OUR VICHY TRIAL AND ERROR: A STUDY OF AMERICAN-VICHY RELATIONS

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[illegible] the [illegible] following [illegible] from the conclusions reached.

1. The [illegible] policy [illegible] the [illegible] are not necessarily a result of that policy.

2. United States [illegible] not anti- [illegible].

3. [illegible].

Approved -
John R. Harrison

THE

"And if it is a death to your world darling,
see first that his throne created within
you is destroyed."----------Ibrahim

INTRODUCTION

In his book, For All Mankind, Leon Blum has said, "The problem of civilization, as it has been ever since humanity became conscious of itself, is precisely that of replacing animal energies by disciplined, harmonized, and spiritualized forces, of transforming savage idolatries and bigotries into reasoned certainties or into convictions based on the demands of the individual conscience."[1]

This statement represents a goal toward which humanity must strive if it is to progress and survive. Hitler and Nazism represented a retrogression to the "savage idolatries and bigotries" of which Blum spoke. It was our duty to stop the spread of fascism and demand that we oppose this relapse-this decadence which formed an internal part of Nazism. The problem of France under the Vichy regime was one of our many opportunities to test the ideals that we claim as part of the American creed.

Our government was faced with two possibilities in respect to France. In 1940 she could not have prevented the French military collapse; that much must be conceded. Militarily the United States was not prepared to support anyone in 1940. The question is whether after the collapse, the United States, in recognizing the Vichy Government and refusing the Free French under de Gaulle, failed in her duty to the ideals which her own constitution established, or whether she was justified in this step as a necessary device toward furthering her own military welfare.

The problem that confronted our government in 1940 and the years

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1. Leon Blum, For All Mankind, New York, 1946, p. 30

that followed is one that is old and familiar--that other expediency is more important than moral integrity. In the long run, one wonders whether a sacrifice of moral integrity actually proves to be the expedient move. But, one cannot ignore the fact that we are judging by hindsight, not foresight and had we been placed in the position of Cordell Hull or Franklin Roosevelt, it is hard to say which direction we might have taken.

Chapter I

France falls

On June 17, 1940, France-the once invincible number one power on the continent of Europe, the nation Napoleon had led to glory, the nation whose civilization set the pace for the entire world-was humiliated in defeat after a mere six weeks of fighting. Her conqueror was her age old enemy, Germany. People the whole world over were stunned. It seemed to them that what had happened was impossible. The most sensitive was France. If mighty France had fallen before the jaws of the Nazi war machine, what chance had the other nations of the world should Hitler decide to concentrate his force on them? What chance did England have with such a small army and only an alliance and navy to protect her? And after England, perhaps the world. This blow had really brought home to all the nations of the world the reality of their unpreparedness to oppose the well organized, well equipped, and highly mechanized force that Hitler possessed.

One question, which was foremost in the minds of the world in 1940, was why? Why had France fallen so quickly? Was it due entirely to the immensity and power of Hitler's forces or was it due to the lack of preparedness in France's military might? Perhaps the unpreparedness was not military. Could one blame the instability of the French government? the decreasing birth rate? the apathy of the French people? These and a thousand other suppositions crossed the minds of those who could not believe, let alone understand, the sudden collapse of France who so long had been the leader in European civilization. Today we know that the answer is not any one of these things but a combination of all the conflicting elements within France, preventing the spirit of national unity which

was necessary to give France the time needed to withstand the blows of the German military machine.

"The moral unity of the nation at the outbreak of the First World War was to make the Marne and Verdun possible. If the miracle was not repeated in 1939 or 1940, we shall see that to a considerable extent it was because internal unity had been lacking, because foreign and military policies were hampered and weakened by political friction, class conflict, and social division within France."[1]

The explanation for the disunity in France in 1940 lies not alone in recent years. Disunity resulted from many of the same factors which existed prior to the French downfall of 1871-factors which have not ceased to exist but rather, have grown.

First of all, France is the stronghold of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. The Church still holds a great deal of sway over the political affairs of France-not so much through its influence on the men who run the government, but through the pressure it can and does apply to the voters through the parish priests. The Church is historically a conservative body which has even at times been the bulwark of moral power for the ruling kings of France. Thus the Church formed a faction that sometimes managed to split in two the most strongly united political groups.

Right along side of the clergy, is the military element in France, also traditionally conservative. Its reputation was one of glory from earliest times. However, it was during the time of Napoleon Bonaparte when France's strength made itself felt the world over. The story of

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1. Leon Dostert, France and the War, New York, 1942, p. 5

Napoleon to victory with which we are all familiar and in spite of his ultimate defeat, what remained strongest in French hearts was the legend of Napoleon the Victor, not the final defeat and chagrin. France had developed a military leadership and confidence that would take two defeats by Germany to destroy. This overconfidence which had originated in the Napoleonic Wars was one factor that convinced the military leaders of 1940 that warfare was still the same as in 1914. The army that had brought them victory then, was the army that would bring them victory now. Both they and the general population suffered under the illusion that the Maginot Line was impregnable.

"The General Staff had for years asserted that any great offensive against the Maginot fortis would entail such great losses and involve such grave risks as to remain really a practical impossibility."[2]

How well we know now the folly there was in such an assertion. And how well it revealed the failure of the French General Staff to keep up with the developments of modern warfare, especially the role to be played by air power. Leon Dostert condemns the military leaders for their blindness to new and improved military developments.

"It should not be overlooked that older military leaders, Petain, Weygand, and after 1935, Gamelin whose first World War records gave them a prestige and authority that none of the younger and bolder military minds could challenge, were another obstacle to the development of more aggressive strategy, tactics, and weapons."[3]

Just such a younger mind was that of General Charles de Gaulle. "The army of the future will move on motorized treads," de Gaulle

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2. Dostert, Op. cit., p. 18

3. Ibid., p. 9

wrote in 1934. "The Maginot line is limited in depth and leaves Northern France exposed," he warned.[4] It was not until June of 1940, however, that de Gaulle was recognized and elevated in a position where he might further expand his ideas, and by that time, of course, it was tragically late.

The ugly spectre of anti-Semitism had also left its mark on France. The first time this feeling had come to a head, was in the 1890's when the Dreyfus affair occurred.[5] The Dreyfus case not only split the country over the Jewish question; it seen divided the country into two factions, representing the old groups of right and left. The rightists were anti-Dreyfusards, and predominantly composed of the clergy, monarchists, militarists, the upper bourgeois, and the peasants. The leftists included the proletariat, the lower bourgeois and the intelligentsia. Not only did the Dreyfus affair cause a stronger break between right and left; it also caused breaks within political parties themselves that prevented stability in any French cabinet.

Again in 1940, anti-Semitism had reached new heights. That, along with the anti-alien feeling that had also spoken up, added one more factor to the disunity in France leading to her collapse.

"There was a preponderance of anti-alien feeling-strong in a country that takes in billions each year from the tourist trade. At the same time, anti-Semitism which had been rampant since the Dreyfus overturnment, rose to unprecedented proportions. Peace-loving Jews, thus went the story, was being driven into war merely because fascist mere,

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4. "Paper-porin on France", Time, August 4, 1941, p. 14

5. For a complete account of the Dreyfus case, see: William Herson, Two Dreyfus to Let in, New York, 1941.

above all Englishmen, Americans and the Jews of all nations desired it."[6]

The anti-English feeling mentioned above is an important point. The French had never been very strongly pro-British, and historically these two nations had been almost constant foes. The Entente Cordiale was the first sign of friendship and this had been none too firm. The fact that France, because of her vulnerable location was the nation to suffer the first brunt of any German attack did not aid Anglo-French relations.

"It would no doubt fairly express the French dilemma, as felt by most Frenchmen, to say that France is trapped between the devil and the deep blue sea. Since 1914 she has hated Britain and feared Germany; hated Britain because in her fear of Germany, she felt bound to accept the Entente Cordiale and then found its logical fulfillment, war with Germany gave to Britain the comfortable protection of the English channel, while France herself had to face the first and worst onslaught of the enemy. No honest Briton will deny that generally dealt unfairly with France . . ."[7]

"The phrase that 'England would be willing to fight to the last French soldier' was known all over France long before the war and had its effect."[8] This anti-English sentiment was used to great advantage by the Vichy government under Laval and Darlan, as we shall see later.

It would be difficult and lengthy to include a discussion of all the political parties in France prior to her collapse in 1940. Suffice

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6. Heinz Pol, Suicide of a Democracy, New York, 1940, p. 40

7. L. Allen, "Foreign Affairs", Contemporary Review, November 1941, p. 322

8. Pol, Op. cit., p. 50

it to say that they were exceedingly numerous. However, a description could be made of the Socialist party as represented by Leon Blum. In 1936 the Popular Front under Blum had made an attempt to form a government and had failed. He had been called in as a representative of the left wing whose member groups-the Radical Socialists, the Socialists, and Communists-had sought to use their strength to get in power. At the time that Blum entered office, he was faced with a nation threatened by strikes and labor difficulties. He managed to cope with the immediate troubles. Nevertheless, when his attempt to straighten out financial difficulties failed and he asked for special emergency powers to try to solve the problem, the Senate refused him these powers. Consequently Blum resigned to be followed by Radical Socialist Chautemps, who tried unsuccessfully to maintain the Popular Front Government.[9] On January 14, 1938 Chautemps resigned to be followed by Edouard Daladier.

While Daladier remained in office, some efforts were made to improve France's military condition. However, in March of 1940, when German aggression left no doubt in the minds of anyone as to the imminence of war, Daladier was succeeded by Paul Reynaud, a champion of Paul Ferrary.

The Blum wing had also considered that France was obligated to stand by her treaty with Czechoslovakia and if Hitler were told in no many words just what France's stand would be that Hitler would not dare to undertake the risk of war by invading Czechoslovakia.[10]

Out of this maelstrom of groups-political, social, and economic-emerged two ugly heads, Fascism and Communism. The communist strength was not

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9. F. Lee Benns, Europe Since 1914, New York, 1917, p. 516

10. Dal, Op. cit., p. 97

naturally so great in France; however, communism no matter how weak, was a potential threat to the conservative interests in France. The conservatives, especially the peasants, could not afford to take chances with this myth which challenged property ownership. Consequently they were more than vulnerable to the anti-communist propaganda that the fascist groups provided. These groups, of course, did not call themselves fascistic, but like which they sponsored were as fascist as Hitler's Government itself.

"Just as had happened in Germany, a certain portion of French industry believed it could bring about the downfall of the democratic regime by financial and ideological support of a fascist terrorist organization, on the premise that this was the only way to beat out Bolshevism."[11]

Well indeed, might Blum ask, "Why was there no uprising in France after the Anschluss, after the occupation of Prague, or before or after Munich, of the spirit of national unity that in England brought together all sections of society in a common impulse? It was the duty of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class to take charge of this movement, and direct it; in fact, it not only did not do so, but tried to stamp it."[12]

Among the groups which led this spirit of fascism which prevailed prior to 1940 were the Croix de Feu, the Action Française and the Jacquelards. The first organization claimed as a charter member none other than General Maxime Weygand, who along with Petain has been questioned about his efforts to resist the Germans.[13]

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11. Bel, Op. cit., pp. 11-12

12. Blum, Op. cit., p. 92

13. E. Buckeline, "The Other France", Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 1941, p. 3

The second group found a leader in Charles Maurras, a collaborationist propagandist, and the last group was one that people associated with Marshal Petain and his personal staff, although whether or not Petain was actually a member is questionable.

"The political orientation of the Petain government-whose all its foreign and domestic policies-may be said to be almost identical with the ideas of the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français."[14]

Furthermore, French industry had become involved with Germany. Such collaboration between these countries was natural. Germany had many resources which French industry needed, especially the coal of the Ruhr area. In return France was shipping iron ore to German industrial centers. Even as late as 1939, the French continued to ship ore to Germany in large shipments.

"German rearmament was no secret . . . When even after the attack on Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia the (French industrialists) maintained that shipping raw materials to Germany was the best guarantee for the maintenance of peace, they were simply being hypocritical."[15]

Finally there was the factor of general despair which prevailed in France even before war started between France and Germany. Such an attitude of despair might be attributable to several things. The state of devastation in which France found herself subsequent to World War I was not a fact to be considered lightly. Recall that an enormous part of the fighting had taken place on French soil, and consider how much material

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14. Bel, Op. cit., p. 37

15. Ibid., pp. 77-78

[illegible] this [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] Allied victory of 1918, in proportion to [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]. 1,400,000 [illegible] killed in battle; 4,200,000 were wounded or maimed; a large portion of territory, containing almost one-third of France's productive resources, was devastated by four years of conflict; and the public debt increased several fold. These losses left the French unable to face the critical years of internal and European reconstruction.[16] Little wonder, then, that little more than a decade later, France would be still unprepared materially and psychologically to meet another struggle with Germany.

Secondly, France's concern often led to insecurity. Fear of another assault led her frequently to use her influence to make security from a disarmed Germany the basis for her foreign policy.[17] At the Paris Conference, France's demands were not accepted in full, and a treaty by which France, Britain and the United States would aid France if she were again the victim of German aggression, was not ratified by the United States. Subsequently, Britain withdrew from a pact to the treaty also.[18] In fact, France was [illegible] that the [illegible] agreement with England, Britain's security, [illegible] Allies. Unfortunately, the indifference with which such [illegible] pact contributed to France's feeling that she was left in the face of a Titanic [illegible].

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15. Dechent, G. op. cit., p. 7

17. Ibid., p. 8.

18. Thomas, D. op. cit., p. 222

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Claude Bourdet, a former [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], describes the city-firm that existed previous to the war and that has changed little since the war.

"When the economic situation has been critical, the French ruling class [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] effort for technical improvement and better management, but [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Letter II

Daladier, Britain, and the Capitulation

Germany invaded the low Countries on May 10, 1940 and within a week, both the French and British forces that had entered the struggle had been pushed back in such a way as to clearly reveal the weakness of their position.[1] The tragedy of Dunkirk at the end of May caused that French colleague would probably be just a matter of time, and not a very long time at that.

The leadership of Daladier itself it may be called into at the time of the collapse in the spring of 1940, was in the hands of Premier Paul Reynaud under the presidency of Albert Lebrun. That Reynaud's intentions were honest and courtly I personally acknowledge. Of his patriotism, there is little question. Unfortunately, however, Reynaud was not a strong man, and was surrounded by defeatists, and peace-lists, the most influential one being his mistress, Madame Helene de Portes. Yet unlike Pontius Pilate, the French Premier attempted to wash his hands of the entire affair by appointing Petain to the Vice-Premier's office and Weygand to the supreme command of the army in place of General Gamelin. It is interesting to note that on June 6th, he appointed General Charles de Gaulle as Undersecretary of War.[2]

As if to further aid in securing any moral stability from his own person, the Premier made frantic pleas to the British, and especially the United States. The only aid that the United States could have made then would have been a fleet perhaps. However, although our

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1. William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, New York, 1947, pp. 5-6

2. Ibid., pp. 10-11

[illegible] and Pearl Harbor, at the time it was hoped [illegible] in the Pacific and our Atlantic fleet was really impossible.[3] Leopoldie's ties to the United States were very strong, although not quite [illegible]-l.[illegible]. The British, under the admirable fortitude of Winston Churchill tried to [illegible] the King of Belgium the reasons [illegible] for holding out and even went so far as to offer a union of the two nations, France on the land, for the duration of the war.[4] The purpose of the union was to bolster the French and to unite the French fleet with that of the British.[5] The proposal was dismissed after little consideration by the French Government. The anti-British faction immediately used this suggestion of union to show that Britain wanted to make France a ward of the British Empire. At any rate the idea failed to win any support except from General de Gaulle who had helped to initiate it.

It was not long after this that Leopoldie was in the last alternative. At 9:00 P.M. on the 16th of June, Leopoldie bowed in his resignation in hope of [illegible], although he still probably had the support of the French Government and his own cabinet.[6] The reason was that he did not want to be in office when a capitulation took place and undoubtedly he felt that the French people would stand more united under Petain-Pétain, hero and leader of World War I than they would under him. In this assumption, it has made it, Leopoldie was correct. The French people showed the resolve expected to follow Marshal Petain in the [illegible] of [illegible], and I think it would be fair to say that French public

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3. Ibid., pp. 17-18

4. Ibid., p. 22

5. Ibid., p. 23

6. Ibid., p. 23

opinion were substantial support to the theme of Vichy.[7] But the French forgot or did not know that Pétain had been a notorious pacifist even in World War I, and he had been looked on disapprovingly by prominent leaders like Léon Blum and Clemenceau.[8] Or perhaps they felt, too, as Jouvenel did that since peace with Hitler was about to come, Pétain and Laval would be in a better position to bargain with Hitler than anyone else. In any case, it is generally acknowledged that Pétain was a mystical, and respected by a majority of the French population when he first took over the government. If they do not be retained this support is set up for a later chapter.

". . . prior to the total occupation of France in November, 1942, the government of Pétain had a good deal of popular support they might be expected. In June 1940, the people of France were dismayed when they were told an armistice had been asked for, but the vast majority later almost without question, themselves were satisfied that it would Pétain had saved their country from a terrible fate and that he had been right in doing dishonorably justice."[9]

Pétain, supported by Laval, wasted no time in requesting an armistice. In fact he was so rushed, considered that France was defeated, and would be well to salvage the best and strike the best bargain possible with Hitler. It must also be remembered that the French did not feel that England would be able to hold out much longer against

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7. A British Subject Recently in France, "But Vichy Was Done for France", Contemporary, March 1945, p. 172

8. Lagger, Op. cit., p. 8

9. A British Subject Recently in France, Op. cit., p. 173

Hitler either.[10] In 1940, it was difficult to foresee a possible British victory and anti-British and defeatist propaganda had its effect. Britain was, after all, only the creating of a million mathematic and industrious people.

The question of an armistice brought with it another question of Par-excellence importance-the disposition of the French fleet. Both the United States and England were anxious to keep the fleet out of Hitler's hands, and this goal became a major premise in the United States policy with Vichy. The French navy contained sufficient strength to become a real menace to the Allies if it were combined with the naval forces of Germany. Consequently British and American diplomacy moved to the armistice sought to keep the French Government from allowing the fleet to Germany in the event of a complete settlement.

According to the terms of the armistice, which Germany and France signed on June 22, Germany was to assume the entire military and financial assets and to occupy two thirds of the country to the Loire. Disarmament was to be immediate and complete. In regard to the fleet, it was to be returned to French ports and be disarmed under German supervision. Some units were to be released for the protection of the French Empire. Germany declared that she did not intend to use the fleet for her own purposes. This promise, coming from Hitler was not very assuring to either the United States or Great Britain.[11]

There had never been any question in the mind of Britain as to whether or not peace terms would be continued in the empire. Unlike

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10. Ibid., Op. cit., p. 42

11. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, 1948, Vol. 1, p. 705

Reynaud, who would have desired a renewed fight from South Africa or Western headquarters, but in reality wanted to call it quits and that is just what he did in signing an armistice, rather than surrendering unconditionally.

Petain had reached his eighty-fifth year by the time he took over the French Government. It might once more be mentioned that he had been known to his superior officers as very pessimistic during the first war, and old age is not noted for optimism nor zeal during. Nor was Petain the exception. He also had a reputation for being a devout Catholic, although Duverger points out that he married a divorced woman when he was over sixty years old.[12] Petain was not a republican but a man nobject who held the republic in scorn.

"It is a formidable significant to note that the present Chief of State (Petain) has blamed attributed the defeat of France to her republican institutions, and to the democratic ideal."[13]

In June 1940, Petain said the following: "For the three quarters of a century that preceded the war, the political regime to which France had been submitted, had for its mainspring the exploitation of discontent."[14]

For a right comprehension of the aged, uncertain, cunning, of Petain at this time, one must never forget the tournament of the French people. His name was symbolic of a certain security once known to France through pride in tradition. The Lorraine even for just a while symbol around

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12. Maurice Duverger, The Governments of France, New York, 1944, p. 274

13. Dentent, op. cit., p. 4

14. Ibid., p. 8

which the country could rally, if not in love, then in disaster. It looked like the most honorable out to [illegible] in that I think the French considered subconsciously dishonorable.

In the following excerpt, a French [illegible] defends Petain in a fashion probably not unlike the feeling among many Frenchmen.

"The [illegible] we can be sure that Petain will never consent that French forces be used against France and that as the great soldier and truly representative Frenchman that he is, he could consent nothing that would be against the honor of France."[15]

This was the type of French sentiment that justified the Petain government on July 11, 1940 by summoning Petain in a [illegible] assembly with an overwhelming majority vote, of 570 to 80.[16]

Here, then, is the [illegible] on which the United States was to place so much hope in her relations with France. Yet the [illegible] was one [illegible] to learn so bitterly the truth of the words, "[illegible] will save his life shall lose it."[17]

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15. I. Hewlett, "The New French Empire", Commonweal, March 7, 1941, p. 4[illegible]

16. Ibid., p. 407

17. Luke 9:24

Chapter III

Our Wishy Policy

The collapse of France was a [illegible] problem of great concern to our State Department. It brought home too well, how little stood between the United States and an aggressive, ruthless, and world conquering Hitler. If France had fallen so quickly, how long Britain would last, was indeed problematical. If British strength also were wrecked by the Nazi onslaught, the conquering predatory [illegible] would not seem overly impressive.

The most important question, then, was the disposition of the French fleet which was large enough to tip the scales against the Axis if it were combined with the German and Italian navies. To keep this fleet out of enemy hands was the number one purpose of a minimum use of relations with Vichy.

Generally, Franco-British relations had been badly strained by the British attack at Mers-el-Kebir. In July, 1940, Britain had taken over the French ships located at British ports. The ships in port at that time at Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran, were ordered to join the British. When Admiral Gensoul, who commanded the ships, refused to comply, the British attacked and destroyed most of the squadron.[1] This move had an [illegible] of France's cooperation and disliking for the British. The incident thus relations were neither in United States-French relations.[2]

A relatively clear and concise [illegible] of United States policy in

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1. Langer, Op. cit., pp. [illegible]

2. Hull, Op. cit., V. 1, p. 704

[illegible] relations with the Vichy Government is contained in Roosevelt's instructions to Admiral Leahy when his appointment as envoy to the Vichy Government in December of 1940.

1. "The President pointed out to Leahy the unfavorable position assumed by Britain both in the courts of the French people and in the Government. Leahy should therefore endeavor to the utmost possible maintain with him.

2. "Leahy should let the British and his colleagues know that information of his mission was of an urgent character of a vacating the office. He should have himself informed of any French movement being planned at the disposal of Germany and the requirements of the armistice. He should try to convince Petain and others of our Government's conviction that a German victory would inevitably result in the disappearance of the French Empire and the extinguishing of most of its overseas world state.

3. "Leahy was to convince the officials of the French Government and the high officers of the navy that the equitable use of the French fleet or naval bases by Germany or to aid in German aims would most seriously forfeit the friendship and good will of the United States and result in the destruction of the French fleet to the improvement of France.

4. "Leahy was to point out our desire to maintain the status quo in the West Indies, and our desire that the naval vessels in the French Western Hemisphere possessions be withdrawn and disarmed on the assumption that the [illegible] would be used to the benefit of Germany.

5. "Finally the President noted generally the efforts of France to maintain her authority in her North African possessions and to [illegible] their economic status, and offered our assistance in this regard."

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5. Hull, Op. cit., Vol, p. [illegible]

This last point was of rather important significance. On September 6th General [illegible] had been appointed delegate-general in North Africa with equal authority. The State Department never [illegible] pursuing the idea of recognizing General Giraud as the Vichy government for enough to allow for collaboration with the Allies in any military activity in North Africa. He pursued this goal until Giraud was displaced in November of 1942.

Hull, himself, told of such considerations in his memoirs. "Because it seemed that we could in North Africa right because a cooperative ground which to build a policy of recognition for the Darlan. We could have no hope that he would desert in favor of the Free French but we could hope he would recognize the French army in North Africa, stay away from concessions to the Axis and hold the time when an Allied army could join him in aligning French North Africa in the battle against Hitler."[4]

The government of the United States was convinced that it would not be able to pursue the aims listed above by means of continued diplomatic relations. It could perhaps gain Petain in favor of the Allies, at least keep the French fleet in ports, and also have channels through which valuable military information might be obtained.

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4. Hull, Op. cit., V. 1, p. 955

Chapter [illegible]

De Gaulle and the Free French

[illegible] in France, however, was [illegible] content to submit to Hitler under [illegible] government. [illegible] people began to form underground movements and resistance groups of all sorts both within and without of the country itself. Most [illegible] of these organizations [illegible] the free French under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle. On June 18, 1940 General de Gaulle began his resistance movement in London where he received recognition and aid from the British Government. The plan was to continue the fight against Hitler, along side of England. William Langer, states that de Gaulle set up a rival government.[1] However, de Gaulle never considered his organization as a French government in exile.

General de Gaulle is an extremely [illegible] man, who can neither be described as quiet and even shy. He is supposed to have a proud disposition, [illegible] and [illegible], he has been considered as both [illegible] and needlessly [illegible]. He received [illegible] of Mr. C. M. [illegible] French [illegible] of [illegible] point, and the [illegible] excellent. De Gaulle, as I have stated [illegible], was not content to [illegible] himself with the "impossible [illegible] thing" [illegible], and [illegible] other [illegible] [illegible] his book, [illegible], written in 1934. However, the [illegible] movement [illegible].[2]

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1. Langer, Op. cit., p. 55

2. F. Sonderm, "What of Philippe De Gaulle", Readers Digest, March 1944, pp. 55-61

In Paris, [illegible] of the French [illegible] Political Light must [illegible] be [illegible] as the [illegible]. "Your [illegible] are [illegible]," said the [illegible], "because they are [illegible] Jesus. You are the young and [illegible] and to learn how to [illegible] a war. [illegible] of this [illegible]! Do you understand?" The [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. "Out, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible]."[7]

[illegible] previously stated [illegible] finally [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], but [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], but [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

not afraid [illegible] ted, and it would be desirable to [illegible] [illegible] within [illegible] possible."[1]

General de Gaulle [illegible] the [illegible] time to yield the [illegible] government would [illegible], if it did not [illegible] to [illegible] get the Vichy regime under [illegible]. There is no question as to which side was the more heroic and valiant. The courage of the French resistance [illegible] that the world is something never to be forgotten. [illegible] war is no longer fought on [illegible] lines and [illegible] alone. [illegible] still a [illegible] only be [illegible] by [illegible] life.

William Langer in his book, *Our Vichy Gamble*, shows [illegible] considered a recognition of de Gaulle, and the subsequent [illegible] of Vichy [illegible].

"Had we [illegible], it [illegible] break with Vichy would [illegible] the field to the Gaullists. On the other hand, [illegible] anything which would be [illegible] by recognizing de Gaulle as the representative of the real France. [illegible] of the French [illegible] as well as of French officials [illegible] closely [illegible] with the [illegible] of political [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of the movement [illegible] the French [illegible] would [illegible] *Vive la [illegible]!*" The British themselves, though they were de Gaulle's [illegible] and [illegible], carefully abstained from [illegible] all the way to recognition. [illegible], de Gaulle had not succeeded in rallying [illegible] his cause. The [illegible] in the [illegible] of 1940 [illegible]

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1. H. [illegible], "New [illegible]", *Christian Science Monitor*, [illegible] 4, [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible] on [illegible]. In its [illegible] [illegible] of every shade of opinion, [illegible] right to the [illegible] left. [illegible] de Gaulle's Colleagues had [illegible] in the service of [illegible].[7]

[illegible] would [illegible] the [illegible] in all the different [illegible].

[illegible] the President [illegible] benefit to be derived [illegible] de Gaulle. Such recognition would have meant the recognition of our unique [illegible] of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. It would have meant a complete break with Vichy, the withdrawal of our diplomatic mission there and of our consular [illegible] in cities of extraordinary [illegible]. It would have left the field clear for the collaborationists. It would have resulted in a rupture of the Quai d'Orsay [illegible] with [illegible] in North Africa, and the recall of our officials in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and French West Africa."[8]

The successors of the Vichy policy also tried to show that French sovereignty were violated only by sympathetic to and labeled Petain, the de Gaulle-that the de Gaulist movement had [illegible] traitors within itself. That this was to [illegible] in the [illegible], [illegible] will be [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] them in the [illegible] in other [illegible] which our State Department endeavored to [illegible] another question.

It is generally acknowledged that President Roosevelt disliked de Gaulle personally, and both the President and Prime Minister Churchill

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7. Langer, Op. cit., p. 174

8. Hull, Op. cit., V.2, p. 211

were uneasy when dealing with the unpredictable French [illegible]. Another cause of Roosevelt's misapprehension in regard to de Gaulle could be his personal feelings, [illegible] to Stalin [illegible], and his desire to place no preference toward any group which might take root in the establishment of the British-American concept of France. In other words, Roosevelt felt that de Gaulle was seeking his own political glory by means of French negativism.[7]

"Since 1940, the General had consistently behaved with an arrogance and touchiness that were not pleasant to any of the Anglo-Saxons. . . It was apparent that he had inevitably confused the cause of France with the cause of General de Gaulle and Gaullism and France."

The conclusion of our argument was that, of course, the cause of the Free French was a certainly noble. Its emotional appeal was one that even President Roosevelt and Stalin would like to be given in to. But from a national standpoint, a break with Vichy which would necessarily follow a recognition of de Gaulle could jeopardize our entire policy and problems in the old, previous lines.[8]

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7. W. L. Shirer, and L. Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War, New York, 1947-1948, p. 545

8. Ibid., p. 546

9. J. Davis, and T. Lindley, How War Came, New York, 1942, p. 51

Chapter V

Our Vichy Policy and Public Opinion

The religious clergy, too, were [illegible] with Vichy to preserve the [illegible] previously listed, namely keeping the Church out of lower hands, supporting [illegible] by inflation, and further encouraging the French revolution.

The State Department, however, did not receive the unanimous support of public opinion [illegible] either here or abroad. The American people have always been very idealistic. American history is built on a basis of lofty ideals concerning freedom, democracy, the rights of man. Some individuals there is a complaint to political [illegible] which were to be removed from these ideals. Just as one might guess, American public opinion was out strongly in favor of de Gaulle. The Free French movement represented opposition to Hitler at all cost. In only his forces were the underdog. Furthermore, he symbolized the cause of Lorraine, whose original homeland, dear at war, is the best known province of French history. His appeal to the [illegible] American tradition of the American public was great again. There also seemed to be a corresponding lack of understanding of the [illegible] the State policies could be fulfilled.

Among journalists and writers, however, there were those who were loyal and steadfast in their support of the unpopular Vichy policy. Included in this group are Dwight Lindley, writer for Newsweek, and joint author of [illegible], and [illegible] Collins, writer for [illegible], a Canadian publication.

In January of 1943, Lindley wrote an article for Newsweek at time as Hull and the State Department had consistently, that the Free French

were [illegible] of [illegible] but that after all "[illegible] one ad-
mires the spirit of the Free French, they do not control the French
fleet, [illegible] Dakar, or [illegible]. [illegible] and ill-
informed critics, [illegible] National Council has been described as
[illegible]! It has been the exact opposite. Its only purpose has
been to restrain some account by the only authorities who have [illegible]
[illegible] from the [illegible]."[1]

Building agrees with Lindley that the public concerning is based
more on hollow or [illegible] than is that of Lindley's. Building
maintains that more ties to break with Vichy, as American public opinion
would like, we would be throwing [illegible] to the wolves. It would be irre-
sponsible possibly for a civil war in France.[2]

The opponents of our [illegible] "[illegible]" policy were vehement
in their condemnation of the State Department. What might had we to
smile [illegible] I do [illegible] from our [illegible] because of his lack of
personal [illegible]? The Tribune [illegible] asks: Why not the United
States itself? Of what [illegible] our [illegible] [illegible] democ-
ratic government?

George Santillana, writing for Commonweal, offered a refutation to
the stand taken by Dulles, who was [illegible] [illegible].

"Mr. Dulles claims that he is only interested in [illegible] the war. If
that is so, . . . he might have called to [illegible] the Vichy forces the
French [illegible] who was one of the spokesmen of [illegible] [illegible] doctrine,

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1. T. Lindley, "Our Relations With Vichy", Commonweal, [illegible] 10, 1940, p. 24
2. C. C. Dulles, "Moral [illegible] Policy", Commonweal, December 5, 1941, p. 15

instead of digging out and setting up against him an equally gentlemanly officer of equally strong and one who was . . . enough to see clearly responsible for French political insanity."[3]

Continuing his tirade further, Cantillons said, "They (the State Department) chose to consider the political future, the limitations of available alternatives, the delicate situation, and then comes the clinching argument: De Gaulle is unpopular. The French don't want him. It might be asked who tried to black him out, who tried to stamp him as a British puppet by refusing to recognize him and recognizing civilian Giraud and then Darlan. But that might seem invidious. Let us rather ask: who are the people for the State Department? Here are, it will be candidly answered, the people who followed the French Government. They are those who stand for order, for continuity, for honest business; they are the law-abiding, the practical minded, the serious; those who aim to the symbol of national unity, and tried reconstruction."[4]

Some eminent followers of the General situation like Leo Cherne have been willing to see the efforts of the State Department but still to see our success in the nation. In one of his many articles on the French problem, Cherne said, "It is not at certain whether the policy is a continuation of the swiftly forge of large scale tactics or whether it is only a weak, tight-lipped and reluctantly given species of temporizing until the United Nations are strong enough to stop waiting wholeheartedly.

"Washington's attitude toward Giraud produces the impression that the

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3. C. Cantillons, "French Policy", Commonweal, Jan 14, 1943, p. 29

4. Ibid., p. 29

United States is losing far more than it is getting in return even in [illegible] quarters."[7]

Mr. Taylor contends, in another article, "Is it also requisite, one wonders, that Washington should publicly [illegible] at doubt on the political competence of the emigré group that still [illegible] regime as a de facto government in exile?"[8]

The support of writers for Life, Action, and the Independents [illegible] with respect to the Free French and de Gaulle, and these writings were expressed single-minded of the "consensus."

A difference of opinion could be found in The United States. Writing had regarded de Gaulle as a [illegible] since of 1940, but undoubtedly [illegible] opinion [illegible] the [illegible] in big [illegible] dimension of [illegible]. However, England did [illegible] de Gaulle movement both financial [illegible] and in public opinion. This issue later became a source of controversy between the United States and England.

Early in 1943 a British news correspondent sent a dispatch to the New York Herald Tribune [illegible] "[illegible] the State Department has been [illegible] [illegible] in its [illegible] policy, utterly out of touch with and contemptuous of the potent forces of resistance in occupied and unoccupied France."[7]

On the other side, there is the statement of an American [illegible] which

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5. I. Lenghor, "[illegible]", Current History, March 1943, p. 44

6. I. Lenghor, "[illegible]", Current History, June 1943, p. 254

7. I. Lenghor, "Lights Lower in South Africa", Current History, March 1943, p. 49

[illegible] which had been in [illegible] in 1945 and which stated that the main [illegible] and which stated that the main [illegible] behind de Gaulle constituted only about [illegible] of the population of France, this section being composed of less influential men than the section behind Giraud. Furthermore the model of Giraud, which the United States supposedly had [illegible], had [illegible] from political [illegible] in North Africa.[5]

In France, public opinion was quite understandably confused. There were many who did not know what side to take; they were disillusioned and overwhelmed by the war and the sudden defeat. [illegible] immediately rallied to Petain, [illegible] and Laval who would no doubt be in the best position to bargain with Hitler. There were also [illegible] Resistance movement only because they thought that [illegible] the foreign government of President Roosevelt did [illegible] right. [illegible] structure and [illegible], and might in fact be [illegible]. There was a reflection of gratitude to the foreign government [illegible] to flow [illegible] two [illegible], letters, and [illegible] encouraging the young people to write [illegible] [illegible].[6]

The voice of President Roosevelt left its mark on the French as well as everyone. It is doubtful, not surprising that the people were much influenced by the winning appeal of such [illegible] as the one which the President made on November 7, 1942, at the time of the Allied invasion.

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5. A Political Subject [illegible], in [illegible], op. cit., p. 17[illegible]-[illegible]

6. Here is a compilation of letters and notes by French citizens, see: [illegible], Elegies [illegible], [illegible], 1944

[illegible], [illegible] of self- [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] . . .

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] small [illegible].

[illegible]![10]

[illegible] attitude of the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] reports in [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible] "[illegible] puzzled by [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]."[11]

[illegible]. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] *[illegible]* [illegible].

[illegible] preferred to [illegible], [illegible] called [illegible]. [illegible] ". . ." [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]! [illegible]; [illegible] . . .

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[10] [illegible], [illegible] ([illegible]), *[illegible]*, [illegible], p. [illegible]

[11] [illegible], "[illegible]", *[illegible]*, [illegible], p. [illegible]

"[illegible]

[illegible]."[1]

1[illegible]. [illegible] II, "[illegible]", [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] 11

[illegible] in 1911 Prior to December 7

[illegible] to be fulfilled in [illegible]. [illegible] seem to think that the [illegible] would [illegible] the allies [illegible] than [illegible]. [illegible] under the control of [illegible]. The [illegible] the [illegible] Britain, [illegible] to the allied side. It was felt that [illegible] the [illegible] would [illegible] the [illegible] that the [illegible] in Belgium and [illegible]. [illegible] South Africa, the allies would [illegible] the population there and the only [illegible]. In the situation [illegible], however, [illegible] the [illegible] South Africa, the allies might find themselves [illegible] motives [illegible] in their [illegible] from the Germans. Here, too, was a possible reason for that [illegible] hesitating for so [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible].

In until the spring of 1911, [illegible] relations. Although by [illegible] Russia was [illegible], the [illegible] did not [illegible] until June 11, 1911. [illegible] been [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] Russia.[1] It is interesting to note at this point, too, that [illegible] Germany, possessing [illegible] of food, oil, [illegible]

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1. [illegible], op. cit., p. 111

[illegible] Spain, the navy [illegible] land, [illegible] Italy.

Italy, he claims, had drawn [illegible] into war to its destruction. Since the sunking 750,000 tons of merchant shipping had been lost to British ships and now the British navy [illegible] Mediterranean. "In victorious [illegible] war would, he said, "France would become only a second rate power."[2] Italy had been convinced since the collapse of France that land, too, would constitute in short order. Le [illegible] the war or the winning team, and this his entry to the Allied side in 1940.

Germany had completely control in the Balkans by June of 1941, and the German forces had not yet [illegible] to a military Italian [illegible] in Greece, [illegible] into the German [illegible]. In other words, Italy was really "on the run" and it looks as the Mussolini could hold him back.

In the Mediterranean, the Duce never relented in his pressure on General Graziani in hopes of [illegible] the [illegible] to the part of North Africa. With the accumulation of Spain, [illegible] the over difficulty, exceed the [illegible] and thus end the position of North Africa. [illegible] fighting, however, [illegible] had not been ready to enter the war in December of 1941 as Hitler would have liked.[3] Again at the end of 1941 and the first [illegible] of 1942, it seems likely that a German invasion of Spain, [illegible] would [illegible]

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2. I. Jensen, "Duce Collaborator", Current History, April 1941, p. [illegible]

3. "Hitler Tower", Newsweek, June 8, 1942, p. 12

4. Ibid., Op. cit., p. 111

[illegible] Africa, [illegible] had not [illegible] them, but to be [illegible] large number."[5]

North Africa, as part of the French Empire, had been suffering to an extent from the effects of the British blockade, although the blockade had not been as strict as it could, because of Allied [illegible] and the [illegible] of [illegible]. Nevertheless, the needs for food and oil were there. It would be the time to exercise a little of our "military diplomacy" in order to get two [illegible] Vichy and North Africa around. The State Department knew well enough that we would not get cooperation from Vichy for nothing. But we were in a position to bargain. We had something to offer. Economic aid would be our trump card in dealing with Vichy. The United States would drop these [illegible] with Britain and still it would not consider the violation of our "allegiance" neutrality.

Such was Roosevelt's feeling. This was how he said, "We had two weapons in the [illegible] of our diplomacy toward Vichy, in addition to the very-strong representations we made by the possibility of Vichy [illegible] the [illegible] of the negotiations with Germany. One was military and [illegible] to [illegible] in [illegible] the other was economic and [illegible] with French North Africa, built around [illegible] oil."[6]

Rather [illegible] we [illegible] [illegible] assistance from the United States [illegible] a matter of conjecture. However, the negotiations with Vichy [illegible] concrete that we would not [illegible] to [illegible]. In other words, we were

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5. Langer, Op. cit., p. [illegible]

6. Hull, Op. cit., v. 1, p. [illegible]

[illegible] that if [illegible] were sufficient, [illegible] of help from the United States, both now and later, military, he would be required to support the allies in South Africa when the time came.

[illegible] the fall of 1941, Hull had been formulating policy in regard to South Africa. Consequently, in a spirit of his [illegible], he had put [illegible] to South Africa in regard of the [illegible] movement or conditions there. [illegible] Hull's [illegible] to include begging the [illegible] with [illegible] and the officials of South Africa, all the while feeling [illegible] common ground on which some [illegible] might be reached.

Consequently, from December 1941 until [illegible] of 1941, [illegible] efforts were concentrated on trying to reach a working concept with [illegible]. Of course, [illegible] involved a great deal of negotiation with [illegible] Britain [illegible]. The [illegible] explained to [illegible] who was still [illegible] to Britain, if not [illegible]. It would [illegible] a [illegible] of the blockade on [illegible], and [illegible] in a position to [illegible] more than we were at the time, [illegible] to [illegible]. [illegible] time, however, Britain [illegible] to [illegible] of South Africa.

Summarizing the second statement "the United States would [illegible] South Africa with [illegible] quantities (gasoline, [illegible], and others [illegible]) provided they were [illegible] and were not allowed to accumulate. They would be a [illegible] through [illegible] new [illegible] in [illegible] ports, thus avoiding [illegible] of shipping from the [illegible] important ports to Britain; [illegible] would be returned to the United States when such [illegible]. [illegible] officials would be

[illegible] to [illegible] to encourage the elements in [illegible] [illegible] and on the [illegible]."[7]

"Little [illegible] to this [illegible] by [illegible], [illegible]. In fact, [illegible] attitude [illegible] [illegible] indicative of [illegible] on the United States [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] definite [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] forced to [illegible] with [illegible] eight [illegible] to [illegible].

The [illegible] in the Agreement providing for American control of-
fices in North [illegible] under [illegible] authority [illegible]
[illegible] later came to be called [illegible] Office of Strategic Services. [illegible]
[illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible] Dollars. [illegible]
[illegible] consisted of [illegible] in [illegible] and reporting all
valuable intelligence [illegible] strategic importance, whether [illegible] or
military, with the [illegible] [illegible] conducted in-
[illegible] of the territory.

[illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] had been placed in the number of
the [illegible]. Early in 1943, he had filled the position of the
office of Foreign Relations in Tokyo [illegible], a situation well suit-
ed for his [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]
[illegible], his [illegible], of the [illegible] individual, [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], however,
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible], and [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] in
1944, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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10. [illegible], Time, [illegible], p. [illegible]

11. New York Times, [illegible], [illegible], p. [illegible]

12. [illegible], [illegible], Current History, [illegible], pp. [illegible]

occupation of the [illegible]-[illegible], [illegible] the [illegible]-[illegible] "the [illegible] of collaboration [illegible] to be a reality."[13]

The fruits of Darlan's efforts [illegible] in the [illegible] of the Paris Protocols on May [illegible], 1941. [illegible], but [illegible] [illegible]. The Germans [illegible] rights in Syria, and [illegible] in North Africa [illegible] with further [illegible]. With [illegible], the [illegible] finally [illegible] after lengthy debate with [illegible], that the Protocols could not be agreed to [illegible].[14] [illegible]-[illegible], [illegible]-[illegible] between [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible].

The official reaction [illegible] to the [illegible] negotiations was [illegible] by Hull to Leahy telling the ambassador to "first endeavor to ascertain what can be gained through the Vichy Government by every kind of [illegible]. Second, and in the same connection, [illegible] all [illegible] of the matter thoroughly to ascertain what can be [illegible] and the situation in North Africa [illegible] in return for cooperation by us. Third, keep in constant conference with the British."[15]

[illegible] with the aid of [illegible] and [illegible] consideration of the Paris Protocols [illegible],

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13. Langer, Op. cit., p. [illegible]

14. Ibid., p. [illegible]

15. Hull, Op. cit., [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible] this [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the fulfillment of the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

"[illegible] now," he said, "[illegible] to see the meaning of the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

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17. *Ibid.*, [illegible]

18. [illegible], *op. cit.*, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], "[illegible]", *[illegible] Post*, [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], [illegible], of the [illegible]. [illegible] in the [illegible] killing of [illegible], [illegible] in [illegible]; in [illegible] and the [illegible] of [illegible].[21]

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] into [illegible], [illegible]. It is [illegible], however, to tell [illegible], [illegible] in [illegible] it.

[illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible]. [illegible].[22]

[illegible] of the [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible]. [illegible].

[illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible], [illegible] 19[illegible], [illegible]

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21. [illegible], "[illegible] of France", [illegible], [illegible] 19[illegible], pp. [illegible]

22. "[illegible]", [illegible], [illegible], 19[illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]. The [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible] by the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], and the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible].[13]

If the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] position [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

In other words, once Vichy yielded to German pressure, she would yield again. At any rate on [illegible], 1941, the following telegram [illegible] to Washington. "[illegible] which has been operated for several months and which this country took in [illegible], the [illegible] has taken the decision to suspend the [illegible] in Africa which involves the recall of General Weygand.

"If the Marshal had not made this decision there is every indication to believe that German [illegible] in Africa would have been inevitable, and would undoubtedly have occurred very soon."[17]

Certainly this move was one of the few that made our State Department wonder what our policy was accomplishing, and what object there would be in continuing it. Leahy himself in spite of his rationalization in the long telegram, hesitated on the best course to take, although [illegible] he felt that the continuance of relations with Vichy was the only thing to do. The dismissal of Weygand seemed to indicate [illegible] had no intention of letting [illegible] with the United States. [illegible] no doubt anxious to keep African ports open to supplies from the United States. Although [illegible] never openly [illegible] to weight [illegible], either [illegible] or [illegible], the United States was still [illegible] the continuance of cordial relations with us.

If Leahy [illegible] this point, [illegible]

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17. Langer, Op. cit., p. [illegible]

[illegible] did not [illegible]. [illegible], to [illegible] out of [illegible]. [illegible] had been [illegible]. On [illegible], [illegible], "[illegible] the [illegible] to [illegible] with the [illegible] successful [illegible] to [illegible], it would [illegible] the initiative and not interrupt [illegible] to provide facilities [illegible]."[illegible]

The opponents of our Italy policy took occasion at this time to further criticize the State Department upon its policy to continue our Italy relations [illegible]. It is not difficult to [illegible] such criticism [illegible], [illegible] consider [illegible] of the real facts in the case were [illegible] known to the American public. The [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] (of our Italy policy) [illegible], [illegible] (of [illegible]) [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible], [illegible]."[illegible]

[illegible]. *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

[illegible]. "[illegible]", *New Republic*, [illegible], [illegible], p. [illegible]

The opinion [illegible] not [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] into the public [illegible] one of the [illegible] of [illegible], and the one that [illegible] could not easily justify in the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible].

It is [illegible] to note [illegible] [illegible]. "[illegible]," he said, in [illegible], "to [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] (T[illegible]) told [illegible], nothing [illegible] [illegible] in French policy [illegible]. [illegible] that [illegible] to the other world. [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible] will [illegible] this letter, will tell [illegible] I [illegible] on the [illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] of the world."[30]

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[30] I[illegible], Op. cit., p. 1[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Twenty-[illegible]

[illegible] we look at the situation [illegible] in retrospect, it seems to me [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] it would seem [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] most people were [illegible] their [illegible] on the Twenty-[illegible] [illegible], [illegible] by the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on Tuesday 7. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. However, in the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. However, it did not take long for the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the President [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible]. From the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]" [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]" [illegible] "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]." [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

policy with Italy to [illegible] its [illegible]. The United [illegible]-[illegible]. [illegible] in South Africa [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] all the [illegible] of the State [illegible] to [illegible] to our side.

[illegible] with [illegible] to be [illegible] to either Britain, [illegible], or both of them.

[illegible] the United States is in the war, [illegible] [illegible], the President [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] the [illegible] resistance of the French [illegible] or Italian [illegible] in [illegible] of the Colonial [illegible] by the President [illegible]. [illegible] of the United States, but it would [illegible] of the United States [illegible] possible [illegible]."[1]

Such a definite statement of position was bound to encourage [illegible], and was more [illegible] with Italy declaration of neutrality in the war with the United States.

"[illegible] Italy [illegible] in Washington, the [illegible]. [illegible] of its declaration of neutrality [illegible] undesirable [illegible]

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[1] [illegible], Op. cit., p. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] loyal to Petain, and his Vichy Government so that he [illegible] control over these territories.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *[illegible]*. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *[illegible]*, [illegible]

[illegible] *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

[illegible].

[illegible].

[illegible] However, the State Department [illegible]. [illegible] States, [illegible]. [illegible], Furthermore, [illegible].

[illegible], 194[illegible], [illegible] to 'destroy' [illegible]. Therefore, in order [illegible] without [illegible] (underlined words are [illegible]). [illegible] complete [illegible]."

Then, it seems that the [illegible]

[illegible]. "[illegible]", [illegible], [illegible], 194[illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], "[illegible]", [illegible], [illegible] 17, 1947, p. [illegible]

7. R. E. [illegible], [illegible], New York 194[illegible], p. [illegible]

of [illegible] weakness, [illegible] inexpedient [illegible] present [illegible] of the United States Government. "[illegible] considered [illegible] suggest [illegible] to destroy [illegible]." [illegible]

Of course, [illegible] on the [illegible] furthering [illegible] did the [illegible] and [illegible] the endorsement of public opinion. There has probably been few breaches [illegible] between the State Department [illegible] public opinion [illegible]. [illegible] according to the [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible]. He should [illegible] to prevent such an event.

"With that excerpt," [illegible], "there is only one thing [illegible]. It is [illegible] unquestionably [illegible] for [illegible] critics [illegible] of [illegible] to justify the [illegible]

[illegible]. "[illegible] Sentiment", [illegible], [illegible], 19[illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible].[9]

[illegible], "[illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] and national resistance. [illegible] went to Chiang Kai-shek and [illegible] in order to retain the good will of [illegible] whose badness verges on stupidity. It is to [illegible] the possibilities of resistance in [illegible] and [illegible] and to strike at the heart of [illegible] in [illegible] itself."[10]

The *New York Times* supported the policy of the State Department saying, "It is [illegible] to understand why the State Department [illegible] so strongly to [illegible] not to [illegible]."[11] The *New York Post* on the other hand condemned Washington's [illegible]. "[illegible] on the [illegible], [illegible], bribery, [illegible], and stupidity [illegible]. Now it is [illegible] too late."[12]

The editor of *Nation* [illegible] the following [illegible] to the [illegible] question: "[illegible] and the [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] of all [illegible]

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9. I. Deutscher, "[illegible]", *Current History*, February 1949, p. 570

10. *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

11. "[illegible]", *Newsweek*, January 7, [illegible], p. [illegible]

12. *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] that their government's [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] the defense of freedom in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on [illegible]."[13]

This feeling was voiced by [illegible] [illegible] enthusiastically and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] world. "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], the [illegible] righteous, the [illegible] clarity of the [illegible] of [illegible] League [illegible] [illegible] their [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] it was not possible that the noble [illegible] would not be [illegible] with us in the cause of liberty and in the [illegible] right of peoples to self-determination. [illegible] [illegible], we will hold on to the end. [illegible] [illegible] of the world [illegible] League, like your statue of liberty, is a symbol."[14]

Not all [illegible] [illegible] were opposed the stand Washington had taken [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] which had [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] its position on the question under discussion. In defense of the State Department, it said, "[illegible] for excellent, multiple, and [illegible], [illegible] reasons it (the State Department) seeks to avoid [illegible] with [illegible]. [illegible] through [illegible] representation in [illegible] country, whose population [illegible] its hope in our strength, also seeks to [illegible] contact with the conquered peoples of Europe and thus to [illegible] and strengthen their opposition to the [illegible] [illegible] is our [illegible]. At the same time the United States has [illegible] with [illegible] directly or indirectly, the [illegible] [illegible] . . . [illegible] or not, the [illegible] taken by the

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13. "[illegible] League", *Nation*, January 7, 194[illegible], p. [illegible]

14. *Ibid.*, p. [illegible]

[illegible] interference with a [illegible] negotiations with the [illegible] government."[15]

[illegible] of the [illegible] in [illegible] to the [illegible] United States [illegible] two islands under the [illegible] of the United States [illegible] combined with [illegible] compensation [illegible].[16] Nevertheless, the incident did not [illegible] [illegible] in action. The [illegible] government [illegible] United States [illegible] another negotiation.

The [illegible] of 1917 was great in terms of the decision [illegible] United States [illegible] the [illegible] of the two [illegible]. The [illegible] in [illegible] on this [illegible] question. In [illegible], 1917 discussions were [illegible] conclusive.

It is [illegible] little [illegible] and [illegible] in the story of the [illegible] of [illegible] in the [illegible] government in April of 1917. Tension, it seems, had not [illegible] to [illegible] demands. The [illegible] in June 1917, [illegible] in _[illegible]_ in which the [illegible] the most [illegible] means for the purpose. According to [illegible], the [illegible] of April 11, [illegible] solution of the [illegible] problem [illegible] to [illegible] for the [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] acceptable to [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] with the [illegible] of [illegible] in the [illegible] of the new

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15. "Mission and Policy", _op. cit._, January, 1918, p. [illegible]

16. Sherwood, _op. cit._, p. [illegible]

[illegible] intelligence."[17]

It is probably that [illegible] appeared two top secret to the Express. [illegible] Guatemala [illegible] with [illegible] other members of the [illegible] group [illegible] being nominated in the July [illegible] convention. On [illegible], [illegible] the revolution [illegible]. Castillo Armas [illegible] to power.

[illegible] it was the judgment that [illegible] Guatemala [illegible] the Communist [illegible] the region, where the [illegible] underway in [illegible] was intensified. Colonel [illegible] was sent from [illegible] to [illegible] the work closely with [illegible] Guatemala. The C.I.A. had been doing [illegible] excellent work in intelligence [illegible] since its establishment in June of 1947. [illegible] the [illegible] experience [illegible] in the [illegible] influence the attitude of the native population.

"[illegible] that [illegible] Government on the Continent [illegible] Guatemala [illegible] the British, who, so [illegible], have not wanted it this way; but the Americans forced it. [illegible] Guatemala [illegible] Communist [illegible] with [illegible] and [illegible] in Guatemala, but it is designed by the Guatemalans and not by the Americans [illegible] years."[18]

[illegible] discussion, it was decided what was to be done. On July [illegible], 1954, the decision "to alert [illegible] Guatemala [illegible]

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17. I. [illegible], "[illegible] Tower", [illegible], June 1957, p. [illegible]

18. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], 1958, pp. [illegible] Note: At the time this was written, [illegible] Guatemala [illegible] had not been published.

[illegible] the position, [illegible] [illegible],
[illegible].[15] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [

[illegible]

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12. [illegible], op. cit., pp. [illegible]

[illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible]

population.[47]

[illegible], Roosevelt said to Prime Minister Churchill: "In the [illegible]

[illegible] the strategic [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] the situation [illegible] solely in the [illegible]

[illegible] ever,"[48]

[illegible] between [illegible]

[illegible] still."[49]

[illegible]

[illegible] with the

Allied Forces [illegible] South [illegible]

"For the last two years, [illegible]

[illegible]

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47. Churchill, _op._ _cit._, p. [illegible]

48. _Ibid._, p. [illegible]

49. _Ibid._, p. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] *Op. cit.*, [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible], Op. cit., p. [illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], "[illegible]", [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], op. cit., pp. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]."[illegible]

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[illegible]. [illegible], [illegible], pp. [illegible]

[illegible]. [illegible], p. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] may be surrendered to the [illegible]

[illegible] consistent in one thing—broken promises. It should have been difficult, in our opinion, [illegible]

[illegible]

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[1] [illegible]

[illegible] Hitler. [illegible] it seems [illegible] [illegible] English defeat.

In Ireland, then, [illegible], it could hardly have been [illegible] [illegible] the following [illegible]tion.

"[illegible]."[1]

England did [illegible] anti-British [illegible] consideration of [illegible] anti-British feeling [illegible] policies.

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1. [illegible], Op. cit., pp. [illegible]

2. [illegible], Op. cit., p. [illegible]

[illegible] Soviet [illegible] that [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] Hitler [illegible] not have been [illegible]. J. [illegible], editor for *Nation*, [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] [illegible] tension to [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible]. [illegible] mental [illegible] the [illegible] of public opinion. He [illegible] unable to [illegible] the [illegible] would [illegible] their [illegible] Soviet. [illegible] to deliver the [illegible] the [illegible]."[4]

The [illegible] opinion [illegible] by [illegible] J. Gardiner [illegible] J. [illegible], editors for *Nation* and *New Republic*, respectively.[5] The question [illegible] that [illegible], Gardiner [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible]. "[illegible] the Soviet [illegible] not [illegible], [illegible] not only better relations with [illegible] but [illegible] of the [illegible], would [illegible] its [illegible] or [illegible]?"[6]

[illegible] it seems [illegible] that [illegible] de[illegible] all [illegible], with the possible exception of [illegible] South [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible] than [illegible] to [illegible]. The allies were in no position to receive [illegible] the [illegible] had [illegible]

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[4] [illegible] J. [illegible], "[illegible] Washington", *Nation*, January 17, 194[illegible], p. 58

[5] [illegible] Gardiner, "[illegible]", *Nation*, [illegible] 21, 194[illegible], p. 177; [illegible], "[illegible]", *New Republic*, [illegible] 4, 194[illegible], p. 601

[6] Gardiner, *Op. cit.*, p. 177

[illegible] it [illegible] has already [illegible] by [illegible] superiority. [illegible] [illegible] realize [illegible] the French [illegible] would [illegible]. The Allies [illegible] this [illegible]. Fortunately, [illegible] there were some people within France who refused to tolerate the conditions of the capitulation and the collaboration with the enemy which was taking place. [illegible], the French [illegible] [illegible] Britain.

In [illegible] of 1941, [illegible] control. "On land [illegible] the [illegible] French [illegible] troops are fighting the Axis in Africa and the Middle East . . . In the skies 1500 [illegible] French [illegible]. In the seas, 60 [illegible] on, [illegible] supplies and troops for the Allies. [illegible] out the world [illegible]. [illegible] French [illegible] countless [illegible]."[5] Besides this, [illegible], [illegible] colonies [illegible] Equatorial Africa, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] islands in the Pacific, the French [illegible] in India, the [illegible], [illegible] Islands,[6] [illegible] this [illegible]! But we were [illegible], [illegible], that we turned our backs on it until we were forced to do otherwise.

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5. [illegible], "[illegible]", *Life*, [illegible], 1941, p. [illegible]

6. [illegible], "[illegible] Fighting French", *Christian Science Monitor*, [illegible], [illegible], p. 5

[illegible] people, [illegible] consideration. [illegible][9] [illegible] be useless.[10]

[illegible] 1941 [illegible] President [illegible] people, [illegible] the United States of [illegible][11]

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9. [illegible], "[illegible]", Time, [illegible], 194[illegible], p. [illegible]

10. [illegible], "[illegible] the [illegible]", [illegible], [illegible] 194[illegible], p. [illegible]

11. [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible], 194[illegible], pp. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible]

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[illegible]. [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible]

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[illegible]. [illegible], op. cit., p. [illegible]

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