A STUDY OF THE TWO
NATIONAL CQ-NGEIEESSIONAL CAMPNESN
COfifiWTTEES

Thesis écor fhc begs“ 0f 56:. A.

MRCMGAN STA“ UHNERSH‘Y

Jaha- Wwdwmcfi mama
W6?

LIBRARY

Michigan State
University

 

ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE TWO
NATIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEES

by John Woodward Thomas

The Congressional Campaign Committees are unique
political organizations which have emerged in response to the
needs of a developing political system. They are a natural
outgrowth of the American system of government which assures
a division of power between its executive and legislative
branches. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the
origins of the Congressional Campaign Committees and to
analyze and interpret their role in contemporary political
life.

To secure historical data on the Committees, it was
necessary to look up party records and campaign literature
and search this material for references to them. Much of the
historical material was obtained from literature of the
history of Congress and its leaders.

Data on the role of the Committees in contempOrary

Politics was secured through interviews with Congressional and

Party leaders, Committee staff members. present and past

J. W. Thomas
members of Congress who had conducted recent campaigns. and
cmtsiders Who, through advisory assistance to the Committees
cu through scholarly investigation, were acquainted with the
work of the Committees.

Attributes and characteristics of Committee leader—
ship were studied on the basis of individual Committee
leaders. Congressional districts represented by leaders
vmre analyzed for rural-urban characteristics, history of
party affiliation. and degree of party reliability. The
jmflividual voting records in Congress were also rated to
determine the degree of party loyalty of Committee leaders.

The results of the historical research indicate that
'UmeCommittees emerged in their present form in 1866. as
organizations to assist members of the legislative branch
in.their struggles for political survival. The strength
and the role of the Committees in subsequent years has
maxed or waned according to the role played by Congress
culthe national scene.

The analysis of the Committees today indicates that
they vary considerably in nature and functions according to
PartY- Both. however, provide assistance to candidates

ulnmny forms. from advice and campaign films to financial

grants.

J. W. Thomas

Examination of districts represented by the Congres-
sional Campaign Committee leadership indicates that leaders
are chosen from safe and reliable areas which are representa-
tive of the areas of party strength. Within Congress these
leaders are always members of the powerful inner circle
within each party. Voting records show that Committee
leaders deviate little from the party majority.

The long-term effects of the Committees. are numerous.
By giving institutional support to Congressional candidates,
strengthening local party organizations and providing
campaign assistance. they have heightened the intensity and
the effectiveness of congressional campaigns. By making
themselves valuable to candidates and by encouraging financial
coordination and cooperative relationships, the Committees
are an important factor working toward party unity. In
addition, the Committees emerge as useful tools of the
Party leaders for maintenance of their control in Congress
and as a means of improving party discipline.

The Congressional Campaign Committees have become
a Permanent institution in contemporary American political
life and their influence may increase for two reasons:
(1) Changing campaign methods with new, complicated and

costly techniques, make it constantly more difficult for

J. W. Thomas
candidates to succeed if they rely solely on themselves
or on their local party organization. (2) The margin
of party control in Congress seems to be diminishing. A
few seats won or lost by either party has an important
bearing on who controls Congress. So long as control of
Congress is sharply contested, the usefulness of the
Committees seems unlikely to be questioned.

Though conjecture as to the future potential of the
Committees is uncertain and though the results of their
efforts remain imponderable. they have convinced congress-
men and the political parties of their usefulness. and, above
all, they have become an accepted part of the American

political system.

A STUDY OF THE TWO
NATIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN

COMMITTEES

BY

John Woodward Thomas

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science
College of Business and Public Service

1961

PREFACE

Among the phenomena which engage the attention of
the modern political scientist. few are more interesting
than those governmental structures which have emerged
in response to the needs of a developing political system.
In this category are the Congressional Campaign Committees,
a distinctive. though inconspicuous (and in some quarters
unknown) part of the American electoral process. Like
their sister organizations, the Senatorial Campaign Committees,
the two Congressional Campaign Committees have become an
accepted part of the working structure of their respective
parties.

The Committees. in both genesis and operation.
are distinctively American. The Constitution of the
United States. in providing a framework of government,
allowed for flexibility and growth. Not only did it
provide for its own amendment; it permitted the creation
of such structures as the President's cabinet and executive
bureaus. and allowed room for the growth of such practices
as judicial review. But the genius of American government
lies in the freedom it gives for the growth of autonomous

structures such as political parties. with their national

ii

conventions, and party organization.

‘Within the latter the Congressional Campaign
Committees have developed to meet specific electoral cam—
paign needs. The Committees reflect American conditions -
geographical, social, and political. We have in America
a large land area with a wide variety of climatic conditions
and distinct regional characteristics, a continent settled
only gradually. and by a heterogeneous people. In such
a nation, political decentralization, with control in the
hands of party leaders in local areas. is a normal pattern.
Since congressional candidates represent the widely divergent
interests of the areas from which they come, it is difficult
for either party to achieve ideological unity.

This means that American party contests, unlike
their western European counterparts, are not clearly focused
upon party issues. In "off" years congressional candidates
are thrown upon their own resources. During presidential
campaigns. though supposedly strengthened by sharing the
presidential ticket. congressional candidates may find it
necessary. because of local conditions. to run on issues
quite disparate from those of their party at the national
level. or they may be eclipsed by a popular presidential
candidate. In either case, and in both presidential and
off-year elections. the isolation of congressional candidates

iii

creates a need for some organization, roughly comparable to
the National Committees of the two parties, devoting its
energies to the problems of congressional elections, to
which candidates may turn for assistance in the lonely and
difficult struggle to win a congressional seat. This need

the Congressional Campaign Committee seeks to meet.

Nature of the problem

To date the Congressional Campaign Committees have
never been adequately studied. Although they occupy an
important niche in the structure of our party and electoral
systems and perform an essential service in the political
process, they are given no formal recognition in Washington
and have been overlooked, to a great extent, by students
of American government.

The fact that very little has been written about
them is understandable, for it is most difficult to secure
information on committees that are extra—legal and semi-
formal, that have no recorded history. and that publish no
annual reports or official records of any kind. Nor are
the committees mentioned in any governmental publication,
not even in the Congressional Directory. Indeed, a case
might be made for the contention that the usefulness of the

committees would be impaired if too much were known about

iv

their operation and functions.

The only available records are minutes of the annual
meetings of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.
held at the beginning of each year for the election of
officers. These go badk as far as 1920 but are of a cursory
nature. serving only to supply names of the committee chair-
men, and including such details as authorization of a letter
of condolence to the family of a deceased committee member.
Neither present committee staffs nor committee members know
much about the history of the committees, nor do they con-
sider such knowledge important.

Furthermore, committee operations are quite fluid.
‘with policies. strategy, and methods varying from time to
time to meet the needs of the many congressional districts.
the changing character of Congress and the fluctuating
political climate. ‘When you add to this the fact that
the Republican and Democratic committees differ in many
respects - some basic. some very minor - and that much of
the work of both (particularly of the Democratic committee)
is highly personal and confidential. with a great deal of
secret strategy. it becomes clear that the task of trying to
investigate these committees is a difficult one.

Since any first study. such as this, must proceed
‘without much help from past research. and since no one

V

person. in a limited period of time, can absolutely verify
all this new and fragmentary information or reconcile all
the conflicting evidence. there will inevitably be some gaps,
some sources undiscovered. some wrong conclusions. One

can only attempt to uncover as many facts as possible and
try to interpret them objectively.

An example of the type of problem encountered is
this: In the 1880's and 1890's the Democratic Party had
a campaign committee which was an adjunct of the National
Democratic Committee and which operated only in presidential
campaigns. for the benefit of presidential candidates. At
times this was referred to in the National Convention
Proceedings and party campaign textbooks as "the campaign
committee." This makes it difficult to distinguish from
the Congressional Committee which, also. is often referred
to as "the campaign committee."

Since data on the history and functions of these
committees can be found in neither primary nor secondary
sources, one must search the literature of the history of
Congress and its leaders in the hope of casual mention of
the committees. For present-day functions of the committees,
interviews must be used. Yet, although the investigator
is courteously received by committee officials, the limits

of the interview technique are apparent and the researcher

vi

is not permitted to pry too deeply into the secrets of the
committee's inside operations.

The writer would not have had the temerity to face
such obstacles but for the encouragement of Dr. Ralph M.
Goldman. whose interest in the Congressional Campaign
Committees and belief that research into their history.
function, and contribution to American party politics
would yield rewarding results. provided the necessary moti-
vation. I am indebted to him for the opportunity to spend
one academic quarter in Washington studying the committees,
and for that guidance and encouragement necessary to the

successful completion of such an investigation.

Treatment of the subjectL methods used; tools

It may be well. at this point, to discuss briefly
the methods used in this study. The work will be divided
into two major sections. The first. "Origins and Evolution,"
‘will attempt a historical analysis of the genesis and
development of the Congressional Campaign Committees. The
second. “Role of the Committees in Contemporary American
Politics," will examine the present activities of the
committees and their role in political campaigns. It will
study committee leadership in relation to such factors as

length of tenure in office, geographical and urban-rural

vii

distribution, and liberal-conservative voting patterns. A
final chapter, ”Problems and Prospects," will attempt to
assess the role of the committees in our party and electoral
system.

In the section on Origins and Evolution I have made
considerable use of party campaign textbooks. These,
published by the National Committees in presidential election
years and by the Congressional Campaign Committees in off
years, provide names of Congressional Committee chairmen,
officers, and executive committee members, and give an
interesting picture of campaign methods and issues in the
second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter
of the twentieth.

Nevertheless, they leave large gaps, for, except
for occasional attacks upon the campaign practices of the
other party, they tell little of the work of the committees.
To fill in these lacunae, the researcher must depend upon
the memoirs of leaders of the Congressional Campaign Committees
or of other members of Congress who may chance to mention
their Congressional Campaign Committee responsibilities in
connection with their other duties. Such records as
the Detroit Post and Tribune's biography of Zachariah
Chandler and LaFollette's Autobiography have provided much
useful material.

viii

As for secondary sources, very few are available.
Except for two current journal articles, there is nothing
more recent than Jesse Macy's Party Organization and
Machinery in a 1912 edition. From this point on, information
has been pieced together from such sources as the Proceedings
of the National Conventions, the occasional and abbreviated
minutes of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
and histories of Congress and of the two parties. These
scanty sources, supplemented by an interview with a former
chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee,
are the only ones available on the history of the Congressional
Campaign Committees. The Congressional Directories and the
Biographical Directorygof the American Congress,1 which
gives a brief biographical sketch of every member of the
Uhited States Senate and House of Representatives from 1774
to 1949, made possible greater utilization of this material.

Part II, "Role of the Committees in Contemporary
American Politics" necessitated a different approach. Here
the only way to obtain the information was through interviews

with congressional and party leaders, members and former

 

1 ‘ . . .
U. S. Congress, Biographical Directory of the

American Congress 1774-1949, ed. James L. Harrison (Washington:
U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1950).

ix

members of the Congressional Campaign Committees and their
executive committees, members and former members of Congress
who had conducted recent campaigns, and outsiders who, through
advisory assistance to the committees or through scholarly
study, were acquainted with the work of the committees.
Recognizing the difficulties and limitations of
the interview technique, it was necessary to plan carefully
for the interviews. I began by reading Hugh Bone's article
in western Politicalguarterly2 and Guy Hathorn's in the
Southwestern Social Science‘Quarterly,3 and by talking with
Professor Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins, and with Stanley
Kelley and Richard Bain, both then of the Brodkings
Institution. Each one gave me valuable insights into the
work of the Committees and suggested leads as to the
available literature on the subject. Special mention should
be made of the assistance given by Dr. Kelley, who first
suggested this study and who gave generously of his time in
helping to get the project started.

‘With the help of Dr. Ralph M. Goldman, a preliminary

 

2Hugh Bone, "Some Notes on the Congressional
Campaign Committees," The Western Politicalgguarterly, IX,
No. 1 (March, 1956). pp. 116-137.

3Guy Hathorn, "Congressional and Senatorial Campaign
Committees in 1954," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
xxxvrx, No. 4 (December, 1956), pp. 207—221.

outline of the material needed was drawn up to provide a

frame of reference for the interviews and some specific goals
toward Which they might be directed. The next problem was
planning to make maximum use of the time devoted to inter-
views and to formulate questions which would draw out the
necessary information. In doing this, Alexander Heard's
article, ”Interviewing Southern Politicians,"4 which discusses
the preparation, interviewing, and tabulating of material

for Southern Politics5 was of great value.

The third step was to secure the names and positions
of persons who should be interviewed,6 and to prepare an
outline, to be used from memory, and from which a detailed
record of each conversation and a later analysis, under the
outline headings, could be made.7

Whenever possible I attempted to secure an intro-
duction to those with whom I had appointments. I opened
each interview with an explanation of the project, giving
the name of the university and my professional advisor; the

response in all cases, was a friendly reception.

 

4American Political Sciegce Review, XLIV, No. 6
(December, 1950). p. 86.

5V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politigs in State and

Nation (New YOrk: Knopf, 1949).
6See list in Bibliography.

For a copy of the outline used for interviews, see
Appendix I.
xi

I found the staff of the Republican Committee gracious
and willing to give all possible assistance. The chairman
of the Democratic Committee, though friendly, warned that,
because of the personal nature of the relationship between
the committee staff and members of Congress whom they served,
it would be impossible to reveal the real nature of the
Committee's work, beyond a statement of the general functions
performed. He advised abandonment of the project on the
grounds that it would be impossible to secure the necessary
data.

The Republican committee staff members, on the
other hand, assured me that their work included very little
of a confidential nature. They made available such records
as they had and answered questions, though I was aware,
of course, that confidential materials were not shared.

In this instance, the popular assertion that the Democratic
Party is more open to study and observation than the
Republican was not borne out. Whether this was a reflection
of the changing policy of the respective Congressional and
National Committees, a response to varying problems faced

by the two Committees or a reflection of the ideas of the
executive officers, I had no way of determining.

I found the members of both committees cordial, but

either unwilling or unable to give detailed information as

xii

to the functioning of the committees. They referred me to
staff members for such information. Democratic congressmen
interviewed seemed to feel that, beyond the small amount
of financial aid made available to them during their campaigns,
their committee had been of little assistance. The
Republicans were usually more positive that their committee
gave real assistance to candidates campaigning in marginal
districts and was of some help to congressmen during
congressional sessions. Neither could give much information.
From the beginning it was recognized that the inter—
view, as a fact-finding technique, was subject to limitations,
since it requires that the informant speak spontaneously,
without time for reflection. In discussing the informal
and semi—confidential work of the Congressional Campaign
Committees there were naturally areas that committee staff
members hesitated to discuss. Nor could one expect a
staff member to give a completely objective account of
services performed by his committee. Yet, since there was
no other source of information, it was impossible.to test
the objective validity of the information given. One
proceeded, believing that the words of Alexander Heard
applied in this case: "The limitations inherent in the

interviewing process have been recognized at the outset,

xiii

but the need to rely on material subject to incompleteness
and even error only pointed up one of the recurring require—
ments of social research: imaginative yet disciplined
thinking, able to work in spite of imperfect data."8
Keeping in mind the imperfect nature of the data, an attempt
has been made both to give a fair representation of the
points of View of the informants and to use disciplined
imagination in interpreting the data.

In Chapter VII, "Attributes and Characteristics of

Committee Leadership,‘ which attempts to analyze and correlate
the available data on the leadership of both committees,
the lists of chairmen and executive committee members from
committee records and campaign textbooks have proved in-
valuable. Congressional Directories, the appendix of
Moos' Politics, Presidents,and Coattails,9 and 1956

. . . lO .
CongreSSional Vbte Statistics, compiled by the

Republican Congressional Committee, were used in studying

marginal districts.

 

8Heard, op. cit.
9Malcolm Moos, Politics, Presidents,_and Coattails
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1952).

10 . . . .
Republican CongreSSional Committee, 1956 CongreSSional

Vbte Statistics (Washington, D. C., 1956).

xiv

In determining the rural-urban classification of
congressional districts I have utilized the standards
adopted by Dr. Ralph M. Goldman in his dissertation,
Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban Representation in Congress11
and am very grateful for permission to do so. By using
these standards in connection with United States Census
statistics, it has been possible to make a detailed study
of the district of each Campaign Committee chairman.12
Some Special problems encountered in this connection will
be dealt with in Chapter VII.

A final evaluative chapter (VIII), "Problems and
Prospects," includes the generalizations which inevitably
emerge from such a study. As research progresses, the
student becomes increasingly convinced of the importance
of the Congressional Campaign Committees. Though ostensibly
set up merely to help congressional candidates by giving
advice and some financial assistance, the Committees actually

exert an appreciable and, apparently, a growing influence

 

11Ralph M. Goldman, "Some Dimensions of Rural and

Urban Representation in Congress" (unpublished Master's
dissertation, Department of Political Science, University
of Chicago, 1948).

12See Appendix IV for population figures by
Imunicipalities and rural-urban classification of each.

XV

on American political life at local, state, and national
levels. They have, indeed, become both an indispensable
political instrument and a center of power. How this has

come to be, and why, this study will attempt to show.

xvi

‘--I
n!"
O I“!

5’

.-

.
V-«I

PREFACE

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABIIES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Chapter

I.

II.

PART I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL DOMINANCE:
1789 - 1825 O o o o o o o o o a o o o o

CONGRESSIONAL ASCENDANCY CHALLENGED;
CONGRESS FIGHTS BACK . . . . . . . . .
III. THE COMMITTEES EMERGE . . . . . . . . . .
IV. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1866 TO THE TURN OF THE
CEN TURY O O O O O O O O O O O I O C O 0
PART II. ROLE OF THE COMMITTEES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS
V. THE TWO COMMITTEES: STRUCTURE AND FINANCE
VI. MODERN CAMPAIGN FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
VII. ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . .
VIII. COMPARISONS AND PROSPECTS . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvii

Page
ii

xviii

20

3O

47

66

87

128
169

205

Table

10.

11.

12.

LIST OF TABLES

Experience of Members of the First House
of Representatives . . . . . . . . . . .

Party Distribution in the House of
Representatives, 1855 - 1867 . . . . . .

Party Distribution in the Senate, 1855 -
1867 O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O 0

Party Representation by States, 39th
Congress, Showing Republican Strength
by States in 1866 . . . . . . . . . . .

Congressional Campaign Committee Receipts
and Expenditures as Reported for 1956 .

Contributions of over $1,000 from Individual
Donors Reported by Congressional Campaign
Committees, 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . .

Size of Gifts from Individual Donors
Reported by Congressional Campaign
Committees in 1956 . . . . . . . . . . .

Expenditures Reported by the Two
Congressional Campaign Committees, 1952 -
1956 C O C C O I O C O O O C O O O O O 0

Congressional Districts Which Were Marginal
in the Congressional Elections, 1956 . .

Distribution of Marginal Districts in Ten
Congressional Elections, 1938 - 1956 . .

States in Which Grants from One or Both
Committees Totaled $1,000 or Less in

the 1956 Campaign . . . . . . . . . . .

States in Which Grants from One or Both
Committees Totaled $10,000 or More . . .

xviii

Page

11

42

42

43

83

83

84

84

89

91

108

109

Table

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

States in Which Grants from One or Both
Committees in the 1956 Campaign
Totaled $5,000 to $9,999 . . . . . . . .

States in Which Grants from One or Both
Committees in the 1956 Campaign Totaled
$1,000 to $5,000 . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of Grants by the Republican Committee
in the 1956 Campaign to Incumbents and
Non-incumbents in Marginal and Non-
Marginal Districts and Number of Seats
Won . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Table 15 . . . . . . . . . . .

Amount of Money Distributed in the 1956
Campaign by the Republican Committee
in Grants of Incumbents and Non-
incumbents in Marginal and Non-
marginal Districts . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Table 17 . . . . . . . . . . .

Size of Grants by the Republican Committee
to Incumbent, Non-incumbent, Marginal and
Non—marginal Candidates (1956 Campaign)

Number of Grants by the Democratic Committee
in the 1956 Campaign to Incumbents and
Non-incumbents in Marginal and Non-
marginal Districts . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Table 20 . . . . . . . . . . .
Amount of Money Distributed by the Democratic
Campaign Committee in Grants to Incumbent
and Non—incumbent Candidates in Marginal

and Non-marginal Districts (1956) . . .

Summary of Table 22 . . . . . . . . . . .

xix

Page

110

111

113

113

114

114

115

117

117

118

118

Table

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

Page

Size of Grants by the Democratic Committee
in the 1956 Campaign to Incumbents,
Non-incumbents, Marginal and Non-
marginal Districts . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Number and Percentage of Grants by Both
Committees During the 1956 Campaign
to Incumbents, Showing Length of
Service in Congress . . . . . . . . . . 121

Age of Republican Congressional Campaign
Committee Chairmen from 1865 to 1957
at the time of assuming the chairmanship -
by five, ten, and twenty year groupings 134

Age of Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee Chairmen from 1865 to 1957,
at the time of assuming chairmanship -
by five, ten, and twenty year groupings 135

Positions Held by Campaign Committee
Chairmen (1865 - 1957) Prior to Their
Chairmanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Length of Congressional Service by Campaign
Committee Chairmen (1865 - 1957) before
Election to Chairmanship of Campaign
Committees .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Length of Service as Congressional Campaign
Committee Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Geographical Distribution of Committee
Chairmen by Regions . . . . . . . . . . 142

Rural—urban Distribution of Republican
Committee Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Rural-urban Distribution of Democratic
Committee Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Rural-urban Classification of Committee
Chairmen of Both Parties to Show

Distribution in Three Groupings . . . . 150

XX

Table

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

Voting Pattern in Districts Represented by
Committee Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . .

Deviant Voting of Campaign Committee Chair-
men, Past, Incumbent, and Future, in the
79th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deviant voting by Members of the Republican
Campaign Committee's Executive Committee
in the 79th Congress . . . . . . . . . .

Deviant VOting by Members of the Democratic
Campaign Committee's ExeCutive Committee
in the 79th Congress . . . . . . . . . .

Deviation in voting to the Right or Left of
the Two-Party Coalition by Campaign
Committee Chairmen, Past, Incumbent and
Future in the 79th Congress . . . . . .

xxi

Page

153

157

159

160

163

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix

I.

II.

III.

IV.

MATERIALS USED IN INTERVIEWING CONGRESSIONAL

CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE PERSONNEL . . . . . .

A. Questions Used in Interviewing
Congressional Campaign Committee
Chairmen and Staff Members . . . . . .

B. Questions Asked of Congressional
Campaign Committee Members (Present

and Past) 0 O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O.

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
LEADERSHIP: NAMES OF OFFICERS AND
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS . . . . . .

A. The Democratic Committee . . . . . . .
B. The Republican Committee . . . . . . .
MAI GN TOOLS . O O O O O O O O O O O O O

A. Copy of Questionnaire Sent to All
County Chairmen in 1956 by the
Republican Congressional Committee . .

B. Candidate Analysis Sheet Prepared by
Republican Congressional Committee . .

C. Copy of Precinct Analysis Sheet as
Prepared by the Republican
Congressional Committee . . . . . . .

D. Data Sheet for Compiling Election Data
by Sta tes O O O O O C O O O O O O O O

E. Michigan State Election Results
1952-1956 0 o o o o o o o o o o o o o

POPULATION STATISTICS ON DISTRICTS OF
COMTTEE GIMMN O O O O O O O O O O O

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS BY BOTH.CONGRESSIONAL

COMMITTEES TO CANDIDATES IN THE 1956
EECTION O 0 ' 0 o o o o

xxii

Page

215

215

220

222
222
235

244

244

249

250

252

254

257

284

PART I

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL DOMINANCE:

1789 - 1825

The Congressional Campaign Committees, though of
comparatively recent origin, are a natural outgrowth of the
American system of government. That system (though in the
English constitutional tradition) has one distinctive
feature; the separation of power. This can best be under-
stood in the light of a dominant fear generated by events
in both Europe and America during the colonial period - the
fear of tyranny, particularly as represented by a strong
executive.

It was as a deterrant to tyranny that separation
of powers was written into our governing instrument. The
complete separation of the executive and the legislative
branches created a dualism, not only legally, as in
England, but in fact. This has given rise to perpetual
tension, if not open conflict, between the President and
Congress - tension whiCh helped create the need for
Congressional Campaign Committees.

Furthermore, the Constitution, while establishing
the broad outlines of government, leaves to later authorities

2

the making of specific decisions as to the exact powers
belonging to each branch. The general nature of many
Constitutional provisions is illustrated by Article II

which provides for the Executive Department of the govern-
ment. Corwin calls Article II the most loosely drawn

chapter of the Constitution: "To those who think that a
constitution ought to settle everything beforehand, it should
be a nightmare; by the same tOken, to those who think that
constitution—makers ought to leave considerable leeway for
the play of future political forces, it should be a vision
realized."l

Article II begins: "The executive power shall be

vested in a President of the United States." Do these

words comprise a grant of power or are they a mere designation
of office? The exact definition of the powers granted

must depend upon the viewpoint of the interpreter. An

able and aggressive President, feeling that the good of

the nation can best be served by strong executive leadership,
can find in the Constitution authority for pursuing a

strong course of action. Conversely, a Congress convinced

that there is danger in the seizure of too much power by

 

1Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Power
(3rd ed.; New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 2.

4
the Chief Executive, can use all the weapons in its arsenal,
as a reading of the constitutional provisions for Congress
will show, to check the President.

In this context, with power divided, and with executive
responsibility not clearly defined, both the President and
Congress must operate. Since both are dependent upon party
organizations to carry their plea for re-election to their
constituents, and since the President, as leader of his
party, can exert considerable influence upon his party and
may even exercise control of its machinery, it is not
surprising that congressmen should desire a party instrument,
such as the Congressional Campaign Committee, designed to
serve them and them alone.

The Constitution, in its design to provide a
system of cheeks and balances in government, provides for
the election of Representatives on the basis of population,
two Senators from each state, and a President from the
country at large. This means, in practice, that the

congressman has a different constituency from that of the

President.

 

2The fact that many influential Congressmen represent
conservative rural areas while the President, representing the
nation, is responsible for the national welfare, causes a
division between the two branches of government that is often
hard to bridge. For a discussion of presidential and
congressional constituencies, see V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics,

 

5

In a nation as large as the United States,
sectionalism is almost inevitable. National issues do not
have the same appeal in every state, much less in every
congressional district. Furthermore, congressional
elections occur every two rather than every four years, and
congressmen, each with a different constituency, to which
different issues appeal, and compelled to hold frequent
campaigns, need a party instrument tailored to their
requirements. This the Congressional Campaign Committees
provide.

The Congressional Campaign Committees are, again,
a natural product of the development of the American two-
party system. Being highly decentralized, American political
organization has tended to proliferation. Instead of the
logically-planned structure designed to serve a centralized
political system, American political party agencies, commonly
called committees, spring up in response to need and con-
tinue as long as the need exists. The Congressional Campaign

.Committees were organized to meet the needs of congressmen.

 

Parties, and Pressure Groups (3rd ed.; New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell, 1953), p. 715.

3An excellent discussion of the need of congressmen
for the Congressional Campaign Committee is found in Jessee
Macy's Party Organization and Madhinery (New York: Century,
1912). pp. 87—95.

6
As years have passed, the Congressional Campaign Committees,
while retaining their original function of helping congress-
men win elections, have added other functions as the needs
of the congressmen they serve have multiplied.

The question now arises: if Congressional Campaign
Committees fill such a need, why were they nor organized
in 1790 rather than in 1866? Many answers might be
given. One emerges as we consider that, in the early years
of the United States, when Congress held the dominant power
over the Executive, the need of congressmen for a special
committee was less urgent.

There are several reasons why Congress was dominant
during its early years. First, the pattern by which the
Federal Government was fashioned was derived largely from
colonial experience. As Professors Binkley and Moos put
it, "Slowly and surely there emerged out of colonial
political experience the pattern of American government as
we know it, with its executive, its bi-cameral legislature,
and its courts. The development of the colonial legis-
lature became the supreme political experience of the

American colonists."4 The colonial assembly, though it

 

4Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, A Grammar
of American Politics (2nd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1952),
p. 21;

came into being more by accident than by intent, became
the dominant power in colonial government. Members of the
assembly were elected by the people, while the governors,
usually appointed by the king, were responsible for
seeing that the king's laws were executed and his taxes
collected.5
As the agent of the mother country, required to
place her interest above that of the colonists, the governor
became, in the minds of most colonists, the incarnation of
tyranny. Binkley and Moos put it well when they say,
"The persistent, deep-seated, American suspicion that tyranny
lurks in the executive, is a tradition rooted in colonial
experience."
Members of the Assembly were elected to protect
the rights of the people.
In time every colony had a popularly elected
branch whose members felt that they had a mandate
from their constituents to safeguard taxation

and public expenditures. Through this control of
the purse, they effectively checked the power

 

5"In the charter colony of Massachusetts, the governor

was elected by the freemen, which term at first included
only the stockholders and members of the established church.
In Connecticut and Rhode Island the legislatures elected

the governor annually and he was consequently their
obsequious servant." Ibid., p. 23.

61bid.

8

of the governor, even when he was appointed by

the King. The governor was dependent for his salary

upon the will of the Assembly and he had to bargain

for it, quite commonly by dickering with the

legislature when it wished his approval of certain

measures.7
Men emerging from such an experience wanted Congress dominant
in the new government. Later, when these men were elected
to the House of Representatives or appointed to the Senate,
they used the procedures to which they had become accustomed
to keep the Executive subservient to the Legislature.

Another factor in early congressional ascendancy
was the suspicion with which the Executive was regarded.
In early post-Revolutionary days all centralized government
was held in suspicion - so much so that enemies of
constitutional ratification attacked the document as setting
up congressional tyranny to replace that of King George.
There was even deeper distrust of the Executive.

This was understandable, for the colonists had just gone

through seven years of war, with its attendant hardships,

and their motivation had been largely hatred of George III.

 

71bid., p. 22.

8"The opposition promptly focused attention on the
imposing list of powers delegated to Congress. They had not,
as they put it, overthrown King George only to enthrone King
Congress." Ibid., p. 23.

9

For most colonists, the royal governors were his symbol.
Small wonder that “the colonial period ended with the
belief prevalent that the 'executive magistracy' was the
natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend
of liberty, a belief strengthened by the contemporary spectacle
of George III's domination of Parliament.“9

A third factor that contributed to the power of
Congress during the country's formative years was the dis-
parity in political experience between the members of
Congress and the President. washington, though an able
statesman, was a planter and soldier, with little experience
in practical politics. Nor was he, by temperament or
background, prepared to take the lead in legislation.
Moreover, the entire Executive Branch was weak. There were
only five cabinet members, and other executive departments,
left by the Constitution to be established by Congress,
were few.

The First Congress, on the other hand, was made up
of the nation's ablest political leaders. The colonists,
used to regarding their elected assemblies as the seat of

government, chose as their representatives the men who had

 

9C0rWin. OE. Cite. p. 4.

10

controlled the political machinery in their local communities.
Both political theorists and men with wide experience in
practical politics were elected to the Heuse of Representatives.
Thirty-five of its sixty-six members had been members of
the Continental Congress. Its roster included the strongest
local leaders the colonies had produced: signers of the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, future
state legislators and governors, cabinet members, and even
a President - men who were to influence the political life
of the states and the nation for years (see Table 1).

Of a total of sixty-six members, we find, in addition
to a distinguished list of past services, that eleven were
to serve once and more as presidential electors, that seVen
became state governors, that seventeen served in the United
States Senate (of which three were presidents pgg‘tgm),
that two served as Speakers of the House of Representatives,
that sixteen were elected as state senators, and that
twenty became court officials, national, state, or local.
The list includes a President of the United States, a
Vice President, a Secretary of State, a United States
Treasurer, and a minister to Spain and Portugal.

These men, particularly those chosen as the formal

leaders of Congress, expected to assume national leadership,

11
TABLE 1

EXPERIENCE OF MEMBERS OF FIRST HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR To ELECTIONa

 

 

Number holding Percentage holding
Position position position

Member Colonial or

State Legislature 50 75.7
Member Continental ,
Congress 35 53

Member State Consti-
tutional Convention
(to write state or
ratify federal con—
stitution)c 24 36

Judge (includes one
state Attorney General) 12 18

Governor, Lieut. Governor,
member of governing

councilc 10 15
Member U.S. Constitutional
Convention 10 15

Signer of U.S. .
Constitution 6 9

Signer, Declaration of
Independence 4 6

Signer, Articles of
Confederation 2 3

AA- ,_ _.

aData from the Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1774-1947.

b66 = 100% (66 members of the First House of Representatives).

CIncludes one who declined to serve.

12

and the relative weakness of the Executive gave them their
opportunity.

This leadership had electoral implications. Men
used to controlling local politics assumed campaign leader-
ship as a matter of course. Without the formality of a
campaign committee they saw that promising candidates were
nominated and exerted influence in their communities to
help them win their campaigns.

Beginning with the selection of a successor for
Washington, the House of Representatives, through the
use of the caucus, began to take over the nomination of the
president. The Constitution is silent on the subject of
nominations for the presidency. The founding fathers
evidently assumed that the president could be chosen
without a formal method of nomination. They feared the
disruptive influence of political parties (factions). It
was their hope that by means of the electoral congress
they had made it impossible for "factions" to influence

10
the government.

 

10For a discussion of the feeling of the writers

of the Constitution on political parties, or factions, see
the Federalist Papers #10, The Federalist, ed. Edward
Gaylord Bourne (washington: M. W. Dunne Co., 1901).

 

13
In this they were mistaken.ll Before the end of

washington's second term, parties were at work. Despite
this, there was no attempt at party selection in preparation
for the campaign of 1788. Candidates practically nominated
themselves. The result was that the electorate was presented
with nine presidential candidates. With such procedures
no party system could work. If a party was to win an
election some method was needed whereby candidates could
be agreed upon in advance. Otherwise the votes might be
so distributed among several candidates that they would
yield no majority.

'Faced with this problem, early Americans drew
upon their experience in colonial politics, where they had
found the caucus a convenient way of chooSing candidates
for local offices. Shortly after the Revolutionary War
the caucus was widely used by the states for selecting and
nominat1ng state officers. Here was a tool ready for use
by party members in the House of Representatives.

It seems that the caucus was first used for the

selection of a vice—president in 1796. "As the time for

 

llSee E. E. Schattschneider, Partngovernment

New York: Rinehart, 1942), Chapters I and II, pp. 1-34
for a discussion of the constructive part political parties
have played in the United States.

14

waShington's retirement approached,’ says Edward Stanwood
in,A Historygofgthe Presidency, "Federalists and Republicans
prepared for a contest. In 1796 there appears to be some
previous understanding within each party, perhaps through
the medium of a caucus."12

There is no doubt that in 1800 the caucus was used.
As the election approached, the Federalists were badly
divided. Hamilton, recognizing that a divided party could
not win an election, and motivated by fear of Jefferson,
sought some means of uniting the party and yet insuring the
defeat of Adams. His task was made more difficult by
the contention of the Federalists that factionalism.wou1d
lead to the destruction of constitutional government.

wa was he to unite a party without repudiating the Federalists'

 

2Edward M. Sait, American Parties and Elections
(3rd ed.; New YOrk: Appleton - Century, 1942), p. 312 citing
Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928).

3See Ostrogorski, Democracygand the Organization of
Political Parties, VOl. II (New YOrk: Macmillan Co., 1902),
pp. 14, 15. A letter reflecting the method of dealing with
such matters is quoted in a footnote, p. 15: "What!
Discuss! Are you daring enough to arrest the votes of
Americans by telling them that their servants in Congress
have already decided the choice? Are you so abandoned as
to stab the Constitution to its Vitals by checking the
free exercise of the people in their suffrage?" From Niles',
weekly Register, Baltimore, XXVI, p. 178.

15
stand against "factions"?

He attempted a solution by holding a caucus, the
members of which were sworn to secrecy, but news of the
meeting leaked out through an unfriendly journalist. This
led to a violent attack on the Federalists by their
Republican opponents - an attack which did not, however,
keep the opposition from calling a secret caucus of its own
and agreeing upon candidates. The FederaliSts were so
shattered by the election of Jefferson that they held no
more caucuses, but left the selection of candidates to
party leaders.

The Jefferson Republicans used the caucus again in
1804, doing away with any attempt at secrecy and making it
an open assembly. The Republican members of Congress met
publicly, with all the formalities of a deliberative
assembly, as if they were acting in pursuance of their
mandate.

For almost a quarter of a century the caucus con-
tinued to be used as the means by which the Jeffersonian
Republicans, later known as the Democrats, nominated

candidates.14

14Used for this purpose there was much to be said

for the caucus. Claudius 0. Johnson lists five advantages
of the caucus over the convention system: "(1) The caucus,

16

Eventually, however, the caucus ran into popular
(fisfavor. It ran counter to the growing opinion, particularly
strong among workers and western pioneers, that even nomina-
tions should be made by a body representing all the people.
The caucus, they complained, did not give all elements in
a party a chance to be heard.

Dissatisfaction became articulate with the
presidential election of 1808, when the congressional
caucus nominated Madison, rather than Monroe, to succeed
Jefferson. Feeling ran so high that Monroe supporters
agitated in favor of overthrowing Madison as a nominee.
Though the nomination stood, dissatisfaction mounted.

In 1812 Monroe supporters initially refused to
support the renomination of Madison. The caucus attempted
to heal the breach by appointing a Committee of Correspondence

to conduct the campaign. ”This caucus, (June, 1812)

 

composed of congressmen, was better fitted than ordinary
voters or even state officers, to pass upon the fitness of
men for the highest office in the nation. (2) Since its
nembers held office, it could not escape responsibility for
its choice of candidates, as a convention meeting quadrien-
nially, for only a few days, may so easily do. (3) The
caucus did not name 'dark horses' but tended to nominate men
of ripe experience and known opinions on public affairs.

(4) It was likely to name candidates acquainted with legis-
lative temperament and methods, thus assuring some degree of
harmony between Congress and the President. (5) The caucus
was a convenient way of making nominations." From Claudius
0. Johnson, American National Government (3rd. ed.; New YOrk:
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), p. 186.

l7

Tmcording to Simeon Fess, I'took an important step in appointing
a Committee of Correspondence which was the first Congressional
Campaign Committee in our history. It was made up of one
member from each state, except Connecticut and Delaware.
This step was the beginning of the party machinery which
was soon to play such an important part in the elections."15

The use of the caucus as a means of selecting candi-
dates gave Congress even more power over the Executive.
The one strong president of‘the period was Thomas Jefferson,
though he exercised his power more as party leader than as
president. "Mr. Jefferson,"&wrote Representative John
Marshall in a letter to Hamilton, in which he refused to
support the re-election of Jefferson, "appears to me to be
a man who will embody himself with the House of Representatives.
By weakening the office of President, he will increase his
personal power. He will diminish his responsibility,
sap the fundamental principles of government, and become

leader of that party which is about to constitute the

majority in the legislature."

 

5Simeon Fess, Political Theory and Partngrganization
in the Unitengtates (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1916). p. 131.

16W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President (New
York: Doubleday, 1937). P. 50, citing Hamilton's Works VI,
pp. 501—03, quoted in A. J. Beveridge, Life of Johp;Mar§hall
(New YOrk: Hbughton Mifflin, 1916-1919). P. 537.

18

Marshall's prophesy was, in a measure, fulfilled,
for Jefferson's leadership was exerted through his party.
In undisputed control here, he was able so to direct
congressional elections that the Speaker of the House, as
well as prominent committee members, were his loyal lieu-
tenants. What Marshall did not understand was that Jefferson's
technique would prove_to be ". . . remarkably productive in
terms of legislative accomplishments."l7 But Marshall was
correct in believing that Jefferson would "weaken the office
of the presidency." To quote Corwin again, "This, too, was
justified when the Ulysses bow of party leadership passed
into feebler hands."18

From the election of 1812 to 1825 Congress dominated
the Executive. The presidents of that period, realizing
their dependence upOn Congress for renomination, knew that
they would be tempting Fate to flout Congress. Indeed,
they were less impressed by the approval or disapproval
of their far-flung constituency than by the reaction of -
Congress which, with its caucus system, was in a position

to apply pressure at an earlier stage in the electoral

4

7 . . . -

Edward S. CorWIn, TheAPreSIdent: Office and
Powers (3rd ed., New YOrk: New York University Press, 1948),
p. 21.

18Ibid.

l9
process. Since congressional approval was the first hurdle
for a president seeking re-election, it behooved him to
cultivate Congress in order that he might have an
opportunity to take his case to the people. As Binkley
Observes, "A visiting foreigner with penetrating insight
might have contributed an interesting chapter on our
unwritten constitution in 1825. He might have observed
that under the circumstances of congressional influence
on presidential elections, these events did not constitute
popular referenda on presidential policies."19 By
controlling its party machinery through the caucus, Congress
stood in a position of such dominant power that it felt no

need for Campaign Committees.

 

19W. E. Binkley, The Powersgof the President, p. 66.

CHAPTER II

CONGRESSIONAL ASCENDANCY CHALLENGED7

CONGRESS FIGHTS BACK

With the disappearance of the Federalist Party in
1820, presidential nominations were controlled by one party,
the Democratic-Republican, though other parties sent members
to Congress. When the Democratic—Republican Party held its
caucus, people argued, voters in those districts which had
elected an opposition candidate to Congress went without
representation. Discontentment came to a head When, in 1824,
the Republican caucus nominated for presidentWilliam H.
Crawford, a man well-known in Washington circles but
unknown to the voters, who expressed their resentment by
refusing to vote for Crawford.

The caucus brOke down with the failure of its
selection for president in 1824. With that breakdown, the
country entered a new era. Since none of the nominees
in the 1824 campaign were elected, the election was thrown
into the House of Representatives. The Heuse decided in
favor of John Quincy Adams, though Andrew Jackson had a
plurality of the popular vote. Jackson's followers lOOked

upon Adams as the beneficiary of a corrupt bargain. This

20

21
suspicion was heightened when Adams appointed Henry Clay,
whose influence in the House had elected Adams, as his
Secretary of State.

Jackson's followers got their revenge at the mid-
term elections of 1826, when for the first time in history,
according to Binkley, a large majority of the voters opposed
the administration. Adams was prepared to give more aggres-
sive leadership than the country had had since Jefferson's
administration, but with Congress in the hands of an antago—
nistic faction, he could not even get his measures effectively
presented. "Disregarding the President's messages and pro-
gram," says Binkley, "Congress spent its energy in a grand
inquest into the conduct of the Executive. Only the absence
of great issues prevented serious conflict between Congress
and the President."1

The result of the disputed election of Adams and his
unsatisfactory four years in the White Hbuse was the over—
thrOW'Of the caucus system. HOw the nominations of 1828
were made seems uncertain. Cousens ventures that "the
candidacies of Adams and Jackson for the presidency were

well understood from the time of the previous election.

 

1W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 68.

22
VThe choice of vice-presidential candidates was not so
easily accomplished, but the continuance of Calhoun in
office was known to be satisfactory to Jackson and his
supporters, while the President's followers were willing
to support anyone whom their leader should think of most
assistance to the ticket. In this situation the nominations
of Jackson and Calhoun on the one side and of Adams and
Rush on the other appear to have been made by the state
convention in Pennsylvania (the state then having the
largest electoral vote) and by acquiescence of the rest
of the country."2

The election of Andrew Jackson marked a distinct
change in the relationship between Congress and the

Executive. "Jackson's presidency.’ observes Corwin,
"was, in truth, no mere revival of the office; it was the
. . "3
remaking of it.
Jackson was the first president since washington
to be nominated without congressional involvement. This

gave him a degree of power and independence not known to

his predecessors. He was dependent for re—election not

A__-_

2TheodoreW. Cousens, Politics and Political Organizations
in America (New YOrk: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 344-45.

 

3Corwin, op. cit., p. 22.

23
upon Congress but upon the agrarian and laboring masses
that had elected him. Under his leadership the presidency
was transformed from an office subservient to Congress to
one primarily dependent upon popular support.

”This transformation of the presidency from a
congressional to a popular agency was not to take place
without a gigantic struggle, which came to a head in
Jackson's veto of the bill to recharter the Bank of the
United States four years before its expiration."4

Though Congress, under the able leadership of Henry
Clay, tried to prevent it, President Jackson was re-elected.
Clay then introduced in the Senate a motion to censure the
President. The motion was defeated, largely through the
efforts of Thomas H. Benton, leader of the Jackson forces
in the Senate, and that body, under pressure from the
administration, voted to expunge the vote of censure from
the record.5 The presidency had finally declared its right

to stand on equal footing with other branches of the

 

4Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 69.

"The Senate," declared Clay, "is no longer fit for
a decent man. I shall escape from it with the same pleasure
that one would fly from a charnel house." From Henrprlayfs
Life and Speeghes, VOl. II, quoted by Binkley, The Powers
of the President, p. 88.

24
Federal Government.
"Through the development of the party organization

under Jackson, says Corwin, "an instrument was forged
which reached to the ends of the Union. By the use of this
new instrument . . . Jackson became the first president
in our history to appeal to the people over the heads of
their legislative representatives. At the same time, the
office itself was thrust forward as one of three equal
departments of government and to each and every one of its
own powers was imparted new scope, new vitality. The
Presidency became tridimensional and all its dimensions
underwent more or less enlargement."6

The response of Congress to Jackson's leadership
was to create a new party, the Whigs. Its dominant purpose
was to recapture the government for congressional leader-
ship. ”Since the Whig party originated as an anti—Jackson
coalition," says Binkley, “resistance to executive auto-
cracy became the common denominator in it . . . . John
Locke had written the Bible of‘Whiggery in his Treatise on

Government in order to vindicate the sovereignty of the

legislature and settle for all time the issue of just such

 

6Corwin, op. cit., p. 23.

25

autocracy as Jackson was now imposing on the American
people."7

Thus, out of the conflict between Congress and the
Executive, congressional leaders were able to gather the
various interests opposed to Jackson into a political party.
This party, composed as all American parties have been, of
a number of interest groups, soon foundered on the issue
of slavery. Nevertheless it did institutionalize, for a
brief period, the desire for legislative supremacy in govern-
ment.

It is interesting to speculate as to what might
have happened if Jackson had been followed by presidents
able to exercise the same quality of dynamic leadership.
This, however, was not to be. Martin Van Buren, whom
Jackson chose as his successor, did not, as his biographer
admits, have "the strong, vivid personality of Jackson."8

Early in van Buren's administration occurred one of
the worst financial panics in the nation's history, for which

the Chief Executive, though not responsible, was blamed.

 

7Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties,
Their Natural History (New YOrk: Knopf, 1951), pp. 170-71.

8Frank R. Kent, The Democratic Party (New YOrk:
Century, 1938), p. 27.

26
The result was the election of a Congress hostile to the
Administration. Under this double handicap, Van Buren was
unable to exercise executive leadership.

In 1840 the Whigs won the election by abandoning
their principles in favor of a popular military hero, William
Henry Harrison, whom they felt sure they could elect.

At this point, the Democratic Party claims, their
Congressional Campaign Committee began. "Democratic
Congressional Committees, including membership from both
Hbuse and Senate, were in existence as early as 1842, when
a committee of the Democratic members of the Congress
published a declaration of principles for General Harrison's
administration."9 The Democratic Manual goes on to say
that permanent organization was not effected until 1866.

John Tyler succeeded Harrison, Who died a few months

after his inauguration. The Whigs anticipated that Tyler

 

9Clarence Cannon, The Official Manual of the Democratic
National Convention (Washington: Democratic National
Committee, 1956). P. 10. No other reference to the existence
of a Democratic Congressional Committee in 1842 is to be
found. Neither members of the.present Congressional Campaign
Committees nor Clarence Cannon, author of the Manual, can
supply the source of the statement just quoted, nor can give
any information about the committee formed in 1842. This
may have been an early experiment in which members of the
party, in Congress, banded together for mutual advantage
during the campaign, gaining experience which was utilized
at a later date.

27

would be a willing tool in the hands of Congress, but actually
Tyler, as a president, was more a Democrat than a Whig. The
result was a deadlock between Congress and the President.

In 1844 Polk was elected by the Democratic Party.
Polk believed in a strong executive and attempted to give
decisive leadership. His efforts were frustrated by a
clamorous‘Whig minority in the lower House during his first
two years and by a hostile majority during the last two.

In 1848 the Whigs again turned to a military hero,
General Zachary Taylor. Taylor's inaugural appeared to be
a statement of surrender to Congress. "The Executive,"
he said, "has authority to recommend, not to dictate,
measures to Congress. Having perfOrmed this duty, the
Executive Department of the government cannot rightfully
control the decisions of Congress on any subject of
legislation until that decision has been rightfully submitted
to the President for approval."10

Taylor must soon have discovered that it was impossible
to play this dual role, for before his death, which occurred
early in his administration, he was giving aggressive leader-

ship to the forces arrayed against Clay's compromise.

 

loWilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress
(New York: Knopf, 1947), P. 103.

28

With Taylor's death, Millard P. Fillmore assumed
the presidency. He played the role assigned him by the
Whigs, which once more assured Congress of the dominant
position.

The administrations of Pierce and Buchanan were
likewise characterized by surrender to Congress. From the
close of the Mexican war, attempts had been made to avoid
a national split over the issue of slavery. The search for
a compromise brought Congress back into power, since, "for
the handling of this highly-charged question by the devices
of negotiation and compromise, Congress and especially the
Senate, offered a far better theater than the Presidency.

So the forces making for compromise systematically depressed

the Presidency by taking care that only manageable personalities
were elevated to it. From the close of the War of 1861 the

"11

Presidency was in the doldrums . . . .

This legislative-executive struggle, with its

 

lCorwin op. cit., p. 26. In a footnote Corwin
adds, ”The instrument by which the slave-holding interest
was able to assure the nomination of manageable personalities
was the two-thirds rule Which was established by the first
Democratic National Convention and was not abolished until
104 years later. Yet it is significant that even during
this period the charge of 'executive usurpation' was
sometimes made." (Quoted from Charles Warren, Presidential
_Declaration of Independence, pp. 19-20).

29
fluctuating locus of power, was no temporary phenomenon,
characteristic of the first half of the nineteenth century.
It is a continuing aspect of American politics. From the
time of Jackson, as Congressional dominance became increasingly
threatened by the Presidency, Congress has felt the need
for a party instrument that could be used to further its
interests. The Congressional Campaign Committees, came into

being and have persisted, to meet this need.

CHAPTER III
THE COMMITTEES EMERGE

Although most scholars, like Congressional Campaign
Committee members, claim that the committees were organized
in 1866, during the struggle between President Johnson and
the Congress, there is evidence that the Committees (at
least the Republican Committee) were in existence as early
as 1860. The official Proceedings of the first Republican
National Convention, held in Pittsburgh in 1856, show no
permanent party organization in existence at the time. At
the Convention, however, a motion to form a committee for
the purpose of investigating and developing a permanent
party organization was passed.

This motion, apparently, was implemented before the
next National Convention of the party (Chicago, 1860), yet
the official Proceedings of that Convention, though they
mention the National Committee, make no reference to a
Congressional Committee. The Campaign Documents Collection
in the Library of Congress, however, contains a pamphlet
entitled The Ruin of the Democratic Party, published in
1860 by the Republican Congressional Committee. It seems

certain, therefore, that a party organization bearing that

30

31

name existed as early as 1860. The pamphlet gives no
information about the organization under whose auspices
it was published. Its text is typical of the campaign
literature of the period, accusing opponents of base and
immoral conduct. Its statements are based on "the Report
of the Cavode and Other Committees."l

It appears that either the committee named at the
1856 Republican Convention established a Congressional
Committee or that congressional and party leaders saw the
need for a Congressional Committee in the permanent
party organization, and that such a committee had come
into being before the campaign of 1860 and was known as the
Republican Executive Congressional Committee.

Although it is generally held, says Hathorn, "that
the Congressional Campaign Committee issued from the struggle

between the Radical Republicans and President Johnson during

 

The Cavode Committee was a congressional investi-
gating committee appointed in 1860, of which Bates says,
"Persistent rumors of political corruption, centered in
the White HOuse itself, led to the appointment of a
committee headed by Congressman John Cavode - Republican of
Pennsylvania and a close personal friend of Thaddeus Stevens.
It sat behind closed doors for three months, disregarding
repeated protests from Buchanan, and dug up an unsavory

II

mess of scandal . . . . Ernest S. Bates, The Story
of Congress (New YOrk: Harper Bros., 1936), p. 211.

 

32

the congressional elections of 1866, actually, in the
elections of 1860 and 1864 the Republicans in Congress
used a joint campaign committee to propagandize in favor
of the Presidential and House candidates. Though the
official name in 1860 was the Republican Executive
Congressional Committee and in 1864 the Union Congressional
Committee, both committees consisted of congressmen and
senators. In 1860 the committee made over seventy titles
available to the public."2

There is no evidence of congressional committee
activity in the off—year election of 1862, but in the
presidential campaign of 1864 the Union Congressional Committee
put out a series of strongly partisan campaign pamphlets,
three of which were entitled: Rebel Terms of Peace, About

the Rank anggFile of the Union Army, and Shall We Have an

 

Armistice? All three were for sale in large quantities.

They dealt with the major issue between the two parties:

whether to pursue the Civil‘War or seek an armistice.
During the early days of the‘War (December, 1861)

the Radical Republicans in Congress organized the Committee

 

2 . . .

Guy Hathorn, "CongreSSIOnal and Senatorial Campaign
Committees," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, vol.
xxxvrr, No. 3 (December, 1956). p. 207.

33
on the Conduct of the War, of which Zachariah Chandler was
chairman. This committee attempted to wrest the initiative
in the conduct of the War from President Lincoln. Its
activities — often inquisitorial in nature - had important
implications. Although the committee did not succeed in
wresting from.Lincoln his power (in part, as Chamberlain
points out, because Lincoln "usually chose to obtain his
objectives by executive decree, without resort to Congress")3
its Radical leaders realized that congressional committees,
with official sanction and powers, could be used as
effective political instruments.

Much of the political literature used in the campaign
of 1864 was based on the records of this committee. The
inflammatory campaign publications of the Union Congressional
Committee, in particular, reflected the influence of the
Committee on the Conduct of the war. It is interesting to
note that, in 1870, its chairman, Zachariah Chandler, became
chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

From 1856 to 1864 Edwin D. Morgan was chairman of
the Republican National Committee. According to the

Biographical Directory of the American Congress, in 1864

 

3 . ' .

Lawrence Chamberlain, The PreSIdentL Congress, and
Legislation (New YOrk: Columbia University Press, 1946),
p. 12.

34
he was also chairman of the Union Congressional Committee,
a further indication of the existence of a Congressional
Campaign Committee in 1864.4

It seems fairly certain that Congressional Campaign
Committees were of little importance until the campaign of
1866 got under way. In that election the Radicals trans-
formed the Union Congressional Committee into a powerful
and effective weapon with.which to attack Johnson. To
understand this strengthening of the Campaign Committee
as an instrument of party warfare, one must see it in the
context of contemporary politics.

During the Civil War two factions arose within the
Republican Party. President Lincoln consistently stood
for moderation and reconciliation within the Union.

Growing in opposition to the President was a group

from New England, the middle Atlantic states, and the middle

west, which came to be known as the Radicals. This group

 

4It should be noted that in 1864 the Republican
National Convention substituted the name Union for Republican
to signify the party's stand on the crucial issue of the
day. For several years thereafter the Republican Party was
called the Union Party and its congressional committee the
Union Congressional Committee. It was under the name
Union Party that the Convention of 1864 named Democratic,
but strongly Unionist Andrew Johnson as the party's
candidate for vice-president and running-mate of Lincoln.

35
proposed a policy of vengence and destruction for the con-
federacy. They were joined by the idealistic Abolitionists,
disgruntled because President Lincoln was unwilling to
propound a policy of immediate and complete equality between
the races.

In the summer of 1864 the Radicals stated their
views in the wade-Davis Bill, a bitter indictment of the
President, presidential powers, and the Presidential Plan
of Reconstruction. When the President defeated it by a
pocket veto, its authors, Benjamin wade and Henry Winter
Davis, issued the Wade-Davis Manifesto, which contained
most of the features of the bill, without legislative power.
It accused the President of "perpetrating a 'studied outrage
on the legislative authority of the people' from the basest
motives of personal ambition."5 These statements of
position drew the battle lines for the impending conflict.

On November 8, 1864, Lincoln was re-elected by an
electoral vote of 212 to 21. On April 15, 1865, five days
after the surrender of General Lee at Appomatox, President

Lincoln was assassinated and the Democratic Unionist,

 

5Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager,
The Growth of the American Republic, Vol. I (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 731.

36
Andrew Johnson, was elevated to the presidency.

At first it was believed that Johnson would pursue
a policy similar to that of the Radicals, but this belief
was mistaken, as the President's proclamation on May 29th
revealed. ‘While Congress was not in session President
'JOhnson proceeded to put Lincoln's Plan for Reconstruction
into effect.

When Congress met in December, 1865, it set to work
to impose its own reconstruction plan on the South. It
refused to seat representatives of southern states and
appointed a joint committee of fifteen, controlled by
Radicals, to investigate the problem of reconstruction.

By February, 1866, it became apparent that, while the

Radicals had a majority in both Houses, they could not marshal
the two-thirds vote necessary to override the President's
veto. ‘Winning such a majority became their goal and the
elections of 1866 their opportunity. This made the
congressional election of 1866 crucially important to both
Johnson and the Congress.6 On its outcome would depend,

to a great extent, the political future of the President and

 

6It is interesting to note that the campaign of

1866 was one of the first in which a president, as titular
head of his party, injected himself into a congressional
campaign.

37
the fate of his policies. To the Republicans - especially
the Radicals - it would be a battle for the maintenance of
the party in a dominant position, with the social and economic
prestige of many individuals involved. To the Abolitionists,
led by Charles Sumner, it would be a battle of idealism.

President JOhnson, a Democrat elected on a Union
ticket with a Republican president, had inherited a Cabinet
which he kept almost entirely intact. This meant that he
had no party machinery at his command and, unlike Lincoln,
no political organization built around him.

Recognizing this problem, friends of the President's
moderate program rallied to his support. They urged that he
build a party organization around himself and most of them
recommended extensive use of patronage as the best means
available.7 Others urged that he remodel his Cabinet by
bringing in capable and respected moderates, such as

Governor Oliver P. Morton or Governor John Andrews. Johnson's

 

7Typical is a letter to Johnson from Governor Morton

of Indiana. "were I in your place I would not fail to
employ every power and instrumentality in my hands to sustain
my policy and the friends Who sustain it . . . . The
resolute wielding of patronage in favor of your friends
inside the Union Party cannot fail to build you up with the
people and disarm the Opposition in Congress." Howard

K. Beale, op. cit., p. 120, quoting from Johnson Manuscript,
LXXXII (letter from Oliver P. Morton to Andrew Johnson

dated Dec. 1, 1865).

38

indecision lost him his best opportunity to build a party
organization.

Plans were made for a National Union Convention, to
meet in Philadelphia on August 11, 1866. Senator James
R. Doolittle led the movement. His party faced serious
problems. The Democratic Party, which was out of popular
favor, saw an opportunity totake over the campaign and thus,
it was hoped, regain political supremacy. Leading Democrats
attempted to associate themselves permanently with plans
for the National Convention, moderation in reconstruction,
and Andrew Johnson. The wisest of moderate leaders, both
Democratic and Republican, saw that such a course could
only bring defeat to the moderate cause in 1866 and that
this would mean further loss of prestige for the Democrats.
Their efforts halted Democratic attempts to take over the
Convention.

Even Doolittle was now skeptical that the Convention
could retrieve the political situation for Johnson and the

8 . . . .
Moderates. Yet leading politic1ans were pursuaded to

 

8Shortly before the Convention he wrote his wife,
"What is ahead in the political world just now, we cannot
certainly see . . . . My only fear is that the President
has waited too long in making his Cabinet a unit. It has
demoralized our friends in all states." Ibid., p. 123, quoting
from Proceedings, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (1909)
(Letter dated June 20, 1866), p. 291.

39
support the Convention.

On August 14 the National Union Convention met in
Philadelphia, with all the states, both north and south,
represented. For a week Philadelphia reverberated with
the tumultuous enthusiasm of the delegates, and through the
North ran acclamatlons of President Johnson. When the
Convention adjourned, it had created Sentiment favoring the
President's program and had assured the country of strong
support for it, in both North and South.

”The delegates . . . went home to their various
congressional districts full of enthusiasm," says Beale.
"By a variety of methods they sought to secure the election
of candidates who endorsed the Philadelphia platform. But
no systematic campaigning was launched. Their enthusiasm
for righteousness of principle could not win an election
without campaign tools. On August 17, the Philadelphia
Convention was generally deemed eminently successful, but
on that day it reached its peak. HOW signally it failed and
why is the story of the campaign."

On the other side of the political fence were the

Radicals, led by as astute and capable politicians as ever

 

91bid., p. 138.

40
appeared on the American political scene. Ever since Johnson's
ascendancy, they had looked toward the election of 1866 as
an opportunity to assert the power of Congress over the
President. Their tactics differed, however, from those of
the MOderates. Their emphasis was notion conventions and
enthusiasm but on party organization.

Almost a year before, in a letter to Charles Sumner,
Thaddeus Stevens had stated, "We need a good cOmmittee On
elections."10 This was the keynote of a battle plan that
emphasized organization. The Radicals had succeeded in
having a Joint Committee of Fifteen appointed to deal with
those problems of Reconstruction that might come before
Congress. They felt that some type of campaign organization
was needed. The first place to turn was to the Republican
national organization but, as already stated, National
Union Party Chairman, Henry J. Raymond, had supported the
National Union Convention of moderates, and his committee
'was nominally a tool of the President (though actually so
split as to render it ineffective). The Radicals in Congress

found it easier to form a committee of their own to deal

*with campaign matters than to attempt to use the existing

 

Iggpgg., p. 73 (Letter of Aug. 26, 1865, from Thaddeus

Stevens to Charles Sumner, Sumner Manuscripts, LXXIV).

41

party organization.

The Committee of Fifteen had been successful, so
"when Johnson appointed Congressman Knapp to work for him
in the campaign of 1866 the Radicals revamped the Union
Congressional Committee in order that they might use it to
fight Johnson. The new committee was composed of one
member representing each state's combined party delegation
in the Senate and the House of Representatives (Tables 2,
3, and 4). Senator Morgan was named chairman, but active
control was given to an unofficial executive committee
headed by Representative RObert Schenck of Ohio."11

Little is known of the work of the Congressional
Committee in that election. Though the Committee had published
campaign pamphlets in the two previous elections, there is
no record of such activity in the campaign of 1866. M.
OstrogorSki gives the only available description of the work

of the Committee in 1866 and his description seems to fit

year-round activities better than tactics used in a Specific

campaign. He says:

 

11Ralph M. Goldman,'”Party Chairmen and Party
LFactions" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago), p. 327.

42

TABLE 2

PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 1855—1867a

 

 

House of Representatives

 

 

Number of
Repre- Re-
senta- ‘Demo- publi— Other
Congress tives crats cans_ parties Vacant

34th 1855-57 234 83 108 43
35th 1857-59 237 131 92
36th 1859-61 237 101 113 23 2
37th 1861-63 178 42 106 28
38th 1863-65 183 80 103
39ph1865-67 191 46 145 1 y__

 

aData from Ralph R. Roberts, List of Nominees for the
Office of United States Senator and for the Office of

Representative in the EightyeFifth.Congress, Washington, 1956
(Nov. 1), p. 31. ‘

TABLE 3

PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN THE SENATE, 1855-1867a

 

 

 

 

Senate

Number of Demo- Re—

Senators crats publi- Other
Congress cans parties vacant
34th 1855-57 62 42 15 5
35th 1857-59 64 39 20 5
36th 1859-61 66 38 26 2
37th 1861-63 50 ll 31 7 1
38th 1863-65 51 12 39
39th 1865-67 52 10 42

 

aIbid.

PARTY REPRESENTATION BY STATES,
SHOWING REPUBLICAN STRENGTH BY STATES

43

TABLE 4

39TH CONGRESS,

 

 

 

 

IN 1866a
Senators Representatives Republicans
Demo- Republi-' Demo— Republi- in both
State crats cans crats cans houses

California 1 1 3 4
Connecticut 2 6
Delaware 2 l 0
Illionis 2 4 10 12
Indiana 1 l 2 9 10
Iowa 2 6 8
Kansas 2 1 3
Kentucky 1 l 3 6 7
Maine 2 5 7
Maryland 1 l 2 3 4
Massachusetts 1 l 10 11
Michigan 2 6 8
Minnesota 2 2 4
Missouri 2 1 7' 7
Nevada 2 1 3
New Hampshire 2 3 5
New Jersey 1 l 3 2 3
New York 2 ll 19 21
Ohio 2 3 l6 18
Oregon 1 l 1 2
Pennsylvania 1 l 8 15 16
Rhode Island 2 2 4
Tennessee 1 l 2 5 6
vermont 2 3 5
‘West Virginia 2 3 5
Wisconsin 2 l 5 7

Totalb . 13 39 41 147 186

a . . . .
Data from the Biographical Directory of the American

A

Congress, 1774-1947.

bDiscrepancies between totals and those of Tables 2

3 are to be explained by substitutions in both houses.

44

A central committee was created at Washington to
control throughout the Union the elections to the
House of Representatives, which had hitherto been left
to the local organizations. It was composed of members
of Congress appointed by their colleagues of the same
party (in the proportion of one member to each state)
and in this way it revived, to a certain extent, the old
Congressional Caucus which, however, only loOked after
Presidential elections. The new central organ called
the Congressional Campaign Committee, in watching the
electoral situation in the congressional districts,
penetrated more deeply and more continuously into
political life than could be done by the permanent
committee of the National Convention, which made its
appearance on the eve of and solely in view of the
Presidential election.12

Thus far we have dealt almost entirely with the
Republican Party and the development of the Republican Con-
gressional Committee. This emphasis is correct, since there
was no Democratic Committee before 1866, and if a permanent
organization was established then, it was only a last-minute

and ineffective attempt by Democratic moderates to counter the

. . . . 13
effective work of the Republican CongreSSIOnal Committee.

12M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of

Political Parties, vol. II, trans. Frederick Clarke (New York:
Macmillan, 1902), p. 127.

13The 1956 Democratic Manual says of the Democratic

Congressional Committee, "Permanent organization was effected
in 1866 when the Democratic members of the two Houses,
supporting President Johnson against the efforts of his own
party to impeach him, appointed a National Congressional
Committee to manage the Congressional Campaign of that year."
Cannon, 0 . cit., p. 10. Although the impeachment of

Johnson was not until 1868, it seems safe to assume that it
is correct to trace the origins of the Committee to this
period. The Manual, however, is the only source that
mentions the Democratic beginnings in 1866.

45

It is impossible to Show the degree of effectiveness
of the Republican Congressional Committee in the election
of 1866 by pointing to the statistics of party membership
in the new Fortieth Congress. This is true fortwo reasons.
First, it is safe to conclude that the Committee supported,
both in the primaries and in the final election, any candidate,
regardless of party label, who shared the views of the Radicals,
and whom they felt would back them in Congress. Second, in
the words of Ralph Goldman, "The period was one in which
party labels were lightly held. Not even the Congressional
Directory editor, Ben Perley Poare, presumed to record who
was a Radical Republican, Conservative Republican,
Administration Republican, Unionist,'War Democrat or Peace
Democrat."14

Despite this lack of statistical proof there can
be little doubt of the success of the Campaign Committee.
After the election, the Radical Republicans took control
of Congress and proceeded to wrest party and national leader-
ship from the President. Never, since that time, has
Congress so dominated the American political scene. The

credit for this success must be given in large measure to

14Ralph M. Goldman, “Presidential Party Leadership."

(unpublished manuscript), p. 68.

46
the Republican Congressional Committee which saw to it that
the Radicals had sufficient strength in Congress to be able
to attain such a position.

Says Josephson, "The outcome of the conflict between
President Johnson and Congress over the policy of Reconstruction
has often been treated as an instance of the victory of
congressional over presidential authority in our Government.
It might more accurately be described as the triumph of the
Republican Party Organization over the Presidency."15
From this time on, Congressional Campaign Committees were
accepted as essential structures within the framework of

American political parties .

\

15Matthew Josephson, The Politicos 1865-1895

(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938). PP- 15'16-

CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1866 TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

The election of 1866 marked a major power shift
within the Federal Government. Then it was that the locus
of power moved once more to Congress, where it was to reside
for more than twenty years.

Congress now became almost as powerful as in the
pre-Jackson era. In the Ostrogorski passage already quoted,
the Congressional Campaign Committee is compared to the
congressional caucus which nominated Presidents in the early
nineteenth century. Although no organic connection exists
(except, perhaps, that members were chosen in similar
fashion to serve on the caucus and on the committee) a
funcitional connection may be said to exist in the role
0f eaCh within the party system. Both were organized to
help Congress dominate the Executive and both fulfilled
the function as intended. The Congressional Committees
were destined, for pragmatic reasons, to become a permanent
part Of the national party structure and a weapon of Congress
in its perpetual power struggle with the Executive.

From 1866, the role of the Congressional Campaign

Commlttees moves forward or recedes as the power of Congress

47

48
increases or declines. These undulations are difficult
to trace, for at times the Committees go into almost total
eclipse, and the Democratic Committee seems never to have
been conspicuously prominent or powerful.

In the campaign of 1868 both Congressional Campaign
Committees were active on the presidential aswell as the
congressional level. In this campaign the Democratic
Party called its committee “the Democratic Congressional
Executive Committee,"1 because it was given some functions
in the presidential campaign, and also "the Democratic
Presidential Conunittee" because four of its members were
not congressmen but prominent residents of Washington.

One of the major functions of the Committees in this
campaign was that of raising money. Charles H. Coleman
describes the fund—raising activities of the two parties thus:

Levies upon federal office holders for party

Purposes were complicated by the political situation

in Washington. With the President a Democrat or . . .
leaning heavily in that direction, the Cabinet divided,
and Congress controlled by Republicans, the clerks were
e“Posed to attack from both sides. The Democrats passed
the hat first. On August 31 a circular was distributed
to ”clerks" and other employees of the government,
Signed by Montgomery Blair, acting treasurer, and J.

D- Hoover, Secretary of the Finance Committee of the

Democratic Congressional Committee. This . . . was

K

See Appendix II for list of members.

49
addressed to government employees "who claim to belong
to the Democratic and Conservative Parties, and desire
the election of Seymour and Blair, and are willing and
desire to contribute their mite to the cause."

(Washington Exppess, September 3, 1868)

The Republican circular in October was briefer and
spoke with greater authority. It was signed by William
Clafin and William E. Chandler, Chairman and Secretary
of the Republican National Committee and Representative
Robert Schenck of Ohio, Chairman of the Republican
Executive Committee (i.e., the executive committee of
the Congressional Committee). The circular "would
suggest a voluntary offering in aid of the work. What-
ever amount is contributed will be acceptable and
judiciously expended." (Washington E ress, October 21,
1868).

In addition to fund-raising, both Committees under-
took the function, established in the campaign of 1866, of
writing and distributing party literature and preparing
press releases for local papers.

In the campaign of 1868 trends that were to play
crucial roles in determining the later positions and
activities of the Congressional Committees began to emerge.
In this election the Democratic Committee appears to have
been more active than the Republican and to have worked
more closely with the national party organization. It

sponsored a washington conference of top party leaders,

including Seymour and Blair, in an attempt to work out campaign

 

2Charles H. Coleman, The Election of 1868 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1933). PP. 299-300.

50
strategy. The Democratic Congressional Committee put more
effort into the presidential campaign and less into the
congressional campaigns than did the Republican Committee.

After 1868 the Republican Congressional Committee
seems to exercise more power in its party's organizational
hierarchy than does the Democratic Committee within its
party. The latter appears never again to have played quite
so important a role as in the election of 1868.

In 1870 Zachariah Chandler became chairman of the
Republican Congressional Committee, a position he held
until he became National Committee Chairman in 1876.
Chandler had been a leading Republican and Radical. He
was in his third senatorial term when he became chairman of
the Congressional Committee. From his biography comes most
of our information on the committees of this period.

In both 1870 and 1872 Chandler traveled about the

nation, presenting the Republican case. Meanwhile

the Republican Committee was preparing and distributing
literature. "The special objects which it aimed

to accomplish were the securing of a uniform

treatment of political topics by newspapers and

speakers throughout the country, and the circulation
(under the franking privilege and otherwise) of
instructive and timely documents. During the
Reconstruction era, it also devoted much attention to
the work of Republican organization in the South
where special efforts were necessary to form into
effective voting masses the emancipated slaves, not
yet . . . familiar with the responsibilities of
citizenship. But the great aim of the Committee . . .

was the circulation of political literature. This

51,
end it sought: . . . First, by the publication and
mailing to individuals and to local committees in all
parts of the country of such congressional speeches
as treated thoroughly and effectively any phase of the
current political situation, second, by furnishing
the Republican press, through the medium of weekly
sheets of carefully prepared matter,\vith accurate
information as to the facts underlying existing
issues and with suggestions as to their best treat-
ment before the people.

The Post and Tribune's biography of Chandler goes on
to speak of the effectiveness of the work of his Committee
throughout the 1870's in every Congressional District in
the nation.

In the campaign of 1872 was begun the practice of
preserving campaign materials for possible future use. The
biography mentions that ". . . a monthly periodical named
'The Republic' was issued, which preserved in desirable form
the most careful and elaborate articles prepared under the
Committee's supervision."4

In this campaign the Republican Congressional Committee,
performing a function of a National Committee, employed a

staff of over three hundred people to comb back issues of the

New York Tribune in an attempt to discover facts in the

4L_-

3Detroit Post and Tribune, "Zachariah Chandler"
(Detroit, 1880), pp. 312-13.

4Ibid., p. 316.

52
record of Greeley, the Democratic presidential candidate,
which might be used against him.

One of the main functions of the Congressional
Committees in the last quarter of the nineteenth century
was that of raising money. Wealthy officers and members
of the Committees (which, until 1913, when the direct
election of senators was inaugurated, included senators)
often contributed large sums.5 Chairmen Morgan, Chandler,
Cameron, and Flower, for example, gave generously to their
respective Congressional Committees. Other chairmen depended
on taxing federal employees or soliciting contributions from
men of means. HOw funds were raised in 1872 is thus
described by Josephson:

The Republican managers . . . attempted to

rally powerful moneyed interests who had been their
patrons. "Who knows what Greeley might do?"

murmured Zach Chandler to Jay Cooke, and ZaCh's

wily lieutenant, W. E. Chandler (of N. H.) pursuaded
Cooke, now for $5,000 to win a state in an easy
election, now for $10,000 to save New Jersey for the
Secretary of the Navy. Did the Cookes care to see the
naval account lost to their bank? And Cooke, as he

himself said, groaning, "was ridden to death like a
fire horse," giving up, according to some reports,

 

The Democratic Manual gives 1882 as the year when
the Congressional Campaign Committee began to concentrate
on the election of members to the Heuse. After this, no
:more senators appear as committee chairmen.

53

as much as $50,000 to safeguard the new government-
aided Northern Pacific project.6

Money was also raised by "contributions" from federal

employees. Ostrogorski describes it thus:

The Congressional Campaign Committee, founded
about 1866, inaugurated the new era by putting
'the practice (a ”tax for the benefit of the
<5rganization" on all officials) in force with the
:regularity of a government budget. It demanded from
Federal officeholders throughout the union a
percentage of their salaries as a contribution
euphemistically described as voluntary.7

This means of raising funds for Congressional campaigns
was stzill being used in the 1880's under the chairmanship
015 Jay Hubbell. The following letter gives an insight into

the operation of the Republican Committee in 1882:

Headquarters, Republican
Congressional Committee,
520 30th Street, N;W.,
‘Washington, D. C.

May 15, 1882

Skirn

This committee is organized for the protection
‘31? the interest of the Republican Party in each of
‘tlie congressional districts of the Union. In order
'tllat it may prepare, print, and circulate suitable
InEiterial illustrating the issues which distinguish
tile Republican Party from any other and may.meet
all proper expense incident to the campaign, the
cOmmittee feels authorized to apply to all citizens

\

6Josephson, op. cit., p. 167.

7Ostrogorski, op. cit., p. 144.

54

whose principles or interests are involved in the
struggle. Under the circumstances in which the
country finds itself placed, the Committee believes
that you will esteem it both a privilege and a
pleasure to make to its funds a contribution, which
it is hoped will not be less than $ . (2% of the
recipient's salary) The Committee is authorized to
state that such voluntary contributions from
jpersons employed in the service of the United
States will not be objected to in any official
quarter .

The labors of the Committee will effect the result
(Jf the Presidential election of 1884 as well as the
Changressional struggle and it may therefore reasonably
kuope to have the sympathy and assistance of all
“flio look with dread upon the possibility of the
reestoration of the Democratic Party to the control
of the government.

Please make a prompt and favorable response to this
ileetter by bank check or draft or postal money order
Payable to the order of Jay A. Hubbell, Acting
Treasurer, P. 0. Lock Box 589, Washington, D. C.

By order of the committee,

(signed), D. B. Henderson, Secretary8

This went to all government employees and those

who filid not see fit to make "a prompt and favorable response'

reeej:ved a second communication, as follows:

\

8The Democratic Campgign BoOk, 1882 (washington,
D- e- . 1882), p. 208. Although this letter and the one
fellcfining are taken from Democratic campaign literature,
theY’iappear to be legitimate copies of-the original. They
seFVEE as documentation for statements describing the money-
zralejdag procedures of the day. On pp. 164 and 165 are
rePrinted similar letters sent to federal employees during

the Campaign of 1878.

55

Washington, D. C.
August 15, 1882

Sir:

Your failure to respond to the circular of May
15 sent to you by this Committee is noted with
surprise. It is hoped that the only reason for
such failure is that the matter escaped your attention
lowing to the press of other cares.

Great political battles cannot be won in this
Ivay. This committee cannot hope to succeed in the
Ipending struggle if those most directly benefitted
tug success are unwilling or neglect to aid in a
sribstantial manner.

we are on the skermish line of 1884 with a conflict
before us, this fall, of great moment to the Republic,
arid,you must know that a repulse now is full of
danger to the next Presidential Campaign.

Unless you think that our grand old party ought
Ilcrt to succeed, help now in its struggle to build up
a :new South, in which there shall be, as in the NOrth,
a. free ballot and a fair count, and to maintain such
llcild in the North as to insure good government to
tile country.

It is hoped that by return mail you will send
a. voluntary contribution equal to 2% of your annual
compensation as a substantial proof of your earnest
desire for the success of the Republican Party this
152311, transmitting by draft or postal money order,
Payable to the order of Jay A. Hubbell, Acting
Threasurer, P. 0. Lock Box 589, washington, D. C.

(signed) D. B. Henderson, Secretary9

Hubbell's letter aroused strong public reaction.

\

9
Ibid.’ p. 1440

56
.A typical response appeared in the New York Sun:
Harrisburg, Pa., July 9, 1882

The presevering meanness of the Hubbell assessment

is strikingly exemplified in the levy made upon one

of the government institutions which ought to be farthest
removed from any sort of partisan control and from the
visit of the toll gatherers. The old government
barracks at Carlysle, Pa. . . . (are) used as an Indian
training school under the direction of Captain Pratt
of the regular army . . . . The school and the
admirable work it is doing not only attracted the
Ihearty interest and earnest commendation of the
:surrounding community, but every official inspection
exnd examination increase the high favor with Which it
143 regarded by those whose special duty it is to
iJnvestigate this new and salutary mode of treating
'tlae Indian problem.

There is probably not a member of the entire staff
cxf this institution who owes his or her place to
I>cfljtical influences and certainly the tenure of
ruone of them is dependent upon Republican supremacy
1:) state or nation. The managers and teachers themselves,
‘nuostly ladies . . . take little . . . interest in
Enolitics and are even reticent on this assessing
lensiness, this information regarding it being obtained
Eiccidentally. Several of them, including Captain
lPratt (Superintendent) and several of his assistants
Eire pronounced Democrats and, it is safe to say, will
Ilot respond to Hubbell's call, and if disturbed for their

Jrefusal, it will be by some influence outside of the
:Lnstitution itself. What the Silver haired matron, the
\renerable nurse, the blooming school marms, the hostler

\ A‘

. 10According to H. K. Beale in the appendix of Th3
SHEJELgal Year; the Sun, a prominent New York daily edited
Y Cfliarles Dana, which, though inclined to emphasize the
Seesational, performed a public service by exposing scandal.
Theii it could do because it claimed no allegiance to either
political party.

" - 1" _ 93:12.1“;

mi“?

 

57

and day laborer will do about it remains to be seen.
But the eneffable impudence of "Dear" Hubbell's
extortionate demands was never better illustrated than
by this comprehensive levy.11

Popular indignation was not limited to writers of
letters to editors. Serious students of politics toOk up
the cause. In 1882 the NorthuAmerican Political Review
carried an article condemning the assessment of federal
employees, using Hubbell's letter as the chief case in

point. "Nothing so disgraceful," it declared, "has happened

in this country for a century."12

The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
in an attempt to turn the popular outrage to its own advantage,
printed both Hubbell letters and the following letter
(sent out for distribution to the press by Chairman Flower

of the Democratic Committee) in the Democratic Campaign

Bodk of 1882:13

Headquarters, Democratic
Congressional Committee,
washington, D. C.

June 30, 1882

Dear Sirs:

The Board of Control of the Democratic Congressional

11Inserted in the Congressional Record, July 12, 1882,
as part of the remarks of Rep. Isaac N. Cox, of New York.

12Dorman Eaton, "Political Assessments," North American

IPolitical Review, September 1882, p. 219.
13Democratic Campaign Book, 1882, Washington, D. C., p.

‘7]!

 

222.

58

Committee, having neither the funds nor the
disposition to corrupt the public mind, yet
very desirous of placing the views of the
Democratic Party before the country, earnestly
requests and confidently anticipates the co-
operation of the local Democratic press to that
end.

The Board would suggest that liberal extracts
from the speeches which will be sent to you from
time to time be printed in your paper with such
comments as you deem proper. Your participation
in this work cannot fail to increase your
circulation and influence, while it will be of
greatest service in crystallizing and educating
the party.

Very sincerely yours,
. . l4
(Signed) R. P. Flower, Chairman
The furore over campaign finance pointed up the

need for reform and hastened the passage of the Pendleton

 

14In using these letters as an indication of the

campaign practices of the two Congressional Committees in
1882, the following facts should be borne in mind:

(1) Both letters were selected for publication by the
Democratic Committee, which raised funds of its own in
1882, though probably not by political assessments.

(2) Since the Democrats had been out of office for many
years most federal employees were indebted to the Republican
Party for their appointments. Consequently employee
assessments were more effective as a fund—raising technique
for the Republicans than for the Democrats. (3) The letter
quoted in the discussion of the campaign of 1868 shows that
‘both parties had used the political canvass as a means of
raising money to meet party campaign expenses. (4) In
this case, the Republican letter was written on May 15th,
the Democratic on June 30th. The public response to
Ihibbell's letter warned the Democrats against using the
same technique .

unit-I- Era-r- «T-

59
15

Civil Service Bill, which became law in January, 1883.
This required that federal appointments be made on the basis
of competitive examinations and prohibited assessments on
office holders for political purposes.

The effect of this period of reform on party organi-

zation is thus described by Josephson:

Where the government service remained chaotic, the
party organizations had developed extremely strong.
concealed bureaucracies and controls within themselves
which provided such stability as was needed. In the
end, patronage politics had gone to such extremes . . .
(that) . . . the leaders in both great parties, who
had delayed their own housecleaning for the sake of
their own tactical necessities, now hastened to bow

to the popular voice which was felt in the new
landslide of votes for Democratic congressmen in

1882.16
In 1882 another development in the Congressional
Campaign Committees occurred. From 1866 to 1882 the
Committees had been the arms of their respective parties

in both House and Senate. In 1883 the Congressional

Committees became organs of the House of Representatives.

 

15Even before the Hubbell letter there had been a

growing civil service reform movement, backed by idealists
‘who carried little political weight. ‘With the assassination
cxf Garfield in 1881, by Charles Guiteau, alleged to be a
disappointed office seeker, the demand for civil service
reform gained wide popular support.

16JosephsOn, op. cit., p. 321.

ii"!

 

 

71*. r

60

The Democratic Manual states that the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee "was organized in 1882 for the purpose
of aiding in the election of the Democratic members of the
House."17 Whether this change represented a shift of power
within Congress or a growing feeling of independence on the
part of the House, it had little effect on the organization
of the Congressional Committees, for the last Senator to be
chairman of either committee had retired in 1877 and, until
1916, when the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted (after
which the two parties in the Senate formed their own campaign
committees), Senators continued to serve on both Committees.

During this period the Democratic Committee had a
difficult struggle. Since 1870 the Democrats had been out
of office and had had little success in raising funds by
political assessments. Congressmen therefore turned for
help to the national party organization which was growing
in strength.18

In 1881, however, General William Rosecrans, a well-
known Union general in the Civil War, had been elected chairman

«of his Congressional Committee, as much for his reputation

 

17Cannon, op. cit., p. 10.

18This was indicated by the fact that it was strong

enough to elect a president in 1884.

-q.siI-I.-‘9‘ . r F: ”I“ ““ " “" _“."-.“" F!

61
as for his abilities. Under him Roswell P. Flower became
chairman of the Board of Control (equivalent to the Republican
Executive Committee). It was Flower who carried forward
most of the Committee's work in the campaign of 1882. After
the campaign of 1884, General Rosecrans resigned the chair-
manship and there is no record as to who, if anyone, succeeded
him.

With the election of 1882, the Republicans lost
control of Congress. Furthermore, lack of harmony with the
National Committee in 1880 "had given rise to the question

19

of the utility of the double organization." In 1884,

with the triumph of Cleveland over Blaine, the Republican

defeat was complete. The status of the Republican Congressional

Campaign Committee reflected the decline in party fortunes.
"For some twelve years thereafter“ (i.e., after the breach
between the National and the Congressional Committee in

1880), says Kleeberg, "the activities of the Republican

. , 2
Campaign Committee almost ceased." 0

After a decade of comparative inactivity, the

19Jesse Macy, Party Organization and Machinery
(New York: Century, 1912), p. 90.

20Gordon Kleeberg, The Formation of the Republican
Party as a National Political Organization (New YOrk:
Columbia University Press, 1911), p. 228.

' H,&—l‘v «

62
Congressional Campaign Committees revived. In 1889 R. P.
Flower returned to Congress and, because of his earlier
experience with the Democratic Committee, was elected its
chairman. During his two year chairmanship the Committee
became more active than it had been since his previous term
of office.

Macy dates the revival of the Republican Committee
as 1894 when, he says, it "assumed new life and has ever
since been the prominent and efficient agent of the party
for election of congressmen in the off years."21

In the case of both committees, it was the leadership
of the chairmen that aroused them to action. These men
saw their first task as discovering new sources of revenue.
In the case of the Republican Committee, the need was urgent,
Josephson says, because of "the loss of Federal patronage,
the diminution of assessments as large numbers of officials

‘were classified under the merit system, and declining

22

revenues from the sale of offices . . .

JOseph Babcock of Wisconsin, who became chairman of

the Republican Committee in 1893, was quick to see that

 

21Macy, op. cit., p. 90.

22Josephson, op. cit., p. 406.

 

’1‘“ .'.. ‘

. inl‘I-lrh _
I; T

63

working hand in hand with business, asking for money during
campaigns and seeing that the legislative interests of the
Committee's supporters received attention during the ensuing
session of Congress, would be advantageous both to the
Committee and to its supporters.

LaFollette says that it was Babcock's office “to
fry the fat out of manufacturers, brewers, railroads, and
other special interests, with which to aid in carrying on
the campaign and thereafter, with Cannon (Speaker of the
House) and two or three other members of the inner circle,
it was Babcock's business to see that no legislation
detrimental to special interests should be permitted to go
"23
through the House . . .

The Democratic Committee was less effective in

. . ' ~24 . . . .

raISIng money. Flower, during his chairmanship, had
made substantial contributions to the Committee, but had
devised no long-range fund raising techniques. Nor did his

immediate successors discover any that would compare in

 

23Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette's Autobiography

Madison, Wisconsin: The Robert M. LaFollette Co., 1913),
pp. 735-36.

4JOsephson calls him "a wealthy grain and stock
narket speculator," one of the four aspirants for the
governorship of New York in 1882, "who promised to contribute
generously to his own advancement.” He contributed $16,000
to the Cleveland campaign in 1884.

-LHL—J

64

effectiveness with the Republican Committee's methods. As

a result, the Democratic Committee accepted the fact of its

less favorable financial position, adapted its techniques

to its budget, and developed the conviction that its methods,

being more direct and personal, were preferable to those

of the Republican Committee. This conviction still persists.
By the last decade of the nineteenth century both

Corrunittees had demonstrated their capacity for survival

and had won for themselves a continuing place in the

machinery of their respective parties.

 

iT'..rf

PART TWO

ROLE OF THE COMMITTEES IN

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS

CHAPTER V
THE TWO COMMITTEES: STRUCTURE AND FINANCE

By the turn of the century, both Congressional
Campaign Committees had reached a point of relative stability.
During the preceding thirty-four years, the role of the
Committees seemed to evolve; after that time, it remained
fairly static for a considerable interval. M. Ostrogorski's
description of committee activities, written in 1902, is, in
general, applicable to both committees during the first
half of the twentieth century. This pattern may be
regarded as a base upon which the committees, particularly
the Republican Committee, have erected superstructures
adapted to their needs.

The existence of the Congressional Committee is
as temporary as that of the Legislature from which
it emanates, and it disappears with the expiration
of the powers of the particular Congress. Consider-
ations of general policy are even more foreign to
the congressional committee than to the national
committee: it pays no heed to platform or programs
and simply endeavors to ensure the success, at the
congressional elections, of the candidates who bear
the party label, whatever their complexion. It
divides all the congressional districts into
categories: the good, the hopeless, and the doubt-
ful; almost neglecting the first two groups, it directs
all its efforts toward the districts of the last group.
Its means of action consist of overt propaganda by
speaking and by political literature and methods of
a more secret kind, in which money fills, it would
appear, a not inconsiderable place. The sinews of

66

 

67

war are supplied to the congressional committee by

wealthy members of the party, but these donations are

much smaller than those made to the national committee;

the disinterested or calculated generosity of the

donors is reserved for the presidential campaign in

which the great stake is played for. The congressional

committee intervenes actively in the election campaign

of the "off years," that is to say, those years in

which the congressional elections do not coincide with r
the presidential elections, for instance 1884, 1898. 5
At the request of the candidates interested it sends ‘
them speakers and ”political literature“ for distri-
bution, and perhaps money as well. But the committee

does not remain inactive in the interval between
elections; it follows the fortunes of the party

in the districts attentively: it analyses the vote at

each succeeding election by counties; and if it notes

a fall in the number of votes polled by a candidate

of the party, it makes inquiry into the causes.

Perhaps the fault lies with the factions which are
devouring each other, or the candidate is not a

popular one or the policy of the party is creating
discontent, or the rival party is employing too energetic
or too pursuasive methods of propaganda. The congressional
committee interposes to smooth down these difficulties.

It is in constant relation with all the county

committees in the Union: the latter point out to it

the special steps necessary to retrieve the fortunes

of the party in their congressional district, and

in general make the congressional committee the confidant
of their troubles. On the opening of the presidential
campaign, the congressional committee places all its
resources at the disposal of the national committee and
becomes its close ally, forgoing its own initiative

even in what concerns the congressional elections, for

in the "presidential year" all the elections follow

the fortunes of the contest for the president.1

From 1900 until the 1930's both committees functioned

quietly according to their customary procedures. Even the

 

1M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of
Political Parties, vol. III, pp. 283-85.

68
split between the House and the Senate after the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1916 caused no serious dislocation. In 1930,
however, both Committees gave up their money—raising function
and began to depend for support upon their respective national
party organizations. Since that time, the two committees

have developed distinctive characteristics and each now

-m ‘W'IQJI' :1

functions according to its concept of its role.

d—Q-r 1 L1

Committee organization

Both committees are made up of congressmen, one from
each state represented in Congress by their party. Seniority
is considered in choosing members, as is political influence
and sagacity. The Democratic Committee chairman may also
appoint one woman from each state. This is a hang-over from
the days before woman suffrage, when the Democrats had a
women's Committee. They now appoint to the committee a
few capable women, such as Gracie Pfost of Idaho and Edith
Green of Oregon,"to represent the women's point of view."

The Republican Committee has a Chairman, five Vice-
Chairmen who represent different geographical areas and who
serve as consultants with respect to them, a Secretary and

a Treasurer. An Executive Committee of five is appointed

69

by the Chairman.2 The officers and the Executive Committee
carry on with little help from the full Committee, which
meets occasionally - three times during the first six months
of 1957 - to hear reports and/or approve the budget. A
professional staff carries the work of the office.

The work of the Republican Committee is divided
into three departments: Administration, headed by the
Executive Secretary, William S. Warner; Field Service, under
the direction of Bernard Lamb; and Public Relations. working
with the latter is a former Director of Public Relations for
the National Republican Committee, Richard L. Guylay. Each
of these departments is well staffed and carries on a full
program which will later be discussed. As Bone observed,
Republican Committee work has now become a "big—time"
operation, employing about thirty persons.3

The Democratic Committee has a Chairman, three
Vice—Chairmen, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and an Executive
Committee of nine. There are sub-committees on Speakers

and Finance.

 

2For lists of chairmen, officers, and executive
committee members of both Committees, see Appendix II.

3Hugh A. Bone, "Some Notes on the Congressional
Canpaign Committees," The western Political Quarterly,
Vol. IX, No. 1 (March, 1956). pp. 116-37.

 

in D_L_'u.__"_ L- '_Z._'__ _ _

70

The office staff is headed by Assistant to the Chair—
man, a position now held by Kenneth Harding, which corresponds
to the Republican Committee's Executive Secretary. Another
paid staff member heads research. These, with two or three
assistants, carry the full office load.

The full Committee meets rarely, perhaps once during
each session of Congress. One member of the Committee was
unable to recall when they had last met. Sub-committees
meet as needed, though they seldom seem to be needed. Mr.
Harding, Assistant to the Chairman, admits that "because
the Committee's work is highly personal and confidential"
members can have little idea what transpires. This was
confirmed in talks with several committee members. A
member of the Sub-committee on Speakers, for example, states
that when a request for a speaker is received, usually
during a campaign, it is turned over to the Speakers'

Bureau of the National Committee. This member has never
been present at one of the confidential conferences which
are said to constitute the chief work of the Committee and
feels, on the basis of personal experience, that the
Committee's chief function is to dispense funds for use in
campaigning. The full Committee, according to this member,

hears the report of the Assistant to the Chairman but does

71
not even approve the budget.

The Democratic Committee is set up primarily on
paper, with most decisions made by the Chairman and his
Assistant. The Chairman frequently confers with Speaker Sam
Rayburn, who seems to be as important in determining
Committee policies and actions as the chairman. The
Committee's chief function is to help new congressmen find
living quarters and set up their offices in Washington, to
give advice and financial assistance to candidates running
in marginal districts, and to publish an occasional campaign
pamphlet. It keeps a file of opponents' voting records and
of clippings from the Congressional Record but makes no
pretense of scientific evaluation of such data.

While much has depended upon the interest, energy,
and resourcefulness of the chairmen, Whose role it is to
give policy direction, the fact that chairmen sometimes
change in periods of two to four years4 has meant that the
stability and continuity provided by the office staffs, which

"keep the show on the road" is essential to the functioning

of either Committee.

 

4For the terms of office of all committee chairmen,
see Appendix II.

72

Since Captain Victor Harding5 became Assistant to
the Chairman of the Democratic Committee in the 1930's,
the trend has been toward increasing emphasis on the
professional staff and the political activities of the
Assistant Chairman. This makes the operation a personal
arrangement in which the political abilities of the Assistant
to the Chairman are crucial. NMch.of the Committee's work
is done on an individual basis, between the congressman Who
comes to the Committee with his problem and the Assistant
to the Chairman who attempts to aid in solving it. The
Assistant to the Chairman also does the field work, while
the small staff of three to five do what research they can.

The locus of power in the Democratic Committee
resides, at the moment, in a triumvirate made up of Michael
Kirwan, Chairman, Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, and
John‘w; MCCormack, HOuse Majority Leader. Interestingly,
Rayburn and McCormack are not officially committee members,
but they know Congress, individual congressmen, and the
situation in an amazing number of congressional districts -
particularly the critical, marginal ones. Since the Demo-

cratic Committee is organized on a more informal basis than

 

5Father of Kenneth Harding, he served the committee
from 1937 to 1954.

73
the Republican, with more reliance upon subjective evaluation,
it is essential that they have knowledgeable men to consult.

The Democratic Committee uses such terms as
"personal” and "direct" in describing its work. Harding
makes it a point to know, personally, as many Democratic
congressmen as possible. When not on the road, he goes
daily to the House, to confer with congressmen in the cloak-
rooms. To him, and of course to Kirwan, congressmen come
with their problems, with confidential information about
developments in their districts, or with news of opposition
strategy. The information is not recorded and does not go
beyond the man to whom they talk.

Not only does Harding know the Democratic congressmen,
through his field work he has become acquainted with state
and county chairmen all over the country. He has acquired
a facility for remembering names and has a wealth of
statistical information at his finger tips. His encyclopedic
knowledge of the matters that concern them encourages congress—
men to seek his advice.

When it comes to the distribution of funds, Harding,
Kirwan, Rayburn, and McCormack pool their knowledge and
make joint decisions according to a procedure which will

later be discussed. The point here is that the Democratic‘ i

74

Committee continues to function according to its traditional
pattern, on a face—to-face basis, with a minimum of organi-
zation and staff. Although the Assistant to the Chairman
assured the writer that this method has been deliberately
chosen, because of belief in its effectiveness, a study of
the financial structure of the two Committees suggests that
inadequate financial support has probably played a part in
determining its working procedures.

Not that the Committee is unaware of its need for
funds. "We have in the file," I was told, "a set of plans
for expanding and improving our services - plans which must
await the time when funds become available." A larger field
staff, in particular, is needed, since, during campaigns,
Harding must remain in the office.

The success of the Democratic Party in recent
congressional elections, however, has created a sense of
satisfaction with present methods and has provided little
incentive for a reappraisal of methods or confrOntation of
the inadequacy of present financial undergirding as compared
with that of the Republican Committee.

The Republican Committee, on the other hand, has
undergone what amounts almost to a change in function. This

has been an evolutionary process, most rapid under the guidance

75
of strong leaders. Among these were: Jospeh Babcock,
chairman from 1893 to 1905, under whose leadership the
relationship between the Republican Party and business was
solidified, resulting in larger contributions to the party
and increased consideration of the interests of business
by it; Joseph Martin, chairman from 1937 to 1939, under whose
direction the Committee was reorganized and, in the words
of Earl venable, Executive Secretary of the Republican
National Committee from 1920 to 1950, ”made into a working
organization."; and Leonard Hall, chairman from 1947 to
1953. During WOrld‘War II the Republican Committees did
little more than remain alive. "All we could do," said
Mr. venable, "was to conduct a holding operation." Under
Mr. Hall's leadership, the Congressional Committee experienced
a renascence. A full-time Director of Public Relations
was added to the staff,6 the field work program for the
systematic collection of data was revived on an expanded
basis, and an elaborate system for the tabulation and analysis
of this data was set up.

The Republican Committee's field work is carried on

 

6The financial statements in the office of the Clerk

of the HOuse of Representatives show that the Director of
Public Relations is the most highly paid officer on the staff.

76
by a staff of seven men, selected for their training and
experience in making and interpreting community surveys.
These men visit those states and congressional districts
which are held or might be won by Republicans.

Recognizing the importance of local party officials,
each study begins with a conference with local leaders,
usually at the county level. Field representatives meet
with the county chairmen, explaining to them the purpose
of the study, namely: to learn the voting pattern of each
precinct so that, when analysis is completed, both weak and
strong precincts may be readily and reliably spotted.
Republican organizations and leaders can then proceed to
strengthen weak precincts in preparation for the next election.

Field workers secure a map of each county, showing
precinct boundaries, ascertain the names of county committee
men and women, and get the current registration figures.
After precinct analysis statistics have been collected
a summary sheet is prepared - one for each town or city with
more than one precinct, and one for each county. These
sheets are returned to headquarters where their contents

are analyzed.7 Results are sent to county chairmen and

 

7For a "Data Sheet" for the state of Michigan, giving

an analysis of the data gathered by field workers, see
Appendix III.

77
other local party leaders. Field workers supply each county
chairman with a county information blank which shows how
well the county is organized.8 This, too, is returned to
headquarters, where the information is collated and placed
in the Committee's file. From this material the Republican
Committee is building a permanent file of factual information
for use by the Republican organization.

Field Service also offers assistance in the selection
of qualified candidates. This is done by rating potential
candidates on an evaluation sheet prepared by the central
office. Again the information is studied and results are
shared with local party leaders.9

Since a successful political campaign requires a
considerable number of party workers, these must be enlisted
and organized before the opening of the campaign. Republican
Committee field workers secure a precinct-by-precinct list
of active Republican workers, each of whom receives a series
of robo-typed personal letters inviting him to participate
actively in the coming campaign. Copies of the workers'
lists and of all replies are turned over to county chairmen

and other party leaders.

 

8For a copy of the blank used, see Appendix III.

9For a copy of Candidates' Evaluation Sheet, see
.Appendix III.

78

Next in importance to Field Service, which ranks
first because it provides the information that is basic
to all the other services, is the Department of Public
Relations, which gives advice on the conduct of an effective
campaign, provides speech kits, and gives help in preparing
newsletters and scripts for radio and television. Closely
allied with Public Relations is the Art Department, which

designs posters, prepares "gimmicks,? plans layouts, etc.
Photographic Service makes film strips for motion picture
and television use and takes photographs for newspaper and
other publicity. It maintains a service whereby congressmen
'with visiting constituents may have group pictures taken and
made up at once in post-card form, to be mailed home by
visitors.

These departments, under the direction of the

administrative officers, work together to plan effective

campaigns for Republican congressional candidates.

Finance

In nothing is the difference between the two
Committees more apparent than in the nature and extent of
the support which each receives. Ever since the days when

the Republican Committee, unable longer to levy a tax on

79
office-holders, learned ways of approaching business interests
for support, it seems to have been in a more favorable
financial position than the Democratic Committee.

The latter, for a time, resorted to levies upon
Democratic legislators. "In 1913," says Hathorn, "it was
revealed that the Democratic committee had aSsessed party
members in both houses $100 each to raise campaign funds.
Apparently this had been standard procedure for years."10

Despite rivalry between the Congressional and
National Committees, it soon became apparent that financial
cooperation between the Committees would be for the good
of both. By the 1920's cooperative arrangements to this
end had been worked out within both parties. This came
out in a Senate investigation of campaign expenditures held
in 1921. In the investigation of Republican expenditures,
the following exchanged was recorded:

Chairman: Loans to the Senatorial Campaign Committee -
What can you tell us about that?

Mr. Upham: (treasurer, Republican National Committee):
I have had no conference with the senatorial
committee, personally, with the exception
of a talk with Senator Poindexter; but my
understanding is that we are to loan the
Senatorial Committee up to $200,000.

 

10Hathorn, op. cit., p. 210 (See "Contributions for
IPolitical Purposes,” House Report No. 677, 63rd Congress,
Second Session).

80

Chairman: By the way, how mudh are you to loan the
Congressional Campaign Committee?

Mr. Upham: $500,000.
A similar conversation was recorded during the investigation
of the Democratic Congressional Committee:

Chairman: Do you cooperate with the National Committee?

Mr. Flood: (Chairman, Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee) I do.

Chairman: And do they furnish any funds to your committee?

Mr. Flood: My understanding is that they are to finance
my committee.

Chairman: Do you go out and raise money separately?

Mr. Flood: I haven't done so but I have received voluntary
contributions for which I account to the
National Committee, and they are, as I
understand it, to finance the committee.

Chairman: Have you any budget?
Mr. Flood: ‘We have not.

Chairman: Or any estimate of what you expect to raise‘
or spend?

Mr. Flood: we expect to spend a good deal in printing
if the National Committee will furnish us
the money, and we expect the National Committee
to take care of any speakers' expenses that
we have to incur. Of course we do that
by conference with them.11

 

llSait, op. cit., pp. 291-92. Hearing before a sub-

committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections,
66th Congress, 1921.

81
The next step was a plan whereby the Republicans
tried to unify the solicitations of all their committees.
Bone describes the plan in some detail:

For a number of years the Republicans have operated
under a formalized organization known as the "united
finance drive." This function is entrusted to the
Republican National Committee, which raises funds for
the national, congressional, and senatorial committees.
Its objective is to solicit each contributor only
once . . . to avoid multiple appeals to the same
donor and to make collections more efficient.

The finance committee has its main office in the
national committee headquarters . . . . The committee
is semiautonomous with its own chairman, general counsel,
finance director, and executive secretary. Its compo-
sition includes eighteen specially appointed members
and forty-eight state finance chairmen. The committee
is brought together fairly frequently . . . . The
national finance committee assigns each state a quota
of the annual budget for the three committees, and each
state finance chairman has the responsibility for
raising this. Figures on the state quotas are not made
public: but some of the factors used to arrive at each
quota are the general electoral vote, the Republican
vote, population, purchasing power, and the personal
income tax. The relative weight given to each is like-
wise kept confidential. The committee discourages
direct contributions to candidates and encoura es
contributions to the state finance committees.

The Democratic Party, though it has no such National
Finance Committee, encourages contributions to the national
party organization. Allocations to the Congressional

Committee are subsequently arranged by negotiation between

 

lzBone, op. cit., p. 127.

82

the chairman of the National and Congressional Committees.

Some gifts are, of course, received directly by the
Congressional Committees, but these are mainly "exchange
funds" or "directed funds." The former are monies con-
tributed by donors with the understanding that they be
used to help the party campaign in their state. The latter
are funds earmarked for the use of a designated candidate.

The Democratic Committee receives more exchange and
directed funds than does the Republican. 0f the $210,450
reported as received by the Democratic Committee in 1954,
43.6% of it was in exchange funds, 23.2%»in directed funds.
This left an undesignated balance of only 33.2%.which
consisted of funds collected by the Congressional Campaign
Committee (5.7%) and grants from.the National Committee (27.5%).

The difference in the receipts and expenditures of
the two committees is considerable, as is the number and
size of contributions from individual donors. In 1956 the
Republican Committee reported four times as many gifts of
$1,000 or more as were reported by the Democratic Committee.
This means that the Democratic Committee must rely more
heavily on gifts under $1,000. At the same time, the
percentage of such gifts favors the Republican Committee

whose public relations program, with its radio and television

83

appeals for small gifts, reaches a wide audience (Tables 5,

6, 7).

TABLE 5

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE RECEIPTS AND
EXPENDITURES AS REPORTED FOR 1956

 

 

 

Democrats Republicans
Receipts $190,630.00 $2,808,489.44
Expenditures 188,818.00 2,778,286.97

 

Based on reports filed by the Committees with the
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 6

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OVER $1,000 FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS
REPORTED BY CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES,

 

 

 

 

1956
Size of Number of contributors
contributions Democratic Republican
$1,000 to $4,999 56 258
$5,000 or more 7 41

 

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House
of Representatives.

84

TABLE 7

SIZE OF GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS REPORTED
BY CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES

 

 

 

IN 1956
Total
number of Number %. %
Congressional gifts over over over
Committee reported $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Democratic 131 63 55.7 44.3
Republican 678 299_ 44.1 55.0

A

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House
of Representatives.
Although Tables 5, 6, and 7 are based on the reports
of the Committees in the 1956 election, the financial position
of the Republican Committee has been consistently better
than that of the Democratic, as comparison of their expenditures

for the five year period from 1952 to 1956 will show (Table 8).

TABLE 8

EXPENDITURES REPORTED BY THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES, 1952 - 1956

 

 

1952 1953 1954 1955 1956

 

Democratic $ 57,050 $ 38,644 $208,592 $ 30,763 $ 188,818
Republican 1,707,574 401,404 706,072 337,039 2,778,286

 

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House
of Representatives.

The procedural implications of these financial

85

differences have already beei suggested. One more observation
about the financial relationship of the National and Congres-
sional Committees should perhaps be made.

The Congressional Committees also provide a
valuable service for the national committees in presidential
election years. When a National Committee has reached the
$3,000,000 ceiling set by the Hatch Act for campaign expendi—
tures, it may allocate funds to its Congressional Campaign
Committee, on condition that the latter pay some of the
bills incurred by the National Committee.

The financial operations of the Committees leave
the student dissatisfied. For all his efforts, he feels
that many facts have eluded him. This, as Bone points out,
is because "financial arrangements within both parties are
often personalized and largely the result of negotiation
and bargaining between the . . . committee chairmen.
Members of the committees themselVes seldom meet as a group
to prepare budgets and estimates . . . . Financial conver-
sations are confidential; it is next to impossible to
determine what rules and customs, if any, are followed in
the making of individual allocations. Reports filed in
compliance with federal laws reveal very little of the
intercommittee financial relationships."13 But they do

13Ibid., p. 128.

 

86
suffice to emphasize a basic difference between the
Republican and Democratic Committees, to show the complexity
of inter-committee relationships, and to point up the problems
involved in the study of an organization the operations of

which are fluid.

fid.

3e:
if:

CHAPTER VI
MODERN CAMPAIGN FUNCTIONS

Preparation for a campaign

Since the Congressional Campaign Committees have
become permanent organizations, concerned with the success
of their respective parties, most of their activities may
be regarded as campaign activities. On the day after each
congressional election the Committees begin to plan for the
next one. The first step, as noted, is tabulation of election
returns. This gives a picture of the current political
situation, particularly in marginal districts, and reveals
any unusual patterns in the safe districts. If the majority
by which victory has been won in a safe district shows a
decline over previous years, the situation calls for
immediate study, to discover the reasons for the change.

"The sharpness of the political battle," as V. 0.
Key observes, "differs enormously among congressional
districts." Since "many districts return a Republican or
1

a Democrat with the regularity of the election calendar . . ."

these can be disregarded, though of course returns from them

 

1V. 0. Key, PoliticsLiParties, and Pressure Groups

(3rd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), P- 515.

87

88
are carefully noted and filed. It is to the marginal
districts that both committees devote the major portion of
their time and money. These are the districts in which,
at the preceding congressional election, the victorious
party won by a margin of 5% or less of the total vote.
There were ninety such districts in the congressional
elections of 1956 — thirty-nine Republican and fifty-one
Democratic2 (Table 9).

The Committees operate on the assumption, as Bone
points out, "thattwenty million people, living in ninety to
one hundred districts determine the outcome of national
elections."3 The Committees' task is not only to help
candidates in the districts that were marginal in the pre-
ceding election, especially those that swung to the opposing
party, but to study trends and assess probabilities, in an
attempt to discover those districts which, though not
(currently marginal, are apt to swing to the opposition
(Table 10). In doing this the Republican Party relies to
a great extent upon scientific instruments, the Democratic

upon unrecorded information.

 

2These were found in all states except Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, vermont,
and‘WYoming.

3Bone, op. cit., p. 120.

89

TABLE 9

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE MARGINAL IN THE

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS,

1956a

 

 

State

Number of
Districts

Number Marginal
(Republican)

Number Marginal
(Democratic)

 

Ariz.
Cal.
Colo.
Conn.b
Del.b
Fla.
Ill.
Ind.
Iowa
Kan.
Ky.
Me.
Md.
Mass.
Mich.
Minn.
Mo.
Mont.
Neb.
Nev.
N.J.
N.Mex.C
N.Y.
N.Car.
Ohio
Ore.
Pa.
R.I.
S.Dak.
Tenn.
Va.
Wash.b
w.va.
Wis.

Total

I—‘N w

P'H
m.>+A¢>nahao<p.b~aooa>oimlacncnbasic-c>w

[.1

[_J

F’ H (p Rahie
o<m~q<D\OKJKJC>b4»IOt»

NI—‘l—‘H U'IWNN I—‘l—‘NUJF‘

'...a

I.-

(.0

39

P‘UIk)h’h‘h‘k‘h)h’k‘k)buw

NI—‘I—‘i—‘le—‘Nl—‘NWH

N

51

 

90

TABLE 9 (Continued).

 

 

Data from Marginal Districts 1956 (Washington, D.C.:
Republican Congressional Committee, 1956).

aStates with no marginal districts in 1956:
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, vermont, wyoming.

bIncludes one district at large.

CBoth at large.

 

 

XHH N Xh.hN m $0.0H m Xm.mm 5 OH .flQflz
RON N XHB m RwH H 5 .n2
fiH.mm H XH.mm H RH.mm H m .02
*5 H fim.mN w Rb H Xmg m ¢H .mmmz
XOOH m m .mq

Xm.NH H firm m Xm.NH H m .%M
Rom N Xom N XmH ,H o mmmcmm
Xm.NH H RmN N Xm.NH H Rum m m MBOH.
fim.¢m o Xmo h Xm.¢m 0 KO H HH .UCH
RON h Rom OH RON h RON o mN .HHH
Xom H XOOH N N OSMUH
XOOH OH OH .mw

fim.NH .H Xm.NH H Xmm m m .MHm
XOOH H XOOH H XOOH H H .HOQ

m“ Rom m XOOH m Xmm m o .GCOU
XmN H XOOH w Rom N w .OHOU
Rm m XO.®© O X¢.MH c Xm.mm OH Om .HMU
XOOH m m .xnd

Rom H N .NHHd

*00H m m .MH¢

X .02 “RV .OZ .Nu .02 X .02
ommHlmfimH ommHlmmmH mmmHlmmmH ommHlmmmH mmmH Oumum
umCOHDOOHm O>Hm NO GOOD ummmq D< mGOHuOOHm m0 HmnHmHmz MO mm mumum CH
OGO Dmmmq pm CH huumm ommcmflo XOm ummmfl u< “OZ muOHHumHQ MO .02

Muuwm oomcmno

GH Hmchumz

 

 

mommHlmmmH .mZOHBUMHm H¢ZOHmmmMUZOU Zmfi ZH mBUHMBwHQ adZme¢z m0 ZOHBDmHmBmHQ

OH mam¢9

 

 

AOOH H H .u>
XOOH N AOOH N N Hwy:
Am H _xm H xmm 0N HN mmxme
$6.66 6 m .ant
Rom H som H N .Hwo.m
AOOH o o .nmo .m
XOOH N N .H.m
xmm 6H xmm mN ANN A $6.6 N om .mm
nAmA m xmA m nAmN H w .95
No.6H H No.6H H $6.6H H xom m o .MHHo
Rom A Ame HH ARON A AoN m mN 0Hso
AOOH N N .xmo.z
Am.mm m NH .nmo.z
Am.mN HH xm.mm AH Ao.s N Am.mm AH ms .Muz
2 N .xmz.z
9 ANN v Aom A AHN N Am.mN s «H .n.z
Rom H N .m.z
AooH H NOOH H AOOH H H .>mz
me H me H me H w .902
nRom H ASH N n8m H N . use:
Rom a AHm m Ame m Am H HH .0:
AOOH o m .mmHs
xHH H New 6 .ANN N nvaH H m 5an
X. .02 X .02 HR .02 x .02

mmmHnmva ommHummmH ommHummmH ommHnmmmH mmmH mumum

umCOHHUQHm G>Hh M0 GUCO #mmmfl HAN MGOHHUGHM MO HMCHmHME who mm QUMHW CH

0G0 ummmHH Hm EH \nuhnmm UCOGMSU nRoom Ummmq “AN #02 WHUHHHmHQ MO .02

mpumm pomcmno

CH HmchHmz

 

 

.HomscHucoov 0H mqmaa

93

.mwuuHEEOO HmGOHmmemcoo GMOHHQsmom ~moHumHumum muo> HMGOHmmommaoo mmmH

.mUHumHumum aoHuumHm

 

 

.owuuHEEoO HMCOHmmmHmcoo cmoHHflsmom .mmmH .mpUHHumHQ HmchHmz Eoum mumnm

.u>oo .m
.mmmH

.5 com mmmH
.coumngmmz

 

 

 

AOOH .H AOOH H H .omz
AON N Nam m AOH H AOH H OH .mHz
ANN N me m ANN m m .m>.3
nANN. N Row 6 nANN N A .333
n8N N 8N N 8H H nAoA A 0H 4.5
nxu .02 X .02 3 .02 w“. .02
ommHumva ommHnmmmH ommHnmmmH mmmHummmH .mmmH mumum

umGOHHUOHm 0>Hh MO OOGO Hmmwfl ”IN mGOHuUOHm HO HMGHOHMS m0 mm Tubufi SH
0C0 vmwwfl #0 CH hflhmm OOmCMSU ARom ummmfl uhm “OZ mUUHHumHQ MO .02

munmm oomcmao

 

 

sH HmaHmHmz

 

 

 

 

I‘ il

 

 

.HomscHucooV 0H mamas

94

The Republican Committee lists each Republican marginal
district with a breakdown by municipalities or precincts.

It gives, in tabular form, the vote (Republican; Democratic;
Other; Total; Plurality; Republican % of Total;) in
congressional, senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential
elections for the last five congressional election years.

It lists former incumbents, describes population character-
istics, and names the daily newspapers that serve the district,
giving their circulation. It makes a similar tabulation

of marginal districts in which the Republicans lost.

The Democratic Committee tabulates Democratic marginal
districts under the headings: State, District, (winning)
Party, Incumbent, Margin, Percent of the Two-Party Vbte.

After tabulation of election results, the two
Committees proceed differently, according to their established
patterns and within their budgetary limitations. In the
Democratic Committee, with its limited staff, Kenneth
Harding, assistant to the Chairman, visits marginal and
changing districts for conference with local leaders, in an
attempt to discover both favorable and unfavorable factors
in each situation. He is e5pecially alert to discover

changes in the usual voting pattern.

 

3Such shifts, according to an official of the
Republican Committee, can often be traced to one or more

95

The Republican Committee, with its more adequate
staff, approaches campaign preparations in a more formal
manner. When election results have been tabulated and
analyzed, Field Service representatives visit all marginal
districts and those which show a shift in voting pattern.
Each field man is equipped with instruments prepared by the
national office, whereby he attempts to help local organi-
zations discover the important factors, both positive and
negative, that helped influence election results and to
evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts.

Since,as Mr. Warner observed, Pnext to effective
organization, the most important factor in a successful
campaign is a good candidate," the Republican Committee has
developed a Candidate Analysis Sheet for use by local

party organizations.4 A good candidate, according to Mr.

 

of the following causes: (1) An incumbent candidate who
has grown careless about maintaining contact with his
constituents. (2) A candidate with little voter appeal.

(3) Deterioration of local organization. (4) Failure of
local organization to enlist volunteers. (5) A population
shift that has introduced interests at variance with those
of former residents. (6) Change in party loyalty resulting
from failure of party leaders to mold policies according to
interests of the district, e.g., the shift from the Repub-
lican party in the rural mid-west as a protest against

the Administration's farm policy.

4For a copy of Candidate Analysis Sheet, see Appendix
III.

96

Warner - though not all local party officials agree with him -
should be young, have a good personality, and be addicted to
hard work. It is the task of Field Service to help local
party officials accept the facts revealed by the Committee's
study of the district and use the Candidate Analysis Sheet.
To do this without leading to suspicion that "the men in
washington are trying to dictate" often requires considerable
tact .

A good campaign, Mr. Warner believes, requires:
(1) effective party organization developed within the district,
(2) selection and support of a personable candidate who is
young, vigorous, and hard—working, (3) effective use and
adaptation to the local situation of materials prepared by
the Committee, and (4) in the case of incumbent candidates,
preparation at the local level by having kept constituents
informed as to what their Congressman has been doing
(through newsletters, broadcasts, press releases, telecasts,

etc.).

Finding the right candidate

Though the results of the Committees' studies of
voting patterns are always available to party workers, and

though their interest in good candidates may lead them to

97
apply subtle pressure at an early stage, the campaign,
according to representatives of the Committees, does not
normally begin until after the primaries. This nice
distinction may, however, be more theoretical than actual,
for, says Sait, "notwithstanding the polite doctrine that
they should stand above faction and act in the common interest,
their influence in the pre-primary campaign is sometimes
decisive."

One suspects, however, that the availability of the
.Committees to the incumbents means in reality that the Committees
tend to help incumbents to resist challenges in the nominating
process. It is also probable that in cases where one con-
tender for a Congressional nomination appears to have far
greater chances of success according to Committee standards,
or is more acceptable to Committee and Party leadership,
that the Committees have little difficulty in finding ways
to assist the candidate of their choice.

Once more the Democratic approach is entirely personal.
.After analyzing each situation, Mr. Harding, in personal
interviews, attempts to help local Democratic leaders under-

stand their problems and correct whatever defect in candidate

 

5Sait, op. cit., p. 289.

98

or strategy may have contributed to it.

In evaluating the qualifications of candidates,
Mr. Harding depends upon his background of experience.
His Committee has made little attempt to work out formal
instruments for evaluating a proposed candidate's qualifi-
cations, nor has it any formal program for preparing a
candidate for a campaign. Nevertheless, it has had the
assistance of local organizations that have functioned
effectively in recent elections. Whether the recent
Democratic successes in Congress are traceable to activities
of the Party Congressional Campaign Committee or to other
factors in the current political scene is a question which
plagues the student of the Committees. William Warner,
Executive Director of the Republican Congressional
Campaign Committee, explained Democratic successes as
follows, “It is organization that wins elections, and the
Democrats are well organized. They have the labor unions
on their side and the unions are effectively organized right
down to the precinct level."

Congressmen Jonas of North Carolina and Cramer of
Florida, Mr.‘Warner feels, conduct the type of campaign
Which meets these standards. Both men, by careful study of

their districts, good organization, and hard work, were able

99
to carry districts that had traditionally voted Demo-
cratic. Mr. Warner contrasted these men, who conducted
the type of campaign advocated by the Committee, with
Dewey Short of Missouri, a defeated congressman from a
traditionally safe district who became so absorbed in his
congressional duties that he neglected "the home folks"
and failed to spend the necessary time in his district,
campaigning.

To assure their party of an opportunity at the
general election, a Campaign Committee may occasionally
give financial assistance at the pre-primary stage. In
1954, for example, the Democratic Committee, fearing
that no Democratic candidate would be running in certain
California primaries, offered financial assistance for use
in the primary campaigns.6 Such flexibility is, of

course, characteristic of this Committee's operations.

Conduct of the campaign

During the congressional campaign the Democratic
Committee makes no formal overtures to candidates, but it is
understood that any Democratic candidate may, at any time,

seek a conference with Mr. Harding or with a member or

 

6Hathorn, op. cit., p. 212.

100
members of the Campaign Committee. From such a conference
the candidate, particularly if he is a neophyte, receives
valuable information, as well as suggestions for running
his campaign. He may even discover that Mr. Harding has
a better grasp of political realities in his district than
he has.

As a result of the confidential talks between him
and the Committee representative whom he consults, financial
assistance may be forthcoming. There is no fixed rule as
to the amount allocated or the formula used in determining
it. The amount, I was told, is "based on need" and
arrived at by consultation. The consultative process seems
to operate thus: early in the campaign Mr. Harding tallies
the available resources and lists the "needs.” The list is
then handed to the Committee Chairman for additions or
deletions - though the chairman rarely uses his veto at
this stage. Similar lists are made by the Committee's
consultants, Congressmen Rayburn and McCormack. Then, in
a final session, the four men involved decide how funds
shall be allocated.

Names are ranked in the order of priority and funds
allocated according to need. The decision must be “objective,"

I was told - "based entirely on facts" - and may require

101

that a man "cut his best friend." This means, presumably,
that the party's chance of winning, if help is extended,
takes priority over personal considerations. It also
takes priority over "moral" considerations. A candidate's
personal character or even his value to the country must
not be weighed against his power to win votes. If a relatively
unknown candidate of unsullied reputation were to run
against an unscrupulous candidate of such popularity as was
enjoyed by, let us say, Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin during
his heydey, the Committee would be obliged to reject him,
on the grounds that, in their opinion, he would not poll
a sufficient number of votes to warrant the investment.
The maximum amount given is usually $500 or less, though
in special cases it may run as high as $1,000.7

As the campaign progresses Mr. Harding continues to
assist candidates by correspondence. Although the Democratic
Committee does not itself assign speakers, its suggestions to
the National Committee that speakers be assigned to a given
district are usually given favorable consideration. The
Committee publishes a few campaign pamphlets but, in general,

eschews "canned materials."

 

7This is, of course, exclusive of "directed funds,"
which may run as high as $2,500. In one case in the 1956
campaign it was $3,500. Analysis of grants made in this
campaign appears later in the chapter,

102

Republican campaign procedure is, of course, more
formal. The Republican Committee disavows secret enclaves,
"deals," and negotiations. It professes to have no secrets
and to rely almost entirely on "scientific" techniques.

Following the primary elections, all Republican
congressional candidates are invited to Washington for a
coaching conference. While there, candidates are photo-
graphed with the President, if he is a Republican, or with
other highly-placed Republican officials. These photographs
become available for campaign use. At the conference the
Committee supplies each candidate with a kit of materials
on how to conduct a successful campaign and makes available
to him the information which has been collected on his district.
Candidates are given speech-making tips and are invited to
choose designs for publicity folders, posters, and gimmicks.
They leave with information as to the services their Committee
is prepared to give, and with assurances of its help.

During the campaign itself, the Republican Committee
provides many services. In the 1956 campaign, which was
probably typical, these included:

1. A Speech Kit - a compendium of facts, with quotations
from prominent Republicans, on most of the issues to be

discussed during the campaign. These include the party's

103
achievements, and its views on such questions as the
federal budget, agriculture, civil rights, defense,
foreign policy, highways, health and education, labor, small
business, social security, taxes, trade, and veterans'
benefits.

2. A Speaker's Handbook - a well indexed, pocket-sized
abridgement of the Kit. Alphabetically arranged, it gives
enough material for a complete speech on each subject listed.
It includes at least one general speech. In 1956 it
contained two: "A Republican Congress - A Must for Ike
in '56“ and VPeace - Prosperity - Progress."

3. A newsletter to candidates mailed from‘Washington
each wednesday during the campaign. (This is sent to Party
officials and Republican newspapers all year). It carries
"news events, official reports, statistical data of
independent and non-partisan organizations, and other
accurate and dependable sources."8

4. Newspaper advertising layouts on major campaign
issues (together with suggestions as to the best way of
approaching friends for the contributions necessary to cover

the cost of this advertising.) The layouts are so complete

 

8Campaign Services of the Republican Congressional
Committee (washington, D. C: Republican Congressional
Committee, 1956), P. 3.

104
that the candidate needs only to supply a photograph, his
name, and if he wishes, a little personal data.

5. Campaign films of two types: (a) those prepared
for general use, with provision at the beginning or end for
a personal presentation by the candidate. The sections
presenting the candidate "can be filmed in color or in
black and white in Washington, using Committee facilities,

9

or in (his) own district." (b) Films or film strips

prepared on an individual basis "for candidates visiting
washington . . . ." These will show candidates "against
Washington backgrounds, with Administration officials or in
any way helpful to their campaign."10 With both types, the
cost to the candidate is minimal.

6. Television "spots" running, in length, from ten
to forty seconds. These are arranged on a flip-card device
and may contain "in addition to a vocal message, a GOP
jingle or other suitable music and sound effects." The
time is divided, the first half giving reasons why all

viewers should vote Republican, the second, why they should

vote for the Republican congressional candidate. The forty

 

9Ibid., p. 6.

10Ibid., p. 7.

105
second “spot' is arranged to give the candidate an opportunity
for ”a personal message” at its close. This may be done
either in person or on film. Candidates are assisted by
the Committee in the preparation and filming of "spots."

7. Radio spot announcements. The Committee provides
candidates with recordings of various lengths, all of the
"open end" variety, which allow the candidate to make a
personal appeal. The Committee suggests that candidates
confer with local radio and television experts. It also
suggests the best hours for reaching specific audiences.

8. If the incumbent is a Democrat, the Committee
furnishes the non-incumbent Republican candidate with:

a. Opponent's voting record.

b. Copies of all bills and resolutions introduced
by opponent in the current session of Congress,
with the history of action taken, if any.

c. A record of opponent's attendance at both quorum
calls and roll calls.

9. Services of the field staff, as desired. If in a
marginal district, Field Service will seek out the candidate.

10. A Republican‘WOrkers' Manual containing detailed
instructions for precinct workers on campaign tactics, tools

to be used, temporary and permanent committees to be organized,

106
methods for organizing the precinct, and for conducting
meetings.

All of these services are available to any Republican
congressional candidate on request. The Committee regrets
that only about three hundred candidates fully avail them-
selves of the proffered services.

It is interesting that, although the Republican
Committee says very little about making grants to candidates,
it actually does more in this area than the Democratic
Committee. In the 1956 campaign it distributed $230,300
in grants to 214 candidates as against $176,400 allotted

to 186 candidates by the Democratic Committee.

Size and distribution of grants by bgth Committees

It may be appropriate at this point to note to whom
this money was distributed by each Campaign Committee and to
what districts it went. Examination of distributions made
during the 1956 campaign by both committees, including directed
funds, show that the Republicans gave nothing to candidates
in four southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi,

South Carolina), one northern state (North Dakota), Alaska,
or Hawaii. The Democratic Committee gave nothing in three

of the same states (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina)

or in Arkansas, Maine, vermont, and Alaska. In several

107
states both committees made grants which totaled $1,000
or less, though the total in these states was $6,000 for
the Republican Committee, $3,900 for the Democratic (Table
11).

Candidates in six states received grants which
totaled $10,000 or more from the Republican Committee. In
only two states did grants from the Democratic Committee
reach a five-figure total (Table 12).

The number of states in which grants totaled
from $1,000 to $4,999 was quite similar for the two
committees (18 for the Republican Committee and 19, plus
Hawaii, for the Democratic). This was also true of grants
from $5,000 to $9,999, a category in which the Republican
Committee totaled 12, the Democratic Committee 13 (Tables
13 and 14).

The highest individual grant was $3,500 to Henry
0. Talle, Republican incumbent of thirty—eight years, in
Iowa's marginal second district. Three other grants of
$3,000 each were made by the Republican Committee to
incumbent candidates in other marginal districts in Iowa
(4th, 5th, and 6th). In each of these districts $1,000
was in directed funds; in the second district $1,500 was

in directed funds. The Democratic Committee's largest

108

TABLE 11

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM.ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES
TOTALED $1,000 OR LESS IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN*

 

 

 

State Republican total Democratic total

Delaware $ 500.

Georgia $ 100.
Louisiana 1,000. 300.,
North Dakota 1,000.
New Mexico 500.
Oklahoma 1,000. 500.
Rhode Island 1,000.

Tennessee 500.
Texas 1,000. 500.
vermont 500.

wyoming 1,000. 500.

*This includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the two committees.

109
TABLE 12

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES
TOTALED $10,000 OR MORE*

 

 

State Republican total Democratic total
Illinois $ 13,250 $ 12,000
Iowa 18,000
Nunnesota 10,000
Michigan 20,000
New York 14,000
Pennsylvania 17,750 15,850

 

*This includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the committees with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives.

110
TABLE 13

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES IN
CAMPAIGN TOTALED $5,000 tO $9,999*

 

 

 

State Republican total Democratic total
California $ 7,500
Connecticut 6,500
Indiana 8,300 $ 8,250
Kansas 5,000
Maryland 7,000
Massachusetts 6,250
Michigan 8,250
Minnesota 7,750
Missouri 9,000 7,500
NebraSka 5,000
New Jersey 8,000 5,000
New Mexico 5,000
New York 7,950
Ohio 9,250
Virginia 6,500 5,000
washington 7,000
‘West Virginia 8,000 6,500
‘Wisconsin 6,750 6,000

*Includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
for 1956, filed by the committees with the Clerk of the
House of Representatives.

111
TABLE 14
STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES

IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN TOTALED $1,000 to $5,000
(INCLUDING DIRECTED FUNDS)

 

 

State Republican total Democratic total
Arizona $ 2,500 $ 1,500
Arkansas 1,500
California 3,750
Connecticut 4,500
Delaware 2,000
Florida 2,500 4,000
Idaho 3,500 2,250
Iowa 1,750
Kansas 3,500
Kentucky 4,500 2,000
Louisana 1,000
Maine 2,000
Montana 2,500 1,500
Nebraska 2,000
Nevada 2,000 1,500
New Hampshire 2,500 1,500
New Mexico 2,000
North Carolina 4,750 3,000
Ohio 3,000
Oregon 4,250 1,000
Rhode Island 1,200
South Dakota 2,500 1,250
Tennessee 2,500
Utah 2,750 2,000
vermont 500
‘Washington 4,500
Hawaii 1,500

Total $ 46,750 $ 45,200

 

 

 

112

grant was $3,000 to eight-year incumbent, Roy W. Wier, in
Minnesota's marginal eighth district. Of this $2,000 was
in directed funds.

The Republican Committee made a $500 grant (directed)
to an uncontested incumbent, Thomas L. Ashley, who had served
thirty-two years in Ohio's tenth district, and one of $1,500
to Chairman Simpson (Pennsylvania 18th). No Democratic
Committee officer accepted a grant, nor did the Committee
make any grants to uncontested candidates.

The Republican Committee made grants to 214
candidates, of whom 126 (58.8%) won seats, the Democratic
Committee to 186 candidates, of whom 86 (46.2%) won.

How many grants were distributed by the Republican
Committee to incumbents and non-incumbents in marginal and
non-marginal districts, and to what extent these grants
produced results in terms of victory at the polls, for
candidates in each category, is shown in the following
series of tables, as is the amount of money involved for
each category (Tables 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19).

One fact which these tables reveal is the rather
even apportionment of funds by the Republican Committee
between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. A group of

119 incumbents (55.6% of the grantees) received grants

113

TABLE 15

NUMBER OF GRANTS BY THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE IN THE
1956 CAMPAIGN To INCUMBENTS AND NON-INCUMBENTS
IN MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS AND
NUMBER OF SEATS WON
(INCLUDING DIRECTED FUNDS)

 

 

Classification Number of Number of % of grantees
of grantees grants seats won who won

 

Incumbents from

 

marginal districts 29 22 75.8
Incumbents from

non-marginal districts 90 89 98.8
Non-incumbents from

marginal districts 48 10 20.8
Non-incumbents from

non-marginal districts 47 5 10.6

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF TABLE 15

 

 

 

Classification Number of Number of %.of grantees
of grantees grants seats won who won

Incumbents 119 111 93.2

Non-incumbents 95 15 15.7

Candidates from
marginal districts 77 32 41.5

Candidates from
non-marginal districts 137 94 68.6

 

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the Republican Committee with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

114

TABLE 17

AMOUNT OF MONEY DISTRIBUTED IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN BY
THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE IN GRANTS OF INCUMBENTS
AND NON-INCUMBENTS IN MARGINAL AND
NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Classification Number of Amount dis- Average

of grantees grants tributed grant
Incumbents from
marginal districts 29 $ 41,800 $ 1,441.38
Incumbents from
non-marginal districts 90 85,500 950.00
Non-incumbents from
marginal districts 48 59,750 1,244.79
Non-incumbents from
non-marginal districts 47 43,250 920.21

TABLE 18
SUMMARY OF TABLE 17
Classification Number of Amount dis- Average
of grantees grants tributed grant
Incumbents 119 $127,300 $ 1,069.75
Non-incumbents 95 103,000 1,084.21
Candidates from
marginal districts 77 101,550 1,318.82
Candidates from
939.78

non-marginal districts

137

128,750

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the Republican Committee with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

115
totaling $127,300, or 55.3% of the total amount distributed,
while 95 non—incumbents (44.4% of the grantees) received

44.7% of the funds.

TABLE 19

SIZE OF GRANTS BY THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE TO INCUMBENT,
NON—INCUMBENT, MARGINAL, AND NON-MARGINAL CANDIDATES,
(1956 CAMPAIGN)

 

 

 

Number
receiving
Number between Number
receiving $1,000 receiving

Classification $1,000 and $2,000

of grantees or less % $2,000 % or over %
Incumbents 87 40.6 18 8.4 14 6.5
Non-incumbents 61 28.5 18 8.4 16 7.4
Candidates from
marginal districts 39 18.2 19 8.8 19 8.8
Candidates from
non-marginal
districts 109 50.9 17 8.0 11 5.1

There is greater disparity between candidates from
marginal and non-marginal districts. Those from the former
(77 of the 214 grantees), though they constituted only 36%,
received 44% of the $230,300 distributed in grants, while
the 137 candidates from non-marginal districts (64% of
the grantees) received only 55.9% of the funds. This is

Shown in the average size of the grants awarded these two

116
groups - $939.78 to non-marginal candidates, $1,318.82 to
those from marginal districts.

Despite this balance in favor of marginal districts,
only 41.5% of these grantees won congressional seats, as
contrasted with 68.6% of those from non-marginal districts.
In terms of victories, incumbents far outdistanced novices;
93.2% of the incumbent grantees won, as contrasted with only
15% of the non-incumbents.

As for the size of the Republican Committee's grants
to individuals, the largest number, to candidates in all
categories, amounted to $1,000 or less, with 50.9% of these
going to candidates from non-marginal districts. In the
larger grants, there was no great difference in the number
of recipients in the several categories.

A study of the grants made by the Democratic Committee
Shows many similarities to the pattern of distribution to
candidates in the several categories that we have just
observed in the Republican Committee (Tables 20, 21, 22, 23,
and 24).

These tables show that the Democratic Committee
slightly favored incumbents in making grants. The 80
incumbents who constituted 43% of the grantees received

$99,300 or 56.3% of the funds granted, while the 106 non-

incumbents (57% of the grantees) received only $77,100

117

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF GRANTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE IN THE 1956
CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS AND NONHINCUMBENTS IN
MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS

 

 

 

 

Classification Number of Number of % of grantees
of grantees grants seats won who won

Incumbents from

marginal districts 38 32 84.2

Incumbents from

non—marginal districts 42 42 100.0

Non-incumbents from

marginal districts 35 9 25.7

Non-incumbents from

non-marginal districts 71 3 4.2

TABLE 21

SUMMARY OF TABLE 20

 

 

Classification

Number of Number of

% of grantees

 

of grantees grants seats won who won
Incumbents 80 74 92.5
Non-incumbents 106 12 11.3
Candidates from
Marginal districts 73 41 56.1
Candidates from
non-marginal districts 113 45 39.3
By all 186 86

46.2

Data for both tables from reports of campaign
expenditures for 1956 filed by the Democratic Campaign
Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

118

TABLE 22

AMOUNT OF MONEY DISTRIBUTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE IN GRANTS TO INCUMBENT AND NON-INCUMBENT
CANDIDATES IN MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL
DISTRICTS (1956)
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

A L

 

Classification Number of Amount dis— Average
of grantees grants tributed grant

A _ A

Incumbents from

 

marginal districts 38 $ 40,800 $ 1,073.68
Incumbents from

non-marginal districts 42 58,500 1,392.86
Non-incumbents from

marginal districts 35 30,100 860.00
Non-incumbents from

non-marginal districts 71 47,000 661.97

TABLE 23

SUMMARY OF TABLE 22

 

 

 

Classification Number of Amount dis— Average
of grantees grants tributed grant
Incumbents 80 $ 99,300 $ 1,241.25

Non-incumbents 106 77,100 727.36

Candidates from
marginal districts 73 70,900 971.23

Candidates from

non-marginal districts 113 105,500 933.63
Data in both tables from reports of campaign

expenditures for 1956 filed by the Democratic Campaign

Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

119
or 43.7%.of the funds allocated as grants.
Candidates from marginal districts Who made up
39.2% of the grantees received $70,900 or 40.25% of the
funds granted, while the 113 candidates (60.7%) running in

non-marginal districts received $105,500 or 59.75%w

TABLE 24

SIZE OF GRANTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE IN THE 1956
CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS, NON-INCUMBENTS,
MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS

 

Number who

 

received
Number who between. Number Who
received $1,000 received

Classification $1,000 and over

of grantees or less % $2,000 % $2,000 %
Incumbents 40 21.5 16 8.6 24 12.9
Non-incumbents 90 48.4 16 8.6 0
Candidates from
marginal districts 42 22.6 12 6.4 19 10.3
Candidates from
non-marginal
districts 88. 47.3 20 10.75 5 2.7

Data from reports of expenditures in the 1956
campaign filed by the Democratic Campaign Committee with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

As for seats won, a higher percentage of Democratic

than of Republican grantees were successful at the polls.

Of the Democratic grantees in marginal districts, 56.1%

120

won, as against 41.5% of the Republican grantees in marginal
districts. Of the Democratic grantees from non—marginal
districts, only 39.3% were successful as compared with the
Republican's 68.6%. Democratic incumbent grantees, like
their Republican counterparts, won elections in a high
percentage of instances - 92.5%.

Like the Republican Committee, the Democratic
Committee made more grants of $1,000 or less than any
other amount (130 of the 186 grants made, or 69.9% were in
this category). Grants between $1,000 and $2,000 accounted
for 32 grants, of which 26 were for $1,500. There were 23
grants of $2,000 and only one above that amount.

In making grants to incumbents both Committees
favored candidates who had served in Congress ten years
or less. The Republican Committee gave 64.6% of its grants
to incumbents in this category, the Democratic Committee,
83.7%. The 36 grants made by the Republican Committee to
candidates with eleven to nineteen years of service
represented 30.1% of their grants to incumbents, whereas
the Democratic Committee gave only nine grants (11.25%)
to this group. Both Committees gave 5%.of their incumbents'
grants to men who had served for twenty years or more

(Table 25).

121

TABLE 25

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF GRANTS BY BOTH COMMITTEES

DURING THE 1956 CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS,
SHOWING LENGTH OF SERVICE IN CONGRESS
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

 

 

Democratic

 

 

Republican
Length of
service No. of % of in- % by No. of %.of in— %.by
in years grants cumbents 10 yr. grants cumbents 10 yr.
groups groups
2 yrs. 11 9.24 20 25.0
4 " 21 17.6 16_ 20.0
64.6 83.7
6 " 25 21.0 3 3.75
8 " 5 4.2 19 23.75
10 " 15 12.6 9 11.25
12 " 6 5.0 3 3.25
14 " 18 15.1 4 5.0
30.1 11.25
16 “ 6 5.0 l 1.25
18 " 6 5.0 1 1.25
20 " 2 1.7 3 3.75
24 " 1 .8
5.0 5.0
26 “ 1 .8
30 " 1 .8
32 " 1 .8
34 " 1 1.25
Total 119 80

A

House of Representatives.

Data from reports of expenditures during the 1956
campaign filed by both Committees with the Clerk of the

122

In attempting to interpret these statistics, it
should be borne in mind that averages and percentages do
not tell the whole story. Victory or defeat in one strategi-
cally located district may seriously affect the balance of
political power in an entire state, a fact which leads both
committees to hazard considerable sums in critical areas.
Each grant, as both committees realize and Democratic
Committee leaders in particular emphasize, should be made
only after evaluation of a complex of factors difficult to
capture in a statistical table. The fact that no two
districts are exactly alike compounds the difficulty of
making comparisons. Such factors as the temperament of
candidates, the strength of the opposition, and the
political complexion of the district play so large a part
that a composite of all the determinative factors can hardly
be constructed. This, of course, is why Democratic Committee
leaders insist that only persons who understand these nuances

are qualified to allocate funds.

Committee services to incumbents

Since both committees maintain offices in Washington
with full-time staffs the year around, they are available to

give whatever assistance they can to incumbents. They may

123
help the new congressman find housing or secure an efficient
office staff, and are always available for consultation on
organizational problems. The Committees - particularly the
Democratic - "cultivate" their congressmen, with much profit
in terms of confidential information.

As would be expected, the Republican Committee offers
incumbents a wide variety of services. "Public Relations"
will help with publicity; for those who wish to run articles
or advertisements in their home papers, the Art Department
will assist with layout; Photographic Service is always
willing to photograph congressmen with visiting constituents;
the Committee's newsletter is available for mailing to
constituents. If a congressman is asked to give a political
address, he can call on the Committee's Research Department
for facts and figures. In short, most of the services

offered to candidates are available to incumbents.

Services to other groups

In addition to their services to candidates and
congressmen the Campaign Committees conduct an educational
program for the general public, as a means of keeping the
political field under cultivation. The Republican Committee

is able to carry on a better organized educational campaign

124

than its rival. It prepares literature for the political
education of selected groups and distributes it to doctors,
teachers, etc.11 It prepares press releases for distribution
to sympathetic news services. In short, it makes a constant
effort to keep the Republican Party and the work of Republican
congressmen before the voter.

In recent years the Republican Committee has added
to its usual functions cooperation with the National and
Senatorial Committees in the sponsorship of training schools
for party workers, in an attempt to develop trained volunteer
staffs for party organizations. However related to the
concern over the Party's congressional defeats, these
training conferences testify to the aggressive leadership
of the Republican Committees at all levels, and to their
desire to exert increasing influence in local party politics.

The Democratic Committee, fully aware of its comparative

dearth of campaign services, faces the variety of Republican

 

1An example is an attractive, well-written, two—
page folder in two colors, usable as a poster. Prepared
especially for teachers, it comes in two parts. Part I,
"VOter Registration“ asks the reader to check his knowledge
as to the size and population of his precinct, the regulations
governing voter registration, including time, place, and voter
eligibility. Part II, ”Election Day," is a quiz on the time
and place of voting, methods of balloting, assistance
available to voters, and absentee voting.

125
services with candor and defends its methods. Its
representatives maintain that the Democratic Party has been
more successful at the polls, in part at least, because its
Committee has helped candidates plan their own campaigns,
which then reflect the personality of the candidates and
are tailored to meet the requirements of their districts.
The Republican Committee, they feel, provides so much "canned"
material that it gives the campaigns a "made in Washington"
stamp and robs them of that indigenous quality on which the
Democrats pride themselves.

A representative of the Republican Committee admitted
that his party was disturbed by its recent failures in
congressional elections. "The year 1956 really hurt,"
said Mr. Warner. He felt, however, that the reason lay in
the inability of candidates to adapt the material provided
by the Committee to their local situations. He felt that
candidates were often too apathetic or unimaginative to use

campaign helps creatively.

Differences in philosophy

0

In reviewing the campaign functions of the two
Committees it seems apparent that the greatest difference

between them is in philosophy. A paragraph in the Republican

126
Campaign Manual for 1952 states the Republican Committee's
position as essentially that of a public relations organi-
zation:

Organization in the political field has a

single purpose - to SELL the Party's leaders and
principles to the public. A political organization
laCking the ability to sell has little value. Organi-
zation is the first requirement for victory, for with-
out organization it is difficult to sell the party.
The art of successful campaign management demands a
thorough understanding of the principles of political
organization.12

The long list of Republkzan Committee services which has been

enumerated represents an attempt to implement this "sales"

philosophy.

The Democratic Committee seems never to have so
explicitly identified its methods with those of salesman-
ship. It professes to emphasize above all else personal
relationships - relationships between constituents and
candidates, between candidates and local party officials,
and between candidate, local organization, and the Campaign
Committee.

Despite obvious differences in philosophy and

technique, the two Congressional Campaign Committees, working

for the same objectives within their respective parties,

 

12Republican Campaign Manual, 1952 (Washington, D. C.:
Republican National Committee, 1956), P. 7.

127
have in common more similarities than differences.
Their competition, at once sharp and friendly, gives
each local campaign an added dimension of national

importance and strengthens the sense of solidarity in

American politics.

CHAPTER VII

ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF

COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

Problems and methods

In scrutinizing Congressional Campaign Committee
leadership, two gaps handicap the student. The first is in
the records. Since the Committees, as has been observed,
regard themselves as functional organizations within the
congressional structure, not directly dependent upon the
public either for funds or for direction, they feel no
obligation to divulge their affairs or, indeed, to keep
records, except as these may serve their own purposes.

Even their private records contain serious omissions:and

no attempt has been made to compile historical data. There
are consequently gaps in the lists of committee chairmen,
with no Democratic chairmen listed for the period from

1869 to 1879 and no Republican chairmen from 1883 to 1893.

The search for information on committee leadership
has led in many directions - to the Committee's offices for
interviews and for such lists of chairmen, officers, and
executive committee members as could be furnished, to
gpngressional Directories for names of counties or

128

129
municipalities in the districts represented by Committee
leaders at the time of their election to Congress and their
appointment to Committee leadership, and to census abstracts
and reapportionment charts for statistical data as to the
population of these districts.

In attempting to determine a standard for rural-
urban classification of congressional districts, another
problem was encountered. The United States Census Bureau
counts all places with a population over 2,500 as urban.
Some students consider this figure too low, since towns with
a population of 2,500 to 5,000, unless contiguous or adjacent
to large cities, are often little more than rural marketing
centers. Even towns ranging in size from 5,000 to 10,000,
though they usually have a number of industries, may, in

some cases, be chiefly "market towns,‘ rather than industrial
or commercial centers, and are considered, in a study made
by the Congressionalgguarterlyl in 1956, as small towns.
The Quarterly's study considers a district rural if it
contains no city of 25,000 or more. This figure, however,

seems high and, if used, would give the impression that many

congressional districts which contain towns of ten, fifteen,

 

l"Rural Urban 'Districts' Role in Elections,fl45
Congressionalgguarterly weekly Report, VOl. XIV, No. 3
(washington, 1956), p. 360.

130
and twenty thousand inhabitants, are 100% rural.

All factors considered, it has seemed most reasonable,
for purposes of this study, to adopt the U.S. census figure
of 2,500 as the dividing line between rural and urban for
incorporated towns, boroughs, and cities. Townships will
not be considered urban unless their population, exclusive
of towns of 2,500 or more, is at least 5,000 and they lie
in an area contiguous or adjacent to a city of 20,000 or
more.2 Details as to the rural—urban classification scale
to be used will be given later in the chapter.

When an attempt was made to study the voting patterns
of Congressional Campaign Committee leaders, a serious
problem was encountered: that of discovering a satisfactory
basis for classifying voting records. "Conservative"
and ”liberal? appear, superficially, as useful categories
for this purpose, but an attempt to discover objective
standards for defining these terms proved difficult. In
the hope of using contrasting standards set by organizations
with such widely differing positions on public questions as
the National Association of Manufacturers and the Committee

on Political Education of the CIO, these organizations were

 

2See Appendix IV for a breakdown on all districts
studied.

131
contacted, as were the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A.
and the Friends (Quakers) Committee on National Legislation —
with disappointing results.

The Chamber of Commerce and the National Association
of Manufacturers do not publish lists of congressional votes
for public distribution. The Friends Committee on National
Legislation has files of voting records that go back to 1950:
the CIO'S Political Education Committee, to 1947. These,
however, are ”right and wrong" lists which might legitimately
be used only if balanced by lists which demonstrate rather
clear-cut polarity in line with the expressed purposes of
the organizations publishing them.

"Liberal" and "conservative“ are also relative terms
with respect to time. Liberal legislation at one period
may, at a later date, be regarded as conservative. New
Deal legislation eventually becomes standard practice,
advocated by leaders who consider themselves conservative,
while positions on new issues are called liberal. The
problems inherent in determining when the transition has
been accomplished are obvious.

Lacking objective criteria for defining these terms,
as applied to legislation, the writer turned to a study of

party unity in voting, made by publishers of The Congressional

132
'Quarterly, in which the 79th Congress is chosen as the
"guinea pig." This study sets up a criterion for determining
a "party issue" and then tabulates votes on such issues,
on coalition issues, and on deviations to the right and the
left. Further details will be given later in the chapter.

For personal data on Committee leaders, The Biographical

 

Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949 has proved
an invaluable source.

General features of Committee leadership — age,
political maturity and congressional experience

A cursory look at Campaign Committee leadership
impresses one with the fact that distinguished representatives
of the two parties have served as Committee chairmen. On
the Republican list are such names as Zachariah Chandler,
Chairman of the Radical Republicans' "Committee on the
Conduct of the'War" (1861), and Joseph W; Babcock, of whom
Speaker Joseph Cannon wrote, “His continuance in public
life is a matter of concern not only to his own district
and state, but to the whole country . . . ."3 There is
also James S. Sherman who served as Vice President of the

United States with William Howard Taft, Joseph Martin, an

 

3Quoted in LaFollette, op. cit., p. 739.

133
elder statesman of the House, and Leonard Hall, chairman
of the Republican National Committee.

Democratic Committee Chairmen include James R.
Doolittle who, in 1872, was chosen as permanent chairman of
the Democratic National Convention, R. P. Flower, the
financier who governed New York for four years (1891—1895),
William L. Wilson, who held the post of Postmaster General
under Cleveland, Frank E. Doremus, a mayor of Detroit, and
five men who made serving in Congress their life's work and,
after terms of thirteen to twenty-seven years, died in
office.4

More careful study reveals that in both parties
the chairmen had many features in common. Their age when
chosen as chairmen and their previous experience in the
political arena, both indicate that they had come to the
position as mature men who had won their spurs on the
political battlefield.

Of the seventeen Democratic chairmen, the age range
at the time of accepting the chairmanship was from forty to

sixty-one years; with the Republicans it was from forty-one

 

4James M. Griggs (13 yrs.), H. D. Flood (20 yrs.),
William A. Oldfield (19 yrs.), Joseph W. Byrnes (27 yrs.),
and Patrick Drewry (27 yrs.).

134
to seventy-four. For both committees the mean was just
under fifty-two and the greatest concentration was from
fifty to fifty-four. Of the Republican chairmen, 88%
were under sixty. For the Democrats, the figure is 82%

(Tables 26 and 27).

TABLE 26

AGE OF REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN FROM 1865 TO 1957 AT THE TIME OF
ASSUMING THE CHAIRMANSHIP - BY FIVE
AND TEN YEAR GROUPINGS

A

*4—

No. in No. in No. in No.

over

5 yr. age each 40-49 yr. 50—59 yr. 60 yrs.

groupings bracket bracket bracket

 

40-44
45—49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74 2

10

Ol—‘l—‘kONw

Average age 51.7 yrs.

 

Data from Biographical Directory of the American

Congress, 1794-1949.

135
TABLE 27
AGE OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

FROM 1865 TO 1957, AT THE TIME OF ASSUMING CHAIRMANSHIP -
BY FIVE AND TEN YEAR GROUPINGS

 

 

 

No. in No. in No. in
5 yr. age each 40—49 yr. 50-59 yr. No. over
groupings bracket braCket bracket 60 yrs.
- 2
4O 44 6
45-49 4 8
50-54 6
55-59 2
60-64 3
65-69 0 3
70-74 0

Average age 51.8 yrs.

 

Data from Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1794-1949.

One measure of their political maturity is the
experience gained in political office prior to becoming
Campaign Committee chairmen. Both Republicans and
Democrats had held numerous posts: as members of state
legislatures, in which some had been Speakers, as delegates
to the National Conventions of their respective parties, as
judges, and in numerous municipal and county officers. Here
again, the record of the two parties is strikingly similar

(Table 28).

136

TABLE 28

POSITIONS HELD BY'CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(1865-1957) PRIOR TO THEIR CHAIRMANSHIP

 

 

Position

State legislator

Municipal or
county officeb

Delegate to party's
National Conventionc

Member of state Board
or Commissiond

State judge or attorney

Delegate to party's
State Conventionc

Presidential elector

Office in party's
State Committeef

Helped organize party
Foreign minister
State governor

Member of President's
Cabinet

Number of
chairmen who
held position

A n-

15

13

13

.5

I-‘F-‘Nw

1

Percentage who
held positiona

44.1

38.2

38.2

20.6
17.6

14.7
11.7

2.9

Based on data from Biographical Directory of the

Amgnican Congress, 1774-1949.

a

34 = 100% (17 chairmen of each party, 1885-1957).

bIncludes prosecuting attorneys, judges, and assistant

Postmaster General.

c I
Includes one chairman.

dIncludes one delegate to a state constitutional,

convention.

e . . . .
Chairman, member executive committee, executive

secretary.

137

Another criterion of political maturity is the number
of years served in Congress before being elected to the
chairmanship of one of the Campaign Committees. Among the
Democrats, the average length of service before assuming
Committee chairmanship is just under ten years, or five
congressional terms. Among Republicans, the average is
slightly under eight years, or four terms.

Eleven of the seventeen Republican chairmen (65%)
accepted the chairmanship before they had served in Congress
a decade. Five of these had served less than five years.
Of the Democratic chairmen, eight (47%) had served less
than a decade, with four serving less than five years.

In both Committees most chairmen had served in Congress at
least four years. Only 12% of the Republican and 18%»of
the Democratic chairmen had served for a Shorter period
(Table 29).

Once elected, a chairman usually holds the office
for more than one Congressional term. This, it might be
added parenthetically, is also true of Executive Committee
members. Republican Committee chairmen have served in that
capacity for an average of two and a half Congressional

terms, Democratic chairmen for an average of two (Table 30).

138

TABLE 29

LENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE BY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

CHAIRMEN (1865—1957) BEFORE ELECTION TO

CHAIRMANSHIP OF CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES

 

No. of years

% serving

% serving

 

 

served in over or over or
Congress before under 10 under 10
Chairmanship Number yearsa Number years
19 2
16 2 2
15 1
12 3 35.3% 52.9%
11 served ten 2 served ten
years or years or
10 1 over 2 over
9 2
8 3
7 l
6 3
5 64.7% 1 47.0%
4 3 served 1 served
3 under ten 1 under ten
years years
1 l l
0 1 1

Data from Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, 1744-1949.

a

17 = 100% (17 chairmen for each Committee).

139

TABLE 30

LENGTH OF SERVICE AS CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

 

 

 

Republican Chairmen Democratic Chairmen
Area of greatest FA Area of greatest
Yrs. No. concentration No. concentration
1 1 0
2 1 5
3 2 12 (2 to 4 yrs.)
4 9 5
5 1 l3 (4 to 6 yrs.) 0
6 3 2
7 0 0
8 0 l
9 0 0
10 l 1
11 0 1
12 1 0

 

Data from committee records.

140
The last three Democratic chairmen, i.e., those
serving Since 1928, have had longer terms than any previous
ones. They served for eight, ten, and eleven years, respectively,
and Michael Kirwan is still in office as this is being
written. For the Republicans, Babcock, who served twelve

years (1893-1905) and William R. Wood who served ten

(1923-1933) hold the record.

Geographical distribution; urban—rural classification

The question now arises: from what parts of the
country do Committee Chairmen come? Are they from regions
in which their party is strongly entrenched or from areas
in which it is trying to gain a foothold? From marginal or
safe districts? From metropolitan or rural areas? Or are
chairmen chosen on the basis of ability, achievement, or
party loyalty, without regard to geographical distribution?

When the chairmen of the two committees are classi—
fied geographically, an interesting pattern emerges. The
Republican Committee has never had a chairman from a
southern or border state, and only one from west of the
(Mississippi River (Frank P. WOods of Iowa, 1913-1919).
Eight (47%) have come from the North Central States (west

of Pennsylvania and east of the Mississippi), six (35%)

141
from the Middle Atlantic States, and two (just under 12%)
from.New England. They have been drawn from one relatively
small area in which the Republican Party has historically
been strong.

Most Democratic Committee chairmen on the other
hand (eight or 47%) came from southern or border states east
of the Mississippi. Southern and border states west of the
Mississippi tie with North Central States east of the
Mississippi for second place (three each). If the two
groups of southern and border states are considered together,
65% of the Democratic chairmen represent this regiOnal
grouping. Two (12%) come from Middle Atlantic States and
one from California (Table 31).

Until the twentieth century the Democratic Committee
had had no chairman from farther south than West Virginia,
but of the five chairmen who toOk office between 1900 and
1920 only one (Frank E. Doremus of Michigan) was from the
north. Since 1920 five chairmen have been elected and,
again, only one (Michael Kirwan of Ohio) has come from the
north. This is to say that, of the eleven Democratic chair-
men who have held office since the beginning of the twentieth
century, 82%»have come from southern and from three border

states (Tennessee, Missouri, and Oklahoma). The area

142

TABLE 31

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
BY REGIONSa

 

 

 

Republican b Democrats

Region No. ‘% No. %
New England 2 12%
Middle Atlantic

States 6 35% 2 12%
North Central

States
(East of Miss. R.) 8 47% 3 18%
Southern and Border

States (East of

Miss.) 8 47%
Southern and Border

States (west of

Miss.) 3 18%
Northern States
(west of Miss.) l 6%. l 6%

Total 17 17

u

a . . . . .
Data and regional ClaSSlflcatlon from CongreSSIOnal
Directories.

b17 = 100% (17 Chairmen of each committee).

143
represented is that of the party's greatest electoral
reliability. The fact that Kirwan, from a northern urban—
rurban district (YOungstOwn, Ohio, area) has held the chair-
manship for the last decades may be indicative of the
Democratic Party's recognition of its growing strength in
the industrial north.

Our next task is to study the rural-urban character
of the districts represented by Committee chairmen. As
already indicated, the United States Bureau of the Census
figure (2,500) will be used as the dividing line between
rural and urban. In every case, the population of the
district, as apportioned when the chairman under consider-
ation accepted the chairmanship of his Committee will be
considered. Five categories for rural-urban classification,
borrowed, with permission, from the master's thesis of Dr.
Ralph M. Goldman,5 will be used, as follows:

I. Rural. 70% or more rural.

II. Rural-rurban. 60-69%.rura1.
III. Middle rurban. 40-59% rural.
IV. Urban-rurban. 30-39% rural.

V; urban. Less than 30% rural.

 

5Ralph M. Goldman, Some Dimensions of Ruralpand Urban

Representation indCongress, Appendix II, pp. 143-62.

144

Two problems were encountered in trying to ascertain
the rural—urban classification of William Rosecrans' district.
The first question: "What was his district?" was posed by
an apparent contradiction in facts given in the Biographical
Directory of the American Congress — 1774-1949.

The Directopy lists "William S. Rosecrans, San
Francisco" as a member of the 47th and 48th Congresses.
Its biographical data on Rosecrans, however, states that
after resigning from the United States Army in 1867 Rosecrans
"moved to California and settled in Los Angeles County."7
Both his business connections and his place of burial indicate
a Los Angeles residence. Other sources, however, ShOW’him
as residing in San Francisco prior to his election. These

include the Congressional Directories for the 47th and 48th

 

Congresses and the San Francisco Directory, 1880, in which
he appears as a "general mining and civil engineer, r.
Abbotsford House."8 His name is also found in the 1878

and 1879 San Francisco Directories.

 

6Biographical Directorypof the American Congpessp:g
1774-1949, ed. James Harrison (Washington: U.S. Government
Pringint Office, 1950), pp. 368 and 378.

71bid., p. 1756.

8Langley, San Francisco Directory for the Year
CommencinguApril, 1880 (San Francisco: valentine and Co.,
1880), p. 780.

145

The second question was: what was the population
of the district? The Congressional Directory states that
the First District included San Francisco County and part
of the city of San Francisco. Census figures for 1880 give
the population of the county as 233,959, with a footnote
indicating that population figures for the city had been
destroyed by fire. Another census table, giving population
of cities in 1880 lists the population of San Francisco as
233,959.9

All records of "San Francisco" as of 1880 give this
figure. This is explained by the fact that when San Mateo
and San Francisco Counties were separated in 1856 the term
FSan Francisco? was applied to a governmental unit known as y
"The City and County of San Francisco.2 This raises the
question as to how Rosecrans' district should be classified.
To be conservative, it has been classified as Middle-Rurban

on the assumption that San Francisco in 1880 was a city of

approximately 100,000 (since by 1890 it had grown to 298,997).

 

9The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of

Representativesgfor the.First Session of the Fifty-Secopd
Copgress, 1891-1892, VOl. 50, Part 3 (Washington, 1895)
(Table 4 for population statistics 1870, 1880, 1890);
also, Census Report, VOl. IgggTwelfth Census of the United

States, 1900. Part I - Population (Washington: U. S.
Census Office, 1901), Table 4.

146
In this case it would have accounted for approximately half
the population of the county.

The most striking fact emerging from comparison of
the rural-urban classification of Campaign Committee chair-
men is the number of chairmen in both parties from rural
districts (Tables 32 and 33). The Democratic Committee
has had eight chairmen from rural districts, the Republican,
five. Every Democratic chairman from a rural area represented
a district in a southern or border state. Four of the
Republican chairmen from rural districts came from the
middle west, the other from a middle Atlantic state. Since
1920, however, only two chairmen from rural districts have
been chosen by the Democrats, only one by the Republicans.

In the rural-rurban category (II), we find two
Republican but no Democratic chairmen. The Republicans
represented "small town" districts in Ohio and Indiana.
Three chairmen Of each party came from middle-rurban districts
(III). The Democratic Committee has had only one chairman
from an urban-rurban district (IV) (Kirwan, from the
YOungstown area) but two from urban districts (V) - Flower
from New York City and Doremus from Detroit. With the
Republicans thefigures are reversed, with two (WOod from

the East Chicago area of Indiana and Martin from the Fall

147
TABLE 32

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(SENATORS EXCLUDED)

Categories
Dates of
Chairman District chairmanship I II III IV V

A

 

Hubbell Mich. 9 1879-83 X

Babcock Wis. 3 1883-1905 X

Sherman N.Y. 27 1905-09 X
McKinley I11. 19 1909—13 X

Woods Iowa 10 1913-19 X

Fess Ohio 7 1919-23 X

Wood Ind. 10 1923-33 X
Bolton Ohio 22 1933—37 X
Martin Mass. 15 1937—39 X
Ditter Penna. 2 1939-43 X
Halleck Ind. 2 1943—47 X

Hall N.Y. 2 1947-53 X
Simpson Penna. 18 1953- X

Key: I Rural - 70% or more rural, II Rural—urban - 60-69%
rural, III Middle-rurban - 40—59% rural, IV Urban-rurban -
30-39% rural, V Urban - less than 30%.rural. From
Ralph M. Goldman, Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban
Representation in Congress, MS, University of Chicago,
Appendix II, p. 143.

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(SENATORS EXCLUDED)

148

TABLE 33

 

 

 

Categories

Dates of
Chairman District chairmanship II III IV V
Rosecrans Cal. 1 1881-85 X
Flower N.Y. 11 1889-91 X
Wilson W.Va. 2 1891-93
Richardson Tenn. 5 1897-01
Griggs Ga. 2 1901-07
Lloyd Mo. 1 1907-13
Doremus Mich. 1 1913-17 X
Ferris Okla. 6 1917-19
Flood Va. 10 1919—21
Rouse Ky. 6 1921-25 X
Oldfield Ark. 2 1925-28
Byrnes Tenn. 6 1928-36 X
Drewry Va. 4 1936-47
Kirwan Ohio 19 1947- X

For key to categories,

A

see Table 32.

149
River-Taunton section of Massachusetts) from urban-rurban
districts and one (Bolton of Cleveland) from an urban district.
If categories IV and V (urban-rurban and urban) are considered
together, the two parties are equally represented by chair-
men from districts which are predominantly urban or urban—
dominated.

The pattern which emerges shows a wider distribution
of Republican than of Democratic chairmen. Democratic
chairmen seem to come from the two poles, rural or urban
districts. Of the fourteen Democratic chairmen considered,
eleven are from districts which are either rural or pre-
dominantly urban}O Of the Republicans, eight of the fourteen
fall into these categories. The other Six represent districts
which are either rural—urban or middle-rurban.11

It will be noted that the classification used lends
itself to comparison in large percentage groupings: the

most densely populated districts (70% or more urban), the

‘1-

0Three senators who served as chairmen are excluded
from consideration.
11Ditter's district (Penna. 2nd) is typical. Though
a large area of rural Bucks and Montgomery Counties is
included in the district, densely populated townships
contiguous to Philadelphia are also included, together with
four cities of over 10,000 inhabitants.

150
the least densely populated districts (70% or more rural),
and the 40% that falls between these poles. According to
this, the Republican Committee Chairmen from districts
falling between the two extremes outnumbered the Democratic

two to one (Table 34).

TABLE 34

RURAL—URBAN CLASSIFICATION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
OF BOTH PARTIES TO SHOW DISTRIBUTION IN
THREE GROUPINGS

 

Rural-urban to
urban-rurban

 

Rural-(I) (II, III, IV) Urban-(V)
No. of 70% or more Middle 40% 70% or more
Chairmen rural (BO-69%.rural) urban
Republicans 5 8 1
Democrats 8 4 2

 

Based on U. S. Census statistics. For details as
to chairmen and their districts, see Appendix III.
As the Democratic Committee has chosen the majority of its
chairmen from areas of its traditional strength, so the
Republican Committee has sought the majority of its leaders
from northern districts which, though not classified as rural,
lie outside the bounds of large cities. Unlike the Demo-
cratic Committee, the Republican Committee shows no recent

trend away from this pattern.

151

Political distribution

What of the political complexion of the home districts
of Committee Chairmen? Since 1920 the Democratic Committee
has had six chairmen, the Republican Committee eight.
Inasmuch as this period covers the elections of over three
decades, it has been chosen to give a picture of modern
committee practice.

Here, the pattern of the two committees is quite
distinct. Of the six Democratic chairmen serving during
the period under consideration, five came from safe districts
which, at the time of their chairmanship, had been returning
Democrats to Congress year after year and had never been
marginal. The only exception to this is the present chairman,
Michael Kirwan from the 19th District, Ohio. Kirwan was
elected chairman in 1947. His district had been Republican
through 1934, when the vote was marginal. The District has
since been Democratic, and was marginal only once - in 1940.

Three congressional elections - all firmly Democratic - had

occurred in Kirwan's district between this and his Chairman-

ship.12

2It may be noted in passing that of the four Demo—
cratic Committee Chairmen who served in the 20th century
before the 1920's, three came from solidly Democratic
districts of southern or border states - Georgia 2nd, Missouri
lst, Oklahoma 6th.

152

The districts from which the Republican Committee's
leadership has been drawn show a more varied pattern. The
first three chairmen of the 1920's — Simeon Fess, (Ohio 7th),
Will R. WOod (Indiana 10th), and Chester C. Bolton (Ohio
22nd) - represented districts which, at the time of their
election to Committee chairmanship, had been consistently
returning a Republican vote. The district of the fourth
chairman, Joseph Martin (Massachusetts 14th), had swung to
a Democratic vote in 1934, three years before Martin became
chairman, but had returned to a Republican majority in the
election of 1936. It was marginal in 1940.

The sixth and seventh chairmen of this period,
Charles Halleck (Indiana 2nd) and Leonard Hall (New York 2nd)
represented districts which had changed their voting patterns,
but had become stable Republican districts by the time
Ha11GCk and Hall became chairmen. The district of J.
“William Ditter (Pennsylvania 8th) returned a marginal vote
in 1936, two years before he accepted the chairmanship,
but has been marginal Since then only once — in 1954.
Equally steady is the district of Richard Simpson (Pennsylvania
18th). It has returned a marginal vote only twice in the
century - in 1934 and 1936, almost two decades before Simpson

became chairman (Table 35).

153

.monm6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hoou CmEHHmflu SUHQB pm “CHOQ mzosm OCHH OHQDOQ .Ommo HOBOH an omumoHpCH muo> HmchHmS
o o o o. afzo o o o o o H m m m m m m numH OHEO nAamH HOOEHSNHM
o o o o o 1m o o o o o__o o o o o o o o o use .m> Ae|6mmH ‘Hoomuamuo
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o__oo o o o Hue .acme omnmNmH IHOmecnsm
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o, o o o o o ocN .xnm mNumNmH \HOHOHOHHOHM
6 o o o o e o o o o o o o o u n.1o mgmoo gum .sx mNsHNmH HOHumsom
omeaszHHm o o o o o a: o 6.3 .m> HNanNH H8 toon
m m_»m m m ,m m m m m u H m m m m m m aDmH .mm ummmH AmusemnaHm
m m 4m m m m m o o o o o o o o o o o .ocN .M.z mmuAamH HmOHHmm
m m m m m m m =mn m m m o o o e o e 6 ch .oaH AenmamH (HmoxomHHmm
m H m m m -m m m m__m u m m m m m m m Hum .mm maummmH HmvuwuuHo
m m m m m m m m u mwm o mxlm m m m m HUGH .mmms mmuAmmH HchHuums
m m m m H m m m m m o HHHM m m m m m ocNN OHHO AmummmH AMHdouHom
m m m m u m n m u n e o u u m m me—m HDOH .ocH mmnmNmH Hmooooz
m m m m e m m m mjwm e m m m m m m 4m #1) ABA oHEo mNumHmH Hmemmmm
T. I
%%mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
9 .V z 0 8 9 .V .C 0 8 9 .V z 0 8 9 .V z 0 8
DUHHDMHC mo cuwuumm OCHDO> uOHHDMHQ moumn CmEHHmnu

 

 

ZHSMHde mmBBHSZOU Mm QMBmemmmmm mBUHMBmHQ ZH ZMHBBdm OZHBO>

mm mqm¢9

SIVHOOWEG

SNVDITHfldEH

154
This study seems to indicate that chairmen are

chosen from safe and solid districts. Rarely indeed does
there appear to be any correlation between the choice of a
chairman and the need to influence the vote or even the
trend in a district. Occasionally, however, appointment to
the executive committees may go to a congressman from a
state the party is trying to woo. Appointment of Robsion,
the only Republican representative in the 79th Congress

from Kentucky, is a case in point.

Party unity: deviation in voting

A further criterion for judging Campaign Committee
leadership is by its adherence to "the party line" insofar

as one exists. In 1946 the Congpessional NoteboOk made a

 

study of party unity in the 79th Congress, based on the

voting records of congressmen from January, 1945, to the

Easter recess in April, 1946.13 To bring the results up-

to-date a second study was made, covering the last three

months in the 79th Congress (April 9 - Aug. 2, 1946).14

 

13 . .
"Party Unity Part I - House," CongreSSIonal Notebook,

Vol. III, No. 35 (Washington, D. C.: Press Research, Inc.,
May 3, 1946). Results used by permission.

 

4"Party Unity Part II - House," Congressional Notebook
.Qparterlerews Features, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Washington, D. C.:
Press Research, Inc., September 23, 1946). Results used by
permission.

155

Taken together, these studies shed considerable light on the
degree of party unity displayed in the voting of Campaign
Committee chairmen, past, incumbent, and future, and of
Campaign Committee officers and executive committee members
who were then in Congress. No explanation is given as to
why the 79th Congress was chosen for study, except for a
statement that deviation from the party line had by then
become so frequent as to merit study. Since this trend has
continued in subsequent Congresses, it is perhaps legitimate
to select the 79th Congress as a random example of modern
congressional voting.1

The study was based on the assumption that, since
there is in the United States very little party discipline,
the position of a party might, for purposes of study, be
determined by its congressional vote. When the two parties
divide sharply, according to this analysis, with the
majority of one party voting in opposition to the majority
of the other, a party issue emerges.

The NoteboOk reported a study of fifty-seven
record votes on party issues determined by this criterion,

excluding those on which the intra-party split was so

 

15See also explanation in introductory section of this

chapter.

156
even that no clear-cut majority emerged. On the fifty—seven
record votes, twenty-seven of the House Democrats (12%)
and sixteen Republicans (about 8%) voted with their party
in every case. These non-deviant voters are designated by
the NoteboOk as “party liners.“

In Congress at this time were Charles Halleck,
chairman of the Republican Committee, former Republican
chairman, Joseph Martin, and two future chairmen, Leonard
Hall and Richard Simpson. Patrick Drewry was just completing
his chairmanship of the Democratic Committee and Michael
Kirwan, who was to succeed him, was serving his fifth term
in the House. None of these men voted as ”party liners.”
Their deviation varied from one vote, by Simpson, to eleven
by Drewry (Table 36).

"The key members of the House,’ says the Congressional
Notebook, ". . . whose votes have a deciding influence on
every controversial question, are those who broke with their
party between 6 and 18 times on the 57 roll call votes.

These are crucial also from the standpoint of party discipline.
Party leaders can usually count on members in the under-five
category, while those in the 19-or-more class are considered

as beyond salvation so far as the party is concerned."16

 

16uparty Unity Part II - House," Congressional NoteboOk,

157
TABLE 36
DEVIANT VOTING OF CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN,

PAST, INCUMBENT, AND FUTURE,
IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

 

No. of votes against party
in 57 record votes in which
Dates of chair- the majorities in both

 

Party Chairman manship V parties voted opposite ways
Rep. Martin 1937-39 3
Rep. Halleck* 1943-47 2
Rep. Hall 1947-53 7
Rep. Simpson 1953- 1
Dem. Drewry* 1936-47 11
Dem, Kirwan _ 1947- y 7

*Incumbent Chairman at time of study.

This would put Republican chairmen, Halleck, Martin,
and Simpson in the "safe” category and place Hall and both
Democratic Chairmen, Drewry and Kirwan, in the group
classified as sufficiently deviant to be regarded in the
House as influential, but not so deviant as to be regarded
by the party as out of line.

A comparison of the Executive Committees of the two
Campaign Committees, including officers, shows that five
Republicans and six Democrats voted in the “safe" category,

i.e., cast no more than five deviant votes. This represents

158

50%»of the Republican Committee's executive committee and
40%.of the Democratic Committee's larger executive committee.
,Among these, two Democrats - Sol Bloom of New York and Herman
P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania - fall into the "party liners"
category. No Republican executive committee members were
so classified.l7 Nine Democratic and three Republican
executive committee members cast between six and eighteen
deviant votes (60% and 30%.respectively) which puts them
in the category which the Notebook calls influential in the
House but not out of line. One Republican executive committee
:member, WOlverton of New Jersey, deviated on nineteen votes
(1/3 of the 57) thus falling at the lower edge of the "out
of line" classification. There were no Democratic executive
committee members so classified (Tables 37 and 38).

The Notebook's study also included the votes on
twenty-seven issues upon which coalitions were formed, with
a majority of both parties voting together. These votes
frequently representedCompromises arrived at after prolonged

debate. On these twenty-seven issues, as might be expected,

 

17Three members of the 32-member Republican Campaign
Committee are so classified but, since a list of the entire
Democratic Campaign Committee during the 79th Congress is
unobtainable, a comparison of the voting of the full Come
mittees cannot be made.

159
TABLE 37
DEVIANT VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE REPUBLICAN

CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

 

 

 

 

 

Categories
I II III
Exec. Comm. State "Safe" "Influential" "Out of line"
Hinshaw Cal. X (14)
Halleck Ind. (2)
Dirksen Ill. X (9)
Robsion Ky. (2)
Wigglesworth Mass. X (11)
Short Mo. (1)
wo1verton N.J. X (19)
Hall N.Y. X (7)
Hess Ohio (1)
Simpson Pa. (1)
Total deviant
members (50%) 4 (40%) l (10%)

 

160

TABLE 38

DEVIANT VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN

COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN THE

79TH CONGRESS

 

 

 

Categories

Exec. I II III
Member State "Safe" "Influential" "Out of line"
Hobbs Ala. X (13)
Murdoch Ariz. X (1)
Woodhouse Conn. X (1)
Madden Ind. X (3)
Chapman Ky. X (6)
Allen La. X (18)
Lane Mass. X (9)
Bloom* N.Y. X (0)
Bulwinkle N.Car. X (12)
Kirwan Ohio X (17)
JOhnson Okla. X (13)
Eberharter* Pa. X (0)
Drewry va. X (11)
Jackson wash. X (1)
wasielewski ‘Wis. X (13)

Total deviant

members in

each category 6 (40%) 9 (60%)

A‘

*Party liner

I .lylsilrdr"

 

161
deviant voting was much more frequent than on the fifty-seven
issues on which the parties voted in opposition to each
other. On seventeen of these issues the minority vote was
to the right of the coalition majority; on ten it was to the
left. The terms "right" and "left" are not defined but are
given substance by the issues upon which "left" and "right"
positions emerged during debate on the House floor.

To interpret the vote of Congressional Campaign
Committee leaders on these selected issues, it is first
necessary to observe the voting pattern of all the Democrats
and all the Republicans in the House, as a base with which
the votes of the chairmen and executive committee members
may be compared.

There were in the 79th Congress two hundred thirty-
seven Democrats. If Speaker Rayburn and fourteen non-
deviant Democratic voters are excluded, 222 Democrats voted
against their party's majority on one or more of these
twenty-seven issues, casting 334 votes to the right of the
majority and 646 to the left, an average of 1.05 votes to
the right for each representative voting and 2.99 to the
left.

Republicans in the House numbered 189. Excluding

the non-deviants, 157 of them voted against the coalition

162
majority, casting an average per person voting of 3.4 votes
to the right and only .45 to the left.

In comparing the two parties it will be noted that
the Republicans had more than twice as many non—deviant
voters (32 as against the Democrats' 14). Average votes,
when compared, Show 3.4 to the right for the Republicans,
and 1.05 for the Democrats; .45 to the left for the Repub-
licans, 2.99 for the Democrats. ‘

The six Campaign Committee chairmen, past, incumbent,
and future, in the 79th Congress were distributed between
the two parties in a two-to-one ratio - four Republicans and
two Democrats. They all showed general conformity to their
party's position, though all voted independently at least
twice.

The four Republicans voted to the right of the coalition
majority in fourteen votes, an average of 3.5 times, which
is very close to the average for the party. Their deviation
varied from two votes by Hall to five by incumbent Halleck.
They cast no votes to the left of the coalition majority.

The two Democratic Chairmen, incumbent Drewry and future
chairman Kirwan, cast eleven deviant votes, four to the right
and seven to the left, an average of 2 and 3.5 respectively,

as against their party's average of 1.05 and 2.99 (Table 39).

163
It should be noted that Republican chairmen deviated only
to the right, while the two Democrats divided sharply.
This is perhaps explainable by the divergent interests of
their respective districts, since Drewry was from a rural

district in Virginia, Kirwan from the industrial north.

TABLE 39

DEVIATION IN VOTING TO THE RIGHT OR.LEFT OF THE TWO—PARTY
COALITION BY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, PAST,
INCUMBENT AND FUTURE IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

A

Dates of chair— No. of votes No. of votes

 

Party Chairman manship to right to left
Rep. Martin 1937-39 4 0
Rep. Halleck* 1943—47 5 0
Rep. Hall 1947-53 2 0
Rep. Simpson 1953- 3 0
Dem. Drewry* 1936-47 4 O
Dem. Kirwan 1947- 0 7
Total deviant votes) 18 7

 

*Incumbent chairman

Turning now to the executive committees of the two
Campaign Committees, we find that two Republican members
were non-deviant voters, but that all Democrats deviated on
at least one issue. Republican deviation was strongly to

the right, with twenty-six such votes as against two to the

164
left. The average to the right (3.7 votes) was very close
to the 3.4 average of all House Republicans. Since only
one member voted to the left of the coalition majority,
the term "average" cannot be applied.

The Democratic Committee's executive committee,
which had no non-deviant voters, cast fifteen votes to the
right of the majority (average 3.7 votes) and forty-five
to the left, an average of 3.2 votes per person voting.
This is higher than the average for Democrats in the House
as a whole, whose average was 1.05 to the right and 2.99
to the left.

To complete their analysis of party unity in the
79th Congress the NoteboOk publiShed a later study based on
voting records from.April 19 to August 2, 1946, a period
during Which forty—five votes were taken. In studying
these votes, the NoteboOk established four new categories
as follows: (1) VOted or declared with their party majority,
(2) VOted or declared against their party majority, and
(3) undecided, absent, or general pairs. It then calculated
the percentage of votes cast by each Congressman with his
party's majority, but made no attempt to classify votes as
being to the right or left of the party's position. It

called those Who voted with their party in 90% or more of

165

the forty-five votes "party stalwarts." During the period
considered, three chairmen were so rated - Simpson and Kirwan,
each with a score of 92% and Republican incumbent Halleck,
with a 100% record of voting with his party on the forty—

five record votes.

During this period, Campaign Committee chairmen,
past, incumbent, and future, then in Congress voted with
their party's majority on an average of 83.5% of the forty-
five votes, though the four Republicans averaged 87.7%
conformity, the two Democrats only 75%, Conformity to their
party's position by members of the two Campaign Committees'
executive committees was as follows: Republicans, an average
of 80.2%.of the forty-five votes, Democrats, 75.4%.

The NoteboOk asserts that "the balance of power
rested with the 22% of the House membership - 63 Democrats
and 34 Republicans who voted with their party majority
more than one half but less than three fourths of the
time."18 Five such voters are to be found on the executive
committee of the Democratic Campaign Committee (Murdoch,

Allen, Bulwinkle, Wasielewski, and Kirwan), four appear among

 

8"Party Unity Part II - House," Notebook,
Congressional Quarterly News Features, VOl. IV, No. 3
(washington, D. C.: September 23, 1946), p. 3.

166
members of the Republican Committee's executive committee
(Hall, HinShaw, Wigglesworth, and Wolverton). In both
executive committees this constitutes 40% of the membership.
In "party stalwarts" (90% or more votes with party majority)
the Republican committee ranks above the Democratic, with
four of their ten members (40%) qualifying; three of the
Democrat's fifteen executive committee members (20%)
rank as "stalwarts." Since forty-three House Democrats
(18%) and eighty—four Republicans (44%) fall into that
category, Republican executive committee members rank near
the average for their party in this respect. Democratic
executive committee members, with 20% stalwarts rank slightly
above the average for their party.

According to the Notebook's figures, and despite the
handicap posed by the change in method introduced in Part.II,
the most striking fact in the entire study is the similarity
in the way chairmen, executive committee members, and other
members of the House voted. The variation in pattern
between the two parties is much more conspicuous than that
between Campaign Committee leaders and other congressmen
of their own party. In voting, Campaign Committee leaders
seem to function as loyal party members, influenced by

commitments to their home districts, and, to a somewhat

167
lesser extent, by their position on their party's Campaign
Committee.

It is significant that, though the session of the
79th Congress chosen for study, gives only a sampling, it
does include in its membership the men who have chaired the
two Congressional Campaign Committees for the past two
decades. Drewry became chairman in 1936 and Martin in 1937.
Especially interesting is the difference in the voting of
Simpson and Kirwan, incumbent chairmen as this is being

written.

Summary

In conclusion it may be said that the leadership
of both Congressional Campaign Committees has been placed
in the hands of able party members, men who came to their
positions in the Committees in middle life (average age,
52 years), with records of political leadership in their
home communities and with at least two terms of congressional
service behind them. They have come from districts in which
their party is firmly entrenched, politically, and from
areas in which it has historically been strong. Democratic
Committee leadership has come principally from the rural

south, though northern cities or their environs holds second

168
place. Republican leadership has come mainly from the north,
east of the Mississippi River, and has shown, since 1920,
a trend away from rural districts to those whose rural
population runs from 30 to 69%. In voting, the RepUblican
Committee leadership, according to the sampling used, voted
more conservatively than its Democratic counterpart, though
in both cases deviation from the party or coalition majority
was not so frequent as to cause party concern. "Representative”
seems to be the best word for describing them, for they are
representative of their party's voting position, its geo-
graphical strongholds, and its numerical strength. Their
maturity and record of service both in and out of Congress
are such that their parties willingly acknowledge and accept

their leadership.

 

CHAPTER VIII
COMPARISONS AND PROSPECTS

Before attempting to evaluate the Congressional
Campaign Committees it may be instructive to observe how
the functions performed by Campaign Committees in the
United States are handled in Countries with a smaller area,
a fairly homogeneous population, and centralized parties.
Elections in England are a case in point.

The British system of government and elections
eliminates many of the campaign problems endemic to the
United States. Election campaigns are brief, never running
more than twenty days from the dissolution of Parliament
and the call for elections to the polling day. Expenditures
are strictly limited by law to approximately $4,000 per
district. The government apportions radio time with the
state-owned British Broadcasting Company and provides
candidates with limited free mailing privileges. British
newspapers often devote considerable space to information
about the candidates and a factual presentation of the issues.
Such spreads may include photographs and biographical data
on all candidates, with an unbiased statement of the history

and present position of both parties.

169

170

The political traditions of Great Britain help the
able candidate. Emphasis is placed on political meetings
with questions and heckling. This habit, Neumann observes,
"tests both the stamina and the sense of humor of the candidate.
While it may seem startling and rude to foreign observers,
it forces the candidate to think on his feet, a habit which
will stand him in good stead when he takes his seat in the
House of Commons."1 Street corner oratory is an accepted
practice and meetings in which the candidate appears only
to answer questions are common. Such meetings emphasize
the personal talents of the candidate rather than his
ability to afford a professional public relations advisor
and the expensive publicity techniques that are of value
mainly in isolated districts.

The British system, with a government in which one
branch predominates, with all elections held at the same
time, and with all candidates committed to support their
party's ideology and strategy, focuses national attention
on the parties. In such a system the candidate, even though
from a small or rural district, is never politically iso-

lated nor is his campaign lacking in national significance.

 

1Robert Neumann, European and Comparative Government
(2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 85.

171

This being true, the parties do everything possible
to develop strong local organizations, including both
professional leaders and lay workers, and make every
possible service available to the candidates. Their
leadership training programs are expensive, far outdoing
anything in the United States.2 Their Summer Schools, for
example, are described as follows:

Summer schools are conducted for young people and
adults by the Labor, Conservative, and Liberal Parties.
One or two week courses are repeated from June to
September and are attended by party workers and by the
more politically-minded of the party faithful.
Government and party officers from the Cabinet to
the local ward club visit the schools - which are
usually held in university towns or holiday resorts -
to lecture or teach courses on party organization,
local government, home policy, or international
relations. The Conservative Party maintains an
additional year—round curriculum at its Bonar Law
College. More specialized instruction in party
organization and elections is given by the major
parties to candidates for employment in the
permanent staffs. The graduates are duly certified and,
when employed as parliamentary agents, maintain their
own trade unions (within their respective party
organizations) and professional journals.

 

2It should be noted, however, that in the summer of
1955 the Republican Party in the United States held a
campaign school in Washington for state leaders and other
selected party workers. FOr an account of the work and
agenda of this school, see the New York Times, September 6,
1955.

Herman S. Beukema, et al., Contemporary Foreign
Governments, ed. rev., Associates in Government, U.S. Military
Academy (New York: Rinehart, 1949), pp. 30-31.

.5 0
; "nun-

 

 

172

When a British election is called, the party organi-
zation is already formed on an area basis, and is ready to
mobilize and begin campaign functions. At the same time
the National Party Headquarters is ready to make every service
available to the local organization and candidates. "Each

party headquarters,’ says Finer, "issues, at cost, to the
candidates various kinds of leaflets, placards, 'election
news,‘ some on special topics such as education, war and
peace, and housewife and prices, etc. Slogans are invented,
such as 'Fair shares for all,' 'Whose finger is on the
trigger?’ and 'Make Britain strong and free.”4

In order to facilitate this work, the parties maintain
Regional (Labor) and Area (Conservative) offices. These
offices represent the National Party Headquarters at the
local level.

The most important factor in this system is the
ideological and responsible nature of British political
parties. The party programs and Elections Manifesto are
key factors, and the local campaign is often little more

than a continuation of the party struggle in a particular

area. Finer puts it well:

Herman Finer, Governments of Greater European Powers
(New York: Henry Holt, 1956), p. 81.

173

The campaign is strongly in the hands of party
headquarters. The leaders on all sides have con-
centrated on the problems of victory almost constantly.
The momentary Prime Minister and MHnisters, and the
Leader of the Opposition and the Opposition Bench
and their confidants and top managers and agents divide
the lines, though they themselves, of course, are
asking for their own election merely as members of
the Commons like any ordinary M.P. Policy is decided
here at the top level, not in the constituencies.

It is expressed in the Election Manifesto. These
fairly brief documents state the Chief issues and

the party answers. Each is taken by its opponents as
a commitment on which a mandate has been asked from
the electorate. VOters know that the local variations
of the Manifesto will not commit the leaders and also
that the leaders will be expected to fill their
promises . . . .

The Prime Minister and the leader of the
Opposition tour the nation: so do the other party
leaders. They cross examine the speeches of the
principal opponents. Their impact in the localities
far outdoes that of the local candidates.5

The same general pattern prevails on the

continent. France, Italy, and Germany have multi-party

systems and use a form of proportional representation

which makes adherence to the party program almost inevitable.

Here again, all national elections occur simultaneously and

the parties rise or fall with the election of their

candidates to Parliament. Though candidates in France and

Italy tend to be more "on their own" than in Britain, yet

in all three countries the party performs many of the functions

 

51bid.. pp. 80—81.

174
of the Congressional Campaign Committee in the United States.

In France candidates receive assistance, as American
congressional candidates do not, from both the state and the
party. French campaign practices also encourage more meetings
with the candidates and more discussion than in America.

This obviates the need for candidates to make large financial
outlays or to find original and captivating ways of presenting
their political messages.

According to Duverger6 the control of electoral propa-
ganda is precisely to insure equality between the candidates
and to prevent wealthy candidates having an advantage over
poorer ones. Thus the national radio service gives equal
time to all candidates, and assigned poster sites, divided
equally among candidates, are the only ones allowed for the

affixing of posters.7 The impartiality of government service

 

6Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, trans.
Barbara and Robert North (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958).

7In the matter of posters a rough-and tumble battle

ensues and seems to be sanctioned, possibly because the

rivalry involved whets interest in the campaign. Roche and
Stedman observe that "at election time the French tend to
desert their national sport, soccer, in favor of another and
hardly less rough form of recreation known as billboard war-
fare. The object is to paste the propaganda of one's own

party over that of opposition parties on the billboard, and
each party has offensive as well as defensive teams in the
field." John P. Roche and Murray S. Stedman, Jr., The Dynamics
of Democratic Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 153.

175
to all candidates is policed by a committee which includes
representatives of all parties, and is presided over by a
judge.
A glimpse of the French system at work in an election
is given in Governments of Continental Europe, as follows:

Appeal is made to the people through most of the
methods employed in other democratic countries. Thus
use is made of the basic and elementary procedure of
addressing by mail the individual voters. Statutory
provisions arrange that declared candidates may have
printed at the public expense, envelopes, ballots,
election Circulars, and'posters.8 Dispatch of
materials by mail is likewise free of charge. Deposits
must be made by candidates, the money being returned
if a fixed fraction of the votes is received. Such
candidates as secure the return of their deposits
may also be reimbursed for gasoline and for the cost
of arranging display posters . . . . Members of the
government and other orators of national reputation,
most of whom will themselves be candidates somewhere,
make speeches in various parts of the country.

Less formal discussion is particularly characteristic

of French politics. The Café du Commerce in provincial
communities has become a proverbial center of political
‘activity. The electoral systems of the Fourth Republic,
have undoubtedly tended to cause national issues to be
stressed and party programs to be followed more closely

 

8French voters place their ballots in envelopes and
deposit them in the ballot box. Formerly ballots and
envelopes distributed by candidates could be used; now
only official ballots and envelopes are permissible. Since
1946 postal voting has been available to men in the armed
forces, women nearing childbirth, hospital patients, civil
servants away from.bome on official duty, etc. Proxy voting
is available to men in the armed services and merchant
‘marine who are within six days of home by mail.

176

by the candidates, but personalities and local
interest have continued to play no little part.9

One is struck by the fact that in such democratic
countries as England and France the parties, the electoral
systems, and especially the absence of that degree of conflict
between the executive and the legislative branches of govern-
ment which is built into the structure of American government,
eliminate much of the necessity for the duality of party
organization which, in the United States, corresponds to
this bifurcation.

Work of the Campaign Committees in a
non—ideological system

In contrast to European systems, the United States

has a non-ideological system of politics, a system of the

ins_ opposed by the "outs," "the government" and the party
which opposes the government. The opposition, unlike that
in England, is not so much an opponent of ideas as a con-
testant for position. As Duverger puts it, “we must recall
that . . . American parties are founded on no ideological

or social bases, that they include diverse elements and

doctrines . . . , that fundamentally they are organizations

 

9Gooch, Zurcher, Lewenstein, Florinsky and Shotwell,

Governments of Continental Europe, ed. James T. Shotwell
(New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 98-99.

177
10

for the conquest of administrative and political offices . . .
Under our system, as contrasted with the multiparty systems
of many European countries,11 the two major parties represent
nearly all the voters and are of approximately equal strength.
Though minor parties are permitted, their combined strength
is so negligible that it constitutes no threat to the major
parties, of which one must always be in the majority and
constitute the government (i.e., its executive branch).
The legislative branch, while divided between the two
parties, is often dominated by one.

Under this sytem both parties tacitly accept the
fact that elections are not so much ideological contests
as contests for the control of government. This is well
expressed by Leiserson:

When campaign issues are centered upon competition

for control of government between parties sharing a
basic political consensus, party propaganda is more

 

0Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization
and Activities_in the Modern State, trans. Barbara and Robert
North (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), p. 210.

llBerdahl notes that in 1930 the number of parties
in European countries ranged from four in Austria to twenty-
four in the Reichstag, that in these systems parties often
represent mere shades of opinion, that no one party is ever
dominent, and that governing is actually by a series of
coalitions. Clarence Berdahl, Our Two Party System
(Jackson, Miss.: University of Mississippi, 1951).

178

concerned with tactics than with ideology: notwith-
standing the efforts of propagandists on either side

to clothe the interparty debate in the dress of
"fundamental issues" and ”basic philosophy." Even

more determining, probably, than basic ideological
consensus is the geographic and social composition

of the party members, supporters, and "independents."
When all parties hope to attract large groups of workers,
farmers, business and professional men, women, and

older people, it is idle to expect and incompetent

to propose that the parties deliberately set out to
establish sharp and clear differences between each

other of interest, membership, and doctrine . . . .

The result of emphasizing too-specific policy positions
may be to alienate sizeable segments of the floating,
independent, or interest-group vote. Hence the

resort to generalized statements of beliefs and principles,
and emphasis upon personalities around which people

can cohere.12

Though this statement applies particularly to presidential
elections in which both parties aim at a national majority,
its pragmatism reflects the philosophy of both Congressional
Campaign Committees. As we have seen, they are concerned
with tactics, rather than ideology and their boasted neu-
trality applies both to candidates, and to party platforms
and policies. '

Let us see first, how this affects their work with
candidates, party workers, and State and local party organi-
zations. It is because of the needs of these groups, which

the Committees regard as their primary responsibility, that

 

2Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics (New York:
anf, 1958)! pp. 262-63.

‘1

y¢|L I. I

....ll|.lw

179
the pattern of neutrality exists. The more the Committees
adhere to their role as service organizations, concerned
only with the winning of elections the more useful they can

be to congressional candidates.

The congressional candidate finds himself in a position

between that of the national candidate, who appeals to a
widely dispersed constituency and can rely on a broad

base for support, and the local candidate who is known and
supported within his precinct. He must campaign on what-
ever slogans will appeal to his constituency regardless of
their possible inconsistency with the slogans of other
candidates or with party platforms and policies. Ewing
states the problem:

. . .The president seeks his office upon the basis
of a policy or program. It may be ill defined,
general, or ambiguous, but it nevertheless reflects
the nominee's personal convictions or his appreciation
of the demands of political expediency. This is not
so with congressional candidates. In the same party
candidates will support policies which together run
the full gamut of the ideological scale. Thus some
Democrats seek the office upon an unadulterated program
of denying the suffrage to Negroes; and other Democrats
will ask election upon a promise to remove all racial
barriers to political participation. Likewise there
will be free-trade Republicans and high-tariff
Republicans; pro-social-security Democrats and anti-
social-security Democrats; nationalistic Socialists

and internationalists of the same political designation.13

 

13Cortez A. M. Ewing, Congressional Elections 1896-
1944, (Norman, Okla.: university of Oklahoma Press, 1947),
p. 49.

180
Unabashed by such apparent inconsistencies, the
Congressional Campaign Committees extend their help to those
who need it, provided they stand a reasonable chance of
winning the election. Similarly, they ask no questions of
party workers at precinct, county, or state levels. Rela-
tively impervious to criticism, they adhere to their purpose

within the non-ideological American system.

lgroblems of the Campaign Committees

The problems of the Committees as their officers
and administrative personnel see them, have also to do with
practical matters. There is, for example, the question of
Republican penetration of the south and of Democratic strength
in industrial cities.

The Republican Party has been a regional party
supported, for the last quarter century, by farm and business
groups in the north and unable successfully to invade
"the solid South." So long as the South remained solidly
Democratic, with the rest of the country fairly evenly
divided between the two parties, the Democrats were assured
of a solid core of strength in Congress which was larger
than that upon which the Republicans could depend.

Today the regional blocks where each party can count

181
on certain victory are breaking up. Most notable of these
is the South which has, since the Civil war, been the strong-
hold of the Democratic Party. Elections since 1950 have
indicated that the old voting patterns are beginning to
disintegrate.

In the industrial areas of the north where the cities
have always been Democratic, the pattern is also changing.
The cities still tend to return a strong Democratic vote,
but the city vote is dwindling. The major area of population
growth is in the residential suburb. Neither party can lay
particular claim to the suburbs, and it has become a major
battleground of the two parties.

Another traditional block that seems to be in flux is
the farm block. Farm areas such as South Dakota, Nebraska,
Iowa and Kansas have recently given indications that they
can no longer be considered entirely safe for Republican
candidates.

The Republican Congressional Committee seems
particularly aware of these changes and is working hard to
exploit its opportunities and to reinforce areas that appear
to be changing. The Republicans are particularly aware
of the new opportunities in the South. Its Field Service

has sent workers to study the situation and strengthen state

182
and local party organizations. To secure strong candidates,
the Committee has provided funds for use in what seemed
like hopeless districts. The Committee points with pride
to the success of Congressman Jonas of North Carolina, Poff
of Virginia, and Cramer of Florida. The Committee staff
feels that when it finds other able and vigorous candidates
like these men who will work closely with the Committee
in planning and executing their campaigns, they will make
further inroads in the South.

The Democratic Committee faces a difficult problem
in the large industrial cities of the North. These cities
are characterized by political organizations such as Tammany
Hall in New YOrk and, in past years, the Hague machine in
Jersey City. The city organization is jealous of its power,
which it can maintain only as it keeps the officials and
representatives of the area dependent upon it for nomination
and election. It naturally looks with suspicion upon any
"competing" party organization such as the Congressional
Campaign Committee, which seeks to enter its territory.

This lays upon the Committee the necessity of adjusting to
the wishes of local party leaders and trying to gear its
work into that of the local party organization.

With the development of the media of mass communication,

183
however, the city organization is finding it increasingly
difficult to maintain its power. If this trend continues,
it may well have two consequences: (1) the development of
a functioning two-party system in the industrial cities of
the North, and (2) the entrance of the Congressional Campaign
Committees into the situation to meet the needs of congressional
candidates Who, deprived of the support of a strong city
organization, become more open to the assistance proffered
by the Committees. This, of course, would considerably
strengthen the position of the Committees - particularly
the Democratic Committee - in industrial cities.

Another problem of the Committees is their loose
relationship with other party agencies. According to Mr.
William Warner, Executive Secretary of the Republican
Committee, this problem is recognized and an effort is being
made to coordinate the activities of all party organizations
working in the same field. The magnitude of the problem is
obvious when one considers that there are three committees
in each party - the National, Senatorial, and Congressional
Committees - operating at the national level. The difficulty
is increased by the fact that each of these must work with
committees from all the states and a host of local committees.

From an administrative point of view, such overlapping areas

184
of influence seem inexcusable. It must be remembered,
however, that these Committees came into being not as the
result of the planning of an administrative genius but as
a pragmatic response to the political situation in the United
States. This proliferation of committees is no doubt
inefficient, but it does prove useful to the political
parties, so has come to be accepted as part of the American
party system.

Let us look first at the three committees (National,
Senatorial, and Congressional). Since there are no formal
lines delimiting the responsibilities and functions of the
various committees, some duplication of effort is inevitable,
as is a certain amount of tension. Clarence Adamey, Assistant
to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, stated
in an interview that there is occasional conflict, the major
source of which is finance, though he recognized that our
constitutional separation of powers, with its resulting
conflict between Congress and the Administration, has
contributed to the tension.

Some attempts have been made to relieve these tensions
between competing committees. Both parties, as noted in
Chapter V, have arranged to have practically all funds

collected by and channeled through their National Committees.

185
In the Republican Party the National Finance Committee
which receives all funds is so closely related to the National
Committee that it can almost be considered the latter's
finance department. This arrangement, though it cannot
resolve all the tension resulting from the overlapping of
financial interests, has proved viable for the committees
concerned.

Each committee is also concerned with party services,
nominations, and campaign procedures, yet there are no clear
lines defining the functions of each. Disagreements as to
jurisdiction and procedures are thus inevitable. Richard
Simpson of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee,
gave an illustration of this. During the last two weeks of the
1956 campaign, he said, when everyone felt sure that
President Eisenhower would be re—elected, the National
Committee insisted on pushing ahead with the campaign.
During this period it spent thousands of dollars to convince
people that they should vote for Eisenhower. The result,

Mr. Simpson speculated, was to bring out many Democrats

Who might not otherwise have voted. These split their
tiCkets, voting for Eisenhower as president, but for demon
cratic congressmen. If the National Committee had allocated

the same amount of money to the Congressional Campaign Committee

186

for an intensive last—minute push, Mr. Simpson felt that a
Republican congress would have been elected.

Despite such difficulties, the Committees have
learned by experience that the values of cooperation out-
weigh the difficulties. In 1924 the chairman of the
Democratic National Committee, referring to the Senatorial
and Congressional Campaign Committees said, "Their work and
ours has been virtually merged now, with the most satisfactory
results."14 In spite of such statements, recurring clashes
have led to attempts by the two committees to work separately.
One such experiment was in 1934 when the Republican Congres-
sional and Senatorial Committees severed all relations with
the National Committee and carried on independently. The
attempt proved unsuccessful; after the election it was
abandoned.15'

What efforts have been made to coordinate the
National and Congressional Committees? On a formal basis

nothing has been done and it is doubtful if attempts would

prove fruitful. On the informal level, however, techniques

 

4Proceedings of the Democratic National Convenpipn
(Washington, D. C.: 1924), p. 1092.

15For a full account see the New YOrk Times, Feb.
24, 1934.

187
of coordination have been worked out. The Democratic
Committees keep in close touch by telephone and arrange
for conferences when problems arise. In the Republican
Committees, with their more systematic approach, the chair-
men and executive heads of the three committees meet weekly
to share plans and clear up difficulties. This practice
was inaugurated by Leonard Hall when he was chairman of the
National Committee. It worked particularly well in those
days because, as a former chairman of the Republican Con-
gressional Campaign Committee, Hall understood its problems.
Hall, Dirksen (Chairman of the Senatorial Committee) and
Simpson had served together in the House, so shared a common
background of experience. Under such conditions, it was
easy to find a basis for understanding.

White HOuse breakfasts, held weekly during
campaigns, provide another informal approach to coordination
between the Republican committees. At these breakfasts
the executive officers of the three committees meet with
a representative from the White HOuse to discuss plans and
procedures.

A more formal approach has been the sharing of
personnel and information. The Republican Field Service,

with headquarters in the office of the Congressional Campaign

188
Committee, is used by all three Republican committees.
Though each committee has a public relations director, these
men cooperate closely, discussing common problems and sharing
information and ideas. While it is improbable that the
committees will ever be able to eliminate all tensions, the
informal measures now in effect do much to relieve it.

The second level of tension is between the three
national committees and the state and local organizations.
In our decentralized system, local organizations, through
which all committees at the national level must function,
are of paramount importance. Their autonomy, which they
stoutly maintain, creates a situation which, whatever
difficulties it may present, must be accepted as a fact of
American political life. It is obviously advantageous for
the Committees to approach this problem with a maximum
of skill and tact.

The Democratic Committee, as we have seen, deals
with the matter on an informal basis. Mr. Harding hopes,
by his visits to local leaders, to iron out whatever mis-
understandings may have arisen. The Republican Committee
hopes, through its area campaign schools, to win the co-
operation of state and local leaders. While these schools

are financed and conducted under the direction of the National

189
Committee, the chairmen of both the Senatorial and the
Congressional Campaign Committees are given prominent places
on the program. The schools devote sessions to such topics
as: "HOW to Run a Campaign," "HbW'tO Develop an Efficient
Organization," and "HOW to Make Effective Use of the Media
of Mass Communication." Ample time is allowed for discussion
of problems raised by the trainees. Mr.‘Warner states that
these sessions have done much to promote understanding and
coordination of effort between the Congressional Committee

and local party organizations.

Influence of Campaign Committees on trends and changes

Despite these problems, the Committees not only meet
a need, as shown in previous chapters, but also afford a
vantage point from Which to observe trends and changes in
both campaign techniques and in our political system.

One observable tendency in American politics is the
Democratic emphasis upon strong executive leadership and
the Republican emphasis upon congressional leadership.
Since the time of Lincoln the Democratic party has produced
strong presidents — Cleveland, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt,

and Truman — while, except for Theodore Roosevelt, Republican

190
executive leadership has been only ."average."16 Binkley‘
sees this trend as deeply rooted in history.

"I had not suspected before I began investigation
of the subject," he says, ”the remarkable extent to which
our major political parties have aligned themselves on
opposite sides of the controversy regarding Presidential
leadership. No sooner had universal, white, manhood suffrage
been established and Jackson elected president, than the
masses turned to the President as Tribune of the People.
The party that attracts the underprivileged has maintained
this tradition now for more than a century.

"Meanwhile Whig and Republican leaders have been
only a little more critical of Democratic 'tribunes' than
of Presidents of their own party who essayed the role.
Historically, the Republican Party philosophy stressed the
Congressional check of the Executive and views with jealous

eyes any pronounced shift of the center of gravity in the

 

16It may be noted, however, that there has been

increasing alteration of parties in the presidency. The
Democrats were dominant for 60 years, from 1800 to 1860
(except 1824-1840), the Republicans for 50, from 1860 to
1912 (except 1884-1892). The Democrats held office from
1912-1920 (8 years), the Republicans from l920-1932'(12
years), the Democrats from 1932-1952 (20 years), after
which the Republicans again toOk office.

191

government to the President. Republican Congresses have
beel almost, if not altogether, as severe in denouncing the
'usurpations' of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt as
they were in decrying Grover Cleveland, WOodrow‘Wilson, and
Franklin Roosevelt, indeed any chief executive who essays
vigorous leadership."17

The presidential emphasis of the Democratic party
may be explained, in part at least, by the somewhat more
ideological emphasis of that party.18 Binkley, in the
quotation just used gives a clue: it is the party that
"attracts the underprivileged" and as such it must commit
itself to work for social welfare goals and, to remain in
power, must make good on at least some of its promises.

The Democratic Committee in its personal relation-
ship with candidates, is in a position to point out this
need. Both Committees, being realistic, prefer candidates

with campaign talents to those with legislative ability,

but the Republican Committee puts more emphasis on appearance

 

l7Wilfred F. Binkley, President and Congress (New

YOrk: Knopf, 1947), p. vii.
18This is not to negate what has already been said
about non-ideological system, as compared with England for
example. It is a relative observation involving only our
two major parties.

192
and personality than does the Democratic, which encourages
face-to-face contacts with the voter and assurances that
his problems are understood.

While this is a congressional rather than a presi-
dential emphasis, it must be remembered that the leaders
of the Campaign Committees are influential party leaders,
that the congressmen who are elected with the Committee's
help and are imbued, to some extent, with its philosophy,
have influence within their districts. It would seem, then,
that the Republican Committee's emphasis upon campaign
mechanics and personable candidates and the Democratic
Committee's emphasis upon personal relationships may be
exerting subtle influence within their respective parties,
upon the viewpoint of congressmen, and indirectly, upon the
kind of men that may ultimately be considered by the parties
as presidential candidates.

As for the congressional emphasis which has, historically,
characterized the Republican party, that pattern may be in
the process of changing. This, on the surface, seems
paradoxical. The aggressive methods of the Republican
Committee with its use of scientific procedures for
collecting and processing data, assessing results, and fore-

telling trends, and its increasing reliance upon public

193
relations techniques, might be expected to produce results
in terms of strong congressional leadership. Why, then,
have the Democrats done so well in recent elections?

So complex is the evaluation of election results
that no easy answer can be given. The Democratic Committee,
however, maintains that its emphasis on personal relation-
ships has been the decisive factor, while the Republican
Committee attributes the victory to Democratic organization,
both in the cities, where it extended "right down to the
precinct level" and in the Labor Unions where the party
could utilize existing organizational structures.

Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that the
Democratic Party and its Campaign Committee are challenging
Republican predominance in Congress and that the Republican
Committee can be expected to exert every possible effort
and use every technique at its command to maintain its
historic position.

A second trend is the increasing tendency for the
president and the congressional majority to represent opposing
parties. The assumption - once taken for granted - that
Congress would be dominated by the party of the Administration,
has been seriously challenged.

This assumption was predicated upon three propositions:

194
that during presidential elections congressional candidates
are swept along with the tide or 9ride coat-tails," that
mid-term elections are comparatively unimportant, and that
relatively few voters split their tickets. All of these can
now be called into question.

Though one cannot deny the importance of the Presidency
in holding a party together during presidential campaigns,
the "coat-tail theory" now appears to be an over-simplification,
mid—term elections are increasing in importance, and ticket-
splitting has become an accepted practice. In all of these
changes, the Congressional Campaign Committees have played
a significant part. By giving institutional support to
congressional candidates, strengthening local party
organizations, and providing both with Vthe sinews of war,"19
they have heightened both the intensity and the effective—
ness of congressional campaigns. The result is that
congressional seats are hotly contested and in an increasing
number of districts, the outcome of congressional elections
cannot be assumed in advance.

Another discernible trend is toward party unity and

centralization. Though politics in the United States are

 

9Ostrogorski's phrase. These sinews include campaign
tools (see Appendix III), funds, and advice.

195
not characterized by the fragmentation which has bedeviled
many European states, there is enough sectionalism,
reflected in party factions, to require constant efforts in
behalf of party unity. Here the Campaign Committees seem
to be making a significant contribution.

The steps that have been taken toward financial
coordination and cooperative working relationships between
the officers and staff members of the National, Senatorial,
and Congressional Committees of each party promote party
centralization. On the other hand, the existence of ever-
recurring tensions and the remoteness of the possibility
that these committees may unite, underscore the problems
that hamper moves toward centralization.

Despite such limitations the Committees have pro-
moted party centralization by making themselves valuable to
candidates. Advancing technology has, of course, had much
to do with this, but the Committees' (especially the
Republican Committee's) utilization of public relations
techniques has played a large part in it. This has been
accompanied, as V. 0. Key points out, by a decline in the
influence of local party machines. He says, "Political
power was (previously) based on a stable network of party

machinery, around each member of which was clustered a little

196
group loyal through thick and thin. Apparently this source
of strength is being replaced by a power structure broadly
based on mass consent and support. As leaders have avail-
able devices and methods of appealing directly to the great
mass of people, the representatives and opinion-managerial
faction of the party machinery is becoming less important."20
The increasing focus of campaign functions in the Campaign
Committees limits the candidate who depends solely on his
local organization and weights the election in favor of his
opponent or fellow candidate in the same party who avails
himself of Campaign Committee services.

The Committees have promoted party unity by building
morale in candidates and party members, appealing to their
pride, and giving them a sense of membership in an important
organization. The availability of year-round, as well as
campaign, services for congressmen, party members, and
candidates, builds an esprit de corps among party members.
Knowledge that their party, in the guise of the Campaign .
Committee and its representatives, is behind them, gives

candidates the security of institutional support. As the

Committees succeed in taking their program to "the grass

 

20V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure

Grou s, p. 479.

197
roots" (e.g., through Republican Campaign Schools or
Democratic ”personal contacts") more and more party members
throughout the country become aware of the party as a functioning
institution.

With the growth of party unity and centralization
should occur a concommitant increase in party discipline.
There appear to have been some gains in this direction but
thoughtful observers of the political situation are asking
why the Committees do not have more influence in this area
and whether they could have more.

Lack of party discipline in any government based
upon a balance of powers is understandable. One of the
strengths of the Campaign Committees was that, when they came
into being, they accepted the situation which they found and
worked within its limitations for attainable ends. Now,
however, the time may be ripe for enlargement of their role
to include the encouragement of party discipline.

Party discipline implies sufficient cohesion and
harmony within a party to win elections and to carry out a
legislative program in support of an administration toward
which it is sympathetic or to frustrate the program of one
it opposes. It should lead to support of party nominees,

policies, and programs. Such support presents special

198
difficulties in the United States because of the wide
divergence of sectional interests, as was shown by the
almost frigid response of congressmen to the efforts of
the Democratic National Committee to establish a party
policy committee after the 1956 election. Nevertheless,
this is the direction in which the parties are moving and
in which the Campaign Committees can exert considerable
influence.

In the United States, party discipline is usually
more effective during election campaigns than afterward.
Once elected, congressmen within each party tend to divide
into factions. Reactionaries, liberals, middle—of-the-
roaders, and those with views which fall between these
categories seek like-minded members of the opposite party
with whom they form voting coalitions, disregarding party
lines and, quite often, party commitments.

There are, of course, some controls. The seating
arrangement in the House encourages party voting, the use
of "whips" helps keep members in line, and the knowledge
that another election is never more than two years away may
have a sobering effect, particularly upon members from
marginal districts. In the last analysis, however, the power

of discipline resides in the constituency. This fact gives

199

the Campaign Committees their opportunity.

we have already observed how the Committees -
particularly the Democratic Committee with its close
personal contacts - can inject the philosophy of the party
as expressed in platform and policies, into the campaign.
Even the more formal techniques of the Republican Committee
allow some scope for this. By helping the incumbent congress-
man keep his constituents informed, and by emphasizing in
newsletters and other materials prepared for his use, his
adherence to campaign promises or, in some cases, to his
party's platform, the Committee is promoting party discipline.

By increasing their year-round services, the Campaign
Committees have enlarged their opportunity to affect party
discipline. By maintaining a well—staffed office, open at
all times, extending a welcome to party members, supplying
news releases to sympathetic publications, and offering
services to incumbents, party workers, and aspiring
politicians (as the Republican Committee, in particular, is
trying to do) the Committees are growing in influence.
If they choose to use this influence on the side of party
discipline, they should be able to exert increasing
pressure for adherence to party platforms and policies.

It has been suggested by Clarence Berdahl that a

200
major reason for the weakness of party discipline lies in
the gap between party organization at the national and state
levels. He sees the parties at the state level as independent,
indeed as almost sovereign organizations which determine
their own platforms, policies, and membership requirements.

Here again the Congressional Campaign Committees
are in a favorable position. If they succeed in their
increasing efforts to prove useful not only to candidates
but to county and state organizations, they will be in a
position to make policy suggestions between elections.

Their attempts to help in the selection of candidates might
become a step in this direction, provided party commitments
received consideration in making the selection. Too often

the pragmatic emphasis - "Can he win?” - has so outweighed

other considerations that the opportunity to promote party

discipline has been lost.

It is also true that the opportunity to make policy
decisions at the state and local level has usually been
unavailable to the Congressional Committees because they
have not sufficiently enjoyed the confidence of party
members, yet their intensive study of the political situation
at the precinct level in each congressional district in the

United States has fitted them to participate in such policy

201

making. As confidence in the Committees increases, it should
be possible for them to render more service in this area and
thus contribute further to party unity and discipline.

Among the possibilities for creative action to
promote party discipline is a suggestion for united effort
by the National, Senatorial, and Congressional Committees
of the party which is out of power to consolidate party
leadership. This plan, propounded by Paul David21 would
establish the titular head of the opposition party in a
'Washington office, in a position of ”dignity and recognized
responsibility." He would be given official “opposition
status,“ as in Britain, with a salary, a travel budget.
and access to secret information available to Congress.
Such a leader would not only spearhead his party's opposition,
but would facilitate changes in administration.22 The
author outlines a phased program for accomplishing this, which

he sees as "a promising first step in strengthening the national

 

21Paul David, "New Role for the Opposition Party,"

New York Times Magazine, September 18, 1955.

2The author points out that in 15 presidential
contests prior to 1955 the party out of power won only 5
times. A turnover in administrations has occurred once in
12 years on the average, i.e., in one election in three.
To change party control once in 8 years the "out" party
would have to win half the elections.

202

party structure.”

To what extent the Campaign Committees would work
to promote such a plan is, of course, uncertain. A con-
jecture, based on an understanding of their pragmatic
approach, suggests that they would cooperate to the extent -
and only to the extent - that they could expect favorable
congressional election returns to result from the plan.
However that may be, the proposal suggests the type of
creative possibility open to exploration by party agencies

with an imaginative approach.

What of the future?

One question which is sometimes asked deserves
consideration: HOW permanent are the Congressional Campaign
Committees? Though prediction is hazardous, it would seem
that the Committees have become a permanent institution in
contemporary American political life and that their
influence is apt to increase for at least two reasons.

The first is that changing campaign methods - which
change, it might be added has been greatly accelerated by
the work of the committees themselves, especially the
Republican Committee - are making it ever more difficult

for candidates to succeed if they rely solely on themselves

203
or their local party organization.

New techniques are costly and their use requires
considerable expertise. The unaided candidate will have
difficulty in making effective use of the media of mass
communication without the guidance and material assistance
which his Campaign Committee makes available. The
Republican Committee, with its public relations techniques
may well be anticipating the most important function of the
Campaign Committee of tomorrow.

The second reason is that the margin of party control
in the House seems to be diminishing. Bone states the case
thus: "A very few seats lost or won by either party has a
most important bearing on who controls Congress. The reali-
zation of this by congressmen has tended to favor the mainte-
nance of strong, permanent . . . congressional committees.
There is no material sentiment for abolishing the committees
or reducing them from.year-round establishments to temporary
committees active only during campaigns."23 So long as
control of Congress is sharply contested the usefulness
of the Committees seems unlikely to be questioned.

‘Whatever one may conjecture as to the future potential

 

23Bone, op. cit., p. 137.

204
of the Committees, one thing seems certain: they appear
to be here to stay. They have proved themselves in the
rough-and-tumble of political life and have survived. More
than that, they have proved themselves valuable to
congressional candidates. They have adapted their methods
to changing circumstances and have worked out a mgdgg
vivendi with rival committees. They have promoted party
growth, unity and some measure of discipline. Though the
results of their efforts remain imponderable, they have
convinced congressmen and the political parties of their
usefulness. Above all, they have become an accepted part

of the American political system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books

Alexander, DeAlva Stanwood. History and Procedure of the
House of Representatives. New York: Houghton

Bates, Ernest Sutherland. The Story of Congress. New York:
Harper and Bros., 1936.

Beale, Howard K. The Critical Year. New York: Harcourt,
1930.

Bean, Louis Hyman. The Mid-Term Battle. American Council
on Public Affairs. ‘Washington: Cantillon Bodks,

Berdahl, Clarence Arthur. Our Two Party System.
University of Mississippi, 1951.

Beukema, Herman S. et a1. Contemporary Foreign Governments.
Revised edition. Associates in Government, U. S.
Military Academy, Department of Social Science.

New YOrk: Knopf, 1949.

Binkley,‘Wi1fred E. The Powers of the President. New Ybrk:
Doubleday, 1937.

Binkley, W. E. President and Congress. New York: Knopf,
1947.

. American Political Parties, Their Natural
History. New York: Knopf, 1951.

 

Binkley, W. E., and Moos, Malcolm C. A Grammar of American
Politics. 2nd Edition. New York: Knopf, 1952.

Blaine, James G. Twenty Years of Congress. vol. I and II.
Norwich, Connecticut: Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1884-1886.

Bone, Hugh. American Politics and the Party System. lst
Edition. New YOrk: McGraweHill, 1949.

205

206

Bourne, Edward Gaylor (ed.). Federalist. Washington:
M. W. Dunne, 1901.

Bowers, Claude G. The Party Battles of the Jackson Period.
New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922.

Brown, George R. The Leadership of Congress. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merill, 1922.

Bruce, Harold R. American Parties and Politics. 3rd Edition.
New YOrk: Henry Holt and Co., 1937.

Chamberlain, Lawrence Henry. The President, Congress,_and
Legislation. New York: Columbia university Press,
1946.

Clark, Champ. Mygguarter Century of American Politics.
Vols. I and II. New YOrk: Harper Bros., 1920.

Clark, Harry Hayden (ed.). Alexander Hamilton and omas
Jefferson. New York: American Bock Company, 1934.

Coleman, Charles H. The Election of 1868. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1933.

Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers. 3rd
Edition. New York: New York University Press, 1948.

Cousens, Theodore W. Politics and Political Organization
in America. New York: Macmillan, 1942.

Daver, Manning J. The Adams Federalists. Baltimore: JOhns
Hopkins University Press, 1953.

Davis, Harold T. Political Statistics. Evanston, Illinois:
Principia Press, 1954.

Detroit Post and Tribune. Zachariah Chandler. Detroit:
The Post and Tribune Company (New York: C. Drew),
1880.

Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties, Their Organization
and Activities in the Modern State. Translated
by Barbara and Robert North. New Ybrk: John
Wiley and Sons, 1954.

207

. The French Political System. Translated
by Barbara and Robert North. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958.

 

Ewing, Cortes A. M. Presidential Elections. Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1940.

. Congressional Elections 1896-1944. Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947.

 

Fess, Simeon. Political Theory and Party Organization in
the United States. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1910.

Finer, Herman. Governments of Greater European Powers.
New YOrk: Henry Holt, 1956.

Gammon, Samuel Rhea, Jr. The PresidentialyCampaign of 1832.
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and
Political Science, Series XL, No. 1. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923.

Goldman, Ralph M. “Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban
Representation in Congress." Unpublished Master's
dissertation, Department of Political Science,
University of Chicago, 1948.

. "Party Chairmen and Party Functions 1789-
1900.“ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1951.

 

. "Presidential Party Leadership."
Unpublished manuscript.

 

Gooch, Zurcher, Lowenstien and Florensky. Governments of
Continental Europe. .Edited by James T. Shotwell.
New YOrk: Macmillan, 1944.

Gosnell, Harold Foote. Grass Roots Politics. ‘Washington:
American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

Hasbrouck, Paul D. Party_Government in the House of
Representatives. New YOrk: Macmillan, 1927.

Johnson, Claudius 0. American National Government. 3rd
Edition. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953.

208

Josephson, Matthew. The Politicos 1865-1895. New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1938.

Kent, Frank Richardson. The Democratic Party. New YOrk:
Century, 1938.

Key. V. 0., Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation.
New YOrk: Knopf, 1949.

. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups.
3rd Edition. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953.

 

Kleeberg, Gordon. The Formation of the Republican Party as
a Political Organization. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1911.

LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette's Autobiography. Madison,
'Wisconsin: The Robert M. LaFollette Co., 1913.

Laski, Harold J. Parliamentary Government in England. New
YOrk: Viking Press, 1938.

Lazarsfeld, Paul Felix, Berelson, Bernard, and Caudet,
Hazel. The People's Choice. Columbia University.
Publication of the Bureau of Applied Social Research.
New York: Duell, 1944.

Leiserson, Avery. Parties and Politics. New Ybrk: Knopf,
1958.

Macy, Jesse. Party Organization and Machinery. New Ybrk:
Century, 1912.

Merriam, Charles Edward and Gosnell, Harold Foote. The
American Party System. Revised Edition. New York:
Macmillan, 1930.

Moos, Malcolm. Politics,fPresidents and Coattails. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1952.

Morgan, Robert J. A Whig Embattled. Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press, 1954.

209

Morison, Samuel Eliot and Commager, Henry Steele. The
Growth of the American Republic. Vols. I and II.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Morse, Anson. Parties and Party Leaders. Boston: Marshall
Jones Co., 1923.

Neumann, Robert G. European and Comparative Government.
2nd Edition. New York: McGraw—Hill, 1935.

Neumann, Sigmund (ed.). Modern Political Parties. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Ostrogorski, M. Democracy and the Organization of Political
Parties. Vol. II. Translated by Frederick Clarke.
New York: Macmillan, 1902.

Riddick, Floyd M. The United States CongressL Organization
and Procedures. washington: New Capitol Publishers,
1949.

Roche, John P. and Stedman, Murray 8., Jr. The Dynamics
of Democratic Government. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1954.

Sait, Edward McChesney. American Parties and Elections.
3rd Edition. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942.

Scammon, Richard M. America Votes. Governmental Affairs
Institute. New York: Macmillan, 1956.

Schattschneider, E. E. Party Government. New York:
Rinehart, 1942.

Titus, Charles Hickman. voting Behavior in the United States.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935.

Turner, Julius. Party and Constituency. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1951.

210

Articles and Periodicals

American Political Science Association. Committee on
Political Parties. “Toward a More Responsible Two
Party System,9 published as a supplement to

The American Political Science Review, vol. XLIV
(September, 1950).

Berdahl, Clarence. "American Government and Politics:
Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress,"
American Political Science ReviewL vol. XLIII,
No. 2 (April, 1949).

Bone, Hugh. “Some Notes on the Congressional Campaign
Committee,“ The‘Western Politicaliggarterly,
v01. IX, No. 1 (March, 1956).

David, Paul Theodore. ”New Role for the Opposition Party,"
New York Times Magazine, September 18, 1955.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. "Experimental Propaganda Techniques
and voting Behavior," American Political Science
Review, Vol. L, No. 2 (March, 1956).

Goodman, T. William. "How Much Political Party Centralization
Do we Want?” The Journal of Politics, vol. XIII,
No. 4 (November, 1951).

Hathorn, Guy B. "Congressional and Senatorial Campaign
Committees in the Mid-Term Election Year, 1954,”
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, vol. XXXVII,
No. 3 (December, 1956).

Heard, Alexander. "Interviewing Southern Politicians,"
American Political Science Review, vol. XLIV,
No. 6 (December, 1950).

Huntington, Samuel P. "A Revised Theory of American Party
Politics," American Political Science Review, vol.
XLIV (September, 1950).

Lowell, A. Lawrence. ”The Influence of Party upon Legislation
in England and America," Annual Report, vol. I,

American Historical Association, 1901.

211

"Party Unity, Part I - House," Notebooky Congressional
'ggarterly News Features, Vol. III, No. 35.
Washington: Press Research, May 3, 1946.

"Party Unity, Part II - House," Notebook, Congressional
.Quarterly News Features, Vol. IV, No. 3. Washington:
Press Research, September 23, 1946.

Press, 0. C. "Prediction of the Mid-Term Elections,”
Western Political Quarterly, vol. IX, No. 3 (September,
1956).

"Rural Urban Districts' Role in Elections," Congressional
.anrterlyfweekly Report, vol. XIV, No. 13.
Washington (March, 1956).

Official Publications (Local, State and National)

Congressional Campaign Committees. Financial Records.
Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives,
1956.

Harrison, James L. (ed.). Biographical Directory of the
American Congress, 1774:1949. 'Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1950.

 

Langley's San Francisco Directory_for the Year Commencing
April 1880. San Francisco: Valentine and Co., 1880.

Roberts, Ralph L. List of Nominees for the Office of United
States Senator and for the_House of Representatives
in the Eighty-Fifth Congress. ‘Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1956.

U. S. Bureau of the Census, as follows:

1. ‘The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives -
First Session - 52nd Congress, 1891-1892. Vol. 50,
Part 3 (Compendium of the Eleventh Census, Part I).

2. Census Reports vol. I - Twelfth Census of the United
States, 1900 Part I, Population. washington, 1901.

212

3. Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910. V01.
1. Population.

4. Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910. Population
by Counties, Advance Bulletin,‘Washington, 1910.

5. Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Population.

6. Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920. vol. I
Population - Number and Distribution of Inhabitants.

 

7. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Edited by
D. Goldfield. 1957.

8. Vote Cast in PresidentiaL_and Congressional Elections
1928-1944. Elections: 1944, No. 5 (Published 1946).

U. S. Congress. Congressional Directories to 1957. washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office.
Campaign Literature and Party Publications

Brown C. Edgar. Democracy at Work. Official Report of the
Democratic National Convention. Philadelphia, 1948.

Cannon, Clarence. The Official Manual of the Democratic
National Convention. Washington, 1956.

‘ngggratic Campaign Bock (for 1882, 1890, 1894, 1896),
'Washington, D. C.

Democratic Campaign Book 1902. Baltimore: Sun Printing
Office.

Qempcratic Campaign Textbook, 1906, Baltimore: Sun Printing
Office.

.ngggpapic Campaign Textbook (for 1910, 1912, 1916, 1920,
1924, 1928, l930),'Washington, D. C.

Democratic Fact Books, washington, D. C.

213

Prgceedings of the Democratic National Convention for 1884,
1924, 1948.

Proceedings of the Republican National Convention for 1864,
1880, 1884, 1888, 1892.

Republican Congressional Committee. Campaign Services of

the Republican Congressional Committee,‘Washington,
D. C., 1956.

Republican Congressional Committee. 1956 Congressional vote
Statistics. Washington, D. C., 1956.

 

,yp . Marginal Districts 1956. ‘Washington, D. C.,
1956.

‘Bepublican Campaign Documents, 1876. washington, D. C.

ngublican Campaign Textbooks for the years 1882, 1894,
1896, 1898, 1902, 1906, 1910. Washington, D. C.

Republican Fact Bodks. ‘Washington, D. C.

Republican National Committee. Republican Campaign Manual,
1952. washington, D. C., 1951.

 

-; . Republican Speakers} Handbodk,‘Washington,
1956.

 

‘. Speakers' Kit. Washington, D. C., 1956.
-; . Republican workers' Manual. 1956.

Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

Speech Kit, 1956.
'Washington, D. C., 1956.

Union Republican Congressional Committee Documents, 1880.
'Washington, D. C.

214

Personal Interviews

List of officials interviewed

l.

The chairman of each of the Congressional Campaign
Committees.

The Executive Secretary of each committee.

The Assistant Executive Secretary of the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee.

The Director of National Field Services for the
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

The members of each of the Congressional Campaign
Committees in important congressional or party
positions.

Individuals recommended by staff members of the two
committees:

a. The Director of Public Relations for the
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

b. The Director of Public Relations for the
Republican National Committee in the presidential
campaigns of 1952 and 1956 who, in this capacity,
had had experience in working with the Republican
Congressional Campaign Committee.

c. A former Executive Secretary of the Republican
Congressional Campaign Committee. '

d. Congressmen who had been assisted by their
respective Congressional Campaign Committees.

SECTION A.

II.

III.

APPENDIX I

QUESTIONS USED IN INTERVIEWING CONGRESSIONAL

CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND STAFF MEMBERS

Committee Membership

1.

2.

How are members of the Committee chosen?

Does membership on the Committee indicate that
congressmen are leaders in party affairs?

Are party leaders in the House of Representatives
members of their party's Congressional Campaign
Committee?

Is membership on a Congressional Campaign Committee
regarded as opening a door to advancement in
party affairs?

Professional Executive Staff of the Committees
Size and nature of the staff.

How is it selected?

What are its functions?

Is staff membership a means to political preferment?

Committee Organization

1.

HOW is the Committee organized?

a. Who chooses the Chairman?

b. How is the Executive Committee selected?

c. How and by whom are long-range policy decisions

made? 215

IV.

216
d. What part does the professional staff play
in:
1. Policy decisions?
2. Procedural decisions?
e. What records of committee decisions, policies

and procedures are kept?

Functions of the Committee in preparation for campaigns.

1.

What are the criteria used by the Committee in
selecting its area of concentration? (Major

and minor)

How does the Committee influence local preparation
for a campaign?

What part does the Committee play in the
nominating of candidates? (How is its influence
exerted?

How does the committee discover and work with
local leaders?

What techniques have the committees developed

for recruiting local party workers? for training
them? for training candidates?

What techniques have been developed for influencing

the general public?

217
How iS campaign strategy developed?
a. What part is played by local workers?
b. What part is played by candidates?
c. Who is responsible for developing the final
master-plan?
What part does the Committee play in reconciling
conflicting forces, in case of division within

the party?

Functions of the Congressional Campaign Committee

during Campaigns.

1.

What materials are prepared by the Committee

for Congressional campaigns? Who is responsible
for this?

How does the Committee recruit and assign speakers
for campaign work in Congressional districts?

How does the Committee determine what appeals

will be answered with assistance?

Does the Committee ever decide, during a

campaign, to increase the amount of assistance
given to a candidate? If so, by whom is the
decision made? What are the criteria for arriving

at a decision?

VI.

VII.

5.

218
What techniques has the committee developed for
keeping in touch with developments in each

congressional district?

Functions of the Congressional Campaign Committee

between campaign.

1.

What services to congressmen, both old and new,
does the Committee provide during the period
between campaigns?

How does the Committee help congressmen keep

in touch with their constituents?

What techniques have been developed for securing
information on party health in local districts

in the intervals between campaigns?

4. Is any attempt made to influence the general
public between campaigns? If so, what techniques
are used?

Finance

1. How are the Congressional Campaign Committees
financed?

2. Who is responsible for the collection and dis-

bursement of funds?

VIII.

219

Committee Relationships

1.

What is the relationship of the Congressional
Campaign Committee to the National Committee?
a. During a campaign?

b. Between campaigns?

c. During presidential campaigns?

What is the relationship of the Congressional

to the Senatorial Campaign Committee?

220

APPENDIX I

SECTION B. QUESTIONS ASKED OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

MEMBERS (PRESENT AND PAST)

What do you conceive to be the function of the Congressional
Campaign Committee?

Do you think that the Committee fills an important place
in the life of your party?

Does the Committee receive adequate financial support?
From what sources?

Do you think that the Committees are bringing about
changes in our political system? If so, how and in

what direction?

What role has the Committee played in campaigns during
your association with it?

What is the comparative importance of the Committee in
presidential campaigns as compared with midterm elections?
How does the Committee decide who should receive
assistance? How much should be given?

What criterion does the Committee use in evaluating
specific cases?

What methods does the Committee use in helping local

Committees select qualified candidates?

10.

ll.

12.

13.

221
What is the relationship of the Congressional Committee
to other party organizations such as the National
Committee, Senate Committees, local Committees?
What new campaign techniques, if any, have been developed
by the Committee during your term of office?
What improvements in the work of the Committee would
you suggest?
Do you think that the Campaign Committee was helpful

to you in your campaign? In your work as a congressman?

In what ways?

222

APPENDIX II

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

1866-1869

1879-1881
1881-1885

1889—1891
1891—1893
1893-1897
1897-1901
1901-1907
1907-1913
1913-1917
1917—1919
1919—1921
1921-1925
1925—1928
1928-1936
1936-1947
1947-

A. THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
1. List of Chairmen

James R. Doolittle (Senator)

‘William A. Wallace - Huntington, Pa.

William S. Rosecrans - Los Angeles, Cal.

Roswell P. Flower - New York, N.Y.
‘William L. Wilson - Charleston, W;Va.
Charles Faulkner — Martinsburg, W.Va.

. Tenn.

James D. Richardson - Murfreesboro,

James M. Griggs - Alapaha, Ga.
James T. Lloyd - Shelbyville, Mo.

Frank E. Doremus - Portland, Mich.

Scott Ferris — Lawton, Okla.

H. D. Flood - Appomattox, va.

Arthur B. Rouse - Burlington, Ky.
William A. Oldfield - Batesville, Ark.
Joseph W; Byrnes - Nashville, Tenn.
Patrick Drewry - Petersburg, va.

Mdchael Kirwan - Youngstown, Ohio

223

APPENDIX - II - COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
2. List of Officers

 

40th Congress*
(1867-1869)

46th Congress
(1879—1881)

 

Chairman James R. Doolittle (senator)
Sec'y Samuel J. Randall

Treas. William H. Barnum

Members Charles R. Buckalew (senator)

J..M. Humphrey
Lewis Ross
Lawrence Trimble
(Josiah D. Hoover
From (Charles Mason
‘Washington (Gen. Thomas Ewing
(Montgomery Blair
*No lists
available 1869—1879.

47th Congress*
(1881-1883)

‘William A. Wallace
(senator)

Duncan S. Walker
(not in Congress)

JOhn G. Thompson
(not in Congress)

No
record of
Executive
Committee
membership

Slst Congress
(1889-1891)

 

Chairman William Rosecrans
Sec'y Benjamin LeFevre
Treas.

Finance H. G. Davis (senator)

Committee A. P. Gorman
Lewis Beach

Board of R. P. Flower

Control Philip B. Thompson, Jr.
H. G. Davis '
Thomas R. Cobb
A. P. Gorman

R. P. Flower
T. O. Towles

James L. Norris
(Washington)

R. P. Flower
Levi Maish

W. I. Hayes
John F. Andrew
J. B. McCreary

[m

\n) x)

224

47th Congress (Cont.)
(1881-1883)

Board of W. S. Rosecrans
Control Zebulon B. vance
(Cont.) C. C. Baldwin

(not in Congress)

*No lists available from the 1883-1889

Slst Congress (Cont.)
(1889-1891)

N. C. Blanchard

J. R. Whiting

S. S. Yoder

Samuel Flower

C. A. O. McClellan

 

53rd Congress*
(1893-1895)

57th Congress
(1901-1903)

 

Chairman Charles J. Faulkner

Sec'y. Lawrence Gardner

Treas. James L. Norris
(Washington)

Subcommittee

on Campaign

Book ‘William D. Bynum

Executive James P. Piggott

Committee Thomas C. McRae

‘William McAleer
‘W. D. Bynum
Jonathan T. Heard
Benton McMillin
Justin R.‘Whiting
Joseph Wheeler
William A. Jones
W. S. Forman

(Also five senators)

*No records 1895-1901 or 1903-1907

LA

James M. Grigg
Charles A. Edwards

James L. Norris
(washington)

Benjamin T. Cable
F. M. Cockrell
Edward M. Shepard
James R. Richardson
Judson Harmon
David Overmeyer
Jacob Ruppert, Jr.
Josiah Quincey

F. G. Newlands

E. C. Wall

John S. Robinson
C. B. Randall
Daniel L. Gooch
James M. Griggs

__4

Chairman

V. Chairman

Sec'y.

Ass't
Sec'y.

Sargeant at
Arms

Executive
Committee

Committees:
Campaign
Litera—

ture
Finance

225

60th Congress
(1907-1909)

James T. Lloyd

David Finley
D. L. D. Granger

Frank Clark

William Hughs

Henry T. Rainey
David E. Finley
Lincoln Dixon

D. W. Hamilton
William J. Stone

Lincoln Dixon

John Wesley Gaines
H. D. Flood

6lst Congress
(1909-1911)
James T. Lloyd

David Finley
A. Mitchell Palmer

Lincoln Dixon

Thomas M. Bell
South Trimble

N. J. Sinnott

Henry T. Rainey
David E. Finley

Ben Johnson

Gilbert M. Hitchcock
A. Mitchell Palmer

Lincoln Dixon

Gilbert Hitchcock
Joseph E. Ransdell

Chairman

V. Chairman

Sec'y

Ass't.
Sec'y.

Treas.

Executive
Committee

Committees:
Finance
Litera-

ture
Advisory

Textbook

226

62nd Congress
(1911—1913)

James T. Lloyd

David E. Finley
A. M. Palmer .
Henry T. Rainey

Thomas J. Scully

Henry D. Flood

Henry T. Rainey
David Finley

Ben Johnson
William Richardson
Robert N. Page

W. S. Hammond

A. Mitchell Palmer
H. M. Goldfogle

D. H. Mays
William.A. Ashbrook
H. B. Ferguson

E. F. Sweet

H. D. Flood

Jack Beall
William J. Stone

63rd Congress
(1913-1915)

Frank E. Doremus

Cyrus Cline

George E. Chamberlain
Henry F. Hollis

Henry M. Goldpage
John E. Raker

Thomas J. Scully

South Trimble
J. Henry Goeke

Frank Doremus
Ollie M. James
Thomas P. Gore
Thomas J. Scully
Edward Taylor

Robert‘W.‘Wooley

Chairman

men

Sec'y.

Ass't.
Sec'y.

Sergeant
at Arms

Treas.

Executive
Committee

Speakers
Bureau

227

64th Congress
(1915-1917)

_._A~

Frank E. Doremus

Cyrus Cline
Charles F. Johnson
Atlee Pomerene
William E. Chillon
John E. Raker
Edwin Y. webb
Harry L. Gandy

Thomas J. Scully

South Trimble

J. Henry Goeke

Frank E. Doremus
Daniel J. McGillicuddy
Edwin Yu‘Webb

Guy T. Helvering

Arthur B. Rouse

65th Congress
(1917—1919)

Scott Ferris

William Cox
John Shafroth
J. K. Shields
W. H. Thompson
J. E. Raker
Edwin‘Webb
Harry Gandy

Augustine Lonergan

South Trimble

N. J. Sinnott

228

66th Congress
(1919-1921)

67th Congress
(1921—1923)

 

 

Chairman H. D. Flood A. B. Rouse
V. Chair- A. B. Rouse John E. Raker
men S. Ferris J. C. Linthincum
Nfichael F. Phelan
John E. Raker
Harry L. Gandy
B. F. Welty
Charles P. Caldwell
Sec'y. A. Lonergan
Treas.
Sergeant
at Arms N. J. Sinnott N. J. Sinnott
Exec.
Committee ‘William A. Oldfield
A. J. Sabath
Joseph W. Byrns
Carl Hayden
Charles F. X. O'Brien
Patrick Drewry
68th Congress 68th Congress
(1923-1925) .(1925)*
Chairman A. B. Rouse 'W. A. Oldfield
V. Chair- A. Raker A. Raker
men J. C. Linthicum J. C. Linthicum
Sec'y. Robert H. Clancy
Treas. South Trimble
Sergeant
at Arms N. J. Sinnott

Exec.
Committee

Chairman,
Finance

229

68th Congress (Cont.)

(1923-1925)

William A. Oldfield
A. J. Sabath

Joseph Byrns

Carl Hayden

John J. Kindred
Patrick Drewry

68th Congress (Cont.)

(1925)*

A. B. Rouse

A. J. Sabath

Carl Hayden

John J. Kindred
Patrick Drewry
William‘W. Larsen

(Also a Women's Executive Committee)

John J. Kindred

 

*Committee reorganized after resignation of
Rouse as chairman.

 

Chairman

men

Sec'y.
Treas.

Sergeant
at Arms

Exec.
Committee

Speaker's
Bureau

Exec.
Sec'y.

69th Congress
(1925—1927)
‘William A. Oldfield

Clarence Lea
Charles Linthicum
John Kindred

Everett Kent
Robert Harper

N. J. Sinnott

A. J. Sabath
Patrick Drewry
Ralph Lonzier
Fred Vinson
Edward T. Taylor

James V. McClintock

Ralph Roberts

70th Congress
(First Session)

A.

‘William A. Oldfield

Clarence Lea
Charles Linthicum
John Kindred

Jeremiah O'Connell

A. B. Rouse

A. J. Sabath
Carl Hayden
Patrick Drewry
Ralph F. Lozier

James V. McClintock

Ralph Roberts

230

70th Congress
(Second Session)

7lst Congress
(1929-1931)

 

Chairman Joseph W. Byrns
V. Chairman Clarence Lea

Sec'y. Mrs. Mary T. Norton

Joseph W. Byrns
Clarence Lea

Mrs. Mary T. Norton

 

72nd Congress
’ (1931—1933)

___ A A

Chairman Joseph W. Byrns

V. Chairman Clarence Lea
J. Charles Linthicum

73rd Congress
(1933-1935)

Joseph W. Byrns

J. V. McClintock
Eugene Crowe

 

 

Edward Pou Edward Pou
Sec'y. Isabella Greenway
Treas. Robert N. Harper Robert N. Harper
Exec. Patrick Drewry
Committee ‘William A. Ayres
Virgil Chapman
Samuel B. Hill
Joseph L. Smith
Mark‘Wilcox
Committees:
Finance Sol Bloom
Special Patronage J. V. McClintock
Speakers ‘William Arnold
Exec.
Sec'y. Joe F. Baker Charles S. Hayden
74th Congress 75th Congress
(1935-1937) (1937-1939)
Chairman Patrick Drewry Patrick Drewry

V. Chairmen Eugene B. Crowe
Abraham Murdock
Claud V. Parsons

Sec'y. Joseph L. Smith

Eugene B. Crowe
Abraham Murdock
Claud V. Parsons

Joseph L. Smith

231

74th Congress (Cont.)
(1935-1937)

75th Congress (Cont.)
(1937-1939)

 

Treas. Robert Harper

Chairmen:
Exec. Comm.
Finance
Speakers and

publicity

Exec.
Sec'y. Charles Hayden

Virgil Chapman
Sol Bloom
Jed Johnson

Victor Harding

 

76th Congress
(1939-1941)

77th Congress
(1941—1943)

 

Chairman Patrick Drewry

V. Chairmen Charles F. McLaughlin
Robert Ramspeck”
Edward J. Hart

' Sec'y. Joseph L. Smith
Treas. George Allen
Exec. Virgil Chapman

Committee Sol Bloom
Jed Johnson
Herman Eberharter

Chairmen:
Finance
Speakers

Exec.
Sec'y. Victor Harding

Patrick Drewry

Robert Ramspeck
Edward J. Hart
Thaddeus wasielewski

George Allen.

Virgin Chapman
Joseph L. Smith
Thomas F. Ford

Henry B. Steagnall
Lawrence Lewis
Herman P. Eberharter
Alfred L. Bulwinkle

Sol Bloom
Jed JOhnson

Victor Harding

 

\EUIV

Chairman

V. Chairmen

Sec'y.
Trea.

Exec.
Comm.

Committees:
Finance
Speakers

232

78th Congress
(1943-1945)

Patrick Drewry

Robert Ramspeck
Edward J. Hart
Thaddeus Wasielewski

Mrs. Chase woodhouse
George Allen

Virgil Chapman

Sam Hobbs

Herman Eberharter
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Michael Kirwan
Henry M. Jackson
Ray J. Madden

Sol Bloom
Jed Johnson

79th Congress
(1945-1947)

A!

Patrick Drewry

George Allen

Virgil Chapman

Sam Hobbs

Herman Eberharter
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Michael Kirwan

Henry M. Jackson

Ray J. Madden

John Murdock

Thomas Lane

Thaddeus wasielewski

Sol Bloom
Jed Johnson

233

80th Congress
(1947—1949)

Blst Congress
(1949-1951)

 

Chairman Patrick Drewry

V. Chairmen Michael J. Kirwan
Edward J. Hart
John A. Carroll

Sec'y. William Dawson
Treas. George Allen
Exec. Virgil Chapman

Committee Sam Hobbs
Ray J. Madden
Thomas J. Lane
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Henry M. Jackson
Herman Eberharter
Overton Brooks

Patrick Drewry

Nuchael J. Kirwan
Edward J. Hart
John A. Carroll

‘William Dawson
George Allen

Virgil Chapman

Sam Hobbs

Ray J. Madden
Thomas J. Lane
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Henry M. Jackson
Albert A. Gore

Mike Mansfield

 

 

Committees:
Speakers John Murdock
Finance Sol Bloom
Exec.
Sec'y. Victor Harding Victor Harding
82nd Congress 83rd Congress
(1951-1953) (1953-1955)
Chairman Michael Kirwan Nuchael Kirwan

V. Chairmen Edward Hart
Herman Eberharter
Overton Brooks

Sec'y. ‘William Dawson

Ass't.
Sec'y.

Treas.

Exec.
Committee

Herman Eberharter
Overton Brooks
Harry Sheppard

William Dawson

Gracie Pfost
John M. Redding

Ray J. Madden
Thomas J. Lane
W. F. Norrell
Noble J. Gregory

Executive

234

82nd Congress (Cont.)
(1951-1953)

A

Committee (Cont.)

83rd Congress (Cont.)
(1953-1955)

Lee Metcalf
Clifford Davis
Paul Brown
Eugene J. Keogh
Louis C. Rabaut

 

 

Finance Aime J. Fornad
Speakers John L. McMillan
Exec.
Sec'y. Victor Harding Kenneth Harding
84th Congress 85th Congress.
(1955—1957) (1957-1959)
Chairman Michael J. Kirwan Ruchael J. Kirwan

V. Chairmen

Sec'y.
Asst.

Sec'y.
Treas.

Exec.
Comm.

Committees:
Finance
Research
Speakers

Asst. to
Chairman

Herman P. Eberharter
Overton Brodks
Harry R. Sheppard

William L. Dawson

Gracie Pfost
John M. Redding

Ray J. Madden
Thomas L. Lane
‘W. F. Norrell
Noble J. Gregory
Clifford Davis
Lee Metcalf

Paul Brown
Eugene J. Keogh
Louis C. Rabaut

Aime J. Forand, Ch.

E. L. Bartlett, Ch.
John L. McMillan, Ch.

Kenneth R. Harding

Herman P. Eberharter
Overton Brooks
Harry R. Sheppard

William L. Dawson

Gracie Pfost
John M. Redding

Ray J. Madden
Thomas L. Lane
‘W. F. Norrell
Novel J. Gregory
Clifford Davis
Lee Metcalf

Paul Brown
Eugene J. Keogh
Louis C. Rabaut

Aime J. Forand, Ch.

E. L. Bartlett. C110
John L. MoMillan, Ch.

Kenneth R. Harding

‘\

link

.7ll."v
.

235

APPENDIX II

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

1864-1869
1869-1873
1873-1879
1879-1879
1879-1883

1893-1905
1905-1909
1909-1913
1913-1919
1919-1923
1923-1933
1933-1937
1937-1939
1939-1943
1943-1947
1947-1953
1953-

B. THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

1. List of Chairmen

Edwin D. Morgan (Senator) - New York, N.Y.
Zachariah Chandler (Senator) - Detroit, Mich.
Simon Cameron (Senator) - Maytown, Pa.

Eugene Hale - Elsworth, Maine

Jay A. Hubbell - Houghton, Mich.

Joseph W. Babcock - Necedah,‘Wis.
James S. Sherman - Utica, N. Y.
'William B. MoKinley - Champlain, Ill.
Frank P. woods — Estherville, Iowa
Simeon R. Fess - Yellow Springs, Ohio
‘Will R. wood - Lafayette, Ind.
Chester C. Bolton - Cleveland, Ohio
Joseph Martin - Attleboro, Mass.
J.‘Wi11iam Ditter — Ambler, Pa.
Charles Halleck - Rensselaer, Ind.
Leonard Hall - Oyster Bay, N. Y.

Richard Simpson - Huntington, Pa.

236

APPENDIX II - COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

2. List of Officers

 

Chairman
Sec'y.
Treas.

Exec.
Committee

42nd Congress
(1871—1872)

Zachariah Chandler

James M. Edmonds

Gov. H. D. Codke

J. A. Logan

H. W. Corbett

J. H. Ketcham
Simon Cameron

John Pool

H. H. Starkweather
G. A. Halsey

John Coburn

* Committee on finance
** Committee on publicity

No lists available for 43rd Congress
No lists available for 45th Congress

Chairman
Sec'y.

Exec.
Committee

AA AA

46th Congress
(1879—1880)

Jay A. Hubbell
Edward McPherson

‘William B. Allison
Edward H. Rollins
Frank Hiscock

Mark H. Dunnell
Godlove S. Orth
William McKinley
Joseph Jorgensen
George R. Davis
Horatio C. Fisher

44th Congress
(1875-1876)

Simon Cameron

James M. Edmonds

Jacob Tome

A. H. Cragin

John A. Logan

J. R. West*

S.‘W. Dorsey**
Thomas C. Platt*
Jay A. Hubbe11**
J. M. Rusk*

C. H. Sinnickson**

(1873—1875)
(1877-1879)

47th Congress
(1881-1882)

Jay A. Hubbell

D. B. Henderson

William B. Allison
Eugene Hale
Frank Hiscock
Nelson Aldrich
George M. Robeson
‘William McKinley
Thomas Ryan
George R. Davis
wm. D. Washburn

L. C. Hbuk

237

A

 

46th Congress (Cont.) 47th Congress (Cont.)
(1879—1880) (1881-1882)
Exec. R. T. Van Horn
Committee (Cont.) Orlando Hubbs

‘W. H. Calkins

Horatio F. Page

Horatio C. Fisher
1883-1895 - Decade of inactivity.

 

54th Congress 55th Congress
(1895—1896) . (1897-1898)
Chairman Joseph‘W. Babcock Joseph W. Babcock
V. Chairman Lewis D. Apsley James S. Sherman
Sec'y. David Mercer Jesse Overstreet
Asst. Sec'y.Warner P. Sutton Fredrich Schrader
Treas. ‘William B. Thompson William B. Thompson
Exec. John A. T. Hull John A. T. Hull
Committee Joseph G. Cannon Joseph G. Cannon
Jeter C. Pritchard David H. Mercer
Jesse Overstreet Redfield Proctor*
James S. Sherman J. H. Gallinger
John H. Mitchell John L.‘Wilson

James T. McCleary
H. C. Loudenslager
Richmond Pearson

* Senator

 

57th Congress 58th Congress
(1901-1902) (1903-1904)
Chairman Joseph‘W. Babcock Joseph‘w. Babcock
V. Chairman James S. Sherman James S. Sherman
Sec'y. Jesse Overstreet Jesse Overstreet
Treas. ‘William B. Thompson William B. Thompson
Exec. John A. T. Hull John A. T. Hull

Committee Daniel H. Mercer ‘William Connell

238

 

57th Congress (Cont.)

58th Congress (Cont.)

 

 

 

(1901-1902) (1903—1904)
Exec. C. A. Russell E. C. Burleigh
Comm. William Connell J. R. Mann
(Cont.) Joseph G. Cannon H. C. Loudenslager
H. C. Loudenslager Victor H. Metcalf
W. C. Lovering J. A. Tawney
Victor H. Metcalf Nicholas Longworth
E. C. Burleigh Geroge Lilley
59th Congress 6lst Congress
(1905:1906)' (1909-1910)
Chairman James S. Sherman Wm. McKinley, Jr.
V.Chairman James A. Tawney James A. Tawney
Sec'y. Henry Loudenslager H. C. Loudenslager

Asst. Sec'y

Treas.

Asst. Treas.

Auditor

William MoKinley, Jr.

Asst. Auditor

Director, Library

Bureau

Exec.
Committee

*Senator

Charles Burke
George S. Nixon*
James H. Davidson
Richard Bartholdt
John‘W.‘Weeks
Nicholas Longworth
Sydney Mudd

Jas. M. Miller
Herschel M. Hogg
H. Burd Cassel

Henry Casson
Charles H. Duell
John C. Eversman

‘wm. J. Browning

Dennis E. Alward

Francis Curtis

Jas. A. Tawney
George S. Nixon*
James M. Miller
J. Hampton Moore
Richard Bartholdt
Adin B. Capron
Simon Guggenheim
Jas. H. Davidson
John‘w.‘weeks

J. vanv. Olcott
John M. Morehead

239

 

67th Congress

68th Congress

 

 

 

(1921—1922) (1923-1924)

Chairman Simeon Fess ‘W. R. Wood
V.Chairman W. R. wood J. Q. Tilson

J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith

J. N. Tichner H. McL. Wurzbach
Exec. Geo. Scott Graham John M. Robsion
Committee C. B. Timberlake S. E. Winslow

Wm. A. Rodenberg Geo. Scott Graham

C. w. Ramseyer J. T. Begg

A. T. Smith H. P. Snyder

S. E.‘Winslow Wm. F. James

C. B. Slemp J. C. McKenzie

H. P. Snyder C. W. Ramseyer

F.‘W. Mondell Sidney C. Roach

Greene (not identified) Johnson (not identified)

69th Congress 70th Congress

(1925-1926) (1927-1928)

Chairman Will R. Wood ‘Will R.‘Wood
V.Chairmen J. Q. Tilson J. Q. Tilson

A. T. Smith A. T. Smith

H. McL.‘Wurzbach H. McL.‘Wurzbach
Exec. Geo. Scott Graham Geo. Scott Graham
Committee A. T. Treadway A. T. Treadway

C. W. Ramseyer
Chas. F. Curry
L. H. Hadley
Robert L. Bacon
F. A. Britten
wm.F.Jmmsq

C. B. Timberlake
M. H. Thatcher
Chas. E. Moore
N. L. Strong

C.‘w. Ramseyer
C. F. Curry

L. H. Hadley
Robert L. Bacon
F. A. Britten
Wm. F. James

C. B. Timberlake
M. H. Thatcher
Chas E. Moore

N. L. Strong

240

[J AA A; A

7lst Congress
(1929-1930)

72nd Congress
(1931-1932)

 

 

 

 

Chairman ‘Will R. Wood ‘Will R. Wood
V.Chairmen J. Q. Tilson J. Q. Tilson

A. T. Smith A. T. Smith

M. H. Thatcher M. H. Thatcher
Exec. Geo. Scott Graham Geo. Scott Graham
Committee R. L. Bacon R. L. Bacon

Chas. E. Moore Chas. E. Moore

wm. F. James wm. F. James

C. W. Ramseyer C.‘W. Ramseyer

N. L. Strong N. L. Strong

Chas. F. Curry Chas. F. Curry

F. H. Foss F. H. Foss

H. McL.‘Wurzbach H. McL. wurzbach

F. R. Lehlbach F. R. Lehlbach

C. R. Chindblom C. R. Chindblom

C. A. Christopherson C. A. Christopherson

73rd Congress 74th Congress

_(1933-1935) (1935-1937)
Chairman Chester C. Bolton Chester C. Bolton
V.Chairmen R. L. Bacon R. L. Bacon

A. E. Carter A. E. Carter
Exec. F. R. Lehlbach F. R. Lehlbach
Committee F. H. Foss C. R. Hope

Frank R. Reid James‘Wolfenden

C. R. Hope Joseph Martin

James wolfenden C. A. Christopherson

75th Congress 76th Congress

(1937-1939) (1939-1941)
Chairman Joseph Martin J. wm. Ditter
V.Chairmen A. E. Carter A. E. Carter

J. M. Robsion
Everett M. Dirksen
J. wm. Ditter

E. M. Dirksen
J. M. Robsion
R. B. Wigglesworth

241

 

75th Congress (Cont.)
(1937-1939)

76th Congress (Cont.)
(1939-1941)

 

 

 

 

Exec. M. J. Maas Charles Halleck
Committee B. C. Reece B. C. Reece
Charles Halleck D. A. White
C. A. wo1verton C. A. Wolverton
D. A. White Andrews
77th Congress 78th Congress
(1941-1943) (1943-1945)
Chairman J.‘Wm. Ditter Chas. Halleck
V.Chairmen A. E. Carter A. E. Carter
E. M. Dirksen E. M. Dirksen
J. M. Robsion J. M. Robsion
R. B. Wigglesworth R. B. Wigglesworth
Exec. Leonard Hall Leonard Hall
Committee Chas. Halleck ‘W. E. Hess
W. E. Hess Dewey Short
Dewey Short C. A. wo1verton
C. A. Wolverton 'R. Simpson
79th Congress 80th Congress
_(1945—1947) (1947-1949)
Chairman Chas. Halleck Leonard Hall
V.Chairmen E. M. Dirksen E. M. Dirksen
J. M. Robsion J. M. Robsion
R. B.‘Wigglesworth R. B. Wigglesworth
Carl Hinshaw Carl Hinshaw
Exec. Leonard Hall 'W. E. Hess
Committee W. E. Hess Dewey Short

Dewey Short
C. A. wo1verton
R. Simpson

C. A. wo1verton
Geo. A. Dondero
Hugh D. Scott, Jr.
(or Hardie Scott)

242

8lst Congress
(1949-1951)

‘1- A ‘4

82nd Congress
.(1951-1953)

 

 

Chairman Leonard Hall Leonard Hall
V.Chairmen R. B.‘Wigg1esworth R. B. Wigglesworth
Carl Hinshaw Carl Hinshaw
Charles Halleck Charles Halleck
Dewey Short Dewey Short
Exec. C. A. wo1verton C. A.‘Wolverton
Committee George A. Dondero George A. Dondero
John Jennings, Jr. S. K. McConnell, Jr.
Sam'l K. McConnell, Jr. John M. Vorys
John M. vorys Hal Holmes
83rd Congress 84th Congress
(1953-1955) (1955-1957)
Chairman Richard M. Simpson Ridhard M. Simpson
V.Chairmen R. B.‘Wigg1esworth R. B.‘Wigglesworth
Carl HinshaW‘ Carl Hinshaw
Dewey Short Dewey Short
William C.‘Wampler Jos. P. O’Hara
Exec. C. A. wo1verton C. A. wo1verton
Committee John M. vorys Hal Holmes

Hal Holmes
J. Edgar Chenoweth
Dean P. Taylor

J. E. Chenoweth
Dean P. Taylor
Charles A. Halleck

.01

Chairman

V. Chairmen

Secretary
Ass't. Secretary

Executive
Committee

Executive Secretary

Treasurer

Public Relations
Director

243

85th Congress
(1957-1959)

Richard M. Simpson (Pennsylvania)

Richard B.‘Wigglesworth (Massachusetts)
Joseph P. O'Hara (Minnesota)

Charles R. Jonas (North Carolina)

Hamer H. Budge (Idaho)

‘William M. McCulloch (Ohio)

Ben F. Jensen (Iowa)
John J. Rhodes (Arizona)

Charles A.‘Wolverton (N.J.)
Hal Holmes (Washington)

J. Edgar Chenoweth (Colorado)
Charles A. Halleck (Indiana)
Henry J. Latham (New York)

‘William S.‘Warner

Robert V. Fleming

Harold Slater

244
APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS
A. COPY OEZQUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO ALL COUNTY CHAIRMEN IN 1956

BY THEAREPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

State County Congressional District

A A A-qA A

Name Address City or Town Phone

County Chairman

State Committee Member
State Committee Member

Number of Precincts .
or Number of Places Using votingyMechines
voting Places

AA

Number Using Paper Ballots

Total Registration Republi- Demo- Un- County
as of Nov., 1954 cans crats declared Population

A A_- A__ A A’AA A

Do you elect precinct or voting district County Committeemen
and women onyprimary ballot?

AA A A AA _A

Do you select or elect County Committeemen and‘Women at
precinct or county caucus?

_A A AA A_A

Are County Committeemen and women or Precinct Captains
appointed by district or ward leaders?

-A AA

How many precinct or voting distriots have vacancies?

Do you have one or two Precinct Poll Boards?
Receiving? Counting?

When does Counting Board function (hours)?

How many Poll Officials function in each precinct on Election
Day?

A AA A A _A

245
Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

What are their titles?

How many Republicans? Hg! many Democrats?

If one party has the majority of Precinct Poll Officials,
what controls‘number?

A

How are Pollggfficials selected?

How are Poll Officials appointed? Does County Chairman
recommend them?

Do Republican County Committee Members also serve on poll board:

Yes? No? - How many?‘ What precincts?

 

If paper ballots are used, do they have stub? How many stubs?
Could you furnish us with sample ballot for 1952-1954
General Election? (attach)

If paper ballots are used, are they removed from ballot box
one at a time for counting?

AA _A

.fipw many absentee ballots weregcast in 1952? in 1954?

Are absentee ballots counted at polling place or courthouse?

_A A.- A

What is the procedure when voter asks for ballot assistance?
Is he assisted by Poll Officialsgof both parties?"y

Must assisted voter sign affidavit? Could we obtain copy of
y; affidavit? (attach)"

Do you have challengers or watchers in polling place on

Election Day? How many precincts? Are they compensated

or volunteer? 1 _11111 1

Could you furnish us with list of Republicans elected and

residing in your county to -

State County and Municipal Office Name,Address, and Title?

(attach list)

 

. U.llsl1l.l~v

246

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

Are there Republican Women's Clubs (National Federation of
Republican women) and National Federation of Young Republican
Clubs ingyour county? (Specify which) _g 4
Do the officers and members of these clubs participate in
Ayour county organization? ‘_Atuthe_precint leyel?

Could we obtain a list of these clubs and list of officers
and number of their membership?_

.po candidatesypay a filing fee when they file?

Do the voters pay a poll tax or any other fee to qualify as
voters?

What is the voter registration procedure in your county?
What is the period of registration? (Time)

Where does the voter register? At the courthouse?
Town or city hall? Or in the precinct? -1-
If registration is in the precinct, how many Precinct
Registrars are appointed? 11.11 - _y
Are both parties represented? How are they selected?
yy whom areythey appointed? pg. _y
Do you have permanent registration?

When mustnyou vote to remain on list?,

If removed from 1ist,gwhat notice isggiven?

What_§;eprovisions_for transfersgg

A

When was the voter register purged? Is it mandatory to purge?
Whatyperiod? Ag_4. 11

.Qogyou have'anyynew registration projects?

gpuld you furnish copy of form used for registration?_(Attach)

247

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

Do you provide training programs for precinct leaders?
Co—leaders? 11 1 1
Republican Precinct Poll Officials? Watchers?
Challengers? “

How often do you hold county committee meetings?
How many attend the average meeting?

Do you have County Campaign Headquarters at election time?
‘Qnyou provide transportationgfor voters on Election Day?

Do.vou have a county financeggommittee? 11
Do you have an up-to—date list of all (Republican, Democrat,
and Undeclared) voters in everyyprecinct or voting place?

Are there any serious factional differences in your county?

How effectively are the Democrats organized in your county?
Details will_be,appreciated.

What newspapers (daily or weekly) circu1ate in your county?

Are publishers, editors, political reporters presenting the
Republican story impartially? _g -1
we would be pleased to have your personal opinion on what
could be done to strengthen the Republican Party in your

gounty. _ __ 1
Do you have any organized relationship with other county
ghairmen in your Congressional District?

A

How long haveyyou served as County Chairman?

248

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

How long has the Vice Chairman (Woman) served?
was she elected or appointed?

A
a

Aregyou elected byuthe County Committee members?

Special Information

249

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

B. CANDIDATE ANALYSIS SHEET PREPARED BY REPUBLICAN

CONGRESSIONAL_CQMMITTEE

District

Name

A

POLITICAL YARDSTICK
HOW TO MEASURE YOUR CANDIDATES

Reputation
Qualified for office
Experienced in campaigning
Physical appearance
Personality
Really wants the job
Active in community affairs
Record as prior candidate
Name familiar to voters
Appeal to independent voters
Press relations
Platform performance
Television performance
Radio voice -1- ##1,
Military record
Athletic record
Party support
Fraternal affiliations
Labor support

Parent-teacher association support

Smaller organized group supports

Position on popular local issues
Aggressive campaigner

AA

Racial background favorable to community

Financial ability to run
TOTAL POINTS
HOW TO SCORE EACH POLITICAL FACTOR

5 Excellent 4 Above average
3 Average 2 Fair 1 Poor

Date

Address

HOW TO EVALUATE TOTAL SCORE

100 Plus Excellent candidate
78-99 Good candidate

60-78 Fair candidate

59 or below Poor candidate

250

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

C. COPY OF PRECINCT ANALYSIS SHEET

AS PREPARED BY THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

II.

III.

Page 1 - Precinct Analysis Procedure

Determine the actual number of precincts in each county

A.

B.

Obtain from the Congressional Committee four (4)
analysis forms for each precinct.

Distribute sufficient number of forms to each
county chairman.

Explain the purpose of the analysis to each county
chairman

A.

B.

Purpose is to learn the voting history or behavior
in every precinct in every county.

When the analysis is completed, the weak precincts
and the strong precincts will be readily and
reliably spotted.

Republican organizations and leaders can then
proceed to strengthen the weak precincts before
the November 1958 election.

County chairmen and other party leaders will
receive copies of the summary to be compiled by
the Congressional Committee.

Data obtained from this analysis will provide the
most factual blueprint for building Republican
organization on the grass-roots level for victory
on all levels in November 1958.

The voting records for completing the forms can usually
be obtained from each county courthouse.

A.

The county chairmen may offer to have the work
done or volunteers may be recruited from members
of a Republican Women's Federation Club or

Young Republican organization in the county.

251

Precinct Analysis Procedure (Continued)

IV.

VI.

The Precinct Analysis form

A. It is important to obtain the current registration
figures for each county when same is available
for each precinct.

B. It is very important to have the names of the
committeemen and women in each county.

C. The years listed on the form for Senate and
Governor races may vary for your own state.

D. A summary sheet should be prepared for each city
or town having more than one voting district
and for the county.

Obtain a map for each county showing precinct boundaries.

Return One (1) set of completed forms for each county
to the office of the Congressman and the National
Republican Congressional Committee, Congressional
Hotel, Washington, D. C.

252
APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS
D. DATA SHEET FOR COMPILING ELECTION DATA BY STATES

(Prepared by Republican Campaign Committee. Filled in
for Michigan, Election of 1956)

1956 Registration Total: 3,620,651
wayne County 1,305,118
Outside 2,315,533

STATE Michigan POPULATION 1950: 6,371,766* 1956: 7,516,000
POTENTIAL VOTE 1950: 4,106,606* 1956: 4,509,600
COUNTIES: 83 PRECINCTS: 4,790
1952-1956

 

 

 

 

 

 

REPUBLICANS FAILED TO VOTE FOR CONGRESS 1952: 32,094 1956: 82,536
ESTIMATED MINIMUM.DEMOCRAT VOTE FOR IKE 1952: 80,991 1956: 130,939
82,536 VOTED FOR.PRESIDENT IN 1956 BUT FAILED TO VOTE FOR
CONGRESS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

President Senate
1952 1956 1952 1956
R 1,551,529 1,713,647 1,428,352 no. cont.
D 1,230,651 1,359,898 1,383,416 " "
Governor Congressional Can.
1952 1 1956 1952 1956
R 1,423,275 1,376,376 1,453,181 1,500,172
D 1,431,893 1,666,689 1,310,578 1,490,837

 

 

 

 

'52 R won by 320,872 R won by 444,936 R lost by §§18
R pp. Marg. by 142,603 .

'56 R won by 353,749 R by R lost by 290,313
Rep. Marg. by 9,335
1954
REPBULICANS FAILED TO VOTE FOR CONGRESS 21,327

 

 

Data Sheet for Compiling Elec

253

tion Dnta by states (Continued)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Senate Governor Congressional Cand.
Rep. 1,049,420 Rep. 963,300~‘ Rep. 1,028,093
Dem. 1,088,550 Dem. 1,216,308 Dem. 1,100,939‘
Rep. 1psp‘by 39,130 Rep. 1psp by 253,008 Democrat Marg. by
72,846
Stay-At—Homes Non-voters Total vote

Rep. Dem.

1952: 1,240,626 1952: 2,865,908
1954:421,118 257,835 1954: 2,322,573 1954: 2,187,027
1956: 1956: 1,436,055 1956: 3,073,545
NON4WHITE: 453,961* NON4WHITE OVER 21: 293,843*
FOREIGN BORN: 603,735

 

Poland 81,595; Germany 45,323
Italy 38,937; USSR 30,804

CONGRESSIONAL LINEUP: Rep:

12 Dem: 6 Marginal seats: 3
6th Chamberlain - R
7th McIntosh - R:
17th Griffiths

254

E. Michigan State Election Results 1952-1956

Population (1950 Census)
Population (1956 New York Times estimate)

Eligible VOte (over 21 years old) 4,106,606
('50)

Total Vote Cast — 1952
Eligible (over 21) failed to vote - 1952
Total Vote Cast - 1956
Eligible (over 21) failed to vote - 1956

voted for President, 1952, failed to

vote for Congress
1956,

VOted for President, failed to

vote for Congress
Republican
1952 Eisenhower received (votes)

1956 Eisenhower received (votes)

1956 Eisenhower received more (votes)

1952 Congress received (votes)

1956 Congress received (votes)

1956 Congress received more (votes)

6,371,776

7,516,000

4,509,600
2,865,980
1,240,626
3,073,545

1,436,045

26,655*

82,536

1,551,529
1,713,647

162,118
1,453,181
1,500,172

46,991

(Governor)

255

Michigan State Election Results 1952-195s (Continued).

 

Democrat
1952 Stevenson received (votes) 1,230,657
1956 Stevenson received (votes) 1,490,837
1956 Stevenson received more (votes) 260,180
1952 Congress received (votes) 1,310,578
1956 Congress received (votes) 1,490,837
1956 Congress received more (votes) 180,259

*1952 - Governor received 94,043 more votes than Congress
and Governor received 67,388 more votes than the

President. The Governor won election by 8,618 votes.

256

In Michigan there were approximately 1,240,600 in 1952 and
1,436,045 in 1956 eligible voters over 21 years old not
voting in the elections. Where are these non-voters?

In Michigan, 26,655 in 1952 and 82,536 in 1956 voted for
President but did not vote for Congress. Where are these
voters?

In Michigan in 1956, as compared to 1952, President Eisenhower
received 162,118 more votes and Stevenson received 260,180
more votes.

In Michigan in 1956, the Republican Congress received 46,991
more votes and the Democrat Congress received 180,259 more
votes.

In 1956, as compared to 1952, there were 207,565 more votes
cast.

See tabulation vote results sheet for each Congressional
District.
Ike Carried

Differences in Differences in vote Cast

 

Republican vote Democrat vote 1956 Com— Cong. Dist.
Compared 1952- Compared 1952— pared to 1952 12§6
1956 1956 ‘4, 1952
lst Dist. -3,305 —6,405 -10,557 no no
2nd Dist. -4,599 -3,432 -7,478 yes yes
3rd Dist. +4,995 -1,447 +2,778 yes yes
4th Dist. -3,826 +8,04l +3,695 yes yes
5th Dist. +10,542 +3,752 +13,531 yes yes
6th Dist. +8,307 +15,921 +23,400 yes yes
7th Dist. +12,738 +32,229 +44,626 yes yes
8th Dist. +1,626 +6,466 +7,438 yes yes
9th Dist. -2,290 +6,152 +3,415 yes yes
10th Dist. +3,054 +4,564 +7,618 yes yes
11th Dist. -1,766 +3,902 +2,136 yes yes
12th Dist. -1,448 +1,542 + 103 yes yes
13th Dist. -10,021 -1,120 -ll,387 no no
14th Dist. -10,433 +5,025 +5,604 yes yes
15th Dist. -15,263 +2,718 -12,776 no no
16th Dist. +13,174 +43,448 +55,487 no no
17th Dist. +3,915 +28,810 +32,447 yes yes
18th Dist. +32,383 +23,301 +55,165 yes yes

Do the Republican Congressmen in Michigan have field assistants
in their districts?

 

 

257

APPENDIX IV - POPULATION STATISTICS ON DISTRICTS OF

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

RURAL—URBAN CHARACTER OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

 

 

 

 

REPRESENTED BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Chairman: Jay A. Hubbell Population 203,266
District: Michigan 9th Population Density 10.6/sq. mi.
Census: 1880
Rating: Rural
Counties Population 1880 Towns 2,500 - 5,000
Antrim 5,237 Cadillac 2,213
Benzie 3,433 Escanaba 3,026
Charlevoix 5,115 Lake Linden 2,610
Chippewa 5,248 Marquette 4,690
Delta 6,812 Negaunee 3,931
Grand Traverse 8,422 Ludington 4,190
Houghton 22,473 Menominee 3,288
Kalkaska 2,937
Keweenaw 4,270 Total 23'948
Lake 3,233
Leelanaw 6,253
Mackinac 2,902
Manistee 12,532 Towns 5,000 - 10,000
Manitou 1,334 Manistee 6,930
Marquette 25:394 Ishpeming 6,639
Mason 10,065
Mecosta 13,973 Total 13'569
Menominee 11,987
Missaukee 1,553
Newaygo 14,688
Oceana 11,699
Ontanagon 2,565
Osceola 10,777
Otsego 1,974
Schoolcraft 1,575
wexford 6,815

Total 203,266

258

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chairman: Joseph W. Babcock Population 1880: 174,194
District: ‘Wisconsin 3rd Population density 32.6/sq. mi.
Census: 1880
Rating: Rural
Counties Population 1880 Population 1890 Population 1900
Brown 34,978 39,164 46,359
Crawford 15,644 15,987 17,286
Grant 37,852 36,651 38,881
Juneau 15,582 17,121 20,629
Richland 18,174 -l9,121 19,433
Sauk 28,729 39,575 33,006
vernon 23,235 25,111 28,251
Total 174,194 192,730 203,845
Igwns 2,500 - 5,000 1880 1890 1900
De Pere 3,629 4,038
Prairie du Chien 2,777 3,131 3,232
Platteville 2,740 3,340
Baraboo 4,605
Total 2,777 14,105 10,610
Cities 5,000 - 10,000 Population Population Population
‘ ,,,~ 1800 1890 1900
Green Bay 9,069 18,684
Baraboo 5,751
Total 24,435

259

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented

gw Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

Chairman: James S. Sherman

District: New York 27th

Census: 1900

Raging: Middle rurban

Counties Population 1900

Madison 40,545

Onondaga 168,735
Total 209,280

Towns 21500 -

Baldwinsville
Canastota

East Syracuse)

Total

5,000

2,992
3,030
2,509

 

8,531

Population:

209,280

Population Density:

Towns 5,000 - 10,000

Oneida

Cities over 10,000

Syracuse

108,374

6,364

146.2

260

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented

By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

Chairman: William B. McKinley Population 1900: 184,593
District: Illinois 19th 1910: 241,728
Census: 1900,1910 _ Density 1900: 49.7/sq.mile
Rating: Rural (74.1% in 1900) 53°1/Sq°mle
Counties Population 1900 Population 1910
Champaign 47,622 51,829
Coles 34,146 34,517
Dewitt 18,972 18,906
Douglas 19,097 19,591
Macon 41,003 54,186
Moultrie 15,224 14,630
Piatt 17,706 16,376
Shelby 32,126, 32,693

Total 225,896 241,728

Towns 2,500 - 5,000

Population 1900 Population 1910

 

Clinton 4,452

Shelbyville 3,546 3,590

Sullivan 2,621
Total 7,998 6,211

Towns:5,000 - 10,000

Population 1900 Population 1910

Clinton , 5,165
Champaign 9,098 ,
Charleston 5,488 5,884
Mattoon 9,622 ,
Urbana 5,728 8,246
Total 29,936 19,295

Cities over 10,000

Population 1900 Population 1910

Champaign 12,421
Mattoon . 11,465
Decatur 20,754 . 31,140

Total 20,754 55,017

261

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

Cahirman: Frank B. Woods Population: 239,304
District: Iowa 10th Population density: 31.4/sq.mi.
Census: 1910
Rating: Rural (81.6%)
Qounties ' Population 1910 .
Boone 27,626
Calhoun 17,090
Carroll 20,117
Crawford 20,041
Emmett 9,816
Greene 16,023
Hamilton .19,242
Humboldt 12,182
Kossuth 21,971
Palo Alto 13,845
Pocahontas 14,808
Webster 34,629
Winnebago 11,914
Total 239,304
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Towns 5,000 - 10,000
Algona 2,908 ‘Webster City 5,208
Carroll 3,546
Estherville 3,407
Denison 3,133 5,208
Total 12,994

Cities over 10,000

Boone 10,347
Fort Dodge 15,543

Total 25,890

262

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Simeon Fess Population 1910: 264,367
District: Ohio 7th 1920: 277,974
Census: 1910,1920 Density: 1910 - 68.5; 1920 - 71.7

Rating: Rural urban (65.1%.rura1)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1910 Population 1920
Champaign 26,351 25,071
Clark 66,435 80,728
Clinton 23,680 23,036
Fayette 21,774 21,518
Greene 29,773 31,221
Logan 30,084 30,104
Madison 19,902 19,662
Union 21,871 20,918
Warren 24,497 25,716

Total 264,367 277,974
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1910 1920
Lebanon 2,698 4,080
London 3,530 3,635
Marysville 3,576 3,396
Wilmington 4,499

Total 13,393 11,111
Towns 5,000 - 10,000 _ 1910 1920
Urbana 7,739 7,621
Wilmington 5,037
Washington Court House 7,277 7,962
Xenia 8,706 9,110
Bellefontaine 8,238 9,336

'Total 31,960 39,066
Cities over 10,000
Springfield 46,921 60,840

263

Rural—Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Will R. wood
District: Indiana 10th
Census: 1920, 1930

Rating: Urban-Rurban

Density 1920:
Density 1930:

(37.2% rural)

 

Population 1920:

 

 

 

 

 

Qounties Population 1920
Benton 12,206
Jasper 13,961
Lake 159,957
Newton 10,144
Porter 20,256
Tippecanoe 42,813
Watren 9,699
White 17,351
Total 286,387
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Population 1920
Crown Point 3,232
Hobart 3,450
Rensselaer 2,912
West Lafayette 3,830
Total 13,424
Towns 5,000 - 10,000 Population 1920
Hobart
valparaiso 6,518
West Lafayette
Total 6,518
Cities over 19,000 Population 1920
Gary 55,378
East Chicago 35,967
Hammond 36,004
Lafayette 22,486
Whiting 10,145
Total 159,980

286,387
391,770

31.2/sq.mi.
43.3/sq.mi.

Population

11,886
13,388
261,310
9,841
22,821
47,535
9,167

15,831
391,779

Population

4,046

2,798

6,844
Popnlation

5,787
8,079

5,095
18,961

Population

100,426
54,784
64,560
26,240

10,880
256,890

1930

1930

1930

1930

264

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
,By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Chester C. Bolton Population 633,678
District: Ohio 22nd Density: Not ascertained
Census: 1930

Rating: Urban (11.5% rural)

 

 

Counties: Population 1930
Lake 41,674
Geaugeau 15,414
Cuyahoga (exclusive of C1eve1and)301,026
Parts of Cleveland: 275,564

 

(Parts of wards 9, 11, 17,
18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

32, 33) Total 633,378
Towns 2,500 — 5,000 Population 1930
Chagrin Falls 2,739
Fairport 4,972
Fairview Park 3,689
Mayfield Heights 2,612
Newburgh Heights 4,152
North Olmsted 2,624
*South Euclid 4,399
'Willoughby 4,045
Total 29,232
Towns 5,000 - 10,000 Population 1930
*Bedford. 6,814
*Berea 5,697
Maple Heights 5,950
*Rocky River 5,632
Total 24,093
gaties over 10,000 1930 Cities over 10,000 1930
Painesville 10,944 Cleveland Heights 50,945
*East Cleveland 39,667 *Euclid 12,751
*Lakewood 70,509 *Parma 13,899
*Shaker Heights 17,783 *Garfield Heights 15,589
Total 232,087

*Part of Cleveland Metropolitan Area, Fourteenth Census of the
United States, vol. I, Population 1920, p. 66.

 

265

Rnral-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

 

 

Chairman: Joseph Martin Population: 284,790
District: Mass. 14th Density: Not ascertained
Census: 1930 Rating: Urban—rurban
Bristol County: Norfolk County:

Cities (over 10,000) Towns (townshipsL:
Attleboro 21,769 Bellingham 3,189
Fall River 115,274 Foxborough 5,347
Taunton 37,355 Franklin 7,028

-—-—- Medfield 4,066

Total 174,398 Medway 3.153
Millis 1,738

Towns (Townships) Norfolk 10,845
Plaineville 1,583

Berkley 1,120 Sharon 3,351
Dighton 3,174 walpole 7,273
Easton 5,298 wrentham 3,584

*Freetown 1,656
Mansfield 6,364 T°tal 48'137
N. Attleboro 10,197
Norton 2,737
Raynham 2,136 'Worcester County:
Rehoboth 2,610
Seekonk 4,762 Blackstone 4,647
Swansea 3,941

*Westport 4,408
Somerset 5,398

Total 53,801

Middlesex County:

Towns:
Holliston 2,864
Sherborn 943
Total 3,807

*Contiguous to Fall River

266

Rural—Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By CommitteeJChairmen (Continued).

Chairman: J. William Ditter
District: Pennsylvania 2nd
Census: 1930, 1940

Rating: Middle rurban

 

Population 1930 - 362,531

Population 1940 - 396,247

Density - 326.9 (1930)
358.8 (1940)

 

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1930 Population 1940
Bucks 96,727 107,715
Montgomery 265,804 289,247
Total 362,531 396,962
Boroughs,2,500;— 5,000
Ambler 3,944 3,953
Doylestown 4,577 4,976
Hatboro 2,651 2,605
Jenkintown 4,797
Narberth 4,669
Perkasee 3,463 4,121
Quakertown 4,883
Royersford 3,719 3,605
Souderton 3,857 4,036
Total 36,560 23,296
Boroughs 5,000 - 10,000
Bridgeport 5,595 5,904
Jenkintown 5,024
Lansdale 8,379 9,316
Morrisville 5,368 5,493
Narberth 5,217
Quakertown 5,150
Total 19,342 36,104
Boroughs or cities over 10,000
Conshohocken 10,815 10,776
Bristol 11,799 11,895
Norristown 35,853 38,181
Pottstown 19,430 20,194
77,897 81,046

Total

267
Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
gm Committee Chairmen (Continued).
Population 1930 Population 1940

Townships over 5,000, adjacent or contiguous to
Philade1phia

Abington 18,648 20,857
Bensalem 7,276
Bristol 5,857
Cheltenham 15,731 19,082‘
Lower Merion* 35,166 39,506
Springfield 5,541 5:603
Upper Merion 6,143
Upper Moreland. 5,103

Total 75,056 109,427

*Classified as urban under special rules, Abstract of the
Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, p. 32, Table 16.

268

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

 

Chairman: Charles Halleck Population: 253,952
District: Indiana 2nd Density: 48.2 per sq. mile
Census: 1940 Rating: Rural-urban (67.6%
rural)
Counties Populationol940
Benton 11,117
Carroll 15,410
Cass 36,908
Fulton 15,577
Jasper 14,398
Kosciusco 29,561
Newton 10,774
Porter 27,838
Pulaski 12,056
Starke 12,258
Tippecanoe 51,020
White 17,037
Total 252,955
Rochester 3,835 Warsaw 6,378
Rensselaer 4,204 _ ‘Walparaiso 8,763
Monticello 3,153 ‘West Lafayette 6,270
Total 11,192 (21,411

Cities over-10,000

Lafayette 28,798
Logansport 20,760*
' Total 49,558

Rating: ‘% Urban 19.6
% Rural 80.4

*The population of logansport, according to the 1940 census
was 20,177. The rest of Eel Township, in which it is located,
had a population of 583. This was annexed to Logansport in
three bites in 1940, 1941, and 1946, making the two co-
extensive. This explains the figure given above.

269

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented

By Committee Chairmen

Chairman: Leonard Hall
District: New York 2nd
Census: 1940, 1950

Rating: Middle-rurban

goonties
Part of Nassau
Towns 2,500 - 5,000

New Hyde Park
Sea Cliff
Westbury

Total
Towns 5,000 - 10,000

Great Neck
New Hyde Park
Westbury
Williston Park
Oyster Bay

Total
.Towns over 10,000

Floral Park
Garden City (part)
Hempsted

Mineola

Glen Cove

Total

(Continued).

Population 1940:
Density:

Population 1940
331,131
Population 1940

4,691
4,416

4,524
13,631
Population 1940

6,167

5,750

11,917
Population 1940

12,950
11,223
20,856
10,064
12,415

67,509

331,131

Not determined

Population 1950

4,868

 

Population 1950

7,759
7,349
7,112
7,505

5,215
34,940

Population 1950

14,582
14,368
29,135
14,831
15,130

93,261

270

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

Chairman: Richard Simpson Population: 339,528
District: Pennsylvania 18th Density:
Census: 1950 Rating: Rural (87.8%)
Counties Population 1950
Bedford 40,775
Franklin 75,927
Fulton 10,387
Huntington 40,873
Mifflin 43,691
Snyder 22,912
Somerset 81,813
Union 23,150
Total 339,528

Towns, boroughs or cities:

 

 

Bedford 3,521 Huntingdon 7,330
Burnham 2,954 LeWisburg 5,268
Greencastle 2,661 Windber 8,010
Myersdale 3,137
Mt. Union 4,690 Total 20'608
Selinsgrove 3,513
Somerset 5,936

Total 26,413

Over 10,000

Chambersburg 17,212
LeWiStOWn 13. 894
waynesboro 10,334

Total 41,440

271

Rural—urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: William L.‘Wilson Population 1880: 163,368
District: West Virginia 2nd 1890: 187,305
Census: 1880,1890 Density 1880: 25.5

Rating: Rural 1890: 29.3

 

 

 

 

Qounties Population 1880 Population 1890
Barbour 11,870 12,706
Berkeley 17,380 18,702
Grant 5,542 6,802
Hampshire 10,366 11,419
Hardy 6,794 7,567
Jefferson 15,005 15,553
Marion 17,198 20,721
Mineral 8,630 12,085
Monongahela 14,985 15,705
Morgan 5,777 6,744
Pendleton 8,022 8,711
Preston 19,091 20,355
Randolph 8,102 11,633
Taylor 11,455 12,147
Tucker 3,151 ‘6,459
Total 163,368 187,305
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1880 1890
Grafton 3,030 3,159
Towns over 5,000
Martinsburg 6,335 7,226

272

gpral—Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: James D. Richardson Population 1890: 153,773
District: Tennessee 5th 1900: 149,316
Census: 1890, 1900 Density 1890: 47.2

1900: 45.8
Rating: Rural

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1890 Population 1900
Bedford 24,739 23,845
Cannon 12,197 12,121
Coffee 13,827 15,574
Dekalb 15,650 16,460
Lincoln 27,382 23,304
Marshall 18,906 18,763
Moore 5,975 5,706
Rutherford 35,097 33,543
Total 153,773 149,316
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1890 1900
Murfreesboro 3,739 3,999
Fayetteville 2,708
Tullahoma 2,684
Total 3,739 9,391

No cities over 5,000

 

273

Rural—Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By1Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: James M. Griggs Population 228,880
District: Georgia 2nd Density 34.3/sq. mi.
Census: 1900

Rating: Rural

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1900
Baker 6,704
Berrien 19,440
Calhoun 9,274
Clay 8,568
Colquitt 13,636
Decatur 29,454
Dougherty 13,679
Early 14,828
Miller 6,319
Mitchell 14,767
Quitman 4,701
Randolph 16,847
Terrell 19,023
Thomas 31,076
‘Worth 18,664
Total 228,880
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Towns 5,000 — 10,000
Bainbridge 2,641 Thomasville 5,322
Albany 4,606
Cuthbert 2,641
Dawson 2,926

Total 12,814

274

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
‘By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

Chairman: James T. Lloyd Population 1900: 183,590
District: Missouri lst 1910: 174,975
Density 1900: 35.8/sq. mi.
Rating: Rural 1910: 34.1/ sq. mi.
Counties Population 1900 Population 1910
Adair 21,728 35,340
Clark 15,383 12,811
Knox 13,479 12,407
Lewis 16,724 15,514
Macon 33,018 30,868
Marion 26,331 30,572
Putnam 16,688 14,308
Schuyler 10,840 9,062
Scotland 13,232 11,869
Shelby 16,167 14,864
Total 183,590 174,975

Population 1900
4,068

Population 1910
3,584

Towns 2,500 — 5,000

Macon

 

Towns 5,000 - 10,000 Population 1900 Population 1910

 

Cities over 10,000
Hannibal 12,780 18,341

N on“..-

3": 09?, (i
‘3 are...

F
“

   
   
 

  

.

a" ' . .",_
' '41.“! g

I

9.1.9.1.- .95
(I .

 

o I“: 0] 3“} ' ' ’..

 

 

 

275

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Frank E. Doremus Population: 354,731
District: Michigan lst Population, as reapportioned:
Census: 1910 345,419

Rating: Urban

Includes:
A. Before reapportionment
City of Detroit, wards l to 15 and 17
B. After reapportionment
City of Detroit, Wards 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, ll, 13, 15, 17,

19, and 21.

276

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
ABprommittee Chairmen (Continued).

 

 

 

 

Chairman: Scott Ferris Population: 207,451
District: Oklahoma 6th Density: 24.3 / sq. mi.
Census: 1910
Rating: Rural
Counties Populationfl910
Blaine 17,960
Caddo 35,685
Canadian 23,501
Comanche 41,489
Grady 30,309
Jefferson 17,430
Kingfisher 18,825
Stephens 22,252
Total 207,451
(Towns 2,500 — 5,000 Towns 5,000 - 10,000
Anadarko 3,439 El Reno 7,872
Kingfisher 2,538 - - Lawton 7,788
'Waurika 2,928 Total 15,660
TOtal 8' 905

Cities over 10,000
Chickasha 10,320

277

Rural-urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: H. D. Flood Population 1910: 179,461
District: Virginia 10th 1920: 180,704
Census: 1910, 1920 Density: 1910: 28.1

Rating: Rural Den51tY= 1920: 28-3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1910 Population 1920
Alleghany 14,173 15,332
Amherst 18,923 19,771
Appomattox 8,904 9,255
Augusta 32,445 34,671
Bath 6,538 6,389
Botetourt 17,727 16,557
Buckingham 15,024 14,885
Craig 4,711 3,562
Cumberland 9,195 9,101
Fluvanna 8,323 8,547
Highland 5,317 4,931
Nelson 16,821 17,277
Rockbridge 21,171 20,626
Total 179,461 180,704
Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1910 1920
Buena Vista* 3,245 3,911
Covington(part) 4,234
Lexington 2,931 2,870
Total 10,410 6,781
Cities 5,000 - 10,000 1910 1920
Clifton Forge* _ 5,748 6,164
Covington 5,623
Total 5,748 11,787
Cities over 10,000 1910 1920
Staunton* 10,604 10,623

*Independent cities should be added to population of counties,
making the district's total population 199,058.

278

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Arthur B. Rouse Population 186,068
District: Kentudky 6th Density 124.2 / sq. mi.
Census: 1920

Rating: Middle rurban (40.4% rural)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Counties Population 1920
Boone 9.572
Kenton 73,453
Campbell 61,868
Trimble 6,011
Carroll 8,346
Gallatin ’4,664
Grant 10,435
Pendleton 11,719
Total 186,068
Igwns 2,500_: 5,000 Population 1920
Ludlow 4,582
Cities 5,000 : 10,000 Population 1920
Bellevue 7,379
Dayton 7,646
Fort Thomas 5,028
Total 20,052
Cities over 10,000
Covington (wards 1—6) -57,121
Newport (wards 2, 4, 6) 29,317
Total* 86,438

*The total given is that for the entire city in each case,
but, obviously, this portion of the District is entirely
urban.

279

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: William A. Oldfield Population 220,444

 

District: Arkansas 2nd Density: 27.6 / sq. mi.
Census: 1920
Rating: Rural
qunties ngulation 1920
Cleburne 12,696
Fulton 11,182
Independence 23,976
Izard 13,871
Jackson 25,446
Lasrence 22,098
Monroe 21,601
Prairie 17,447
Randolph 17,713
Sharp 11,132
Stone 8,779
White 34,603
Total 220,444

Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Population 1920

Batesville 4,299
Brinkley 2,714
Clarendon 2,638
Newport 2,771
Searcy 2,836

Total 15,258

280

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
.By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Joseph W. Byrnes Population 1920: 250,404
District: Tennessee 5th 1930: 194,915
Census: 1920, 1930 Density 1920: 31.5

Rating: Middle rurban (48% rural) 1930: 24'6

 

 

 

Counties Population 1920 Population 1930
Cheatham 10,039
Davidson 167,815
Montgomery 32,265
Robertson 25,621
Stewart 14,663

As reapportioned:

 

 

 

 

 

Dickson 18,491
Giles 28,016
Hickman 13,613
Houston 5,555
Humphreys 12,039
Lawrence 26,776
Lewis 5,258
Maury 34,016
Perry 7,147
Wayne 12,134
Williamson 22,845
Total 250,404 194,915_

Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1920 Towns 2,500 - 5,000 1930
Springfield 3,860 Dickson 2,902
Pulaski 3,367
Lawrenceburg 3,102
Franklin 3,377
Total 12,748

Towns 5,000 - 10,000 Towns 5,000 - 10,000
Clarksville 8,110 Columbia 7,882

Cities over 10,000
Nashville 118,342

281

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

 

Counties as reapportioned

Amelia
Appomattox
Brunswick
Buckingham
Cumberland
Dinwiddie
Greensville
Lunenburg
Mecklenburg
Nottoway
POWhatan
Prince Edward
Prince George
Surrey
Sussex

Total

8,495
9,020
19,575
31,477
7,505
18,166
14,866
13,844
31,933
15.556
5.671
14,922
12,226
6,193

12,485
221,934

Chairman: Patrick Drewry Population 1930: 241,842
District: Virginia 4th Population as reapportioned
Census: 1930, 1940 (1940): 221,934
Density 1930: 56.5 / sq. mi.

Rating: Rural Density as reapportioned: 36.6
Counties Population 1930
Carroll 22,141
Charlotte 16,061
Franklin 24,337
Grayson 20,017
Halifax 41,283
Henry 20,088
Patrick 15,787
Pittsylvania 61,424
Wythe 20,704

Total 241,842

Population 1940

282

Rural—Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented

By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Before reapportionment After reapportionment

Galax
South Boston
wytheville

Total

Cities 5,000 — 10,000

None

Qities over 10,000

Danville

(1930 census)

2,544
4,841

3,327
10,712

0

193

 

22,247

(1940 census)

 

Blackstone 2,699
Emporia 2,735
Farmville 3,475
8,909
1940
H0pewe11 8,679
19.41

Petersburg 30,631

283

Rural-Urban Character of CongressionalpDistricts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Michael Kirwan Population 1940: 441,240
District: Ohio 19th 1950: 495,239
Census: 1940,1950 Density 1940: 252.8 per sq.mi.

Density 1950: 283.8
Rating: Urban-rurban

 

 

Counties ngulation 1940 Population 1950
Ashtabula 68,674 78,695
Mahoning 240,251 257,629
Trumbull 132,315 158,915
Total 441,240 495,239

Towns 21500 - 51000

 

Geneva 4,171 4,718
Sebring 3,902 4,045
*Hubbard 4,189 4,560
Newton Falls 3,120 4,451
TOtal 15.382 17,774
Conneaut 9,355 10,230
*Girard (part) 9,756 10,054
Total 19,111 20,284

Cities over 10,000

Ashtabula 21,406 23,696
*Campbell 13,735 12,882
*Struthers (part) 10,704 11,073

Ybungstown (part) 167,720 168,237
*Warren (part) 42,837 49,856
*Niles 16,273 16,773

Total 272,675 282,517

*Ybungstown urbanized area according to Census of Population:
1950' V01. I.

284

APPENDIX V

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS BY BOTH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Arizona
District

lst

2nd

Arkansas

3rd

California

 

11th

Colorado
lst
2nd
3rd
4th

Connecticut

lst
2nd
3rd

TO CANDIDATES IN THE 1956 ELECTION

Grants by the Republican Committee

Candidate

 

John J. Rhodes
John G. (Jack) Speiden
Total

William S. Spicer
Total

Leroy Johnson

Total

Robert S. McCollum

‘William S. Hill

J. Edgar Chenoweth

Hugh L. Caldwell
Total

Edward H. May, Jr.
Horace Seely-Brown, Jr.
Albert W. Cretella

(more)

*Indicates candidate won

9:25.11
$1,500.00*
1,000.00

$2,500.00

$1,500.09,
$1,500.00

$1,000.00
$1,000.00

 

$2,000.00
2,000.00*
2,500.00*
1,000.00

$7,500.00

$1,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

285

Connecticut (continued)

4th
5th
At large

Delaware

 

At large

Florida.
lst
4th
5th
6th
7th

Idaho
lst
2nd

Illipois

 

lst
2nd
3rd
4th
9th
‘11th

Albert P. Morano

James T. Patterson

Antoni N. Sadlak
Total

Harry G. Haskell, Jr.
Total

William C. Cramer

Leland Hyzer

Arnold L. Lund

Dorothy A. Smith

G. M. (Gus) Nelson
Total

Louise Shadduck
Haver H. Budge
Total

George W. Lawrence
George B. McKibbin
Emmet F. Byrne
William E. Mcvey
Johann S. Adkerman
Timothy P. Sheehan

(more)

*indicates that candidate won

$2,000.00*

500.00*

1,000.00*
$6,500.00

 

$ 500.00
500.00

$ 500.00*
500.00
500.00
500.00
500.00

$2,500.00

$2,500.00

1,000.00*
$3,500.00

$ 750.00
250.00
1,250.00*
750.00*
750.00
750.00*

Grantspby the Republican Committee (Continued).

Illinois (continued)

 

12th
16th
18th
19th
20th
let
22nd
23rd
25th

Indiana

lst
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th

286

Edgar A. Jonas
Leo E. Allen
Robert H. Michel
Robert B. Chiperfield
Sid Simpson
Frederic S. O'Hara
William L. Springer
Albert W. Vursell
Samuel J. Scott

Total

Donald K. Stimson, Jr.
F. Jay Nimtz

E. Ross Adair

John V. Beamer

Cecil M. Harden
William G. Bray

D. Bailey Merrill
Earl'Wilson

Ralph Harvey

Charles B. Brownson

Total

*indicates candidate won.

$1,250,00
250.00*
1,000.00*
500.00*
1,000.00*
1,250.00
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
11509.00
$13,250.00

$ 500.00
2,000.00*
500.00*
500.00*
750.00*
750.00*
1,500.00
1,300.00*
250.00*
250.90*
$8,300.00

287

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

 

 

 

 

BEE
lst Fred Schwengel $1,000.00*
2nd Henry 0. Talle 3,500.00*
3rd H. R. Gross 1,000.00*
4th Karl M. LeCompte '3,ooo.oo*
5th Paul Cunningham 3,000.00*
6th James I. Dolliver 3,000.00
7th Ben F. Jensen ' 2,500.oo*
8th Charles B. Hoeven 1,000.00*
Total $18,000.00
Kansas
lst ‘William H. Avery $ 750.00*
2nd Errett P. Scrivner 750.00*
3rd Myron V. George 1,250.00*
4th Edward H. Rees 750.00*
5th John W. Crutcher 1,250.00
6th Wint Smith 750.00*
Total $5,500.00
Kentucky
2nd R. B. Blankenship $1,000.00
3rd John M. Robsion, Jr. 1,ooo.oo*
5th Jule Appel 500.00
6th Wallace "wah‘Wahf Jones 1,000.00
7th Scott Craft 1 500.00
8th Eugene Siler 500.00
Total . $4,500.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

Maine
lst
2nd

Maryland
lst
2nd
4th
5th
6th
7th

Michigan

 

2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
17th
18th

288

Robert Hale
James L. Reid

Total

Edward T. Miller
James P. S. Devereaux.
George Denys Hubbard
William B. Prendergast
DeWitt S. Hyde
David A. Halley

Total

George Meader

August E. Johansen
Clare E. Hoffman
Gerald R. Ford, Jr.
Charles E. Chamberlain
Robert J. McIntosh
Alvin M. Bentley
Robert P. Griffin
Elford A. Cederberg
Victor A. Knox

John B. Bennett
Willis F.‘Ward

Harold F. Youngblood
George E. Smith
William S. Broomfield

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ 500.00*
11500.00
$2,000.00

$1,000.00*

2,750.00*
750.00
1,000.00

1,000.00*
500.00
$7,000.00

$1,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
2,000.00*
2,000.00*
1,000.00*
2,000.00*
1,000.00*
2,000.00*
2,000.00*
1,500.00
500.00
1,000.00
11000.00*
$20,000.00

289

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

Minnesota

lst
2nd
3rd
5th
6th
7th
9th

Missouri

 

lst
2nd
3rd
4th
6th
7th
8th
11th

Montana
lst
2nd

Nebraska

 

lst
2nd
3rd
4th

August H. Andresen
Joseph P. O'Hara
George Mikan
‘Walter H. Judd
Joseph L. Kaczmarek
H. Carl Andersen
Harold C. Hagen
Total

Bill Bangert

Thomas B. Curtis

Sidney R. Redmond

Jeffrey P. Hillelson

Stanley I. Dale

Dewey Short

Frank W. May

George H. Miller
Total

W. D. (Bill) McDonald
Orvin B. Fjare

Total

Phil‘Weaver
Glenn Cunningham
Robert D. Harrison
A. L. Miller

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$1,000.00*
1,500.00*
2,000.00
1,000.00*
1,000.00
1,500.00*
2,000.00
$10,000.00

$ 500.00
1,500.00*

500.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
1,000.00
1,009,00
$9,000.00

$1,000.00
1,500.00'
$2,500.00

$1,000.00*
2,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*

$5,000.00

(hantslnrthe Republican Committee (Continued).

Nevada

At large

New Hampshire_

lst
2nd

New Jersey

 

lst
2nd
4th
6th
8th
10th
11th

New Mexiqq

At large

New York
4th
5th
6t11
9th.

12th
15th

290

Richard W. Horton
Total

Chester E. Merrow
Perkins Bass

Total

Charles A.‘Wblverton
T. Millet Hand
William H. Wells
Florence P. Dwyer
Gordon Canfield
G. George Addonizio
Chester K. Ligham
Total

Forrest S. Atchley
Dudley Cornell
Total

Henry J. Latham
Albert H. Bosch
Albert H. Buschmann
Benjamin W. Feldman
Francis E. Dorn
JOhn H. Ray

(more)

*indicates candidate won

$2,000.00
$2,000.00

$1,500.00*
1,000.00*
$2,500.00

$1,000.00*
500.00*
1,000.00
2,000.00*
1,000.00*
500.00
2,000.00
$8,000.00

$1,000.00
1,000.00
$2,000.00

$1,000.00*
1,000.00*
500.00
500.00
1,000.00*
1,000.00*

291

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

New york (continued)

17th
18th
19th
25th
Blst
32nd
40th
4lst
42nd

North Carolina

5th
8th
9th
10th
12th

2.129.
3rd
4th
7th

10th
16th
17th

Frederic R. Coudert, Jr.
James G. Donovan
Maurice G. Henry, Jr.
Paul A. Fino
Dean P. Taylor
Bernard W. Kearney
‘William E. Miller
Edmund P. Radwin
John R. Pillion

Total

Joe New

Fred E. Myers

A. M. Miller

Charles Raper Jonas

Richard C. Clarke, Jr.
Total

Paul F. Schenck

William.M. MCCulloch

Clarence J. Brown

Thomas A. Jenkins

Frank T. Bow

J. Harry McGregor
Total

*Indicates candidate won

$2,500.00*
2,000.00

500.00

1,000.00*
1,000.00*

$00.00*
$00.00*
$00.00*
$00.00*

$14,000.00

$1,000.00

500.00

1,000.00
1,500.00*

750.00

$4,750.00

$ $00.00*

$00.00*
$00.00*
$00.00*
$00.00*
$001Q9*

$3,000.00

 

 

292

Grants bLthe Republican Committee (Continued).

$1,000.00*
$1,000.00

 

Oklahoma
lst Page Belcher
Total
Oregon
lst Walter Norblad
2nd Sam Coon
3rd Phil J. Roth
4th Harris Ellsworth
Total
Pennsylvania
4th Horace C. Scott
5th James J. Schissler
6th Hugh D. Scott, Jr.
8th Willard S. Curtin
9th Paul B. Dague
10th Joseph L. Carrigg
11th Enoch H. Thomas, Jr.
12th Ivor D. Fenton
17th Alvin R. Bush
18th Richard M. Simpson
19th S. Walter Stauffer
20th James E. Van Zandt
let Herbert O. Morrison
22nd John P. Saylor
23rd Leon H. Gavin
24th Carroll D. Kearns
25th Sidney L. Lockley
27th James G. Fulton

(more)

*Ind icates candidate won

$ 250.00*
1,500.00
1,250.00
1,250.00

$4,250.00

$2,500.00
1,000.00
500.00*
500.00*
500.00*
1,000.00*
500.00
1,000.00*
500.00*
1,500.00*
500.00*
2,000.00*
1,000.00*
500.00*
1,000.00*
500.00*
750.00
500.00*

 

 

 

Grants by the Repub1ican Committee (Continued).

293

Pennsylvania (continued)

 

28th
29th
30th

Rhode Island

lst

2nd

South Dakota

 

lst

2nd
Tennessee

3rd
Texas

8th
Utah

lst

2nd
vermont
At large

Richard C. Witt
Robert J. Corbett
Ross V. Walker

Total

Samuel H. Ramsay
Thomas H. Needham
Total

Harold O. Lovre
E. Y. Berry
Total

P. H. Woods
Total

C. Anthony Friloux, Jr.

Total

Henry Aldous Dixon
William A. Dawson

Total

Winston L. Prouty
Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ $00.00
$00.00
$00.00
$17,750.00

$ $00.00
$00.00
$1,000.00

 

$1,500.00
‘1,000.00*
$2,500.00

 

$2,500.00
$2,500.00

$1,000.00
$1,000.00

$1,500.00*
1,250.00*
$2,750.00

$ $00.00*
$ 500.00

 

 

294

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).

Virginia
lst
2nd
3rd
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th

10th

Washington
lst
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th

At large

west Virgipia
lst
2nd
3rd
4th
6th

HOrace E. Henderson

William R. Burns

Royal E. Cabell, Jr.

Jackson L. Kiser

Richard H. Poff

A. R. Dunning

Horace B. Clay

William C. Wampler

Joe T. Broyhill
Total

Thomas M. Pelly
Jack Wéstland
Russell V. Mack-
Hal Holmes
Walt Horan
Thor C. Tollefson
Philip Evans
Total

Arch A. Moore, Jr.

Mary (Mrs. Davis) Elkins
Daniel L. Louchery

Will E. Neal

Cleo S. Jones

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ 750.00
250.00
1,250.00
250.00
750.00*
750.00
750.00
500.00
1,250.00*
$6,500.00

’.'|. 'v- -'

’1.—

. .5 FL.”

Cm“.
'ii ' .'

$1,500.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
$00.00*
1,000.00
$7,000.00

$1,500.00*
2,000.00
1,500.00
2,000.00*
1,000.00

$8,000.00

 

295

(hantstw'the Republican Committee (Continued).

Wisconsin
lst Lawrence H. Smith
2nd Donald E. Tewes
3rd Gardner R.‘Withrow
4th ‘William J. Burke
5th Russell‘Wirth, Jr.
8th John W. Byrnes
9th Arthur L. Peterson

Total
Wyoming
At large E. Keith Thomson

*Ind icates candidate won

Total

$ 750.00*
1,000.00*

250.00*
1,000.00
1,500.00

$00.00*
1,750.00
$6,750.00

$1,000.00*
$1,000.00

 

 

 

Arizona
District

lst

2nd

California
3rd
4th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
17th
29th

Colorado
lst
2nd
3rd
4th

296

Candidate
William P. Mahoney, Jr.
Stewart L. Udall

Total

John E. Moss, Jr.

James L. Quigley

H. Roberts Quinney

Laurance L. Cross

George P. Miller

James T. MCKay

William H. vatcher, Jr.

John J. MCFall

B. F. Sisk_

William Kirk Stewart

Harlan Hagen

Cecil R. King

D. S. (Judge) Saund
Total

Byron G. Rogers

Byron L. Johnson

Alva B. Adams

Wayne N. Aspinwall
Total

*Ind icate 5 candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee

greet

$1,000.00
$00.00

$1,500.00

$1,500.00*
250.00
1,500.00
$00.00
$00.00*
500.00
250.00
1,500.00*
1,500.00*
250.00
1,500.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
$11,750.00

$1,500.00*
500.00
750.00
1,000.00
$3,750.00

,onv - ‘-',,

 

"i-nnv-7_
u

_fl-L

 

297

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).

 

 

 

Connecticut
lst Patrick J. Ward
2nd Douglas J. Bennet
3rd Robert N. Giaimo
5th Luke F. Martin
At large Matthew P. Kuta
‘Total
Delaware
At large Harris B. McDowell, Jr.
Total
Florida
lst Winton H. (Win) King
4th Dante B. Fascell
5th A. S. (Sid) Herlong, Jr.
6th Paul G. Rogers
7th James A. Haley
Total
Georgia
lst Prince H. Preston
Total
Idaho
lst Gracie Pfost
2nd J. W. Reynolds
Total
Illinois
2nd Barratt O'Hara
3rd James C. Murray
4th Michael Hinko

~(more)

*Indicates candidate won

$1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
500.00
$4,500.00

$2,000.00
$2,000.00

$1,500.00
$00.00*
$00.00*
1,000.00*
$00.00*

$4,000.00

$ 100.00*
$ 100.00

$2,000.00*
250.00

$2,250.00

$1,000.00*
1,000.00
500.00

 

«rm—21am. 7

 

 

298

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).

111inois (continuedl

9th
10th
11th
12th
19th
20th
let
23rd
24th
25th

Indiana

lst
3rd
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th

Iowa
2nd

4th
6th

Sidney R. Yates
Marvin E. (Curly) Lore
Roman C. Pucinski
Charles A. Boyle
Martin P. Sutor
Henry W. Pollock
Peter F. Madk, Jr.
Albert R. Imle
Melvin Price
Kenneth J. Gray
Total

Ray J. Madden
John Brademas
William Catlin Whitehead
John W. King
vernon R. Hill
Winfield K. Denton
Wilfrid J. Ullrich
Total

Leonard G. Wolf

Steven V. Carter

Merwin Coad

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$1,000.00*
250.00
750.00
1,000.00*
250.00
250.00
2,000.00*
1,500.00
$00.00*
2,900.00*
$12,000.00

$1,000.00*
1,500.00
1,000.00
750.00
1,000.00

2,000.00*
1,000.00
$8,250.00

$ 750.00
$00.00
$00.00*

$1,750.00

 

4?

.m 8: .‘i “19915-7
<

 

299

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).

Kansas
lst
2nd
4th
5th
6th

Kentucky,
3rd
6th
7th

 

Louisiana

2nd-

Maryland
lst
2nd
5th
6th
7th

Massachusetts

 

2nd
4th

5th
8th
9th
10th

Howard S. Miller
Newell A. George
John D. Montgomery
J. Floyd Breeding
Elmo J. Mbhoney
Total

Philip Ardery
John C. Watts
Carl D. Perkins

Total

Hale Boggs
Total

Hamilton P. Fox

A. Gordon Boone
Richard E. Lankford
John R. Foley
Sanuel N. Friedel

Total

Edward P. Boland
Harold D. Donohue
Lawrence E. Corcoran
Torbert H. Macdonald
‘William McAuliffe
Jackson J. Holtz
Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ 500.00
250.00
750.00

1,000.00*
1,000.00
$3,500.00

$ $00.00

$00.00*
l,000.00*
$2,000.00

$ 300.00*
$ 300.00

$1,250.00
500.00
1,500.00*
1,250.00
1,500.00*
$6,000.00

 

$1,500.00*

$00.00*
250.00

2,000.00*
750.00
1,250.00
$6,250.00

 

 

 

300

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).

Michigan
6th
7th
9th

12th
14th
17th
18th

Minnesota

 

3rd
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th

Missouri
2nd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th

11th

Don Hayworth
Ira McCoy
‘William E. Baker
Joseph S. Mack
Louis C. Rabaut
Martha‘W. Griffiths
Paul Sutton

Total

Roy W. Wier
Joseph Robbie
Fred Marshall
Clint Haroldson
John A. Blatnik
Cova Knutson

Total

James L. Sullivan
George H. Christopher
Richard Bolling
‘W. R. Hull, Jr.
Charles H. (Charlie) Brown
A. S. J. Carnahan
Morgan M. Moulder
Total

*Indicates candidate won

$2,000.00
1,000.00
500.00
1,500.00
$00.00*
2,000.00*
750.0Q
$8,250.00

 

$3,000.00*
500.00
1,500.00*
250.00
$00.00*
_2L000.00*
$7,750.00

$ 500.00
2,000.00*

$00.00*
2,000,00*

$00.00*
1,000.00*
1,000.00*
$7,500.00

 

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).

Montana
lst
2nd

Nebraska
2nd
3rd

 

Nevada

At large

New Hampshire

lst

New Jersey

 

4th
6th
8th
10th
11th
12th

New Mexico

At large

301

Lee Metcalf
Leroy A. Anderson

Total

Joseph W. Benesch
Lawrence Brock

Total

Walter S. Baring
Total

James B. Sullivan

Total

Frank Thompson, Jr.
Harrison A. Williams, Jr.
‘Walter H. Gardner
Peter‘W. Rodino, Jr.

Hugh J. Addonizio

Irving L. Hodes

Total

Antonio M. Fernandez

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ $00.00*
1,000.00*
$1,500.00

$1,000.00
1,000.00
$2,000.00

$1,500.00*
$1,500.00

$1L$OOLQO
$1,500.00

$ $00.00*
2,000.00
250.00
$00.00*
1,500.00*
250.00
$5,000.00

$ $00.00*
$ 500.00

 

’91
SL‘. ' IM4

 

 

302

(hantslnrthe Democratic Committee (Continued)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New‘flnm
lst J. Bronson O'Reilly $ 250.00
2nd Julius J. D'Amato 250.00
3rd Francis X. Hardiman 250.00
5th John J. Quinn 500.00
6th Lester Holtzman 1,500.00* 137-7i
9th Eugene J. Keogh $00.00*
11th Emanuel Celler 100.00*
12th Donald L. O'Toole 500.00
15th Ralph Di Iorio 1,000.00 E
17th Anthony B. Akers 1,100.00 ;““"
26th Julia L. Crews 250.00
27th ‘William D. Carlebach 500.00
28th ‘William H. Mauldin $00.00
34th Edwin L. SlusarczYk 250.00
4lst Edwin P. Jehle ' 500.00
Total $7,950.00
Nprth Carolina
9th Hugh Q. Alexander $1,500.00*
10th Ben E. Douglas 1,500.00
Total $3,000.00
North Dakota
At large Agnes Geelan $ 500.00
S. B. Hocking 500.00
Total $1,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

 

303

Grants by_the Democratic Committee (Continued)

 

 

 

 

91112
3rd R. William Patterson $1,000.00
5th George E. Rafferty 500.00
6th James G. Polk 1,500.00*
9th Thomas L. Ashley 2,000.00*
11th James P. Bennett 1,000.00
15th Herbert U. Smith 750.00
16th John McSweeney 1,000.00
18th Wayne L. Hays 1,500.00*
Total $9,250.00
Oklahoma
lst Harry B. Moreland $ 500.00
Total $ 500.00
Oregon
lst Jason Lee $ 250.00
2nd A1 velman 1,000.00*
3rd Edith Green 2,000.00*
4th Charles 0. Porter 750.00*
Total $4,000.00
Pennsylvania
lst ‘William A. Barrett $ $00.00*
2nd Kathryn E. (Mrs.‘William T.)
Granahan $00.00*
3rd James A. Byrne $00.00*
4th Earl Chudoff 500.00*
5th ‘William J. Green, Jr. $00.00*
8th John P. Fullam 1,000.00
10th Jerome P. Casey 1,000.00
11th Daniel J. Flood 2,000.00*
(more)

*Indicates candidate won

— jr—Zl—
,

“’I-'-.:.C»- L's—o' hath-(4.13}
. .

~~~~~

 

 

304

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)

Pennsylvania (continued)

14th
15th
19th
20th
let
22nd
24th
25th
28th

Rhode Island
lst

South Dakota
lst

Tennessee

3rd

Texas

5th

George M. Rhodes
Francis E. Walter
James M. Quigley
John R. Stewart
Augustine B. Kelley
Joseph C. Dolan
William D. Thomas
Frank M. Clark
Herman P. Eberharter

Total

Aime J. Forand

Total

George McGovern
Total

James B. Frazier, Jr.

Total

Henry Wade
Total

Carlyle F. Gronning
Oscar‘W. McConkie
Total

*Indicates candidate won

$1,500.00*
$00.00*
2,000.00
250.00
$00.00*
1,000.00
1,000.00
2,000.00*
600.00*
$15,850.00

$1,200.00
$1,200.00

$1,250.00
$1,250.00

$00.00
$00.00

$00.00
$00.00

$1,000.00
1,000.00
$2,000.00

-' x '_ l"

 

m..- .2" ~...;'3.-iin'
7'
ll.

 

 

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)

Washington
lst
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th

At large

West Virginia
lst
2nd
3rd
4th

wyoming
At large

Hawaii (delegate)

305

James B. Wilson
Payson Peterson

Al McCoy

Frank LeRoux

Tom Delaney

John T. McCutcheon
Don Magnuson

Total

C. Lee Spillers

Harvey O. Staggers
Cleveland M. Bailey

M. G. (Burnie) Burnside

Total

Jerry A. O'Callaghan
Total

John A. Burns

Total

*Indicates candidate won

$ 500.00
500.00
250.00
500.00
500.00
250.00

2,000.00*
$6,500.00

$1,500.00
2,000.00*
1,000.00*

2,000.00
$6,500.00

$ 500.00
$ 500.00

$1,500.00*
$1,500.00

! WM _Dt-I-i mm cargoes-1.1.x,
. -‘ - - ' rm
4