SELF CONCEPT AND DEGREE OF LIKING OF ONE'S FIRST NAME BY SELF AND PEERS

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
ELIZABETH ANN WALKER

1970



ABSTRACT

SELF CONCEPT AND DEGREE OF LIKING OF ONE'S FIRST NAME BY SELF AND PEERS

by

Elizabeth Ann Walker

Although psychologists and anthropologists have long believed that the name is an important part of the self, little supporting research exists on the connection between a person's feelings about his name and his self concept. No studies had been done investigating the relationship of the degree of liking of a person's name by peers and his self concept.

The present study attempted to investigate the relationship of the level of self esteem to the degree of liking of a person for his own name, and the degree to which his name was liked by others. Positive relationships were predicted.

Fifty-nine ninth grade students (30 male and 29 female) at a middle to upper-middle class suburban high school rated their own first names along with those of

their classmates. All of the names appeared on a list of names to be rated on a seven point scale from "like very much" to "dislike very much." The Tennessee Self Concept Scale was also administered. The subjects in this sample were found to have a mean self concept score 24 points lower than the mean for the published test norms.

Major findings were as follows:

1. Most subjects like their own first names, but males rated their own names a full point higher than did females, on the average ($p < .01$).

2. Subjects rated their own names, on the average, over a full point higher than the mean rating they gave to the names of their classmates ($p < .001$).

3. Correlational analysis failed to demonstrate a positive, linear relationship between self concept and degree of liking for one's first name. A comparison of the extreme groups on the name-liking measure, however, showed a difference in self concept scores in the predicted direction ($p < .025$).

4. Correlational analysis of the relationship between self concept and degree of liking of one's name by peers yielded nonsignificant results.

5. The "family self" subscale of the self concept measure was positively correlated with degree of liking for one's name, especially for males.

6. The "moral-ethical self" subscale of the self concept measure was negatively correlated with the degree to which the first name was liked by peers, especially for females.

It was concluded that a person's feelings of like or dislike for his name are indicative of his level of self concept when they are especially strong in either direction. Speculations were made concerning the determinants of low self esteem in early adolescence, and its relationship to conflicts between adolescent and family. It was further concluded that feelings about one's first name are closely related to one's feelings about oneself as a member of a harmonious family unit.

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By

Elizabeth Ann Walker

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1970

A man's name is not like a mantle which merely hangs about him, and which one perchance may safely twitch and pull, but a perfectly fitting garment, which, like the skin, has grown over him, at which one cannot rake and scrape without injuring the man himself.

--Johann Wolfgang Goethe

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express her thanks to Dr. Albert I. Rabin for his valuable guidance and encouragement both in the course of the present investigation and throughout her program of graduate education.

Thanks are extended, also, to the other members of the author's committee, Dr. Charles Hanley and Dr. Dozier Thornton, for their advice and suggestions in all phases of this study. In particular, Dr. Hanely's assistance with the statistical methodology employed is deeply appreciated.

The help and encouragement of Dr. Arthur A. Seagull, especially in the earlier phases of the present study, are also gratefully acknowledged.

Finally, the author wishes to extend special thanks to Miss Diane Oldaugh, Mr. Richard Sharer, Mr. Harold Shelton and all of the students in their ninth grade social studies classes at East Lansing High School who served as subjects in this investigation. Without

their generous donation of time and their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

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INTRODUCTION

Although the belief is widespread, among psychologists and anthropologists, that a person's name has great psychological and social significance for him, there is little research which supports this assertion or elucidates the nature of the alleged significance. In the course of clinical work, I have from time to time observed that a person speaking about his name, his feelings about it and its characteristics, is usually giving his account of his feelings and attitudes toward himself. A search of the literature on the subject reveals that the same observation of this spontaneous "projective technique" has been made by others.

Only two studies (Boshier, 1968; Strunk, 1958), however, attempt to demonstrate systematically a relationship between a person's degree of liking for his name and his self-concept. Both show a small but significant positive relationship, but both have the disadvantage that the subject is asked to write his name and then rate it. As Boshier points out in his discussion, this

self-consciousness may have led to the reluctance of subjects to indicate dislike for their names. In both studies the extremes of the name rating scale were used very little. Lack of anonymity may have tended to drive all ratings toward the "safer," more neutral values.

In the present study, great pains were taken to avoid spotlighting the name as the subject's own at the time of rating, by presenting him with a list of names to rate, one of which was his own. Thus, the task would be a much less self-conscious one, leaving the subject freer to express his true feeling for his name. Likewise, the self concept measure was taken anonymously, to allow subjects to give their true opinions of themselves, and avoid the pressure to "fake good."

This study also goes beyond the earlier studies by investigating, as well, the relationship of a person's self concept to the degree of liking of his name by his peers. Previously, the latter measure has been related only to popularity (McDavid & Harari, 1966).

First names only were chosen as the object of investigation because it was felt that they are more closely related to the identity of an individual than

are middle or family names. They identify one as distinct from other family members and are in more frequent usage than the other names. Furthermore, the child becomes conscious of his given name between the ages of one and two (Murphey, 1957), while knowledge of the last name does not develop until about the age of three (Hartman, 1958). It would seem, then, that the first name, appearing earlier in the child's cognizance of himself, would be most intimately connected with his basic identity formation.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Anthropological

Overview

There is a considerable body of anthropological writing on the customs, beliefs and religious and social functions associated with personal names in ancient and primitive societies. In presenting their data, anthropologists stress the special significance with which a person's name is invested by the primitive. Although its expression in custom varies throughout the world, there seems to be an underlying belief in all cultures that an individual's name is closely associated with his identity as a person, as much a part of him as a bodily organ. In some parts of the world, the name is even regarded as the soul. A corollary to this belief is that if one knows the name of a person he has power over his soul. A great many magical and superstitious customs result regarding name-giving, name usage, and name taboos. In his review, Firth (1951) stresses how such customs have an important

place in the larger fabric of the society, fitting into religious, family, kinship, legal and other social institutions.

The Name as Soul

According to Brown (1954, p. 21),

> The Greeks regarded the name or logos of a thing as intimately connected with its very nature. Plato held the view that it was not merely a label, symbol or representation, but a true reality with independent existence, the material thing being but its shadow.

If the name is akin to the soul, it follows that a thing without a name is soulless. Miller (1927, p. 586) reports that among the simpler peoples, those with little established history and no written language,

> An unnamed child . . . is never counted in the enumeration of a family. Should such a child die before the ceremony of naming, a mother "would mourn for it no more deeply than had it been stillborn." The unnamed child is "under a cloud" or a taboo in the social sense . . . . Certain it is that the child not yet named is little better than an animal, or not to be distinguished from it in the eyes of his folk.

A modern remnant of this primitive idea thrives in modern Greece where unbaptized children are called dragons or snakes because they are believed to turn into snakes and vanish if they remain unbaptized. Indeed, in

many parts of the world today, unbaptized children are believed to have no soul and there are instances of the church refusing a burial to such children (Brown, 1954).

Name Taboos

Since the name is so closely related to the soul, and so vital to the being, it must be carefully guarded from attack, for an attack on the name is regarded in many places to be just as dangerous as an attack on any physical part of the self. (Even in Modern Western culture this remains. We speak of "defending one's good name" or of a name being sullied when a person's honor has been attacked.) There are many ways of attempting to maintain this protection, resulting in the name taboos which are found in great variety all over the world, and yet show striking similarity in places quite distant from each other (Bendann, 1930; Brown, 1954; Budge, 1961; Frazer, 1951; Miller, 1927; Smith, 1954). The basic idea that if one knows the true name of another, he acquires power over him, is found in various forms in the custom, folk-tales and religious legend of every culture. The fairy tale of Rumpelstiltskin is a familiar form of this

belief (Fenichel, 1945). In it, the heroine must know the name of the little magic dwarf in order to be released from his power. Clodd (1889) found quite similar versions of this story in Scotland, England, Wales, Ireland, the Scandanavian countries, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Iceland, Spain, Basque France and Mongolia.

Naming

Another aspect to naming is that of creation. The Bible says, "In the beginning was the Word" (John i, 1).

The Ancient Egyptians had a similar belief (Budge, 1961). Many primitive peoples believe that a child named after someone will thereby acquire the qualities of the namesake; thus, naming helps to create the child's character. In many places, as widely separated as Greenland and Australia, the child is named after the most recently deceased person in the village, helping to secure rest for the recently departed soul. The grown child was supposed to brave the influences which caused the death of his namesake. Another form of this belief is that the soul of the child is not new, but is that of a dead

ancestor, merely taking another turn in the world, hence, it is fitting that he should retain his old name. In such cases the child may be referred to as "grandmother" or whatever the relationship was to the deceased, and may be asked to give advice on weighty matters (Guemple, 1965; Miller, 1927). In contrast, there are places where personal names are not perpetuated, as it is believed that anyone bearing the name of a dead person will not live (Bendann, 1930).

Name Change

There are many occasions upon which names are changed: sickness, an important event, a ceremonial occasion such as circumcision, puberty rites, marriage, old age--any event which changes the status of a person may be accompanied by a change of name or by the addition of a name. Many of these survive today (e.g., Marriage, divorce, adoption, the conferring of certain degrees, joining some orders such as the Black Muslims, etc. See Donald, 1952, for a description of slaves changing their names after they were freed.) (Bendann, 1930; Budge, 1961; Frazer, 1937; Miller, 1927).

In some places, if a child sickens his name will be changed to bring him better luck, or in the hope that the Angel of Death will not be able to find him. This belief was also found among the Jews in the Middle Ages (Roback, 1942). The name may be changed in old age for the same reason, or to give the oldster a new lease on life.

A widespread belief in eastern and western cultures is that to give a child a deprecatory name will protect him from envious evil spirits. In some places this is done only if a child is sickly, in the hope that the spirits will think a person with such a terrible name is not worth bothering. Another form of the custom is to give a child an opprobrious name after previously born children given good names have died (Masani, 1966).

Name and Character

Jahoda (1954) found that in a certain area of the British Gold Coast, Ashanti children were given a name according to the day of the week on which they were born. Two outstanding cultural stereotypes existed regarding these names. Boys born on Monday were supposed to be

quiet and peaceful, while Wednesday boys were supposed to be troublemakers. (Interestingly enough, the root for the word Wednesday in this culture means "to die," and in another form, "to commit murder.")

> It should perhaps be mentioned that day names merely indicate that a particular type of Kra has entered the body; which produces a disposition toward certain kinds of behavior, but the disposition may to some extent be counteracted and does not amount to a fixed destiny (p. 193).

Jahoda examined the records of delinquency in the district to see whether they upheld this theory of names. He found that Monday boys had significantly fewer offenses than any other day, thus living up to their reputation as calm and well-behaved. Wednesday boys, however, did not differ significantly unless crimes against the person (assault, fighting, causing wounds, etc.) were examined separately. In this class of offense, Wednesday boys were far more frequent than any other day. Jahoda concluded,

> The results here presented are consistent with the hypothesis that Ashanti beliefs about a connection between personality, character, and day of birth may be effective in selectively enhancing certain traits which otherwise may have remained latent (p. 195).

Name and Self

The literature on identity largely ignores the role of the name in the early development of a sense of self. In her intensive psychoanalytic treatment of identity development, for example, Jacobson (1964) does not mention the function of the name at all. Erikson (1956, 1963, 1968), too, fails to deal with the role played by the name in identity formation, mentioning only in passing the phenomenon of the nickname in adolescence. "The angry insistence on being called by a particular given name or nickname is not uncommon among young people who try to find a refuge from diffusion in a new name label" (1956, p. 86).

Those writers in this area who do take account of the name, however, stress its importance with particular emphasis. Allport (1937), for example, calls the name the most important "anchorage point" for selfhood. As the child grows, the name becomes a point of contact with the interpersonal world. "With the name comes the formality of receiving salutations and address from others, and with this formality comes a sense of self-importance and of position within the social hierarchy" (p. 163).

As support for his view of the importance of the name, he cites an earlier work in which he found that defending one's name was second only to the immediate physical safety of oneself and intimates as a cause for justifiable homicide. The defense of property and possessions was considered not nearly as justifiable a cause as the defense of one's good name.

De Levita (1965), whose thinking was stimulated by, but who goes beyond Erikson, says,

> The name has in common with the body the fact that it fulfills a function as a formant of identity before it becomes an idential. The child says its name before it says "I" and needs its name in order to be able to delineate itself as an ego . . . . The personal role expectation of the parent-name givers with regard to the child is expressed in it, but is inseparably interwoven with the communis opinio in the prevailing culture with regard to what the name symbolizes" (pp. 173-174).

He says further that identity problems may arise from names that are too unusual, leading to loneliness, or from names that are too common, leading the person to feel he must do something to distinguish himself from others. Other studies show that these are two of the most common reasons given by people who dislike their names.

Strauss (1959) begins his work on identity with a discussion of the name, saying that it reveals the judgments of the namer.

> The names that are adopted voluntarily reveal even more tellingly the indissoluble tie between name and self-image. The changing of names marks a rite of passage. It means such things as that the person wants to have the kind of name he thinks represents him as a person, does not want any longer to be the kind of person that his previous name signified" (p. 16).

He stresses that "to name is to know," not in a magical sense, but in the sense that naming is central to a person's cognition of the world.

Psychological

Clinical Papers

Wilhelm Stekel (1949) was the first of the psychoanalytic school to publish on the psychological significance of people's names in 1911. Jones (1955, p. 136), however, gives this account:

> In a paper he [Stekel] wrote on the psychological significance people's surnames have for them, even in the choice of career and other interests, he cited a huge number of patients whose names had profoundly influenced their lives. When Freud asked him how he could bring himself to publish the names of so many

> of his patients he answered with a reassuring smile: "They are all made up," a fact which somewhat detracted from the evidential value of the material. Freud refused to let it appear in the Zentralblatt, and Stekel had to publish it elsewhere.

However, Stekel held to his belief that a person's neurosis, character, and occupation may be related to his name, affirming additionally that the name is often used in a repetition compulsion, repeated many times as a sort of magic chant. Abraham (1955) supported Stekel's assertions in a paper a year later, citing two cases where the content of an obsession was related to the name of the patient and one homosexual case where there was an obvious correspondence between the name and the problem. He suggested that in families where a name suggests a character trait, both may be handed down, the original ancestor having been appropriately named. Abraham also thought that the name might be an important determinant in the choice of a love object. (See also Nunn, 1929; J. C. Flugel, 1935).

Another writer (I. Flugel, 1930, p. 209) concurs, saying,

> The cases of unconcious influence of name on conduct that have been observed by myself, seem to fall naturally into three main divisions,

> 1) general influence on character and behaviour, 2) choice of profession or occupation, 3) choice of love object--though in certain cases influence of a name may manifest itself in more than one of these categories.

As recently as 1957 we find the same view expressed by Murphey who had a Fiddler with a masturbatory problem, Small and Little with inferiority complexes, McCold who had trouble with his sinuses and a Hogg who first overate and then developed anorexia nervosa. One of his cases seems less coincidental. In this case each of a young man's parents had a different nickname for him. "Throughout his life and his career . . . he wavered between the choice of one of these nicknames as he wavered in his identification with and his allegiance to each of his parents" (pp. 93-94).

Oberndorf (1918, p. 47), however, disagrees. Although in the course of analyses he has noticed the "striking frequency with which patients have referred to their attitude toward their Christian names or in some way altered their surnames," he goes on to say that, "Where the reaction has had any intense force, the vital influence has depended <u>not</u> so much upon the force of the name on the person, as Abraham states, <u>but upon innate feelings</u>

which the patient believes is [sic] in some way mirrored in his name, to or against his advantage."

Plottke (1946, 1947) agrees. He refers to the widespread belief that a person's name directly influences his character as "prescientific" and "magical." Although he stresses that the individual's life pattern is formed before he develops an opinion of his name, he agrees that certain people do focus upon their name, using it according to their "guiding fiction" to symbolize their life-style. "The opinion a person has of his name can therefore reveal the life-style, as can the analysis of dreams, childhood recollections, or faulty acts" (p. 111).

Freud (1960) first published on this topic in Totem and Taboo in 1913. There he makes some connections between the behavior regarding names of primitive peoples, children and neurotics, and cites the case of a young woman who would not write her name down for fear this would fall into the hands of someone who would thereby be in possession of part of her personality. In the same place he comments,

> Even a civilized adult may be able to infer from certain peculiarities in his own behavior that he is not so far removed as he may have thought from attributing importance to proper names and

> that his own name has become to a very remarkable extent bound up with his personality. So, too, psycho-analytic practice comes upon frequent confirmation of this in the evidence it finds of the importance of names in unconscious mental activities (p. 56).

Two psychoanalytically oriented writers deal theoretically with naming. Brender (1963) lists the possible factors which may influence parents when naming a child and his opinion of the psychological correlates of each factor. Feldman (1959) sees naming as an essentially hostile, limiting act. He says names are an expression of the antagonism which people feel toward what they name, and the means by which we come to terms with unwanted, resistant objects. The named person, in turn, reflects the hostility of the namer, feeling imposed upon, as the name given him by another is an alien imprint on his personality, and yet at the same time identified with it. As evidence of this underlying feeling of hostility, he cites the fact that calling a person by his first name is often regarded as impertinence, the expression "to call names," the many name taboos that exist (based on the idea that he who can name can control) and the fact that the Greek origin of the verb "to name" is also connected with <u>onoma</u>, meaning to insult, upbraid, or blame.

Finally, he states: "Naming by parents is not a castration but a limitation of the area in which Eros may be enjoyed, a threat of castration, in the same way that the accompanying rite of circumcision or baptism is" (p. 245).

Two papers comment on the development of magical thinking in children with regard to names. Fenichel (1945, p. 46) says:

> Tying up words and ideas makes thinking proper possible. The ego has now a better weapon in handling the external world as well as its own excitations. This is the rational content of the ancient magical belief that one can master what one can name.

Berguer (1936) expands on this idea by saying that for the child it is true that control comes about through naming. Little by little, as the child learns more and more names of things and people, he is better and better able to get what he wants. Correct pronunciation, the child learns, is also of extreme importance, for if the word is not enunciated properly, the child does not have his desires fulfilled. Like the primitive, the child learns to believe that the great secret of the name, complete with correct pronunciation, is the key to power over his environment, as, indeed, in a sense it is.

In a speculative article on the psychological correlates of name change, Memmi (1966) suggests that name changes by Jewish people, ostensibly for the purpose of concealing their Jewish origin are really a compromise between retaining the Jewish identity and concealing it. He cites such changes as Aron to Nora, a reverse; Benamar to Emmanuel, a change to a name that might be Jewish; Schwartz to Black, Bronstein to Brownstone, Grunfeld to Greenfield, all translations; and Davidovitch to David, a shortened form. If these people really wished to conceal their Jewish origin, he argues, they would take a name like Smith or Jones, instead, they compromise by choosing a name that could be Jewish without having to be Jewish. The change concedes something to the demands of the non-Jewish world, yet retains a link with the Jewish name. "The name literally sticks to the person, and most people suffer when they hear theirs mutilated, as if it hurt their very being. It is doubtless the old magical fear of losing one's soul" (p. 40).

Interestingly enough, however, Israeli Jews do the same; "although the intention is exactly the opposite, the mechanisms of transformation are identical" (p. 41).

Thus, a remnant of the old name is kept, either by translation into Hebrew, keeping the meaning of the old name, choosing a name with similar sound or significance, or by the common practice of taking the name Ben_____, followed by the Hebraic name of the father. Memmi concludes, "It seems that, even in triumph, an absolute rupture with the self is not always desired" (p. 41).

Research Studies

Two early introspection studies by English (1916) and Alspach (1917) investigated whether the psychological response to unknown last names (invented by the experimenter) would be related to the form or sound of the word. They were not able to establish such a relationship.

Another group of workers studied the relationship between the frequency of a name and whether it is liked or disliked. Walton (1937) found by the method of Paired Comparisons and by the method of Absolute Judgments that common first names do have affective value (students were able to indicate a like or dislike for the name alone), and that men and women generally agree on which names

they prefer. Allen, Brown, Dickenson and Pratt (1941) found that men prefer more common first names, but that women prefer names which are neither too strange nor too common. Both men and women dislike very strange names. Finch, Kilgren and Pratt (1944) did a similar study using three age groups instead of just a college sample. An elementary school sample and a heterogeneous group of adults were also surveyed. It was found that common male names were generally preferred by all groups, but that there was greater variability among preference for female names. Among grade school girls, those dissatisfied wished for a name still more common. One of the conclusions drawn was that "Variability of name preference reaches its greatest amount among the females of childbearing age. This means that many unique names, those which are bizarre and those which represent a passing fad will be bestowed upon children" (p. 263).

In Plottke's (1950) study of 50 adolescent French girls, 64% liked their first name whereas 42% disliked their last name.

Eagleson's (1946) sample of Negro women college students indicated a preference for unusual names.

Fourteen of the 77 students who disliked their names and 32 of the 257 students who liked their names stated that their names had affected them in some manner. Of the first group all said that their names had made them more sensitive, shy, or embarrassed. Dexter (1949) found that college students with nicknames tended to be more popular than those not having nicknames.

Plank (1964) surveyed the names of several hundred twins over a period of about a score of years and found that since 1950 there has been a definite trend toward the giving of similar names to sets of twins. This may be done by rhyming the names, starting them with the same initial and so on. Plank considers this a dangerous trend since a person's name is so closely related to his status as an individual.

Three studies look for a relationship between psychopathology and unusual first names. Savage and Wells (1948) found that among Harvard undergraduates 9% of the total had unusual names, 15% of those diagnosed as psychoneurotic had unusual names and 17% of those flunking out had unusual names. Houston and Summer (1948) found a difference between a group of Negro women college students

with common first names and those with uncommon first names on the Bernreuter Personality Inventory Scale. Those with uncommon names appeared less well-adjusted on this measure; however, this was a statistically non-significant difference. In the same study, the Simms Socio-Economic Status test showed a nonsignificant difference closer to significance than the neuroticism measure in discriminating women with common from those with uncommon names. This appeared to indicate that in this group, women with less common first names came from a higher socio-economic background than those with more common first names. Ellis and Beechley (1954) went through children's case histories at a clinic over a period of three years and found that disturbance was associated with peculiar names in boys, but not in girls. The explanation they gave was that since women's names have a much wider range of acceptable variability, a girl with an unusual name is not spotlighted, as is a boy with a peculiar name. Several of the above authors speculated that strange names were more likely to be bestowed upon children by strange parents.

McDavid and Harari (1966) studied the relationship between the ratings of degree of liking of first names and the popularity of children having those names. They found a correlation of + .63 ($p < .001$) between the ratings given a name (with directions emphasizing the abstract) in a group of children, and the popularity, as assessed by sociometric analysis, of a child bearing the name. More surprisingly, however, the ratings given names by an entirely separate group from the first also correlated (+ .49, $p < .01$) with the popularity of children with those names in the first group. The two separate ratings of names by the two groups had a correlation of + .71 ($p < .001$) showing that there is a definite preference for certain names. The authors remark, "attention is drawn to the possibility that the child who bears a generally unpopular or unattractive name may be handicapped in his social interactions with peers" (p. 458).

One article (Spencer and Worthington, 1952) explains the use of the style in which a person writes his own name and those of significant others as a projective technique. (See also Hartman, 1958.) The underlying assumption is that the writing of these names is a

projection of the individual's personality, just like any other form of behavior, and the authors claim that it can be used systematically and effectively in hiring salesmen.

Name change is an area which has been surprisingly neglected by psychologists. Murphey (1957, p. 104) asserts that "Aliases and noms de plume reveal the unconscious fantasies of those using them," and no doubt many others would agree, but only two studies touch this area. Hartman (1951) studied criminal aliases and found many striking similarities between the alias and the real name of the individual. He agrees with Memmi (1966) in his conclusion that "Probably the most important psychological process underlying the selection of aliases is a conflict between the desire to achieve anonymity and the need to retain one's personal identity" (Hartment, 1951, p. 55).

He further asserts,

> The degree of similarity between original and assumed names may be taken as an important indication of the degree of personality reorganization or conflict. Where the change in name is clear-cut, we may assume corresponding changes in the individual's self-concept, and in strength of identification with his original family and social group (Hartman, 1951, p. 55).

Broom, Beem, and Harris (1955) studied the characteristics of all petitioners for a change of name in

Los Angeles County for a year. They found that 46% of the petitioners were Jewish. Among the non-Jewish petitioners ethnic considerations played a very small role. In this group the reasons for name change were usually familial (due to divorce, family break-up, etc.) or because the name itself was difficult to pronounce or had obscene or humorous connotations.

Finally, from experimental psychology we find a different kind of evidence for the importance of a person's name to him. In his studies of attention in dichotic listening, Moray (1959) found that no stimulus would break through the attention barrier except the subject's own name. He concludes, "The present results raise a problem that we may call the 'identification paradox'; that while apparently the verbal content of the rejected message is blocked below the level of conscious perception, nonetheless a subject can respond to his own name" (p. 59).

Research Related to the Present Study

Two studies attempt to find a positive relationship between a person's attitude toward his name and his

attitude toward himself. Strunk (1958) surveyed 100 male and 20 female undergraduate students using an inventory on which they were asked to write their first, middle and last names. Below these spaces were rating scales with the labels "great like," "like," "indifferent," "dislike" and "great dislike," which subjects rated for each of their names. Three days later a modified version of the Brownfain Self-Rating Inventory was administered. Findings were as follows: Very few subjects used the extremes of the scale in rating any of their names, so results were grouped into the three categories, "like," "indifferent," and "dislike." Most students liked their names, with 68% liking their first name, 58% liking their middle name, and 76% liking their last name. The first name received the largest number of "dislike" ratings with 22%, whereas the middle name was most frequently marked "indifferent" of the names with 26%. The first name was felt to be the most important of the three names judging from the written comments of the students. A statistically significant difference was found between the mean Brownfain scores of students who liked and students who disliked their first names, indicating that those who like

their names give a higher self-rating. Correlational analysis produced a significant correlation of + .356 between name rating and self-rating scores.

In a similar study, Boshier (1968) surveyed 40 female and ten male young adults using Strunk's name-rating method. One week later a modified version of Bills Index of Adjustment and Values was administered. As in the earlier study, Boshier's subjects made little use of the extremes of the rating scale; therefore, he grouped them into the three groups of "like," "indifferent" and "dislike." His findings confirmed that most subjects like their name, but in this study the first name was most liked (70%), the middle name most disliked (26%) and the last name received the most ratings for indifference (40%). Boshier attributed the indifference finding to the preponderance of female subjects in the study, whose last names have undergone or may undergo a change. All correlations between degree of liking of one's name and Bills IAV scores were statistically non-significant except one. A significant correlation of + .60 was found between the Bills self concept score and the rating of the middle name. Boshier's explanation was

that it may be easier for a subject to admit dislike of his middle name than for his first name, which is such a significant aspect of the self.

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis I:

Self esteem is positively related to the degree of liking of one's first name.

Hypothesis II:

There is a positive relationship between the level of one's self esteem and the extent to which others (peers) like one's first name.

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 37 male and 35 female ninth grade students who comprised three classes at a middle to upper-middle class suburban high school.

Measures

Self concept was measured using the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (Fitts, 1965). This is a 100-item group administered self-report inventory of statements to be rated as true or untrue of the self, using the categories, "completely false," "mostly false," "partly false and partly true," "mostly true" and "completely true." It requires a sixth grade reading level. In addition to yielding an overall self concept score, sub-scale scores provide measures of "physical," "moral-ethical," "personal," "family" and "social" self concept. (See Appendix I.)

Feelings of like or dislike of the name were measured using a seven-point rating scale with the anchors (1) "dislike very much," (2) "dislike," (3) "dislike slightly," (5) "like slightly," (6) "like" and (7) "like very much." The middle point (4) on the scale was left unlabeled. Anchor points were not numbered to avoid bias based on the response to particular numbers. The names rated on the name-liking measure were the first names of the students in the subject's high school class. The order in which the names were listed on the measure were randomized, and a rating scale, as described above, appeared next to each name. The subject thus found his own name embedded in a list of names, each of which he was to judge. Directions emphasized that the task was to judge the name qua name. (See Appendix II.)

Procedure

Each subject was given a Tennessee Self Concept Scale question booklet and answer sheet, and a copy of the name-liking measure. The self concept measure was completed first. The rating scales were administered in a group. When the rating scales were completed, each

subject was asked to write his first name on the back of the name-rating questionnaire. At this time the students were invited to write any comments or impressions they had concerning the study and its purpose. After the questionnaires were collected, the hypotheses of the study were explained and questions answered.

Method of Analysis

Hypothesis I was tested using the Pearson product-moment correlation technique to correlate the person's rating of his own first name with his overall self concept score. A "Student's" t-test of the difference between the means of the extreme groups on the name measure was also performed.

Hypothesis II was tested as follows: for each name, a mean rating score was determined using the ratings given that name by all the other subjects who rated it besides the person bearing the name. This was used as an index of how well the name is liked by students in the high school class of the person who has the name. These name-rating index scores were then correlated with the

overall self concept scores for the same individuals, using a Pearson product-moment correlation.

RESULTS

Overview

Of the 72 subjects surveyed, eleven wrote on the back of the name-rating measure a name which either did not appear on the list, or was a variant of a name appearing on the list. Thus, as these subjects had not rated their own names, data from them could not be included. Two more subjects failed to write any name on the form, likewise making it impossible to use their data. This brought the number of subjects to 59, of whom 30 were males and 29 were females.

The name-rating scores were tested for possible bias on account of response set by correlating subjects' ratings of their own name with their mean rating of all other names besides their own. "Yea-saying" or "nay-saying" response set would be indicated by a significant positive correlation of these two scores. A small, non-significant positive correlation ($r = +.142$) indicated that such a response bias was not operating to a significant degree.

As shown in Table 1, the average rating given by subjects of their own first names was 5.728, falling slightly below the "like" category on the name-rating scale. Male subjects rated their names a full point higher than female subjects, on the average. The mean rating of their own name by male subjects fell slightly above the "like" category on the scale, while the mean rating by female subjects of their own name fell just above the "like slightly" scale anchor point. This difference is significant at the .01 level (t* = 3.131).

TABLE 1

Mean Name Rating Scores of Self and Others

Group	N	Mean Rating of Own Name	Mean Rating of Names of Others
All Subjects	59	5.728	4.598
Males	30	6.233	4.578
Females	29	5.206	4.619

Also shown in Table 1 are the mean values given by the subjects to the names of others in their class. On the average, the names of others were given a rating

*All t-tests are two-tailed except where otherwise specified.

falling about halfway between the middle, indifferent, scale value and "like slightly." On the average, this rating was more than a full point lower than the ratings the subjects gave their own names, a difference which is significant at the .001 level ($t = 5.736$). The difference between own name rating and the rating of other's names by male subjects was even greater than for the whole group, as they rated their own names higher and the names of others lower than did the group as a whole ($p < .001$, $t = 7.258$). For female subjects, the difference between mean ratings of their own names and the names of others is in the same direction, but is only significant at the .10 level ($t = 1.937$).

Table 2 gives the mean self concept scores obtained by the subjects on the Tennessee Self Concept Scale. The group mean, 321.186, differs significantly ($p < .0005$, $t = 6.02$) from the mean self concept score given in the published normative data for this instrument (Fitts, 1965), which is 345.57. Male and female subjects in the present study differed somewhat from each other in mean self concept score, with females obtaining, on the average, a score about six points higher than males; however, this difference is not statistically significant.

TABLE 2

Mean Self Concept Scores

Group	N	Mean	S. D.
All Subjects	59	321.186	23.495
Males	30	318.366	24.314
Females	29	324.103	22.248

Hypothesis I

The results of the tests for the first hypothesis are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Correlational analysis (Table 3) failed to support the hypothesis that the degree of liking of one's own name is positively related to one's self concept. Correlations of +.103 for the group of 59 subjects, +.263 for the 30 male subjects and +.088 for the 29 female subjects were all statistically nonsignificant, although in the predicted direction.

TABLE 3

Correlation Values of Rating of Own Name with Self Concept

Group	N	r	Significance Level
All Subjects	59	+.103	not significant
Males	30	+.263	not significant
Females	29	+.088	not significant

Table 4 shows the results of comparing the differences between the mean self concept scores of subjects grouped according to their rating scores of their own name. A comparison of the mean self concept scores of the two extreme groups, those who rated their own name "like very much" or "dislike" (none of the 59 subjects rated his own name "dislike very much"), yields a difference of 27.439, which is significant at the .025 level ($t = 2.238$). When those who rated their names "like very much" and "like" are grouped together and the mean self concept of this group is compared with that of a group of subjects who rated their name "dislike" or "dislike slightly," the difference is 6.456, which is only significant at the .10 level ($t = 1.568$). When all subjects are grouped into two groups according to their rating of their own name, with all degrees of "like" in one group, and "indifferent" grouped with both "dislike" ratings, the difference between the mean self concept scores of the two groups is 8.025, which is not statistically significant ($t = .906$).

TABLE 4

Comparison of Mean Self Concept Scores of Subjects Who Like or Dislike Their Name

Group	N	Mean	t*	Significance Level
"like very much"	19	320.105		
vs.			2.238	$p < .025$
"dislike"	3	292.666		
"like very much" + "like"	41	322.122		
vs.			1.568	$p < .10$
"dislike" + "dislike slightly"	6	315.666		
"like very much" + "like" + "like slightly"	51	322.275		
vs.			.906	not significant
"dislike" + "dislike slightly" + "indifferent"	8	314.250		

*one-tailed test.

Hypothesis II

Table 5 shows the results of correlational analysis testing the second hypothesis. The small nonsignificant correlations between the mean rating given a name by peers and the subject's self concept score (r = -.014, -.114 and +.140 for the whole group of subjects, the males and the females, respectively) do not support the

hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the level of self esteem and the extent to which peers like one's name.

TABLE 5

Correlation Values of Rating of Name by Peers with Self Concept Score

Group	N	r	Significance Level
All Subjects	59	-.014	not significant
Males	30	-.114	not significant
Females	29	+.140	not significant

The Self Concept Subscales

Correlational analysis, as shown in Table 6, of subjects' ratings of their own name with the self concept subscales of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, reveals that physical, moral-ethical and personal aspects of the self concept are unrelated to one's degree of liking of his name. The aspect of family self, however, appears positively related to the degree of liking of one's own name ($r = +.263$, $p < .025$), particularly in males ($r = +.356$, $p < .05$). The social self concept appears

unrelated to the degree of liking of one's name in the group as a whole, and in female subjects, but in male subjects there is a positive relationship between the social self concept and the degree of liking of the name ($r = +.386$, $p < .025$).

TABLE 6

Correlation Values of Rating of Own Name with Self Concept Subscales

	Group	N	r	Significance Level
Physical Self	All Subjects	59	+.144	not significant
	Males	30	+.194	not significant
	Females	29	+.104	not significant
Moral-Ethical Self	All Subjects	59	-.134	not significant
	Males	30	+.030	not significant
	Females	29	+.015	not significant
Personal Self	All Subjects	59	-.015	not significant
	Males	30	-.098	not significant
	Females	29	+.055	not significant
Family Self	All Subjects	59	+.263	$p < .025$
	Males	30	+.356	$p < .05$
	Females	29	+.181	not significant
Social Self	All Subjects	59	+.009	not significant
	Males	30	+.386	$p < .025$
	Females	29	-.161	not significant

Table 7 shows correlations between mean ratings of subjects' names by peers and their scores on the subscales of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale. Physical, personal and social aspects of the self concept appear to be unrelated to the degree to which one's name is liked by peers. Moral-ethical self concept appears to be negatively related to the degree of liking of one's name by peers for the group as a whole ($r = -.290$, $p < .025$) and for females analyzed separately ($r = -.320$, $p < .05$). Male subjects show a nonsignificant trend in the same direction ($r = -.163$). The family self concept appears to be unrelated to the degree of liking of one's name by peers in the group taken as a whole, and in female subjects. Male subjects, however, show a significant positive correlation between family self concept and degree to which the first name is liked by others ($r = +.317$, $p < .05$).

TABLE 7

Correlation Values of Rating of Name by Peers with Self Concept Subscales

	Group	N	r	Significance level
Physical Self	All Subjects	59	+.004	not significant
	Males	30	-.037	not significant
	Females	29	+.027	not significant
Moral-Ethical Self	All Subjects	59	-.290	$p < .025$
	Males	30	-.163	not significant
	Females	29	-.320	$p < .05$
Personal Self	All Subjects	59	+.006	not significant
	Males	30	+.162	not significant
	Females	29	-.137	not significant
Family Self	All Subjects	59	+.135	not significant
	Males	30	+.317	$p < .05$
	Females	29	-.012	not significant
Social Self	All Subjects	59	+.034	not significant
	Males	30	+.150	not significant
	Females	29	-.001	not significant

Additional Findings

There is a significant positive correlation between subjects' ratings of their own names and the rating of their names by others, if the group is analyzed as a

whole ($r = +.241$, $p < .05$). (See Table 8.) This trend is especially marked among male subjects ($r = +.434$, $p < .01$).

TABLE 8

Correlation Values of Rating of Own Name with Rating of Name by Peers

Group	N	r	Significance level
All Subjects	59	+.241	$p < .05$
Males	30	+.434	$p < .01$
Females	29	+.049	not significant

This finding led to the speculation that since there is significant agreement between self and peers as to how likeable first names are, perhaps self concept would show a significant positive relationship with a difference score indicating how much higher a person rated his own name than the mean rating given it by others. Accordingly, difference scores were computed and correlated with self concept scores. The results are shown in Table 9. Difference scores indicating how much more a person likes his name than his peers do appear unrelated to self concept.

TABLE 9

Correlation Values of Difference Scores with Self Concept

Group	N	r	Significance level
All Subjects	59	+.101	not significant
Males	30	+.179	not significant
Females	29	+.136	not significant

DISCUSSION

Overview

The name-rating data uphold the findings of earlier studies (Boshier, 1968; Strunk, 1958) that most subjects like their own first names. That the mean rating of their own names was a full point higher for men than for women may be explained by earlier findings (Allen, Brown, Dickinson & Pratt, 1941; Finch, Kilgren & Pratt, 1944) which indicate that women tend to be rather choosy in their preference for female first names. They like names that are neither too common, nor too uncommon. Men, on the other hand, only dislike very uncommon names, so there are fewer names to which they would object. A clear-cut sex difference in liking of one's own name, however, is a new finding not previously reported.

That subjects rated their own names significantly higher than the names of others is understandable if one accepts that the personal name is, indeed, highly

cathected. From this point of view it would be surprising if subjects did not give their own names ratings further from indifference than the names of others.

Self Concept Scores

Perhaps the most interesting finding of this study, that the self concept scores for this group of ninth grade students have a mean value that is 24 points lower than the mean value for the normative group on which the scale was standardized, raises many more questions than it answers. Other work with the Tennessee Self Concept Scale has shown delinquent adolescents and young unwed mothers to have lower self concept scores than control groups of the same age (Atchison, 1958; Boston & Kew, 1964; Lefeber, 1964), but no age related differences are reported in normal groups (Fitts, 1965). Engel (1959) found low self concept among high school dropouts, and found that those eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade subjects with low self concept scores also rated higher on the Pd and D scales of the MMPI.

Are we to conclude, then, that the ninth grade middle to upper-middle class students in the present study

are potential high school dropouts, delinquents, unwed mothers or psychopathic deviates? Two additional findings may help to clarify the meaning of these low scores. In Engel's (1959) longitudinal study of self concept in high school students, those whose self concept was higher at the time of the second testing (two years after the first), also had increased ratings by peers. Secondly, she found that self concept scores, overall, rose for the older group between the time of their testing as tenth graders and their later testing in the twelfth grade.

A number of factors, then, may be contributing to these depressed scores. East Lansing High School, where the data were gathered, is commonly felt by the students there to be a high-pressure school with much fierce competition to succeed. Many students seem to feel that everyone else is doing better than they. In keeping with Engel's data, if students feel that their peers do not think highly of them, self concept scores may be lowered. Also in keeping with Engel's data, it may be that this ninth grade age group (like her tenth grade group) is at a particularly vulnerable time in terms of lowered self concept, and that with the passage of a few years, self

concept will rise with increased status and ease in the high school milieu.

A further consideration is response set. How were the subjects answering the questions? According to whose frame of reference? One student volunteered the written comment, "On the self concept test right and wrong are what I feel was right and wrong, not other people."

That she felt it necessary to defend this response set in spite of the encouragement of the test instructions to respond "as if you were describing yourself to yourself," indicates that such an inner struggle may have been going on in other students as well. It may be that on encountering an item such as, "I do what is right most of the time," many students thought, "I do what I think is right, but not what my parents think is right," and were confused as to how to mark the item. With stereotypical adolescent rebelliousness, many may have answered negatively to such items, using an outer reference point for the definition of "what is right." At this early adolescent stage, much self-definition seems to occur negatively, as the child begins to grow away from the family. That there was considerable conflict between the students

in this sample and their families is born out by the scores on the family self subscale. Of the 72 subjects who took the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, 37.5% fell below the normal cut-off point for the family self concept subscale, more than for any other subscale. This fact alone, of course, also helps to account for the lowered overall self concept scores, as they are additive with family self a contributing factor. Whether self concept is low in this age group in general, and why, is a subject certainly worthy of further investigation.

An additional factor is that the self concept measure was administered anonymously. Subjects were asked to write their names only on the back of the name-rating measure, not on the self concept answer sheet. Thus, they could respond in terms of their true feelings, unhampered by a response set for socially desirable answers. This view is perhaps supported by the data from the two subjects who gave no name at all. Their self concept scores were 260 and 249, far below even the mean for this group.

Hypothesis I

Findings related to the first hypothesis indicate that the relationship between a person's degree of liking for his name and his self concept is not a positive linear one. Rather, it seems to be a phenomenon of extremes. Apparently feelings about the name are a good measure of self concept when they are very strong in either direction. This, of course, would fit with data from clinical practice where one encounters patients with low self esteem who violently dislike their names. It may be, then, that to ask a person how he feels about his name will not necessarily be very revealing. On the other hand, if a person's feelings about his name are salient enough and strong enough for him to express them spontaneously, his verbalizations may give important clues about his self image.

Hypothesis II

The hypothesis that the level of self concept is positively related to how well others (peers) like one's name was not supported by correlational analysis.

Unfortunately, the rating of names by others tended toward the mean, so a test of extreme groups could not be performed. It may be that, as was the case with the first hypothesis, this hypothesis would hold true for names that are highly liked or disliked, although a positive linear relationship cannot be demonstrated. This would probably be especially true for social self, as other studies have reported that unusual, humorous or difficult to pronounce names had made the bearer feel socially ill at ease, shy or embarrassed.

The Self Concept Subscales

The finding that family self concept shows a significant positive correlation with a person's degree of liking for his own name gives an additional clue to the meaning of the name as a part of the self. It appears that the name, bestowed and used by the parents, is especially closely tied to one's concept of oneself as a family member. Certainly anthropological data emphasize the importance of the name as a part of a family or kinship system. It would seem that this is also true in our own culture. An additional light is thrown on this

finding by Erikson's (1956) passing comment that adolescents often insist on being called by a different name or nickname, a common practice in this country which parents often find exasperating because they forget to call their teenager by his "new" name with ensuing quarrels. So it may be that the adolescent who is still relatively satisfied with himself in the context of his family, who is managing to grow up without undue family disharmony, remains satisfied with his name, his family identity. In contrast, the adolescent who is growing away from his family in the style of "storm and strife" appears to reject his childhood name, if only for awhile, along with his family in his attempt at self definition.

Another way of viewing findings relating family self concept to degree of liking for one's name is to look more closely at the self concept measure itself. A factor analytic study of the construct validity of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale (Vacchiano & Strauss, 1968) revealed that two factors which contained two thirds of the items on the family self subscale alone accounted for 36% of the variance (the other twenty factors combined accounted for only 30% of the variance). Thus, it seems that family

self is a powerful dimension, more so than any other portion of the scale. This would tend to indicate that the degree of liking for one's name is a stronger indicator of self concept than it appears to be when correlated with overall self concept scores.

The finding that social self concept shows a significant positive correlation with degree of liking of one's name in male subjects, but not in female subjects, or the group taken as a whole, is difficult to explain. Perhaps in their typically more advanced stage of social development at this point in adolescence, the determinants of social self concept are simply much more complex for females than for their male age counterparts.

That moral-ethical self concept is negatively related to degree of liking of peers for one's name is equally puzzling. If one has an unpopular name, does he then make an extra effort to be an especially ethical person, in order to compensate and make a good impression on different grounds? Or is it that those who see themselves as morally weak are admired by their adolescent age mates for this type of "rebellion" and this esteem, in turn, is reflected in a higher rating given to the

name? That this finding should be significant for females, but not for males, perhaps supports the latter explanation, reflecting the admiration of peers for girls who appear provocatively "immoral."

The positive relationship between family self concept and degree of liking of one's name by peers in males may indicate that those boys who say they get along well with their family are also easy for peers to get along with, and this is reflected in the higher ratings given their names by classmates. On the other hand, it may also be the case that those given attractive, popular names by their parents have parents who are more considerate of them and empathic toward them than parents who choose less likeable names for their boys, and consequently, they get along with these parents. Why, then, would this finding be absent in girls? The complex determinants of self concept in the adolescent girl make attempts at explanation extremely difficult. One can only say that whatever qualities make peers like or dislike female names, they are not the same qualities that determine how well a girl says she gets along with her family.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Findings on the name rating measure indicated that most subjects like their own first names, but males like their first names better than do females, rating them a full point higher. This sex difference is a new finding, not reported elsewhere. Subjects also rated their names over a full point higher, on the average, than the mean of the ratings they gave to the names of their peers. This supports the view that the first name is a highly cathected part of the self, not viewed with indifference by the individual.

Subjects in the present study had significantly lower self concept scores than the group on which the self concept test was standardized, especially in the area of family self concept. This was attributed, in part, to the typical conflict between the adolescent and his family, and his changing reference point for values, but it was felt that the self concept in early adolescence was an important area for further study. No age

differences were reported for the normative sample for the Tennessee Self Concept Scale.

Although a positive linear relationship between a person's self concept and his degree of liking for his own first name was not demonstrated, analysis of the groups who rated their names at the extremes of the name liking measure indicated that there is a significant difference in self concept between those who strongly like and those who strongly dislike their names. This led to the prediction that those who feel strongly enough about their names to spontaneously give an account of their feelings about their names will be giving an indication of their level of self esteem.

The hypothesis that self concept would show a positive relationship to the degree of liking of the first name by peers was not supported by correlational analysis. It was suggested that if extreme groups could be obtained for peer ratings of names, a comparison of mean self concept scores would show a significant difference in the predicted direction.

Of the self concept subscales, family self was found to correlate positively with degree of liking for

one's first name, especially for males. This may be understood both in terms of the significance of the first name as a part of the concept of the self as a member of a family with whom one is in harmony, and as an indication of the strength and importance of this subscale of the self concept test. It may be that the degree of liking for the first name is a more powerful measure of self concept than the correlational test of the first hypothesis indicates.

Moral-ethical self was found to correlate negatively with the degree of liking of one's name by one's peers, especially for females. Like other sex difference findings in this study, this is difficult to explain. One can only say that the correlates of self concept in females are confusing and complex enough to indicate that the determinants of self concept in the young adolescent girl are likely to be equally complex.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ITEMS COMPRISING SUBSCALES OF THE TENNESSEE SELF CONCEPT SCALE

PHYSICAL SELF

1. I have a healthy body.
2. I like to look nice and neat all the time.
3. I am an attractive person.
4. I am full of aches and pains.
5. I consider myself a sloppy person.
6. I am a sick person.
7. I am neither too fat nor too thin.
8. I am neither too tall nor too short.
9. I like my looks just the way they are.
10. I don't feel as well as I should.
11. I would like to change some parts of my body.
12. I should have more sex appeal.
13. I take good care of myself physically.
14. I feel good most of the time.
15. I try to be careful about my appearance.
16. I do poorly in sports and games.

Appendix I (Cont.)

17. I often act like I am "all thumbs."

18. I am a poor sleeper.

MORAL-ETHICAL SELF

19. I am a decent sort of person.

20. I am a religious person.

21. I am an honest person.

22. I am a moral failure.

23. I am a bad person.

24. I am a morally weak person.

25. I am satisfied with my moral behavior.

26. I am as religious as I want to be.

27. I am satisfied with my relationship to God.

28. I wish I could be more trustworthy.

29. I ought to go to church more.

30. I shouldn't tell so many lies.

31. I am true to my religion in my everyday life.

32. I do what is right most of the time.

33. I try to change when I know I'm doing things that are wrong.

34. I sometimes use unfair means to get ahead.

Appendix I (Cont.)

35. I sometimes do very bad things.

36. I have trouble doing things that are right.

PERSONAL SELF

37. I am a cheerful person.

38. I have a lot of self-control.

39. I am a calm and easy going person.

40. I am a hateful person.

41. I am a nobody.

42. I am losing my mind.

43. I am satisfied to be just what I am.

44. I am as smart as I want to be.

45. I am just as nice as I should be.

46. I am not the person I would like to be.

47. I despise myself.

48. I wish I didn't give up as easily as I do.

49. I can always take care of myself in any situation.

50. I solve my problems quite easily.

51. I take the blame for things without getting mad.

52. I change my mind a lot.

Appendix I (Cont.)

53. I do things without thinking about them first.

54. I try to run away from problems.

FAMILY SELF

55. I have a family that would always help me in any kind of trouble.

56. I am an important person to my friends and family.

57. I am a member of a happy family.

58. I am not loved by my family.

59. My friends have no confidence in me.

60. I feel that my family doesn't trust me.

61. I am satisfied with my family relationships.

62. I treat my parents as well as I should.

63. I understand my family as well as I should.

64. I am too sensitive to things my family say.

65. I should trust my family more.

66. I should love my family more.

67. I try to play fair with my friends and family.

68. I do my share of work at home.

69. I take a real interest in my family.

70. I quarrel with my family.

Appendix I (Cont.)

71. I give in to my parents.

72. I do not act like my family thinks I should.

SOCIAL SELF

73. I am a friendly person.

74. I am popular with women.

75. I am popular with men.

76. I am mad at the whole world.

77. I am not interested in what other people do.

78. I am hard to be friendly with.

79. I am as sociable as I want to be.

80. I am satisfied with the way I treat other people.

81. I try to please others, but I don't overdo it.

82. I should be more polite to others.

83. I am no good at all from a social standpoint.

84. I ought to get along better with other people.

85. I try to understand the other fellow's point of view.

86. I see good points in all the people I meet.

87. I get along well with other people.

88. I do not feel at ease with other people.

Appendix I (Cont.)

89. I do not forgive others easily.

90. I find it hard to talk with strangers.

APPENDIX II

NAME-LIKING QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions:

On the following pages are lists of boys' and girls' first names. Next to each name is a rating scale on which you are to rate the name from "like very much" to "dislike very much." Please rate how much you like the name itself, not how much you may like or dislike people who bear the name.

Examples:

If you like the name "June" very much, you would mark the scale like this:

June



If you slightly dislike the name "Pete," you would mark the scale like this:

Pete



If you really cannot decide whether you like or dislike the name, "Dorothy," or you feel truly indifferent toward the name, you would mark the scale like this:

Dorothy



Appendix II (Cont.)

Remember your ratings should reflect your degree of like or dislike for the name itself, regardless of how much you may like or dislike people you know who have the name.

Thank you very much.

Helen



Carter



Steve



Theresa



Gordon



Julie



Kathy



Sandy



Ernie