ABSTRACT AN ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN MEXICAN REACTION TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: A Study in Cross-cultural Attitudes by Robert Osborne Turley The problem of this study is to determine whether the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, which occurred when the fieldwork for a representative sample of 1,126 re— spondents drawn from urban Mexico was nearly half-completed, affected the attitudes of those interviewed after the event. If it did affect their attitudes, in what ways and by how much did they change? - fter reviewing precedents and the relevant theoretical literature, disaster research and general systems theory, empirical questions are addressed to the data: 1) Is there a difference in attitudes as measured before and after the assassination? and 2) To what extent can the differences, if any, be attributed to the assassination? The research design approximates the "before-after stu- dy with interchangeable groups". In order to answer the questions, the assassination is employed as a fortuitous, "experimental condition" to divide the sample into "before" and "after” subsamples, which correspond to the "control" and "experimental" groups, respectively, of this variation on classical research design. The responses of the two groupings to forty—one attitudinal items are tabulated and compared. The respondents in the respective groupings are compared along five standard sociological variables which are then partialled with the attitudinal items. There appears to have been little change in attitudes except for a cluster of attitudes toward the United States, which changed consistently across certain sociological stra- ta at high levels of significance and in a uniformly posi— tive direction. The more positive attitudes and evaluations of the United States and its people expressed by urban Mex- icans in the wake of the assassination were apparently re- sults of that event, but the exact contribution of the assas— sination to the change is difficult to isolate due to the possible contamination of population differences in the sub- samples. The findings do, however, agree with those reported in studies of the response of the American public. Women; the young; those with little or no education, in lower occu- pational strata and in more highly urbanized settings tend— ed to react more strongly to the assassination of President Kennedy. AN ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN MEXICAN REACTION TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY: A STUDY IN CROSS-CULTURAL ATTITUDES By -- w .4 Robert O?tTurley A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Sociology 1969 “"3 \‘T'; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful to Dr. Charles P. Loomis for the oppor- tunity he gave me to work on the Five Nation Study. He and his associates in the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University were very helpful and my association with all of them was a valuable and rewarding experience. I also want to thank my former colleagues of the De— partment of Sociology at Central Michigan University for much inspiration and unrestricted use of the facilities. I especially appreciate the assistance of Dr. Bernard N. Meltzer, Chairman, who read the manuscript and made sugges— tions for the final draft. For their extensive suggestions for revision of the first draft, submitted in 1965, I thank Dr. Eugene Jacobson, member, and Dr. Donald Olmsted, chairman of my committee. Kudos for their patience in the 1965-67 Peace Corps and succeeding intervals. Special appreciation is due my wife, Anne M. Turley, for her constant encouragement, assistance, and typing of the final draft. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v Chapter I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Review of the Literature . . . . . . . . u Precedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Reactions in the United States . . . . 12 Foreign Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Mexico, Mexicans, the United States and Kennedy . . . . . . . . . 21 Mexican Reaction . . .i. . . . . . . . 29 II. THE STUDY DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 The Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 III. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . 40 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 iii Table 10. 11. LIST OF TABLES Effect of Assassination on Selected Basic Beliefs Significantly Different At- titudinal Items, Before to After Significant vs. Non—signi- ficant DiffErences in Forty—One Attitudinal Items, Before to After 9 Sex of Respondent, by 0 o 6 Age of Respondent, by Education of Respondent, O by 6 Head of Household Occupation, by % Size of Place of Residence, by % Before-After Comparison of Stratified Sociological Variables by Attitudinal Items . . . . . . . Stratified Significant/Not Significant Differences by Non—U.S./United States Attitudes . . . . . Direction of Mean Change for Significant Differences, Before to After, by Non— U.S./United States Atti- tudes iv Page 17 H2 H3 uu MS H5 45 H6 H9 50 51 TH LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page I. The Kennedy Assassination as Related to the Salient Dimensions of Disaster Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 II. Phase I, Five—nation Study; Selected Hypotheses Com- paring Mexico and the United States, 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 III. The Before—After Study with Interchangeable Groups as a Variation on the Classi- cal Before—After Study with One Control Group . . . . . . . . . . 34 IV. The Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Tl- CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Violence is an existential constant of the human con— dition. As such, it provides one enduring mode of social change. A society, in order to survive, must continually and effectively adapt to new conditions in the environment, some of them caused by events or acts of a violent nature. The source may be natural or human; the effects are material and/or social. The persistence of violence in all its mani- festations and the high material and human costs accruing from it justify its study. Science ultimately seeks to establish cause and effect: physical science, to predict and control the occurrence of natural violence; behavioral science, to assess the human consequences of natural disasters, as well as to explain those elements in the human character which produce and re— act to man-made violence. At this time, science is far short of these objectives. Natural and human disasters occur daily. To most people, it seems that violent crimes strike randomly. We live with the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. Indeed, violence is very much a part of human existence. The social effects of a human act of violence comprise the subject of this work. The event is the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963. In light of the subsequent assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert Francis Kennedy, the assassina- tion of President Kennedy can no longer be viewed as a unique isolated event, although it probably produced a great- er impact. The social causes and consequences of political assassination and, perhaps, related phenomena such as the death of an important person should be categorized and in- corporated into the theory of the behavioral sciences, either within the middle—range hypotheses of "disaster research" or, perhaps more heuristically, within the broader perspective of "general systems theory." This study is the result of a natural experiment imposed on an attitudinal study of a representative sample drawn 1 from urban Mexico. The assassination occurred near the -mid-point of the fieldwork for this sample. Although all the studies reported to date regarding the American response2 1This sample was one of five drawn from Phase I of the Five Nation Study coordinated by Professor Charles P. Loomis, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University. The fol- lowing agencies have contributed to the support of the Study: International Programs, M.S.U.; the Carnegie Corporation; the United States Public Health Service and the Agricultural Ex- periment Station (Michigan State University). 2Throughout the present study, "American" will be used to indicate citizens of the United States of America. concur on the nature and extent of the immediate, emotional response,3 there was no apparent change in basic, enduring American attitudes.u Despite the geographical contiguity of the United States and Mexico and the long—standing, relative- ly high rate of interaction between the systems, the two states maintain very different cultures. Therefore, the pragmatic question arose as to whether the assassination had affected the responses of Mexicans interviewed after it oc- curred. The answer to such a question could provide an opportunity to measure cross—cultural attitudinal response toward events in another socio-cultural system. The Problem The primary problem of this study is to determine whether the assassination of President Kennedy, which inter- vened when the fieldwork in urban Mexico was nearly half- completed, a-fected the attitudes of the respondents inter— viewed after the event. If the assassination did affect Mexican attitudes, what was the nature and extent of the effect? 3Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (Eds.), The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis'TStanford, California: Stanford University Press, 19655. qPaul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "A National Survey of Public Reactions and Behavior," in Greenberg and Parker, pp. l7H—5. Review of the Literature The literature which is relevant to this problem has been divided into four sections. The first section will cite precedents for this type of study. As far as the author has been able to determine, no directly comparable studies have been reported. The study design conforms, in some respects, to the "before-after study with interchangeable groups" in the Selltiz, 3: a1. typology of experimental designs.5 There are, however, some related methodological and substantive precedents. The next section will view the problem from the perspectives of two theoretical approaches: The Study of Disaster and General Systems Theory. The third section will review the findings of students of the assassination regard- ing the American reaction to the assassination. The final section will attempt to describe Mexico and Mexicans and their relationship to the United States, in general and speci- fically, to President Kennedy. Precedents There are a few disparate precedents for this type of study. American reaction to the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the subject of two studies conducted in the 5Claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch and Stuart W. Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959) p. 110. United States.6 Public reaction to Roosevelt's death was also gauged in France on June 1, 19145.7 Hadley Cantril studied attitude change over a period of time in relation to the events of World War II.8 Richard Centers, in his The Psychology of Social Classes, bases a major postulate -of his work on the effect of the British Labour Party victory on self-identification with the working class in the United States.9 Dr. Stephen Withey of the Survey Re- search Center, the University of Michigan, cites a similar situation to the present study in which the announcement of our first H—bomb test intervened in a survey of public at- titudes toward war, international threat, and civil defense. Regarding such situations, he says that there are very few projects that have been lucky enough to bridge a signifi- cant social event without creating confusion in the data. 6D.E. Johannsen, "Reactions to the Death of President Roosevelt," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (lgus), H1, 218—22 and H. OrIansky, "Reactions to the Death of President Roosevelt," Journal of Social Psychology (1947), 26, 236-66. 7Hadley Cantril (Ed.), Public Opinion, 1935-19u6 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951). 8Hadley Cantril, "Opinion Trends in World War II: Some Guides to Interpretation," Public Opinion Quarterly (l9u8), 12, 30—HH. 9 . . Richard Centers, The Psychology of Soc1a1 Classes, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19u9), pp. 139-u0. It is highly probable that there were other surveys and studies in process at the time that the assassination occur—> red. It seems unlikely that the potential effects of such a significant event could or would be ignored. If their study were vulnerable to such effects, the investigators would have at least three other alternatives: scrap the study; try to assess the consequences of the assassination for the study and control for it; or use it as an experimen- tal variable. Dr. Robert T. Bower of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. informed the author of one projected study. Professor Lark 0. Daniel of San Diego State College had administered a pre-test in an experiment in "profile tech- niques for program analysis" to 250 students at 9:00 a.m. (PST) on the day of the assassination and a post-test on another group of 250 students at 11:00 a.m. As in the present study, the pre-test group had not been exposed to 'the assassination, but the post-test group had. The data were not analyzed.10 A study which successfully bridged the assassination was conducted by David 0. Sears. He used the assassination as the experimental variable and compared political partisanship among college students surveyed before and after the assassination.11 10Letter from Professor Daniel to the author, June 19, 1968. 11David 0. Sears, "Effects of the Assassination on Political Partisanship," in Greenberg and Parker, pp. 305—26. Theory In an effort to bring the findings of this study, as well as other relevant studies, into a meaningful theoreti- cal context, two alternative bodies of behavioral scientific thought will be briefly considered: disaster research and systems theory. The Study of Disaster Prior to this analysis, the Kennedy assassination had not been viewed as a "disaster situation" in the sense which is used in the study of disaster.12 It is doubtful whether adding a new category such as "assassination of noted per- sons” to the plethora of disaster categories already extant would be of much scientific value. .Perhaps a more generic "deaths of significant persons" would be of value, however. At any rate, the conceptual framework of this field pro- vides one matrix in which the Kennedy assassination could be meaningfully analyzed. The study of disaster is mainly a product of the Atomic Age and the Civil Defense movement. Only two studies were conducted prior to World War II.13 Disaster research is an 12Since this paper was first submitted in June, 1965, Wilbur Schramm in his article, "Communication in Crisis," in Greenberg and Parker, pp. ”—7, has proposed a similar argument. 13Samuel H. Prince, "Catastrophe and Social Change," Studies in History, Economics and Public Law (Columbia University Press, 1920), Vol. 9H, No. l and Hadley Cantril, The Invasion from Mars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press), 19H0. interdisciplinary effort to describe and explain empirically human reaction to disaster or extreme situations. Inventor— ies of studies and reviews of the literature abound.1” To date, however, no general, systematized theory of disaster has been constructed which can stand independently, although attempts have been made to subsume disaster concepts into other theoretical matrices.15 Basically, any disaster involves a disruption of the social context in which the individual func- tions. Deaths, injuries, destruction of property and disruption of communications all acquire impor- tance principally as departures from the pattern of normal expectations upon which the individual builds up actions from minute to minute. The central problem for research becomes, "What factors produce what degrees of disruption in this social context, and how do individuals and groups behave in the face of this disruption?"16 l“'A.H. Barton, 33 al., Social Organization Under Stress: A Sociological Review of Disaster Studies (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, 1963); Disaster Research Groups, Field Studies of Disaster Behavior: An Inventory (Washington, D.C.: Natiohal Academy of Science — National Research Council), 1961; Charles E. Fritz, with Mark E. Nearman and Devorah K. Rubin, An Inven— tory of Field Studies on Human Behavior in Disaster, Disaster ResearEh Groups, Augusf_15, 1959; Jeannefte F. Rayner, "Stu- dies of Disasters and Other Extreme Situations - An Annotated Selected Bibliography," Human Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer, 1957), pp. 30—90. 15Charles P. Loomis, "Social Systems Under Stress -- Disasters and Disruptions," Social Systems: Essays 93 Their Persistence and Change (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 129-67; Pitirim Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1942). See also journal issues devoted to disaster research: Human Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 1957) and Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1954). ”" ”‘ 16Lewis M. Killian, "Some Accomplishments and Some Needs in Disaster Studies," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 10, No. 3 (195a), p. 67. “ ““"“ One inventory lists 110 field studies conducted on 103 events in the following categories: airplanes; blizzards; earthquakes; volcanoes and other land movements; epidemics and epidemic threats; explosions and fires; false alerts; floods; hurricanes and typhoons; mine disasters; tornadoes; toxicological substances; World War II bombings and miscel— 17 In reviewing these studies, it becomes readily laneous. apparent that the emphasis is on natural disasters and the primary focus of interest is those people immediately af- fected by the disaster. Yet, Form and Nosow urge that "generalizations dealing with disaster . . . should cover both natural and artificial disasters, predictable and un— predictable ones."18 A few studies have been conducted in 19 Fewer have analyzed intercultural co— other cultures. operation in disaster situations.20 To the writer's know- ledge, no systematic study has been conducted to measure cross-national border reactions to disaster. l7Disaster Research Groups. 18William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow, Community in Disaster (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) p. 11. lgSee J.E. Ellemers, General Conclusions: Studies in Holland Flood Disaster 1953 (Amsterdam and Washington D.CT: Institute for Social Science Research in the Netherlands and National Academy of Sciences - National Research Coun- cil Committee on Disaster Studies, 1955); and Hilda Grieve, The Great Tide: The Study of the 1953 Flood Disaster i3 Essex (Chelinsford, EnglandT‘ County Council of Essex, 1959). 2OSee Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Catastrophe and Crisis in a Flooded Border Community (unpuinshed Ph.D. Thesis, Depart- ment of Sociology, Michigan State University, 1961). 10 The Kennedy assassination deviated from the normal di— saster situation in a number of ways: the source of the di- saster; the target and scope of the disaster; and the net ef- fect of, and reactions to, the disaster. Normally, the source is natural, the target is broader than one individual and the effects are physical as well as psychological. Due to its variation along these dimensions, the generic category in- cluding assassination could possibly be employed as a polar ideal-typical construct in the formulation of disaster theory. Figure I shows how the Kennedy assassination can be classi- fied according to the salient dimensions of disasters. FIGURE I: The Kennedy Assassination as Related to the Salient Dimensions of Disaster Situations Dimensions of Disaster Research21 Predictability Inevitability Controllability Nature of precipitating agent Assignable intent of the agent Speed of onset Scope Duration Primary destructive effects Lingering destructive effects Repetitive quality Correspondence of the Kennedy Assassination Ng_warning; more precaution was imprac- ticable Man, as opposed to natural forces Man-made, as opposed to fortuitous; possibly punitive or retributive Instantaneous, as OppOSed to progressive Focalized, as opposed to diffuse Short, as opposed to prolonged Individual, as Opposed to mass destruc- tion Psychological, as opposed to physical Non-recurring, as opposed to intermit- tent or continuous 21Fritz, Nearman and Rubin, p. iii. 11 The variation of the assassination along these dimen- sions does not preclude its integration into the study of disaster. The assassination does seem to conform to Killian's definition of a disaster situation. As noted above, its deviation may be of heuristic value for the field. At least 'two students of the assassination have subsequently cast it vvithin the disaster framework.22 The assassination created an ambiguous, unstruc— tured situation that was outside normal experience Without exception the accounts revealed one or more of the classic responses to a threatened crisis, e.g., psychological evasion, irrational behavior, expressions of fear.23 (Seneral Systems Theory As an alternative to disaster research, Wilbur Schramm ssuggests that the assassination can be viewed more meaning- :fully from the perspective of general systems theory.2u Iiis rationale is as follows. Systems theory would describe the response to crisis as a sudden imbalance in the system, fol- lowed by emergency steps to restore balance, and then a gradual restoration of normal functioning 22Wi11iam H. Mindak and Gerald D. Hursh, "Television's Phinctions on the Assassination Weekend" in Greenberg and Parker, p. 130 . 23Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Ekihgyigr (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957), chapter 2 as quoted irl Ibid. 2L+For example, L. Bertalanffy, "General Systems Theory: At Critical Review," Yearbook of the Society for General _§é2§tems Research (1962), 7, 1:22; K.E. Boulding, The Image rgfiUun Arbor, Michigan, 1956); and Walter Buckley (Ed.), HOdern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist Cnilcago, Illinois: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968). 12 around whatever new balance is achieved. This comes closer to describing what seems to have happened in the case of the Kennedy assassina— tion. We can identify three periods. First came the time when the news had to be told. Then followed a period when society staggered under the blow but struggled to restore equi- librium - the shocked response of ordinary men and women, the shocked but disciplined re— sponse of officials striving to maintain law, order, and government. And finally came a period of social reintegration: the govern- ment closed ranks around a new chief, and the people overcame their shock, expiated their grief, and returned to old responsibilities in a new situation.25 It is hoped that this study and others with the assas— sination as their subject will be integrated into a larger theoretical scheme. It is not our purpose here to judge the relative merits of disaster research and general sys- tems theory for the heuristic incorporation of these stu— dies, but it does seem that as the ultimate objective of systems theory moves toward realization, it will incorporate the study of disaster, anyway. So, it appears that the al— ternatives will not prove viable in the long run. Reactions in the United States Successful and attempted assassination of the President is not a new phenomenon in the United States. In 1835, President Andrew Jackson was the intended victim of an assassin, but the gun misfired. The most famous preced- ing assassination to the current one was, of course, that 25Schramm, p. 7. 13 of Abraham Lincoln on April 1M, 1865. James A. Garfield was the next victim on July 2, 1881. Just after the turn of the century, on September 6, 1901, President William McKinley was assassinated. Eleven years later, an unsuc— cessful attempt was made on the life of Theodore Roosevelt. Americans had a twenty—one year reprieve until 1933, when bullets, whose target was President—elect Franklin Roosevelt, were deflected by a by—stander. Finally the most recent precedent was the attempt on President Harry Truman in 1950. The assassination of John F. Kennedy, too, is now a matter of history. Dispite the precedent, however, the loss of this young and vital man by violence was no less a shock to the current generation. Evidence analyzed thus far indicates that the assas- sination captured and retained the attention - and gripped the emotions — of a larger number of people, at a deeper level of awareness and affect, for a longer duration than any other singular event in the twentieth century; perhaps, in history. In these respects, the event seems to bear greater significance than "the beginning - or end — of World War II or the equally sudden death of Franklin D. Roosevelt."26 For these reasons and because the audience is now peopled with social scientists, this event and related ones will probably be the object of research for a long time to come. 26Waldo W. Burchard, "Reactions to the Assassination of President Kennedy - A Preliminary Report I," (Northern Illinois University), p. 1. 14 A group of social scientists met in Washington, D.C. the day after the assassination to organize and coordinate study 27 of the event. As of mid-April, 1964, scarcely five months after the assassination, at least thirty-three research projects were underway.28 Diffussion of the News Due to the ubiquity of the mass media, the bureaucra- tic settings in which most Americans interact and the time of day, the news of the assassination diffused at a very swift pace. In those studies measuring time elapsed between the assassination and first hearing of it, over two-thirds of the respondents heard about it within thirty munutes and over ninety per cent before an hour had passed.29 Three Systemic Stages During the initial stage of reaction, most Americans felt shock and disbelief.30 Most people turned to the mass media for confirmation. The majority of Americans then 27E. Langer, "Kennedy's Assassination: Study Organized by Social Scientists," Science, Vol. 142, No. 3598 (December, 1953), pp. 1146-7. 28Burchard, p. 2. 29Schramm, p. 15. 30Ibid., p. 16. 15 suspended their normal activities and moved into the se- cond stage: the emotional response that characterizes grief or a loved one. Included in this grief syndrome are phy- Ff; sical as well as psychological reactions.31 The third stage was one of reintegration in which Americans recovered and returned to their normal activities. The majority a- chieved this by the fourth day after the assassination.32 Demographic Differences Women consistently showed deeper, more emotional, vivid and dramatic reactions than men.33 The reactions of different age groups were not compared in these studies. All the studies consistently found an inverse relationship between social status and the i5- tensity of feelings and beliefs about the as— sassination. Working—class and, to some extent, middle—class respondents expressed more intense sadness and sorrow and more extreme Opinions than those with upper—class educations, incomes, or occupations. This relationship held for both the immediate responses and the responses a few weeks later, when most passions had some— what subsided. What those of higher status did was resort to cognitive rather than affective behavior.3” 31Sheatsley and Feldman, pp. 159-60. 32Sheatsley and Feldman, p. 160; Mindak and Hursh, p. IMO; and Charles M. Bonjean, Richard J. Hill and Harry W. Idartin, ”Reactions to the Assassination in Dallas" in (Breenberg and Parker, p. 185. 33Greenberg and Parker, "Social Research on the Kennedy f\ssassination" in Greenberg and Parker, p. 367. 3”Ibid., p. 371. 16 Level of education seemed to follow the same pattern as social status. The "civilizing effect” of education is posited as an explanation for these differences.35 Mass Media One indication of the unparalleled attention to the mass media is the amount of television viewing estimated by the A.C. Neilsen Co. for the period from November 22-25, 1963. Approximately 166 million Americans in over fifty— one million homes tuned in at some time and in one—sixth of these homes, the television set was on for eleven hours a day. The average viewing time was approximately eight 36 hours per day. According to some observers, television and the other media were largely responsible for the pre— vailing calm, lack of collective disorganization or violence, and the relative absence of fear and anxiety. Television provided a personal experience that the individual shared with the nation. The experiences of 150 million Americans before their television sets during the dark weekend, were a sharing of common information, a reas— sertion of national norms, and a national act of mourning, which must have been for many view- ers a catharsis of grief. When the experience 18 seen in this way, it is somewhat easier to 35James S. Coleman and Sidney Hollander, Jr., "Changes in Beliefs in the Weeks Following the Assassination" in Greenberg and Parker, p. 263. 36A.C. Neilsen Co., "T.V. Responses to the Death of the President" (New York, 1963). l7 understand why the experience was so largely grief rather than anxiety, why Americans closed the book on an anxiety over conspiracy more quickly than Europeans did, and why the recovery after the weekend of grief came so comparatively soon, came with elements of rededication and reintegration rather than divisiveness and disquiet. In a related observation, Sheatsley and Feldman report that the assassination "had practically no effect at all, even in the short run, on certain basic beliefs and values of the American people.”38 Table 1 shows their findings. TABLE 1: Effect of Assassination on Selected Basic Beliefs39 Before Assassination After Belief Date Z Agreeing, z Agreeing Feel strongly or very strongly about religious beliefs...............6/63 66 69 Most people can be trusted..............4/57 75 77 Communist Party members should be allowed to speak on the radio.........4/57 17 18 Death is like a long sleep..............1/63 55 59 Death is not tragic for the person who dies, only for the survivors......1/63 82 82 White students and Negro students should go to the same schools (Whites onlY)oo00.000000000000000.00006/63 63 62 37Schramm, p. 24. 38Sheatsley and Feldman, p. 17H. 391bid. , p. 175. 18 This table has important implications for the present study.' If there was no shift in basic American attitudes as a re- sult of the assassination and the subsequent murder of the accused assassin, might we expect any shift in another culture? Foreign Reaction In partial answer to the above question, Greenberg and Parker note that "speculative comparisons with Europe, which lacked our pervasive coverage, might suggest that the extensive television coverage during the weekend en- abled (the American) people to achieve 'cognitive closure'."”0 On the other hand, outside the United States, there was not the same intensive involvement throughout the four days that was experienced by nearly all Americans. There has also been a slower decline in publica— tions about Kennedy, in rumors, in suspicions that the facts are not known, and in a belief that Oswald either was not the killer or was the tool of a larger plot. A traveler outside the United States is quickly aware of a continued attention to Kennedy that is far greater than in the United States, of an unwillingness to close a book that Americans have firmly closed. It is unclear even which of the two phenomena requires explanation: the rapid decline in the attention paid by Ameri— cans, or the continued attention in other countries. Even without explanation, the difference reminds us of the different courses public opinion cap take and of our meager knowledge of its dynamics.u ”OGreenberg and Parker, p. 364. L*lColeman and Hollander, p. 268. 19 To repeat, it appears that the American public re- flected no change in basic attitudes as a result of the assassination. By definition, foreign nations constitute ”publics—at—a-distance" when attending to internal events in other nations. The distance, of course, varies among foreign publics and with the relative magnitude of the event. Consequently, it would appear to be a safe assump- tion that if American attitudes were not affected by this extraordinary event, the attitudes of other nations would also by unaffected. Apparently, however, this is not the case. In the United States, mass media coverage was contin— uous for four consecutive days following the assassination. The constant flow of information was comprehensive and perceived as reliable. The apparent effects of the cover— age and the concomitant attention were to allay anxieties; provide a mass, emotional catharsis and a high degree of ”cognitive closure;" and in large measure, contribute to the reintehration of the American social system. The re- action of the American public could be characterized as personal-emotional. The end of the television coverage on the fourth day seemed to coincide with the recovery of the American public and their adaptation to the new situa- tion. In their daily round of activities, few foreigners probably have occasion to think about the United States. 20 An extraordinary event such as the assassination, however, undoubtedly imposed the United States on the awareness and perceptions of most foreigners. This heightened awareness Ff) o the nation and things ”American” could affect the re- sponses of foreigners regarding the United States, its leaders and citizens. Other nations did not have as extensive mass media coverage of the event. Speculative accounts from other nations indicate that there was a strong personal—emotional reaction, but doubts about conspiracy, for instance, per- sisted long after they had died in the United States.”2 The volume of press coverage on Kennedy and the assassina— tion after the four days was greater in the foreign press. Apparently, people outside the United States did not achieve the same degree of "cognitive closure." Consequently, had any systematic research been conducted in Europe, for in— stance, there may have been a marked, albeit temporary, shift in attitudes toward America. It was partly on the basis of such as assumption that the present study was undertaken. Before we try to assess the Mexican reaction, let us look at Mexico. ”2Coleman and Hollander, p. 268; and Greenberg and Parker, p. 364. 21 Mexico, Mexicans, the United States and Kennedy A disaster occurring within one social system has con- sequences for that social system. Yet in this day of rapid diffusion and systemic interdependence, the consequences are likely to extend beyond national boundaries. Since the United States is a leading world power, its national lead- ,ers are thrust to the top of the international hierarchy; if a catastrophe should strike such a leader, repercus- sions naturally resound throughout the world. This was the case with the assassination of President Kennedy. The focus of this study is the reaction of the Mexican people. Although interaction between the two systems is continually increasing, the United States—Mexican border- line remains a cultural-dividing line. Socio-cultural variables make prediction of reactions in Mexico on the basis of reactions in the United States virtually impossible. In order to exploit this natural experiment in cross- 43 it was necessary to approach it from cultural attitudes, a sociological perspective. Form and Loomis have said, ”Studies of personality adjustment under stress, although important, must be analyzed within the broader social and \ \ “3Eugene Jacobson, Hideya Kumata and Jeanne Gullahorn, ”Cross-cultural Contributions to Attitude Research," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Summer, 1960), p. 223. 22 cultural contexts of life."LW In another source, Loomis says that ”. . . if modern industrial societies are con- sidered sensate or Geselleschaft—like, many more primitive societies of more Gemeinschaft-like or ideational cultures may react differently to disaster."”5 The Mexican society is, indeed, more Gemeinschaft-like and ideational than United States society. Mexico is con— sidered an underdeveloped nation, albeit all indexes of development seem to indicate that she is developing rapidly. , The political Revolution spanned two decades and 5 ended in 1930. Since then, Mexico has been in the throes of an economic revolution that has gained increasing momentum, and is now focussing on agrarian reform and industrial ex- pansion.”6 As these changes are effected, social benefits accrue. Since 1930, the gross national product has in- creased five times; per capita income has more than doubled; one hundred million acres of land have been distributed; agricultural production has increased fourfold. The mortal- ity rate has been cut in half. The literacy rate has doubled to 60% of the population.“7 LMWilliam H. Form and Charles P. Loomis, 3: 21., "The Persistence and Emergence of Social and Cultural Systems in Disasters," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April, 1956), p. 185. usCharles P. Loomis, "Social Systems Under Stress — Disasters and Disruptions," p. 134. 48Edwin M. Martin, "The Economic Revolution in Mexico" Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 1278 (December 23, 1963), p. 960. ”71616. 23 For the most part, however, these statistics reflect only one of the ”two economies". One is advanced and the other is at subsistence level or below, a characteristic situation in the developing countries. Today, the per capita income is $330 and approximately half the population received less than $100 annually. The rural population com- prises fifty per cent of the total, yet it produces only twenty per cent of the national wealth. The reciprocal of the figure cited above: forty per cent (conservative es- timate) cannot read. Finally, the pOpulation growth rate of three per cent adds one million individuals annually and necessitates the creation of 350,000 new jobs annual- 1y.L“8 "Mexico is moving toward the Gesellschaft—type of society and . . . strains accompany this process of change.”9 Much of Mexico's success can undeniably be attributed to its contiguity to and interaction with the United States. In his book published just months prior to the assassination, Howard F. Cline described the status of interaction between the United States and Mexico. Mexico and the United States are interacting more vigorously, more extensively, and more intensely, than at any earlier time. But unlike some pre- vious epochs, contacts are friendly, cordial, and largely routine . . . A distillation from ”8Martin, p. 961. L+9Charles P. Loomis, Zona K. Loomis and Jeanne E. Gullahorn, Linkages of Mexico and the United States, (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1966) Research Bulletin 14, p. 54. 24 experience has firmly established the working conclusion (accepted by both countries): the only viable long-term basis for living together is partnership, based on mutual es— teem and reciprocal confidence. He continues: Contacts between the republics . . . have mul— tiplied. Probably more Americans know Mexico than any other foreign land. Across countless conference tables, in numerous joint enter— prises, and in informal, popular interchanges among businessmen, students, and just plain citizens. The deep reservoir of good will that has been thus accumulated displaces many of the hidden resentments which formerly poked above the surface to founder the unwary. In order to measure the amount of and desire for ”syste- 'mic linkage” between Mexicans and Americans, the Loomis study from which the data for this study were taken measured the amount of interaction between citizens of the respective sys- tems and their attitudes toward cooperation with citizens of the other system.51 Some pertinent observations on interaction between the two systems follow. The income which Mexico receives via tourist dollars and bracero labor from the United States has been crucial for her stability and growth. The number of Mexicans who desire to become and eventually do become 50Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico, revised and enlarged edition, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 432. 51The theoretical base for the Loomis study is expounded in: Charles P. Loomis, Social Systems: Essays 93 Their Persistence and Change (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1960). 25 naturalized American citizens has always been relatively large.52 About eight per cent of Mexicans Speak English and about hree per cent of Americans speak Spanish. Be- tween ten and seventeen per cent of Mexicans attend to ra- dio or television broadcasts originating in the United States. Sixteen per cent of Mexican respondents reported having American friends and nineteen per cent of Americans have Mexican friends.53 The Loomis study indicated that nearly one—quarter of the population of the United States and the same proportion of the urban Mexican population had visited across the national border.54 In spite of these behavioral linkages, however, Mexican culture has maintained a unique identity which blends the assimilated cultures of its origin: Latin and American Indian. The consequent "national character: complicates the problem of prediction of reaction. Cline asserts: The important traits of the Mexican character, as judged by themselves and foreigners over the years, include a number of favorable sides, as well as some that evoke strong criticism. Both are 'Mexican.‘ Perhaps a noteworthy primary fact is that on a great number of matters Mexi- cans are ambivalent; they show two faces, and have at the same time two opposed views. No one is certain why this occurs, but it is a basic and bewildering fact. 52Loomis, 3: 31., Linkages 9: Mexico and the United States, pp. 4 6 5. 53Ibid., pp. 13—15. 5U’Loomis, et al., Linkages . . . , p. 74. 26 The following instances are illustrative of this "fact": Running in parallel channels to gaiety, humor, and wit is a deep morbid strain. This sadness or tristeza is attributable to both European and Indian backgrounds and manifests itself in innumerable facets of Mexican life. Melancholia underlies song and story. Death is not feared; it is a constant companion whose presence is taken as natural rather than shocking. The co— existence of melancholia and optimism seems us- a likely, but . . . connected in obscure ways to ; pessimism and submission is a pattern of violence and relative indifference to personal suffering and cruelty to humans and animals. Callousness and violence are as much a part of the Mexican heritage as the strong Mexican emphasis on human- itarianism and an easy—going tolerance of indi- vidual and group diversity.55 One finding that emerged from the Loomis study contradicts Cline's last assertion. Using the Bogardus Social Distance Scale, Loomis found that . . . Mexicans manifest a surprising amount of preju- dice, particularly toward Protestants, Negroes, Jews and Indians, especially those Indians who do not speak Spanish. The rather high prejudice manifested toward ”whites" appears to be respon— ses of Mexicans who take pride in brown or ”In— dian" color, a characteristic of considerable value, for example, in running for political of- fice in Mexico. The greater prejudice in Mexico than in the United States, particularly for such status-roles as fellow citizens or fellow workers, was unexpected by the investigators associated with the study. However, these facts concerning the relatively high amount of prejudice manifest by the Mexicans as compared with citizens of the United States need to be set against another con- sideration. The extent of prejudice of Mexicans as compared with that of North Americans is con- siderably more closely related to educational 55Cline, pp. 60-62. 27 attainment — the higher the education the less the tendency to reject others who are different.56 Such findings which are contrary to expectation illustrate he power of scientific survey research to dispel "common— sense” generalizations which, by virtue of their wide— spread acceptance, may be paid lip service, even by experts. H These generalizations can and should be utilized as the 3 basis for hypotheses to be tested. Figure II shows some further hypotheses which Loomis and his associates tested in the first phase of the Five a Nation Study.57 56Loomis, gt al., Linkages . . . , p. 74. For a fuller explanation of these findings, see: Jeanne E. Gullahorn and Charles P. Loomis, "A Comparison of Social Distance ttltudes in the United States and Mexico," Social Science Institute, 1966. b7Loomis, et al., Linkages . . . . 28 FIGURE II: Phase I, Five-Nation Study; Selected Hypotheses Comparing Mexico and the United States, 1963 The data confirm that Mexicans: Are linked to systems different from those in which they tradi- tionally interact less... (pp. 64-5) Engage in religious activity and evaluate religious organizations more highly... (pp. 55-8) Are more territorially immobile and anticipate moving less... (131% 61-2) '1 Are less oriented toward the future... (p. 62) Z Manifest less trust in people, generally... (pp. 64-5) Accept social welfare programs which may increase the power of the government more readily than... (pp. 65-6) Believe their lives will change more in the near future... (pp- 69-72) ., Evaluate particularism in office less negatively... (PP. 72-3) g Desire more c00peration and closer ties with the United States... (pp- 28-9) ...than Americans. The data offer little or no support to indicate that Mexicans: Interact more within the family and evaluate the family as more important... (pp. 58-61) Derive social rank more from ascription and less from achieve- ment... (pp. 63-4) Evaluate change less favorable... (p. 72) Are more frustrated in the face of rapid change... (PP. 68-9) ...than Americans. Behavior contacts and friendships with citizens of the other country; level of education; and size of the place of resi— dence were all positively correlated with both behavioral and desired linkage with the other social system.58 581bid., p. 75. 29 Mexican Reaction President Kennedy apparently liked the Mexican people and they reciprocated. He and his new wife honeymooned in Mexico. As he prOposed and eventually established the self-help Alliance for Progress for Latin America, he had Mexico in mind as a model. During his state visit to '-*r“r'—;n Mexico in the year before the assassination, President and Mrs. Kennedy received a welcome that was unprecented except by Madero riding down the same streets in 1911.59 1 There can be little doubt that Mexicans, in general, S were aware of and identified with, President Kennedy to a greater extent than any previous American leader. His charismatic qualities, to which people all over the world responded, were enhanced for Mexicans by his religion. His high regard for Mexico was readily apparent on his visits there. His interest in Latin America, in general, was expressed in his foreign policy priorities. Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, bore none of the charismatic qualities, was Protestant and a Southerner from a state which remembers the Alamo with pride. To the extent that Mexicans were aware Of these factors and synthesized them, it is conceivable that their attitudes might be affected. It is highly doubtful, however, whether most Mexicans met either condition. 59Cline, p. 429. 30 Due to the relative limitation on the use of the mass media and the relatively high rate of illiteracy extant in Mexico, the major mode of diffusion of the news was proba- bly by word of mouth. Despite these limitations, however, it will be assumed that the news diffused to the urban population with which we are dealing at much the same rate as in the United States. It will be assumed further, for the purposes of this study, that virtually all subjects interviewed on or after November 23, 1963, were aware of the assassination.60 Partly as a result of its long—standing interaction with American society, Mexican society is in a period of rapid social change, moving toward a more Gesellschaft— like system. Mexicans are stereotyped, with some validity, as having an emotionally volatile, ”Latin temperament" as a component of their national character. These condi— tions make it difficult to prejict the reaction of Mexi- cans to the assassination. A correspondent for an American newsmagazine filed the following report of his impressions of the reaction in Mexico City. 60In survey research, it is a rule of thumb that 10 to 20 per cent of a national sample constitutes a hard core of "know-nothings." In the United States, five and a half hours after the President was shot, only 0.2% had not heard the news. By the morning of the 233g most urban Mexicans had probably heard the news. 31 Mexicans are stunned. You hear people talking in horrified tones about the assassination and the fact that it could happen in the United States, which Mexicans look to as a model of law and order . . . Sympathy and friendship here for Mr. Kennedy were heightened by his re— ligion in this almost completely Catholic coun- try, by .is overwhelmingly successful visit to Mexico with Mrs. Kennedy last year and by his action in returning the disputed Chamizal area of El Paso to Mexico after a 100—year dispute. Mexicans, it is clear from the reactions to his death, felt a personal identification with Mr. Kennedy. They believed he honestly worked for peace . . . Mexicans are also concerned. They considered Mr. Kennedy 'a great friend' and the most revolutionary President the United States ever had.61 61Anon, "Foreign Countries, Too, Mourn 'First Citizen' of the World!,” U.§. News and World Report, Vol. 55 (December 2, 1963), pp. 48—9. ‘AA ~411¥ ...h .~IU ~— AA .1 a. J; r1 IL :1 Av ab . C CHAPTER II THE STUDY DESIGN The data for this study were taken from the first phase of the Loomis Five Nation Study to which reference was made EL _in the first chapter. This phase involved the United States and Mexico. The present study will use data from the sample drawn to represent urban Mexico. J The urban Mexican sample was a stratified random sample of the people in urban areas of Mexico, aged twenty-one or older. The findings are based on 1,126 personal interviews. The sample constitutes a close approximation to the adult population of Mexico living in areas of 2,500 or more. The fieldwork began on November 2, 1963 and was finished on December 20, 1963. President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. By that evening, twenty—one days had elapsed since the beginning and interviews had been conduc— ted for 496 respondents, or forty-four per cent of the sam- ple. In the remaining twenty—eight days subsequent to the 222d, the remaining 630 respondents, or fifty-six per cent of the total, were interviewed. In this study, the pre— assassination subsample will be used as the "control group;” 32 33 the assassination as the "experimental variable;" and the post-assassination subsample as the "experimental group." Thus, the analysis will attempt to impose experimental conditions on a fortuitous situation and determine whether and, to what extent, the assassination affected the attitudes of urban Mexicans. The study is actually an 3i post facto "nonexperiment" which approximates a "before-after study with interchangeable groups." In this type of study, two samples are selected in such a way that they represent the same population, i.e., they are matched to make them as near identical as possible with regard to population character- istics. One group, the "control group," is measured with- out exposure to the experimental variable and the other group, the "experimental group," is measured after expov sure to the experimental condition. It is a basic variation on the classical before—after experimental design with one control group. The derivation of the former from the latter experimental design is shown in Figure III. The whole figure represents the classical design, but the solid lines represent the parts employed in the design using inter- changeable groups. 34 FIGURE III: The Before-After Study with Interchangeable Groups as a Variation on the Classical Before-After Study with One Control Group Experimental Before Condition After I F"‘ Y Experimental 1 1 ————— X—--—-—-—+~ group L. _ _J- I ‘ Y Y Y 2 l X Control ———————— +i- -! group L. ._ .J l l Y1 Y2 The difference between the before measure taken on the first group (Yl') and the after measure (Y2) is assumed to be due to the effects of the experimental condition (X). In this study, ” 1'" is the before—assassination subsample, "X" is the assassination and "Y2" is the after subsample. There are a number of reasons why this study, although cast in an experimental frame, cannot be considered an " ex- periment", in the formal sense. It was not conceived and designed in advance; it is ex post facto. The urban Mexican sample was independently and randomly drawn and representative of urban Mexico; the subsamples do not necessarily have these properties partially because of the fortuitous introduction of the experimental condition, the assassination. Further— more, there is no way to determine whether the respondents in the after subsample were, in fact, aware of the assassina- tion or the level of their knowledge of the assassination and subsequent events; the schedule was designed for other purposes and was not altered in order to access and assess .C the possible e fects ol the assassination. These problems, which inhere in this type of study, are formidable but it is best to delineate them before the analysis is made. The Sample62 The urban Mexico sample was designed and interviewed by the International Research Associates, S.A. de C.V. of Mexico City. The interview schedule, which was thoroughly pretested, was lengthy, taking some two hours to administer by trained interviewers. The sample design employed in this study was a new sample, designed during 1963, and using the latest census figures as provided in preliminary form by the Mexi— can census bureau. This universe was divided into four urbanization strata, in accordance with data from the census. The number of in- terviews assigned to each stratum was in the same proportion as that of the actual population, but each stratum was sampled separately in order to prevent random variation from affecting this proportionality. The cities were arranged geographically into six regions, reflecting broadly the major ethnic and cultural groupings that exist regionally in Mexico. A minimum of one city in 62This section adapted from: International Research Associates S.A. de C.V., "An Attitude Survey in Mexico in 1963: A Description of Sampling Performances," (March, 1964). 36 each stratum was selected for each of the six zones in which cities of these different populations existed. Within the broad geographic arrangement, the balance of the cities was selected by systematic sampling techniques, beginning frOm a random start. In both the selection of the minimum of one city per stratum per zone, and in the subsequent selection of the balance required, a probability of inclusion propor- tionate to population was accorded to each city. Within each city selected by these methods, a sample of blocks was chosen. These blocks served as second stage sampling units. In order to select households within the sample blocks, a complete list of households on each of the blocks chosen for the city was complied. The precise num— ber of interviews assigned to each block was calculated by multiplying the total number of interviews for the city by the ratio which households on a given block bore to the to- tal number of households on all sample blocks for the city. In each group of blocks in the sample the specific house- holds interviewed were chosen in the same manner in which the blocks were selected. A weighting procedure was carried out in order to re- duce the bias from sampling mortality. Five call—backs were made in half of the total sample, and one call—back in the other half. It is generally accepted that those persons who are more difficult to reach, and who are interviewed after 37 re eated call—backs, are more nearly similar to those peOple *0 who are never located at all, than are those who are found easily. Thus those persons who were found and interviewed only on the second or later call-back were accorded a weight in tabulation sufficient to compensate for the entire mor- tality of the sample. Upon inspection, it was found that this procedure, as .(expected, had significantly increased the percentage of mapper class and male respondents in the sample. These two Egroups are traditionally the most difficult to interview, sand are the principal sources of bias. The proportions of Inen and of upper class respondents, as they appear in the .final deck used in tabulation, resemble closely the actual 13ercentages of persons of these characteristics in the {DOpulation. The Variables It has been pointed out that the urban Mexican sample vvas divided into two subsamples by the date of interview Irelative to the date of the assassination which is used as 'the "experimental condition” for our purposes. Those re- ESpondents interviewed on or before November 22, 1963 were (Zombined to form the "before subsample," or "control group,” le 496 respondents. Those interviewed after that date com— IPI?ise the "after subsample," or "experimental group," of 83O respondents. The same question schedule was administered 38 to 11 respondents. From this schedule, forty—one attitu- {u dinal items were selected as the dependent variables in the analysis. In an effort to isolate the effect of the experi- mental variable, five dependent, sociological variables were selected. Figure IV provides a schematic representation of the variables employed and their analytic inter—relation- ships. FIGURE IV: The Variables Experimental Variable: Date of Interview ‘7 Before After n=496 n=630 Subsamples: H 44% 56% ( Control ("Experi- group”) mental group”) I Tests for Difference 7 1r Forty—one Tests Five Variables: Attitudinal h+———————for- >: Sociological (dependent) Relationship (independent) Date of interview was used to distinguish the before and a ter subsamples; The set of five sociological variables includes: sex, age, level of education completed, head of household occupation and size of place of residence. These variables will be used to determine the interchangeability Of the subsample. 39 The forty—one attitudinal items selected for this ana- lysis seek to measure a wide range of attitudes. They are of two kinds. Thirty-eight of the forty—one are of the Linkert-type, where the respondent is asked to indicate the extent of his agreement with the statement, ranging on a five—point scale from "strongly agree” to "slightly agree" ”a through "don't know", refusal or other response to "slightly disagree" and "strongly disagree”.63 The other three items employ a ten—point semantic differential scale, ranging from i highest, pos1t1ve to lowest, negative evaluations.“L L “A 63Sellitz, 3: el-: pp. 366-9. 6”Ibid., pp. 380—3. CHAPTER III ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The problem of this study, as stated in the first chapter, is to determine whether the assassination affected urban Mexican attitudes and, if so, to describe the nature and extent of the effect. Due to: the insufficiency of relevant theoretical and methodological precedent for this type of problem; the inherent problems specified in the study design; and the nature of the data, it was considered ina,propriate to test formal hypotheses. Rather, the ob- ject of this analysis will be to answer questions derived from the problem statement. QUESTION 1: Is there a difference in attitudes as measured before and after the assassination? In order to answer this question, forty—one items which tap a broad range of attitudes were selected from the schedule and categorized, on the basis of related item content, into fourteen clusters, each containing from one to seven items. The item clusters focus on the degree of ali— enation, authoritarianism, autonomy, compartimentalization-- internalization, religious orthodoxy and fanaticism and the respondents' attitudes toward birth control, foreign linkages, 4O 41 W tne r r, uture, property rights, social change, socialism and social status. Comparison of the collective responses of the before and after subsamples seems to indicate that the answer to Question 1 is negative, with qualification. Sixteen of the forty—one items reflect differences, significant at the five per cent or greater level, from before to after. With forty- one items, some of these differences may be attributable to chance. Examination of item content revealed no meaningful pattern of response to explain the differences, with one noteworthy exception. As Table 2 indicates, there is no apparent relationship among the significantly different responses as measured be— fore and after the assassination, except for the last five items, all of which concern attitudes toward the United States. These five items are all significant at greater than the one per cent level and the mean shift in response for all five is in the positive direction, whereas the dif— ference in response to some of the preceding eleven items are relatively more likely to have occurred by chance and some of them reflect negative mean shifts. 42 TABLE 2: Significantly Different Attitudinal Items, Before to After, p‘(.05* X2 & Direction Sig. of Item and (Item Designation) Level Mean Shift Real friends are as easy as ever to find. (1-2) 19.08 .01 People can be trusted.(I-7) 15.10 .01 Whatever we do, it is necessary that our leaders outline carefully what is to be done and exactly how to do it.(II—Z) 10.85 .05 We should be as helpful to people we don't know as we are to our friends.(III-l) 12.20 .05 Married couples should practice birth con— trol.(IV) 17.06 .01 Political beliefs should have nothing to do with a person's work.(V—l) 17.07 .01 New methods of raising children should al— ways be tried out.(XI—l) 15.21 .01 I like the kind of work that lets me do things about the same way from one week to the next.(XI—3) 9.78 .05 I would be willing to have decay-preven- tive chemicals added to water.(XII-l) 15.17 .01 Political leaders should be changed regu- larly, even if they are doing a good job.(XII-2) 12.25 .05 The only way to provide good medical care for all the people is through some pro- gram of governmental health insurance. (XII-5) 13.65 .01 Our leaders should be working more with the leaders of the U.S.A.(XIV-l) 31.16 .01 Our country should have closer connections and ties with the U.S.A. than we now have.(XIV-Z) 19.80 .01 On which step would you place the United States right ppg_as to strong and weak? (XIV-3) 19.50 .01 Where would you place the United States right ppy_as to good and bad?(XIV—4) 24.81 .01 On which step would you place yourself in terms of how friendly you feel toward the American pe0p1e?(XIV-5) 19.67 .01 *For complete listing of forty-one attitudinal items, see Appendix. 43 TABLE 3: Significant vs. Non—significant Differences in Forty-one Attitudinal Items, Before to After* EEEEE. Significant Not Significant Tpggl Non-U.S. 11 25 36 U.S. 5 0 5 Total 16 25 41 *With Yate's correction. As might be expected, the Chi-square of 6.22 is highly significant, approaching the .01 level. So, the gross com— parison of attitude responses, before with after, seems to indicate that there is little difference generally in atti- ‘tudes as expressed by urban Mexicans interviewed before and after the assassination and no discernible relationship or consistent direction of response among the eleven significantly different non—U.S. items. The responses to the items measur- ing attitudes toward the United States, however, were all Significantly different at a very high level and the shift -.in response from before to after were consistently in the gbositive direction. These findings suggest that, generally, ‘there was little change in urban Mexican attitudes, but, £Specifically, with regard to the United States, attitudes did Cfliange. This brings us to the next question. (QUESTION 2: To what extent can the differences in attitude be érttributed to the Kennedy assassination? The primary objective of this analysis is to determine t11e effect, if any, of the Kennedy assassination on the re- Sponses of urban Mexicans interviewed after the assassination. Ideally in order to isolate the possible effect of the as— nation, the experimental variable, the before and after H- sass subsamples should represent the same population, i. e., the subsamples should not differ significantly. Five sociologi- cal variables were employed to determine the degree of devia- tion from the ideal; sex, age, education, head of household occupation and size of place of residence distributions for the respective subsamples were compared to determine the sub—samples' interchangeability. Tables 4 through 8 show the distributions of subsamples, which were tested for signi- ficance of difference by the Chi—square test. TABLE 4: Sex of Respondent, by Z Before Assassination .AEEEE Male 34.16 43.17 Female 65.84 56.83 Total 100.00 100.00 (n = 496) (n = 630) The sex distributions of the subsamples were significant- ly different at the .01 level. Both subsamples had higher proportions of women, but the after subsample included a sig- nificantly smaller proportion of women. 45 TABLE 5: Age of Respondent, by Z Years Before ggtgg 21—29 29.70 24.60 30-39 27.47 27.46 40-49 20.40 19.21 50-59 11.72 13.17 60 & above 10.71 15.56 Total 100.00 100.00 The Chi-square test reflected no difference in the age distributions of the two subsamples. TABLE 6: Education of Respondent, by Z Egg£§_ Before A££§£_ 0 16.57 25.71 1 - 4 38.79 42.06 5 - 8 35.15 23.65 9 & above 9.49 .8.58 Total 100.00 100.00 The ”0” and ”5-8” year categories made large contribu— tions to the Chi—square statistic which was significant at the one per cent level. TABLE 7: Occupation of the Head of the Household, by Z Category Before After White Collar (mgrs., employees, etc.) 8.69 7.62 Service, blue collar and farm workers 46.87 47.14 Not in Labor Force 44.44 45.24 Total 100.00 100.00 46 No significant differences obtained in the respective occupational distributions. TABLE 8: Size of Place of Residence, by Z Population Before §££g£_ 2,500-24,999 29.70 18.73 25,000-99,999 7.88 12.22 Fil 100,000-499,999 49.90 17.62 '1 500,000 & over 12.52 51.43 j Total 100.00 100.00 a. _v” The size of the respondents' places of residence in the be— fore and after subsamples was significantly different above the .01 level. Tables 4 through 8 indicate that there is considerable variation between the respondents interviewed before and after the assassination along three of the five sociological variables selected for this analysis. In comparing the after subsample with the before, we find that it had relative— ly fewer women, lower education and more urbanization. The differences between the ages and head of household occupation were no greater than might have been expected to occur by chance. On the basis of these findings, the interchangeabil— ity of the subsamples remains in doubt. The sociological variables and the differences they re— flect between the subsamples are only important to this ana— lysis to the extent that they are related to, or associated with, the attitudinal items. It may well be that the depen- dence of the so-called "dependent variables" on the 47 ”independent”, sociological variables may be more variable in Other, less highly differentiated cultures. In other words, although the subsamples could possibly represent different populations as described by standard sociological measures, both populations might express similar attitudes in spite of the population differences. The differences amon '3’ CD the sociological variables may not bear consequences as grave for a Mexican study as they do for a study of Ameri— can attitudes. This appears to be the case in the present study. In an effort to clarify the dependence issue, both sub- samples were stratified along the sociological variables and each respective stratum in one subsample was compared with the corresponding stratum in the other, e.g., the responses of males in the before subsample were compared with those in the after subsample for each attitudinal item and the cell's Chi—square was computed to test for difference in response. In addition, the mean response for each item was examined for direction of difference, if a difference was found. The results of this analysis appear in Table 9. In the table a positive sign (”+") indicates a Chi—square significant at l,hL3 J;iv(: p«:P (JUILL ()1: grwgalxzr‘ J(:v«:l .nlul .1 lLllecr' Huldll lXJr that after subsample as compared to the before subsample. Like- wise, a negative sign (”—") indicates a significant difference between the response of the respective strata of the before and after subsamples to each item and a negative shift from 48 the before to after mean response for that item. The absence of any sign indicates that there was no significant difference beyond what might have been expected to occur by chance. The data presented in the right-hand column, ”Item" significance and direction, represents that given in Table 2. 49 TABLE 9: Before—After Comparison of Stratified Sociological Variables by Attitudinal Items: Significance of Difference, p <.05, and Direction of Mean Shift in Response Sociological Variables* Attitudinal Sex A e Education Occupa— Residence Item Items tion Measuring Degree of.. Or Expressed about... Alienation(l)l A 00 Female Male 21—29 30-39 40—49 50-59 60+ 5-8 SOOOOO+ 0 +" 1-4 +9+ . 2500— ' 25000- + + + Blue White ' + ' 100000— l—‘\IO\U1-£\LAJN Authorita- rianism(II)2 + + - 3 + Autonomy(III)1 — - - 2 Brth Cnt1(IV) - - - — - Compart.— l + + + + + + + Intern.(V)2 - + - Foreign l Linkages(VI)2 + + Future(VII) + Property 1 + + Rights(VIII)2 Religious Fa—l + naticism (IX)2 Religious 1 Orthodoxy(x)2 3 4 _ _ k, 5 Self and l Change(XI)2 - + 3 — + + Socialism 1 — — + - . _ mm + + + 3 + 4 5 Status(XIII) + + United States(XIV) + + + + + + + + + + LII-PDJNJ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + *Sex, Education and Size of Place of Residence were significantly different at the .01 level; Age and Head of Household Occupation were not significant- ly different for the two subsamples. 53 This table provides additional support for observations made earlier. The differences in the response patterns be— tween the non—U.S. items and those measuring attitudes to— ward the United States are readily discernible in terms of the relative number of significant differences and their direction. A tentative evaluation of Table 3 indicated this difference regarding the comparison of the gross responses and implied that attitudes changed in a consistently posi- tive direction with regard to the United States. There are 738 stratum—by—attitude cells in Table 9. 111 (15.0%) reflect significant differences: seventy-two non-U.S. out of 648 (11.1%) and thirty-nine U.S. out of ninety (43.3%). Table 10 provides the relative distribu— tions with regard to significance. TABLE 10: Stratified Significant/Not Significant Differences by Non-U.S./United States Attitudes Significant Not Significant Total Non-U.S. 72 576 648 United States 39 51 90 Total 111 627 738 The Chi-square of 61.71, significant at the .01 level, indi- cates that there is a significantly larger proportion of differences along the sociological strata with regard to at- titudes toward the United States vis—a—vis other attitudes than was probable by chance. 51 mg}, . . . g . g. . . lQJle 9 also spec1f1ed the direction of cnange in mean response for each Significant difference. Table 11 summarizes fl " +—- 7 +' {:4— ~.° a - ‘ tne tabulation oi this measure, wnen the non-U.S. and U.S. U) L H, shi are compared. TABLE 11: Direction of Mean Change for Significant Differences, Before to After, by Non-U.S./United States Attitudes Positive(+) Negative(-) Total Non-U.S. 38 34 72 United States 39 O 39 Total 77 34 111 The Chi-square, corrected for Yate's, is 24.37 which is sig— 7“ 11.; icant at the .01 level. The fact that all of the statis- Ff) tically different cell means for attitudes toward the United States were higher after the assassination, whereas the shifts in means for the other items were about equally positive an‘ negative, provides further justification for looking at these groupings separately. Furthermore, examination of the whole configuration of he incidence of the differences in Table 9 reveals quite dif- Ff ferent patterns for the two groupings. Horizontally, across the sociological variables, only three of the non—U.S. atti— tudinal items have at least one entry under every variable; all of the U.S. items meet this criterion. Vertically, there seems to be a common tendency for change along strata in both groupings, i.e., those strata which reflect differences in the non-U.S. items also tend to differ on the United States 52 items, although the association between the strata and non- U U.S. .ttitudes does not appear to be as strong as it is with ( attitudes toward the United States. Although these findings are not conclusive, they do suggest strongly that the atti- tudes measured before and after the assassination were es- sentially the same or, at least, there was no discernible differential pat ern of response, except for attitudes con— cerning the United States. So, it seems that the assassina— tion did affect urban Mexican attitudes. Given the nature of the data and the mode of analysis employed, however, it is impossible to determine the precise contribution of the assassination to the change in attitudes toward the United tates. Discussion and Conclusion In summary, we have conducted a "natural" experiment, i.e., exploited a fortuitous event occurring in one social system as an experimental condition to measure its potential effect on an attitude survey midway through the data collec- tion process in the field in another social system. There is little precedent for this type of study within one social system, let alone across socio—cultural lines, despite gen- eral recognition of the effect of outside, uncontrolled events on the survey research process as a significant source of problems of validity. In this case, the assassination of President Kennedy was an extraordinary event and the survey was being conducted in urban Mexico. The pragmatic question 53 arose regarding the possible consequences of the assassina— tion for the larger study. To answer this question was the primary objective of the present analysis. Perhaps the findings of this and other studies related to deaths of significant persons will be incorporated in a larger context. Two existing bodies of knowledge seem appro— priate: the field of disaster research and general systems theory. Given the nature of the data and the cross—cultural setting of the present study and the state of these larger matrices within which this study may eventually be meaning— fully integrated, it was not possible to draw formal hypotheses predicting the effect of the assassination on the population of urban Mexico. Rather, two basic, descriptive questions were addressed to the data. Before we discuss these questions, however, let us review factors relevant to the Mexican reaction. One of the salient findings to emerge from studies of the American public was that basic American attitudes were un— affected by the assassination, in spite of the general person- al disorientation and deep, emotional response which character- ized the post-assassination period. Observation of foreign publics revealed that they did not achieve as high a degree of cognitive closure regarding the assassination as the American public. Mexico, in addition to being subject to this general— ization, lies contiguous to the United States and is highly dependent on it. There is a high amount of intercultural in- teraction, although cultural boundaries are maintained. Mexico 54 is relatively the more underdeveloped and homogeneous and less highly differentiated of the two societies and, viewed stereotypically, a ”peasant society” with a subsistence economy and characterized by a "volatile, Latin Termperament"; a "banana republic” manifesting, to varying degrees, the im- plications of this epithet. Mexico is also, nominally, a Roman Catholic society; John Kennedy was a Roman Catholic. This fact, his charismatic personality and championship of Latin American progress were probably all important contri- buting factors to his popularity in Mexico —- his photograph .is still prominently displayed in small shops in rural and urban Mexico. The net result of these observations for this study is the practical impossibility of predicting, or even hypothesizing, the outcome of this analysis.~ In the analysis, the before - and after - assassination subsamples were compared in an effort to answer two focal questions: 1) Is there a difference in attitudes as measured before and after the assassination? and 2) To what extent can' the differences in attitude be attributed to the Kennedy as— sassination? An overall comparison of the attitudinal items indicated that there was little difference in the attitudes of the subsamples, except for their respective attitudes to- ward the United States. The evidence for this finding was strengthened by the stratification and subsequent partial— ling of the sociological variables with the attitudinal items. The differences in attitudes toward the United States, as 55 contrasted with the other attitudinal items, were consistentv ly and highly statistically significant; consistent across sociological strata and uniformly positive. Although it is impossible to isolate and determine the exact contribution the assassination to these differences, due to the pos- Ft, 0 sible contamination of pOpulation differences in the two groupings, it seems clear from the pattern and nature of the differences that the assassination did affect the atti- tudes toward America held by certain segments of the urban Mexican public. The strata which reflected statistically significant differences consistently across the five attitu- dinal items were: females; respondents aged 30—39 years; those with no education; those not in the labor force and blue collar workers; and those living in cities of 100,000 or more. The general American reaction, as we have seen, was deep, but variable among population strata. The studies of the American response were designed specifically to elicit and describe that response; we have discussed the shortcom- ings of the present study in this regard. The statements