LA CONFEDERATION DES SYNDICATS NATIONAUX: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS GROWTH BETWEEN 1961 AND 1970

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ABSTRACT

LA CONFEDERATION DES SYNDICATS NATIONAUX: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS GROWTH BETWEEN 1961 AND 1970

By

Allen M. Ponak

The main purpose of the thesis was to determine the factors that contributed to a large expansion of La Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) during the Sixties, even while the rest of the labour movement in North America barely grew at all. The CSN, a French-Canadian trade union situated in Quebec, doubled its membership during the decade. At present it accounts for approximately 30 percent of union membership in Quebec and for about 10 percent of Canadian trade unionists.

Believing that myriad factors were responsible for the growth, the thesis carefully examined the history of the CSN, its structure and intra-organizational distribution of powers, its membership composition, its philosophy and tactics, and the Canadian and Quebec social, political, and industrial relations environments. Also included was a statistical chapter depicting the significance of the CSN's growth during the Sixties vis-a-vis its own record, compared to the rest of the North American labour movement, and compared to the non-CSN unions in Quebec.

In researching the thesis, reliance was placed mainly on secondary sources. Several interviews were conducted but were used primarily to verify the material already perused. Quantitative data were collected

chiefly from Canadian Department of Labour publications or from publications of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

The findings of the thesis were divided into three sets or categories, each one contributing in a different way to the expansion of the union.

The first set of factors includes those which were responsible for the creation of a climate in Quebec, during the 1960s, that was favourable to unionism. The most important of these factors was the defeat, in 1960, of an anti-labour government and its replacement by a government sympathetic to unions, the passage, in 1964, of a new Quebec Labour Code which opened up whole new areas to unionization (particularly the public sector), and Quebec's so-called "revolution tranquil", a period of unprecedented economic prosperity and social change.

The second category of factors included those features of the Sixties that specifically favoured the CSN. The key factor here was the rise of French-Canadian nationalism. As the only French-Canadian union in Quebec, the CSN was at a natural advantage. Too, the CSN benefited from the weakness of certain international unions, especially those that could not adequately service their members in Quebec. In addition, the CSN was on unusually good terms with the political party in power.

The third set of factors contributing to the expansion of the CSN in the ten-year period from 1961 to 1970 constitutes the actions initiated and policies adopted by the union itself during thatperiod. The most consequential of these was the centralization of powers and structure of the union at the start of the decade. Its new structure resulted in maximum flexibility and mobility of resources, giving the CSN a clear advantage over the other unions in the province. An equally important factor was the CSN's ability to organize workers in the most rapidly expanding sector of the

economy, the tertiary sector. Too, the union displayed a strong appeal to white collar workers organizing many of them. Finally, the union benefited from a hugely successful raiding campaign.

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DEDICATION

I am taking this opportunity to thank the members of my committee, my typist, Emma, and the two people closest to me, Elizabeth and Bob, who put up with my carrying-on while the thesis was being written. But, most of all, I owe the largest debt of gratitude to myself, for in the end it was I who had to sit down and do all the work.

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INTRODUCTION

The Subject and the Intent

La Confederation des Syndicates Nationaux (CSN)[1] is an indigenous French-Canadian trade union movement of the province of Quebec. It accounts for approximately 35 percent of Quebec's trade unionists and for about 10 percent of Canadian trade union membership. Prior to 1960 the union was called la Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC).

For most of its history, the CSN was rather conservative and ineffectual as a trade union. Founded by the Church in 1921 to rival the influx of international unions entering the province, the CSN seemed more interested in perpetuating the social doctrine of the Church than in bargaining collectively to gain benefits for their membership at the workplace. While such a formula was tolerably successful in the Church-dominated traditional society that was the earmark of Quebec prior to World War II, the changes wrought by the war rendered such a policy inadequate.

To adapt to changing conditions, principally an acceleration in the rates of industrialization and urbanization, the CSN was forced to undergo a period of transition following the Second World War. It became increasingly secular and increasingly aggressive. It engaged in militant strike activity and for the first time in its history openly opposed a Quebec government. Membership growth, however, remained moribund in a pattern that had plagued the organization since its founding--a pattern of wide fluctuations from year to year: up one year, down the next; gain 10,000 workers one year, lose 15,000 the next.

The 1960s seemed to mark an end, at last, to this sporadic and irregular pattern of growth. Commencing in 1961, membership in the CSN began to climb and by 1970 had reached a total more than double that of the 1961 figure. Never before in its history had the union undergone such a long

period of sustained growth. Moreover, this growth was all the more striking considering that the Sixties was a period of relative stagnation for the remainder of the North American labour movement, including the non-CSN unions situated in the province of Quebec.

It is the purpose of this thesis to try and examine the reasons behind this unprecedented growth. It is the contention of this author that no single factor was responsible for the expansion but, rather, that myriad factors contributed to it. The research and analysis is, thus, undertaken from a number of different perspectives.

A preliminary chapter is devoted to depicting the organization's expansion for the period under consideration, 1961-70. Other chapters then deal with the environmental variables acting upon the union, its history, its structure, its composition, and its philosophy and tactics.

The primary function of the above-mentioned chapters, which together compose the bulk of the thesis, simply is to present the facts. Most analytical interpretation of the data is reserved to the last and concluding chapter. This final chapter analyzes and measures the impact and influence of the many diverse factors presented during this thesis upon the organization's growth during the ten-year period of interest.

It should be clear, therefore, that I have not formed an hypothesis, in the strict sense of the word, and then set out to either prove or refute it. Rather, I set down as objectively as possible "the whole story" of the CSN, and then interpreted the implications of "the whole story" for a particular period of time. Undoubtedly, others would interpret the ramifications of this "whole story" somewhat differently; hence, it will not surprise me in the least if some disagree with my analysis of the situation. Yet, though it would be presumptuous on my part to insist that all who disagree with my assessment must be wrong, I strongly believe that

the facts "speak for themselves" and bear strong witness to the correctness of my concluding observations.

Statement of the Main Object

The principal object of this thesis is to determine and identify the factors that contributed to the rapid expansion of the CSN between the years 1961 and 1970 through an examination of numerous variables acting upon the union and through analysis of its own actions.

Research Methodology and Research Sources

The first and principal category of sources comprises any literature, published or unpublished, written on the subject or related topics. Included are various published texts, journal articles, newspaper articles, doctoral and master's theses, and various commission, institute, or seminar reports and studies.

A second important source of information was the CSN itself. Numerous documents, publications, and pamphlets were on record in the CSN's library. As well, records of the union's biennial convention were freely available and of great value.

Government publications, particularly those of the Canadian federal government, were a third useful source of information. Quantitative data on numerous subjects were available from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and the Canadian Department of Labour.

Finally, some personal interviews were conducted. They were used mainly to augment and verify written material. Although all interviews were of an informal nature, they proved invaluable in "filling the gaps", so to speak.

CHAPTER I.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CSN'S GROWTH BETWEEN 1961 AND 1970

A basic premise of this thesis is that the CSN underwent a period of significant expansion between the years 1961 and 1970. The purpose of this chapter is to verify the legitimacy of that premise. The endeavor, therefore, is to illustrate the growth of the CSN during the ten-year period under consideration.

Membership growth of any organization can be expressed in a variety of manners: absolutely, as a comparison to similar organizations, as a rate per annum, as an indice, etc. For the purposes of the analysis about to be undertaken, it will be sufficient to depict the growth of the CSN in two ways:

1) Intra-organizationally over time, i.e., as a comparison of membership increase within the CSN since 1961 to membership increase within the CSN prior to 1961, and;
2) Inter-organizationally, i.e., as a comparison of the CSN growth rate from 1961 to 1970 vis-a-vis other relevant segments of the labour force.

A comparison of CSN membership during 1961-1970 to membership growth prior to this period immediately reveals the significance of this ten-year period. The Sixties was not merely a period of huge membership enlargment for the organization; the expansion in those ten years numerically surpassed total membership growth during the previous forty years. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

The addition of 109,000 new members more than doubled the organization's size. Prior to this time, the next largest ten-year expansion had occurred between 1941 and 1950. The expansion of 34,000 then, however,

TABLE 1

CSN GROWTH, 1921-1960*

Year	Membership (000)
1921	40
1925	25
1930	25
1935	38
1940	46
1945	68
1950	80
1955	99
1960	102

*Percentage increase 1921-1960, 127 percent;
Percentage increase per year, 3.2 percent.

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1921-1960).

TABLE 2

CSN GROWTH, 1961-1970

Year	Membership (000)
1961	98
1962	102
1963	111
1964	122
1965	150
1966	188
1967	198
1968	201
1969	208
1970	207

*Percentage increase 1961-1970, 111 percent;
Percentage increase per year, 11.1 percent.

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961-1970).

was less than one-third that of the Sixties and was in no small part due to a specialized climate created by World War II that tended to benefit the trade union movement as a whole.

Furthermore, annual percentage growth of membership between 1961 and 1970 was three and a half times the rate of the previous forty years. (See Tables 1 and 2.) Whereas in its first forty years the Confederation experienced an increase in size at an average annual rate of 3.2 percent, the Sixties saw the rate jump to a mean annual increase of 11.1 percent. This once again identifies the years 1961-1970 as notable and as especially important ones for the CSN.

Compared to the rest of the labour movement, the CSN growth, particularly during the first part of the Sixties, was equally impressive. The CSN growth was not simply a case of the union participating in a widespread labour expansion. In fact, during the first few years of the 1960s the rest of organized labour experienced a decline in membership.

Figure 1 (next page) testifies to these facts. It illustrates that the CSN expanded at a much more rapid rate than either unions in the United States or unions belonging to the Canadian Congress of Labour (CLC). More pertinent to this discussion is the comparison of the CSN growth rate to that of the rest of the labour movement in the province of Quebec. As is seen in Figure 1, the growth rate of the CSN surpassed the growth rate of all non-CSN unions in Quebec by a wide margin. Indeed, the CSN's rate of expansion over the ten years was double that of the rest of the province's labour. Between 1961 and 1969[1] the CSN grew by 112 percent while the non-CSN unions in Quebec advanced by 56 percent.

In short, the extraordinary growth rate of the CSN was a unique phenomenon. It is not as if the rest of the labour movement on this continent doubled its membership, too. If this were the case, the expansion of the CSN would be much less noteworthy.

FIGURE 1.

COMPARISON OF UNION GROWTH, 1961-1970, CSN, CLC, UNITED STATES, NON-CSN (QUEBEC), Base Year 1961 = 100



Source: Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961-1970).
Canada Department of Labour, Labour Gazette (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961-1970).
United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), Table 151, p. 339.

While Table 3 (next page) does not portray membership growth, per se, it reveals a vital property of the CSN's growth. It discounts the possibility that the large expansion of the Sixties represented merely a "catching up" phase for Quebec unionism. The table indicates that there existed in 1961 only a slight difference between the percentage of unionized non-agricultural workers in Quebec and elsewhere.

If there had been a notable difference detected (i.e., Quebec's rate of unionization being considerably less than the rate of unionization in Canada or the United States), one might be warranted in assuming that the CSN growth was in a large part a predictable growth that was necessary to bring Quebec's rate of unionism in line with that of the rest of North America.

That this was not the case is illustrated by the fact that once Quebec unionism had reached a level comparable to that of the rest of the continent, it surged significantly ahead. Under the latter assumption (namely, that the CSN increase was a manifestation of a predictable catch-up phase), such a spurt would be difficult to account for.

This I feel eliminates an explanation of CSN growth based on an hypothesis of a below-average rate of Quebec unionization. In so doing, it heightens the importance of the CSN's expansion and by necessity suggests that other factors were responsible.

Briefly summarizing, certain points have been made:

(1) In terms of the organization itself, the membership expansion was extremely significant, being unparalleled in CSN history.

(2) The CSN was not the beneficiary of a "bandwagon effect" generated by a widespread trend of unusually high union growth. The growth rate of the CSN between 1961 and 1970 was markedly greater than that of other labour organizations relevant for comparison.

(3) The CSN growth rate cannot be simply explained by the fact that Quebec lagged behind the rest of North America in terms of percentage of the non-agricultural labour force unionized.

TABLE 3.

COMPARISON OF UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL PAID WORKERS: UNITED STATES, CANADA, QUEBEC, 1961-1969

Year	U.S.A.	Canada	Quebec
1961	30.2	31.6	27.9
1962	29.8	30.2	27.8
1963	29.2	29.8	27.0
1964	28.9	29.4	28.3
1965	28.4	29.7	30.6
1966	28.1	30.7	33.7
1967	27.8	32.3	36.2
1968	27.8	33.1	37.9
1969		32.5	37.3

Source: Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General de la CSN, CSN Convention report, Montreal, 1970, Table 4, p. 11.

CHAPTER II.

ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the more salient features of the Canadian and Quebec environment and to fix the place of the CSN within it. Notwithstanding the frequent herculean efforts of the Quebec Church, the CSN did not evolve in a vacuum, isolated from the rest of North America. It was affected then, and continues to be affected today by the context in which it interacts. Particular attention will be paid to the place and the role of the American-dominated international unions in Canada and in Quebec. (As will be shown later, the CSN was founded originally to combat the intrusion of the internationals into the province of Quebec.) Implicit is the belief that by establishing the position of the CSN within an overall perspective, factors affecting its development during the period under consideration (1961-1970) will be more easily identifiable.

Canadian Environment

Of all the characteristics of the Canadian environment, the proximity of the United States probably has had the greatest implications for Canadian industrial relations. For a variety of reasons, American international unions began to enter Canada about 1860 and soon became the most significant form of unionism in the country.[1] By 1911, the first year for which reliable statistics are available, international unions accounted for 89.7 percent of the 130,000 union members in Canada.[2] This proportion has fluctuated somewhat since then, though never falling below 50 percent of all Canadian unionists, and today stands at 62.5 percent of the total.[3]

Over the last several years, however, the proportion has been on a downward trend, having fallen from slightly more than 70 percent just five years ago.[4] Concurrently, the representation of national unions (unions with their headquarters in Canada such as the CSN or the Canadian Union of Public Employees) has risen from approximately 25 percent in 1965 to 35 percent today.[5] Chiefly responsible for this increase has been the fast-paced unionization of public service employees and the growth of the CSN in Quebec. Commenting on this resurgence of national unions, Labour Organizations in Canada (1970) noted:

> The extension of collective bargaining rights to new groups of employees over the past several years is reflected in the increase in the number and size of national and regional unions, mainly because public service unions active in Canada are national or regional in character...It is interesting to note that seven of the nineteen unions with 30,000 or more members in 1970 were national and regional organizations.[6]

Of these seven unions, five were composed almost exclusively of public employees.

Aside from the public service and the province of Quebec, though, international unions continue to predominate. According to a Royal Commission Report in 1957, international unions represented 85 percent of total union membership in Canada's 40 leading manufacturing industries.[7] Too, most organized workers in Canada's major export industries are members of international unions.[8] There is little indication of any substantial shifts in these areas.

These latter findings, however, should not seem too surprising in light of the fact that a major portion of these industries are American-owned and controlled. Indeed, another important feature of the Canadian environment is the extent of American domination of Canada's chief industries, especially those involving manufacturing and natural resources.

Where American corporations operating in Canada tend to be the strongest, so too do international unions. An excellent example of this can be found in the automobile industry.

Arising from the penetration of international unionism into Canada is the problem of a multiplicity of unions operating in the country. Many observers have remarked on both the large number of unions operating in Canada and the small size of many of them. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that whereas many smaller international unions still have operable jurisdictions in the United States, the same may not be true in Canada where the constituency is apt to be one-tenth the size resulting in an almost miniscule membership. The fact that many smaller international unions insist upon operating in Canada has created circumstances that Crispo, among others, feels warrant some sort of reorganization of the Canadian labour movement. Two labour centrals exist in Canada, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and the CSN. Of the two, the CLC is by far the larger, with 75.1 percent of Canadian unionists compared to 9.5 percent affiliated with the CSN.[9]

The CLC was formed in 1956 by the merger of the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of Labour, the Canadian counterparts of the AFL and CIO, respectively. It is a loose confederation of largely autonomous international and national unions. Its major functions include political lobbying, representing Canadian labour on national and international bodies, and mediating disputes among affiliates.[10] The vast majority of its members belong to international unions also affiliated with the AFL-CIO. As in the United States, for practical purposes the locus of power resides not in the CLC, but in the individual international or national unions. The CLC does not participate in collective bargaining. Thus, as

Gerard Dion has pointed out, Canada remains in the unique situation of being the only free country in the world where as important an institution as labour unions are controlled in another country.[11]

Provincial federations of labour affiliated to the CLC exist in each province. Since membership in these bodies by the various unions operating in the particular provinces is not obligatory, these federations are often weak and ineffectual, acting chiefly in a lobbying role. The lone exception is the Federation des Travailleurs du Quebec (FTQ).

The FTQ has emerged as much more than a typical provincial federation of labour. As the CSN piled up success after success in Quebec during the early Sixties, often directly at the expense of the fragmented CLC unions, the need for some kind of coordination and cohesion among non-CSN unions operating in Quebec became obvious. As one observer commented:

> ...the international and national unions, even the most powerful and rich ones capable of providing the necessary technical and related services, sensed the need for a new kind of central, having its own identity, and acting, or being capable of acting, as a point of reference or identification, and as a center of initiative and coordination....[12]

In other words, to protect the CLC syndicates against the offensive of the CSN, the FTQ was, in effect, turned into another CSN with power and rights well beyond those usually accorded such a body. Though the FTQ still lacks the overall authority of the CSN, it has proven itself a formidable opponent that has on various occasions effectively countervailed the power of the CSN.

Aside from the effect of a United States influence on Canadian industrial relations, other factors have had an impact, too. As is the case in other Western industrial nations, the Canadian labour force is undergoing changes, both qualitatively and quantitatively. There has been a marked shift in employment from primary and secondary industry to tertiary sectors

of the economy (administration and services). As a result, white collar workers now outnumber blue collar workers and the gap is widening.

With the coming of age of the post-war "baby boom" children, the average age of the labour force has also been dropping. Women, too, have been entering the labour force in ever-increasing numbers. Approximately 33.6 percent of non-agricultural workers in Canada are unionized.[13]

Two other significant aspects, as well, of the Canadian environment include a sharp constitutional division of power between the federal and provincial governments and the so-called "French fact." In the field of labour relations it is the provincial governments that establish the law. The authority of the federal government is limited. Thus, there exists, in fact, eleven separate industrial relations jurisdictions in Canada (10 provinces and the federal government). In reality, though, there is much conformity, most legislation borrowing heavily from American law. A major exception is in the area of public service unionism where by and large Canadian law has recognized the rights of civil servants to participate in collective bargaining well in advance of similar American legislation.

The "French fact" in Canada will be dealt with at length below. Suffice to say that approximately 30 percent of canada is French and that virtually all French-Canadians reside in the province of Quebec. Different language, culture, and traditions distinguish this segment of the population from the rest of Canada.

Following is a summary of the key points.

1) The great majority of Canadian unionized workers belong to American international unions.
2) The two areas where national unionism remains strong is in the public service and in the province of Quebec (CSN).

3) To a large extent due to the presence of international unionism, there exists a multiplicity of small unions operating in Canada.

4) The labour force is becoming more white collar, female, and younger.

5) Individual provincial governments are responsible for the regulation of most aspects of industrial relations.

6) A large, geographically concentrated French-Canadian minority exists in Canada with a distinct culture and different traditions.

7) The CSN is the only purely Canadian labour federation of significance, the CLC being dominated by international unions.

8) The fragmentation and lack of cohesiveness among the CLC unions was partially overcome in Quebec through the emergence of a strong provincial federation of labour, the FTQ.

Quebec Environment

Quebec shares many characteristics in common with the rest of Canada. Like each of the other nine provinces, Quebec controls all of its own matters in the field of industrial relations. The Quebec Labour Code, passed in 1964, is a very liberal one and assures virtually all groups protection under the law to organize and bargain collectively, including professionals and civil servants.

As elsewhere, the labour force in Quebec is undergoing marked changes in its age, sex composition, and the proportion of white collar workers. And, like therest of Canada, Quebec, too, was invaded by international unionism over a century ago.

Notwithstanding these, and other, similarities, however, fundamental differences exist. Repeatedly, it has been asserted that Quebec is not a province "like the others."

> ...Quebec is inhabited by a people whose language is different from that of the majority, whose laws are couched in terms and reflect a philosophy definitely foreign to the English Common Law and common tenets, and finally whose religion happens to be precisely the Catholic one, which England had rejected and outlawed.[14]

The first and foremost difference that distinguishes Quebec from the rest of Canada is the fact that the rest of the nation is English-speaking and "Americanized," while Quebec remains French, linguistically and culturally. The French are a minority in Canada, albeit a large minority, but, nonetheless, a minority. Quoting John Crispo on this subject:

> As a bastion of the French language and culture in North America, Quebec has developed a variety of distinctive customs and institutions. Many of these customs and institutions date from the days French Canada was a colony of France. Some of them, however, appear to be a product of later attempts to preserve the French heritage. In this sense, they often reflect a defensive reaction to founded and unfounded fears of continental absorption.[15]

A second critical feature distinguishing the Quebec environment from that of the rest of Canada is the pervasive and historic influence and the Catholic Church. Although, due to the ever-increasing industrial and urban nature of the province, the Church no longer exercises the influence it did in the past, its role in shaping Quebec institutions cannot be overlooked. Indeed, the CSN itself sprang from the Church.

Ever since the English conquered Quebec in 1759, the Church acted as the self-appointed guardian of French-Canadian morals, culture, language, and religion. This role was greatly facilitated by the agrarian nature of Quebec society. The basic social unit was the parish. The parish was led by a cure, generally the only educated person in the village. The bond between the Church and inhabitants was unusually close, the Church predominating in everyday affairs of the community. Under these conditions, the authority of the Church permeated the entire province.

In the field of labour relations, for instance, the Church's influence was manifested in overt opposition to the arrival of international unionism in Quebec. The international unions were depicted as alien, Communist, socialist, and anti-Christian.

> These workers' associations (international unions) are a fruit of the early nineteentn century social revolution which, like a daughter who follows her mother, followed in the footsteps of the earlier political upheaval, the French Revolution. They were born out of hatred against God, against the Church, against religion, against order and authority, especially the authority of employers....[16]

Despite the opposition of the Church, international unionism flourished in Quebec. In direct response, the Church established its own unions. (These initial syndicates were the forerunners of the CSN.)

A second force has also historically remained strong in Quebec--nationalism. As was the case of so many Church-inspired policies, nationalistic sentiment sprang from a desire of Quebecers to protect their French heritage. Though the intensity of nationalistic feeling periodically varied, provincial leaders persistently demanded special status for Quebec, especially in the field of social welfare. The depth of nationalistic feeling was conveyed by a leading Quebec journalist on the eve of Canada's one-hundredth birthday.

> Few French-Canadian leaders share the enthusiasm of their English speaking counterparts at the approaching centeneray of Confederation. The English believe we are to celebrate the hundredth anniversity of the birth of a nation. Quebec's leaders hold, on the contrary, that the birth of Canada dates from the seventeenth century and that what we're marking this year is the centenary of a political regime--a regime which has never been completely satisfactory for French-Canadians.[17]

Nationalistic sentiment reached a new high level of intensity during the Sixties following the death, in 1959, of Maurice Duplessis, and the defeat of his party one year later. Duplessis, a reactionary provincial premier who ruled Quebec with an iron fist for 15 years, almost single-handedly prevented any progressive innovations to take root in Quebec during

his tenure of office, attempting to preserve, instead, the status quo of a Church-dominated, traditional society. Upon his demise, many forces for change, long-suppressed, were unleashed all at once.

Under the guiding hand of a newly elected Liberal Party (with which the CSN maintained close ties), Quebec seemed to jump, literally overnight, into the Twentieth century. The era, at last, witnessed the final transformation of Quebec from a primarily agricultural and socially conservative soceity into an urban, industrial and modern one. Quebec entered a period of unbridled prosperity and unparalleled change that came to be known as "le revolution tranquil" (in English, "the quiet revolution"). A new pride was instilled in Quebec, and a re-awakening of French-Canadian nationalism on an immense scale resulted.

The unprecedented economic boom of the earlyand middle Sixties came to a jarring halt in the latter years of the decade as Quebec fell victim to the same general pattern of recession (high inflation, high unemployment) affecting the entire continent. As the rate of change slowed down and many expectations remained unfulfilled, disenchantment set in. The shift in the province's fortunes spawned an even more intense form of nationalism--Separatism. Blaming most of Quebec's ills on the English-Canadian domination of the province, Separatists advocated the secession of Quebec from the rest of Canada. Their position, based on the claim that linguistically and culturally Canada was, in fact, two nations and that the people of Quebec had been forced into the original merger that had resulted in the creation of one nation, Canada, won considerable support. A chronically higher rate of unemployment among Quebec workers than among workers of most other regions fed the discontent.[18]

Yet, today there remains considerable appeal in the province for the material benefits concomitant with the "American way of life." Though it

would appear that most Quebecers, especially the young and educated, favour a good deal more political autonomy for the province, this desire has been tempered by economic realities. Observers have commented that they have detected an inverse relationship between nationalist sentiment and economic prosperity: the stronger nationalism (and Separatism) is, the weaker the Quebec economy is. Specifically, as a result of increased Separatist outbursts, foreign investments in Quebec (particularly American) declined, hurting the economy. In this light it is easy to understand the widespread support among Quebec workers for the hardline policies adopted by Prime Minister Trudeau during the 1970 FLQ crisis. (Trudeau imposed martial law, the War Measures Act, after the FLQ, a Separatist terrorist group, kidnapped a diplomat and a government official and then killed the government official.)

In summary, certain features stand out. The most important is that the province is French-speaking and culturally different from the rest of North America. Further, the attempts by the people to preserve their uniqueness has generated forces that, though not in themselves unique, distinguish Quebec in the North American context. The two most important of these forces are the Roman Catholic Church and nationalism.

The impact of "le revolution tranquil" upon the character of the province is equally important. A period of economic prosperity and broad social change, it returned Quebec to the Twentieth Century after the reactionary era of Maurice Duplessis.

CHAPTER III.

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CSN

The First Catholic Syndicates--the Forerunners

The first Catholic syndicates began appearing in Quebec about the turn of the century. Most analysts attribute their birth to the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to parry the expansion of the secular, American (or international) unions into Quebec.

> The Quebec Roman Catholic Church has in the past strongly opposed the international unions. Since the English conquest, the Church has been the rallying point for the defence of French-Canadian culture, the French language, the rights of Quebec, and of course, the Catholicism of the people...it is not surprising that the internationals were regarded [by the Church] as a hostile element... the religiously "neutral" international unions were equated with anti-Christian Communist and Socialist unions of the continent [Europe].[1]

The initial resistance of the clergy was limited to denunciations of the international unions and to advice to their flocks against joining. In particular, the Knights of Labour were singled out for condemnation. For example, in 1888 Cardinal Taschereau stated: "I advise all Catholics not to join the Order [Knights of Labour]."[2] The tactic of moral suasion soon proved to be inadequate, however, as many Quebec workers failed to heed the words of the Church and joined the international unions anyways.

Thus, following the 1891 papal encyclical "Rerum Novarum", which legitimized the right of workers to form associations, the clergy replaced passive resistance with a more active approach encouraging the workers to form their own unions along confessional lines.

In these first Catholic syndicates the clergy played a direct and active role. A chaplain, appointed by the Bishop of each diocese, was assigned to each union. He acted as the chief executive officer and in this capacity was responsible for recruitment, organization, and negotiation.[3] There was a marked paucity of competent lay leaders.

Not surprisingly, fundamental differences existed between these original Church-dominated Catholic unions and their international union counterparts. The Catholic unions adhered closely to the social doctrine of the Church and had a membership restricted exclusively to Roman Catholics.[4] Also unlike the international unions, whose members were grouped around economic interests, the workers belonging to the Catholic syndicates were grouped around ideas, the stress being on religious and nationalistic values over economic objectives. In a sense, these unions were multi-functional, with least emphasis placed on the trade union function.[5] This philosophy won favour among most employers and resulted in the Catholic syndicates being preferred by management over the more militant international unions.[6]

As the number of Catholic syndicates grew, so too did contact among them. In 1919, at Trois-Rivieres, a Congress was called of all Catholic syndicates in the province. Two more Congresses followed, in Chicoutimi in 1920, and in Hull in 1921.[7] The Convention of Hull culminated with the formation of a Confederation of the Catholic unions, called the Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC).[8] At its founding it consisted of 88 locals with a combined membership of approximately 40,000.[9] The CTCC later became the Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux.

The CTCC Between the Wars

Following its founding the CTCC underwent a long period of consolidation. Membership in the organization fell and did not regain its 1921 level until midway through the 1930s.

Ideologically, the union continued to adhere closely to the social doctrine of the Church. It remained nationalistic and opposed to international unionism. Stressing the maintenance of the economic and social

status quo, it generally followed a no-strike policy. Indeed, at its founding Convention in 1921 strikes were deemed a "dangerous weapon."[10] Emphasized was the identify of interests shared by workers and management in the same enterprise.[11] This conservative approach, though winning favour with employers and the government, greatly antagonized the international unions who felt, somewhat justifiably that the CTCC was undermining their position. Commenting on this policy of the CTCC, Samuel Barnes, who closely scrutinized Catholic unionism in Quebec, noted: "...the typical Quebec employer much preferred thedocile CTCC to the... aggressive international unions...."[12]

The period, however, was marked by one exceedingly important development, namely, an emerging trend toward secularization. An increasing number of administrative functions were given over to laymen. Finally, in 1938, the first full-time paid union official was appointed.[13] Many more followed as Church influence within the union began to slowly diminish.

World War II to 1960

World War II signalled the beginning of a profound change in the union's orientation. With the War the dual processes of urbanization and industrialization accelerated in Quebec.[14] The nature of industry changed, too--expansion occurring most rapidly in sectors where the CTCC had traditionally been the weakest--aerodynamics, shipbuilding, electronics, petroleum, plastics, and heavy manufacturing in general.

The expansion found the CTCC handicapped by its economic conservatism and religious exclusiveness. Moreover, the emergence of vigorous CIO affiliates on the Quebec scene not only introduced a new source of competition, but spurred the existing internationals to new recruitment drives.[15]

The CTCC found itself faced with a major crisis. While its confessional approach to unionism had enjoyed a modicum of success in the Church-dominated traditional society typifying pre-industrial Quebec, this philosophy no longer seemed suited for the rapidly industrializing, rapidly urbanizing milieu characteristic of Quebec following the War. To cope with the crisis, to continue to survive as a viable organization, the CTCC and the Church were forced to rethink and then ultimately discard their traditional philosophy. The CTCC began to display more and more militancy. From outside the movement new lay leaders were recruited. Intellectual and university trained (Laval University, for the most part), these new recruits instilled a fresh aggressive spirit in the CTCC. Deconfessionalization picked up steam.

For the Church, the radical change it initiated in the CTCC was not as appopleptic as it might seem at first glance. The ideology of the Catholic Church, on a worldwide basis, was itself undergoing change, breaking with its traditionally conservative posture in various spheres. Thus, though a drastically altered socio-economic situation was the immediate cause of the union's radical shift in orientation, the changing philosophy of the Church itself also had an impact.

The famous Asbestos Strike of 1949, led by the CTCC, heralded the arrival of the "new" CTCC. The strike, which was technically illegal, lasted five months. Both sides committed a great deal of violence, but Quebec provincial police and hired thugs of the company did more.[16] Though the workers eventually emerged only partially victorious from an economic standpoint, the strike had far-reaching implications for the union.

The strike marked the first time in the history of the CTCC that it had openly defied a Quebec premier. Of more immediate import, it signalled

the union's clear break with the anti-union government of Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis, a decision of tremendous consequence. The Asbestos Strike was only the first of a number of major conflicts which focused public attention on the organization's new aggressiveness and its anti-Duplessis stand. Indeed, the strike set a precedent for future militant strike action by the CTCC. Samuel Barnes summed up the effect of the strike this way:

> This strike has taken on symbolic significance as the time when the CTCC became of age, when it proved its independence, its courage, its new aggressiveness, and its willingness to oppose authority.[17]

For the province of Quebec, too, the strike carried important implications. The Church sided with the workers, publicly opposing Duplessis. Thus, at last, the powerful coalition of Church, government, and employers was broken.[18] Observers have cited this development as the beginning of a new "social conscience" for Quebec.[19]

The CTCC was identified with this spirit. Following the Asbestos Strike, the union continued its aggressive policy. Now almost completely in the hands of lay leaders, the union fought lengthy and difficult strikes at Louisville (1952), with Dupuis Freres (1952) and at Arvida (1957), to name three of the most bitter. In each of these strikes, and others, the CTCC claseded with Duplessis, a formidable adversary. Describing the tremendous suppression of organized labour under the Duplessis regime, one well-known analyst wrote:

> In effect it appeared that in Quebec the only union expression permitted is that of the influential, or of the friends of the regime...But between these two minority groups lies the bulk of the wage earning population...[It is] a situation that... continuously threatens the activities and expansion of trade unionism.[20]

Though more often than not it was Duplessis who emerged victorious, the CTCC's opposition never flagged. Samuel Barnes put it this way:

> The Confederation is the most anti-capitalistic and anti-government organization in the province. It is probably the most vocal critic of the Duplessis regime....[21]

In 1955 the formation of the AFL-CIO in the United States resulted in the establishment of the CLC in Canada. For a time the CTCC seriously contemplated joining this new labour center. Ultimately, however, the merger fell through. The main stumbling block proved to the CTCC's insistence that it be granted status of a "national union" with its own affiliated organizations being considered as "locals" in the traditional sense of American trade unionism. When the CLC balked at this proposal, feeling the formula portended numerous jurisdictional problems, the merger was rejected by the CTCC.[22]

In summary, by 1960 the CTCC had emerged as a militant and vigorous organization. The preceding two decades had witnessed a break with the conservative ideology of the past, the institutionalization of the lay role, and a complementary decline in ther clerical role, particularly in the upper echelons of the union. For the first time, economic goals had been established as the number one priority of the union. In short, in spirit, tactics, and ideology it was a totally different union from the one it had been at the start of the Second World War. Its membership, however, was still relatively small, totalling approximately 100,000.

The Sixties

The CTCC entered the Sixties strong in spirit but weak in numbers. As a reflection of its by then completely non-confessional nature, the name of the union was changed from the Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC) to la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (CSN) at the 1960 Convention.

One year later two much more fundamental and consequential changes occurred. The first was the election of Jean Marchand to the union's presidency. Marchand, one of a number of bright Laval University graduates recruited by the CSN more than a decade before, was an astute administrator and excellent orator. One of Quebec's most outspoken Duplessis critics, he was widely known and admired among members of Quebec's rapidly emerging middle class, an attachment that was to prove invaluable during the CSN's organizing drives among white collar workers. Too, Marchand held very close ties with leading cabinet members in the provincial government that had replaced the Duplessis regime, ties which again proved valuable when the CSN launched its campaign to organize the public service. Indeed, so close were relations that the CSN is credited by many with having influenced many progressive innovations initiated by the government during Quebec's "revolution tranquil".[23]

Under Marchand's leadership very successful organizing drives were begun. Too, the union embarked on a highly profitable raiding program, taking numerous workers away from international unions, and captured significant media publicity and the attention of the public. During his presidency the CSN also branched out forcibly into the most rapidly expanding sector of the Quebec economy, the tertiary sector, organizing scores of service workers and public employees, many of them white collar. The very success of the CSN in this area ultimately changed the nature of the union's membership composition. By the end of the decade, the CSN, which throughout its history had been predominantly a blue collar organization, had become one tilted slightly in favour of white collar workers. Though Marchand quit the presidency in 1965 to enter federal politics, membership in the union continued to climb and by the end of the decade the CSN had

undergone the most significant and substantial growth in its history, gaining more than 100,000 new members and doubling its size.

The militancy that characterized the union in the Fifties continued unabated during the 1960s. If anything, the number of CSN strikes increased in frequency. The CSN also retained its penchant for involvement in publicity-grabbing conflicts. CSN workers struck the Quebec Liquor Commission (a government-run monopoly) during the Christmas and New Year rush, greatly angering consumers. Struck, too, were the Montreal Transportation Commission during Expo 67, the Montreal harbor, and Quebec Hydro-Electric. Still unresolved as this is being written is a two-year-old dispute of mail truck drivers. (The entire issue of the CSN's strike policy will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.)

The CSN also became identified, by much of the media and the public, with Separatism. Despite repeated denunciations of Separatism by CSN president Marcel Pepin on the grounds that Separatism was not in the best interests of Quebec workers, his radical rhetoric on many of the other issues of the day placed him closer to the philosophy of the Separatists than to any other group in the province. Too, Pepin's position was further undercut by other high-ranking union officials, notably the leader of the Montreal Central Council, Michel Chartrand, who publicly endorsed the Separatist's cause.

In retrospect, the Sixties were unquestionably a remarkably successful period for the union. Too, while the CSN entered the Sixties as a blue collar organization, by 1970 it was rapidly becoming a predominantly white collar one. Yet, by 1970 it was also apparent that the heady expansion rate characteristic of most of the decade had slowed down markedly. Further, considering the political instability besetting Quebec, and the uncertain allegiances of the CSN, it was difficult to assess in which direction the union was headed in the future.

CHAPTER IV.

THE STRUCTURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER WITHIN THE CSN

Except for two short periods, one immediately following its founding and another during the Sixties, the CSN has been comprised of four main components:

1) Local unions (syndicates)
2) Central councils
3) Federations
4) The Confederation

The local unions of the CSN are analagous to their counterparts elsewhere in North America. They form the basic unit of organization at the level of work. The central councils are bodies that group the local unions together on a regional basis. All local unions in the Quebec City area, for example, whether consisting of office workers, miners, nurses, or public servants, are affiliated with the Quebec City Central Council. The federations, on the other hand, are province-wide and group the locals together on an industrial basis. For instance, all locals throughout the province composed of textile workers belong to the Textile Workers Federation.

The Confederation refers to the central body and headquarters of the organization to which both the central councils and the federations are affiliated. The Confederation formally consists of the Congres Confederal, the supreme body of the union which meets biennially; the Bureau Confederal, officially the ultimate authority within the union between Congresses; and the executive committee. The executive committee is composed of the president of the CSN, the secretary general, the treasurer, the first vice-president,

and numerous vice-presidents. In reality, it is the executive committee that runs the day-to-day activity of the union.

A fifth component was added to the structure between the years 1961 and 1968. The Convention of 1961 created regional offices, composed of permanent offices responsible to the executive committee. In essence, these offices, scattered throughout the province, were regional branches of central headquarters ane extended Confederation authority directly to all parts of the province. At the 1968 Convention, however, these offices were eliminated.

According to the latest survey, the CSN consists of 1007 local unions.[1] On the average, each local comprised 237 workers.[2] These locals are affiliated to twelve federations[3] and twenty-one central councils.[4] (See Tables 4 and 5.) In 1967 nine regional offices were active.[5]

One additional feature is noteworthy, namely, the unusually high ratio of full-time union experts to total membership. In a comparison with various international unions carried out in 1965, the CSN's membership to expert ratio was far and away the greatest, i.e., there were more experts per union member within the CSN than within any other union.[6] The results of this study can be observed in Table 6.

Historical Evolution of the Structure and the Distribution of Power Within the CSN

Since its founding, the CSN has undergone several structural changes, each one accompanied by a new power distribution within the organization. The CSN evolved from a decentralized, loose organization in which power lay in the hands of the central councils to a highly centralised structure with power vested principly in the Confederation itself. Summing up this transformation, one analyst commented:

TABLE 4.

THE FEDERATIONS OF THE CSN (1970)

Federation	Number of Locals
Batiment et bois (Construction	119
Commerce (Commerce)	127
Enseignants (Teachers)	23
Fonctionnaires provincaux (Provincial civil servants)	1
Ingenieurs et cadres (Engineers and cadres)	21
Metallurgie, Mines, et produits chimiques (Steel, Mine, and chemical products)	132
Pates et papers, forets (Pulp and paper, forestry)	71
Services (hopitaux) (Services (hospital))	180
Services publics (Public service)	232
Textile (Textile)	54
Vetement (Clothing)	42

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada--1970 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 1-91.

TABLE 5.

THE CENTRAL COUNCILS OF THE CSN (1970)

Central Council	Percent of CSN Members
Beauhornois	1.2
Cote Nord	2.2
Drummondville	1.4
Gaspesie	1.1
Granby	2.3
Hull	2.2
Joliette	1.8
Laurentides	1.2
Montreal	29.2
Nord-Ouest	1.4
Quebec	21.7
Rimouski	2.5
Saguenay	9.8
Shawinigan	2.1
Sherbrooke	6.1
Sorel	2.7
St-Hyacinthe	2.9
St-Jean	1.1
Thetford Mines	2.0
Trois-Rivieres	1.7
Victoriaville	2.8

Source: Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General de la CSN, CSN Convention report, Montreal, 1970, p. 9.

TABLE 6.

MEMBERSHIP-EXPERT RATIO IN THE CSN AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS OF SOME LARGE AMERICAN UNIONS

Name of Union	Number of Experts	Membership in '000	'000 of Members per Expert
UAW	57	948	17
ILGWU	37	423	11
Teamsters	4	1103	266
Plumbers	1	180	180
IBEW	9	450	50
Railway Clerks	8	350	44
Trainmen	8	211	26
Machinists	12	600	50
Mineworkers	7	600	86
Rubber Workers	9	150	17
Chemical Workers	4	130	33
CWA	9	240	27
Teachers (AFT)	4	50	13
Typographers	1	96	96
Amalg. Butchers	4	175	44
CSN*	39	141	4

*These are the CSN membership and expert figures at the time of the biennial Convention of September 1964.

Comparative statistics on other unions are taken from Harold Wilensky Intellectuals in Labour Unions, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1956, pp. 300-301.

Source: Shirley Goldenberg, Experts on the Union Staff: The Evolution of a Role in the Confessional Labour Movement of Quebec (unpublished Master's thesis, McGill University, 1966), pp. 49-50.

> [The CSN] was characterized at the start by the great autonomy afforded its local unions and later by the importance of the central councils and then the federations. Gradually the CSN was transformed into a vast industrial union....[7]

The most recent and probably the most detailed interpretive study ever undertaken on the structural development of the CSN was completed a year ago by Jean Marie Deporq. According to Deporq:

> From its founding it appears that the CSN experienced important tensions between two conflicting philosophies of unionism, one marked by an ideological orientation, the other postured toward economic action similar to that of the AFL, the former corresponding to a horizontal form of organization (predominance of central councils) and the latter to a vertical form of organization (predominance of federations).[8]

In other words, it is Deporq's contention that the structure and distribution of power within the CSN reflected its orientation. Since the union's orientation, in turn, usually reflected environmental considerations, by definition, so too did the power alignment and structure of the union.

Deporq identified four main stages in the CSN's structural evolution.[9] The first phase, lasting from the union's establishment in 1921 until the middle 1930s, was characterized by a horizontal structure largely decentralized on a regional basis. Decision making power rested with the central council of each region. Deporq attributes this structure and division of power to the organization's posture, noting:

> The union in these first few years was not a pressure group, but a social movement oriented towards particular values. It recruited as many workers as possible regardless of their craft or skill... The movement mobilised workers for ideological reasons rather than for economic action.[10]

Hence, with the CSN lacking a professional orientation and still without strong centralised authority, the various central councils operating throughout the province logically assumed control of the union.

By the end of the Thirties such a structure no longer could suffice. As Canada entered World War II and Quebec began to industrialize and urbanize rapidly, the Catholic orientation of the union placed it in a non-competitive position vis-a-vis other unions. Thus, as the CSN's ideology shifted, by necessity, to one favouring economic action, the second structural stage began.

The second phase lasted from the end of the Thirties to the end of the Forties. It was characterized by the domination of the vertical organizations, i.e., the federations. All local unions were grouped on an industrial basis and encouraged to engage in economic action. The power of the central councils, however, was not completely emasculated, resulting in disputes over who was responsible for what activities. Central authority remained weak.

By the start of the 1950s the environment again induced an alteration within the organization. The CSN, in breaking completely with its pro-government position, became engaged in many bitter strikes that pitted the union against the Duplessis regime, e.g., Asbestos strike, Louisville strike, Dupuis Freres strike. Neither individual federations nor central councils were capable of handling these intense and lengthy disputes without help. As a result, more and more responsibilities were assumed by the Confederation. Consequently, the third stage was marked by the rise of the authority of the Confederation itself.

Still, even as the Confederation gradually increased its power during the 1950s, the need for an even greater change became apparent. The merger of the AFL and the CIO resulted in a similar merger in Canada, the CLC being the offspring, and the CSN was dwarfed in comparison. Also, with the defeat of the anti-labour Duplessis government in 1960, it became

greatly evident that great new opportunities for union recruitment had been opened. Deporq declares that by 1960:

> ...the survival of the movement itself depended on purely professional action capable of challenging international unions. This appeared possible only with a radical expansion of the powers of the Confederal authority. The special Congress of 1961 adopted a structural reform that reinforced the central leadership, extended the Confederation's authority over the central councils and the federations, and established regional offices.[11]

Prior to the Reform of 1961, schematically, the CSN structure appeared as below:

FIGURE 2.

STRUCTURE OF THE CSN PRIOR TO 1961



Source: Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montreal, 1970), p. 24.

After the reform of 1961, the CSN structure resembled the following:

FIGURE 3.

STRUCTURE OF THE CSN AFTER 1961



Source: Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montreal, 1970), p. 24.

The new structure that resulted under the Reform expanded the authority of the Confederation considerably. The newly created regional offices, really regional extensions of the central headquarters, possessed the power to oversee or intervene in the following areas:

1) The negotiation and application of collective agreements at the local level upon arrangement with the federation concerned or upon demand of Confederation headquarters.
2) The organization of new workers, by assigning permanent officers to areas showing promise, with the assistance of central councils.
3) Assist central councils in their political and educational activities.
4) Act an an intermediary body, when necessary, between central councils and Confederal headquarters.[12]

In reality, the jurisdiction of the regional offices was never precisely defined, but was left ambiguous. Their activity ultimately varied from region to region depending on the circumstances and especially on the effectiveness of the central council and federations operating in the district.

Numerous services were also dispensed directly from Confederation headquarters. Among the more important were:

1) An organization service that coordinated the organization activities of the regional offices.
2) A negotiation service which could intervene in collective bargaining at the local level upon arrangement with the affected federation.
3) The union's strike fund.
4) A research and documentation service that included a library.
5) An education service responsible for organizing special sessions for officers at all levels and that coordinated education services throughout the organization.
6) A research service responsible for studying the industrial climate and making recommendations to aid the union in collective bargaining.
7) An information and communications service.
8) A Council of Political Action charged with coordinating the political activities of the central councils.[13]

To maintain these wide-ranging powers, the bulk of the per capita dues payments of the rank and file was collected directly by the Confederation. According to a permanent officer of the organization, the Confederation collects approximately $1.20 per month, per member, for general services plus $1.35 per month (on the average) for its strike fund.[14] (The exact amount

each employee contributes to the strike fund varies according to the average wage rate within individual federations.) The federations, the central councils, and the local syndicates share what is left.

In sum, the advantages that the CSN derived from this structure were many. Fundamentally, it enabled the CSN to cope successfully with the challenges of the day. Deporq maintained:

> This structure, more centralized, yet at the same time more flexible and better adapted to the political and provincial realities. It permitted the CSN to profit more than its rival, the FTQ.... [15]

There is, also, no mistaking the supremacy that the Reform of 1961 gave to the Confederation, a predominance that it largely retains today. Unlike the AFL-CIO or the CLC, where the individual parts are not subservient to the whole, under the CSN structure the whole is much stronger than any of its parts. This is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that the Confederation maintains the union's strike fund, not the individual federations.

Analysis of the Division of Power Within the CSN Following the Reform of 1961[16]

Organizing Activities

Prior to the Reform of 1961, the job of recruiting new workers fell to the central councils. (The role of the federations was limited.) Organizing was, thus, undertaken on a region-by-region basis and was marked by a notable lack of union-wide systematic coordination and little uniformity among districts.

The Reform of 1961 removed the responsibility for organizing from the central councils and gave it to the regional offices. As arms of the Confederation, the regional offices followed centrally set priorities. Organizing activities, thus, became a truer reflection of union-wide needs and not merely a mirror of the abilities of the respective central councils.

This new organizing set up had several appreciable consequences. It established provice-wide equality among the various regions throughout the province. This was particularly important where central councils had been derelict in their recruitment duties. Under the system it was simply necessary for a regional office to demonstrate the utility of a particular organizing campaign and funds from headquarters were immediately forthcoming. Too, by removing organizing responsibilities from the central councils, it facilitated the launching of province-wide recruitment campaigns requiring large expenditures and a degree of coordination impossible under the old structure. Indeed, it was the efficient allocation of resources afforded by the new organizing structure that greatly contributed to the success of some of the union's most ambitious organizing drives.

Education

Two distinct types of educational services are offered by the organization. First, there are general education services. The function of these services is to impart basic information on the current system of industrial relations, on the organization of the CSN, and on political, economic, and social problems. The second type of educational services are of a more specialized nature. They consist of technical and professional services aimed at local officers and other specialists and experts responsible for the negotiation and application of collective agreements.

After the Reform, general educational services remained, as traditionally, the responsibility of the individual central councils. Beginning in 1967, each central council was required to establish a special committee to coordinate these services. At least one-quarter of the finances of each central council was allocated to this committee.

The individual federations were granted the responsibility of providing the technical education services. Since the quality of these services

varied considerably from federation to federation, the Confederation also offered technical training services.

Political Activities

Political action proceeds at several levels and remains an important part of the CSN's overall posture. Though essentially non-partisan, it is quite unlike the type of activity engaged in by the rest of organized labour in North America. (The CSN's political activities will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.)

The general orientation of the union's political action is determined by the Confederal Council on Political Action. The committee retains a permanent officer responsible for government submissions. The officer is also responsible for reports to the central councils on political and economic problems.

The majority of political activity, though, occurs on a regional basis. Responsibility for the implementation of political activity was delegated to the central councils. It is their function to define and organize programs. Similar to educational services, each central council forms a political action committee to coordinate and maintain its political program. This committee is allocated 25 percent of the central committee's financial resources.

Generally the role of the regional offices and the federations is circumscribed in the political sphere. Only where central councils are particularly weak may a regional office become involved in political activities, but such cases are rare. The only federation that is involved in political action to any extent is the Federation of Engineers and Cadres.

The Negotiation and Application of Collective Agreements

Responsibility for the negotiation and application of collective agreements was retained by the local unions assisted by the appropriate federation. Where special arrangements are worked out, permanent officers from a regional office can also be assigned to assist. Too, if the Confederation wishes, it possesses the power to intervene. It is specified, however, that such intervention is restricted to special circumstances, such as during a major strike or province-wide negotiations.

The initiative for a strike falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the local union, although formal approval is usually required from its federation. Funds from the Confederation's strike fund are automatically to be allocated.

Although emphasis was placed on application of collective agreements by individual local unions affected by it, in practice, a large staff of permanent officers hired by the federations and by the Confederation play an indispensable role. In 1967 there were 65 permanent officers hired by the federations and 106 employed by the Confederation.[17]

Postscript

Inevitably the extreme centralization engendered by the Reform of 1961 spawned new tensions within the organization. As white collar workers poured into the CSN in ever-increasing numbers, blue collar workers, their traditional position of great numerical superiority diminishing, began agitating for the return to a structure in which the individual federation would retain greater autonomy. The white collar federations, on the other hand, more politically oriented, favoured a centralised structure, believing that it afforded a better vehicle for political action.

At the 1968 Convention a compromise was worked out. The regional offices were eliminated and ostensibly more power was granted to the federations. At the same time, the Confederation, in a move designed to appease the politically minded within the organization, launched a political and social campaign it called a "second front", ostensibly aimed at politicizing the masses. The effects of these moves are, as yet, unclear. Even without the power of the regional offices, the Confederation holds overwhelming power within the union. As yet, it appears that the Confederation has relinquished very little power. But, as Deporq himself noted: "We must conclude that the debate [within the CSN over which bodies should retain what powers] is not yet over."[18]

Summary Observations

Two aspects of the CSN's structural development and the accompanying evolution of the distribution of powers stand out. The first is the CSN's demonstrated ability to react to changing environmental conditions by shifting its structure and the locus of power within the organization. As illustrated, both after World War II and in the Sixties, the CSN overcame obstacles by changing itself.

The second noteworthy feature is the extreme decentralization of power during the Sixties following the Reform of 1961. Because of this centralized and cohesive structure, one that allowed for coordinated and efficient allocation of resources, greatly reduced intramural inequality, and coordinated from headquarters all union activity, the CSN was superbly equipped to deal with organizing opportunities it encountered.

CHAPTER V.

THE MEMBERSHIP COMPOSITION OF THE CSN

A key contributing factor to the relatively slow growth of the North American labour movement in the early 1960s was its inability to organize new groups of workers, particularly in the largely white collar tertiary sector of the economy. Yet it was these very workers who were rapidly dislodging blue collar workers from their position of numerical predominance in the labour force.

In this context it is intriguing to investigate the nature of the growth of the CSN during the Sixties. The CSN organized scores of workers in the most rapidly expanding sector of the economy, the tertiary sector. It organized employees in occupations that the rest of the labour movement seemed unable to appeal.

In this chapter the success of the CSN in the tertiary sector will be closely examined. Special attention will be focused on the distribution of the union's membership by economic sector. The industrial composition of the organization will also be investigated.

Even the most cursory investigation of the changes in the Quebec province from 1961 to 1970 reveals the strategic importance of the CSN's efforts to organize tertiary sector workers. The Quebec labour force changed fundamentally during the Sixties, showing a marked shift into industries falling in the tertiary sector of the economy. Table 7 bears witness to this radical shift of the province's work force. In 1961 the majority of Quebec workers were employed in manufacturing and construction, i.e., in the secondary sector. Just ten years later only one-third of the province's workers were engaged in secondary industry.

TABLE 7.

DISTRIBUTION OF NON-AGRICULTURAL QUEBEC LABOUR FORCE BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

Sector	% of Labour Force in Each Sector 1961	1965	1970
Primary	5.7	4.3	2.8
Secondary	58.6	47.4	33.5
Tertiary	35.7	48.3	63.7

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Estimates of Employees by Province and Industry, Ottawa, June, 1961, June, 1965, June, 1970.

Between 1961 and 1970 the number of workers deployed in the tertiary sector mushroomed. Whereas that sector accounted for a one-third share of Quebec employees in 1961, 60 percent of a-l Quebec workers were involved in the tertiary sector by 1970. Since in absolute terms the size of the labour force increased,[1] it is evident that most workers entering the Quebec labour force in the Sixties found jobs in the tertiary sector of the economy.

While the degree of the shift within the Quebec labour force may have been important, the pattern exhibited was by no means unique. Labour forces in other regions throughout North American under similar, if not as marked, changes existed.

Yet, by and large, North American trade unions reacted slowly to the altered structure of the labour force. The same, however, was not true of the CSN. The growth of the CSN seemed to pattern the growth of the labour force. Of the slightly more than 100,000 members the CSN gained during the decade, approximately 90 percent were employed in the tertiary sector.[2]

Furthermore, membership composition of the CSN seemed to mirror the employee composition of the labour force. In 1960 three out of four CSN members were engaged in secondary industries; by 1969[3] less than 40 percent were so employed. (See Table 8.) Correspondingly, whereas the tertiary sector provided less than 20 percent of the organization's membership in 1960, ten years hence 60 percent of the union were tertiary sector employees. Table 9 clearly illustrates the remarkable extent to which the membership distribution within the CSN parallels the industrial distribution of the Quebec labour force.

Table 9 also indicates the most recent industrial composition of the CSN membership. Though manufacturing still accounts for the single largest block of workers within the organization, it is a situation that will probably not continue for very much longer. Should the current direction of the CSN growth persist, it appears likely that either service workers or public employees will soon become the dominant group within the Confederation.

The same trends are reflected in the changes undergone by the federations of the CSN, which group the workers by industry. In 1960 the CSN consisted of 14 federations, 9 of which operated in the secondary sector of the economy, manufacturing in particular. By 1970 the number of federations was reduced to 12, but only six comprised workers engaged in industries in the secondary sector. In comparison, the number of federations composed of workers in the tertiary sector rose from 4 in 1960 to 6 in 1970.

Tables 10, 11, and 12 confirm these trends. The consolidation of the number of federations operating in the secondary sector has largely been accomplished through mergers. Indeed, very soon, the demise of the

TABLE 8.

DISTRIBUTION OF CSN MEMBERSHIP
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

Sector	Percent of CSN Membership 1960	1966*	1969
Primary	5.2	2.4	3.5
Secondary	75.6	47.1	37.3
Tertiary	19.2	47.3	59.2

Sources: 1) Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Montreal, 1970) pp. 129-130.

2) Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General de la CSN, CSN Convention report, Montreal, 1970, Table 6, p. 13.

*These figures do not include union members of the 33 locals directly affiliated to the central.

TABLE 9.

DISTRIBUTION BY INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC SECTOR
OF CSN MEMBERSHIP AND THE QUEBEC LABOUR FORCE (1969)

Industry/Sector	Quebec Labour Force(%)	CSN Membership(%)
Primary Sector	2.5	3.5
Forestry	1.1	0.8
Mines	1.4	2.6
Secondary Sector	34.7	37.3
Manufacturing	30.0	30.4
Construction	4.7	6.9
Tertiary Sector	62.8	59.2
Trans./Comm./ Public Util.	10.3	5.5
Commerce	15.0	5.0
Finance	4.8	0.4
Services	27.5	28.1
Public Administration	5.2	20.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General de la CSN, CSN Convention report, Montreal, 1970, Table 5, p. 12.

TABLE 10.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CSN MEMBERSHIP
BY FEDERATION IN 1960

Federation	Membership
Primary Sector	
Mining	4700
Secondary Sector	
Construction	18600
Steel	15400
Textile	8300
Pulp & Paper/Forestry	7400
Clothing	4700
Printing/Information	4700
Leather/Shoes	4300
Chemicals	3000
Woodworkers	2200
Tertiary Sector	
Services	9100
Corporation Municipal et Scolaire	4500
Commerce	3300
Barbers and Coiffures	500

Source: Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Montreal, 1970), p. 129.

TABLE 11.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CSN MEMBERSHIP
BY FEDERATION IN 1966

Federation	Membership
Primary Sector	
Mining	5100
Secondary Sector	
Steel	30300
Construction/Woodworkers	29500
Textiles	11100
Clothing	9100
Pulp & Paper/Forestry	9000
Chemicals	4000
Printing/Information	3500
Tertiary Sector	
Service	36500
Quebec Civil Servants	25800
Public Service Employees	21000
Commerce	9500
Engineers/Cadres	2800
Barbers and Coiffures	1240

Source: Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montreal, 1970), p. 130.

TABLE 12.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE CSN MEMBERSHIP
BY FEDERATION IN 1970

Federation	Membership
Secondary Sector	
Steel/Mine/Chemicals	32500
Construction/Woodworkers	20000
Pulp & Paper/Forestry	10000
Textiles	8200
Clothing	7200
Printing/Information	3100
Tertiary Sector	
Services	49400
Government of Quebec Civil Servants	30000
Public Servants	24700
Commerce	14500
Teachers	4500
Engineers/Cadres	3000

Source: Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada--1970 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 1-91.

Printing and Information Federation will reduce the number of federations in the secondary sector still further.[4] In the tertiary sector, however, 4 new federations were added during the 1960s.[5]

In addition, Table 12 also depicts the current distribution by federation of the CSN members. In so doing, it reveals some additional relevant characteristics of the union's worker composition. The three largest federations are composed almost entirely of public or quasi-public employees. The Federation Nationalle des Services (Services) is comprised predominantly of hospital workers. The Federation Canadienne des Employees de Service Publics (Public Servants) embraces municipal workers while the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provincaux du Quebec (Government of Quebec Civil Servants) is composed of employees of the Quebec government. Together these three federations contain more than half the workers in the organization.

Interesting also is the existence of two small federations composed of professional workers, one of teachers and one of engineers. The teachers' union consists mostly of teachers from French-speaking junior colleges in Quebec (called CEGEPs). But it also contains a small group of professors from McGill University as well as some from certain departments in the University of Montreal. The engineers' federation, as yet, comprises only engineers employed by the government and, so far, the CSN has been unable to organize any engineers in the private sector.

It is worth noting that, although both the engineers and the teachers still account for an insignificant percentage of CSN membership, each group has been accorded federation status. This is a good indication of the CSN's interest and seriousness in these groups of workers. The professional realm remains a large untapped source of potential union members and these two small federations could be harbingers of the future.

A further important feature of the CSN's composition is its very large white collar membership. This is consistent with the fact that the majority of the CSN's workers are employed in industries in the tertiary sector of the economy. The public service federations remain largely white collar although they do contain many blue collar workers (e.g., workers in the Roads Department, sanitation workers). The Commerce Employees Federation is almost all white collar, composed predominantly of retail clerks. Thus, although exact figures were unavailable, it is estimated that the union is now fairly evenly divided between white collar and blue collar workers, with the former enjoying a slight numerical advantage.[6] This gap is likely to widen in the future.

In sum, two features of the CSN's membership stood out. The first and most important was the CSN's proven ability to parallel the shift of the labour force to the tertiary sector in its recruitment of new members. Equally apparent is the fact that the CSN was able to parallel the labour force through its capacity to organize large numbers of public employees and white collar workers, a feat that, by and large, the rest of the labour movement was unable to match.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PHILOSOPHY AND THE TACTICS OF THE CSN

Following numerous unsuccessful attempts to establish an ideologically based American labour movement, a trade union movement adhering to the pragmatic "business unionism" philosophy of Samuel Gompers eventually emerged triumphant. It was characterized by an absence of ideology and a preoccupation with bread and butter issues. Its most pervasive orientation seemed attuned to obtaining "more, more, more, now" [1] for the worker. Politically, it espoused a non-partisan approach of "rewarding one's friends and punishing one's enemies" and engaged in lobbying activities. Above all, and here it differed fundamentally with its predecessors and challengers, such as the Knights of Labour and the Wobblies, the AFL (and the AFL-CIO) accepted as "given" the reigning capitalistic ideology. In other words, it clearly believed in working within the existing system. As Albert Rees summarized:

> Socialism was once an important force in American unionism and vestiges of its influence remain. However, all important American unions now accept and work within a system of modified capitalism or free enterprise. They have views on the desirable evolution of the system, but they do not seek to change it radically, either by peaceful or violent means.[2]

Outwardly, it appears the CSN does not recognize such constraints. Thus, President Marcel Pepin at the 1968 Convention declared that the CSN's ultimate goal was to change the entire system.[3]

Too, CSN leadership has at various times denounced the concept of business unionism and the concept of "Gomperism." International unions have been castigated as decadent, pro-Establishment, lacking class consciousness, bureaucratic, and undemocratic. According to Marcel Pepin:

> Business unionism seeks to give the impression of a force integrated within the established order and one, that supports as well

> the reigning social philosophy...In this it has succeeded or at least given sufficient proof to convey that effect. We believe this atittude constitutes a fundamental error, not to mention the fact that it constitutes treason as well. Not only treason to unionism, but treason to democracy.[4]

Yet, can one really accept the rhetoric of self-proclaimed or even legitimate spokesmen at face value? Despite the apparent conservatism of the AFL-CIO dogma, some observers have suggested that when all is said and done, the AFL has in fact been a radical force for change in American society.[5] Judging it solely on its actions, and not its proclamations, one could credit the American labour movement with acting as a harbinger of the mixed economy system, of ending the unfettered discretion of business as the prime shaping force of America, of being in the forefront in exerting political pressure for Civil Rights legislation, and of being since 1933 the most consistent pressure group on the left of center for social welfare.

Subsequently, in examining the philosophy and tactics of the CSN during the 1960s attention will be paid not only to what the CSN has said, but to what the CSN has done. In short, have philosophical postulations translated into actions? Has the CSN actually been aiming at a complete change of society? Has the CSN really differed from other "business unions"?

The activities of the CSN will be discussed in three separate spheres: industrial relations, socio-economic, and political. The industrial relations realm will include that activity directed principally to employer-employee relations, such as collective bargaining, strikes, or organizing. The socio-economic sphere will cover activity basically aimed at dealing with the worker as a citizen functioning within a "treacherous" capitalistic society. The political sphere will include the activity aimed at the worker as a political entity capable of effecting the direction and position of government. Undoubtedly there will be some overlap, for example, certain

strikes have political overtones, political activity may affect employer-employee relations, etc.

Industrial Relations Sphere

There is little that distinguishes a collective agreement negotiated by the CSN and ones negotiated by other unions. If, in fact, the CSN is what other unions are not, namely, that the CSN is anti-Establishment, class conscious, democratic, etc., it certainly has not been reflected in the contracts it has negotiated.

Like other unions on this continent, CSN agreements have tended to stress wages, hours, and working conditions. Indeed, according to Pepin, besides remunerative clauses, collective agreements should stress seniority, employment security, industrial safety, and should protect the worker from unfair job evaluation and time and motion studies.[6]

Even in areas where one might anticipate the CSN to press for innovation, such as in areas relating to worker participation in decision-making, or in instituting techniques to increase job satisfaction, the CSN's thrust has been relatively mild. It has been limited to vague pronunciations decrying the monotony of work or to suggestions that union members should participate in certain kinds of decisions, such as those regarding questions of industrial safety.[7] But, this kind of participation, far from being revolutionary, is enjoyed by numerous members of many international unions.

In sum, then, there seems little of import that would distinguish a CSN contract from those negotiated by an international union. Like the unions the CSN denounces, when it comes right down to it, the CSN also cries "more, more, more, now", at least at the level of the collective agreement.

In its militant use of the strike tactic to gain its collective bargaining ends, however, the CSN has separated itself from many other unions. Here,

indeed, it would seem that the CSN's claim of being an anti-Establishment, anti-capitalistic, and vigorous organization has manifested itself to some extent.

Table 13 testifies to the CSN's strike activity. With the exception of 1961 and 1966, the CSN, with less than half the organized workers in Quebec, has accounted for well over half the man-days lost during the decade under study.

The CSN has also displayed a talent for engaging in highly controversial, long, and bitter strikes. Some of the more recent ones have ended less than admirably from the union's point of view.

A Quebec Liquor Board strike in 1968 was crushed by the Quebec government. The strikers, after five months on the picket lines without strike pay,[8] settled for disappointing pay raises in lieu of the personal costliness of their lengthy stay on the picket lines.

At present, a strike of 352 mail-truck drivers approaches its second year. This strike, probably the most costly in CSN history, merits analysis in some detail. It provides insights regarding what can happen when philosophical positions are clearly dictating industrial relations tactics.

The dispute began when the private company the men worked for, G. Lapalme Inc., decided not to renew its contract with the post office (run by the federal government) to deliver mail. Five companies successfully bid to take over the services formerly undertaken by Lapalme. Though urged to hire the former Lapalme drivers, the companies would accept them only as new employees, in other words, the men would forfeit all seniority rights accumulated under the old agreement. The workers balked at this stipulation and went on strike.

With mail service in Montreal immobilised and the drivers, dubbed "les gars de Lapalme",[9] being eulogized by the Quebec radical movement, the federal

TABLE 13.

NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS LOST DUE TO STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS IN QUEBEC BETWEEN 1961 and 1968*

	Man-Days Lost (000)		
Year	CSN	Non-CSN	Percent of Total by CSN
1961	82	374	19
1962	345	184	66
1963	190	149	56
1964	435	213	67
1965	284	162	64
1966	500	1276	28
1967	636	367	63
1968	1373	554	71

*The figures for the years 1961-1965 were computed by Shirley Goldenberg (cited below), while statistics for years 1966-1968 were computed by this author.

Source: Shirley Goldenberg, Experts on the Union Staff: The Evolution of a Role in the Confessional Labour Movement of Quebec (unpublished Master's thesis, McGill University, 1966), p. 39. Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966-1968).

government stepped in. It decided to take over the delivery service itself and offered the striking drivers jobs under conditions similar to those enjoyed under Lapalme. There was one hitch, however. The drivers would have had to become public employees (since they would have been working directly for the federal government) and, as such, would have had to give up their CSN affiliation since all postal employees belonged to an already established exclusive bargaining unit. With strong CSN urging the workers rejected this proposal.

The drivers' rejection prompted the government to go out and hire new drivers to staff its new delivery service. Powerless to prevent such action, "les gars de Lapalme" remain on "strike" to this day, though their jobs have been filled long ago.

Through an exerted effort that has all but depleted its strike fund, the CSN has managed to ensure that the men have received some strike pay. At the same time it has continued to laud them for their struggle:

> The resistance of the "gars de Lapalme" is exemplary. Their action provokes consternation in the federal government and stirs public opinion.[10]

Notwithstanding the "exemplary behavior" of the men and the attention the dispute has attracted, it still remains that after two years the prospect of the "gars de Lapalme" looks bleak. Few would dispute that the CSN lost the strike. Yet, throughout the entire affair, the CSN repeatedly assured and promised the men that their loyalty to the CSN would result in their regaining their jobs under optimum conditions. Ultimately, even the men themselves realized the unlikelihood of the CSN delivery on its pledge. In sheer anger and frustration, they seized the CSN headquarters in Montreal, expelled all CSN officers, and held the building for several days before departing peacefully.

The men had a legitimate right to be piqued at the union. In a large measure the whole debacle was precipitated by the CSN's continued obstinacy and its refusal to compromise with the "Establishment", in this case, the federal government, even when it became quite obvious that the government held the clear advantage in the conflict due to its ability to replace the strikers with other workers. By ignoring this reality and repeatedly advising the Lapalme drivers to refuse government offers, the CSN quite literally cost the men their jobs, after promising them the sky.

While the CSN's policy towards strikes resulted in somewhat dubious rewards, another tactic was far more successful. The CSN espoused a "No-holds barred" philosophy on inter-union raiding. Jean Marchand enunciated the CSN's position:

> Too many people attach absolute value to unity within the labour movement and to inter-union peaceful relations. If petty, meaningless, and unethical fights are to be regretted, one should not be unduly alarmed by the inevitable clashes brought about by different conceptions of trade unionism, its role and its objectives. There is no better explanation for these so-called brother slaying conflicts than the very freedom of individuals and communities to develop according to their own character.[11]

The findings of an exhaustive study undertaken at the behest of the Woods Task Force on Labour Relations revealed the tremendous dividends that the CSN's philosophy paid. Between 1957 and 1967 the CSN was engaged in 60 raiding sorties.[12] It was successful on 34 occasions, had encountered failure 19 times, with seven cases undecided at the time the report was prepared.[13] Moreover, although attempts to raid the CSN had been initiated 17 times, success by other unions had been achieved only nine times, the CSN repulsing the other union on the other eight occasions.[14]

The net result of this inter-union competition saw the CSN attract more than 15,000 workers from others unions to its ranks.[15] The CSN, however, lost 3,700 men of its own.[16] All told, the CSN registered a net increase of 11,700 members.[17]

For a union with membership of approximately 200,000, the addition of more than 10,000 workers represented a significant gain. In fact, raiding accounted for 10 percent of the total CSN growth during the Sixties, no minor sum.

The success of the CSN's raiding tactics was not without cost, however. It earned the union the bitter enmity and distrust of other unions in the province. At the height of the CSN's raiding spree, Claude Jodoin, president of the CLC, charged that the CSN's tactics were divisive and that it was more interested in raiding than in organizing the unorganized. Further, Jodoin charged:

> The tactics followed by that organization in its attacks against other unions is not only disastrous and harmful for Canadian workers but also for the unity of our country.[18]

In a similar vein, the headline of an article in an international union newspaper proclaimed: "Canada Labour Fights Raids by Jingo Outfit."[19]

Nonetheless, the CSN's philosophy vis-a-vis inter-union conflict, translated into aggressive raiding tactics, reaped great benefits for the organization.

Socio-Economic Sphere

From its founding to the time the Church relinquished its control, the CSN, in essence, was less an industrial relations movement than a socio-economic one. Resources were allocated towards assuring that Christian values were maintained among its members rather than towards employer-employee relations. Following a painful transition period, a new, revitalized, and above all, secular CSN emerged, and proceeded to devote all its resources to the industrial relations sphere.

Over the last ten years, howevever, the union began a re-entry into socio-economic activities. Though judged in terms of results, this thrust is still in its infancy, the raison d'etre for its actions has been well-enunciated.

At the core of its socio-economic philosophy lies the belief that the CSN must go a firm step beyond a policy that emphasizes simply the defense of workers at the plant level. Jean Marchand introduced this concept, certainly not a new idea, at the 1964 Convention of the CSN. Marchand said:

> But the prospects of trade unionism is of a much wider scope. Modern trade unionism aims at protecting the worker not only in the factory or at the office, but wherever their interests are at stake.[20]

Jean Marchand resigned the presidency a year later and it was left to Marcel Pepin to elaborate on Marchand's pledge. Hence, at the following Convention Pepin insisted that for the CSN to enter effectively the socio-economic realm it would have to acquire powers of "intervention, participation and decision-making."[21]

Too, it was left to Pepin to justify the contemplated efforts in this area. Pepin, an intellectual, based the union's position on a somewhat doctrinaire platform premised on the injustices inherent in a capitalistic society. He bitterly denounced a socio-economic system that permitted high unemployment and considerable regional disparity, that had failed to establish any worthwhile profit controls on industry, that allowed capital to ignore the social will of the minorities, and that ignored the social consequences of technological change.[22]

Pepin insisted that "hidden" profits of capitalism be taxed, that the wastefulness of the existing economic system be eliminated, that military spending be reduced, and that numerous specialized professional services be socialized. Above all, he demanded a system be devised aimed at fulfilling the real needs of consumers rather than aimed at producing only those goods producing the greatest profit.[23] The upshot of Pepin's views lay in his suggestion that it was the duty and responsibility of the CSN to eliminate capitalistic inequities by implementing programs towards the goals he had enumerated.[24]

At the 1968 Convention the CSN opened its much-publicized "Second Front". Whereas the first front lay in union-management relations, the second battlefront was to be in the consumer field. As announced at the previous Convention, the avowed purpose was to free the worker from exploitation resulting from high prices, misleading advertising, and unscrupulous credit agencies.

At the most grass roots level, a "Service du Budget Familial" was established. An educational service, its function was to advise union members in matters concerning family budgeting, use of credit unions, shopping at cooperative stores, and other matters of a similar nature. The CSN hired a full-time director for this service.

A second result of the program was the CSN's involvement in a cooperative movement. Although the results were mixed, Marcel Pepin voiced some optimism:

> The foundation of a large co-operative weekly newspaper, the establishment of consumer clubs, the foundation of a large COOPRIX store in Montreal and another in Quebec, the formation of numerous credit co-operatives, indicate that there are resources and imagination in Quebec and that we weren't completely dreaming in 1968 when we said that organized workers could also become organized consumers.[25]

The Montreal Central Council established some programs of its own. A service was established to advise non-unionized workers regarding the prevailing minimum wage standards. The Council also established a kind of legal aid service, though the program has seemed more preoccupied at keeping Quebec revolutionaries out of jail than with defending the working class poor.

Still, despite the progress made, the lofty changes envisioned by Marchand and Pepin appear a long way from fruition. Nonetheless, those programs initiated thus far have impressed observers as being sensible and effective.

For example, in the small towns of Quebec, a union official proudly noted that the CSN has built a reputation as an organization "on which one can count, in which one has confidence."[26] Thus, in the socio-economic sphere, at least, while not exactly achieving "the ultimate goal which is to change the entire system," the CSN has firmly departed from a business type of unionism displayed by its counterparts elsewhere.

Political Sphere

Historically, the CSN followed a strict non-partisan approach to politics. Indeed, until 1959 Article XXIX of its constitution categorically stated: "No discussion of partisan politics will be permitted in the Congress of the Confederation."[27]

Beginning in the late 1940s, however, the union's increasing opposition to the anti-union government of Maurice Duplessis prompted political action. The activity took the form of publishing legislative briefs and of openly declaring against candidates it felt were blatantly anti-union. Reflecting this shift, the union's constitution was readjusted in 1959. It allowed for greater political participation but prohibited affiliation with a political party.[28]

From its timid beginnings the orientation of the CSN's political activity emerged during the Sixties to take on the following general characteristics: information, mobilization of workers at the grass roots level, and direct non-partisan pressure aimed at various power groups in society,[29] this, plus a liberal dose of rhetoric.

From the time in 1962 when Jean Marchand denounced the federal Social Credit Party and urged Quebecers and CSN workers not to vote for it (to no avail), to the recent FLQ crisis, where Marcel Pepin denounced the War Measures Act, CSN leaders at various levels have seen fit to take numerous stands on the issues of the day.

Some of the most controversial and most highly publicized positions were taken by the leader of the Montreal Central Council of the CSN, Michel Chartrand. Chartrand, an outspoken Separatist, endorsed the Separatist party in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois. In addition, Chartrand advocated a French-only policy in Quebec and also favoured the nationalization of all industry in Quebec. During the FLQ kidnapping crisis in 1970, he publicly came out in support of the kidnappers, stating:

> ...the FLQ would never attack salaried people but rather the dominant minority which has caused all the current ills of Quebec....[30]

Yet, notwithstanding these and similar views expressed by others within the organization, the 1970 CSN Convention, coming directly on the heels of the FLQ crisis, was remarkably placid. On one of the most controversial issues, the question of whether the CSN should adopt a French-only policy, a compromise was reached. Though advocating that legislation be enacted guaranteeing the supremacy of the French language in Quebec, suggestions that the CSN cease publication of the English language version of its newspaper or that all negotiations be held only in French, were rejected. Indicative of the union's position was the fact that all documentation at the Convention was in both languages and that simultaneous translation was provided to anyone who desired it.[31]

Otherwise, the political issues raisedat the Convention were of a sedate nature, or if potentially explosive, played down. Aggressive resolutions, such as one calling for Quebec independence, were never debated. Indeed, Pepin called mainly for a more democratic society and contrasted the union with the rest of society, calling the former "A Camp for Liberty."[32] He suggested that the present electoral laws were undemocratic in that they denied the right to vote to certain groups, particularly the poor, and declared that the laws be revamped. He also called for laws establishing the right of citizens to full employment.

If such proclamations seemed unduly mild in light of Pepin's anti-capitalistic and anti-Establishment feelings, there seemed good reason for caution. Many union members were becoming increasingly vocal about the political stands taken by union leaders, leaders who unwittingly or not, were viewed by the public as spokesmen for the entire movement. Many workers seemed particularly infuriated with the union's stand on the War Measures Act (a temporary measure imposing martial law in Quebec) and Separatism. One such critic proclaimed:

> The CSN has seen fit, especially during the October crisis [FLQ kidnapping], to express itself on all kinds of political subjects in the name of membership. But not once were we consulted and not once did most of us agree with their stand against the War Measures Act.33

Thus, some analysts felt that the non-inflamatory remarks at the recent Convention were undertaken to assuage the feelings of the dissident workers.

But, if generally leadership stands were notable for their flamboyance, the specific programs initiated were marked by pragmatism. The emphasis of the CSN's political tactics was on mobilizing the workers at the grass roots level. Towards this end the CSN launched itself into a campaign to establish citizen's committees in working class communities throughout the province. The overriding aim of this program was to further the struggle of the worker in his dual capacity of citizen and consumer.

As a result of the union's participation in community organization, it became directly involved, unofficially, in the 1970 Montreal municipal elections. Various citizen groups around the city combined to form an opposition political party to challenge the incumbent mayor, Jean Drapeau, considered insensitive to the plight of the poor of the city. The party formed, called "Front d'action Politique," or FRAP, as it was usually referred to, had as its leader Paul Cliche, who also was responsible for the CSN's political

action program. Moreover, according to a candidate for FRAP, the Montreal Central Council of the CSN not only donated money and allowed the party to use free of charge its printing facilities, but it also assigned five permanent officers of the union to assist FRAP full-time.[34] The attempt to defeat Drapeau proved unsuccessful, however, and today little remains of FRAP as the individual citizen's committees that combined to form the party returned to their own programs.

The depth of the union's involvement in the election raised anew an issue that, off and on, had been an intensely debated subject within the organization: the feasibility and desirability of engaging in direct political action through founding its own party or through affiliating with an existing party. Both CSN presidents during the Sixties, Marchand and Pepin, repeatedly reiterated their firm opposition to such a course. Pepin's objections seemed to be based on philosophical grounds:

> In our present political democracy, the fundamental rule of the game is that any interest group can reign over another group if it has the support ofthe "majority" of the population.
>
> The fundamental technique in this democracy is the play of oppositions and diversions. Political democracy maintains a perpetual struggle between political groups.
>
> Union democracy seeks to maintain harmony between groups. Union democracy is, in its principles the exact opposite of political democracy.[35]

Thus, it seems Pepin condemned partisan politics out of a sense of moral imperative. He states:

> I formally propose to you that our movement decline to commit itself to the formation of a political party or to give definite support to a party; in order that our own political action service, our regional representatives, the militants, be able to apply the principles of the second front in a firm manner through the central itself. For I believe that we shall secure more results in this sector through our union organization than through political parties.[36]

A less charitable view of Pepin's stand is held by other analysts. Disputing the claim that Pepin adopted the stand he chose out of moral convictions, some claim that his reasons were decidedly less profound. One commentator insisted:

> But what Mr. Pepin is really saying...is that the CSN has not yet achieved anything like a political consensus, and that too precipitous an entry into politics would seriously endanger the cohesion and solidarity that is the basis of union power.[37]

In summary, the political orientation of the union during the Sixties might best be described as "confused." But, then again, soo too was the political situation in Quebec. Still, through wily maneuvering Pepin seemed to convince the more radical members to settle for a general endorsement of a goal of overall societal transformation while assuring the majority that the union was not about to become a partisan political instrument.

Summary Observations

From the preceding discussions it is difficult to assess the CSN's overall posture. While apparently enunciating a philosophy that would have placed it decidedly to the left of most other labour organizations in North America, its activities frequently diverged from its stated intentions.

If the CSN's general philosophy was to change society fundamentally, this notion certainly was not manifested in its actions in the realm of industrial relations, except possibly for its propensity to involve itself in "strikes of principle". If its raiding tactics seemed grounded in high-sounding philosophical abstraction (self-determination of the individual worker), so, too, do many other activities variously undertaken by individuals and organizations seemed bound up in moral rationale, only to cloak purely egoistic aims.

In the socio-economic realm, all that emerged out of the union's vociferous critique of capitalistic society was a mildly socialistic policy of

worker cooperatives and free advice agencies and services. Though the services provided were no doubt useful and from all indications quite successful, even the most optimistic would have been hard put to predict that these were the programs that would eventually eliminate the oft-cited inequalities of society.

Again in the political sphere, the cautiousness of tactics seemed entirely inconsistent when compared to the raucousness of the rhetoric. For example, for an organization that supported wholeheartedly the FLQ, the Montreal Central Council's contribution of a few officers and some money appeared a paltry offering indeed when one considers that the mayor FRAP challenged was probably the most vociferous anti-Separatist, French person of importance in Quebec. And while the idea of politicizing the base, as Marcel Pepin intended doing through citizens' committees was an innovative idea, the ultimate outcome of such tactics remained very much in question.

Yet, it would certainly be incorrect to conclude, as some have done, that the CSN, in the final analysis, is nothing but a warmed-over business union. Such an assumption is a misconception if one considers that one of the principal characteristics of a business union is its acceptance of the prevailing system. This the CSN certainly does not, although the issue is pressed in some areas more than in others. Looking at only industrial relations activities, for example, one would indeed come away with the impression that little distinguished the CSN from other trade unions. But one must look elsewhere. Indeed, the very fact that one has the opportunity to view the union's operations in spheres other than industrial relations is in itself an indication of its distinctive nature.

The key to the apparent split personality of the union lies in the division of powers. Where the lines of power from the Confederation to the rank and file were most direct, tactics appeared to reflect most closely

the philosophy of the top. For example, the Confederation held widespread powers of intervention in disputes it deemed "important". But its powers were circumscribed in the negotiations of most collective agreements, which were handled by the individual locals with the aid, if necessary, of their federations. Thus, one was more apt to find strikes reflecting the ideological stances of the leadership, than one was likely to find collective agreements reflecting such sentiment.

A similar analysis can be used to explain the situation in other realms. Where the leadership of the union were in a position to directly control the implementation of programs, tactics did tend to more closely mirror the doctrine. An example of this would be the establishment of cooperatives which, because of the size of the undertaking, came directly under Confederation control. But where responsibility for enactment was delegated to intermediary bodies, such as the case with political action which was the responsibility of the individual central councils, the less likely it became that the union would closely adhere to the philosophy of the leaders.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSIONS

As stated in the introduction, the six chapters that together comprise the main body of this thesis (growth, environment, history, structure, composition, and philosophy and tactics) were primarily intended to illuminate "the whole story" of the CSN; i.e., the intent was to investigate the facts. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to use those facts to explain why the CSN grew as it did between 1961 and 1970.

Theories abound that attempt to explain why workers join unions. Many, like those of Brentano, or the Webbs, or Marx, or Commons, or Hoxie, or Perlman, to name some of the more famous theoreticians, offer explanations regarding the origin of trade unions.

Brentano, a German economist and historian writing in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, regarded trade unions as the successors of the old Guilds, viewing them as an effort by workers to restore the old order.[1] Later, Sydney and Beatrice Webb attributed union growth to the attempt of employees to standardize the conditions of employment of all workers who are potential competitors for work.[2] A third European, Karl Marx, believed that the emergence of trade unions was a response by workers to the need to protect their day-to-day interests.[3]

American analysts were no closer to arriving at a consensus. John R. Commons argued that the rise of trade unionism was a manifestation of economic developments (namely, the expansion of the market) which placed competitive pressures on employers, forcing them to push down wages. To thwart these employer attempts to reduce wages, workers banded together to form unions.[4] Robert Hoxie, on the other hand, believed that unions were the outgrowth of pluralistic forces, and that no explanation that

attributed the emergence of trade unions to a single phenomenum was satisfactory.[5] Selig Perlman, however, maintained that the rise of trade unions was due to the development by labour of a collective job consciousness, a recognition by workers of the scarcity of opportunity.[6]

Most contemporary writers, though building on these so-called classical theories of the labour movement, tend to take the existence of a firmly entrenched labour movement pretty much for granted. They seem less interested in explaining the origins of trade unions and more preoccupied with determining why workers join them.

Seidman, London, and Karsh, for instance, conducted a study of a large industrial union and concluded that workers join unions to protect themselves from arbitrary action by management. They also discovered that family background was an indicator of which workers were more likely to join unions.[7] Many other studies have noted that besides family background, characteristics such as age, education, type of work, area lived in, as well as numerous other variables, can also indicate which workers are more likely to join unions. Joseph Shister, though, contended that a sense of social immobility is an important reason for the growth of unionism. He maintained, as well, that a "dramatic source of dissatisfaction", too, is necessary if workers are to join unions.[8]

More recently, George Bain, in reference to white collar workers, argued that employment concentration, the degree of union recognition by the employer, and the attitude of government are the key determinants of why workers belong to unions.[9] Albert Blum, on the other hand, devised a system for categorizing the reasons workers are attracted to unions. He placed their reasons under four headings: economic, political, socio-psychological, and industrial relations. Using these classifications as a guide, Blum analyzed what factors led, for example, white collar workers,

to join unions. Implicitly, Blum's approach suggests that union growth is due to pluralistic forces.[10]

Given, then, this plethora of theories from which to choose, can one, or perhaps several, be applied to explain why workers joined the CSN in great numbers during the 1960s? For undeniably workers did join the CSN between 1961 and 1970, the union growing by over 100,000 members during those ten years, doubling its membership. The answer is, only partly.

The reason for this is that the workers of Quebec were not simply faced with the task of choosing between joining the CSN or not joining any union at all. Rather, workers in the province of Quebec were confronted with three choices: either to join the CSN, or to join a rival international union, or not to join any union.

Explaining the growth of the CSN between 1961 and 1970, thus, becomes, in reality, a two-dimensional process: first, it is essential to determine what prompted workers in Quebec to join unions in significantly greater numbers than ever before, between 1961 and 1970, and, second, it is then necessary to determine why workers chose to join the CSN rather than a competing union. In other words, the analysis must look beyond the question of why workers join unions to the question of why they choose a particular union. Whereas most of the theories cited above provide some answer to the former question, they rarely provide adequate clues to the latter one, a task for which most of the theories were really not intended. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to consider what factors were responsible for the creation of an atmosphere in Quebec favourable to unionism during the Sixties, because such a climate served as a springboard to the CSN's success, and as such is a partial explanation of its growth.

Why Workers Joined Unions in Quebec Between 1961 and 1970

During the Sixties unionization in Quebec increased markedly. Whereas in 1961 only 27.9 percent of this labour force was unionized, by 1969 fully 37.3 percent of the work force was unionized, the highest rate in Canada. In isolating factors that contributed to this increase in the degree of unionization, Blum's four categories (economic, political, socio-psychological, industrial relations) will be nominally used as convenient reference points.

Economic Reasons

For many years it was widely held that the fortunes of trade unions were inexorably linked to the business cycle; in times of prosperity trade unions fluorished, in times of recession or depression trade unions floundered. Though this theory has since been refuted by numerous analysts, the economic boom that Quebec underwent during the Sixties, nonetheless, had a favourable impact on the growth of unionism in the province.

Because Quebec industrialized later than most of the rest of North America, when a prolonged period of prosperity finally did occur, the ramifications were more dramatic. While a large tertiary sector had been evolving gradually for quite some time in most places, Quebec seemed to develop one overnight. Consequently, though the boom created many new jobs in all industries, the vast majority were produced in the tertiary sector.

Too, as elsewhere, many of the jobs were traditionally low paying service jobs. In contrast to more heavily unionized workers in other industries, whose unions, taking good advantage of high prosperity and a tight labor market, were winning hefty salary increases, the wages of workers in the tertiary sector appeared especially paltry.

The combination of these two factors, the tremendous increase in the tertiary sector and the poor wages of this group relative to unionized

workers in other sectors, produced a large group of employees susceptible to trade union overtures.

Political Reasons

Two notable political developments considerably encouraged union growth. The first was the defeat, in 1960, of the notoriously anti-union provincial government of Maurice Duplessis, long an obstacle to unionism in Quebec. Though the demise alone of the Duplessis regime constituted an improvement of immeasurable proportions for labour, labour further benefited from the election of a Liberal Party government sympathetic to unions. Though this party was voted out of office in 1966, the virulent anti-unionism of the Duplessis days were over forever.

The second major political development was the passage, in 1964, of the new Quebec Labour Code. A very progressive legislative reform, it recognized the right of virtually all groups of workers, both private and public, as well as professionals, to collective bargaining. This bill, thus, afforded recognition under the law to employees previously denied the right to bargain collectively, opening up whole new sectors for unionization.

Socio-Psychological Factors

The Sixties brought not only economic prosperity to Quebec but a host of other changes as well. The decade saw a fundamental change in many of the social and cultural institutions of the province and a further weakening of the Church's influence.

This transformation of Quebec, dubbed "le revolution tranquil", saw the loosening of many historical traditions and mores and a lessening of traditional Quebec conservatism. An important manifestation was a new spirit of acceptance accorded to institutions previously distrusted. Trade unions, as well, benefited from this climate.

Industrial Relations Factors

The effect of the AFL-CIO rivalry is well-documented. During their competition for workers, the degree of unionization increased markedly (though other factors were at work, too).

A similar rivalry existed between the CSN and the international unions during the 1960s. The CSN and the internationals were often involved in bitter competition for employees. The contest provoked vigorous recruitment drives on the part of the two rivals and also drew a large amount of media attention. This competition was a definite spur to union growth in general.

In short, certain factors were uniquely operative in Quebec during the Sixties. The most important of these were the economic boom with its special implications for the province, a brand new political climate vis-a-vis trade unions, Quebec's "revolution tranquil", and an intense inter-union competition for workers. The result of the combination of these features, replicated nowhere else on the continent, produced a special climate favouring union growth in the province.

Why Workers Joined the CSN Between 1961 and 1970

The fact that a combination of various conditions produced an atmosphere favourable to unionism does not in itself explain why one union was favoured over another. Why did workers choose the CSN rather than other unions operating in the province?

The answer lies in the effect of two distinct sets of factors. The first set of factors are those over which the CSN exercised little control, but nonetheless benefited from, mostly by simply being a French-Canadian union in a French-Canadian province. The second set of factors are those over which the CSN bore direct responsibility and include those concrete actions or changes initiated by the union that contributed to its own success.

In essence, then, it is my contention that the CSN growth between 1961 and 1970 was due both to circumstance and initiative. The union was both a beneficiary and an iniator and it is the combination and the interaction of these dual roles that accounted for the CSN's success.

Circumstantial Factors Contributing to the Expansion of the CSN

Though the environment of the Sixties was favourable to unionism in general, special chracteristics made it particularly favourable to the CSN.

The most crucial variable benefiting the CSN was the rise of French-Canadian nationalism during the decade. There can be no question but that the fortunes of the CSN, the only purely French-Canadian union in the province, rose with the rising tide of nationalistic sentiment. The CSN was able to appeal to Quebec workers on an emotional level, something that the international unions generally could not do.

Further, the rebirth of nationalism saw a re-emphasis on the French language as the language of business and work in Quebec. Naturally, this presented no problems to the CSN, all of whose officers were completely conversant in French. Most international union representatives, however, displayed a vocabulary confined to "bonjour" and "au revoir", a fact that escaped the attention of few French-speaking workers.

Another factor that aided the CSN was the poor service provided by a number of international unions in the province. No person interviewed failed to mention this point. Not only did few international unions publish any union literature at all in French, but some, with relatively small memberships in Quebec, were accused of consistently ignoring the appeals of the workers to provide adequate service. While such failings might merely have caused restlessness elsewhere, in Quebec, where workers had another option, the CSN was able to win new members in certain instances

almost by default. The strengthening of the FTQ toward the end of the decade partly remedied the situation, but much damage had already been done.

An additional condition favouring the CSN was its close ties with the provincial government that was in office from 1960 to 1966. Due to its steadfast anti-Duplessis stand during the 1950s, the CSN had won many friends within the main opposition party of that era, the Liberals. When the Liberals swept into power in 1960, some of the CSN's closest friends gained influential positions within the new government. While it is impossible to know exactly what kind of aid the CSN received when it was trying to unionize the public service, it is no secret that the CSN was favoured over other interested unions. Most likely the friendship took the form of government cooperation and encouragement, not an inconsiderable benefit.

In sum, without question circumstance played in important role in the successful growth of the CSN from 1961 to 1970. Its success was due in no small measure to a rise of French-Canadian nationalism and its implications. Too, the failures of the international unions certainly benefited the CSN. Furthermore, the union was undeniably the beneficiary of favouritism on the part of the Quebec government when it organized the public service.

Yet, the mere existence of a set of circumstances favouring the CSN was not in itself a guarantee that the union would automatically unionize the number of workers that it did. The fact that the CSN seized the opportunities it was confronted with, implies that the CSN must have taken certain actions on its own initiative to attract the number of workers it did.

Policy Adopted and Action Taken by the CSN Contributing to Its Expansion Between 1961 and 1970

The ability of the CSN to survive as a viable organization has historically depended on its capacity to adapt itself to changing conditions. Adaptation has chiefly been accomplished through either a reorientation of organizational goals and objectives, or through an overhaul of its structure. Whereas the larger organizations with which the CSN has always competed were not free from this requirement, their bigness rendered them more immune to shifting circumstances and subsequently the need for adaptation less urgent.

As Quebec industrialized around World War II, the CSN was forced to abandon its traditional regional division of powers and place more power in the hands of the federations. Too, as the influence of the Church upon the people of the province waned, lay personnel displaced the clergy from key posts throughout the organization. Further, when it became clear that the entire concept of a union geared towards perpetuating Roman Catholic social doctrine was no longer viable, the CSN re-oriented itself towards pursuing economic goals. And, if this meant refuting a traditional no-strike policy and adopting an anti-government stance, again the CSN took the requisite steps.

At the start of the 1960s the CSN once again seemed confronted with a situation that demanded drastic action. The merger of all the international unions into one organization dwarfed the CSN by comparison. It was widely felt that the new unified labour movement would turn from inter-union squabbling to the task of organizing the unorganized. Its size and the resources at its disposal made the CSN appear miniscule in contrast.

To meet this perceived challenge (which, in fact, never quite emerged), the CSN initiated yet another change. It centralised its structure and in

so doing centralised its resources. Power was removed from the individual federations and central councils and lodged in the Confederation itself. Thus, unlike the CLC or AFL-CIO where power flows from the bottom up, in the CSN it flowed from the top down.

Further, to insure that implementation of headquarter policy was carried out uniformly, special regional extensions of the confederal headquarters were created. Called regional offices, these bodies cut across federation lines to coordinate matters relating to all workers within a particular geographic region. These offices assured Confederation control in the field.

The centralised structure had important implications. Primarily, it allowed for an extraordinarily efficient allocation of resources, something absolutely vital considering the superior resources collectively held by the international unions. Also, by establishing the pre-eminence of central headquarters in coordinating all union activity, it greatly reduced intramural bickering and contributed greatly to the cohesiveness of the organization. This was a trait sorely lacking on the part of the international unions who remained fragmented and uncoordinated until more power was vested in the FTQ.

Though centralised, the new structure resulted in an unprecedented degree of flexibility. Through centralisation a tremendous mobility of funds and resources was effected. It enabled the union to strategically and selectively concentrate its resources. Manpower and funds could be delivered to where it was needed most, without regard to which particular federation or central council it actually "belonged". Pressure and a show of strength could be brought to bear more swiftly and with a more telling impact than previously. In the organizing and servicing spheres this placed the CSN at a particular advantage. For example, unlike the CLC

or AFL-CIO, the organization of a particular industry could not be hindered by an unimaginative or financially weak federation already operating within the sector.

Yet, all the advantages of the CSN's centralized operation would have gone largely for naught, had not the CSN grasped very early the implications for trade unionism of a rapidly changing labour force. Well ahead of most international unions, the CSN seemed to realize that the future of unionism lay in the tertiary sector, among white collar workers, service employees, and civil servants. Too, well ahead of international unions, the CSN reacted to exploit the new situation, launching vigourous organizing campaigns in the tertiary sector.

In embarking on massive recruitment drives to organize, for example, hospital workers throughout the province, or Quebec public servants, the CSN was aided by a number of factors. As previously noted, a centralised structure greatly facilitated coordination and strategic resource allocation. Yet, tertiary sector employees, many of them white collar, have generally proved very difficult to organize in North America. Certain characteristics of the CSN, however, helped to overcome the usual barriers.

Because power within the organization flowed from the top down, the CSN was able to create new federations virtually at will. Each new group of workers could be accorded their federation, and generally were. Thus, a federation was created to accommodate Quebec government employees, another was created for service employees (chiefly hospital workers), another served municipal public employees, another was for teachers, and another for engineers. In this way, white collar workers were generally separate from blue collar workers, greatly increasing the attractiveness of the CSN to the former group.

Furthermore, because of a confederation-wide strike fund, even the smallest and newest federations immediately could begin bargaining from a position of strength rather than weakness. In this manner, a traditional disadvantage associated with joining a fledgling federation was negated. For example, the Engineer's Federation, though numbering less than 3000 members was able to maintain a strong bargaining position through access to the overall confederation strike fund and other resources.

Besides the benefits accruing from its structure, the CSN's chances for success among white collar workers was greatly enhanced by the nature of its leadership. The union's president during the big organizational campaign of the early Sixties was Jean Marchand, a university graduate and one of the most highly respected intellectuals in the province. Men similarly well-educated and respected surrounded Marchand. With men of this calibre and reputation running the union, a traditional fear of white collar workers, namely that joining a union was a step downward in social status, was largely eliminated. Thus, one of the key obstacles blocking international union recruitment of white collar workers, their reticence at the prospect of lowering their social status by assocating with blue collar workers, was easily overcome by the CSN.

The CSN was also quick to capitalize on previously cited discontent among members of certain international unions. Taking advantage of two factors, the CSN launched a vigorous raiding campaign. As in other spheres, a large measure of its success was owed to a centralised structure that enabled it to move resources and manpower to diverse and scattered regions quickly and efficiently. But also, the fragmented structure of the other unions in Quebec presented many easy targets.

Various dividends arose from the CSN's raiding campaign. First, it added to the CSN's membership total. Too, the fact that the CSN convincingly

demonstrated its capacity to inflict damage on international union affiliates served as a real morale booster within the organization. But more important, it further strengthened the image the CSN was building, that of a winner. Thus, in addition to bolstering the union's size, the CSN's success in the raiding field considerably enhanced its reputation among Quebec's workers.

It is much less facile to judge the impact on union expansion that the militant strike philosophy of the CSN produced. Although most observers generally agree the initial stages of a collective relationship are more prone to strikes, this would still not account for the CSN's continued disproportionate share of strikes in the province, even after its rate of recruitment had subsided.

Conceivably the union's tactics could have attracted to its ranks militant workers seeking aggressive action. But, it remains equally possible that some workers were scared off, fearful that joining the CSN would involve them in numerous strikes. Frankly, it is really beyond the scope of this thesis to state definitively which attitude was stronger among Quebec workers.

It is slightly less risky to judge the effect of some of the more highly publicized CSN strikes on the union's growth. Most of these kind of strikes (Quebec Liquor Board, Montreal bus strike, the "gars de Lapalme" affair) not only received little public sympathy, a sharp contrast to some monumental CSN strikes during the Duplessis era, but also, in most, the CSN did not fare especially well. Indeed, the recent Lapalme strike was a disaster, stirring dissension within the CSN itself. These strikes would appear to have exercised a negative influence on the union's growth, not only giving the union poor publicity but draining away resources. Still, it is impossible to make a definitive statement any more precise within the framework adopted.

Most debatable of all, however, are the implications for expansion evoked by the CSN's philosophy and tactics in the socio-economic and political realms. In the heady days of "le revolution tranquil" the rhetoric of Marchand and Pepin probably spurred recruitment. After all, then, society was being literally changed. With high prosperity and low unemployment, anything seemed possible. The CSN was in the forefront of these changes and the public proclamations calling for even more changes probably enhanced the CSN's prestige and attracted Quebec workers to it.

But, as the prosperity of the early and middle Sixties dissolved to be replaced by unemployment and inflation, and "le revolution tranquil" gave way to terrorist activities, revolutionary rhetoric, no matter how non-violent, became anathema to Quebec workers. A good example of this negative reaction could be seen within the CSN itself, as certain groups tried to disassociate themselves from statements made by their leaders. Hence, whereas in the early and even middle Sixties the fairly radical stands taken by union leaders probably encouraged union growth, by the end of the decade the more radical views being espoused by CSN leaders were probably hindering union expansion.

Of the concrete programs that emerged as a result of leadership philosophy regarding the need for change in the society, it is still too early to judge their impact. But the much-trumpeted political mobilisation campaigns and the experiment in cooperatives are too new to have exercised any appreciable influence on the CSN expansion during the period under study.

And so, in the final analysis, it is clear that myriad factors contributed to the CSN expansion. Still, three broad sets of factors responsible for the CSN expansion from 1961 to 1970 can be identified. The first was the emergence in Quebec of a climate favouring unionism in general. The

second was the existence of environmental and industrial relations conditions that favoured the CSN, in its quest for workers, over the other unions operating in the province.

Yet, it was the third set of factors, the initiatives and changes instituted by the CSN itself, that were most directly responsible for its growth. It was the CSN's ability to exploit to the fullest all the advantages inherent in its unique centralised structure. It was the ability of the CSN to read correctly the new direction that unionism would be required to take. It was the capacity of the union for action, not only in organizing and raiding but in servicing as well. But, most of all, the CSN's success during the Sixties was a result of its ability to react quickly to a changing environment that dictated new directions and new structures. Ultimately, it was this capacity to change, that was most responsible for the CSN's expansion between 1961 and 1970.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1]In English the CSN is referred to as the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU).

CHAPTER I

[1]Comparable figures were not available for 1970.

CHAPTER II

[1]For a detailed explanation of the reasons international unions entered Canada, see John Crispo, International Unionism (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada, Limited, 1967), pp. 11-49.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970), p. xv.

[4]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1965, p. xv.

[5]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1965, p. xv, and Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, p. xv.

[6]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, p. ix.

[7]I. Brecher and S. S. Reisman, Canada-United States Economic Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), p. 202.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, p. xv.

[10]Arthur M. Kruger, "The Direction of Unionism in Canada", in Richard U. Miller and Fraser Isbester (eds.), Canadian Labour in Transition (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1971), p. 104.

[11]Gerard Dion, "Le Syndicalisme au Canada", in Gerard Dion, et al., Le Syndicalisme au Canada: une Reevaluation (Quebec: Presses de l' Universite Laval, 1968), p. 263.

[12]Leo Roback, L'ideologie de la Federation des Travailleurs du Quebec: Evolution Historique (unpublished address given to the Seminar on French Canada, Laval University, December 27, 1967), p. 15.

[13]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, p. xiv.

[14]Marcel Faribault (speech delivered to the fourteenth Business Men's Weekend and Alumni Reunion, March 15, 1963), in Frank Scott and Michael Oliver, Quebec States Her Case (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1964), p. 146.

[15]John Crispo, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

[16]Abbe Maxime Fortin, L'action Catholique (Quebec), April 3, 1916, p. 8.

[17]Claude Ryan, "The Enigma of French Canada", Saturday Night (Toronto), January 1967, p. 21.

[18]Sylvia Ostry, "The Canadian Labour Market", in Miller and Isbester (eds.), op. cit., p. 49.

CHAPTER III

[1]Samuel Barnes, "The Evolution of Christian Trade Unionism in Quebec," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 1959, p. 570.

[2]Victor O. Chan, The Canadian Knights of Labour (unpublished Master's thesis, McGill University, 1949), p. 200.

[3]Jean Marie Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs de la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Montreal, 1970), p. 20.

[4]Shirley Goldenberg, Experts on the Union Staff: The Evolution of a Role in the Confessional Labour Movement of Quebec (unpublished Master's thesis, McGill University, 1966), p. 12.

[5]Gerard Dion, "The Trade Union Movement in Quebec," Canadian Journal of the Humanities, April 1958, p. 377.

[6]Goldenberg, op. cit., p. 9.

[7]Deporq, op. cit., p. 22.

[8]In English the CTCC is referred to as the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (CCCL).

[9]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1921, p. xii.

[10]Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada: 1827-1959 (Montreal: Canadian Social Publications, Ltd., 1966), p. 225.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Barnes, op. cit., p. 571.

[13]Goldenberg, op. cit., p. 14.

[14]Ibid., p. 18.

[15]John Crispo, International Unionism, p. 42.

[16]Lipton, op. cit., pp. 323-324.

[17]Barnes, op. cit., p. 573.

[18]For an excellent account of the strike and its implications, see Pierre Elliot Trudeau, La Greve de l'Amiante (Montreal: Cite Libre, 1956).

[19]Richard Desrosiers, "Evolution du Syndicalisme" in Le Travailleur Quebecois et le Syndicalisme (Montreal: Les Cahiers de Sainte Marie, 1966), p. 106.

[20]Dion, op. cit., pp. 372-373.

[21]Barnes, op. cit., p. 575.

[22]John Crispo, op. cit., p. 575.

[23]Ibid., p. 266.

CHAPTER IV

[1]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, p. xv.

[2]Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General, report delivered at 44th CSN Convention, 1970, p. 10.

[3]Canada Department of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, Labour Organizations in Canada: 1970, pp. 1-93.

[4]Ibid., pp. 113-114.

[5]Deporq, Les Structures et Pouvoirs, op. cit., p. 49.

[6]Goldenberg, Experts on the Union Staff, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

[7]Mathieu Vaillancourt, "La Distribution des Pouvoirs a la Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux", Relations Industrielles, May 1968, p. 3.

[8]Deporq, op. cit., p. 113.

[9]Ibid., pp. 3-5, 113-117.

[10]Ibid., p. 114.

[11]Ibid., p. 116.

[12]Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[13]Ibid., p. 50.

[14]Guy Ferland (officer of the CSN), private interview held at CSN headquarters, Montreal, June 1971.

[15]Deporq, op. cit., p. 116.

[16]For the following section I am indebted to Jean Marie Deporq (previously cited) on whose work the analysis that follows is based.

[17]Deporq, op. cit., p. 93.

[18]Ibid., p. 117.

CHAPTER V.

[1]Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted Labour Force Statistics: January 1953-December 1969, Catalogue No. 71-201 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 49.

[2]This figure is based on data obtained from two sources: Deporq, op. cit., p. 129, and Parent, op. cit., p. 20.

[3]No figures were available for 1970.

[4]La Presse (Montreal), June 29, 1971, Section D, p. 16.

[5]Two federations that existed in 1960, Barbers and Coiffures and Corporation Municipal et Scolaire, have since disaffiliated.

[6]Guy Ferland, private interview held at CSN headquarters, Montreal, June, 1971.

CHAPTER VI.

[1]Jerold S. Auerbach (ed.), American Labor: The Twentieth Century (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969), p. 66.

[2]Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 2.

[3]Marcel Pepin, Moral Report of the President, report delivered at 43rd CSN Convention, 1968, p. 31.

[4]Marcel Pepin, Positions (Montreal: Presses of the CSN, 1970), p. 39.

[5]Albert A. Blum, private interviews held at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, November 30, 1970.

[6]Marcel Pepin, Positions, op. cit., p. 32.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Robert Stewart, Montreal Star, December 12, 1970, p. 63.

[9]Although no literal translation is possible, it roughly means "Lapalme lads".

[10]Raymond Parent, Rapport du Secretaire General, op. cit., p. 15.

[11]Jean Marchand, Moral Report of the President, op. cit., p. 14.

[12]Paul Belanger et al., La Rivalite Intersyndicale au Quebec (unpublished draft study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, Quebec, 1968), p. 152.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Idem.

[15]Ibid., p. 167.

[16]Idem.

[17]Idem.

[18]Claude Jodoin, Canadian Labour (official publication of the Canadian Labour Congress), September 1965, p. 27.

[19]The Hat Worker (publication of the United Hatters International Union, New York), February 1965, p. 3.

[20]Jean Marchand, Moral Report (1964), op. cit., p. 16.

[21]Marcel Pepin as reported in Eastern Worker (Karachi), July 1967, p. 145.

[22]Marcel Pepin, Positions, op. cit., p. 32.

[23]Ibid., p. 69.

[24]Ibid., p. 33.

[25]Marcel Pepin, Moral Report (1970), op. cit., p. 20.

[26]Guy Ferland, private interview held at CSN headquarters, Montreal, June, 1971.

[27]Guy Lortie, "Evolution de l'action Politique de la CSN", Relations Industrielles, October 1967, p. 533.

[28]Ibid., p. 543.

[29]Deporq, op. cit., p. 80.

[30]Montreal Star, October 14, 1970, p. 3.

[31]Montreal Star, December 8, 1970, p. 5.

[32]Marcel Pepin, Moral Report (1970), op. cit., p. 52.

[33]Montreal Star, January 22, 1971, p. 3.

[34]Mrs. B. Zachon, private interview held at McGill University, Montreal, November 13, 1970.

[35]Marcel Pepin, Moral Report (1970), op. cit., pp. 47-48.

[36]Ibid., p. 68.

[37]Montreal Star, December 9, 1970, p. 8.

CHAPTER VII.

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