Africans most commonly report "representing the people" as an elected official's most important responsibility; however, only 16% of respondents report that their legislators "listen to what people like [them] have to say" (Afrobarometer Public Opinion, 2005). Given citizen preferences, under what conditions are African elected officials most likely to represent their constituents' interests? Scholars have continuously linked the development of representative institutions to the taxation of citizens. Originating in studies of Western Europe, theory suggests, in order to raise revenue for war/border protection, rulers enter into a contract with citizens: citizens agree to provide tax revenue in exchange for an enhanced role in governance. With taxation comes the incentive for political leaders to shift public policy and spending toward citizen interests. They do so in order to maintain their income source. However, this previous theory ignores how, in many instances, politicians have access to revenue from sources other than taxation. In particular, income from natural resources serves as a large, lucrative alternative to tax revenue. This is especially the case in the African context. How does access to natural resource wealth influence the development of representation? The central hypothesis is that access to an external revenue base provides an avenue that is less costly than bargaining with citizens. Those able fund their governments without taxation can also bypass the need to defer to citizen interests, stymieing the development of representative institutions. In an application of this theory to Africa, analysis focuses on the Nigerian case, where interactions between income from taxation and petroleum create varied revenue compositions across (sub-national) states. Public opinion data as well as data collected during fieldwork in Nigeria (October 2010 - July 2011) are utilized to this end. This includes: budgetary data (1999 - 2009) from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), original interviews with state and national legislators, and expert interviews with civil servants at the Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Inland Revenue Service, and various state internal tax revenue boards. Analysis begins with an outline of the contemporary system of revenue extraction and taxation in Nigeria. Next, utilizing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) statistical models, examination of CBN budgetary data confirms that as revenue from taxation increases, both local and state government spending on public service provision increases. Following this finding, Hierarchical Linear (Statistical) Models are used to test the taxation-representation link at the micro-level. Evidence suggests that state legislators in more tax-reliant states spend the most time performing constituency services. Likewise, when making decisions, these legislators are most likely to prioritize citizens' preferences over other considerations. Last, the investigation considers the other side of the tax contract, investigating how ordinary Nigerians perceive taxation and representation. Using public opinion data, analysis confirms that, in exchange for tax payment, Nigerians expect government to shift their policy and spending to reflect public priorities. Therefore, in circumstances where Nigerians are more satisfied with government performance, we observe higher willingness pay taxes. A relationship between taxation and representative governance suggests that strengthening local and state governments' tax administration and building citizen capacity to monitor government budgeting can also bolster responsive and democratic governance in Africa.
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