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THE INTEGRATION
OF MULTIPLE SETS lNTO A NEW
BELIEF SYSTEM

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
ROBER 1‘ N. VIDULICH
1956

Tl. HES;

THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE SETS
INTO A NEW BELIEF SYSTEM

By
Robert N. Eidulich

A THESIS
Submitted to the School of Advanced Graduate Studies of

Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied
Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1956

846'“

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express his most sincere
appreciation and thanks to Dr. Milton Rokeach, whose
friendly guidance and understanding help made this
study possible;

to the members of his committee,

Dr. M. Ray Denny, Dr. Charles hanley, and Dr. Eugene
Jacobson for their advice and assistance;

to those

students who participated in the study; and especially to his wife, Barbara, whose support, advice,
understanding and assistance was, and is, invaluable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I.

Introduction

II.

Subjects and Brocedure

III. Results

11
25

IV.

Discussion

45

V.

Summary and Conclusions

52

VI.

Bibliography

56

LIST OF TABLES

Table

1.

2.

3.

Correlations between ACE and other variables

26

Comparison between High and Low Dogmatic
Groups under two experimental conditions
on the total time taken to solve the Denny Doodlebug troblem

28

Comparison between High and Low Dogmatic
Groups under two experimental conditions
on the mean time taken to overcome the
first, second and third sets

4.

5.

6.

7.

Page

31

Number of sets overcome within the first
five minutes and within the first ten

minutes by High and Low Dogmatic Groups

32

Comparison between High and Low Dogmatic
Groups under two experimental conditions
on the time taken to solve the problem
after the first, second, and third sets
are overcome

34

Comparison between High and Low Dogmatic
Groups under two experimental conditions
on the score on a post-experimental questionnaire designed to measure rejection
of the problem situation

38

Comparison between high and Low Dogmatic
Groups under two experimental conditions
on the time taken to recall the sets

41

INTRODUCTION

This study is part of a larger body of experimental research being conducted on the beliefthought model formulated by Dr. Milton Rokeach of
Michigan State University (4,5,6,7,8).

It was an

attempt to investigate, by means of a specially devised problem, some of the cognitive processes of
the dogmatic individual.

As employed by Rokeach (4,5,6,7,8), dog-

matism refers to (a) a relatively closed cognitive
organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about real-

ity,

(b) organized around a central set of beliefs

about absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provide a framework for patterns of intolerance and
qualified tolerance toward others.

Perhaps the best and simplest way to define the construct of dogmatism is to distinguish
it from rigidity.

"Both dogmatism and rigidity re-

fer to forms of resistance to change, but dogmatism
is conceived to represent a relatively more intel-

lectualized and abstract form than rigidity" (5).'
Whereas rigidity refers to the resistance to change
of single ideas, sets, beliefs, or expectancies,

dogmatism refers to the resistance to change of

systems of ideas, sets, beliefs or expectancies.
These systems or networks of beliefs, by virtue of
their being organized together in a closed manner, are
altogether resistant to change.

Thus, dogmatism is

seen by Rokeach as a higher-order and more complexly
organized form of resistance to change.

Furthermore,

rigidity refers to individual-to-thing relationships,
while dogmatism necessarily requires situations in-

volving human interaction and person-to-person communication.

An example from Rokeach (5) should suffice
to illustrate the differentiation between the two
constucts.

A rat or a person may be said to approach

a problem situation rigidly, but it would be inappropriate to say that the animal or person behaves
dogmatically in this individual-tc-thing situation.
we may, however, speak of a person expressing himself
to others dogmatically on a scientific, religious, or
any other belief system which he espouses.

This distinction between dogmatism and rigidity has received some experimental support in a re-

cent study by Rokeach, McGovney and Denny (6).

In

this experiment, the subjects were presented with a
new cognitive task, the solution of which required

(l) the overcoming of three separate sets or beliefs,
and then (2) the integration of these sets or beliefs
into the problem situation.

Persons high in rigidity,

as determined by the Sanford-Gbugh Rigidity Scale

were found to be slower than persons low in rigidity
in overcoming each of the individual sets, but there
was gg_difference between the high and low dogmatic
subjects in this respect.

0n the other hand, sub-

jects scoring high on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (8)
were found to be significantly slower than those low
in dogmatism in integrating the three new sets once
they had overcome the three older sets.

The high and

low rigid groups did not differ with respect to the
integration process.

These authors conclude, on the

basis of these findings, that the greater difficulty
shown by the highly dogmatic subjects in integrating
the new beliefs into a new system is a function of
the stronger Operation of systems of older beliefs

which are organized into a relatively closed network.

The present study was an attempt to indi-

cate experimentally what it is about the cognitive
process of the highly dogmatic individual which leads
him to have difficulty in integrating new beliefs in-

to a new system.

From the theoretical model, it W38

hypothesized that the reason why the highly dogmatic

person finds the integration process more difficult
than an individual low in dogmatism is because fun-

damentally such an individual is unwilling to accept
or entertain new systems of thinking and reject old
systems of thinking.

In other words, he is prevented

from accepting a new system or pattern of thinking or
believing because his older, habitual thought patterns
are firmly rooted in authority and are highly resis-

tant to change.

.As a consequence of this inability

to accept new belief systems, he has relatively
greater difficulty in remembering new beliefs which
are in contradiction to his older belief system.

It

is this failure of memory which in turn leads to the
greater inability of the highly dogmatic individual
to integrate new beliefs into a new system, and consequently to gain a solution to a new problem.

To

put it quite briefly, a lack of acceptance of new beliefs results in a failure of memory, which in turn

leads to a difficulty with integration.

The cognitive task to be employed here is
the same as that used by Rokeach, McGovney and Denny

in their previously cited study (6) with modifiestions.

It is called the Denny Doodlebug Problem,

after E. Bay Denny, who devised it in 1945.

The

problem is presented to the subjects on a typed sheet

of paper as follows:

THE CONDITIONS:
Joe Doodlebug is a strangesort of imaginary bug.
He can and cannot do the following things:
1.

He can jump in only four directions - north,

south, east or west, not diagonally.

(Not

southeast, northwest, etc.)
2.

Once he starts in any direction, that is,
north, south, east or west, he must jump

four times in that same direction before he
can switch to another direction.
3.

He can only jump, not crawl, fly or walk.

.4.

He can jump very large distances or very
small distances, but not less than one inch
per jump.

5.

Joe cannot turn around.

THE SITUATION:
Joe has been jumping all over the place getting
some exercise when his master places a pile of
food three feet directly west

of him.

Joe no-

tices that the pile of food is a little larger

than be.

As soon as Joe sees all this food he

stops dead in his tracks facing north.

After

all his exercise Joe is very hungry and wants to
get to the food as quickly as be possibly can.

Joe examines the situation and then says, "Darn
it, I'll have to jump four times to get the food!"

THE PROBLEM:
Joe Doodlebug was a smart bug and he was dead
right in his conclusion.

Why do you suppose

that Joe Doodlebug had to take four jumps, no
more and no less, to reach the food?

The correct solution to the problem is that
Joe had to take exactly four jumps because at the moment the food was presented he had already taken one

jump to the east.

Therefore, it was necessary for

him to first take three more jumps to the east to meet
the requirement of taking four jumps before changing
direction.

He then takes one jump to the west and

lands on top of the food, thus making a total of four
jumps.
The subject must first overcome three dis-

crete sets or beliefs to solve the Doodlebug Problem:
(1) the facing set:

Joe does not have to face the

food in order to eat it - he can land on top of it;

(2) the direction set:

Joe can jump sideways and

backwards as well as forwards; and (3) the movement
set:

Joe could have been in the middle of a sequence

of jumps as well as at the beginning of a sequence

when the food was presented.

But overcoming these

three beliefs does not automatically lead to the solution.

What the subject must do after overcoming

the beliefs is to integrate them into a new system
to gain a solution to the problem.

Hypothetically, it was thought that eXper-

imentally assisting the highly dogmatic individual

while he is working on this cognitive task should (1)
increase the acceptance of the problem situation and

the new belief system inherent in the task, (2) aid
the subject in remembering the new beliefs, i.e.,

facilitating the recall process, which in turn should

lead to (5) a facilitation of the integration process
and consequently a more rapid solution of the problem.

The Doodlebug Problem was modified from
the earlier usage in accordance with these hypothetia

cal considerations as follows:

The three new be-

liefs - the facing, direction and movement sets were typed on 5X5 cards.

As each subject overcame

one or more of these sets by himself, the appropriate
card was placed before him.

In case the subject did

not overcome the individual sets by himself within
Specified time intervals, the cards bearing the new

beliefs were placed before him in the form of "hints".

From one-half of each of the high and low dogmatic
groups, these cards were then taken away immediately
after the contents were read.

This group was des-

ignated the Take Card Away Condition.

The other one-

half of each of the high and low dogmatic groups was
allowed to retain the cards before them until the solution of the problem had been gained.

This was

termed the Keep Card Condition.

More Specifically, the following sets of
interrelated hypotheses were tested:
A.

Concerning the total time taken to solve the

problem, which involves both the overcoming of
sets and their integration:

1. Persons high in dogmatism, under both sets of
experimental conditions, should take longer
to solve the problem than persons low in dog-

matism.
2. Persons high in dogmatism, when allowed to

keep the new beliefs ("hints") before them,
should solve the problem more rapidly than
persons high in dogmatism from whom the hints

are taken away.
3. Persons low in dogmatism, when allowed to

keep the new beliefs (”hints") before them,
should solve the problem more rapidly than

persons low in dogmatism from whom the hints
are taken away, but this difference in performance should not be as extreme as in A2.

B.

Concerning the overcoming of specific sets or beliefs:

1. Persons high in dogmatism should take no more
time in overcoming the sets than those low in

dogmatism regardless of experimental condition.

0.

Concerning the recall of sets at the conclusion
of the problem solving task:
1. Persons high in dogmatism, under both sets of
experimental conditione, should manifest a
poorer incidental recall for the new beliefs
than those persons low in dogmatism.
2. Persons high in dogmatism, when allowed to
keep the new beliefs before them, should
manifest a higher incidental recall for these

beliefs than should those persons high in dogmatism from whom the new beliefs are taken
away.
3. Persons low in dogmatism, when allowed to
keep the new beliefs before them, should man-

ifest a higher incidental recall for these
new beliefs than those persons low in dog-

lO

matism from whom the beliefs are taken away,
but this difference should not be as extreme

as in CZ.
D.

Concerning reaction to the problem:

1. Persons high in dogmatism should

show more

rejection of the problem than persons low in

dogmatism on a questionnaire designed to
measure rejection.

2. Persons high in dogmatism should make more
qualitative remarks during the experiment
showing rejection of the problem than persons
low in dogmatism.

11

SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE

Two hundred forty-nine students, mainly
Sophomores, enrolled in an introductory psychology

course at Michigan State University during the
Spring of 1955, were used as the original group of
subjects from which the experimental subjects were
chosen.

These students were mainly white and non-

Jewish, but there were two foreign-born, six negro,
and seven Jewish individuals in this group.

These individuals were given, under classroom conditions, a questionnaire composed of 137

items.

Forty of these items represented the "Dog-

matism Scale" devised by Rokeach (8).

The remain-

ing items were "filler" items interspersed among the
dogmatism items.

Instructions:
The following is a study of what the
general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions.
The best
answer to the statements below is your ersonal
opinion.
we have tried to cover many d
area and
oppos ng points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps

uncertain about others.‘ Whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many
other people feel the same way you do.
Mark each statement in the left margin

according to how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3. or -1, -2,

12

-3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1
+2
+5

I AGREE A LITTLE
-1
I AGREE PRETTY MUCH -2
I AGREE VERY MUCH
—3

I DISAGREE A LITTLE
I DISAGREE PRETTY MUCH
I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

The 40 items employed were as follows:

1.

2.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
The main thing in life is for a person to

want to do something important.
3.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to
repeat myself several times to make sure I

am being understood.
4.

Most people just don't know what's good for
them.

5.

In times like these, a person must be pretty
selfish if he considers his own happiness

primarily.
6.

A man who does not believe in some great

cause has not really lived.
7.

I'd like it if I should find someone who
would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

8.

Of all the different philosophies which have
existed in this world, there is probably
only one which is correct.

9.

It is when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that his life becomes meaningful.

10.

In this complicated world of cure the only
way we can know what is going on is to rely

upon leaders or experts who can be trusted.
11.

There are a number of persons I have come to

hate because of the things they stand for.
12.

There is so much to be done and so little

time to do it in.

13

13.

It is better to be a dead hero than a live
coward.

14.

A group which tolerates too much difference
of opinion among its own members cannot exist
for long.

15.

It is only natural that a person should
have a much better acquaintance with ideas
he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

16.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes have the ambition to be-

come a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
17.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups
is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately
necessary at times to restrict the freedom
of certain political groups.

18.

If a man is to accomplish his mission in
life, it is sometimes necessary to gamble

"all or nothing at all."
19.

Most peOple just don't give a "damn" about
others.

20.

Any person who gets enthusiastic about a
number of causes is likely to be a pretty
wishy-washy sort of person.

21.

To compromise with our political opponents
is dangerous because it usually leads to
the betrayal of our own side.

22.

If given the chance, I would do something
that would be of great benefit to the world.

23.

In times like these it is often necessary
to be more on guard against ideas put out by

certain peOple or groups in one's own camp
than by those in the opposing camp.
24.

In a heated discussion I usually become so

absorbed in what I am going to say that I
forget to listen to what the others are
saying.
25.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion,

14

I just can't stop.
26.

There are two kinds of peOple in this world;
those who are on the side of truth, and those
who are against it.

27.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable
creature.

28.

The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

29.

In the history of mankind there have prob-

ably been just a handful of really great
thinkers.

30.

The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a
government run by those who are most intelligent.

31.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is the future that counts.

32.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom
I have discussed important social and moral

problems don't really understand what is
going on.

33.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a
pretty lonely place.

34.

It is often desirable to reserve judgement
about what's going on until one has had a
chance to hear the opinions of those one
respects.

35.

The worst crime a person can commit is to
attack publicly the peOple who believe in
the same thing he does.

36.

In the long run the best way to live is to
pick friends and associates whose tastes

and beliefs are the same as one's own.
37.

Most of the ideas that get published nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed
one

38.

It is only natural for a person to be rather

fearful of the future.

39.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly
refuses to admit he's wrong.

40.

When it comes to differences of opinion in

religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently
from the way we do.

The subjects were allowed, as can be seen,

the same six choices of response for each item (+3

to -3, with no neutral response), and the responses
were converted into scores in the same way (-3 = 1

point, -2 = 2 points, etc., up to +6 a 7 points).
For the forty items, then, the total scores can

range between 40 points ( 1 point on each item, low
dogmatism extreme) and 280 points (7 points on each

item, high dogmatism extreme).

Two sections of students (N = 89) were
utilized in computing the reliability of the Dogmatism Scale in the present study.

The split-half re-

liability of .78 corrected by the Spearman-Brown

Formula, is comparable to reliabilities previously

reported by Rokeach.1
From this preliminary group of 249 students who took the Dogmatism scale, 30 subjects were

I; Rokeach'TSIfireports riiiabilities f6? the {0 item
Dogmatism scale of .78 and .81.

16

chosen on the basis of extremely high scores, and 30
subjects were chosen on the basis of extremely low
scores, a total of 60 subjects in all.2 These subjects were then randomly assigned to experimental
groups, by an acquaintance of the writer, so that he

‘would not know whether a given subject was high or
low in dogmatism when conducting the experiment.
The experimental groups are as follows:

I.

EXPERIMENTAL GROUP
A. gggh.dogmatic - 5322 gggd condition: Fifteen
subjects (11 male and 4 female) who scored
extremely high on the DOgmatism Scale.

This

group was allowed to keep each of the three

cards, on each of which was written one of
the three beliefs.

Each card was placed be-

fore the subject as soon as the subject
overcame the set by himself, or failing this,

at a specified time interval during the experimental session.

B. £93! dogmatic - k_e_e_p 9333 condition:

Fifteen

subjects (10 males and 5 females) who scored

3'

Of the original 60 subjects asked to appear for
individual experimentation, 55 appeared for the
two individual sessions held a week apart.
rive

additional subjects were obtained (3 Highs and 2
Lows) from the larger pool to bring the number to
60.

17

low on the Dogmatism Scale.

This group fol-

lowed the same procedure as in Group A.

II.

CONTROL GROUP
C. High dogmatic - remove card_condition:

Fif-

teen subjects (9 male and 6 female) who
scored High on the Dogmatism Scale.

This

group was shown a card containing each new

belief for about ten seconds after the subject himself overcame the belief, or after a
specified interval if the belief was not overcome by the individual.

D. Low dogmatic - remove 331:1 condition:

Fif-

teen subjects (7 male and 8 female) who
scored low on the Dogmatism Scale.

This

group followed the same procedure as Group C.

The subjects were told that they had been
selected randomly, and were asked to appear for indi-

vidual experimentation.

Each session required ap-

proximately one hour, and the sixty experimental
sessions were conducted over a four week period with-

in one school quarter (April-May, 1955).

The ex-

perimenter did not know the individual subject's

score on the Dogmatism Scale until the testing of the
subject on the problem had been completed.

There

were no nonawhite subjects, two subjects were Jewish,

18

and one subject was foreign-born.

Each interview was standardized.

Timing

was with a step watch, calibrated for seconds.

As

the subject sat down, the experimenter said:

"Today you are going to be given a newly devised test of general intelligence.

The prob-

lem is not a simple one but the solution can be
reached by good logical analysis.

problem.

Here is the

Read it over carefully.“

The mimeographed problem was handed to the subject.
After he had read the problem, the experimenter con-

tinued:

'

"I'd like to ask you to think out loud as you
work the problem

so I can let you know whether

you are correct or not.

You may ask questions

as you go along and you may refer to the problem at any time.

You may use the scratch pa-

per in any way you wish.

Now let's read the

problem over together."

The total time allowed for solution of
the problem was forty minutes.

For the first ten

minutes the subject worked continuously regardless
of whether he overcame any of the three sets by him-

self.

If he did overcome any of the three sets by

l9

himself, the time it took to do so was recorded by
the experimenter.

At the end of the ten minutes,

the eXperimenter asked:

“Have you figured it out yet?"
If the subject had not, the experimenter
gave a hint designed to overcome one of the three

sets.

Which hint was given depended on which set(s)

the subject had already overcome by himself.

If

the subject had not overcome any of the three sets,

the first hint was designed to overcome the facing

gap.

The subject was then told that he would be

given an additional five minutes.

If no solution

was forthcoming at the end of this time, the subject
was given a second hint to overcome the direction
set, and was given an additional five minutes.

If

there was still no solution at the end of this time,
the subject was given a third hint designed to overcome the movement set.

These hints designed to assist the sub-

ject in overcoming the various sets (beliefs) were
presented to the subject typed on 3x5 cards.

For

conditions A and B in the Experimental Group, the
subjects were allowed to keep the cards before them.
For conditions C and D in the Control Group, the
subjects were allowed to read the hints for ten

20

seconds and the cards were taken away by the eXperimenter.

In the cases where the subjects overcame
one set on his own within the first ten minutes, he
was given the second set at the end of ten minutes

and the third set at the end of fifteen minutes.

In

the cases where the subject overcame two sets within
the first ten minutes by himself, he was given the
third set at the end of ten minutes.

This procedure

was followed for all subjects without exception.

The hints were given as needed and as
follows:

1. Th3,facing gag.

hint.

"I'm going to give you a

It's on this card.” (On card: "Joe

does not have to face the food in order to

eat it.")

"O.K., 1'11 give you five min-

utes more."
2. The direction set.
other hint."

I'm going to give you an-

(On card: "Joe can jump side-

ways and backwards as well as forwards.")
"I'll give you five minutes more."

3. Thg_movement Egg,

"Here is one more hint."

(On card: "Joe was moving east when the food

was presented.")
utes."

"You have five more min-

21

After the subject had solved the problem,
or at the end of forty minutes, the subject was told

the solution to the problem if he had not solved it,
and was asked to read magazines "for a few minutes
while I work on something."

After ten minutes, the

eXperimenter said:

"Now I would like you to tell me what the three
hints were that I gave you or that you figured
out by yourself while you were trying to solve
the problem.

You have three minutes.

Go a-

head."

As soon as the subject had recalled the
sets, or at the end of the three minutes if he had
not recalled all of them, the experimenter asked

the subject to fill out a short five-item questionnaire designed to test the subject's reaction to
the problem situation, and his acceptance or rejection of it.

This questionnaire, with instruc-

tions, is given below:

Below are five questions which we would like
you to answer.

Indicate how you feel by cir-

cling the number which best reflects your true
feelings.

1 means that you disagree very

strongly; 2 means you disagree somewhat; 3 means

22

you have no feelings one way or the other; 4
means you agree somewhat; 5 means you agree very
strongly.

The five questions to which reaponses
were requested are:

1)

Do you think the hints helped you to solve
the problem?

2)

Do you feel that you understood the hints?

3)

Did you enjoy the problem?

4)

Did you get angry with me or with the problem during the experiment?

5)

Did you think that this experiment was
worth your time and effort?
Is there anything else you want to say about the experiment?

Please feel free to

make any statements you wish below.

The questionnaire was scored by giving

the same number of points for each question as to
the number circled (l = 1 point, 2 = 2 points,

etc.), with the exception of question number 4, in
which 1 = 5 points, 2 a 4 points...5 a 1 point.

Thus, the lowest possible score on the questionnaire

was 5 (1 point on each question, extreme rejection),

while the highest possible score was 25 (5 points

on each question, extreme acceptance).

Following the questionnaire, the subject
was asked to return for "a very few minutes" in seven days for "another part of the experiment."

He

was also requested not to discuss the problem with
others.

When the subject returned in seven days, he

was again asked to recall the three hints used during the problem solving, again with a three minute
time limit, and with the same instructions used previously.

Following this, the subject was told that

the problem was not a test of intelligence, was
thanked for his cooperation, and was again asked not
to discuss the problem with others.

The following quantitative measures were
obtained by the experimenter for each subject:

A. Concerning the total time taken to solve the
problem:
1. Total time taken to solve the problem.

B. Concerning the overcoming of the individual
sets:

2. Time taken to overcome the first set.
3. Time taken to overcome the first and se—
cond sets.

24

4. Time taken to overcome all three sets.

5. Number of sets overcome in the first five
minutes.
6. Number of sets overcome in the first ten
minutes.
C. Concerning the integration of the new sets
after the older sets had been overcome;
7. Time taken to solve the problem after the

first set was overcome.
8. Time taken to solve the problem after the
first and second sets were overcome.
9. Time taken to solve the problem after all
three sets were overcome.
D.

Concerning the immediate recall of sets:

10. Mean recall time on immediate recall (after ten minutes).
E. Concerning the delayed recall of sets:
11. Mean recall time on delayed recall

(af-

ter one week).
F. Concerning rejection of the experimental
situation:
12. Post-experimental questionnaire score.

In addition to these quantitative measures,
all comments made by a subject during or following
the problem-solving situation were recorded by the
eXperimenter.

25

RESULTS

In order to determine the relationship of
intelligence, as measured by the American Council on
Education Test, and the findings to be reported, a
t-ratio and three correlation coefficients were computed for the various measures.

Because of the trun-

cated sample used in the experiment, it was necessary
to use the t-ratio to ascertain the relationship between the ACE and the scores on the Dogmatism scale.
For the High Dogmatic group, the mean ACE score was
5.59 with a standard deviation of 1.66; the mean ACE

score for the Low Dogmatic group was 6.03, with a
standard deviation of 1.71.

The t-ratio of 1.0 in-

dicates that there is no significant difference be-

tween the High and Low DOgmatics in intelligence.
Correlation coefficients were computed between the

ACE scores and the total time required to solve the
problem, the time taken to overcome the first set,
and the time taken to solve the problem after the

second set was overcome.
is significant.

None of these correlations

These results make it clear that

whatever differences may be found between the High
and Low Dogmatic groups cannot be attributed to dif-

26

TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ACE AND OTHER VARIABLES

Variable

N*'

r

Time taken to overcome first set

59

.16

second set was overcome

59

.22

Total time taken to solve problem

59

.08

Time taken to solve problem after

1tThe ACE score for one of the 60 experimental subjects
was unavailable.

27

ferences in intelligence between them.5

Because of the skewness of the various
measures in this study, it was necessary to employ a

distribution-free statistical technique to analyze
all of the data except the measures of the time taken
to overcome the various sets.

These latter measures

were analyzed by means of Chi-Square.

The rank test

for the significance of the difference between two
groups described by White

(9) was used throughout for

uniformity of the remaining analysis.

This statistic

tests the null hypothesis that two sets of observations are from a common pepulation without any assumption being made concerning the distribution of
the measures in this population.

A normal curve

approximation with corrections for continuity and

for ties (where necessary) was used.

One-tailed

tests of significance were utilized throughout since
the direction of the differences was predicted in
advance.

In Table 2, the results on the total time
to solve the problem are presented.

This time score

inglndgg bgph the gzeggoming of the new bgliefg and

3

Rokeach, McGovney and Denny 6 and Ehrlich (3
have also found no significant correlation between
dogmatism and intelligence. The former writers report a correlation of -.02, while Ehrlich reports

one of -.01.

28

TABLE 2

COMBARISON BETWEEN HIGH AND LOT DOGMATIC GROUPS
UNDER TWO EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON THE TOTAL
TIME TAKEN T0 SOLVE THE DENNY DOODLEBUG PROBLEM

Group

N

Mean

2

p

2‘78?

'003

1'057

'15

Time“
High Dogmatic
Low Dogmatic

30
30

24.035
17.157

Remove Cards Cond.

30

21.890

Keep Cards Cond.

30

19.301

High Dogmatic-Remove 15

25.677

High Dogmatic-Keep

15

22.392

°

Low Dogmatic-Remove
Low Dogmatic-Keep

15
15

18.103
16.210

'

768

22

°
768

22
'

‘fiThe mean times are presented for comparison purposes,
and do not enter into the computation of the rank-order
statistic utilized.

29

the ensuing integration process.

One finds that the

High and Low Dogmatic groups are significantly different from each other in the amount of time taken to
solve the problem.

The former takes a mean time of

24.04 minutes while the latter takes a mean time of
17.16 minutes.

This difference is significant at

the .003 level of confidence.

On this same measure, one finds that the
experimental group which was allowed to keep the
cards does not differ significantly from the group

which was not allowed to keep the cards.

The Remove

Card condition takes a mean time of 21.89 minutes
while the Keep Card condition takes 19.30 minutes.
The results are in the expected direction, but the

difference reaches only the .15 level of significance.

For the sub-group comparisons, i.e., High

Dogmatism-Remove Card condition compared with High
Degmatism-Keep Card condition and Low Dogmatism—Remove Card condition compared with Low Dogmatism Keep Card condition, the differences are again in

the expected direction but do not reach the 5% level
of confidence.
isons are

Significance levels for both compar-

.22.

That the Low Dogmatic group clearly solves

30

the problem faster than the High DOgmatic group, and
that the Keep Card group tends to solve the problem
faster than the Remove Card group supports the first
group of hypotheses, namely, that persons high in
dogmatism should take longer to solve the problem

than persons low in dogmatism, and that those individuals receiving experimental assistance should
solve the problem more rapidly than those not receiving this help.

However, these results do not

tell us much about the thought processes preceeding

these end results.

Let us now therefore consider

more closely the relative performance of the several

groups and the ease with which they (1) overcome the
sets, and (2) then integrate these sets into the
problem

solution.

Hypothesis Bl states that persons high in
dogmatism should take no more time to overcome the

sets than those low in dogmatism regardless of experimental conditions.

In Table 3 is presented the

mean time taken by the several groups and sub-groups
to overcome the first set, the second set and the
third set.

It will be noted by inspection of the

means that the High and Low Dogmatic groups are very
similar in time taken to overcome the first, second

and third sets.

However, it was not possible to as-

51

TABLE 3

COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC GROUPS
UNDER TWO EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON THE MEAN
TIME TAKEN TO OVERCOME THE FIRST, SECOND
AND THIRD SETS’

Group

N

Pirst
Set

Second
Set

High Dogmatic
Low Dogmatic

30
30

4.909
4.309

9.775
8.767

Remove Card Cond.

30

3.859

9.392

14.150

Keep Card Cond.

30

5.359

9.150

14.100

High Dogmatic-Remove 15
High Dogmatic-Keep
15

3.817
6.000

9.667
9.883

14.333
14.933

Low Dogmatic-Remove
Low Dogmatic-Keep

3.900
4.717

9.117
8.417

13.967
13.267

15
15

Third
Set

14.633
13.617

*Tests ofMsignificance of the differences presented
hef3“b"eéaHSeof the extreme skewness of the data and
the large number of tied scores present.

52

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF SETS OVERCOME WITHIN THE FIRST
FIVE MINUTES AND WITHIN THE FIRST TEN
MINUTES BY HIGH AND Low DOGMATIC GROUPS“

Group

N

o

I

2

3

Chiz

df

p

I. Number of sets overcome within first 5 minutes.

High Dogmatic

30

12

15

3

o

#4

II. Number of sets overcome within first 10 minutes.

High Dogmatic

30

7

16

6

1

Low Dogmatic

so

4

17

e

1

.

1 098

2

NS

*To eliminate small theoretical frequencies, the data
for 2 and 3 sets have been combined on measures I and 11
above.

33

certain the significance level of these results either by parametric or non-parametric devices because

(a) the distributions were highly skewed in a positive
direction and (b) because of a large number of ties
in scores.

We therefore computed another measure

which would be susceptible to statistical treatment

by the Chi Square method, namely, the number of sets
overcome within the first five minutes, and the num-

ber of sets overcome within the first ten minutes.
These results are shown in Table 4.

It will be seen

that these results confirm the results shown in

Table 3 and that the Chi Square values are not significant.

The findings of no significant differ-

ences between the two groups on these measures support the presented hypothesis and further substantiate the results reported by Rokeach, McGovney and

Denny (6), namely, that high and low scorers on dogmatism do not differ from each other in the speed of
overcoming the individual sets.

Let us now consider the integration process as measured by the amount of time taken to solve
the problem after the first set is overcome, after
the first and second sets are overcome, and after
all three sets are overcome.
sented in Table 5.

These data are pre-

The same method of interpretation

50

1;

2
p

.

lh-ZOS
11.505 1 . “7 . 07

16.592

5

05

. -

21.871 1.66 .0

15.9 9 1 9h

18.0 8

13.835 2.82 .002

l .l 2

Mean
time*
2
p
‘

.
69

.
25

.Sh '26

8.992 .56 .29.
7.799

12.505

16,010

10.151

12.501

1%.532
.2
2.95 .002

Mean
time*

After Second Set

2

p

.

.
15

u.1
2.9285 1 . 02 . 15

7. £5 1 02

11.- 5

5.302

7. NB 1.56 .09

. 0 2.86 .002
2.314%

Mean
time*

After Third Set

* The mean times are presented for comp
arison purposes, and do not enter into
the computation of the rank-order stat
istic utilized.

LL33193§E§t1§
D t1 -x§§§V°
'3
15
15

High Dogmatic-Keep

High Dogmatic-Remove 1

50

Keep Cards Cond.

0

Remove Cards Cond.

t1
20

D

N

Loéh Dggggtig

H1

Group

After First Set

COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC GROUPS
UNDER TWO EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON THE TIME
TAKEN TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AFTER THE FIRST, SECOND
AND THIRD SETS ARE OVERCOME

,TAHLH 5

5h

35

that was outlined for Table 2 may be used for all of
the time measures in Table 5.

With respect to the personality variable,
we find that the High Dogmatic Group differs significantly from the Low Dogmatic Group on all three messures.

The former takes longer to solve the problem

after each set is overcome than does the latter group.

These differences are all significant at the .002
level of confidence.

In the case of the experimental variable,

the results are somewhat less decisive.

After the

first set is overcome, the Remove Card Condition and
the Keep Card Condition differ significantly in the
amount of time taken to solve the problem.

The mean

time of 18.04 for the Remove Card Condition differs
from the mean time of 13.95 for the Keep Card Condition at the .03 level of confidence.

After the

second set is overcome, the two conditions again
differ from each other in the expected direction
but this reaches only the .26 level.

After the third

set is overcome, the two conditions differ from each

other in the expected direction, but again the dif-

ference falls short of significance (.09 level).

It

is clear, however, from the overall data that the sub-

36

Jects in the Keep Card Condition integrate more quickly than do the subjects in the Remove Card Condition.

Much the same pattern of results is revealed upon examination of the sub-group compari-

sons.

For both the High Uogmatic Groups, Remove Card

Condition compared with the Keep Card Condition, and
for the Low Dogmatic Groups, Remove Card Condition,
compared with Keep Card Condition, the subjects subJected to the Remove Card Condition are consistently
slower than those in the Keep Card Condition in solving the problem after the first, the second, and the

third sets are overcome.

While most of these dif-

ferences, considered alone, do not reach an accep-

table level of significance, it is to be noted that
each and every one of the differences under consideration are in the expected direction.

The findings thus far reported illustrate
very emphatically two very important hypothesized aspects of the problem solving situation.

The faster

solving of the whole problem by the Low Dogmatic
group as compared with the High Dogmatic group, and
by the Keep Card group as compared with the Remove
Card group, is definately ggt_a function of the speed

of overcoming the individual sets.

What the data

37

clearly indicate is that those groups showing a su-

perior integration facility are able to solve the
whole problem more rapidly than those who have dif-

ficulty with the integration process.

Let us now turn to some findings which
will shed further light on this issue.

The results

presented thus far with respect to the differences
between High and Low Dogmatic groups are consistent
with those found earlier by Rokeach, McGovney and

Denny (6).

One important suggestion regarding the

explanation of these differences is to be found by

looking at the data shown with respect to the exa
perimental variable.

That is, these data suggest

that when the beliefs are clearly in the phenomenal

field the integration process is facilitated.

It will be remembered that after the experiment was completed, the subjects were given a

ten-minute rest and then asked to first recall the
three sets and then

to fill out a questionnaire

pertaining to the problem.

We will first deal with

the questionnaire, the purpose of which was to mea-

sure the amount of rejection (and conversely, the
amount of acceptance) ef the problem by the subject.
The pertinent results are presented in Table 6.

In

TABLE 6

COMIARISON BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC GROUPS
UNDER TWO EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON THE SCORE
ON A POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED TO
MEASURE REJECTION OF PROBLEM SITUATION

—:

Group

N

Mean

2

p

Score“
High Dogmatic
Low Dogmatic

30
30

20.80
22.10

1 77
'
2 08

Remove Card Cond.

30

20.67

Keep Card Cond.

30

22.24

High Dogmatic-Remove 15

20.00

High Dogmatic-Keep

15

21.60

Low Dogmatic-Remove

15

21.33

Low Dogmatic-Keep

15

22.87

'

04
°
02
°

1 13

'

13

°

1 79

°

04

°

*’The lower the mean score, the greater indicated reThe mean times are presented
Jection of the problem.
for comparison purposes and do not enter into the computation of the rank-order statistic utilized.

39

the following analysis, the lower the mean score, the

more the subjects' rejection of the problem.

The results substantiate Hypothesis D1
which states that persons high in dogmatism should
show more rejection of the problem than persons low

in dogmatism.

As can be seen by Table 6, the Low

Dogmatic group showed more acceptance of the problem
than the HighDogmatic group.

The mean score for the

High Dogmatic group is 20.80, as compared to a mean

score of 22.10 (out of a possible score of 25) for
the Low Dogmatic group.

This difference is signifi-

cant at the .04 level of confidence.

0n the same measure, the Keep Card Condition showed more acceptance than the Remove Card
Condition.

Here the difference between the respect-

ive means of 20.67 and 22.24 is significant at the
.02 level.

In the case of the sub-groups, this questionnaire measures differentiates significantly be-

tween the Low Dogmatic, Remove Card Condition, and
the Low Dogmatic, Keep Card Condition.
ficance level here is .04.

The signi-

There is not a signifi-

cant difference between the High Dogmatic, Remove
Card Condition and the High Dogmatic, Keep Card Con-

4O

dition on this measure, but the difference is again

in the expected direction (p = .13).
Having found that the High Dogmatic groups
reject the problem significantly more than the Low
Dogmatic groups, it follows that those groups which
reject the problem more should also manifest poorer
memory for the new beliefs to be integrated.

The

findings for the recall process are presented in
Table 7.

As shown in Table 7, the High Dogmatic
group takes a mean of about 46 seconds to recall the
three new beliefs while the Lew Dogmatic group takes

a mean ef about 23 seconds to remember the beliefs
on the immediate recall test given ten minutes after

the problem was completed.

This difference is sig-

nificant at the .02 level of confidence, and corroborates Hypothesis Cl, which states that persons

high in dogmatism, under both sets of experimental
conditions, should manifest a poorer incidental recall for the new beliefs than those persons low in
domatisme

In the case of the experimental variable,

the Remove Card Condition takes a longer amount of
time (mean time 50.01 seconds) to recall the sets

27
:2

:2 .1
:1 .29

50

High Dogmatic-Remove 15
High Dogmatic-Keep
l5

Low Dogmatic-Remove
Low Dogmatic-Keep

,

.
11

.05
.06

:05.h
:06.1

.71 .22
1.29 .10

* The mean times are presented for comparison
purposes and do not enter into
the computation of the rank-order statistic utili
zed.

:10.15 1 25

:5h.56

.6
.5

p

.8 .05
3.22 1.11 .15

0l 7 .87

:5

2

igéiég 231% :3?

00 ee

:33:Z% '17 'u5

:32.lh
:15.21 1.06 .15

O0

20 9

Mean
time

H

'98 '16

9 2.67 .09h

p

AiU\

5l 2.59 .01

2

;2%,§2 1.69 .05

:2e

Mean
time*

III.Comparison

HH

:5

p

2.11 .02

2

II.After 1 week

\0000\

15
15

:1

50

1

Keep Cards Cond.

5

Remove Cards Cond.

g2

50

30

Low Dogmatic

gh

Mean
time*

High Dogmatic

N

Group

I.After 10 min.

COMPARISON BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW DOGMATIC GROUPS
UNDER TWO EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS ON THE TIME
TAKEN TO RECALL THE SETS

TABLE 7

bl

42

than does the Keep Card Condition (mean time 18.63
seconds).

This difference is significant at the .01

level of confidence.

From Table 7, we also see that the fin-

dings for the sub-group comparisons are in accordance
with Hypotheses C2 and 03 which state that indivi-

duals high in dogmatism who are allowed to keep the
hints before them should recall faster than those
persons high in dogmatism from whom the hints are
taken away, and that the same should be true for the

low dogmatic groups, but to a 1esSer degree.

For

the High Dogmatic, Remove Card Condition -- High Dogmatic, Keep Card Condition comparison, the difference

between a mean time of 70.89 seconds for the former
and a mean time of 20.96 seconds for the latter is
significant at the .004 level of confidence.

The

Low Dogmatic experimental groups again differ in the
expected direction, but in this case the difference

is not significant (p = .16).
It will be remembered also that a week after the experiment, the subjects were again tested

for recall of the sets.
are shown in Table 7.

These "delayed recall" data
Again, the High Dogmatics

take longer than the Low Dogmatics, with the differ-

43

ence being significant at the 5% level of confidence.
Also, the two experimental groups differ from each
other in the expected direction, the Remove Card Condition taking a mean time of about 32 seconds with the
Keep Card Condition requiring a mean of about 15 seconds.

This difference, however, is not significant.

Similarly, the sub-group comparisons do not reach the

confidence level required for significance.

Although

not significant, these differences are all in the expected direction.

A comparison was also made of the differ-

ences between the times required for recall for the
various groups and conditions on the immediate and
delayed recall measures, with rather interesting results.

This data is shown in column III of Table 7,

and involves a comparison of the measures in columns
I and II.
Significant decreases in the amount of
time required to recall the sets from the immediate
recall to the delayed recall tests are evident in

three of the groups.

The High Dogmatic group re-

quired a mean time of 45.93 seconds to recall the

sets on the immediate recall test (ten minutes after
the completien of the problem), while this same

44

group used 24.99 seconds on the delayed recall test

(given one week after the original problem situation).
This difference is significant at the 5% level.

In

the comparison of the two measures for the Remove
Card Condition and for the High Dogmatic, Remove Card
Condition, the differences are

significant at .03

and .02 respectively.

In short significant decreases in the a-

mount of time taken to recall the sets a week after
the experiment was completed, as compared with the

amount of time required ten minutes after the completion of the problem, are found in the High Degmatic group and in the group where the cards are re-

moved.

Nb such differences

are found in the Low

Dogmatic group or in the group allowed to keep the
0815.8.

DISCUSSION

The results are regarded as having substantiated all the hypotheses presented.

The fin-

ding that there is no difference between the High and
Low Dogmatic groups on the time taken to overcome the
old beliefs lends further experimental verification

to the findings of Rokeach, loGovney and Denny (6).
These authors found an experimental distinction between rigidity and dogmatism, finding that High and

Low Dogmatics could not be differentiated on a measure of time taken in overcoming the individual sets,
but that High and Low Rigid groups could.

That the High Dogmatics do have more diffi culty than the Low Dogmatics in integrating the
new beliefs is evident from the data presented in

Table 5.

The results show that the former group takes

significantly longer than the latter to solve the

problem after the first, after the second, and after
the third sets are overcome. This tells us little about where in the problem-solving process integration begins.

However, for our purposes, it is not of

crucial importance to localize the onset of the integration process.

What is of importance here is

that such a process is seen to take place in dis-

46

tinction to the process of the overcoming of sets in
even clearer form than is evident in the Rokeach,

McGovney and Denny study (6).

We now turn to consider the effects of the
experimental manipulation of the sets.

This manipu-

lation, i.e., allowing the subjects to either keep
the new beliefs in front of them or removing the beliefs from their perceptual field, clearly has an

effect on the subjects' performance on the Doodlebug Problem.

As Rokeach points out, "...when the

new beliefs are all together 'pnmped' into the phenomenal field by artificial~experimental means, the
integration of these beliefs into a new system is

clearly facilitated."
From the data we can conclude that what
is referred to as "the integration process" has two
distinct components, or causative factors, if you

will.

These factors, acceptance (conversely, rejec-

tion) and memory, will now be discussed.
As measured by the questionnaire given at
the finish of the problem situation, the Low Dogmatic group showed more acceptance of the problem than

the High Dogmatic group.

The new beliefs inherent

in the Doodlebug Problem are a threat to the closed

47

system of the latter group, and their resistance to
change is later manifested by a rejection of the

problem on the questionnaire.

Interestingly enough,

The Keep Card Condition groups indicated significantly more acceptance of the problem than the Remove Card Condition groups.

This seems to be an ad

hoc demonstration of the perceived value of the assistance while the personality variable is held conStante

Rejection of the problem by the High Dogmatic group, as measured by a structured questionnaire given at the end of the experiment, is also
evident in the nature of their remarks and comments

during the test situation.

A record of the comments

of all subjects was kept by the experimenter and
these remarks were later analyzed in the following
manner:

Three judges, familiar with the theoretical

framework in which the study was conducted, were

asked to individually sort these comments into High
and Low Dogmatic groupings, i.e., they were to try

to judge which comments were made by high dogmatics
and which were made by low dogmatics.

The basis for

this classification was the degree of rejection or
acceptance implied in the individual remarks.
sorting was, of course,

”blind."

The

That is, the raters

48

did not know whether the comment had been made by a
high or low dogmatic subjects.
Typical of the comments made by the individuals judged to be indicative of rejection of the
problem situation are the following:
"Are you sure he wants to eat the food?"

"That's illogicali"
"He could have died of hunger when he st0pped

dead."
"If he's so smart, why doesn't he do it in one
jump?"
"Maybe he really doesn't want to eat the food."

"He can starve for all I care!"
"Jeez, what a screwball of an outfit!"
"This is impossiblet"

"All those hints seem to go in one ear and out
the other."

"I know there's a tricky answer to this:"
"There's no solution!

How in hell can he

change directions if he can't turn around?"

From the total pool of 87 comments made
by the subjects, 41 were selected by two of the three
judges or by all of the three judges as indicating
rejection of the problem.

Of these, 30 had been

made by high dagmatic individuals, while 11 had been

49

voiced by individuals low in dogmatism.

A chi-

square analysis revealed that the selection by the
judges on the basis of rejection of the problem significantly differentiated the two personality groups

(Chi-square e 4.38).

1

Thus we find that rejection of the problem, as measured by the two methods, one quantitative, the other qualitative, is indeed an important
aspect of the closed cognitive system of the high
d0gmatic individual.

Let us now turn to a discus-

sion of the effects of this rejection on the memory
and integration process.

With regard to the incidental memory process, the high dagmatics remember fewer of the new
beliefs and take longer doing this than the low dogmatics.

In theoretical terms, this is a function of

the closed nature of the cognitive system of the
highly dogmatic individuals, and it is because they
do not remember these beliefs that they do not integrate more rapidly than they do.

It seems prob-

able that the greater the difficulty in remembering
the beliefs, the less the likelihood that there is
anything to remember.

Why, one may ask, do the High Dogmatic

50

individuals remember the sets less well than the Low

Dogmatics?

The findings on the questionnaire dis-

cussed above point clearly to the answer to this
question.

They do not recall because they have not

really accepted either the beliefs or the basic tenets of the problem to begin with.

The beliefs are

abandoned once the task has been completed.

The

high dogmatic "goes along" with the problem, so to
speak, but never really accepts it as true or as
something intimately pertaining to him.

As one mem-

ber of the High Dogmatic group succintly phrased it,

"The hints just seemed to go in one ear and out the
other."

That the high dogmatics are affected by
the problem, however, is clearly pointed out by the
fact that their performance on the delayed recall
test is significantly better than their performance
on the test of immediate recall given one week ear-

lier.

Evidently, the subjects with closed systems

mulled over the problem gftg£_the experiment was
over, when they were alone and when they were not
threatened by the experimental situation.

From the

data, it appears that these individuals made a
strong attempt to further reintegrate the new ideas

into their own cognitive frameworks.

It has been

51

suggested by Rokeach that dogmatism requires a social or interpersonal situation for its elaboration —one cannot be dogmatic when alone.

In light of this great improvement found
for the high dogmatics from immediate to delayed recall, with the hypothesized "post-problem reintegration", a test of the diminution of rejection would
be interesting.

If, as speculated, an individual

with a closed system makes apparently successful attempts to accept and integrate the new beliefs after rejecting them to some degree, it would seem
that the rejection process is not of a final nature.
Its strength may be, rather, inversely related to
the length of time and degree to which the individual
has been attempting to "work through" the new beliefs
encountered in the problem.

52

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to investi—
gate, by means of a new cognitive task, certain cognitive aspects of the phenomenon of dogmatism, especially the integration process which has been shown

to be a major factor in the dogmatic thought process.

It was hypothesized that the greater difficulty in integration shown by highly dogmatic sub-

jects is a function of two factors: (a) greater rejection ef the problem situation, and, consequently,

(b) poorer memory for the individual beliefs (sets)
which must be integrated if there is to be a solution.

It was further hypothesized that permitting

the subjects to keep the new sets before them (as

hints typed on cards) should (a) increase the accept-

ance of the problem situation and the beliefs, (b)
facilitate the memory for the individual sets to be

integrated, and (c) facilitate the integration process because of this increased acceptance and improved recall.

249 subjects were given the Dogmatism
Scale.

From this group, 60 experimental subjects

‘were chosen, such that 30 were high in dogmatism and

30 were low; also 15 subjects from each of these
groups were allowed to keep the new beliefs, in the
form of hints typed on card, in front of them, while
15 subjects from each group had the hints removed after ten seconds.

These subjects were all confronted

with a cognitive task -- the Denny Doodlebug Problem 4
which contains three separate beliefs which first
must be overcome and then integrated if the correct
solution is to be reached.

Five types of measures were obtained:

(a) total time taken te solve the problem; (b) time
taken to overcome the beliefs and number of beliefs

overcome within given periods of time; (0) time taken to solve the problem after the sets were over-

come; (d) measures of immediate (10 minutes) and de-

layed (one week) recall of the beliefs; (6) questionnaire scores indicating rejection (or acceptance) of
the problem.

The results show that the High Dogmatic
groups took a significantly longer total amount of
time to solve the problem.

No significant differ-

ences were found between High and Low Dogmatics on
the time taken to overcome the beliefs or in the
number of beliefs overcome within specified time

54

periods, indicating that the relative slowness of the

High Dogmatics cannot be attributed to this factor.
The High Dogmatics did take significantly longer to
solve the problem after the beliefs were overcome
than the Low Dogmatics, indicating that the relative

difficulty of problem solution is a function of the
integration process.

The questionnaire measure in-

dicated that the Low Dogmatics accepted the problem
and beliefs significantly more than the High Dogmatics.

The High Dogmatics also took significantly

longer to recall the beliefs than the Lew Dogmatics,
both on the immediate and delayed recall tests.

A

significant decreasein the amount of time taken by
the High Dogmatics to recall the beliefs was found

in comparing the immediate and delayed recall measures.

For all measures, the subjects who were al-

lowed to keep the beliefs did consistently better
than those from whom the beliefs were taken away,

with the High Dogmatics showing more gain from the
experimental assistance than the Low Dogmatics.
Qualitative data were found to lend further support to the above findings.

These findings are in accord with the hypotheses posed and lend further experimental support
to the validity of the construct of dogmatism, and

also demonstrate that personality variables play an
important role in problem-solving behavior.

In ad-

dition, the findings show that the determinants of a
closed cognitive system in problem-solving activity
can be eXperimentally verified and quantitatively
measured.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.

Adorno, T.W., Frenkel- Brunswik, Else, Levinson, D.
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Statistical methods for the behav-

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Ehrlich, H.J.
Dogmatism and intellectual change.
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The Ohio State University,
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Dogmatism and Opinionation on the

left and on the right.

Amer. rsychol., 1952

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""

Rokeach, M.

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