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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

3
MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
01' PERISHABLE SUBSISTENGE

; presented by

W J. mm: '
has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

CURRICULUM IN FOOD DISTRIBUTION v

'Q’“ ; 

Majorrprofessor

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MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION
or PEBISHABLE SUBSISTENCE

By
Bradley J. Radike

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree or

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of General Business
Curriculum in Food Distribution
1955 ‘\ t

Thesis

(D’j

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his thanks and sincere
appreciation to Dr. Kenneth Wilson, Director of the
Division of Business, and Dr. Edward A. Brand, Director
of Curriculum in Food Distribution. for their interest
and guidance in the preparation.of this thesis.

Grateful acknowledgment is also due the officer
and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces who gave so
freely of their time and effort to assist the author in
gathering information.for this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

mpose O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 0
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. PERISHABLE SUBSISTENCE AND THE SUBSISTENCE
SUPPLY SYSTEM PRIOR TO THE MARKET CENTER
SYSTEM 0 I O 0 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O

Perishable Subsistence . . . . . . . . .

The Subsistence Supply System . . . .

III. THE QUARTERMASTER MARKET CENTER

Fresh Fruits and vegetables ; ;

Expansion of Procurement

Dairy Products and Poultry

Meat

waterfoods

Further Expansion of Procurement

0

O

O

O 0

Frozen Fruits and Vegetables

Milk

SYSTEM

Coordination of menu Planning and
Procurement .

Training Problems at Installation
and Opposition to the Program . . . . .

InSpection Service for the Market Center

System

0

Level

0 O

16
28
28
32
32
52
34
56
36
37

4O

43

46

Chapter

V.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Procurement for Other Agencies . . . . . .

Navy . . . . . . . . . . .
Marine Corps . . . . . . .
Air Corps . . . . . . . .

Other Agencies . . . . . .
The National Security Act of

Size and Scope of the Market

1947 . . . .

Center System

Advantages of the Market Center System . .
IV. ADMINISTRATION PROCUREMENT METHODS . . . . .

SWY O O O O O O O O O O O
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . .

Page
5O
51
52
52
55
55
55
56
59
66
75

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to present a picture of
a relatively new and unique concept of food procurement
and distribution as related to the Armed Forces of the
Uhited States of America. This concept began in 1941
with the establishment by the Army of the Quartermaster
Market Center System for the supply of perishable sub-
sistence to the members of the Army. The Market Center
System was a wartime measure designed to fill the needs
of millions of men for perishable foods in terms of the
right quality, quantity. time, and place. As such, it
replaced the peacetime policy of independent local pro-
curement by the individual installations, which was
incapable of meeting wartime requirements.

Formulation of this program represented a complete
departure from the traditional Government method of
subsistence procurement by formal advertising for
relatively small lots which was used up to that time
by the local installations of the Army. Uniqueness of
the concept lay in the idea of transferring to the

organizational and administrative structure of the Army
the fast, mass-buying techniques of the commercial chain
stores. whereby civilian marketing Specialists negotiated
directly with wholesale vendors or producers for the pro-
curement of perishables. From its inception, therefore.
the Quartermaster Market Center System possessed a dual
military-civilian setup that has remained an identifying

characteristic throughout its existence.

Sources

Sources of material for the thesis were varied.
Recourse was made to several publications relating to
procurement procedures and to service technical manuals
detailing procedures. Mimeographed material from the
Quartermaster Market Center System constituted the
remainder of the written source material. Several of
the publications were secured from the Superintendent
of Documents, Washington, D. C. Extensive use was also
made of the library facilities at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Interviews were secured from former officers of the
Market Center System, the Director of Supply for Headquarters
of the 10th Air Force and the Sales Officers at Fort Custer
and Selfridge Field, Michigan. In addition, the chief clerks
of commissary stores and the Purchasing and Contracting
Officers for commissary stores at these installations were

interviewed.

CHAPTER II

PERISHABLE SUBSISTENCE AND THE SUBSISTENCE SUPPLY SYSTEM
PRIOR TO THE MARKET CENTER SYSTEM
Perishable Subsistence

While the most important components of the American
Army ration have always been those two staples, bread and
meat. the use of vegetables and milk was authorized at the
beginning of the Continental Army. The first legislation
fixing the components of the Army rationl passed by Congress
on November 4, 1775. included 6.8 ounces of peas or vegetable
equivalent and 16 ounces of milk in addition to the staples:
16 ounces of beef or 12 ounces of pork, or 16 ounces of salt
fish and 16 ounces of bread or flour. Other items covered
by this action were one quart Spruce beer, 1.4 ounces of
rice. .1830 ounces soap, and .0686 ounces candle.2

On December 24, 1775, the ration established by Congress
was modified somewhat by a general order from Army Headquarters.

Corned beef and pork were recommended for four days of the

 

1Definition of Ration - the allowance of food for the
subsistence of one person for one day.

2Rationg. Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia,
January. 1949, p. 1.

week. salt fish for one day. and fresh beef for the
remaining two days. Since milk was not available during
the winter seasons, the men were to have 1% pounds of
beef or 18 ounces of pork. Besides the fresh beef, other
perishables added at this time were 6 ounces of butter

or 9 ounces of lard per week, and onions. potatoes, and
turnips, as the I'vegetable equivalent“ of the peas.3
These perishablecomponents of the ration remained
substantially unchanged during the entire war, though
the deficiencies of transport in the Continental Army
make it appear that they were seldom issued in the field.
After the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown on October
19, 1781, and the demobilization of the Continental Army
by Congress in 1783, the meat component was reduced in
the next year or two to one pound of beef or 12 ounces
of pork per man per day. and milk, butter, and fish
disappeared entirely from the ration.4

The virtual elimination of perishable subsistence
was to prevail generally in the American Army for more

 

5Prescott, Samuel C. TrOOp Feeding Programs: A

Survey of Rationing and Subsistence in the United States
1775-194 . National Defense Research Committee,

Office of Scientific Research and DeveIOpment,‘Washington,
D. C., 1944, p. 5.

4Cassidy, Elliott. The DeveIOQment of Meat. Dgigz.

Poultry. and Fish Products for the Army. Historical
Section, Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington,

D. C., 1944, p. 2.

than a century, despite the fact that there was to be a
slow growth in the use of perishable food and a gradual
increase in its popularity. With green and leafy vegetables
absent from the ration.and with potatoes. onions, and
turnips classified only as alternatives to the dry peas,
the Army diet was now largely confined to salted meat or
fish and to starchy foods.

Indicative of the slow headway made by perishable
food in the Army is the fact that it was not until the
Civil War that the use of fresh beef was extended and
potatoes were included as a regular component in the ration
rather than as a substitute. One of the several Civil war
legislative acts for the military establishment of the
United States passed August 3, 1861, provided for the
issuance of fresh beef, when practicable, as often as
required by the commanding officer of any detachment or
regiment. and for one pound of potatoes per man at least
three times a week, though this was conditioned on
practicability and availability.

Neither fresh beef nor fresh vegetables were always
available in the active campaigning of the war. and the
men were confined, more often than not, to subsisting on
their iron rations consisting generally of side-meat

known as 'sowbelly,“ crackers termed 'hardtack,‘ coffee.

6

and sugar. As in the earlier periods such a diet, consisting
as it did, of too much salt meat and an insufficiency of
vegetables, frequently became a cause of scurvy among the
men. By 1863, however, 30 pounds of potatoes per 100 rations
were being authorized, and it was also around this time that
the use of dried compressed potatoes and vegetables mixed
came into being-~very early forerunners of the dehydrated
products that were to be employed so extensively in‘Wbrld
War I.5

While the Army ration remained essentially unchanged
in its components after the Civil War, interest now began
to be diaplayed in the question of the food and energy
value of the subsistence supplied to the troops. In a
report to the Surgeon General in 1875, an analysis of the
ration made at Fort Leavenworth concluded that the American
ration was below the English ration in energy value, being
particularly deficient in fresh vegetables and milk. The
general impression that the united States soldier was
liberally supplied was held to be erroneous. Recommendations

 

5Prescott, Samuel C. TrOOp Feeding Programs: A

Sgrvgy of Rationing and Subsistence in the United Stgtgg
Aggy, 1775-19 2 . National Defense Research Committee,

Office of Scientific Research and DeveIOpment, washington,
Do CO, 1944, pp. 9-10.

made in the report as to desirable changes in the diet
included the issuance of fresh fruits and vegetables,
dried fruits, and other items suitable for transportation
such as cheese, canned milk, butter, canned meats, and
canned vegetables. Encouragement of the cultivation of
gardens in garrisons and at posts was urged, with the
cost to be borne by the Government. It was contended
that the development of such local sources of supply
for perishables would also enable the keeping of cows
and fowl, thus providing the men with milk, cheese, butter,
and eggs as “indispensable elements in the dietary of
military populations."6

As a result of such investigations, the Army ration
of 1892 provided for fresh beef and fresh fish, in addition
to pork, bacon, salt beef, and dried and salted fish. The
fresh vegetable components now included, besides potatoes,
a limited amount of onions, canned tomatoes, cabbage,
beets, carrots, turnips, and squash. Through company
savings, augmented by profits from the Post Exchange, it
was possible for company commanders to make outside

purchases. In this way desirable perishables, not

 

531d. . p- 19.

8
included in regular rations, such as butter, lard, eggs,
and milk, could be made available to the men.7

At the outset of the Spanish-American war the 1892
ration was still in effect, and in order to meet require-
ments great quantities of canned beef and canned corned
beef were ordered. At the same time, fresh carcass beef,
pork, and mutton also began to be used extensively as a
result of the considerable progress that had already been
made by the packing industry in improving the methods for
the processing and handling of fresh meats, as well as
through the use of railway, refrigerated cars introduced
commercially in the last quarter of the century. In
addition, field refrigeration plants and refrigerated
transports were also employed for the first time. The
use of the refrigerated transport made it unnecessary to
ship livestock, thus permitting a reduction in tonnage
during the war of nearly 50 percent.8

For a variety of reasons, however, neither the canned
nor chilled or frozen.meats achieved results that could
be termed satisfactory. In the case of canned products,

the lack of thorough inspection due to the hasty deliveries

 

7Ibig., p. 24.
anion p. 26.

9
demanded, the imperfect sterilization and sealing of the
containers, and the insufficiency of trained subsistence
officers and personnel to insure proper quality procurement,
resulted in spoilage of the contents of the cans. In the
case of the fresh or carcass meats, the storage and re-
frigeration.facilities were far from adequate. As a
consequence of both situations the trOOps were issued
large quantities of half-decomposed meats.9

In addition to the troubles experienced with.both
canned and chilled or frozen meats, another great difficulty
was encountered in the securing of fresh vegetables and
rice from the Commissary Department. In a criticism.of
the Army ration during the war, Major Louis L. Seaman,
in.May, 1899, stated that the vegetables 'brought by the
regiment rotted on the ship before they could be landed,
and those issued by the commissary were for the most part

so decayed as to be unfit for use.'10

 

9Cassidy, Elliot. The Development of Meat, Dairy,
Pogltrz, gag Fish Products for the Aggz., Historical
Section, Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington,

D. C., 1944, p. 9.

loPrescott, Samuel C. Troop Feeding Programs: A
Survey of Rgtionigg and Subsistence in the United States
Army, 1775-1959. National Defense Research Committee,
Office of Scientific Research and DeveloPment, washington,
D. C., 1944, p. 41.

10

Out of the food experiences of the Spanish-American
war came an act of Congress, passed in 1901, which author-
ized the President to prescribe the kinds and quantities
of the Army ration, and to direct the issue of substitute
equivalent components whenever, in his Opinion, with a
due regard for economy, the health and comfort of the
trOOps so required.11 This act was followed by a general
order of the war Department defining the garrison ration.
Insofar as perishables were concerned the garrison ration
provided for the inclusion of 20 ounces of fresh'beef and
16 ounces of potatoes, with substitutions of 4-4/5 ounces
of onions or 4-4/5 ounces of fresh vegetables for an equal
amount of potatoes. The field ration contained the same
amount of fresh beef and potatoes as the garrison list,
but permitted dried potatoes and onions, and canned
tomatoes as substitutes.12

The scientific advance made in the first part of the
twentieth century in the research, processing, and handling
of perishable foods, in the development of the refrigeration
principle to a higher level, and in increasing the speed
and efficiency of tranSportation facilities and methods,

 

llIbid. , p. 46.
121bid., p. 48.

ll
enabled marked progress to be made in supplying the Army
of Werld War I with fresh meats of all kinds including
carcass and boneless beef. In addition poultry, eggs,
milk, butter, cheese, vegetables, and fish were supplied.
Contributing to this advance in the Army's use of perishables
since the Spanish-American war were the newly created
national eating habits of the pepulation of the country
and the concepts of proper diet in relationship to health
that had arisen out of the deveIOpments mentioned above.
These factors made it a virtual necessity for the Army to
purchase and use large quantities of fresh perishable
foods for an Army of civilians accustomed to having them.

In the domestic installations the use of perishable
foods were, relatively Speaking, widespread. The use of
fluid milk was rather extensive in some of the camp training
areas. Processed eggs were in evidence in quantity,
particularly for cooking purposes, and to a limited
extent for table use. Lard was employed on a large
scale, along with smaller quantities of vegetable
shortening. Cheese also assumed an important role
as a substitute for meat both in the United States
and overseas, while butter was issued at the rate of

one-half ounce per ration.

12

In respect to the use of perishables, the so-called
Pershing garrison ration of 1918 called for 20 ounces of
fresh beef per day with fresh mutton, boneless beef, and
pork listed as substitute meat items. Also in the substi-
tute category for fresh beef were such smoked, canned and
fried articles as bacon, sausage, roast beef, corned beef,
corned beef hash, fish, dried fish, and cheese. In the
vegetable category, 20 ounces of fresh potatoes were issued,
with onions and canned tomatoes as substitutes for an equal
amount of potatoes, but not exceeding 20 percent of the
total issue in each case. Canned tomatoes to the extent
of 15 ounces could also be used in lieu of the fresh
variety. Other fresh vegetables were to be used for an
equal amount of potatoes wherever they could be obtained
by local purchase or when they could be tranSported from
a distance in good condition.15

During the twenty-year period after the end of the
first World War, and continuing until the inception of the
Quartermaster Market Center System, the smallness of the
military units, their wide diapersal throughout the country,
and the fact that their total requirements were a very
small part of the nation's production, caused food pro-

curement in the Army to become completely decentralized

 

lstid., p. 54.

13
to a local procurement basis, with each post, camp, and
station purchasing its own perishables from adjacent
wholesale markets.

With the range of items in the legal ration being
gradually expanded in the period between the two werld
wars, the ration came to represent, in effect, little
more than a monetary unit used to establish the money
allowances granted to each post, camp, or station for
the purchase of its own food requirements. Under these
regulations, the procurement of a wide variety of perishables
by each installation was possible, with the composition
of the actual menu largely under the control of the company
commander and mess officer.

In 1925, because the money value of the Army ration
was only 31.5 cents compared to the marine ration value
of 49.7 cents and the Navy ration of 52.6 cents, complaints
began to be voiced that the Army was being discriminated
against, that its ration was inadequate and compared most
unfavorably not only with those of other branches of the
Government Service but also with the fare of unskilled
laborers, and that this situation had an adverse effect
upon morale. As a result of this agitation for further
improvement in the Army ration, President Coolidge signed

14

Executive Order 4850 on February 5, 1927, modifying and
increasing the list of components in the ration. Order
4850 increased the meat components to 18 ounces of fresh
or frozen beef and 6 ounces of bacon, fresh vegetables
to 17 ounces of potatoes, 5 ounces of onions, and 2 ounces
of canned tomatoes and butter to 1.75 ounces.l4

Intensive study, investigation, and experimentation
by the Quartermaster Subsistence Branch with certain.food
components, as well as on the broader aspects of the whole
perishable food problem, revealed that, in spite of the
increased ration components, a deficiency in respect to
vitamin and mineral requirements existed that could only
be corrected through recourse to a wider range of fresh
dairy products, vegetables, and fruit. On November 25,
1952, President Hoover signed Executive Order 5952,
changing the ration to include the desired modifications.
The meat component now embraced, in addition to fresh
beef and bacon, chicken, pork, and eggs; canned string
beans, corn, and peas were added to the potatoes, onions,
and canned tomatoes of the former fresh vegetable list;
allowances for butter and cheese were increased; and fresh
.milk, to the extent of 8 ounces daily, officially became

a part of the ration.15

 

14Ib1d., p. 67.

151b1g., p. 72.

15

With a few minor changes from time to time, the new
Army ration represented the high mark in the evolution of
the ration between the two World wars. It had come about
as the result of continuous and intensive research on the
part of the Subsistence Branch of the Quartermaster Corps
between 1920 and 1940, especially in the second decade.
During this latter time, when the effects of the depression
began to be felt more and more, lack of funds and personnel
greatly limited the areas and scape of research. But by
relying heavily upon the facilities and experience of
industry, which actively cooperated with the Quartermaster
Corps in the conduct of its investigations and experiments,
the Subsistence and Research and Development Branches of
the Office of the Quartermaster General were able to
achieve notable results. Besides the development of
specific food and ration items, such vitally important
aspects of the total food problem as calorie value, storage
and keeping quality, vitamin and mineral content, availa-
bility, and finally, palatability and general acceptance
by the troops, were all studied intensively.

The research efforts between.wars were directed to
the sole end of securing for the American soldier a diet
more varied, acceptable, and nutritious than any he would

be likely to encounter in civilian life. Not until

16
world War II, with its much greater emphasis upon the
procurement and distribution of perishable foods as an
activity separate and distinct from the supply of DOD?
perishables, were the quality, desirability, and health-
giving properties of this diet to be surpassed.

The Subsistence Supply System

Organization of the supply of subsistence in the Army
began on June 16, 1775, when Congress passed a resolution
stating: ”There shall be one Commissary General of Stores
and Provisions.“ Prior to that, each colony supplied its
troops by their own colonial commissaries, aided by
committees. On July 19, 1775, Joseph Trumbull was
appointed Commissary General of Stores and Provisions
for the Army of the United Colonies, whereupon Army
Headquarters issued a general order directing all previously
appointed colonial or district commissaries to report
promptly to Trumbull as to all types of provisions on
hand in or near the camps at Cambridge or Roxbury. It
was in this manner that the first orderly methods and
procedures were set up for the handling of commissary
accounts in the Army, and for the maintenance of an
accurate record of supplies. The Congress also established

a Commissary of Stores and Provisions for the New York

17

Department, and in the spring of 1776 created Commissaries-
General for the Army of the United Colonies in Canada, and
for supplying rations to tr00ps in Virginia. In the first
plan of Organization for the Subsistence Department, the
regimental quartermasters served also as the regimental
commissaries, drawing the supplies for their regiment each
week, and settling their accounts with the Commissary-
General or his deputies.

Establishment of this food supply organization, however,
did not solve all of the difficulties of the earlier system,
and after the authorization of the first ration in 1775,
new and additional problems arose, with a consequent increase
in inefficiencies and irregularities in administration and
management. The first congressional committee to investi-
gate these matters was appointed in 1777. In a report
that has a familiar ring, the committee charged that there
was either a lack of ability or integrity in the men of
the department in discharging their trust, that extravagance
and dissipation of public money was continuing, and that
"disqualified persons” were being employed who, "regardless
of the general good," were bidding against each other,
“under an idea of receiving commissions or compensations

preportioned to the sums they expend."16

 

3532.9.” p0 100

18

Congress accepted the committee's report and adopted
the recommendations. The new systemcalled for the appoint-
ment and control by Congress of a Commissary-General of
Purchases and four Deputy Commissaries-General, and a
Commissary-General of Issues and three Deputy Commissaries-
General. As many assistant commissaries as necessary were
to be appointed by the deputies. An important feature of
the new system was that each assistant commissary, as an
incentive to efficient Operation, was allowed ”ten percent
on the sum which he saved by purchasing good provisions
at less prices than such as are fixed in the respective
states.'17

In 1779, in place of direct supervision by Congress,
the whole purchase and issue system was transferred to
the Board of war, the functions of which corresponded to
the later Secretary of War. Transport problems and scanty
or undelivered rations bythe contractors created difficulties
that resulted in reaponsibility for the purchase of Army
supplies being delegated to the Treasury Department with
the contracting system continuing. 'With the exception of
legislation in 1802 providing for civilian purchasing

agents and assistant agents, who were line officers and

 

17Ibig., p. 13.

19
assisted at each military post, the same general system
was the program for a number of years.

The act of 1818, which set up a separate military
organization for the procurement and supply of subsistence
for the Army, contained several important provisions and
provided the basic organizational structure that was to
endure until 1912. The first called for the appointment
by the President, as soon as the state of existing contracts
permitted, of ”one Commissary-General with the rank, pay
and emoluments of colonel of Ordnance." He and his
assistants, who were to be taken.from officers of the
line, were to give bond and security concerning the
performance of their function of purchasing and issuing
rations to the Army. The second provision called for
contracting by "public notice" with "inspection on.delivery,'
under such regulations as the Secretary of war might direct.'
The third provision prohibited the Commissary-General and
his assistants from being “concerned, directly or indirectly,
in the purchase or sale, in trade or commerce, of any
article entering into the composition of the ration, allowed
to the troops in the service of the United States, except
on account of the United States." This same provision,
which made the Commissary-General and his assistants subject

20
to martial law, also directed that no officer was to ”take
and apply to his own.use any gain or emolument for negoti-
ating or transacting any business connected with the duties
of his office, other than what is or may be allowed by law.“
The effect of these provisions was to eliminate most of thefi
evils of the previous private-contract system, set up
standards of policy for officers that were to be enduring
in the war Department, and lay the foundation for the type
of Subsistence Department that eventually evolved in the
20th century.18

Ninety-four years after the establishment of the
commissariat in 1818 as a separate military organization
for the procurement, storage, and distribution of food to
the Army, a rider to the Army Appropriation Act of 1912
merged the Subsistence Department with the Quartermaster
and Pay Departments to form the present Quartermaster Corps.
It was with this organizational structure that the United
States entered the first World War on April 6, 1917.

The tremendous Job of purchasing, distributing,
storing, and issuing subsistence to the rapidly expanding
army in the camps was accomplished through a system of

decentralized procurement, under the Quartermaster depots,

 

lBIbid., p. 56.

21
for the various districts in the country. Experience,
however, soon demonstrated that too narrow and rigid
consolidation of procurement on the different supply
items among the depots failed to utilize to the fullest
extent all of the country's resources. In order to provide
for the broad development of the national potential, as
well as to implement the policy of centralized procurement
control by Washington, the Office of the Quartermaster
General in July 1918, established a system of procurement
and distribution by "zones" in the United States. The
thirteen general procurement zones in which the general
supply depots Operated, modified somewhat for subsistence
procurement and also for the Quartermaster distribution
function, were clearly defined, with little possibility
Of conflict or overlapping of operations. Through the
zone system the Office of the Quartermaster General was
now able to keep every part of the country under a closer
surveillance on subsistence matters, and thus achieve
better overall direction and coordination Of procurement.
It was now possible for the Office of the Quartermaster
General to keep informed as to the market conditions,
relative prices, surpluses or shortages, and the status

of production in each section or locality in the country.

22
This made it possible to allocate purchases throughout
the nation, thus better distribution of orders resulted
in lower prices and improved quality of the products
Obtained.

Under the zone system all procurement in the field
was by competitive bidding after advertising, except in
instances of emergency or inadequate supplies. In such
cases, contracts or orders to vendors were made by the
depots through allocation procedures. This purchase and
procurement procedure first called for the submission Of
estimates of food needs from the depots to the Office
Quartermaster General Subsistence Division. The Office
of the Quartermaster General then saw to it that the
proper purchase allocations were made to the various zones.
Placement of the awards was also under Office of the
Quartermaster General supervision, with the bids received
by the depots having to be relayed to'Washington for
comparison. After comparing the bids, the Subsistence
Division issued directions as tO which depot should make
the procurement, or, if needed, set forth whatever other
specific procedure should be used instead. Adopted at
first for the procurement Of 55 food items, this system

came to be extended to include most of the food purchased

by the We

25

The final feature of the zone supply system from the
subsistence standpoint grew out of the formation of the
distribution zones based upon the procurement zones. The
creation of zones for distribution brought to an end the
separation that had been established at the beginning of
the emergency between the supply departments and the
territorial military departments in the field. Under the
earlier arrangement, the divisional camps had been made
independent in supply matters as well as military ones.

Now they were placed directly under the Jurisdiction of

the zones for supply. This meant that all field installations
would henceforth be supplied directly from the Quartermaster
zone depot, without the interposition Of the territorial
department quartermasters.

After World War I the size of the Army, in conformance
with American practice, was sharply reduced. Due to this,
centralized direction and coordination of food procurement
by the Office of the Quartermaster General in.Washington
was abandoned. Subsistence purchasing now became almost
decentralized, with the Quartermaster depots reaponsible
for the procurement of non-perishable subsistence, while
all perishable foods were purchased independently by the
local military installations.

24

The system Of procuring the various perishable items
locally was the Army's standard, orthodox method of ins
definite quantity contracts, which were made on the basis
of bids submitted by the vendors thirty to sixty days in
advance of the delivery date. The contracts were usually
awarded each month by a purchasing and contracting Officer
who was guided by a list of fair market prices sent to him
at stated intervals by the subsistence sections of one or
more Quartermaster depots. Requirements for each instal-
lation were determined by its mess or commissary Officer,
known as the Sales Officer, who was granted a certain
monetary ration allowance per day for each man of the
unit. Using this ration allowance, which was subject to
revision from time to time as changes took place in.food
price levels, the Sales Officer could arrange to buy whatever
perishables he thought desirable. Under the indefinite
quantity type of contract, the quartermaster on delivery
date could request as much more or less than the quantity
named in the contract as he wished, since the quantities
listed in the request for bids and the contracts were “for
information only." It was estimated that under this system
the vendor charged 15 percent more than normally, to cover
the risks of the indefinite quantity provision and the

market uncertainties of the extended period between contract

25
and delivery., In addition, it was believed that the
“better merchants" refused to participate in such a
speculative business.

Besides the greater costs of perishable merchandise
accruing to the Government from those extra overhead and
risk charges attached to the prices bid by the vendors,
as well as from the fact that competition was thus limited
to wholesalers inclined to charge more by virtue of the
reluctance of the more conservative firms to bid for Army
business, the local procurement policy contained many other
weaknesses and disadvantages, even.under the peacetime
economy. Operations on a local procurement basis resulted
in numerous variations throughout the country in both the
prices paid and the quality of the produce Obtained.
Because of the virtually independent character of this
type of local purchasing, only limited overall control
could be maintained by Washington. Hence, in a time of
scarcity the local procurement system did not lend itself
well to being coordinated on a national scale for the
purpose of effecting economy in buying. Conversely, when
a national surplus deveIOped, it was not always possible
to take full advantage Of it under this system.

Another weakness in the system lay in the fact that
the men who Operated it were Officers attached to individual

26
military units, who did not usually possess the wide
knowledge and experience that was essential to procurement
in the perishables field, especially in respect to fresh
fruits and vegetables, and in regard to all perishable
procurement in large quantities.

With the growing emergency in 1940 and early 1941,
however, the supply of perishables to the Army and other
military and naval branches fast became a wartime problem
that could no longer be viewed from the local procurement
standpoint. Once the Selective Service and Training Bill
became law in September, 1940, and the Army began to
expand rapidly in consequence of it, the need for planning
an expanded perishable subsistence procurement became
clear and urgent. Reports began to come in.from various
sections Of the country showing inordinate and dangerous
disruptions of the civilian.food supply and economy caused
by the large concentrations and movements of troops in
the training areas.

In the light of all these considerations it was Obvious
that the peacetime local procurement system would prove
inadequate to meet the requirements of war supply of
perishables to the armed forces Of the country. It was of
vital importance that a new concept for a different supply
system.be evolved almost immediately-~one that would

27
successfully meet and handle the difficulties and exigencies
that were certain to ensue in war time. The resulting
concept was the Quartermaster Market Center Supply System

established in the Spring of 1941.

CHAPTER III
THE QUARTERMASTER MARKET CENTER SYSTEM

The planning and initial development of the Market
Center System were emergency measures designed to effect
the rational and coordinated procurement, storage, and
distribution of perishable subsistence to the armed
forces of the United States during WOrld'War II. It
was a three-point program calling for centralized
national control, decentralized field Operations, and
maximum reliance upon trained and experienced civilian
marketing Specialists to do the purchasing. The agency
constituted a cooperative undertaking participated in
by the Army, other Government agencies, and representatives

of the commercial perishable food trades.

Fresh Fruits and Vegetables
On March 19, 1941, the Office of the Quartermaster
General Circular Letter NO. 42 heralded the birth of the
Market Center System. The organization was only a skeleton,
leaving room for development and expansion according to
need. Confined at this time to the procurement of fresh
fruits and vegetables only, the Quartermaster Market Centers

29

for Perishable Subsistence numbered thirty and were under
direct control of the Quartermaster General, who allocated
funds for all purposes. The Market Center in Chicago was
designated the central office for administrative purposes.
The thirty market centers were listed by corps areas
with the camps they were to serve. Posts, camps, and
stations with strengths of less than two thousand and
other military installations not within a reasonable
distance were exempted from market center procurement.
They were to utilize the facilities of the market center
in order to check prices and insure full use of seasonal
perishable subsistence. Later the exempted installations
were attached to larger camps in their areas, as "satellites,”
and thus supplied by the Market Center System.1 4

Each market center was in charge of a commissioned
officer of the Army known as the Purchasing and Contracting
Officer. He was advised and assiSted by as many civilian
market Specialists, inspectors, and clerks as the Quarter-
master General authorized. The marketing specialists,
selected for their expert knowledge of all phases of.

marketing fresh fruits and vegetables, were Specifically

 

1Rijkind, Herbert. Fresh.Foods for the Armed Forces,
Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General,

Washington, D. C., 1951, p. 27.

50
charged with the reSponsibility of selecting, inspecting,
and grading all of the commodities purchased.

Market centers were informed Of the needs of posts,
camps, and stations by means Of requisitions which were
submitted at least 15 days before requisitioned items were
'needed. These requisitions were based on master menus
prepared by the Office of the Quartermaster General and
indicated the day to day requirements of the installation
for fresh produce.

The Market Center System encouraged the purchasing of
carlot and trucklot quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables,
since material savings would be made by this method. Carlot
procurement was not made solely for the camps, posts, or
stations served by a market center, but was also made by
a market center in a large producing area for military
installations on a nation-wide basis. Carlots and truck-
lots might be split between two or more delivery points.
Less than carload lots would be procured only when it was
not possible to purchase in carlot quantities.

The inception of carlot buying, plus the overall
supervision by Field Headquarters in Chicago, was a
develoPment Of paramount importance. Teletype machines

were placed at Field Headquarters and in all market centers

51
permitting immediate intercommunication with local markets.
Market centers referred all carlot requirements to the
Field Headquarters. If after surveying national market
conditions it was found that the local market center could
make the most advantageous procurement, it was instructed
to do so.

Carlot buying was developed to facilitate buying from
growers instead of from.commission merchants or jobbers.
The procurement Specialists who came to the Market Center
System from the commercial world were accustomed to field
buying for fresh.fruits and vegetables. The large chain
stores with which most of them had previously been connected
maintained temporary field buying offices in all of the
major producing regions of the country and achieved many
of their economies by the practice Of buying in large
quantities directly from the producers. The field buying
Offices established by the market center were temporary.
Frequently a hotel room equipped with a telephone was used
by the field buyer to cover adjacent growing districts.
Eventually a systematic rotation of temporary field buying
offices was arranged, whereby the field buyer Operated
in different sections of the country at different seasons

and so was in harvest areas throughout the year.

52
Expansion of Procurement
As soon as the procurement of fresh fruits and
vegetables was in progress, preparations were begun for
the procurement of dairy products and poultry. Establish-
ment of procurement in these fields was followed by the
inauguration of procurement of meat and fish, of frozen

fruits and vegetables and, in limited areas, fresh milk.

Epipz Prodpppp and Pppltry
Procurement for dairy products and poultry was begun

on July 1, 1941. Emphasis was placed on buying these
products as close to production points as possible. It
was necessary to conduct many of the negotiations with
commission merchants, because in many cases they assembled
these foods in.units that fit the needs Of the military.
Major emphasis was on carlot procurement in order to

realize the greatest economies.2

‘Mggp

Central procurement of meat began in the Spring of
1942. The Chicago Market Center was designated to handle
the procurement of all carlot quantities, while less than

 

BCassidy, Elliott. The Development Of meat, Daipy,
Popltpy, and Epsh Products for the Arpy._ Historical
Section, Office of Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C.,
1944, p. 57.

55
carload quantities were handled by ten market centers at
which meet procurement Specialists were stationed. These
ten market centers were known as "subheadquarters' and
bought for the other nearby market centers not having meat
procurement specialists. Requisitions were handled in
the same fashion as for other commodities and were passed
to the designated market centers from.which, if in carlot
quantities, they were referred to the Chicago Market
Center.3

Centralized procurement by the market Center System
afforded several improvements over local type procurement.
First, Open.market purchases, eliminating formal invitations
to bid on indefinite quantities, resulted in more accurate
market values. Second, competition between installations
was eliminated. Third, valuable market information was
made available to posts, making it possible to suggest to
them the use of varieties, grades, and cuts that not only
represented the best values, but that also had the least
effect upon the market. Finally, because the Speculative
character of Army contracts was lessened, new sources of

supply were Opened, particularly among small packers.

 

31b1g., p. 45.

54

Wptprfoodp

The nation-wide procurement Of water foods by the
Market Center System was begun almost simultaneously
with meat procurement. However, as the major supply
Of waterfoods was found in coastal areas on both the
east and west coasts, many of the operations of the
Market Center System were decentralized. Central control
still rested at Field Headquarters in Chicago, but as
far as Operations were concerned Field Headquarters
merely served as a transmittal point for waterfood
requisitions. Seven selected port market centers were
staffed with fish procurement Specialists and assigned
the responsibility of procuring waterfoods for Field
Headquarters and for the posts, camps, and stations in
the immediate vicinity. Field Headquarters received
requisitions from.the inland market centers not staffed
with waterfoods procurement Specialists, and then passed
the requisitions on to the coastal market centers where
procurement was accomplished. These seven market centers
were also responsible for the storage and distribution
of waterfoods.4

There were few precedents to follow in distributing

waterfoods to the various installations about the country,

 

4Ibid., p. 54.

55
since up to that time the Army had made use of these
products. Furthermore, facilities for the storage of
waterfoods in Army installations were inadequate, and
it was necessary for the Market Center System to Operate
central storage facilities from which distribution was
made to camps. Those installations which could take
carlot quantities and store them adequately were shipped
waterfoods directly. In the majority Of cases the Market
Center System itself stored the waterfoods in commercial
warehouses and arranged distribution to the camps as
needed. To insure that adequate stocks of waterfoods
would be maintained, a seasonal storage program was
instituted under which catches were stored, when the
fish were running, for later use during scarce periods.

Because military installations were not experienced
in the use of waterfoods, the market Center System
carefully edited requisitions and made suggestions to
the camps by which economy and better results could be
achieved in.waterfoods preparation. When camps appeared
particularly lax in develoPing the use of waterfoods,
pressure was exerted via a letter from the Office of the
Chief, Subsistence Branch, Office Of the Quartermaster
General, pointing out that the installation concerned

56
had used very little or no fresh or.frozen.fish and

emphasized the nutritional values of Seafoods.

Further Expansion Of Procurement
As the Army grew and the program proved effective in
the supply of adequate amounts Of fresh foods to the armed
forces, the Market Center System assumed the procurement
of perishable foods which it had not originally planned
to purchase. Foremost among these items were frozen

fruits and vegetables, and milk.

Frozen Fppits and Vegetablep

In December, 1942, a frozen fruit and vegetable pro-
curement Specialist was assigned to Field Headquarters in
Chicago. He assumed the reSponsibility for directing
market center procurement of frozen fruits and vegetables.
Individual market centers bought frozen.fruit locally in
small amounts and Field Headquarters was reSponsible for
the procurement of frozen vegetables.5

The plan was restricted to six basic vegetables:

aSparagus, peas, snap beans, lima beans, corn, and

spinach. Posts, camps, and stations were to use the

 

5Rijkind, Herbert. Fresh Foods for the Armed Forces.
Historical Section, Office Of the Quartermaster General,

Washington, D. C., 1951, p. 49.

57
varieties Of frozen vegetables in approximately the same
preportions as they were procured by the Market Center
System. For Zone of Interior installations the use of
frozen vegetables was restricted to the seasons of the
year when fresh vegetables were scarce.6

Procured stocks were stored as close as possible to
the market center area where they were used, and held in
the accountabilityof the local center. Distribution
was restricted to these posts, camps, and stations at
which conditions were suitable for use and storage. The
elements considered in selecting the installations were:

sufficient troop strength to consume a ten ton assorted

truckload within a short period Of time, available freezer

space for storing at least one truckload at 0° to 10° F.,
and adequate trucking facilities to carry the produce

from storage to camp.'7

yppp,

As military installations increased and expanded,
it became apparent to the Office of the Quartermaster
General that the procurement of milk for the Army would

have to be coordinated on the same nation-wide basis as

 

6Ibid., p. 100.
7M0 s P. 500

58
other perishables. Nation-wide planning became inevitable
during World war II when large numbers of Army personnel
were located in areas where milk production was low,
particularly in the south. The absence Of coordination
caused milk shortages at many of the posts, camps, and
stations. The independent tranSportation, by many military
installations in the south, of milk from northern states
where surplus supplies were obtainable, together with the
failure to plan and coordinate deliveries, made for misuse
Of the nation's tranSportation.facilities at a time when
rail equipment was at a premium. Another result was
extremely high cost.

In December, 1942, the Office of the Quartermaster
General announced that effective February 1, 1945, milk
and ice cream for military installations in Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas
would be purchased through the Market Center System. The
centers for milk procurement were the Columbus, Wilmington,
and Fort WOrth Quartermaster Market Centers with centralized
control in Field Headquarters for procurement Of carlot

Shipments from the north.8

 

BIbiQH p. 50.

59

The volume of Ebrket Center System milk procurement
in the south and southeast is indicated by the following
statistics: procurement for Virginia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina conducted by the Wilmington market
center averaged about 4,600,000 quarts of milk and
150,000 gallons Of ice cream a month. From February,
1945 to March, 1946, a total of about 170,000,000 quarts
of milk were purchased for this area at a cost of
$24,000,000, the average unit cost being slightly less
than 14 cents a quart.

Procurement for the states Of Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and southern Tennessee conducted by the Columbus
market center was 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 quarts of milk
monthly. F0r_the period from February, 1945 to March,
1946, the total procured was more than 190,000,000 quarts.
The proportion of milk Shipped into this area varied from
20 to 45 percent of the total requirements depending upon
the season. The average price of locally procured milk
was about 15.5 cents per quart.

Procurement for the states of Texas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and New Mexico conducted by the Fort WOrth
market center totaled 200,000,000 quarts of milk for
the period March, 1945 to March, 1946, and the total

average cost was slightly over 15 cents a quart.9

 

glbige, p. 510

40

Coordination Of Menu Planning and Procurement

While centralized procurement was being develOped, it
was perceived that a major change in Army procedures in
connection with the type of troop ration then being used
would have to be made if the Market Center System plan
was to function effectively. To do this it was necessary
to modify the type of ration and install a central control
over the menus used at the various posts, camps, and
stations. Menu standardization would make possible
coordination of menu planning with procurement, thus
large scale carlot purchases could be arranged, and
advantage could be taken of seasonal production and
price differences.

AS stated previously, prior to the establishment
of the Market Center System, the posts, camps, and stations
Operated under the garrison ration. Under this plan each
organization was credited with a sum Of money based on
a definite quantity and quality Of subsistence items
per man per day, which had been found sufficient for
military use in the past. The organization, however,
was free to purchase whatever food supplies it desired
with the funds allotted to it. The garrison ration used
in peacetime was supplanted in.wartime by a field ration

41
which was issued in kind, with the War Department or the
commanding general of the field forces prescribing what
items of food should be issued on a certain day or during
a prescribed period Of time. The Market Center System,
based on the concept of procuring and distributing large
quantities of food from a central point, was a subsistence
supply procedure best adapted to the field rations.

In February, 1941, the War Department issued a circular
stating that effective May 1, 1941, all posts, camps, and
stations within the continental limits of the United States
would go on the field ration. The United States Mfllitary
Academy, general hOSpitalS, and such small stations as
might be approved by the War Department on recommendation
of the corps area commanders were exempted from this
requirement. The menu Planning Section Of the Quartermaster
Market Center System in Washington prepared a master menu
which prescribed the monthly menu for installations. The
components for each of the three daily meals with a daily
recapitulation of the total quantity needed by unit of
purchase of each item required to feed the prescribed
menu to 100 men was calculated. A.c0mputation, based on
current prices, was also prepared to indicate the cost

of feeding the proposed menu to 100 men per month. Field

42
Headquarters in Chicago issued a one hundred eighty day
list which predicted the availability of food items in
the Zone of Interior to assist the Menu Planning Section
in drawing up the master menu.

The plan was finally perfected so that the master menu
reached each post, camp, and station one hundred twenty
days prior to the first day of the month in which the menu
was to be served. To further coordinate procurement and
requirements, each market center issued to installations
in their jurisdiction a list of available perishables to
reach the installations forty-five days prior to the date
of the master menu to which it applied. The list was
keyed geographically to compensate for regional seasonal
differences. However, availability of meats, dairy products,
and poultry were determined solely by Field Headquarters
on a national basis, with no local data in these categories
being included in the list.

The station menu board - consisting of the food service
supervisor as chairman, the sales officer, the post surgeon
or his representative, and such representatives of tactical
organizations as deemed necessary by the senior commander -
met one hundred to one hundred twenty days prior to the
first day of the month in which the menu was to be served.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss and review the

45
master menu, in light of the list furnished by the Market
Center System, and revise it to the extent deemed advisable
in view of local conditions.10

The plan for coordination of menu planning and pro-
curement proved very effective after initial opposition
to the Market Center System had been overcome at the post,
camp, and station level and sales officers had been instructed
in procedure regulations of the Market Center System.

Training Problems at Installation Level
and Opposition to the Program

The biggest promotional problem for the Market Center
System was among the sales officers and quartermasters at
the local posts, camps, and stations for which they effected
procurement. Often the subsistence officers, drawn as they
were from all walks of life, were not trained foodmen and
the turnover rate among them was high. As a result, the
.Market Center System found itself confronted with a
personnel training problem which it had to undertake in
order to facilitate its operations. For example, it was

necessary to instruct the sales officers in procedures

regarding menu planning and food inspection.

 

10Department of the Arpy Technical Manual 10-215,
Department of the Army, June, 1948, p. 5.

44

The method evolved to solve this problem was to send
market center teams on direct visits to the installations
that were procuring through the system. The teams met
with the subsistence personnel to discuss common prOblems
and demonstrate market center procedures and also observed
at first hand the method of requisitioning, menu making,
inventory, and storage used.

In addition, opposition to the market center plan
existed among some of the purchasing officers in the
various posts, camps, and stations. This opposition
stemmed from the fact that a centralized and nationally
controlled system of perishable food supply stripped
these officers of the local procurement power they had
previously exercised. Captain T. R. MOBrien said:

The program at its start was not too popular with
the non-commissioned officers or the sales officers
at base level. A large portion of this difficulty
was due to the fact that in most cases the mess
sergeants were making the decisions concerning
acceptability of product. This made them important
to the vendor who attempted to gain their favor by
'kickbacks.‘ The Market Center System broke up

the 'racket' and they resented it. As a result
they found fault with the product purchased and
price paid by the market center personnel. In
isolated cases their complaints may have had some
basis but the overall favorable results of the
market center program brake down their resistance.

The most seriouslibjectors were transferred to
other positions.

 

llInterview'with Captain.T. R. chrien, Director of
Supply, Headquarters 10th Air Force, Selfridge Field,
Michigan, J une, 1955.

45

Besides local sales officer, a lack of enthusiasm for
the Market Center System was evidenced among Army personnel
on other grounds. Some officers took a dim view of two of
the basic principles of the program - use of civilian buyers
and centralized control. In reSpect to the first, they
felt that the adoption of a method which turned over a
portion of the armed forces' procurement activities to
civilian marketing SpecialiSts would result in some loss
of the military control they deemed essential. Secondly,
they were dubious as to the practicability of starting on
a nation-wide scale an entirely new system which would be
free from the supervision of local command. Others
questioned the value of the Market Center System on a
merit basis, comparing it to the local procurement method.
They contended that the local procurement method had proved
satisfactory and could be expanded readily to handle increased
requirements in an adequate manner. Still others were
particularly unsympathetic to that aspect of the Market
Center System program which provided for the substitution
of low priced items in plentiful supply for articles that
were more expensive because of out-of-season conditions

or Scarcity.12

12Rijkind, Herbert. Fresh Feeds for the Armed Fprpep.
Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General,

washington, D. C., 1951, p. 55.

46

Subsequent events dispelled these objectives to the
Market Center System. The military assumed organizational
and administrative control of the Market Center System
and established effective teamwork with the civilian
elements. The Market Center System worked in close
cooperation with the installations it served by supplying
them with a greater variety of perishable subsistence than
had been available to them in the past and in the freshest
possible condition. Expansion of trOOp strength and
installations resulted in local procurement problems
that refuted those who had advocated retention and
extension of the local procurement system. Finally, the
substitution of cheaper but equally wholesome and nourishing
items for higher priced ones in periods of seasonal
scarcity, effected significant monetary savings to the

Government.15

Inspection Service for the Market Center System

The Quartermaster Inspection Service was responsible
for the inSpection of subsistence procured by the Market
Center System. It consisted of veterinary personnel of
the Army and civilian inSpectors 0f the Federal Department
of Agriculture. In addition, services of qualified

13Ibid., p. 54.

47
inspectors of State Departments of Agriculture were
available. The Quartermaster Inspection Service maintained
close liaison with Field Headquarters to further effective
procurement and distribution of the perishable subsistence.
The policy maintained by the Market Center System and the
Quartermaster InSpection Service was all products bought,
whether animal or vegetable in origin, were inSpected at
both purchase point and destination.

meats, poultry, dairy products, and waterfoods had to
conform to Federal Specifications and be produced or menu-
factured in federally inspected and approved plants. In
order to assure full protection on the quality and grade
of these products when purchased, and to insure delivery
of a suitable quality to the consuming installations at
all times, the veterinarians performed five types of
inspections. These were at origin (contractor's plant);
at destination (camps or storage); at final destination
(Government property); out of stOrage (Government property);
and in storage (monthly).14 . I

Inspection 0f the remaining categories of perishable
foods, frozen fruits and vegetables and yeast, procured

by the Market Center System was not the reSponsibility of

 

l4Subsiptence Sppply Structpres. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, 111., May, 1952, p. 9.

48

the Veterinary Corps. At origin, fresh fruits and vegetables
were approved by qualified inSpectors of either the Federal
Department of Agriculture or State Department of Agriculture.
Both of these services were available in practically all
parts of the United States, and continuously in the major
growing areas.’ Federal inSpectors were shifted back and
forth among these regions in accordance with crop and
seasonal requirements. In absence of Federal Department
of Agriculture inSpection, state inspection was used.

Inspection for type, class, and grade was a contract
provision for fresh fruits and vegetables. In areas having
Federal inSpection, every purchase order was required to be
supported by an origin inspection certificate from the
Department of Agriculture. Where inspection was not
obtainable, the contractor was required to furnish an
affidavit attesting to compliance with contract specifi-
cations in every reSpect. The veterinarian of the receiving
market center was required to check, review, and approve
both the origin and destination certificates of inspection.
This did not apply on purchases for direct delivery to
installations or to other Government agencies. In.such
cases, origin inspections certificates were sufficient

for administrative and fiscal clearance actions.

49

Fruits and vegetable purchases of less than carload.
lots were inspected individually by the Market Center System's
marketing Specialists at the establishments of the vendors.
In the majority of instances, the buyers personally picked
out the products to be delivered to the installations.

On frozen.fruits and vegetables, Federal Department
of Agriculture certificates of inspection had to be secured
immediately prior to delivery, when the quantities being
procured on a single purchase order aggregated one thousand
pounds or more. Similarly, all carlot purchases of frozen
fruits and vegetables required the accompaniment of inspection
certificates issued at the time the product was shipped to
the Government. Deliveries against purchase orders for
quantities totaling less than one thousand pounds were
acceptable without a Federal Department of Agriculture
inspection certificate provided the product offered had
been inspected federally within ninety days of the datev
of purchase. Each case of frozen food purchased in less
than carload lots had to bear the inspection and grading
stamp of the Frozen Food Division of the Department of
Agriculture. The proviSiOn for the review and clearance
of fresh fruit and vegetable inSpection certificates

applied to frozen fruits and vegetables. Procedure on

50
yeast called for inspection at origin by the Federal
Department of Agriculture.15

At destination, inSpection was for count and condition
by either the personnel of the receiving installation, the
sales officer, food service supervisor, or market center
marketing Specialist. Cases involving doubt of quality
or grade at destination were resolved by calling upon the
Federal Department of Agriculture inspectors for verification

and final decision.

Procurement for Other Agencies

As eXpansion continued, the necessity for coordinating
the perishable food purchases of the armed forces became
apparent to the various services. Underscoring this'
necessity were the procurement difficulties, interagency
competition for supplies, and transportation troubles
resulting in shortages at installations. AS these
installations experienced difficulty in procuring adequate
supplies of good quality, they sought permission to secure
perishable foods through the Market Center System. The
service was gradually extended until by the end of 1945

most Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Corps posts, camps, and

 

15Ib1g., p. 10.

51
stations were receiving their perishable food through the
Market Center System.

Npgy
In March, l942,the Navy assigned a supply officer to
Field Headquarters in Chicago. His duties were receipt
of requisitions from Naval installations and the transmittal
of these requisitions to the market centers. In addition,
he was responsible for the payment of Navy food require-
ments on a prorated basis.l6
Actual procurement was begun in April, 1942, in the
Ninth Naval District (Chicago area).‘ In August, 1942,
the Market Center System began procurement of perishable
goods for the Navy at Boston. Similar procurement services
were extended progressively to Jersey City and Baltimore
in October, 1942; to Norfolk in December, 1942; and then
later to Jacksonville, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco
and Seattle. The inclusion of the Navy into market center
procurement was a step by step process due to the fact
that District Commandants adopted the program on a

voluntary basis.17

 

lerid., p. 57.

l7Ibid., p. 57.

52

Marine Corps

As a result of an overall Marine Corps' order from
Washington in July, 1942, the Market Center System began
procurement of all perishables except meats for Marine
bases at New River, North Carolina, Paris Island, South
Carolina, Quantico, Virginia, and San Diego, California.
The service proved satisfactory and the corps gradually
extended services to include all bases. In addition, in
October, 1942, it authorized procurement of meats through
the Market Center System.18

Marine Corps installations submitted their requisitions,
based on the monthly menu prepared by the Army Quartermaster
Corps, directly to the market center to which they were
assigned. Payment was made by the base receiving the
subsistence. No Marine officer was stationed at Field
Headquarters but overall coordination of procurement for
the Corps was handled through liaison between the Marine

Corps and the Perishable Branch, Subsistence Division,

Office of the Quartermaster General at Washington.

Cor
In September, 1942, Air Corps stations were directed

to procure their perishable subsistence requirements from

 

181bid., p. 59.

55
the Market Center System after November 1, 1942. Previously,
the War Departmenthad permitted all Air Corps bases exempt
from the control of Corps area commanders to go on the
garrison ration instead of the field ration, if they so
desired. Most had elected to remain under the garrison
ration system of local procurement, however, some instal-
lations had voluntarily requested and were granted Market

Center Systemprocurement.19

Other Agepcies
In addition to procuring perishable foods for the

Army Air Corps, Navy and Marine Corps, the Market Center
System procured for the Coast Guard which placed its
requisitions through the Navy, the Maritime Commission,
the'War Relocation Authority, and aided the Veterans

Administration in solving their procurement problems.

The National Security.Act of 1947
After cessation of hostilities in 1945, the services
continued the wartime policy of the field ration and
required that the supply of perishable subsistence
continue through the Market Center System. Voluntary

c00peration of the armed forces with the Quartermaster

 

19Ib1d., p. 60.

54

Market Center System continued until the National Security
Act of 1947 made such procedure mandatory.

The National Security Act became effective September
17, 1947. Its purpose was the unification of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force into a single coordinated team. A
single Department of Defense was created with a Munitions
Board composed of a civilian chairman appointed by the
President and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. One of the functions of the Munitions Board
was ”to recommend the service (Department) which Should be
reSponsible for the procurement of all requirements for a
particular item, i.e., the principle of single service
procurement."2O

On December 22, 1947, the Munitions Board assigned the
Army the reSponsibility for single service purchase of
subsistence and designated the Quartermaster Corps the
purchasing agency for this commOdity. The Quartermaster
Corps assigned the function of procurement and distribution
of perishable subsistence for the Armed Forces, and such
other consumers as the Quartermaster General might direct,

to the Market Center System.21

 

2°Subsistence 1 St ct res. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, May, 1952, p. 2.

211514., p. 5.

55
Size and Scope of the Market Center System

When the Market Center System was organized on March
12, 1941, it consisted of thirty market centers and its
procurement reSponsibility was confined to the purchase
of fresh fruits and vegetables for the Army. Three years
later through Field Headquarters in Chicago it controlled
thirty-six market centers and seven.field buying offices.
In addition to procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables,
it was reSponsible for the purchasing of dairy products
and poultry, meat, waterfoods, frozen fruits and vegetables,
and milk. Besides the Army, it procured for the Navy,
Marine Corps, Army Air Corps, and Coast Guard. In addition
it assisted the Maritime Commission, the war Relocation
Authority, and the Veterans Administration.

The number of installations in the Zone of Interior
served by the Market Center System in 1945 was 581, with
a total strength of 4,562,765. One year later this figure
jumped to 572 posts, camps, and stations having a total
strength of 5,601,101.22

Other figures that reveal the tremendous growth of
the Market Center System are the procurement statistics.

 

22Rijkind, Herbert. Fresh Foods for thg ppmed Forces.
Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General,

WaShlngton, D. C., 1951, pp. 222, 577.

56

In the first full year of operation, fiscal 1942, the
total dollar procurement of the Market Center System amounted
to $97,586,000. In 1944 this figure leaped to 51.171.826.000,
an increase of more than 51.000.000.000. In quantitative
terms, 549,604 tons of perishables were purchased in 1942
and 5,925,180 tons in 1944, an increase of over 5,500,000 tons.
The year 1945 represented peak procurement with 4,599,771
tons valued at $1,514,854 being purchased. In reSpect to
this last point, during the last ten months of the fiscal
year, market center procurement losses due to Spoilage
and shrinkage totaled less than five-thousandths of
1 percent.23 1

After V-J Day the system contracted to eleven market
centers servicing 205 installations with a troop strength
of 744,455. Total procurement in terms of dollars and

tonnage was $557,511,000 and 168,655 tons.24

Advantages of the Market Center System
The Market Center System.of Single agency procurement
and distribution embodied the following advantages over
the local procurement method: (1) A single medium through
which policy could be applied and controlled, and duplication

 

23;p;g., p. 578.
24Ib1ge, pp. 377-780

57
eliminated. (2) The elimination of competition between
two or more Federal agencies for the same items of supply.
(5) The provision for attaining the maximum in competition
and quality control through solicitation of bids on a
nation-wide basis, along with centralized control of
inspection. (4) The existence of an agency having the
necessary flexibility for expansion or contraction in time
of war or peace in accordance with the varying requirements
of the Armed Forces. (5) Better utilization of the nation's
transportation facilities through the elimination of cross;
hauling and duplications. (6) The diffusing of Specialized
knowledge on perishable foods throughout the Armed Forces
by trained Market Center System personnel. (7) A.medium
for aiding in the standardization of menus, specifications,
and inSpection. (8) The provision for frequent consolidation
of the requirements of two or more installations in carlot
shipments, thus effecting economies by being able to procure
in larger amounts at one time, as well as by obtaining
higher quality merchandise through direct procurement in
producing areas. (9) Effect equitable division among
the various departments of the Armed Forces of commodities
in short supply and provide substitute items in plentiful
supply, without impairing nutritional standards. These

advantages undoubtedly constituted major factors in the

58
decision that resulted in the continuation of the Market
Center System as the peacetime perishable subsistence

agency of the Armed Forces.25

 

25Subsiptence Procurement Operatiopp. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, 111., May, 1952, pp. 2-5.

CHAPTER IV
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCUREMENT METHODS

The two principal methods of military procurement are
by means of formal advertising or by means of negotiation.
Under formal advertising the following procedure was
followed in solicitation of bids: (1) The Invitation for
Bid was issued by the contracting officer charged with
the procurement of the supplies involved. (2) The
Invitation for Bid as a rule allowed thirty days between
date of issuance and the opening of the bids. A shorter
period was allowed, but no period less than ten days was
designated except in case of an emergency. In the event
of an emergency the appropriate reasons were explained by
a certificate attached to the Invitation for Bid. (5) The
Invitation for Bid was mailed or delivered to the interested
parties. Submission of Bid involved the following:

(1) Bids were to be filled out, executed, and submitted

by each bidder in accordance with instructions which
accompanied the bid form and telegraphic bids were not
considered unless Specifically authorized. (2) Bids were
to be submitted in.sufficient time to reach the designated

60
office prior to the time fixed for Opening.1 Negotiation
entailed the following: when procurement was by this
method ”Requests for Quotations or Proposals" were allowed
by any of these means - (a) in writing with a written form
known as a ”Notice of Intent to Purchase.” (b) by telephone
or telegraph, (c) by personal contact.2 — '

The Armed FOrces distinguish negotiation from formal
advertising as "that method of procurement under which the
procedures for procurement by formal advertising as pertains
to the solicitation and sealed bids is not required.'3

Upon cessation of hostilities, a paramount issue was
whether or not to continue the wartime practice of Short
term contracting by negotiation upon which the Market
Center System had been based and which was considered
fundamental to its procurement program. The alternative,
formal advertising, was the usual procedure followed for
all other Quartermaster items and also for non-perishable
subsistence. The formal advertising procedure had also

been adhered to for perishable subsistence in the prewar

 

1Procprement by Formpl Advertisipg._ Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago,- 11., May, 1952, pp. 4-5.

2Procurement by Nggotiation. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, 111., May, 1952, p. 2.

3Ibid. , p. 1.

61
period when each installation, using the monetary ration
allowance, independently purchased its own requirements.
One of the Army's standard methods, known as the indefinite
quantity type of contract, was employed. Under such a
contract, awards were made on the basis of bids submitted
by the vendor thirty to sixty days in advance of delivery.

Prior to the advent of the Market Center System
procurement through sealed written bids was considered
the most advantageous and to the best interest of the
Government, because it was supposed to provide for the
greatest possible competition among the vendors and also
act as a preventative to collusion and price fixing.
Hence, it was the system approved by Congress. However,
the efficient record of perishable subsistence procurement
by the Market Center System caused wide debate as to
which procurement principle would be employed in the
post-war era.

Many reasons were advanced in favor of the continuation
of the negotiation principle. The difference in the time
factors between negotiation and formal advertising was
considered one of the most important in the procurement
field of perishable subsistence. Under negotiation the

maximum lead time between requisition and delivery was

62
approximately ten days, while the time allowance ranged
from Sixty to one hundred fifty days under the formal
advertising method. Excessive lead time added to the
vendors' risk in bidding, making their quotations more
or less speculative, capacially where such other factors
as seasonal marketing conditions and weather had to be
taken into consideration. Under formal advertising these
conditions usually were reflected in higher bids from
the vendors. Moreover, because many of the more reputable
firms in the perishable food industry were unwilling to
take such gambling risks, it was found that the bidding
was frequently confined to less reliable representatives
of the trade.

Procurement by negotiation was generally on the basis
of a single delivery under one contract. The formal
advertising indefinite quantity contract called for the
supply of perishable subsistence for extended periods
of thirty to ninety days. Therefore, under negotiation
a greater number of bidders were encouraged to submit
quotations because of the smaller risks involved. It
followed, therefore, that contracts for perishables
ought to be of as Short a duration as possible. or for
one delivery only, if the most economical prices were

to be obtained.

Single delivery contracts under the negotiation
system meant that many reliable small businessmen were
able to enter the competition.for awards because financing
for future deliveries was not necessary. Each delivery
they made was accomplished shortly after the award and
payment followed within a ten-day period.

Collusion of bidders, or between producers and vendors,
was contrary to the best interest of the Government. The
Market Center System plan of obtaining bids informally
under the negotiated method tended to prevent such agree-
ments. The short time lag between notification and award
and the wider markets secured under negotiated buying
stimulated keener competition among the vendors and made
for lower prices.

The practice of bid-Splitting under the formal
advertising procedure, whereby dealers deliberately bid
high or omitted bids entirely on certain items in order
to avoid being stuck with a contract for articles in short
supply or on which there was only a marginal profit, was
kept to a minimum through purchasing by negotiation. The
close contact of market center buyers with the dealers
often enabled them to persuade reluctant vendors to submit

reasonable bids on such items in order to obtain an award

64
for the more profitable commodities. In addition, under
formal bidding, re-advertising for offers sometimes became
necessary as a result of previous non-bidding by vendors.
In contrast, re-advertising was not used under negotiated
purchasing since the marketing Specialists always had
recourse to the solicitation of as many informal bids as
were needed, through use of the telephone.

Another point in favor of procuring perishable food
through negotiation was the fact that produce men conducted
their transactions on an informal buy-and-sell basis. Not
accustomed to formal bidding they viewed any departure
from their normal methods with some misgivings.

Under negotiation quality of product was more uniform.
All items had to conform to specifications but there could
be a relatively wide range of quality within the grade
purchased by the Government. It was believed by the
Market Center System that absence of personal negotiation
and supervision of procurement as practiced by the buyers
of the agency would result in the Government obtaining
only the lower level of each grade meeting Specifications.

Reasons such as these indicating the greater flexi-
bility of the negotiated procedures caused the War

Department to continue to exempt the procurement of

65
perishable subsistence from adherence to the formal
advertising procedures through 1947, while the Armed
Forces Procurement Act was still being debated in Congress.
Final approval of the Act, Public Law 415, was gained
February 19, 1948 and it became effective three months
later.

.The Act exempted the Market Center System.from the
principal of formal advertising. Armed Services Procurement
Regulations state: '5-209 Perishable Subsistence Supplies;
5-209-1 Authorization. Pursuant to the authority of
Section 2(c)(9) of the Act, purchases and contracts may
be negotiated without formal advertising if ‘for perishable
subsistence supplies'; 5-209-2 application. (This authority
may be used for the purchase of any and all kinds of

perishable subsistence.“4

 

4§pmed Services Procurement Regplation Revision.
U. S. Government Printing Office, June, 1950, p. 506.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY

Prior to the establishment of the Market Center System
the posts, camps, and stations of the Army operated on a
local procurement basis for perishable subsistence. Under
this system each organization was credited with a sum of
money based on a definite quantity and quality of subsistence
items per man per day, which had been found sufficient for
military use in the past. USing this allotted sum the
organization could arrange to buy whatever perishables
it thought desirable.

The system of procuring the various perishable items
locally was through the Army's standard method of formal
advertising, indefinite quantity bids which were made on
the basis of bids submitted by the vendors thirty to Sixty
days in advance of delivery. Under this type of contract
the Quartermaster on delivery date could request as much
more or less than the quantity named in the contract as
he-wished since the quantities listed in both the request
for bids and the contracts were for information only. It

is estimated that under this system the vendor charged

67
15 percent more than normally, to cover the risks of
indefinite quantity provision and the market uncertainties
of the extended period between contract and delivery. Other
weaknesses of the system included limited overall control
by Washington and quality and price variations in perishable
subsistence due to geographical location.

With the growing emergency in 1940 and 1941 the supply
of perishables to the Army and other branches of service
became a wartime problem that could no longer be viewed
from the local procurement standpoint. Once the Selective
Service and Training Bill became law the Army expanded
rapidly and the need of a planned perishable subsistence
program became urgent. Reports began to come in from
various sections of the country showing inordinate and
dangerous disruptions of the civilian food supply and
economy caused by the large concentrations and movement
of troops in the training areas. The resulting program
was the Quartermaster Market Center System established
in the spring of 1941. '

The Market Center System.was a three point program
calling for centralized national control, decentralized
field Operations, and maximum reliance on trained marketing

Specialists to do the purchasing.

68

As outlined in Quartermaster Circular Letter No. 42
the program was in skeleton form leaving room for develop-
ment and expansion according to need. At first procurement
was confined to fresh fruits and vegetables only. The
market centers numbered thirty and were located geographically
to facilitate the service of procurement and distribution
to the installations in their respective jurisdictions.
The Market Center in Chicago was designated the central
office for administrative and control purposes.

A commissioned officer of the Army was in charge of
each market center. He was assisted by civilian marketing
Specialists. The officer was reSponsible for purchasing
procedures. The marketing Specialists, selected for their
expert knowledge of all phases of marketing fresh.fruits
and vegetables, were specifically charged with the
reSponsibility of selecting, inspecting, and grading all
commodities purchased.

Market centers were informed of the needs of the
posts, camps, and stations by means of requisitions.

These requisitions were based on master menus prepared
by the Office of the Quartermaster General and indicated
the day to day requirements of the installation for fresh

produce. The master menu was a standardized menu which

69
indicated the components of each of the three daily meals
for a period of one month. It was issued to each instal-
lation one hundred twenty days prior to the first day of
the month it was effective so that necessary revisions
could be made in light of local market center conditions
pertaining to perishable subsistence. In addition, the
Standardized menu coordinated procurement with overall
requirements.

The Market Center System encouraged carlot and truck-
lot purchases since material savings were effected by such
procurement. Market centers in large producing areas
effected such procurement for nation-wide distribution
as well as for the installations under their jurisdiction.

In order to realize the greatest benefits from carlot
and trucklot procurement overall supervision rested in
Chicago Field Headquarters which had immediate teletype
intercommunications to all market centers. Thus Field
Headquarters could survey national conditions and determine
where the most advantageous procurement could be affected.

The concept of carlot buying was closely allied to
the development of buying directly from the growers whenever
possible instead of from the commission merchant or jobber.

This was made possible by the use of temporary field buying

70
offices in major producing areas. Large quantity purchasing
directly from the growers was possible resulting in sizeable
monetary savings to the Government. Eventually a systematic
rotation of temporary field buying offices was arranged,
whereby the field buyer operated in different sections of
the country at different harvest seasons.

Distribution of fresh fruits and vegetables was usually
directly from the point of purchase to the installation. To
encourage carlot procurement delivery to two or more points
was allowed as were mixed carlots. Small camps not able
to handle large shipments were serviced from the market
center storage facilities or they might be attached to the
larger camps on a "satellite" basis to draw perishable
subsistence issue.

As soon as the procurement of fresh fruits and vegetables
was in progress, preparations were begun for the procurement
of dairy products and poultry, meat, and waterfoods. Es-
tablishment of procurement in these fields was followed
by the inauguration of procurement for frozen fruits and
vegetables and, in limited areas, milk.

Buying as close to the production points as possible
was stressed in dairy products and poultry procurement.

However, in many cases it was necessary to negotiate with

71
commission merchants because they initially assembled
these products in.units that fit the need of the military.
Again, major emphasis was placed in carlot buying for it
was believed that by carlot purchase the greatest economies
would be achieved.

Meat procurement by carlot was handled by Field
Headquarters in Chicago. Less than carlot quantities
were handled by ten market centers at which meat procurement
Specialists were stationed. These market centers were
known as “subheadquarters” and procured the requirements
for nearby market centers not having meat specialists.
Requisitions were handled in the same fashion as for other
commodities.

Major supplies of waterfood were in the coastal areas.
Seven port market centers were opened and waterfood
Specialists assigned to each. These market centers
supplied directly the posts, camps and stations in the
immediate areas.' Field Headquarters transmitted require-
ments of inland inStallations to these centers for fulfillment.

Individual market centers purchased frozen.fruits in
small amounts locally and Field Headquarters was reSponsible
for procurement of the six basic frozen vegetables procured.
Distribution was restricted to those installations which

had proper facilities for frozen foods.

72

Milk procurement was confined to those areas where
production was low. These areas, the south and southwest,
were supplied by the market centers at Fort WOrth, Columbus,
and Wilmington. They were to coordinate procurement and
deliveries to their respective areas.

InSpection of perishable subsistence was by Army
Veterinary Officers. Federal and State InSpectorS, and
market center Specialists. All products purchased were
inspected at origin to conform to Federal Specifications
and at destination inSpection was for count and condition.
The Veterinary Officers were reSponsible for inspection
of all products of animal origin - meats, dairy products,
poultry, and waterfoods. The remaining products were
inspected at origin by Federal or State inspectors and
at destination by qualified personnel of the installation
or by a market center Specialist.

As expansion of the armed forces continued, the
necessity for coordinating the perishable food purchases
became apparent to the various services. Underscoring
this necessity were the procurement difficulties, inter-
agency competition for supplies, and tranSportation trouble
resulting in shortages at many installations. As a result
the Navy joined the Market Center System procurement

75
program followed by the Marine Corps and the Army Air Corps.
In addition the Market Center System procured for the Coast
Guard, the Maritime Commission, the war Relocation Authority,
and aided the Veterans Administration.

After cessation of hostilities in 1945 the Market Center
System continued to procure for the other services on a
voluntary basis. The National Security Act of 1947, which
unified the armed forces, made procurement by the Market
Center System mandatory for all services.

In 1948 another legislative act of extreme importance
to the Market Center System became effective. It was the
Armed Services Procurement Act which allowed perishable
subsistence supplies to be purchased by negotiation without
formal advertising. Purchase by negotiation allows price
quotations from the bidder in writing, by telephone or
telegraph, or by personal contact. Formal advertising,
on the other hand, makes a written Invitation for Bid
.mandatory. A.thirty-day period between Invitation for Bid
and the Submission of Bid is standard practice. The period
cannot be less than ten days except for an emergency
situation.

By using the negotiation method the maximum.time
between bid and delivery is ten days, whereas, sixty to

74

one hundred fifty days could elapse between Invitation
for Bid and final delivery under the formal advertising
indefinite contract method.

The advantages of the Market Center System are:
(1) Centralization of purchase authority and control of
Operations, (2) the negotiated type contract employed,
(5) buying at points of production, (4) mass buying and
diStribution, (5) inspection at origin for quality,
(6) economical coordination of transportation,
(7) utilization of qualified civilian marketing
Specialists, (8) prevention of waste. In respect to
the last point, it is noted that during the last ten
months of the fiscal year 1945, market center procurement
losses due to Spoilage and shrinkage totaled less than
5/1000 of 1 percent. Total purchases for the year were
nearly nine billion dollars.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

75
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Military Publications

Cassidy, Elliot. The D velo ment of at Del Po t

and Fish 220 gnctg for the Anny. Historical Section,
Office of the Quartermaster General, Washington, D. C.,

1944, p. 102.

Prescott, Samuel C. Troop Feeging Programn: A Snpvgy pi

Rntioning ann Snbsistence in the United Staten Anny.
1775-1940. National Defense Research Committee,

Office of Scientific Research and DevelOpment,
washington, D. C., 1944, p. 81.

Rijkind, Herbert. Fresh Foons ior tne Armed Forcea.
Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster

General, Washington, D. C., 1951, p. 591.

Service Technicaleanuals

inmng Sppvipes Erppnpgnent Regnigtion vainion. 'U. S.
Government Printing Office, June, 1950, p. 715.

Departnpnt of the Anny Technical Mannal i0~2i5._ Department
of the Army, Washington, D. 0., June, 1945, p. 159.

Bulletins

Depnypment of thg npny Snpply nniietin 10-260. Department
of the Army and the Air Force, washington, D. C.,
September, 1952, p. 67.

Rationp. Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia,
January, 1949, p. 19.

Procnpement by Formal Adyertising. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, Ill., May, 1952, p. 15.

Procppement by Negotiation. Quartermaster Subsistence
School, Chicago, Ill., May, 1952, p. 7..

Procur e t Pbl i s a tice . Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, 11., May, 1952, p. 9.

76

Snbgistgncg Erocnrnnenp Opgpations. Quartermaster
Subsistence School, Chicago, Ill., May, 1952, p.5.

Subsistpnce Snppiy Stpnptnrp§., Quartermaster Subsistence
School, Chicago, Ill., May, 1952, p. 11.

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