

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
RADICALISM IN CHILE:
A STUDY OF ATTITUDES

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ABSTRACT

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM IN CHILE: S STUDY OF ATTITUDES

By

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This study discusses some socio-psychological aspects of what has been viewed as a transitional phase of social disorganization in underdeveloped societies. The emergence of radical attitudes is viewed as the only possible response to the growing gap between aspirations and opportunities. However, for various reasons, the masses have been unable to develop revolutionary models. It seems that the basic response has been the expansion of socially radical attitudes. The general hypothesis postulates that radical attitudes are associated with the acceptance of the idea of predestination and with the perception of regressive or static life conditions.

It has been the constant intent of this study to emphasize the structural and cultural framework within which the manifestations of the socio-psychological variables occur. Given these structural conditions, a major development in this study is the comparative evaluation of the

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revolutionary potential of rural, slum, and city dwellers.

The analysis is based on secondary data from a research study done in December, 1964, by the Institute of Economic Planning at the University of Chile, as one part of the Research Program of the Interamerican Program of Mass Communications, under the direction of G.Briones and F.B. Waisanen.

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IN CHILE: A STUDY OF
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	vi
1. THE PROBLEM	1
1.1 General Orientation	
1.2 The Central Question	
1.3 The Conceptual Model	
2. THE BASIC VARIABLES AND THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS . .	12
2.1 The Idea of Destiny and the Perception of Life Conditions	
2.2 Political and Social Radicalism	
2.3 Social Control and Modernization	
2.4 The General Hypothesis	
3. THE VARIABLES: OPERATIONALIZATIONS	22
3.1 The Control Variables	
3.2 The Basic Variables	
3.3 Operationalization of the Hypotheses	
3.4 The Research Setting and Some Methodological Problems	
4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA	33
4.1 Introduction	
4.2 The Specific Hypotheses	
4.3 Introducing the Control Variable	
4.4 Final Results	
4.5 Discussion	
5. CONCLUSIONS	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70
APPENDIX I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES . .	72
APPENDIX II. CROSS TABULATION	75
APPENDIX III. IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE CONCEPT OF RADICALISM	77

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. General Results: Descriptive Summary	35
2. General Results: Specific Hypotheses	36
3. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Politically Radical Attitude	39
4. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Socially Radical Attitude	39
5. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Politically Radical Attitude	39
6. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Socially Radical Attitude	39
7. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior-Orientation	42
8. Association between Area of Residence and Perceived Life Conditions	42
9. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior-Orientation: Slum	45
10. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior-Orientation: Santiago	45
11. Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior-Orientation: Lampa	45
12. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Political Radicalism: Slum	47
13. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Political Radicalism: Santiago	47
14. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Political Radicalism: Lampa	47
15. Association between Behavior-Orientation and Social Radicalism: Slum	49

Table		Page
16.	Association between Behavior-Orientation and Social Radicalism: Santiago	49
17.	Association between Behavior-Orientation and Social Radicalism: Lampa	49
18.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: Slum	51
19.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: Santiago	51
20.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: Lampa	51
21.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: Slum	52
22.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: Santiago	52
23.	Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: Lampa	52
24.	Final Results	54

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Conceptual Model: Self-Autonomy and Radicalism with Restricted Opportunity Structure -- the Dialectics between the Sociological and the Psychological Levels of Analysis	8
2. Pattern-variable for the Study of Conservative Constellations of Thought	15
3. Pattern-variable for the Study of Radical Constellations of Thought	15
4. Types of Radical Behavior	17
5. Operationalization of the Variables	27
6. Operationalized Hypotheses	31
7. Model of the Specific Tables: Final Results .	53
8. Modern Systems Approach to Power and Authority	83

1. THE PROBLEM

1.1 General orientation

Underdeveloped politicians are a kind of naive social scientists who employ their intellectual skills according to the immediate needs of the moment. They are naive structuralists when their objective is to absolve individuals, groups, and classes from their social responsibility: nobody is responsible for social injustices, poverty, ignorance, etc., in as much as the problem is structural. Or they become faithful reductionists when their objective is to avoid change: the first thing that must be changed is Man, not laws, policies, and structures. According to this view, development, and modernization are reduced to a mental process: social change is the natural consequence of mental change. And when politicians want to neutralize discontent without changing the status quo, they become "comparative sociologists", showing other social systems where such specific causes of discontent do not exist and "proving" that history is repeating: so, the causes of discontent are transitory and the only thing required in order to arrive there (modern society, for example) is patience. Bendix has indicated some ways by which these ideological constructions have received "scientific" support from many sociological studies through the adoption of evolutionist assumptions. He points out,

from this perspective, that the historical experience of backward countries is viewed as a mechanical movement from an ideal-typical situation (traditional society) towards another ideal-typical situation (modern society).

According to Bendix, this approach implies a methodological mistake, the confusion between ideal-type and generalization, which leads to serious misinterpretations and wrong focusing in studies of social development:

"In his introduction to Lerner's book, David Riesman notes that the transitional individual is defined as one who attends to the mass-media, but cannot read, to which he appends the disturbing question: 'What will a society look like which is dominated by such 'post-literate' types?'"(1) This question points to the possibility of a 'transition' of long duration, a contradiction in terms which arises from evolutionist assumptions and leads to a questionable nomenclature about 'developing' or 'transitional' societies which may never become developed enough to be called modern."(2)

He explains this questionable and problematic character of the modernization process by pointing out that

"once industrialization has occurred anywhere, this fact alone alters the international environment of all other societies. There is a sense in which it is true to say that because of timing and sequence industrialization cannot occur in the same way twice."(3)

More precisely, by differences in timing and sequence, he means that

¹
Quoted by Bendix from Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1964), p.46.

²Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.IX, 1966-67, p.309.

³Ibid., p.328.

"Within the limitations imposed by nature and history all aspects of modernity (as developed abroad) are up for adoption simultaneously, and the problem is which of the adoptable items represents a short cut to modernity. Since the achievement of modernity is not assured, it is part of this process that the adoption of items of modernization may militate against modernity, or may be irrelevant to it." (4)

Bendix' approach to problems of modernization and development has been adopted as the general orientation for the definition of the problem treated in this thesis, and evaluation of its significance. Again using Bendix' words, this general orientation may be stated as:

"The social structure of a country's 'transitional phase' should... be a primary focus of analysis rather than be dismissed as a survival of the past." (5)

The next section will discuss the main criteria for determining those aspects of the social structure in transitional societies which should receive priority for study.

1.2 The Central Question

When studying development, sociologists have shown little concern for the problem of how developmental goals are to be achieved. Even when social conditions preventing or obstructing the attainment of the goals are identified,

⁴
Ibid., pp.334-335.

⁵
Ibid., p.328.

"less attention is given to the more central question of how to effectively combat or remove such obstacles... I am seeking to indicate that even on the practical level sociological students devote precious little study to the ways of achieving the cultural values and social forms which they accept as the goals of social development." (6)

It seems that this criticism is in perfect agreement with Moskos' statement that

"/i/n fact, the American social scientist's lack of concern with social stratification around the world is perhaps his most characteristic blind spot." (7)

In other words, international and social stratification are central subjects leading to the comprehension of the substratum of interests which constitutes the major obstacle to development. However, this kind of approach demands the discussion of explosive issues and clear commitments within each specific historical situation. As Moskos has noted,

"/The subjects of revolution, class and history/ are almost central to any serious study of developing countries, but in most of the third world literature they are ignored. ...discussions of neo-colonialism, economic exploitation, and military imperialism seem to be in bad taste." (8)

In short, a double criterion has been used for determining the central concern of this thesis:

⁶ Herbert Blumer, "The Idea of Social Development," Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.II, 1966, p.9.

⁷ Charles Moskos, "Research in the Third World," Trans-Action, June 1968, p.2.

⁸ Ibid., p.2.

a) "Transitional" or "developing society" is a highly problematic concept, and the transitional structure must be carefully studied in order to determine whether development is occurring or not. It seems that in most contemporary transitional societies it is not.

b) The most relevant aspects to be investigated when studying underdeveloped societies concern:

1 - the way these societies are internally stratified and

2 - the relative position of such societies within a general framework of international stratification.

From these two types of stratification are derived the most important social conditions preventing or obstructing the attainment of developmental goals.

Given these premises, a general way of stating the central question discussed in this paper is:

"Why are elite groupings of Latin America unable to develop legitimizing models, and why are working classes unable to develop revolutionary models?" (9)

More specifically, the second part of this question will be the central concern of this paper. In order to answer this question it is necessary to understand how the interaction of structural and socio-psychological elements

⁹Irving Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josué de Castro, John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p.13.

prevent or neutralize the appearance of radical attitudes within the underdeveloped social system. On the other hand, it is also necessary to understand how social control mechanisms prevent and neutralize the transformation of radical attitudes into concrete and disruptive action. In sum, two different types of social control mechanisms must be investigated: how the development of radical attitudes is avoided, and how their transformation into disruptive action is prevented. An adequate study of each of these mechanisms demands the understanding of both their structural and their socio-psychological aspects, and of the interaction between them.

A general theory of social control will be tentatively outlined in order to indicate how the structural aspects set limits to the socio-psychological variations, and how the structural conditions channel similar socio-psychological characteristics into different kinds of behavior.

After this exploratory model of social control theory is established, the empirical study of its socio-psychological implications will become the central focus of this thesis. Then, the central question investigated in this thesis, re-stated in a more specific form, will be:

How relevant are general socio-psychological characteristics for determining the development of radical tendencies, given specific structural characteristics?

The first thing necessary now is to define the concepts that will be used to state the general hypothesis.

This is the objective of the next section.

1.3 The Conceptual Model

Man's consciousness is conditioned by social existence; that is, human thought is conditioned by the social context within which it arises. Complex and heterogeneous social realities cause the development of complex and heterogeneous distributions of perceptions. These two concepts -- reality and perception -- are here understood in the broadest possible sense: the first as a quality independent of human volition, and the second as the certainty that the phenomena are real, and that they possess specific characteristics.¹⁰

On the other hand, the opposite relationship is also true: insofar as the social reality is also a human product, the relationship between man and society is best described as a continuing dialectical process. The objective and historical social reality determines man's internalization and is determined by man's externalization. In sum, this process, as indicated in Figure 1 presents four distinct moments:

Externalization: "Society is a human product"

Objectivation: "Society is an objective reality"

¹⁰See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp.1-3.




Figure 1 - Conceptual Model: Self-Autonomy and Radicalism with Restricted Opportunity Structure - The Dialectics between the Sociological and the Psychological Levels of Analysis.

Internalization: "Man is a social product" ¹¹

Identification: Man is a social actor and assumes social roles.

The contemporary world is characterized by a highly complex social reality, which corresponds to a highly complex distribution of perceptions. The heterogeneity of the socializing personnel, mediating different realities to the same individual leads to competition between reality-definitions during the socialization process. This becomes a permanent process throughout one's life time: after a primary socialization, which is more homogeneous and uniform, new pressures towards adaptation and adjustment (secondary socialization) or towards substantive modification of older patterns (re-socialization), continuously arise. As Berger has written

"In re-socialization the past is reinterpreted to conform to the present reality, with the tendency to retroject into the past various elements that were subjectively unavailable at the time. In secondary socialization the present is interpreted so as to stand in a continuous relationship with the past, with the tendency to minimize such transformations as have actually taken place. Put differently, the reality base for re-socialization is the present, for secondary socialization the past." (12)

Any process of socialization involves the internalization of two orders of objectivations: the first order refers to the internalization of institutions and of

¹¹Ibid., p.61.

¹²Ibid., p.163.

roles, and the second order refers to the internalization of their legitimation. Legitimation is here understood as the way by which institutions and roles are explained and justified. The internalization of each order of objectivation may vary with a certain degree of independence regarding the other, but their interaction leads to a continuous readaptation and reharmonization between them. From this perspective, reified and autonomous attitudes may be viewed as alternative polar types which put together the internalization of structural elements and the internalization of their legitimations in a coherent way

In short, the two dimensions of the process of reification as a process of attitude formation are:

1 - the internalization of one's objectified life conditions as evolving independently of his own control.

2 - the identification and acceptance of the legitimations which explain such a lack of control.

At the other pole, the two dimensions of the process by which autonomous attitude is formed are:

1 - the internalization of one's objectified life conditions as evolving under control and according to one's own design.

2 - the rejection of legitimations which explain and justify the lack of control of one's own life.

In between these extremes is placed what appears to be the typical empirical case: rejection of partial aspects of institutions and/or roles and attempts at legitimating

new realities by the same values which were employed for legitimating the rejected structural elements. In other words, there is an attempt at adjusting old values to new definitions of the situation because these reinterpretative schemes "guarantee biographical continuity and smooth inconsistencies as they arise."¹³ When the gap between the older legitimations and the new reality is too wide, that is, when re-socialization occurs, then new legitimations are necessary, and this new reality may threaten the older institutional order by becoming a possible re-orientation and an alternative direction of institutionalization.

¹³Ibid., p.162.

2. THE BASIC VARIABLES AND THE GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

2.1 The Idea of Destiny and the Perception of Life Conditions

A very common type of values which are used in legitimating the social institutions of backward societies refers to the ideas of destiny and fatalism. When internalized, these ideas become the basic elements which determine most behaviors within backward societies. Through the internalization of these ideas, institutions, social roles, and identity are reified, and the individuals are incapable of autonomous, independent behavior. In Berger's words, institutions are viewed as a "necessity and fate"; roles are "also apprehended as an inevitable fate, for which the individual may disclaim responsibility." And identity itself ("the total self") may be totally identified with one's socially assigned typifications.¹⁴ These normative definitions seem to be consistent with the perception of stagnation and immobility within one's own life, or even the perception of things always becoming worse. In sum, the perception of one's own life as stagnant or regressive is postulated to be associated with reified definitions of the social reality. On the other hand, the perception of improvement and dynamism in one's own life is consistent with the opposite normative definitions. If one's life has

¹⁴Ibid., pp.89-92.

improved, it is more understandable that he would believe in the possibility of changing roles, identity and institutions.

Before advancing further, a general condition must be introduced into the model: the narrowness of the opportunity-structure in underdeveloped countries will be assumed as generally true. This means that new life chances are not structurally available for most of those individuals who are willing to improve their life conditions. It will also be assumed that the gap between the slower development of the opportunity-structure and the faster expansion of aspirations has been continuously increasing. The emergence of autonomous individuals, without corresponding creation of new life chances for them, leads necessarily to the expansion of radical attitudes i.e., attitudes oriented toward the rupture of generally accepted normative patterns and/or toward the rejection of the generally adopted value system. In other words, there is a convergence of autonomous and radical attitudes whenever the opportunity-structure is inadequate and restricted.¹⁵

2.2 Political and Social Radicalism

Given the inadequacy of the opportunity-structure, reification and radicalism, as indicated above, may be viewed as polar types, or opposite systems, of coherent

¹⁵Robert K.Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), Chapter IV-V, pp.131-194.

attitude. Horowitz' "conservative and radical constellations of thought" may be understood as including these concepts; Figures 2 and 3 reproduce his definitions of both types.¹⁶

Within this broad conceptual framework, radical constellations of thought include both political and social radicalism. Political radicalism occurs when the basic characteristics of the system of thought coincide with those described under "Utopian System" in Figure 3. Social radicalism is basically characterized by the dimensions described under "Counterideology", in the same Figure.

Each of these two types -- political and social radicalism -- corresponds to a great variety of distinct behaviors. But the behaviors that belong to each type may be grouped into two sub-types, according to their degree of institutionalization and legitimation. Therefore politically radical behavior may be viewed either as (1) conventional dissent, or as (2) revolutionary politics. And socially radical behavior may be viewed either as (1) non-conventional social behavior or as (2) deviance. The characterization of each of these types is summarized in Figure 4.

Conventional dissent and non-conventional social behavior are always partially institutionalized and socially

¹⁶The Figures are from Irving L. Horowitz, "A Formalization of the Sociology of Knowledge," Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp.69-70.

Ideology		Counterutopian
Psychol.	Adoption of popularly accepted or dominant ideas about the structure, processes, and aims of the political and economic system of which the individual is a member.	Goal-attainment seen to reside within the operative values of government or other agencies of the social structure.
Sociol.	Projection of techniques of persuasion and delimitation of the ground rules of permissible range of organized action.	Integration of social functions within established system of norms, values, and goals of the political-economic structure.

Figure 2 - Pattern-Variable for the Study of Conservative Constellations of Thought

15

Utopian		Counterideology
Psychol.	Adoption of system of moral perfection from which to examine and judge the political and economic system.	Goal-attainment seen to reside outside the operative values of government or other agencies of the social structure, whence is derived justification of change.
Sociol.	Projection of techniques of persuasion (prophetism, proselytism, messianism) grounded in the desire to revise thoroughly the ground rules of permissible range of organized action.	Integration of social functions outside and against the established system of norms, values, and goals, but not without the substitution of another set of norms, values, and goals.

Figure 3 - Pattern-Variable for the Study of Radical Constellations of Thought

accepted (not punished) forms of radical behavior.

Revolutionary politics and deviance are non-institutionalized and repressed forms of radical behavior. Both of these are viewed as social problems, and they are differentiated by treating deviance "in therapeutic rather than political terms." ¹⁷

This "welfare or rehabilitation model" for deviance is an extremely misleading orientation for sociological analysis. In most cases, deviant status is not sought by the actor but is a function of existing normative structures and power dynamics; deviance is a lower class phenomenon, and deviant individuals generally occupy subordinate positions. Moreover, "the selection of decision-makers who define deviance as a social problem is a political process.../and/ ...the political decision has been to treat deviance as a nonpolitical problem." ¹⁸

As quoted by Horowitz, Lemert's considerations seem to be a very adequate contribution for the clarification of this issue:

"In studying the problem-defining reactions of a community, it can be shown that public consciousness of 'problems' and aggregate moral reactions frequently center around forms of behavior which on closer analysis often prove to be of minor importance in the social system. Conversely, community members not infrequently ignore behavior which is a major disruptive

¹⁷Irving L.Horowitz, "Social Deviance and Political Marginality," Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p.108.

¹⁸Ibid., p.110.

RADICALISM	INSTITUTIONALIZ. AND LEGITIMATION	SOCIAL "LABEL"	MAIN CLASS- SOURCE	MAJOR OBJECTIVE	MAJOR FUNCTION	SOCIAL CONTROL
SOCIAL	(yes) NON CONVENTIONAL BEHAVIOR	self- initiative	higher status +class	individual affluence	stability "coopting"	tolerance acceptance reward
	(no) DEVIANCE	social problem	lower status +class	individual affluence	isolated disruption	therapy repression "coopted"
	(yes) CONVENTIONAL DISSENT	constructive opposition	higher status +class	orderly structural change	change(?) stability "coopting"	acceptance repression "coopted"
POLITICAL	(no) SUBVERSION	political crime	lower status +class	rapid general change	disruption	repression "coopted"

Figure 4 - Types of Radical Behavior

influence on their lives. We are all too familiar with the way in which populations in various cities and states have been aroused to frenzied punitive action against sex offenders. Nevertheless, in these same areas the people as a whole often are indifferent toward crimes committed by businessmen or corporations -- crimes which affect far more people and which may be far more serious over a period of time." (19)

On the other hand, the apolitical approach to deviance is easily understood, because deviants have avoided political participation and have not demanded changes in the configuration of the social hierarchy. However, this apolitical feature of deviant social movements does not imply that deviance is a social phenomenon without political roots. Fundamentally, deviance is apolitical because it is treated apolitically and because social control mechanisms prevent the politicalization of deviance. Probably the most important cause of deviance is the structurally generated malintegration of individuals, groups, and classes within contemporary social systems. And being structural, the causes of deviance present profound political implications.

Social control mechanisms function on two levels:

(1) determining how each type of radicalism is treated individually and (2) determining the convergences and interchanges between the 4 types of radicalism.

By this reason, the clarification of these interchanges becomes a necessary condition for understanding the functioning of the social control mechanisms which

¹⁹Ibid., p.110.

determine:

- a) the apolitical character of deviance, and its repression;
- b) the forms and intensity of the fight against subversion;
- c) the institutionalization of some types of deviance, and
- d) the institutionalization of political dissent.

2.3 Social Control and Modernization

It seems that this framework is generally consistent with Horowitz' approach to problems of development and modernization in Latin America. Especially, his conceptualization of "the norm of illegitimacy," "the/ illegitimacy as a style of doing business, "or "institutionalization of crisis as a normative pattern of politics" seems to be extremely useful for the understanding of the social conditions obstructing the social development of the continent.²⁰

He defines legitimacy and illegitimacy as follows

"...those societies which over a long period of time display norms sanctioned in law and made viable through mass-participation can be considered legitimate; those societies that rest visibly and demonstrably on unaccepted or barely tolerated power structures and relations can be considered illegitimate." (21)

²⁰ Irving Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: The Political Sociology of Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving L. Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969),

²¹ Ibid., p.4

Pointing out that illegitimacy is a basic structural characteristic of Latin American countries, he explains

"In order for a political system to 'survive' in Latin America, it must perennially change its policies and generate instability as a survival pattern." (22)

This "norm of illegitimacy" prevails in almost any kind of situation and occurs not only nationally but also in the interaction of backward Latin American nations with the developed world:

"The norm of illegitimacy is informally sanctioned from the lowest petty official living off bribes in some remote custom house in Asuncion or São Paulo to the highest official living off the mineral produce of Latin America in some highly visible counting house in New York or London. To break the cycle of crisis and collapse, to eliminate the norm of illegitimacy as an operational code for Latin America means to break the organizational impasse created by both local bureaucrats and imported businessmen." (23)

This perspective is extremely useful for indicating:

- a) how deeply rooted irrational tendencies are within backward societies,
- b) the disfunctional character of many so-called modernizing attitudes and behavior for developmental goals and
- c) the highly problematic character and the uncertainty of developmental processes within the contemporary world.

What so many writers have described and evaluated as being merely a transitory phase of social disorganization occurring within a more general process of development and

²²Ibid., p.8.

²³Ibid., p.23.

modernization may be the only or the most important occurrence in underdeveloped countries, given the increasing inadequacy of the opportunity structure in underdeveloped countries.

2.4 The General Hypothesis

Up to this point, this chapter has had a double purpose: (a) to conceptualize the basic socio-psychological variables which will be used in the empirical study, and (b), to understand the structural conditions which influence or determine the development of those socio-psychological characteristics. The significance of the structural concomitants of the socio-psychological variables is derived from a central perspective adopted in this thesis: a given social system tends to produce and/or stimulate the development of socio-psychological mechanisms which present an important social control function. It is necessary to keep this in mind in order to evaluate the empirical significance of the general hypothesis:

POLITICALLY AND/OR SOCIALLY RADICAL ATTITUDES
ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY CORRELATED WITH AUTONOMOUS
BEHAVIOR-ORIENTATION AND WITH PERCEPTION OF
STATIC OR REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS;
NON-AUTONOMOUS BEHAVIOR-ORIENTATION, OR
PERCEPTION OF PROGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS, OR
BOTH, ARE SITUATIONS THAT PREVENT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICALLY AND/OR SOCIALLY
RADICAL ATTITUDES.

3. THE VARIABLES

3.1 The Control Variables

As it was indicated earlier, the inadequacy of the opportunity structure is a basic condition for the expansion of socially and/or politically radical tendencies. In the underdeveloped countries there are several causes contributing to making the opportunity-structure increasingly restricted and limited: institutional weaknesses; demographic growth, structural imbalances, and social inequalities are among the main causes preventing an adequate expansion of the opportunity-structure. The result is a permanent process of marginalization of the masses, leading to the coexistence of both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures. The more restricted the legitimate opportunity structure is, then the more important the illegitimate one becomes.

The opportunity-structure is not equally narrow and restricted for every individual nor for every class in different social conditions. Individual and class differences determine different life chances. Thus, class situation and social conditions are dimensions which not only determine whether or not an individual is to be socially defined as marginal, deviant, subversive, etc.; these dimensions also determine how restricted the

opportunity-structure actually is for a given individual in a specific social situation.

By this reason, the specification of self-defined social class as an indicant of class situation and the differentiation of residence areas as an indicant of social conditions lead to the determination of more homogeneous sub-samples in relation to two aspects:

a) from a structural perspective, the specification of social class and residence areas indicate that two individuals in the same sub-sample will have a similar chance of being viewed and treated as marginal, when they behave in a specific way;

b) this specification further indicates that such individuals have similar chances in relation to the opportunity-structure, implying that they will have similar chances of manifesting socially and/or politically radical tendencies.

Thus, a and b are the reasons for the adoption of the two control variables -- area of residence and social class -- in the tabulation of the data. The original questions that were used for the manipulation of these variables appear in Appendix I. The way in which these variables have been operationalized appears in Figure 5.

3.2 The Basic Variables

The independent variable

In section 2.1 it was indicated that the independent

variable refers to the adoption of normative definitions related to the reification of institutions, roles, and, identity. Accordingly, the definition of autonomous or non-autonomous behavior-orientation results from the combination of these three elements; at least two reifications occur for defining an individual as presenting a non-autonomous attitude, and likewise, autonomous behavior-orientation occurs when at least two reifications are rejected. The three possible reifications are:

- a) reification of institutions occurs when destiny is accepted as a category governing the whole life.
- b) reification of roles occurs when one accepts, as a general norm, the idea of living only in the present.
- c) reification of identity occurs when one believes he should not try to plan his life, since he does not control it.

The questions referring to these three types of reification appear on Appendix I. The way the questions have been operationalized is indicated on Figure 5.

The intervening variable

The strategy of action one adopts depends on how wide is the dissonance between his personal objectives in life and the way he perceives his life conditions. So, when one has tried to be autonomous, active and dynamic but perceives that his life conditions have been static or regressive, it is likely that he will try to reduce the dissonance, either by adopting more efficient forms of

behavior or by changing his autonomous behavior-orientation. Thus, whether a person will present radical tendencies or not depends simultaneously on how autonomous he is and on how he perceives his life conditions. An autonomous individual attempting to improve his life conditions will be prone to try less conventional forms of behavior if he perceives that his previous attempts have failed.

In sum, the process of attitude formation depends on a normative element and a cognitive one. The independent variable corresponds to the normative element and the intervening variable corresponds to the cognitive one.

The way this last variable is operationalized is outlined on Figure 5 and the original question is formulated in Appendix I.

The dependent variables

Radicalism, as defined in section 2.1, is the dependent variable. Politically radical attitudes are defined through the combination of three questions, as indicated in Figure 5 or Appendix I. In order to be defined as politically radical, an individual has to identify his interests as being depended by leftist parties and/or define the Left as the group that should be the most powerful in the country. However, it is the purpose of this paper to study radical attitudes which are likely to be transformed in concrete action. In addition to showing radical tendencies, we felt it important that the respondent indicate a favorable perspective related to political action in order to be considered

politically radical. This "activism" dimension is viewed as an indicator of the commitment of the individual to an abstractly defined radical posture.

Social radicalism is vaguely defined because of the reasons explained in section 2.3. It is so general and so pervasive that it is very difficult to reach an intermediate position between generality and specificity. Vagueness is not a weakness in the operationalization since it corresponds to an essential trait of the empirical manifestations of social radicalism, deviance, and of marginality (see section 2.2).

Many things considered not right are often judged as not wrong in underdeveloped countries: they simply are things that everyone does in order to succeed. Thus, a simple question is used for determining socially radical tendencies: if one thinks he must do wrong things in order to succeed, and if one wants to succeed, that is, if he presents an autonomous behavior orientation, he will then present a strong tendency towards wrong behavior. It is very important to note that a subjective definition of "right" and "wrong" is implied here. This means that inferences and generalizations about socially radical tendencies may be made only if assumptions are made in such a way that a general concept of right and wrong can be attributed to every individual of each sub-sample. The operationalization of these variables and further details are presented in Figure 5 and Appendix I, respectively.

CONTROL VARIABLES

<u>social class</u>	<u>place of residence</u>
	<u>rural</u>
<u>worker</u>	<u>slum</u>
	<u>Santiago</u>

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: behavior-orientation

	<u>certitude of destiny</u>	<u>unplanned life</u>	<u>present- oriented</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>non- autonomous</u>	<u>D??</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>A</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>D??</u>	<u>A</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>D??</u>
	<u>A??</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>
<u>autonomous</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A??</u>	<u>D</u>
	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A??</u>
	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>D</u>

indetermin. any two or three "don't know" and/
or "doesn't understand"

A = totally agree or slightly agree

D = totally disagree or slightly disagree

?? = don't know or does not understand

INTERVENING VARIABLE: perception of life conditions

<u>there is no difference</u>	<u>static</u>
<u>positive</u>	<u>progressive</u>
<u>negative</u>	<u>regressive</u>
<u>indeterminate</u>	

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: politically radical attitude

	<u>class-party</u>	<u>power allocation</u>	<u>political action</u>
	<u>L</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>radical</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>A</u>
	<u>L</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>not</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>O</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>radical</u>	<u>any</u>	<u>any</u>	<u>O</u>

L = The Left, (The Popular Front) or
Communist, Socialist or Radical Party

O = any other category

A = totally agree or slightly agree

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: socially radical attitude

	<u>wrong things necessary</u>
<u>radical</u>	<u>A</u>
<u>not-radical</u>	<u>O</u>

Figure 5 - Operationalization of the Variables

3.3 Operationalization of the Hypotheses (see Figure 6)

1 - GENERAL HYPOTHESIS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as regressive or static and who assume any radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

1a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume any radical attitude.

1b - the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume any radical attitude.

1c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as static or regressive and who assume any radical attitude.

2 - POLITICAL RADICALISM + REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume a politically radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

2a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a politically radical attitude.

2b - the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a politically radical attitude.

2c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume a politically radical attitude.

3 - POLITICAL RADICALISM + STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a politically radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

3a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a politically radical attitude.

3b - the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a politically radical attitude.

3c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a politically radical attitude.

4 - SOCIAL RADICALISM + REGRESSIVE LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume a socially radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

4a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a socially radical attitude.

4b - the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a socially radical attitude.

4c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as regressive and who assume a socially radical attitude.

5 - SOCIAL RADICALISM + STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

The percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a socially radical attitude is GREATER THAN:

5a - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a socially radical attitude

5b - the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as progressive and who assume a socially radical attitude.

5c - the percentage of non-autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as static and who assume a socially radical attitude.

3.4 The Research Setting and Some Methodological Problems

The research from which the data used in this thesis are derived is a study of communication and migration conducted by Frederick Waisanen and Guillermo Briones as one part of the research program of the Interamerican Program of Mass Communications. The study was done at the Institute of Economic Planning at the University of Chile.

The data are derived from three samples: (1) 160 migrants residing in the city of Santiago; (2) 108 migrants residing in the slums of Santiago (callampas) and (3) 301 rural inhabitants residing in Lampa.

A random selection of city dwellers was derived from

VARIABLES		When the behavior-orientation is...														
Independent		AUTONOMOUS														
		... and life conditions are perceived as ...														
intervening		not-progressive	regressive	static	regressive	static										
		... the percentage of workers assuming ...														
dependent		ANY	POLITICALLY			SOCIALLY										
		... radical attitude will be GREATER THAN the percentage assuming ...														
dependent		ANY	POLITICALLY			SOCIALLY										
		... radical attitude when life conditions are perceived as ...														
intervening		P	P	R	P	S	P	R	P	S						
		... and the adopted behavior-orientation is ...														
Independent		NA	A	NA	A	NA	NA	A	NA	NA	A	NA				
		1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c	4a	4b	4c	5a	5b	5c
		GENERAL														
		SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES														

Code: F = not-progressive = static or regressive life conditions
P = progressive; R = regressive; S = static life conditions
A = autonomous; NA = non-autonomous

Figure 6 - Operationalized Hypotheses

a larger sample of 1540 persons born outside of Santiago. The larger sample was obtained from another study by the Institute of Economics at the University of Chile.

The random selection of slum migrants was based on a registration of households in 30 different "callampas" areas, which were located on the periphery of Gran Santiago. The sample of rural inhabitants was also randomly selected from a household census of the Lampa Community.

In every case, heads of households were interviewed. The interviews were done in December, 1964.

The present study presents the typical limitations of any study based on secondary data: the indicators which are being used here were originally established in fit with other research-objectives, and their adequacy to the operationalizations of the present research is, of course, problematic and difficult to assess.

Another important limitation which occurs when secondary data are used refers to the questionable validity and representativeness of the sampling procedures in relation to the specific purposes of the secondary analysis.

On the other hand the composite measurements of autonomy and political radicalism, which are being used here, were not previously tested. Item analysis was not done on the indices, and it is necessary to keep in mind the possibility that interactions between the components of the indices could wash out or distort the results.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

4.1 Introduction

From the original sample, composed of 569 respondents, 300 questionnaires have been used; 247 not-workers, 12 cases with indeterminate intervening variable, and 10 cases with indeterminate independent variable were not used.

Initially, in sections 4.2, the data will be analysed as a whole, without taking into consideration the control variable (area of residence). This will be done because it is assumed that, if it will be possible to discover clear tendencies and patterns of association without discriminating too many variables and without having to go into specific details, the theoretical and practical implications of the analysis will be much more meaningful. In one word, the analysis would present more "generalizability."

As it will be clear in section 4.2, the analysis will not present clear patterns of association and the hypothesis will not be accepted, at least as far as area of residence is not introduced as a control variable. And when place of residence is introduced an additional problem appears: many tables present very small numbers in cells and in marginal totals. However, other tables will present a

satisfactory number of cells and some meaningful results will be derived from them. This is done in the next sections of this chapter, which will finish with a general discussion of the findings.

The basic way by which the figures which will be used in this chapter were established is outlined in Appendix II, and is consistent with the criteria indicated in Figure 5. The basic technique adopted for identifying associations and for analysing tendencies is the comparison of percentages, as found in Zelditch.²⁴

4.2 The Specific Hypotheses

Table 1 is a summary description of the results in Table 2. Both Tables clearly demonstrate that the hypotheses cannot be accepted:

1 - The general trend seems to be exactly the opposite from what was proposed as the general hypothesis. On the whole, non-autonomous behavior-orientation and perception of progressive life conditions seem to be positively associated with any kind of radical behavior, as it is indicated in Table 1 (1a, 1b, and 1c).

2 - There is no meaningful difference in tendency toward political radicalism between persons perceiving

²⁴Morris Zelditch, Jr., A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), Chapter 6-7, pp.125-187.

TABLE 1 - General Results: Descriptive Summary

the percentage of autonomous workers who evaluate their life conditions as...				and who assume...				according to the hypotheses, these percentages should be GREATER THAN ...				which are the percentages of workers who assume ...				radical attitudes when they perceive their life conditions as ...				and whose behavior-orientations are ...					
static		regressive		static		regressive		static		regressive		static		regressive		static		regressive		static		non-auton.		auton.	
socially				politically				any				socially				politically				any					
radical attitude is ...				radical attitude is ...				radical attitude is ...				radical attitude is ...				radical attitude is ...				radical attitude is ...					
27.27				23.33				22.73				30.00				42.31				58.57					
25.00				35.48				42.86				34.67				42.86				35.48					
35.48				34.67				42.86				35.48				29.03				30.00					
42.86				35.48				42.86				35.48				29.03				30.00					
42.86				35.48				42.86				35.48				29.03				30.00					
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42.86				35.48				42.86				35.48				29.03				30.00					
42.86				35.48				42.86				35.48													

Table 2 - General Results - Specific Hypotheses

static or regressive		
1	SA	NA
R 30	57.69	79 109
R 22	42.31	68 53.74 90 54.77
R 52	46.26	147 45.23 199
	100.00	100.00 100.00

progressive life conditions		
	SA	NA
R 15	48.39	29 44 41.43 43.56
R 16	51.61	41 57 56.44
R 31	70 101	58.57 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

Code:

SA - self-autonomous
 NA - non-autonomous
 R - any type of radicalism
 R - not radicalism
 PR - politically radical
 PR - not politically radical
 SR - socially radical
 SR - not socially radical

regressive life conditions		
2	SA	NA
PR 21	70.00	50 71 66.67 67.62
PR 9	30.00	25 34 33.33 32.38
30	75 105	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

progressive life conditions		
	SA	NA
PR 22	70.97	49 71 70.00 70.30
PR 9	29.03	21 30 29.70
31	70 101	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

static life conditions		
3	SA	NA
PR 17	77.27	61 78 84.72 82.98
PR 5	22.73	11 16 15.28 17.02
22	72 94	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

regressive life conditions		
4	SA	NA
SR 23	76.67	49 72 65.33 68.57
SR 7	23.33	26 33 34.67 31.43
30	75 105	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

progressive life conditions		
	SA	NA
SR 20	64.52	40 60 51.14 59.41
SR 11	35.48	30 41 42.86 40.59
31	70 101	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

static life conditions		
5	SA	NA
SR 16	72.73	54 70 75.00 74.47
SR 6	27.27	18 24 25.00 25.53
22	72 94	100.00 100.00
	100.00	100.00 100.00

progressive and regressive life conditions, whether or not they adopt autonomous behavior-orientation (see 2a, 2b, and 2c of Table 1).

3 - On the other hand, people who perceive their lives as static tend to be politically less radical than those who perceive their lives as progressive or regressive. Among individuals perceiving their life conditions as static, autonomous behavior-orientation seems to be positively associated with radicals, as it may be verified in Table 1 (3c).

4 - Self-autonomous individuals who perceive their life conditions as regressive tend to be socially less radical than either non-autonomous and regressive, or progressive individuals, as Table 1 (4a, 4b, and 4c) demonstrates.

5 - Self-autonomous individuals who perceive their life conditions as static tend to be much less radical, socially speaking, than progressive individuals. Progressive and non-autonomous individuals tend to be more radical than progressive and autonomous. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy does not make a meaningful difference among individuals who perceive their life conditions as static.

In short, individuals who think that their life conditions have been improving during the last five years present the highest percentage of socially radical attitudes. On the other hand, self-defined regressive individuals present the highest percentage of politically radical

attitude. The percentage of individuals presenting a radical tendency is greater among non-autonomous persons than among autonomous persons. The group of individuals perceiving their life conditions as static present the lowest percentage of both kinds of radical tendency. In general, the highest percentage indicating a tendency towards any kind of radicalism is associated with individuals who perceive improvement in their life conditions.

In Tables 3 and 4 the marginal values of Table 2 are compared, in order to show how the perceived life conditions are associated with each specific type of radical attitudes. Table 3 indicates that, by percent people are much less radical when they perceive their life conditions as static than when they perceive their life conditions as progressive or as regressive. Table 4 indicates that the percentage of persons who perceive their life conditions as improving and who adopt a socially radical attitude is greater than the percentage of individuals who perceive static or regressive life conditions and who adopt a socially radical attitude. This is an interesting finding: 40.59% of those who said that their life conditions have improved agree that the only way one can improve his life conditions is by doing wrong things. This sounds like a confession that they judge the channels of affluence, as socially unacceptable and morally wrong even though they have used these channels to improve their life conditions.

Tables 5 and 6 show that the association between

Table 3 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Politically Radical Attitude

	<u>static</u>	<u>progressive</u>	<u>regressive</u>	
not politically radical	78	71	71	220
	82.98	70.30	67.62	73.33
politically radical	16	30	34	80
	17.02	29.70	32.38	26.27
	94	101	105	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 4 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Socially Radical Attitude

	<u>static</u>	<u>progressive</u>	<u>regressive</u>	
not socially radical	70	60	72	202
	74.47	59.41	68.57	67.33
socially radical	24	41	33	98
	25.53	40.59	31.43	32.67
	94	101	105	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 5 - Association between Behavior Orientation and Politically Radical Attitude

	<u>autonomous</u>	<u>non-auton.</u>	
not politically radical	60	160	220
	72.29	73.73	73.33
politically radical	23	57	80
	27.71	26.27	26.67
	83	217	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 6 - Association between Behavior Orientation and Socially Radical Attitude

	<u>autonomous</u>	<u>non-auton.</u>	
not socially radical	59	143	202
	71.08	65.90	67.33
socially radical	24	74	98
	28.92	34.10	32.67
	83	217	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00

behavior-orientation and radical attitude is very weak in the case of socially radical attitudes and that this association is practically inexistent in the case of politically radical attitude.

Finally, after examining the general associations between intervening and dependent variables (Tables 3 and 4), and between independent and dependent variables (Tables 5 and 6), it is useful to investigate the relationship between intervening and independent variables. This is done in Table 7, which shows that people with static life conditions feel slightly less autonomous than people with progressive or regressive life conditions.

In sum, the analysis of the entire sample, without taking into consideration area of residence as a control variable, has shown that the hypothesis cannot be accepted, and that there are very weak associations between the variables, which were postulated to constitute the nuclei of coherent attitude. The most meaningful relationship which was discovered refers to the association between the intervening and the dependent variable, that is, between perceived life conditions and radicalism. It seems that there is no relationship between self-autonomy and radicalism, although this was a central postulation of this thesis. Autonomy has been viewed as implying an orientation towards achievement and affluence, which leads necessarily to radical attitudes since the opportunity-structure of underdeveloped countries is too narrow and too limited and

since such an opportunity-structure prevents people from improving their life conditions. However, up to this point, not acceptance of the hypotheses does not mean its complete rejection.

The sample investigated has been put together without differentiating people located in extremely varied social conditions. It is possible that, within a given percentage, opposite tendencies have been included. In order to investigate this possibility it becomes necessary to introduce area of residence as a control variable, and to study separately what happens in the rural, slum and urban areas.

Table 7 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior Orientation

	static	progressive	regressive	
autonomous	22	31	30	83
	23.40	30.70	28.58	27.70
non autonomous	72	70	75	217
	76.60	69.30	71.42	72.30
	94	101	105	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 8 - Association between Area of Residence and Perceived Life Conditions

	Slum	Santiago	Lampa	
static	12	19	63	94
	14.28	31.67	40.39	31.33
progressive	39	21	41	101
	46.43	35.00	26.28	33.67
regressive	33	20	52	105
	39.29	33.33	33.33	35.00
	84	60	156	300
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

4.3 Introducing the Control Variable

Association between control and intervening variable

Table 8 demonstrates that there are different patterns of distribution of the intervening variable -- perceived life conditions -- for each different area of residence. As it is reasonable to expect, people in the slum present the lowest percentage perceiving their life conditions as static (14.28% compared to 31.33% over-all percentage). On the other extreme, rural inhabitants perceive their life conditions as static to the highest degree. A meaningful finding refers to the fact that approximately every other slum dweller feels that his life condition has improved lately. This is an indicant that the idea of dualism and relative deprivation leading to the "revolution of rising expectations," is, at least, highly problematic.²⁵ Although life conditions may appear to be miserable to external observers, 46.43% of the slum dwellers consider their life conditions to have improved. It is also reasonable to expect that the rural people should present the lowest percentage of progressive life conditions and that slum people should present the highest percentage of regressive life conditions, as demonstrated in Table 8.

²⁵Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1964) and Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.IX, 1966-67.

Association between control intervening and
independent variable

The comparison of the marginal values in Tables 9, 10 and 11 shows the different patterns of distribution of the independent variable -- behavior orientation -- for each different area of residence. These patterns are fairly similar in the cases of Santiago and Lampa, but are different in the case of slum dwellers. Surprisingly, the least autonomous are urban residents (only 20% are autonomous), who are even less autonomous than the rural inhabitants (24.36%). And people in the slum are much more autonomous than either urban or rural dwellers, with 39.29% being autonomous. These results are consistent with the results in Table 7 which shows that the static individuals are the least autonomous and the progressive are the most autonomous. As Table 8 indicates, slum individuals are the least static and the most progressive. It is convenient remark that, although equally defined, autonomy may present different meanings, depending on the specific socio-cultural environment of its definition. Thus, it is likely that autonomy in the slum corresponds to anomy in Merton's sense of the word;²⁶ on the other hand, autonomy in the urban milieu may be viewed as a more modern attitude, perfectly consistent with the developing norms and values of that specific socio-cultural context.

²⁶Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), Chapter IV-V, pp. 131-194.

Table 9 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior Orientation: SLUM

	static	progressive	regressive	
autonomous	4	13	16	33
	33.33	33.33	48.48	39.29
non autonomous	8	26	17	51
	66.67	66.67	51.52	60.71
	12	39	33	84
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 10 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior Orientation: SANTIAGO

	static	progressive	regressive	
autonomous	2	6	4	12
	10.53	28.57	25.00	20.00
non autonomous	17	15	16	48
	89.47	71.43	75.00	80.00
	19	21	20	60
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 11 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Behavior Orientation: LAMPA

	static	progressive	regressive	
autonomous	16	12	10	38
	25.40	29.27	19.23	24.36
non autonomous	47	29	42	118
	74.60	70.73	80.77	75.64
	63	41	52	156
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

The analysis of these three Tables -- 9, 10, and 11 -- further indicates that the main factors contributing to the differentiation of the distribution patterns are:

a) almost 50% of slum-dwellers perceiving regressive life conditions are autonomous, although only 25% of the urban group and 19.23% of the rural group are autonomous.

b) only 10.53% of the urban group perceiving their life conditions as static are autonomous, although 25.40% of the rural group and 33.33% of the slum group are autonomous.

Association between independent and dependent variable

Tables 12 through 17 indicate the associations between the independent variable -- behavior-orientation -- and each different type of radicalism, for each specific area of residence.

Autonomous slum-dwellers are the most radical, politically speaking (42.42%), although autonomous rural people are the least radical (15.70%). The figures on Tables 12, 13, and 14 confirm the former suggestion that, without controlling area of residence, opposite tendencies could be represented within the same category, which would have a neutralizing effect and which would conceal distinct patterns and tendencies. These three Tables further demonstrate that other results, which would be reasonable to expect, are slightly confirmed: slum-dwellers are the most politically radical and rural people are the least. But the

Table 12 - Association between Behavior Orientation and Political Radicalism: SLUM

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not politically radical	19	36	55
	57.58	70.59	65.48
politically radical	14	15	29
	42.42	29.41	34.52
	33	51	84
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 13 - Association between Behavior Orientation and Political Radicalism: SANTIAGO

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not politically radical	9	35	44
	75.00	72.92	73.33
politically radical	3	13	16
	25.00	27.08	26.67
	12	48	60
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 14 - Association between Behavior Orientation and Political Radicalism: LAMPA

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not politically radical	32	89	121
	84.21	75.42	77.56
politically radical	6	29	35
	15.79	24.58	22.44
	38	118	156
	100.00	100.00	100.00

difference between rural and urban dwellers is very small, although it would be reasonable to expect a greater difference, assuming that the rural area is the typical locus of more conservative and conformist attitudes.

Surprisingly, autonomous slum-dwellers show the lowest percentage in tendency toward social radicalism, as may be verified by comparing Tables 15, 16 and 17. But if autonomy within the slum areas is understood as a manifestation of anomy, a reasonable explanation may be suggested: the normative definition of right and wrong is much more vague and more liberal within the slum milieu, that is, many things which are commonly done by slum-dwellers and which are generally judged as wrong from without are not evaluated as wrong from within. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that 41.18% of the non-autonomous slum-workers present socially radical tendencies; this figure indicates that social radicalism is an important characteristic of the slum as a social system. And if social radicalism constitutes an attitude inherent to the particular social conditions of the slum, it is reasonable that autonomous individuals should adopt such an attitude as a legitimate normative pattern, without feelings of moral uneasiness.

The analysis of Tables 16 and 17 indicates how similar the patterns of distribution of social radicalism actually are for autonomous and for non-autonomous urban and rural residents. It seems that, in both cases, behavior-

Table 15 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: SLUM

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not socially radical	27	30	57
	81.82	58.82	67.86
socially radical	6	21	27
	18.18	41.18	32.14
	33	51	84
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 16 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: SANTIAGO

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not socially radical	8	34	42
	66.67	70.83	70.00
socially radical	4	14	18
	33.33	29.17	30.00
	12	48	60
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 17 - Association between Behavior Orientation and
Social Radicalism: LAMPA

	autonomous	non autonomous	
not socially radical	24	79	103
	63.16	66.95	66.03
socially radical	14	39	53
	36.84	33.05	33.97
	38	118	156
	100.00	100.00	100.00

orientation does not represent a meaningful determinant of whether or not the individual tends to adopt a socially radical attitude.

Association between intervening and dependent variable

Tables 18 through 23 indicate the associations between the intervening variable, perceived life conditions, and the dependent variable, political or social radicalism, maintaining residence area as control.

The main factor which contributes to making the slum dwellers politically more radical than other groups is that, in this case, 39.39% of the regressive people assume politically radical attitudes. Among slum dwellers the highest percentage is regressive; and among regressive slum dwellers is found the highest percentage of autonomous and politically radical individuals (see Tables 8, 9 and 18).

The main factor which contributes to making the rural inhabitants the least radical, politically speaking, is that only 14.28% of static people assume politically radical attitudes. Among rural dwellers the highest percentage is static (Table 8) and among static rural dwellers is found the lowest percentage of politically radical individuals (Table 20).

The most important factor of differentiation among the distributions in Tables 21, 22, and 23 is found under the column of regressive life conditions. Although only 20% of the regressive urban dwellers are socially radical,

Table 18 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: SLUM

	static	progressive	regressive	
not politically radical	9	26	20	55
	75.00	66.67	60.61	65.48
politically radical	3	13	13	29
	25.00	33.33	39.39	34.52
	12	39	33	84
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 19 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: SANTIAGO

	static	progressive	regressive	
not politically radical	15	15	14	44
	78.95	71.43	70.00	73.33
politically radical	4	6	6	16
	21.05	28.57	30.00	26.67
	19	21	20	60
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 20 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Political Radicalism: LAMPA

	static	progressive	regressive	
not politically radical	54	30	37	121
	85.72	73.17	71.15	77.56
politically radical	9	11	15	35
	14.28	26.83	28.85	22.44
	63	41	52	156
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 21 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: SLUM

	static	progressive	regressive	
not socially radical	9	24	24	57
	75.00	61.54	72.73	67.86
socially radical	3	15	9	27
	25.00	38.46	27.27	32.14
	12	39	33	84
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 22 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: SANTIAGO

	static	progressive	regressive	
not socially radical	13	13	16	42
	68.42	61.90	80.00	70.00
socially radical	6	8	4	18
	31.58	38.10	20.00	30.00
	19	21	20	60
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 23 - Association between Perceived Life Conditions and Social Radicalism: LAMPA

	static	progressive	regressive	
not socially radical	48	23	32	103
	76.20	56.10	61.54	66.02
socially radical	15	18	20	53
	23.80	43.90	38.46	33.98
	63	41	52	156
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

27.27% of the regressive slum dwellers and 38.46% of the regressive rural inhabitants are socially radical. The marginal results in these three Tables further indicate a fairly regular pattern of over-all distribution between "socially radical" and "not socially radical" for each of the three residence areas.

4.4 Final Results

Table 24 summarizes the data derived from eighteen different 2 x 2 tables which interrelate the variables in the most specific and most discriminatory manner possible within the framework adopted for this paper. Figure 7 gives an example of the format of the original 2 x 2 tables from which the figures in Table 24 were derived.

Association between Behavior-Orientation and Radicalism

(control variables) SLUM WORKER

(intervening variable) PERCEIVING STATIC LIFE CONDITIONS

(independent variable)		BEHAVIOR ORIENTATION		
		autonomous	non autonomous	
(dependent variable)	not socially radical	4 100.00	5 62.50	9 75.00
	socially radical	0 00.00	3 37.50	3 25.00
	ATTITUDE	4 100.00	8 100.00	12 100.00

Figure 7 - Model of the Specific Tables: Final Results

Table 24 - Final Results

control	independent	intervening	#	dependent:radicalism		ref.
				political	social	
				#	%	
			4	1	0	?
		static	13	6	25.00	00.00
	autonomous	progressive	16	7	46.15	23.08
		regressive	8	2	43.75	18.75
SLUM		static	26	7	25.00	37.50
	non autonomous	progressive	17	6	26.92	46.15
		regressive	84	29	35.29	35.29
		SUB-TOTAL			34.52	32.14
			2	1	1	?
		static	6	1	50.00	50.00
	autonomous	progressive	4	1	16.67	50.00
		regressive	17	3	25.00	00.00
URBAN		static	15	5	17.65	29.41
	non autonomous	progressive	16	5	33.33	33.33
		regressive	60	16	31.25	25.00
		SUB-TOTAL			26.27	30.00
			16	3	5	L L
		static	12	2	18.75	31.25
	autonomous	progressive	10	1	16.67	41.67
		regressive	47	6	10.00	40.00
RURAL		static	29	9	12.77	21.28
	non autonomous	progressive	42	14	31.03	44.83
		regressive	156	35	33.33	38.10
		SUB-TOTAL			22.44	33.98

The last column of Table 24 indicates the relative position of the figure of each row in relation to the over-all percentage for each specific sub-sample. The first symbol, a question mark, indicates that the number of cases in that specific row is too small to be analysed. The second symbol (H or L) indicates that the percentage of political radicalism in the row is higher (H) or lower (L) than the sub-total, which is the average of the specific sub-sample. The third symbol (H or L) indicates that the percentage of social radicalism in that row is higher or lower than the average of the entire specific sub-sample.

The analysis of the sub-totals shows that the slum dwellers present the highest percentage of political radicalism (34.52%), followed by the urban dwellers (26.67%) and then by the Lampa inhabitants (22.44%). With reference to social radicalism, the three figures are very close to each other; the highest percentage belongs to rural inhabitants (33.98%), which is slightly higher than the percentages for the slum-dwellers (32.14%) and for the urban dwellers (30.00%). Establishing the over-all result as a reference point, 80 of 300 cases present politically radical tendencies (26.67%), and 98 of the same 300 present socially radical tendencies (32.67%). If each row of Table 24 is compared with these two general averages, rather than with the specific sub-totals of each sub-sample, then only one alteration has to be made in the last column: non-autonomous slum-workers perceiving their life conditions as

static should be considered high (H) in political radicalism, rather than low (L), since the percentage in this case (26.92%) is slightly higher than the over-all percentage, although lower than the percentage for the specific sub-sample (34.52%).

Thus, the four cases that may be distinguished for analysis are:

- a) HH - indicating for a given specific combination of control, independent, and intervening variables that both dependent variables present higher percentages than the average of that specific sub-sample.
- b) HL - given the same conditions in a), politically radical attitudes are more frequent and socially radical attitudes are less frequent than the average of the sub-sample.
- c) LH - given the same conditions in a), politically radical attitude is less frequent and socially radical attitude is more frequent than the average of the sub-sample.
- d) LL - given the same conditions in a), both politically and socially radical attitudes are less frequent than the average of the sub-sample.

HH: high percentages of both political and social radicalism

Four different combinations of control, intervening, and independent variables are included here:

- 1) slum-non-autonomous - regressive
- 2) urban - non-autonomous - progressive
- 3) rural - non-autonomous - progressive
- 4) rural - non-autonomous - regressive

The two common characteristics of these four cases are (1) that all of them are non-autonomous and (2) that all

of them are non-static. This shows that the individuals in this case feel that the only means for coping with a changing environment is either by breaking or by changing rules and norms. These individuals feel that the changes in their lives are necessary effects of more general changes which they do not control; there are only two possibilities of influencing the outcome (their lives):

1) through patterns of behavior which they judge morally wrong, or

2) through action the objective of which is to change the structure determining their lives.

HL: high percentage of political radicalism only

Three different combinations of control-intervening dependent variables are included here:

1) slum - autonomous - progressive

2) slum - autonomous - regressive

3) urban - non-autonomous - regressive

The two common characteristics of these three cases are (1) that all of them are non-rural and (2) that all of them are non-static. If autonomous behavior-orientation is seen as a more modern attitude in comparison to non-autonomous behavior-orientation, then the co-existence of autonomous and of non-autonomous orientation within this group may indicate that the degree of autonomy is not relevant for determining political radicalism. On the other hand, the former suggestion must be taken into account that autonomy may present different meanings in different social

contexts.

As Tables 12 through 14 suggest, autonomy presents a clear and positive association with political radicalism in the slum; this relationship is less clear in the case of the rural milieu, and there seems to be no meaningful relationship in the case of the urban setting.

LH: high percentage of social radicalism only

Three different combinations of control, intervening, and dependent variables are included here:

- 1) slum - non-autonomous - progressive
- 2) rural - autonomous - progressive
- 3) rural - autonomous - regressive

These results are consistent with the findings in Tables 15 and 17. Non-autonomous slum-dwellers feel a stronger tendency toward social radicalism, and autonomous rural inhabitants have indicated this same tendency. These results point in the same direction suggested by the last paragraph. Although the degree of autonomy does not make a difference in the case of urban people, it does influence the outcome in the case of slum-dwellers and of rural people. It seems that autonomy affects slum-dwellers and rural-dwellers oppositely.

LL: low percentages of both political and social radicalism

Three different combinations of control-intervening-dependent variables are included here:

- 1) urban - non-autonomous - static
- 2) rural - autonomous - static
- 3) rural - non-autonomous - static

The common feature here is that all of the three cases are static. It seems that there is a very clear association between low radicalism and perception of static life conditions, in any residence area, and for any kind of behavior-orientation.

General patterns

Slum - Within the slum, most workers perceive their life conditions as progressive or regressive (85.72%). Among these, the group with autonomous behavior-orientation tend to be politically, but not socially, radical; the non-autonomous and progressive workers tend to be socially, but not politically, radical. And the slum workers who are non-autonomous and regressive tend to be both politically and socially radical. Autonomy in the slum is clearly associated with political radicalism, whenever the life conditions are not perceived as static.

Santiago - Within the urban milieu, most workers (75.64%) adopt a non-autonomous behavior-orientation. Among these, the ones who perceive their life conditions as static tend to reject politically radical attitudes. Those workers who do not perceive their life conditions as static present relatively more tendency for adopting politically radical attitudes, than for adopting socially radical attitudes.

Lampa - Within the rural setting, most workers (80%) adopt a non-autonomous behavior-orientation. Among these, the ones who perceive their life conditions as static present a low tendency toward any kind of radicalism. But those who perceive their life conditions as progressive or regressive present a higher tendency towards both kinds of radicalism.

4.5 Discussion

The Slum and the "Transitional Phase"

Slum dwellers, says Worsley, "are essentially people in process. They are 'becoming' townsmen -- eventually, they hope, a part of the settled, employed urban working-class population."²⁷ Recent analyses of many social scientists, sociologists and economists, have demonstrated that the measurement of development is highly controversial, and that the existence of a general process of development in the Third World is highly questionable and not confirmed. On the contrary, to use Gunder Frank's expression, it seems that what is occurring in the Third World is "the development of the underdevelopment."²⁸

From this perspective, the study of the manifestations of social disorganization within underdeveloped countries becomes much more important and

²⁷Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theories," Monthly Review, Vol.I, no.1 (May 1969), p.42.

²⁸Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968)

strategic for understanding the historical alternatives which are available to the Third World today. The evaluation of the actual social disorganization as an historical accident without lasting effects in the social structure of underdeveloped countries is consequence of false assumptions based on an uncritical adoption of western models of development. The deterministic certitude implied in this approach has been questioned by many authors who point out, as Frantz Fanon has written, that

"...sooner or later, colonialism sees that it is not within its powers to put into practice a project of economic and social reforms which will satisfy the aspirations of the colonised people." (29)

If it is assumed that development is very unlikely to happen according to western patterns, the investigation of the potentially revolutionary forces within the social structure of underdeveloped countries is a necessary step for the clarification of the historical alternatives which are actually available for the Third World today.

From Frantz Fanon's viewpoint, the key sources of revolutionary change are the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat. Peter Worsley has clearly synthesized and explained Fanon's viewpoint by commenting that

"/y/et, if one considers the massive and rapid growth of the cities of the Third World, the ever-swelling exodus of the peasants to the cities--

²⁹Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p.168.

to São Paulo, Johannesburg, Saigon, Cairo, Nairobi, Bangkok, or Manila -- and the appalling conditions under which these new urban populations live in the favelas, barriadas, bidonvilles, shanty towns, or whatever the local name is for the universal phenomenon of life in encampments made of cardboard, flattened petrol tins, and old packing cases, one must surely challenge the highly insulting and analytically unilluminating Marxist term lumpenproletariat, and begin to treat seriously both the human beings this pejorative epithet purports to describe and Fanon's theories about them... /O/ne of the major factors keeping the urban lumpenproletariat depoliticized is the very theory that they are a lumpenproletariat... Their revolutionary potential he sees as quite equal to that of peasants who for centuries have put up, fatalistically and resignedly, with their miserable conditions." (30)

The Slums of Santiago and Political Radicalism

A tentative and exploratory interpretation of the data indicates some support to Fanon's position. Slum dwellers show the highest percentage of politically radical tendencies. It is also important to remark that they show the highest percentage of autonomous behavior-orientation. This means that their politically radical tendencies are more likely to become concrete action, if autonomy is viewed as implying more dynamism and initiative. On the other hand, if the possible politicalization of deviance is considered, it is convenient to remember that the slum is the typical focus of institutionalized deviant behavior. The fact that this characteristic is not clearly translated into higher percentages of social radicalism in the slum

³⁰Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theories," Monthly Review, Vol. I, no.1 (May 1969), pp.39-42.

was explained by the institutionalization and the anomic characteristics of that social milieu.

The slum worker comes from a situation in which most of them perceived their life conditions as static. Now, most of them perceive their life conditions as progressive or regressive. Autonomous behavior orientation is much more frequent in the slum (39.29%) than in the rural area (24.36%). 34.52% of the slum dwellers are politically radical; only 22.44% of the rural inhabitants are politically radical. And although the percentages of slum dwellers and rural inhabitants who present socially radical tendencies are about the same (32.14% and 33.97% respectively) it was assumed that the criteria of judgement are much more rigid and intolerant within the rural milieu than in the slum.

Although rural and urban dwellers present fairly similar percentages of political and social radicalism, it is easy to understand that urban dwellers have much more means of affluence available for them than both slum and rural dwellers. Thus, it is likely that it is easier, from a social control viewpoint, to prevent or neutralize the political radicalism of the urban inhabitant, in comparison with radical tendencies of both the rural and the slum inhabitant. These means may be either legitimate or illegitimate but, in both cases, their existence prevents the possibility of the politicalization of deviance.

In short, given the basic assumptions and analysed

the most meaningful figures which were available in this paper, it may be concluded that, potentially, the people who live in the slums constitute the most expressive source of revolutionary action; the rural inhabitants are in second place, and urban dwellers present the lowest potential. This possibility has already become a concrete reality in many cases, as Worsley exemplifies with Algeria:

"...tens of thousands of the volatile lower depths of the city slum population were transformed from being an anarchic, hopeless, depoliticized, mass into a reservoir for the revolution." (31)

The safety-valve for the structural imbalances of the rural regions is internal migration. The safety-valve for the lack of legitimate opportunities within the urban milieu is the development of clientelism and of a partially institutionalized illegitimate opportunity-structure. But what is the safety-valve for the slum dweller? The expansion of the illegitimate opportunity-structure has limits and deviant behavior is repressed, when adopted by the poor. Horowitz has indicated that there is a

"correlation of urbanism generating political reform and ruralism generating revolution. /However, city-based political changes/ only redistribute power among the holders of power, and do not shatter the structure of power as such. /And/ it must equally, if indeed not more emphatically, be kept in mind that the cities of Latin America, for its inhabitants, are labyrinths of sharp class

³¹Ibid., p.40.

differentiation, examples of industrial distortions produced by centuries of both external and internal colonialism. These cities are essential proving grounds for social change based on social reform, and when that fails, for change based on social revolution." (32)

³²Irving L. Horowitz, "Electoral Politics, Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) pp. 140-176.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Since there is a growing contradiction between restricted opportunity-structure and expanding expectations, deviance, corruption, and opportunism are at the very core of the social structure of underdeveloped countries. Although an alternative behavior could be adopted (political action), many reasons contribute to the prevalence of social radicalism as the preferred course of action. One possible explanation is that deviant behavior is more consistent with the western tradition of the individual search for the solution of existential problems, even when these are collective problems.

Another possible explanation, less philosophical and more sociological, is that structural social control mechanisms channel the individual behavior in such a way that deviant tendencies are institutionalized, becoming an important part of the opportunity-structure. Given this "norm of illegitimacy," the existence of a high percentage of individuals adopting a politically radical attitude does not imply they are likely to behave consistently with such an attitude. The concrete choice of one type of behavior over another may only be explained by a structural analysis of the social control mechanisms which are functioning in each specific historical situation.

Probably the most efficient social control mechanism is what Mills has called "the cultural apparatus."³³ In underdeveloped countries, the central ideas which are transmitted through and maintained by this apparatus may be divided into two types:

a) the ideas of destiny, fatalism, conformity and "the will of God"

b) the ideas of development, democracy, modernization, planning, achieving or developing societies, etc.

The great paradox of underdeveloped countries is that these two types of ideas are mutually exclusive and conflictant, but both must necessarily be part of the dominant ideology in order to maintain the status quo. It is simultaneously necessary to maintain the mobilized masses in peaceful expectancy by manipulating the ideas in b) and to prevent the mobilization of new areas of the population by manipulating the ideas in a). However, the manipulation in b) causes additional mobilization and the manipulation in a) causes disruptive behavior by those already mobilized.

This thesis has attempted to investigate how those ideas in a) are internalized and altered in different social conditions, and how they are related to different psychological perceptions.

³³C. Wright Mills, Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C.Wright Mills, ed. by Irving L.Horowitz (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), p.405.

The significance of attempting to understand the socio-psychological concomitants of the behavior of the masses, especially in the slum-situation, may be clearly explained when the strategic position of the urban centers in most underdeveloped societies is considered. To use Worsley's words

"Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Uruguay all have 40 percent or more of their population in towns and cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants. They are often quite different cities from those in industrial societies, however; merely to record their size obscures these qualitative differences. And the functions and influence of the larger, "primate" cities, the centers of government, trade, and what industry there is, are incapable of absorbing into productive employment the growing migrant population." (34)

In Chile, particularly, 68.7% of the population was urban in 1965, and an increase of 3.9% was estimated for 1970. ³⁵

In more general terms, this kind of study is viewed as necessary and significant in order to take advantage of the great opportunity available to the backward societies in their efforts of development. This opportunity refers, first, to the need of developing new patterns of mass mobilization and mass participation as the only way for overcoming hunger, disease and misery. ³⁶

³⁴ Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theories," Monthly Review, Vol. I, no.1 (May 1969), pp.43-44.

³⁵ Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund (Fifth Annual Report, Washington, D.C., 1965)

³⁶ See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, no.3 (September 1961), pp.493-511.

It further refers to the need of creating new and more adequate models of development, without trying to repeat the western experience; to use Stavenhagen's expression, "four hundred years of diffusion" is enough for proving that the western model has not worked for the colonised societies.³⁷ Third, it is a good opportunity for avoidance of the most tragic mistakes committed in the development of the actual over-developed societies; as Horowitz has observed

"...technical and industrial development is not total development and does not settle the major problems of politics, economics, war and peace, etc., but only raises such issues to a new pinnacle of desperation." (38)

³⁷Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Theses About Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, ed. by Irving L.Horowitz, Josué de Castro, John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) pp.102-117.

³⁸Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development; The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) p.69.

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APPENDIX I

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND VARIABLES

CONTROL VARIABLE - social-class: worker

Question 74, every card, column 20:

Social class	0 - No answer
	1 - Upper
	2 - Middle
	3 - Worker

CONTROL VARIABLE - place of residence

Every card, column 11:

Area	1 - Slum
	2 - Santiago
	3 - Lampa

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE - behavior-orientation: non-autonomous X
autonomous:
- acceptance X rejection of destiny (114)
- unplanned X planned activities (117)
- present X future-oriented (120)

Question 114, card 4, column 70:

Everybody is born with a fixed destiny, and nothing is gained by fighting it.
0 - He doesn't understand
1 - Totally agree
2 - Slightly agree
3 - Don't know
4 - Slightly disagree
5 - Totally disagree

Question 117, card 4, column 73:

Planning only makes a person unhappy because plans hardly ever work out anyway. (same as question 114)

Question 120, card 4, column 76:

The way things are today, the best thing one can do is to make the present secure and not worry too much about the future. (same as question 114)

INTERVENING VARIABLE - perception of life conditions.

Question 30, card 6, column 44:

Life conditions - direction of the difference a and b:

- | | |
|------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 0 - There is no difference |
| a=actually | 1 - Positive (a greater than b) |
| b=five years ago | 2 - Negative (b greater than a) |
| | 8 - Indeterminate |
-

DEPENDENT VARIABLE - politically radical attitude:
 political participation (113)
 (+) class-party (75)
 (and/or) power allocation (135)

Question 113, card 4, column 69:

Every citizen should take an active part in politics.
 (same as question 114)

Question 75, card 3, column 61:

Party that defends your class interests.

- | |
|---------------------------|
| 0 - No answer, don't know |
| 1 - Communist |
| 2 - Socialist |
| 3 - Christian Democrat |
| 4 - Radical |
| 5 - Liberal |
| 6 - Conservative |
| 9 - Other |
-

Question 135, card 5, column 60:

What group should be more powerful in Chile?

- | |
|-----------------------------------|
| 1 - The people, the workers |
| 2 - The middle class |
| 3 - The christian democrats |
| 5 - None |
| 6 - The left, (The Popular Front) |
| 7 - Others |
| 9 - Don't know |
-

DEPENDENT VARIABLE - socially radical attitude.

Question 61, card 3, column 54:

To get ahead, one must do things that are not right.

- 0 - Does not understand
 - 1 - Strongly agree
 - 2 - Slightly agree
 - 3 - Don't know
 - 4 - Slightly disagree
 - 5 - Strongly disagree
 - 6 - No answer
-

APPENDIX II

CROSS TABULATION

starting deck: 322 workers in all areas										Q
A = agree			D = disagree			I = indeterminate				114
A	D	I	A	D	I	A	D	I	I	117
-	A	D	I	A	D	I	A	D	I	- 120
NA	NA	SA	I	NA	SA	I	NA	I	SA	I
Code:										Q
SA = self-autonomous					NA = non-autonomous					
Q=question	A		A		A		A		A = not agree	61
L=left	A		A		A		A		A	113
O=other	A		A		A		A		A	
D=deviant	L	O	-	L	O	-	L	O	-	135
R=radical	-	L	O	-	L	O	-	L	O	- 75
	D+R	D+R	D	R	R	-	D+R	D+R	D	R

APPENDIX II
CROSS TABULATION

SEPARATE TABULATION OF EACH OF THE FOUR CASES:	SLUM	STATIC
		PROGRESSIVE
		REGRESSIVE
		INDETERMINATE
D + R D R (-)	URBAN	STATIC
		PROGRESSIVE
		REGRESSIVE
		INDETERMINATE
	RURAL	STATIC
		PROGRESSIVE
		REGRESSIVE
		INDETERMINATE

APPENDIX III

Ideological Implications in the Concept of Radicalism

This Appendix aims to discuss the problematic nature of the scientific use of concepts such as radicalism, deviance, marginalism, etc., and to indicate the theoretical significance of a new approach to problems of radicalism and social control. Although not specifically discussed here, the idea of structural violence emerges as an extremely important and worthwhile area for sociological investigation from the following considerations.

A - Social Control and the Politicalization of Deviance

Superficially analysed, the right to dissent politically seems to be much less questioned than the right to dissent socially. However, this does not indicate that the political system is more tolerant and more dynamic, but rather indicates that social dissent generally represents a more immediate and clear threat to the social system and demands more direct forms of social control. Less direct forms of social control are employed for the neutralization of political dissent, keeping it under control

on a level that does not threaten the political stability of the society. Illiteracy and manipulation of mass media are examples of means of political domination. But when political dissent seems to become so powerful that the status quo is threatened, then the direct repression against it becomes violent, and/or co-optation becomes intensive.³⁹ What is defined as legitimate dissent in one moment may be re-defined as subversion in the next moment. In any case, the starting point for definition, control and repression of dissent or of subversion is the political evaluation of the danger they represent to the power structure. Given this common starting point, the conceptual distinction between subversion and legitimate dissent becomes obsolete, depending exclusively on the subjective and ideological definition of the situation made by the power elite.⁴⁰

Exactly the same process occurs in the case of deviance: when deviance becomes so intense, so massive, and so varied that it constitutes a vital part of the social structure, direct repression against less important focuses of deviance and co-optation of more important focuses are simultaneously intensified. There is an interchange between deviance and non-conventional self-initiative. If the

³⁹ See William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), pp.135-142.

⁴⁰ This concept is here adopted in a very broad sense, as defined by C. Wright Mills, "The Labor Leaders and the Power Elite," in Power, Politics and People: the Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills, ed. by Irving Louis Horowitz (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), pp.97-98.

deviant is important and powerful, he becomes an important public personality and is not viewed as deviant. As in the case of political behavior, also here the starting point for definition, for control, and for repression of deviance is the political evaluation of the threats posed against the power structure. And also here, the conceptual distinction between deviance and non-conventional social behavior becomes obsolete, depending exclusively on the subjective and ideological definition of the situation by the power elite.

In sum, the four analytical concepts that were distinguished as sub-types of political and social radicalism are again reduced to two: depending on political circumstances subversion and legitimate dissent are empirically distinguished, but this does not lead to a clear conceptual distinction between them; and the same process occurs with deviance and non-conventional social behavior.

On the other hand, political and social radicalism are interactive categories. The politicalization of deviance is a phenomenon that includes two opposite processes: the adoption of deviant methods by political radicals, and the adoption of a politically radical perspective by deviants. The result of both types of interaction is basically the same and each may endanger the stability of the system to a much higher degree than if social and political radicals were discrete categories. This is easy to understand because the adoption of a politically radical conscience by deviants and the adoption of socially condemned instruments of action by

political radicals are phenomena that make the social control mechanisms become much less effective than they actually are for controlling each separated type.

From a social control viewpoint, the main problem caused by this interaction between social and political radicals is the politicalization of deviance. Several strategies may be adopted by the power elite in order to neutralize the effect of this interaction:

a) to face the structural causes of deviance and radicalism;

b) to co-opt the political radicals even by corrupting them and making them more deviants (without punishment) and less radicals;

c) to co-opt the deviants by institutionalizing their deviance in order to prevent them of assuming a politically radical posture.

The need for preventing the politicalization of deviance and for adopting these strategies is based on the assumption that effective political radicalism is much more disruptive than massive (but partially institutionalized) deviance. By these strategies, the growth and increasing effectiveness of political radicalism are avoided. Social stability is attained with a little use of direct methods of repression, and only low status-low class deviants constitute a major target of violent repression. Persons with higher status-higher class positions always have some legitimate and institutionalized opportunity for

"respectable deviance."

2.3 Theoretical Implications

Regarding the relationship between deviance and social control the perspective of this thesis seems to be in agreement with the central orientation lately assumed by many sociologists and well synthesized by Lemert:

"Their common concern is with social control and its consequences for deviance. This is a large turn away from older sociology which tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe that the reverse idea, i.e., social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society." (41)

Horowitz has indicated that the convergence of social deviance and political radicalism "compels social scientists to reconsider their definitions of the entire range of social phenomena -- from deviance to politics." He also says that

"/f/or the social sciences, this implies a new connection between social problems and political action. The old division between the two can no longer be sustained. In terms of theory, the new conditions throw into doubt the entire history of political science as an examination of the electoral situation, and of social problems research as a study of personal welfare. If politics is amplified to incorporate all forms of pressure, whether by deviants or orthodox pressure groups, to change the established social order, and if sociology is redefined to include pressure by deviants to redesign the social system so that they can be

⁴¹Irving L. Horowitz, "Social Deviance and Political Marginality," Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p.110.

accepted by the general society on their own terms, then there is a common fusion, a common drive, and a common necessity between sociology and political science, not only on the level of empirical facts, but on the level of scientific interpretation." (42)

Walter Buckley goes further in this direction when he develops the idea that "...the more proper study of social control is the study of power, authority, and legitimacy and of the related purposeful forces that tend to maintain or to change the dominant institutional structure."⁴³ By adopting this orientation, he attempts to support the following points:

"First, there are at least two analytically distinguishable, though often phenomenally similar, patterns of social behavior that should be kept separate in our thinking. One such pattern is characterized by the control, direct or indirect, of behavior of numbers of people, against their "will" or without their informed commitment or understanding. The other pattern is characterized by such direction or control of behaviors, but with the informed and committed 'consent' or consensus of those directed. ...Second, these two patterns have usually been referred to as 'power' and 'authority,' respectively, and the latter is said to be based on some principle of 'legitimacy.'...Third, the mere fact that a majority of individuals and subgroups are overtly complying with a set of normatively defined role expectations in any organization or institutional setting is not to prejudice the separate question as to whether such norms and role-structure have a certain basis of legitimacy. A great deal of knowledge on the level of social-psychological dynamics would be essential to any answer. Fourth, power and

⁴²Ibid., p.114.

⁴³Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp.177-178.

authority have been found by many researchers to be significantly related to the primacy, in a group, of competitive goal orientations or of cooperative goal orientations, respectively.

These three distinctions -- between power and authority, dissensus and consensus, and competitive or cooperative goal orientations, are closely interrelated. From the modern systems view, they are related in a complex systemic process, such that no one of them can be taken as the causal determinant, each being emergent, in its current social and personal manifestations, from the interplay of all of them. This is roughly suggested in the two diagrams of Figure /8/⁴⁴




Figure 8 - /Modern Systems Approach to Power and Authority/ ⁴⁴

Whereas the more traditional approaches to social control overemphasize the disruptive character of deviance and subversion, this new approach indicates the possibility of studying them as indicants of social stability and immobilism. In other words, a social system must generate social and/or political radicalism in order to maintain the status quo, whenever the legitimate opportunity-structure is so narrow and so limited that it can not satisfy a significant part of individuals, groups, and social classes.

⁴⁴The quotation and the Figure are from ibid., pp.177-178.

In this situation the expansion of the illegitimate opportunity-structure indicates that the social structure is maintained by the expansion of constraint and power (Figure 8 B). It also indicates that the social control mechanisms must be increasingly directed towards the manipulation of the illegitimate opportunity-structure, since changes in the legitimate opportunity-structure are not desired by the dominant classes. By means of this mechanism, politically and/or socially radical behavior gradually becomes a permanent and more important feature of the social system if the system is rigid and if the status quo is to be kept unchangeable.⁴⁵

⁴⁵This refers to what Buckley has called "deviation amplifying model." See, ibid., p.171.

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