The relationship between feminism and liberalism is a tenuous one given claims that a significant number of the central categories of analysis found within liberal theory link to male domination. Within feminist critiques of liberal theory, one finds critical examination of concepts such as autonomy, neutrality, consent, and the social contract. However, the literature leaves liberalism's central category of analysis choice under-contested. Although feminist theorists have complicated our understanding of choice through discussions of adaptive preferences and autonomy, there has yet to be a coherent argument against this concept as the framework for understanding oppression as well as liberation. Where theorists have focused on clarifying the conditions of the possibility of choice - i.e., what is necessary for women to properly be understood as having and making choices - I argue against an understanding of freedom from oppression primarily in terms of the nature and number of one's available choices. The primacy of choice within contemporary social and political feminist theorizing is problematic because it directs away from the goal of non-domination and toward the development of atomic individuals - a goal both arguably impossible and contrary to the general, practical aims of feminist theory. I further argue, via discussions of freedom of personality and the imaginary domain, that we must be able to conceive of ourselves as deserving particular choices and be capable of imagining our selves otherwise if the category of choice is to prove useful in the fight against oppression.
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