procedure are instructed to "interpret the particular points related to their units of work, arranging procedures for the exchange of information and the referral of applicants, and establishing procedures for staff and applicants to utilize the appropriate professional technical, and financial services".²

In addition to the above contacts, the director is instructed to maintain contact with "influential groups" and to seek to gain opportunities for explaining the "why" and "how" of Red Cross activities. A special check is to be made by the disaster field director, of local chapter relationships with civic, veterans, labor, professional, racial, and religious groups, with schools and churches, and with welfare and social organizations. The field director is to enlist the support of these groups and to encourage their "participation" in Red Cross rehabilitation

¹Sec. 2, p. 40, The American Red Cross, Disaster Relief Handbook.

²Ibid, sec. 2, p. 40.

activities, as well as in local Red Cross chapter activities.¹ It is significant to note that these community contacts are to be made prior to the selection of the committee and represent prescribed means for facilitating linkage with the local community.

The Disaster Relief Advisory Committee

Selection of the Committee.

Since the disaster relief advisory committee is formally intended to carry out a number of important functions in the disaster rehabilitation operation, it is particularly appropriate to gain an understanding of the selection of its members and various aspects of its composition. As formally stated, members of the committee are to be selected jointly by the field director of the Red Cross disaster unit and the local Red Cross chapter chairman. The field director is instructed by organizational prescription to acquaint the chapter chairman with "the problems and functions of the committee and provide him with sufficient information and guidance to insure the best possible selection of representative community leadership".² The size recommended for the committee is not less than five, nor more than fifteen members. The membership is to include appropriate representation from local Red Cross chapter board with no fewer than two board members on the disaster advisory committee.

The factors that are to be considered in choosing the members of the

¹Ibid, p. 6, section 5.

²Ibid, sec. 2, p. 41

committee are outlined by organizational prescription as follows:

"(1) Special skills and knowledge of the community patterns and practices, and of the living standards of the affected families. (2) Representation from the locality of the section in which the disaster occurred. (3) Representation from other local welfare agencies having special interest or activities in the locality. (4) Representation from leaders in education, the professions, business, labor, and religious and service organizations".¹

It is further advised that the director avoid choosing members that are likely to exploit their membership on the committee or whose membership might be construed by the rest of the community as being inconsistent with the disaster rehabilitation program. Further, if a committee member should apply to the organization for assistance, his resignation from the committee is automatically effected.

That the committee members are to be selected jointly by the disaster unit field director and the chairman of the local Red Cross chapter may be interpreted as a prescription intended to insure at least two goals: First, that the chapter not be isolated from the disaster operation and hence pose a potential source for substantive problems of rapport and cooperativeness on the part of the local chapter. Secondly, that the composition of the committee not represent a unilateral decision on the part of the representatives of the national organization who are strangers to the community and hence relatively unknowledgeful concerning the potential symbolic significance which certain persons placed on the committee might have in the context of local values. The stipulation that the composition of the advisory committee include

¹ Ibid, sec. 2, p. 42.

at least two chapter board members may be taken as yet further indication of insuring that relations between the national organization and the local unit are closely maintained.

In noting the factors that are to be considered in the selection of the committee members from the local community, we may deduce that those persons chosen to serve on the committee on the basis of their knowledge of "community patterns and practises" and as representative from those areas stricken by disaster, are so chosen to serve two functions. The most obvious function which they are to serve is that of providing the Red Cross organization with a source of information regarding those characteristics of the community and the disaster area which are unique for the specific relevant areas. The second and less obvious function which these prescriptions serve is that of the precautionary device by which the organization seeks to avoid any potentially hostile reactions to its rehabilitation program, arising from charges of not carrying on its program within the context of local values and local needs.

Choosing representatives from "other local welfare agencies having special interest or activities in the locality" serves the function of providing ready access for the Red Cross to professional knowledge of local welfare conditions. These representatives also provide a means by which amicable relations with the Red Cross are insured, thus preventing hostile reactions that may arise on the basis of disagreement over role definition and organizational jurisdiction.

By incorporating representatives of education, the professions, business, labor and religious and service organizations, the Red Cross organization thereby has a means by which it may advance its organizational aims to esteemed members of the local community and thus assure itself of community organizational acceptance and support in terms of both the

immediate disaster rehabilitation program and the longer range goal of community support for the organization per se.

Formally Intended Functions of the Advisory Committee.

The formally intended functions or operational goals of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee are prescribed by the national organization of the American Red Cross as follows:

- (1) To inform the director and the appropriate staff of community economic conditions and other pertinent community patterns and practices.
- (2) To inform the director and appropriate staff concerning the reactions of the community to Red Cross disaster relief activities and advise on methods to bring about better community understanding.
- (3) To assist the director in the solution of problems encountered in the community during the course of the relief operation.
- (4) To participate actively in interpreting the Red Cross disaster relief program to individuals and community groups.
- (5) To review facts concerning individual families to assist the director and staff to make certain that the kind and amount of assistance recommended utilizes all resources available to the family, represents a sound rehabilitation plan, and is in keeping with community and family standards of living.¹

It is clear from noting the formally intended goals of the advisory committee that it is expected to engage in a considerable range of activities and to perform what would appear to be some crucial functions in relation to the carrying out of a successful disaster relief operation by the Red Cross field staff.

The five stated purposes listed above may be classified into three major types of functions which are considered essential for the viability

¹Ibid, sec. 2, p. 41.

of an organization. These three major functions are instrumental, expressive and evaluative.

In regard to the instrumental function, it would appear that the committee is to provide an important means for aiding in the actual mundane operations of the field staff. Thus, it is to aid in facilitating actual case work development with respect to helping in the rehabilitation of disaster victims. The instrumental function encompasses the first and third listed intended functions. This includes providing the Red Cross field staff with information deemed essential for case work processing, and other activities directly associated with the dispensing of organizational resources to disaster victims.

The second and fourth purposes of the advisory committee stated above appear to be an attempt to fulfill an expressive function. These purposes serve as a legitimization device by which the Red Cross operations are made acceptable to the local community. Involved here is the utilization of the committee as a communications channel by which the organization seeks to maintain a means for establishing effective contact with the local community. These two stated purposes are interdependent. Taking note of the reactions of the community in regards to Red Cross operations, serves to help structure the manner in which the Red Cross operation is to be interpreted to the community.

The fifth stated purpose serves an evaluative function. Involved here is an effort to insure that Red Cross operations adhere to the value system that exists in the local community. More specifically it is designed to aid in determining the actual needs of disaster victims and to advise on adequate resource allocations to meet such needs in the context of the local community.

It becomes apparent that a number of difficulties may be involved in securing a committee which is on the one hand capable of carrying out at an adequate level the above enumerated activities, and on the other hand is adequately motivated to do so. In addition to the factors of membership capacities and motivation, certain other factors clearly enter into the situation to determine the extent to which a committee can be expected to achieve the intended goals as organizationally prescribed.

One factor which we should expect to be of considerable importance in this regard is that of the unique characteristics involving size and social structure of the local community in which Red Cross relief operations are being carried out. Likewise we should expect interactional factors involving relationships among committee members on the one hand, and between committee members and the Red Cross staff on the other hand, to have an important bearing upon the committee's success in fulfilling its intended functions.

In regard to the relationship between committee members and the Red Cross personnel, it would appear that the high degree of professional training of Red Cross personnel in their role functions of assessing disaster-caused need and the fact that contacts are to be maintained with community influentials beyond the confines of the committee, would minimize the necessity of utilizing the committee according to its intended functions.

Restatement of the Problem

The problem which this thesis proposes to analyze consists of three parts. First, this thesis will analyze the extent to which the committees studied fulfilled each of the stated functions. The second

aspect of the problem is to describe and account for the observed departures from the achievement of the intended purposes. It is here that we shall have recourse to explore the ramifications of the structure of the social system of the Red Cross, the communities, and some values of the larger society which intrude upon the organizational policy. Finally, we shall explore some of the more salient unstated functions of the advisory committee

Methodology

The research for this study was conducted during October and November, 1960 in the State of Florida. Ten days were spent in the Fort Myers area, six days in the Islamorada area, and seven days in the Marathon area. These three communities represented those among the most severely stricken by Hurricane Donna. They will be referred as Areas I, II and III respectively.

In each of the three areas, research activities centered around interviewing and observation. Interviews were conducted with Red Cross field directors, casework supervisors, case workers, and individual committee members. Observations were made of committee meetings, the Red Cross field operation as a whole, and the general social characteristics in each area. The research was conducted during the final stages of the Red Cross relief operations.

In Area I (Fort Myers), all but one committee member was interviewed. In Area II (Islamorada) all active members were interviewed (two additional members never took part in committee functions). In Area III (Marathon) all committee members were interviewed. Committee meetings that were observed included two in Area I, one in Area II and two in Area III.

The committee meetings in each of the three areas were held on a weekly basis with between five and seven meetings being held in each area. Meetings prior to those observed were reconstructed by talks with the area directors. This reconstruction enabled the researchers to gain a better comprehension of the typicality of patterns observed in the meetings actually attended.

The research in each area was conducted in the following manner. First, each of the field directors were interviewed extensively. The interview with each director was designed to elicit information on key points regarding the mode of operations of the field staff, their conceptions of the role of the disaster relief advisory committee and their orientations toward the committee. In each instance, interviews were held on the basis of a "discussion". Where it seemed apparent that the director was merely providing perfunctory responses reflecting a defensive attitude, probing was utilized in order to determine how much of this response was actually a result of internalized organizational norms, and how much was a facade which could be removed in order to reveal the "true feelings" of the director. In the act of probing, the researchers were careful to avoid producing feelings of hostility on the part of the interviewee. Following the interviews with the directors, the conversations were recorded. Numerous sessions of this character were held in each area.

Casework supervisors were interviewed in much the same way as the directors, although considerably more emphasis was placed upon determining their conceptions of the instrumental utility of the committees in relation to the casework process. Caseworkers were individually interviewed, with special emphasis upon the role which the committee

played in aiding the caseworker in the development of the case as well as the caseworker's evaluation and interpretation of the committee's intended functions.

Individual committee members were interviewed in physical locations separate from that of the Red Cross unit. Generally these took place in their homes or places of business. The principal focus in these interviews was on their overt actions while on the committee, the extent of their involvement in the situation, their feelings toward the committee and their feelings toward the Red Cross organization as a whole, arising as a result of their association with it through the committee. The committee member's conceptions of the purpose of the committee and their conceptions of its effective influence upon case decisions were also explored.

Observations of committee meetings focused on 1) the mode of operation during the committee meetings, 2) the degree of involvement in the committee meeting proceedings on the part of committee members, and 3) the manner in which the Red Cross staff handled the cases presented to the committee for review. Observations also were made of each Red Cross field unit in terms of its general orientation to the surrounding environment, as well as internal relationships. To this end, informal interviews were conducted with other staff members besides those dealing solely with case development. These included "intake" and "disbursement" supervisors and building inspectors.

Information on the general community characteristics was gathered from committee members, Red Cross caseworkers, chambers of commerce, local welfare workers, and informal contacts in the community at large, as well as from published statistical sources. A "Warner approach" of

assessment was used in these areas and in judging class occupancy of committee members.¹

The Disaster

Originating south of Puerto Rico, "Hurricane Donna" struck the Florida Keys on September 10, 1960 with winds reaching a velocity of 135 miles per hour in parts of the area from south of Marathon in the Lower Keys to Tavernier in the Upper Keys area. As a result of the storm, some eighty per cent of the buildings in Marathon were damaged. Further, the Keys water main burst and parts of the overseas highway were destroyed. Early reports declared that some 40,000 people were evacuated from the area to Red Cross emergency shelters. "Hurricane Donna" was the worst storm to hit the Keys Area since 1935.

The next day, September 11, the hurricane swung in a north-easterly direction across the Florida Peninsula and continued along the eastern coast of the nation. As a result of the large-scale damage in Florida, the Red Cross immediately dispatched ninety-five disaster workers to Florida for its largest hurricane mobilization effort ever undertaken.

Hardest hit on the Florida peninsula were the coastal city and adjacent areas of Fort Myers and, to a lesser extent, the communities of Naples, Wauchula, Bartow, Lakeland, Arcadia and Orlando.

Eight persons were killed in Florida as a result of the disaster. Total destruction was estimated at nearly one billion dollars. Twenty-seven counties in Florida were declared disaster areas.

General Gruenther, head of the American Red Cross reported to President Eisenhower that, immediately after the storm, 45,000 persons were housed and fed by the Red Cross in agency centers in Florida, It

¹Warner, Meeker, and Mells, Social Class in America, New York: American Book-Stratford Press, Inc., 1949) pp. 1-44.

was further reported that 741 houses and trailers were completely destroyed. Further, 12, 323 dwellings were damaged of which 3,200 were left uninhabitable.

As previously stated, the location of the research for this study was in the three areas most badly damaged by the storm. These were; 1) the Fort Myers area, 2) the Upper Keys area, particularly the Islamorada and Tavernier communities, and 3) the Lower Keys area which included the community of Marathon.

Descriptions of the Areas Studied

Area I, Fort Myers, Lee County.

Fort Myers, the county seat of Lee county is located on the west side of the lower half of the Florida Peninsula near the mouth of the Caloosahatche River. The population of Fort Myers is 23,000, with a marked increase of this figure in the winter months, due to the influx of tourists and winter residents.

The main source of income in this area is from the tourist trade and related industries, as well as from the sale of real estate and some commercial fishing. Many land and housing development projects exist in Lee County, and there is a plethora of trailer courts and motels.

There are no single large industries in the Lee County area. Of a list of sixty-seven industries compiled by the local chamber of commerce, fifty industries have less than twenty employees, of which forty-two industries employ less than ten persons. Ten industries employ between twenty-one and forty persons. Three industries employ between forty-one and sixty persons. The nature of the industries is widely

diversified. The top five industries listed in rank order of frequency are: construction and related industries, fishing and related industries, agricultural-related industries, commercial printing establishments, and boat and marine equipment establishments.

Socially, the dominant power within the community appears to be centered among a few old established southern families. However, their position is being threatened by the growing number of residents from northern states. As a result of this influx, some antipathy exists between the long term residents or "Crackers" and the more recently arrived northern "Yankees". In the main, the focus of this antipathy is upon the traditionally based conservatism of the south versus the so-called liberalism represented by the faction from the north. Politically it represents a challenge to the dominance of the powerful local Democratic Party by northern businessmen and professionals aligned with the Republican Party.

Although the originally economic dominant groups in the area achieved their position as land owners, new means of achieving wealth appear to be based mainly upon the professions, construction, real estate and related industries. It is in these areas of endeavor that the comparatively short-term residents are successfully challenging the traditionally based community leadership.

According to informants, the community as a whole has been quite anti-labor in the past. Only at present are labor unions beginning to become successfully established, particularly in construction, electrical, and communications industries. Having representatives of organized labor on a community representative group, such as was intended in choosing disaster relief advisory committee members was

unprecedented in the Fort Myers area.

A high degree of social isolation exists between Negroes and Puerto Ricans who live on the southern outskirts of Fort Myers and the white inhabitants of the city. The former groups are employed mainly in construction, in agriculture, and as domestic servants by private families. These groups wield little or no influence in the community at large. There was no representation of these groups on the advisory committee.

Area II, Upper Keys Area.

Although the jurisdiction of the Red Cross field staff extended from the Miami suburb of Coconut Grove, south along the Keys to Craig on Long Key, the main area of Red Cross activity was centered upon the keys from Key Largo, south of Craig. Prior to the impact of the hurricane, evacuees had been sent to Homestead, 13 miles south to Coconut Grove. The base of Red Cross operations under study was located in Islamorada and also included the community of Tavernier in the Upper Keys area.

The permanent population of the Upper Keys area is 3,770 according to the Miami office of the census bureau. This figure is more than doubled during the tourist season which extends from December 1 to April 1.

The principal means of livelihood in the area includes tourist - related industries such as motels, trailer courts and deep sea fishing. Real estate, the building industry, and to a lesser extent, retail businesses also exist in this area. Some commercial fishing is also done.

Length of residence in this area determines to a large degree the

social status and occupations. Long-term residents occupy the prestigious positions in the community. Social influence appears to be wielded principally in descendants of four long-established families. Some of the original families, known as "Conchs" settled in this area during and after the Civil War on newly established pineapple plantations. Main lines of social cleavage appear to be between those who gain a livelihood by fishing as opposed to those gaining a livelihood by other means, with the fisher folk occupying the lowest strata. Leadership in the area appears to be held by only a few individuals. There is no Negro settlement as such in the area.

Social intercourse is on an extremely informal and apparently intimate basis with the more prestigious individuals taking a somewhat patronizing attitude toward the rest of the population. Acquaintances are on a first name basis, and apparently, no one escapes the scrutiny of his neighbor.

Politically, the area is tightly controlled by a Democratic Party machine, and although there were expressions of dissatisfaction by some of the informants, there appeared to be no real threat to its continued existence. Labor is still unorganized, nor is there apparently any movement toward this end.

Damage left by the hurricane was considerably more severe in this area as compared to Area I. During the research period the populace was concerned with repairing motels, restaurants, boats, piers and other structures before the tourist season was to open.

Area III, Lower Keys Area.

Immediately prior to the impact of the hurricane, Red Cross headquarters had been set up at Key West and had continued there for

a brief period. However, since little if no damage occurred south of Key Vacas, 54 miles to the north of Key West, the field headquarters was moved to the community of Marathon, located on Key Vacas. The total area of jurisdiction extended from Craig on Long Key to Key West. The main damage and subsequent Red Cross activity was centered on Key Vacas. Grassy Key and the lower part of Long Key to the north of Key West.

Marathon, with a permanent population of 4,296 is the main center of social and economic activity in this area. As in the communities in Area II, the population more than doubles during the tourist season.

The distinctiveness of this area as compared to that of Areas I and Area II is the comparative new development of the area. Most of the present stage of development of the community of Marathon is the result of a resurgence of a land boom beginning in 1954. Economic activity is completely oriented toward the tourist trade, except for a comparatively small amount of commercial fishing.

Social status appears to be based upon organizational membership and length of residency in the area, although there are extremely few long established families. In this regard, the area appears to bear all the traits of a typical American suburb but without an orientation toward a larger urban area. Prestigious individuals appear to have gained their status by affluence and membership in the more exclusive of the many social organizations that exist in the area. Social cleavage is further maintained by geographic location, with the more affluent persons living in select and exclusive areas.

At the bottom of the social scale are the inhabitants of "The Rock", a Negro ghetto on the "bay side" of the community of Marathon. These persons make a living as domestic servants,

construction workers and related occupations. Two Negro employees of a prominent household were members of the Red Cross advisory committee.

Politically, this area, like the whole Keys area, is dominated by a Democratic party machine. Republicans are only nominally represented in the area. A faction of the local Democratic party, which is growing in strength, appears to pose a considerable threat to the ruling political clique. As in Area II, there is no active movement of labor unions in the area. Also there is a typical absence of lower class representation in the civic functions in this area.

Evidence of the hurricane's damage was much more in existence in this area than in the first two areas. Although most of the damage done to structures belonging to the more affluent classes was covered by insurance, comparatively large resource allocations were required by the Red Cross to meet the needs of those not as fortunately endowed.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have sought to clarify the distinction between the social organization and the bureaucracy as a specific form of social organization. We have noted that bureaucracies as such have no substantive goals but rather are a means by which an organization may more efficiently accomplish its goals. We have pointed out that although organizations are formed for the achievement of a variety of goals, the analytic goal of maintaining the viability of the organization appears to gain particular prominence. Although the concern for the organization's viability appears to be a result of the perceived necessity to

accomplish the organization's substantive goals, as will be shown later. maintenance of the organization may become a primary goal for which substantive goals are structured.

The problem of goal-setting is particularly crucial for the organization if it is to remain extant. Because the organization can exist only to the degree that it is permitted to do so by its social environment, goal-structuring must be constantly altered according to the demands of the society. On the other hand the organization will use its own means to gain acceptance of its goals by its environment. Hence goal-structuring is not a passive unconscious modification of environmental demands, but rather is a continuous conscious effort on the part of policy-makers of the organization to insure that the organization is made acceptable to its environment.

To be acceptable to the environment requires that the organization successfully integrate its activities into the external social system. For the Red Cross, successful maintenance of its existence requires that it successfully integrate its operations at two levels. At the national level of American Society, the organization must adhere to a universalistic value orientation in its operational goals. However, since the organization must rely almost totally upon locally dominated funds and volunteer labor for its very existence, it must successfully integrate its operations at the local level, which may be oriented to more particularistic values. That the Red Cross is aware of the complications involved in this bi-level integration is apparent by the elaborate organizational prescriptions that govern its disaster relief operations. Included in these prescriptions is the establishment of a Disaster Relief Advisory Committee. This committee is ostensibly

appointed to assist the Red Cross field unit in assessing disaster-caused need, interpreting the community standards to the unit. Interpreting Red Cross operations to the community, aiding in the solving of problems that may arise during the course of the relief operations and aiding in the decisions affecting awards granted by the Red Cross to disaster victims.

It is the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee that is the primary focus of our study. We will be interested in the degree to which the committee achieved its prescribed goals as well as in explicating those factors which limited, its achievement. In this regard it was felt necessary to explain in some detail the characteristics of the three areas under study in which Hurricane Donna struck.

Because this study is largely exploratory in nature, no specific hypotheses were outlined prior to the field research. Instead, general interests guided the study. These interests were focused upon (1) the degree to which the committee accomplished its prescribed goals (2) factors accounting for departures from the achievement of these goals and (3) important latent functions which the committee served for Red Cross organization. Toward these interests the field research was centered upon those elements of disaster relief activity having direct bearing upon the activities of the committee in each of the three areas studied. For a better understanding of the functions of the committee, we will want to first consider those factors in the history of the Red Cross which led to the complexity of problems attendant to the integration of the organization to its environment. In this regard, the following chapter will be devoted to tracing the evolution of

the Red Cross from a loosely organized voluntary association to a highly complex, bureaucratically structured organization which is dependent for its existence upon donated funds.

Chapter II

THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

Introduction

In this chapter, we are principally concerned with an analysis of the over-all structure of the American National Red Cross organization. We will be mainly interested in (1) how the analytic goal of viability has been exemplified in the history of crises of the American Red Cross and (2) the extent to which substantive organizational goals have been modified in the course of adjusting to changes in the external environment and in keeping with the analytic goal of viability. We will also note (3) the evolvement of the national organization from a small scale, simple, non-bureaucratically structured organization, characterized by the rule of a charismatic leader, to a large-scale, complex, bureaucratically-structured organization, characterized by the dominance of rational-legal standards of authority, and (4) how the problems of integration of the organization's operations at the local level have increased with the increasing complexity of the internal structure of the national organization, with the multiplication of local chapters, and with instances of a growing and widespread hostility toward the organization.

An analysis of the American National Red Cross organization can best be presented by noting four main stages of its historical development. These stages may be delineated by three periods of crisis for the organization. In this chapter we will consider each phase in the evolvement of the Red Cross, bearing in mind the four previously mentioned primary interests. Following the consideration of these four

phases, emphasis will then be given to an analysis of the present organizational structure. Finally the operational goals of disaster relief activity will be pointed out.

Developmental Phases of the American National Red Cross

Phase I (1864-1905)

The original group which fostered the movement leading to the inception of the American Red Cross was made up of women volunteers whose main purpose was to administer aid and relief to the wounded of the American Civil War. Following the War, Clara Barton, the main organizer among this group was profoundly influenced by the international Red Cross movement and sought to establish an organization along similar lines in America. As a result of Miss Barton's efforts, the American Red Cross Society was officially founded in 1881. In 1882, the American Red Cross became a recognized member of the international body. Originally organized for the relief of war victims, the American organization soon expanded its goals to include the relief of victims of peace-time disaster.

During its formative years, the Red Cross organization was completely dominated by Clara Barton. It was upon her that the total operation of the Red Cross depended. As a result of the charismatic quality of her leadership, the organization was kept informally structured on a more or less Gemeinschaft-like basis, with little concern for standardization and routinization of functions or the delegation of authority. As head of the emerging welfare organization, Barton was little concerned with public sentiment, as long

as there were funds available to carry out the functions entrusted to it. In this regard she appeared to reflect the then current attitude of the so-called economic "empire builders" who tended to maintain an attitude of "the public be damned!"

In June, 1900, the organization was incorporated by an Act of Congress. The federal charter granted to the Red Cross fully authorized activities which it had in actuality been carrying on for the previous twenty years. The granting of this charter was an especially significant event in that it not only broadened the scope of Red Cross activities and defined its purposes more clearly, but it also gave the organization an official status, which it had previously lacked. In the charter, three "obligations" were placed upon the Red Cross. These were: (1) to furnish volunteer aid to sick and wounded of the armies in time of war; (2) to serve as a medium of communication between the people of the United States and their army and navy; and (3) "to carry on a peacetime program of national and international relief to mitigate the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great calamities and to devise and carry on measures for preventing such suffering".¹ In addition to these stated goals of the organization, the Red Cross was required to submit annual reports of receipts and expenditures to the federal government. Due to the organization's status as a federally chartered organization, and the specific purposes incorporated in its charter, the Red Cross developed a close association with the federal government over the course of time. Indeed, the President of the United States and his Cabinet served as an honorary "Board of Consultation" for the Red Cross organization.

In what has been described as the "Progressive Era", beginning with

¹Dulles, Foster Rhea, The American Red Cross, A History, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950) p. 1.

the turn of the century, the American public evinced a growing humanitarian feeling, coupled with a concern for greater public responsibility of relief and welfare agencies. Reflective of these general concerns, the contributing constituency of the American Red Cross sought to initiate more responsible policies of the organization, particularly in regard to its handling of contributed funds. The mounting threat to the personal direction by Miss Barton of the national organization was culminated by charges of incompetence in the direction of relief activities in the Galveston, Texas tidal-wave and hurricane disaster of September 8, 1900. An intra-organizational conflict of considerable magnitude developed as a direct result of the pressure for policy changes. Under the leadership of Mabel Boardman, a woman of considerable wealth and influence, an attack was launched against the personalistic direction of Clara Barton which was particularly directed at her fiscal policies. The success of the Boardman forces in June, 1904, initiated a new phase of the history of the Red Cross.

Phase II (1905-1918).

As a result of loss of support (which included the President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt) for her methods of operation, Clara Barton, the original leader of the Red Cross movement in America, "gracefully" resigned in 1904. In January, 1905, the Red Cross was reincorporated with a new charter which maintained the three original purposes of the organization. However, its structure was considerably changed. The major changes specified in the new charter required that there be a governing body consisting of a Central Committee of eighteen members, of whom six were to be elected by the incorporators of the

organization, six chosen by state and territorial societies, and six appointed by the President of the United States. The last six were to consist of the chairman of the Central Committee and five Cabinet members, representing the Departments of State, War, Navy, Treasury and Justice. In addition, it was provided that the War Department annually audit the accounts of the Red Cross. Since 1904, the Presidents of the United States have served as Honorary Presidents or Honorary Chairmen of the National organization.

Although Mabel Boardman never aspired to the visible office of authority in the organization, it was her influence that determined the character of the Red Cross from 1905 until her death in 1946. Under Boardman's direction, efforts were made to develop the American National Red Cross into an efficient organization. This encompassed a program of maintaining contributing members throughout the nation by which reliable means of environmental support could be assured. To these ends, delegation of authority and decentralization of organizational functions was initiated, while maintaining a strong governing body. In order to maintain assurance of environmental support, Boardman felt the organization should be controlled and led by influential leaders of American society, with primary emphasis upon wealth and prestige. She further sought to expand the number of local chapters throughout the country in order to attract a large supportive base made up mainly of the wealthy and local influentials. Originally, these local chapters were viewed principally as sources for eliciting financial support to the national organization. Substantive operational goals for these chapters were: (1) to increase membership in the organization, (2) to participate in "general Red Cross activities", and (3) to be prepared for action

when needed. As can be seen, these goals were sufficiently broad to allow for considerable flexibility in interpretation. This was in keeping with the general conception of the local chapter as a means for eliciting support for the national organization, both in terms of funds received and in terms of favorable publicity at the local level.

The enrollment of contributing members to the local units of the national organization was comparatively small. In 1908, there was a total enrollment throughout the nation of only 11,000. Further, there was considerable disappointment with the inactivity of the existing local chapters. It soon became apparent therefore, that to maintain interest on a broad scope, new substantive goals would be needed to contribute to the organization's viability if it was to remain effective in carrying out emergency relief. To this end, the operational program of the national organization became increasingly diversified. In 1909 a nursing service was begun, headed by the National Committee on Red Cross Nursing Service. Besides providing a pool of nurses in the event of a disaster, this service also promoted classes for women in home nursing, hygiene and first aid. First aid work was particularly successful and in 1909 there was an establishment of a First Aid Department. This Department later came to include a successful program of water safety and life-saving classes. Also during this same period a public health program was instituted which encompassed programs of municipal sanitation, preventive medicine, and dietetics.

In regard to the structure of the national organization during this period, authority was delegated to three main bodies. These were: (1) the Central Committee, (2) an executive committee, and (3) the departments

of Civilian Relief and Military Relief. Various subsidiary units complemented the above bodies.

With the entrance of the United States into the First World War, the size and importance of the Red Cross grew to the extent that it was a recognized integral part of the war effort. Besides carrying out its traditional role of nursing and furnishing entertainment to the allied troops, it also concerned itself with the care of many civilian war refugees. It was during this time, however, that the army took over the field medical units of the Red Cross and incorporated them into its own medical corps.

Following the First World War, the problems of reconversion to peacetime operation resulted in new tensions upon the organization. An issue of contention within the organization was the extent to which the Red Cross should maintain peacetime operations on as huge a scale as those it had supported during the War. Further, there was pressure brought to bear for increased professionalization of Red Cross personnel. The resulting issue of salaried versus volunteer workers in the national organization caused further dissension within the organization. With the substantive goals of a peace-time operation less salient than those during the war, chapter apathy became a serious problem to the national organization. Various means were instituted by the national organization for apparently no other purpose than to keep the local chapters active as a means to sustain membership interest.

The developing crisis that brought the second phase of Red Cross organizational policies to an end was climaxed by a critical public charging it with extravagance and mismanagement of funds during and immediately after the war. Of far greater importance for the internal

structure of the organization during this period was the issue of policy change regarding the expanding of peacetime activities and subsequent hiring of professional workers.

Further ramifications were involved in the issues facing the Red Cross after the war. Chief of these was the loss of arbitrary policy decisions made by the national organization during the war. Instead, if the organization was to maintain active support, it was recognized that chapters would have to gain more importance in policy decisions.

Phase III (1918-1941).

To meet the threats posed as a result of environmental pressures upon the Red Cross, structural reorganization was undertaken. The focus of attention was shifted to the local chapters, and efforts were made to change the somewhat autonomous nature of the chapters to more integral parts of the national organization. Under the stated goal of "streamlining that would make both for efficiency and lower operating costs", reorganization was based upon more centralization of authority and simplification in the structure of the Red Cross. There was a creation of a line-and-staff form of organization, accompanied by an emphasis upon utmost economy in Red Cross operations. Further, there was an emphasis upon increased professionalization of Red Cross services. As a result of the need for a new, main substantive goal by which the activities of the Red Cross could be maintained, it was declared in an official announcement from national headquarters "that public health in the United States was to become a major concern of the American Red Cross in the days of peace".¹

¹Ibid, p. 219.

Concurrently, with the development of the public health program, attempts were made to facilitate better working relationships with the growing number of salaried professional workers and the Red Cross volunteers. In this regard, efforts were made to achieve a clearer delineation of volunteer and professional roles. The result of these efforts, was and still is only partially successful.¹ In regard to the public health program, in an era of isolationism and individualism the importance of such a program was only minimally recognized by the general contributing public.

To supplement the more diffuse substantive goals of maintaining readiness for disaster relief and promoting the public health program, additional activities were promoted to increase local chapter involvement in the larger organization. Initiated during this time were the Motor Services, the Gray Lady Service and the Volunteer Nurse's Aide Service. In addition there was a Braille Corps which promoted Braille transcription. Volunteers in the clerical field were included in the Administration Service, the Social Welfare Aide Service and the Staff Aide Service.

¹ The crux of the problem appears to be based upon different interpretations as to the primacy of goals. Among professional workers there is apt to be a process of sanctification of the instrumental means of operation. Merton notes, in this regard that "through sentiment-formation, emotional dependence upon bureaucratic symbols and status, and affective involvement in spheres of competence and authority, there develop prerogatives involving attitudes of moral legitimacy which are established as values in their own right, and are no longer viewed as merely technical means for expediting administration". Social Theory and Social Structure, op cit. p. 202.

Contrasted to this orientation is the volunteer who is concerned only with the accomplishment of immediate goals and resents the intrusion of what appears to be the callous and officious manner of the professional. Particularly is this true in disaster work where local volunteer workers may be prone to resent the dominance of professionals who are strangers to the community and hence appear to the volunteer to be relatively unknowledgeable of the local situation.

The character of the organization was further modified by increased professionalization of its workers and a shift from reliance upon the wealthy to a broader base of public support. During the depression the functions of the Red Cross were considerably expanded, particularly with respect for caring for the destitute. However, with increasing governmental services, the public health program became almost non-existent as a main substantive goal. A continual effort was exerted to present a favorable image to the public as a result of accusations against the Red Cross' alleged anti-labor policies and racial discrimination. Pressure was thereupon brought to bear by the National organization to promote greater adherence of local chapters to the organization's announced policies.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the Red Cross assumed much the same role--except for its nursing services--as it had in World War I. In addition to these services an extensive blood bank program was developed. With the cessation of the war effort a major crisis again threatened the viability of the Red Cross organization. The Red Cross was again charged with irresponsibility and misuse of donated funds and supplies. The heightened sensitivity over democratic principles caused by the ideological conflict inherent in the war brought charges that the American National Red Cross was not democratically organized, particularly with respect to adequate chapter representation in decision making bodies. A final and perhaps more serious threat to the organization's existence was the increasing governmental services that were being made available to the general public in the years after the Second World War.

Phase IV (1945-Present).

The fourth phase of the existence of the Red Cross brought about considerable change in organizational substantive goals, both long-range and operational. The vast increase of governmental services both on the international scene and within the national boundaries forced the Red Cross to drastically alter its past functions. For example, on the international scene the activity of United Nations missions has almost completely taken over programs of relief to war refugees. Further, the initiative of the American Red Cross in independently undertaking international operations has been sharply curtailed by the United States involvement in international political and economic rivalries. As a result of the implications of international relief and rehabilitation work, the international activities of the American Red Cross appear to have become more restricted and to have come more and more to depend upon United States foreign policy considerations.

On the national scene, increasing governmental services, as for example the Civil Defense program, and its involvement in disaster relief activities has posed very real threats to the continued identity of the Red Cross organization. Social security measures and the maintenance of government welfare services for the unemployed have drastically reduced the involvement of the Red Cross in these areas in which it once was active. The seriousness of these threats to the organization was exemplified during the national convention in 1949. In a speech entitled "Can the Red Cross Survive", the problem was posed as being not only one of re-evaluating the mission of the Red Cross, but also whether "the Red Cross, founded in the 19th century still had

any place in the vastly altered world of the 20th century".

Concomitant with the problem of staving off environmental threats to its existence by governmental bodies, the national organization was under considerable pressure after the Second World War from local chapters demanding more adequate chapter representation in the decision-making bodies.

In response to the problems facing it during this most recent phase of the evolution of the Red Cross, two innovations were employed to maintain its continued existence. In regard to goal-structuring, the Red Cross formed, as its paramount substantive goal, a national blood donor program. This is currently an ongoing program, carried on mainly at the local community level, and involving the accessibility of a supply of blood for the needs of local hospitals and for emergency situations.

With reference to the demands for more adequate chapter representation in the policy-making bodies of the Red Cross, an Advisory Committee on Organization was set up in 1946 which subsequently made recommendations for the reorganization of the national organization. As a result of these recommendations, Congress, while maintaining the original charter "obligations", adopted as law, the committee's recommendations in a new charter. The recommendations consisted mainly of three structural goals; (1) that the Red Cross become more representative of the nation it serves, (2) that the governing organization truly represent and be responsive to the entire membership of the Red Cross, and finally (3) that the organizational structure lend itself to the most effective handling of the activities of the Red Cross.¹

¹ Hurd, Charles, The Compact History of the American Red Cross, (New York, Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1959) p. 253-254.

Present Structure of the American National Red Cross

In order to gain a better understanding of the American National Red Cross as it now exists, we shall present an overview of its bureaucratic structure. After presenting the organizational structure, we will give special attention to the organization of the disaster relief operation.

As can be seen on page 53, at the top of the organizational structure, there are honorary offices. These are filled by the President, the Attorney General and the Treasurer of the United States. These offices are largely non-functional to the organization except to lend it a more "official" status.

The Board of Governors, having powers of "government, direction and management" appears to serve as a deciding body for organizational policy. Recommendations for policy changes frequently emerge from the managerial level of the vice presidents and may be acted upon by the Board. In addition, the Board has the power to appoint and remove all officers and employees of the Red Cross with the exception of the president.

The office of the president is a salaried position and is filled by election by Board members. Actual administrative duties are handled by this office. This involves delegating responsibility and insuring that actual policy decisions are carried out. The delegation of responsibility is divided among the vice presidents who are in charge of specific departments within the organization. The office of the chairman is elected by the Board. This office appears to serve largely a coordinating function among Board members.

The resulting modification of the structure of the national organization consisted of the following: the President of the United States became the honorary chairman of the organization with the right to name the chairman and eight members of the new fifty member Board of Bovernors. Of the remaining forty-two members of the Board thirty members were to be chosen by chapter elections at the annual conventions in successive blocks of ten, for three year terms. Further, each slate of candidates was to represent various geographical areas. The remaining twelve members of the fifty man body were to be chosen by the thirty-eight previously mentioned members from among persons of "national stature". These appointees, serving as members-at-large were to be representative of labor, the sciences, arts, and the professions.¹ The chairmanship was eliminated and principal administrative duties were placed in the office of the president. Administrative officers became vice-presidents headed by an executive vice-president and general manager. An additional change was made in 1954 when presidential duties were made separate from the position of chairman and "principal officer". A chairmanship was again created and a full-time president was installed, elected by the Board of Governors.

In the history of the American Red Cross, continual efforts on the part of the organization have resulted in the achievement of the analytic goal of viability. The organization as it now exists evinces a complex bureaucratic structure which has been a result of the concern for continued existence. The present structure of the Red Cross and its relationship to disaster relief activity will be considered next.

ORGANIZATION OF
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS
(APRIL 20, 1959)

HONORARY COUNSELOR
ATTORNEY GENERAL

HONORARY CHAIRMAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

HONORARY TREASURER

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

CHAIRMAN

PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT

SECRETARY
AND COUNSELOR

TREASURER

COMPTROLLER

- * Office of the budget
- * Office of accounting and auditing

VICE PRESIDENT

- * Service at military installations
- * Service in Mil. and vet. hospital
- * Service at VA offices
- * Home service
- * Supplemental recreational activities overseas
- * Office of telecommunications services
- * Overseas areas

SENIOR
VICE PRESIDENT

- * Office of volunteers
- * Domestic areas

VICE PRESIDENT

- * Disaster services
- * Blood program
- * Office of Personnel and training
- * Office of procedures management
- * General Supply
- * Office of machine records
- * Office Management

VICE PRESIDENT

- * Office of fund raising
- * Office of public information
- * Office of education relations
- * Convention office
- * Office of publications

VICE PRESIDENT

- * International relations
- * Safety services
- * Nursing services
- * Office of research information
- * Office of insurance

A direct line relationship, headed by the Senior Vice President connects the domestic areas and the local chapters with the national organization. The national organization is divided into four domestic areas; the Pacific Area, the Midwestern Area, the Southeastern Area and the Eastern Area. Figure II shows the organization structure of a domestic area. In the area organization structure, each regional manager is assigned jurisdiction over specific states in the total area. The area organization serves to coordinate the activities of the local chapters.

Figure III on page 56 shows the structure of the chapter. The chapter director is responsible both for the local program and for maintaining organizational functions consistent with the larger organization. The board of directors at the local level acts in much the same role as the Board of Governors at the national level. The role of the chapter director then becomes one of familiarizing the local board with national policies as well as obtaining their approval for carrying out local operations. The chapter chairman may be a volunteer or a salaried worker, depending upon the size of the chapter and the scope of its operations. Members on the board typically are influential citizens in the local community.

Disaster relief operations are directly under the jurisdiction of the area organization. The figure on page 57 shows this relationship. Notice that the field director is in a direct subordinate relationship to the area office. It is upon him, typically acting in close cooperation with the casework supervisor, that direct responsibility for disaster operation policies is centered. His authority is limited by a fixed sum of allocation of organizational resources. Need

AREA ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure II





Figure III

ORGANIZATION OF DISASTER RELIEF FIELD OPERATIONS



* Assigned when expanded operation warrants.

* Assigned only to operations with large number of casualties or where major health problems exist.

Figure IV

requests that are proven to be valid, which exceed this sum are submitted to the area office for a final decision. Notice in the figure that the local chapter is relegated to a mere staff function in the disaster operations. In addition to the local chapter serving a staff function to the Red Cross field director is the coordinator of volunteers in the local community and the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee. A liaison link is further established with governmental bodies represented in the area of disaster. The disaster relief operation is completely dominated by a professional corps of trained workers mobilized into the stricken site by the area headquarters. This staff is subordinate only to the area office.

Operational Goals of Disaster Relief Activity

In disaster relief activity, two sources formally outlining the duties or operational goals of the Red Cross may be cited. The organizational charter states the American Red Cross is to "continue and carry on a system of national and international relief in time of war and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for preventing the same".¹ The Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook further states:

"Hence, in the field of disaster relief the Red Cross has both a legal and moral mandate that it has neither the power nor right to surrender. It cannot abdicate the responsibilities placed upon it by the federal government. The Red Cross may establish the scope of its program, its

¹ Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook, sec. 1, p. 1.

policies, and methods within the framework established by the Congressional Charter, but it must comply with the charge to mitigate the sufferings caused by disaster".¹

Disaster relief has been one of the prime reasons for the existence of the Red Cross organization. The ends involved in disaster relief are two-fold: (1) the mitigation of human suffering, and (2) the conduction of relief activities in such a way as to insure continued community support of the Red Cross as a permanent national organization.

With increasing governmental services being given in terms of welfare and the involvement of government and other agencies in disaster relief, it has become imperative that the Red Cross clearly define the explicit duties which it is to perform at a disaster site. A whole section in the Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook is devoted to the enunciation of the duties of the Red Cross as contrasted to the federal government during a disaster. In the main, division of duties is based upon a protective function of property and personnel assumed by the government while the Red Cross assumes responsibility for "the relief of persons in need as a result of disaster". In the following discussion of the operational goals of the disaster relief operation we will briefly consider three aspects of the operation, namely operational goals in the predisaster period, the "emergency" period and the rehabilitation period.

In regard to the operational goals in the predisaster period, prior to the impact of the disaster, a basic problem exists in keeping the organization at the chapter level in a constant state of preparedness.

¹Ibid, sec. 1, p. 2.

Thus, steps are taken, via training programs to develop capable personnel, able to act in a meaningful way toward the alleviation of suffering in the event of a disaster. In this respect, many local communities have a Red Cross disaster committee which is trained and oriented solely for disaster relief activity.

Since there will be lax periods between disasters, continuous projects are devised to keep interest in the local units as well as the national organization on an active level. As previously described, the blood bank program is the main organizational activity serving this function.¹ There are also many less broad functions carried out by the local chapters.

With reference to the operational goals during the emergency phase, The Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook states that emergency assistance by the Red Cross is "designed to mitigate the suffering caused by the disaster immediately upon its occurrence through the provision of food, clothing, shelter, and medical nursing or hospital care on the basis of evident need".² To this end, aid is given to disaster victims during this period without question. The Red Cross further acts in assisting evacuations of persons and in providing services such as food and coffee canteens to personnel engaged in preparatory activity in the immediate period previous to the impact of

¹In regard to the Blood Program, Dulles writes "such a project represented an opportunity for service which would not conflict with governmental welfare work, would be of great value in the event of war as well as meeting the immediate needs of civilians, and was conspicuously in line with Red Cross idealism and experience". Dulles, op cit, p. 527

²Disaster Relief Handbook, op cit. sec. 1, p. 7.

disaster. It furnishes similar services in the period immediately following the impact of the disaster.

The transition from emergency aid given on the basis of evident need, to the rehabilitation period where aid is given on the basis of evident need, to the rehabilitation period where aid is given on the basis of "actual" need, is termed by the organization as a "tender period". Involved here is the likelihood of misunderstanding, by elements of environment, of the change of emphasis in assessing need. Assessment of need entails minute evaluation of the resources of the disaster victim and his ability to provide help for himself. In order to insure continued environmental support for disaster rehabilitation activities, stress is laid upon the necessity of providing effective interpretation to the "unnamed yet powerful leadership that exists within the affected area".¹

Organizational goals during the rehabilitation phase are stated in the Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook as follows;

"The objective of Red Cross disaster rehabilitation is to assist an individual or a family in re-establishing its capacity to provide these basic needs required to reach and maintain its predisaster standard of living. In fulfilling this objective, the Red Cross meets needs by giving the assistance determined necessary by the family and the Red Cross. The Red Cross is primarily concerned with the adequacy or inadequacy of a family's resources to meet disaster-caused problems . . . The Red Cross deals directly and positively with the material losses and the injury and illness that follow disaster by giving assistance when it is determined that the applicant has disaster-caused needs he is unable to meet himself."²

¹Ibid, sec. 5, p. 13.

²Ibid, sec. 1, p. 8

It is upon the rehabilitation period that the remainder of our study will be centered.

Summary

In this chapter we have traced the development of the national organization of the Red Cross from its beginnings as a movement based mainly on charismatic leadership, to what is at present a highly developed bureaucracy. We have seen how, with each period of crisis, the analytic goal of continued existence gained primary importance. The result of the concern for this analytic goal was a recurring change of substantive goals. This change in substantive goals was shown to demarcate four distinct phases in the development of the Red Cross. Problems of integrating the national organization at the local level increased, particularly with regard to (1) greater professionalization of services, (2) the increasing importance of local chapters in the national organization, and (3) the necessity to foster amicable environmental relations for the continued support of the organization.

It is apparent that the Red Cross has been successful in adjusting its substantive goals to counter threats from the environment and thus maintain its goal of viability. In seeking to account for the continued existence of some organizations and the demise of others, Blau suggests two contributing factors. These are (1) the degree of identification of personnel with the organization and the resulting concern for the defense of the organization against environmental threats, and (2) the degree of acceptance of the organization by its environment.¹ The

¹Blau, op cit. pp. 94-96

high degree of achievement in relation to these two factors appear to be a basic cause for the continued existence of the organization.

In regard to disaster relief activity it was shown how substantive goals were structured in the predisaster stage, the emergency stage and rehabilitation stage of disaster. The success of maintaining organizational readiness and the actual carrying out of disaster relief also appears to depend upon the identity of functionaries with the Red Cross and the degree of acceptance by the local community. In subsequent chapters, we will continue to be interested in the means used by the Red Cross in gaining acceptance in its environment, particularly with respect to its disaster relief activities.

CHAPTER III

THE ACCOMPLISHMENT BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES ON THE FIRST FOUR PRESCRIBED OPERATIONAL GOALS

Introduction

This chapter will be concerned with the degree to which the disaster relief advisory committees fulfilled the first four functions for which they were formally created. Since the fifth stated function of the committees was the one around which the activities and efforts of both Red Cross staff and committee members centered primarily, it will be considered separately in Chapter IV. Before presenting the analysis of the effectiveness of the committees with respect to the first four stated functions, the manner in which the committee members were selected will be considered. Second, in order to provide a better perspective of the degree to which the various sectors of the communities were represented on the committees, an examination of the socio-economic backgrounds of committee members will be presented. Third, the extent of involvement of committee members in the Red Cross prior to their installment of the committees will be considered.

Selection of Committee Members and Composition of the Committees

In the following analysis of the committees, each area in which Red Cross disaster operations were centered will be considered separately. This will be done in order to show both the important similarities and selection process and committee composition.

Area I.

The procedure for the selection of advisory committee members in Area I differed somewhat in substance, but not in form, from that prescribed by the Red Cross organization. While the chapter chairman was involved by the area director in the formal selection of committee members, the chairman in this case did not actually serve as an important resource in establishing a roster of prospective committee members. In the area director's estimation, the chairman of the local chapter was not sufficiently knowledgeable concerning the requirements of the relief operation nor sufficiently acquainted with the capacities of local citizens to allow him to function as a resource person. The chapter chairman's social status in the community was not, in the field director's opinion, of such a character as to allow the chairman to have very much personal influence in the community. Therefore, the establishment of a roster of prospective committee members was arrived at through the help of two other persons with considerable status and influence in the community. The names of persons compiled in this manner were then discussed with the chapter chairman by the director. The chapter chairman subsequently contacted the persons suggested by the director, indicating to them that the area director desired to have a meeting with them for purposes of discussing the possibility of their participation on a disaster advisory committee. The area director, then, undertook to contact each of the persons who had indicated their interest and probable availability for service.

The committee, as finally constituted in Area I, was composed of fourteen individuals. Five were professionals, two were labor union officials, two were retired persons of which one was a former machinist

and the other a former lumber dealer, three were housewives representing their spouses occupation of law, real estate, and "undetermined". One member was a local businessman, and one was co-operator of a fishing supply center. Table I shows the rank order of these occupations. As shown in Table II, nine members were men and five were women. Table III shows the range of incomes of the committee. With respect to length of residence in the community, the majority of the members were relatively short-term residents, as shown in Table IV. Eight out of the total of thirteen respondents had resided in the area less than ten years. Six members had completed a college or university education, while two others had attended college. Three committee members held post-graduate degrees. This is shown in Table V. As indicated in Table VI, committee members were involved to some extent in a variety of local organizational affiliations. Business and professional organizations were among those with which committee members were most frequently affiliated. Table VII shows the social class ranking of the committee members. As can be seen, the majority of committee members were ranked in the upper-middle class.

It may be observed from Table VIII that half of the disaster advisory committee members had been associated at one time or another, with the local Red Cross, either as chapter members or as members of the local disaster committee. In addition, two members had also been active in soliciting for funds for the Red Cross and one had had previous contact with the Red Cross through a training program. Thus, of the fourteen members, two had been associated with the Red Cross in some capacity prior to their appointment to the committee. Only four committee members in Area I had had no previous association with the Red Cross.

Table I

Occupations of committee Members

Occupation*	Area I	Area II	Area III
Local Government		1	
Clergy	1	3	2
Physician		1	
Lawyer	2	1	
Building Industry	1	1	2
Education	1	1	
Social Welfare	2		2
Local Retail Business	1	2	3
Non-Local Business		1	
Insurance			1
Real Estate	1	1	1
Skilled Worker	1		
Fishing related occupation	1	1	1
Service Occupations			2
Organized Labor	2		
Undetermined	1		
Totals	14	13	14

*Occupations are based upon rank order given by the National Opinion Research Center, in "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation", in Class, Status, and Power, ed. Bendix and Lipset, Glencoe, Ill.; The Free Press, 1953, pp. 412-414. Where members were retired, their former occupations were listed. Ranking was based upon the occupation of the head of the household in cases where members were not gainfully employed.

Table II

Sex Composition

Sex	Area I	Area II	Area III
Male	9	12	10
Female	5	1	4
Totals	14	13	14

Table III

Income Distribution

Income	Area I	Area II	Area III
Below 4,000		1	1
4,000 but less than 6,000	4	1	3
6,000 but less than 8,000	2	1	2
8,000 but less than 10,000	2	3	1
10,000 but less than 15,000	3	1	4
15,000 and over		2	2
Totals	11	9	13

Table IV

Length of Residence in the Community

Number of Years	Area I	Area II	Area III
Less than 5	3	2	5
5 to 10	5	2	7
11 to 15	1	1	1
16 to 20	1		1
21 and over	3	5	
Totals	13	10	14

Table V
Educational Level

Amount of Education	Area I	Area II	Area III
No Formal Education			1
Grade School Only			
Some High School	2	1	1
Completed High School	1	3	3
Some College	2	1	7
Completed College	3	2	
Some Post-Grad, Schooling		1	
Advanced Degree	3	2	2
Totals	11	10	14

Table VI
Community Organization Representation On the Committee*

Type of Organization	Area I	Area II	Area III
Service Clubs	4	4	3
Fraternal Clubs		6	4
Veterans organizations		4	3
Community Interest organizations	8	4	5
Business and Professional groups	4	3	8
Non-vocational interest clubs	1	5	4
Community voluntary units		5	4
Miscellaneous			4
Unspecified	1		
None			2
Total Membership	18	31	37

*This table is based upon 12 respondents in Area I, 10 respondents in Area II and 14 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses. For a detailed listing of organizations, see Table I, Appendix A.

Table VII

Social Class Occupancy of Committee Members*

Occupancy	Area I	Area II	Area III
Upper	1	2	1
Upper-Middle	9	6	9
Lower-Middle	1	3	2
Upper-Lower	1		2**
Lower-Lower			
Totals***	12	11	14

*Class ranking was based upon a modification of Warner's "Index of Status Characteristics". A seven point scale was used in evaluating occupation, source of income, type of dwelling and dwelling area. These were then weighted as follows: Occupation: 4, Source of Income: 3 House type 3, Dwelling area: 2. The resulting scores were then ranked in social classes according to Warner's table of "Social-Class Equivalents". This scale was slightly altered to eliminate the "indeterminate" rankings. Where information on house type was unavailable, amount of income was substituted. Where information on dwelling area was unavailable, education was substituted. Additional weight of 2 points was given to long-term residents in Area II where the importance of relationships with long established families contributed to local community evaluation. (See Warner, Meeker and Eells, Social Class in America, pp. 121-159)

**This figure represents a Negro married couple. Class occupancy was somewhat difficult to evaluate as they appeared to represent upper-middle class ranking of the local segregated Negro community which was a distinct and separate social system.

***Information was impossible to collect for two committee members in Area I and in Area II.

Table VIII

Association of Committee Members with the Red Cross

<u>Type of Association</u>	<u>Area I</u>	<u>Area II</u>	<u>Area III</u>
<u>Local Red Cross Chapter</u>			
<u>Board Member.</u>			
Past Member			1
Present Member	1		
<u>Local Red Cross Chapter Member.</u>			
Past Member	2		
Present Member	1		
<u>Local Disaster Committee Member.</u>			
Past Member	2	2	
Present Member	1	3	1
<u>Association through Red Cross</u>			
<u>training programs.</u>	1		1
<u>Participant in fund-drives and</u>			
<u>similar non-member activity.</u>	2	2	3
<u>Total number having association.</u>	10	7	6
<u>Members having had no association.</u>	4	3	7

Area II.

In Area II, circumstances prevented the field director from working with the Local Red Cross chapter chairman. The chapter headquarters was located seventy miles from the site of the disaster and subsequent Red Cross activity. Hence the field director, in consultation with the local emergency Red Cross disaster committee chairman, sought out those individuals whom he deemed most suitable for serving on the advisory committee. Since the community was small, with local interaction being on a comparatively intimate level, the director's choices were structured largely in terms of the more salient positions of authority of the committee members in the community. The role played by the disaster committee chairman was that of suggesting individuals to serve on the advisory committee. This was done after the director had explained to the local disaster committee chairman the criteria for choosing committee members. The director of the field unit thereupon evaluated the suggestions and finally, personally contacted the prospective members.

The total number of members on the advisory committee was thirteen. The director followed the organizational prescription that at least two members from the Red Cross chapter board be placed on the committee. However, the fact that the chapter was located at a considerable distance from the disaster site, prevented these members from being active in the committee. One of the two Red Cross board members (a non-local businessman) never attended any committee meetings, while the remaining one (a lawyer) attended only the first committee meeting. These two committee members were never contacted by Red Cross caseworkers.

A Catholic priest and a Methodist minister represented the clergy on the committee. However, a considerable amount of conflict developed

between the Methodist minister and the Red Cross field unit, and the minister subsequently was asked to resign on the basis of the organization's allegation that he had applied for aid for himself. The final number of active members on the committee, totaled ten.

Occupations of members are shown in Table I. Five members on the committee were professionals, six were in business or related fields, one was in the local county government, and one was a housewife who's spouse was a minister.

Sex composition of the committee in Area II, shown in Table II, was twelve men and one woman. Of the nine committee members who provided information on income, it may be seen in Table III that, a wide range of income levels was represented although six members were of the higher income range.

Length of residence in the community in Area II was about evenly divided between short and longer term residents, with six members living in the area only fifteen or less years and five of the eleven respondents living in the community twenty-one years or more. Five members completed college or its equivalent, with three of the five having had some additional education. All members except one, had completed high school. (See Tables IV and V.)

Table VII shows the ranking of the members of the committee in Area II. Two members were ranked as upper class, six were ranked as upper-middle class, and 3 were ranked in the lower-middle class. Table VIII shows that five members had had an active association with the Red Cross prior to becoming a committee member, while two had participated in non-member activities. Only three members had never been associated in any way with the Red Cross organization.

Area III.

The choosing of disaster advisory committee members in area III was somewhat complicated by problems similar to those in Area II. Again the Red Cross chapter headquarters was quite far removed from the site of the disaster. Further, the field director had considerable difficulty eliciting the support and cooperation of the chapter chairman.

Thus, in a manner similar to Area II, the director relied upon the local Red Cross disaster committee chairman, a locally well-known businessman, for aid in selecting committee members. The basis of selection was largely in terms of their occupying the more obviously prominent social and economic positions in the community. Committee members were contacted individually and asked to participate on the committee by the director, who was accompanied by the disaster committee chairman.

The disaster relief advisory committee in Area III, totaled fourteen members. Included in the membership were a Negro man and his wife. Only in this area were Negroes represented on the advisory committee. As shown on Table I, the occupational composition of the committee was four professionals, eight persons involved in some type of business, and two in service occupations. Ten members were men and four were women. Table III, shows the income distribution of the members.

Length of residence of the committee members in Area III was comparatively short. Table IV shows that twelve of the fourteen members resided in the area ten years or less. Only two members had lived in the area more than ten years. Although most of the committee members had not completed college or university training, two members did have advanced degrees. Seven members had attained some formal education

above the high school level. Three members graduated from high school while two members had never attained a high school education. This is shown on Table V.

Table VI shows that the largest group of organizations represented on the committee was business and professional groups. The remaining types of organizations were fairly evenly represented. Two committee members belonged to no formal organization. Ranking of the committee members as shown on Table VII resulted in one member in the upper class, nine members in the upper-middle strata, two members in the lower-middle class, and two in the upper-lower class.

Over half of the committee members had never had any previous association with the Red Cross. As shown in Table VIII, four members had only a nominal association while only two had at some time been an active participant in the local Red Cross organization.

The Degree of Achievement of the First Four Prescribed

Committee Functions.

Function One.

The statement of function one is as follows:

To inform the director and the appropriate staff of community economic conditions and other pertinent community patterns and practises.

In the initial stages of the relief operations, the committee served no function with respect to orienting the Red Cross staff to local community "economic conditions", and "community patterns and practices". The committees could perform no function in this respect because in all the areas studied the members were not selected and installed until ten to fourteen days after relief operations were begun. By this time

the Red Cross staff had already established contacts with agencies, associations and persons in the communities.

The frequency of use of the committee members as resource persons by the Red Cross caseworkers is shown on Table IX. As can be seen, only two committee members were consulted in Area I. In Area II, the utilization of the committee by the Red Cross staff was considerably more extensive than in Area I. Of eleven committee members interviewed, six were consulted more than ten times, three were consulted between four and ten times, while two were never contacted. In Area III, only three members were consulted with any great frequency, one member being consulted more than ten times. Six members were consulted three times or less, while five were never consulted.

Table IX

Extent to Which Committee Members Were Consulted by
Red Cross Caseworkers.

Frequency of consultation	Area I	Area II	Area III
10 or more times		6	1
4 to 9 times	1	3	2
3 times or less	1		6
Never	10	2	5
Total	12	11	14

An examination of Table IX shows distinct differences in areal patterns with respect to the use of advisory committee members as resource persons for the caseworkers. It will be recalled that the three areas studied, Area I includes a comparatively large community.

Fort Myers, Red Cross field headquarters in Area I is the county seat and the center of social and economic activity of the surrounding rural area. Thus, readily available to the Red Cross staff were county governmental services and other formal means by which the community and family standards of the area could be ascertained. It was from these formal sources that most of the information pertaining to community characteristics and subsequent casework development was obtained. In Area I the two committee members that were consulted by the caseworkers were affiliated with such formal organizations in the community. The member consulted most frequently was an official of the state social welfare department, who also made his staff available for consultation with Red Cross staff members. The second member, who was consulted only once, was an attendance officer for the local county schools.

Responses of committee members in Area II shown in Table IX reflect the more intimate and widespread knowledge shared by residents of the small community. Because formal sources of information were almost nonexistent and because the means of livelihood were somewhat alien to the Red Cross staff's experience, committee members were utilized comparatively more often as sources of information with respect to individual applicants and interpretations of community patterns and characteristics. Further, the Red Cross field staff was made up of a large proportion of "reserve workers" (part-time workers who remain "on call" until needed by the organization for emergency service). Hence, the director strongly encouraged these less experienced personnel to use every opportunity to substantiate their findings and recommendations by consulting with individual committee members.

The degree to which individual committee members were involved in consultation with Red Cross workers is reflected by the fact that many members indicated that they were aware of the case recommendations prior to the formal committee meetings at which the recommendations were presented.¹

In Area III, response patterns were different from those of the first two areas. It will be remembered that compared to Area II, Area III exhibited a more cosmopolitan atmosphere due to its diverse and comparatively short-term inhabitants. This was reflected in the degree to which committee members were intimately familiar with the individual cases. However, the main factor responsible for the pattern of responses is the fact that during the field operations the one person most utilized as a source of information was not a member of the committee, but was a generally recognized knowledgeable person in the community. As a result of his services, he was proclaimed by the director, an "ex-officio" member of the committee. The field staff as a whole was encouraged by the director to make use of contacts with committee members.

It is apparent that although the committee did not provide an initial general orientation to the Red Cross field staff of the local community, once established, it did perform to some degree a useful function in the conduct of the disaster relief operations. In each area, at least a few members provided useful information in the development of some cases. However, from the data, it is apparent

¹ This proved to be potentially dysfunctional in one instance where an applicant had been led by a committee member to believe that she would receive a certain type of aid. In the meantime, the modifications of the caseworker's recommendations served to create some hostility between the committee member and the applicant on the one hand and the Red Cross staff on the other.

that the degree to which the committees were utilized as resource bodies varied according to the size and complexity of the different communities, and the availability of formal sources of information. In Area I, a larger and more complex community, where formal sources of information regarding applicants for aid and general community patterns were more readily available, these sources were used more frequently by Red Cross caseworkers than were the committee members. In Areas II and III where the communities were smaller, less economically diversified, and socially more homogeneous, and where the means of livelihood of applicants for aid were foreign to the caseworkers, the committees were utilized more often by Red Cross caseworkers. Further, the relative absence of official sources of information in Area II, and the slightly more numerous formal sources in Area III contributed to differences in the utilization of the committee.

The orientation of the Red Cross field staff personnel toward the committees also was somewhat influential in determining the degree to which the committees were utilized as sources of information. The larger number of experienced caseworkers on the field staff in Area I served to minimize the use of the committee in that area. The majority of the staff there were full-time welfare workers either on loan from other welfare agencies or were regular employees of the Red Cross. As a result, the staff, in Area I using resources readily available, relied more upon their own professional training and experience in ascertaining case requirements. In Area II and III the larger number of comparatively inexperienced caseworkers were encouraged by the field directors to use the committee members and they did so with much greater frequency.

Function Two.

The second stated function is as follows:

To inform the director and appropriate staff concerning the reactions of the community to Red Cross disaster relief activities and advise on methods to bring about better community understanding.

In no area was it observed that committee members initiated actions intended to convey to the Red Cross reactions of the community to the Red Cross disaster relief program or to advise on methods of fostering better community understanding. It was the Red Cross personnel who initiated such activities -- and these were on a superficial level. In Area I, the director asked the committee at the last meeting for suggestions in bettering Red Cross operations in the future. Responses were based upon a better program of publicity. In Area II, the director prodded committee members to offer opinions or suggestions in an effort to keep members' interest aroused. In Area III, where applicants for aid were not coming to the Red Cross in the volume anticipated, the committee was consulted by the director who was thereupon informed that "everyone knew about the presence of the Red Cross and that those needing help had received it". Voluntary opinions of the committee members regarding Red Cross activity were also solicited by the Area III director to be sent to the regional headquarters

Factors contributing to the low level of achievement were both motivational and social in nature. With respect to motivational factors, the majority of committee members in all the areas simply did not view this function as central to their roles. The fact that the Red Cross field unit had established lines of communication with the community outside the context of the committee reduced the need to

motivate the committee to act in this capacity. Further, the operation worked against the probability that they could be centers of a flow of favorable and unfavorable public opinion. There was thus little pressure on the part of the Red Cross organization and on the part of the community to motivate the committee members to carry out this role.

Social factors also contributed to the low level of achievement with respect to the second function. As previously shown, almost all of the committee members were middle or upper-middle class whites. With American communities stratified into ethnic and social status groups and with communication and social interaction between persons of different status levels and ethnic identities tending to be limited to formal, institutionalized social contexts, it is highly questionable whether the average committee member would be likely to be acutely aware of the reactions of those in the community outside his own social sphere. In the case of Area III, there was no evidence that the committee members who assured the director that all victims were aware of the Red Cross Services, employed any accurate means of assessment. Most of the information passed on by committee members was based upon informal relationships within their own social groupings. As previously stated most of the victims were of the lower social strata so that full knowledge of their condition, because of limited communication with committee members would be tenuous at best. The very criteria upon which the selection of the committee members is based strongly tends to preclude the formation of a group which is representative. It may be posited moreover, that the greater the extent of ethnic diversity and social differentiation within the community, the less probability that the committees will effectively perform this function.

Function Three.

The statement of function three reads as follows:

To assist the director in the solution of problems encountered in the community during the course of the relief operation.

During the period of research there were no problems of sufficient magnitude to evaluate the performance of the committee with respect to the third function. Two factors may account for this. On the one hand there appeared to be no significant descriptive problems involving the community and the Red Cross field unit. However, on the other hand it should be noted that the director and administrative staff are expressly directed to maintain contact with "influential groups" and to take advantage of opportunities to explain the "why" and "how" of Red Cross activities with these groups. Part of the director's job is to seek out potential disruptions to disaster relief operations. Examples of this may be cited for each area. In Area I, minor problems involving organizational conflict with the local Civil Defense Unit over their respective functions and responsibilities were handled and minimized entirely by the director. In Area II, problems attendant to the recalcitrant committee member were handled by the director and his staff with the concurrence of the remaining committee members. In Area III, the only problem was that existing between the field unit and the local Red Cross chapter chairman. This problem was resolved by Red Cross staff without any involvement of the advisory committee.

Function Four.

Table X shows the breakdown of activities of committee members

with respect to function four. This function is stated as follows:

To participate actively in interpreting the Red Cross disaster relief program to individuals and community groups.

As can be seen in the table, activity of the committee members in all three areas centered mainly upon contacts with friends and acquaintances,

Table X

Activities of Committee Members With Respect to Interpreting
Red Cross Activities to the Local Community*

Contacts	Area I	Area II	Area III
Spoke to close friends or acquaintance.	7	6	9
Spoke to disaster victims.	3	2	5
Spoke to business associates.	2	1	
Spoke to a group.	2		5
Did not speak to anyone.	2	3	1
Total Responses	16	12	20

*This table is based upon 13 respondents in Area I, 9 respondents in Area II and 13 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses.

Contacts with disaster victims were restricted mainly to acquaintances who had suffered loss. ("As a result of my efforts, our colored girl got a roof on her house".) Contact with disaster victims was also a partial result of general occupation orientations, such as ministers and social workers. Three members in Area I, two members in Area II and five members in Area III included disaster victims in the persons whom they contacted.

It is impossible to ascertain accurately how effective these contacts were in interpreting Red Cross activity in the community as a whole. To ascertain this, one would have to trace the communication pattern beyond the committee members' contacts. Further complications in tracing such a pattern would result from the fact that intensive efforts were made by all three field directors to insure adequate publicity of Red Cross operations by maintaining close contact with local newspapers and other forms of mass media.

Although it would appear that this function would be most important to the success of the operational goals of the Red Cross in the local community, extremely few committee members viewed this function as important. Only two persons in Areas I and III and three persons in Area II mentioned this function as an important part of the committee's duties. Hence, again there was little motivation to carry out this function. Furthermore, the stress placed upon secrecy of membership by all three area directors appears to have contributed to the low level of activity in interpreting the disaster relief program to individuals and community groups. No committee member made an attempt to publicize his membership. Table XI shows the extent to which the committee members believed it was known that they were on the committee.

Table XI

Estimates of Community knowledge of Membership in the
Disaster Relief Advisory Committee*

To Whom Membership is Known	Area I	Area II	Area III
No one, or intimates only.	6	3	6
Close friends.	4	1	1
Business associates.	4		
A few disaster victims.		1	1
Generally known throughout the community.		5	6
Total Responses	14	10	14

*This table is based upon 13 respondents in Area I, 9 respondents in Area II and 14 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses.

Community characteristics appear to influence the degree to which it was generally known that members were serving on the committees. In Area I knowledge of membership on the committee was mainly confined to intimates or close friends. In Area II, five out of the nine respondents felt that their membership was generally known throughout the community. In Area III half of the committee members believed that knowledge of their membership did not extend beyond their close friends.

Six of the fourteen members however, felt their membership was generally known throughout the community.

Although secrecy of membership was strongly encouraged by the area directors in order to protect committee members from exposure to individual demands for special consideration in the granting of awards, it would appear that general knowledge within the community of precisely

who is on the advisory committee would result in greater success in fulfilling function four. Not only does secrecy of membership diminish the probability of establishing a communications network between the community and the Red Cross unit, but it also obviates the emergence of a strong motivation to carry out his function. So long as there is no public identification with the Red Cross, the committee members are not exposed to community pressures which, with a high degree of probability, could be expected to evoke strong motivations to actively articulate their roles¹.

SUMMARY

In all three areas, committee members were selected mainly on the basis of criteria established by the field directors. Although each director worked in cooperation with a selected local Red Cross functionary, decisions regarding who should serve on the advisory committee were made by the director. Most of the committee members in all of the areas had had some previous association with the Red Cross. Thus, they were somewhat familiar with the organization. Although the members of the committees in each area were drawn from a variety of occupations, the vast majority of choices for the committee were in all areas occupants of upper-middle or middle class. Moreover, they had suffered little deprivation in comparison to occupants of the lower strata who were less able to absorb the losses inflicted by

¹One committee member--a representative of a labor organization--related the following: "After I was on the committee, I talked to the men in the organization, but I quit when Mr. __ (the field director) said that if anyone knows who was on the committee, we had told them: so I thought maybe we weren't supposed to tell anyone".

Hurricane Denna. This, plus the fact that social intercourse was restricted mainly to persons of similar social status served to minimize communication with those requiring relief assistance. In Area I and III the majority of committee members were relatively short-term residents of these areas. Although these committee members were active in community organizations, their comparatively recent arrival into the local communities may have served to further attenuate their knowledge regarding disaster victims' conditions.

Although labor was represented in Area I and Negroes were represented in Area III the importance of these groups was minimized by the complete dominance of the other members. Especially does this appear to be so in Area III. The Negro man and his wife on the committee in this area represented the upper-middle strata of the local Negro community. However, they did not feel an integral part of the committee. They attended only two committee meetings, and were never contacted by field staff members outside of the formal meeting. The fact that they were both employees of an influential person also on the committee further served to diminish the importance of their representation.

The committees were largely ineffective in carrying out the first four stated functions. The committee members on the whole did not serve to provide a general orientation to the Red Cross field staff regarding pertinent community patterns and practises or the economic conditions of the community, simply because other sources of information were used for these purposes prior to the selection of the committees. However, the committees did provide helpful assistance to caseworkers in the development of cases in two of the areas studied. It was noted however, that the degree to which the committee serves this instrumental

function appears to be dependent upon the size and complexity of the community and the availability of formal sources of information.

The committees further were not active in keeping the director and field staffs informed as to the reactions of the community to the Red Cross disaster relief program. Two principal factors appear to account for this. On the one hand, the committee members lacked the motivation to carry out this function because of its lack of saliency to them and the fact that their anonymity reduced the forces of expectancy from the community. On the other hand, the committee members were not capable of carrying out this function because of their social distance from representative areas stricken by the disaster and the lack of training in assessing need requirements. There was no evidence that the committees were helpful in assisting the director to solve problems that arose in the course of the Red Cross operation. This may have been due to either (1) the actual absence of any problems, or (2) the adequate handling of such problems by the director and his staff.

The committee members did not actively interpret the Red Cross disaster relief program to individuals and community groups. Several factors contributed to the low level of activity in this regard. Committee members did not view this function as particularly central to their role expectancies. Further, although it is impossible to trace the final effects, committee members generally restricted their activities in interpreting the disaster relief program to informal contacts mainly within their own social group which was predominantly from the middle and upper-middle class strata. Finally the stress placed upon secrecy of membership in all three areas eliminated a

public identification with the Red Cross, which in turn reduced the exposure of the committee members to community pressures which would have forced them to articulate their roles in this regard.

The committees then appeared to serve to some degree an instrumental function in carrying out the actual development of cases. However, the expressive functions of providing an effective systemic linkage between the Red Cross and the local community appears to have been minimally achieved.

CHAPTER IV

The Extent to Which the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee Achieved the Fifth Prescribed Operational Goal

Introduction

The importance of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee is defined mainly in terms of its advisory role in disaster relief operations of the Red Cross. Thus, an analysis of the fifth stated function merits separate and detailed treatment. This function is stated as follows:

To review facts concerning individual families, to assist the director and staff to make certain that the kind and amount of assistance recommended utilizes all resources available to the family, represents a sound rehabilitation plan, and is in keeping with community and family standards of living.

The weekly meetings of the committee constituted the principal social context in which the fifth stated function was intended to be carried out. These meetings were the main locus around which advisory committees¹ were centered. That the Red Cross also viewed these meetings as extremely important is apparent in the following policy statement:

"The bringing together of the knowledge and resources of the local community and the experience and resources of the Red Cross in an advisory committee meeting is one of the most important phases of a disaster relief operation."

In this chapter we shall analyse the extent to which the committees performed effectively with respect to function five. In regard to

¹ American National Red Cross, op cit., sec. 2, p. 51

this concern, we shall note first the process of accomodation of the committee into the decision-making processes of the Red Cross disaster relief unit. Second, we shall note how actual committee meetings were conducted. Finally, we shall present our findings in regard to the achievement of function five.

The Process of Accomodation of the Committee into the Red Cross Organizational Structure

The activity of committee members and Red Cross staff in relation to the fifth stated function of the committees centers around the committee meetings. At these meetings caseworkers present their recommendations with respect to the disposition of applications for Red Cross assistance. The advisory committee is formally vested with "financial authority" equal to that held by the field operations director. Thus, formally, no awards can be granted to applicants for aid without the concurrence of the committee. It is evident that in order to insure a smooth operation, the committee must be rapidly oriented to an attitude of acceptance or neutrality towards these standards. As noted in the previous chapter, the process of selection of the committees is intended to insure that radically hostile persons or persons with a vested interest are not incorporated into the committee.

In accomodating the disaster relief advisory committee into the Red Cross organizational framework, certain procedures are undertaken by the director to insure that the committee members are made aware of Red Cross standards and procedures. As formally stated, the first committee meeting is held for the purpose of familiarizing the committee

members with the policies and mode of operations of the Red Cross. Prior to the meeting the local chapter chairman is to be instructed by the director on how to conduct the meeting. At the time of the meeting the chapter chairman or, as in areas II and III, his equivalent, introduces the director and staff members to the committee members. A committee chairman is later elected from among the assembled committee members. Also at the first meeting, the director outlines in detail the policies of the Red Cross, the rationale underlying these policies and a description of the functions expected of the committee members. At this time, a few "typical" cases may be presented to illustrate what is expected of the committee in the way of deliberating upon the cases.

In subsequent committee meetings, the casework supervisor functions as an intermediary between the committee and the caseworkers. It is her responsibility to reinforce the caseworkers' presentation of their cases when needed, and to explicate the details of the case. It is an organizational prescription that the assistant director in charge of family service--a function served by the casework supervisors during the period of research--carefully observe the committee proceedings and be prepared to make follow-up contacts "with members of the committee who seem not to accept or to understand the answers given them at the meeting".¹

Organization directives instruct the director and his staff to anticipate any disruption in the process of case presentation to the advisory committee and to plan the presentation of cases accordingly. As stated in the Disaster Relief Handbook, "They (the field director and assistant director, Family Service) should be aware of any case to

¹Red Cross Disaster Relief Handbook, Sec. 8, p. 34.

be presented in which there is an indication that serious controversy may arise and should be prepared to take prompt action if the controversy develops".¹

Should a disagreement arise between the advisory committee and the field director relative to cases that are within the delegated authority of the field director, such cases are, by organizational prescription, to be referred to the area manager for a decision. Should this decision prove to be unacceptable to the committee, the case is referred back to the national headquarters with committee recommendations. In case of further disagreement between the advisory committee and the higher authority, "final decisions rest at national headquarters, with full consideration being given to the opinions and recommendations expressed by the advisory committee". As stated by the Red Cross, "All financial authority is exercised in accordance with established policies of the American National Red Cross".²

Description of the Committee Meetings

In the analysis of the degree to which the fifth stated function was fulfilled by the committees, it will be useful to describe how the meetings proceeded. Although, all committee meetings were not observed, those which were observed appear to have been typical ones. Reconstruction of the nature of the unobserved meetings was accomplished principally through interviews with the field directors and other Red Cross staff.

Area I.

The format that was followed in the committee meetings in Area I

¹ Ibid, sec. 2, p. 53.

² Ibid, sec. 2, p. 42.

was as follows. The meeting was called to order and chaired by the committee chairman. The chairman first gave the field director an opportunity to summarize past Red Cross activities. At this time the director announced the number of cases handled and the amount of Red Cross expenditures incurred to the date of the meeting. Following the field director's presentation, the dominant role was played by the casework supervisor who introduced each caseworker. The caseworker, in turn, presented data bearing on the cases under consideration, including the recommendation with respect to the allocation of Red Cross assistance.

In the presentation of the cases, the caseworker either initiated the presentation by indicating the nature of the recommendation, followed by the presentation of the details of the case, or presented the details of the case first and stated the recommendation last. Details of each case typically included and were limited to the following:

- (1) reference to the case by number,
- (2) place of residence,
- (3) number and age of family members,
- (4) occupations of family members,
- (5) family income,
- (6) recent work history,
- (7) health features in the family situation,
- (8) kind and extent of loss from the disaster,
- (9) expressed needs of the family to recover its predisaster state,
- (10) the ability of the family to participate in its rehabilitation, (This was expressed in terms of economic resource accessibility plus other non-economic factors).

- (11) the caseworker typically stated that in view of the various factors considered above, "we are recommending" that a given amount of money be disbursed to the family for its rehabilitation.

Following the caseworker's presentation of the case, the chairman would call for questions from committee members concerning the case. At times the committee members would interrupt the caseworker's presentation to pose questions regarding the case. Although there were significant exceptions, most questions tended to be perfunctory. Questions that were posed were answered directly by the caseworker. Where further explanations were required, the casework supervisor became involved. Not infrequently the field director would also take part in explicating the details or the general Red Cross policies involved in the case.

Following the questions, if there were any, the chairman would ask for a motion. A motion to approve the recommendation would be made subsequently. With a second to the motion forthcoming, the chairman would ask for a vote either by voice or show of hands. Upon completion of the vote, the caseworker either would begin the presentation of her next case or if she had completed the presentation of her cases, she would withdraw by thanking the committee and leaving the meeting room.

Two meetings were observed in Area I. During the first meeting all cases presented were approved by the committee, with only a few questions asked. However, there was lively discussion over two different cases which was finally resolved by the field director stating the Red Cross policies involved in evaluating case needs. When the two cases were each brought to a vote, one member was opposed to the majority vote of approval of the recommendations for both cases.

Nineteen cases were presented at this meeting. Three cases

represented recommendations for denial of Red Cross assistance to the applicants. Following the presentation of the cases, the director asked for an evaluation of the committee experience. The question posed by the director was with respect to how the committee process might be improved. Indicative of the committee members' evaluations is the following discussion which followed the director's questions:

Member "A" - "All we're doing is approving what you have done. We're merely accepting some responsibility in case something back-fires".

Member "B" - "I feel this committee was a good thing. It was wonderful to see how the Red Cross operates".

Member "C" - "This helps the community to know what's going on -- what is really happening".

Director - "We're anxious in making this a really interacting process. Do you feel this is just a rubber stamp?"

Member "A" - "I think it is a rubber stamp".

Member "D" - "I place full confidence in the workers . . . I felt the decision of the workers was the same as mine. I feel I served more to give a stamp of approval".

Member "A" - "That's just what I said -- a stamp, a rubber stamp or stamp of approval, whatever it is. I'm not criticizing, but all we could do was to accept the decisions".

Member "E" - "John, you were no rubber stamp. You voted twice in opposition".

The above discussion was followed by the director asking for advice or suggestions. Two members responded with suggestions for better publicity of the Red Cross activity.

Six days after the last formal meeting, an effort was made by the casework supervisor and the director to call the committee together to review the last four cases of the operation. About half of the members were assembled. Conspicuously absent were the two most active members. Three of the cases presented involved recommendations for denial of assistance. All cases were almost automatically approved by the committee. One member stated, "If you folks have investigated, we might as well approve it".

A copy of the Red Cross operations records were turned over to the local chapter chairman. Expressions of appreciation and gratitude were made by both the Red Cross field director and the casework supervisor. These sentiments were reciprocated by the committee members.

Table XII shows the breakdown of the number of cases handled according to type of case. As can be seen, of the total number of cases considered by the Red Cross in Area I, 608 cases received assistance. Twenty-six applicants withdrew their applications upon being so advised by the Red Cross or through discovering resources they were previously unaware had existed. Those cases receiving no assistance, (denials) after having been completely processed, numbered nineteen. At first only cases involving more than \$1,000 were brought before the advisory committee for consideration. However, when cases were not as large as anticipated, this standard was reduced to \$500. Only forty-six cases out of a total of 653 were brought before the committee. Although figures were incomplete at the time of the research, total case disbursements for both the emergency and rehabilitation phases was expected to reach \$110,000 to \$150,000.

Control of the committee process always resided with the Red Cross

field director. The director was extremely sensitive to any signs of dissension or misunderstanding of Red Cross operations on the part of committee members and was effective in coping with such instances in a quiet and capable manner.

Area II.

The format followed in the committee meeting observed in Area II was similar to Area I. There were a few minor exceptions however. In Area II, the meeting that was observed was opened by the field director with a few introductory remarks. Mention was made of the past week's activities with a statement that the meeting was to be the last one of the Red Cross operations. The meeting was chaired by the elected committee member in a manner similar to that in Area I.

Present at the meeting were three casework supervisors who were in charge of the presentations of the caseworkers. Thus, each supervisor introduced the caseworkers, under her supervision, who, thereupon, presented their findings in a manner similar to Area I. Cases were referred to by number. However, most of the family involved in each case was immediately identified by the committee members. Names of the cases were furnished by the caseworkers upon request. Characteristic during the presentation of the cases was the discussion among the committee members of the person involved as an applicant for aid. Almost all committee members were acquainted to some extent with the applicants.

Of a total of twenty-six cases presented at the meeting, of which four were recommendations of denial for aid, all but five cases were immediately approved. These five cases were also approved but only after considerable discussion and some signs of discontent. By way of

illustration in which we may notice the ~~manner~~ in which the feelings of discontent were handled by the Red Cross Staff, we cite the following brief exchanges:

Committee member: "He doesn't need that much to replace the trailer".

Caseworker: "Well, we've had three separate appraisals on it so we feel the figure is accurate".

In another instance:

Committee member: "They have joint ownership. He doesn't own the boat himself".

Casework supervisor: "Well he says he does but we could investigate more".

Further example:

Committee member: "This guy gets nothing while the fishermen get everything. Those guys (fishermen) are bums. Why not help one of these boys. They work hard".

Casework Supervisor: "We have to consider each case on its own merits rather than compare them with other cases".

Caseworker: "We will see that he gets help in applying for a S B A (Small Business Administration) loan".

As can be seen in the above illustrations, each potentially disruptive situation was met by a show of competent, though not antagonistic, rebuttal.

The place of the meeting was a conference room, with the committee members seated around a large table and the Red Cross caseworker and the casework supervisor at one end of the table. The field director sat to the side of the group. Caseworkers waiting to present

their cases sat at one end of the room. Committee members present at this meeting were seven men and one woman. The committee meeting was closed by the field director with a brief summary of the Red Cross operations in Area II and an announcement that the Red Cross would soon close operations in the area.

In Area II, all cases involving sums over \$500 were brought before the committee. As can be seen in Table XII the proportion of cases presented to the committee in Area II was considerably larger (110 cases out of a total of 535) than that in Area I. Only seven cases in Area II were denied aid. Four cases were not yet completed at the time of the research. Of the total number of cases, 511 received assistance. There were thirteen withdrawals of applications for aid. Total Red Cross expenditures for case awards in this area came to \$130,000 during the rehabilitation phase and \$116,280 was allocated for emergency assistance.

Table XII

Tabulation of Cases Handled by the Red Cross Disaster

Field Units

Breakdown	Area I	Area II	Area III
Total Number of Cases	653	535	514
Number of cases receiving assistance	608	511	468
Number of voluntary withdrawals	26	13	42
Number of denials	19	7	4
Number of cases brought before the advisory committee	46	110	83
Percentage of cases brought before the advisory committee	7%	20.5%	14%

Area III.

Two meetings held during the last part of the Red Cross operations were observed in Area III. Again, the general format was similar to that followed by the meetings in Area I. In the meetings observed, the committee chairman took charge, calling the meeting to order, asking for any announcements and, finally, turning the meeting proceedings over to the casework supervisor. Prior to the presentation of the cases, the field director gave a summary of Red Cross operations and future plans for the field staff's withdrawal.

Cases were presented by number and name in a manner similar to that in the other areas. In the first meeting observed, recommendations were passed in a more or less mechanical fashion, with only a minimum of discussion. At least one committee member was familiar with each case presented. One case was presented which had been considered at an earlier meeting but had been re-investigated by the Red Cross after considerable committee opposition had been expressed. Although the recommendation had not been changed at the time of the second presentation, the committee was satisfied with the recommendations after being told that the case had been reinvestigated.

At this meeting, 21 award, and three denial recommendations were presented to and approved by the committee. Only those cases involving sums above \$1000 were considered in detail by the committee. In addition to the 24 cases so considered, those involving sums between \$500 and \$1000 were merely read off by the casework supervisor. The name of the family involved in the case, the sum involved, and the recommendation were indicated. In the meetings observed, unless questions on specific cases were raised by the committee, these cases were approved en masse.

This meeting was closed by the area director. He cited the number of cases handled and the amount of aid disbursed. He also announced the time and place of the last "clean-up" meeting of the advisory committee.

As in the other areas, the committee members were seated around a large table, with the casework supervisor and her subordinate caseworker at one end of the table. The field director sat at a separate desk to the side of the group. The casework supervisor played the main role in representing the Red Cross to the committee members.

The final committee meeting in Area III again followed the general format of the others. All cases were quite rapidly approved. However, there was one notable exception. One case, presented a second time because of a readjustment in the recommendation for the use of the granted award, provoked considerable discussion. Although the discussion became quite lively, the casework supervisor and the caseworker defended each aspect of the recommendation by citing facts, figures, community ordinances and sources of their information. A vote of acceptance was finally completed, but not without some dissatisfaction exhibited by several individuals on the committee. During this last session, twelve cases were presented, of which one was a recommendation for denial of aid. A list of recommendations involving sums between \$500 and \$1000 was read by the casework supervisor and all were approved by the committee members. The meeting was closed by the director who cited the total number of cases handled, types of cases, and financial expenditures of the Red Cross in the field operation. Expenditures amounted to \$31,350 spent during the emergency phase and \$130,047 during the rehabilitation phase of operations.

Again, noting Table XII, it can be seen that of the total of 514 cases considered by the Red Cross unit, only 83 were brought before the committee. Families receiving assistance numbered 468. Four families were refused assistance and 42 applicants withdrew their requests before processing had been completed.

As a result of the observations of committee meetings in the three areas, certain generalizations with respect to the mode of operations may be cited. First, the manner in which the committee meetings were conducted remained consistently the same in all the areas. Details of cases were presented in routine order, explication followed when needed, and recommendations of the Red Cross caseworkers were subsequently approved.

Second, of the total number of cases which the Red Cross relief unit acted upon, the percentage brought before the committees was extremely low. The number of cases presented to the committees was arrived at arbitrarily. In Area I when it was apparent that case awards above \$1,000 were not numerous enough to warrant a weekly committee meeting, the level of consideration was dropped to \$500. All cases above \$500 were presented before the committee in Area II. In area III, cases were individually considered where recommendations were in excess of \$1,000. They were approved en mass where awards totaled between \$500 and \$1,000.

Third, in no committee meeting were the recommendations of case awards not approved by the committee members. In instances where the Red Cross reinvestigated questionable cases, the initial recommendations were not changed and were subsequently approved by the committee. Questions that were raised in regard to specific cases by committee members were mostly perfunctory in nature and did not exhibit much

insight into the intricacies of casework procedure.

Fourth, in all areas the casework supervisor played the dominant role in explicating case details. Policy interpretations were handled by the area directors. The elected committee chairman functioned only to call the meeting to order, call for votes of approval and call for a motion to adjourn.

Fifth, in all areas, signs of disruption to committee meeting proceedings were not allowed to mature to outright hostility. The administrative staffs made every effort to insure that amicable relations prevailed.

From the above findings it appears that the committees were made dependencies of the Red Cross disaster units, and as such could exercise little power in influencing Red Cross disaster operations. In no instance did the elected committee chairman exercise his authority during the meeting except in the maintenance of parliamentary procedure. In all areas, signs of disruption to meeting proceedings or disagreement with organizational policies were effectively handled by the Red Cross staff. The following methods of control were employed by the Red Cross field staffs to insure that the locus of power remained with the Red Cross organization.

First, upon initial contact with the committee members, elaborate procedures were taken to carefully indoctrinate them with organizational policies and mode of operations of the Red Cross disaster relief program. Further, continued efforts were maintained by the administrative staff to discover any potential disruptions on the part of the committee to organizational procedures.

A second method of control was the manner in which the cases were

presented to the committee. Generally, case presentations were highly developed and were rapidly presented with impressive citations of facts and sources of information. Confronted with such a presentation, committee members could hardly attempt more than an occasional comment.¹

A third, and perhaps the most important, method of control was the role played by the area director during the meetings. The director helped maintain control by explaining precisely why methods of Red Cross relief operations so dictated the case recommendations. Case presentations were protected from potentially disruptive attacks by joining forces with the supervisor in either explaining the details of the case or in announcing that the case would be considered for further review. In support of the director was the "buffer role" played by the casework supervisor. In this regard, the supervisor often played a role of arbitration between the committee and the caseworker, either defending the caseworker's presentation or stating that the committee's suggestions would be further considered in reviewing the case a second time. The combined efforts of the director and the casework supervisor provided an effective means of deflecting implications from the committee that the caseworker may not have presented a sound rehabilitation program for the case under consideration.

Because the committees were so carefully controlled by the Red Cross field staffs it was virtually impossible for them to carry out their prescribed function of assisting the director and staff "to make

¹ Although all committee members were given paper and pencil to record needed information as an aid in their assessment of recommendations almost none of the members bothered to use them. Those who made an effort to do so soon discovered that it was quite impossible to keep up with the delivery of the cases. Attempts by the researcher to note all of the significant aspects of cases were similarly frustrated.

certain that the kind and amount of assistance recommended utilizes all resources available to the family and represents a sound rehabilitation plan". Such planning was done solely by the Red Cross, and the committee was effectively prevented from altering any part of it.

Perceptions of the Committee Members Regarding Function Five

In support of our conclusions regarding the degree of achievement of the fifth stated function we shall note the degree to which the committee members were aware that they were effectively prevented from carrying out this function. Committee members were asked whether or not they felt the committee was effective in advising the Red Cross in the granting of awards to applicants for aid. Table XIII presents the responses.

Table XIII

Committee Members Evaluations of the Effectiveness of the Committee in Advising the Red Cross in the Granting of Case Awards

Evaluation*	Area I	Area II	Area III
Highly effective	1	1	1
Somewhat effective	1	1	1
Only slightly effective	3	4	4
No effect	8	3	8
Undetermined		1	
Totals	13	10	14

*The categories of evaluations range from the enthusiastic response regarding the highly effective role of the committee, to a belief that the committee was effective but uncertainty in what way, to some reservations about the committee effects, to absolutely no effect.

Notice that only one committee member in each area felt the committee was highly effective in influencing Red Cross decisions. Although two of these three respondents felt the Red Cross could operate without the committee, one felt it was highly effective in giving a "psychological effect" to the caseworkers, while the second respondent felt the committee helped to expedite casework procedures. Those who felt the committee was somewhat effective cited a few instances when they felt the committee was able to force the Red Cross to reconsider a few cases.

In Area I, eight of the thirteen respondents felt the committee had no effect on the granting of case awards. In Area II, six out of the total of 10 respondents felt the committee exercised their influence in forcing the Red Cross to reconsider a few cases. One respondent did not commit himself on the issue. In Area III, eight of fourteen felt the committee had no effect on the Red Cross award decisions. Four members felt the committee was only slightly effective.

The reasons accounting for the members' evaluation of committee effectiveness are based on both positive and negative orientations to the management of the relief operations. Although most committee members felt the committee was not very effective in advising the Red Cross, they viewed this only as a result of the Red Cross organization being so capable that there was little the committee could do to improve upon the operations of the organization. To illustrate, notice the following response as to the effectiveness of the committee: "I don't think so. They had the training for this sort of thing. Our only value was as moral support. Actually we didn't know what was going on. It was beautifully handled though".

To a much lesser extent, committee members were negatively oriented toward the Red Cross, only seven of the total of thirty-eight committee members exhibited negative orientations. In this respect, the committee members felt the organization completely ignored the potential value of the committee. The following was typical of this attitude. "After I'd gone to the first three or four meetings, I felt it was just routine. A question would be raised, and bang! -- they start out with Red Cross policy, standards and all that. Take the crawfish traps. We tried to tell them that nobody strung out that many any more. But they came right back and quoted licenses, regulations and everything . . .".

It is apparent that committee members themselves did not view the committees as performing very effectively the function of advising the Red Cross staff concerning case recommendation. However, on the whole this did not result in antagonistic feelings on the part of the members toward the Red Cross. As will be seen in the next chapter the Red Cross, as an organization, and the committee experience were quite favorably evaluated by committee members. The extent to which the Red Cross staff viewed the effectiveness of the committee with respect to function five will next be considered.

Evaluation of the Advisory Committee by Red Cross Administrative Personnel on the Local Disaster Relief Operation

In the three areas studied, when asked what factors contributed to a "good committee", the directors replied in terms of proper selection of members and adequate orientation to organizational policies. In all areas the need for adequate control of the committee was either explicitly

mentioned or alluded to. In Area I, the director stressed the need for "patience in accepting an opposing view, followed by carefully explaining of the case in terms meaningful to the disident's background". The Area II director expressed his views a bit more bluntly, "If I can't control the committee, I might as well quit". The director of Area III stressed the importance of adequately interpreting Red Cross policies to the committee as a means for gaining their cooperation.

All the area directors stressed the importance of keeping the committee actively involved in case deliberation. The director of Area I stated that it took at least three meetings before interest on the part of the committee was "activated". He stressed that he did not want the committee to become a "rubber-stamp" but that the committee members should be made to feel that "they, as members of the community, had a share in casework deliberations". The director of Area II stated that once the committee feels it serves only a "rubber-stamp" function "there is danger of committee members feeling that they have somehow been tricked into merely approving Red Cross activities".

In contrast to the Area I director, the Area III director reported that during the early meetings, the committee is usually quite active in casework proceedings. He noted however, that there later develops a tendency to merely acquiesce in Red Cross decisions. He attributed this tendency to the "trust built up in Red Cross operations." Nevertheless, this director felt that the committee should be kept as active as possible, for the benefit of the Red Cross field unit.

Evaluation of the specific committees in each area were, in the main, favorable. The Area I director expressed satisfaction with the committee except for one member who did not know or seem to understand

the policies of Red Cross. The Area II director held a favorable evaluation of the committee in his area in terms of his conception of the purpose of the committee. In Area III, the director stated that he didn't have much need for the committee in terms of gathering information about the overall community, but he felt it functioned favorably in fostering good relations with the community.

In Area II, the casework supervisor felt the committee was somewhat difficult to deal with because of the intimate nature of interpersonal association within the community. As she stated, "Down here, these people know everyone and their business. It's hard to make them understand our standards. They tend to be too subjective". She further stated that too much familiarity with the applicants too frequently led to invidious comparisons of the applicants. The casework supervisor in Area III felt that the committee was "better than some". Her evaluation was based on the amount of interest shown by the committee members toward Red Cross activities during the rehabilitation period.

The degree to which the committee exercised power was discussed with each of the directors and casework supervisors. The director of Area I was asked whether he knew of any case in which the committee changed or over-ruled the decisions of the Red Cross regarding a case. He could think of none, except in a different disaster in which he had been an area director. It was stated by the Area I director that too many instances of disagreement over case decisions between the committee and the Red Cross reflects unfavorably on (1) the competence of the director and his staff, (2) the selection of committee members, or (3) the orienting of the committee members.

The director of Area II cited specific instances in other disasters

where chaos developed as a result of a director having lost control of a committee, either by asserting his control in too authoritarian a manner or by not having exercised enough control in the beginning stages of the committee's orientation. In no case in Area II did the committee's deliberations change the Red Cross staff's recommendations.

The director of Area III stressed the importance of the committee's potential power. The committee was viewed by him as a representative body of the community upon which the success of Red Cross operations was dependent. Success was viewed in terms of acceptance of Red Cross goals and the means of achieving its goals.

One casework supervisor felt the committee in her area didn't actually realize its power potential insofar as helping to decide the cases. However, later in the interview, she stated the following; "Well, if you want my own personal opinion, it doesn't actually have or share equal responsibility with the director. I would say that if it did have that much power, the director would be on very shaky ground. I suppose, in the end, Red Cross has the final authority". The casework supervisor in Area III questioned whether the committee ever realized just what it means to "share financial responsibility". As she stated, "the committee has no recourse, but the Red Cross does".

It is apparent that the evaluation of a "good" committee is, according to Red Cross administrative staff personnel, one which is active, but in the context of organizational controls. Active support of organizational policies appeared to administrative staff members to be a result of successful orientation of the committee to organizational policies. An apathetic committee was considered hard to assess and thus was viewed with some anxiety.

It is further apparent that the Red Cross personnel were well aware that the committees were in fact controlled by the Red Cross. The possibility of a committee existing without adequate controls was viewed as threatening to the entire administrative structure of the Red Cross field staff.

Summary

In assessing the degree to which the committees were effective in assisting the Red Cross director and staff in formulating adequate rehabilitation plans for disaster victims, it is concluded that they generally were not effective. They almost completely failed to perform function five. In no instance, was the committee responsible for significant changes in case recommendations nor did the committees exert sufficient influence to change organizational standards of evaluation in the development of the case, or in the execution of organizational policies. Case development and recommendations were done solely upon criteria established by organizational prescription and in no instance were these criteria modified.

In the main, two factors appear to have contributed to the low level of achievement with respect to function five. These were (1) the limited abilities of the committee members to accurately assess the rehabilitation plan required for an applicant for aid, and (2) the methods of control employed by the Red Cross to restrict the influence or power of the committee members.

With respect to the first factor, the organizational criteria for the selection of committee members resulted in choices of persons who

were not antagonistic to the Red Cross, who had no vested interests at stake or who were not themselves applicants for aid. These criteria contributed to make the committees virtual dependencies of the Red Cross relief organization. As such, they were relatively powerless in decision-making activities. Further, the social distance between victims and committee members prevented an intimate knowledge of the need requirements of disaster victims. This was in spite of the fact that in the smaller committees, the names and reputations of families were frequently known to one or more committee members. As one member states "In several cases we thought we knew the cases but the caseworkers turned up facts we knew nothing about." In the larger community studied committee member' lack of knowledge concerning available family resources was even more evident. In contrast to the committee members, the Red Cross staff, through its casework investigation and formal agency contacts, did have a clear understanding of the resources available to families. From the evidence gathered, it is apparent that both Red Cross personnel and committee members, generally, recognized this situation.

Since the committee members were not trained in social casework, they could scarcely be presumed to know if the recommendations of the Red Cross caseworkers represented a sound rehabilitation plan. Only under conditions of grossest error on the part of the caseworker and the supervisory staff could it be expected that the advisory committee members might serve a significant function in this respect. Both Red Cross personnel and committee members, in general, recognized this also.

Besides the factor of the limited capabilities of committee members, organizational controls further prevented their achieving the fifth stated function. Local standards of evaluation were not

permitted in the process of allocating or denying awards, whenever these local standards were at variance with those of the Red Cross. A period of orientation and indoctrination of the committee members to the organizational standards of evaluation and mode of operations was initiated by the field staff prior to any actual presentation of cases recommendations to the committees. These standards, more universalistic in nature, were clearly in opposition to local particularistic means of evaluation.¹

During committee meetings the Red Cross administrative staff actively engaged in defending its recommendations whenever these were questioned by committee members. Often, where instances of disagreement developed, the Red Cross was able to counter attacks upon its mode of operations by either citing sources of mutually recognized authority in support of its position or by withdrawing the controversial case and announcing it would seek more facts regarding it. The arousal of controversy over a particular case was viewed by administrative staff personnel as being mainly due to faulty casework procedure and presentation. Control of the committee, then, was also effected by a show of competence on the part of staff personnel. This minimized any cause for question of casework procedure.

That the Red Cross field personnel were cognizant that the committee in fact was rigidly controlled was apparent from the data. Among the administrative staffs, all held the effective control of the committee

¹One committee member was cognizant of the differences in the standards of evaluation. When asked how he evaluated his committee experience he stated, "Well, if you can adjust your thinking to Red Cross it was O.K. It takes time though. Seventy-five percent of the applicants wouldn't be able to get help from any one else."

to be tantamount to a "good" committee. In the main, the committee members were also aware of the limits of their influence. This was viewed as a result of the complete competence of the staff which did not require the services of the committee, and as a result of overt means of control imposed upon the committee by the field staff.

It is apparent then that the committee exercised little or no power over the process of deciding case allocations or the withholding of allocation. The formal statement that the committees held authority equal to that of the area director simply did not hold in the real situation. The assumption of authority by the committee equal to that of the area director would certainly pose grave threats to successfully carrying out a disaster relief operation by the Red Cross. As has been previously shown, the Red Cross is aware of this fact and as a result, organizational directives instruct the administrative staff to be aware of any signs of dissident and unaccepting attitudes of committee members. The administrative staffs were quite aware of such possible problems and took precautionary steps to maintain control over the committees.

Chapter V

Unstated Functions of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee

Introduction

It has previously been shown that in each of the three areas under consideration, the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee was comparatively unsuccessful in achieving the functions for which it was ostensibly created. Further, the Red Cross field staff and the committee members were aware that the committee failed to perform its stated functions. However, as will be seen, the existence of the committee was firmly defended by the Red Cross field staff. It is apparent that the committee served, or was intended to serve functions other than those formally stated. These appear to be latent functions. Latent functions have been defined as actual consequences of a social pattern not culturally prescribed. In the context of organizational analysis, the use of the term "latent" may be considered to include those functions which are not officially stated. For the following analysis the scope of the concept has been broadened to include those functions that may be either intended or are unintended. These functions may be recognized or unrecognized. It is the absence of formal statement of these functions that defines them as latent.¹

Two levels of analysis are appropriate in considering the latent functions of the advisory committee. On the level of the Red Cross

¹Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, op cit., p. 25. As Gouldner states, "it is often difficult to determine whether the actor recognizes or intends certain consequences. . .". Hence in organizational analysis, the delineation between manifest and latent functions must rest upon official statements of policy.

Disaster Service, certain factors directly related to its position in the organizational hierarchy appear to contribute to an understanding of the defense for the existence of the committee. On the level of the total organization of the Red Cross certain factors appear to contribute to the continued existence of the committee as part of the general operational policy. The concern in this chapter is centered upon these two levels of functional analysis. After reviewing the factors contributing to the committee's failure to perform its stated functions, the extent to which its existence was defended will be noted. This will be followed by an analysis of the latent functions of the disaster relief advisory committee.

Factors Accounting for the Low Level of Achievement of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee

As previously shown the success of the committee in carrying out its prescribed functions in each of the three areas was minimal. With respect to the stated expressive functions, the committee failed to keep the Red Cross field staff informed of community reactions because there were no community or organizational demands prompting such activity. Social distance of the committee members from other relevant sectors of the community further prevented a realistic assessment of community reactions. The committee also failed to interpret significantly the Red Cross operation to members of the community. This function was not viewed as central to their role expectations. The members' community contacts did not extend beyond their immediate friends and acquaintances.

The evaluative functions of the committee were similarly

inconsequential in the Red Cross relief operations. These functions were to advise the Red Cross field staff in the granting of awards so that an adequate rehabilitation program consistent with local community and family standards was administered. The limited abilities of the committee members to assess the actual needs of the applicants for aid and the controls exerted upon the committee by the organization prevented the committee from carrying out these functions.

In regard to the stated instrumental functions, there was no evidence that the committee helped to solve problems that were expected to arise during the course of the relief operations. Further, the committee did not serve to orient the field staff to local community conditions. This was simply because other sources were used for this purpose prior to the selection of the committee members.

There was some evidence, however, that the committee did provide some assistance to caseworkers in the development of the cases. This was true in two of the three areas studied. It was posited that the extent to which the advisory committee is used for this purpose is dependent upon the size and complexity of the local community and the availability of local official sources of information.

It was pointed out in Chapter IV that both the Red Cross staff and the committee members were aware that the committee was not effective in achieving the stated functions. Especially was this true with respect to carrying out the evaluative functions. Despite this fact, however, the existence of the committee as part of Red Cross operational procedure was favorably viewed by the field staff and the committee members.

Attitudes of Red Cross Disaster Personnel Toward the
Inclusion of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee
in Operational Procedures.

All of the three disaster area directors viewed the existence of the advisory committee as an added measure of insuring that the Red Cross achieved legitimation in the local community. Although the Area I director believed that the committee was not influential in deciding the outcome of disaster relief cases, he felt its inclusion in Red Cross operations was necessary. He viewed the committee as a means of fulfilling an obligation of the Red Cross to its supporting constituency. By allowing members of the local community to observe the manner in which the Red Cross handled and disbursed its donated funds, the committee was regarded as providing assurance to the community that the Red Cross was an organization of responsibility and integrity.

The director of Area II felt that the committee was to some extent an encumbrance upon the disaster relief activities. Although he felt the committee served to foster favorable opinions in the local community, he questioned its effectiveness in actually accomplishing this purpose. He suspected that there was little continuation of identification with the Red Cross or active support of it after the Disaster Service unit had left the community.

The director of Area III viewed the inclusion of the committee as an effective means of promoting a good Red Cross "image". He further felt that the committee provided assurance that Red Cross relief operations were acceptable to the local community.

The casework supervisors expressed many of the same notions, regarding the policy that there be a committee, as the area directors. In addition to these notions, the supervisors felt the committee was necessary to insure proper adherence to case development procedures. Approval by the committee of case recommendations was viewed as lending support to the supervisors' own decisions. Caseworkers viewed the committee as an important part of the relief operations because it provided confirmation for the adequacy of their case development. The success of organizational operations was viewed as contingent upon committee acceptance. Also, the committee represented an accessible means of gaining information when other sources were lacking.

Factors Accounting for the Defense of the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee by Disaster Service Personnel

In order to understand the factors contributing to the defense of the committee on the part of Disaster Service personnel, it is necessary to examine the ramifications involved in the roles of these persons in the Red Cross' bureaucratic structure. At the Disaster Service level, two main role functions were extant; the managerial role of the disaster area directors and the professional roles of the caseworkers, casework supervisors and other specialized functionaries. At the managerial level the main job orientation was directed toward keeping the relief program consistent with organizational policy. Disaster area directors were expected to adhere to the prescription that there be a committee. It was their responsibility to maintain the disaster relief program on a basis defined by Red Cross policy and Red Cross values. At the

professional caseworker level, concern was directed toward carrying out proper casework procedures. The committee was considered a necessary means to insure casework procedures. The committee was considered a necessary means to insure that professionally developed case recommendations were acceptable to perceived representatives of the local community. It represented an additional organizational prescription of particular importance in the development of cases involving large sums of financial aid.

As bureaucratic functionaries, the directors and the casework personnel were concerned with adequate role fulfillment. Job security in the context of the larger organization of the Red Cross demanded that they conform to established policy. Thus, the committee was included in the role definitions of members of the Red Cross field staff. Involved in successful role fulfillment was the internalization of organizational values. The degree to which Red Cross values were internalized by the field staff was reflected in the strong defense of the committee's existence. In this regard, the attitudes of area directors and casework personnel converged. The significance of the committee to these field personnel reached such proportions that it was viewed as an end in itself, rather than as a means to better facilitate relief operations.¹ Acceptance of operational procedures by the committee represented almost automatic proof to the field staff of successful role fulfillment.

¹The degree to which this prescription was internalized as a value in itself was exhibited in almost every interview with Disaster Service personnel. In the initial stages of the interviews, Red Cross personnel defended the committee solely in terms of the stated functions. It was only after considerable probing that they permitted themselves to respond according to their own personal perceptions.

The defense of the committee thus appears to be a direct outgrowth of the bureaucratic structure of the Red Cross. An effective bureaucracy demands that there be reliability of response and strict devotion to regulations. However, such devotion to rules may lead to their transformation into absolutes.¹ The resulting sentiments foster an undue importance upon procedure to the extent that they gain tremendous symbolic importance to bureaucratic functionaries. The advisory committee, because it was a part of organizational policy thus gained this importance. Internalization of organizational values and sentiments of devotion resulted in an almost complete identification with the goals of the Red Cross. Not only was this expressed in the concern for the success of operational goals, but also in the concern for the long-range goal of viability. Organizational prescriptions, because they were part of organizational policy; were seen as beneficial. The committee's existence was defended not on the basis of the functions it performed for the individual Red Cross worker, but rather upon its contributions to the furtherance of organizational goals. Because the committee was viewed as an accurate representation of the local community acceptance of operational procedures by the committee members was viewed as necessary for the maintenance of environmental support for the Red Cross.

In summary it can be seen that factors contributing to the defense of the committee were directly related to the inherent nature of the bureaucratic form of organization. Concern for adequate role performance by Disaster Service personnel resulted in a transformation of means into absolute. The committee was viewed as beneficial largely because

¹Merton, op cit, pp. 200-202

it was prescribed by organizational policy. What Merton terms "santification" of rules by bureaucratic personnel may further result in failure to initiate needed innovations for the organization. In the case of the field staff the santification of the rule that there be a committee prevented them from considering alternatives to it. These factors however, do not explain the existence of the organization prescription itself. For understanding of this the unstated but intended functions of the committee for the total organization must be analyzed.

Principal Latent Functions of the Disaster

Relief Advisory Committee

It is apparent that certain unstated functions must account for the organizational prescription that there be created advisory committees. In view of the relative ineffectiveness of committee performance with respect to their stated functions, the whole idea of the committee device makes very little sociological sense without considering these unstated functions. Two principal latent functions are posited here as the principal reasons for creating such committees. These functions are as follows:

- (1) To serve as a device for the cooptation of potentially powerful and disruptive opposition to organization or to its manner of carrying out the relief operation.
- (2) To serve as a device for meeting criticism or attacks on the organization or on its manner of carrying out the relief operations.

Since these functions are not incorporated in formal policy statements pertaining to the committee, it cannot be assumed that they

are consciously held or shared by all personnel in the Disaster Service or by those working in the disaster areas which were studied. The staff interviewed did not have a clear conception of these functions and, in fact, rather strongly tended to reject such notions. Although the fact that most of the staff members interviewed agreed that the committee was intended to serve a "public relations" function, this conception, although comprehending the two unstated functions indicated above, is too broad and unanalytic to be of great utility in understanding the committee. By analyzing the additional unstated functions, it is hoped that what appears to be an area of confusion resulting from unstated policy may be clarified. If in fact, these unstated functions are among the primary purposes of the committee then its relative ineffectiveness with respect to the stated purposes takes on different significance.

The positing of the first principal latent function of the committee, that of coopting potentially powerful and disruptive opposition, is based upon the Red Cross extreme concern for establishing legitimacy in local communities. Cooptation represents a maneuver designed to mitigate threats to the organization's existence. Since the formal authority of an organization--particularly a voluntary organization--may fail to reflect the true balance of power in the community, cooptation provides to obviate the potentiality of obstruction arising from environmental forces. By incorporating neutral or hostile elements into the administrative structure, the organization is able to maintain contact with these elements and, thus, is better able either to reduce their potentially disruptive effects or to win these elements over to the ends of the organization. The actual sharing of power by the



are consciously held or shared by all personnel in the Service or by those working in the disaster area. The staff interviewed did not have a clear conception and, in fact, rather strongly tended to reject the fact that most of the staff members interviewed substantive power. The committee was intended to serve a "public relations" conception, although comprehending the technical aspects, it becomes above, is too broad and unanalytic to be of great use to the committee. By analyzing the additional control and thus hoped that what appears to be an area of decision-making. The unstated policy may be clarified. If the device is under are among the primary purposes of the committee the coopted elements with ineffectiveness with respect to the same time controlling the significance.

The positing of the first principle that of coopting potentially powerful elements with the loci of power in upon the Red Cross extreme faces unique problems as a voluntary local communities. Cooptation of the community on a comparatively short threats to the organization's elements cannot be identified easily an organization--particularly its identity, and hence, may not be incorporated reflect the true balance of power from the early stages of its activities. to obviate the committee is based on what the organization forces. The influential elements in the community. The admir installing the committee appears to provide a cor the problem of defining its effective environment. disaster relief advisory committee, thus, elicits to identify effective environmental

the organization with the coepted elements is not necessary. The mere inclusion of these elements into the structure of the organization may suffice. The ultimate goal of such a device, then, is to share only the public symbols and administrative burdens of authority, and consequently public responsibility, without any transfer of substantive power.

The device of coeptation is not without its dangers. With the decision making body exposed to environmental elements, it becomes necessary in the interests of the organization to insure that the coepted elements do not get beyend organizational control and thus jeopardize the organization's prerogative to decision-making. The administrative body of an organization employing the device is under constant tnesion as a result of providing the coepted elements with apparently important duties while at the same time controlling the potential threat to the continuity of leadership and organizational policy.

Because of the relative unfamiliarity with the loci of power in the local community, the Red Cross faces unique problems as a veluntary relief organisation residing in the community on a comparatively short term basis. Specific hostile elements cannot be identified easily prior to their show of hostility, and hence, may not be incorporated into the disaster relief unit from the early stages of its activities. The appointment of the committee is based on what the organization perceives as potentially influential elements in the community. The act of selecting and installing the committee appears to provide a measure of closure to the problem of defining its effective envorement. The creation of the disaster relief advisory committee, thus, elicits an organizational tendency to identify effective enviremental

hostility in the committee itself. Committee approval of casework procedures and general organizational operations is viewed by Red Cross personnel as tantamount to community-wide legitimation of these actions. The organization, then, strives to gain the committee's approval of its actions.

As previously pointed out, cooptation is not without its dangers. However, the persistent threat to the organization which the committee represents, serves an additional although not necessarily intended function that is an indirect result of this continual threat. This function is the utilization of the committee as an external control device by the field administration to insure that proper casework standards are maintained by individual caseworkers. To this end, the committee represents a final and significant step in obtaining approval for case recommendations. Evidence of non-approval of these recommendations by the committee is viewed by the field staff not as a valid cause for changing the recommendation, but rather as faulty case development or poor case presentation by the caseworker. Presentation of a case before the committee approaches in importance the actual development of the case.

That the organization was successful in its endeavors to minimize potential threats, at least from those specific elements identified with the committee, is apparent by the favorable attitudes toward the Red Cross exhibited by almost all the committee members. However, it is difficult to assess from the data at hand whether the favorable attitudes of the committee members filtered through the rest of the community. The accuracy of the assumptions upon which the field staff based their definition of the committee as true representation of the community is

open to serious question. It has already been shown that the committee members were predominately from the middle or upper-middle social strata and that many were favorably oriented toward the Red Cross organization prior to their selection. Further, it was apparent that the committee members made little effort to convey their favorable orientation toward the Red Cross beyond the circle of their own immediate friends and acquaintances. It would appear, then, that favorable attitudes toward the Red Cross by the committee members does not necessarily imply like attitudes on the part of the rest of the community or complete acceptance of organizational policies by the general community.¹ There is also evidence that the committee was not the only means by which favorable attitudes of committee members toward the Red Cross were fostered. The data from Table XIV suggests that other factors also played an important part.

Table XIV

Committee Members' Attitudes Toward the Red Cross Organization

Attitude	Due To:							
	General Red Cross Activity				Serving on the Committee			
	Area I	Area II	Area III	Total	Area I	Area II	Area III	Total
Mere Favorable		4	7	11	4	3	5	12
Favorable views reinforced.		1		1	8	1	1	10
Neutral Attitude.			1	1	1	1		2
Less Favorable.		1		1				
TOTAL		6	8	14	13	5	6	24

¹ Fern and Nosew's study of disaster in Flint, Michigan and Moore's study of disaster activity in Texas both provide evidence that among disaster victims, the Red Cross organization was evaluated unfavorably in comparison to other relief organizations. See Fern, William H., Nosew, Sigmund, Community in Disaster (New York, Harper Bros, 1958) p. 209-210. and Moore, Harry, E., Tornadoes Over Texas, (Austin, Texas; Univ. of Texas Press, 1956) pp. 100-102.

For eleven members, favorable opinions toward the Red Cross were structured by general Red Cross activity. Twelve members viewed the committee experience as structuring more favorable attitudes while for ten members their favorable attitudes were merely reinforced by the committee. It is significant to note that the characteristics of the local community appear to play an important role in the degree to which the committee changes or reinforces attitudes. In Area I, where committee members were less familiar with the actual relief operations of the Red Cross following the disaster, favorable opinions were structured or reinforced solely by the committee. As one member from this area stated, "I always had a high regard for it (the Red Cross). However, I do feel more closely related to Red Cross through the committee".

In Areas II and III, the committee members were more familiar with actual field activity. A significant number of committee members structured their opinions by general activity of the Red Cross. As an articulate member stated, "My attitude has changed . . . Hell, the damn committee had nothing to do with it. I was on the chow line right after 'Donna'. I worked in the kitchen and I saw how they worked. Next time the Red Cross won't have trouble getting funds."

It appears that the assumptions upon which cooptation was based may have been quite unrealistic in the disaster operations of the Red Cross.

In one sense, the device of cooptation was successful. Whereas most analyses of this device have noted that there is an altering of organizational goals or policy as a result of having coopted hostile elements into the organizational structure, the field units were able to maintain their operational goals without any modifications due to

the influence of the committee. In this regard, organizational controls were successful in keeping the committee relatively powerless. Also, the relatively short duration of the disaster operations may have prevented any growth of an awareness of power potential by committee members.¹

The second principal latent function indicated above, appears to have been designed to serve both in the interests of the organization within the particular community in which relief activities are centered and in the interests of the environment beyond the local community. On both these levels this function serves to protect the organization from attacks on its administrative structure. Although this function is directly related to the function of cooptation, it serves as a defensive device to ward off environmental attacks.

On the extra-local level, the organization is concerned with protecting itself from two main types of attack. On the one hand, it is concerned with protecting itself from charges of favoritism and similar attacks based upon a conflict with the universalistic values of the larger American Society. On the other hand, it is concerned with protecting itself from charges of acting in a high-handed "bureaucratic" manner, unresponsive to local conditions.

¹Once installed, the committee never ceases to become a potentially disruptive sector of the organization structure. Its creation initiates an organizational need to exercise control over it. However, the committee never completely identifies itself as an integral part of the organization. nor do the Red Cross personnel identify it as such. The organizational control over the committee is thus somewhat limited. In response to this dilemma, the disaster field unit strives to end its disaster operations as quickly as possible in order to eliminate any tendencies of the committee to gain additional power and to prevent unwanted effects from possible additional environmental demands.

With respect to the first type of attack, the committee serves as "proof" that the Red Cross operates in a manner consistent with the values of the larger society. Charges that the organization is guilty of *discriminatory* practises or of malfeasance may be effectively countered by citing the policy of the organization to allow community representatives to observe the operations of the Red Cross. The legitimacy of the organization's mode of operations may be supported by citing the approval of the committee. Similarly, the potential charges of the Red Cross having acted in a totally unilateral manner may be effectively rebutted by reference to the committee. It's stated function as an advisory committee designed to insure the adequacy of Red Cross operations in the local community may be cited.

At the local level, the committee appears to be designed to protect the organization against unfavorable reactions to its decisions involved in disaster relief operations. By sharing the symbols of authority, decisions bearing upon the disaster operations appear to be based upon joint responsibility of both the Red Cross and representatives of the local community. Regardless of what the committee actually does -- whether it engages in decisions bearing upon the allocation of assistance or not -- the organization can defend itself against accusations that it fails to consider local circumstances and local values, by referring to the committee.

On both the local and extra-local levels, the committee serves as an effective escape mechanism for the administration of the organization. This is based upon a circular type of relationship with the committee by allowing it to share the symbols of authority. Environmental challenges may thus be countered by citing the body of "community representatives"

who ostensibly shared in the decision-making process. This renders the administration at both the Disaster Service level and at the national organizational level relatively impervious to environmental attacks. Further, attacks directed toward the committee based upon non-loyalty to community interests can similarly be met by members' citing the operational imperatives of the Red Cross. In effect, then, the committee is utilized as an organizational weapon designed to protect Red Cross interests.

Summary

Although the advisory committee failed to achieve its stated functions in each of the three areas studied, this fact did not result in unfavorable attitudes toward its existence. Disaster area directors viewed the committee as valuable in fostering environmental support for the Red Cross. One director however, did question its effectiveness in this regard. Casework personnel viewed the committee as a means of legitimizing case decisions.

The factors accounting for the defense of the committee were found to be implicit in the very nature of a bureaucracy. With the concern for proving their reliability in carrying out their bureaucratic roles, the field staff defended the committee's existence as beneficial simply because it was prescribed. The development of a strong sentiment in support of the existing rules further supported the field staffs' evaluation of the committee. The committee, formally intended to be a means to facilitate more effective disaster operations, became an end in itself. Much of the disaster relief program was directed toward gaining approval by the committee. Acceptance of organizational

operations was viewed as proof of successful role achievement by organizational personnel. At the managerial level, the disaster area directors viewed committee acceptance as a result of successful adherence to organizational rules of administration. At the professional casework level, committee approval was viewed as obtaining acceptable casework development.

For the national organization, two principal latent functions directly related to the viability of the Red Cross were found to be served by the committee. These functions appeared to be designed as devices for (1) coopting powerful and disruptive opposition into the relief operation, and (2) meeting criticisms or attacks on the organization emanating from local and extra-local sources.

The first function -- cooptation -- represents an offensive device by which the organization is better able to control potentially disruptive elements in the environment by incorporating these elements into the policy-making body of the organization. Although the Red Cross appeared to be successful in this regard, it was posited that so far as actual powerful elements being incorporated in the committee was concerned the assumptions of the Disaster Service personnel were quite unrealistic. However, it cannot be denied that the favorable attitudes of committee members toward the Red Cross was not without significance. Membership on the committees was from relatively high status groups. Many of these persons were well known and some were influential in business, social, and religious spheres. Among these persons, the organization succeeded in establishing a relatively high personal identity with the organization and the ends of the disaster relief operation.

In another respect, the Red Cross was successful in this cooptation device. Contrary to most instances of cooptation the advisory committee did not interfere with the organization's established procedures for determining needs of disaster victims and allocating assistance to victims. It was posited that effective control of the committee and the short duration of its existence, kept it from becoming aware of its potential power. The only obstruction which the committee posed to the relief operations was in terms of reducing the speed with which applicants for large resource awards were handled.

The second major latent function was that of protecting the decision-making body of the Red Cross. By employing this defensive mechanism the organization was able to protect itself both at the local and the extra-local levels. In the former case, the committee, by sharing the symbols of responsibility protected the Red Cross decisions regarding specific cases. At the extra-local level the committee served to provide "proof" that the organization was operating in a manner consistent with the values of the larger society. At both of these levels, the committee served to complete a circular authority structure by which the locus of authority was never clearly defined. As a result, both the organization and the committee were protected from external attacks.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Selznick has stated that analysis of organizations must follow a selective principle.¹ Following this suggestion, this study has concentrated upon the relationship of one aspect of an organization to its stable needs. More precisely, this has been a study of an administrative device -- the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee -- intended to accomplish certain goals in response to the needs inherent in the continued existence of the Red Cross.

It is apparent that for an organization to exist in a changing environment there must be a change in emphasis from substantive goals, which are attainable, to the analytic goal of viability. As a result of this displacement, concern of the organization for both its internal structure and its acceptance by the environment became paramount. In regard to the internal structure of the Red Cross, concern for viability has led to a more efficient form of organization based upon bureaucratic principles.² The problems of acceptance by the environment has led to a continual succession of substantive goals. These goals have arisen in response to threats upon the viability of the organization. They have subsequently provided a rationale for the existence of the

¹Selznick, Philip, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization, American Sociological Review, vol. 13 (1948) pp. 25-26.

²

This has supported Weber's statement: "For bureaucratic administration is, other things being equal, always, for a formal, technical point of view, the more rational type. For the needs of mass administration today, it is completely indispensable. The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilletantism in the field of administration." Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York:Oxford University Press, 1947) p. 337.

Red Cross.

The structuring of substantive goals is exceedingly complex. These goals cannot be structured independently from the environment. Rather, integration must be achieved with the social system. The Red Cross, being a voluntary organization dependent upon local support and national acceptance for its existence, must successfully integrate its activities at the level of the local community as well as at the level of the larger American Society. Certain methods must therefore be adopted to bridge the gap between the particularistic value orientation of the community and the universalistic demands of the larger society. The Disaster Relief Advisory Committee represents one means intended to accomplish this purpose. While adhering to the universalistic values of the larger society, the Red Cross seeks to utilize the committee for successful integration at the local level. The committee's stated substantive goals are designed to legitimate the existence of the Red Cross in the disaster area as well as to provide certain instrumental functions for actual disaster relief operations. The focus of this study has been upon (1) the degree to which the committee accomplished its officially stated goals, (2) factors accounting for its level of achievement of these goals, and (3) important intended but unstated functions of the committee.

It was shown that with respect to the five stated functions of the committee all were only minimally achieved. Only an instrumental function appeared to be more successfully accomplished. In regard to the instrumental functions, factors accounting for the degree of achievement appeared to be directly related to (1) the size and complexity of the local community, (2) the availability of official sources of information,

and (3) the professional experience and orientation of the Red Cross field staff.

The expressive functions were not significantly performed. This was shown to be due to a lack of motivation of committee members based upon (1) a lack of central importance in their perceptions, and (2) a lack of the forces of expectancy from both the Red Cross and the environment. A second contributing factor was shown to be based upon the social status of committee members. Committee members were almost entirely middle and upper-middle class whites. This resulted in (1) limited social intercourse with principal recipients of aid, who were predominately of the lower class, (2) limitation of assessment of community reactions due to selective contact, and (3) limitation of effective interpretation of relief activities to all sectors of the community due to the members' restricted social intercourse. Finally, stress placed upon secrecy of membership further reduced the achievement of the expressive functions.

The most salient function for both the Red Cross staff and committee members was shown to be the committee's prescribed evaluation functions. Factors accounting for the low level of achievement in this regard were shown to be (1) the criteria used in selecting the committee members, (2) the limited ability and training of members to accurately assess disaster victims' need requests, (3) an intensive program of orientation to Red Cross operational imperatives resulting in a partial loss of concern for imposing local standards upon the Red Cross, (4) evidences of efficient, responsible planning presented by Red Cross workers to the committee, and (5) every means employed by the field staff to retain the locus of power with the organization.

It was apparent that because the officially stated purposes of the committee were achieved, its main significance seemed to be upon its latent or unstated functions. Two levels of analysis were presented. At the lower level, factors contributing to the defense of the committee by the field staff were analysed. At the higher level of the national organisation, underlying latent functions apparently intended by policy makers were presented. Factors contributing to this defense of the committee by field staffs were shown to be due to a sanctification of organisational rules. Related to this role of sentiments was the perception of committee approval as "proof" that role functions were successfully carried out. For the disaster operations directors, a complaint committee was interpreted in terms of successful adherence to organisational prescriptions. For the professional caseworker staff, committee approval meant that casework procedures were acceptable to the local community.

At the higher level of the national organisation, it was posited that two main underlying intentions were responsible for the prescription that there be a committee. First was the principle of cooptation whereby hostile or neutral elements were brought into the decision-making body of the local Red Cross disaster relief unit. By so doing the organization was better able either to reinforce already favorable attitudes or to change the attitudes of these elements into a favorable orientation to the Red Cross.

The second principal unstated function was the use of the committee as a defensive device. By sharing the symbols of authority, the organisation sought to shield its administrative structure from direct environmental attack. Although the committee did not in fact share

authority, the shared symbols protected the organization from direct responsibility for actions which may not be wholly acceptable to the local community and to the larger environment.

Implications of the Study

This being a case study, it does not warrant drawing conclusions regarding all voluntary organizations which are bureaucratically-structured. A purpose of a case study is to point out certain implications that may provide a meaningful contribution to the general fund of knowledge. Implications to sociological knowledge that have arisen from this study are based upon three principal concerns. These are: (1) the role of sentiments among bureaucratic personnel, (2) the use of the concepts manifest and latent functions in organizational analysis, and (3) a more precise definition of "cooptation".

The Role of Sentiments

The study has supported those analyses which have noted the importance of sentiments among bureaucratic functionaries. Although the study of sentiments in regard to internal informal relationships are of importance, our concern is upon the role of attachment toward the organization based upon sentiment and the resulting orientation of the functionaries toward the environment.

The structuring of positive sentiments toward the organization seem to be particularly important for the voluntary organization. This type of organization, forced to rely upon voluntary contributions for its support, presents a particularly unreliable means of assurance for

continuance of office to the functionary. It is thus to the bureaucratic incumbent's benefit that he promote organizational goals and adhere to organizational rules, thereby helping to insure that the existence of the organization, and his office will continue. Strong sentiments of attachment tend to develop toward the organization. These are often exhibited in a defensive manner toward the environment. The concerns of the organization become concerns of the personnel.¹ It appears that the bureaucratically-structured voluntary organization exhibits the characteristics of what Gouldner has termed "representative bureaucracy". Contrary to the imposition of rules and enforced compliancy of a "punishment-centered bureaucracy", this form is based upon rules established by agreement. These are "rules which are technically justified and administered by specially qualified personnel to which consent is given voluntarily".² Concern for the continuance of office then results in agreement to organizational rules which fosters the internalization of organizational values. This internalization is exhibited by strong sentiments of attachment to the organization.

The sentiments of attachment toward the organization may frequently lead to irrational behavior with respect to rules and the carrying out of these rules. During the disaster operation, adherence to the prescription that there be a committee resulted in its existence. However, concern for the organization and the continued

¹ This is not to say that office occupancy per se structures these attitudes. These offices may attract certain individuals having a propensity for such role commitment. However, once installed, their concern for achievement becomes fused with the continued existence of their office and hence the organization.

² Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, op cit., p. 24.

existence of office resulted in effective controls, employed to minimise the potential disruptions of the committee to Red Cross Operations. This suggests that where organizational rules tend to come into conflict with respect to the functionary's office, concern for these rules supporting the office will take precedence over those rules which may pose as a threat to the office.

Manifest and Latent Functions

The attempts to apply a functional analysis to an organisation are exceedingly complex. It is generally recognized that organizational analyses based only upon stated goals or manifest functions fail to note the important consequences of the unstated or latent functions. However, attempts to account for both manifest and latent functions of an organization must ascertain the following: (1) For whom are the stated functions intended? Are they intended for bureaucratic functionaries at specific levels in the organizational hierarchy or for the total organization? (2) For whom is the recognition of the intended function crucial in the analysis? Is primary importance to be placed upon recognition by the environment; by the bureaucratic functionaries; or by the policy-makers? (3) To whom is it crucial for the recognition of the consequences of the intended functions?

In answer to the first question, this study has focused upon the functions intended to benefit the total organization at both the local community level and the larger societal level. With respect to the second question, we have identified as substantive goals those functions whose intentions are recognized by the social environment via official statements. Analytic goals have been implicitly defined as those intentions not

not recognized by the social environment. With respect to the consequences of these goals we have left them unclassified. For the heuristic purposes at hand, manifest functions were considered to refer to those goals publicly stated which result in recognized consequences by the environment, while latent functions were considered to be those goals not publicly stated whose consequences may or may not be recognized. Further is it possible for these consequences to be intended or unintended.

Merton has defined manifest functions as "objective consequences for a specific unit (person, subgroup, social or cultural system) which contribute to its adjustment or its adaptation or were so intended". Latent functions refer to "unintended and unrecognized consequences of the same order".¹ These definitions may be illustrated by the following paradigm.

Figure V

Paradigm of Merton's Definitions

Consequences	Cultural Patterns	
	Intended	Unintended
Recognized	Manifest	
Unrecognized		Latent

Gouldner has modified these definitions in organizational analysis.

He defines manifest functions as those "consequences of a social pattern, e.g. bureaucracy, which are culturally prescribed for it. Latent functions

¹Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, op cit., p. 63.

are referred to as a "pattern's actual consequences but in this case, these are not culturally prescribed or preferred".¹ The following paradigm illustrated these definitions:

Figure VI

Paradigm of Gouldner's Definition

Consequences	Cultural Prescription	
	Intended	Unintended
Recognized	Manifest	Latent
Unrecognized		Latent

Notice that Gouldner regards latent functions as being unintended, but they may be either recognized or unrecognized.

It is apparent that two aspects of analysis should center upon latent and manifest functions in organizational analysis. One aspect of analysis should center upon latent and manifest functions of policy not officially stated, and the other upon latent and manifest functions of policy officially stated.² It appears then that for this purpose, the possibilities appearing in the following paradigms would be fruitful. These are based upon two different levels in organizational analysis. At the level of officially stated goals, the significance of the consequences lies in whether or not they are recognized by the social

¹ Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, op. cit., p. 25.

² Another approach to this problem is presented by Cicourel in what he terms "front" and "back" of organizational policy. Cicourel, Aaron V., "The Front and Back of Organizational Leadership" in The Pacific Sociological Review, vol. 1, no. 2 (1958) pp. 54-58.

environment. With respect to goals that are unofficially stated, the significance of the recognition of consequences lies with organizational personnel.

Figure VII

Paradigm of Officially Stated Goals

Officially Stated Goals		
Consequences*	Intended	Unintended
Recognized	Manifest	
Unrecognized		Latent

*Of importance to the effective social environment

Figure VIII

Paradigm of Goals Not Officially Stated

Goals Not Officially Stated		
Consequences*	Intended	Unintended
Recognized ^o	Manifest	
Unrecognized		Latent

*Of importance to organizational personnel

Empirical examples of these cell entries may be cited by first noting the officially stated functions and secondly noting the goals not officially stated.

Officially Stated Goals

- (1) Officially intended goal; consequences recognized by the effective social environment. For some of the committee members of Area II

the function of providing needed information to the Red Cross regarding community patterns and practices was intended. The consequences, in some cases, were recognized as an actual achievement of the formally stated intention.

- (2) Officially unintended goal; consequences recognized by the effective social environment. Some committee members felt the committee served as a means to foster continued support of the Red Cross after the disaster operations. Although this was not formally stated by the organization or its functionaries. The consequences were seen as fostering greater participation in fund drives.
- (3) Officially intended goals; consequences unrecognized by the effective social environment. Although some committee members perceived their primary role as providing information to the Red Cross, most of them were not aware of the final consequences of this activity.
- (4) Officially unintended goals; unrecognized by the effective social environment. The committee was not intended to slow down the processing of cases. However, this did appear to happen, contrary to the belief of many members that the committee helped expedite the handling of cases.

Goals Not Officially Stated

- (1) Intended goals; consequences recognized by organizational personnel. Although the Red Cross personnel were not sure in what manner the the committee served to foster improved "public relations" they viewed the committee as serving this purpose and attributed the favorable attitudes of committee members toward the Red Cross as consequences of this goal.

- (2) Unintended goals; consequences recognized by organizational personnel. Most Red Cross personnel recognized that the committee slowed down the actual handling of case development however, this was not so intended.
- (3) ~~Intended goals; consequences unrecognized by organizational personnel.~~ The staffs' ~~assumption that committee approval of relief operations meant similar approval by the total community~~ was shown to be open to doubts. Evidence from other operations seems to point to unfavorable evaluations of the Red Cross by certain sectors of the local community. Hence, the consequences of this assumption were not known to the organizational personnel.
- (4) ~~Unintended goals; consequences unrecognized by organizational personnel.~~ It was the intention of the organization to foster favorable attitudes toward the organization by committee members exhibited resentment toward the Red Cross. This occurred as a result of the organizations' efforts to prevent actual functioning of the committee. This fact was unrecognized by the Red Cross personnel, nor was it an intended goal.

Coeptation.

From this study it has become apparent that a limitation of the concept of "coeptation" is of value in analyzing one means of an organization's adaptation to its environment. The use of the term has arisen from Selznick's definition: " . . . the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence".¹

¹ Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, op cit., p. 13.

The need to employ this device arises out of the intrusion of environmental values upon the organization. The primacy of the goal of viability of the organization forces it to devise methods to foster legitimation in its environment and to protect it from external attacks. In American Society the values of democracy force a variety of demands upon the bureaucratic organization. These values, involving the ideal of individual equality and the suspicion toward centralized control, requires that the organization maintain at least a semblance of democratic orientation. Cooptation is one means of serving this end.

Two types of cooptation have been defined by Selznick; formal and informal. Formal cooptation is likely to occur when the legitimacy of authority of the organization is questioned. By incorporating elements of the environment into the organization, an effort is made to establish orderly and reliable mechanisms for reaching a "client public or citizenry". This is accomplished in a formally declared manner.

In-formal cooptation arises in response to the pressure of specific centers of power within the environment. Although legitimation may well be established in the community, there may be forces which are able to threaten the organization's formal authority and effectively shape its structure and its policy. By coopting these elements into the organization, the demands of these forces tend to be mitigated. Although the organization may seek to control these forces the sharing of actual power may actually occur. Because a formal announcement of the cooptation of these elements would undermine public confidence in the strength and legitimacy of the organization, these elements are brought into the organization without public statement.

With the organizational concern over its viability, it would appear

that two functions are in fact operative. For analytic purposes, we would propose limiting the term cooptation to the act of bringing into the organizational policy-deciding body, neutral or hostile elements in an effort either to change them to a favorable orientation to the organization or to mitigate the threats which they represent. By coopting these elements into the confines of the organization, they are more easily influenced and more effectively handled according to the purposes of the organization. However, once installed, these elements pose grave dangers to the organization since they are never under complete jurisdiction of the administration. The degree to which these dangers are minimized is dependent upon the means and degree of control employed by the organization.

Whereas in cooptation, active efforts are employed by the organization to change or mitigate the hostility of environmental elements, a second function is that of the defense of the organization's administrative body. Selznick includes this function in the concept of cooptation. However, its importance warrants more explicit treatment. The defensive function which is served by a body like the Disaster Relief Advisory Committee, is of no small importance to potential challenges aimed at operational methods of an organization. Once in existence, coopted elements become identified by the rest of the environment as part of the organization. If they are not so identified formally, the organization has recourse to make such references public. The coopted elements may or may not share actual power. The importance of the defensive function rests upon the identity of the coopted elements with the organization's policy-deciding body. The result is the diffuseness of the authority structure and the resulting protection

of the organization from attacks from these external elements not coopted into its structure. This defense is effected because of the impossibility of accurately locating the center of authority.

Evidence supporting the above differentiation of functions is shown in this study. Continual efforts were made by the Red Cross to foster amicable relations with the advisory committee members. This was intended to insure support for the organization. It was further posited that having acquired favorable attitudes toward the organization, the committee served a defensive role for the organization, shielding it from attacks arising from both local and extra-local sources.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLES

TABLE I

Religious Affiliation of Committee Members

Denomination	Area I	Area II	Area III
Episcopal	2		3
Presbyterian	2		3
Methodist	3	7	
Lutheran	1		
Catholic	1	1	4
Baptist	2	1	
Jewish			1
None	1	1	3
Total	12	10	14

Table II

List of Represented Organization
on the Committee

Service Clubs

Liens
Rotary
Kiwanis
Lady K's
Rotary Ann's

Fraternal Clubs

Elks
Moose
Masons
Eastern Star

Veterans Organizations

American Legion
Veterans of Foreign Wars

Community Organizations

PTA and other school related
organizations
Voluntary welfare organizations
Civic Club

Business and Professional Groups

Business and Professional
Women
Chamber of Commerce
Ministerial Association
Bar Association
Labor Organizations

Non-vocational Interest Groups

Garden Club
Yacht Club
Conservation League

Voluntary Units

Fire Department
Rescue Squad
Ambulance Corps

Miscellaneous

Little Theatre
Sheriff's Association
Citizen of the Year

Table III

Reasons Given for Favorable Attitudes Regarding the Committee
By Committee Members

Response	Area I	Area II	Area III	Total
Learned how the Red Cross operates.	8	3	11	22
Was a means for representing the community.	4	1	1	6
Was able to give the Red Cross information.		3		3
Helped the Red Cross make decisions on the cases.		2		2
Learned more about the local community.		1		1
No special reasons	1		2	3
Total	13	10	14	37

TABLE IV

Members' Conceptions of the Main Purposes of the Committee*

Response	Area I	Area II	Area III
To verify the recommendations.	1		2
To approve or disapprove the recommendations.	1	2	
To provide a means to gain community acceptance.	5	1	5
As an advisory body.		2	
To provide the Red Cross with information for specific cases.	2	4	3
To provide a means for publicizing Red Cross activities.	2	2	2
To provide a "cover for Red Cross in the event of adverse community reactions.	2	2	1
To approve what has already been decided by the Red Cross.	2		1
To act as a "check" on Red Cross activities.	1	1	9
To act for the Red Cross as a "sounding board" for community reaction.	2	2	
To provide moral support for the Red Cross workers.	1		
Total	19	16	23

*This table is based on 10 respondents in Area I, 10 respondents in Area II, and 14 respondents in Area III. Multiple responses.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

SCHEDULE OF QUESTIONS USED IN STUDY OF
DISASTER RELIEF ADVISORY COMMITTEES IN
HURRICANE DONNA

(for Committee Members)

1. How do you evaluate your experience as a committee member? (probe)
2. Have you spoken before any groups regarding Red Cross activity?
3. Who else have you talked to concerning Red Cross rehabilitation?
4. Who knows that you are serving on the committee?
club members? - business associates? - other associates?
5. Has your attitude toward R.C. changed?
What was the main factor that changed your attitude? (probe)
6. Do you think the committee was of proper size to deal with the problems presented to it?
7. Do you think the members of the committee were good representation of the community.
8. Are there any other persons in the community or county who you feel should have been on the committee?
9. Why do you think you were chosen to be on the committee?
10. Do you think the committee was effective in advising the R.C. in the granting of awards? Was it essential? Useful? (probe)
11. What do you feel was the main purpose of the committee? (probe)
12. Apart from the committee meetings, have you been consulted by case workers for information on any particular cases? Did you know what the worker would recommend before the committee meeting?
13. Do you have any other opinions or thoughts regarding your activity as an advisory committee member?

Background material:

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Salary (of spouse if subject not employed) | 5. Age |
| 2. Education | 6. Membership in other organizations. |
| 3. Length of residence in the community | 7. Church affiliation |
| 4. Occupation | 8. Any previous assoc. with R.C. |

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CASEWORKERS

1. How many cases have you worked on in this area in this disaster?
2. How many voluntary withdrawals were there?
3. How many denials were there?
4. What, if anything, do you tell your families about the advisory committee? a.

b. Do you tell all of them this?

c. What do you tell those for whom you recommended denial?
5. Have you sought the advice or counsel of an advisory committee member in this disaster?
6. How has this advisory committee effected your casework so as to keep it in line with family and local community standards?
7. What functions for you, as a case worker, does the advisory committee serve?
8. What do you think is the main purpose of the committee?

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