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SOCEAL AND PCLETICAL
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Jose Panic Vieira
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ABSTRACT

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM
IN CHILE: S STUDY OF
ATTITUDES

By
José Paulo Vieira

This study discusses some socio-psychological
aspects of what has been viewed as a transitional phase of
social disorganization in underdeveloped societies. The
emergence of radical attitudes is viewed as the only
possible response to the growing gap between aspirations and
opportunities. However, for various reasons, the masses
have been unable to develop revolutionary models. It seems
that the basic response has been the expansion of socially
radical attitudes. The general hypothesis postulates that
radical attitudes are associated with the acceptance of the
idea of predestination and with the perception of regressive
or static life conditions.

It has been the constant intent of this study to
emphasize the structural and cultural framework within which
the manifestations of the socio-psychological variables occur.
Given these structural conditions, a major development in

this study is the comparative evaluation of the

Jose Paulo Vieira
revolutionary potential of rural, slum, and city dwellers.
The analysis is based on secondary data from a
research study done in December, l96u, by the Institute of
Economic Planning at the University of Chile. as one part of
the Research Program of the Interamerioan Program of Mass
Communications, under the direction of G.Briones and F.B.

Waisanen.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM
IN CHILE: A STUDY OF
ATTITUDES

By

Jose Paulo Vieira

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1969

Ggflfifi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many thanks are due to Dr. Frederick Waisanen,
without whom this thesis could not have been done. He
permitted the use of the data upon which this thesis is
based, and provided intellectual guidance whenever needed.
In addition, Dr. waisanen's ability to bring personal
concern and open mindedness to his involvement with the
intellectual development of his students was greatly

appreciated by the author.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . .

1. THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 General Orientation

1.2 The Central Question
1.3 The Conceptual Model

2. THE BASIC VARIABLES AND THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

2.1 The Idea of Destiny and the Perception of Life

Conditions
2.2 Political and Social Radicalism
2.2 Social Control and Modernization
2. The General Hypothesis

3. THE VARIABLES: OPERATIONALIZATIONS

The Control variables
The Basic Variables

Problems
4. ANALXSIS OF THE DATA . . . . . . . .

a 1 Introduction

h 2 The Specific Hypotheses

#.3 Introducing the Control Variable
4 Final Results

A 5 Discussion

5. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .
BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O C O O O O O O O 0

APPENDIX I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES

APPENDIX II. CROSS TABULATION . . .

APPENDIX III. IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE

CONCEPT OF RADICALISM

iii

3 l

3 2

3.3 Operationalization of the Hypotheses

3 The Research Setting and Some Methodological

iv

vi

12

22

33

66
7o
72
75

77

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. General Results: Descriptive Summary . . . . . 35
2. General Results: Specific Hypotheses . . . . . 36

3. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Politically Radical Attitude . . . . . . . 39

u. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Socially Radical Attitude . . . . . . . . . 39

5. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Politically Radical Attitude . . . . . . . . . 39

6. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Socially Radical Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . 39

7. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Behavior-Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . U2

8. Association between Area of Residence and
Perceived Life Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . 42

9. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Behavior-Orientation: Slum . . . . . . . . “5

10. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Behavior-Orientation: Santiago . . . . . . 45

11. Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Behavior-Orientation: Tampa: . . . . . . . 45

12. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Political Radicalism: Slum . . . . . . . . . . 47

13. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Political Radicalism: Santiago . . . . . . . . #7

14. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Political Radicalism: Lampa . . . . . . . . . 47

15. Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Social Radicalism: Slum . . . . . . . . . . . #9

iv

Table
16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

2h.

Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Social Radicalism: Santiago .. . . . . . . .

Association between Behavior-Orientation and
Social Radicalism: lampa . . . . . . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Political Radicalism: Slum . . . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Political Radicalism: Santiago . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Political Radicalism: Lampa . . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Social Radicalism: Slum . . . . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Social Radicalism: Santiago . . . . . .

Association between Perceived Life Conditions
and Social Radicalism: Lampa . . . . . . . .

Final Results 0 O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O

Page

”9

49

51

51

51

52

52

52
5h

Figure
1.

LIST OF FIGURES

Conceptual Model: Self-Autonomy and
Radicalism with Restricted Opportunity
Structure -- the Dialectics between

the Sociological and the Psychological

Levels of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pattern-variable for the Study of Conservative
Constellations of Thought . . . . . . . . . .

Pattern-variable for the Study of Radical
Constellations of Thought . . . . . . . . . .

Types of Radical Behavior . . . . . . . . . .
Operationalization of the Variables . . . . .
Operationalized Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . .
Model of the Specific Tables: Final Results .

Modern Systems Approach to Power and
Authority 0 O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O 0 0

vi

Page

15

15
17
27
31
53

83

1. THE PROBLEM

1.1 General orientation

Underdeveloped politicians are a kind of naive
social scientists who employ their intellectual skills
according to the immediate needs of the moment. They are
naive structuralists when their objective is to absolve
individuals, groups, and classes from their social
responsibility: nobody is responsible for social injustices,
poverty, ignorance, etc., in as much as the problem is
structural. Or they become faithful reductionists when
their objective is to avoid change: the first thing that
must be changed is Man, not laws, policies, and structures.
According to this view, development, and modernization are
reduced to a mental process: social change is the natural
consequence of mental change. And when politicians want to
neutralize discontent without changing the status quo, they
become ”comparative sociologists”, showing other social
systems where such specific causes of discontent do not
exist and ”proving" that history is repeating: so, the
causes of discontent are transitory and the only thing
required in order to arrive there (modern society, for
example) is patience. Bendix has indicated some ways by
which these ideological constructions have received
”scientific" support from many sociological studies through
the adoption of evolutionist assumptions. He points out,

1

2
from this perspective, that the historical experience of
backward countries is viewed as a mechanical movement from
an ideal-typical situation (traditional society) towards
another ideal-typical situation (modern society).
According to Bendix, this approach implies a methodological
mistake, the confusion between ideal-type and
generalization, which leads to serious misinterpretations
and wrong focusing in studies of social development:

”In his introduction to Lerner's book, David
Biesman notes that the transitional individual
is defined as one who attends to the mass-media,
but cannot read, to which he appends the
disturbing question: 'What will a society look
like which is dominated by such 'postA1iterate'
types?'(1) This question points to the
possibility of a 'transition' of long duration,
a contradiction in terms which arises from
evolutionist assumptions and leads to a
questionable nomenclature about 'developing' or
'transitional' societies which may never become
developed enough to be called modern.“(2)

He explains this questionable and problematic
character of the modernization process by pointing out that
“once industrialization has occurred anywhere,

this fact alone alters the international
environment of all other societies. There is
a sense in which it is true to say that because
of timing and sequence industrialization cannot
occur in the same way twice.'(3)

More precisely, by differences in timing and

sequence, he means that

 

1

Quoted by Bendix from Daniel Lerner, The Passi
of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1933), p.%2.

2Reinhard Bendix, “Tradition and Modernity
Reconsidered', Cam rative Studies in Societ and Histor ,
V01. Ix, 1966-67, p. 309 0

3Ibid,, p.328.

3
“Within the limitations imposed by nature
and history all aspects of modernity (as
developed abroad) are up for adoption
simultaneously, and the problem is which
of the adoptable items represents a short
cut to modernity. Since the achievement
of modernity is not assured, it is part of
this process that the adoption of items of
modernization may militate against modernity,
or may be irrelevant to it." (a)

Bendix' approach to problems of modernization and
development has been adopted as the general orientation for
the definition of the problem treated in this thesis, and
evaluation of its significance. Again using Bendix' words,
this general orientation may be stated as:

”The social structure of a country's
'transitional’phase' should... be a primary
focus of analysis rather than be dismissed
as a survival of the past.“ (5)

The next section will discuss the main criteria for
determining those aspects of the social structure in
transitional societies which should receive priority for

study.

1.2 The Central Question

When studying development, sociologists have shown
little concern for the problem of how developmental goals
are to be achieved. Even when social conditions preventing

or obstructing the attainment of the goals are identified,

 

h
__Ib1d. , pp. Bait-335.

Ibid., p.328.

a

“less attention is given to the more central
question of how to effectively combat or
remove such obstacles... I am seeking to
indicate that even on the practical level
sociological students devote preciously little
study to the ways of achieving the cultural
values and social forms which they accept as
the goals of social development.” (6)

It seems that this criticism is in perfect agreement

with Moskos' statement that
“/i/n fact, the American social scientist's
lack of concern with social stratification
around the world is perhaps his most
characteristic blind spot.“ (7)

In other words, international and social
stratification are central subjects leading to the
comprehension of the substratum' of interests which
constitutes the major obstacle to development. However,
this kind of approach demands the discussion of explosive
issues and clear commitments within each specific historical
situation. As Moskos has noted,

”/The subjects of revolution, class and
history/ are almost central to any serious
study of developing countries, but in most
of the third world literature they are
ignored. ...discussions of neo-colonialism,
economic exploitation, and military
imperialism seem to be in bad taste.” (8)
In short, a double criterion has been used for

determining the central concern of this thesis:

 

6*
Herbert Blumer, ”The Idea of Social Development,“

Studies in Comparative International Development, Vbl.II,
19 9 P090

7Charles Moskos, “Research in the Third World,“
Trans-Action, June 1968, p.2.

81bid., p.2.

5
a)“Transitional' or “developing society"is a highly
problematic concept,and the transitional structure must be
carefully studied in order to determine whether development
is occurring or not. It seems that in most contemporary
transitional societies it is not.
b) The most relevant aspects to be investigated when
studying underdeveloped societies concern:
1 - the way these societies are internally
stratified and
2 - the relative position of such societies
within a general framework of international stratification.
From these two types of stratification are derived
the most important social conditions preventing or
obstructing the attainment of developmental goals.
Given these premises, a general way of stating the
central question discussed in this paper is:
”Why are elite groupings of Latin America
unable to develop legitimizing models, and
why are working classes unable to develop
revolutionary models?” (9)
More specifically, the second part of this question
will be the central concern of this paper. In order to

answer this question it is necessary to understand how the

interaction of structural and socio-psychological elements

 

9Irving Horowitz, “The Norm of Illegitimacy: The
Political Sociology of Latin America,“ in Latin American
Radicalism, ed.by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro,
John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p.13.

6
prevent or neutralize the appearance of radical attitudes
within the underdeveloped social system. On the other hand,
it is also necessary to understand how social control
mechanisms prevent and neutralize the transformation of
radical attitudes into concrete and disruptive action. In
sum, two different types of social control mechanisms must
be investigated: how the development of radical attitudes is
avoided, and how their transformation into disruptive action
is prevented. An adequate study of each of these mechanisms
demands the understanding of both their structural and their
socio-psychological aspects, and of the interaction between
them.

A general theory of social control will be
tentatively outlined in order to indicate how the structural
aspects set limits to the socio-psychological variations,and
how the structural conditions channel similar socio-
psychological characteristics into different kinds of
behavior.

After this exploratory model of social control
theory is established, the empirical study of its socio-
psychological implications will become the central focus of
this thesis. Then, the central question investigated in this
thesis, re-stated in a more specific form, will be:

How relevant are general socio-psychological
characteristics for determining the development of radical
tendencies, given specific structural characteristics?

The first thing necessary now is to define the

concepts that will be used to state the general hypothesis.

7
This is the objective of the next section.

1.3 The Conceptual Model

Man's consciousness is conditioned by social
existence: that is, human thought is conditioned by the
social context within which it arises. Complex and
heterogeneous social realities cause the development of
complex and heterogeneous distributions of perceptions.
These two concepts -- reality and perception -- are here
understood in the broadest possible sense: the first as a
quality independent of human volition, and the second as the
certainty that the phenomena are rea1,and that they possess
specific characteristics. 10

On the other hand, the opposite relationship is also
true: insofar as the social reality is also a human product,
the relationship between man and society is best described
as a continuing dialectical process. The objective and
historical social reality determines man's internalization
and is determined by man's externalization. In sum, this
process, as indicated in Figure 1 presents four distinct
moments:

Externalization: “Society is a human product“

Objectivation: “Society is an objective reality"

 

10See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social

Construction of Realit : A Treatise in the Sociolo of
Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp.1-3.

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9

Internalization: “Man is a social product“ 11

Identification: Man is a social actor and assumes
social roles.

The contemporary world is characterized by a highly
complex social reality, which corresponds to a highly
complex distribution of perceptions. The heterogeneity of
the socializing personnel, mediating different realities to
the same individual leads to competition between reality-
definitions during the socialization process. This becomes
a permanent process throughout one's life time: after a
primary socialization, which is more homogeneous and uniform,
new pressures towards adaptation and adjustment (secondary
socialization) or towards substantive modification of older
patterns (re-socialization), continuously arise. As Berger
has written

”In re-socialization the past is reinterpreted
to conform to the present reality, with the
tendency to retroject into the past various
elements that were subjectively unavailable at
the time. In secondary socialization the
present is interpreted so as to stand in a
continuous relationship with the past, with
the tendency to minimize such transformations
as have actually taken place. Put differently,
the reality base for re-socialization is the
present, for secondary socialization the past.“ (12)

Any process of socialization involves the
internalization of two orders of objectivations: the first

order refers to the internalization of institutions and of

 

111b1d., p.61.

lzIbid., p.163.

lO
roles, and the second order refers to the internalization
of their legitimation. Legitimation is here understood as
the way by which institutions and roles are explained and
justified. The internalization of each order of
objectivation may vary with a certain degree of independence
regarding the other, but their interaction leads to a
continuous readaptation and reharmonization between them.
From this perspective, reified and autonomous attitudes may
be viewed as alternative polar types which put together the
internalization of structural elements and the
internalization of their legitimations in a coherent way

In short, the two dimensions of the process of
reification as a process of attitude formation are:

1 - the internalization of one's objectified life
conditions as evolving independently of his own control.

2 - the identification and acceptance of the
legitimations which explain such a lack of control.

At the other pole, the two dimensions of the process
by which autonomous attitude is formed are:

1 - the internalization of one's objectified life
conditions as evolving under control and according to one's
own design.

2 - the rejection of legitimafiOns which explain and
justify the lack of control of one's own life.

In between these extremes is placed what appears to
be the typical empirical case: rejection 0f partial aspects

of institutions and/or roles and attempts at legitimating

11

new realities by the same values which were employed for
legitimating the rejected structural elements. In other
words, there is an attempt at adjusting old values to new
definitions of the situation because these reinterpretative
schemes "guarantee biographical continuity and smooth
inconsistencies as they arise." 13 When the gap between the
older legitimations and the new reality is too wide, that
is, when re—socialization occurs, then new legitimations are
necessary, and this new reality may threaten the older
institutional order by becoming a possible re-orientation

and an alternative direction of institutionalization.

 

13Ibid.. p.162.

2. THE BASIC VARIABLES AND THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

2.1 The Idea of Destiny and the Perception of Life Conditions

A very common type of values which are used in
legitimating the social institutions of backward societies
refers to the ideas of destiny and fatalism. When
internalized, these ideas become the basic elements which
determine most behaviors within backward societies. Through
the internalization of these ideas, institutions, social
roles, and identity are reified, and the individuals are
incapable of autonomous, independent behavior. In Berger's
words, institutions are viewed as a "necessity and fate";
roles are ”also apprehended as an inevitable fate, for which
the individual may disclaim responsibility.” And identity
itself ("the total self”) may be totally identified with
one's socially assigned typifications.1u These normative
definitions seem to be consistent with the perception of
stagnation and immobility within one's own life, or even the
perception of things always becoming worse. In sum, the
perception of one's own life as stagnant or regressive is
postulated to be associated with reified definitions of the
social reality. On the other hand, the perception of
improvement and dynamism in one's own life is consistent with

the opposite normative definitions. If one's life has

 

luIbldo 9 pp. 89-92 0

12

13

improved, it is more understandable that he would believe in
the possibility of changing roles, identity and institutions.

Before advancing further, a general condition must
be introduced into the model: the narrowness of the
opportunity-structure in underdeveloped countries will be
assumed as generally true. This means that new life chances
are not structurally available for most of those individuals
who are willing to improve their life conditions. It will
also be assumed that the gap between the slower development
of the opportunity-structure and the faster expansion of
aspirations has been continuously increasing. The emergence
of autonomous individuals, without corresponding creation of
new life chances for them, leads necessarily to the expansion
of radical attitudes i.e., attitudes oriented toward the
rupture of generally accepted normative patterns and/or
toward the rejection of the generally adopted value system.
In other words, there is a convergence of autonomous and
radical attitudes whenever the opportunity-structure is

15

inadequate and restricted.

2.2 Political and Social Radicalism

Given the inadequacy of the opportunity-structure,
reification and radicalism, as indicated above, may be

viewed as polar types, or opposite systems, of coherent

 

l5Robert K.Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), Chapter IV-V,
pp 0 131-19Ll'o

l4
attitude. Horowitz' "conservative and radical constellations
of thought" may be understood as including these concepts;
Figures 2 and 3 reproduce his definitions of both types.

Within this broad conceptual framework, radical
constellations of thought include both political and social
radicalism. Political radicalism occurs when the basic
characteristics of the system of thought coincide with those
described under "Utopian System" in Figure 3. Social
radicalism is basically characterized by the dimensions
described under "Counterideology", in the same Figure.

Each of these two types -- political and social
radicalism -- corresponds to a great variety of distinct
behaviors. But the behaviors that belong to each type may
be grouped into two sub-types, according to their degree of
institutionalization and legitimation. Therefore
politically radical behavior may be viewed either as
(1) conventional dissent, or as (2) revolutionary politics.
And socially radical behavior may be viewed either as
(l) non-conventional social behavior or as (2) deviance.

The characterization of each of these types is summarized in
Figure 4. 9
Conventional dissent and non-conventional social

behavior are always partially institutionalized and socially

 

16The Figures are from Irving L.Horowitz, "A
Formalization of the Sociology of Knowledge," Professing
Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science
(Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp.69-70.

 

15

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16
accepted (not punished) forms of radical behavior.
Revolutionary politics and deviance are non-institutionalized
and repressed forms of radical behavior. Both of these are
viewed as social problems, and they are differentiated by
treating deviance ”in therapeutic rather than political
terms." 17
This ”welfare or rehabilitation model” for deviance
is an extremely misleading orientation for sociological
analysis. In most cases, deviant status is not sought by
the actor but is a function of existing normative structures
and power dynamics; deviance is a lower class phenomenon, and
deviant individuals generally occupy subordinate positions.
Moreover, ”the selection of decision-makers who define
deviance as a social problem is a political process.../and/
...the political decision has been to treat deviance as a
nonpolitical problem." 18
As quoted by Horowitz, Lemert's considerations seem

to be a very adequate contribution for the clarification of
this issue:

”In studying the problem-defining reactions of a

community, it can be shown that public consciousness

of 'problems' and aggregate moral reactions frequently

center around forms of behavior which on closer

analysis often prove to be of minor importance in the

social system. Conversely, community members not
infrequently ignore behavior which is a major disruptive

 

r~—

17Irving L.Horowitz, ”Social Deviance and Political
Marginality,” Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle
of Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p.108.

181bid., p.110.

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18
influence on their lives. We are all too familiar
with the way in which populations in various cities
and states have been aroused to frenzied punitive
action against sex offenders. Neverthless, in
these same areas the people as a whole often are
indifferent toward crimes committed by businessmen
or corporations -- crimes which affect far more
people and which may be far more serious over a
period of time.” (19)

On the other hand, the apolitical approach to deviance
is easily understood, because deviants have avoided political
participation and have not demanded changes in the
configuration of the social hierarchy. However, this
apolitical feature of deviant social movements does not imply
that deviance is a social phenomenon without political roots.
Fundamentally, deviance is apolitical because it is treated
apolitically and because social control mechanisms prevent
the politicalization of deviance. Probably the most
important cause of deviance is the structurally generated
malintegration of individuals, groups, and classes within
contemporary social systems. And being structural, the
causes of deviance present profound political implications.

Social control mechanisms function on two levels:

(1) determining how each type of radicalism is treated
individually and (2) determining the convergences and
interchanges between the 4 types of radicalism.

By this reason, the clarification of these

interchanges becomes a necessary condition for understanding

the functioning of the social control mechanisms which

 

19Ibid., p.110.

l9

determine:

a) the apolitical character of deviance, and its
repression;

b) the forms and intensity of the fight against
subversion;

c) the institutionalization of some types of
deviance, and

d) the institutionalization of political dissent.

2.3 Social Control and Modernization

It seems that this framework is generally consistent
with Horowitz' approach to problems of development and
modernization in Latin America. Especially, his
conceptualization of ”the norm of illegitimacy," "/the/
illegitimacy as a style of doing business, "or
”institutionalization of crisis as a normative pattern of
politics” seems to be extremely useful for the
understanding of the social conditions obstructing the
< 20
social development of the continent.

He defines legitimacy and illegitimacy as follows

'...those societies which over a long period of
time display norms sanctioned in law and made
viable through mass-participation can be
considered legitimate; those societies that rest
visibly and demonstrably on unaccepted or barely

tolerated power structures and relations can be
considered illegitimate.“ (21)

 

20Irving Horowitz, “The Norm of Illegitimacy: The
Political Sociology of Latin America," in Latin American
Radicalism, ed. by Irving L.Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and
John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).

21lbid., p.4

20

Pointing out that illegitimacy is a basic structural

characteristic of Latin American countries, he explains
"In order for a political system to 'survive'
in Latin America, it must perennially change
its policies and generate instability as a
survival pattern.” (22)

This “norm of illegitimacy" prevails in almost any
kind of situation and occurs not only nationally but also in
the interaction of backward Latin American nations with the
developed world:

”The norm of illegitimacy is informally sanctioned
from the lowest petty official living off~bribes in
some remote custom house in Asuncion or Sao Paulo
to the highest official living off the mineral
produce of Latin America in some highly visible
counting house in New York or London. 'To break
the cycle of crisis and collapse, to eliminate

the norm of illegitimacy as an operational code for
Latin America means to break the organizational
impasse created by both local bureaucrats and
imported businessmen.” (23)

This perspective is extremely useful for indicating:

a) how deeply rooted irrational tendencies are within
backward societies,

b) the disfunctional character of many so-called
modernizing attitudes and behavior for developmental goals and

c) the highly problematic character and the
uncertainty of developmental processes within the contemporary
world.

What so many writers have described and evaluated as
being merely a transitory phase of social disorganization

occurring within a more general process of development and

 

221bid., p.8.

23Ibid., p.23.

21
modernization may be the only or the most important
occurrence in underdeveloped countries, given the increasing
inadequacy of the opportunity structure in underdeveloped

countries.

2.4 The General Hypothesis

Up to this point, this chapter has had a double
purpose: (a) to conceptualize the basic socio-psychological
variables which will be used in the empirical study, and
(b), to understand the structural conditions which influence
or determine the development of those socio-psychological
characteristics. The significance of the structural
concomitants of the socio-psychological variables is derived
from a central perspective adopted in this thesis: a given
social system tends to produce and/or stimulate the
development of socio-psychological mechanisms which present
an important social control function. It is necessary to
keep this in mind in order to evaluate the empirical
significance of the general hypothesis:

POLITICALLY AND/OR SOCIALLY RADICAL ATTITUDES
ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY CORRELATED WITH AUTONOMOUS
BEHAVIOR-ORIENTATION AND WITH PERCEPTION OF
STATIC OR REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS;
NON-AUTONOMOUS BEHAVIOR-ORIENTATION, OR
PERCEPTION OF PROGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS, OR
BOTH, ARE SITUATIONS THAT PREVENT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICALLY AND/OR SOCIALLY
RADICAL ATTITUDES.

3. THE VARIABLES

3.1 The Control variables

As it was indicated earlier, the inadequacy of the
opportunity structure is a basic condition for the expansion
of socially and/or politically radical tendencies. In the
underdeveloped countries there are several causes
contributing to making the opportunity-structure.
increasingly restricted and limited: institutional
weaknesses; demographic growth, structural imbalances, and
social inequalities are among the main causes preventing an
adequate expansion of the opportunity-structure. The result
is a permanent process of marginalization of the masses,
leading to the coexistence of both legitimate and
illegitimate opportunity structures. The more restricted
the legitimate opportunity structure is, then the more
important the illegitimate one becomes.

The opportunity-structure is not equally narrow and
restricted for every individual nor for every class in
different social conditions. Individual and class
differences determine different life chances. Thus, class
situation and social conditions are dimensions which not
only determine whether or not an individual is to be
socially defined as marginal, deviant, subversive, etc.;
these dimensions also determine how restricted the

22

23
opportunity-structure actually is for a given individual in
a specific social situation.

By this reason, the specification of self-defined
social class as an indicant of class situation and the
differentiation of residence areas as an indicant of social
conditions lead to the determination of more homogeneous
sub-samples in relation to two aspects:

a) from a structural perspective, the specification
of social class and residence areas indicate that two
individuals in the same sub-sample will have a similar
chance of being viewed and treated as marginal, when they
behave in a specific way;

b) this specification further indicates that such
individuals have similar chances in relation to the
opportunity-structure, implying that they will have similar
chances of manifesting socially and/or politically radical
tendencies.

Thus, a and b are the reasons for the adoption of
the two control variables -- area of residence and social
class -- in the tabulation of the data. The original
questions that were used for the manipulation of these
variables appear in Appendix I. The way in which these

variables have been operationalized appears in Figure 5.

3.2 The Basic variables

The independent variable

In section 2.1 it was indicated that the independent

24
variable refers to the adoption of normative definitions
related to the reification of institutions, roles, and,
identity. Accordingly, the definition of autonomous or non-
autonomous behavior-orientation results from the combination
of these three elements; at least two reifications occur for
defining an individual as presenting a non-autonomous
attitude, and likewise, autonomous behavior-orientation
occurs when at least two reifications are rejected. The
three possible reifications are:

a) reification of institutions occurs when destiny
is accepted as a category governing the whole life.

b) reification of roles occurs when one accepts, as
a general norm, the idea of living only in the present.

c) reification of identity occurs when one believes
he should not try to plan his life, since he does not
control it.

The questions referring to these three types of
reification appear on Appendix I. The way the questions
have been operationalized is indicated on Figure 5.

The intervenigg variable

The strategy of action one adopts depends on how
wide is the dissonance between his personal objectives in
life and the way he perceives his life conditions. So, when
one has tried to be autonomous, active and dynamic but
perceives that his life conditions have been static or
regressive, it is likely that he will try to reduce the

dissonance, either by adopting more efficient forms of

25
behavior or by changing his autonomous behavior-orientation.
Thus, whether a person will present radical tendencies or
not depends simultaneously on how autonomous he is and on
how he perceives his life conditions. An autonomous
individual attempting to improve his life conditions will be
prone to try less conventional forms of behavior if he
perceives that his previous attempts have failled.

In sum, the process of attitude formation depends on
a normative element and a cognitive one. The independent
variable corresponds to the normative element and the
intervening variable corresponds to the cognitive one.

The way this last variable is operationalized is
outlined on Figure 5 and the original question is formulated
in Appendix I.

The_gependent variables

Radicalism, as defined in section 2.1, is the
dependent variable. Politically radical attitudes are
defined through the combination of three questions, as
indicated in Figure 5 or Appendix I. In order to be defined
as politically radical, an individual has to identify his
interests as being depended by leftist parties and/or define
the Left as the group that should be the most powerful in the
country. However, it is the purpose of this paper to study
radical attitudes which are likely to be transformed in concrete
action. In addition to showing radical tendencies, we felt it
important that the respondent indicate a favorable perspective

related to political action in order to be considered

26
politically radical. This "activism" dimension is viewed as
an indicator of the commitment of the individual to an
abstractly defined radical posture.

Social radicalism is vaguely defined because of the
reasons explained in section 2.3. It is so general and so
pervasive that it is very difficult to reach an intermediate
position between generality and specificity. Vagueness is
not a weakness in the operationalization since it corresponds
to an essential trait of the empirical manifestations of
social radicalism, deviance, and of marginality (see section
2.2).

Many things considered not right are often judged as
not wrong in underdeveloped countries: they simply are things
that everyone does in order to succeed. Thus, a simple
question is used for determining socially radical tendencies:
if one thinks he must do wrong things in order to succeed, and
if one wants to succeed, that is, if he presents an autonomous
behavior orientation, he will then present a strong tendency
towards wrong behavior. It is very important to note that a
subjective definition of ”right" and ”wrong" is implied here.
This means that inferences and generalizations about socially
radical tendencies may be made only if assumptions are made in
such a way that a general concept of right and wrong can be
attributed to every individual of each sub-sample. The
operationalization of these variables and further‘details are

presented in Figure 5 and Appendix I, respectively.

27
CONTROL VARIABLES

 

 

 

 

social class place of residence
rural
worker slum
Santiago

 

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: behavior-orientation

 

 

 

 

oertitude unp ed present-
of destipy life oriented
A A A
non- D?? A A
autonomous A D?? A
A A ~ D??
A?? D D
autonomous D A?? D

D D A2?

D D D
indetermin. any two or three Idon't know. and7
or “doesn't understand“
.A - totally agree or slightly agree
D I totally disagree or slightly disagree
7? - don't know or does not understand

 

INTERVENING EARIABLE: perception of life conditions ,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

share is no difference static ,
‘positive progressive .
negative regressive

indeterminate

 

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: politically radical attitude

 

 

class-party power ' political
allocation action
L L A
radical O L A
L O A
not 0 . o .A
O

 

radical
L - The LSft, (The Popular Front) or

Communist, Socialist or Radical Party
0 I any other category
A - totally agree or slightly agree

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: socially radical attitude
wropg thipgs necessary

 

 

 

radicaI , A
not-radical 0

Figure 5 - Operationalization of the variables

28
3.3 Operationalization of the Hypotheses (see Figure 6)

l - GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate
their life conditions as regressive or static and who assume
any radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

1a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
any radical attitude.

lb - the percentage of autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
any radical attitude.

lc - the percentage of non-autonomoug workers who
evaluate their life conditions as static or regressive and
who assume any radical attitude.

2 - POLITICAL RADICALISM + REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate
their life conditions as regressive and who assume a
politically radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

2a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a politically radical attitude.

2b - the percentage of autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a politically radical attitude.
A 2c - the percentage of non-autonopppp workers who

evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume

a politically radical attitude.

29

3 - POLITICAL RADICALISM + STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate
their life conditions as static and who assume a politically
radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

3a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a politically radical attitude.

3b - the percentage of autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a politically radical attitude.

3c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a
politically radical attitude.

4 - SOCIAL RADICALISM + REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate
their life conditions as regressive and who assume a
socially radical attitude.is GREATER THAN:

4a ~ the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a socially radical attitude.

4b - the percentage of autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a socially radical attitude.

4c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who

evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume
a socially radical attitude.

3o

5 - SOCIAL RADICALISM + STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate
their life conditions as static and who assume a socially
radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

5a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a socially radical attitude

5b - the percentage of autonomous workers who
evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume
a socially radical attitude.

5c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who

evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a

socially radical attitude.

3.4 The Reseaigh Settipg and Some Methodological Problems

The research from which the data used in this thesis
are derived is a study of communication and migration
conducted by Frederick Waisanen and Guillermo Briones as one
part of the research program of the Interamerioan Program of
Mass Communications. The study was done at the Institute of
Economic Planning at the University of Chile.

The data are derived from three samples: (1) 160
migrants residing in the city of Santiago; (2) 108 migrants
residing in the slums of Santiago (callampas) and (3) 301
rural inhabitants residing in Lampa.

A random selection of city dwellers was derived from

31

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mdososopsmIso: I dz “maoaosopac I d

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msouuHUSoo 0.3..” obammoawoa .3 0.33m I obammonwoaafios I h «360

 

 

 

 

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dz ¢ <2 dz

 

 

 

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Illa: as Idlo -lnlp IN! om llucm 3 ca pa ca

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03.3w obdnuoauoa can—ova obaumoamoa ebfluoamoaquos aanobkopad

 

 

 

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80202843.

 

 

vac. Icslmlo odd a.

 

:43 soupopsouaoIaonbmnoo. on» son:

 

mmqm<Hm<>

 

32
a larger sample of 1540 persons born outside of Santiago.
The larger sample was obtained from another study by the
Institute of Economics at the University of Chile.

The random selection of slum migrants was based on
a registration of households in 30 different "callampas"
areas, which were located on the periphery of Gran Santiago.
The sample of rural inhabitants was also randomly selected
from a household census of the Lampa Community.

In every case, heads of households were interviewed.
The interviews were done in December, 1964.

The present study presents the typical limitations
of any study based on secondary data: the indicators which
are being used here were originally established in fit with
other research-objectives, and their adequacy to the
operationalizations of the present research is, of course,
problematic and difficult to assess.

Another important limitation which occurs when
secondary data are used refers to the questionable validity
and representativeness of the sampling procedures in
relation to the specific purposes of the secondary analysis.

On the other hand the composite measurements of
autonomy and political radicalism, which are being used here,
were not previously tested. Item analysis was not done on
the indices, and it is necessary to keep in mind the
possibility that interactions between the components of the

indices could wash out or distort the results.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

4.1 Intrgductipp

From the original sample, composed of 569
respondents, 300 questionnaires have been used; 247 not-
workers, 12 cases with indeterminate intervening variable,
and 10 cases with indeterminate independent variable were
not used.

Initially, in sections 4.2, the data will be
analysed as a whole, without taking into consideration the
control variable (area of residence). This will be done
because it is assumed that, if it will be possible to
discover clear tendencies and patterns of association
without discriminating too many variables and without having
to go into specific details, the theoretical and practical
implications of the analysis will be much more meaningful.
In one word, the analysis would present more
"generalizability."

As it will be clear in section 4.2, the analysis
will not present clear patterns of association and the
hypothesis will not be accepted, at least as far as area of
residence is not introduced as a control variable. And when
place of residence is introduced an additional problem
appears: many tables present very small numbers in cells and
in marginal totals. However, other tables will present a

33

34

satisfactory number of cells and some meaningful results
will be derived from them. This is done in the next sections
of this chapter, which will finish with a general discussion
of the findings.

The basic way by which the figures which will be
used in this chapter were established is outlined in
Appendix II, and is consistent with the criteria indicated in
Figure 5. The basic technique adopted for identifying
associations and for analysing tendencies is the comparison of

24

percentages, as found in Zelditch.

4.2 The Specific Hypotheses

Table 1 is a summary description of the results in
Table 2. Both Tables clearly demonstrate that the
hypotheses cannot be accepted:

1 - The general trend seems to be exactly the
opposite from what was proposed as the general hypothesis.
On the whole, non-autonomous behavior-orientation and
perception of progressive life conditions seem to be
positively associated with any kind of radical behavior, as
it is indicated in Table 1 (la, lb, and 1c).

2 - There is no meaningful difference in tendency

toward political radicalism between persons perceiving

 

2“Norris Zelditch, Jr., A Bagic Course ip
Sociological Statistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1959), Chapter 6-7, pp.125-187.

35

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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TABLE 1 - General Results: Descriptive Summary

 

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msoaOGOpszsos I «z ww.nam n:.H:H mmumd
msoaosousquHom I dm . H3 _ mm I MH MI
¢m

”0000

42
mQOHuHunoo oMHHomemoH 0H

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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mOH mm on In
m:.Hm{ qu$m N
R N N. mm
me e m m mm
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mn.~n __ «Mann . oo 0 mm
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37

progressive and regressive life conditions, whether or not
they adopt autonomous behavior-orientation (see 2a, 2b, and
2c of Table 1).-

3 - On the other hand, people who perceive their
lives as static tend to be politically_1ess radical than
those who perceive their lives as progressive or regressive.
Among individuals perceiving their life conditions as
static, autonomous behavior-orientation seems to be
positively associated with radicals, as it may be verified
in Table 1 (3c).

4 - Self-autonomous individuals who perceive their
life conditions as regressive tend to be socially less
radical than either non-autonomous and regressive, or
progressive individuals, as Table 1 (ha, 4b, and no)
demonstrates.

5 - Self-autonomous individuals who perceive their
life conditions as static tend to be much less radical,
socially speaking, than progressive individuals. Progressive
and non-autonomous individuals tend to be more radical than
progressive and autonomous. On the other hand, the degree
of autonomy does not make a meaningful difference among
individuals who perceive their life conditions as static.

In short, individuals who think that their life
conditions have been improving during the last five years
present the higheSt percentage of socially radical attitudes.
On the other hand, self-defined regressive individuals

present the highest percentage of politically radical

38
attitude. The percentage of individuals presenting a radical
tendency is greater among non-autonomous persons than among
autonomous persons. The group of individuals perceiving
their life conditions as static present the lowest
percentage of both kinds of radical tendency. In general,
the highest percentage indicating a tendency towards any kind
of radicalism is associated with individuals who perceive
improvement in their life conditions.,

In Tables 3 and h the marginal values of Table 2 are
compared, in order to show how the perceived life conditions
are associated with each specific type of radical attitudes.
Table 3 indicates that, by percent people are much less
radical when they perceive their life conditions as static
than when they perceive their life conditions as progressive
or as regressive. Table 4 indicates that the percentage of
persons who perceive their life conditions as improving and
who adopt a socially radical attitude is greater than the
percentage of individuals who perceive static or regressive
life conditions and who adopt a socially radical attitude.
'This is an interesting finding: 40.59% of those who said that
their life conditions have improved agree that the only way
one can improve his life conditions is by doing wrong things.
This sounds like a confession that they Judge the channels of
affluence, as socially unacceptable and morally wrong even
though they have used these channels to improve their life
conditions.

Tables 5 and 6 show that the association between

39

Table 3 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Politically Radical Attitude

 

static progressve regressive
not politically 78 71 71220

radical 82,28 70,30 67,62 23,33
politically 1 30 34

radical 12,02122,20 32,38 26,22
200.0011220040015100.0030100,OO

 

 

Table # - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Socially Radical Attitude

 

 

 

static ro resdve regressive2
not socially 70 60

radical 383?“. 47 #1 68.572 62,33
socially
radical 25,53 40,52 31,4} 32,6 2
9 101’ 105 300

190,00 ioo.oo 200.00 100,00

 

 

 

Table 5 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Politically Radical Attitude

 

 

autonomous non-auton
not politically 60 160 220

radical 22 ,22 23,23 23,33
politica y 23

radical “22,2 26 ,223 26,62
100, 002 7100,003 0100,00

Table 6 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Socially Radical Attitude

 

 

 

autonomous non-auton
not socially 153 202
radical 21,08 65.90 62,33
socially 9
radical 28,22 __ 3%.10 32,62
3 00

17
100.00 100.00 100,00

 

 

 

40
behavior-orientation and radical attitude is very weak in
the case of socially radical attitudes and that this
association is practically inexistent in the case of
politically radical attitude.

Finally, after examining the general associations
between intervening and dependent variables (Tables 3 and
h), and between independent and dependent variables (Tables
5 and 6), it is useful to investigate the relationship
between intervening and independent variables. This is done
in Table 7, which shows that people with static life
conditions feel slightly less autonomous than people with
progressive or regressive life conditions.

In sum, the analysis of the entire sample, without
taking into consideration area of residence as a control
variable, has shown that the hypothesis cannot be accepted,
and that there are very weak associations between the
variables, which were postulated to constitute the nuclei of
coherent attitude. The most meaningful relationship which
was discovered refers to the association between the
intervening and the dependent variable, that is, between
perceived life conditions and radicalism. It seems that
there is no relationship between self-autonomy and
radicalism, although this was a central postulation of this
thesis. Autonomy has been viewed as implying an orientation
towards achievement and affluence, which leads necessarily
to radical attitudes since the opportunity-structure of

underdeveloped countries is too narrow and too limited and

41
since such an opportunity-structure prevents people from
improving their life conditions. However, up to this point,
not acceptance of the hypotheses does not mean its complete
rejection.

The sample investigated has been put together
without differentiating people located in extremely varied
social conditions. It is possible that, within a given
percentage, opposite tendencies have been included. In
order to investigate this possibility it becomes necessary
to introduce area of residence as a control variable, and to
study separately what happens in the rural, slum and urban

areas .

. #2

Table 7 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Behavior Orientation

 

static progreséwe regressive

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

22 31 30 83
autonomous
23,00 30.70 28,58 22,20
72 70 75 ~ 217
non autonomous
76.60 __,. 69.30 - 71.02 72.30
94 101 105 300
200.00 100.90 200.00 100,00

 

Table 8 - Association between Area of Residence and
Perceived Life Conditions

 

 

 

 

 

 

Slum'- Santiago Lampa

i2 '19 63 9a

Static ' a. 8 31,62 00,32 ’ “31,33
1 2
39 21 1 101
progressive Ihé h 6“ 8 , 6

, 3 35.00 2 ,2 33, 2

33 20 52 0

.6regressive

 

 

32,22 0 33,33 15 33,33 300 35.00

;00.00 ;90.00' 100.00 100,00

43
#.3 Introduggng the Control variable

Association between control and intervening variable

Table 8 demonstrates that there are different
patterns of distribution of the intervening variable --
perceived life conditions -- for each different area of
residence. As it is reasonable to expect, people in the
slum present the lowest percentage perceiving their life
conditions as static (lh.28% compared to 31.33% over-all
percentage). On the other extreme, rural inhabitants
perceive their life conditions as static to the highest
degree. A.meaningfu1 finding refers to the fact that
approximately every other slum dweller feels that his life
condition has improved lately. This is an indicant that the
idea of dualism and relative deprivation leading to the
“revolution of rising expectations,“ is, at least, highly

‘25 Although life conditions may appear to be

problematic.
miserable to external observers, h6.#3% of the slum dwellers
consider their life conditions to have improved. It is also
reasonable to expect that the rural people should present
the lowest percentage of progressive life conditions and

that slum people should present the highest percentage of

regressive life conditions, as demonstrated in Table 8.

 

25Daniel Lerner, The Passi of Traditional Societ
(New York: Free Press, 1965) and Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition
and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society
and Histor , V01. IX, 1966-67.

44

Association between control intervening and

independent variable

The comparison of the marginal values in Tables 9,
10 and 11 shows the different patterns of distribution of
the independent variable -- behavior orientation -- for each
different area of residence. These patterns are fairly
similar in the cases of Santiago and Lampa, but are
different in the case of slum dwellers. Surprisingly, the
least autonomous are urban residents (only 20% are
autonomous), who are even less autonomous than the rural
inhabitants (2h.36%). And people in the slum are much more
autonomous than either urban or rural dwellers, with 39.29%
being autonomous. These results are consistent with the
results in Table 7 which shows that the static individuals
are the least autonomous and the progressive are the most
autonomous. As Table 8 indicates, slum individuals are the
least static and the most progressive. It is convenient
remark that, although equally defined, autonomy may present
different meanings, depending on the specific socio-cultural
environment of its definition. Thus, it is likely that
autonomy in the slum corresponds to anomy in Merton's sense
of the word; 26 on the other hand, autonomy in the urban
milieu may be viewed as a more modern attitude, perfectly

consistent with the developing norms and values of that

specific socio-cultural context.

 

 

26Robert K. Merton, Social Theo and Social Structure
(London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), Chapter IV;V, pp.
131-199.

45

Table 9 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Behavior Orientation: SLUM

 

static progresdve regressive

 

 

 

 

 

1» 13 16 33
autonomous
' 33.33 33.33 1.. #8.98 32,22
26* 17 51
non autonomous .
_ 66.67 66.67 51,52 6o.7;_
12 39 33 8h
200.00 299.00 100.90 100,00

 

Table 10 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Behavior Orientation: SANTIAGO

 

static progresdve regressive

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 67 h 12
autonomous
10,53 28,52 25,00 20 OO
17 15 1 58
non autonomous
a 89.“? ____7L£3 75.00 89_. 00
19 21 20 60
100.00 200.00 100.00 100,00

 

Table 11 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Behavior Orientation: LAMPA

 

static progresdve regressive

16 12 10 33
2 #0 22,22 1 2 2n 6
EEC—"'5‘““ 29 2 TERI"":‘
u 60 70.73 80.77 75.60
33 E1. 52 156

100.00 100.00 45;00.00 100,00

 

 

 

autonomous

 

non autonomous

 

 

46

The analysis of these three Tables -- 9, 10, and
11 -- further indicates that the main factors contributing
to the differentiation of the distribution patterns are:

a) almost 50% of slum-dwellers perceiving regressive
life conditions are autonomous, although only 25% of the
urban group and 19.23% of the rural group are autonomous.

b) only 10.53% of the urban group perceiving their
life conditions as static are autonomous, although 25.h0% of

the rural group and 33.33% of the slum group are autonomous.

Association between independent and dependent

variable

Tables 12 through 17 indicate the associations
between the independent variable -- behavior-orientation --
and each different type of radicalism, for each specific
area of residence.

Autonomous slum-dwellers are the most radical,
politically speaking (42.42%), although autonomous rural
people are the least radical (15.70%). The figures on
Tables 12, 13, and 14 confirm the former suggestion that,
without controlling area of residence, opposite tendencies
could be represented within the same category, which would
have a neutralizing effect and which would conceal distinct
patterns and tendencies. These three Tables further
demonstrate that other results, which would be reasonable to
expect, are slightly confirmed: slum-dwellers are the most

politically radical and rural people are the least. But the

47

Table 12 - Association between Behavior Orientation and

Political Radicalism:

SLUM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

autonomous non autonomous
not. 19 36 55
politically .
M1 _ 57.58 ... 70.59 65.48
1h 15 29
politically
radical 42,92 22,91 39.5;
33 51
_;O0-00 200.00 100,00
Table 13 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Political Radicalism: SANTIAGO
autonomous non autonomous
not 9 35 AER
politically
radical 75.00 22,22 __ 73.33
3 “'13 16
politically
radical ‘, 25,00 22,08 26,62
12 48 60
7200.00 290.00 100,00
Table lb - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Political Radicalism: LAMPA
autonomous non autonomous
not 32 89 121
politically
radical 89.2; 75,92 77.56
6 29 35
politically
radical 15,22 i__ 2#,58 22,hh
38 118 156
100.00 100.00 100.00

48

difference between rural and urban dwellers is very small,
although it would be reasonable to expect a greater
difference, assuming that the rural area is the typical
locus of more conservative and conformist attitudes.

Surprisingly, autonomous slum-dwellers show the
lowest percentage in tendency toward social radicalism, as
may be verified by comparing Tables 15, 16 and 17. But if
autonomy within the slum areas is understood as a
manifestation of anomy, a reasonable explanation may be
suggested: the normative definition of right and wrong is
much more vague and more liberal within the slum milieu, that
is, many things which are commonly done by slum-dwellers and
which are generally Judged as wrong from without are not
evaluated as wrong from within. This interpretation is
confirmed by the fact that 41.18% of the non-autonomous
slum-workers present socially radical tendencies; this
figure indicates that social radicalism is an important
characteristic of the slum as a social system. And if
social radicalism constitutes an attitude inherent to the
particular social conditions of the slum, it is reasonable
that autonomous individuals should adopt such an attitude as
a legitimate normative pattern, without feelings of moral
uneasyness.

The analysis of Tables 16 and 17 indicates how
similar the patterns of distribution of social radicalism
actually are for autonomous and for non-autonomous urban and

rural residents. It seems that, in both cases, behavior-

49

Table 15 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: SLUM

 

autonomous non autonomous

 

 

 

 

 

 

not 27 3O 57
socially , .
radical 81.82 58.8_I__1 67,§§
' '” ”' 6 ‘21 2
socially -. . .
radical 18,18 41 18 32,14
33 35 84
290.00 ;;Q0.00 100,00

 

Table 16 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: SANTIAGO

 

autonomous non autonomous

 

 

 

 

 

 

not 8 3E *hz
socially ,
radical 66.62,_,. .70.83 _,. 70.00
4 I4 18
socially
radical 1» 33.33 22,12 30.00
12 48 760
._;00.00 A ,;00.00 100,00

 

Table 17 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: LAMPA

 

autonomous non autonomous

 

 

 

 

 

 

not 24 79 * 103
socially. .
radical , 63,;é 66,25 66.03
14 39 53
socially .
radical 236.84'__ 33.05 _ 33.97
38 18 156

100.00 100.00 100,00

50
orientation does not represent a meaningful determinant of
whether or not the individual tends to adopt a socially
radical attitude.

Association between intervening_andfldepen§gnt

variable

Tables 18 through 23 indicate the associations
between the intervening variable, perceived life conditions,
and the dependent variable, political or social radicalism,
maintaining residence area as control.

The main factor which contributes to making the slum
dwellers politically more radical than other groups is that,
in this case. 39.39% of the regressive people assume
politically radical attitudes. Among slum dwellers the
highest percentage is regressive; and among regressive slum
dwellers is found the highest percentage of autonomous and
politically radicallindividuals (see Tables 8, 9 and 18).

The main factor which contributes to making the
rural inhabitants the least radical, politically speaking,
is that only 14.28% of static pe0ple assume politically
radical attitudes. Among rural dwellers the highest
percentage is static (Table 8) and among static rural
dwellers is found the lowest percentage of politically
radical individuals (Table 20).

The most important factor of differentiation among
the distributions in Tables 21, 22, and 23 is found under
the column of regressive life conditions. Although only

20% of the regressive urban dwellers are socially radical,

51

Table 18 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Political Radicalism: SLUM

 

static progresdve regressive

 

 

 

not 9 26 20 55
politically
radical 475.00 a. 66.67 _ 6Q.6_ 65.48
13 13 29
politically
radical 25,00._‘_ 33.33 39.39 34.52
12 39 33 84
;oo.00 ;00.00 ;00.00 100,00

 

Table 19 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Political Radicalism: SANTIAGO

 

static progresdwe regressive

 

 

 

 

not 15 15 14 44
politically 8 4
radical 7 .95 l 70.00
'75 6"':”“'fl *6’ ‘16"21‘33
politically

radical 7 21,05 28,52 30,00 26 6
"—"'"'—""""" 19 21 20 '6‘_"'10

.;00.00 100,00 100,00 100,00

 

Table 20 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Political Radicalism: LAMPA

 

static progresflve regressive

 

 

 

not 34 30 37 121
politically .
radical 85,22 23,12 21,15 5 77.56
' 9 11 15 3
politically

radical 14 28 26,83 28,85 22 44
63 1 52 156

100.00 100.00 .;Q0.00 100,00

52

Table 21 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Social Radicalism: SLUM

 

static progresave regressive

 

 

 

 

not 9 24 24 57
socially
radical 75.00 61,54 22,23 67.86
3 15 9 27
socially 46 4
radical 2 00 38. 22,22 32,1
2 39 33
100.00 109.00 4200.90 100,00

 

Table 22 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Social Radicalism: SANTIAGO

 

static progresdve regressive

 

 

 

 

not 13 13 16 42
socially
radical 68.42 61,20 80.00 20,00
6 4 l
socially
radical l 8 8 10 20,00 30.00
9 21 20 60
200.00 200.00 200.00 100,00

 

Table 23 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and
Social Radicalism: LAMPA

 

static progresdve regressive

 

not 48 2 3 32 103
socially
radical 26,20 56,10 61,52 66,02
1 11 5 1 20 _ 53
soc a y

 

radical 2 80 43.90 738.46 8
33 4'1 52 '1Tm5

100.00 100.00 100.00 100,00

53
27.27% of the regressive slum dwellers and 38.46% of the

regressive rural inhabitants are socially radical. The
marginal results in these three Tables further indicate a
fairly regular pattern of over-all distribution between
”socially radical“ and "not socially radical“ for each of

the three residence areas.

4.4 Final Results

Table 24 summarizes the date derived from eighteen
different 2 x 2 tables which interrelate the variables in
the most specific and most discriminatory manner possible
within the framework adopted for this paper. Figure 7 gives
an example of the format of the original 2 x 2 tables from

which the figures in Table 24 were derived.

Association between Behavior-Orientation and Radicalism

(control variables) SLUM WORKER
(intervening variable) PERCEIVING STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

(independent variable) BEHAVIOR ORIENTATION

 

 

 

 

non
autonomous autonomous
(dependent not socially 4 5 9
.variable) radical 100,00 62,50 75.00
RADICAL socially O 3 3
ATTITUDE,L radical 4 00.00 8 37.50 25,00
12

100,00 100,00 100,00

Figure 7 — Model of the Specific Tables: Final Results

 

54

Table 24 - Final Results

 

SLUM

URBAN

RURAL

dependent:radicalism

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

control indqaendent intervening # olitical social ref.
4 l O ?
static 2 00 00,00
13 Q6 3 H L
autonomous progressive 46,15 23,08
16 7 3 H L
regressive 43.75 18,25
8 2 3 ?
static 25,00 32,50
non 26' 7 6 12 46 L H
autonomous progressive 2 ,22 ,15
17 ' ' H H
regressive 35,22 35,22
‘61? 29 ‘ 27 H L
SUB-TOTAL 34,52 32,14
2 l ' 1 ?
static 50,00 50.00
1 ' 3
autonomous progressive 16,62 50.00
4 1 0 ?
regressive 25,00 00.00
17 3 ' 5 L L
static 12,65 22,41
non . 15 5 5 H H
autonomous progressive .33.33 33.33
16 5 141 H
regressive 31,25 25,00
60 1 ' 1 L L
SUB-TOTAL 26,22 30.00
13 3 ' 5 L L
static 18.75 31,25
12 2 6’6 5 4 6 L H
autonomous progressive l , 2 1, 2
10 1 4 L H
regressive 10 00 0.00
47 6 10 ‘ L L
static 12 ' 21,28
222 29 9 13 H H
autonomous progressive l O 44.83
- 42 1 w ' ' l6 ' H H
regressive 33.33 38,10
715 35 53 H
SUB-TOTAL 22.44 33.98

 

 

55
The last column of Table 24 indicates the relative

position of the figure of each row in relation to the
over-all percentage for each specific sub-sample. The first
symbol, a question mark, indicates that the number of cases
in that specific row is too small to be analysed. The
second symbol (E or 2) indicates that the percentage of
political radicalism in the row is higher (H) or lower (L)
than the sub-total, which is the average of the specific rt
sub-sample. The third symbol (2 or 2) indicates that the u
percentage of social radicalism in that row is higher or ‘2
lower than the average of the entire specific sub-sample.
The analysis of the sub-totals shows that the slum
dwellers present the highest percentage of political
radicalism (34.52%), followed by the urban dwellers (26.67%)
and then by the Lampa inhabitants (22.44%). With reference
to social radicalism, the three figures are very close to
each other; the highest percentage belongs to rural
inhabitants (33.98%), which is slightly higher than the
percentages for the slum-dwellers (32.14%) and for the
urban dwellers (30.00%). Establishing the over-all result
as a reference point, 80 of 300 cases present politically
radical tendencies (26.67%), and 98 of the same 300 present
socially radical tendencies (32.67%). If each row of Table
24 is compared with these two general averages, rather than
with the specific sub-totals of each sub-sample, then only
one alteration has to be made in the last column: non-

autonomous slum-workers perceiving their life conditions as

56

static should be considered high (H) in political radicalism,
rather than low (L), since the percentage in this case
(26.92%) is slightly higher than the over-all percentage,
although lower than the percentage for the specific sub-
sample (34.52%).

Thus, the four cases that may be distinguished for
analysis are:

a) HH indicating for a given specific combination
of control, independent, and intervening
variables that both dependent variables
present higher percentages than the average

of that specific sub-sample.

b) HL - given the same conditions in a), politically
radical attitudes are more frequent and
socially radical attitudes are less frequent
than the average of the sub-sample.

0) LR - given the same conditions in a), politically
radical attitude is less frequent and
socially radical attitude is more frequent
than the average of the sub-sample.

d) LL - given the same conditions in a), both
politically and socially radical attitudes
are less frequent than the average of the
sub-sample.

HH: high.percentage§iof both political and social radicalism

Four different combinations of control, intervening,

and independent variables are included here:

1) slum-non-autonomous - regressive

2) urban - non-autonomous - progressive

3) rural - non-autonomous - progressive

4) rural - non-autonomous - regressive

The two common characteristics of these four cases

are (1) that all of them are non-autonomous and (2) that all

 

57
of them are non-static. This shows that the individuals in

this case feel that the only means for coping with a
changing environment is either by breaking or by changing
rules and norms. These individuals feel that the changes
in their lives are necessary effects of more general changes
which they do not control; there are only two possibilities
of influencing the outcome (their lives):

1) through patterns of behavior which they Judge
morally wrong, or

2) through action the objective of which is to

change the structure determining their lives.

BIa high.percentage of_politica1 radicalism only

Three different combinations of control-intervening
dependent variables are included here:

1) slum - autonomous - progressive

2) slum - autonomous - regressive

3) urban - non-autonomous - regressive

The two common characteristics of these three cases
are (1) that all of them are non—rural and (2) that all of
them are non-static. If autonomous behavior-orientation is
seen as a more modern attitude in comparison to non-
autonomous behavior-orientation, then the co-existence of
autonomous and of non-autonomous orientation within this
group may indicate that the degree of autonomy is not
relevant for determining political radicalism. 0n the other

hand, the former suggestion must be taken into account that

autonomy may present different meanings in different social

 

58
contexts.

As Tables 12 through 14 suggest, autonomy presents a
clear and positive association with political radicalism in
the slum; this relationship is less clear in the case of the
rural milieu, and there seems to be no meaningful

relationship in the case of the urban setting.

LH: high percentage of social radicalism only

Three different combinations of control, intervening,

and dependent variables are included here:

 

1) slum - non-autonomous - progressive

2) rural - autonomous - progressive

3) rural - autonomous - regressive

These results are consistent with the findings in
Tables 15 and 17. Non-autonomous slum-dwellers feel a
stronger tendency toward social radicalism, and autonomous
rural inhabitants have indicated this same tendency. These
results point in the same direction suggested by the last
paragraph. Although the degree of autonomy does not make a
difference in the case of urban people, it does influence
the outcome in the case of slum-dwellers and of rural
people. It seems that autonomy affects slum-dwellers and

rural-dwellers oppositely.

LL: low percentages of both political and social radicalism

Three different combinations of control-intervening-

dependent variables are included here:

59

1) urban - non-autonomous - static

2) rural - autonomous - static

3) rural - non-autonomous - static

The common feature here is that all of the three
cases are static. It seems that there is a very clear
association between low radicalism and perception of static
life conditions, in any residence area, and for any kind of

behavior-orientation.

General patterns

223g - Within the slum, most workers perceive their
life conditions as progressive or regressive (85.72%).
Among these, the group with autonomous behavior-orientation
tend to be politically, but not socially, radical; the non-
autonomous and progressive workers tend to be socially, but
not politically, radical. And the slum workers who are non-
autonomous and regressive tend to be both politically and
socially radical. Autonomy in the slum is clearly
associated with political radicalism, whenever the life
conditions are not perceived as static.

Santiago - Within the urban milieu, most workers
(75.64%) adopt a non-autonomous behavior-orientation. Among
these, the ones who perceive their life conditions as
static tend to reject politically radical attitudes. Those
workers who do not perceive their life conditions as static

present relatively more tendency for adopting politically

radical attitudes, than for adopting socially radical

attitudes.

 

60
ngpg - Within the rural setting, most workers (80%)
ad0pt a non-autonomous behavior-orientation. Among these,
the ones who perceive their life conditions as static
present a low tendency toward any kind of radicalism. But
those who perceive their life conditions as progressive or

regressive present a higher tendency towards both kinds of

radicalism.
4.5 Discussion [—

The Slum and the "Transitional Phase”

,.
f

Slum dwellers, says Worsley, “are essentially people
in process. They are 'becoming' townsmen -- eventually,
they hope, a part of the settled, employed urban working-
class population.“ 27 Recent analyses of many social
scientists, sociologists and economists, have demonstrated
that the measurement of development is highly controversial,
and that the existence of a general process of development
in the Third World is highly questionable and not confirmed.
On the contrary, to use Gunder Frank's expression, it seems
that what is occurring in the Third World is ”the
development of the underdevelopment." 28

From this perspective, the study of the
manifestations of social disorganization within

underdeveloped countries becomes much more important and

 

0

2?Peter Worsley, ”Revolutionary Theories,” Monthly

Review, V01.I, no.1 (May 1969), p.42.

28Andre Gunder Frank, Ca italism and
Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1968)

61

strategic for understanding the historical alternatives
which are available to the Third World today. The
evaluation of the actual social disorganization as an
historical accident without lasting effects in the social
structure of underdeveloped countries is consequence of
false assumptions based on an uncritical adoption of western
models of development. The deterministic certitude implied
in this approach has been questioned by many authors who
point out, as Frantz Fannon has written, that

”...sooner or later, colonialism sees that it

is not within its powers to put into practice

a project of economic and social reforms which

will satisfy the aspirations of the colonised
people.” (29)

If it is assumed that development is very unlikely
to happen according to western patterns, the investigation
of the potentially revolutionary forces within the social
structure of underdeveloped countries is a necessary step
for the clarification of the historical alternatives which
are actually available for the Third World today.

From Frantz Fannon's viewpoint, the key sources of
revolutionary change are the peasantry and the
lumpenproletariat. Peter Worsley has clearly synthetized
and explained Fannon's viewpoint by commenting that

"/y/et, if one considers the massive.and rapid

growth of the cities of the Third World, the
ever-swelling exodus of the peasants to the cities--

 

ngrantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by
Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p.168.

 

62

to 850 Paulo, Johannesburg, Saigon, Cairo, Nairobi,
Bangkok, or Manila -- and the appaling conditions
under which these new urban populations live in the
favelas, barriadas, bidonvilles, shanty towns, or
whatever the local name is for the universal
phenomenon of life in encampments made of cardboard,
flattened petrol tins, and old packing cases, one
must surely challenge the highly insulting and
analytically unilluminating Marxist term
lumpenproletariat, and begin to treat seriously
both the human beings this pejorative epithet
purports to describe and Fanon's theories about
them... /O/ne of the major factors keeping the urban
lumpenproletariat depoliticized is the very theory
that they are a lumpenproletariat... Their
revolutionary potential he sees as quite equal to
that of peasants who for centuries have put up,
fatalistically and resignedly, with their miserable
conditions." (30)

The Slums of Santiago and Political Radicalism

A tentative and exploratory interpretation of the
data indicates some support to Fanon's position. Slum
dwellers show the highest percentage of politically radical
tendencies. It is also important to remark that they show
the highest percentage of autonomous behavior-orientation.
This means that their politically radical tendencies are
more likely to become concrete action, if autonomy is viewed
as implying more dynamism and initiative. On the other
hand, if the possible politicalization of deviance is
considered, it is convenient to remember that the slum is
the typical focus of institutionalized deviant behavior.
The fact that this characteristic is not clearly translated

into higher percentages of social radicalism in the slum

 

30Peter Worsley, ”Revolutionary Theories,” Monthly
Review, Vol. I, no.1 (May 1969), pp.39-42.

63
was explained by the institutionalization and the anomic
characteristics of that social milieu.

The slum worker comes from a situation in which most
of them perceived their life conditions as static. Now,
most of them perceive their life conditions as progressive
or regressive. Autonomous behavior orientation is much more
frequent in the slum (39.29%) than in the rural area
(24.36%). 34.52% of the slum dwellers are politically
radical; only 22.44% of the rural inhabitants are
politically radical. And although the percentages of slum
dwellers and rural inhabitants who present socially radical
tendencies are about the same (32.14% and 33.97%
respectively) it was assumed that the criteria of judgement
are much more rigid and intolerant within the rural milieu
than in the slum.

Although rural and urban dwellers present fairly
similar percentages of political and social radicalism, it is
easy to understand that urban dwellers have much more means
of affluence available for them than both slum and rural
dwellers. Thus, it is likely that it is easier, from a
social control viewpoint, to prevent or neutralize the
political radicalism of the urban inhabitant, in comparison
'with radical tendencies of both the rural and the slum
inhabitant. These means may be either legitimate or
illegitimate but, in both cases, their existence prevents
the possibility of the politicalization of deviance.

In short, given the basic assumptions and analysed

 

64

the most meaningful figures which were available in this
paper, it may be concluded that, potentially, the people who
live in the slums constitute the most expressive source of
revolutionary action; the rural inhabitants are in second
place, and urban dwellers present the lowest potential. This
possibility has already become a concrete reality in many
cases, as Worsley exemplifies with Algeria:

“...tens of thousands of the volatile lower depths

of the city slum population were transformed from

being an anarchic, hopeless, depoliticized, mass
into a reservoir for the revolution." (31)

 

The safety-valve for the structural imbalances of
the rural regions is internal migration. The safety-valve
for the lack of legitimate opportunities within the urban
milieu is the development of clientelism and of a partially
institutionalized illegitimate opportunity-structure. But
what is the safety-valve for the slum dweller? The
expansion of the illegitimate opportunity-structure has
limits and deviant behavior is repressed, when adopted by
the poor. Horowitz has indicated that there is a

”correlation of urbanism generating political reform
and ruralism generating revolution. /However,
city-based political changes/ only redistribute
power among the holders of power, and do not shatter
the structure of power as such. /And/ it must
equally, if indeed not more emphatically, be kept

in mind that the cities of Latin America, for its
inhabitants, are labyrinths of sharp class

 

311bid., p.40.

65

differentiation, examples of industrial distortions
produced by centuries of both external and internal
colonialism. These cities are essential proving
grounds for social change based on social reform,
and when that fails, for change based on social
revolution.“ (32)

"“1

[5.75;

 

32Irving L.Horowitz, ”Electoral.Politics,
Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in
Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz,
Josue de Castro, John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969)
pp.140-176.

5. CONCLUSIOXS

Since there is a growing contradiction between
restricted opportunity-structure and expanding expectations,
deviance, corruption, and opportunism are at the very core
of the social structure of underdeveloped countries.
Although an alternative behavior could be adopted (political
action), many reasons contribute to the prevalence of
social radicalism as the preferred course of action. One
possible explanation is that deviant behavior is more
consistent with the western tradition of the individual
search for the solution of existential problems, even when
these are collective problems.

Another possible explanation, less philosophical and
more sociological, is that structural social control
mechanisms channel the individual behavior in such a way
that deviant tendencies are institutionalized, becoming an
important part of the opportunity-structure. Given this
”norm of illegitimacy,“ the existence of a high percentage
of individuals adopting a politically radical attitude does
not imply they are likely to behave consistently with such
an attitude. The concrete choice of one type of behavior
over another may only be explained by a structural analysis

of the social control mechanisms which are functioning in
each specific historical situation.

66

67

Probably the most efficient social control mechanism
is what Mills has called “the cultural apparatus.“ 33 In
underdeveloped countries, the central ideas which are
transmitted through and maintained by this apparatus may be
divided into two types:

a) the ideas of destiny, fatalism, conformity and
“the will of God“

b) the ideas of development, democracy,

modernization, planning, achieving or developing societies,

 

etc.

The great paradox of underdeveloped countries is
that these two types of ideas are mutually exclusive and
conflictant, but both must necessarily be part of the
dominant ideology in order to maintain the status quo. It
is simultaneously necessary to maintain the mobilized masses
in peaceful expectancy by manipulating the ideas in b) and
to prevent the mobilization of new areas of the population
by manipulating the ideas in a). However, the manipulation
in b) causes additional mobilization and the manipulation
in a) causes disruptive behavior by those already mobilized.

This thesis has attempted to investigate how those
ideas in a) are internalized and altered in different social
conditions, and how they are related to different

psychological perceptions.

 

'33b. Wright Mills, Power. Politics and People: The
Collected Essays of C.Wri ht Mills, ed. by Irving L.Horowitz
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1933), p.405.

68
The significance of attempting to understand the
socio-psychological concomitants of the behavior of the
masses, especially in the slum-situation, may be clearly
explained when the strategic position of the urban centers
in most underdeveloped societies is considered. To use
Worsley's words

“Argentina, Chile, venezuela, and Uruguay all

have 40 percent or more of their population in
towns and cities with more than 20.000

inhabitants. They are often quite different cities
from those in industrial societies, however; merely
to record their size obscures these qualitative
differences. And the functions and influence of
the larger, “primate“ cities, the centers of
government, trade, and what industry there is, are
incapable of absorbing into productive employment
the growing migrant population.” (34)

In Chile, particularly, 68.7% of the population was

urban in 1965, and an increase of 3.9% was estimated for
1970. 35

In more general terms, this kind of study isxdewed
as necessary and significant in order to take advantage of
the great opportunity available to the backward societies
in their efforts of development. This opportunity refers,
first, to the need of developing new patterns of mass
mobilization and mass participation as the only way for

36

overcoming hunger, disease and misery.

 

34Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theories,“ Monthly
Review, vel. I, no.1 (May 1969), pp.43-44.

aslnter-American Development Bank, Social Progress
Trust Fund (Fifth Annual Report, Washington, D.C., 1965)

6
3 See Karl W. Deutsch, ”Social Mobilization and
Political Development,“ The American Political Science
Review, Vbl. LV, no.3 (September 19 1 , pp. 93-511.

5‘“

69

It further refers to the need of creating new and
more adequate models of development, without trying to
repeat the western experience; to use Stavenhagen's
expression, "four hundred years of diffusion” is enough for
proving that the western model has not worked for the
colonised societies.37 Third, it is a good opportunity for
avoidance of the most tragic mistakes committed in the
development of the actual over-developed societies; as

Horowitz has observed

 

”...technical and industrial development is not
total development and does not settle the major
problems of politics, economics, war and peace,
etc., but only raises such issues to a new
pinacle of desperation." (38)

 

37Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Theses About
Latin America,” in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving

L.Horowitz, Josue de Castro, John Gerassi (New York: Vintage
Books, 1969) pp.102-ll7. '

38Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development;
The Theory and Practice of International Stratifigation (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.39.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Bendix, Reinhard. “Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered."
Com arative Studies in Societyfiand Histor , Vol.IX,
1962-67, p. 292-346 .

Berger, Peter, and Luckmann, Thomas. The Social Construction
of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge
Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1966.

 

Blumer, Herbert. "The Idea of Social Development." Studies
in Comparative International Development, Vol. II,
19 9 pp03‘110

Buckley, Walter. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory.
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

 

Cohen, Albert K. Deviance and Control. Englewood Cliffs,
NOJO: Prentice-Hall, 1966;

Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and Political
Development.“ The American Political Science Review,
Vol.LV, no.3 (September 19 1 , pp. 93-511.

Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by
Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 1963.

Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in
Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Furtado, Celso. Development and Underdevelopment. Translated
by Ricardo W.de Aguiar and Eric Charles Drysdale.

Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1967.

Gamson, William A. Power and Discontent. Homewood, 111.:
Dorsey Press, 19

Horowitz, Irving Louis. "The Norm of Illegitimacy: The
Political Sociology of Latin America.” Latin American
Radicalism. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue
de Castro and John Gerassi. New York: Vintage Books,

1969.

. “A Formalization of the Sociology of Knowledge.“
Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of

Social Science. Chicago: Aldine, 1988.

70

 

71

Horowitz, Irving Louis. Three Worlds of Development: The
Theory and Practice of International Stratification.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Heilbroner, Robert L. The Great Ascent: The Stppggle for
Economic Development in our Time. New York: Harper
& Row, 1963.

Institute of Planning. University of Chile. Interamerioan
Program of Mass Communication. San Jose, Costa Rica.
Study of Communication and Migration. East Lansing,
MiCho, 1966.

Inter-American Development Bank. Social Progress Trust Fund.
Fifth Annual Report. washington, D.C., 1965.

Lerner, Daniel. The Passin of Traditional Societ “ New
York: Free Press, 1964. ;

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure.
London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957.

Mills, C.Wright. ”The Labor Leaders and the Power Elite.“

Power, Politics and People: the Collected Essays of
C.Wright Mills. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz.

New York: Ballantine Books, 1963.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Political Power and Social Theo :
Seven Studies. New York: Harper & Row, 1955.

Moskos, Charles. ”Research in the Third World.“ Trans-Action
June 1968.

Worsley, Peter. “Revolutionary Theories.” Monthly Review.
V01.I, no.1 (May 1969), pp.30-49.

. The Third World. Chicago: University of Chicago

:—

Press, 19 .

Zelditch, Morris, Jr. A Basic Course in Sociological
Statistics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1959.

APPENDIX I
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES

CONTROL VARIABLE - social-class: worker

Question 74, every card, column 20:

 

Social class 0 - No answer
1 - Upper
2 - Middle
_3

- Worker

 

 

CONTROL VARIABLE - place of residence

Every card, column 11:

 

 

Area I - Slum
2 - Santiago

,3f- Lampa

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE - behavior-orientation: non-autonomous X
autonomous:
- acceptance X rejection of destiny (114)
- unplanned X planned activities (117)
- present X future-oriented (120)

Question 114, card 4, column 70:

 

Everybody is born with a fixed destiny, and nothing is
gained by fighting it.
0 - He doesn't understand
Tbtally agree
Slightly agree
Don't know
Slightly disagree

Totally disagree

LANNH
llll

 

 

Question 117, card 4, column 73:

 

 

I-Tfififining oil} makes a person unhappy because plats hardly
ever work out gpypgy. (same as Question 1141

 

 

Question 120, card 4, column 76:

 

The way things are today, the best thing one can do is to
make the present secure and not worry too much about the

future. (same as Question 114) 4--4444

 

 

72

1

4444 v
\

73
INTERVENING VARIABLE - perception of life conditions.

Question 30, card 6, column 44:

 

Life conditions - direction of the difference a and b:
- There is no difference
Positive (a greater than b)
Negative (b greater than a)
Indeterminate

O
a-actually 1
b-five years ago 2

DEPENDENT VARIABLE - politically radical attitude:
political participation (113)

(+) class-party (75)
(and/or) power allocation (135)

..Question 113, card 4, column 69:

 

Every citizen should’take an active part in politics.

(same as guestion 114)

 

 

Question 75, card 3, column 61:

 

-_Party that defends your class interests.

- No answer, don't know
Communist

Socialist

Christian Democrat
Radical

Liberal

Conservative

Other

KOOWANNHO
lllllll

Question 135, card 5, column 60:

 

 

What group should be more powerful in ChiIe?
The people, the workers
The middle class
The christian democrats
None
The left, (The Popular Front)
Others . .
Don't know

\O'QOWAWNH
Illllll

r

74

DEPENDENT VARIABLE - socially radical attitude.

Question 61, card 3, column 54:

 

To get ahead, one must do things that are not right.
0 - Does not understand

QMWNH

Strongly agree
Slightly agree
Don't know
Slightly disagree
Strongly disagree
No answer

Ilm
.. o ....

 

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75

APPENDIX II
CROSS TABULATION

 

SEPARATE
TABUIATION
OF EACH OF
THE FOUR
CASES :

D + R
D
R

(-)

STATIC

 

PROGRESSIVE

 

SLUM
REGRESSIVE

 

INDETERMINATE

 

STATIC

 

PROGRESSIVE

 

URBAN
REGRESSIVE

 

INDETERMINATE

 

STATIC

 

PROGRESSIVE

 

RURAL
REGRESSIVE

 

INDETERMINATE

 

76

APPENDIX III

Ideological Implications in the Concept of Radicalism

This Appendix aims to discuss the problematic
nature of the scientific use of concepts such as radicalism,
deviance, marginalism, etc., and to indicate the theoretical
significance of a new approach to problems of radicalism and
social control. Although not specificaly discussed here,
the idea of structural violence emerges as an extremely
important and worthwhile area for sociological investigation

from the following considerations.

A - Social Control and the Politicalization of Deviance
Superficially analysed, the right to dissent
politically seems to be much less questioned than the right
to dissent socially. However, this does not indicate that
the political system is more tolerant and more dynamic, but
rather indicates that social dissent generally represents a

moreimmediate and clear threat to the social system and
demands more direct forms of social control. Less direct
forms of social control are employed for the neutralization

of political dissent, keeping it under control

77

78

on a level that does not threaten the political stability of
the society. Illiteracy and manipulation of mass media are
examples of means of political domination. But when
political dissent seems to become so powerful that the status
quo is threatened, then the direct repression against it
becomes violent, and/or co-optation becomes intensive. 39
What is defined as legitimate dissent in one moment may be
re-defined as subversion in the next moment. In any case,
the starting point for definition, control and repression of
dissent or of subversion is the political evaluation of the
danger they represent to the power structure. Given this
common starting point, the conceptual distinction between
subversion and legitimate dissent becomes obsolete,
depending exclusively on the subjective and ideological
definition of the situation made by the power elite. 40

Exactly the same process occurs in the case of
deviance: when deviance becomes so intense, so massive, and
so varied that it constitutes a vital part of the social
structure, direct repression against less important focuses
of deviance and co-optation of more important focuses are

simultaneously intensified. There is an interchange between

deviance and non-conventional self-initiative. If the

 

39See William A.Gamson, Power and Discontent
(Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 19 , pp.135-1 2.

uoThis concept is here adopted in a very broad sense,
as defined by C.Wright Mills, ”The Labor Leaders and the
Power Elite,” in Power, Politics and People: the Collected

Essays of C,Wright Mills, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), pp.97-98.

79

deviant is important and powerful, he becomes an important
public personality and is not viewed as deviant. As in the
'case of political behavior, also here the starting point for
definition, for control, and for repression of deviance is
the political evaluation of the threats posed against the
power structure. And also here, the conceptual distinction
between deviance and non-conventional social behavior becomes
obsolete, depending exclusively on the subjective and
ideological definition of the situation by the power elite.

In sum, the four analytical concepts that were
distinguished as sub-types of political and social radicalism
are again reduced to two: depending on political circumstances
subversion and legitimate dissent are empirically
distinguished, but this does not lead to a clear conceptual
distinction between them; and the same process occurs with
deviance and non-conventional social behavior.

0n the other hand, political and social radicalism
are interactive categories. The politicalization of deviance
is a phenomenon that includes two opposite processes: the
adoption of deviant methods by political radicals, and the
adoption of a politically radical perspective by deviants.
The result of both types of interaction is basically the same
and each may endanger the stability of the system to a much
higher degree than if social and political radicals were
discrete categories. This is easy to understand because the
adoption of a politically radical conscience by deviants and

the adoption of socially condemned instruments of action by

80
political radicals are phenomena that make the social control
mechanisms become much less effective than they actually are
for controlling each separated type.

From a social control viewpoint, the main problem
caused by this interaction between social and political
radicals is the politicalization of deviance. Several
strategies may be adopted by the power elite in order to
neutralize the effect of this interaction:

a) to face the structural causes of deviance and
radicalism;

b) to co-opt the political radicals even by
corrupting them and making them more deviants (without
punishment) and less radicals;

c) to co-opt the deviants by institutionalizing their
deviance in order to prevent them of assuming a politically
radical posture.

The need for preventing the politicalization of
deviance and for adopting these strategies is based on the
assumption that effective political radicalism is much more
disruptive than massive (but partially institutionalized)
deviance. By these strategies, the growth and increasing
effectiveness of political radicalism are avoided. Social
stability is attained with a little use of direct methods of
repression, and only low status-low class deviants
constitute a major target of vrflent repression. Persons with '
higher status-higher class positions always have some

legitimate and institutionalized opportunity for

81

”respectable deviance.”

2.3 Theoretical Implications

Regarding the relationship between deviance and
social control the perspective of this thesis seems to be in
agreement with the central orientation lately assumed by
many sociologists and well synthetized by Lemert:

“Their common concern is with social control
and its consequences for deviance. This is

a large turn away from older sociology which
tended to rest heavily upon the idea that
deviance leads to social control. I have
come to believe that the reverse idea, i.e.,
social control leads to deviance, is equally
tenable and the potentially richer premise
for studying deviance in modern society.“ (41)

Horowitz has indicated that the convergence of social
9
deviance and political radicalism “compels social scientists

to reconsider their definitions of the entire range of social
phenomena -- from deviance to politics.“ He also says that

“/f/or the social sciences, this implies a
new connection between social problems and
political action. The old division between
the two can no longer be sustained. In
terms of theory, the new conditions throw
into doubt the entire history of political
science as an examination of the electoral
situation, and of social problems research
as a study of personal welfare. If politics
is amplified to incorporate all forms of
pressure, whether by deviants or orthodox
pressure groups, to change the established
social order, and if sociology is redefined
to include pressure by deviants to redesign
the social system so that they can be

Ma 1 litlrying L.Horowitz, “Social Deviance and Political
rg na ya ProfessingSociology: Studies in the Life 22°19

pgpSocial Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p.110.

82

accepted by the general society on their

own terms, then there is a common fusion,

a common drive, and a common necessity

between sociology and political science,

not only on the level of empirical facts,

but on the level of scientific interpretation." (42)

walter Buckley goes further in this direction when
he develops the idea that "...the more proper study of social
control is the study of power, authority, and legitimacy and
of the related purposeful forces that tend to maintain or to
change the dominant institutional structure.” “3 IBy
adopting this orientation, he attempts to support the
following points:

“First, there are at least two analytically
distinguishable, though often phenomenally
similar, patterns of social behavior that
should be kept separate in our thinking.

One such pattern is characterized by the
control, direct or indirect, of behavior of
numbers of people, against their “will“ or
without their informed commitment or
understanding. The other pattern is
characterized by such direction or control

of behaviors, but with the informed and
committed 'consent' or consensus of those
directed. ...Second, these two patterns have
usually been referred to as 'power' and
'authority,‘ respectively, and the latter is
said to be based on some principle of
'1egitimacy.'...Third, the mere fact that a
majority of individuals and subgroups are
overtly complying with a set of normatively
defined role expectations in any organization
or institutional setting is not to prejudice
the separate question as to whether such norms
and role-structure have a certain basis of
legitimacy. A great deal of knowledge on the
level of social-psychological dynamics would
be essential to any answer. Fourth, power and

 

42Ibid.. p.114.

43

walter Buckley, Sociolo and Modern 8 stems Theo
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp.177-l78.

83

authority have been found by many researchers
to be significantly related to the primacy,
in a group, of competitive goal orientations
or of cooperative goal orientations,
respectively.

These three distinctions -- between power and
authority, dissensus and consensus, and
competitive or cooperative goal orientations,
are closely interrelated. From the modern
systems view, they are related in a complex
systemic process, such that no one of them can
be taken as the causal determinant, each being
emergent, in its current social and personal
manifestations, from the interplay of all of
them. This is roughly suggested in the two
diagrams of Figure /8/'

 

 

 

 

 

“Group < 3 Authority Group Power
Consensus Structure Com liancee—m> Structure
\ (A) -/- \(B) /
Group Goal Differential

Promotion Goal
Promotion A

Figure 8 - /Modern Systems Approach to Power and Authority/ 44
Whereas the more traditional approaches to social
control overemphasize the disruptive character of deviance
and subversion, this new approach indicates the possibility
of studying them as indicants of social stability and
immobilism. In other words, a social system must generate
social and/or political radicalism in order to maintain the
status quo, whenever the legitimate opportunity-structure is
so narrow and so limited that it can not satisfy a

significant part of individuals, groups, and social classes.

 

unThe quotation and the Figure are from ibid..
pp. 177-178.

84

In this situation the expansion of the illegitimate
opportunity-structure indicates that the social structure is
maintained by the expansion of constraint and power
(Figure 8 B). It also indicates that the social control
mechanisms must be increasingly directed towards the
manipulation of the illegitimate opportunity-structure, since
changes in the legitimate opportunity-structure are not
desired by the dominant classes. By means of this mechanism,
politically and/or socially radical behavior gradually becomes
a permanent and more important feature of the social system if
the system is rigid and if the status quo is to be kept

45

unchangeable.

 

uSThis refers to what Buckley has called “deviation
amplifying model." See, ibid., p.171.

JUL '1 1 meg

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