SGCIMSM AND TEE AGRECULTEJRAL CGMMUNIW
EN FRAE‘é-CE, 1830-1914

Thesis for ihe Degree of M. A
WGHEGAN S‘E-‘ATE WVERSETY
SAMES L. WDJCIUCH
E967

w

L I B R A R Y
5 Michigan State
University

 
    

I‘HESIS

SOCIALISM
AND THE
AGRICULTURAL COB-MIN IN

IN mm ,

1880-1914

BY

4

0

was L: :WOJCIUCH

Submitted to the Department of History, College of
Arts and.Letters, Michigan State University in par-
tial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master
of Arts Degree

August, 1967

PREFACE / '

In writing this thesis my aim has been to investigate the devel-
Opnsnt of French Socialism in relation to that country's agricultural oom-
mnnity between 1880 and 1914. Three basic questions are considered. First,
what were the agricultural policies of the Socialists and why were such
policies adopted? Second, given the Socialist commitment to the working
class and to colleetivization, how’was the SFIO able to become the second-
largest political party in.1914 when the country was dominated by a con-
servative, agrarian electorate favoring the principle of private property?
lhird, recognizing the differences in character and of values between the
Socialists and the peasantry, how did these two groups interact in prac-
tice? The answers to these questions suggest other problems which are con-
sidered in the course of the paper.

Socialist policies related to the peasants in two ways. First,
there were programs and adjustments directly related to agriculture. In-
cluded in these were the Socialist notions concerning private preperty and
the place of agriculture in the productive process, ranging down in speci-
ficity to proposed reforms to meet agricultural calamities, the needs of
small owners, of agricultural laborers, and the like. Second, there were
Socialist policies and attitudes that either drew or repelled the peasantry
in ways having little to do with agriculture directly. These included the

Socialists' position in relation to authority, pacifism, clericalism and

ii

protectionism. The Socialists' stand on these matters related them to
the character and values of the peasantry.

The period, 1870-1914, is significant in two respects. First,
during this time span the peasantry was sepecially powerful as a vet-
ing community. The peasants enjoyed this influential polition because
of the universal suffrage prescribed by the Constitution of the Third
Republic. Second, the Socialist movement defined itself and united in
the form of a single party (1905) during the course of this period.

I would like to acknowledge the direction and aid given to me
during the course of writing this thesis by Dr. Donald Baker, Michigan
State University. He has directed my attention to numerous sources that
were of valuable assistance to me, and he has made various suggestions

which have improved the final formulation of the paper.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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WOFCONIEN'ISQeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeiv
Chapter

I. THE CHARACTER AND SOCIAL BASIS OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY
UNDERTHE‘IHIRDREHJBLIC.................. 1

II., SOCIALIST AGRICULTURAL POLICIES TO 1905 . . . . e . . . e e . 16
III. SFIO AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, 1905 - 1914 . . e . . . e . e . e 44
IV. ELECTIONS, IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA . e . . e e e . . . e . e e 59

V. CONCLUSIONS . e . . e e e e e . . . . e . . . e e . e . . . . 71
APPENDIX e e e e e . e e . . . . . e . e e . . . . . . . e e . . e . 77

BIHJImRAPHImESSAYOOOOCOOOOOOOO.0.0.0.00...79

iv

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTER AND SOCIAL BASIS OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY

UNDER TIE THIRD REPUBLIC

prographically, France's physical environment is suited for agri-

culture. 1

Within the country's boundaries there is a wide diversity of
climate and structure, from the northern lowlands to the French Alps and
Pyrenees in the south. While the Mediterranean coastal area is favorable
to a great variety of creps, the area around Burgundy and the southwestern
regions specialize in viniculture. The Acquitaine basin in the southwest-
ern corner and parts of Brittany have rich soil, and wheat is a major crop
of western France. The Loire and Seine Valleys and the Nord are important
agricultural areas. Largeholdings were more prevalent in the Seine basin
and in the west, while smallholdings were numerous in the south and central
regions. The richness of French soil has thus been an important factor in

holding a large preportion of the French population to agricultural voca-

2
tions, although the percentage has been decreasing during the last century.

 

1
For a description of France's agricultural geography see Neil Hun-

ter,P “santgy and Crisis in France (London: Gollancz, 1938), Chapter I,
pp. 18-33.

2Gordon wright, Rural Revolution in France: The Peasantry in the
TWentieth Century (Stanford, Cal.s Stanford University Press, 1964), p. "13.
In 1870 the percentage of Frenchmen engaged in agriculture was ap roximate—
1y 52% compared to approximately 44% in 1914, 35% in.1930 and 30%?thereafter,.
Thirty percent is relatively high when compared to the United States. The

 

In.

Within the context of this physical environment the social, econ-
omic, religious and political aspects of life are most important. These
four strands intertwine with each other to form a basic cord of character
and a system of values representative of the peasantry.

The social character of the French nation of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was already visible a century earlier, and
it reflected the influence of the life of the provinces as wellas the gs-
ographical characteristics that marked the rural areas}3 The social struc-
ture was chiefly composed of peasants, artisans, and bourgeoisie; and an
understanding of French social values and psychology, particularly as e1r
emplified by these groups, is necessary for a comprehension of French pol-
itics. Socially, there is a strong belief in the value of private property
and private ownership that reflects the basic peasant and bourgeois back-
ground of the nation. There is also an idealism which pervades the French
character that is noticeable through its demand for intellectual independ-
ence and autonomy in private life. Because of its individualism and immi-
1yhcentered Operations, France long resisted the introduction of modern ma-
chines and collective efforts on a large scale.

The element of this French society that this paper is concerned

with is the peasantry, one of the major groups under the Third Republic.

 

United States reached the present French percentage (30%) in 1920, and by
1964 only 6.8% of its population was engaged in agriculture. U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Statistical Abstract 2; the United States, 1965 (86 Edition),
p. 614.

3For a discussion or this see Andre’ Siegfried, France, 5 Study 433
ygtionality CLondon: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 2-18; also see his
article, ”Approaches to an'Understanding of Modern France," in.Edward Heads

Earle, (ed.), Eodern France, Problems 9! thg Third and Fourth Repggligg (New
York: Russell and Russell, 1964), pp. 3-9.

 

As rural France is physically diverse, so also is its social community var-
iegated that few generalizations can be made about it as a whole. Structur-
ally, the agricultural community is composed of large landowners, absentee
landlords, seigneuries (feudal landlords), small independent farmmrs, pg;
3213;; (tenant farmers), fermiers (sharecroppers), landless farm.laborers,
journaliers (day-laborers), roturiers (non-noble landowners), and manoeuv-
piggg (peasants who supplemented their agricultural labors by working in
the rural textile industries). The use of the word peasantry in this paper
Idll include all farmers and agricultural laborers who worked with their
hands, whether they owned land or not.

One of the characteristics of this agricultural community was small
ownership, which can be traced back to the Middle Ages and was still wide-
spread by the time of the French Revolution, especially in the southern and
central regions.4 There were two reasons for the practice of this small-
ccale ownership. First, the peasant desire for preperty urged him to save
his money for the purchase of land. However, his savings were meager and
allowed him to buy only small parcels at a time. Second, the written law
of the central and southern regions and, later, the Code Napoleon required
the division on inherited lands among the deceased’s survivors according to
the principle of equality. ‘

Throughout the nineteenth century the French peasantry resisted the

introduction of modernization and new economic trends. Their resistance was

4Wright, Rural Revolution, p. 3; Paul A Gagnon, France Since 1789
(new York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 285. Gagnon also discuss-
es the demographic crisis, as well as the Code Napolcon, in relation to the
increase in small holdings. He believes that the Code forced individual
families to restrict their reproduction as an economic necessity so that
they could make a subsistence living on their small farms.

directed not so much against the survival of the old feudal order as it
was against the coming of a newer capitalistic one based upon mass col-
lective rather than individual efforts. Peasant preprietors, rentiers,
large landowners and absentee landlords successfully resisted these new
trends.5 Alfred Cobban writes: "It was the better-off peasant farmers
whose stubborn defense maintained the common rights, and whose inherent
conservatism and power consolidated by the revolution, set the pattern
of French agriculture and village life for the next century ans a half."6
Gordon wright also notes that the tendencies which characterized the pea-
santry offered an insulation against economic and social change.7 One can
see the intertwining of social and economic factors at this point. The e-
conomic mode of production in French agriculture influenced the social
classes to form.along the structural lines that they did. It also placed
emphasis on individual effort, thrift and private property. The smallhold-
ings of economic production favored the development of a conservative so-
cial life among the peasantry.

Between 1814 and 1870 the agricultural community changed less than
any other segment of society.8 There was an increasing number of small-

holdings, and the peasants Joined the large landowners and the businessmen

 

5Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution

 

(Cambridge, England: Cambridge'University Press, 1965), pp. 46, 167, 170-
172.

62.12.. p. 119-
7Wright, Rural Revolution, p. 2.

8Gordon wright, France in Modern Times, 1760 to the Present (Chi-
cago: Rand Ho Nelly and Company, 1960), pp. 122, 222.”

 

1"

 

in the advocacy of high tariffs. A law of 1819 protected the domestic wheat
market from Russian competition, and even the winegrowcrs called for a high
duty on imported tea.9 The protective system was meant to provide security
of the domestic market for indigenous French businessmen and farmers. The
small-scale type of production system that existed in France could not stand
against foreign competition. This inability of the French to compete a-
gainst foreign producers increased as other countries adopted modern pro-
duction methods during the course of the next century and a half. The pro-
tective tariff system allowed French prices to remain relatively high; but,
at the same time it failed to encourage the modernization of French industry
and agriculture.

Besides the social conservatism and economic laxity of the French
nation, and of the rural community in particular, there was a political lag
that was more pronounced than either the social or economic lags. By 1848
small peasant preprietors and rural laborers found themselves without any
political life because of income and property qualifications. The major
aspects of life which occupied the attention of the peasantry, then, were
the social, economic and religious spheres of activity. At this time there
were 6,248,000 rural preprietors divided into three classes. There were
5,580,000 small proprietors holding 14,800,000 hectares (one hectare equals
two and a half acres) of land for an average holding of 2.65 hectares.
There were 633,000 middle-class proprietors owning 21,200,000 hectares for

an average holding of thirtybthree hectares each. And there were 34,700

 

91bid., p. 198.

grand proprietors owning 9,455,000 hectares for an average holding of 273
hectares.10 The average holdings of the small proprietor testify to his
meager condition. The large proprietors could withstand high living costs
and low market prices for their produce better than could the small ones.
The peasant uprisings in the summer of 1848 stemmed from basical-
ly economic factors and was directed against usurers, large landowners and
the emergency surtax.ll The peasants wanted easier credit (as high as fif-
teen percent interest was being paid by many peasants),12 concessions on
pasture and land rights, the abolition of enclosures, and the abolishment
of the forty—five centimes surtax.13 Peasant bands won skirmishes with the
National Guard in Gueret in the department of Creuse and in Gourdon in the
department of Lot, and there were also serious disturbances in the depart-
ment of Gore. Walter contends that the peasants” actions during this time
influenced the course of French history for the first time.14 This is a
somewhat controversial assertion because it appears that the peasant up-
risings in‘August, 1789, had an influence on French history; but, in any
event, the peasants had to be recognized as a political influence since
they comprised about sixty percent of the population and gained suffrage

rights under the Second Republic and the Second Empire.15 let, its po-

1OGerard Walter, Histoire des pgypons g2 §;_Fgg (Paris: Flammarion,
1963), p. 405.

llilwigh-fi, Burg; Revolution, p. ‘3.
lzwalter, Histoire, p. 406.
1322é9,, pp, 407-408.

14lhi§., p. 415.

151bid., pp. 415-416.

I.

ll

litical influence did not become particularly effective until the Third
Republic.

Between 1848 and 1870 many new programs affecting the peasantry
were announced by the government.16 Agricultural banks and credit unions
were established, and a program to lower interest rates on land and cap-
ital goods was announced: but these did not develop enough to have a ma-
jor effect upon the peasantry. There were changes in the laws which ben—
efited the propertied. A program of agricultural education, which saw the
slow spread of literacy among the rural elements, was initiated. Loius
Elanc's Luxembourg Commission did some communal agricultural experiments.
In 1881 a Chamber of Agriculture was created which functioned more as an
investigating body and an information agency for an interest group than as
functional governmental organization. The use of the ballot was inaugur-
ated in the rural areas. Secondary railroad lines were built after 1880,
and some work was done in the area of land reclamation. But the changing
conditions of rural life did not solve the agrarian problem. The use of
railroads, the introduction of hydraulic mills, the develOpment of drain-
age and irrigation works, and the employment of fertilizer only more clear-
ly'larked economic class distinctions. Conditions in France remained rela-

tively the same among the majority of the peasants in 1882 as they did in
1872 and in 1862.17

 

16Ibid., Wright, Rural Revolution, pp. 8-11.

17wa1ter, Histoire, pp. 413-419.

In 1870 rural France was preparing to transform itself into an or-
ganic part of the nation; the years from.1870 to 1939 can be described in
some ways as the era of the French peasantry, in view of the peasants' new-
found political importance in these seven decades. The other important el—
ement of the social structure was the bourgeoisie; and the Third Republic
basically reflected the interests of the peasantry and the bourgeoisie as
a working compromise between the forces of republicanism.and anti-republi-
sanism, conservatism and liberalism, democracy and government, and the cen-
tralization and decentralization of authority. Since the French Parliament
rather than the executive controlled the policies of the government, the
Republic can be described as a system of parliamentary sovereignty checked
by popular election. The Constitution of the Republic was heavily weighted
in favor of the countryside. Universal suffrage gave the peasants the de-
ciding voice in determining the character of the Chamber of Deputies, which
became the political center of gravity after 1877; and the system of elec-
toral colleges used for Senate elections also gave the determining influence

18

to the rural constituencies. The communes, which were the bases of the

parishes and were elected bodies, helped to somewhat develop the political
participation of the peasantry.19 The peasants, whose social and economic

values coincided with the bourgeoisie, were inclined to support the latter

 

18Hunter, easantry and Crisis, p. 232; David Thomson, Democracy in
France, Th3 Thigd Eng Fourth Repgblics (3rd ed.; London and New York: Oxfoni
University Press, 1958), p. 92. During the duration of the Republic the Son-
ate tended to be more conservative than did the Chamber.

19Hunter, zeasantry and Crisis, p. 88.

at the polls. This support of the bourgeoisie was logical since the pea-
santry had failed to Produce its own grass roots 1eaders.20 Politics,
therefore, fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie, even though the pea-
santry remained an outright majority in over half of the departments.21
By 1876 most peasants had lost their fears that republicanism
would be radical and had identified it with universal suffrage. They
had developed a belief in a democratic republic and overwhelmingly voted
for Gambetta, who decided to campaign for the peasants' vote rather than
the vote of the proletariats.22 There were ten million eligible voters
in France in.1876. Of these, 5,383,000 lived by agriculture, 3,552,000
owning the land that they worked.23 Cambetta became the link between
revolutionary ideas and the powerful class of peasant proprietors and
small property owners of the Republic. Politically, he was associated
with the radical vein; but, socially, he was conservative in that he did
not want to drastically change the status quo of the social structure. In
essence, the Third Republic was a rural, conservative democracy, even
though it was administratively dominated by the bourgeoisie, because it

was politically dependent upon the peasantry; and these two classes shared

 

ZOWright, Rural Revolution, pp. 14-15; Andre, Siegfried, Tableau des
partis en France (Paris: Bernard Gasset, 1930), p. 51.

 

21Wright, France _ip Modern Times, pp. 13, 343,360. In 1870 the ag-
ricultural community comprised 52% of the total pepulation; in 1914 it com-
prised 44% of the total. Also see Robert th1, French Communism in the Mak-
ing, 1914-1924 (Stanford, 091.: Stanford University Press, 196613.71275111
notes little increase in the size of the proletariat between 1906 and 1913,
but he notices an increase in the size of the bourgeoisie, which he attribu-
tes to an influx from the ranks of the peasantry.

 

22Thomson, Democra , pp. 39-40, 42; Stanley Heffmann 23 al,, 13
Search 2; France (Cambridge, Hass.s Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 15.

”Thomson, Democracy, pp. 39-40.

 

0e.

10

many of the same social and economic values. The Republic maintained con-
ditions that small and medium agricultural proprietors supported; it main-
tained the middle classes of the towns and villages.

Politics for the peasantry reflected the individualism and local-
ism of their social and economic life. In local affairs the consensus on
the allocation of values within the subcultural group was more dominating
than the consensus of similar allocations on a national level, where there
was much attitudinal dissonance and fragmentation. This fragmentation was
due, in part, to the individualism of the various local communities. This
higher degree of local consensus is reflected in a comparison of local and
national elections.24 0n the national level, Deputies are more responsible
to their constituencies than to their parties; they feel independent of ev—
ery one except the voters. Political groups have developed rather than po-
litical parties. Siegfried sums up the situation very acutely: "lhus the
political systems rest on a local foundation, in fact on a polyarchy of con-
stituencies, where the deputy is absolutely at his best if he happens to be
personally a local man, in which case he becomes the plenipotentiary of the
district to Paris."25 I

The fourth strand in the peasant character is religion. The peasan-

try, as well as almost all of France, was distinguished by its Catholicism,

k

24For a discussion of local consensus in French politics and a dif-
ferentiation of the national consensus see Hark Kesselman, "French Local Pol-

iticaL.A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus, "America; Political
Science Review, LX(4, Dec., 1966), pp. 963-973.

25Siegfried, 1_i Study 3; Nationality, p. 104.

11

a religion of authority, which has caused a division among Frenchmen be-
cause of a value conflict.26 Ihe revolutionary ideas of liberty and de-
mocracy came into a conflict with the traditional hierarchical system of
authority and obedience. The peasants' individualism, their system of
smallpscale units in their economic organization of production, and their
desire for autonomy in private life conflicted with the ideas espoused by
the Church that called for collectivism within the religious community, a
large organizational operating structure and total dependence of the indi-
vidual upon the Church for salvation. The rise of positivism during the
nineteenth century also tended to advance secularism in France.

Prior to l914 the political workings of the Third Republic did pro-
duce some legislation that had an effect on the development of the four in-
tertwined strands of the cord of the peasant character. In the 1880's the
Ferry school laws and the law requiring the registration of religious or—
ganizations tended to promote secularism and increased the scope of state
intervention in the lives of the private citizen. The law of 21 March 1884,
allowing the legal fornation of agricultural and industrial syndicates, was
important in the development of the modern peasant.27 The formation of these
syndicates aided agricultural laborers to obtain wage demands throgh col-
lective efforts. Ihey were composed mainly of day-laborers and small pro~

prietors; and, as a rule, they were inclined to consist of small groups than

 

26
Ibid., pp. 2-18; Earle, godern France, pp. 5-8; Hoffman! et gl_.,

'2; Search pg France, pp. 1-117. .-

27
halter, Histoire, p. 421.

12

large unions. The syndicates forced a number of concessions from employ-
ers such as obtained by the woodcutters around Uzay-le-Vernon (in the de—
partment of Cher) in 1892 and in Limousin in 1899, the vineyard laborers
around Languedoc in 1901, and the laborers at Peyriac-de4uer in 1903 and
at r;;ier. in 1904 (both in the department of Aude).28

Other major agricultural endeavors of the Republic were the Melina
Tariff of 1892, the provision of subsidies for developing cooperatives and
mutual insurance societies, and the provision for old-age pensions for eg-
ricultural laborers. 29 the Meline Tariff deserves special attention be-
cause it is reflective of the dominent peasant-bourgeois consensus in French
society. It boosted tariff rates to protect French agriculture from foreign-
ccmpetition, especially from the major wheat-producing countries of Russia,
Canada and the United States.30 It preserved the domestic market and the
basic family firm of French life to the disadvantage of modernization, cone
petition, and mass and collective organizationsl methods of production on a
large scale; this diSadvantage was to remain in French economics until after
the Second world 3hr.

What was the condition of the French peasantry between 1880 and 1914?

 

'7

281bid., pp. 422-427.
zgwright, Rural Revolution, p. 16.

‘D

”01bid., pp. 17-18. Foreign competition in the produce market had a1-
so increased since the introduction of refrigeration in transportation. ihe
tariff was later increased in 1910 to the extent that French tariffs became
the fourth highest in the world. See Gordon wright, lhg Reshapigg of French
Democracy (London: Methuen and 90., Ltd., 1950), p. 346. Ihe bourgeoisie al-
so supported and promoted the Meline Tariff because the inroads of foreign
competition.were mass-producing consumer goods that sold for a lower price
:han similar French-produced goods coming from swellrrcsle units of Ircdun-

ion.

r3

13

Its condition can best be described as marginal. Wright notes several rea-
sons for this condition: population pressure; the decay of the rural tex-
tile industry and its replacement by the urban textile industry; the sporad-
ic continuation of the eighteenth centure enclosure movement, which chal-
lenged peasents' ancient rights: and the tendency of the urban bourgeoisie
to buy rural property, which had the effect of raising land values at a
time when the peasants' desire for land was intense.31 Yet, the French ag-
ricultural community's harmony with the basic value structure of the lhird
Republic remained, as did its alliance with the bourgeoisie, which, most
often, possessed peasant backgrounds. There was little social mobility,
and economic disparities remained in spite of the progress made by the de-
velopment of rural unionism. In 1901 the departments with the highest per-
centage of men engaged in agriculture were found in the middle and south-
western parts of France; Lot had seventy-four of every one hundred men en-
gaged in agriculture, Gers seventy-one, Corrbzs seventy-one, the HauteaAlpes
seventy; the lowest percentages were found in the Seine with two, the Nord
with seventeen, the thne with twenty-one, and Pas-de-Calais with thirty-
one.32 Of every one hundred men in agriculture at this time, twenty-nine
were fermiers, with the highest averages existing in northwestern France,
and nine were méta era, with the highest averages being in southwestern

33
France. As for the agricultural area around Paris, one historian has

 

31wright, Rural Revolution, p. 8.

32 ,
Album graphique g2 13 statistigue generals d3 la France (Paris:
Imprimierie, nationals, 1907), p. 77.

33Ibide, pp. 78-790

14

provided an acute description:

In the region around Paris, the social problems of agriculture
were not those of the metayers but of the labourers. This fertile
region . . . was in the hands of small proprietors working their
own land and of great capitalist farmers holding on long lease, in
some cases working the same farm for generations. The socially and
politically disturbing body here was the farm laborer working for the
capitalist farmer. He had many grievances. He was often so badly
lodged that he openly admitted that he was better off in the army;
his food, when it was supplied, was monotonous, and he wanted and
did not always get what he thought was his due, a ration of wine or
cider with each meal. He also wanted a rise in wages or, still more,
a regular wage, for more and more he was employed on piece-work, paid
a good deal at the most busy times, and little or nothing in the slack
season. He was assimilated in many ways to the town worker and re-
acted in.much the same way. The great strikes that broke out in 1906
and subsequent years were, in some regions, directed against piece-
work which the rural labourer was coming to regard with the same dis-
like as the factory worker. The militant trade-unionists of the Paris
region saw a chance to spread their syndicalist doctrines, and there
were riots, attacks on farmhouses, mass intimidation of blacklegs, all
the warlike apparatus of an industrial strike. Taken by surprise, the
farmers yielded, and there followed on this success a sudden spread of
trade-unionism among the farm workers. But all agricultural unions
were shallowly rooted; they never enrolled more than a small minority
of the farm workers and these chiefly among the specialists, the for-
est-workers of the Centre, the market-gardeners of the Paris district,3
By 1914, rural unionism.was little more than it had been before 1906. 4

It is into this rural democracy with its particular character, val-
ues and conditions that the Socialists introduced their programs of reform
and collectivization. In relation to the national characteristics of France
and the individualism of her local community develognants, one is not sur-
prised to notice the political advance of the left in only particular local-

35
ities. The national consensus among Frenchmen between 1880 and 1914 did

 

34D.W. Brogan, France Under thg’Repgblic, ghgiggzelopment 2; Modern
France (1870-1939) (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1940 5’ p. 406.

34 .
Siegfried, §_Study‘;n Nationality, pp. 80, 84-85. Siegfried states
"that the left is a tendency rather than a party, a permanent tendency that

15

not favor any change in the "stalemate society" they had produced; and,
therefore, there was much, but not total, indifference to the Socialists'
programs.36 The paradox of the situation is that many of the peasants
found themselves attracted to the left. Thus, it becomes necessary to
turn one's attention to the develOpmcnt and the agricultural policies of

Socialism in France in order to obtain an understanding of this paradox.

 

always dominates the same regions: the south (excluding the Gironde, the Bas-
que country, and the Cevennes); the central plateau of the southwest, which
formerly was the territory of the Bonapartists; the Parisian basin, but not
Paris itself or the department of Seine-et-Oise; the east, except Lorraine;
the Brittany of the Bretons . . . " Ibid., pp. 84-85. Socialism, as a tend-

ency of the left, has developed within these areas, notably in the northeast,
east, south and central regions of France.

361bid., p. 37.

I‘

MQFERII

SOCIALIST AGRICULTURAL POLICIES TO 1905
French Socialism, as it developed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, had its genesis in the traditions of Proudhcnfs wfed-
eralism.&nd French Jacobinism, which held a belief in a strong cmnicompe-
tent state. Empirical examples of this Jacobin belief were manifested in

/ / / .
such measures as the levee en masgg, the law of the maximum generals which

 

was used by the state to set maximum prices on goods and wages, and the con-
fiscation of royal and ecclesiastical property. Robespierre, conscious of
Rousseau's distinction between the possession of property as a natural right
and as a right given by society, considered property to fall into the latter
category.1 From this supposition it is but a short stop to the Socialist i-
dea that property should be owned by the whole of society and that it should
be held collectiVely under the proprietorship of the state; or, on the other
hand, that public ownership of preperty should be organized on the Connunal
level or in guild units. Both of these positions, the centralized and the
decentralized, find adherents in the development ofFrench Socialism.

many different currents of Socialiam developed in France during the

nineteenth century. Bebeuf, who based his beliefs on the class struggle and

A ~

lLeo A. Lenhlre, "The Intellectual Origins of French Jacohin Sccial—

ifma" Igicrnaiicngl Peview 3: Social Fietoryl(l;§::, IV (Part 3, lCS?;.

 

Io

17

a plea for greater social equality, became a link between the éiéiiéifl
strand of Jacobinism and French Socialism. His emphasis on equalith rath-
er than liberty and his belief that this equality should be imposed by the
intervention of the state is a precursor to the ideas of later Socialists
which stressed equality in the spheres of production and distribution.
Saint-Simon and Fourier deviated from the idea of class struggle and placed
their hepes in fraternal and voluntary sceperation between classes, which
would see the yielding of economic privilege by the "haves." Although re-
formists concerned with social and economic conditions, they did not seek
the nationalization of wealth.2

Louis Blane was another statist Socialist. He advocated the take-
over of the state to im;lement socialism, and many of his ideas advanced
toward Marxism. He advocated a type of producers’ cosperative which would
be run by the workers and financially aided in its formation by state con-
tributions. This cooperative would be the basic structural economic unit
of production.3 Later, Socialists and trade unionists promoted scepera-
tives as a basic unit of economic organization; but they put more emphasis
on and were more successful with consumers' rather than producers' cOOper-
atives.

Pierre Leroux, in the 1830’s, supported a scheme for the collec-

tivization of industrial property and capital; but he offered a different

 

2Thomson, Democracy, pp. ZOff.

3wright, France in Mgdern.11mes, pp. 235-238.

18

plan of "generalization" for agricultural preperty.4 "Generalization" meant
that the farmer could be a quasi-proprietor of the land, or at least a por-
tion of it, as a sort of trustee for the state which was the actual owner.
This idea was later to be modified by those Socialists who called for the
collectivizaticn of all property but allowed for the existence of small hold-
ings of priVately owned "peasant preperty." Ii 1,4} plans the Socialists ap-
pear to recognize the importance of land proprietorship among the peasantry.
The latter program was less directed towards state ownership of limited ag-
ricultural lands because of the increasing number of small holdings during
the course of the nineteenth century and because of the increased political
importance of the peasantry. In both instances the Socialists' program was
intended to lessen the hostility of the peasantry towards the idea of col-
Ieetivization.

Constantin Pecqueur, a firm believer that the state should be the
sole owner and organizer of all preperty, supported a form of "Christian col-
lectivism” in which the state would own the means of production and operate
them in a democratic and humanitarian spirit.5 The state would act adminis-
tratively, like a benevolent despot. Pecqueur seems to have had some diffi-
culty in eXplaining the practical application of its democratic aspect in
this sphere, except for the fact that he associates equality with democracy.

Auguste Blanqui is referred to as the Socialist of the barricades.

He advocated direct revolutionary action, and he was an anarchist of the

f u

4Loubhre, IRSH, IV, p. 427.

5Ibid., pp. 428-429; wright, France ig Modern Times, p. 237.

I‘

v!

19

anti-parliamentarian vein.6

"In the secret societies of the extreme left,
the Society of Families (1834) and the Society of Seasons (1837), Blanqui
combined the tactics of Hebertism and a vague collectivism based in part
on Babouvism, thus laying out a different revolutionary movement, that of
Jacobin Communisma"7

Pierre-Joseph Preudhon represented the anarchist, voluntarist cur-
rent of the revolutionary tradition. He was opposed to an all-powerful
state, and he believed that the workers would have to depend upon thu-
selves to improve their condition. He had little faith in politics, but
he believed that economic change would improve the laborers' condition.
He was a fore-runner of the syndicalists and believed that the solution
to the possession of power was federalism.8 This federal and apolitical
position had much influence among the peasants and posed many problems
to the Socialists in later years. They had to struggle for cooperation
with the syndicalists, who were working through cOOperatives; they had
to spread counter-propaganda in favor of centralization and collective
ization in rural, as well as urban, areas. They had to persuade the pea-
sants and workers that the apolitical doctrines of the syndicalist posi-
tion was inimical to their best interests. In the end, the Socialists
found themselves almost completely divorced from the trade-union move-
ment, and they adopted a policy that supported the idea of cooperatives

in an effort to gain rural support.

 

6Loubhre, IRSH, IV, p. 424; wright, France ig,rodern Times, p. 237.

VLoubér” IRSH, Iv, p.424.

8. . t . . ,
thight, France ig'flodern Times, p. 238; Thomson, bemgggacy, p. 23.

Conflicting forces in France, spurred on by empirical social and
econmmic disparity, reached a crisis in.1871 with the emergence of the Com-
mune. The Commune did not represent Karxism but the national interactions
of the left; it meant something different for each group and marked the end
of the old tradition.9 However, it was important for Marxism because its
failure helped to somewhat discredit the older currents of French Socialism
that were revolutionary in nature.10 These currents were regarded as too rad-
ical and revolutionary by the conservative majority of the existing society.
The problem Socialists were faced with was that of reconciling their violent
tradition with.the peace-desiring community. The repression of the Commune
also forestalled the growth of the development of Socialism because most of
its victims, those killed and exiled, were nonéflarxists. This led to the e-
mergence and the expansion of the marxist strand of Socialism in France,
which came to be directed by Jules Guesde in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century.11 The fall of the Commune also caused a loss of morale a—
mong the Socialists, who did not regain their strength for another two de-
cades and could not match strength with the Harxists until after 1905.

The Communards of 1871 urged the peasants to support them and of-

fered them a specific appeal. 12 They set forth a general program of land

 

9Thomson, Democracy, pp. 24-26. The new political tradition which
emerged during the Third Republic is best described in the contest of the
"stalemate society.” See Hofflman 33 al., lg §eapch ginpance, pp. 1-117.

10Roy Pierce, Contemp_rary FrenchP Politicalfl ought (London and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 17-18.

HWright, France 23 Modern Times, 1). 318.

leirter, Passentr1_ in Crisi 5, Appendix B, pp, 282-285.

21

for the peasants and an end to economic discrimination and disparity be-
tween the rich and the poor. Their slogan was: "The Land for the Peasant,
the Tool to the fibrker, work for AlISTla

By 1880 French Socialists found themselves facing a number of prob-
lems with which they had to concern themselves; some were ideological, some
political, some pragmatic. Ideologically, the idea of Socialism is to re-
place nationality and race consciousness with class consciousness. A.front
of united oeasants and workers could provide the basis for this class con-
sciousness, but the idea of class was subservient to the conservative and
individualistic French national character. It was ideologically difficult,
if not impossible, to include the land-owning peasantry in this front un-
less tne pnilosopn, oz Socialism, which rested upon the laboring classes,
was mmdified. It is also difficult to move the French into any kind of
association that is directed towards the establishment of a positive pro-
gram; French consensus is basically negative and conservative in nature.
And the most conservative element of French society is the peasantry.

It was because the peasantry presented obstacles to the progress
of Socialism.- or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the pea-
santry could make Socialism progress faster if the two could get together--
and because it wasnot recognized as a revolutionary class that the Social-
ists found themselves in so much difficulty with the agrarian problem. Those
Socialists who wanted the peasantry to Join the ranks of the Socialist move—

ment faced this dilemma: ideologically, they had to reconcile collectivism

 

13Ibid., p. 285.

22

with a long tradition of private ownership - they were the prOponents of
the collectivization of prOperty, but the peasants were anti-collectiviets.
Chaeactorized by individualism.and acclimated to family values, the peasants
advocated the ownership of private property. The Socialists were forced to
recognize a special interest in the agricultural population simply because
of their nmnbers and their voting influence under the Republic.14 They need-
to find a plank on the question of prOporty with which they could appeal to
the peasantry without losing the support of the proletariat.15 The plank
turned out to be the idea of "peasant property", and it helped to provide
some cohesion between the values of the Socialists and the peasants because
it allowed for small rural holdings of private prOperty; and the peasantry
was characterized by their small holdings of private property.

But, there was no uniform.agreement on a peasant policy among Social-
ists between 1880 and 1914; in fact, there was a general division on the
methodological approach that should be employed towards the peasantry which
was not fully resolved even after the formation of the Unified Socialist Par-
ty in 1905. After the Congress of Paris in 1880 there emerged five general
divisions in the ranks of the Socialists. There were the Independents, the

Blanquists, the Allemanists, the Broussists and the Gnosdists. After a brief

14Encyclope’die socialiste, Syndicate gt coopérative gg’lflnter- '
nationals guviere, Aristide Quillet, (ed.), (XIV; Paris, Aristide Quillet,
1912), II, pp. 246-247. The Socialists also recognised that the charge of
violence attached to themselves had to be reconciled with the pacifism of
tho p.35antryo Ibido, pp. 254.255.

15Baron Pierre de Coubertin, 323,Evolution 22 France Under the

gaggg Repgblic, trans. by Isabel F. Eapgood, (New York and Boston: Crowell
and Company, 1897), pp. 407-408.

23

flirtation with the Opportunists, Jean Jauros became the Leader of the In-
dependents, and Edouard Vaillant was one of the leading spokesmen for the
Blanquists.16 Jean.Allemane, who distrusted politics and favored strikes,
became the leader of the workingman's Socialist Revolutionary Party. Paul
Brouese led the Federation of the Socialist Laborers of France}7 The marx-
ist orientated Jules Gvesdc formed the French workingnan’s Partylgai Roanne
in 1882 shortly after abandoning the Socialists at the Congress of Saint-
fitienne (25 September 1882) where his minority group questioned the adep-
tion of a.motion which allowed Socialists to hold governmental offices.l?
The 20F adhered to the Havre program of 1880, which set uppa minimum'narx-
ist program;29 and, thus, completed the split with the Broussists, whom
Guesde labelled the ”Possibilists" because they supported a collectivist
reform program which did not coincide with Marxist doctrine, believing So-
cialism.was possible gradually and through nonprevolutionary means.

This division of Socialists is important to the peasantry in two

respects. The first was concerned with policy. The Guesdists, recogniz-

ing the misery and poor economic condition of the peasantry, placed the

 

16The Blanquist organization was the Central Revolutionary Com-

mittee. They later organized into the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Parti
socialists revolutionaire.

17The Party's subtitle was Parti ouvrier socialists revolution-
airs (POSR).

18This was the Parti ouvrier francais (PCF).

19Daniel Ligou, Histoire du socialisme en France (1871-1961) (Paris:
Presses universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 69-70; Claude Willard, Le vouve-

ment socialists en France, Les Guesdistes, (1893-1905) (Paris: Editions soc-
isles, 19657; p. 23.

ZOLigcu, Histoire, pp. 43-45-

blame for these conditions upon finance capital and discriminatory taxa—
tionszl Their program called for the collectivization of agricultural
property as quickly as possible.22 At this point the Guesdists would not
support the existence of private property for the farmers in Socialism;
this formal policy, however, was changed at the Congress of Marseilles in
1892. The Possiblists looked toward collectivization as possible, but
not in the immediate future. The Guesdists’ rigid and doctrinaire policy
on collectivization did not aid them politically among the peasants dur-
ing the 1880's.

The second respect in which division among the Socialists was ap-
portant to their relationship with the peasantry concerned methodology.
The Guesdists believed that a revolutionary overthrow of the government
was necessary for the establishment of Socialism. 23 The Allemanists fav-
ored direct action, such as strikes, to obtain their demcnds; and they
distrusted the political arena as a means to their ends, which were es-
sentially reforms and a transformation of the state. They were in the
Proudhonist tradition and were kin to the agricultural syndicalists, who

also began to deve10p during the 1880's. The Possibilists, on the other

 

216.D.H. Cole,.A meter! of Socialist mouggt (v; 3rd ed.; Lon-
don: Eheflillan.and Company Ltd., 1963 first published in 1956 I, III,
p. 325. '

22This was adapted at Havre in 1880 and became an integral part
of their early program. Aaron Noland, The Founding of the French Social-
ist Barty (1893-1905) (Cambridge, Mass.s Harvard University Press, 1956),
p. —7; Harvey Goldberg, "Jaures and the Formulation of a Socialist Peasant
Policy, 1885-1898," IRSH, II (Part II, 1957), p. 380. The call for the im-
mediate collectivization of agricultural property was impractical in 1882.

 

23Ligou, Histoire, pp. 54—56

hand, believed that Socialism cculd conquer the state by an evolutionary
transformation, using the means of the existing democratic machinery.24
With these different methodological approaches towards the establishment
of Socialism, the Guesdists found themselves in an untenable position if
they wanted to obtain the support of the rural conservative community --
but it was not until the 1890's that they began to look for rural sup-
port. How could/they obtain peasant support when they could not gain the
trust of the pacific peasantry? How could they reconcile their philoso-
phy of Socialism with the values of the agrarian community! These prob-
lems, which became recognised in the 1880's, were attacked in the 1890's,
not only by the Guesdist but by other Socialists as v.11.

One of these other Socialists was Jean Jaurbss When he was first
elected in 1885, he eat as an Opportunist, not advocating theeollectivi-
zation of property or revolutionary Socialism. During his first term in
the Chamber Jaurbs voted for two church budgets, against an income tax,
and against a bill that preposed the direct election of Senators.25 He
believed in an evolutionary Socialism.‘ He thought "that as the Republic
had grown out of the Revolution soSocialism would grow out of the Repub-
lic."26 His belief in this continuity of history led hin.te support the

Republic as a structure of the Revolution. Soeialism would be the end re-

 

24I‘bide’ Pp. 67’68 Q
25 ‘

York: BOW. BJOlbsch, 1917), pp. $4.55.

26

cult of Republicanimn.

One of the major problems that the Socialists faced in relation
to the agricultural community was that of reconciling the peasants' trap
dition of private preperty with their proposals calling for the collee-
tivization of preperty; and it was in the late 1880’s and the decade of
the 189C's that Jaurbs formulated a program to resolve this difficulty.
He said that it was an error to believe that Socialism would destroy all
private property. Collective and individual property are not diametrical-
ly opposed to each other. Under Socialism:property would be assured to
those who worked and produced, not to those who exploited the laborers.27
Individual property would be extended and universel.28 And it is here that
Jarres brings in the fliea of "peasant property," the property of the small
landholders which would be able to coexist side by side with the collecti-
vized property of Socialism. He noted that modernization was different in
industry than in agriculture; and that in the case of the latter, machines
had the effect of keeping a high percentage of small proprietors in exist-
once.29 There was, in fact, little modernization among the small farmers.
Jennes recognized that the small farmer could not be forced into the ranks

of collectivism. Peasant property could exist in the Socialist movement --

as indeed an appeal for peasant support would have to admit under the ex-

 

7
Oeuvres de Jean Janres, max Bonnafous, (ed. ), (IX; Paris: Les
Editions Rieder, 1932), III, pp. 165-168. Ihe article cited here first ap-
peared in La Depeche de Toulouse, 3 October 1893.

28Ibid., p. 167.

29
Ibide’ p. 277.

27

isting conditions of the French peasantry -- because it is the small farm-
r ' proper life to have preperty,30 It is evident that Jaurbs had a well-
founded and proper understanding of the peasant character at this time.
Jaurbs noted that the problems facing the peasantry in the 1890's
were both structural and substantive in nature.31 Among those falling into
the first category were the inequality of land ownership (28,000 of the large
proprietors owned as much land as 6,000,000 small proprietors), the frag-
mentation of land holdings, and the undermechanization of French farms. In
the category of the substantive difficulties Jaurbs included high taxes, in-
debtedness, the inroads of foreign.competition, the sharp decline of agri-
cultural prices on the market, and natural disasters such as the phylloxera
plague in the Midi. Tb alleviate rural difficulties, Jaures preposed the
lowering of rents for tenant farmers, the raising of wages for laborers,
the lowering of the cost of freight transportation to facilitate marketing
for the small farmers, an.equalization of the tax system and the facilita-
tion of easier credit.32
let, in spite of favoring these reforms, Jaurbs believed that the

final solution did not rest on reforms but that it would only be resolved

by Socialism. He proposed an organizational plan for the agricultural com-

 

30Ibid., p. 284. For other statements by Jaurbs on property in the
rural community see Ibid., pp. 161-286.

31Goldberg, Jau__;_‘_es, pp. 190-192; Goldberg, IRSH, II, p. 375.
laures believed that the immediate solutions to these problems could best
be attacked by working for reforms through legislative action.

32Goldberg, IRSH, g, pp. 376-378. His call for a tax equalization
took the form of support for a progressive income tax, a major change from
his early days in the Chamber when he voted against an income tax (1887).

munity which included collective farms and small, private family firms.
lhere were three levels of organization in his scheme; paysans des petite
domaines, paysans des groupes agriooles cultivant'les grands domaines, and
ouvrieps commdnaugf4 The first level allowed for private property to be
cultivated on a small scale; the second reflected the collective ownership
of large tracts of land by the state; the third allowed for communal owner—
ship.35 In some sense of the word, all farmers would be preprietors. The
plan contained elements that could appeal to small farmers (small holdings
could be privately owned) and to the farm laborers who felt that their mea-
ger condition resulted from the exploitation by the large, capitalist lend-
owners. It was intended to be a working compromise between Socialism and
the politically dominant elements of the rursl'community.

The Guesdists also concerned themselves with a solution to the prop-
erty question in the 1890's. At the Congress of Marseilles (24-27 Septem—
ber 1892) and at the Congress of Nantes (14-16 September 1894} they adopted
an eighteen-point agricultural program that advocated such things as mini-
mum wages, the improved facilitation of agricultural health services, and

36

the extension of agricultural cooperatives. The main deviation from

their former policy, however, was the acceptance of the idea that allowed

 

_ _. 7 \ ‘
33Goldberg, Jaures, p. 184; Cole, §,History pf Socialist Thought,
III, p. 378'. ' “

34Oeuvres, Ill, pp. 180-184.

sq \

3"ooldberg, Jaures, p. 41. Jaures advocated municipal ownership
of natural monopolies for the urban communities. It appears that the idea

of euvriers communaux was its agricultural counter-part.

3 / . . .
. 6 Encyclopedic socialists, II, pp. 20-22. The text of thiszpro-
gram is reproduced in the appendix of this paper; see below, pp. 77-7 .

EI‘I

.I
'1'.
II.
III

- ---

29

the retention of small holdings of private property by the agricultural com-
munity under Socialism. This policy modification was made due to the recog-
nition of the differences between urban and rural conditions,37 the need to
attract rural political support, and the realization that Socialist Deputies
were able to enact some social reforms in the Chamber.38 This program.was
attacked by the International and the German Socialists; Kautsky and Engels
both denounced it.39 This policy modification by the Guesdist can be inter-
preted as both a defensive and an offensive maneuver.' Defensively, it re-
presented a reaction to the basic peasant (and bourgeois) value which ap-
preciated the priority of private ownership. Offensively, it represented a
propaganda effort directed to appeal to a new element of society (the peas-
antry) previously unclaimed under the auspices of Socialism. It represent-
ed the embarcation of a new Socialist policy, signifying an ”erosion” of
French Marxism.

The issue of conflict between collective and private property was
debated in the Chamber of Deputies. JauPes campaigned in the Chamber dur-
ing the summer of 1897 for an agricultural program.and, with it, the recog-
nition of the value of collective preperty. He noted the problems of the

agricultural laborers and the exclusion of many farmers from the ownership

 

37L1gou, Histoire, p. 63.

38Carl Landauer, ”The Guesdists and the Small Farmer: Early Erosion
of French Marxism," Internation§;,ReviGW'g§ Social History (IRSH), VI, (Part
2, 1961), pp. 213-214. Landauer maintains that the change of policy by the
Guesdists in relation to the small farmer signified the beginning of an ero-
sion of Marxist doctrine by French Socialists.

 

39Ibid., pp. 215, 222.

30

of land. 40 He stated his views on the smallholder and on centralization;
and he urged the reduction of financial burdens on the anall peasants, and
he called for government aid to help them secure capital for land improve-

ments. 41

His motion proposing national control over the means of produc-
tion to prevent individual usurpation of prOperty was defeated in favor of
a motion by Deschanel which mildly acclaimed the integrity and superiority
of individual property. 42 Deschanel also sponsored another resolution de-
claring the superiority of private property over collectivism in November.43
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the Third Republic officially
commendedprivate over collective property.

Tfith the stands taken by the Jauressians and the Guesdists on the
property question, the French Socialists became renegades within the inter-
national Socialist movement. They had been attacked by Kautsky and Engels.
The property question plagued the Socialists of the International, and Gold-
berg notes this situation at the International Socialist workers and Trade
Union Congress held in 1896: ”Devoted to collectivism, they balked at de-

fending property, even small peasant property. Tied to a deterministic the-

ory of history, they were convinced of the futility of trying to stay the

 

/ Journal officiel g3 lg Republigue francaise, Chambre des Dé’ ties,
Debate parlementaires, 19 June 1897, pp. 1579-1591, 1593.

4lIbid., 26 June 1897, pp. 1688-1694.

421bid., 3 July, 1897, pp. 1806-1807.

43Ibid., 21 November 1897, p. 2531. The resolution passed by a vote
of 348 to 152. It should be noted here that the speeches by Jaures in the

Chamber do not deviate from his other writings. His appeal and the program
that he advocated are the same in the Chamber as they are out.

31

inevitable disappearance of peasant holdings.”44

Another major problem tackled by the Socialists in the 1890's was
that of gaining political support from the peasantry. Jaunbs received the
support of two rural cantons in the election of 1893; and Goldberg views
this as "the penetration of socialism into an essentially rural area of the
Midi and the emergence of a leader closely associated with the life of peas-
ant France."45 He also believes that Jaurbs possessed the qualities which
attracted the peasantry: the physical stature of a man of the Midi, the fact
that he was not confined to the tight doctrines ef’Marximn, his attachment
of a ”moral fervor” to Socialism, and the ability to analyze agricultural
problems into their various parts and offer solutions that appealed to the
different elements of the rural society.46 Jaurbs attempted to address the
peasants on their practical level rather than on the level of Marxist prag-
matism. He favored a progressive income tax, preposed a reduction in taxes
for anall landholders and advanced a system of socirl security for agricul-
tural laborers. He did not believe that protectivi m was beneficial for the
rural masses, reflecting his humanitarian spirit for the poor; and he at-
tacked the Meline Tariff as an instrument_of bourgeois capitalism.47

The Nantes program of the Guesdists also found an appeal among the

 

44Goldberg, ggsg, 11, p. 383.

45;;2g., p. 372. ‘

461b1d., pp. 390-391.

47;§;§.. p. 182; wright, Rural Revolution, p. 23. The Meline Tariff

was supported by most Socialists, however. Opposition to the Tariff came
mainly from the ranks of the Independents among the Socialists.

peasantry. It was successfully presented to the W the m,
and the small proprietors. Theorectically, it had a tendency to preserve
small-scale agriculture; and, practically, the election gains of 1896 were
recognized, at least in part, as being the result of the Nantes program.

It was, therefore, politically expedient for the Guesdists to modify their
former policy on property and to direct an appeal to the peasantry. Robert
wohl notes that by 1897 "the Guesdists had given up their anti-militarias,
had modified their attitude toward private preperty in an attempt to win
over the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, and had begun to refer to them-
selves as the ‘party of order and social peace.' ' 49 The Guesdists, it can
be said, had to consider the values of the dosdnmting elementsof French
society; and, in so considering, they had to adapt their program to ‘h‘_d°‘
sires of those elements if they wanted to increase their political strength
from those sectors.

By the turn of the century the Socialist agricultural reform pro-
gram became a defense of the small farmer and the agricultural laborer. It
included the demand for minimum salaries, health and security laws, the reg-
, ulation of labor, the extension of social legislation, the extension of ag-
ricultural cosperatives, the abolition of direct taxes and the substitution

ef a direct income tax.50 If one considers the advocacy of the expropiation

 

48Lendeuer, gasp, VI, pp. 214-215, 223; Ligou, Histoire, p. 63. This
result was recognized by the German, Bonnier, but the majority of the other
German Socialists depreciated the value of the agricultural program in re-
lation to election gains. The Nantes program conflicted with Kantsky's.

49Woh‘l, French Communism, p. 15.

5°Encyclepedig socialists, II, pp. 257-259.

‘1. 1‘ llls' ‘1

33

of the large propertyhclders, the Socialists can be assumed to have had two
different agricultural policies for France's two different types of agricul-
ture. lhese two policies can simply be defined as the "Reform Policy",which
supported the peasantry, and the "Collective Policy", which attacked the
class of large, eXplciting agricultural capitalists. Both policies, it can
be noticed, were directed at lessening the hostility of the politically dom-
incnt sectors of the nzral community to Socialism. As one historian has apt-
ly written: "It is worth noting that ever since the 1890's the agrarian pro-
gram of the French Socialists had become a mere defense and illustration of
small preperty - thus clearly sacrificing the “productive' thrust of ori-
ginal Harxism to a concern for justice—in—distribution characteristic of the
stalemate society . . . ."51 French Socialism had shifted its emphasis from
equality in the sphere of production to equality in the sphere of distribu-
tion.

TWo developments in France during the nineteenth century became in-
terwoven with Socialism: positivism and anti-clericalism. The positivist
movement towards materialism and scientism sought progress at the expense
of theology and metaphysics, and positivism's militant appendage was Free-

52 4A struggle developed between Catholicism and positivism; and as

masonry.
the latter made gains during the century, the Socialists, who were allied
with positivism in the Jacobin tradition, also advanced. So far as Social-

ism is concerned, the struggle did not possess so much of an irreligious

 

51

52vmght, France 23 Modern Times, pp. 298-299.

ts

9‘»-

character as it did an anti-clerical disposition.53 When the Emile Combos
cabinet was in power (1902-1905}, Jaures became most influential in the
Delégation des gauches which supported the ministry.54 A vigorous anti-cler-
ical program.was initiated, and it culminated with the separation of church
and state in 1905. This separation served as a catalyst in the process of
dechristianization and appears to have had a marked effect upon those seg-
ments of the peasantry that had observed Catholic ceremonies as a custom rath-
er than as a genuine faith. In the Limoges area, for example, nonbaptized
children increased from two percent to forty percent and civil marriages from
fourteen to sixty percent between 1899 and 1914.55 However, at Chanzeaux, a
village in Anjou in the west of France, a different pattern emerged. when
there was a high degree of conflict between the church and the state, the vil-
lage voted almost entirely for the right. Thus, in 1902 and 1906 seventy per—
cent or rcre of the Village voted for the rifht. In years when the conflict
was not intense, the left obtained as much as thirty to forty percent of the

56

vote. The interaction between the Socialists and the peasantry is indirect

on this issue and varies from are; to area, depending Upon the iend3"o;es of

 

531mm; Loub‘ere, IRLH, N, p. 426.

542'Jright, France in Tic-darn Tires, pp. 333-334; Goldberg, Jaures,

stright, France in ggdern limos, pp. 330-332. Bright notes that a
revival of Catholicism occurred in France after the First fitrld war and that
it gained momentum in the 1930‘s. Also see Hoffmrnn §1_g;., 23 Search 22
* ancg, p. 280.

56Laurence wylie, (ed.) Chanzeaux, é Village 22_Anjou(c&mbridge.
Mass.x Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 62—63. It must be remembered
that Chanzanx was in the east, an area.in.which Socialism did not advance
to any degree at this time.

'I ll I'll ll

lll'lll all.

ltllllllllll‘llll II'I"!

ax

35

each area. Anti-clericalism was associated with the left; and, defending
Upon the values of each locality, Socialists g ined or lc:t seats in elec-
tions through their association with anti-clericalism. It became a value
that could either associate or disassociste the Socialists with the peas-

antry.

I.
(
r
(.
L.

.. .

;'?essians withdrew their surport cf the combos "overrr~~* t
achieve formal Socialist unity. They accepted the idea behind the resolu-
tion of the Congress of Japy of3 Decembct -r 1899, fihich forbade any Social-
ist to participate in a bourgeois government.57 Disagreement on this is-
sue had widened the distance between the two major Socialist parties, the
Jaurbssian Parti socialiste francais and the Guesdist Parti socialists de
France, at the Congress of Lyons in 1901 (26-28 Hay).58 The reconcilia-
tion of these differences began to emerge in a Spirit of unity for col-
laboration at the Amsterdam Congress in August, 1904. The Rheims—Dres-
den resolution passed as a ccmpromisc between the motions sponsored by
the Guesdists and the Jaunessians. The adopted resolution proposed that no
Socialists could participate in the ministry of a capitalist government,
but that tarliamentary groups were permissible and could be used for the

L:
advancement of reform legislation towards the final endsof Socialism."9

 

57EncycIOpedie socialists, II, ppo Slff. The resolution passed by
a vote of 818 to 634. Also see the discussion between Guesde and Jaures
on the question at the conference at Lille in October, 1900; Oeuvres, III,
pp. 189-218.

8Encyc1o1/oie sch
me____n__t socialia t—9 sons Li Trcir:
pp, “99-133.

 

te, II, pp. 56-60; George sLefranc, Le Nonve-
e e rublique (1875-1940) (Paris: Peyet,1963),

11‘:-
0‘
1‘51"

I
59hncyclore€1c socialists, II, pp. 67ff.

36

The Guesdists took the lead in the move toward final unity and passed a res-
olution on 5 October 1904 to discuss the question; the French Socialist Par-
ty passed a similar resolution of 12 December. On 23 April 1905 the Social-
ists merged to found the Parti socialists, Section frsnpeise ds l'Interna—
tionale cuvrihro {$910) as a class party dedicated to the goal of changing
the present capitalistic society into one of collectivism in which the state
would possess the ownership of the means of production and oxchango.60
Tho unification of the Guesdists and the Jsurissisns strengthened the
Socialist movement in France. Daniel Ligou states that the Guosdists gavo
the Party its essential doctrine, steblo elements of organization, a philos-
ophy and e liturgy of Socialism.61 Tho Jaurhssians wero to provide lsador—
ship, in the person of Jeurss himself, and on humanitarian olsment. Although
tho basic reform programs of both Party factions wsro essentially the same,
there remained a general disagreement as to the final form of organization
that the rural means of production should possess and so to the methodology
that should be employed to insuro the victory of Sooielism.62 It should be
noted that the consensus for unity among the Socialists was fundamentally
negative. They unitod on conditions of no participation in e bourgeois gov-
ornmsnt, anti-cloricelism, anti-expansionist: and anti—capitalizing and they

united under the threat of not being recognized in tho International unless

 

601bid., pp. 67-68, 97 ff. For a description of the movement for unity
soo Willard, Lg Mouvoment, pp. 572—590 and Noland, Ihg Founding of the French
Socialist Party, pp. 162-174.

 

61Ligou, Histoire, p. 66.

62'1hoso disegroomonto will be discussed in the next chapter; they in-

volve such things as the organization of cooperatives and support of the gen-
eral strike.

‘lill

37

they took steps toward unity.

During the same time that the Socialists were developing as a poli-
tical force (1880-1905), another group of social and economic reformers e-
morgcd which caused the Socialists many problems in rural as well as indus-
trial areas. These reformers were the syndicalists.

In relation to the French countryside syndicalism had more of a hour-
istic than a lasting functional value as far as politics is concerned. By
this is meant that it did not act as a functional pressure group insisting
on any type of reform legislation, but that it could be useful as a means
of support and pressure for other groups which were political. As Gordon
wright states: ”If agricultural syndicalism was useful to the peasants and
politicians, it did not do anything to help the peasants influence politi-
cal decisionpmaking, develop a sense of solidarity, or solve the fundamen-
tal economic er social problems of rural France.”63 The basic doctrine of
syndicalisn was the apolitization or complete separation of labor movement
activity from politics or political connections. In time it grew to a near
rejection of the theory and principal techniques of democracy.64 lhe oppor-
tunity for the development of syndicalism came when the law of 21 March 1884
legalized the erganization of workers' unions. Although the idea behind the
law was practically discussed in 1876, the final legislation came as the re-

sult of the 1883 proposal of H. Innviray, a professor associated with the

 

63
Wright, Rural Revolution, p. 21.

54E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr., 'Ihe Fate o__i_' the genera Non-Commnist Left
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 14-18. It
represented the voluntarist and anarchist strand of the Republican tradition.

---_.

38

department of agriculture, 65 whose object was to provide a defense for the
economic interests of the peasant, the proletariat and the small business-
man. One of the compelling forces moving Tanviray to attempt to put his
plan into operation was the prevalence of frauds on the market.

Numerically, agricultural syndicalism increased from approximately
six hundred organizations affiliated with various locals with a little over
200,000 members in 188% to around 7,000 groups with over 1,000,000 members
in 1914.66 Although syndioalism did not advance among the rural workers to
the extent that it did among the industrial workers, many agricultural syn-
dicates were found. Among them were the Societe des Agriculteurs de France,
the Societe Nationals d'Encouragement a l'Agriculture (these two and one oth-
er federatcd in 1909 into the Federation Nationals des Syndicate Agricoles
and had for their objective the amalgamation of rural France), the Conro’dé-
ration Geherale des Vignerons du Midi, and the Confederation des Vigncrons
du Sud-Est.6l7 Syndicalism.grew in rural France so that by 1912 there were
six hundred and twenty-eight agricultural syndicates;68 but the size of the

locals was small, and the social composition tended to favor the propertied

 

95Leuis Prugnaud, Les fitapes g3 syndicalisme ggricole 23 France
(Paris: Editions de I'api, 1963), pp. 17-20, _....___

66l§;§., pp. 29-30. lhere is a discrepancy in the figures. lhe union
figures show 6,667 organizations with 1,029,727 members, but the government
figures show 7,501 groups with 1,180,737 members.

67

Ibid., pp. 22-26, 40-43. It should be noted that the strongest syn-

dicate to emerge before world war One was the industrial-based Confederation
Gén‘rale du Iravail (GOT), which was led by Victor Griffuelhes. This was the
syndicate that caused much disagreement among flocialists between 1894 and 1914.

erncyclepfi . socialists, VIII, p. 274.

lo.
I
‘I
II].
I
I
. II.
1|

l
11"

]u\

I
l

l
'1

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I.

39

interests. For example, in 1900 in the Union Centrale sixty percent of its
members were proprietors, but only fifteen percent were fgggiggg and five
percent laborers.69 Rural syndicalicm became more prevalent in some areas
than in others. Py 1914 the greatest number of organizations were found in
the Midi, in the Valleys of the Rhone, the séBno and the Loire, and in the
Catholic departments of the west.7C The departments with the highest number
included the Haute—Sasne, Ishre, Marne, Indra-et-Loire, Doubs, Aube, Yonne
and the Basses-Pyreneese7

The reasons for the growth of syndicalism in the agricultural com-
munity were that its ideas and programs were well-suited to the peasant val-
ue structure and that its economic inclination served a useful function in
the promotion of the well-being of the peasantsr condition. Its anti-mili-
tary and apolitical goals coincided with the rural character. In 1906 the
Federation des Travailleurs de la Terra advanced a program which included
suppression of the colony tax which was imposed annually upon the gétgyggg
by agricultural proprietors and general farmers, the intervention of health
officials to oblige proprietors to maintain proper health standards, the ,
abolition of the license requirement for general farmers, and the creation

of a grgg'hommes aggicoles.72 This last-item called for was a special court

 

69 ' ’
Prugnaud, Egg Etapes, p. 97.

7OIbid., p. 33.

7

1Ibid.,p. 34. It should be noted that some of the areas of major
syndicalist penetration were identical with the areas of Socialist penetrap
tion such as in the south and in the Midi.

721bid., note on p. 39

n~

III
I

1
{1

for the settlement of claims between agricultural workers and their employ-
ers. It was the call for an agricultural counterpart to the ggggggilg g2
gpgdfhggmgg which already existed in the industrial sphere, but which was
mainly composed of employers and controlled by them. In 1908, the Fedora-

dos Caisses Regionales de Credit Agricola Hutuel was founded. It was a re-
gional federation of banks and agricultural mutual credit associations, and
its function was to provide easier credit for capital goods for the farmers.
Agricultural mutual security societies, allowed under a law passed in 1900,
grew from three hundred and forty-two in 1900 to over eleven hundred by 1906.73
In 1907 prefects were given authorization to accept agents designated by
the syndicates for the inspection of fraud on the market.74 Support of pri-
vate preperty, agricultural pensions, the extension of credit, and the call
for higher prices for produce placed the syndicalists in good standing with
the rural community. Besides this, the syndicalists held the peasants' in-
terest by forming cooperatives for seeds, fertilizers and other capital ne-
cessities; and it was in the realm of consumer rather than producer seapor-
atives that these organizations were of value to the peasantry. They adjust-
their emphasis and their program to promote "justice-in-distribution” rather
than justice-in-production equality, reflecting the desires of the existing
society. Managerial functions of the syndicates were handled by the town-

dwellers, the local crusaders from the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoi-

 

73Ibid., p. 75.

74Ibid., p. 80. Market fraud was one of the original motives which
prompted Tanviray to promote the law of 1884. The syndicalists encountered
some difficulty in this same year (1907) with the government. A plan was
proposed by the government to maintain distinctions between commercial and
professional associations. See Ibid., pp. 51, 59-75.

li'llllllll‘ll‘ll

Iililll'lllll'l’liliill if"

Q\

‘\

‘1‘

I

41

sie.75 Although the Socialists came to support and promote the extension
of agricultural cooperatives, they recognized that the early sceperative
programs were essentially the work of the syndicates.76

Although the Socialists and the syndicalists agreed on such matters
as anti—militarism, pacifism and the need for reform, there were many dif-
ferences in the approach to the peasantry that each group employed. Where
the syndicalists tried to emphasize the idea of solidarity in a single peas-
ant class, the Socialists pointed out the diversities within the peasantry.77
While the former preached an apolitical doctrine, the latter tried to en-
tangle the peasants with politics. When the syndiealists organized on the
local level and federated, the Socialists did nothing to impreve their or-
ganizational links with rural areas and tried to remain a centralized struc-
ture. Where the syndicalists supported private preperty and tried to devel-
op each locality in reference to its own peculiar circumstances, the Social-
ists talked of collectivization of preperty and tried to apply their theories
and policies in a similar manner to all localities. In the final analysis,
the syndicaliste provided much opposition to the doctrines and practices of
the Socialists among the peasantry.

Initially, the POF (the Guesdists) enjoyed the support of the syn-

dicalists, who were somewhat influenced in the direction of POF policy un-

 

75Wright, Rural Revolution, ppc 19—20.

76Eneyc1epedie socialists, VIII, p. 274. Compere-Morel was the chief
supporter of sceperatives among the Socialists before the War. He felt that
the extension of sceperatives would provide a solution to the agrarian prob-
lem of the Socialists. His views are discussed further in Chapter III, see
below, pp. 51-56.

77Wright, Rural Revolution, p. 24.

 

it'll-Ill! l:lllll1llilllll‘lll'l:'.1 I!!!"

I'I‘.‘

42

till 1894 when relations between the two groups were ruptured over the issue
of the general strike, which the syndicaliets supported and the Guesdists op-
posed. 78 The disagreement was also concerned with syndicalist involvement
in politics. The syndicaliste declared against direct participation in pol-
itics at Nantes in 1895 and at Amiens in 1906.79 At Amiens the CGI‘adopted
its apolitical position by the near-unanimous vote of 830 to 8.80 Guesdc,
however, stil desired SFIO control over the CGT so that the Party could in-

crease its influence and its militant 3tr0ngth.81

During this period, the
Guesdists also had to struggle against the Broussist faction, which was also
trying to gain influence over the syndicates.82 Even though the Blanquists
added strength to the Guesdists when they Joined the latter faction in 1901,
they did not suppert the Guesdist policy toward syndicalisn, opposing them
and supporting Jaurbs on the issue of the general strike.

lhus, by 1905 the French Socialists had become a formally united and
important political force; but their relationship to the agricultural commun-

ity was structurally and substantially weak. The peasantry presented prob-

 

78Ligeu, Histoire, pp. 56-58.

791bido’ Pp. 59-50.

80Encyglep§dig socialists, VIII, p. 71

81Goldberg, Jaur‘es, pp. 390-393.

82Carl Landauer, European Socialism, g fiistory 2; Ideas and Movements
from the Industrial Revolution 33 Hitler’s Seizu e g; fewer (II; Berkley and
Les Angelesx‘University of California Press, 19595, I, p. 340. Landauer notes
that by the early 1900's there were more Broussists and Allemanists in syndi-
calist positions than there were Guesdists.

Balhig" pp. 329,493, Vaillant, a Blanquist originally, was to sup-
port the general strike at Copenhagen in 1910.

v c»-

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.

43

Isms which had to be overcome if the Socialists were to advance politically
under the existing conditions of the Third Republic. They had attacked the
problems, but they had not completely resolved them. By this time, however,
the Socialists were more closely -- but not completely -- associated with
the value structure and ideals of the rural commmity than they had been in
1880. Their agricultural problems were further complicated by the doctrines
and practices of the syndicalists. If the Socialists vould have taken over
the syndicalist movement in the early 1900's, they would have greatly ad-
vanced their organizational links with the countryside and broadened the ac-
tive base of their political strength. But most of the agricultural prob-

lems that confronted the Socialists in 1905 remained unsolved a decade later.

CHAPTER III

S F I 0 AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, 1905-1914
In the decade preceding Wbrld war I the main attention of the Social—
ists and, in fact, most of France was directed toward the international situ-
ation and toward a concern over labor conditions and industrial organization.
A direct concern with the agrarian problem was relegated to secondary consid-
erations; and this problem remained generally unsolved at the outbreak of war
in 1914, and specifically unsolved among the Socialists. Indirectly, however,
the Socialists' policies pertaining to international circumstances and labor
organisation did affect their relations with the peasantry.
the first decade and a half of the twentieth century was a period of
economic growth for France. Between 1901 and 1913 her per capita industrial
production rose at a higher rate than the general rise in EurOpe.1 Iho rural
sectors of the economy benefited from tariff protections, improved technolo-
gy, rising prices for farm produce, and a general increase in European trade.2
Yet, Gordon wright notes that the stalemate society continued to exist:
lhe surviva1.of the static sector was even clearer in agriculture, where
the excessively slow drift to the cities (amounting to about one percent
ef the rural population per year] left far too many marginal farms oper-
ating, and where most peasants had no easy access to capital for improve-

ments. French agriculture increasingly became a museum with exhibits
ranging from the medieval to the ultra modern.

 

1Goldberg, Jaures, p. 361.
2131a.

awright, France ggtnodorn Times, p. 348.

-.--

.xN

45

The inconsistency between the economic growth and the remaining marginal con-
dition of much of the peasantry is explained by two reasons. First, economic
advances were made in agriculture, but they were made by the better-off far.»
are who could obtain credit for capital investment.4 Second, much of the exp
pansion at this time came from the industrial sphere.5
During this period of economic expansion the Dreyfus Affair emerged
and discredited the army, causing a surge of anti-militarism and anti-patriot-
imm on the left.6 This surge expanded with the increasing tensions of the
Franco-German conflict over Merocco, incidents such as occurred at Casablanca,
Rabar and Agadir acting as catalysts. The issue of war or peace came at occu-
py most of the attention of the Socialists; and, indirectly, the issue had an
hnportant relationship with the peasantry. The reserve of manpower for the
army in case of war would come from the ranks of the peasantry: and as Gordon
Wright notes, the peasants "disliked military service and retained an old pre-
Judice against the officer clash“? lhe 1.1% in the rural districts, led par-
ticularly by the Radicals who had a foothold in these areas, began to denounce

the army and to support a reduction in the term of military service. A reduc-

 

4Ibid., p. 344. Wright also notes that improved conditions in agri-
cultural areas were aided by a falling birth-rate and the urban migration,
which reduced pressure on farm land. The rise in the increase of small held»
ings reached a peak in the early 1890's and started to decline thereafter.
Within the classifications of the peasantry, the day-laborer who owned some
of his land was declining the fastest, moving to the city in an attempt to
hnprove his condition. Brogan, France, p. 406.

sGoldberg, Jaurbs, p. 361 Per capita industrial production rose 57%
in France between 1901 and 1913.

6Jaur\es became a Dreyfussard, but Guesde refused to associate with
the Dreyfussards because he considered them bourgeois.

7
Wright, France ig modern limes, p. 339.

46

tion in the term of service from three to two years, which has to be coun-
teracted in 1913, was an early result of this antipmilitarism.8 The Social-
ists supported Rouvier, one of the leading proponents of this legislation,
and the bill was enacted in April, 1905.9 It is not surprising to See So—
cialist-Radical cooperation on this issue because the Radicals had their
seats in the pacific countryside at stake and because one of the cohesive
factors of unity among Socialist factions in 1905 was an abhorence of war,
which they feared could break out on an international level.10 The pacifism
of the Socialists was one element that associated them with the value sys-
tem of the peasantry; and this value association partly eXplains the in-
creased support given the Socialists by the peasantry between 1906 and 1914.
The leading Socialist spokesman for the pacific policy of the SFIO
was Jean Jaurhs. He remained an advocate of peace until he was assassinated
by Ludwig Frank on July 31, 1914. He proposed a plan which would reorganize
the French army, changing it from a permanent body to a citizens' armyyl This
plan was described in.a book, Lfggmé: neuvelle (Egg gggfggmy), that Jaures
published in 1910. The idea behind this popular army was that it would be
able to guarantee the defense of the nation, if attacked, until more effec-

tive units could be mobilized; and it would deter the bourgeois government

 

8Goldberg, Jaurbs, p. 335.

91bid.

logpgg. This fear was related to the Russo-Japanese car then in pro-

gross.
11
Ibid., pp. 329-330; Pease, Jaures, pp. 110-119; L. Levy-Bruhl, Jean
Jaurcs, Essai biographigue (Paris: F. Rieder et Cie, editeurs, 1924), pp. 121—
122. The complete text of the plan as presented to the Chamber in November,
1910 can be found in Oeuvres, IV, pp. 454-460.

 

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47

from engaging in any offensive wars.12 Thus, it would tend to secure peace.
Offensive war was anathema, but defensive war allowed for the patriotic ele-
ment of the French character. As D.W. Brogan notes: ". . . Jauris allowed
for the deep-rooted patriotism of the average French man, and he understood
that to affront it was not to make of the peasant or the worker a nationless
member of the international proletariat, but to drive him into the hands of
the Nationalists . . . ."13 Milorad M. Drachkovitch states that Jaures' re-
erganisational pland the general question of war support acted as a polem—

ic within the SF10.14 Supported by Jaures and those Socialists who maintain-
ed a belief in the moral righteousness of defensive wars, the plan was attack-
ed by Hervd'and other Socialists who were opposed to any type of war whether
it was defensive or offensive.15 These differences among the Socialists on
the war issue were voiced at the Congress of Limoges in November, 1906. Herve’
urged opposition to every war; Guesde presented a resolution “which subordin-
ated the specific struggle against war to the larger effort against capital-

"16 and Jaurcs spoke in favor of support for defensive wars. A

isnsitself,
compromise motion was presented by Vaillant and accepted by the delegates. It

called for the defense of the nation against unprovoked attacks, but it com-

 

lzGoldberg, Jaures, pp. 385-388.

13Erogan, France, p. 430.

14
Milerad H. Drachkovitch, Les Socialismes frangais et allemand et
le problems_ de la guerre, 1870-1914-zaeneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1953), pp.
114-121.

IsGoldberg,_Jau£es, p. 379.

161bid.

mitted the Socialists to ”'parliamentary action, public agitation, popular
protest meetings, even the general strike and insurrectien' in order to pre-
vent wars of aggression."17 When war broke out in 1914, all Socialists, even
Herve, supported the government and the war in defense of the French nation.
Guesde even became a minister without portfolio in the war cabinet. Under—
lying his belief in peace, Jaurbs was convinced that it could only be attain»
ed by the growth of understanding and trust on an international level. What
was needed was a free federation of sovereign nations which would give up
the exercise of military force and submit itself to arbitration and the ra-

tional operation of the rules of law}8

lhe issue of war or peace intensified between 1910 and 1914, and the
efforts of the SFIO were directed toward the maintenance of peace. In 1913
Earthen proposed a three-year military service law which was denounced by the
Socialists, who resolved at Brest (march, 1913) to fight the proposed law.19
Ihe debate in the Chamber began in June and lasted for seven weeks. The bill
finally passed in the middle of July.20 One of the reasons for the length
and intensity of this debate was the political lag of the rural community.
The nationalist revival of 1911~l914, which resulted because of the behavior
of Germany, did not affect the Radicals as quickly because most of their dis-

tricts were in rural areas, which changed their attitude more slewlyfi1 There

 

7
1 Ibid.

18Pease, Jaurbs, pp. 133, 143.
19Goldberg, Jau£ES, p. 441.
mIbid" p. 442.

leright, France in Modern Times, p. 339.

I'll III ill I'll-l

49

was collaboration between Radicals and Socialists on this issue. Thus, this
"rural leg was reflected in the last prewar elections (April-May, 19l4),when
the country chose a Chamber wnose majority was committed to a reduction in
military service and s pacific foreign policy."22

Anti-eXpansionism was also involved in the program of the anti-mili-‘
tarists. In reality, they feared that French expansionist efforts could eas-
ily lead to an outbreak of host111t1es. Ihey were, therefore, much concerned
with the intentions of the French government in Africa and condemned any ac-
tions that could lead to an estrangement with Germany.

lhe other major concern that confronted Socialists between 1905 and
1914, i.e. labor conditions and industrial organization, became stifled for
a time because of the disagreement between the SF10 and the CGl'as to what
their relationship should be. When the CGT‘reiterated its apolitical posi-
tion at Amiens in 1906, the Socialists were divided along three courses as to
what the proper relation should be. Herve wanted them to be completely sep-
arate; Guesde wanted to incorporate the CGT‘into the SFIC; and Jaurbs, act-
ing in the spirit of compromise in the quest for unity, wanted a cosperative
alliance between the two groups. Jaur‘es' position was officially adopted in
November, 1906 at the Congress of Limoges,23 but there continued to be a mild
friction within the Party on this issue. By 1909 there existed a tacit work-
ing agreement between the CGT and the SFIO, which tended to broaden and to

strengthen the working-class movement. Both appeared to be heading in the same

 

Ibido

 

23Goldberg, Jaurbs, pp. 390-393. Although the Guesdist were the more
powerful faction when the Socialists unified in 1905, the Jauressians had be-
come the majority and controlling faction by November, 1906.

 

direction; the CGT economically, the SFIO politically. The working rela-
tionship is important in reference to the peasantry because many of the syn-
dicates were agricultural units. Syndicalist support for the Socialists en—
tailed, at least in part, some political support from the rural areas, as
well as industrial support from urban areas. The rural support came chief-
ly from the ranks of the day-laborers and the small proprietors. It is in-
teresting to note that there is a corresponding rise of both the CGl‘and the
SFIO in the decade prior to 1914.

The elections of 1906 resulted in gains for the United Socialists, but
the middle coalition of Radicals, Radical-Socialists,‘Left-Republicans and
Independent Socialists gained the most.24 Clemenceau became Premier in No-
vember and announced a reform program, which did not materialise during his
administration (1906-1909). This period was characterized by social unrest
and waves of strikes, stemming essentially from economic rather than politi-
cal considerations.25 In 1907 the revolt of the winegrowers of the Midi was
suppressed by the government by means of force. The crisis was caused by an
attack of phyloxera, foreign competition, and the tendency of a large area
of the Midi to engage in monoculture which made it become "more susceptible
to the fluctuations of the market."25 Demonstrations occurred at Mbntpellier
in June; and when Clemenceau sent troops to arrect the leaders and to dis-

perse the demonstrators, violence erupted and there was a mutiny of the peas-

 

24 .
Ibid., p. 353; Brogan, France, p. 423.
25Wright, France in Modern Times, p. 338; Goldberg, Jaurcs, p. 364;
Brogan, France, p. 423.

26Wright, Rural Revolution, p. 27

51

ant soldiers,27 ihe leader of the revolt, Marcellin Albert, led a march on
Paris but dispersed his followers after receiving some money from the Pre-
mienggGagnon writes of this incident that "Clemenceau's abrupt treatment of
the southern wincgrowers was an exception to the generally favorable policy
of the Republic toward the farmer; agricultural schools, testing stations, and
touring eXperts were offered and, above all, a comfortably high tariff."29
One positive aspect that was an outgrowth of the 1907 uprising was the for-
mation of the Confedoration Generals des Vignerons du Midi, which soon gained
over 70,000 members. It became a pilot organization that was soon imitated
by other growers. In 1913 these organizations of winegrowers joined together
to found the Federation des Associations Viticoles (FAV). This was the first
of the "specialized associations" to emerge; and there was a rapid expansion
of these associations during the interwar period.

The formulation of a direct agricultural program was one of the most
difficult problems that confronted the SFIO between 1905 and 1914, and a for-
mal solution to the agrarian question was still wanting at the outbreak of
the War. At the Congress of Limoges in 1906 the Socialists set up an inves-
tigating committee under the direction of Comphre-Morel to study the rural

situation and to make recommendations for a unified agricultural program?)l

 

271bid.; Gagnon, France Since 1789, p. 275.
28Ibid.
29 .

Gagnon, France Since 1789, p. 281.
30Wright, Rurg; RCVOIUtion, p. 28.

31Alexander .Zevaes, Le Parti socialiste g3 1 4‘él
Riviera, 1923), p. 42; Encyclopedie socialists, I I, pp. 2
Mouvement, pp. 168-169.

3(Paris: Marcel
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A questionnaire inquiring into eleveh different areas was prepared and sent
out to survey the working conditions of rural laborers, the conditions of
rural "exploitation," and the ownership of the means of production.32 The
commission's report was accepted at Nancy‘in 1907. It noted that the cons
ditions of rural laborers were the same as those of the urban workers and
that the small peasant proprietors were being exploited by the agricultural
capitalists.33 It called for a program of immediate legislative reforms that
would promote a tendency toward equality in the distributive sphere, noted
the importance of the syndicalists' cooperative program, and advocated the
extension of agricultural cooperatives.34 The work of the commission was
noted, and Comficre-Morel was designated to continue to direct it in the for-
mulation of a Socialist agricultural program. Comfibre—Morel's position as
chairman of this commission led him to become the chief figure among Social-
ists in the formulation of an agrarian program from this time until after
the war.35
Discussion of the agricultural question was put off to the Congress
of Ibulouse (October, 1908), but nothing was resolved there either. Cemfibre-
Morel believed that the proper way to prepare for the collectivization of

rural France was to promote a system of cooperatives. He stated that he be-

lieved soaperatives would lead to voluntary collectivization among the farm-

 

3PTLefranc, Lg Mouvement, p. 169.

33%“ Encycloge’die socialiste, III, pp. 255-257.

34Lefranc, L__g Mouvement, pp. 165, 168-169.

35th1 2:333; Communism, p. 410. th1 goes so far as to state that

outside of Compere-Morel's efforts the SFIO had no agricultural program be-
fore the War. Also see Lefranc, g3 Mouvement, p. 170.

n.-

.e.

e
I
--.—-
,.
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a v

53.

ers, but in some aspects it appears that he believed in cOOperatives as an
end in themselves rather than as a means under which Socialism could evolve
in the agricultural community, i.e., cooperative rather than collective or-
ganization would be the final form of ewnership of the means of production.36
He saw an advantage in the cooperative system which he believed could improve
the inferior condition of French agriculture.37 He felt that the period for
individual initiative had passed and that modern machines were necessary to
overcome inferior conditions.38 The best way for the poorer farmers to mech-
anize would be to form seeperatives for the purchase of machinery, as well
as for the purchase of other capital necessities. ,But his efforts at ibu-
louse were fruitless, and discussion of the question was again postpontad.39
The Congress of Saint-fitienne in.April, 1909 dealt primarily upon
two considerations: the elections of‘lQlO and the agricultural question.40
It was acknowledged that the Socialists would have to intensify their cam-
paign in the rural areas if they were to be politically successful in the
coming elections. A prolonged discussion ensued concerning the agricultur-
al problem, i.e., the official program that the Socialists would adopt.
lhe discussion was directed along two different viewpoints: the Jauressians

supported the necessity of reforms and a special program for the agricul-

tural community as long as Socialism was the final goal; the Guesdists did

 

36Compbre-More1, £3 Politigue ggraire gg_£arti socialists (Paris:
Librairie populaire, 1921), pp. 24, 29-32.

37Ibid., pp. 14-15.,
38Ibid. 9 p. 350
39

Lefranc, Lgpmouvement, p. 170.

4°Encyclopédio socialists, III, p. 184.

(J

I}

r.

 

54

not see a need for a Special program and though that Socialism should be ap-
plied in the same way in the countryside as in the cities.41 Vaillant felt
that the language of the agricultural program was becoming less and less so—
cialistic, compromising Socialisn.with the values of the bourgeois society.42
A total of twenty-six speakers addressed the delegates on this matter,43 but
it lay unresolved at the end of the Congress.44 The question was also put
off later in 1909 at the Congress of Saint-Quentin.45 It was never resolved
before 1914.

There was also disagreement among the Socialists upon reform legis-
lation. Early in 1910 a pension bill was introduced into the Chamber. At
the Congress of Nines in February, 1910 a controversy arose in the Social-
ist ranks over support of this bill. It was supported by Jenr‘es who spoke
of democracy as the key to Socialist influence of the capitalist state.46
Hervd’attacked the bill and Juurss. Paul Lafargue, a Guesdist and Marx's
sonpinwlaw, attacked the bill as it would permit the capitalists to steal

from the workers.47 Guesde was against the bill and tried to persuade the

delegates to adopt an official resolution condemning it.48 lhe final rese-

 

411bid., pp. 186-188.

 

422...;., Part; socialists, p. 43.
43Engyclopedie socialists, 111, pp. 186-188.
44zé§a}., Parti socialists, pp. 42-46
45Encyc10pedie socialists, III, p. 260.
45001dberg, gagggg, p. 406

4?;2;g., p. 405.

481bid., p. 405-406.

I‘

ll

’55

lution, as adepted by the Congress, supported the bill, Jaurhs having the
support of the majority of the delegates. Guesde spoke against the bill in
the Chamber, Jaurhs for it; it passed the Chamber in.April, 1910.49 As the
pension bill covered agricultural workers, there is a relationship between
the various Socialists positions and the agricultural community. Given that
the legislation would be beneficial to the workers, the position taken by
Guesde and his followers appears to be hostile to the best immediate inter-
ests of the workers; but it is consistent with their doctrine of non-collab-
oration with the bourgeoisie. The Jaurbssian position is more humanitarian
and is directed to improve the workers' immediate condition, even at the ex-
pense of collaboration with the bourgeoisie. The less doctrinaire approach
of Jaurhs was more flexible and could be adjusted to meet the opportunities
for social and economic reform as they occurred. Thus, in relation to the
final end - Socialism through evolutionary and democratic means for Jaurhs,
Socialism through doctrinal and Marxian means for Guesde - each was con-
sistent in an extended perspective. But, as both proclaimed to work for im-
mediate reforms, the Jauressian current was more consistent in the short run
perspective. The Guesdists“ emphasis on the priority of a political take-
over sometimes provided them with a justified reason, or at least a ration-
alization, to oppose specific proposals of economic and social reform.

Thus, during this period there was internal disagreement in the SFIO
on the adaption of a particular agricultural program and on the methodolog-
ical approach that should be used to establish Socialism. Mbst of the ef—

forts toward a consolidated program came from ComporeéMorel. He was able

 

49Ibid., p. 407

56

somewhat to coordinate the party's reform program, which was eclectic in na-
ture, including many of the Guesdist and Jauncssian reform policies developed
in.the 1890's. These reforms included the reduction of transportation costs,
the regulation of labor, minimum wages, the extension of c00peratives, health
laws, and,in general, an extension of social and economic legislation?o But
he did not arrange an agreement on the question of the method of ownership of
the means of production in the rural community under Socialism. In fact, he
tended to complicate the problem with his emphasis on cooperatives, which he
personally thought represented the solution to the problem. In his orienta-
tion, he was a Guesdist rather than a Jaurhssian; and this presented a prac-
tical problem in itself: a Guesdist was the chairman of the party's agricul-
tural commission, but the majority of the party was Jaunhssian. He is ac-
cused by Lofranc of being resyonsible for the party factions not getting to-
gether on a unified agrarian program before the Whr.51 Hi8 position as the
chairman of the commission could well be used in playing politics toward this
disjunctive and, especially if he felt that he did not have enough support to
put through his own program. Yet, the party was able to come to an agreement
on one thing: it concurred that an intensified approach to the peasantry was
necessary in order to strengthen its political position. With its organiza-
tional links with the countryside being relatively weak, campaign approaches
were carried on by the individual candidates in each locality in the tradi-
tional French fashion. The intensified ele ctoral propaganda -- not to be con-

fused with an intensified agricultural program.-- paid off so that "by 1914

 

/ -
50Encyclopedic socialiste, II, pp. 257ff.

$1Lofranc, Lg Houvement, pp. 169-171.

 

n

I’

 

 

 

57

Socialist prepaganda had begun to penetrate the peasantry"52 and had on-
croached upon the territory of the Radicals.

By 1914 the SFIO could not be considered a purely proletarian party
committed to a revolutionary takeover of the state. It directed its appeal
to many different elements of society in an effort to gain political sup-
port. The majority of its members had accepted class collaboration toward
reform and had abandoned the doctrinaire approach of’marxism. The party had
committed itself to a peaceful, evolutionary transformation of the state to
Socialism. The left wing of the party had been forced to yield to the more
numerous reform faction headed by Jaures. In relation to the peasantry, the
party had abandoned the doctrine of complete collectivization of property
and had conceded allowances for the existence of small holdings of private
property for the small, independent farmers, although there was some dis-
agreement on this matter within the party ranks. It recognized its need of
political support from the rural areas and started to intensify its propa-
ganda efforts there. In reality, however, the agricultural program and the
agrarian community were given secondary consideration in view of the two
major considerations of the times: international peace and labor problems
and organization. Even though it theorectically proclaimed to be the party

of the proletariat,53it found itself somewhat divorced from direct involve-

ment with the labor movement because of its differences and difficulties with

the syndicalists. More and more, it had become the party of the petty bour-

geoisie, including many civil servants, journalists, white-collar workers,

 

T

52th1, French Communism, p, 19.

53Encyclopédie socialists, II, p. 259

58

teachers, and professionals in its ranks. Its greatest associational val-
ues with the stalemate society were pacifism and anti-militarism. And even
though there was an association of some values with the peasantry, the So-
cialists found that in 1914 they still remained in a situation of unresolved
conflict with the agricultural community on the issues of property and socio-

economic change.

CFAI—‘ER IV

ELECTIONS, IDEOLOGx AND PROPAGANDA

The outcome of elections in France was dependent upon the peasantry
because of its influential position under the Constitution of the Third Re-
public, and the countryside maintained its electoral advantage until prepor-
tional representation was adopted in 1945. It failed, however, to provide
sufficient leadership from within its own ranks so that in practice its al-
liance with bourgeoisie sent members of this latter class to Parliament.
In reference to this, one historian has written:

For a long time, the organizations representing agricultural inter-
ests have been divided by their political allegiances. Some (in the Rue
d'Athenes and Rue Scribe) were dominated by the representatives of the
landed aristocracy. Others (in the Boulevard St. Germain) were domina-
ted by middle-class representatives Who belonged to the Radical Party.
The traditional leaders of agriculture -- whether right or left -- came
mostly from the rich regions of specialized agriculture. Most of them,
noble or middle class, did not really belong to the peasant group.

Political life for the peasant did not seem to intertwine sufficiently with
the realistic conditions in his economic or social Spheres.2 The peasant
found little else besides his intermittent treks to the polls on election

day to connect him directly with the nation's political activity. His poli-

tical demonstrations, such as occurred in 1907,3 had economic origins and did

 

_,_

lefflmann 33 g;., In Search‘gf France, p. 381.
21bid., p. 393.

3See pp. 50-51.

59

0)

f0

not pressure the government into adapting any significant program changes.

The main political concern of the peasantry was directed toward maintaining
its economic welfare; and it appears that it was satisfied with its role in
the operation of the government, allowing the bourgeoisie to control the cp-
eration of administrative matters. One sociologist has written: "What orients
change in a society, however, seems to be what its people want out of life,
and this is determined by their values."4 The peasant, his value system co-
inciding with that of the bourgeoisie, wanted to maintain the status quo of
the political operation of the stalemate society.

There was no political party that specifically represented or sought
to represent the peasantry as distinct from other social classes; ”and any
group which in substance stood for a special agrarian interest was usually
careful to disguise the fact."5 France's problem, in this reapect, was the
failure of the develOpment of her political groups into well~defined, well-
disciplined and well-organized parties. While a mass electorate was emerg-
ing, there was no similar emergence of political parties with mass appeal,
which was necessary for a healthy political environment. The development of
the SFIO was unlike that of its British counterpart, the Labour Party.

The Socialists' first supporters from the agricultural community were
the farm laborers of the northeast and "scattered clusters of marginal small-
owners and tenants in the center and southwest."6 Goguel cites the followa

ing departments as having developed a leftist orientation by 1885: Ardennes,

 

4Hoffmann‘gt 2;., lg Search 2; France, p. 302
5Thomson, Democracy, p. 51

6wright, Rural ggvglutipn, p. 23; Francois Goguel, Géhgraphie des elec-
tions frangaises g: 1870 g 1951 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1951), p. 105.

 

.I. lllllllillll lull!

 

61

Aisne, Nievre, Cher, Allier, Cruese, Haute-Vienne, Correze, Dordogne, Dere,
Basses-Alpes, Var, Isere, Ardhche, Vaucluse, Gard, Bouches-du-Rfibne, Herault,
Aube, Pyréndes Orientals, Arihge, Haute-Garonne and the Seine.7 Between 1902
and 1914 the departments of Gore and Landes turned to tne left, as did the de-
partments of Pas-de—Calais, Somme, Oise, Seine-et-Oise and Charente after the
sar.8 All of these departments cluster in four areas: the south, the south-
west, the canton and the northeast.- They are not heavily industrialized and
are rather characterized by the diversity of their economic occupations. Of
these areas, the most industrialized was the northeast, but it also had many
small farms. Light industrialization, mining and small-scale agriculture char-
acterized the center; the southern and southwestern areas were predominantly
populated by farmers and winegrowers, and the textile industries employed al-
most all Of the rest of the pepulation.

Although there were only six Socialists elected to the Chamber in 1885,
their strength grew until they found themselves, i.e., the SFIO, the second-
largest party in France in 1914. The elections of 1893 gave the Socialists
their first sizable parliamentary group. They polled 8.6% of the total pop—
ular vote and held thirty-one seats in the Chamber.9 Their number of seats
increased to fifty-five in 1888, and in the 1902 ehactions they obtained over
fifty seats with the Jauressian Part1 socialists franpais having triple the

number of seats as the Guesdist Part1 socialiste de France.10 One reason for

 

7Goguel, Gepgraphie, p. 105.
81bid.

9Peter Campbell, French Electoral Systems and Elections since 1789
(2nd ed.; Hamden, Conn.s Archon Books, 1965), p. 82.

lCIbid., pp. 82-83; Cole, History 2: Socialist Thought, III, p. 351.

IQ

A,

62

the greater success of the first party was its electoral tactic of forming
coalitions with bourgeois parties.11 This election came at a time when the
issue of collaboration with the bourgeoisie was causing much debate among
the ranks of the Socialists. In view of their position tn the Dreyfus Af-
fairlz and the Millerand controversy}3 it is not difficult to understand the
Guesdists' position in Opposing coalitions with the bourgeoisie. Ihe'Jaurbs-
sians emerged more powerful in Parliament than the Guesdists at a time when
their membership was dropping and the number of Guesdists was increasing.
The key to the political success of the Socialists was to collaborate with
the bourgeois groups, which they tended to do (particularly with the Radicals)
on an increasing scale over the next decade. Examples of this collaboration
between Socialists and Radicals can be seen in reference to the military ser-
vice bills of 1905 and 1913.

Greater gains were made by the Socialists after they united in 1905.
In 1906 seventy-one Socialists were elected to Parliament; fifty-three of them

14

were members of the SFIO, the rest were Independents. The discussions at
the Congress of Saint-Etienne in 1909 produced a campaign program in 1910 that

revolved around the eight-hour day, a progressive income tax, prOportional ro-

presentation, the maintenance of peace and other planks declaring for social

 

llGole, History 2: Social Thought, III, p. 351.

12See below, note 6, p. 45.

13Millerand was a Socialist who accepted a ministerial post under the
waldeck-Rousseau cabinet. He was condemned for this act by the Guesdists, but
not by the Jaurbssians. When the Socialists unified in 1905 Jaurbs had to ac-
cept the Guesdist position of non-participation in bourgeois governments.

14
Campbell, French Elgctoral Systems, p. 84. [hbhl identifies fifty-
four with the SF10; hohl, French Communism, p. 17. Zevabs puts the number at
fifty-one; zétcos, Parti ggcialiste, p. 19.

‘l'l'lll'l‘l

63

and economic welfare legislation.ls Seventy-six SFIO representatives were

elected that year, along with two dozen Independent Socialists.16 The char-
acter ef the SFIO members of the Chamber in 1910 was basically bourgeois.
The SF10 Deputies included eight university professors,aseven small farm-
ers, seven Journalists, seven lawyers, six doctors and pharmuchists, five
manufacturers and shepkeepers, one engineer, one chemist and the rest were

17 The majority of the ero mem-

white-eollar workers and manual laborers.
bers of Parliament to the 1914 Chamber were also bourgeois in character.18
In 1914 there were only five proletarians among the t0p twenty-seven mili-
tant leaders of the party.19 The majority of the party membersnow came
from.the departments of the Nerd, Gard, Haute-Vienne, Aube, Vaucluse, Ar-
dennes, Pyr‘néte-Orientales, and the Seine.20 These departments represented-
the traditionally strong areas of the Socialists: the Nerd, Ardennes and
Aube in the north; Haute-Vienne in the center; Pyrehees-Orientales in the
south; Gard and Vaucluse in the southwest; and the Seine represented the So-
cialists in the Paris district. Socialist support in these areas came from
diversified socio-economic classes. For example: industrial laborers and

civil servants supported the Socialists in the Seine; in Aube, vineyard la-

borers, woodcuttere, farmers, farm laborers, and the industrial workers of

 

lsEncycIOpedie socialists, III, p. 15.

16Ibid., p. 84; th1, French Communism, p. 20; Campbell, French Elec-
toral Systems, p. 84.

17

 

Whhl, French Communism, p.20.

l8Lefrene, ;3_Mouvemont, p. 188.

19190111, French Connnunim, p. 20.

201bid., p. 17.

(H

‘
‘1‘
e
a
,—.
A
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I
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I
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64

Troyes and Romilly voted for the Socialists;El and in the Nerd, there was
support from miners, textile workers, small farmers, peasants, and workers
from mony diverse industries.22 With this varied support, the SFIO could
not be considered as an exclusively proletariat party; this is evident not
only from the ranks of its supporters, but from the party members and Do-
puties also. As a party, it represented many varied and diverse occupation-
al groups, some of which vere bourgeois.

In the election of 1914, the SF10 increased its campaign efforts in
the rural areas. In central and southern France, it took away some of the
Radicals traditional strongholdsf3 The number of seats it held in the Chanr
ber increased to one-hundred and three, and the percentage of votes that it
polled rose to 16.9% of the total as it tallied some 1,400,000 votes.311hus,
in 1914 the SFIC became the second-largest party in the Chamber, possessing
about one-sixty of the total seats. Between 1885 and 1914 the Socialists and,
generally speaking, the entire French left increased the number of depart-
ments in which they held majorities, while the number controlled by the con-
servatives and moderates tended to decrease, except in 1910?5 the gains of
the left were most striking in central and southern France.

The SFIO also made gains in France's local elections, i.e.,elections

 

/
21Encyclopedic socialiste, IX, p. 126.

221bid., pp. 392-393.

'33 \
‘ Goldberg, Jaures, p. 447.

24Ibid., p. 453; Campbell, French Electoral Systems, p. 85. fibhl iden-
tifies only 101 Socialists as belonging to the SFIO, wohl, French Communism,
p. 17. The total votes polled by the SF10 in the first elections after unity
(1906) was 878,000. Thus, by 1914 they gained a half of a million votes.

25

 

Goguel, Geographic, pp. 30-41, 52-63.

65

of mayors, deputy mayors and town councilers. Between 1908 and 1912 the
number of Socialists elected in these contests increased from one-hundred
and ninety—six to two-hundred and eightybtwo, and there were many coali-
tions with the Radicals in these elections.26 In 1910 the Socialists cam-
paigned locally on a social and economic reform platform,27 and by 1912 they
had generally included the extension of agricultural coOperatives as part

of this p1atform.28

What eXplains the political growth of Socialism during this period?
The first factor lies in the person of Jean Jaurts. He worked diligently
at keeping the party unified and in guiding it in a reformist direction in-
stead of a revolutionary one which would have been opposed to the social val-
ues of the dominating conservative forces of French encicty. Related to
this is the second factor of Party unity. The SFIO tended to act more as a
unit even though there existed some disagreement within its ranks on method
and on the question of preperty. Increased support from the rural areas is
a third factor. By 1914 the SFIO had only started to make inroads into the
countryside, and these intensified efforts of prOpaganda were proving to bear
political rewards.' Indeed, their campaign here could well adapt itself to a
-- then unused -- slogan of "Peace, Land and Bread;" peace for the major sup-
ply of army recruits, land for the small propertyholder, and bread, 1.e., a
regular income, for the farm laborers who were often subject to employment

fluctuations, depending upon seasonal work for the most part. It is in ref-

 

/
26Encyc10pedie socialists, Ix, pp. 436-453; III, pp. 19-30, 92-84.
27Ibide’ III, P. 15.

28Ibid., p, 18. This reflects the influence of CompEre-Uorel, who
pushed the extension of cooperatives in the rural areas.

66

erence and in reSponse to such pacific and economic appeals -- made not only
by the Socialists -- that the peasantry gave increased support to the french
left. The fourth, and perhaps the most important, factor was the adaptation
of the SFIO to the bourgeois values of the stalemate society. The Socialists
conceded on the question of total collectivization of preperty and allowed
for the existence of private property on the level of the small landholder.
This idea found itself in accordance with the character of the atomized so-
ciety of the Third Republic. Only the property of the large, eXploiting
landholders would be collectivized by the state under Socialism. The evo-
lution of Socialism and the peaceful security of the individual and of the
nation was socially more appealing to the countryside and thepetty bour—
geoisie then the call for revolution and the overthrow of the existing or-
der. By shifting the emphasis of their program to economic matters in the
case of the peasantry and to social matters in the case of the proletariat“:9
the Socialists were able to hedge upon the forces of the existing society
and stay within the scope of its equilibrium, 1.0., they hedged upon the
petty bourgeois and peasant elements of society, and they presented a polit-
ical platform that could be tolerated within the value limits of society.

Yet there were many areas of weaknesses within the party; and these
wesknesses prevented its Operation as a well-organized and disciplined par-
ty capable of successfully presenting its program to the mass electotcrate. A
successful presentation, in this sense, is meant that the party could appeal
to a larger number of its existing supporters and that it could appeal to those

groups not presently supporting the Socialist, such as most of the manufac-

 

29;§i§., II, pp. 169-170, 234-236, lhe Socialists were often accused

by their opponents of having two political programs, one for the peasantry
and petty bourgeois and the other for the workers, and of being Opportunists.

 

\L‘Il'lllllllll'lli 1‘ ll,

'3

67

turers, and the farmers of the west and northwest. In theory, the main thrust
of the party's program was directed toward the proletariat, but the proletar-
iat in France was not yet numerous enough to give the Socialists the degree
of support that they wanted and needed. The SFIO also failed to "command the
financial and organizational help-of the working classes."30 This was caused,
for the most part, by the dissociation of the syndicalist movement with the
Socialist movement. The breakup of the SF10 after the war and the founding
of the French Communist Party affected Socialist strength and unity, and this
split siphoned off some Socialist support.

In relation to the agricultural community, the SFIO failed to present
a cohesive agricultural program supported by the entire party; it failed to
develop its organizational links with the countryside; and it failed to di-
rect and command the peasantry as a revolutionary group within the framework
of its political tradition. Moreover, there was an ideological gap between
the peasantry and the Socialists which had not been bridged. This gap was
the difference between the collectivist philos0phy of the latter and the in-
dividualism of the former. The individual in Socialism becomes port of the
organic body of the state; he is an individual in the corporate sense. He is
an owner in the state corporation much as the stockholder is an owner of a
business corporation. Although social and economic inequalities would be
remedied by state intervention, family preperty would be suppressed?1 Soli-

darity replaces individualism.

 

3OGagnon, francs Since 1789, p. 278.

31Gustave Le Ben, The Psychology 2; Socialism (tells, Vermont: The
Fraser Publishing Company5£1965 first published in New York: The MacMillan
Company, 189?] ), p. 31.

‘lll il 11"!

68

The French agricultural community of this period doesnot fit into
the formal structure of Socialist ideology. It values individualism over
solidarity, and private ownership over collective ownership. It supports
the family ideal over the corporate. It tends to adapt itself more slowly
to the exegencies of the modern world and to the use or modern agricultural
machinery. By 1914, there was little modernization in French agriculture;
in fact, there was relatively little modernization as late as the post world
war 11 period. This rural slowness of change was also reflected in its e-
lection of a pacific and anti-militaristic Chamber majority in the election
of 1914. The peasants, at this time, were not ready for any changes; nor
did they want any, except those that would’promote their economic welfare.
Particularly, they resisted any change in social areas for they were inor-
dinately conservative in this sphere and had "not developed much of a so-
cial conscience."32 ”Atomism" was a characteristic of the French peasantry
because of the relative isolation of agriculture and its slowness to modern-
ize.33 There were no large associations or solid group structure. Frag-
mentation thus resulted among the agrarians; and the corollary of fragmen-
tation was individualism.34 Individualism is in essence opposed to soli-
darity and the collective ideas of Socialism.

The family unit was entrenched among the values of the rural commune
ity. It is difficult for this type of structure to allow a corporate struc-

ture to abide alongside of it, or to replace it altogether. This value of

 

”Wright. Emacs is Ewes; “Times, 10' 353'

- o 4 -

33Hof1mann gt _l., 23 Search 2; France, p. 11

34mm.

 

‘IIII

69

the fenily had its corollary in the eccncric sphere as most French business-
es in 1914 were organized on a small-scale basis, cccentuuting the value of
micro—associaticnalism (association in small-membership groups rather than
in large-membership ones) and the problem of fragmentation. Thrift and in-
heritance were valued by the peasants, as was private preperty. The peasants'
way of life, their character, and their values would not allow them to ac-
cent the ideology of Socialism in its unabridged form.

fihere, then, did the concessions come from which associated the dif-
erences of these two value systems? They came mainly from the Sochilists,
who adapted Socialist doctrines to the agricultural community along nonsMarx-
ist lines. The main oouzossion was given on the prOperty question when they
allowed for the existence of holdings of small-scale private property under
Socialism. This tended to lessen the alienation of the smallholders toward
Socialism. The Socialist emphasis on economic improvement rather than social
change to the rural constituencies who a propaganda device which tended to
allay conservative fears of social change. The adeption of evolutionary rath-
or than revolutionary Socialism was also more appealing to the peasant value
structure. The Socialists' acceptance of working through parliamentary and
democratic means to attain their goals tended to alleviate the fears of the
petty bourgeoisie that the Socialists would employ radical methods to imple-
ment Socialism. By 1914 the SF10 could be trusts as a "'party of order and
social peaco.'" This idea was reinforced by the Socialists' policies of paci-
fism and anti-militarism.

Yet, because of differences on the agricultural question within the

SFIO, there remained a problem with relation to the rural comnunity that was

not entirely resolved among the Socialist factions. There was a tendency to

70

avoid a direct face to face confrontation with the problem in its totality;
this can be noticed by the postfonement of discussion on the question from
congress to congress between 1905 and 1914, except at the Congress of Saint-
fitienne in 1909 which did not resolve the matter. The crux of the problem
was the official determination of the final organization of the means of pro-
duction in the agrarian community under Socialism. The Guesdists wanted
collectivization in the end, using the ideas of private property and coop-
eratives simyly as a means to the end and as a prepaganda device to obtain
political support. The Jaurtssians would, theoretically, allow the existence
of small units of private preperty under Socialism in its final form. The
disagreements among the factions of the SFIO crystallized in the postwar per-
iod; and the left-wing faction, which thought SFIO programs were becoming too

bourgeois, broke off and founded the French Communist Party in 1920.

cinema v

CONCLU S IONS

Between 1880 and 1914 French Socialism develOped into a strong poli-
tical force, receiving much of its support from the petty bourgeoisie and the
peasantry. The Socialists' agricultural program was eclectic in nature, re-
flecting the factional divisions among Socialists of the time. By 1914, the
program officially emerged along quasi-Marxist linesin an effort to obtain
electoral support from France's rural community. Even though the program had
incorporated its major characteristics ty the mid-1890's, there was no inten-
sified efforts directed at the peasantry by the parties until after the Con-
gress of Saint-Etienne in 1909. Noticing their increasing strength in the ag-
ricultural districts, they came to realize that they needed support from oth-
er elements besides the proletariat if they were to continue to be political-
ly successful under the parliamentary system. The percentage of the proletar-
iat remained approximately the same between 1905 and 1914; but the bourgeois
elements of society increased their numbers by about one-sixth, obtaining a
great many of these new recruits from the peasant classes which were migra-
ting to the cities.'The Socialists increasingly directed their attention and
modified their program toward the petty bourgeoisie, the small propertyhold-
ers and therural laborers.

The Socialist agrarian program consisted of two elements: social and

economic reform, and a stand on property under Socialism. While the reform

71

 

I‘lllll‘ll I‘llllnli III"!!!

program was directed to the laborers, the preperty Ilhnk'ma3 intended t0 gain
the support and trust of the small landholders. Socialism.modified its dec-
trine calling for collectivization of all preperty to allow for the survival
of private property, but only small units of private property. This was the
major ideological value concession made to agriculture by the Socialists dur-
ing this period. Also important was the modification of its ideology from
the revolutionary Marxist tradition to an acceptable reformist endeavor.

In reality, the Socialists gave secondary consideration to their ag-
ricultural program. Theorectically, they placed their hopes in the industrial,
proletarian masses. Indeed, the entire philosophy and psychology of Social-
ism.wae better-suited for the type of person composing the urban working force.
The proletariat was peer, propertyless and more accustomed to the group ef-
forts of the factory. However, it was not numerous enough in France to be ef-
fective before the War. Moreover, the apolitical position adapted by the syn-
dicalists tended to hamper Socialists' political efforts among the trade un-
ions. The Socialists needed the political support of the peasantry to sup-
plement and increase their strength in the Chamber. Thus, agrarians were
secondary in Socialist theory, but they were an indispensable element in the
practical aspect of electoral support. The Socialists' concern over the in-
ternational situation also drew their attention away from a primary consid-
eration of agriculture.

Moreover, there existed a fundamental conflict between the values
and ideas of the Socialists and the values and character of the peasantry.
lb bridge these differences, the Socialists had to accede to the values of

the countryside. In doing so, they tended to become the defenders of the

73

petty bourgeoisie,-the small prepertyholders, and the labor classes. Also,
Ithero was a coincidence of values between the Socialists and the peasantry
which included such advocations as anti-militarism and a desire for peace.
By 1914 the Socialists had become, in method if not in essence (depending
on whether one was a Guesdist or a Jauressian), social democrats emphasiz-
ing a reform program.

Thus, Socialist concessions to agriculture in return for political
support does not wholly eXplain the change in Socialist policies in relation
to the question of peasant property. There was also a partial change in sub-
stantive values; and this change was chiefly accomrlished by Jaurbs and his
followers. Private property was allowable under Socialism. Ihe membership
of the SF10 was basically bourgeois rather than proletarian as can be seen
by its composition in the 1910 and 1914 Chambers. The bourgeoisie would
control the state if and when Socialism triumphed. It seems quite impossi—
ble that they would be able to control the peasants' desire for more land
through their scheme of nationization of all large tracts of land -- or,
as Guesde desired, the eventual collectivization of all land. It would be
more plausible that the peasantry would demand that the confiscated land be
divided up and offered for sale. Prior confiscation and sale of land did
not lessen the peasant desire for property between 1789 and 1830. But, if
such a division and sale of land were offered, who would gain from such a
sale? The peasants would not be able to afford it unless the parcels were
small. Those who would profit would be the bourgeois Socialists Who were in
control at the time. Such a situation, ifuncontrolled, could reactiVate
the reactionary and revolutionary character of the peasantry as it did in

the summers of 1789 and 1848. What the Socialists would have to provide in

74

this instance would be a means to supply cheap and easy credit extension to
the peasants.

The results obtained by the Socialists' campaign and propaganda ef-
forts can perhaps best be described as the "benevolent neutrality” of the
peasantry. There were electoral gains made in rural districts, but not in
all of the departments. One of the major propaganda accomplishments was to
lessen the direct hostility of the peasantry toward Socialism. This descrip-
tion fits well the interaction between the SFIO and the peasantry within the
context of the equilibrium of the stalemate society. Fear of the far left
was dissipating; it could now be trusted more than it could in its violent
past.1

The period from 1890 to 1930 is referred to by H. Stuart Hughes as
a time of crisis in liberal values.2 Robert Wohl identifies the SFIO as a
social democratic party and states that by 1914 it had failed to solve this
liberal crisis.3 He believes that this failure caused the emergence and
founding of the French Communist Party after the war.

Such an analytical interpretation is only partially valid, at least
in relation to the agricultural problem. Hughes identifies the liberal cri-
sis es the "recognized dispariy between external reality and the internal

Aappreeiation of that realityfi"4 The reaction to this crisis is character-

 

1This last statement is made in reference to the Jacobin tradition
of the far left. After the war the Communists would emerge from a faction
within the SFIO and move farther left than the Socialists.

0

2H. Stuart Hughes, Conscicusnc es and Society, The Reorientation of
European Social Thought, 1890-1930*1New York: Random House, Vintage Books
Edition, 1958), Chapter I, pp. 3-32.

3wchl, French Communism, pp. 447-454.

4Hughes, Consciousness, p. 16.

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75

ized by a revolt against positivism and a criticism of the doctrines of the
Enlightenment, especially that of the self-conscious, rational man.5 Wohl
believes that the crisis was the failure of liberal ideas and practices to
solve the social, political and economic problems brought about by moderni-
sation. In this sense, there was a liberal crisis in the political sphere,
characterized by the immobility of the Third Republic. France's liberal

form of government failed to solve that country's problems. The fact is,
that in the political area, France had adopted liberal ideas. Socially

and economically, however, Srance remained essentially conservative in re-
lation te incorporating new ideas; it had not "depted liberal ideas in these
spheres. A partial excertion to this is the idea of equality; but, here too,
the emphasis was on political equality, i.e., universal suffrage, rather than
on economic and social equality. In reality, most liberal ideas had not been_
adopted in practice. If they are not adopted, they do not exist; and, if they
do not exist, they cannot be accused of failure.

The social and economic patterns of life in rural France were con-
servative, dating back te the Middle Ages. It was these conservative values
in the economic and the social spheres that were not solving the problems of
modernization. Agricultural machinery, a modern phenoment associated with
the liberal development, was not found on French farms to any significant
degree. The traditional pattern of organization of French businesses, the
small preduction unit, was a conservative phenomenon.

In reality, Socialists and other leftist groups were calling for the

adaption of liberal ideas and practices to solve the problems that conser-

 

sIbido, Pp. 4.5, 15-17.

 

 

l
I'll-III
l
I'll-Ill
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III
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76

vative practices could not. These liberal advocations included a progressive
income tax, the introcucticn of modern machinery in agricultural areas, pro-
portional representation, the formation and extension of cooperatives, the
collective ownership of the means of production, easier and cheaper credit
for the little man, and higher wages for the workers. These programs called
for the establishment of the liberal value of equality in the social and e-
conomic spheres of life, sepecially emphasizing the need for equality in the
area of distribution.

In so far as these advocations depended upon political implementa-
tion, there was a social and economic liberal crisis. But, in as much as
the problems themselves stemmed from the inability of conservative practices
to solve them, the crisis can be seen as a conservative one. The liberal
crisis, for the most part, was that liberalism could not successfully over-
come the traditionally entrenched values of conservatism in the French so-
ciety. It was not a question of the failure of liberal values to solve the
problems; it was a question of liberalism's failure to have its practices
adopted and implemented to meet the problems. Thus, it would be more ap—
propriate to say that the SFIO did not fail tes olve the liberal crisis (in
the meaning of wohl's interpretation), but that it failed to have its lib-
eral ideas and practices implemented -- and the responsibility for this fail-
ure lies more with the French society than the SF10 -- to combat the prob-

lems of modernization in the conservative crisis.

APPENDIX

ms NAN'HGS AGRICULTURAL Paocmml

Adopted by the Congress of Marseilles (24-27 September, 1892) and
by the Congress of Nantes (14-16 September, 1894).

1.

2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

Minimum wages fixed by agricultural workers' syndicates and

the town councils, so much paid to the workers hired by the

day as would be equivalent to that paid workers hired by the
year (herdsmen, farm hands, farm maids, etc.);

Creation of an agricultural claims court;

Prohibition of the communes to transfer their communal lands;

a tax reduction by the State on communcal land domains, mari-
thee and others presently lying fallow; the employment of com-
munal budget credits to be applied to the improvement of com-
munal property;

Allocations. by the communes, of lands ceded by the State, ob-
tained or bought from it, to the prepertyless families, the
homeless and the naturally deprived, with the banishment of the
employer of the salaries, and the obligation to pay a property
tax to benefit the budget to be used for communal assistance;
Agricultural pension funds for the disabled and the old, pro-
vided by a special tax on the incomes of the large estates;
Organization, by district, of free medical service and pharmacy
service at cost price;

An indemnity, during periods of military call, to the families
of reservists, at the «panes of the State, of the department
and of the commune;

Purchase, by each commune, in concurrence of the State, of agri~
cultural machines placed where they are at the free disposal of
the small farmers; the creation of associations of agricultural
workers for the purchase of fertilizer, grains, seeds, and plant
slips;

Reduction of the transfer rates for preperties under 5,000 francs;
Abolition of all indirect taxes and the transformation of all di-
rect taxes into one progressive income tax on incomes over 3,000
francs; meanwhile, a reduction of the property tax for all pro-
prietors cultivating their own land and a reduction of this tax
for those farmers whose land is mortgaged to the bank;

 

/.. . . - .
1Encyclopedia seeialiste, II, pp. 30-22. This 18 the Guesdist program.
Translated by author.

77

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

78

Reduction of the legal and conventional rates of interest charged
on cash loans;

A reduction of transportation tariffs for fertilizer, machines,
and agricultural products;

Reduction by the arbitration commission, as in Ireland, of the
rates of tenant farming and sharecropping, and payment to depart-
ing farmers and sharecrOppers at the highest value_given to the
land;

The abolition of Article 2102 of the Civil Code giving the pro-
prietors a privilege over the harvest profits; . . . the estab-
lishment for the cultivatcrs of a large reserve including irri-
gation machinery, surplus quantities of crops, manure and a nume
ber of cattle, which are indispensable for the exercise of their
profession; '

A review of the land surveys and, while awaiting the realization
of this general measure, a review of the land surveys by the com-
munes; '

The immediate implementation of a program of public works, having
for its object the improvement of the soil and the development of
agricultural production;

lhe liberty to hunt and to fish, without further limitations of
measure necessary for the conservation of game and fish, and the
right to keep the profit of one's efforts; the abolition of re-
eorvod hunts and of game wardens;

Free courses of agricultural study and the establishment of agri-
cultural experiment stations.

BIBLIOGRfiFHICAL EESAY

GOVnRNEgfil'DGCUEENTS

Two documents that provide good statistical information on France

/ . . . / /
for the period 1880-1914 are Resultats statistiques EB recensement generals

 

nglé population (III; Paris: Imprimerie nationals, 1906, 1911, and 1913)
/ . .
and §tatistigue Egnétflc +2_1: France (Paris: lmprimerie nationals, 1907).

A visual conCEption of the different agricultural vocations as found in the

Various regions of France can be found in Album g2 st tisticue agricolo

 

(Nancy: Imprimerie administrative, Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1887) and in

. . . / / 1 e . . .
Album grahique g__lg statistique generals g9 la France (Paris: Imprlmerie
nationals, 1907). The first work provides a visual description of the

French countryside in 1882, while the second gives a description of France

0 I I e o 1 /
in 1901. The Journal offiC1el d3 12 Republic francaisc, Chrmbre oes Dep-

 

/ / . . . . .
utes, Debats parlcmentaires prov1des off1c1al statements of the Deputies
on agricultural ans other matters. Of use in comparing statistics of the

United States with those of France was the Statistic 1 Abstract of the

 

United States, 1965 (86th ed.; mashington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Gen-

sue, 1965).

PRII'ARY SOU RCES
The most useful primary sources have been the Oeuvres g3 Jean

\ /
Jaures, Max Bonnafous, (ed.) (IX; Paris: Les Editions Rieder, 1932) and

79

il‘lllll‘llll'l‘lllullll

 

80

the Encyclopedic socialists, Syndicale gt cooperative 33 I'International
ouvriere, Aristide Quillet, (ed.) (XIV; Paris: Aristide Quillet, 1912).

The former work is a collection or tne writings of Jaurhs as formulated

by him from 1885 to 1914. The latter series of volumes is a descriptive
history or the deveIOpment of Socialism in France as seen by the Socialists.

\ o O o e I o I e e l I
Compere-horel's L3 Politique,agraire d3 part1 socialists (Paris: Librairie

 

Pepulaire, 1921) provides an insight to the development of his agricultural
policies during the first part of the twentieth century.
For an ideological discussion of Socialism and its workings in a

capitalist society, see Gustave Le Bon, Egg Psychology of Socialism (wells,

 

Vt.; Fraser Publishing 00., 1965 [first published in New York: The Macnil-
lan Co., 1899)). For a later discussion of Socialist tactics and prepaganr
da, refer to Lebn Blum, Notre tactique electorale (2nd ed.; Paris: Librairie
Pepulaire, 1932) and the pamphlete Parti social francais: Lg Paysan sauvera
13 France avec lg §.§.§, (Paris: Siege social, n.d.). Blum notes that the
Socialists used a different type of electoral prepaganda for the peasants

and for the workers. This was already evident bythe first decade of the
twentieth century and shows a continuity of electoral tactics employed by
the Socialists from 1900 through the 1930's. The last pamphlets contains

an attack on the capitalist state, blaming it for the evils of the conditions

of France and calling for electoral support from the peasants for the party.
SECONDARY SOURCES

For background material of nineteenth century France, read Albert

/
L. Guerard, French Civilization in the 19 Century: A H;§*p£ipgl Introdugjipn

— * — - _ e g. or

81

(New York: Century Cc., 1918) and F.C. Green, The Ancient Regime: é ganggl

g; Erench Institutions and Socigl Classes (Edinburgh, England: Edinburgh
University Press, 1958). Andre/Siegfried presents a character study of

France in his France, g Study in Nationality (London: Oxford University Iress,
1930). An insight to the dovelctncnt of the revolutionary strands of Social-
ism is found in Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation £5 the EPE§25.B£EE’
lotion (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1965) and Gerard halter,
Histoire des jacobins (Paris: Aimery Somcgy, editeurs, 1966}. also see Joan
Pautard, Les Disrarites ggéggnélgg §-n§ la croissance g2 l'agriculture fran-
ggégg (Paris: Gauthier*Villars, editeurs, 1965) and Pierre Brunet, Sirrcttre

atGaUY terriers: :rtrc l;.§£il2 ,3 l'

1,1,

agraire gt ehoncmic ruralc dos
(Caeng.Sociétefdilmpressicn: Caron at Cie, 1960) for information on the ag-
gricultural conditions in France. Only parts of these books are relevant to
this paper, as they are mainly concerned with conditions in mid-twentieth ccn—

I tury France. however, there are some interesting comparisons made with nine—
teenth and early twentieth century Franco; and frunct discusses changes in

the agricultural Iorulation and in landholdings during the early 1900's.

TWO of the boot general works are Gordon wright, France in Ecéern Times,
gzgg 33 the Present (Chicago: Pand He fially and Co., 1960) and David Thomson,
Democracy‘ig France, The Third and Fourt Republics (3rd ed.; London and New
York; Oxford University Press, 1958). wrigrt's work is excellent in relation
to agricultural matters, and Thomson's analysis puts the year 1905 as an im-
portant division mark in French history. Other general works include Paul A
Gagnon, France Siggg‘lzgg (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), D.N.
Brogan, France under the Rerublic, The Development 9: Modern France (1870-

1939) (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1940), and Ed-

 

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ll

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.
.
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. .
u
.
. .
.
.
.
.\ o
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.
I
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.
.
<
.
'5 A
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- 4
.m
.
.2
.
.
. I.
I
. . u
.
.
.
a
.1
.
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_
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.
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9
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I

82

ward Meade Earle, (ed.) Hodern France, Problems cg the Third and Fourth fig-
Egbliee (New torn: Russel and Russell, 1946). For a book written from the
conservative viewPoint, se. Baron Pierre de Coubertin, 312 Eflolution 93: £322.22
Eager the ggggg Re ublic, trans, by Isabel F. Hapgood (New York and Boston:
Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1897). The introductory chapters of Gordon wright's

The Reshaping 2; French Democracy (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1950) are

 

of some value, but the book is chiefly concerned with the constitutional for-
mation of the Fourth Republic. For an introouction to some of the major per-
sonalities of the early twentieth century in France, see Charles Dawbarn, Egg-
gggwgi New France (New Yerk: James Pott and Ce., 1915).

One of the best biographies of Jean Jaurbs is Harvey Goldberg's Egg
£333 2: Jean Jaurhs (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1962).
TWO other biographieeof Janrbs are Margaret Pease, Jean JaurES, Socialist and
Humanitarian (New Yerk: B.W.'Huebsch, 1917) and L. Léty—Bruhl, Jean Jaurss,
335%} biographiggg (Paris: F. Rieder at Cie, fioiteurs, 1964). Of the two, the
latter is the better.

For a discussion of the French national character, see Stanley Hoffl-

mann.et $1., in osarcl f Lranqg (Cambridge, Hass.x HarVard University Press,

 

1963). The case studies on the character n? rural pvdch firs Laurglcg wyiii,

Village in the Vaucluse (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1964) and Laurence wylie, (ed.) Chanzeaux, g _illaqe $3.5niog (Oxnbridgo, Eis1.:

Harvard University Press, 1?66).

“I § 4 _" . 0‘ D I
do ’3- “1'3 53345 Saw-3.38 an “’10 Trenrrh peasantry ara T7311 :Enr- 3r yea-s

. ’
W... .

I ~- '1 "“
entry and grisig‘igygzgggg (London; fictor Goilanoz, Ltd., 1:36) and Gordon

83

”Firisrht, tiaral HeVSilbit ion in France: _ e Batiiéfltfl .....'n is. 27.693291. .3831,er
e r! I 7? v . _ _ / ‘ ‘
(Stanforc, baIAL Staniorc on1V“r31ty Frogs, 199%). RiSU, 31) Gerard flutter,

—

Histoirc do: paypggg fig France (Paris: Flannarion, 1963) and Serge Mallet,

-o. n. .

 

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74
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‘3‘ 3‘ q. .1 “C:-
Les Falslns centre :3_3:s

.

)o

is a good stady; however, only the first two chapters of mallet's work hi?)
significance for this paper as it chiefly deals with the agricultural confida—
ity since 1945. For L discuss1on of tre.syn6icvtes' influence in Tranh og-
riculture, see Louis Frugnaud, £2§.éta£es guysyndicalisme agricole 23 France
(Paris: Editions do 1'531, 1963).

Three of the best works on the develOpment of French Socialism are
Georges chrsnc, gg,Mouvement socialists sous la TroieiEgg reéubliqgg (1875-
1940) (Paris: Payot, 1963), Claude Wfillard, Lg_yggzggg§t_gggialiste on France
(gggg-iggg), £33 Guesdistes (Paris: Editions seciales, 1965), and Aaron No-
land, 323 Founding g: the French Socialist Party (1893-1905) (Cambridge, Masss.s
Harvard University Press, 1956). While Willard puts more of his attention on
the Guesdists, the other two authors tend generally not to emphasize one fac-
tion over another in their presentations. Daniel Ligou's Histoire g3 social-
éggg en France (nglfilgél) (Paris: Presses universitaires dc France, 196?) is
also a good history of the development of French Socialism. The first two
and the last chapters of Robert thl's French Communiqg in the figking, 1914-
1933 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966) are relevant to this
paper. Also see Milorad M. Drachkevitch, Les §g§ial’§g§§ fronceis gt alle-

mand 33 lg problem2g_ 1a guerre, 1870-1914 (Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1953)

-—.

 

and Alexandre ZEvaes, Lg Parti socialists $3 1904‘; 1993 (Paris: éarcol Ri-

 

\

.\ r
Vioro, 19¢3).

Pater Campbell's French Electoral Svstons and Election: cince 1789

 

/
(2nd ed.; Hamden, Cenn.: Arches Becks, 1965) and Francois Goguel's Geographic

 

 

I! III I [III

'1' JIIIIII'I I 1‘ I

84

I

 

I s Q A e e I D g ‘
dos elections francsises S3 1070 g 1951 (Paris: Librairie armond Colin, 1951)

 

I

are two valuable sources for an analysis of French elections. Also, see Andre

Siegfried, gableau cs -a tie on France (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1930) and

‘r

 

_ / /. . I
Francois Goguel, Lg Eolitigue dos partis sous la llierepubliquo (3° edition;

-~

 

/
Paris: Editions du seuil, 1958). For an understanding of the operation of

the French governmental system, see Brian Chapman, Introduction to French £9“

 

gal Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1953).

For a discussion of the developent ef the political Right in France,
see Rene/Remand, 222.§i§h£ Egng in France; From l§15 19 gg ggullg, trans. by
James a. Laux (Pnilacelpnia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966). Also,
see E. Drexol Godfrey, Jr., 133 Fate 2: the French Non-Communist Left (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1955) for a discussion of left-wing
movements, that of the Socialists as well as these of the Radicals and Radical-
Socialists.

One of the best works on intellectual thought of the period is H. Stuart
Hughes, Consciousness and Society, Bhe reorientation 2; Eurorean Social ghought,
l§ggf12§Q (New York: Random House, Vintage Becks Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1958). Also, on intellectual thought, see Roger Henry Soltau, French Politi-
cal Thought 22 the 19th Century (New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), Irving
Louis Horowitz, Radicalicm and the Revolt against Rocscn (New York: The Lurin-
ities Press, 1961), and Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (Lon-
den and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). TWO excellent works on So-
cialist thought are G.D.H. Cole, é History 2g Socialist Thought (V; 3rd ed.;
London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1963£:first published in 1956? ) and Carl Lan-

dauer, European Socialism, 5 History of Idea_ and Movements from the Industrial

 

i
l

i
i

0‘

I
II.
J

85

 

Revolution to Hitler‘s Seizure 33 Power (II; Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univer-

 

sity of California Press, 1959). The third volume of Cole's work and the first

of Landouer's are most relevant to the period under study.
ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

Tue of the most useful articles for this paper were Harvey Goldberg,
"Jaures and the Founding of a Socialist Peasant Policy, 1885-1898,"Interna-

tienal Review 2: Social History (IRSH), II (Part II, 1957) and Carl Landauer,

 

"The Guesdists and the Small Farmer: Early Erosion French Marxism" ljéfl, VI
(Part 2, 1961). Goldberg's article is an accurate analysis of Jaures' agri-
cultural program, and Landauer's claims that the Guesdists abandoned Marxism
in the 1890's in order to obtain the vote of the small farmer in France. flue
articles that were helpful toward an understanding of left-wing Socialism as
it developed in France were Lee A. Louhhre, "The Intellectual Origins of French
Jacobin Socialism," gags, IV (Part 3, 1959) and Leo A. Loub‘ore, "'l'ho French
Left-Wing Radicals," glass, VII (Part 2, 1962). Also,see J.E.S. Hayward, "‘lhe
Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Leon Bourgeois and
Solidarism," IgSh, VI (Part 1, 1961) for a discussion of the Socialists' in-
tellectual philosoPhy of the period. An article that was of value in relation
to the elections and to French national characteristics was Mark Kosselman,
”French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus,"

American Political Science Review, Li (4, 1966).

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