

A STUDY OF THE TWO
NATIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEES

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE TWO NATIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES

by John Woodward Thomas

The Congressional Campaign Committees are unique political organizations which have emerged in response to the needs of a developing political system. They are a natural outgrowth of the American system of government which assures a division of power between its executive and legislative branches. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the origins of the Congressional Campaign Committees and to analyze and interpret their role in contemporary political life.

To secure historical data on the Committees, it was necessary to look up party records and campaign literature and search this material for references to them. Much of the historical material was obtained from literature of the history of Congress and its leaders.

Data on the role of the Committees in contemporary politics was secured through interviews with Congressional and Party leaders, Committee staff members, present and past

members of Congress who had conducted recent campaigns, and outsiders who, through advisory assistance to the Committees or through scholarly investigation, were acquainted with the work of the Committees.

Attributes and characteristics of Committee leadership were studied on the basis of individual Committee leaders. Congressional districts represented by leaders were analyzed for rural-urban characteristics, history of party affiliation, and degree of party reliability. The individual voting records in Congress were also rated to determine the degree of party loyalty of Committee leaders.

The results of the historical research indicate that the Committees emerged in their present form in 1866, as organizations to assist members of the legislative branch in their struggles for political survival. The strength and the role of the Committees in subsequent years has waxed or waned according to the role played by Congress on the national scene.

The analysis of the Committees today indicates that they vary considerably in nature and functions according to party. Both, however, provide assistance to candidates in many forms, from advice and campaign films to financial grants.

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Examination of districts represented by the Congressional Campaign Committee leadership indicates that leaders are chosen from safe and reliable areas which are representative of the areas of party strength. Within Congress these leaders are always members of the powerful inner circle within each party. Voting records show that Committee leaders deviate little from the party majority.

The long-term effects of the Committees, are numerous. By giving institutional support to Congressional candidates, strengthening local party organizations and providing campaign assistance, they have heightened the intensity and the effectiveness of congressional campaigns. By making themselves valuable to candidates and by encouraging financial coordination and cooperative relationships, the Committees are an important factor working toward party unity. In addition, the Committees emerge as useful tools of the party leaders for maintenance of their control in Congress and as a means of improving party discipline.

The Congressional Campaign Committees have become a permanent institution in contemporary American political life and their influence may increase for two reasons:

- (1) Changing campaign methods with new, complicated and costly techniques, make it constantly more difficult for

candidates to succeed if they rely solely on themselves or on their local party organization. (2) The margin of party control in Congress seems to be diminishing. A few seats won or lost by either party has an important bearing on who controls Congress. So long as control of Congress is sharply contested, the usefulness of the Committees seems unlikely to be questioned.

Though conjecture as to the future potential of the Committees is uncertain and though the results of their efforts remain imponderable, they have convinced congressmen and the political parties of their usefulness, and, above all, they have become an accepted part of the American political system.

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By

John Woodward Thomas

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PREFACE

Among the phenomena which engage the attention of the modern political scientist, few are more interesting than those governmental structures which have emerged in response to the needs of a developing political system. In this category are the Congressional Campaign Committees, a distinctive, though inconspicuous (and in some quarters unknown) part of the American electoral process. Like their sister organizations, the Senatorial Campaign Committees, the two Congressional Campaign Committees have become an accepted part of the working structure of their respective parties.

The Committees, in both genesis and operation, are distinctively American. The Constitution of the United States, in providing a framework of government, allowed for flexibility and growth. Not only did it provide for its own amendment; it permitted the creation of such structures as the President's cabinet and executive bureaus, and allowed room for the growth of such practices as judicial review. But the genius of American government lies in the freedom it gives for the growth of autonomous structures such as political parties, with their national

conventions, and party organization.

Within the latter the Congressional Campaign Committees have developed to meet specific electoral campaign needs. The Committees reflect American conditions - geographical, social, and political. We have in America a large land area with a wide variety of climatic conditions and distinct regional characteristics, a continent settled only gradually, and by a heterogeneous people. In such a nation, political decentralization, with control in the hands of party leaders in local areas, is a normal pattern. Since congressional candidates represent the widely divergent interests of the areas from which they come, it is difficult for either party to achieve ideological unity.

This means that American party contests, unlike their western European counterparts, are not clearly focused upon party issues. In "off" years congressional candidates are thrown upon their own resources. During presidential campaigns, though supposedly strengthened by sharing the presidential ticket, congressional candidates may find it necessary, because of local conditions, to run on issues quite disparate from those of their party at the national level, or they may be eclipsed by a popular presidential candidate. In either case, and in both presidential and off-year elections, the isolation of congressional candidates

creates a need for some organization, roughly comparable to the National Committees of the two parties, devoting its energies to the problems of congressional elections, to which candidates may turn for assistance in the lonely and difficult struggle to win a congressional seat. This need the Congressional Campaign Committee seeks to meet.

Nature of the problem

To date the Congressional Campaign Committees have never been adequately studied. Although they occupy an important niche in the structure of our party and electoral systems and perform an essential service in the political process, they are given no formal recognition in Washington and have been overlooked, to a great extent, by students of American government.

The fact that very little has been written about them is understandable, for it is most difficult to secure information on committees that are extra-legal and semi-formal, that have no recorded history, and that publish no annual reports or official records of any kind. Nor are the committees mentioned in any governmental publication, not even in the Congressional Directory. Indeed, a case might be made for the contention that the usefulness of the committees would be impaired if too much were known about

their operation and functions.

The only available records are minutes of the annual meetings of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, held at the beginning of each year for the election of officers. These go back as far as 1920 but are of a cursory nature, serving only to supply names of the committee chairmen, and including such details as authorization of a letter of condolence to the family of a deceased committee member. Neither present committee staffs nor committee members know much about the history of the committees, nor do they consider such knowledge important.

Furthermore, committee operations are quite fluid, with policies, strategy, and methods varying from time to time to meet the needs of the many congressional districts, the changing character of Congress and the fluctuating political climate. When you add to this the fact that the Republican and Democratic committees differ in many respects - some basic, some very minor - and that much of the work of both (particularly of the Democratic committee) is highly personal and confidential, with a great deal of secret strategy, it becomes clear that the task of trying to investigate these committees is a difficult one.

Since any first study, such as this, must proceed without much help from past research, and since no one

person, in a limited period of time, can absolutely verify all this new and fragmentary information or reconcile all the conflicting evidence, there will inevitably be some gaps, some sources undiscovered, some wrong conclusions. One can only attempt to uncover as many facts as possible and try to interpret them objectively.

An example of the type of problem encountered is this: In the 1880's and 1890's the Democratic Party had a campaign committee which was an adjunct of the National Democratic Committee and which operated only in presidential campaigns, for the benefit of presidential candidates. At times this was referred to in the National Convention Proceedings and party campaign textbooks as "the campaign committee." This makes it difficult to distinguish from the Congressional Committee which, also, is often referred to as "the campaign committee."

Since data on the history and functions of these committees can be found in neither primary nor secondary sources, one must search the literature of the history of Congress and its leaders in the hope of casual mention of the committees. For present-day functions of the committees, interviews must be used. Yet, although the investigator is courteously received by committee officials, the limits of the interview technique are apparent and the researcher

is not permitted to pry too deeply into the secrets of the committee's inside operations.

The writer would not have had the temerity to face such obstacles but for the encouragement of Dr. Ralph M. Goldman, whose interest in the Congressional Campaign Committees and belief that research into their history, function, and contribution to American party politics would yield rewarding results, provided the necessary motivation. I am indebted to him for the opportunity to spend one academic quarter in Washington studying the committees, and for that guidance and encouragement necessary to the successful completion of such an investigation.

Treatment of the subject, methods used, tools

It may be well, at this point, to discuss briefly the methods used in this study. The work will be divided into two major sections. The first, "Origins and Evolution," will attempt a historical analysis of the genesis and development of the Congressional Campaign Committees. The second, "Role of the Committees in Contemporary American Politics," will examine the present activities of the committees and their role in political campaigns. It will study committee leadership in relation to such factors as length of tenure in office, geographical and urban-rural

distribution, and liberal-conservative voting patterns. A final chapter, "Problems and Prospects," will attempt to assess the role of the committees in our party and electoral system.

In the section on Origins and Evolution I have made considerable use of party campaign textbooks. These, published by the National Committees in presidential election years and by the Congressional Campaign Committees in off years, provide names of Congressional Committee chairmen, officers, and executive committee members, and give an interesting picture of campaign methods and issues in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth.

Nevertheless, they leave large gaps, for, except for occasional attacks upon the campaign practices of the other party, they tell little of the work of the committees. To fill in these lacunae, the researcher must depend upon the memoirs of leaders of the Congressional Campaign Committees or of other members of Congress who may chance to mention their Congressional Campaign Committee responsibilities in connection with their other duties. Such records as the Detroit Post and Tribune's biography of Zachariah Chandler and LaFollette's Autobiography have provided much useful material.

As for secondary sources, very few are available. Except for two current journal articles, there is nothing more recent than Jesse Macy's Party Organization and Machinery in a 1912 edition. From this point on, information has been pieced together from such sources as the Proceedings of the National Conventions, the occasional and abbreviated minutes of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and histories of Congress and of the two parties. These scanty sources, supplemented by an interview with a former chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, are the only ones available on the history of the Congressional Campaign Committees. The Congressional Directories and the Biographical Directory of the American Congress,¹ which gives a brief biographical sketch of every member of the United States Senate and House of Representatives from 1774 to 1949, made possible greater utilization of this material.

Part II, "Role of the Committees in Contemporary American Politics" necessitated a different approach. Here the only way to obtain the information was through interviews with congressional and party leaders, members and former

¹U. S. Congress, Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1949, ed. James L. Harrison (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

members of the Congressional Campaign Committees and their executive committees, members and former members of Congress who had conducted recent campaigns, and outsiders who, through advisory assistance to the committees or through scholarly study, were acquainted with the work of the committees.

Recognizing the difficulties and limitations of the interview technique, it was necessary to plan carefully for the interviews. I began by reading Hugh Bone's article in Western Political Quarterly² and Guy Hathorn's in the Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,³ and by talking with Professor Malcolm Moos of Johns Hopkins, and with Stanley Kelley and Richard Bain, both then of the Brookings Institution. Each one gave me valuable insights into the work of the Committees and suggested leads as to the available literature on the subject. Special mention should be made of the assistance given by Dr. Kelley, who first suggested this study and who gave generously of his time in helping to get the project started.

With the help of Dr. Ralph M. Goldman, a preliminary

²Hugh Bone, "Some Notes on the Congressional Campaign Committees," The Western Political Quarterly, IX, No. 1 (March, 1956), pp. 116-137.

³Guy Hathorn, "Congressional and Senatorial Campaign Committees in 1954," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXVII, No. 4 (December, 1956), pp. 207-221.

outline of the material needed was drawn up to provide a frame of reference for the interviews and some specific goals toward which they might be directed. The next problem was planning to make maximum use of the time devoted to interviews and to formulate questions which would draw out the necessary information. In doing this, Alexander Heard's article, "Interviewing Southern Politicians,"⁴ which discusses the preparation, interviewing, and tabulating of material for Southern Politics⁵ was of great value.

The third step was to secure the names and positions of persons who should be interviewed,⁶ and to prepare an outline, to be used from memory, and from which a detailed record of each conversation and a later analysis, under the outline headings, could be made.⁷

Whenever possible I attempted to secure an introduction to those with whom I had appointments. I opened each interview with an explanation of the project, giving the name of the university and my professional advisor; the response in all cases, was a friendly reception.

⁴American Political Science Review, XLIV, No. 6 (December, 1950), p. 86.

⁵V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949).

⁶See list in Bibliography.

⁷For a copy of the outline used for interviews, see Appendix I.

I found the staff of the Republican Committee gracious and willing to give all possible assistance. The chairman of the Democratic Committee, though friendly, warned that, because of the personal nature of the relationship between the committee staff and members of Congress whom they served, it would be impossible to reveal the real nature of the Committee's work, beyond a statement of the general functions performed. He advised abandonment of the project on the grounds that it would be impossible to secure the necessary data.

The Republican committee staff members, on the other hand, assured me that their work included very little of a confidential nature. They made available such records as they had and answered questions, though I was aware, of course, that confidential materials were not shared. In this instance, the popular assertion that the Democratic Party is more open to study and observation than the Republican was not borne out. Whether this was a reflection of the changing policy of the respective Congressional and National Committees, a response to varying problems faced by the two Committees or a reflection of the ideas of the executive officers, I had no way of determining.

I found the members of both committees cordial, but either unwilling or unable to give detailed information as

to the functioning of the committees. They referred me to staff members for such information. Democratic congressmen interviewed seemed to feel that, beyond the small amount of financial aid made available to them during their campaigns, their committee had been of little assistance. The Republicans were usually more positive that their committee gave real assistance to candidates campaigning in marginal districts and was of some help to congressmen during congressional sessions. Neither could give much information.

From the beginning it was recognized that the interview, as a fact-finding technique, was subject to limitations, since it requires that the informant speak spontaneously, without time for reflection. In discussing the informal and semi-confidential work of the Congressional Campaign Committees there were naturally areas that committee staff members hesitated to discuss. Nor could one expect a staff member to give a completely objective account of services performed by his committee. Yet, since there was no other source of information, it was impossible to test the objective validity of the information given. One proceeded, believing that the words of Alexander Heard applied in this case: "The limitations inherent in the interviewing process have been recognized at the outset,

but the need to rely on material subject to incompleteness and even error only pointed up one of the recurring requirements of social research: imaginative yet disciplined thinking, able to work in spite of imperfect data."⁸

Keeping in mind the imperfect nature of the data, an attempt has been made both to give a fair representation of the points of view of the informants and to use disciplined imagination in interpreting the data.

In Chapter VII, "Attributes and Characteristics of Committee Leadership," which attempts to analyze and correlate the available data on the leadership of both committees, the lists of chairmen and executive committee members from committee records and campaign textbooks have proved invaluable. Congressional Directories, the appendix of Moos' Politics, Presidents, and Coattails,⁹ and 1956 Congressional Vote Statistics,¹⁰ compiled by the Republican Congressional Committee, were used in studying marginal districts.

⁸ Heard, op. cit.

⁹ Malcolm Moos, Politics, Presidents, and Coattails (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1952).

¹⁰ Republican Congressional Committee, 1956 Congressional Vote Statistics (Washington, D. C., 1956).

In determining the rural-urban classification of congressional districts I have utilized the standards adopted by Dr. Ralph M. Goldman in his dissertation, Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban Representation in Congress¹¹ and am very grateful for permission to do so. By using these standards in connection with United States Census statistics, it has been possible to make a detailed study of the district of each Campaign Committee chairman.¹² Some special problems encountered in this connection will be dealt with in Chapter VII.

A final evaluative chapter (VIII), "Problems and Prospects," includes the generalizations which inevitably emerge from such a study. As research progresses, the student becomes increasingly convinced of the importance of the Congressional Campaign Committees. Though ostensibly set up merely to help congressional candidates by giving advice and some financial assistance, the Committees actually exert an appreciable and, apparently, a growing influence

¹¹Ralph M. Goldman, "Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban Representation in Congress" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1948).

¹²See Appendix IV for population figures by municipalities and rural-urban classification of each.

on American political life at local, state, and national levels. They have, indeed, become both an indispensable political instrument and a center of power. How this has come to be, and why, this study will attempt to show.

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PART I

ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

THE PERIOD OF CONGRESSIONAL DOMINANCE:

1789 - 1825

The Congressional Campaign Committees, though of comparatively recent origin, are a natural outgrowth of the American system of government. That system (though in the English constitutional tradition) has one distinctive feature; the separation of power. This can best be understood in the light of a dominant fear generated by events in both Europe and America during the colonial period - the fear of tyranny, particularly as represented by a strong executive.

It was as a deterrent to tyranny that separation of powers was written into our governing instrument. The complete separation of the executive and the legislative branches created a dualism, not only legally, as in England, but in fact. This has given rise to perpetual tension, if not open conflict, between the President and Congress - tension which helped create the need for Congressional Campaign Committees.

Furthermore, the Constitution, while establishing the broad outlines of government, leaves to later authorities

the making of specific decisions as to the exact powers belonging to each branch. The general nature of many Constitutional provisions is illustrated by Article II which provides for the Executive Department of the government. Corwin calls Article II the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution: "To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand, it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution-makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the play of future political forces, it should be a vision realized."¹

Article II begins: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States." Do these words comprise a grant of power or are they a mere designation of office? The exact definition of the powers granted must depend upon the viewpoint of the interpreter. An able and aggressive President, feeling that the good of the nation can best be served by strong executive leadership, can find in the Constitution authority for pursuing a strong course of action. Conversely, a Congress convinced that there is danger in the seizure of too much power by

¹Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Power (3rd ed.; New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 2.

the Chief Executive, can use all the weapons in its arsenal, as a reading of the constitutional provisions for Congress will show, to check the President.

In this context, with power divided, and with executive responsibility not clearly defined, both the President and Congress must operate. Since both are dependent upon party organizations to carry their plea for re-election to their constituents, and since the President, as leader of his party, can exert considerable influence upon his party and may even exercise control of its machinery, it is not surprising that congressmen should desire a party instrument, such as the Congressional Campaign Committee, designed to serve them and them alone.

The Constitution, in its design to provide a system of checks and balances in government, provides for the election of Representatives on the basis of population, two Senators from each state, and a President from the country at large. This means, in practice, that the congressman has a different constituency from that of the President.²

²The fact that many influential Congressmen represent conservative rural areas while the President, representing the nation, is responsible for the national welfare, causes a division between the two branches of government that is often hard to bridge. For a discussion of presidential and congressional constituencies, see V. O. Key, Jr., Politics,

In a nation as large as the United States, sectionalism is almost inevitable. National issues do not have the same appeal in every state, much less in every congressional district. Furthermore, congressional elections occur every two rather than every four years, and congressmen, each with a different constituency, to which different issues appeal, and compelled to hold frequent campaigns, need a party instrument tailored to their requirements. This the Congressional Campaign Committees provide.

The Congressional Campaign Committees are, again, a natural product of the development of the American two-party system. Being highly decentralized, American political organization has tended to proliferation. Instead of the logically-planned structure designed to serve a centralized political system, American political party agencies, commonly called committees, spring up in response to need and continue as long as the need exists. The Congressional Campaign Committees were organized to meet the needs of congressmen.³

Parties, and Pressure Groups (3rd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), p. 715.

³An excellent discussion of the need of congressmen for the Congressional Campaign Committee is found in Jesse Macy's Party Organization and Machinery (New York: Century, 1912), pp. 87-95.

As years have passed, the Congressional Campaign Committees, while retaining their original function of helping congressmen win elections, have added other functions as the needs of the congressmen they serve have multiplied.

The question now arises: if Congressional Campaign Committees fill such a need, why were they not organized in 1790 rather than in 1866? Many answers might be given. One emerges as we consider that, in the early years of the United States, when Congress held the dominant power over the Executive, the need of congressmen for a special committee was less urgent.

There are several reasons why Congress was dominant during its early years. First, the pattern by which the Federal Government was fashioned was derived largely from colonial experience. As Professors Binkley and Moos put it, "Slowly and surely there emerged out of colonial political experience the pattern of American government as we know it, with its executive, its bi-cameral legislature, and its courts. The development of the colonial legislature became the supreme political experience of the American colonists."⁴ The colonial assembly, though it

⁴Wilfred E. Binkley and Malcolm C. Moos, A Grammar of American Politics (2nd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1952), p. 21.

came into being more by accident than by intent, became the dominant power in colonial government. Members of the assembly were elected by the people, while the governors, usually appointed by the king, were responsible for seeing that the king's laws were executed and his taxes collected.⁵

As the agent of the mother country, required to place her interest above that of the colonists, the governor became, in the minds of most colonists, the incarnation of tyranny. Binkley and Moos put it well when they say, "The persistent, deep-seated, American suspicion that tyranny lurks in the executive, is a tradition rooted in colonial experience."⁶

Members of the Assembly were elected to protect the rights of the people.

In time every colony had a popularly elected branch whose members felt that they had a mandate from their constituents to safeguard taxation and public expenditures. Through this control of the purse, they effectively checked the power

⁵"In the charter colony of Massachusetts, the governor was elected by the freemen, which term at first included only the stockholders and members of the established church. In Connecticut and Rhode Island the legislatures elected the governor annually and he was consequently their obsequious servant." Ibid., p. 23.

⁶Ibid.

of the governor, even when he was appointed by the King. The governor was dependent for his salary upon the will of the Assembly and he had to bargain for it, quite commonly by dickering with the legislature when it wished his approval of certain measures.⁷

Men emerging from such an experience wanted Congress dominant in the new government. Later, when these men were elected to the House of Representatives or appointed to the Senate, they used the procedures to which they had become accustomed to keep the Executive subservient to the Legislature.

Another factor in early congressional ascendancy was the suspicion with which the Executive was regarded. In early post-Revolutionary days all centralized government was held in suspicion - so much so that enemies of constitutional ratification attacked the document as setting up congressional tyranny to replace that of King George.⁸

There was even deeper distrust of the Executive. This was understandable, for the colonists had just gone through seven years of war, with its attendant hardships, and their motivation had been largely hatred of George III.

⁷Ibid., p. 22.

⁸"The opposition promptly focused attention on the imposing list of powers delegated to Congress. They had not, as they put it, overthrown King George only to enthrone King Congress." Ibid., p. 23.

For most colonists, the royal governors were his symbol. Small wonder that "the colonial period ended with the belief prevalent that the 'executive magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty, a belief strengthened by the contemporary spectacle of George III's domination of Parliament."⁹

A third factor that contributed to the power of Congress during the country's formative years was the disparity in political experience between the members of Congress and the President. Washington, though an able statesman, was a planter and soldier, with little experience in practical politics. Nor was he, by temperament or background, prepared to take the lead in legislation. Moreover, the entire Executive Branch was weak. There were only five cabinet members, and other executive departments, left by the Constitution to be established by Congress, were few.

The First Congress, on the other hand, was made up of the nation's ablest political leaders. The colonists, used to regarding their elected assemblies as the seat of government, chose as their representatives the men who had

⁹Corwin, op. cit., p. 4.

controlled the political machinery in their local communities. Both political theorists and men with wide experience in practical politics were elected to the House of Representatives. Thirty-five of its sixty-six members had been members of the Continental Congress. Its roster included the strongest local leaders the colonies had produced: signers of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, future state legislators and governors, cabinet members, and even a President - men who were to influence the political life of the states and the nation for years (see Table 1).

Of a total of sixty-six members, we find, in addition to a distinguished list of past services, that eleven were to serve once and more as presidential electors, that seven became state governors, that seventeen served in the United States Senate (of which three were presidents pro tem), that two served as Speakers of the House of Representatives, that sixteen were elected as state senators, and that twenty became court officials, national, state, or local. The list includes a President of the United States, a Vice President, a Secretary of State, a United States Treasurer, and a minister to Spain and Portugal.

These men, particularly those chosen as the formal leaders of Congress, expected to assume national leadership,

TABLE 1

EXPERIENCE OF MEMBERS OF FIRST HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR TO ELECTION^a

Position	Number holding position	Percentage holding position ^b
Member Colonial or State Legislature	50	75.7
Member Continental Congress	35	53
Member State Constitutional Convention (to write state or ratify federal constitution) ^c	24	36
Judge (includes one state Attorney General)	12	18
Governor, Lieut. Governor, member of governing council ^c	10	15
Member U.S. Constitutional Convention	10	15
Signer of U.S. Constitution	6	9
Signer, Declaration of Independence	4	6
Signer, Articles of Confederation	2	3

^aData from the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1947.

^b66 = 100% (66 members of the First House of Representatives).

^cIncludes one who declined to serve.

and the relative weakness of the Executive gave them their opportunity.

This leadership had electoral implications. Men used to controlling local politics assumed campaign leadership as a matter of course. Without the formality of a campaign committee they saw that promising candidates were nominated and exerted influence in their communities to help them win their campaigns.

Beginning with the selection of a successor for Washington, the House of Representatives, through the use of the caucus, began to take over the nomination of the president. The Constitution is silent on the subject of nominations for the presidency. The founding fathers evidently assumed that the president could be chosen without a formal method of nomination. They feared the disruptive influence of political parties (factions). It was their hope that by means of the electoral congress they had made it impossible for "factions" to influence the government.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a discussion of the feeling of the writers of the Constitution on political parties, or factions, see the Federalist Papers #10, The Federalist, ed. Edward Gaylord Bourne (Washington: M. W. Dunne Co., 1901).

In this they were mistaken.¹¹ Before the end of Washington's second term, parties were at work. Despite this, there was no attempt at party selection in preparation for the campaign of 1788. Candidates practically nominated themselves. The result was that the electorate was presented with nine presidential candidates. With such procedures no party system could work. If a party was to win an election some method was needed whereby candidates could be agreed upon in advance. Otherwise the votes might be so distributed among several candidates that they would yield no majority.

Faced with this problem, early Americans drew upon their experience in colonial politics, where they had found the caucus a convenient way of choosing candidates for local offices. Shortly after the Revolutionary War the caucus was widely used by the states for selecting and nominating state officers. Here was a tool ready for use by party members in the House of Representatives.

It seems that the caucus was first used for the selection of a vice-president in 1796. "As the time for

¹¹See E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), Chapters I and II, pp. 1-34 for a discussion of the constructive part political parties have played in the United States.

Washington's retirement approached," says Edward Stanwood in A History of the Presidency, "Federalists and Republicans prepared for a contest. In 1796 there appears to be some previous understanding within each party, perhaps through the medium of a caucus."¹²

There is no doubt that in 1800 the caucus was used. As the election approached, the Federalists were badly divided. Hamilton, recognizing that a divided party could not win an election, and motivated by fear of Jefferson, sought some means of uniting the party and yet insuring the defeat of Adams. His task was made more difficult by the contention of the Federalists that factionalism would lead to the destruction of constitutional government.¹³ How was he to unite a party without repudiating the Federalists'

¹²Edward M. Sait, American Parties and Elections (3rd ed.; New York: Appleton - Century, 1942), p. 312 citing Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928).

¹³See Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan Co., 1902), pp. 14, 15. A letter reflecting the method of dealing with such matters is quoted in a footnote, p. 15: "What! Discuss! Are you daring enough to arrest the votes of Americans by telling them that their servants in Congress have already decided the choice? Are you so abandoned as to stab the Constitution to its vitals by checking the free exercise of the people in their suffrage?" From Niles' Weekly Register, Baltimore, XXVI, p. 178.

stand against "factions"?

He attempted a solution by holding a caucus, the members of which were sworn to secrecy, but news of the meeting leaked out through an unfriendly journalist. This led to a violent attack on the Federalists by their Republican opponents - an attack which did not, however, keep the opposition from calling a secret caucus of its own and agreeing upon candidates. The Federalists were so shattered by the election of Jefferson that they held no more caucuses, but left the selection of candidates to party leaders.

The Jefferson Republicans used the caucus again in 1804, doing away with any attempt at secrecy and making it an open assembly. The Republican members of Congress met publicly, with all the formalities of a deliberative assembly, as if they were acting in pursuance of their mandate.

For almost a quarter of a century the caucus continued to be used as the means by which the Jeffersonian Republicans, later known as the Democrats, nominated candidates.¹⁴

¹⁴Used for this purpose there was much to be said for the caucus. Claudius O. Johnson lists five advantages of the caucus over the convention system: "(1) The caucus,

Eventually, however, the caucus ran into popular disfavor. It ran counter to the growing opinion, particularly strong among workers and western pioneers, that even nominations should be made by a body representing all the people. The caucus, they complained, did not give all elements in a party a chance to be heard.

Dissatisfaction became articulate with the presidential election of 1808, when the congressional caucus nominated Madison, rather than Monroe, to succeed Jefferson. Feeling ran so high that Monroe supporters agitated in favor of overthrowing Madison as a nominee. Though the nomination stood, dissatisfaction mounted.

In 1812 Monroe supporters initially refused to support the renomination of Madison. The caucus attempted to heal the breach by appointing a Committee of Correspondence to conduct the campaign. "This caucus," (June, 1812)

composed of congressmen, was better fitted than ordinary voters or even state officers, to pass upon the fitness of men for the highest office in the nation. (2) Since its members held office, it could not escape responsibility for its choice of candidates, as a convention meeting quadriennially, for only a few days, may so easily do. (3) The caucus did not name 'dark horses' but tended to nominate men of ripe experience and known opinions on public affairs. (4) It was likely to name candidates acquainted with legislative temperament and methods, thus assuring some degree of harmony between Congress and the President. (5) The caucus was a convenient way of making nominations." From Claudius O. Johnson, American National Government (3rd. ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), p. 186.

according to Simeon Fess, "took an important step in appointing a Committee of Correspondence which was the first Congressional Campaign Committee in our history. It was made up of one member from each state, except Connecticut and Delaware. This step was the beginning of the party machinery which was soon to play such an important part in the elections."¹⁵

The use of the caucus as a means of selecting candidates gave Congress even more power over the Executive. The one strong president of the period was Thomas Jefferson, though he exercised his power more as party leader than as president. "Mr. Jefferson," wrote Representative John Marshall in a letter to Hamilton, in which he refused to support the re-election of Jefferson, "appears to me to be a man who will embody himself with the House of Representatives. By weakening the office of President, he will increase his personal power. He will diminish his responsibility, sap the fundamental principles of government, and become leader of that party which is about to constitute the majority in the legislature."¹⁶

¹⁵ Simeon Fess, Political Theory and Party Organization in the United States (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1916), p. 131.

¹⁶ W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President (New York: Doubleday, 1937), p. 50, citing Hamilton's Works VI, pp. 501-03, quoted in A. J. Beveridge, Life of John Marshall (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916-1919), p. 537.

Marshall's prophesy was, in a measure, fulfilled, for Jefferson's leadership was exerted through his party. In undisputed control here, he was able so to direct congressional elections that the Speaker of the House, as well as prominent committee members, were his loyal lieutenants. What Marshall did not understand was that Jefferson's technique would prove to be ". . . remarkably productive in terms of legislative accomplishments."¹⁷ But Marshall was correct in believing that Jefferson would "weaken the office of the presidency." To quote Corwin again, "This, too, was justified when the Ulysses bow of party leadership passed into feebler hands."¹⁸

From the election of 1812 to 1825 Congress dominated the Executive. The presidents of that period, realizing their dependence upon Congress for renomination, knew that they would be tempting Fate to flout Congress. Indeed, they were less impressed by the approval or disapproval of their far-flung constituency than by the reaction of Congress which, with its caucus system, was in a position to apply pressure at an earlier stage in the electoral

¹⁷ Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers (3rd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 21.

¹⁸ Ibid.

process. Since congressional approval was the first hurdle for a president seeking re-election, it behooved him to cultivate Congress in order that he might have an opportunity to take his case to the people. As Binkley observes, "A visiting foreigner with penetrating insight might have contributed an interesting chapter on our unwritten constitution in 1825. He might have observed that under the circumstances of congressional influence on presidential elections, these events did not constitute popular referenda on presidential policies."¹⁹ By controlling its party machinery through the caucus, Congress stood in a position of such dominant power that it felt no need for Campaign Committees.

¹⁹W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 66.

CHAPTER II

CONGRESSIONAL ASCENDANCY CHALLENGED;

CONGRESS FIGHTS BACK

With the disappearance of the Federalist Party in 1820, presidential nominations were controlled by one party, the Democratic-Republican, though other parties sent members to Congress. When the Democratic-Republican Party held its caucus, people argued, voters in those districts which had elected an opposition candidate to Congress went without representation. Discontentment came to a head when, in 1824, the Republican caucus nominated for president William H. Crawford, a man well-known in Washington circles but unknown to the voters, who expressed their resentment by refusing to vote for Crawford.

The caucus broke down with the failure of its selection for president in 1824. With that breakdown, the country entered a new era. Since none of the nominees in the 1824 campaign were elected, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives. The House decided in favor of John Quincy Adams, though Andrew Jackson had a plurality of the popular vote. Jackson's followers looked upon Adams as the beneficiary of a corrupt bargain. This

suspicion was heightened when Adams appointed Henry Clay, whose influence in the House had elected Adams, as his Secretary of State.

Jackson's followers got their revenge at the mid-term elections of 1826, when for the first time in history, according to Binkley, a large majority of the voters opposed the administration. Adams was prepared to give more aggressive leadership than the country had had since Jefferson's administration, but with Congress in the hands of an antagonistic faction, he could not even get his measures effectively presented. "Disregarding the President's messages and program," says Binkley, "Congress spent its energy in a grand inquest into the conduct of the Executive. Only the absence of great issues prevented serious conflict between Congress and the President."¹

The result of the disputed election of Adams and his unsatisfactory four years in the White House was the overthrow of the caucus system. How the nominations of 1828 were made seems uncertain. Cousens ventures that "the candidacies of Adams and Jackson for the presidency were well understood from the time of the previous election.

¹W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 68.

The choice of vice-presidential candidates was not so easily accomplished, but the continuance of Calhoun in office was known to be satisfactory to Jackson and his supporters, while the President's followers were willing to support anyone whom their leader should think of most assistance to the ticket. In this situation the nominations of Jackson and Calhoun on the one side and of Adams and Rush on the other appear to have been made by the state convention in Pennsylvania (the state then having the largest electoral vote) and by acquiescence of the rest of the country."²

The election of Andrew Jackson marked a distinct change in the relationship between Congress and the Executive. "Jackson's presidency," observes Corwin, "was, in truth, no mere revival of the office; it was the remaking of it."³

Jackson was the first president since Washington to be nominated without congressional involvement. This gave him a degree of power and independence not known to his predecessors. He was dependent for re-election not

²Theodore W. Cousins, Politics and Political Organizations in America (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 344-45.

³Corwin, op. cit., p. 22.

upon Congress but upon the agrarian and laboring masses that had elected him. Under his leadership the presidency was transformed from an office subservient to Congress to one primarily dependent upon popular support.

"This transformation of the presidency from a congressional to a popular agency was not to take place without a gigantic struggle, which came to a head in Jackson's veto of the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States four years before its expiration."⁴

Though Congress, under the able leadership of Henry Clay, tried to prevent it, President Jackson was re-elected. Clay then introduced in the Senate a motion to censure the President. The motion was defeated, largely through the efforts of Thomas H. Benton, leader of the Jackson forces in the Senate, and that body, under pressure from the administration, voted to expunge the vote of censure from the record.⁵ The presidency had finally declared its right to stand on equal footing with other branches of the

⁴Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 69.

⁵"The Senate," declared Clay, "is no longer fit for a decent man. I shall escape from it with the same pleasure that one would fly from a charnel house." From Henry Clay's Life and Speeches, Vol. II, quoted by Binkley, The Powers of the President, p. 88.

Federal Government.

"Through the development of the party organization under Jackson," says Corwin, "an instrument was forged which reached to the ends of the Union. By the use of this new instrument . . . Jackson became the first president in our history to appeal to the people over the heads of their legislative representatives. At the same time, the office itself was thrust forward as one of three equal departments of government and to each and every one of its own powers was imparted new scope, new vitality. The Presidency became tridimensional and all its dimensions underwent more or less enlargement."⁶

The response of Congress to Jackson's leadership was to create a new party, the Whigs. Its dominant purpose was to recapture the government for congressional leadership. "Since the Whig party originated as an anti-Jackson coalition," says Binkley, "resistance to executive autocracy became the common denominator in it John Locke had written the Bible of Whiggery in his Treatise on Government in order to vindicate the sovereignty of the legislature and settle for all time the issue of just such

⁶Corwin, op. cit., p. 23.

autocracy as Jackson was now imposing on the American people."⁷

Thus, out of the conflict between Congress and the Executive, congressional leaders were able to gather the various interests opposed to Jackson into a political party. This party, composed as all American parties have been, of a number of interest groups, soon foundered on the issue of slavery. Nevertheless it did institutionalize, for a brief period, the desire for legislative supremacy in government.

It is interesting to speculate as to what might have happened if Jackson had been followed by presidents able to exercise the same quality of dynamic leadership. This, however, was not to be. Martin Van Buren, whom Jackson chose as his successor, did not, as his biographer admits, have "the strong, vivid personality of Jackson."⁸

Early in Van Buren's administration occurred one of the worst financial panics in the nation's history, for which the Chief Executive, though not responsible, was blamed.

⁷Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties, Their Natural History (New York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 170-71.

⁸Frank R. Kent, The Democratic Party (New York: Century, 1938), p. 27.

The result was the election of a Congress hostile to the Administration. Under this double handicap, Van Buren was unable to exercise executive leadership.

In 1840 the Whigs won the election by abandoning their principles in favor of a popular military hero, William Henry Harrison, whom they felt sure they could elect.

At this point, the Democratic Party claims, their Congressional Campaign Committee began. "Democratic Congressional Committees, including membership from both House and Senate, were in existence as early as 1842, when a committee of the Democratic members of the Congress published a declaration of principles for General Harrison's administration."⁹ The Democratic Manual goes on to say that permanent organization was not effected until 1866.

John Tyler succeeded Harrison, who died a few months after his inauguration. The Whigs anticipated that Tyler

⁹ Clarence Cannon, The Official Manual of the Democratic National Convention (Washington: Democratic National Committee, 1956), p. 10. No other reference to the existence of a Democratic Congressional Committee in 1842 is to be found. Neither members of the present Congressional Campaign Committees nor Clarence Cannon, author of the Manual, can supply the source of the statement just quoted, nor can give any information about the committee formed in 1842. This may have been an early experiment in which members of the party, in Congress, banded together for mutual advantage during the campaign, gaining experience which was utilized at a later date.

would be a willing tool in the hands of Congress, but actually Tyler, as a president, was more a Democrat than a Whig. The result was a deadlock between Congress and the President.

In 1844 Polk was elected by the Democratic Party. Polk believed in a strong executive and attempted to give decisive leadership. His efforts were frustrated by a clamorous Whig minority in the lower House during his first two years and by a hostile majority during the last two.

In 1848 the Whigs again turned to a military hero, General Zachary Taylor. Taylor's inaugural appeared to be a statement of surrender to Congress. "The Executive," he said, "has authority to recommend, not to dictate, measures to Congress. Having performed this duty, the Executive Department of the government cannot rightfully control the decisions of Congress on any subject of legislation until that decision has been rightfully submitted to the President for approval."¹⁰

Taylor must soon have discovered that it was impossible to play this dual role, for before his death, which occurred early in his administration, he was giving aggressive leadership to the forces arrayed against Clay's compromise.

¹⁰ Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. 103.

With Taylor's death, Millard P. Fillmore assumed the presidency. He played the role assigned him by the Whigs, which once more assured Congress of the dominant position.

The administrations of Pierce and Buchanan were likewise characterized by surrender to Congress. From the close of the Mexican War, attempts had been made to avoid a national split over the issue of slavery. The search for a compromise brought Congress back into power, since, "for the handling of this highly-charged question by the devices of negotiation and compromise, Congress and especially the Senate, offered a far better theater than the Presidency. So the forces making for compromise systematically depressed the Presidency by taking care that only manageable personalities were elevated to it. From the close of the War of 1861 the Presidency was in the doldrums" ¹¹

This legislative-executive struggle, with its

¹¹Corwin op. cit., p. 26. In a footnote Corwin adds, "The instrument by which the slave-holding interest was able to assure the nomination of manageable personalities was the two-thirds rule which was established by the first Democratic National Convention and was not abolished until 104 years later. Yet it is significant that even during this period the charge of 'executive usurpation' was sometimes made." (Quoted from Charles Warren, Presidential Declaration of Independence, pp. 19-20).

fluctuating locus of power, was no temporary phenomenon, characteristic of the first half of the nineteenth century. It is a continuing aspect of American politics. From the time of Jackson, as Congressional dominance became increasingly threatened by the Presidency, Congress has felt the need for a party instrument that could be used to further its interests. The Congressional Campaign Committees, came into being and have persisted, to meet this need.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMITTEES EMERGE

Although most scholars, like Congressional Campaign Committee members, claim that the committees were organized in 1866, during the struggle between President Johnson and the Congress, there is evidence that the Committees (at least the Republican Committee) were in existence as early as 1860. The official Proceedings of the first Republican National Convention, held in Pittsburgh in 1856, show no permanent party organization in existence at the time. At the Convention, however, a motion to form a committee for the purpose of investigating and developing a permanent party organization was passed.

This motion, apparently, was implemented before the next National Convention of the party (Chicago, 1860), yet the official Proceedings of that Convention, though they mention the National Committee, make no reference to a Congressional Committee. The Campaign Documents Collection in the Library of Congress, however, contains a pamphlet entitled The Ruin of the Democratic Party, published in 1860 by the Republican Congressional Committee. It seems certain, therefore, that a party organization bearing that

name existed as early as 1860. The pamphlet gives no information about the organization under whose auspices it was published. Its text is typical of the campaign literature of the period, accusing opponents of base and immoral conduct. Its statements are based on "the Report of the Cavode and Other Committees."¹

It appears that either the committee named at the 1856 Republican Convention established a Congressional Committee or that congressional and party leaders saw the need for a Congressional Committee in the permanent party organization, and that such a committee had come into being before the campaign of 1860 and was known as the Republican Executive Congressional Committee.

Although it is generally held, says Hathorn, "that the Congressional Campaign Committee issued from the struggle between the Radical Republicans and President Johnson during

¹The Cavode Committee was a congressional investigating committee appointed in 1860, of which Bates says, "Persistent rumors of political corruption, centered in the White House itself, led to the appointment of a committee headed by Congressman John Cavode - Republican of Pennsylvania and a close personal friend of Thaddeus Stevens. It sat behind closed doors for three months, disregarding repeated protests from Buchanan, and dug up an unsavory mess of scandal" Ernest S. Bates, The Story of Congress (New York: Harper Bros., 1936), p. 211.

the congressional elections of 1866, actually, in the elections of 1860 and 1864 the Republicans in Congress used a joint campaign committee to propagandize in favor of the Presidential and House candidates. Though the official name in 1860 was the Republican Executive Congressional Committee and in 1864 the Union Congressional Committee, both committees consisted of congressmen and senators. In 1860 the committee made over seventy titles available to the public."²

There is no evidence of congressional committee activity in the off-year election of 1862, but in the presidential campaign of 1864 the Union Congressional Committee put out a series of strongly partisan campaign pamphlets, three of which were entitled: Rebel Terms of Peace, About the Rank and File of the Union Army, and Shall We Have an Armistice? All three were for sale in large quantities. They dealt with the major issue between the two parties: whether to pursue the Civil War or seek an armistice.

During the early days of the War (December, 1861) the Radical Republicans in Congress organized the Committee

²Guy Hathorn, "Congressional and Senatorial Campaign Committees," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (December, 1956), p. 207.

on the Conduct of the War, of which Zachariah Chandler was chairman. This committee attempted to wrest the initiative in the conduct of the War from President Lincoln. Its activities - often inquisitorial in nature - had important implications. Although the committee did not succeed in wresting from Lincoln his power (in part, as Chamberlain points out, because Lincoln "usually chose to obtain his objectives by executive decree, without resort to Congress")³ its Radical leaders realized that congressional committees, with official sanction and powers, could be used as effective political instruments.

Much of the political literature used in the campaign of 1864 was based on the records of this committee. The inflammatory campaign publications of the Union Congressional Committee, in particular, reflected the influence of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. It is interesting to note that, in 1870, its chairman, Zachariah Chandler, became chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

From 1856 to 1864 Edwin D. Morgan was chairman of the Republican National Committee. According to the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, in 1864

³Lawrence Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 12.

he was also chairman of the Union Congressional Committee, a further indication of the existence of a Congressional Campaign Committee in 1864.⁴

It seems fairly certain that Congressional Campaign Committees were of little importance until the campaign of 1866 got under way. In that election the Radicals transformed the Union Congressional Committee into a powerful and effective weapon with which to attack Johnson. To understand this strengthening of the Campaign Committee as an instrument of party warfare, one must see it in the context of contemporary politics.

During the Civil War two factions arose within the Republican Party. President Lincoln consistently stood for moderation and reconciliation within the Union.

Growing in opposition to the President was a group from New England, the middle Atlantic states, and the middle west, which came to be known as the Radicals. This group

⁴It should be noted that in 1864 the Republican National Convention substituted the name Union for Republican to signify the party's stand on the crucial issue of the day. For several years thereafter the Republican Party was called the Union Party and its congressional committee the Union Congressional Committee. It was under the name Union Party that the Convention of 1864 named Democratic, but strongly Unionist Andrew Johnson as the party's candidate for vice-president and running-mate of Lincoln.

proposed a policy of vengeance and destruction for the confederacy. They were joined by the idealistic Abolitionists, disgruntled because President Lincoln was unwilling to propound a policy of immediate and complete equality between the races.

In the summer of 1864 the Radicals stated their views in the Wade-Davis Bill, a bitter indictment of the President, presidential powers, and the Presidential Plan of Reconstruction. When the President defeated it by a pocket veto, its authors, Benjamin Wade and Henry Winter Davis, issued the Wade-Davis Manifesto, which contained most of the features of the bill, without legislative power. It accused the President of "perpetrating a 'studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people' from the basest motives of personal ambition."⁵ These statements of position drew the battle lines for the impending conflict.

On November 8, 1864, Lincoln was re-elected by an electoral vote of 212 to 21. On April 15, 1865, five days after the surrender of General Lee at Appomatox, President Lincoln was assassinated and the Democratic Unionist,

⁵ Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, Vol. I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 731.

Andrew Johnson, was elevated to the presidency.

At first it was believed that Johnson would pursue a policy similar to that of the Radicals, but this belief was mistaken, as the President's proclamation on May 29th revealed. While Congress was not in session President Johnson proceeded to put Lincoln's Plan for Reconstruction into effect.

When Congress met in December, 1865, it set to work to impose its own reconstruction plan on the South. It refused to seat representatives of southern states and appointed a joint committee of fifteen, controlled by Radicals, to investigate the problem of reconstruction. By February, 1866, it became apparent that, while the Radicals had a majority in both Houses, they could not marshal the two-thirds vote necessary to override the President's veto. Winning such a majority became their goal and the elections of 1866 their opportunity. This made the congressional election of 1866 crucially important to both Johnson and the Congress.⁶ On its outcome would depend, to a great extent, the political future of the President and

⁶It is interesting to note that the campaign of 1866 was one of the first in which a president, as titular head of his party, injected himself into a congressional campaign.

the fate of his policies. To the Republicans - especially the Radicals - it would be a battle for the maintenance of the party in a dominant position, with the social and economic prestige of many individuals involved. To the Abolitionists, led by Charles Sumner, it would be a battle of idealism.

President Johnson, a Democrat elected on a Union ticket with a Republican president, had inherited a Cabinet which he kept almost entirely intact. This meant that he had no party machinery at his command and, unlike Lincoln, no political organization built around him.

Recognizing this problem, friends of the President's moderate program rallied to his support. They urged that he build a party organization around himself and most of them recommended extensive use of patronage as the best means available.⁷ Others urged that he remodel his Cabinet by bringing in capable and respected moderates, such as Governor Oliver P. Morton or Governor John Andrews. Johnson's

⁷Typical is a letter to Johnson from Governor Morton of Indiana. "Were I in your place I would not fail to employ every power and instrumentality in my hands to sustain my policy and the friends who sustain it The resolute wielding of patronage in favor of your friends inside the Union Party cannot fail to build you up with the people and disarm the Opposition in Congress." Howard K. Beale, op. cit., p. 120, quoting from Johnson Manuscript, LXXXII (letter from Oliver P. Morton to Andrew Johnson dated Dec. 1, 1865).

indecision lost him his best opportunity to build a party organization.

Plans were made for a National Union Convention, to meet in Philadelphia on August 11, 1866. Senator James R. Doolittle led the movement. His party faced serious problems. The Democratic Party, which was out of popular favor, saw an opportunity to take over the campaign and thus, it was hoped, regain political supremacy. Leading Democrats attempted to associate themselves permanently with plans for the National Convention, moderation in reconstruction, and Andrew Johnson. The wisest of moderate leaders, both Democratic and Republican, saw that such a course could only bring defeat to the moderate cause in 1866 and that this would mean further loss of prestige for the Democrats. Their efforts halted Democratic attempts to take over the Convention.

Even Doolittle was now skeptical that the Convention could retrieve the political situation for Johnson and the Moderates.⁸ Yet leading politicians were persuaded to

⁸ Shortly before the Convention he wrote his wife, "What is ahead in the political world just now, we cannot certainly see My only fear is that the President has waited too long in making his Cabinet a unit. It has demoralized our friends in all states." Ibid., p. 123, quoting from Proceedings, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (1909) (Letter dated June 20, 1866), p. 291.

support the Convention.

On August 14 the National Union Convention met in Philadelphia, with all the states, both north and south, represented. For a week Philadelphia reverberated with the tumultuous enthusiasm of the delegates, and through the North ran acclamations of President Johnson. When the Convention adjourned, it had created sentiment favoring the President's program and had assured the country of strong support for it, in both North and South.

"The delegates . . . went home to their various congressional districts full of enthusiasm," says Beale. "By a variety of methods they sought to secure the election of candidates who endorsed the Philadelphia platform. But no systematic campaigning was launched. Their enthusiasm for righteousness of principle could not win an election without campaign tools. On August 17, the Philadelphia Convention was generally deemed eminently successful, but on that day it reached its peak. How signally it failed and why is the story of the campaign."⁹

On the other side of the political fence were the Radicals, led by as astute and capable politicians as ever

⁹Ibid., p. 138.

appeared on the American political scene. Ever since Johnson's ascendancy, they had looked toward the election of 1866 as an opportunity to assert the power of Congress over the President. Their tactics differed, however, from those of the Moderates. Their emphasis was not on conventions and enthusiasm but on party organization.

Almost a year before, in a letter to Charles Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens had stated, "We need a good committee on elections."¹⁰ This was the keynote of a battle plan that emphasized organization. The Radicals had succeeded in having a Joint Committee of Fifteen appointed to deal with those problems of Reconstruction that might come before Congress. They felt that some type of campaign organization was needed. The first place to turn was to the Republican national organization but, as already stated, National Union Party Chairman, Henry J. Raymond, had supported the National Union Convention of moderates, and his committee was nominally a tool of the President (though actually so split as to render it ineffective). The Radicals in Congress found it easier to form a committee of their own to deal with campaign matters than to attempt to use the existing

¹⁰Ibid., p. 73 (Letter of Aug. 26, 1865, from Thaddeus Stevens to Charles Sumner, Sumner Manuscripts, LXXIV).

party organization.

The Committee of Fifteen had been successful, so "when Johnson appointed Congressman Knapp to work for him in the campaign of 1866 the Radicals revamped the Union Congressional Committee in order that they might use it to fight Johnson. The new committee was composed of one member representing each state's combined party delegation in the Senate and the House of Representatives (Tables 2, 3, and 4). Senator Morgan was named chairman, but active control was given to an unofficial executive committee headed by Representative Robert Schenck of Ohio."¹¹

Little is known of the work of the Congressional Committee in that election. Though the Committee had published campaign pamphlets in the two previous elections, there is no record of such activity in the campaign of 1866. M. Ostrogorski gives the only available description of the work of the Committee in 1866 and his description seems to fit year-round activities better than tactics used in a specific campaign. He says:

¹¹Ralph M. Goldman, "Party Chairmen and Party Factions" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago), p. 327.

TABLE 2

PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 1855-1867^a

Congress	House of Representatives				
	Number of Repre- senta- tives	Demo- crats	Re- publi- cans	Other parties	Vacant
34th 1855-57	234	83	108	43	
35th 1857-59	237	131	92		
36th 1859-61	237	101	113	23	2
37th 1861-63	178	42	106	28	
38th 1863-65	183	80	103		
39th 1865-67	191	46	145		1

^aData from Ralph R. Roberts, List of Nominees for the Office of United States Senator and for the Office of Representative in the Eighty-Fifth Congress, Washington, 1956 (Nov. 1), p. 31.

TABLE 3

PARTY DISTRIBUTION IN THE SENATE, 1855-1867^a

Congress	Senate				
	Number of Senators	Demo- crats	Re- publi- cans	Other parties	Vacant
34th 1855-57	62	42	15	5	
35th 1857-59	64	39	20	5	
36th 1859-61	66	38	26	2	
37th 1861-63	50	11	31	7	1
38th 1863-65	51	12	39		
39th 1865-67	52	10	42		

^aIbid.

TABLE 4

PARTY REPRESENTATION BY STATES, 39TH CONGRESS,
SHOWING REPUBLICAN STRENGTH BY STATES
IN 1866^a

State	Senators		Representatives		Republicans in both houses
	Demo- crats	Republi- cans	Demo- crats	Republi- cans	
California	1	1		3	4
Connecticut		2		4	6
Delaware	2		1		0
Illionis		2	4	10	12
Indiana	1	1	2	9	10
Iowa		2	6	8	
Kansas		2		1	3
Kentucky	1	1	3	6	7
Maine	2		5	7	
Maryland	1	1	2	3	4
Massachusetts	1	1		10	11
Michigan		2		6	8
Minnesota		2		2	4
Missouri	2		1	7	7
Nevada		2		1	3
New Hampshire		2		3	5
New Jersey	1	1	3	2	3
New York		2	11	19	21
Ohio		2	3	16	18
Oregon	1	1		1	2
Pennsylvania	1	1	8	15	16
Rhode Island		2		2	4
Tennessee	1	1	2	5	6
Vermont		2		3	5
West Virginia		2		3	5
Wisconsin		2	1	5	7
Total ^b	13	39	41	147	186

^aData from the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1947.

^bDiscrepancies between totals and those of Tables 2
3 are to be explained by substitutions in both houses.

A central committee was created at Washington to control throughout the Union the elections to the House of Representatives, which had hitherto been left to the local organizations. It was composed of members of Congress appointed by their colleagues of the same party (in the proportion of one member to each state) and in this way it revived, to a certain extent, the old Congressional Caucus which, however, only looked after Presidential elections. The new central organ called the Congressional Campaign Committee, in watching the electoral situation in the congressional districts, penetrated more deeply and more continuously into political life than could be done by the permanent committee of the National Convention, which made its appearance on the eve of and solely in view of the Presidential election.¹²

Thus far we have dealt almost entirely with the Republican Party and the development of the Republican Congressional Committee. This emphasis is correct, since there was no Democratic Committee before 1866, and if a permanent organization was established then, it was only a last-minute and ineffective attempt by Democratic moderates to counter the effective work of the Republican Congressional Committee.¹³

¹² M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II, trans. Frederick Clarke (New York: Macmillan, 1902), p. 127.

¹³ The 1956 Democratic Manual says of the Democratic Congressional Committee, "Permanent organization was effected in 1866 when the Democratic members of the two Houses, supporting President Johnson against the efforts of his own party to impeach him, appointed a National Congressional Committee to manage the Congressional Campaign of that year." Cannon, op. cit., p. 10. Although the impeachment of Johnson was not until 1868, it seems safe to assume that it is correct to trace the origins of the Committee to this period. The Manual, however, is the only source that mentions the Democratic beginnings in 1866.

It is impossible to show the degree of effectiveness of the Republican Congressional Committee in the election of 1866 by pointing to the statistics of party membership in the new Fortieth Congress. This is true for two reasons. First, it is safe to conclude that the Committee supported, both in the primaries and in the final election, any candidate, regardless of party label, who shared the views of the Radicals, and whom they felt would back them in Congress. Second, in the words of Ralph Goldman, "The period was one in which party labels were lightly held. Not even the Congressional Directory editor, Ben Perley Poore, presumed to record who was a Radical Republican, Conservative Republican, Administration Republican, Unionist, War Democrat or Peace Democrat."¹⁴

Despite this lack of statistical proof there can be little doubt of the success of the Campaign Committee. After the election, the Radical Republicans took control of Congress and proceeded to wrest party and national leadership from the President. Never, since that time, has Congress so dominated the American political scene. The credit for this success must be given in large measure to

¹⁴Ralph M. Goldman, "Presidential Party Leadership." (Unpublished manuscript), p. 68.

the Republican Congressional Committee which saw to it that the Radicals had sufficient strength in Congress to be able to attain such a position.

Says Josephson, "The outcome of the conflict between President Johnson and Congress over the policy of Reconstruction has often been treated as an instance of the victory of congressional over presidential authority in our Government. It might more accurately be described as the triumph of the Republican Party Organization over the Presidency."¹⁵ From this time on, Congressional Campaign Committees were accepted as essential structures within the framework of American political parties.

¹⁵ Matthew Josephson, The Politicos 1865-1895 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938), pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1866 TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

The election of 1866 marked a major power shift within the Federal Government. Then it was that the locus of power moved once more to Congress, where it was to reside for more than twenty years.

Congress now became almost as powerful as in the pre-Jackson era. In the Ostrogorski passage already quoted, the Congressional Campaign Committee is compared to the congressional caucus which nominated Presidents in the early nineteenth century. Although no organic connection exists (except, perhaps, that members were chosen in similar fashion to serve on the caucus and on the committee) a functional connection may be said to exist in the role of each within the party system. Both were organized to help Congress dominate the Executive and both fulfilled the function as intended. The Congressional Committees were destined, for pragmatic reasons, to become a permanent part of the national party structure and a weapon of Congress in its perpetual power struggle with the Executive.

From 1866, the role of the Congressional Campaign Committees moves forward or recedes as the power of Congress

increases or declines. These undulations are difficult to trace, for at times the Committees go into almost total eclipse, and the Democratic Committee seems never to have been conspicuously prominent or powerful.

In the campaign of 1868 both Congressional Campaign Committees were active on the presidential as well as the congressional level. In this campaign the Democratic Party called its committee "the Democratic Congressional Executive Committee,"¹ because it was given some functions in the presidential campaign, and also "the Democratic Presidential Committee" because four of its members were not congressmen but prominent residents of Washington.

One of the major functions of the Committees in this campaign was that of raising money. Charles H. Coleman describes the fund-raising activities of the two parties thus:

Levies upon federal office holders for party purposes were complicated by the political situation in Washington. With the President a Democrat or . . . leaning heavily in that direction, the Cabinet divided, and Congress controlled by Republicans, the clerks were exposed to attack from both sides. The Democrats passed the hat first. On August 31 a circular was distributed to "clerks" and other employees of the government, signed by Montgomery Blair, acting treasurer, and J. D. Hoover, Secretary of the Finance Committee of the Democratic Congressional Committee. This . . . was

¹ See Appendix II for list of members.

addressed to government employees "who claim to belong to the Democratic and Conservative Parties, and desire the election of Seymour and Blair, and are willing and desire to contribute their mite to the cause."

(Washington Express, September 3, 1868)

The Republican circular in October was briefer and spoke with greater authority. It was signed by William Clafin and William E. Chandler, Chairman and Secretary of the Republican National Committee and Representative Robert Schenck of Ohio, Chairman of the Republican Executive Committee (i.e., the executive committee of the Congressional Committee). The circular "would suggest a voluntary offering in aid of the work. Whatever amount is contributed will be acceptable and judiciously expended." (Washington Express, October 21, 1868).²

In addition to fund-raising, both Committees undertook the function, established in the campaign of 1866, of writing and distributing party literature and preparing press releases for local papers.

In the campaign of 1868 trends that were to play crucial roles in determining the later positions and activities of the Congressional Committees began to emerge. In this election the Democratic Committee appears to have been more active than the Republican and to have worked more closely with the national party organization. It sponsored a Washington conference of top party leaders, including Seymour and Blair, in an attempt to work out campaign

²Charles H. Coleman, The Election of 1868 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 299-300.

strategy. The Democratic Congressional Committee put more effort into the presidential campaign and less into the congressional campaigns than did the Republican Committee.

After 1868 the Republican Congressional Committee seems to exercise more power in its party's organizational hierarchy than does the Democratic Committee within its party. The latter appears never again to have played quite so important a role as in the election of 1868.

In 1870 Zachariah Chandler became chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee, a position he held until he became National Committee Chairman in 1876. Chandler had been a leading Republican and Radical. He was in his third senatorial term when he became chairman of the Congressional Committee. From his biography comes most of our information on the committees of this period.

In both 1870 and 1872 Chandler traveled about the nation, presenting the Republican case. Meanwhile the Republican Committee was preparing and distributing literature. "The special objects which it aimed to accomplish were the securing of a uniform treatment of political topics by newspapers and speakers throughout the country, and the circulation (under the franking privilege and otherwise) of instructive and timely documents. During the Reconstruction era, it also devoted much attention to the work of Republican organization in the South where special efforts were necessary to form into effective voting masses the emancipated slaves, not yet . . . familiar with the responsibilities of citizenship. But the great aim of the Committee . . . was the circulation of political literature. This

end it sought: . . . First, by the publication and mailing to individuals and to local committees in all parts of the country of such congressional speeches as treated thoroughly and effectively any phase of the current political situation, second, by furnishing the Republican press, through the medium of weekly sheets of carefully prepared matter, with accurate information as to the facts underlying existing issues and with suggestions as to their best treatment before the people.³

The Post and Tribune's biography of Chandler goes on to speak of the effectiveness of the work of his Committee throughout the 1870's in every Congressional District in the nation.

In the campaign of 1872 was begun the practice of preserving campaign materials for possible future use. The biography mentions that ". . . a monthly periodical named 'The Republic' was issued, which preserved in desirable form the most careful and elaborate articles prepared under the Committee's supervision."⁴

In this campaign the Republican Congressional Committee, performing a function of a National Committee, employed a staff of over three hundred people to comb back issues of the New York Tribune in an attempt to discover facts in the

³ Detroit Post and Tribune, "Zachariah Chandler" (Detroit, 1880), pp. 312-13.

⁴ Ibid., p. 316.

record of Greeley, the Democratic presidential candidate, which might be used against him.

One of the main functions of the Congressional Committees in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was that of raising money. Wealthy officers and members of the Committees (which, until 1913, when the direct election of senators was inaugurated, included senators) often contributed large sums.⁵ Chairmen Morgan, Chandler, Cameron, and Flower, for example, gave generously to their respective Congressional Committees. Other chairmen depended on taxing federal employees or soliciting contributions from men of means. How funds were raised in 1872 is thus described by Josephson:

The Republican managers . . . attempted to rally powerful moneyed interests who had been their patrons. "Who knows what Greeley might do?" murmured Zach Chandler to Jay Cooke, and Zach's wily lieutenant, W. E. Chandler (of N. H.) persuaded Cooke, now for \$5,000 to win a state in an easy election, now for \$10,000 to save New Jersey for the Secretary of the Navy. Did the Cookes care to see the naval account lost to their bank? And Cooke, as he himself said, groaning, "was ridden to death like a fire horse," giving up, according to some reports,

⁵The Democratic Manual gives 1882 as the year when the Congressional Campaign Committee began to concentrate on the election of members to the House. After this, no more senators appear as committee chairmen.

as much as \$50,000 to safeguard the new government-aided Northern Pacific project.⁶

Money was also raised by "contributions" from federal employees. Ostrogorski describes it thus:

The Congressional Campaign Committee, founded about 1866, inaugurated the new era by putting the practice (a "tax for the benefit of the organization" on all officials) in force with the regularity of a government budget. It demanded from Federal officeholders throughout the union a percentage of their salaries as a contribution euphemistically described as voluntary.⁷

This means of raising funds for Congressional campaigns was still being used in the 1880's under the chairmanship of Jay Hubbell. The following letter gives an insight into the operation of the Republican Committee in 1882:

Headquarters, Republican
Congressional Committee,
520 30th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.
May 15, 1882

Sir:

This committee is organized for the protection of the interest of the Republican Party in each of the congressional districts of the Union. In order that it may prepare, print, and circulate suitable material illustrating the issues which distinguish the Republican Party from any other and may meet all proper expense incident to the campaign, the Committee feels authorized to apply to all citizens

⁶Josephson, op. cit., p. 167.

⁷Ostrogorski, op. cit., p. 144.

whose principles or interests are involved in the struggle. Under the circumstances in which the country finds itself placed, the Committee believes that you will esteem it both a privilege and a pleasure to make to its funds a contribution, which it is hoped will not be less than \$____. (2% of the recipient's salary) The Committee is authorized to state that such voluntary contributions from persons employed in the service of the United States will not be objected to in any official quarter.

The labors of the Committee will effect the result of the Presidential election of 1884 as well as the Congressional struggle and it may therefore reasonably hope to have the sympathy and assistance of all who look with dread upon the possibility of the restoration of the Democratic Party to the control of the government.

Please make a prompt and favorable response to this letter by bank check or draft or postal money order payable to the order of Jay A. Hubbell, Acting Treasurer, P. O. Lock Box 589, Washington, D. C.

By order of the committee,

(signed) D. B. Henderson, Secretary⁸

This went to all government employees and those who did not see fit to make "a prompt and favorable response" received a second communication, as follows:

⁸The Democratic Campaign Book, 1882 (Washington, D. C., 1882), p. 208. Although this letter and the one following are taken from Democratic campaign literature, they appear to be legitimate copies of the original. They serve as documentation for statements describing the money-raising procedures of the day. On pp. 164 and 165 are reprinted similar letters sent to federal employees during the campaign of 1878.

Washington, D. C.
August 15, 1882

Sir:

Your failure to respond to the circular of May 15 sent to you by this Committee is noted with surprise. It is hoped that the only reason for such failure is that the matter escaped your attention owing to the press of other cares.

Great political battles cannot be won in this way. This committee cannot hope to succeed in the pending struggle if those most directly benefitted by success are unwilling or neglect to aid in a substantial manner.

We are on the skermish line of 1884 with a conflict before us, this fall, of great moment to the Republic, and you must know that a repulse now is full of danger to the next Presidential Campaign.

Unless you think that our grand old party ought not to succeed, help now in its struggle to build up a new South, in which there shall be, as in the North, a free ballot and a fair count, and to maintain such hold in the North as to insure good government to the country.

It is hoped that by return mail you will send a voluntary contribution equal to 2% of your annual compensation as a substantial proof of your earnest desire for the success of the Republican Party this fall, transmitting by draft or postal money order, payable to the order of Jay A. Hubbell, Acting Treasurer, P. O. Lock Box 589, Washington, D. C.

(signed) D. B. Henderson, Secretary⁹

Hubbell's letter aroused strong public reaction.

⁹ Ibid., p. 144.

A typical response appeared in the New York Sun:¹⁰

Harrisburg, Pa., July 9, 1882

The presevering meanness of the Hubbell assessment is strikingly exemplified in the levy made upon one of the government institutions which ought to be farthest removed from any sort of partisan control and from the visit of the toll gatherers. The old government barracks at Carlisle, Pa. . . . (are) used as an Indian training school under the direction of Captain Pratt of the regular army The school and the admirable work it is doing not only attracted the hearty interest and earnest commendation of the surrounding community, but every official inspection and examination increase the high favor with which it is regarded by those whose special duty it is to investigate this new and salutary mode of treating the Indian problem.

. . .

There is probably not a member of the entire staff of this institution who owes his or her place to political influences and certainly the tenure of none of them is dependent upon Republican supremacy in state or nation. The managers and teachers themselves, mostly ladies . . . take little . . . interest in politics and are even reticent on this assessing business, this information regarding it being obtained accidentally. Several of them, including Captain Pratt (Superintendent) and several of his assistants are pronounced Democrats and, it is safe to say, will not respond to Hubbell's call, and if disturbed for their refusal, it will be by some influence outside of the institution itself. What the silver haired matron, the venerable nurse, the blooming school marms, the hostler

¹⁰ According to H. K. Beale in the appendix of The Critical Year, the Sun, a prominent New York daily edited by Charles Dana, which, though inclined to emphasize the sensational, performed a public service by exposing scandal. This it could do because it claimed no allegiance to either political party.

and day laborer will do about it remains to be seen. But the eneffable impudence of "Dear" Hubbell's extortionate demands was never better illustrated than by this comprehensive levy.¹¹

Popular indignation was not limited to writers of letters to editors. Serious students of politics took up the cause. In 1882 the North American Political Review carried an article condemning the assessment of federal employees, using Hubbell's letter as the chief case in point. "Nothing so disgraceful," it declared, "has happened in this country for a century."¹²

The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, in an attempt to turn the popular outrage to its own advantage, printed both Hubbell letters and the following letter (sent out for distribution to the press by Chairman Flower of the Democratic Committee) in the Democratic Campaign Book of 1882:¹³

Headquarters, Democratic
Congressional Committee,
Washington, D. C.
June 30, 1882

Dear Sirs:

The Board of Control of the Democratic Congressional

¹¹ Inserted in the Congressional Record, July 12, 1882, as part of the remarks of Rep. Isaac N. Cox, of New York.

¹² Dorman Eaton, "Political Assessments," North American Political Review, September 1882, p. 219.

¹³ Democratic Campaign Book, 1882, Washington, D. C., p. 222.

Committee, having neither the funds nor the disposition to corrupt the public mind, yet very desirous of placing the views of the Democratic Party before the country, earnestly requests and confidently anticipates the co-operation of the local Democratic press to that end.

The Board would suggest that liberal extracts from the speeches which will be sent to you from time to time be printed in your paper with such comments as you deem proper. Your participation in this work cannot fail to increase your circulation and influence, while it will be of greatest service in crystallizing and educating the party.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) R. P. Flower, Chairman¹⁴

The furore over campaign finance pointed up the need for reform and hastened the passage of the Pendleton

¹⁴In using these letters as an indication of the campaign practices of the two Congressional Committees in 1882, the following facts should be borne in mind: (1) Both letters were selected for publication by the Democratic Committee, which raised funds of its own in 1882, though probably not by political assessments. (2) Since the Democrats had been out of office for many years most federal employees were indebted to the Republican Party for their appointments. Consequently employee assessments were more effective as a fund-raising technique for the Republicans than for the Democrats. (3) The letter quoted in the discussion of the campaign of 1868 shows that both parties had used the political canvass as a means of raising money to meet party campaign expenses. (4) In this case, the Republican letter was written on May 15th, the Democratic on June 30th. The public response to Hubbell's letter warned the Democrats against using the same technique.

Civil Service Bill, which became law in January, 1883.¹⁵

This required that federal appointments be made on the basis of competitive examinations and prohibited assessments on office holders for political purposes.

The effect of this period of reform on party organization is thus described by Josephson:

Where the government service remained chaotic, the party organizations had developed extremely strong, concealed bureaucracies and controls within themselves which provided such stability as was needed. In the end, patronage politics had gone to such extremes . . . (that) . . . the leaders in both great parties, who had delayed their own housecleaning for the sake of their own tactical necessities, now hastened to bow to the popular voice which was felt in the new landslide of votes for Democratic congressmen in 1882.¹⁶

In 1882 another development in the Congressional Campaign Committees occurred. From 1866 to 1882 the Committees had been the arms of their respective parties in both House and Senate. In 1883 the Congressional Committees became organs of the House of Representatives.

¹⁵ Even before the Hubbell letter there had been a growing civil service reform movement, backed by idealists who carried little political weight. With the assassination of Garfield in 1881, by Charles Guiteau, alleged to be a disappointed office seeker, the demand for civil service reform gained wide popular support.

¹⁶ Josephson, op. cit., p. 321.

The Democratic Manual states that the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee "was organized in 1882 for the purpose of aiding in the election of the Democratic members of the House."¹⁷ Whether this change represented a shift of power within Congress or a growing feeling of independence on the part of the House, it had little effect on the organization of the Congressional Committees, for the last Senator to be chairman of either committee had retired in 1877 and, until 1916, when the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted (after which the two parties in the Senate formed their own campaign committees), Senators continued to serve on both Committees.

During this period the Democratic Committee had a difficult struggle. Since 1870 the Democrats had been out of office and had had little success in raising funds by political assessments. Congressmen therefore turned for help to the national party organization which was growing in strength.¹⁸

In 1881, however, General William Rosecrans, a well-known Union general in the Civil War, had been elected chairman of his Congressional Committee, as much for his reputation

¹⁷ Cannon, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁸ This was indicated by the fact that it was strong enough to elect a president in 1884.

as for his abilities. Under him Roswell P. Flower became chairman of the Board of Control (equivalent to the Republican Executive Committee). It was Flower who carried forward most of the Committee's work in the campaign of 1882. After the campaign of 1884, General Rosecrans resigned the chairmanship and there is no record as to who, if anyone, succeeded him.

With the election of 1882, the Republicans lost control of Congress. Furthermore, lack of harmony with the National Committee in 1880 "had given rise to the question of the utility of the double organization."¹⁹ In 1884, with the triumph of Cleveland over Blaine, the Republican defeat was complete. The status of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee reflected the decline in party fortunes. "For some twelve years thereafter" (i.e., after the breach between the National and the Congressional Committee in 1880), says Kleeberg, "the activities of the Republican Campaign Committee almost ceased."²⁰

After a decade of comparative inactivity, the

¹⁹ Jesse Macy, Party Organization and Machinery (New York: Century, 1912), p. 90.

²⁰ Gordon Kleeberg, The Formation of the Republican Party as a National Political Organization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911), p. 228.

Congressional Campaign Committees revived. In 1889 R. P. Flower returned to Congress and, because of his earlier experience with the Democratic Committee, was elected its chairman. During his two year chairmanship the Committee became more active than it had been since his previous term of office.

Macy dates the revival of the Republican Committee as 1894 when, he says, it "assumed new life and has ever since been the prominent and efficient agent of the party for election of congressmen in the off years."²¹

In the case of both committees, it was the leadership of the chairmen that aroused them to action. These men saw their first task as discovering new sources of revenue. In the case of the Republican Committee, the need was urgent, Josephson says, because of "the loss of Federal patronage, the diminution of assessments as large numbers of officials were classified under the merit system, and declining revenues from the sale of offices"²²

Joseph Babcock of Wisconsin, who became chairman of the Republican Committee in 1893, was quick to see that

²¹Macy, op. cit., p. 90.

²²Josephson, op. cit., p. 406.

working hand in hand with business, asking for money during campaigns and seeing that the legislative interests of the Committee's supporters received attention during the ensuing session of Congress, would be advantageous both to the Committee and to its supporters.

LaFollette says that it was Babcock's office "to fry the fat out of manufacturers, brewers, railroads, and other special interests, with which to aid in carrying on the campaign and thereafter, with Cannon (Speaker of the House) and two or three other members of the inner circle, it was Babcock's business to see that no legislation detrimental to special interests should be permitted to go through the House" ²³

The Democratic Committee was less effective in raising money. Flower, ²⁴ during his chairmanship, had made substantial contributions to the Committee, but had devised no long-range fund raising techniques. Nor did his immediate successors discover any that would compare in

²³ Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette's Autobiography (Madison, Wisconsin: The Robert M. LaFollette Co., 1913), pp. 735-36.

²⁴ Josephson calls him "a wealthy grain and stock market speculator," one of the four aspirants for the governorship of New York in 1882, "who promised to contribute generously to his own advancement." He contributed \$16,000 to the Cleveland campaign in 1884.

effectiveness with the Republican Committee's methods. As a result, the Democratic Committee accepted the fact of its less favorable financial position, adapted its techniques to its budget, and developed the conviction that its methods, being more direct and personal, were preferable to those of the Republican Committee. This conviction still persists.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century both Committees had demonstrated their capacity for survival and had won for themselves a continuing place in the machinery of their respective parties.

PART TWO

ROLE OF THE COMMITTEES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS

CHAPTER V

THE TWO COMMITTEES: STRUCTURE AND FINANCE

By the turn of the century, both Congressional Campaign Committees had reached a point of relative stability. During the preceding thirty-four years, the role of the Committees seemed to evolve; after that time, it remained fairly static for a considerable interval. M. Ostrogorski's description of committee activities, written in 1902, is, in general, applicable to both committees during the first half of the twentieth century. This pattern may be regarded as a base upon which the committees, particularly the Republican Committee, have erected superstructures adapted to their needs.

The existence of the Congressional Committee is as temporary as that of the Legislature from which it emanates, and it disappears with the expiration of the powers of the particular Congress. Considerations of general policy are even more foreign to the congressional committee than to the national committee; it pays no heed to platform or programs and simply endeavors to ensure the success, at the congressional elections, of the candidates who bear the party label, whatever their complexion. It divides all the congressional districts into categories: the good, the hopeless, and the doubtful; almost neglecting the first two groups, it directs all its efforts toward the districts of the last group. Its means of action consist of overt propaganda by speaking and by political literature and methods of a more secret kind, in which money fills, it would appear, a not inconsiderable place. The sinews of

war are supplied to the congressional committee by wealthy members of the party, but these donations are much smaller than those made to the national committee; the disinterested or calculated generosity of the donors is reserved for the presidential campaign in which the great stake is played for. The congressional committee intervenes actively in the election campaign of the "off years," that is to say, those years in which the congressional elections do not coincide with the presidential elections, for instance 1884, 1898. At the request of the candidates interested it sends them speakers and "political literature" for distribution, and perhaps money as well. But the committee does not remain inactive in the interval between elections; it follows the fortunes of the party in the districts attentively; it analyses the vote at each succeeding election by counties; and if it notes a fall in the number of votes polled by a candidate of the party, it makes inquiry into the causes. Perhaps the fault lies with the factions which are devouring each other, or the candidate is not a popular one or the policy of the party is creating discontent, or the rival party is employing too energetic or too persuasive methods of propaganda. The congressional committee interposes to smooth down these difficulties. It is in constant relation with all the county committees in the Union; the latter point out to it the special steps necessary to retrieve the fortunes of the party in their congressional district, and in general make the congressional committee the confidant of their troubles. On the opening of the presidential campaign, the congressional committee places all its resources at the disposal of the national committee and becomes its close ally, forgoing its own initiative even in what concerns the congressional elections, for in the "presidential year" all the elections follow the fortunes of the contest for the president.¹

From 1900 until the 1930's both committees functioned quietly according to their customary procedures. Even the

¹ M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. III, pp. 283-85.

split between the House and the Senate after the Seventeenth Amendment in 1916 caused no serious dislocation. In 1930, however, both Committees gave up their money-raising function and began to depend for support upon their respective national party organizations. Since that time, the two committees have developed distinctive characteristics and each now functions according to its concept of its role.

Committee organization

Both committees are made up of congressmen, one from each state represented in Congress by their party. Seniority is considered in choosing members, as is political influence and sagacity. The Democratic Committee chairman may also appoint one woman from each state. This is a hang-over from the days before woman suffrage, when the Democrats had a Women's Committee. They now appoint to the committee a few capable women, such as Gracie Pfost of Idaho and Edith Green of Oregon, "to represent the women's point of view."

The Republican Committee has a Chairman, five Vice-Chairmen who represent different geographical areas and who serve as consultants with respect to them, a Secretary and a Treasurer. An Executive Committee of five is appointed

by the Chairman.² The officers and the Executive Committee carry on with little help from the full Committee, which meets occasionally - three times during the first six months of 1957 - to hear reports and/or approve the budget. A professional staff carries the work of the office.

The work of the Republican Committee is divided into three departments: Administration, headed by the Executive Secretary, William S. Warner; Field Service, under the direction of Bernard Lamb; and Public Relations. Working with the latter is a former Director of Public Relations for the National Republican Committee, Richard L. Guylay. Each of these departments is well staffed and carries on a full program which will later be discussed. As Bone observed, Republican Committee work has now become a "big-time" operation, employing about thirty persons.³

The Democratic Committee has a Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and an Executive Committee of nine. There are sub-committees on Speakers and Finance.

²For lists of chairmen, officers, and executive committee members of both Committees, see Appendix II.

³Hugh A. Bone, "Some Notes on the Congressional Campaign Committees," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 1 (March, 1956), pp. 116-37.

The office staff is headed by Assistant to the Chairman, a position now held by Kenneth Harding, which corresponds to the Republican Committee's Executive Secretary. Another paid staff member heads research. These, with two or three assistants, carry the full office load.

The full Committee meets rarely, perhaps once during each session of Congress. One member of the Committee was unable to recall when they had last met. Sub-committees meet as needed, though they seldom seem to be needed. Mr. Harding, Assistant to the Chairman, admits that "because the Committee's work is highly personal and confidential" members can have little idea what transpires. This was confirmed in talks with several committee members. A member of the Sub-committee on Speakers, for example, states that when a request for a speaker is received, usually during a campaign, it is turned over to the Speakers' Bureau of the National Committee. This member has never been present at one of the confidential conferences which are said to constitute the chief work of the Committee and feels, on the basis of personal experience, that the Committee's chief function is to dispense funds for use in campaigning. The full Committee, according to this member, hears the report of the Assistant to the Chairman but does

not even approve the budget.

The Democratic Committee is set up primarily on paper, with most decisions made by the Chairman and his Assistant. The Chairman frequently confers with Speaker Sam Rayburn, who seems to be as important in determining Committee policies and actions as the chairman. The Committee's chief function is to help new congressmen find living quarters and set up their offices in Washington, to give advice and financial assistance to candidates running in marginal districts, and to publish an occasional campaign pamphlet. It keeps a file of opponents' voting records and of clippings from the Congressional Record but makes no pretense of scientific evaluation of such data.

While much has depended upon the interest, energy, and resourcefulness of the chairmen, whose role it is to give policy direction, the fact that chairmen sometimes change in periods of two to four years⁴ has meant that the stability and continuity provided by the office staffs, which "keep the show on the road" is essential to the functioning of either Committee.

⁴For the terms of office of all committee chairmen, see Appendix II.

Since Captain Victor Harding⁵ became Assistant to the Chairman of the Democratic Committee in the 1930's, the trend has been toward increasing emphasis on the professional staff and the political activities of the Assistant Chairman. This makes the operation a personal arrangement in which the political abilities of the Assistant to the Chairman are crucial. Much of the Committee's work is done on an individual basis, between the congressman who comes to the Committee with his problem and the Assistant to the Chairman who attempts to aid in solving it. The Assistant to the Chairman also does the field work, while the small staff of three to five do what research they can.

The locus of power in the Democratic Committee resides, at the moment, in a triumvirate made up of Michael Kirwan, Chairman, Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House, and John W. McCormack, House Majority Leader. Interestingly, Rayburn and McCormack are not officially committee members, but they know Congress, individual congressmen, and the situation in an amazing number of congressional districts - particularly the critical, marginal ones. Since the Democratic Committee is organized on a more informal basis than

⁵Father of Kenneth Harding, he served the committee from 1937 to 1954.

the Republican, with more reliance upon subjective evaluation, it is essential that they have knowledgeable men to consult.

The Democratic Committee uses such terms as "personal" and "direct" in describing its work. Harding makes it a point to know, personally, as many Democratic congressmen as possible. When not on the road, he goes daily to the House, to confer with congressmen in the cloak-rooms. To him, and of course to Kirwan, congressmen come with their problems, with confidential information about developments in their districts, or with news of opposition strategy. The information is not recorded and does not go beyond the man to whom they talk.

Not only does Harding know the Democratic congressmen, through his field work he has become acquainted with state and county chairmen all over the country. He has acquired a facility for remembering names and has a wealth of statistical information at his finger tips. His encyclopedic knowledge of the matters that concern them encourages congressmen to seek his advice.

When it comes to the distribution of funds, Harding, Kirwan, Rayburn, and McCormack pool their knowledge and make joint decisions according to a procedure which will later be discussed. The point here is that the Democratic

Committee continues to function according to its traditional pattern, on a face-to-face basis, with a minimum of organization and staff. Although the Assistant to the Chairman assured the writer that this method has been deliberately chosen, because of belief in its effectiveness, a study of the financial structure of the two Committees suggests that inadequate financial support has probably played a part in determining its working procedures.

Not that the Committee is unaware of its need for funds. "We have in the file," I was told, "a set of plans for expanding and improving our services - plans which must await the time when funds become available." A larger field staff, in particular, is needed, since, during campaigns, Harding must remain in the office.

The success of the Democratic Party in recent congressional elections, however, has created a sense of satisfaction with present methods and has provided little incentive for a reappraisal of methods or confrontation of the inadequacy of present financial undergirding as compared with that of the Republican Committee.

The Republican Committee, on the other hand, has undergone what amounts almost to a change in function. This has been an evolutionary process, most rapid under the guidance

of strong leaders. Among these were: Jospeh Babcock, chairman from 1893 to 1905, under whose leadership the relationship between the Republican Party and business was solidified, resulting in larger contributions to the party and increased consideration of the interests of business by it; Joseph Martin, chairman from 1937 to 1939, under whose direction the Committee was reorganized and, in the words of Earl Venable, Executive Secretary of the Republican National Committee from 1920 to 1950, "made into a working organization."; and Leonard Hall, chairman from 1947 to 1953. During World War II the Republican Committees did little more than remain alive. "All we could do," said Mr. Venable, "was to conduct a holding operation." Under Mr. Hall's leadership, the Congressional Committee experienced a renaissance. A full-time Director of Public Relations was added to the staff,⁶ the field work program for the systematic collection of data was revived on an expanded basis, and an elaborate system for the tabulation and analysis of this data was set up.

The Republican Committee's field work is carried on

⁶The financial statements in the office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives show that the Director of Public Relations is the most highly paid officer on the staff.

by a staff of seven men, selected for their training and experience in making and interpreting community surveys. These men visit those states and congressional districts which are held or might be won by Republicans.

Recognizing the importance of local party officials, each study begins with a conference with local leaders, usually at the county level. Field representatives meet with the county chairmen, explaining to them the purpose of the study, namely: to learn the voting pattern of each precinct so that, when analysis is completed, both weak and strong precincts may be readily and reliably spotted. Republican organizations and leaders can then proceed to strengthen weak precincts in preparation for the next election.

Field workers secure a map of each county, showing precinct boundaries, ascertain the names of county committee men and women, and get the current registration figures. After precinct analysis statistics have been collected a summary sheet is prepared - one for each town or city with more than one precinct, and one for each county. These sheets are returned to headquarters where their contents are analyzed.⁷ Results are sent to county chairmen and

⁷For a "Data Sheet" for the state of Michigan, giving an analysis of the data gathered by field workers, see Appendix III.

other local party leaders. Field workers supply each county chairman with a county information blank which shows how well the county is organized.⁸ This, too, is returned to headquarters, where the information is collated and placed in the Committee's file. From this material the Republican Committee is building a permanent file of factual information for use by the Republican organization.

Field Service also offers assistance in the selection of qualified candidates. This is done by rating potential candidates on an evaluation sheet prepared by the central office. Again the information is studied and results are shared with local party leaders.⁹

Since a successful political campaign requires a considerable number of party workers, these must be enlisted and organized before the opening of the campaign. Republican Committee field workers secure a precinct-by-precinct list of active Republican workers, each of whom receives a series of robo-typed personal letters inviting him to participate actively in the coming campaign. Copies of the workers' lists and of all replies are turned over to county chairmen and other party leaders.

⁸For a copy of the blank used, see Appendix III.

⁹For a copy of Candidates' Evaluation Sheet, see Appendix III.

Next in importance to Field Service, which ranks first because it provides the information that is basic to all the other services, is the Department of Public Relations, which gives advice on the conduct of an effective campaign, provides speech kits, and gives help in preparing newsletters and scripts for radio and television. Closely allied with Public Relations is the Art Department, which designs posters, prepares "gimmicks," plans layouts, etc. Photographic Service makes film strips for motion picture and television use and takes photographs for newspaper and other publicity. It maintains a service whereby congressmen with visiting constituents may have group pictures taken and made up at once in post-card form, to be mailed home by visitors.

These departments, under the direction of the administrative officers, work together to plan effective campaigns for Republican congressional candidates.

Finance

In nothing is the difference between the two Committees more apparent than in the nature and extent of the support which each receives. Ever since the days when the Republican Committee, unable longer to levy a tax on

office-holders, learned ways of approaching business interests for support, it seems to have been in a more favorable financial position than the Democratic Committee.

The latter, for a time, resorted to levies upon Democratic legislators. "In 1913," says Hathorn, "it was revealed that the Democratic committee had assessed party members in both houses \$100 each to raise campaign funds. Apparently this had been standard procedure for years."¹⁰

Despite rivalry between the Congressional and National Committees, it soon became apparent that financial cooperation between the Committees would be for the good of both. By the 1920's cooperative arrangements to this end had been worked out within both parties. This came out in a Senate investigation of campaign expenditures held in 1921. In the investigation of Republican expenditures, the following exchanged was recorded:

Chairman: Loans to the Senatorial Campaign Committee - what can you tell us about that?

Mr. Upham: (treasurer, Republican National Committee): I have had no conference with the senatorial committee, personally, with the exception of a talk with Senator Poindexter; but my understanding is that we are to loan the Senatorial Committee up to \$200,000.

¹⁰Hathorn, op. cit., p. 210 (See "Contributions for Political Purposes," House Report No. 677, 63rd Congress, Second Session).

Chairman: By the way, how much are you to loan the Congressional Campaign Committee?

Mr. Upham: \$500,000.

A similar conversation was recorded during the investigation of the Democratic Congressional Committee:

Chairman: Do you cooperate with the National Committee?

Mr. Flood: (Chairman, Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee) I do.

Chairman: And do they furnish any funds to your committee?

Mr. Flood: My understanding is that they are to finance my committee.

Chairman: Do you go out and raise money separately?

Mr. Flood: I haven't done so but I have received voluntary contributions for which I account to the National Committee, and they are, as I understand it, to finance the committee.

Chairman: Have you any budget?

Mr. Flood: We have not.

Chairman: Or any estimate of what you expect to raise or spend?

Mr. Flood: We expect to spend a good deal in printing if the National Committee will furnish us the money, and we expect the National Committee to take care of any speakers' expenses that we have to incur. Of course we do that by conference with them.¹¹

¹¹Sait, op. cit., pp. 291-92. Hearing before a sub-committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, 66th Congress, 1921.

The next step was a plan whereby the Republicans tried to unify the solicitations of all their committees.

Bone describes the plan in some detail:

For a number of years the Republicans have operated under a formalized organization known as the "united finance drive." This function is entrusted to the Republican National Committee, which raises funds for the national, congressional, and senatorial committees. Its objective is to solicit each contributor only once . . . to avoid multiple appeals to the same donor and to make collections more efficient.

The finance committee has its main office in the national committee headquarters The committee is semiautonomous with its own chairman, general counsel, finance director, and executive secretary. Its composition includes eighteen specially appointed members and forty-eight state finance chairmen. The committee is brought together fairly frequently The national finance committee assigns each state a quota of the annual budget for the three committees, and each state finance chairman has the responsibility for raising this. Figures on the state quotas are not made public; but some of the factors used to arrive at each quota are the general electoral vote, the Republican vote, population, purchasing power, and the personal income tax. The relative weight given to each is likewise kept confidential. The committee discourages direct contributions to candidates and encourages contributions to the state finance committees.¹²

The Democratic Party, though it has no such National Finance Committee, encourages contributions to the national party organization. Allocations to the Congressional Committee are subsequently arranged by negotiation between

¹²Bone, op. cit., p. 127.

the chairman of the National and Congressional Committees.

Some gifts are, of course, received directly by the Congressional Committees, but these are mainly "exchange funds" or "directed funds." The former are monies contributed by donors with the understanding that they be used to help the party campaign in their state. The latter are funds earmarked for the use of a designated candidate.

The Democratic Committee receives more exchange and directed funds than does the Republican. Of the \$210,450 reported as received by the Democratic Committee in 1954, 43.6% of it was in exchange funds, 23.2% in directed funds. This left an undesignated balance of only 33.2% which consisted of funds collected by the Congressional Campaign Committee (5.7%) and grants from the National Committee (27.5%).

The difference in the receipts and expenditures of the two committees is considerable, as is the number and size of contributions from individual donors. In 1956 the Republican Committee reported four times as many gifts of \$1,000 or more as were reported by the Democratic Committee. This means that the Democratic Committee must rely more heavily on gifts under \$1,000. At the same time, the percentage of such gifts favors the Republican Committee whose public relations program, with its radio and television

appeals for small gifts, reaches a wide audience (Tables 5, 6, 7).

TABLE 5

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE RECEIPTS AND
EXPENDITURES AS REPORTED FOR 1956

	Democrats	Republicans
Receipts	\$190,630.00	\$2,808,489.44
Expenditures	188,818.00	2,778,286.97

Based on reports filed by the Committees with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 6

CONTRIBUTIONS OF OVER \$1,000 FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS
REPORTED BY CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES,
1956

Size of contributions	Number of contributors	
	Democratic	Republican
\$1,000 to \$4,999	56	258
\$5,000 or more	7	41

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 7

SIZE OF GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS REPORTED
BY CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES
IN 1956

Congressional Committee	Total number of gifts reported	Number over \$1,000	% over \$1,000	% over \$1,000
Democratic	131	63	55.7	44.3
Republican	678	299	44.1	55.0

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Although Tables 5, 6, and 7 are based on the reports of the Committees in the 1956 election, the financial position of the Republican Committee has been consistently better than that of the Democratic, as comparison of their expenditures for the five year period from 1952 to 1956 will show (Table 8).

TABLE 8

EXPENDITURES REPORTED BY THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES, 1952 - 1956

	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Democratic	\$ 57,050	\$ 38,644	\$208,592	\$ 30,763	\$ 188,818
Republican	1,707,574	401,404	706,072	337,039	2,778,286

Based on reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

The procedural implications of these financial

differences have already been suggested. One more observation about the financial relationship of the National and Congressional Committees should perhaps be made.

The Congressional Committees also provide a valuable service for the national committees in presidential election years. When a National Committee has reached the \$3,000,000 ceiling set by the Hatch Act for campaign expenditures, it may allocate funds to its Congressional Campaign Committee, on condition that the latter pay some of the bills incurred by the National Committee.

The financial operations of the Committees leave the student dissatisfied. For all his efforts, he feels that many facts have eluded him. This, as Bone points out, is because "financial arrangements within both parties are often personalized and largely the result of negotiation and bargaining between the . . . committee chairmen. Members of the committees themselves seldom meet as a group to prepare budgets and estimates Financial conversations are confidential; it is next to impossible to determine what rules and customs, if any, are followed in the making of individual allocations. Reports filed in compliance with federal laws reveal very little of the intercommittee financial relationships."¹³ But they do

¹³Ibid., p. 128.

suffice to emphasize a basic difference between the Republican and Democratic Committees, to show the complexity of inter-committee relationships, and to point up the problems involved in the study of an organization the operations of which are fluid.

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CHAPTER VI

MODERN CAMPAIGN FUNCTIONS

Preparation for a campaign

Since the Congressional Campaign Committees have become permanent organizations, concerned with the success of their respective parties, most of their activities may be regarded as campaign activities. On the day after each congressional election the Committees begin to plan for the next one. The first step, as noted, is tabulation of election returns. This gives a picture of the current political situation, particularly in marginal districts, and reveals any unusual patterns in the safe districts. If the majority by which victory has been won in a safe district shows a decline over previous years, the situation calls for immediate study, to discover the reasons for the change.

"The sharpness of the political battle," as V. O. Key observes, "differs enormously among congressional districts." Since "many districts return a Republican or a Democrat with the regularity of the election calendar . . ."¹ these can be disregarded, though of course returns from them

¹V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (3rd ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1953), p. 515.

are carefully noted and filed. It is to the marginal districts that both committees devote the major portion of their time and money. These are the districts in which, at the preceding congressional election, the victorious party won by a margin of 5% or less of the total vote. There were ninety such districts in the congressional elections of 1956 - thirty-nine Republican and fifty-one Democratic² (Table 9).

The Committees operate on the assumption, as Bone points out, "that twenty million people, living in ninety to one hundred districts determine the outcome of national elections."³ The Committees' task is not only to help candidates in the districts that were marginal in the preceding election, especially those that swung to the opposing party, but to study trends and assess probabilities, in an attempt to discover those districts which, though not currently marginal, are apt to swing to the opposition (Table 10). In doing this the Republican Party relies to a great extent upon scientific instruments, the Democratic upon unrecorded information.

² These were found in all states except Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.

³ Bone, op. cit., p. 120.

TABLE 9

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE MARGINAL IN THE
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1956^a

State	Number of Districts	Number Marginal (Republican)	Number Marginal (Democratic)
Ariz.	2	1	
Cal.	30	3	2
Colo.	4	2	
Conn. ^b	6	1	
Del. ^b	1	1	
Fla.	8		2
Ill.	25	2	4
Ind.	11	2	2
Iowa	8	3	1
Kan.	6	5	1
Ky.	8		3
Me.	3	1	1
Md.	7	1	1
Mass.	14	1	1
Mich.	18	2	1
Minn.	9		2
Mo.	11	1	5
Mont.	2		1
Neb.	4	2	
Nev.	1		1
N.J.	14	2	3
N.Mex. ^c	2		2
N.Y.	43	1	1
N.Car.	12		2
Ohio	23		1
Ore.	4	1	2
Pa.	30	2	4
R.I.	2		1
S.Dak.	2		1
Tenn.	9		1
Va.	10		2
Wash. ^b	7	3	
W.Va.	6	2	2
Wis.	10		1
Total		39	51

TABLE 9 (Continued).

Data from Marginal Districts 1956 (Washington, D.C.:
Republican Congressional Committee, 1956).

^aStates with no marginal districts in 1956:
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming.

^bIncludes one district at large.

^cBoth at large.

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF MARGINAL DISTRICTS IN TEN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1938-1956^a

State	No. of Districts In State as of 1936	Not Marginal 1938-1956		Marginal In At Least 50% Of Elections 1938-1956		Changed Party At Least Once 1938-1956		Changed Party In at Least One Of Five Elections: 1948-1956	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Ala.	9	9	100%						
Ariz.	2	1	50%						
Ark.	6	6	100%						
Cal.	30	10	33.3%	4	13.4%	20	66.6%	9	3%
Colo.	4			2	50%	4	100%	1	25%
Conn.	6			5	83%	6	100%	3	50%
Del.	1			1	100%	1	100%	1	100%
Fla.	8	3	38%			1	12.5%	1	12.5%
Ga.	10	10	100%						
Idaho	2	2	100%					1	50%
Ill.	25	6	24%	7	28%	14	56%	7	28%
Ind.	11	1	9%	6	54.5%	7	63%	6	54.5%
Iowa	8	3	37%	1	12.5%	2	25%	1	12.5%
Kansas	6			1	15%	2	30%	2	30%
Ky.	8	1	12.5%			3	37%	1	12.5%
La.	8	8	100%						
Mass.	14	6	43%	1	7%	4	28.5%	1	7%
Me.	3	1	33.1%			1	33.1%	1	33.1%
Md.	7	1	14%			5	71%	2	28%
Mich.	18	7	38.8%	3	16.6%	5	27.7%	2	11%

TABLE 10 (Continued).

State	No. of Districts In State as of 1936		Not Marginal 1938-1956		Marginal In At Least 50% of Elections 1938-1956		Changed Party At Least Once 1938-1956		Changed Party In at Least One of Five Elections: 1948-1956	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Minn.	9		1	11%	2	22%	6	66%	1	11%
Miss.	6		6	100%						
Mo.	11		1	9%	5	45%	9	81%	4	36%
Mont.	2				1	50%	2	100%	1	50%
Neb.	4		1	25%			1	25%	1	25%
Nev.	1				1	100%	1	100%	1	100%
N.H.	2				1	50%				
N.J.	14		4	28.5%	3	21%	7	50%	4	28%
N.Mex.	2									
N.Y.	43		17	39.5%	2	4.6%	17	39.5%	11	25.5%
N.Car.	12		9	39.5%						
N.Dak.	2		2	100%						
Ohio	23		6	26%	7	30%	11	48%	7	30%
Okla.	6		3	50%	1	16.6%	1	16.6%	1	16.6%
Ore.	4				1	25%	3	75%	3	75%
Pa.	30		2	6.6%	7	23%	25	83%	16	53%
R.I.	2						2	100%		
S. Car.	6		6	100%						
S.Dak.	2						1	50%	1	50%
Tenn.	9		6	66.6%						
Texas	21		20	95%			1	5%	1	5%
Utah	2						2	100%	2	100%
Vt.	1		1	100%						

TABLE 10 (Continued).

State	No. of Districts In State as of 1936	Not Marginal 1938-1956	Marginal In At Least 50% of Elections 1938-1956		Changed Party At Least Once 1938-1956		Changed Party In at Least One of Five Elections: 1948-1956	
			No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Va.	10	7	1	10%	2	20%	2	20%
Wash.	7		2	28%	6	86%	2	28%
W.Va.	6		5	83%	5	83%	2	33%
Wis.	10	1	1	10%	5	50%	2	20%
Wyo.	1		1	100%	1	100%		

^aData from Marginal Districts, 1958, Republican Congressional Committee, Washington, 1958, 1956 Congressional Vote Statistics, Republican Congressional Committee, 1956 and U. S. Govt. Election Statistics.

The Republican Committee lists each Republican marginal district with a breakdown by municipalities or precincts. It gives, in tabular form, the vote (Republican; Democratic; Other; Total; Plurality; Republican % of Total;) in congressional, senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential elections for the last five congressional election years. It lists former incumbents, describes population characteristics, and names the daily newspapers that serve the district, giving their circulation. It makes a similar tabulation of marginal districts in which the Republicans lost.

The Democratic Committee tabulates Democratic marginal districts under the headings: State, District, (winning) Party, Incumbent, Margin, Percent of the Two-Party Vote.

After tabulation of election results, the two Committees proceed differently, according to their established patterns and within their budgetary limitations. In the Democratic Committee, with its limited staff, Kenneth Harding, assistant to the Chairman, visits marginal and changing districts for conference with local leaders, in an attempt to discover both favorable and unfavorable factors in each situation. He is especially alert to discover changes in the usual voting pattern.³

³Such shifts, according to an official of the Republican Committee, can often be traced to one or more

The Republican Committee, with its more adequate staff, approaches campaign preparations in a more formal manner. When election results have been tabulated and analyzed, Field Service representatives visit all marginal districts and those which show a shift in voting pattern. Each field man is equipped with instruments prepared by the national office, whereby he attempts to help local organizations discover the important factors, both positive and negative, that helped influence election results and to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts.

Since, as Mr. Warner observed, "next to effective organization, the most important factor in a successful campaign is a good candidate," the Republican Committee has developed a Candidate Analysis Sheet for use by local party organizations.⁴ A good candidate, according to Mr.

of the following causes: (1) An incumbent candidate who has grown careless about maintaining contact with his constituents. (2) A candidate with little voter appeal. (3) Deterioration of local organization. (4) Failure of local organization to enlist volunteers. (5) A population shift that has introduced interests at variance with those of former residents. (6) Change in party loyalty resulting from failure of party leaders to mold policies according to interests of the district, e.g., the shift from the Republican party in the rural mid-west as a protest against the Administration's farm policy.

⁴For a copy of Candidate Analysis Sheet, see Appendix III.

Warner - though not all local party officials agree with him - should be young, have a good personality, and be addicted to hard work. It is the task of Field Service to help local party officials accept the facts revealed by the Committee's study of the district and use the Candidate Analysis Sheet. To do this without leading to suspicion that "the men in Washington are trying to dictate" often requires considerable tact.

A good campaign, Mr. Warner believes, requires:

(1) effective party organization developed within the district, (2) selection and support of a personable candidate who is young, vigorous, and hard-working, (3) effective use and adaptation to the local situation of materials prepared by the Committee, and (4) in the case of incumbent candidates, preparation at the local level by having kept constituents informed as to what their Congressman has been doing (through newsletters, broadcasts, press releases, telecasts, etc.).

Finding the right candidate

Though the results of the Committees' studies of voting patterns are always available to party workers, and though their interest in good candidates may lead them to

apply subtle pressure at an early stage, the campaign, according to representatives of the Committees, does not normally begin until after the primaries. This nice distinction may, however, be more theoretical than actual, for, says Sait, "notwithstanding the polite doctrine that they should stand above faction and act in the common interest, their influence in the pre-primary campaign is sometimes decisive."⁵

One suspects, however, that the availability of the Committees to the incumbents means in reality that the Committees tend to help incumbents to resist challenges in the nominating process. It is also probable that in cases where one contender for a Congressional nomination appears to have far greater chances of success according to Committee standards, or is more acceptable to Committee and Party leadership, that the Committees have little difficulty in finding ways to assist the candidate of their choice.

Once more the Democratic approach is entirely personal. After analyzing each situation, Mr. Harding, in personal interviews, attempts to help local Democratic leaders understand their problems and correct whatever defect in candidate

⁵Sait, op. cit., p. 289.

or strategy may have contributed to it.

In evaluating the qualifications of candidates, Mr. Harding depends upon his background of experience. His Committee has made little attempt to work out formal instruments for evaluating a proposed candidate's qualifications, nor has it any formal program for preparing a candidate for a campaign. Nevertheless, it has had the assistance of local organizations that have functioned effectively in recent elections. Whether the recent Democratic successes in Congress are traceable to activities of the Party Congressional Campaign Committee or to other factors in the current political scene is a question which plagues the student of the Committees. William Warner, Executive Director of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, explained Democratic successes as follows, "It is organization that wins elections, and the Democrats are well organized. They have the labor unions on their side and the unions are effectively organized right down to the precinct level."

Congressmen Jonas of North Carolina and Cramer of Florida, Mr. Warner feels, conduct the type of campaign which meets these standards. Both men, by careful study of their districts, good organization, and hard work, were able

to carry districts that had traditionally voted Democratic. Mr. Warner contrasted these men, who conducted the type of campaign advocated by the Committee, with Dewey Short of Missouri, a defeated congressman from a traditionally safe district who became so absorbed in his congressional duties that he neglected "the home folks" and failed to spend the necessary time in his district, campaigning.

To assure their party of an opportunity at the general election, a Campaign Committee may occasionally give financial assistance at the pre-primary stage. In 1954, for example, the Democratic Committee, fearing that no Democratic candidate would be running in certain California primaries, offered financial assistance for use in the primary campaigns.⁶ Such flexibility is, of course, characteristic of this Committee's operations.

Conduct of the campaign

During the congressional campaign the Democratic Committee makes no formal overtures to candidates, but it is understood that any Democratic candidate may, at any time, seek a conference with Mr. Harding or with a member or

⁶Hathorn, op. cit., p. 212.

members of the Campaign Committee. From such a conference the candidate, particularly if he is a neophyte, receives valuable information, as well as suggestions for running his campaign. He may even discover that Mr. Harding has a better grasp of political realities in his district than he has.

As a result of the confidential talks between him and the Committee representative whom he consults, financial assistance may be forthcoming. There is no fixed rule as to the amount allocated or the formula used in determining it. The amount, I was told, is "based on need" and arrived at by consultation. The consultative process seems to operate thus: early in the campaign Mr. Harding tallies the available resources and lists the "needs." The list is then handed to the Committee Chairman for additions or deletions - though the chairman rarely uses his veto at this stage. Similar lists are made by the Committee's consultants, Congressmen Rayburn and McCormack. Then, in a final session, the four men involved decide how funds shall be allocated.

Names are ranked in the order of priority and funds allocated according to need. The decision must be "objective," I was told - "based entirely on facts" - and may require

that a man "cut his best friend." This means, presumably, that the party's chance of winning, if help is extended, takes priority over personal considerations. It also takes priority over "moral" considerations. A candidate's personal character or even his value to the country must not be weighed against his power to win votes. If a relatively unknown candidate of unsullied reputation were to run against an unscrupulous candidate of such popularity as was enjoyed by, let us say, Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin during his heyday, the Committee would be obliged to reject him, on the grounds that, in their opinion, he would not poll a sufficient number of votes to warrant the investment. The maximum amount given is usually \$500 or less, though in special cases it may run as high as \$1,000.⁷

As the campaign progresses Mr. Harding continues to assist candidates by correspondence. Although the Democratic Committee does not itself assign speakers, its suggestions to the National Committee that speakers be assigned to a given district are usually given favorable consideration. The Committee publishes a few campaign pamphlets but, in general, eschews "canned materials."

⁷ This is, of course, exclusive of "directed funds," which may run as high as \$2,500. In one case in the 1956 campaign it was \$3,500. Analysis of grants made in this campaign appears later in the chapter.

Republican campaign procedure is, of course, more formal. The Republican Committee disavows secret enclaves, "deals," and negotiations. It professes to have no secrets and to rely almost entirely on "scientific" techniques.

Following the primary elections, all Republican congressional candidates are invited to Washington for a coaching conference. While there, candidates are photographed with the President, if he is a Republican, or with other highly-placed Republican officials. These photographs become available for campaign use. At the conference the Committee supplies each candidate with a kit of materials on how to conduct a successful campaign and makes available to him the information which has been collected on his district. Candidates are given speech-making tips and are invited to choose designs for publicity folders, posters, and gimmicks. They leave with information as to the services their Committee is prepared to give, and with assurances of its help.

During the campaign itself, the Republican Committee provides many services. In the 1956 campaign, which was probably typical, these included:

1. A Speech Kit - a compendium of facts, with quotations from prominent Republicans, on most of the issues to be discussed during the campaign. These include the party's

achievements, and its views on such questions as the federal budget, agriculture, civil rights, defense, foreign policy, highways, health and education, labor, small business, social security, taxes, trade, and veterans' benefits.

2. A Speaker's Handbook - a well indexed, pocket-sized abridgement of the Kit. Alphabetically arranged, it gives enough material for a complete speech on each subject listed. It includes at least one general speech. In 1956 it contained two: "A Republican Congress - A Must for Ike in '56" and "Peace - Prosperity - Progress."

3. A newsletter to candidates mailed from Washington each Wednesday during the campaign. (This is sent to Party officials and Republican newspapers all year). It carries "news events, official reports, statistical data of independent and non-partisan organizations, and other accurate and dependable sources."⁸

4. Newspaper advertising layouts on major campaign issues (together with suggestions as to the best way of approaching friends for the contributions necessary to cover the cost of this advertising.) The layouts are so complete

⁸Campaign Services of the Republican Congressional Committee (Washington, D. C: Republican Congressional Committee, 1956), p. 3.

that the candidate needs only to supply a photograph, his name, and if he wishes, a little personal data.

5. Campaign films of two types: (a) those prepared for general use, with provision at the beginning or end for a personal presentation by the candidate. The sections presenting the candidate "can be filmed in color or in black and white in Washington, using Committee facilities, or in (his) own district."⁹ (b) Films or film strips prepared on an individual basis "for candidates visiting Washington" These will show candidates "against Washington backgrounds, with Administration officials or in any way helpful to their campaign."¹⁰ With both types, the cost to the candidate is minimal.

6. Television "spots" running, in length, from ten to forty seconds. These are arranged on a flip-card device and may contain "in addition to a vocal message, a GOP jingle or other suitable music and sound effects." The time is divided, the first half giving reasons why all viewers should vote Republican, the second, why they should vote for the Republican congressional candidate. The forty

⁹Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 7.

second "spot" is arranged to give the candidate an opportunity for "a personal message" at its close. This may be done either in person or on film. Candidates are assisted by the Committee in the preparation and filming of "spots."

7. Radio spot announcements. The Committee provides candidates with recordings of various lengths, all of the "open end" variety, which allow the candidate to make a personal appeal. The Committee suggests that candidates confer with local radio and television experts. It also suggests the best hours for reaching specific audiences.

8. If the incumbent is a Democrat, the Committee furnishes the non-incumbent Republican candidate with:

- a. Opponent's voting record.
- b. Copies of all bills and resolutions introduced by opponent in the current session of Congress, with the history of action taken, if any.
- c. A record of opponent's attendance at both quorum calls and roll calls.

9. Services of the field staff, as desired. If in a marginal district, Field Service will seek out the candidate.

10. A Republican Workers' Manual containing detailed instructions for precinct workers on campaign tactics, tools to be used, temporary and permanent committees to be organized,

methods for organizing the precinct, and for conducting meetings.

All of these services are available to any Republican congressional candidate on request. The Committee regrets that only about three hundred candidates fully avail themselves of the proffered services.

It is interesting that, although the Republican Committee says very little about making grants to candidates, it actually does more in this area than the Democratic Committee. In the 1956 campaign it distributed \$230,300 in grants to 214 candidates as against \$176,400 allotted to 186 candidates by the Democratic Committee.

Size and distribution of grants by both Committees

It may be appropriate at this point to note to whom this money was distributed by each Campaign Committee and to what districts it went. Examination of distributions made during the 1956 campaign by both committees, including directed funds, show that the Republicans gave nothing to candidates in four southern states (Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina), one northern state (North Dakota), Alaska, or Hawaii. The Democratic Committee gave nothing in three of the same states (Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina) or in Arkansas, Maine, Vermont, and Alaska. In several

states both committees made grants which totaled \$1,000 or less, though the total in these states was \$6,000 for the Republican Committee, \$3,900 for the Democratic (Table 11).

Candidates in six states received grants which totaled \$10,000 or more from the Republican Committee. In only two states did grants from the Democratic Committee reach a five-figure total (Table 12).

The number of states in which grants totaled from \$1,000 to \$4,999 was quite similar for the two committees (18 for the Republican Committee and 19, plus Hawaii, for the Democratic). This was also true of grants from \$5,000 to \$9,999, a category in which the Republican Committee totaled 12, the Democratic Committee 13 (Tables 13 and 14).

The highest individual grant was \$3,500 to Henry O. Talle, Republican incumbent of thirty-eight years, in Iowa's marginal second district. Three other grants of \$3,000 each were made by the Republican Committee to incumbent candidates in other marginal districts in Iowa (4th, 5th, and 6th). In each of these districts \$1,000 was in directed funds; in the second district \$1,500 was in directed funds. The Democratic Committee's largest

TABLE 11

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES
TOTALED \$1,000 OR LESS IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN*

State	Republican total	Democratic total
Delaware	\$ 500.	
Georgia		\$ 100.
Louisiana	1,000.	300.
North Dakota		1,000.
New Mexico		500.
Oklahoma	1,000.	500.
Rhode Island	1,000.	
Tennessee		500.
Texas	1,000.	500.
Vermont	500.	
Wyoming	1,000.	500.

*This includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the two committees.

TABLE 12

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES
TOTALLED \$10,000 OR MORE*

State	Republican total	Democratic total
Illinois	\$ 13,250	\$ 12,000
Iowa	18,000	
Minnesota	10,000	
Michigan	20,000	
New York	14,000	
Pennsylvania	17,750	15,850

*This includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures in the 1956 campaign filed by the committees with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 13

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES IN
CAMPAIGN TOTALED \$5,000 to \$9,999*

State	Republican total	Democratic total
California	\$ 7,500	
Connecticut	6,500	
Indiana	8,300	\$ 8,250
Kansas	5,000	
Maryland	7,000	
Massachusetts		6,250
Michigan		8,250
Minnesota		7,750
Missouri	9,000	7,500
Nebraska	5,000	
New Jersey	8,000	5,000
New Mexico		5,000
New York		7,950
Ohio		9,250
Virginia	6,500	5,000
Washington	7,000	
West Virginia	8,000	6,500
Wisconsin	6,750	6,000
Total	\$ 84,550	\$ 88,700

*Includes directed funds.

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures for 1956, filed by the committees with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 14

STATES IN WHICH GRANTS FROM ONE OR BOTH COMMITTEES
IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN TOTALED \$1,000 to \$5,000
(INCLUDING DIRECTED FUNDS)

State	Republican total	Democratic total
Arizona	\$ 2,500	\$ 1,500
Arkansas	1,500	
California		3,750
Connecticut		4,500
Delaware		2,000
Florida	2,500	4,000
Idaho	3,500	2,250
Iowa		1,750
Kansas		3,500
Kentucky	4,500	2,000
Louisiana	1,000	
Maine	2,000	
Montana	2,500	1,500
Nebraska		2,000
Nevada	2,000	1,500
New Hampshire	2,500	1,500
New Mexico	2,000	
North Carolina	4,750	3,000
Ohio	3,000	
Oregon	4,250	1,000
Rhode Island		1,200
South Dakota	2,500	1,250
Tennessee	2,500	
Utah	2,750	2,000
Vermont	500	
Washington		4,500
Hawaii		1,500
Total	\$ 46,750	\$ 45,200

grant was \$3,000 to eight-year incumbent, Roy W. Wier, in Minnesota's marginal eighth district. Of this \$2,000 was in directed funds.

The Republican Committee made a \$500 grant (directed) to an uncontested incumbent, Thomas L. Ashley, who had served thirty-two years in Ohio's tenth district, and one of \$1,500 to Chairman Simpson (Pennsylvania 18th). No Democratic Committee officer accepted a grant, nor did the Committee make any grants to uncontested candidates.

The Republican Committee made grants to 214 candidates, of whom 126 (58.8%) won seats, the Democratic Committee to 186 candidates, of whom 86 (46.2%) won.

How many grants were distributed by the Republican Committee to incumbents and non-incumbents in marginal and non-marginal districts, and to what extent these grants produced results in terms of victory at the polls, for candidates in each category, is shown in the following series of tables, as is the amount of money involved for each category (Tables 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19).

One fact which these tables reveal is the rather even apportionment of funds by the Republican Committee between incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. A group of 119 incumbents (55.6% of the grantees) received grants

TABLE 15

NUMBER OF GRANTS BY THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE IN THE
1956 CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS AND NON-INCUMBENTS
IN MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS AND
NUMBER OF SEATS WON
(INCLUDING DIRECTED FUNDS)

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Number of seats won	% of grantees who won
Incumbents from marginal districts	29	22	75.8
Incumbents from non-marginal districts	90	89	98.8
Non-incumbents from marginal districts	48	10	20.8
Non-incumbents from non-marginal districts	47	5	10.6

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF TABLE 15

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Number of seats won	% of grantees who won
Incumbents	119	111	93.2
Non-incumbents	95	15	15.7
Candidates from marginal districts	77	32	41.5
Candidates from non-marginal districts	137	94	68.6

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the Republican Committee with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 17

AMOUNT OF MONEY DISTRIBUTED IN THE 1956 CAMPAIGN BY
THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE IN GRANTS OF INCUMBENTS
AND NON-INCUMBENTS IN MARGINAL AND
NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Amount dis- tributed	Average grant
Incumbents from marginal districts	29	\$ 41,800	\$ 1,441.38
Incumbents from non-marginal districts	90	85,500	950.00
Non-incumbents from marginal districts	48	59,750	1,244.79
Non-incumbents from non-marginal districts	47	43,250	920.21

TABLE 18

SUMMARY OF TABLE 17

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Amount dis- tributed	Average grant
Incumbents	119	\$127,300	\$ 1,069.75
Non-incumbents	95	103,000	1,084.21
Candidates from marginal districts	77	101,550	1,318.82
Candidates from non-marginal districts	137	128,750	939.78

Data from reports of contributions and expenditures
in the 1956 campaign filed by the Republican Committee with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

totaling \$127,300, or 55.3% of the total amount distributed, while 95 non-incumbents (44.4% of the grantees) received 44.7% of the funds.

TABLE 19

SIZE OF GRANTS BY THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE TO INCUMBENT,
NON-INCUMBENT, MARGINAL, AND NON-MARGINAL CANDIDATES,
(1956 CAMPAIGN)

Classification of grantees	Number receiving \$1,000 or less		Number receiving between \$1,000 and \$2,000		Number receiving \$2,000 or over	
		%		%		%
Incumbents	87	40.6	18	8.4	14	6.5
Non-incumbents	61	28.5	18	8.4	16	7.4
Candidates from marginal districts	39	18.2	19	8.8	19	8.8
Candidates from non-marginal districts	109	50.9	17	8.0	11	5.1

There is greater disparity between candidates from marginal and non-marginal districts. Those from the former (77 of the 214 grantees), though they constituted only 36%, received 44% of the \$230,300 distributed in grants, while the 137 candidates from non-marginal districts (64% of the grantees) received only 55.9% of the funds. This is shown in the average size of the grants awarded these two

groups - \$939.78 to non-marginal candidates, \$1,318.82 to those from marginal districts.

Despite this balance in favor of marginal districts, only 41.5% of these grantees won congressional seats, as contrasted with 68.6% of those from non-marginal districts. In terms of victories, incumbents far outdistanced novices; 93.2% of the incumbent grantees won, as contrasted with only 15% of the non-incumbents.

As for the size of the Republican Committee's grants to individuals, the largest number, to candidates in all categories, amounted to \$1,000 or less, with 50.9% of these going to candidates from non-marginal districts. In the larger grants, there was no great difference in the number of recipients in the several categories.

A study of the grants made by the Democratic Committee shows many similarities to the pattern of distribution to candidates in the several categories that we have just observed in the Republican Committee (Tables 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24).

These tables show that the Democratic Committee slightly favored incumbents in making grants. The 80 incumbents who constituted 43% of the grantees received \$99,300 or 56.3% of the funds granted, while the 106 non-incumbents (57% of the grantees) received only \$77,100

TABLE 20

NUMBER OF GRANTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE IN THE 1956
CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS AND NON-INCUMBENTS IN
MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Number of seats won	% of grantees who won
Incumbents from marginal districts	38	32	84.2
Incumbents from non-marginal districts	42	42	100.0
Non-incumbents from marginal districts	35	9	25.7
Non-incumbents from non-marginal districts	71	3	4.2

TABLE 21

SUMMARY OF TABLE 20

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Number of seats won	% of grantees who won
Incumbents	80	74	92.5
Non-incumbents	106	12	11.3
Candidates from Marginal districts	73	41	56.1
Candidates from non-marginal districts	113	45	39.3
By all	186	86	46.2

Data for both tables from reports of campaign expenditures for 1956 filed by the Democratic Campaign Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

TABLE 22

AMOUNT OF MONEY DISTRIBUTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE IN GRANTS TO INCUMBENT AND NON-INCUMBENT
CANDIDATES IN MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL
DISTRICTS (1956)
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Amount dis- tributed	Average grant
Incumbents from marginal districts	38	\$ 40,800	\$ 1,073.68
Incumbents from non-marginal districts	42	58,500	1,392.86
Non-incumbents from marginal districts	35	30,100	860.00
Non-incumbents from non-marginal districts	71	47,000	661.97

TABLE 23

SUMMARY OF TABLE 22

Classification of grantees	Number of grants	Amount dis- tributed	Average grant
Incumbents	80	\$ 99,300	\$ 1,241.25
Non-incumbents	106	77,100	727.36
Candidates from marginal districts	73	70,900	971.23
Candidates from non-marginal districts	113	105,500	933.63

Data in both tables from reports of campaign expenditures for 1956 filed by the Democratic Campaign Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

or 43.7% of the funds allocated as grants.

Candidates from marginal districts who made up 39.2% of the grantees received \$70,900 or 40.25% of the funds granted, while the 113 candidates (60.7%) running in non-marginal districts received \$105,500 or 59.75%.

TABLE 24

SIZE OF GRANTS BY THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE IN THE 1956
CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS, NON-INCUMBENTS,
MARGINAL AND NON-MARGINAL DISTRICTS

Classification of grantees	Number who received \$1,000 or less		Number who received between \$1,000 and \$2,000		Number who received over \$2,000	
		%		%		%
Incumbents	40	21.5	16	8.6	24	12.9
Non-incumbents	90	48.4	16	8.6	0	
Candidates from marginal districts	42	22.6	12	6.4	19	10.3
Candidates from non-marginal districts	88	47.3	20	10.75	5	2.7

Data from reports of expenditures in the 1956 campaign filed by the Democratic Campaign Committee with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

As for seats won, a higher percentage of Democratic than of Republican grantees were successful at the polls.

Of the Democratic grantees in marginal districts, 56.1%

won, as against 41.5% of the Republican grantees in marginal districts. Of the Democratic grantees from non-marginal districts, only 39.3% were successful as compared with the Republican's 68.6%. Democratic incumbent grantees, like their Republican counterparts, won elections in a high percentage of instances - 92.5%.

Like the Republican Committee, the Democratic Committee made more grants of \$1,000 or less than any other amount (130 of the 186 grants made, or 69.9% were in this category). Grants between \$1,000 and \$2,000 accounted for 32 grants, of which 26 were for \$1,500. There were 23 grants of \$2,000 and only one above that amount.

In making grants to incumbents both Committees favored candidates who had served in Congress ten years or less. The Republican Committee gave 64.6% of its grants to incumbents in this category, the Democratic Committee, 83.7%. The 36 grants made by the Republican Committee to candidates with eleven to nineteen years of service represented 30.1% of their grants to incumbents, whereas the Democratic Committee gave only nine grants (11.25%) to this group. Both Committees gave 5% of their incumbents' grants to men who had served for twenty years or more (Table 25).

TABLE 25

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF GRANTS BY BOTH COMMITTEES
DURING THE 1956 CAMPAIGN TO INCUMBENTS,
SHOWING LENGTH OF SERVICE IN CONGRESS
(INCLUDES DIRECTED FUNDS)

Length of service in years	Republican			Democratic		
	No. of grants	% of in- cumbents	% by 10 yr. groups	No. of grants	% of in- cumbents	% by 10 yr. groups
2 yrs.	11	9.24		20	25.0	
4 "	21	17.6		16	20.0	
			64.6			83.7
6 "	25	21.0		3	3.75	
8 "	5	4.2		19	23.75	
10 "	15	12.6		9	11.25	
12 "	6	5.0		3	3.25	
14 "	18	15.1		4	5.0	
			30.1			11.25
16 "	6	5.0		1	1.25	
18 "	6	5.0		1	1.25	
20 "	2	1.7		3	3.75	
24 "	1	.8				
			5.0			5.0
26 "	1	.8				
30 "	1	.8				
32 "	1	.8				
34 "				1	1.25	
Total	119			80		

Data from reports of expenditures during the 1956 campaign filed by both Committees with the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

In attempting to interpret these statistics, it should be borne in mind that averages and percentages do not tell the whole story. Victory or defeat in one strategically located district may seriously affect the balance of political power in an entire state, a fact which leads both committees to hazard considerable sums in critical areas. Each grant, as both committees realize and Democratic Committee leaders in particular emphasize, should be made only after evaluation of a complex of factors difficult to capture in a statistical table. The fact that no two districts are exactly alike compounds the difficulty of making comparisons. Such factors as the temperament of candidates, the strength of the opposition, and the political complexion of the district play so large a part that a composite of all the determinative factors can hardly be constructed. This, of course, is why Democratic Committee leaders insist that only persons who understand these nuances are qualified to allocate funds.

Committee services to incumbents

Since both committees maintain offices in Washington with full-time staffs the year around, they are available to give whatever assistance they can to incumbents. They may

help the new congressman find housing or secure an efficient office staff, and are always available for consultation on organizational problems. The Committees - particularly the Democratic - "cultivate" their congressmen, with much profit in terms of confidential information.

As would be expected, the Republican Committee offers incumbents a wide variety of services. "Public Relations" will help with publicity; for those who wish to run articles or advertisements in their home papers, the Art Department will assist with layout; Photographic Service is always willing to photograph congressmen with visiting constituents; the Committee's newsletter is available for mailing to constituents. If a congressman is asked to give a political address, he can call on the Committee's Research Department for facts and figures. In short, most of the services offered to candidates are available to incumbents.

Services to other groups

In addition to their services to candidates and congressmen the Campaign Committees conduct an educational program for the general public, as a means of keeping the political field under cultivation. The Republican Committee is able to carry on a better organized educational campaign

than its rival. It prepares literature for the political education of selected groups and distributes it to doctors, teachers, etc.¹¹ It prepares press releases for distribution to sympathetic news services. In short, it makes a constant effort to keep the Republican Party and the work of Republican congressmen before the voter.

In recent years the Republican Committee has added to its usual functions cooperation with the National and Senatorial Committees in the sponsorship of training schools for party workers, in an attempt to develop trained volunteer staffs for party organizations. However related to the concern over the Party's congressional defeats, these training conferences testify to the aggressive leadership of the Republican Committees at all levels, and to their desire to exert increasing influence in local party politics.

The Democratic Committee, fully aware of its comparative dearth of campaign services, faces the variety of Republican

¹¹ An example is an attractive, well-written, two-page folder in two colors, usable as a poster. Prepared especially for teachers, it comes in two parts. Part I, "Voter Registration" asks the reader to check his knowledge as to the size and population of his precinct, the regulations governing voter registration, including time, place, and voter eligibility. Part II, "Election Day," is a quiz on the time and place of voting, methods of balloting, assistance available to voters, and absentee voting.

services with candor and defends its methods. Its representatives maintain that the Democratic Party has been more successful at the polls, in part at least, because its Committee has helped candidates plan their own campaigns, which then reflect the personality of the candidates and are tailored to meet the requirements of their districts. The Republican Committee, they feel, provides so much "canned" material that it gives the campaigns a "made in Washington" stamp and robs them of that indigenous quality on which the Democrats pride themselves.

A representative of the Republican Committee admitted that his party was disturbed by its recent failures in congressional elections. "The year 1956 really hurt," said Mr. Warner. He felt, however, that the reason lay in the inability of candidates to adapt the material provided by the Committee to their local situations. He felt that candidates were often too apathetic or unimaginative to use campaign helps creatively.

Differences in philosophy

In reviewing the campaign functions of the two Committees it seems apparent that the greatest difference between them is in philosophy. A paragraph in the Republican

Campaign Manual for 1952 states the Republican Committee's position as essentially that of a public relations organization:

Organization in the political field has a single purpose - to SELL the Party's leaders and principles to the public. A political organization lacking the ability to sell has little value. Organization is the first requirement for victory, for without organization it is difficult to sell the party. The art of successful campaign management demands a thorough understanding of the principles of political organization.¹²

The long list of Republican Committee services which has been enumerated represents an attempt to implement this "sales" philosophy.

The Democratic Committee seems never to have so explicitly identified its methods with those of salesmanship. It professes to emphasize above all else personal relationships - relationships between constituents and candidates, between candidates and local party officials, and between candidate, local organization, and the Campaign Committee.

Despite obvious differences in philosophy and technique, the two Congressional Campaign Committees, working for the same objectives within their respective parties,

¹² Republican Campaign Manual, 1952 (Washington, D. C.: Republican National Committee, 1956), p. 7.

have in common more similarities than differences.

Their competition, at once sharp and friendly, gives each local campaign an added dimension of national importance and strengthens the sense of solidarity in American politics.

CHAPTER VII

ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

Problems and methods

In scrutinizing Congressional Campaign Committee leadership, two gaps handicap the student. The first is in the records. Since the Committees, as has been observed, regard themselves as functional organizations within the congressional structure, not directly dependent upon the public either for funds or for direction, they feel no obligation to divulge their affairs or, indeed, to keep records, except as these may serve their own purposes. Even their private records contain serious omissions, and no attempt has been made to compile historical data. There are consequently gaps in the lists of committee chairmen, with no Democratic chairmen listed for the period from 1869 to 1879 and no Republican chairmen from 1883 to 1893.

The search for information on committee leadership has led in many directions - to the Committee's offices for interviews and for such lists of chairmen, officers, and executive committee members as could be furnished, to Congressional Directories for names of counties or

municipalities in the districts represented by Committee leaders at the time of their election to Congress and their appointment to Committee leadership, and to census abstracts and reapportionment charts for statistical data as to the population of these districts.

In attempting to determine a standard for rural-urban classification of congressional districts, another problem was encountered. The United States Census Bureau counts all places with a population over 2,500 as urban. Some students consider this figure too low, since towns with a population of 2,500 to 5,000, unless contiguous or adjacent to large cities, are often little more than rural marketing centers. Even towns ranging in size from 5,000 to 10,000, though they usually have a number of industries, may, in some cases, be chiefly "market towns," rather than industrial or commercial centers, and are considered, in a study made by the Congressional Quarterly¹ in 1956, as small towns. The Quarterly's study considers a district rural if it contains no city of 25,000 or more. This figure, however, seems high and, if used, would give the impression that many congressional districts which contain towns of ten, fifteen,

¹"Rural Urban 'Districts' Role in Elections," A Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Washington, 1956), p. 360.

and twenty thousand inhabitants, are 100% rural.

All factors considered, it has seemed most reasonable, for purposes of this study, to adopt the U.S. census figure of 2,500 as the dividing line between rural and urban for incorporated towns, boroughs, and cities. Townships will not be considered urban unless their population, exclusive of towns of 2,500 or more, is at least 5,000 and they lie in an area contiguous or adjacent to a city of 20,000 or more.² Details as to the rural-urban classification scale to be used will be given later in the chapter.

When an attempt was made to study the voting patterns of Congressional Campaign Committee leaders, a serious problem was encountered: that of discovering a satisfactory basis for classifying voting records. "Conservative" and "liberal" appear, superficially, as useful categories for this purpose, but an attempt to discover objective standards for defining these terms proved difficult. In the hope of using contrasting standards set by organizations with such widely differing positions on public questions as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Committee on Political Education of the CIO, these organizations were

²See Appendix IV for a breakdown on all districts studied.

contacted, as were the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. and the Friends (Quakers) Committee on National Legislation - with disappointing results.

The Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers do not publish lists of congressional votes for public distribution. The Friends Committee on National Legislation has files of voting records that go back to 1950; the CIO's Political Education Committee, to 1947. These, however, are "right and wrong" lists which might legitimately be used only if balanced by lists which demonstrate rather clear-cut polarity in line with the expressed purposes of the organizations publishing them.

"Liberal" and "conservative" are also relative terms with respect to time. Liberal legislation at one period may, at a later date, be regarded as conservative. New Deal legislation eventually becomes standard practice, advocated by leaders who consider themselves conservative, while positions on new issues are called liberal. The problems inherent in determining when the transition has been accomplished are obvious.

Lacking objective criteria for defining these terms, as applied to legislation, the writer turned to a study of party unity in voting, made by publishers of The Congressional

Quarterly, in which the 79th Congress is chosen as the "guinea pig." This study sets up a criterion for determining a "party issue" and then tabulates votes on such issues, on coalition issues, and on deviations to the right and the left. Further details will be given later in the chapter.

For personal data on Committee leaders, The Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949 has proved an invaluable source.

General features of Committee leadership - age, political maturity and congressional experience

A cursory look at Campaign Committee leadership impresses one with the fact that distinguished representatives of the two parties have served as Committee chairmen. On the Republican list are such names as Zachariah Chandler, Chairman of the Radical Republicans' "Committee on the Conduct of the War" (1861), and Joseph W. Babcock, of whom Speaker Joseph Cannon wrote, "His continuance in public life is a matter of concern not only to his own district and state, but to the whole country" ³ There is also James S. Sherman who served as Vice President of the United States with William Howard Taft, Joseph Martin, an

³ Quoted in LaFollette, op. cit., p. 739.

elder statesman of the House, and Leonard Hall, chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Democratic Committee chairmen include James R. Doolittle who, in 1872, was chosen as permanent chairman of the Democratic National Convention, R. P. Flower, the financier who governed New York for four years (1891-1895), William L. Wilson, who held the post of Postmaster General under Cleveland, Frank E. Doremus, a mayor of Detroit, and five men who made serving in Congress their life's work and, after terms of thirteen to twenty-seven years, died in office.⁴

More careful study reveals that in both parties the chairmen had many features in common. Their age when chosen as chairmen and their previous experience in the political arena, both indicate that they had come to the position as mature men who had won their spurs on the political battlefield.

Of the seventeen Democratic chairmen, the age range at the time of accepting the chairmanship was from forty to sixty-one years; with the Republicans it was from forty-one

⁴James M. Griggs (13 yrs.), H. D. Flood (20 yrs.), William A. Oldfield (19 yrs.), Joseph W. Byrnes (27 yrs.), and Patrick Drewry (27 yrs.).

to seventy-four. For both committees the mean was just under fifty-two and the greatest concentration was from fifty to fifty-four. Of the Republican chairmen, 88% were under sixty. For the Democrats, the figure is 82% (Tables 26 and 27).

TABLE 26

AGE OF REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN FROM 1865 TO 1957 AT THE TIME OF
ASSUMING THE CHAIRMANSHIP - BY FIVE
AND TEN YEAR GROUPINGS

5 yr. age groupings	No. in each bracket	No. in 40-49 yr. bracket	No. in 50-59 yr. bracket	No. over 60 yrs.
40-44	3			
45-49	2	5		
50-54	9		10	
55-59	1			
60-64	1			
65-69	0			2
70-74	2			
Average age 51.7 yrs.				

Data from Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1794-1949.

TABLE 27

AGE OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
FROM 1865 TO 1957, AT THE TIME OF ASSUMING CHAIRMANSHIP -
BY FIVE AND TEN YEAR GROUPINGS

5 yr. age groupings	No. in each bracket	No. in 40-49 yr. bracket	No. in 50-59 yr. bracket	No. over 60 yrs.
40-44	2	6		
45-49	4		8	
50-54	6			
55-59	2			
60-64	3			
65-69	0			3
70-74	0			
Average age 51.8 yrs.				

Data from Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1794-1949.

One measure of their political maturity is the experience gained in political office prior to becoming Campaign Committee chairmen. Both Republicans and Democrats had held numerous posts: as members of state legislatures, in which some had been Speakers, as delegates to the National Conventions of their respective parties, as judges, and in numerous municipal and county officers. Here again, the record of the two parties is strikingly similar (Table 28).

TABLE 28

POSITIONS HELD BY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(1865-1957) PRIOR TO THEIR CHAIRMANSHIP

Position	Number of chairmen who held position	Percentage who held position ^a
State legislator	15	44.1
Municipal or county office ^b	13	38.2
Delegate to party's National Convention ^c	13	38.2
Member of state Board or Commission ^d	7	20.6
State judge or attorney	6	17.6
Delegate to party's State Convention ^c	5	14.7
Presidential elector	4	11.7
Office in party's State Committee ^f	3	8.8
Helped organize party	2	5.8
Foreign minister	1	2.9
State governor	1	2.9
Member of President's Cabinet	1	2.9

Based on data from Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949.

^a34 = 100% (17 chairmen of each party, 1885-1957).

^bIncludes prosecuting attorneys, judges, and assistant Postmaster General.

^cIncludes one chairman.

^dIncludes one delegate to a state constitutional convention.

^eChairman, member executive committee, executive secretary.

Another criterion of political maturity is the number of years served in Congress before being elected to the chairmanship of one of the Campaign Committees. Among the Democrats, the average length of service before assuming Committee chairmanship is just under ten years, or five congressional terms. Among Republicans, the average is slightly under eight years, or four terms.

Eleven of the seventeen Republican chairmen (65%) accepted the chairmanship before they had served in Congress a decade. Five of these had served less than five years. Of the Democratic chairmen, eight (47%) had served less than a decade, with four serving less than five years. In both Committees most chairmen had served in Congress at least four years. Only 12% of the Republican and 18% of the Democratic chairmen had served for a shorter period (Table 29).

Once elected, a chairman usually holds the office for more than one Congressional term. This, it might be added parenthetically, is also true of Executive Committee members. Republican Committee chairmen have served in that capacity for an average of two and a half Congressional terms, Democratic chairmen for an average of two (Table 30).

TABLE 29

LENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE BY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
CHAIRMEN (1865-1957) BEFORE ELECTION TO
CHAIRMANSHIP OF CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES

No. of years served in Congress before Chairmanship	Number	% serving over or under 10 years ^a	Number	% serving over or under 10 years
19			2	
16	2		2	
15			1	
12	3	35.3%		52.9%
11		served ten	2	served ten
10	1	years or	2	years or
		over		over
9			2	
8	3			
7			1	
6	3			
5		64.7%	1	47.0%
4	3	served	1	served
3		under ten	1	under ten
		years		years
1	1		1	
0	1		1	

Data from Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1744-1949.

^a17 = 100% (17 chairmen for each Committee).

TABLE 30

LENGTH OF SERVICE AS CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Yrs.	Republican Chairmen		Democratic Chairmen	
	No.	Area of greatest concentration	No.	Area of greatest concentration
1	1		0	
2	1		5	
3			2	12 (2 to 4 yrs.)
4	9		5	
5	1	13 (4 to 6 yrs.)	0	
6	3		2	
7	0		0	
8	0		1	
9	0		0	
10	1		1	
11	0		1	
12	1		0	

Data from committee records.

The last three Democratic chairmen, i.e., those serving since 1928, have had longer terms than any previous ones. They served for eight, ten, and eleven years, respectively, and Michael Kirwan is still in office as this is being written. For the Republicans, Babcock, who served twelve years (1893-1905) and William R. Wood who served ten (1923-1933) hold the record.

Geographical distribution; urban-rural classification

The question now arises: from what parts of the country do Committee Chairmen come? Are they from regions in which their party is strongly entrenched or from areas in which it is trying to gain a foothold? From marginal or safe districts? From metropolitan or rural areas? Or are chairmen chosen on the basis of ability, achievement, or party loyalty, without regard to geographical distribution?

When the chairmen of the two committees are classified geographically, an interesting pattern emerges. The Republican Committee has never had a chairman from a southern or border state, and only one from west of the Mississippi River (Frank P. Woods of Iowa, 1913-1919). Eight (47%) have come from the North Central States (west of Pennsylvania and east of the Mississippi), six (35%)

from the Middle Atlantic States, and two (just under 12%) from New England. They have been drawn from one relatively small area in which the Republican Party has historically been strong.

Most Democratic Committee chairmen on the other hand (eight or 47%) came from southern or border states east of the Mississippi. Southern and border states west of the Mississippi tie with North Central States east of the Mississippi for second place (three each). If the two groups of southern and border states are considered together, 65% of the Democratic chairmen represent this regional grouping. Two (12%) come from Middle Atlantic States and one from California (Table 31).

Until the twentieth century the Democratic Committee had had no chairman from farther south than West Virginia, but of the five chairmen who took office between 1900 and 1920 only one (Frank E. Doremus of Michigan) was from the north. Since 1920 five chairmen have been elected and, again, only one (Michael Kirwan of Ohio) has come from the north. This is to say that, of the eleven Democratic chairmen who have held office since the beginning of the twentieth century, 82% have come from southern and from three border states (Tennessee, Missouri, and Oklahoma). The area

TABLE 31

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
BY REGIONS^a

Region	Republican ^b		Democrats	
	No.	%	No.	%
New England	2	12%		
Middle Atlantic States	6	35%	2	12%
North Central States (East of Miss. R.)	8	47%	3	18%
Southern and Border States (East of Miss.)			8	47%
Southern and Border States (West of Miss.)			3	18%
Northern States (West of Miss.)	1	6%	1	6%
Total	17		17	

^aData and regional classification from Congressional Directories.

^b₁₇ = 100% (17 chairmen of each committee).

represented is that of the party's greatest electoral reliability. The fact that Kirwan, from a northern urban-rurban district (Youngstown, Ohio, area) has held the chairmanship for the last decades may be indicative of the Democratic Party's recognition of its growing strength in the industrial north.

Our next task is to study the rural-urban character of the districts represented by Committee chairmen. As already indicated, the United States Bureau of the Census figure (2,500) will be used as the dividing line between rural and urban. In every case, the population of the district, as apportioned when the chairman under consideration accepted the chairmanship of his Committee will be considered. Five categories for rural-urban classification, borrowed, with permission, from the master's thesis of Dr. Ralph M. Goldman,⁵ will be used, as follows:

- I. Rural. 70% or more rural.
- II. Rural-rurban. 60-69% rural.
- III. Middle rurban. 40-59% rural.
- IV. Urban-rurban. 30-39% rural.
- V. Urban. Less than 30% rural.

⁵Ralph M. Goldman, Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban Representation in Congress, Appendix II, pp. 143-62.

Two problems were encountered in trying to ascertain the rural-urban classification of William Rosecrans' district. The first question: "What was his district?" was posed by an apparent contradiction in facts given in the Biographical Directory of the American Congress - 1774-1949.

The Directory lists "William S. Rosecrans, San Francisco" as a member of the 47th and 48th Congresses.⁶ Its biographical data on Rosecrans, however, states that after resigning from the United States Army in 1867 Rosecrans "moved to California and settled in Los Angeles County."⁷ Both his business connections and his place of burial indicate a Los Angeles residence. Other sources, however, show him as residing in San Francisco prior to his election. These include the Congressional Directories for the 47th and 48th Congresses and the San Francisco Directory, 1880, in which he appears as a "general mining and civil engineer, r. Abbotsford House."⁸ His name is also found in the 1878 and 1879 San Francisco Directories.

⁶Biographical Directory of the American Congress - 1774-1949, ed. James Harrison (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 368 and 378.

⁷Ibid., p. 1756.

⁸Langley, San Francisco Directory for the Year Commencing April, 1880 (San Francisco: Valentine and Co., 1880), p. 780.

The second question was: what was the population of the district? The Congressional Directory states that the First District included San Francisco County and part of the city of San Francisco. Census figures for 1880 give the population of the county as 233,959, with a footnote indicating that population figures for the city had been destroyed by fire. Another census table, giving population of cities in 1880 lists the population of San Francisco as 233,959.⁹

All records of "San Francisco" as of 1880 give this figure. This is explained by the fact that when San Mateo and San Francisco Counties were separated in 1856 the term "San Francisco" was applied to a governmental unit known as "The City and County of San Francisco." This raises the question as to how Rosecrans' district should be classified. To be conservative, it has been classified as Middle-Rurban on the assumption that San Francisco in 1880 was a city of approximately 100,000 (since by 1890 it had grown to 298,997).

⁹The Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the First Session of the Fifty-Second Congress, 1891-1892, Vol. 50, Part 3 (Washington, 1895) (Table 4 for population statistics 1870, 1880, 1890); also, Census Report, Vol. I - Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900. Part I - Population (Washington: U. S. Census Office, 1901), Table 4.

In this case it would have accounted for approximately half the population of the county.

The most striking fact emerging from comparison of the rural-urban classification of Campaign Committee chairmen is the number of chairmen in both parties from rural districts (Tables 32 and 33). The Democratic Committee has had eight chairmen from rural districts, the Republican, five. Every Democratic chairman from a rural area represented a district in a southern or border state. Four of the Republican chairmen from rural districts came from the middle west, the other from a middle Atlantic state. Since 1920, however, only two chairmen from rural districts have been chosen by the Democrats, only one by the Republicans.

In the rural-rurban category (II), we find two Republican but no Democratic chairmen. The Republicans represented "small town" districts in Ohio and Indiana. Three chairmen of each party came from middle-rurban districts (III). The Democratic Committee has had only one chairman from an urban-rurban district (IV) (Kirwan, from the Youngstown area) but two from urban districts (V) - Flower from New York City and Doremus from Detroit. With the Republicans the figures are reversed, with two (Wood from the East Chicago area of Indiana and Martin from the Fall

TABLE 32

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(SENATORS EXCLUDED)

Chairman	District	Dates of chairmanship	Categories				
			I	II	III	IV	V
Hubbell	Mich. 9	1879-83	X				
Babcock	Wis. 3	1883-1905	X				
Sherman	N.Y. 27	1905-09			X		
McKinley	Ill. 19	1909-13	X				
Woods	Iowa 10	1913-19	X				
Fess	Ohio 7	1919-23		X			
Wood	Ind. 10	1923-33				X	
Bolton	Ohio 22	1933-37					X
Martin	Mass. 15	1937-39				X	
Ditter	Penna. 2	1939-43			X		
Halleck	Ind. 2	1943-47		X			
Hall	N.Y. 2	1947-53			X		
Simpson	Penna. 18	1953-	X				

Key: I Rural - 70% or more rural, II Rural-urban - 60-69% rural, III Middle-rurban - 40-59% rural, IV Urban-rurban - 30-39% rural, V Urban - less than 30% rural. From Ralph M. Goldman, Some Dimensions of Rural and Urban Representation in Congress, MS, University of Chicago, Appendix II, p. 143.

TABLE 33

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
(SENATORS EXCLUDED)

Chairman	District	Dates of chairmanship	Categories				
			I	II	III	IV	V
Rosecrans	Cal. 1	1881-85			X		
Flower	N.Y. 11	1889-91					X
Wilson	W.Va. 2	1891-93	X				
Richardson	Tenn. 5	1897-01	X				
Griggs	Ga. 2	1901-07	X				
Lloyd	Mo. 1	1907-13	X				
Doremus	Mich. 1	1913-17					X
Ferris	Okla. 6	1917-19	X				
Flood	Va. 10	1919-21	X				
Rouse	Ky. 6	1921-25			X		
Oldfield	Ark. 2	1925-28	X				
Byrnes	Tenn. 6	1928-36			X		
Drewry	Va. 4	1936-47	X				
Kirwan	Ohio 19	1947-					X

For key to categories, see Table 32.

River-Taunton section of Massachusetts) from urban-rurban districts and one (Bolton of Cleveland) from an urban district. If categories IV and V (urban-rurban and urban) are considered together, the two parties are equally represented by chairmen from districts which are predominantly urban or urban-dominated.

The pattern which emerges shows a wider distribution of Republican than of Democratic chairmen. Democratic chairmen seem to come from the two poles, rural or urban districts. Of the fourteen Democratic chairmen considered, eleven are from districts which are either rural or predominantly urban.¹⁰ Of the Republicans, eight of the fourteen fall into these categories. The other six represent districts which are either rural-urban or middle-rurban.¹¹

It will be noted that the classification used lends itself to comparison in large percentage groupings; the most densely populated districts (70% or more urban), the

¹⁰Three senators who served as chairmen are excluded from consideration.

¹¹Ditter's district (Penna. 2nd) is typical. Though a large area of rural Bucks and Montgomery Counties is included in the district, densely populated townships contiguous to Philadelphia are also included, together with four cities of over 10,000 inhabitants.

the least densely populated districts (70% or more rural), and the 40% that falls between these poles. According to this, the Republican Committee Chairmen from districts falling between the two extremes outnumbered the Democratic two to one (Table 34).

TABLE 34

RURAL-URBAN CLASSIFICATION OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
OF BOTH PARTIES TO SHOW DISTRIBUTION IN
THREE GROUPINGS

No. of Chairmen	Rural-(I) 70% or more rural	Rural-urban to urban-rurban (II, III, IV) Middle 40% (30-69% rural)	Urban-(V) 70% or more urban
Republicans	5	8	1
Democrats	8	4	2

Based on U. S. Census statistics. For details as to chairmen and their districts, see Appendix III.

As the Democratic Committee has chosen the majority of its chairmen from areas of its traditional strength, so the Republican Committee has sought the majority of its leaders from northern districts which, though not classified as rural, lie outside the bounds of large cities. Unlike the Democratic Committee, the Republican Committee shows no recent trend away from this pattern.

Political distribution

What of the political complexion of the home districts of Committee Chairmen? Since 1920 the Democratic Committee has had six chairmen, the Republican Committee eight. Inasmuch as this period covers the elections of over three decades, it has been chosen to give a picture of modern committee practice.

Here, the pattern of the two committees is quite distinct. Of the six Democratic chairmen serving during the period under consideration, five came from safe districts which, at the time of their chairmanship, had been returning Democrats to Congress year after year and had never been marginal. The only exception to this is the present chairman, Michael Kirwan from the 19th District, Ohio. Kirwan was elected chairman in 1947. His district had been Republican through 1934, when the vote was marginal. The District has since been Democratic, and was marginal only once - in 1940. Three congressional elections - all firmly Democratic - had occurred in Kirwan's district between this and his chairmanship.¹²

¹²It may be noted in passing that of the four Democratic Committee Chairmen who served in the 20th century before the 1920's, three came from solidly Democratic districts of southern or border states - Georgia 2nd, Missouri 1st, Oklahoma 6th.

The districts from which the Republican Committee's leadership has been drawn show a more varied pattern. The first three chairmen of the 1920's - Simeon Fess, (Ohio 7th), Will R. Wood (Indiana 10th), and Chester C. Bolton (Ohio 22nd) - represented districts which, at the time of their election to Committee chairmanship, had been consistently returning a Republican vote. The district of the fourth chairman, Joseph Martin (Massachusetts 14th), had swung to a Democratic vote in 1934, three years before Martin became chairman, but had returned to a Republican majority in the election of 1936. It was marginal in 1940.

The sixth and seventh chairmen of this period, Charles Halleck (Indiana 2nd) and Leonard Hall (New York 2nd) represented districts which had changed their voting patterns, but had become stable Republican districts by the time Halleck and Hall became chairmen. The district of J. William Ditter (Pennsylvania 8th) returned a marginal vote in 1936, two years before he accepted the chairmanship, but has been marginal since then only once - in 1954. Equally steady is the district of Richard Simpson (Pennsylvania 18th). It has returned a marginal vote only twice in the century - in 1934 and 1936, almost two decades before Simpson became chairman (Table 35).

VOTING PATTERN IN DISTRICTS REPRESENTED BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Chairman	Dates	District	Voting pattern of district
Fess(R)	1919-23	Ohio 7th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Wood(R)	1923-33	Ind. 10th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Bolton(R)	1933-37	Ohio 22nd	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Martin(R)	1937-39	Mass. 14th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Ditter(R)	1939-43	Pa. 8th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Halleck(R)	1943-47	Ind. 2nd	d d D d D d R R R R R R R R R R
Hall(R)	1947-53	N.Y. 2nd	D D D D D D D D D D R R R R R R
Simpson(R)	1953-	Pa. 18th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Flood(D)	1919-21	Va. 10th	D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Rouse(D)	1921-25	Ky. 6th	D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Oldfield(D)	1925-28	Ark. 2nd	D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Byrnes(D)	1928-36	Tenn. 6th	D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Drewry(D)	1936-47	Va. 4th	D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Kirwan(D)	1947-	Ohio 19th	R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R

Marginal vote indicated by lower case. Double line shows point at which chairman took office.

This study seems to indicate that chairmen are chosen from safe and solid districts. Rarely indeed does there appear to be any correlation between the choice of a chairman and the need to influence the vote or even the trend in a district. Occasionally, however, appointment to the executive committees may go to a congressman from a state the party is trying to woo. Appointment of Robsion, the only Republican representative in the 79th Congress from Kentucky, is a case in point.

Party unity; deviation in voting

A further criterion for judging Campaign Committee leadership is by its adherence to "the party line" insofar as one exists. In 1946 the Congressional Notebook made a study of party unity in the 79th Congress, based on the voting records of congressmen from January, 1945, to the Easter recess in April, 1946.¹³ To bring the results up-to-date a second study was made, covering the last three months in the 79th Congress (April 9 - Aug. 2, 1946).¹⁴

¹³"Party Unity Part I - House," Congressional Notebook, Vol. III, No. 35 (Washington, D. C.: Press Research, Inc., May 3, 1946). Results used by permission.

¹⁴"Party Unity Part II - House," Congressional Notebook Quarterly News Features, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Washington, D. C.: Press Research, Inc., September 23, 1946). Results used by permission.

Taken together, these studies shed considerable light on the degree of party unity displayed in the voting of Campaign Committee chairmen, past, incumbent, and future, and of Campaign Committee officers and executive committee members who were then in Congress. No explanation is given as to why the 79th Congress was chosen for study, except for a statement that deviation from the party line had by then become so frequent as to merit study. Since this trend has continued in subsequent Congresses, it is perhaps legitimate to select the 79th Congress as a random example of modern congressional voting.¹⁵

The study was based on the assumption that, since there is in the United States very little party discipline, the position of a party might, for purposes of study, be determined by its congressional vote. When the two parties divide sharply, according to this analysis, with the majority of one party voting in opposition to the majority of the other, a party issue emerges.

The Notebook reported a study of fifty-seven record votes on party issues determined by this criterion, excluding those on which the intra-party split was so

¹⁵ See also explanation in introductory section of this chapter.

even that no clear-cut majority emerged. On the fifty-seven record votes, twenty-seven of the House Democrats (12%) and sixteen Republicans (about 8%) voted with their party in every case. These non-deviant voters are designated by the Notebook as "party liners."

In Congress at this time were Charles Halleck, chairman of the Republican Committee, former Republican chairman, Joseph Martin, and two future chairmen, Leonard Hall and Richard Simpson. Patrick Drewry was just completing his chairmanship of the Democratic Committee and Michael Kirwan, who was to succeed him, was serving his fifth term in the House. None of these men voted as "party liners." Their deviation varied from one vote, by Simpson, to eleven by Drewry (Table 36).

"The key members of the House," says the Congressional Notebook, ". . . whose votes have a deciding influence on every controversial question, are those who broke with their party between 6 and 18 times on the 57 roll call votes. These are crucial also from the standpoint of party discipline. Party leaders can usually count on members in the under-five category, while those in the 19-or-more class are considered as beyond salvation so far as the party is concerned."¹⁶

¹⁶"Party Unity Part II - House," Congressional Notebook, p. 2.

TABLE 36

DEVIANT VOTING OF CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN,
PAST, INCUMBENT, AND FUTURE,
IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

Party	Chairman	Dates of chair- manship	No. of votes against party in 57 record votes in which the majorities in both parties voted opposite ways
Rep.	Martin	1937-39	3
Rep.	Halleck*	1943-47	2
Rep.	Hall	1947-53	7
Rep.	Simpson	1953-	1
Dem.	Drewry*	1936-47	11
Dem.	Kirwan	1947-	7

*Incumbent chairman at time of study.

This would put Republican chairmen, Halleck, Martin, and Simpson in the "safe" category and place Hall and both Democratic Chairmen, Drewry and Kirwan, in the group classified as sufficiently deviant to be regarded in the House as influential, but not so deviant as to be regarded by the party as out of line.

A comparison of the Executive Committees of the two Campaign Committees, including officers, shows that five Republicans and six Democrats voted in the "safe" category, i.e., cast no more than five deviant votes. This represents

50% of the Republican Committee's executive committee and 40% of the Democratic Committee's larger executive committee. Among these, two Democrats - Sol Bloom of New York and Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania - fall into the "party liners" category. No Republican executive committee members were so classified.¹⁷ Nine Democratic and three Republican executive committee members cast between six and eighteen deviant votes (60% and 30% respectively) which puts them in the category which the Notebook calls influential in the House but not out of line. One Republican executive committee member, Wolverton of New Jersey, deviated on nineteen votes (1/3 of the 57) thus falling at the lower edge of the "out of line" classification. There were no Democratic executive committee members so classified (Tables 37 and 38).

The Notebook's study also included the votes on twenty-seven issues upon which coalitions were formed, with a majority of both parties voting together. These votes frequently represented compromises arrived at after prolonged debate. On these twenty-seven issues, as might be expected,

¹⁷ Three members of the 32-member Republican Campaign Committee are so classified but, since a list of the entire Democratic Campaign Committee during the 79th Congress is unobtainable, a comparison of the voting of the full Committees cannot be made.

TABLE 37

DEVIANT VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE REPUBLICAN
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

Exec. Comm.	State	Categories		
		I "Safe"	II "Influential"	III "Out of line"
Hinshaw	Cal.		X (14)	
Halleck	Ind.	X (2)		
Dirksen	Ill.		X (9)	
Robson	Ky.	X (2)		
Wigglesworth	Mass.		X (11)	
Short	Mo.	X (1)		
Wolverton	N.J.			X (19)
Hall	N.Y.		X (7)	
Hess	Ohio	X (1)		
Simpson	Pa.	X (1)		
Total deviant members		5 (50%)	4 (40%)	1 (10%)

TABLE 38

DEVIANT VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN THE
79TH CONGRESS

Exec. Comm. Member	State	Categories		
		I "Safe"	II "Influential"	III "Out of line"
Hobbs	Ala.		X (13)	
Murdoch	Ariz.	X (1)		
Woodhouse	Conn.	X (1)		
Madden	Ind.	X (3)		
Chapman	Ky.		X (6)	
Allen	La.		X (18)	
Lane	Mass.		X (9)	
Bloom*	N.Y.	X (0)		
Bulwinkle	N.Car.		X (12)	
Kirwan	Ohio		X (17)	
Johnson	Okla.		X (13)	
Eberharter*	Pa.	X (0)		
Drewry	Va.		X (11)	
Jackson	Wash.	X (1)		
Wasielewski	Wis.		X (13)	
Total deviant members in each category		6 (40%)	9 (60%)	

*Party liner

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deviant voting was much more frequent than on the fifty-seven issues on which the parties voted in opposition to each other. On seventeen of these issues the minority vote was to the right of the coalition majority; on ten it was to the left. The terms "right" and "left" are not defined but are given substance by the issues upon which "left" and "right" positions emerged during debate on the House floor.

To interpret the vote of Congressional Campaign Committee leaders on these selected issues, it is first necessary to observe the voting pattern of all the Democrats and all the Republicans in the House, as a base with which the votes of the chairmen and executive committee members may be compared.

There were in the 79th Congress two hundred thirty-seven Democrats. If Speaker Rayburn and fourteen non-deviant Democratic voters are excluded, 222 Democrats voted against their party's majority on one or more of these twenty-seven issues, casting 334 votes to the right of the majority and 646 to the left, an average of 1.05 votes to the right for each representative voting and 2.99 to the left.

Republicans in the House numbered 189. Excluding the non-deviants, 157 of them voted against the coalition

majority, casting an average per person voting of 3.4 votes to the right and only .45 to the left.

In comparing the two parties it will be noted that the Republicans had more than twice as many non-deviant voters (32 as against the Democrats' 14). Average votes, when compared, show 3.4 to the right for the Republicans, and 1.05 for the Democrats; .45 to the left for the Republicans, 2.99 for the Democrats.

The six Campaign Committee chairmen, past, incumbent, and future, in the 79th Congress were distributed between the two parties in a two-to-one ratio - four Republicans and two Democrats. They all showed general conformity to their party's position, though all voted independently at least twice.

The four Republicans voted to the right of the coalition majority in fourteen votes, an average of 3.5 times, which is very close to the average for the party. Their deviation varied from two votes by Hall to five by incumbent Halleck. They cast no votes to the left of the coalition majority. The two Democratic Chairmen, incumbent Drewry and future chairman Kirwan, cast eleven deviant votes, four to the right and seven to the left, an average of 2 and 3.5 respectively, as against their party's average of 1.05 and 2.99 (Table 39).

It should be noted that Republican chairmen deviated only to the right, while the two Democrats divided sharply. This is perhaps explainable by the divergent interests of their respective districts, since Drewry was from a rural district in Virginia, Kirwan from the industrial north.

TABLE 39

DEVIATION IN VOTING TO THE RIGHT OR LEFT OF THE TWO-PARTY
COALITION BY CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN, PAST,
INCUMBENT AND FUTURE IN THE 79TH CONGRESS

Party	Chairman	Dates of chair- manship	No. of votes to right	No. of votes to left
Rep.	Martin	1937-39	4	0
Rep.	Halleck*	1943-47	5	0
Rep.	Hall	1947-53	2	0
Rep.	Simpson	1953-	3	0
Dem.	Drewry*	1936-47	4	0
Dem.	Kirwan	1947-	0	7
Total deviant votes			18	7

*Incumbent chairman

Turning now to the executive committees of the two Campaign Committees, we find that two Republican members were non-deviant voters, but that all Democrats deviated on at least one issue. Republican deviation was strongly to the right, with twenty-six such votes as against two to the

left. The average to the right (3.7 votes) was very close to the 3.4 average of all House Republicans. Since only one member voted to the left of the coalition majority, the term "average" cannot be applied.

The Democratic Committee's executive committee, which had no non-deviant voters, cast fifteen votes to the right of the majority (average 3.7 votes) and forty-five to the left, an average of 3.2 votes per person voting. This is higher than the average for Democrats in the House as a whole, whose average was 1.05 to the right and 2.99 to the left.

To complete their analysis of party unity in the 79th Congress the Notebook published a later study based on voting records from April 19 to August 2, 1946, a period during which forty-five votes were taken. In studying these votes, the Notebook established four new categories as follows: (1) Voted or declared with their party majority, (2) Voted or declared against their party majority, and (3) Undecided, absent, or general pairs. It then calculated the percentage of votes cast by each Congressman with his party's majority, but made no attempt to classify votes as being to the right or left of the party's position. It called those who voted with their party in 90% or more of

the forty-five votes "party stalwarts." During the period considered, three chairmen were so rated - Simpson and Kirwan, each with a score of 92% and Republican incumbent Halleck, with a 100% record of voting with his party on the forty-five record votes.

During this period, Campaign Committee chairmen, past, incumbent, and future, then in Congress voted with their party's majority on an average of 83.5% of the forty-five votes, though the four Republicans averaged 87.7% conformity, the two Democrats only 75%. Conformity to their party's position by members of the two Campaign Committees' executive committees was as follows: Republicans, an average of 80.2% of the forty-five votes, Democrats, 75.4%.

The Notebook asserts that "the balance of power rested with the 22% of the House membership - 63 Democrats and 34 Republicans who voted with their party majority more than one half but less than three fourths of the time."¹⁸ Five such voters are to be found on the executive committee of the Democratic Campaign Committee (Murdoch, Allen, Bulwinkle, Wasielewski, and Kirwan), four appear among

¹⁸"Party Unity Part II - House," Notebook, Congressional Quarterly News Features, Vol. IV, No. 3 (Washington, D. C.: September 23, 1946), p. 3.

members of the Republican Committee's executive committee (Hall, Hinshaw, Wigglesworth, and Wolverton). In both executive committees this constitutes 40% of the membership. In "party stalwarts" (90% or more votes with party majority) the Republican committee ranks above the Democratic, with four of their ten members (40%) qualifying; three of the Democrat's fifteen executive committee members (20%) rank as "stalwarts." Since forty-three House Democrats (18%) and eighty-four Republicans (44%) fall into that category, Republican executive committee members rank near the average for their party in this respect. Democratic executive committee members, with 20% stalwarts rank slightly above the average for their party.

According to the Notebook's figures, and despite the handicap posed by the change in method introduced in Part II, the most striking fact in the entire study is the similarity in the way chairmen, executive committee members, and other members of the House voted. The variation in pattern between the two parties is much more conspicuous than that between Campaign Committee leaders and other congressmen of their own party. In voting, Campaign Committee leaders seem to function as loyal party members, influenced by commitments to their home districts, and, to a somewhat

lesser extent, by their position on their party's Campaign Committee.

It is significant that, though the session of the 79th Congress chosen for study, gives only a sampling, it does include in its membership the men who have chaired the two Congressional Campaign Committees for the past two decades. Drewry became chairman in 1936 and Martin in 1937. Especially interesting is the difference in the voting of Simpson and Kirwan, incumbent chairmen as this is being written.

Summary

In conclusion it may be said that the leadership of both Congressional Campaign Committees has been placed in the hands of able party members, men who came to their positions in the Committees in middle life (average age, 52 years), with records of political leadership in their home communities and with at least two terms of congressional service behind them. They have come from districts in which their party is firmly entrenched, politically, and from areas in which it has historically been strong. Democratic Committee leadership has come principally from the rural south, though northern cities or their environs holds second

place. Republican leadership has come mainly from the north, east of the Mississippi River, and has shown, since 1920, a trend away from rural districts to those whose rural population runs from 30 to 69%. In voting, the Republican Committee leadership, according to the sampling used, voted more conservatively than its Democratic counterpart, though in both cases deviation from the party or coalition majority was not so frequent as to cause party concern. "Representative" seems to be the best word for describing them, for they are representative of their party's voting position, its geographical strongholds, and its numerical strength. Their maturity and record of service both in and out of Congress are such that their parties willingly acknowledge and accept their leadership.



CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISONS AND PROSPECTS

Before attempting to evaluate the Congressional Campaign Committees it may be instructive to observe how the functions performed by Campaign Committees in the United States are handled in countries with a smaller area, a fairly homogeneous population, and centralized parties. Elections in England are a case in point.

The British system of government and elections eliminates many of the campaign problems endemic to the United States. Election campaigns are brief, never running more than twenty days from the dissolution of Parliament and the call for elections to the polling day. Expenditures are strictly limited by law to approximately \$4,000 per district. The government apportions radio time with the state-owned British Broadcasting Company and provides candidates with limited free mailing privileges. British newspapers often devote considerable space to information about the candidates and a factual presentation of the issues. Such spreads may include photographs and biographical data on all candidates, with an unbiased statement of the history and present position of both parties.

The political traditions of Great Britain help the able candidate. Emphasis is placed on political meetings with questions and heckling. This habit, Neumann observes, "tests both the stamina and the sense of humor of the candidate. While it may seem startling and rude to foreign observers, it forces the candidate to think on his feet, a habit which will stand him in good stead when he takes his seat in the House of Commons."¹ Street corner oratory is an accepted practice and meetings in which the candidate appears only to answer questions are common. Such meetings emphasize the personal talents of the candidate rather than his ability to afford a professional public relations advisor and the expensive publicity techniques that are of value mainly in isolated districts.

The British system, with a government in which one branch predominates, with all elections held at the same time, and with all candidates committed to support their party's ideology and strategy, focuses national attention on the parties. In such a system the candidate, even though from a small or rural district, is never politically isolated nor is his campaign lacking in national significance.

¹Robert Neumann, European and Comparative Government (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 85.



This being true, the parties do everything possible to develop strong local organizations, including both professional leaders and lay workers, and make every possible service available to the candidates. Their leadership training programs are expensive, far outdoing anything in the United States.² Their Summer Schools, for example, are described as follows:

Summer schools are conducted for young people and adults by the Labor, Conservative, and Liberal Parties. One or two week courses are repeated from June to September and are attended by party workers and by the more politically-minded of the party faithful. Government and party officers from the Cabinet to the local ward club visit the schools - which are usually held in university towns or holiday resorts - to lecture or teach courses on party organization, local government, home policy, or international relations. The Conservative Party maintains an additional year-round curriculum at its Bonar Law College. More specialized instruction in party organization and elections is given by the major parties to candidates for employment in the permanent staffs. The graduates are duly certified and, when employed as parliamentary agents, maintain their own trade unions (within their respective party organizations) and professional journals.³

²It should be noted, however, that in the summer of 1955 the Republican Party in the United States held a campaign school in Washington for state leaders and other selected party workers. For an account of the work and agenda of this school, see the New York Times, September 6, 1955.

³Herman S. Beukema, et al., Contemporary Foreign Governments, ed. rev., Associates in Government, U.S. Military Academy (New York: Rinehart, 1949), pp. 30-31.

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When a British election is called, the party organization is already formed on an area basis, and is ready to mobilize and begin campaign functions. At the same time the National Party Headquarters is ready to make every service available to the local organization and candidates. "Each party headquarters," says Finer, "issues, at cost, to the candidates various kinds of leaflets, placards, 'election news,' some on special topics such as education, war and peace, and housewife and prices, etc. Slogans are invented, such as 'Fair shares for all,' 'Whose finger is on the trigger?' and 'Make Britain strong and free.'"⁴

In order to facilitate this work, the parties maintain Regional (Labor) and Area (Conservative) offices. These offices represent the National Party Headquarters at the local level.

The most important factor in this system is the ideological and responsible nature of British political parties. The party programs and Elections Manifesto are key factors, and the local campaign is often little more than a continuation of the party struggle in a particular area. Finer puts it well:

⁴ Herman Finer, Governments of Greater European Powers (New York: Henry Holt, 1956), p. 81.

The campaign is strongly in the hands of party headquarters. The leaders on all sides have concentrated on the problems of victory almost constantly. The momentary Prime Minister and Ministers, and the Leader of the Opposition and the Opposition Bench and their confidants and top managers and agents divide the lines, though they themselves, of course, are asking for their own election merely as members of the Commons like any ordinary M.P. Policy is decided here at the top level, not in the constituencies. It is expressed in the Election Manifesto. These fairly brief documents state the chief issues and the party answers. Each is taken by its opponents as a commitment on which a mandate has been asked from the electorate. Voters know that the local variations of the Manifesto will not commit the leaders and also that the leaders will be expected to fill their promises

The Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition tour the nation; so do the other party leaders. They cross examine the speeches of the principal opponents. Their impact in the localities far outdoes that of the local candidates.⁵

The same general pattern prevails on the continent. France, Italy, and Germany have multi-party systems and use a form of proportional representation which makes adherence to the party program almost inevitable. Here again, all national elections occur simultaneously and the parties rise or fall with the election of their candidates to Parliament. Though candidates in France and Italy tend to be more "on their own" than in Britain, yet in all three countries the party performs many of the functions

⁵Ibid., pp. 80-81.

of the Congressional Campaign Committee in the United States.

In France candidates receive assistance, as American congressional candidates do not, from both the state and the party. French campaign practices also encourage more meetings with the candidates and more discussion than in America. This obviates the need for candidates to make large financial outlays or to find original and captivating ways of presenting their political messages.

According to Duverger⁶ the control of electoral propaganda is precisely to insure equality between the candidates and to prevent wealthy candidates having an advantage over poorer ones. Thus the national radio service gives equal time to all candidates, and assigned poster sites, divided equally among candidates, are the only ones allowed for the affixing of posters.⁷ The impartiality of government service

⁶ Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, trans. Barbara and Robert North (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

⁷ In the matter of posters a rough-and tumble battle ensues and seems to be sanctioned, possibly because the rivalry involved whets interest in the campaign. Roche and Stedman observe that "at election time the French tend to desert their national sport, soccer, in favor of another and hardly less rough form of recreation known as billboard warfare. The object is to paste the propaganda of one's own party over that of opposition parties on the billboard, and each party has offensive as well as defensive teams in the field." John P. Roche and Murray S. Stedman, Jr., The Dynamics of Democratic Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 153.

to all candidates is policed by a committee which includes representatives of all parties, and is presided over by a judge.

A glimpse of the French system at work in an election is given in Governments of Continental Europe, as follows:

Appeal is made to the people through most of the methods employed in other democratic countries. Thus use is made of the basic and elementary procedure of addressing by mail the individual voters. Statutory provisions arrange that declared candidates may have printed at the public expense, envelopes, ballots, election circulars, and posters.⁸ Dispatch of materials by mail is likewise free of charge. Deposits must be made by candidates, the money being returned if a fixed fraction of the votes is received. Such candidates as secure the return of their deposits may also be reimbursed for gasoline and for the cost of arranging display posters Members of the government and other orators of national reputation, most of whom will themselves be candidates somewhere, make speeches in various parts of the country. Less formal discussion is particularly characteristic of French politics. The Café du Commerce in provincial communities has become a proverbial center of political activity. The electoral systems of the Fourth Republic have undoubtedly tended to cause national issues to be stressed and party programs to be followed more closely

⁸French voters place their ballots in envelopes and deposit them in the ballot box. Formerly ballots and envelopes distributed by candidates could be used; now only official ballots and envelopes are permissible. Since 1946 postal voting has been available to men in the armed forces, women nearing childbirth, hospital patients, civil servants away from home on official duty, etc. Proxy voting is available to men in the armed services and merchant marine who are within six days of home by mail.

by the candidates, but personalities and local interest have continued to play no little part.⁹

One is struck by the fact that in such democratic countries as England and France the parties, the electoral systems, and especially the absence of that degree of conflict between the executive and the legislative branches of government which is built into the structure of American government, eliminate much of the necessity for the duality of party organization which, in the United States, corresponds to this bifurcation.

Work of the Campaign Committees in a non-ideological system

In contrast to European systems, the United States has a non-ideological system of politics, a system of the "ins" opposed by the "outs," "the government" and the party which opposes the government. The opposition, unlike that in England, is not so much an opponent of ideas as a contestant for position. As Duverger puts it, "We must recall that . . . American parties are founded on no ideological or social bases, that they include diverse elements and doctrines . . . , that fundamentally they are organizations

⁹Gooch, Zurcher, Lewenstein, Florinsky and Shotwell, Governments of Continental Europe, ed. James T. Shotwell (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 98-99.

for the conquest of administrative and political offices . . ."¹⁰

Under our system, as contrasted with the multiparty systems of many European countries,¹¹ the two major parties represent nearly all the voters and are of approximately equal strength. Though minor parties are permitted, their combined strength is so negligible that it constitutes no threat to the major parties, of which one must always be in the majority and constitute the government (i.e., its executive branch). The legislative branch, while divided between the two parties, is often dominated by one.

Under this system both parties tacitly accept the fact that elections are not so much ideological contests as contests for the control of government. This is well expressed by Leiserson:

When campaign issues are centered upon competition for control of government between parties sharing a basic political consensus, party propaganda is more

¹⁰ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activities in the Modern State, trans. Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), p. 210.

¹¹ Berdahl notes that in 1930 the number of parties in European countries ranged from four in Austria to twenty-four in the Reichstag, that in these systems parties often represent mere shades of opinion, that no one party is ever dominant, and that governing is actually by a series of coalitions. Clarence Berdahl, Our Two Party System (Jackson, Miss.: University of Mississippi, 1951).

concerned with tactics than with ideology, notwithstanding the efforts of propagandists on either side to clothe the interparty debate in the dress of "fundamental issues" and "basic philosophy." Even more determining, probably, than basic ideological consensus is the geographic and social composition of the party members, supporters, and "independents." When all parties hope to attract large groups of workers, farmers, business and professional men, women, and older people, it is idle to expect and incompetent to propose that the parties deliberately set out to establish sharp and clear differences between each other of interest, membership, and doctrine The result of emphasizing too-specific policy positions may be to alienate sizeable segments of the floating, independent, or interest-group vote. Hence the resort to generalized statements of beliefs and principles, and emphasis upon personalities around which people can cohere.¹²

Though this statement applies particularly to presidential elections in which both parties aim at a national majority, its pragmatism reflects the philosophy of both Congressional Campaign Committees. As we have seen, they are concerned with tactics, rather than ideology and their boasted neutrality applies both to candidates, and to party platforms and policies.

Let us see first, how this affects their work with candidates, party workers, and state and local party organizations. It is because of the needs of these groups, which the Committees regard as their primary responsibility, that

¹²Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 262-63.

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the pattern of neutrality exists. The more the Committees adhere to their role as service organizations, concerned only with the winning of elections the more useful they can be to congressional candidates.

The congressional candidate finds himself in a position between that of the national candidate, who appeals to a widely dispersed constituency and can rely on a broad base for support, and the local candidate who is known and supported within his precinct. He must campaign on whatever slogans will appeal to his constituency regardless of their possible inconsistency with the slogans of other candidates or with party platforms and policies. Ewing states the problem:

. . .The president seeks his office upon the basis of a policy or program. It may be ill defined, general, or ambiguous, but it nevertheless reflects the nominee's personal convictions or his appreciation of the demands of political expediency. This is not so with congressional candidates. In the same party candidates will support policies which together run the full gamut of the ideological scale. Thus some Democrats seek the office upon an unadulterated program of denying the suffrage to Negroes; and other Democrats will ask election upon a promise to remove all racial barriers to political participation. Likewise there will be free-trade Republicans and high-tariff Republicans; pro-social-security Democrats and anti-social-security Democrats; nationalistic Socialists and internationalists of the same political designation.¹³

¹³Cortez A. M. Ewing, Congressional Elections 1896-1944, (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), p. 49.

Unabashed by such apparent inconsistencies, the Congressional Campaign Committees extend their help to those who need it, provided they stand a reasonable chance of winning the election. Similarly, they ask no questions of party workers at precinct, county, or state levels. Relatively impervious to criticism, they adhere to their purpose within the non-ideological American system.

Problems of the Campaign Committees

The problems of the Committees as their officers and administrative personnel see them, have also to do with practical matters. There is, for example, the question of Republican penetration of the south and of Democratic strength in industrial cities.

The Republican Party has been a regional party supported, for the last quarter century, by farm and business groups in the north and unable successfully to invade "the solid South." So long as the South remained solidly Democratic, with the rest of the country fairly evenly divided between the two parties, the Democrats were assured of a solid core of strength in Congress which was larger than that upon which the Republicans could depend.

Today the regional blocks where each party can count

on certain victory are breaking up. Most notable of these is the South which has, since the Civil War, been the stronghold of the Democratic Party. Elections since 1950 have indicated that the old voting patterns are beginning to disintegrate.

In the industrial areas of the north where the cities have always been Democratic, the pattern is also changing. The cities still tend to return a strong Democratic vote, but the city vote is dwindling. The major area of population growth is in the residential suburb. Neither party can lay particular claim to the suburbs, and it has become a major battleground of the two parties.

Another traditional block that seems to be in flux is the farm block. Farm areas such as South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Kansas have recently given indications that they can no longer be considered entirely safe for Republican candidates.

The Republican Congressional Committee seems particularly aware of these changes and is working hard to exploit its opportunities and to reinforce areas that appear to be changing. The Republicans are particularly aware of the new opportunities in the South. Its Field Service has sent workers to study the situation and strengthen state

and local party organizations. To secure strong candidates, the Committee has provided funds for use in what seemed like hopeless districts. The Committee points with pride to the success of Congressman Jonas of North Carolina, Poff of Virginia, and Cramer of Florida. The Committee staff feels that when it finds other able and vigorous candidates like these men who will work closely with the Committee in planning and executing their campaigns, they will make further inroads in the South.

The Democratic Committee faces a difficult problem in the large industrial cities of the North. These cities are characterized by political organizations such as Tammany Hall in New York and, in past years, the Hague machine in Jersey City. The city organization is jealous of its power, which it can maintain only as it keeps the officials and representatives of the area dependent upon it for nomination and election. It naturally looks with suspicion upon any "competing" party organization such as the Congressional Campaign Committee, which seeks to enter its territory. This lays upon the Committee the necessity of adjusting to the wishes of local party leaders and trying to gear its work into that of the local party organization.

With the development of the media of mass communication,

however, the city organization is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its power. If this trend continues, it may well have two consequences: (1) the development of a functioning two-party system in the industrial cities of the North, and (2) the entrance of the Congressional Campaign Committees into the situation to meet the needs of congressional candidates who, deprived of the support of a strong city organization, become more open to the assistance proffered by the Committees. This, of course, would considerably strengthen the position of the Committees - particularly the Democratic Committee - in industrial cities.

Another problem of the Committees is their loose relationship with other party agencies. According to Mr. William Warner, Executive Secretary of the Republican Committee, this problem is recognized and an effort is being made to coordinate the activities of all party organizations working in the same field. The magnitude of the problem is obvious when one considers that there are three committees in each party - the National, Senatorial, and Congressional Committees - operating at the national level. The difficulty is increased by the fact that each of these must work with committees from all the states and a host of local committees. From an administrative point of view, such overlapping areas

of influence seem inexcusable. It must be remembered, however, that these Committees came into being not as the result of the planning of an administrative genius but as a pragmatic response to the political situation in the United States. This proliferation of committees is no doubt inefficient, but it does prove useful to the political parties, so has come to be accepted as part of the American party system.

Let us look first at the three committees (National, Senatorial, and Congressional). Since there are no formal lines delimiting the responsibilities and functions of the various committees, some duplication of effort is inevitable, as is a certain amount of tension. Clarence Adamey, Assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, stated in an interview that there is occasional conflict, the major source of which is finance, though he recognized that our constitutional separation of powers, with its resulting conflict between Congress and the Administration, has contributed to the tension.

Some attempts have been made to relieve these tensions between competing committees. Both parties, as noted in Chapter V, have arranged to have practically all funds collected by and channeled through their National Committees.

In the Republican Party the National Finance Committee which receives all funds is so closely related to the National Committee that it can almost be considered the latter's finance department. This arrangement, though it cannot resolve all the tension resulting from the overlapping of financial interests, has proved viable for the committees concerned.

Each committee is also concerned with party services, nominations, and campaign procedures, yet there are no clear lines defining the functions of each. Disagreements as to jurisdiction and procedures are thus inevitable. Richard Simpson of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, gave an illustration of this. During the last two weeks of the 1956 campaign, he said, when everyone felt sure that President Eisenhower would be re-elected, the National Committee insisted on pushing ahead with the campaign. During this period it spent thousands of dollars to convince people that they should vote for Eisenhower. The result, Mr. Simpson speculated, was to bring out many Democrats who might not otherwise have voted. These split their tickets, voting for Eisenhower as president, but for democratic congressmen. If the National Committee had allocated the same amount of money to the Congressional Campaign Committee

for an intensive last-minute push, Mr. Simpson felt that a Republican congress would have been elected.

Despite such difficulties, the Committees have learned by experience that the values of cooperation outweigh the difficulties. In 1924 the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, referring to the Senatorial and Congressional Campaign Committees said, "Their work and ours has been virtually merged now, with the most satisfactory results."¹⁴ In spite of such statements, recurring clashes have led to attempts by the two committees to work separately. One such experiment was in 1934 when the Republican Congressional and Senatorial Committees severed all relations with the National Committee and carried on independently. The attempt proved unsuccessful; after the election it was abandoned.¹⁵

What efforts have been made to coordinate the National and Congressional Committees? On a formal basis nothing has been done and it is doubtful if attempts would prove fruitful. On the informal level, however, techniques

¹⁴Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention (Washington, D. C.: 1924), p. 1092.

¹⁵For a full account see the New York Times, Feb. 24, 1934.

of coordination have been worked out. The Democratic Committees keep in close touch by telephone and arrange for conferences when problems arise. In the Republican Committees, with their more systematic approach, the chairmen and executive heads of the three committees meet weekly to share plans and clear up difficulties. This practice was inaugurated by Leonard Hall when he was chairman of the National Committee. It worked particularly well in those days because, as a former chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, Hall understood its problems. Hall, Dirksen (Chairman of the Senatorial Committee) and Simpson had served together in the House, so shared a common background of experience. Under such conditions, it was easy to find a basis for understanding.

White House breakfasts, held weekly during campaigns, provide another informal approach to coordination between the Republican committees. At these breakfasts the executive officers of the three committees meet with a representative from the White House to discuss plans and procedures.

A more formal approach has been the sharing of personnel and information. The Republican Field Service, with headquarters in the office of the Congressional Campaign

Committee, is used by all three Republican committees.

Though each committee has a public relations director, these men cooperate closely, discussing common problems and sharing information and ideas. While it is improbable that the committees will ever be able to eliminate all tensions, the informal measures now in effect do much to relieve it.

The second level of tension is between the three national committees and the state and local organizations. In our decentralized system, local organizations, through which all committees at the national level must function, are of paramount importance. Their autonomy, which they stoutly maintain, creates a situation which, whatever difficulties it may present, must be accepted as a fact of American political life. It is obviously advantageous for the Committees to approach this problem with a maximum of skill and tact.

The Democratic Committee, as we have seen, deals with the matter on an informal basis. Mr. Harding hopes, by his visits to local leaders, to iron out whatever misunderstandings may have arisen. The Republican Committee hopes, through its area campaign schools, to win the co-operation of state and local leaders. While these schools are financed and conducted under the direction of the National

Committee, the chairmen of both the Senatorial and the Congressional Campaign Committees are given prominent places on the program. The schools devote sessions to such topics as: "How to Run a Campaign," "How to Develop an Efficient Organization," and "How to Make Effective Use of the Media of Mass Communication." Ample time is allowed for discussion of problems raised by the trainees. Mr. Warner states that these sessions have done much to promote understanding and coordination of effort between the Congressional Committee and local party organizations.

Influence of Campaign Committees on trends and changes

Despite these problems, the Committees not only meet a need, as shown in previous chapters, but also afford a vantage point from which to observe trends and changes in both campaign techniques and in our political system.

One observable tendency in American politics is the Democratic emphasis upon strong executive leadership and the Republican emphasis upon congressional leadership. Since the time of Lincoln the Democratic party has produced strong presidents - Cleveland, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman - while, except for Theodore Roosevelt, Republican

executive leadership has been only "average."¹⁶ Binkley sees this trend as deeply rooted in history.

"I had not suspected before I began investigation of the subject," he says, "the remarkable extent to which our major political parties have aligned themselves on opposite sides of the controversy regarding Presidential leadership. No sooner had universal, white, manhood suffrage been established and Jackson elected president, than the masses turned to the President as Tribune of the People. The party that attracts the underprivileged has maintained this tradition now for more than a century.

"Meanwhile Whig and Republican leaders have been only a little more critical of Democratic 'tribunes' than of Presidents of their own party who essayed the role. Historically, the Republican Party philosophy stressed the Congressional check of the Executive and views with jealous eyes any pronounced shift of the center of gravity in the

¹⁶It may be noted, however, that there has been increasing alteration of parties in the presidency. The Democrats were dominant for 60 years, from 1800 to 1860 (except 1824-1840), the Republicans for 50, from 1860 to 1912 (except 1884-1892). The Democrats held office from 1912-1920 (8 years), the Republicans from 1920-1932 (12 years), the Democrats from 1932-1952 (20 years), after which the Republicans again took office.

government to the President. Republican Congresses have been almost, if not altogether, as severe in denouncing the 'usurpations' of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt as they were in decrying Grover Cleveland, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt, indeed any chief executive who essays vigorous leadership."¹⁷

The presidential emphasis of the Democratic party may be explained, in part at least, by the somewhat more ideological emphasis of that party.¹⁸ Binkley, in the quotation just used gives a clue: it is the party that "attracts the underprivileged" and as such it must commit itself to work for social welfare goals and, to remain in power, must make good on at least some of its promises.

The Democratic Committee in its personal relationship with candidates, is in a position to point out this need. Both Committees, being realistic, prefer candidates with campaign talents to those with legislative ability, but the Republican Committee puts more emphasis on appearance

¹⁷ Wilfred F. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. vii.

¹⁸ This is not to negate what has already been said about non-ideological system, as compared with England for example. It is a relative observation involving only our two major parties.

and personality than does the Democratic, which encourages face-to-face contacts with the voter and assurances that his problems are understood.

While this is a congressional rather than a presidential emphasis, it must be remembered that the leaders of the Campaign Committees are influential party leaders, that the congressmen who are elected with the Committee's help and are imbued, to some extent, with its philosophy, have influence within their districts. It would seem, then, that the Republican Committee's emphasis upon campaign mechanics and personable candidates and the Democratic Committee's emphasis upon personal relationships may be exerting subtle influence within their respective parties, upon the viewpoint of congressmen, and indirectly, upon the kind of men that may ultimately be considered by the parties as presidential candidates.

As for the congressional emphasis which has, historically, characterized the Republican party, that pattern may be in the process of changing. This, on the surface, seems paradoxical. The aggressive methods of the Republican Committee with its use of scientific procedures for collecting and processing data, assessing results, and foretelling trends, and its increasing reliance upon public

relations techniques, might be expected to produce results in terms of strong congressional leadership. Why, then, have the Democrats done so well in recent elections?

So complex is the evaluation of election results that no easy answer can be given. The Democratic Committee, however, maintains that its emphasis on personal relationships has been the decisive factor, while the Republican Committee attributes the victory to Democratic organization, both in the cities, where it extended "right down to the precinct level" and in the Labor Unions where the party could utilize existing organizational structures.

Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that the Democratic Party and its Campaign Committee are challenging Republican predominance in Congress and that the Republican Committee can be expected to exert every possible effort and use every technique at its command to maintain its historic position.

A second trend is the increasing tendency for the president and the congressional majority to represent opposing parties. The assumption - once taken for granted - that Congress would be dominated by the party of the Administration, has been seriously challenged.

This assumption was predicated upon three propositions:

that during presidential elections congressional candidates are swept along with the tide or "ride coat-tails," that mid-term elections are comparatively unimportant, and that relatively few voters split their tickets. All of these can now be called into question.

Though one cannot deny the importance of the Presidency in holding a party together during presidential campaigns, the "coat-tail theory" now appears to be an over-simplification, mid-term elections are increasing in importance, and ticket-splitting has become an accepted practice. In all of these changes, the Congressional Campaign Committees have played a significant part. By giving institutional support to congressional candidates, strengthening local party organizations, and providing both with "the sinews of war,"¹⁹ they have heightened both the intensity and the effectiveness of congressional campaigns. The result is that congressional seats are hotly contested and in an increasing number of districts, the outcome of congressional elections cannot be assumed in advance.

Another discernible trend is toward party unity and centralization. Though politics in the United States are

¹⁹Ostrogorski's phrase. These sinews include campaign tools (see Appendix III), funds, and advice.

not characterized by the fragmentation which has bedeviled many European states, there is enough sectionalism, reflected in party factions, to require constant efforts in behalf of party unity. Here the Campaign Committees seem to be making a significant contribution.

The steps that have been taken toward financial coordination and cooperative working relationships between the officers and staff members of the National, Senatorial, and Congressional Committees of each party promote party centralization. On the other hand, the existence of ever-recurring tensions and the remoteness of the possibility that these committees may unite, underscore the problems that hamper moves toward centralization.

Despite such limitations the Committees have promoted party centralization by making themselves valuable to candidates. Advancing technology has, of course, had much to do with this, but the Committees' (especially the Republican Committee's) utilization of public relations techniques has played a large part in it. This has been accompanied, as V. O. Key points out, by a decline in the influence of local party machines. He says, "Political power was (previously) based on a stable network of party machinery, around each member of which was clustered a little

group loyal through thick and thin. Apparently this source of strength is being replaced by a power structure broadly based on mass consent and support. As leaders have available devices and methods of appealing directly to the great mass of people, the representatives and opinion-managerial faction of the party machinery is becoming less important."²⁰ The increasing focus of campaign functions in the Campaign Committees limits the candidate who depends solely on his local organization and weights the election in favor of his opponent or fellow candidate in the same party who avails himself of Campaign Committee services.

The Committees have promoted party unity by building morale in candidates and party members, appealing to their pride, and giving them a sense of membership in an important organization. The availability of year-round, as well as campaign, services for congressmen, party members, and candidates, builds an esprit de corps among party members. Knowledge that their party, in the guise of the Campaign Committee and its representatives, is behind them, gives candidates the security of institutional support. As the Committees succeed in taking their program to "the grass

²⁰V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, p. 479.

roots" (e.g., through Republican Campaign Schools or Democratic "personal contacts") more and more party members throughout the country become aware of the party as a functioning institution.

With the growth of party unity and centralization should occur a concomitant increase in party discipline. There appear to have been some gains in this direction but thoughtful observers of the political situation are asking why the Committees do not have more influence in this area and whether they could have more.

Lack of party discipline in any government based upon a balance of powers is understandable. One of the strengths of the Campaign Committees was that, when they came into being, they accepted the situation which they found and worked within its limitations for attainable ends. Now, however, the time may be ripe for enlargement of their role to include the encouragement of party discipline.

Party discipline implies sufficient cohesion and harmony within a party to win elections and to carry out a legislative program in support of an administration toward which it is sympathetic or to frustrate the program of one it opposes. It should lead to support of party nominees, policies, and programs. Such support presents special

difficulties in the United States because of the wide divergence of sectional interests, as was shown by the almost frigid response of congressmen to the efforts of the Democratic National Committee to establish a party policy committee after the 1956 election. Nevertheless, this is the direction in which the parties are moving and in which the Campaign Committees can exert considerable influence.

In the United States, party discipline is usually more effective during election campaigns than afterward. Once elected, congressmen within each party tend to divide into factions. Reactionaries, liberals, middle-of-the-roaders, and those with views which fall between these categories seek like-minded members of the opposite party with whom they form voting coalitions, disregarding party lines and, quite often, party commitments.

There are, of course, some controls. The seating arrangement in the House encourages party voting, the use of "whips" helps keep members in line, and the knowledge that another election is never more than two years away may have a sobering effect, particularly upon members from marginal districts. In the last analysis, however, the power of discipline resides in the constituency. This fact gives

the Campaign Committees their opportunity.

We have already observed how the Committees - particularly the Democratic Committee with its close personal contacts - can inject the philosophy of the party as expressed in platform and policies, into the campaign. Even the more formal techniques of the Republican Committee allow some scope for this. By helping the incumbent congressman keep his constituents informed, and by emphasizing in newsletters and other materials prepared for his use, his adherence to campaign promises or, in some cases, to his party's platform, the Committee is promoting party discipline.

By increasing their year-round services, the Campaign Committees have enlarged their opportunity to affect party discipline. By maintaining a well-staffed office, open at all times, extending a welcome to party members, supplying news releases to sympathetic publications, and offering services to incumbents, party workers, and aspiring politicians (as the Republican Committee, in particular, is trying to do) the Committees are growing in influence. If they choose to use this influence on the side of party discipline, they should be able to exert increasing pressure for adherence to party platforms and policies.

It has been suggested by Clarence Berdahl that a

major reason for the weakness of party discipline lies in the gap between party organization at the national and state levels. He sees the parties at the state level as independent, indeed as almost sovereign organizations which determine their own platforms, policies, and membership requirements.

Here again the Congressional Campaign Committees are in a favorable position. If they succeed in their increasing efforts to prove useful not only to candidates but to county and state organizations, they will be in a position to make policy suggestions between elections. Their attempts to help in the selection of candidates might become a step in this direction, provided party commitments received consideration in making the selection. Too often the pragmatic emphasis - "Can he win?" - has so outweighed other considerations that the opportunity to promote party discipline has been lost.

It is also true that the opportunity to make policy decisions at the state and local level has usually been unavailable to the Congressional Committees because they have not sufficiently enjoyed the confidence of party members, yet their intensive study of the political situation at the precinct level in each congressional district in the United States has fitted them to participate in such policy

making. As confidence in the Committees increases, it should be possible for them to render more service in this area and thus contribute further to party unity and discipline.

Among the possibilities for creative action to promote party discipline is a suggestion for united effort by the National, Senatorial, and Congressional Committees of the party which is out of power to consolidate party leadership. This plan, propounded by Paul David²¹ would establish the titular head of the opposition party in a Washington office, in a position of "dignity and recognized responsibility." He would be given official "opposition status," as in Britain, with a salary, a travel budget, and access to secret information available to Congress. Such a leader would not only spearhead his party's opposition, but would facilitate changes in administration.²² The author outlines a phased program for accomplishing this, which he sees as "a promising first step in strengthening the national

²¹Paul David, "New Role for the Opposition Party," New York Times Magazine, September 18, 1955.

²²The author points out that in 15 presidential contests prior to 1955 the party out of power won only 5 times. A turnover in administrations has occurred once in 12 years on the average, i.e., in one election in three. To change party control once in 8 years the "out" party would have to win half the elections.

party structure."

To what extent the Campaign Committees would work to promote such a plan is, of course, uncertain. A conjecture, based on an understanding of their pragmatic approach, suggests that they would cooperate to the extent - and only to the extent - that they could expect favorable congressional election returns to result from the plan. However that may be, the proposal suggests the type of creative possibility open to exploration by party agencies with an imaginative approach.

What of the future?

One question which is sometimes asked deserves consideration: How permanent are the Congressional Campaign Committees? Though prediction is hazardous, it would seem that the Committees have become a permanent institution in contemporary American political life and that their influence is apt to increase for at least two reasons.

The first is that changing campaign methods - which change, it might be added has been greatly accelerated by the work of the committees themselves, especially the Republican Committee - are making it ever more difficult for candidates to succeed if they rely solely on themselves

or their local party organization.

New techniques are costly and their use requires considerable expertise. The unaided candidate will have difficulty in making effective use of the media of mass communication without the guidance and material assistance which his Campaign Committee makes available. The Republican Committee, with its public relations techniques may well be anticipating the most important function of the Campaign Committee of tomorrow.

The second reason is that the margin of party control in the House seems to be diminishing. Bone states the case thus: "A very few seats lost or won by either party has a most important bearing on who controls Congress. The realization of this by congressmen has tended to favor the maintenance of strong, permanent . . . congressional committees. There is no material sentiment for abolishing the committees or reducing them from year-round establishments to temporary committees active only during campaigns."²³ So long as control of Congress is sharply contested the usefulness of the Committees seems unlikely to be questioned.

Whatever one may conjecture as to the future potential

²³ Bone, op. cit., p. 137.

of the Committees, one thing seems certain: they appear to be here to stay. They have proved themselves in the rough-and-tumble of political life and have survived. More than that, they have proved themselves valuable to congressional candidates. They have adapted their methods to changing circumstances and have worked out a modus vivendi with rival committees. They have promoted party growth, unity and some measure of discipline. Though the results of their efforts remain imponderable, they have convinced congressmen and the political parties of their usefulness. Above all, they have become an accepted part of the American political system.

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List of officials interviewed

1. The chairman of each of the Congressional Campaign Committees.
2. The Executive Secretary of each committee.
3. The Assistant Executive Secretary of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.
4. The Director of National Field Services for the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.
5. The members of each of the Congressional Campaign Committees in important congressional or party positions.
6. Individuals recommended by staff members of the two committees:
 - a. The Director of Public Relations for the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.
 - b. The Director of Public Relations for the Republican National Committee in the presidential campaigns of 1952 and 1956 who, in this capacity, had had experience in working with the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.
 - c. A former Executive Secretary of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.
 - d. Congressmen who had been assisted by their respective Congressional Campaign Committees.

APPENDIX I

SECTION A. QUESTIONS USED IN INTERVIEWING CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND STAFF MEMBERS

I. Committee Membership

1. How are members of the Committee chosen?
2. Does membership on the Committee indicate that congressmen are leaders in party affairs?
3. Are party leaders in the House of Representatives members of their party's Congressional Campaign Committee?
4. Is membership on a Congressional Campaign Committee regarded as opening a door to advancement in party affairs?

II. The Professional Executive Staff of the Committees

1. Size and nature of the staff.
2. How is it selected?
3. What are its functions?
4. Is staff membership a means to political preferment?

III. Committee Organization

1. How is the Committee organized?
 - a. Who chooses the Chairman?
 - b. How is the Executive Committee selected?
 - c. How and by whom are long-range policy decisions made?

d. What part does the professional staff play

in:

1. Policy decisions?

2. Procedural decisions?

e. What records of committee decisions, policies

and procedures are kept?

IV. Functions of the Committee in preparation for campaigns.

1. What are the criteria used by the Committee in

selecting its area of concentration? (Major

and minor)

2. How does the Committee influence local preparation

for a campaign?

3. What part does the Committee play in the

nominating of candidates? How is its influence

exerted?

4. How does the committee discover and work with

local leaders?

5. What techniques have the committees developed

for recruiting local party workers? for training

them? for training candidates?

6. What techniques have been developed for influencing

the general public?

7. How is campaign strategy developed?
 - a. What part is played by local workers?
 - b. What part is played by candidates?
 - c. Who is responsible for developing the final master-plan?
8. What part does the Committee play in reconciling conflicting forces, in case of division within the party?

V. Functions of the Congressional Campaign Committee during Campaigns.

1. What materials are prepared by the Committee for Congressional campaigns? Who is responsible for this?
2. How does the Committee recruit and assign speakers for campaign work in Congressional districts?
3. How does the Committee determine what appeals will be answered with assistance?
4. Does the Committee ever decide, during a campaign, to increase the amount of assistance given to a candidate? If so, by whom is the decision made? What are the criteria for arriving at a decision?

5. What techniques has the committee developed for keeping in touch with developments in each congressional district?

VI. Functions of the Congressional Campaign Committee between campaign.

1. What services to congressmen, both old and new, does the Committee provide during the period between campaigns?
2. How does the Committee help congressmen keep in touch with their constituents?
3. What techniques have been developed for securing information on party health in local districts in the intervals between campaigns?
4. Is any attempt made to influence the general public between campaigns? If so, what techniques are used?

VII. Finance

1. How are the Congressional Campaign Committees financed?
2. Who is responsible for the collection and disbursement of funds?

VIII. Committee Relationships

1. What is the relationship of the Congressional Campaign Committee to the National Committee?
 - a. During a campaign?
 - b. Between campaigns?
 - c. During presidential campaigns?
2. What is the relationship of the Congressional to the Senatorial Campaign Committee?

APPENDIX I

SECTION B. QUESTIONS ASKED OF CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
MEMBERS (PRESENT AND PAST)

1. What do you conceive to be the function of the Congressional Campaign Committee?
2. Do you think that the Committee fills an important place in the life of your party?
3. Does the Committee receive adequate financial support?
From what sources?
4. Do you think that the Committees are bringing about changes in our political system? If so, how and in what direction?
5. What role has the Committee played in campaigns during your association with it?
6. What is the comparative importance of the Committee in presidential campaigns as compared with midterm elections?
7. How does the Committee decide who should receive assistance? How much should be given?
8. What criterion does the Committee use in evaluating specific cases?
9. What methods does the Committee use in helping local Committees select qualified candidates?

10. What is the relationship of the Congressional Committee to other party organizations such as the National Committee, Senate Committees, local Committees?
11. What new campaign techniques, if any, have been developed by the Committee during your term of office?
12. What improvements in the work of the Committee would you suggest?
13. Do you think that the Campaign Committee was helpful to you in your campaign? In your work as a congressman? In what ways?

APPENDIX II

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

A. THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE1. List of Chairmen


1866-1869	James R. Doolittle (Senator)
1879-1881	William A. Wallace - Huntington, Pa.
1881-1885	William S. Rosecrans - Los Angeles, Cal.
1889-1891	Roswell P. Flower - New York, N.Y.
1891-1893	William L. Wilson - Charleston, W.Va.
1893-1897	Charles Faulkner - Martinsburg, W.Va.
1897-1901	James D. Richardson - Murfreesboro, Tenn.
1901-1907	James M. Griggs - Alapaha, Ga.
1907-1913	James T. Lloyd - Shelbyville, Mo.
1913-1917	Frank E. Doremus - Portland, Mich.
1917-1919	Scott Ferris - Lawton, Okla.
1919-1921	H. D. Flood - Appomattox, Va.
1921-1925	Arthur B. Rouse - Burlington, Ky.
1925-1928	William A. Oldfield - Batesville, Ark.
1928-1936	Joseph W. Byrnes - Nashville, Tenn.
1936-1947	Patrick Drewry - Petersburg, Va.
1947-	Michael Kirwan - Youngstown, Ohio

APPENDIX - II - COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

THE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE

2. List of Officers

	40th Congress* (1867-1869)	46th Congress (1879-1881)
Chairman	James R. Doolittle (senator)	William A. Wallace (senator)
Sec'y	Samuel J. Randall	Duncan S. Walker (not in Congress)
Treas.	William H. Barnum	John G. Thompson (not in Congress)
Members	Charles R. Buckalew (senator) J. M. Humphrey Lewis Ross Lawrence Trimble (Josiah D. Hoover (Charles Mason (Gen. Thomas Ewing (Montgomery Blair	No record of Executive Committee membership
From Washington		
*No lists available 1869-1879.		
	47th Congress* (1881-1883)	51st Congress (1889-1891)
Chairman	William Rosecrans	R. P. Flower
Sec'y	Benjamin LeFevre	T. O. Towles
Treas.		James L. Norris (Washington)
Finance Committee	H. G. Davis (senator) A. P. Gorman Lewis Beach	
Board of Control	R. P. Flower Philip B. Thompson, Jr. H. G. Davis Thomas R. Cobb A. P. Gorman	R. P. Flower Levi Maish W. I. Hayes John F. Andrew J. B. McCreary



	47th Congress (Cont.) (1881-1883)	51st Congress (Cont.) (1889-1891)
Board of Control (Cont.)	W. S. Rosecrans Zebulon B. Vance C. C. Baldwin (not in Congress)	N. C. Blanchard J. R. Whiting S. S. Yoder Samuel Flower C. A. O. McClellan
*No lists available from the 1883-1889		

	53rd Congress* (1893-1895)	57th Congress (1901-1903)
Chairman	Charles J. Faulkner	James M. Grigg
Sec'y.	Lawrence Gardner	Charles A. Edwards
Treas.	James L. Norris (Washington)	James L. Norris (Washington)
Subcommittee on Campaign Book	William D. Bynum	
Executive Committee	James P. Piggott Thomas C. McRae William McAleer W. D. Bynum Jonathan T. Heard Benton McMillin Justin R. Whiting Joseph Wheeler William A. Jones W. S. Forman (Also five senators)	Benjamin T. Cable F. M. Cockrell Edward M. Shepard James R. Richardson Judson Harmon David Overmeyer Jacob Ruppert, Jr. Josiah Quincey F. G. Newlands E. C. Wall John S. Robinson C. B. Randall Daniel L. Gooch James M. Griggs

*No records 1895-1901 or 1903-1907

60th Congress (1907-1909)		61st Congress (1909-1911)
Chairman	James T. Lloyd	James T. Lloyd
V. Chairman	David Finley D. L. D. Granger	David Finley A. Mitchell Palmer
Sec'y.	Frank Clark	Lincoln Dixon
Ass't Sec'y.	William Hughs	Thomas M. Bell South Trimble
Sargeant at Arms		N. J. Sinnott
Executive Committee	Henry T. Rainey David E. Finley Lincoln Dixon D. W. Hamilton William J. Stone	Henry T. Rainey David E. Finley Ben Johnson Gilbert M. Hitchcock A. Mitchell Palmer
Committees:		
Campaign	Lincoln Dixon	Lincoln Dixon
Litera- ture	John Wesley Gaines	Gilbert Hitchcock
Finance	H. D. Flood	Joseph E. Ransdell

62nd Congress
(1911-1913)

63rd Congress
(1913-1915)

Chairman James T. Lloyd

Frank E. Doremus

V. Chairman David E. Finley
A. M. Palmer
Henry T. Rainey

Cyrus Cline
George E. Chamberlain
Henry F. Hollis
Henry M. Goldpage
John E. Raker

Sec'y Thomas J. Scully

Thomas J. Scully

Ass't.
Sec'y.

South Trimble

Treas. Henry D. Flood

J. Henry Goeke

Executive Committee Henry T. Rainey
David Finley
Ben Johnson
William Richardson
Robert N. Page
W. S. Hammond
A. Mitchell Palmer
H. M. Goldfogle
D. H. Mays
William A. Ashbrook
H. B. Ferguson
E. F. Sweet

Frank Doremus
Ollie M. James
Thomas P. Gore
Thomas J. Scully
Edward Taylor

Committees:

Finance H. D. Flood

Literature

Jack Beall

Advisory William J. Stone

Textbook

Robert W. Wooley

	64th Congress (1915-1917)	65th Congress (1917-1919)
Chairman	Frank E. Doremus	Scott Ferris
V. Chairmen	Cyrus Cline Charles F. Johnson Atlee Pomerene William E. Chillon John E. Raker Edwin Y. Webb Harry L. Gandy	William Cox John Shafroth J. K. Shields W. H. Thompson J. E. Raker Edwin Webb Harry Gandy
Sec'y.	Thomas J. Scully	Augustine Lonergan
Ass't. Sec'y.	South Trimble	South Trimble
Sergeant at Arms		N. J. Sinnott
Treas.	J. Henry Goeke	
Executive Committee	Frank E. Doremus Daniel J. McGillicuddy Edwin Y. Webb Guy T. Helvering	
Speakers Bureau	Arthur B. Rouse	

	66th Congress (1919-1921)	67th Congress (1921-1923)
Chairman	H. D. Flood	A. B. Rouse
V. Chair- men	A. B. Rouse S. Ferris Michael F. Phelan John E. Raker Harry L. Gandy B. F. Welty Charles P. Caldwell	John E. Raker J. C. Linthicum
Sec'y.	A. Lonergan	
Treas.		
Sergeant at Arms	N. J. Sinnott	N. J. Sinnott
Exec. Committee		William A. Oldfield A. J. Sabath Joseph W. Byrns Carl Hayden Charles F. X. O'Brien Patrick Drewry
	68th Congress (1923-1925)	68th Congress (1925)*
Chairman	A. B. Rouse	W. A. Oldfield
V. Chair- men	A. Raker J. C. Linthicum	A. Raker J. C. Linthicum
Sec'y.	Robert H. Clancy	
Treas.	South Trimble	
Sergeant at Arms		N. J. Sinnott

68th Congress (Cont.)
(1923-1925)

68th Congress (Cont.)
(1925)*

Exec.	William A. Oldfield	A. B. Rouse
Committee	A. J. Sabath	A. J. Sabath
	Joseph Byrns	Carl Hayden
	Carl Hayden	John J. Kindred
	John J. Kindred	Patrick Drewry
	Patrick Drewry	William W. Larsen

(Also a Women's Executive Committee)

Chairman, Finance	John J. Kindred
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*Committee reorganized after resignation of Rouse as chairman.

69th Congress
(1925-1927)

70th Congress
(First Session)

Chairman	William A. Oldfield	William A. Oldfield
V. Chairmen	Clarence Lea Charles Linthicum John Kindred	Clarence Lea Charles Linthicum John Kindred
Sec'y.	Everett Kent	Jeremiah O'Connell
Treas.	Robert Harper	
Sergeant at Arms	N. J. Sinnott	
Exec. Committee	A. J. Sabath Patrick Drewry Ralph Lonzier Fred Vinson Edward T. Taylor	A. B. Rouse A. J. Sabath Carl Hayden Patrick Drewry Ralph F. Lozier
Speaker's Bureau	James V. McClintock	James V. McClintock
Exec. Sec'y.	Ralph Roberts	Ralph Roberts

70th Congress (Second Session)		71st Congress (1929-1931)
Chairman	Joseph W. Byrns	Joseph W. Byrns
V. Chairman	Clarence Lea	Clarence Lea
Sec'y.	Mrs. Mary T. Norton	Mrs. Mary T. Norton
72nd Congress (1931-1933)		73rd Congress (1933-1935)
Chairman	Joseph W. Byrns	Joseph W. Byrns
V. Chairman	Clarence Lea J. Charles Linthicum Edward Pou	J. V. McClintock Eugene Crowe Edward Pou
Sec'y.		Isabella Greenway
Treas.	Robert N. Harper	Robert N. Harper
Exec. Committee		Patrick Drewry William A. Ayres Virgil Chapman Samuel B. Hill Joseph L. Smith Mark Wilcox
Committees:		
Finance		Sol Bloom
Special Patronage		J. V. McClintock
Speakers		William Arnold
Exec. Sec'y.	Joe F. Baker	Charles S. Hayden
74th Congress (1935-1937)		75th Congress (1937-1939)
Chairman	Patrick Drewry	Patrick Drewry
V. Chairmen	Eugene B. Crowe Abraham Murdock Claud V. Parsons	Eugene B. Crowe Abraham Murdock Claud V. Parsons
Sec'y.	Joseph L. Smith	Joseph L. Smith

74th Congress (Cont.)
(1935-1937)

75th Congress (Cont.)
(1937-1939)

Treas. Robert Harper

Chairmen:

Exec. Comm.

Virgil Chapman

Finance

Sol Bloom

Speakers and
publicity

Jed Johnson

Exec.

Sec'y. Charles Hayden

Victor Harding

76th Congress
(1939-1941)

77th Congress
(1941-1943)

Chairman Patrick Drewry

Patrick Drewry

V. Chairmen Charles F. McLaughlin
Robert Ramspeck
Edward J. Hart

Robert Ramspeck
Edward J. Hart
Thaddeus Wasielewski

Sec'y. Joseph L. Smith

Treas. George Allen

George Allen

Exec. Virgil Chapman

Virgil Chapman

Committee Sol Bloom

Joseph L. Smith

Jed Johnson

Thomas F. Ford

Herman Eberharter

Henry B. Steagnall

Lawrence Lewis

Herman P. Eberharter

Alfred L. Bulwinkle

Chairmen:

Finance

Sol Bloom

Speakers

Jed Johnson

Exec.

Sec'y. Victor Harding

Victor Harding

78th Congress
(1943-1945)

79th Congress
(1945-1947)

Chairman Patrick Drewry

Patrick Drewry

V. Chairmen Robert Ramspeck
Edward J. Hart
Thaddeus Wasielewski

Sec'y. Mrs. Chase Woodhouse

Trea. George Allen

George Allen

Exec. Virgil Chapman
Comm. Sam Hobbs
Herman Eberharter
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Michael Kirwan
Henry M. Jackson
Ray J. Madden

Virgil Chapman
Sam Hobbs
Herman Eberharter
Alfred L. Bulwinkle
Michael Kirwan
Henry M. Jackson
Ray J. Madden
John Murdock
Thomas Lane
Thaddeus Wasielewski

Committees:

Finance Sol Bloom
Speakers Jed Johnson

Sol Bloom
Jed Johnson

80th Congress (1947-1949)		81st Congress (1949-1951)
Chairman	Patrick Drewry	Patrick Drewry
V. Chairmen	Michael J. Kirwan Edward J. Hart John A. Carroll	Michael J. Kirwan Edward J. Hart John A. Carroll
Sec'y.	William Dawson	William Dawson
Treas.	George Allen	George Allen
Exec. Committee	Virgil Chapman Sam Hobbs Ray J. Madden Thomas J. Lane Alfred L. Bulwinkle Henry M. Jackson Herman Eberharter Overton Brooks	Virgil Chapman Sam Hobbs Ray J. Madden Thomas J. Lane Alfred L. Bulwinkle Henry M. Jackson Albert A. Gore Mike Mansfield
Committees:		
Speakers	John Murdock	
Finance	Sol Bloom	
Exec. Sec'y.	Victor Harding	Victor Harding
82nd Congress (1951-1953)		83rd Congress (1953-1955)
Chairman	Michael Kirwan	Michael Kirwan
V. Chairmen	Edward Hart Herman Eberharter Overton Brooks	Herman Eberharter Overton Brooks Harry Sheppard
Sec'y.	William Dawson	William Dawson
Ass't. Sec'y.		Gracie Pfof
Treas.		John M. Redding
Exec. Committee		Ray J. Madden Thomas J. Lane W. F. Norrell Noble J. Gregory

82nd Congress (Cont.) (1951-1953)		83rd Congress (Cont.) (1953-1955)
Executive Committee (Cont.)		Lee Metcalf Clifford Davis Paul Brown Eugene J. Keogh Louis C. Rabaut
Finance Speakers		Aime J. Fornad John L. McMillan
Exec. Sec'y.	Victor Harding	Kenneth Harding
84th Congress (1955-1957)		85th Congress (1957-1959)
Chairman	Michael J. Kirwan	Michael J. Kirwan
V. Chairmen	Herman P. Eberharter Overton Brooks Harry R. Sheppard	Herman P. Eberharter Overton Brooks Harry R. Sheppard
Sec'y.	William L. Dawson	William L. Dawson
Asst. Sec'y.	Gracie Pfof	Gracie Pfof
Treas.	John M. Redding	John M. Redding
Exec. Comm.	Ray J. Madden Thomas L. Lane W. F. Norrell Noble J. Gregory Clifford Davis Lee Metcalf Paul Brown Eugene J. Keogh Louis C. Rabaut	Ray J. Madden Thomas L. Lane W. F. Norrell Novel J. Gregory Clifford Davis Lee Metcalf Paul Brown Eugene J. Keogh Louis C. Rabaut
Committees:		
Finance	Aime J. Forand, Ch.	Aime J. Forand, Ch.
Research	E. L. Bartlett, Ch.	E. L. Bartlett, Ch.
Speakers	John L. McMillan, Ch.	John L. McMillan, Ch.
Asst. to Chairman	Kenneth R. Harding	Kenneth R. Harding



APPENDIX II

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

B. THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE1. List of Chairmen

1864-1869 Edwin D. Morgan (Senator) - New York, N.Y.
1869-1873 Zachariah Chandler (Senator) - Detroit, Mich.
1873-1879 Simon Cameron (Senator) - Maytown, Pa.
1879-1879 Eugene Hale - Elsworth, Maine
1879-1883 Jay A. Hubbell - Houghton, Mich.

1893-1905 Joseph W. Babcock - Necedah, Wis.
1905-1909 James S. Sherman - Utica, N. Y.
1909-1913 William B. McKinley - Champlain, Ill.
1913-1919 Frank P. Woods - Estherville, Iowa
1919-1923 Simeon R. Fess - Yellow Springs, Ohio
1923-1933 Will R. Wood - Lafayette, Ind.
1933-1937 Chester C. Bolton - Cleveland, Ohio
1937-1939 Joseph Martin - Attleboro, Mass.
1939-1943 J. William Ditter - Ambler, Pa.
1943-1947 Charles Halleck - Rensselaer, Ind.
1947-1953 Leonard Hall - Oyster Bay, N. Y.
1953- Richard Simpson - Huntington, Pa.

APPENDIX II - COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE2. List of Officers

	42nd Congress (1871-1872)	44th Congress (1875-1876)
Chairman	Zachariah Chandler	Simon Cameron
Sec'y.	James M. Edmonds	James M. Edmonds
Treas.	Gov. H. D. Cooke	Jacob Tome
Exec.	J. A. Logan	A. H. Cragin
Committee	H. W. Corbett	John A. Logan
	J. H. Ketcham	J. R. West*
	Simon Cameron	S. W. Dorsey**
	John Pool	Thomas C. Platt*
	H. H. Starkweather	Jay A. Hubbell**
	G. A. Halsey	J. M. Rusk*
	John Coburn	C. H. Sinnickson**

* Committee on finance

** Committee on publicity

No lists available for 43rd Congress (1873-1875)

No lists available for 45th Congress (1877-1879)

	46th Congress (1879-1880)	47th Congress (1881-1882)
Chairman	Jay A. Hubbell	Jay A. Hubbell
Sec'y.	Edward McPherson	D. B. Henderson
Exec.	William B. Allison	William B. Allison
Committee	Edward H. Rollins	Eugene Hale
	Frank Hiscock	Frank Hiscock
	Mark H. Dunnell	Nelson Aldrich
	Godlove S. Orth	George M. Robeson
	William McKinley	William McKinley
	Joseph Jorgensen	Thomas Ryan
	George R. Davis	George R. Davis
	Horatio C. Fisher	Wm. D. Washburn
		L. C. Houk

46th Congress (Cont.) (1879-1880)		47th Congress (Cont.) (1881-1882)
Exec. Committee (Cont.)		R. T. Van Horn Orlando Hubbs W. H. Calkins Horatio F. Page Horatio C. Fisher
1883-1895 - Decade of inactivity.		
54th Congress (1895-1896)		55th Congress (1897-1898)
Chairman	Joseph W. Babcock	Joseph W. Babcock
V. Chairman	Lewis D. Apsley	James S. Sherman
Sec'y.	David Mercer	Jesse Overstreet
Asst. Sec'y.	Warner P. Sutton	Fredrich Schrader
Treas.	William B. Thompson	William B. Thompson
Exec. Committee	John A. T. Hull Joseph G. Cannon Jeter C. Pritchard Jesse Overstreet James S. Sherman John H. Mitchell	John A. T. Hull Joseph G. Cannon David H. Mercer Redfield Proctor* J. H. Gallinger John L. Wilson James T. McCleary H. C. Loudenslager Richmond Pearson
* Senator		
57th Congress (1901-1902)		58th Congress (1903-1904)
Chairman	Joseph W. Babcock	Joseph W. Babcock
V. Chairman	James S. Sherman	James S. Sherman
Sec'y.	Jesse Overstreet	Jesse Overstreet
Treas.	William B. Thompson	William B. Thompson
Exec. Committee	John A. T. Hull Daniel H. Mercer	John A. T. Hull William Connell

57th Congress (Cont.) (1901-1902)		58th Congress (Cont.) (1903-1904)
Exec.	C. A. Russell	E. C. Burleigh
Comm.	William Connell	J. R. Mann
(Cont.)	Joseph G. Cannon	H. C. Loudenslager
	H. C. Loudenslager	Victor H. Metcalf
	W. C. Lovering	J. A. Tawney
	Victor H. Metcalf	Nicholas Longworth
	E. C. Burleigh	Geroge Lilley
59th Congress (1905-1906)		61st Congress (1909-1910)
Chairman	James S. Sherman	Wm. McKinley, Jr.
V.Chairman	James A. Tawney	James A. Tawney
Sec'y.	Henry Loudenslager	H. C. Loudenslager
Asst. Sec'y		Henry Casson
Treas.	William McKinley, Jr.	Charles H. Duell
Asst. Treas.		John C. Eversman
Auditor		Wm. J. Browning
Asst. Auditor		Dennis E. Alward
Director, Library Bureau		Francis Curtis
Exec.	Charles Burke	Jas. A. Tawney
Committee	George S. Nixon*	George S. Nixon*
	James H. Davidson	James M. Miller
	Richard Bartholdt	J. Hampton Moore
	John W. Weeks	Richard Bartholdt
	Nicholas Longworth	Adin B. Capron
	Sydney Mudd	Simon Guggenheim
	Jas. M. Miller	Jas. H. Davidson
	Herschel M. Hogg	John W. Weeks
	H. Burd Cassel	J. VanV. Olcott
		John M. Morehead

*Senator

	67th Congress (1921-1922)	68th Congress (1923-1924)
Chairman	Simeon Fess	W. R. Wood
V.Chairman	W. R. Wood J. Q. Tilson J. N. Tichner	J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith H. McL. Wurzbach
Exec. Committee	Geo. Scott Graham C. B. Timberlake Wm. A. Rodenberg C. W. Ramseyer A. T. Smith S. E. Winslow C. B. Slemp H. P. Snyder F. W. Mondell Greene (not identified)	John M. Robsion S. E. Winslow Geo. Scott Graham J. T. Begg H. P. Snyder Wm. F. James J. C. McKenzie C. W. Ramseyer Sidney C. Roach Johnson (not identified)
	69th Congress (1925-1926)	70th Congress (1927-1928)
Chairman	Will R. Wood	Will R. Wood
V.Chairmen	J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith H. McL. Wurzbach	J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith H. McL. Wurzbach
Exec. Committee	Geo. Scott Graham A. T. Treadway C. W. Ramseyer Chas. F. Curry L. H. Hadley Robert L. Bacon F. A. Britten Wm. F. James C. B. Timberlake M. H. Thatcher Chas. E. Moore N. L. Strong	Geo. Scott Graham A. T. Treadway C. W. Ramseyer C. F. Curry L. H. Hadley Robert L. Bacon F. A. Britten Wm. F. James C. B. Timberlake M. H. Thatcher Chas E. Moore N. L. Strong

	71st Congress (1929-1930)	72nd Congress (1931-1932)
Chairman	Will R. Wood	Will R. Wood
V.Chairmen	J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith M. H. Thatcher	J. Q. Tilson A. T. Smith M. H. Thatcher
Exec. Committee	Geo. Scott Graham R. L. Bacon Chas. E. Moore Wm. F. James C. W. Ramseyer N. L. Strong Chas. F. Curry F. H. Foss H. McL. Wurzbach F. R. Lehlbach C. R. Chindblom C. A. Christopherson	Geo. Scott Graham R. L. Bacon Chas. E. Moore Wm. F. James C. W. Ramseyer N. L. Strong Chas. F. Curry F. H. Foss H. McL. Wurzbach F. R. Lehlbach C. R. Chindblom C. A. Christopherson
	73rd Congress (1933-1935)	74th Congress (1935-1937)
Chairman	Chester C. Bolton	Chester C. Bolton
V.Chairmen	R. L. Bacon A. E. Carter	R. L. Bacon A. E. Carter
Exec. Committee	F. R. Lehlbach F. H. Foss Frank R. Reid C. R. Hope James Wolfenden	F. R. Lehlbach C. R. Hope James Wolfenden Joseph Martin C. A. Christopherson
	75th Congress (1937-1939)	76th Congress (1939-1941)
Chairman	Joseph Martin	J. Wm. Ditter
V.Chairmen	A. E. Carter J. M. Robsion Everett M. Dirksen J. Wm. Ditter	A. E. Carter E. M. Dirksen J. M. Robsion R. B. Wigglesworth

75th Congress (Cont.) (1937-1939)		76th Congress (Cont.) (1939-1941)
Exec. Committee	M. J. Maas B. C. Reece Charles Halleck C. A. Wolverton D. A. White	Charles Halleck B. C. Reece D. A. White C. A. Wolverton Andrews
77th Congress (1941-1943)		78th Congress (1943-1945)
Chairman	J. Wm. Ditter	Chas. Halleck
V.Chairmen	A. E. Carter E. M. Dirksen J. M. Robsion R. B. Wigglesworth	A. E. Carter E. M. Dirksen J. M. Robsion R. B. Wigglesworth
Exec. Committee	Leonard Hall Chas. Halleck W. E. Hess Dewey Short C. A. Wolverton	Leonard Hall W. E. Hess Dewey Short C. A. Wolverton R. Simpson
79th Congress (1945-1947)		80th Congress (1947-1949)
Chairman	Chas. Halleck	Leonard Hall
V.Chairmen	E. M. Dirksen J. M. Robsion R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw	E. M. Dirksen J. M. Robsion R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw
Exec. Committee	Leonard Hall W. E. Hess Dewey Short C. A. Wolverton R. Simpson	W. E. Hess Dewey Short C. A. Wolverton Geo. A. Dondero Hugh D. Scott, Jr. (or Hardie Scott)

	81st Congress (1949-1951)	82nd Congress (1951-1953)
Chairman	Leonard Hall	Leonard Hall
V.Chairmen	R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw Charles Halleck Dewey Short	R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw Charles Halleck Dewey Short
Exec. Committee	C. A. Wolverton George A. Dondero John Jennings, Jr. Sam'l K. McConnell, Jr. John M. Vorys	C. A. Wolverton George A. Dondero S. K. McConnell, Jr. John M. Vorys Hal Holmes
	83rd Congress (1953-1955)	84th Congress (1955-1957)
Chairman	Richard M. Simpson	Richard M. Simpson
V.Chairmen	R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw Dewey Short William C. Wampler	R. B. Wigglesworth Carl Hinshaw Dewey Short Jos. P. O'Hara
Exec. Committee	C. A. Wolverton John M. Vorys Hal Holmes J. Edgar Chenoweth Dean P. Taylor	C. A. Wolverton Hal Holmes J. E. Chenoweth Dean P. Taylor Charles A. Halleck

_____)

_____)

85th Congress
(1957-1959)

Chairman	Richard M. Simpson (Pennsylvania)
V. Chairmen	Richard B. Wigglesworth (Massachusetts) Joseph P. O'Hara (Minnesota) Charles R. Jonas (North Carolina) Hamer H. Budge (Idaho) William M. McCulloch (Ohio)
Secretary	Ben F. Jensen (Iowa)
Ass't. Secretary	John J. Rhodes (Arizona)
Executive Committee	Charles A. Wolverton (N.J.) Hal Holmes (Washington) J. Edgar Chenoweth (Colorado) Charles A. Halleck (Indiana) Henry J. Latham (New York)
Executive Secretary	William S. Warner
Treasurer	Robert V. Fleming
Public Relations Director	Harold Slater

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

A. COPY OF QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO ALL COUNTY CHAIRMEN IN 1956BY THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

State	County	Congressional District			
Name	Address	City or Town		Phone	
County Chairman _____					
State Committee Member _____					
State Committee Member _____					
Number of Precincts or Voting Places		Number of Places Using Voting Machines Number Using Paper Ballots			
Total Registration as of Nov., 1954	Republi- cans	Demo- crats	Un- declared	County Population	
Do you elect precinct or voting district County Committeemen and Women on primary ballot? _____					
Do you select or elect County Committeemen and Women at precinct or county caucus? _____					
Are County Committeemen and Women or Precinct Captains appointed by district or ward leaders? _____					
How many precinct or voting districts have vacancies? _____					
Do you have one or two Precinct Poll Boards? Receiving? _____ Counting? _____					
When does Counting Board function (hours)? _____					
How many Poll Officials function in each precinct on Election Day? _____					

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

What are their titles?

How many Republicans?

How many Democrats?

If one party has the majority of Precinct Poll Officials,
what controls number?

How are Poll Officials selected?

How are Poll Officials appointed? Does County Chairman
recommend them?

Do Republican County Committee Members also serve on poll board:

Yes?

No?

How many?

What precincts?

If paper ballots are used, do they have stub? How many stubs?
Could you furnish us with sample ballot for 1952-1954
General Election? (attach)

If paper ballots are used, are they removed from ballot box
one at a time for counting?

How many absentee ballots were cast in 1952? in 1954?

Are absentee ballots counted at polling place or courthouse?

What is the procedure when voter asks for ballot assistance?
Is he assisted by Poll Officials of both parties?

Must assisted voter sign affidavit? Could we obtain copy of
affidavit? (attach)

Do you have challengers or watchers in polling place on
Election Day? How many precincts? Are they compensated
or volunteer?

Could you furnish us with list of Republicans elected and
residing in your county to -
State County and Municipal Office Name, Address, and Title?
(attach list)

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Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

Are there Republican Women's Clubs (National Federation of Republican Women) and National Federation of Young Republican Clubs in your county? (Specify which) _____

Do the officers and members of these clubs participate in your county organization? _____ At the precinct level? _____

Could we obtain a list of these clubs and list of officers and number of their membership? _____

Do candidates pay a filing fee when they file? _____

Do the voters pay a poll tax or any other fee to qualify as voters? _____

What is the voter registration procedure in your county? _____

What is the period of registration? (Time) _____

Where does the voter register? At the courthouse?
Town or city hall? Or in the precinct? _____

If registration is in the precinct, how many Precinct Registrars are appointed? _____

Are both parties represented? How are they selected?
By whom are they appointed? _____

Do you have permanent registration?
When must you vote to remain on list? _____

If removed from list, what notice is given? _____

What are provisions for transfers? _____

When was the voter register purged? Is it mandatory to purge?
What period? _____

Do you have any new registration projects? _____

Could you furnish copy of form used for registration? (Attach) _____

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

Do you provide training programs for precinct leaders?
Co-leaders?

Republican Precinct Poll Officials? Watchers?
Challengers?

How often do you hold county committee meetings?
How many attend the average meeting?

Do you have County Campaign Headquarters at election time?

Do you provide transportation for voters on Election Day?

Do you have a county finance committee?

Do you have an up-to-date list of all (Republican, Democrat,
and Undeclared) voters in every precinct or voting place?

Are there any serious factional differences in your county?

How effectively are the Democrats organized in your county?
Details will be appreciated.

What newspapers (daily or weekly) circulate in your county?

Are publishers, editors, political reporters presenting the
Republican story impartially?

We would be pleased to have your personal opinion on what
could be done to strengthen the Republican Party in your
county.

Do you have any organized relationship with other county
chairmen in your Congressional District?

How long have you served as County Chairman?

Copy of Questionnaire sent to all County Chairmen in 1956 (Cont.)

How long has the Vice Chairman (Woman) served?

Was she elected or appointed?

Are you elected by the County Committee members?

Special Information

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

B. CANDIDATE ANALYSIS SHEET PREPARED BY REPUBLICAN
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

District _____ Date _____

Name _____ Address _____

POLITICAL YARDSTICK

HOW TO MEASURE YOUR CANDIDATES

Reputation _____
 Qualified for office _____
 Experienced in campaigning _____
 Physical appearance _____
 Personality _____
 Really wants the job _____
 Active in community affairs _____
 Record as prior candidate _____
 Name familiar to voters _____
 Appeal to independent voters _____
 Press relations _____
 Platform performance _____
 Television performance _____
 Radio voice _____
 Military record _____
 Athletic record _____
 Party support _____
 Fraternal affiliations _____
 Labor support _____
 Parent-teacher association support _____
 Smaller organized group supports _____
 Position on popular local issues _____
 Aggressive campaigner _____
 Racial background favorable to community _____
 Financial ability to run _____

TOTAL POINTS

HOW TO SCORE EACH POLITICAL FACTOR

5 Excellent 4 Above average
 3 Average 2 Fair 1 Poor

HOW TO EVALUATE TOTAL SCORE

100 Plus Excellent candidate
 78-99 Good candidate
 60-78 Fair candidate
 59 or below Poor candidate

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

C. COPY OF PRECINCT ANALYSIS SHEET

AS PREPARED BY THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Page 1 - Precinct Analysis Procedure

- I. Determine the actual number of precincts in each county
 - A. Obtain from the Congressional Committee four (4) analysis forms for each precinct.
 - B. Distribute sufficient number of forms to each county chairman.
- II. Explain the purpose of the analysis to each county chairman
 - A. Purpose is to learn the voting history or behavior in every precinct in every county.
 - B. When the analysis is completed, the weak precincts and the strong precincts will be readily and reliably spotted.
 - C. Republican organizations and leaders can then proceed to strengthen the weak precincts before the November 1958 election.
 - D. County chairmen and other party leaders will receive copies of the summary to be compiled by the Congressional Committee.
 - E. Data obtained from this analysis will provide the most factual blueprint for building Republican organization on the grass-roots level for victory on all levels in November 1958.
- III. The voting records for completing the forms can usually be obtained from each county courthouse.
 - A. The county chairmen may offer to have the work done or volunteers may be recruited from members of a Republican Women's Federation Club or Young Republican organization in the county.

Precinct Analysis Procedure (Continued)

- IV. The Precinct Analysis form
 - A. It is important to obtain the current registration figures for each county when same is available for each precinct.
 - B. It is very important to have the names of the committeemen and women in each county.
 - C. The years listed on the form for Senate and Governor races may vary for your own state.
 - D. A summary sheet should be prepared for each city or town having more than one voting district and for the county.
- V. Obtain a map for each county showing precinct boundaries.
- VI. Return One (1) set of completed forms for each county to the office of the Congressman and the National Republican Congressional Committee, Congressional Hotel, Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX III - CAMPAIGN TOOLS

D. DATA SHEET FOR COMPILING ELECTION DATA BY STATES

(Prepared by Republican Campaign Committee. Filled in
for Michigan, Election of 1956)

1956 Registration Total: 3,620,651
Wayne County : 1,305,118
Outside : 2,315,533

STATE Michigan POPULATION 1950: 6,371,766* 1956: 7,516,000

POTENTIAL VOTE 1950: 4,106,606* 1956: 4,509,600

COUNTIES: 83 PRECINCTS: 4,790

1952-1956

REPUBLICANS FAILED TO VOTE FOR CONGRESS 1952: 32,094 1956: 82,536

ESTIMATED MINIMUM DEMOCRAT VOTE FOR IKE 1952: 80,991 1956: 130,939

82,536 VOTED FOR PRESIDENT IN 1956 BUT FAILED TO VOTE FOR
CONGRESS

President		Senate	
<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>
R <u>1,551,529</u>	<u>1,713,647</u>	<u>1,428,352</u>	<u>no. cont.</u>
D <u>1,230,657</u>	<u>1,359,898</u>	<u>1,383,416</u>	<u>" "</u>

Governor		Congressional Can.	
<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>
R <u>1,423,275</u>	<u>1,376,376</u>	<u>1,453,181</u>	<u>1,500,172</u>
D <u>1,431,893</u>	<u>1,666,689</u>	<u>1,310,578</u>	<u>1,490,837</u>

'52 R won by 320,872 R won by 444,936 R lost by 8618
R op. Marg. by 142,603

'56 R won by 353,749 R _____ by _____ R lost by 290,313
Rep. Marg. by 9,335

1954

REPULICANS FAILED TO VOTE FOR CONGRESS 21,327

Data Sheet for Compiling Election Data by states (Continued)

<u>Senate</u>	<u>Governor</u>	<u>Congressional Cand.</u>
Rep. <u>1,049,420</u>	Rep. <u>963,300</u>	Rep. <u>1,028,093</u>
Dem. <u>1,088,550</u>	Dem. <u>1,216,308</u>	Dem. <u>1,100,939</u>
Rep. <u>lost</u> by <u>39,130</u>	Rep. <u>lost</u> by <u>253,008</u>	Democrat Marg. by <u>72,846</u>

<u>Stay-At-Homes</u>		<u>Non-Voters</u>	<u>Total Vote</u>
Rep.	Dem.		
		1952: <u>1,240,626</u>	1952: <u>2,865,908</u>
1954: <u>421,118</u>	<u>257,835</u>	1954: <u>2,322,573</u>	1954: <u>2,187,027</u>
1956: _____	_____	1956: <u>1,436,055</u>	1956: <u>3,073,545</u>
NON-WHITE: <u>453,961*</u>		NON-WHITE OVER 21: <u>293,843*</u>	
FOREIGN BORN: <u>603,735</u>			

Poland 81,595; Germany 45,323
 Italy 38,937; USSR 30,804

CONGRESSIONAL LINEUP: Rep: 12 Dem: 6 Marginal seats: 3

6th Chamberlain - R
 7th McIntosh - R;
 17th Griffiths

E. Michigan State Election Results 1952-1956

Population (1950 Census)	6,371,776
Population (1956 New York Times estimate)	7,516,000
Eligible Vote (over 21 years old) 4,106,606 ('50)	4,509,600
Total Vote Cast - 1952	2,865,980 (Governor)
Eligible (over 21) failed to vote - 1952	1,240,626
Total Vote Cast - 1956	3,073,545
Eligible (over 21) failed to vote - 1956	1,436,045
Voted for President, 1952, failed to vote for Congress	26,655*
Voted for President, 1956, failed to vote for Congress	82,536

Republican

1952 Eisenhower received (votes)	1,551,529
1956 Eisenhower received (votes)	1,713,647
1956 Eisenhower received more (votes)	162,118
1952 Congress received (votes)	1,453,181
1956 Congress received (votes)	1,500,172
1956 Congress received more (votes)	46,991



1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the integrity of the financial system and for the ability to detect and prevent fraud.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific procedures for recording transactions. It details the steps involved in the accounting cycle, from identifying the transaction to posting it to the appropriate ledger account.

3. The third part of the document discusses the role of the auditor in verifying the accuracy of the records. It describes the various audit procedures used to test the reliability of the accounting system and to ensure that the financial statements are presented fairly.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the importance of internal controls in preventing errors and fraud. It describes the various types of internal controls, such as segregation of duties and authorization requirements, and explains how they are implemented in the accounting system.

5. The fifth part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to management. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are generated by the accounting system and explains how they are used by management to make decisions about the organization's operations.

6. The sixth part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to the public. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are required by law to be disclosed to the public and explains how they are used by investors and other stakeholders to make decisions about the organization's financial health.

7. The seventh part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to the government. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are required by law to be disclosed to the government and explains how they are used by government officials to make decisions about the organization's financial health.

8. The eighth part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to the media. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are required by law to be disclosed to the media and explains how they are used by the media to report on the organization's financial health.

9. The ninth part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to the public. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are required by law to be disclosed to the public and explains how they are used by investors and other stakeholders to make decisions about the organization's financial health.

10. The tenth part of the document discusses the role of the accounting system in providing information to the government. It describes the various types of financial statements and other reports that are required by law to be disclosed to the government and explains how they are used by government officials to make decisions about the organization's financial health.

Michigan State Election Results 1952-1956 (Continued).Democrat

1952 Stevenson received (votes)	1,230,657
1956 Stevenson received (votes)	1,490,837
1956 Stevenson received more (votes)	260,180
1952 Congress received (votes)	1,310,578
1956 Congress received (votes)	1,490,837
1956 Congress received more (votes)	180,259

*1952 - Governor received 94,043 more votes than Congress
and Governor received 67,388 more votes than the
President. The Governor won election by 8,618 votes.

In Michigan there were approximately 1,240,600 in 1952 and 1,436,045 in 1956 eligible voters over 21 years old not voting in the elections. Where are these non-voters?

In Michigan, 26,655 in 1952 and 82,536 in 1956 voted for President but did not vote for Congress. Where are these voters?

In Michigan in 1956, as compared to 1952, President Eisenhower received 162,118 more votes and Stevenson received 260,180 more votes.

In Michigan in 1956, the Republican Congress received 46,991 more votes and the Democrat Congress received 180,259 more votes.

In 1956, as compared to 1952, there were 207,565 more votes cast.

See tabulation vote results sheet for each Congressional District.

Differences in Republican vote Compared 1952- <u>1956</u>	Differences in Democrat Vote Compared 1952- <u>1956</u>	Vote Cast 1956 Com- pared to <u>1952</u>	Ike Carried Cong. Dist. <u>1952</u> <u>1956</u>	
1st Dist. -3,305	-6,405	-10,557	no	no
2nd Dist. -4,599	-3,432	-7,478	yes	yes
3rd Dist. +4,995	-1,447	+2,778	yes	yes
4th Dist. -3,826	+8,041	+3,695	yes	yes
5th Dist. +10,542	+3,752	+13,531	yes	yes
6th Dist. +8,307	+15,921	+23,400	yes	yes
7th Dist. +12,738	+32,229	+44,626	yes	yes
8th Dist. +1,626	+6,466	+7,438	yes	yes
9th Dist. -2,290	+6,152	+3,415	yes	yes
10th Dist. +3,054	+4,564	+7,618	yes	yes
11th Dist. -1,766	+3,902	+2,136	yes	yes
12th Dist. -1,448	+1,542	+ 103	yes	yes
13th Dist. -10,021	-1,120	-11,387	no	no
14th Dist. -10,433	+5,025	+5,604	yes	yes
15th Dist. -15,263	+2,718	-12,776	no	no
16th Dist. +13,174	+43,448	+55,487	no	no
17th Dist. +3,915	+28,810	+32,447	yes	yes
18th Dist. +32,383	+23,301	+55,165	yes	yes

Do the Republican Congressmen in Michigan have field assistants in their districts?

APPENDIX IV - POPULATION STATISTICS ON DISTRICTS OF
COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

RURAL-URBAN CHARACTER OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
REPRESENTED BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

Chairman: Jay A. Hubbell Population 203,266
District: Michigan 9th Population Density 10.6/sq. mi.
Census: 1880
Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1880</u>	<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>
Antrim	5,237	Cadillac 2,213
Benzie	3,433	Escanaba 3,026
Charlevoix	5,115	Lake Linden 2,610
Chippewa	5,248	Marquette 4,690
Delta	6,812	Negaunee 3,931
Grand Traverse	8,422	Ludington 4,190
Houghton	22,473	Menominee <u>3,288</u>
Kalkaska	2,937	Total 23,948
Keweenaw	4,270	
Lake	3,233	
Leelanaw	6,253	
Mackinac	2,902	
Manistee	12,532	<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>
Manitou	1,334	Manistee 6,930
Marquette	25,394	Ishpeming <u>6,639</u>
Mason	10,065	Total 13,569
Mecosta	13,973	
Menominee	11,987	
Missaukee	1,553	
Newaygo	14,688	
Oceana	11,699	
Ontonagon	2,565	
Osceola	10,777	
Otsego	1,974	
Schoolcraft	1,575	
Wexford	<u>6,815</u>	
Total	203,266	

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Joseph W. Babcock Population 1880: 174,194
 District: Wisconsin 3rd Population density 32.6/sq. mi.
 Census: 1880
 Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1880</u>	<u>Population 1890</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>
Brown	34,978	39,164	46,359
Crawford	15,644	15,987	17,286
Grant	37,852	36,651	38,881
Juneau	15,582	17,121	20,629
Richland	18,174	19,121	19,433
Sauk	28,729	39,575	33,006
Vernon	<u>23,235</u>	<u>25,111</u>	<u>28,251</u>
Total	174,194	192,730	203,845

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1890</u>	<u>1900</u>
De Pere		3,629	4,038
Prairie du Chien	2,777	3,131	3,232
Platteville		2,740	3,340
Baraboo		<u>4,605</u>	
Total	2,777	14,105	10,610

<u>Cities 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1800</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1890</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>1900</u>
Green Bay		9,069	18,684
Baraboo			<u>5,751</u>
Total			24,435

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	James S. Sherman	Population:	209,280
District:	New York 27th	Population Density:	146.2
Census:	1900		
Raging:	Middle rurban		

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>
Madison	40,545
Onondaga	168,735
	<hr/>
Total	209,280

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>		<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	
Baldwinsville	2,992	Oneida	6,364
Canastota	3,030		
East Syracuse	2,509		
	<hr/>		
Total	8,531		

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	
Syracuse	108,374

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	William B. McKinley	Population 1900:	184,593
District:	Illinois 19th	1910:	241,728
Census:	1900, 1910	Density 1900:	49.7/sq.mile
Rating:	Rural (74.1% in 1900)	1910:	53.1/sq.mile

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Champaign	47,622	51,829
Coles	34,146	34,517
Dewitt	18,972	18,906
Douglas	19,097	19,591
Macon	41,003	54,186
Moultrie	15,224	14,630
Piatt	17,706	16,376
Shelby	<u>32,126</u>	<u>32,693</u>
Total	225,896	241,728

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Clinton	4,452	
Shelbyville	3,546	3,590
Sullivan	—	<u>2,621</u>
Total	7,998	6,211

<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Clinton	,	5,165
Champaign	9,098	,
Charleston	5,488	5,884
Mattoon	9,622	
Urbana	<u>5,728</u>	<u>8,246</u>
Total	29,936	19,295

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Champaign		12,421
Mattoon		11,465
Decatur	<u>20,754</u>	<u>31,140</u>
Total	20,754	55,017

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Cahirman: Frank B. Woods Population: 239,304
 District: Iowa 10th Population density: 31.4/sq.mi.
 Census: 1910
 Rating: Rural (81.6%)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Boone	27,626
Calhoun	17,090
Carroll	20,117
Crawford	20,041
Emmett	9,816
Greene	16,023
Hamilton	19,242
Humboldt	12,182
Kossuth	21,971
Palo Alto	13,845
Pocahontas	14,808
Webster	34,629
Winnebago	<u>11,914</u>
Total	239,304

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	
Algona	2,908
Carroll	3,546
Estherville	3,407
Denison	<u>3,133</u>
Total	12,994

<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	
Webster City	5,208
	<u>5,208</u>

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	
Boone	10,347
Fort Dodge	<u>15,543</u>
Total	25,890

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Simeon Fess Population 1910: 264,367
 District: Ohio 7th 1920: 277,974
 Census: 1910, 1920 Density: 1910 - 68.5; 1920 - 71.7
 Rating: Rural urban (65.1% rural)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Champaign	26,351	25,071
Clark	66,435	80,728
Clinton	23,680	23,036
Fayette	21,774	21,518
Greene	29,773	31,221
Logan	30,084	30,104
Madison	19,902	19,662
Union	21,871	20,918
Warren	<u>24,497</u>	<u>25,716</u>
Total	264,367	277,974

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>
Lebanon	2,698	4,080
London	3,530	3,635
Marysville	3,576	3,396
Wilmington	<u>4,499</u>	<u> </u>
Total	13,393	11,111

<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>
Urbana	7,739	7,621
Wilmington		5,037
Washington Court House	7,277	7,962
Xenia	8,706	9,110
Bellefontaine	<u>8,238</u>	<u>9,336</u>
Total	31,960	39,066

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>		
Springfield	46,921	60,840

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Will R. Wood Population 1920: 286,387
 District: Indiana 10th 1930: 391,770
 Census: 1920, 1930 Density 1920: 31.2/sq.mi.
 Density 1930: 43.3/sq.mi.
 Rating: Urban-Rurban
 (37.2% rural)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
Benton	12,206	11,886
Jasper	13,961	13,388
Lake	159,957	261,310
Newton	10,144	9,841
Porter	20,256	22,821
Tippecanoe	42,813	47,535
Watren	9,699	9,167
White	<u>17,351</u>	<u>15,831</u>
Total	286,387	391,779

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
Crown Point	3,232	4,046
Hobart	3,450	
Rensselaer	2,912	2,798
West Lafayette	<u>3,830</u>	<u> </u>
Total	13,424	6,844

<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
Hobart		5,787
Valparaiso	6,518	8,079
West Lafayette	<u> </u>	<u>5,095</u>
Total	6,518	18,961

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
Gary	55,378	100,426
East Chicago	35,967	54,784
Hammond	36,004	64,560
Lafayette	22,486	26,240
Whiting	<u>10,145</u>	<u>10,880</u>
Total	159,980	256,890

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Chester C. Bolton Population 633,678
District: Ohio 22nd Density: Not ascertained
Census: 1930

Rating: Urban (11.5% rural)

Counties: Population 1930

Lake	41,674
Geauga	15,414
Cuyahoga (exclusive of Cleveland)	301,026
Parts of Cleveland:	275,564
(Parts of wards 9, 11, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 27, 30, 32, 33)	
Total	633,378

Towns 2,500 - 5,000 Population 1930

Chagrin Falls	2,739
Fairport	4,972
Fairview Park	3,689
Mayfield Heights	2,612
Newburgh Heights	4,152
North Olmsted	2,624
*South Euclid	4,399
Willoughby	4,045
Total	29,232

Towns 5,000 - 10,000 Population 1930

*Bedford	6,814
*Berea	5,697
Maple Heights	5,950
*Rocky River	5,632
Total	24,093

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>1930</u>
Painesville	10,944	Cleveland Heights	50,945
*East Cleveland	39,667	*Euclid	12,751
*Lakewood	70,509	*Parma	13,899
*Shaker Heights	17,783	*Garfield Heights	15,589

Total 232,087

*Part of Cleveland Metropolitan Area, Fourteenth Census of the
United States, Vol. I, Population 1920, p. 66.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Joseph Martin
 District: Mass. 14th
 Census: 1930

Population: 284,790
 Density: Not ascertained
 Rating: Urban-rurban

Bristol County:

Cities (over 10,000)

Attleboro	21,769
Fall River	115,274
Taunton	37,355
Total	<u>174,398</u>

Towns (Townships)

Berkley	1,120
Dighton	3,174
Easton	5,298
*Freetown	1,656
Mansfield	6,364
N. Attleboro	10,197
Norton	2,737
Raynham	2,136
Rehoboth	2,610
Seekonk	4,762
Swansea	3,941
*Westport	4,408
Somerset	<u>5,398</u>
Total	53,801

Middlesex County:

Towns:

Holliston	2,864
Sherborn	<u>943</u>
Total	3,807

*Contiguous to Fall River

Norfolk County:

Towns (townships):

Bellingham	3,189
Foxborough	5,347
Franklin	7,028
Medfield	4,066
Medway	3,153
Millis	1,738
Norfolk	10,845
Plaineville	1,583
Sharon	3,351
Walpole	7,273
Wrentham	<u>3,584</u>
Total	48,137

Worcester County:

Blackstone	4,647
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Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	J. William Ditter	Population 1930 -	362,531
District:	Pennsylvania 2nd	Population 1940 -	396,247
Census:	1930, 1940	Density -	326.9 (1930)
			358.8 (1940)

Rating: Middle rurban

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>
Bucks	96,727	107,715
Montgomery	<u>265,804</u>	<u>289,247</u>
Total	362,531	396,962
<u>Boroughs 2,500 - 5,000</u>		
Ambler	3,944	3,953
Doylestown	4,577	4,976
Hatboro	2,651	2,605
Jenkintown	4,797	
Narberth	4,669	
Perkasee	3,463	4,121
Quakertown	4,883	
Royersford	3,719	3,605
Souderton	<u>3,857</u>	<u>4,036</u>
Total	36,560	23,296
<u>Boroughs 5,000 - 10,000</u>		
Bridgeport	5,595	5,904
Jenkintown		5,024
Lansdale	8,379	9,316
Morrisville	5,368	5,493
Narberth		5,217
Quakertown	<u> </u>	<u>5,150</u>
Total	19,342	36,104
<u>Boroughs or cities over 10,000</u>		
Conshohocken	10,815	10,776
Bristol	11,799	11,895
Norristown	35,853	38,181
Pottstown	<u>19,430</u>	<u>20,194</u>
Total	77,897	81,046

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

	<u>Population 1930</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>
<u>Townships over 5,000, adjacent or contiguous to</u> <u>Philadelphia</u>		
Abington	18,648	20,857
Bensalem		7,276
Bristol		5,857
Cheltenham	15,731	19,082
Lower Merion*	35,166	39,506
Springfield	5,541	5,603
Upper Merion		6,143
Upper Moreland	<hr/>	<hr/> 5,103
Total	75,056	109,427

*Classified as urban under special rules, Abstract of the
 Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, p. 32, Table 16.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	Charles Halleck	Population:	253,952
District:	Indiana 2nd	Density:	48.2 per sq. mile
Census:	1940	Rating:	Rural-urban (67.6% rural)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>
Benton	11,117
Carroll	15,410
Cass	36,908
Fulton	15,577
Jasper	14,398
Kosciusco	29,561
Newton	10,774
Porter	27,838
Pulaski	12,056
Starke	12,258
Tippecanoe	51,020
White	<u>17,037</u>
Total	252,955

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>		<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	
Rochester	3,835	Warsaw	6,378
Rensselaer	4,204	Walparaiso	8,763
Monticello	<u>3,153</u>	West Lafayette	<u>6,270</u>
Total	11,192		21,411

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	
Lafayette	28,798
Logansport	<u>20,760*</u>
Total	49,558

Rating: % Urban 19.6
 % Rural 80.4

*The population of logansport, according to the 1940 census was 20,177. The rest of Eel Township, in which it is located, had a population of 583. This was annexed to Logansport in three bites in 1940, 1941, and 1946, making the two co-extensive. This explains the figure given above.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Leonard Hall Population 1940: 331,131
 District: New York 2nd Density: Not determined
 Census: 1940, 1950
 Rating: Middle-rurban

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>	
Part of Nassau	331,131	
<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>	<u>Population 1950</u>
New Hyde Park	4,691	,
Sea Cliff	4,416	4,868
Westbury	<u>4,524</u>	<u> </u>
Total	13,631	
<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>	<u>Population 1950</u>
Great Neck	6,167	7,759
New Hyde Park		7,349
Westbury		7,112
Williston Park	5,750	7,505
Oyster Bay	<u> </u>	<u>5,215</u>
Total	11,917	34,940
<u>Towns over 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>	<u>Population 1950</u>
Floral Park	12,950	14,582
Garden City (part)	11,223	14,368
Hempsted	20,856	29,135
Mineola	10,064	14,831
Glen Cove	<u>12,415</u>	<u>15,130</u>
Total	67,509	93,261

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	Richard Simpson	Population:	339,528
District:	Pennsylvania 18th	Density:	
Census:	1950	Rating:	Rural (87.8%)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1950</u>
Bedford	40,775
Franklin	75,927
Fulton	10,387
Huntington	40,873
Mifflin	43,691
Snyder	22,912
Somerset	81,813
Union	23,150
	<hr/>
Total	339,528

Towns, boroughs or cities:

<u>2,500 - 5,000</u>		<u>5,000 - 10,000</u>	
Bedford	3,521	Huntingdon	7,330
Burnham	2,954	Lewisburg	5,268
Greencastle	2,661	Windber	<u>8,010</u>
Myersdale	3,137	Total	20,608
Mt. Union	4,690		
Selinsgrove	3,513		
Somerset	<u>5,936</u>		
Total	26,413		

<u>Over 10,000</u>	
Chambersburg	17,212
Lewistown	13,894
Waynesboro	<u>10,334</u>
Total	41,440

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	William L. Wilson	Population 1880:	163,368
District:	West Virginia 2nd	1890:	187,305
Census:	1880,1890	Density 1880:	25.5
		1890:	29.3
Rating:	Rural		

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1880</u>	<u>Population 1890</u>
Barbour	11,870	12,706
Berkeley	17,380	18,702
Grant	5,542	6,802
Hampshire	10,366	11,419
Hardy	6,794	7,567
Jefferson	15,005	15,553
Marion	17,198	20,721
Mineral	8,630	12,085
Monongahela	14,985	15,705
Morgan	5,777	6,744
Pendleton	8,022	8,711
Preston	19,091	20,355
Randolph	8,102	11,633
Taylor	11,455	12,147
Tucker	<u>3,151</u>	<u>6,459</u>
Total	163,368	187,305
<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1890</u>
Grafton	3,030	3,159
<u>Towns over 5,000</u>		
Martinsburg	6,335	7,226

Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1890</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>
Bedford	24,739	23,845
Cannon	12,197	12,121
Coffee	13,827	15,574
Dekalb	15,650	16,460
Lincoln	27,382	23,304
Marshall	18,906	18,763
Moore	5,975	5,706
Rutherford	<u>35,097</u>	<u>33,543</u>
Total	153,773	149,316
<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1890</u>	<u>1900</u>
Murfreesboro	3,739	3,999
Fayetteville		2,708
Tallahoma	<u> </u>	<u>2,684</u>
Total	3,739	9,391
<u>No cities over 5,000</u>		

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: James M. Griggs Population 228,880
 District: Georgia 2nd Density 34.3/sq. mi.
 Census: 1900
 Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>
Baker	6,704
Berrien	19,440
Calhoun	9,274
Clay	8,568
Colquitt	13,636
Decatur	29,454
Dougherty	13,679
Early	14,828
Miller	6,319
Mitchell	14,767
Quitman	4,701
Randolph	16,847
Terrell	19,023
Thomas	31,076
Worth	<u>18,664</u>
Total	228,880

Towns 2,500 - 5,000

Bainbridge	2,641
Albany	4,606
Cuthbert	2,641
Dawson	<u>2,926</u>
Total	12,814

Towns 5,000 - 10,000

Thomasville	5,322
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<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1900</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Adair	21,728	35,340
Clark	15,383	12,811
Knox	13,479	12,407
Lewis	16,724	15,514
Macon	33,018	30,868
Marion	26,331	30,572
Putnam	16,688	14,308
Schuyler	10,840	9,062
Scotland	13,232	11,869
Shelby	<u>16,167</u>	<u>14,864</u>
Total	183,590	174,975

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>		
Hannibal	12,780	18,341

Reported

183,550
174,975
32.8 ad. ml.
34.1 ad. ml.

1910

35,340
12,811
12,407
12,214
30,868
30,572
14,808
9,062
11,669
14,864
174,975

1910

3,584

1910

6,347

18,341

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	Frank E. Doremus	Population:	354,731
District:	Michigan 1st	Population, as reapportioned:	
Census:	1910		345,419
Rating:	Urban		

Includes:

A. Before reapportionment

City of Detroit, Wards 1 to 15 and 17

B. After reapportionment

City of Detroit, Wards 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17,
19, and 21.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Scott Ferris Population: 207,451
 District: Oklahoma 6th Density: 24.3 / sq. mi.
 Census: 1910

Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>
Blaine	17,960
Caddo	35,685
Canadian	23,501
Comanche	41,489
Grady	30,309
Jefferson	17,430
Kingfisher	18,825
Stephens	<u>22,252</u>
Total	207,451

Towns 2,500 - 5,000

Anadarko	3,439
Kingfisher	2,538
Waurika	<u>2,928</u>
Total	8,905

Towns 5,000 - 10,000

El Reno	7,872
Lawton	<u>7,788</u>
Total	15,660

Cities over 10,000

Chickasha	10,320
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Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	H. D. Flood	Population 1910:	179,461
District:	Virginia 10th	1920:	180,704
Census:	1910, 1920	Density: 1910:	28.1
		Density: 1920:	28.3
Rating:	Rural		

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1910</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Alleghany	14,173	15,332
Amherst	18,923	19,771
Appomattox	8,904	9,255
Augusta	32,445	34,671
Bath	6,538	6,389
Botetourt	17,727	16,557
Buckingham	15,024	14,885
Craig	4,711	3,562
Cumberland	9,195	9,101
Fluvanna	8,323	8,547
Highland	5,317	4,931
Nelson	16,821	17,277
Rockbridge	<u>21,171</u>	<u>20,626</u>
Total	179,461	180,704
<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>
Buena Vista*	3,245	3,911
Covington(part)	4,234	
Lexington	<u>2,931</u>	<u>2,870</u>
Total	10,410	6,781
<u>Cities 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>
Clifton Forge*	5,748	6,164
Covington	<u> </u>	<u>5,623</u>
Total	5,748	11,787
<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>
Staunton*	10,604	10,623

*Independent cities should be added to population of counties, making the district's total population 199,058.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Arthur B. Rouse Population 186,068
District: Kentucky 6th Density 124.2 / sq. mi.
Census: 1920

Rating: Middle rurban (40.4% rural)

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Boone	9,572
Kenton	73,453
Campbell	61,868
Trimble	6,011
Carroll	8,346
Gallatin	4,664
Grant	10,435
Pendleton	<u>11,719</u>
Total	186,068

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Ludlow	4,582

<u>Cities 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Bellevue	7,379
Dayton	7,646
Fort Thomas	<u>5,028</u>
Total	20,052

<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	
Covington (wards 1-6)	57,121
Newport (wards 2, 4, 6)	<u>29,317</u>
Total*	86,438

*The total given is that for the entire city in each case, but, obviously, this portion of the District is entirely urban.

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: William A. Oldfield Population 220,444
 District: Arkansas 2nd Density: 27.6 / sq. mi.
 Census: 1920
 Rating: Rural

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Cleburne	12,696
Fulton	11,182
Independence	23,976
Izard	13,871
Jackson	25,446
Lasrence	22,098
Monroe	21,601
Prairie	17,447
Randolph	17,713
Sharp	11,132
Stone	8,779
White	<u>34,603</u>
Total	220,444

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>
Batesville	4,299
Brinkley	2,714
Clarendon	2,638
Newport	2,771
Searcy	<u>2,836</u>
Total	15,258

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	Joseph W. Byrnes	Population 1920:	250,404
District:	Tennessee 5th	1930:	194,915
Census:	1920, 1930	Density 1920:	31.5
Rating:	Middle rurban (48% rural)	1930:	24.6

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1920</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
Cheatham	10,039	
Davidson	167,815	
Montgomery	32,265	
Robertson	25,621	
Stewart	14,663	

As reapportioned:

Dickson		18,491
Giles		28,016
Hickman		13,613
Houston		5,555
Humphreys		12,039
Lawrence		26,776
Lewis		5,258
Maury		34,016
Perry		7,147
Wayne		12,134
Williamson		<u>22,845</u>
Total	250,404	194,915

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>1930</u>
Springfield	3,860	Dickson	2,902
		Pulaski	3,367
		Lawrenceburg	3,102
		Franklin	<u>3,377</u>
		Total	12,748

<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>		<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>	
Clarksville	8,110	Columbia	7,882

Cities over 10,000

Nashville	118,342
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Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman:	Patrick Drewry	Population 1930:	241,842
District:	Virginia 4th	Population as reapportioned	
Census:	1930, 1940	(1940):	221,934
		Density 1930:	56.5 / sq. mi.
Rating:	Rural	Density as reapportioned:	36.6

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1930</u>
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Carroll	22,141
Charlotte	16,061
Franklin	24,337
Grayson	20,017
Halifax	41,283
Henry	20,088
Patrick	15,787
Pittsylvania	61,424
Wythe	<u>20,704</u>
Total	241,842

<u>Counties as reapportioned</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>
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Amelia	8,495
Appomattox	9,020
Brunswick	19,575
Buckingham	31,477
Cumberland	7,505
Dinwiddie	18,166
Greensville	14,866
Lunenburg	13,844
Mecklenburg	31,933
Nottoway	15,556
Powhatan	5,671
Prince Edward	14,922
Prince George	12,226
Surrey	6,193
Sussex	<u>12,485</u>
Total	221,934

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>	<u>Before reapportionment</u>	<u>After reapportionment</u>	
	(1930 census)	(1940 census)	
Galax	2,544	Blackstone	2,699
South Boston	4,841	Emporia	2,735
Wytheville	<u>3,327</u>	Farmville	<u>3,475</u>
Total	10,712		8,909
<u>Cities 5,000 - 10,000</u>	<u>1930</u>		<u>1940</u>
None		Hopewell	8,679
<u>Cities over 10,000</u>	<u>1930</u>		<u>1940</u>
Danville	22,247	Petersburg	30,631

Rural-Urban Character of Congressional Districts Represented
By Committee Chairmen (Continued).

Chairman: Michael Kirwan

District: Ohio 19th

Census: 1940, 1950

Population 1940: 441,240

1950: 495,239

Density 1940: 252.8 per sq.mi.

Density 1950: 283.8

Rating: Urban-rurban

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population 1940</u>	<u>Population 1950</u>
Ashtabula	68,674	78,695
Mahoning	240,251	257,629
Trumbull	<u>132,315</u>	<u>158,915</u>
Total	441,240	495,239
<u>Towns 2,500 - 5,000</u>		
Geneva	4,171	4,718
Sebring	3,902	4,045
*Hubbard	4,189	4,560
Newton Falls	<u>3,120</u>	<u>4,451</u>
Total	15,382	17,774
<u>Towns 5,000 - 10,000</u>		
Conneaut	9,355	10,230
*Girard (part)	<u>9,756</u>	<u>10,054</u>
Total	19,111	20,284
<u>Cities over 10,000</u>		
Ashtabula	21,406	23,696
*Campbell	13,735	12,882
*Struthers (part)	10,704	11,073
Youngstown (part)	167,720	168,237
*Warren (part)	42,837	49,856
*Niles	<u>16,273</u>	<u>16,773</u>
Total	272,675	282,517

*Youngstown urbanized area according to Census of Population:
1950, Vol. I.

APPENDIX V

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS BY BOTH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

TO CANDIDATES IN THE 1956 ELECTION

I. Grants by the Republican CommitteeArizona

<u>District</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Grant</u>
1st	John J. Rhodes	\$1,500.00*
2nd	John G. (Jack) Speiden	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

Arkansas

3rd	William S. Spicer	<u>\$1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

California

11th	Leroy Johnson	<u>\$1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$1,000.00

Colorado

1st	Robert S. McCollum	\$2,000.00
2nd	William S. Hill	2,000.00*
3rd	J. Edgar Chenoweth	2,500.00*
4th	Hugh L. Caldwell	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$7,500.00

Connecticut

1st	Edward H. May, Jr.	\$1,000.00*
2nd	Horace Seely-Brown, Jr.	1,000.00*
3rd	Albert W. Cretella	1,000.00*

(more)

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Connecticut (continued)

4th	Albert P. Morano	\$2,000.00*
5th	James T. Patterson	500.00*
At large	Antoni N. Sadlak	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$6,500.00

Delaware

At large	Harry G. Haskell, Jr.	\$ <u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

Florida

1st	William C. Cramer	\$ 500.00*
4th	Leland Hyzer	500.00
5th	Arnold L. Lund	500.00
6th	Dorothy A. Smith	500.00
7th	G. M. (Gus) Nelson	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

Idaho

1st	Louise Shadduck	\$2,500.00
2nd	Haver H. Budge	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$3,500.00

Illinois

1st	George W. Lawrence	\$ 750.00
2nd	George B. McKibbin	250.00
3rd	Emmet F. Byrne	1,250.00*
4th	William E. McVey	750.00*
9th	Johann S. Ackerman	750.00
11th	Timothy P. Sheehan	750.00*

(more)

*indicates that candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Illinois (continued)

12th	Edgar A. Jonas	\$1,250.00
16th	Leo E. Allen	250.00*
18th	Robert H. Michel	1,000.00*
19th	Robert B. Chipperfield	500.00*
20th	Sid Simpson	1,000.00*
21st	Frederic S. O'Hara	1,250.00
22nd	William L. Springer	1,000.00*
23rd	Albert W. Vursell	1,000.00*
25th	Samuel J. Scott	<u>1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$13,250.00

Indiana

1st	Donald K. Stimson, Jr.	\$ 500.00
3rd	F. Jay Nimitz	2,000.00*
4th	E. Ross Adair	500.00*
5th	John V. Beamer	500.00*
6th	Cecil M. Harden	750.00*
7th	William G. Bray	750.00*
8th	D. Bailey Merrill	1,500.00
9th	Earl Wilson	1,300.00*
10th	Ralph Harvey	250.00*
11th	Charles B. Brownson	<u>250.00*</u>
	Total	\$8,300.00

*indicates candidate won.

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Iowa

1st	Fred Schwengel	\$1,000.00*
2nd	Henry O. Talle	3,500.00*
3rd	H. R. Gross	1,000.00*
4th	Karl M. LeCompte	3,000.00*
5th	Paul Cunningham	3,000.00*
6th	James I. Dolliver	3,000.00
7th	Ben F. Jensen	2,500.00*
8th	Charles B. Hoeven	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$18,000.00

Kansas

1st	William H. Avery	\$ 750.00*
2nd	Errett P. Scrivner	750.00*
3rd	Myron V. George	1,250.00*
4th	Edward H. Rees	750.00*
5th	John W. Crutcher	1,250.00
6th	Wint Smith	<u>750.00*</u>
	Total	\$5,500.00

Kentucky

2nd	R. B. Blankenship	\$1,000.00
3rd	John M. Robsion, Jr.	1,000.00*
5th	Jule Appel	500.00
6th	Wallace "Wah Wah" Jones	1,000.00
7th	Scott Craft	500.00
8th	Eugene Siler	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$4,500.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Maine

1st	Robert Hale	\$ 500.00*
2nd	James L. Reid	<u>1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

Maryland

1st	Edward T. Miller	\$1,000.00*
2nd	James P. S. Devereaux	2,750.00*
4th	George Denys Hubbard	750.00
5th	William B. Prendergast	1,000.00
6th	DeWitt S. Hyde	1,000.00*
7th	David A. Halley	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$7,000.00

Michigan

2nd	George Meader	\$1,000.00*
3rd	August E. Johansen	1,000.00*
4th	Clare E. Hoffman	1,000.00*
5th	Gerald R. Ford, Jr.	1,000.00*
6th	Charles E. Chamberlain	2,000.00*
7th	Robert J. McIntosh	2,000.00*
8th	Alvin M. Bentley	1,000.00*
9th	Robert P. Griffin	2,000.00*
10th	Elford A. Cederberg	1,000.00*
11th	Victor A. Knox	2,000.00*
12th	John B. Bennett	2,000.00*
13th	Willis F. Ward	1,500.00
14th	Harold F. Youngblood	500.00
17th	George E. Smith	1,000.00
18th	William S. Broomfield	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$20,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Minnesota

1st	August H. Andresen	\$1,000.00*
2nd	Joseph P. O'Hara	1,500.00*
3rd	George Mikan	2,000.00
5th	Walter H. Judd	1,000.00*
6th	Joseph L. Kaczmarek	1,000.00
7th	H. Carl Andersen	1,500.00*
9th	Harold C. Hagen	<u>2,000.00</u>
	Total	\$10,000.00

Missouri

1st	Bill Bangert	\$ 500.00
2nd	Thomas B. Curtis	1,500.00*
3rd	Sidney R. Redmond	500.00
4th	Jeffrey P. Hillelson	1,500.00
6th	Stanley I. Dale	1,500.00
7th	Dewey Short	1,500.00
8th	Frank W. May	1,000.00
11th	George H. Miller	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$9,000.00

Montana

1st	W. D. (Bill) McDonald	\$1,000.00
2nd	Orvin B. Fjare	<u>1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

Nebraska

1st	Phil Weaver	\$1,000.00*
2nd	Glenn Cunningham	2,000.00*
3rd	Robert D. Harrison	1,000.00*
4th	A. L. Miller	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$5,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Nevada

At large	Richard W. Horton	<u>\$2,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

New Hampshire

1st	Chester E. Merrow	\$1,500.00*
2nd	Perkins Bass	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

New Jersey

1st	Charles A. Wolverton	\$1,000.00*
2nd	T. Millet Hand	500.00*
4th	William H. Wells	1,000.00
6th	Florence P. Dwyer	2,000.00*
8th	Gordon Canfield	1,000.00*
10th	G. George Addonizio	500.00
11th	Chester K. Ligham	<u>2,000.00</u>
	Total	\$8,000.00

New Mexico

At large	Forrest S. Atchley	\$1,000.00
	Dudley Cornell	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

New York

4th	Henry J. Latham	\$1,000.00*
5th	Albert H. Bosch	1,000.00*
6th	Albert H. Buschmann	500.00
9th	Benjamin W. Feldman	500.00
12th	Francis E. Dorn	1,000.00*
15th	John H. Ray	1,000.00*

(more)

*indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).New York (continued)

17th	Frederic R. Coudert, Jr.	\$2,500.00*
18th	James G. Donovan	2,000.00
19th	Maurice G. Henry, Jr.	500.00
25th	Paul A. Fino	1,000.00*
31st	Dean P. Taylor	1,000.00*
32nd	Bernard W. Kearney	500.00*
40th	William E. Miller	500.00*
41st	Edmund P. Radwin	500.00*
42nd	John R. Pillion	<u>500.00*</u>
	Total	\$14,000.00

North Carolina

5th	Joe New	\$1,000.00
8th	Fred E. Myers	500.00
9th	A. M. Miller	1,000.00
10th	Charles Raper Jonas	1,500.00*
12th	Richard C. Clarke, Jr.	<u>750.00</u>
	Total	\$4,750.00

Ohio

3rd	Paul F. Schenck	\$ 500.00*
4th	William M. McCulloch	500.00*
7th	Clarence J. Brown	500.00*
10th	Thomas A. Jenkins	500.00*
16th	Frank T. Bow	500.00*
17th	J. Harry McGregor	<u>500.00*</u>
	Total	\$3,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Oklahoma

1st	Page Belcher	\$1,000.00*
	Total	\$1,000.00

Oregon

1st	Walter Norblad	\$ 250.00*
2nd	Sam Coon	1,500.00
3rd	Phil J. Roth	1,250.00
4th	Harris Ellsworth	<u>1,250.00</u>
	Total	\$4,250.00

Pennsylvania

4th	Horace C. Scott	\$2,500.00
5th	James J. Schissler	1,000.00
6th	Hugh D. Scott, Jr.	500.00*
8th	Willard S. Curtin	500.00*
9th	Paul B. Dague	500.00*
10th	Joseph L. Carrigg	1,000.00*
11th	Enoch H. Thomas, Jr.	500.00
12th	Ivor D. Fenton	1,000.00*
17th	Alvin R. Bush	500.00*
18th	Richard M. Simpson	1,500.00*
19th	S. Walter Stauffer	500.00*
20th	James E. Van Zandt	2,000.00*
21st	Herbert O. Morrison	1,000.00*
22nd	John P. Saylor	500.00*
23rd	Leon H. Gavin	1,000.00*
24th	Carroll D. Kearns	500.00*
25th	Sidney L. Lockley	750.00
27th	James G. Fulton	500.00*

(more)

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Pennsylvania (continued)

28th	Richard C. Witt	\$ 500.00
29th	Robert J. Corbett	500.00
30th	Ross V. Walker	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$17,750.00

Rhode Island

1st	Samuel H. Ramsay	\$ 500.00
2nd	Thomas H. Needham	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$1,000.00

South Dakota

1st	Harold O. Lovre	\$1,500.00
2nd	E. Y. Berry	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

Tennessee

3rd	P. H. Woods	<u>\$2,500.00</u>
	Total	\$2,500.00

Texas

8th	C. Anthony Friloux, Jr.	<u>\$1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$1,000.00

Utah

1st	Henry Aldous Dixon	\$1,500.00*
2nd	William A. Dawson	<u>1,250.00*</u>
	Total	\$2,750.00

Vermont

At large	Winston L. Prouty	<u>\$ 500.00*</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Virginia

1st	Horace E. Henderson	\$ 750.00
2nd	William R. Burns	250.00
3rd	Royal E. Cabell, Jr.	1,250.00
5th	Jackson L. Kiser	250.00
6th	Richard H. Poff	750.00*
7th	A. R. Dunning	750.00
8th	Horace B. Clay	750.00
9th	William C. Wampler	500.00
10th	Joe T. Broyhill	<u>1,250.00*</u>
	Total	\$6,500.00

Washington

1st	Thomas M. Pelly	\$1,500.00*
2nd	Jack Westland	1,000.00*
3rd	Russell V. Mack	1,000.00*
4th	Hal Holmes	1,000.00*
5th	Walt Horan	1,000.00*
6th	Thor C. Tollefson	500.00*
At large	Philip Evans	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$7,000.00

West Virginia

1st	Arch A. Moore, Jr.	\$1,500.00*
2nd	Mary (Mrs. Davis) Elkins	2,000.00
3rd	Daniel L. Louchery	1,500.00
4th	Will E. Neal	2,000.00*
6th	Cleo S. Jones	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$8,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Republican Committee (Continued).Wisconsin

1st	Lawrence H. Smith	\$ 750.00*
2nd	Donald E. Tewes	1,000.00*
3rd	Gardner R. Withrow	250.00*
4th	William J. Burke	1,000.00
5th	Russell Wirth, Jr.	1,500.00
8th	John W. Byrnes	500.00*
9th	Arthur L. Peterson	<u>1,750.00</u>
	Total	\$6,750.00

Wyoming

At large	E. Keith Thomson	<u>\$1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$1,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

II. Grants by the Democratic CommitteeArizona

<u>District</u>	<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Grant</u>
1st	William P. Mahoney, Jr.	\$1,000.00
2nd	Stewart L. Udall	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

California

3rd	John E. Moss, Jr.	\$1,500.00*
4th	James L. Quigley	250.00
6th	H. Roberts Quinney	1,500.00
7th	Laurance L. Cross	500.00
8th	George P. Miller	500.00*
9th	James T. McKay	500.00
10th	William H. Vatcher, Jr.	250.00
11th	John J. McFall	1,500.00*
12th	B. F. Sisk	1,500.00*
13th	William Kirk Stewart	250.00
14th	Harlan Hagen	1,500.00*
17th	Cecil R. King	1,000.00*
29th	D. S. (Judge) Saund	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$11,750.00

Colorado

1st	Byron G. Rogers	\$1,500.00*
2nd	Byron L. Johnson	500.00
3rd	Alva B. Adams	750.00
4th	Wayne N. Aspinwall	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$3,750.00

*Indicates candidate won



Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).Connecticut

1st	Patrick J. Ward	\$1,000.00
2nd	Douglas J. Bennet	1,000.00
3rd	Robert N. Giaimo	1,000.00
5th	Luke F. Martin	1,000.00
At large	Matthew P. Kuta	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$4,500.00

Delaware

At large	Harris B. McDowell, Jr.	<u>\$2,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

Florida

1st	Winton H. (Win) King	\$1,500.00
4th	Dante B. Fascell	500.00*
5th	A. S. (Sid) Herlong, Jr.	500.00*
6th	Paul G. Rogers	1,000.00*
7th	James A. Haley	<u>500.00*</u>
	Total	\$4,000.00

Georgia

1st	Prince H. Preston	<u>\$ 100.00*</u>
	Total	\$ 100.00

Idaho

1st	Gracie Pfost	\$2,000.00*
2nd	J. W. Reynolds	<u>250.00</u>
	Total	\$2,250.00

Illinois

2nd	Barratt O'Hara	\$1,000.00*
3rd	James C. Murray	1,000.00
4th	Michael Hinko	500.00

(more)

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).Illinois (continued)

9th	Sidney R. Yates	\$1,000.00*
10th	Marvin E. (Curly) Lore	250.00
11th	Roman C. Pucinski	750.00
12th	Charles A. Boyle	1,000.00*
19th	Martin P. Sutor	250.00
20th	Henry W. Pollock	250.00
21st	Peter F. Mack, Jr.	2,000.00*
23rd	Albert R. Imle	1,500.00
24th	Melvin Price	500.00*
25th	Kenneth J. Gray	<u>2,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$12,000.00

Indiana

1st	Ray J. Madden	\$1,000.00*
3rd	John Brademas	1,500.00
5th	William Catlin Whitehead	1,000.00
6th	John W. King	750.00
7th	Vernon R. Hill	1,000.00
8th	Winfield K. Denton	2,000.00*
9th	Wilfrid J. Ullrich	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$8,250.00

Iowa

2nd	Leonard G. Wolf	\$ 750.00
4th	Steven V. Carter	500.00
6th	Merwin Coad	<u>500.00*</u>
	Total	\$1,750.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).Kansas

1st	Howard S. Miller	\$ 500.00
2nd	Newell A. George	250.00
4th	John D. Montgomery	750.00
5th	J. Floyd Breeding	1,000.00*
6th	Elmo J. Mahoney	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$3,500.00

Kentucky

3rd	Philip Ardery	\$ 500.00
6th	John C. Watts	500.00*
7th	Carl D. Perkins	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

Louisiana

2nd	Hale Boggs	\$ <u>300.00*</u>
	Total	\$ 300.00

Maryland

1st	Hamilton P. Fox	\$1,250.00
2nd	A. Gordon Boone	500.00
5th	Richard E. Lankford	1,500.00*
6th	John R. Foley	1,250.00
7th	Sanuel N. Friedel	<u>1,500.00*</u>
	Total	\$6,000.00

Massachusetts

2nd	Edward P. Boland	\$1,500.00*
4th	Harold D. Donohue	500.00*
5th	Lawrence E. Corcoran	250.00
8th	Torbert H. Macdonald	2,000.00*
9th	William McAuliffe	750.00
10th	Jackson J. Holtz	<u>1,250.00</u>
	Total	\$6,250.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).Michigan

6th	Don Hayworth	\$2,000.00
7th	Ira McCoy	1,000.00
9th	William E. Baker	500.00
12th	Joseph S. Mack	1,500.00
14th	Louis C. Rabaut	500.00*
17th	Martha W. Griffiths	2,000.00*
18th	Paul Sutton	<u>750.00</u>
	Total	\$8,250.00

Minnesota

3rd	Roy W. Wier	\$3,000.00*
5th	Joseph Robbie	500.00
6th	Fred Marshall	1,500.00*
7th	Clint Haroldson	250.00
8th	John A. Blatnik	500.00*
9th	Cova Knutson	<u>2,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$7,750.00

Missouri

2nd	James L. Sullivan	\$ 500.00
4th	George H. Christopher	2,000.00*
5th	Richard Bolling	500.00*
6th	W. R. Hull, Jr.	2,000.00*
7th	Charles H. (Charlie) Brown	500.00*
8th	A. S. J. Carnahan	1,000.00*
11th	Morgan M. Moulder	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$7,500.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued).Montana

1st	Lee Metcalf	\$ 500.00*
2nd	Leroy A. Anderson	<u>1,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

Nebraska

2nd	Joseph W. Benesch	\$1,000.00
3rd	Lawrence Brock	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

Nevada

At large	Walter S. Baring	<u>\$1,500.00*</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

New Hampshire

1st	James B. Sullivan	<u>\$1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

New Jersey

4th	Frank Thompson, Jr.	\$ 500.00*
6th	Harrison A. Williams, Jr.	2,000.00
8th	Walter H. Gardner	250.00
10th	Peter W. Rodino, Jr.	500.00*
11th	Hugh J. Addonizio	1,500.00*
12th	Irving L. Hodes	<u>250.00</u>
	Total	\$5,000.00

New Mexico

At large	Antonio M. Fernandez	<u>\$ 500.00*</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)New York

1st	J. Bronson O'Reilly	\$ 250.00
2nd	Julius J. D'Amato	250.00
3rd	Francis X. Hardiman	250.00
5th	John J. Quinn	500.00
6th	Lester Holtzman	1,500.00*
9th	Eugene J. Keogh	500.00*
11th	Emanuel Celler	100.00*
12th	Donald L. O'Toole	500.00
15th	Ralph Di Iorio	1,000.00
17th	Anthony B. Akers	1,100.00
26th	Julia L. Crews	250.00
27th	William D. Carlebach	500.00
28th	William H. Mauldin	500.00
34th	Edwin L. Slusarczyk	250.00
41st	Edwin P. Jehle	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$7,950.00

North Carolina

9th	Hugh Q. Alexander	\$1,500.00*
10th	Ben E. Douglas	<u>1,500.00</u>
	Total	\$3,000.00

North Dakota

At large	Agnes Geelan	\$ 500.00
	S. B. Hocking	<u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$1,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)Ohio

3rd	R. William Patterson	\$1,000.00
5th	George E. Rafferty	500.00
6th	James G. Polk	1,500.00*
9th	Thomas L. Ashley	2,000.00*
11th	James P. Bennett	1,000.00
15th	Herbert U. Smith	750.00
16th	John McSweeney	1,000.00
18th	Wayne L. Hays	<u>1,500.00*</u>
	Total	\$9,250.00

Oklahoma

1st	Harry B. Moreland	\$ <u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

Oregon

1st	Jason Lee	\$ 250.00
2nd	Al Velman	1,000.00*
3rd	Edith Green	2,000.00*
4th	Charles O. Porter	<u>750.00*</u>
	Total	\$4,000.00

Pennsylvania

1st	William A. Barrett	\$ 500.00*
2nd	Kathryn E. (Mrs. William T.) Granahan	500.00*
3rd	James A. Byrne	500.00*
4th	Earl Chudoff	500.00*
5th	William J. Green, Jr.	500.00*
8th	John P. Fullam	1,000.00
10th	Jerome P. Casey	1,000.00
11th	Daniel J. Flood	2,000.00*

(more)

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)Pennsylvania (continued)

14th	George M. Rhodes	\$1,500.00*
15th	Francis E. Walter	500.00*
19th	James M. Quigley	2,000.00
20th	John R. Stewart	250.00
21st	Augustine B. Kelley	500.00*
22nd	Joseph C. Dolan	1,000.00
24th	William D. Thomas	1,000.00
25th	Frank M. Clark	2,000.00*
28th	Herman P. Eberharter	<u>600.00*</u>
	Total	\$15,850.00

Rhode Island

1st	Aime J. Forand	<u>\$1,200.00</u>
	Total	\$1,200.00

South Dakota

1st	George McGovern	<u>\$1,250.00</u>
	Total	\$1,250.00

Tennessee

3rd	James B. Frazier, Jr.	<u>\$ 500.00</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

Texas

5th	Henry Wade	<u>\$ 500.00</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

Utah

1st	Carlyle F. Gronning	\$1,000.00
2nd	Oscar W. McConkie	<u>1,000.00</u>
	Total	\$2,000.00

*Indicates candidate won

Grants by the Democratic Committee (Continued)Washington

1st	James B. Wilson	\$ 500.00
2nd	Payson Peterson	500.00
3rd	Al McCoy	250.00
4th	Frank LeRoux	500.00
5th	Tom Delaney	500.00
6th	John T. McCutcheon	250.00
At large	Don Magnuson	<u>2,000.00*</u>
	Total	\$6,500.00

West Virginia

1st	C. Lee Spillers	\$1,500.00
2nd	Harvey O. Staggers	2,000.00*
3rd	Cleveland M. Bailey	1,000.00*
4th	M. G. (Burnie) Burnside	<u>2,000.00</u>
	Total	\$6,500.00

Wyoming

At large	Jerry A. O'Callaghan	\$ <u>500.00</u>
	Total	\$ 500.00

Hawaii (delegate)

	John A. Burns	<u>\$1,500.00*</u>
	Total	\$1,500.00

*Indicates candidate won



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