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I . . o..v0..0.. 70.. 4.0 0. 0 . . . . 0 . . . .I . .0 . . .. .. 0 . 5 _ . c. .III. ...r. .r’.. . ....,A.‘..10.. ..IvdcftlL9w100flra .. ‘ . .o . .. .. ... 0 .0. . . 0..."... .. . .. o I. .; .. . u 0 . . . .).Oeravit atque ingressus est Ravennam, et brachio forti elegit praedictum Michelium, et in episc0pio Ravennatis ecclesia introduxit 33Ibid., "Et continue surgens Michaelius scrinarius ipsius ecclesiae . . . prefectus Arimino ad Mauricium ducem Ariminensem - ." See above, 11. 32. 34See above, fn. 32 90 of Ravenna was made immediately by Pepe Stephen III. Nor did the pope speak of the matter in the letter to Charles and Carloman congratulating the In on the reconciliation they had achieved at Selz, mentioned above. 35 Flow ever, Stephen did urge them to discount claims, presumably by De S iderius, that full justice had been done regarding the claims of St. Peter. 35 It thus is possible that Bertrada or Carloman had learned of the coup in Ravenna before May of 770 and the meeting at Selz, rec eiving the assurance that St. Peter's claims were met in full. We can as s ume that the Franks were concerned early in 770 about Desiderius '3 int entions regarding Ravenna. Here was certainly a potential cause of W23. 1- since the Lombards had moved against the one city which Pepin had 1110 st clearly promised to protect for Pope Stephen 11. Thus, the meeting between Charles and Carloman arranged by Bert rada at Selz in 770 takes on a new significance if the Franks were awa. re that the Lombards had severely shaken the equilibrium in Italy by the move against Ravenna. The quarrel between Charles and Carloman 0V8 r Aquitaine was suddenly of minor importance since it new appeared that the Franks might be drawn into another war in Italy. A reconciliation bet‘F‘reen the brothers was needed in order to provide the united front N 35See above, fn. 31. . 36Codex Carolinus, ep. #44, p. 560: "Et videte, . . . fillii, quia obtestamur vos per tremendum diem iudicii etiam beatus Petrus per no? adhortatur atque obtestatur ut sub nimia velocitate ipsas iustitias euls(:lem principis apestolorum exigere a Langebardis iubeatis, fortiter 903 Cum Dei virtute distringentes, ut sua prepria isdem princeps a‘F’S>Stolorum atque sancta Romana rei publice ecclesia recipiat . . . . Si quls autem vobis direxit, qued iustitias beati Petri recepimus, vos ullo mode ei non creditas. " 91 necessary to prevent the Lombards from further efforts to upset the balance in Italy. At least this is possibly the way Bertrada viewed the situation. With the threat of civil war ended by the Selz meeting for the time being, Bertrada embarked upon a journey that took her to Bavaria, then to Pavia and from there to Rome. She went, according to our source, "in the cause of peace. "37 The "peace" that Bertrada had in mind, according to the standard interpretation, was a general EurOpean settlement rather than one focused particularly upon the situation in Italy. 38 It has been argued that her plan was set in motion in 769 by Charles when he dispatched the Abbot Sturm of Fulda to Tassilo of Bavaria. 39 Sturm managed to secure a lasting friendship between Charles and Tassilo, according to the source. Bertrada built upon this foundation in the late spring of 770 by going to Tassilo, possibly to gua. rantee his independence in return for his good officies in arranging 37Annales Einhardi, a. 770, p. 31: "Bertrada vere, mater regum, cum Barlomanno iuniore filio apud Salusiam locuta pacis causa in Italiam Proficiscitur. . . " 38Mohr, Studien, pp. 55-60. Abel, Jahrbtlcher, pp. 61-63. Martens, Die rUmische Fragpt pp. 117-127. 39Abel, Jahrbiicher, p. 66. See Vita Sturmi, c. 23, MGH, W, 11, Ms quoque temporiBuS, suscepta 1egat1one mter Karolum regem Francorem et Thasilonem Noricae provinciae due em, per plures amnos inter ipsos amicitiam statuit. " See ibid. , P: 376, n. l where the dates 771, 773 or 774 are also suggested for Stul‘lrhi's mission, making Abel's assumption doubtful at best. Abel, W, p. 66, carefully noted that there was nothing to prove that as S 110 served as an intermediary for Bertrada as part of the peace negotiated by Sturm. Without this assumption the argument that ert rada's search for peace entailed a comprehensive plan is seriously Wea-12I:"npli, Charles had little choice but to marry Desiderata. Following Bert rada's reading of the situation, Charles could expect the marriage tie to lead to the restoration of Ravenna to Rome. Furthermore, as the son-:i.n-law of Desiderius, Charles could hardly be denied an important plaCB in Carloman's councils on Italian affairs. \___ 46Vita Karoli Magnus, c. 18, p. 453: ”Mater quoque eius Be’"lihrada in magno apud eum honore consenvit. Colebat enim eam cum summa reverentia, ita ut nulla umquam invicem sit exorta discordia, pra'eter in divortio filiae Desiderii regis, quam illa suadente acceperat. ” 96 That things did not go according to Bertrada's expectations is s hown by a letter from Stephen, vehemently denouncing the idea of a marriage with the Lombards. 47 The marriage undermined the ideolo- g ical foundation of the Papal-Frankish alliance. As we have seen in Chapter II, St. Peter had adepted the Franks, making them the brothers of the Romans, and thus spiritual equals in the eyes of St. Peter, in ‘7 54. The purpose of the ad0ption had been made clear at that time: the Franks were to protect St. Peter's relics from contamination by the Lomb ards. 43 Thereafter, POpe Paul had developed the theme that the Franks were a holy pe0ple, in the interests of strengthening the Papal-Frankish alliance. The idea that they were a holy people, (2 orresponded with the Frankish view of themselves developed independ- ently of the papacy. 49 That the Franks would now consider allying themselves by marriage with an inferior peOple was a great shock to Stephen, or at least to an element within the curia speaking through Stephen. The Lombards would now gain access to St. Peter on the same footing with the Franks and the Romans by Charles's unfortunate ma. rriage. 50 Stephen could not accept this possibility, and he unleashed 47Codex Carolinus, ep. #45, pp. 560-563. 48See above, Ch. II, p. 51, fn. 59. 495ee above, Ch. I. 50Codex Carolinus, ep. #45, p. 561: "Non vobis convenit tale Peragi nefas, qui legem Dei tenetis at alios, ne talia agant, corripitis: Elee quippe paganae gentes faciunt; nam absit hoc a vobis, qui perfecte estis christiani et 'gens sancta atque regale estis sacerdotium. ' eeordimini et considerate, quia oleo sancto uncti per manus vicarii eati Petri callesti benedictione estis sanctificati; et cavendum vobis est, ne tantis reatibus inplicemini. ” 97 all the spiritual weapons at his command to undo the marriage. To reinforce his religious objections, Stephen indicated that the Lombards transgressed all that which had been promised to Rome by the Franks. 51 The Lombards did not cease their daily afflictions and oppressions of the Romans. Furthermore the Lombards not only were not inclined to return any lands to Rome, but they had even invaded Roman territory. 52 At the same time, the Lombards sought to convince Frankish Lni_s_s_,_i_ that justice was being done to St. Peter's claims. 53 Stephen sent a missus with this letter to relate in detail Lombard incur- sions in one area of Roman territory. 54 From this protest it should have been clear that Bertrada's policy had backfired. Instead of guaranteeing the equilibrium in Italy, the agreement with Desiderus was being used by the Lombards to give new life to their territorial aspir- ations in the Duchy of Rome. Since Charles and not Carloman had married the Lombard princess, Charles was most threatened by the papal letter denouncing the marriage. Stephen had called upon St. Peter himself to intervene, a gesture that must have caused Charles considerable uneasiness. Carloman could continue to rely upon Christopher and Sergius and their party in the curia for support. If one assumes, as we must, that 51See above, fn. 45. 52See above, fn. 45. 53Codex Carolinus, ep. #45, p. 563: "Et tantummodo per argu- mentum in praesentia de vestris missus simulant iustitias nobis faciendum; nam nihil ad effectum perdicitur et quicquam ab eis de nostris iustitias nequaquam recipere valuimus. " 54Ibid., p. 563. 98 religious concerns were fused with political questions, then Stephen's protest must be credited with shaping Charles's policy in 770. From this point of view, the Lombard marriage alliance had already become a burden to Charles in 770 because it had seriously endangered his tie with St. Peter. However, it has been argued by Lintzel that the marriage alliance was primarily a device to isolate Carloman from all possible allies in preparation for Charles '3 attempt to gain control of both parts of Francia. 55 If this be accepted, then Charles should have allowed nothing to interfere with this coldly conceived plan. But instead of striv- ing to maintain his link with Desiderius, Charles took action in August 770 that shook the newly established alliance. He intervened abruptly in Ravenna by diSpatching a missus, Hucipert, to that city with a warning to the people. 56 Encouraged by this sign of Frankish support, the pe0ple of Ravenna rose in rebellion and drove Archbishop Michael, the unconse- crated usurper, out. 57 A canonical election was quickly held in which archdeacon Leo was elected archbishop. 58 Stephen speedily consecrated 55Karlder Gross und Karlmann”, Hg, CXL (1929), 1-22, esp. p. 10. 56Vita Steplrgnus III, pp. 477: ”Sed dum nullo modo firmissimam mentis constantiam ipsius . . . pontificis flectere potuerunt nequissimi . . . Michelii, tunc dum missis . . . Caruli regis Francorum et patricii Romanorum praesentaliter adessent, dirigens hisdem . . . praesul sous missos denuo tam praeduto Francorum missos quamque omnes Ravinianos ammonedo, statim insurrexerunt super ipsum Michelium et eum cum ob- probrio de ipso episc0po proiecierunt, quem ninctum hie Roman dirigentes, elegerunt sepefatum Leonum . . . Qui ad hanc apostolicam sedem prOperans cum sacerdotibus et clero ipsius Ravenntis . . . in archiepisc0patus honorem ab eodem . . . Stephano papa ordinatus consecratusque est. ” 57Ibid. 53Ibid. 99 Leo, and Desiderius was left to ponder the implications of these events for the Lombard role in Italy. 59 Lintzel's interpretation of Charles and Bertrada's policy, rest- ing upon the assumption that they were locked in a coldly considered struggle for power with Carloman, collapses in the light of Charles's behavior regarding Ravenna. 60 Charles's action in Ravenna was taken to show Pope Stephen that the marriage to the Lombard princess did not mean that Charles had befriended the Lombards at the expense of Rome, as Stephen's letter of protest implied. Lintzel's explanation for Charles's policy is that Charles did not recognize the relationship between the Franco-Lombard alliance and the overthrow of the usurper, Midaael. 61 But this seems a peculiar lapse in one who had presumably coolly plotted the alliance in order to destroy Carloman. Surely, Charles could not have failed to see that his action in Ravenna might have ended the alliance so necessary to overthrow Carloman. We must conclude that there was some other basis for the creation of the alliance with the Lombards and Charles's subsequent behavior in Italy than the motives of Realpolitik. As was said, the marriage alliance grew out of Bertrada's peace mission and was proposed by Desiderius as the price of peace, possibly with the promise that Ravenna would be returned to Rome. The aim of Bertrada did not appear to have been the destruction of Carloman but to guarantee, by different means, the equilibrium which Pepin had committed 59Ibid. 60See above, fn. 55, pp. 1-10. 61.13.?» CX14(1‘929). pp. 11-12. 100 the Franks to preserve in Italy. If Carloman and Charles drifted apart over the marriage alliance, then perhaps it was because Carloman resented Bertrada's meddling in an area for which he saw himself, not Charles, reSponsible. Charles, on the other hand, appears to have accepted his Lombard bride without enthusiasm in order to avert a poli- tical disaster in 770. When Pope Stephen then raised serious objections, Charles was forced to take immediate steps to prove his good intentions toward St. Peter. This was done by effecting a dramatic change in the situation in Ravenna. Perhaps his actions were also prompted by the discovery that Desiderius had not kept a promise to Bertrada to somehow resolve the problem, among others, of Ravenna. Forced by the circumstances surrounding his marriage to Desiderata, which produced from the papacy a threat of eternal damnation, Charles's role in the Papal-Lombard diSpute went far beyond that which Pepin and Carloman perhaps had planned for him. The possible loss of papal support for his royal power was too grave a danger to allow Charles to stand idly by and to ignore Italy. Perhaps the first seed of distrust of the Lombards had been sown in late 770. The Lombard king had negoti- ated a peace in Italy with Bertrada while supporting efforts to upset the equilibrium created there by Pepin. However, Charles's successful effort to restore papal authority in Ravenna probably persuaded him that Desiderius, though untrustworthy, could be intimidated by the threat of Frankish power as of old. But the protection of his tie with St. Peter, making necessary an independent inter- vention in Italy, contributed to the deterioration of relations with Carloman. Carloman either became envious of or alarmed by Charles's success in achieving at a stroke what Carloman's plodding diplomacy had failed to 101 s ecure for Rome. Thus, by the end of 770 the brothers had drifted apart not because Charles deliberately attacked his power but because in pro- tecting Charles‘s own position he had weakened Carloman's hold on the reins of Frankish policy concerning Papal-Lombard relations. Perhaps news of the new tension between them reached Desiderius which might account for his bold move against the papacy during Lent, 771. The news that Desiderius was coming to Rome prompted some of the Romans to prepare new defenses for the city. 62 Ostensibly, Desiderius intended to make his visit a pilgrimage to holy places in Rome, but the fact that he brought an army with him had apparently raised reasonable doubts about his real intentions. 63 But Pope Stephen, in defi- ance of Christopher, apparently did not immediately regard the Lombard King as a menace to Rome. While the defenses were maintained by one group, Stephen apparently slipped outside the city and discussed the problem of territorial claims with Desiderius, who was by now apparently 62Vita Stephanus 111, p. 478: "Unde nimia furoris indignatione contra praenominatos Christophorum et Sergium exardescens ipse Desiderius, nitebatur eos extinguere ac delere. Pro quo suo maligno ingenio simulavit se quasi orationis causa ad beatum Petrum hic Roma pr0peraturum, ut eos capere potuisset, dirigens clam munera Paulo cubiculario cognomento Afiarta et aliis eius impiis sequacibus, suadens eis ut in apostolicam indignationem eos deberent inducere; eique hisdem Paulus consentiens de eorum perditione absconse decertabat. Dumque hoc agnovissent praenominati ChristOphorus et Sergius, et eundem protervum Desiderium regem Romam pr0peraturum agnovissent, ilico aggregantes pOpuli . . . viriliter cum eadem populi congregatione eudem Desiderio regi paraverunt se resistendum Qui etiam portas huius Romanae urbis claudientes, alias ex eis fabricaverunt; et ita armati omnes existebant ad defensionem propriae civitatis. " 631bid. 102 encamped in and around St. Peter's. 64 Later, after being accosted by Christopher, Sergius, and Carloman's missus, Dodo, POpe Stephen swore that he would not negotiate a secret agreement with Desiderius. 65 However, the next day, Stephen did manage to meet privately with the king. Desiderius apparently promised by a solemn vow taken in front of St. Peter's tomb, to restore the lands in dispute with Rome. 66 Desiderius and his pro-Lombard allies were now able to turn their full attention upon their opponents, ChristOpher and Sergius. According to Stephen's account, they fell victim to an unruly mob. 67 In Abel's interpretation, the Franks were unprepared for Stephen's effort to act independently by coming to terms with the Lombards. 68 Stephen's decision to seek a new policy that entailed coming to terms with Desiderius was also bound up with his decision to become pOpe in his own right and to throw off the burdensome pressure of Christopher and Sergius. This, more than a lingering annoyance at Charles for marrying 64Ibid. , pp. 478-479: "Et dum haec agerentur, subito coniunxit ad beatum Petrum antedictus Desiderius rex cum suo Langobardorum exercitu. Et continuo direxit suos missos praefato pontifici, deprecans ut ac eum egredi deberet; quod et factum est. 65We follow Hodgkin's reconstruction of events in Italy and her Invaders, VII, pp. 321-323. 66Hodgkin, VII, p. 322. Vita Hadrianus, p. 487: "'Sed quomodo possum credere eidem regi vestro, in eo quod subtilis mihi sanctae recordationis praedesessor meus domnus Stephanus papa de fraudulenta eius fide referuit, inquiens quod omnia illi mentitus fuisset que ei in corpus beati Perti iureiurando promisit pro iustitiis sanctae Dei ecclesiae faciendis . . . . "' 67See Vita Stephanus 111, pp. 479-480 and Vita Hadrianus pp. 486-487, andTSodex Carolinus, ep. #48, pp. 566-567 for conflicting accounts of the persons responsible for the maltreatment of ChristOpher and Sergius. 68Abe1, Jahrbiich_e‘r, p. 89. 103 without his advice, perhaps inspired his policy during Lent of 771. 69 In order to free himself of his two advisers, Stephen shifted his allegiance away from Carloman to Charles, from whom he could expect the same protection for Rome. 70 Since Charles had already proved that he could hold Desiderius in check, the p0pe probably saw little to fear in attempt- ing to negotiate with the Lombard King. However, the risks involved in Stephen's quest for independence from his two curial watchdogs we re considerable. The Lombard faction would surely try to capitalize upon the situation and fill the vacuum left by the absence of ChristOpher and Sergius. With this objective in mind, the leader of the pro-Lombard group in the curia, Paulus Afiarta, appears to have encouraged Stephen to seek an accord with Desiderius. Wisely or not, Stephen took the Opportunity to align himself more clearly with Desiderius and Charles. In the bargain he eXpected to gain and keep his independence, to preserve the all-important tie with the Franks, and to win new territorial concessions from the Lombards. However, the murders of Christopher and Sergius were more than Stephen had bargained for. Had they been left alive, Carloman would not have had as clear a pretext for intervention in Rome and could have been forced to accept the new arrangement. In a letter to Charles, Stephen attempted to reassure the Frankish King by presenting an account of events in Rome that drove home the idea 691bid. Rather than stress Stephen's remaining irritation at Charles for acting without consulting him, it seems more useful to empha- size Stephen's part in these events as an attempt to secure his independence from not only Christopher and Sergius but the Lombard faction as well. 7OIbid., pp. 88, 92. 'LXII‘! P It ‘1 I .1 altle .d. .61.: e ..c a—rrcras 104 of papal independence from the manipulations of one of Carloman's £3333 Dodo. 71 Desiderius had played a key role in protecting the pope from the threats of ChristOpher, Sergius and Dodo, whom the pOpe accused of try- ing to murder him. 72 Apparently then the situation had gotten out of hand, considering the fate of Christopher and Sergius, but POpe Stephen dis- claimed any responsibility for this piece of mob violence. 73 While the abuse of Christopher and Sergius by the mob was regret- table, Stephen had accomplished much,as he implied in this letter to 71Codex Carolinus, ep. #48, pp. 566-567. Louis Halphen, "La papaute et le compld‘t Lomhard de 771, " Revue Historique, CLXXXII (1938), 238-244. The author's suggestion that Desiderius forced the pope to write the letter raises the question of why the king would have bothered to go to such lengths since the missi who brought the letter were Charles's. They would have exposed me whole plot. Yet, as Lintzel noted, Charles's missi apparently made no effort to intervene in the events in Rome. The Situation was perhaps not as clear to Charles as some have assumed. 72Codex Carolinus, ep. #48, p. 567: "Et credite nobis, . . . filia atque . . . fili, nisi Dei protectio atque beati Petri aposoli et auxilium excellentissimi filii nostri, Desiderii regis, adesset, iam tam nos quamque noster clerus et universi fideles sanctae Dei ecclesiae et nostri in mortis decideremus periculum. Ecce quantas iniquitas et diabolicas immissiones his seminavit atque operatus est praedictus Dodo, ut, qui deliverat in servitio beati Petri et nostri fideliter permanere, ispe contrario animae nostrae insidiabatur, non agens iuxta id, quod a suo rege illi praeceptum est; in servitio beati Petri et nostra oboedientia fideliter essepermansurum. Et arte credimus quod dum tanta eius iniquitas ad aures filii nostri Carlomanni, regis pervenerit, nullo modo ei placebit in eo quod tantem deminorationem atque destructionem . . . is Dodo cum praelatis suis nefandissimis sequaeibus cupiebat deducere . . . 73Ibid, p. 567. 105 Charles. Desiderius had apparently agreed to another territorial settle- ment. 74 This time his oath was given directly to St. Peter in a ceremony before the saint's tomb. 75 Such a vow should have been far more binding than any made to a mere mortal like Bertrada, if such an oath had ever been given. While there were some peOple in the curia who considered the Lombards unfit to take a vow in such a holy place, judging by the pre- vious letter denouncing the marriage, POpe Stephen had not come to this conclusion. He seemed confident that Desiderius had been won over to a reasonable position on the land question, and the pOpe assured Charles that the Frankish -r_n_i_si_i_, who were delivering the letter, would confirm the truth of the papal account. 76 Perhaps Charles's missi were impressed, by Desiderius 's vow, that he was serious in his resolve to come to terms with Stephen, and they thus conveyed the opinion that the pope could now steer his own course in Rome. If we assume that Charles was prepared to accept, for the time being, Stephen's explanation of events and to interpret his letter as an indication that the pope was independent of Lombard control, then we can explain why Charles did not intervene in Rome. Perhaps it was Bertrada who advised this cautious policy of watchful waiting to test Desiderius's willingness to observe the terms of the peace he had negotiated with the 741bid. : ”Agnoscat autem Deo amabilis religiositatis vestra atque . . . tua, eo quod in nomina bona voluntate nos convenit cum praelato excellentissimo et a Deo servato filio nostro, Desiderio rege, et omnes iustitias beati Petri ab eo plenius et in integro suscepimus. Tamen et per vestros missos de hoc plenissime eritis satisfactum. " 75See above, fn. 66. 76Codex Carolinus, ep. #48, p. 567: "Tamen et per vestros missos de hoc plenissime eritis satisfactum. ” 106 pope. Her strongest argument for the course of action, again, was the fact that Charles had recently forced Desiderius to fulfill the terms of the agreement reached at the time the marriage alliance was negotiated in 770. Carloman, meanwhile, prepared a force to go to Rome and avenge the deaths of ChristOpher and Sergius. 77 But his invasion never occurred. Instead, the sources vaguely report that the quarrel between the brothers was reopened. 78 While no certain explanation is possible, it can be argued that the source of their quarrel was Charles 's determination to give Stephen and Desiderius a chance to prove the merits of their respec- tive cases. An independent pope, allied with the Franks and at peace with the Lombards, had been the objective of Pepin's policy. Charles had changed the methods by which that goal was to be reached. Pepin, as we have seen, imposed terms on the papacy and the Lombards, stifling further discussion despite the obvious discontent of Rome. Carloman had apparently also continued to ignore papal dissatisfaction with the terms set by the Franks. Almost by accident, Charles had adOpted different means to quiet papal discontent. Stephen had taken the initiative at this point and had really forced those new methods upon the Frankish king. Charles was content to see if they would work, but Carloman could not rest so easily since he stood to lose most by the new arrangement. Charles was forcing Carloman to accept a secondary role in Italian affairs by his decision to support Stephen's efforts to free himself from the control of ChristOpher 77Ibid. 78See above fn. 107 and Sergius. Pepin's choice of a successor to conduct his Italian policy was thereby endangered although the policy itself had not been deliberate- ly abandoned. Their disagreement seemed to emerge from circumstances rather than from a conscious effort on Charles's part to undermine his brother, although Carloman could easily have chosen to see it as a deliberate attempt to weaken his position. What he probably objected to most was the necessity to transfer the real initiative in Italian policy to Charles imposed upon him by Charles's inaction in 771. Could this not have in- spired the jealousy in Carloman which Einhard noted, and have served as the main cause of their renewed quarrel in 771?79 Einhard's account provides other difficulties for the historian re- garding the events of 771. The repudiation of Desiderata by Charles came at the end of a year of marriage, according to Einhard, which would place the break with the Lombards in the early fall of 771. 80 Historians have argued with this chronology on the ground that Einhard knew little of dates concerning the early years of Charles's career. Most authors have 79Vita Karoli M. , c. 18, p. 452: "Post mortem patris cum fratre regnum partitus, tanta patientia simultantes et invidiam eius tulit, ut omnibus mirum videretur, quod ne ad iracundiam quidem ab eo provocari potuisset. ” Such a mild response could easily have been the product of Charles's recognition of his weakness compared to the resources of Carloman. 8Olbid. , p. 453: ”Deinde cum matris hortatu filiam Desiderii, regis Langobardorum, duxisset uxorem, incertum qua de causa, post annum eam repudiavit et Hildegardem de gente Suavorum . . . in matrimonium accepit. . . . " Perhaps Einhard's lapse of memory derives from his un- willingness to suggest that Charles was trying to make peace with Carloman. If he had repudiated her because of the threat to Rome, Einhard would not have had any sound reason for avoiding this explanation. 108 assumed that the break came shortly after Charles learned of the Lombard £232 in Stephen's letter of explanation discussed above. 31 Lintzel has suggested that, for reasons of state, Charles could not have repudiated her then, and chose to wait for a more opportune moment. 82 The death of Carloman gave him that chance, since it removed the internal crisis that had stayed his hand in the first place. But if Charles was not playing a clear game of Realpolitik, as we have suggested above, and if he nevertheless hesitated to move against Desiderius, believing that Stephen could maintain his independence and secure peace in Italy, then it is possible that Einhard's chronology is not too far off the track. According to the information given in the Vita Hadriani, Stephen spent an undetermined time pursuing further negotiations with Desiderius with the object of carrying out the terms of the agreement made at St. Peter's tomb. 83 Missi were sent to Pavia and they returned with Desiderius 's blunt refusal to restore the territories he had promised to Stephen. 84 The Lombard king observed that he had done enough to aid Stephen by freeing him from the domination of Christopher and Sergius and by preventing Carloman from launching his proposed invasion to avenge 815ee Lintzel, HZ, CXL(1929), 19-20. 321bid. 83Vita Hadriani, I, 487. Hadrian said of his predecessor that ". . . ad eum postmodum suos missos direxisset . . . adhortans eum ut ea quae praesentaliter beati Petri pollicitus est adimpleret . . . . ” 84rlbid.: ". . . taliter ei per eosdem missos direxit in responsis: sufficit apostolico Stephano quia tuli Christophorum et Sergium de medio, qui illi dominabantur, et non illi sit necesse iustitias requiren- dum . . . ." 109 their deaths.85 Nothing more was necessary. Desiderius's claim indi- cates that these negotiations were reopened after Carloman had disbanded his army probably in the early summer of 771. If Charles and Carloman had been acting in concert at the time of Stephen's letter of explanation, as Abel among others assumed, then Desiderius would have been unable to have resisted them. 86 But it seems that they were not united concerning the pr0per course in Italy; Charles had been neutralized. Under these circumstances Carloman could not act. This situation was intolerable to him and led him into open conflict with his brother. Meanwhile, since Charles divorced Desiderata, according to Einhard, after a year, or as we have suggested, in August 771, the king must have learned that Stephen and Desiderius were now divided over the land diSpute again. Charles now acted, both to clarify his position in Rome, which had apparently confused Pope Stephen, and to restore good relations with his brother in order to forestall a war which Charles was ill-equipped to fight. The divorce of Desiderata should have accomplished both. The campaigning season was almost over - too late at least to negotiate a peace with Carloman and march on Rome. Charles could expect no help from Desiderius who preferred to see the brothers quarrel 85Ibid: Nam certe si ego ipsum apostolicum non adiuvavero. magna perditio super eum eveniet, Quoniam Carulomannus, rex Francorum, amicus existens praedictorem christophori et Sergii, paratus est cum suis exercitibus, ad vindicandum eorum mortem, Roma pr0perandum Opsumque capiendum pontificem. " 86Abel, Jahrbiicher, p. 96. 110 and exhaust their energy in a civil war. APeace with Carloman was proba- bly a more attractive option than a disastrous civil war from which Desiderius stood to gain most. Under these conditions it was better to risk the wrath of the pro—Lombard faction, and come to terms with Carloman. By repudiating his Lombard bride Charles clearly shifted sides to Carloman's position. Perhaps with a period in which to nego- tiate Charles hOped to reassure his brother and combine forces to protect the papacy, the one focus of interest they shared. The realization on Charles's part that the Lombards had deceived both himself and POpe Stephen forced him to consider these alternatives. Bertrada, Einhard said, Opposed Charles's decision to repudiate his wife. 87 But now she was overruled. Perhaps she saw that the tension between the brothers could not be negotiated away and that Carloman might seek an alliance against Charles with Desiderius. In any case, from her point of view, in August, 771, Charles's repudiation of Desiderata came at a most inopportune moment since the papacy was threatened and Carloman threatened Charles. Had the kingdom been re- united before the repudiation, as Lintzel asserted, it seems unlikely that she would lave protested so greatly since she surely saw the perfidy of Desiderius in Rome as clearly as Charles; and, equally, she could have seen in December, but not in August, that the Lombard alliance was no longer an asset to Charles as the ruler of a reunited kingdom. Since Charles could not have foreseen the death of Carloman in December, he made his decisions in terms of a policy of cooperation between them to protect their interests in Rome. The war party in Carloman's portion of 87See above, fn. 46. 111 the kingdom perhaps had the upper hand at this time, but Charles could reasonably assume that his severance of the tie with the Lombards would restore him to Carloman's favor. Before any settlement with Carloman had been, reached, Carloman died, allowing Charles with practically no resistance to unite the kingdom. Although there were practical conditions that influenced the smoothness of reunification, such as the maturity Of Charles and the youth of Carloman's heirs, one factor that might have contributed to the ease by which this was accomplished was that the Lombard alliance had ended and that Charles was prepared to take up Carloman's policy of interven- tion in Rome. However, before he could demonstrate his determination to restore the papacy to Frankish control, POpe Stephen died and POpe Hadrian succeeded him. Stability appeared to have returned to Rome, . removing for the moment any need to use force against the Lombards. Charles could safely turn his attention to other concerns. But he came to his position as sole ruler Of the Franks with a deep distrust of the Lombard fortified by bitter eXperience. The foundation for Desiderius's overthrow had been laid. All that was needed was a set Of circumstances to provide Charles an Opportunity to deal with him. Desiderius did not disappoint him, for he soon returned to the Offensive against Pope Hadrian. CHAPTER V THE EXPANSION OF THE PAPAL-FRANKISH ALLIANCE 772-774 By 772 the stage had been set for a vigorous Frankish response to further Lombard pressures upon Rome. The old confidence that the Lombards could be trusted to keep the peace had been shaken to pieces by Desiderius's clumsy attempts to dominate the papacy. Between 772 and 774 Charles was drawn deeper into Italian affairs. The failure of POpe Hadrian to secure an independent position for the papacy in Italy was partly reSponsible. But perhaps more important was Charles's readiness to expand the sc0pe of the Papal-Frankish alliance to meet a new need which had emerged. In April, 774, perhaps at the initiative of Hadrian, the Spiritual resources of the papacy were turned to the new task of supporting Frankish arms against the Saxons in a war of conquest and conversion that had begun in 772. Though the exact terms of the agreement reached during Easter, 774, cannot be precisely determined, this discussion will attempt to show that Charles had formed a spiritual alliance which would remain at the center of his later efforts to develop a consistent Italian policy. Stephen III's successor, POpe Hadrian I, brought new strength to his difficult task by combining the resources of the lay aristocracy with 112 113 those of the pro-Frankish curial party. 1 In 772 Hadrian asked no help from Charles and immediately set about undermining the position of the Lombard sympathizer, Paulus Afiarta. 2 Hadrian's determined leadership perhaps had encouraged Charles's hope to restore the balance in Italy, but the king also knew that Desiderius held the key to peace, a fact which should have inspired pessimism. With the papacy in compe- tent hands once again, Charles turned his attention upon Saxony where, in 772, after holding a synod at Worms, he Opened a campaign that ended with the destruction of the Saxon's most important religious center, the Irminsul. 3 Although some historians have interpreted Charles 's behavior at this time as evidence Of his lack of interest in Italian problems, 4 his policy in 772 reflects more the pressures of the immediate situation than a sign of his disinterest in the threats posed by Desiderius. Through bitter experiences since 770 Charles had learned tosidentify Desiderius as the primary cause of unrest in Italy. As we saw in Chapter IV, the lVita Hadriani, p. 486: "Vir valde praeclarus et nobilissimi generis prosapfi ortus atque potentissimus romanis parentibus editus, elegans et nimis decorabiliis persona . . . . ” Also, Ibid. p. 514, fn. 1; Jan T. Hallenbeck, ”The Election of Pope Hadrian 1", Church History, XXXVII(1968), 261-270. ZVita Hadriani, pp. 487-491; Hallenbeck, Church History, xxxvu (W, . 3Annales Einhardi, a. 772, pp. 33, 34: "Rex vero Karlus con- gregato apud Wormacfam generali conventu Saxoniam bello adgredi statuit eamque sine mora nigressus ferro et igni cuncta depOpulatus Eresburgum castrum cepit, idolum, quod Irminsul a Saxonibus vocabatur, everti . " 4Thomas Hodgkin, Charles the Great (London, 1921), pp. 79, 93. P. Villari, The Barbarian Invasions of Italy trans. L. Villari (London 1902), p. 435. Mohr, Die KarolingischeTleichsidee, p. 36. 114 Lombard king had made it clear by his support of the effort to detach Ravenna from Rome and especially by his treacherous double dealing later, in 771, with Stephen III that he had no intention of preserving the precarious balance favored by Pepin after 756. Furthermore, Charles knew that the repudiation of his Lombard wife was a grave Offense to Desiderius, who would not accept it quietly. And, Carloman's widow, Gerberga, and her sons were potential weapons to be used against the newly unified kingdom. 5 Charles's ties with Rome were seri- ously threatened by the mere presence of the Lombard king now that he had revealed his true colors. Despite all the evidence that the situation in Italy was an explosive one, Charles turned away toward Saxony. For the time being he intended to continue his father's policy. Two elements in the situation of 772 com- bined to force this course of action upon Charles, whatever his private Opinion aboutthe need for action against Desiderius might have been. Immense practical difficulties opposed a policy of immediate war in Italy. At a time when actions as well as words were necessary to com- plete the reunification of the kingdom, war with Desiderius would have seriously split the nobility. Fighting an unpOpular war, eSpecially if Charles encountered vigorous Lombard Opposition, would have undermined 5Vita Hadriani, p. 488: ”In ipsus vero diebus contigit uxorem et filios quondam Carulomanni regis Francorum ad eundem regem Lango- bardorum fugam arripuisse cum Autcario; et nitebatur ipse Desiderius atque incanter decertabat quatenus ipsi filii eiusdem Carulomanni regnum Francorum adsumpsissent; et Ob hoc ipsum sanctissimum praesulam ad . se pr0perandum seducere covabatur ut ipsos antefati quondam Carlomanni filios reges ungveret cupiens divisionem in regno Francorum inmittere ipsumque . . . pontificema caritate . . . Caruli . . . separe, et Romanam urbem . . . sub sui regni Langobardorum potestate subjugare. " 115 his claim to rule. Charles needed success in battle to persuade those who were not moved by his religious claims to power. In the past it had taken the full Spiritual authority of the pope to stir the Franks to intervene against a clear Lombard threat to Rome. In 772, there was no clear military threat to accompany the internal pres- sures gene rated by the Lombard faction in Rome. As long as Desiderius :remained in Pavia, Charles had a weak case for intervention in a situation, Perhaps seen by many to be remote from Francia's immediate interests. Finally, and most importantly, there had been no appeal from Rome for aid. There is no evidence to indicate that Hadrian did anything more than to announce his election to the Franks. 6 Without a request for help Charles had no hope of taking action against Desiderius. In the View of Rome provided by Hadrian's biographer, it appeared that the pope had determined to free the papacy from the Lombards and, if possi- ble, to reduce Frankish participation in papal affairs to the narrowest possible military basis. 7 It was not a lack of interest but a lack Of alter- natives that prompted Charles to maintain Pepin's policy for Italy in 772. The need to consolidate his hold over the kingdom combined with Charles '3 religious Objectives to focus Frankish attention upon the Saxons. After holding a synod at Worms, Charles led his army to the Irminsul. In this fir st real test Of his leadership, Charles passed with flying colors. To the Frankish bishOps the king revealed through this' Qampaign his determination to press the missionary effort. At the same 6Hallenbeck, Church History, XXXVII (1968), 261-264. Annales Einhardi, a. 772, p. 33: "Romae Stephano papa defuncto Adrianus in pontificatus successit. " 7See below, pp. 121—127. 116 time, Charles exercised his authority over men who might otherwise have opposed him if he had chosen to fight Desiderius in 772. But for these men Saxony was neutral ground; neither religious, family nor sentimental ties bound them to the Saxons as they might have to the Lombards. On the contrary, as Einhard noted, the ill-defined border between Saxon and Frankish lands led to constant border raids by both sides. 8 Charles took up the cause of the nobility in Carloman's half Of the kingdom. Here was a war that promised to be popular with his followers. The gold and silver of the Irminsul provided still another graphic incentive for them to serve Charles. 9 The prestige Of the new king gained ground by virtue of the success of his raids in Saxony. When the situation in Italy reached crisis pr0portions in 773, Charles was better prepared to face down his pro-Lombard opponents whose ranks had probably been thinned out by Charles's impressive diSplay of leadership ability. 8Vita Karoli Magni, c. 7, p. 446: ”Suberant et causae quae cotidie pacem conturbare poterant, termini videlicet nostri et illorum paene ubique in plano contiqui, praeter paucaloca, in quibus vel silvae ‘ maiores, vel montium iuga interiecta utroumque agros certo limite disterminant inquibus caedes et rapinae vel incendia vicissim fieri non cessabant, quibus adeo Franci sunt irritati, ut non iam vicissitudinem reddere, sed apertum contra eos bellum suscipere dignum iudicarent. ” 9Annales Regni Francorum a. 772, p. 34: ". . . ad Ermensul usque pervenitfietrfpsam finum destruxit et aurum vel argentum, quod ibi repperit, abstulit." H. Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire, tr. Peter Munz (Harper Torchbooks) New York, 1964, p. 71, argues strongly for booty as the mainspring of Frankish expansion, but he still must agree (p. 71) that religious and political concerns were of crucial importance, especially in Charles's relationship with the papacy. 117 Meanwhile in Italy, Hadrian's ability to Oppose the designs of Desiderius waned under renewed military pressure from Pavia. 10 Re- luctantly, "compelled by necessity” in the biographer's Opinion, Hadrian sent an appeal to Charles for help in recovering cities recently siezed by Desiderius. 11 As in the past, papal charges were answered by Lombard claims that justice had been done concerning St. Peter's possessions. 12 In response Charles sent his own missi, Bishop Georgius, Abbot Gulfardus, and Consilarius Albuinus to investigate the situation. 13 They returned to Francia to support Hadrian's claims against Desiderius. In the interim Desiderius had been deterred from attacking Rome by the papal threat of anathema delivered to him by three of Hadrian's bishops. 14 Charles '3 missi then returned to Italy but they were unable to 10Vita Hadriani, p. 493: "Sed nihil aput eum impetrare valuerunt; potius permanens in sua iniquitate, multa civitatibus ac finibus Romanorum inferre faciebat exomnis parte mala, magnas conminationes dirigens eidem praecipuo pontifici se cum universis Langobardorum exercitibus pr0pera- turum, Romanam civitatem constringendum. " 11Ibid. ”Etdum in magna angustia ac tribulatione consisteret, necessitate compulsus, direxit suos missos marino itinere cum apostolicio litteris ad . . . Carolum . . . deprecans eius excellentiam ut sicut suus pater . . . Pippinus, et ipse succurreret atque subveniret sanctae Dei Ecclesiae et adflictae Romanorum seu exarchatus Ravennantium provin- ciae, atque plenarias beati Petri iustitias et abstultas civitates ab eodem Desiderio rege exigeret. " 125ee below, fn. 14. 13Vita Hadriani, p. 494. 14Ibid. "Dunque haec omnia diSposiusset, ex templo, facto in scriptis anathematis verbo, direxit eidem Desiderio regi tres episiopos . . . pretextans eum in eadem obligationis exhortationisque verbo et adiurans per omnia divina misteria ut nullo modo finibus Romanorum sine eius absolutione ingredi aut conculcari praesumpsisset . . . Susceptoque eodem obligationis verbo per antefatos episcopos, ipse Langobardorum rex ilico cum magna reverentia a civitate Vitervense confusus ad prOpria rever- sus est . . . Post haec coniunxerunt ad sedem apostolicam missi . . . Caroli . . . inquirentes si praefatus Langobardorum rex abstultas civitates et omnes iustitias beati Petri reddidisset sicut false Franciam dirigebat, adserens se omnia reddidisse; et satisfacti sunt presentabiter nihil ab eo redditum fuisse. " 118 persuade Desiderius to return papal lands. 15 Desiderius's intransigence at this point foreshadowed his responses later to overtures from Charles for a negotiated peace. 16 According to Einhard, Charles "had similar, or rather just the same grounds for declaring war that his father had . . . . "17 One possi- ble difference that Einhard failed to mention suggests itself. Obscured by the immediate problem of Desiderius was the potential danger to Charles's tie with Rome posed by the ambitious Duke of Bavaria, Tassilo. In 755 he had aided Pepin in his war with Aistulf, but by 773 Tassilo was following an independent course aimed ultimately toward turning a duchy into a kingdom. Tassilo's aspirations in this direction were made clear in one of his Official documents of 769 in which he styled himself a king. Other signs appeared after 769 to indicate that Tassilo desired to strengthen his position. During Hadrian's clash with Desiderius in 772 news reached Rome of Tassilo's efforts on behalf of the missionary movement in Cilicia.18 Then, in the same year, Tassilo boldly ignored his father-in-law's dispute with Hadrian and sent his son to Rome to be baptized by the pope. 19 The 15Ibid. ”Ipsi itaque Francorum missi properantes cum apostolicae sedis missm declinaverunt ad . . . Desiderium; qui et constanter eum deprecantes adhortati sunt, sicut illis a suo rege praeceptum extitit, ut antefatas quas abstuberat civitates pacifice beato Petro redderet, et iustitias parti Romanorum fecisset. " 161bid.. pp. 494-495. 17Vita Karoli Magni, c. 6, p. 446: ”Sed licet sibi et patri belli suscipiendi similisTac potius eadem causa subesse videretur; haud simili tamen et labore certatum, et fine constat esse completum. " 18Abe1, Jahrbflcher, p. 132. 19Ibid. 119 Bavarian duke was apparently courting favor with Hadrian, perhaps with the hope that Hadrian would supply the same religious sanction to Tassilo's quest for royal power that Zacharias and Stephen II had given to Pepin. To what extent this policy was known to Charles it is not possible to say. But his missi could have learned of Tassilo's attempts to build closer ties with Rome when they investigated the conflicting claims of the pOpe and the Lombards in 773. Charles needed to act far more urgently in 773 than he had early in 772 in the light of Tassilo's ambitious policy. The Franco-Lombard war of 773-774 was possibly as much a struggle between Charles and Tassilo for the Spiritual allegiance of Rome as it was between Charles and Desiderius. Tassilo was more of a menace be- cause his methods relied less upon internal subversion of the curia or brute force and more upon gearing his political policies to meet the religious objectives of the Roman missionary church founded in Bavaria by Boniface. In the light of the Bavarian problem, Charles probably did not want Desiderius to accept peace terms. The time had come to remove the Lombard threat and to separate Bavaria and Rome physically, and if possible, spiritually. The Offer of peace terms to Desiderius placated pro-Lombard sentiment among the Franks; and, when the desperate Lombard king turned them down, Charles invaded Italy. 20 Desiderius, 20Vita Hadrianus, p. 494: " . . . Carolus Francorum rex direxit eidem Desiderio suos missos . . . deprecans ut easdem quas abstulerat pacifice redderet civitates et plenarias parti Romanorum faceret institias, promittens insuper ei tribui XIII milia auri solidorum quantitatem in auro et argento. Sed neque deprecationibus, neque muneribus eius ferocissimum cor flectere valuit. Nihil enim Optinentes ipsi missi Francorum ad prae- fatum suum christianissimum regressi sunt regem. 120 like Aistulf, offered brief resistance and then retreated behind the walls of Pavia. Unlike Aistulf, however, Desiderius was in no hurry to come to terms with Charles. Either he feared that Charles would depose him or that the Lombard nobility would desert him or possibly both. 21 Although Desiderius apparently expected the worst from Charles, the Frankish king failed to give any clear indications of his intentions during the siege of Pavia. 22 When Spoleto sought the protection of Rome very early in the war, judging from the papal biographer's references, 23 Charles gave no Sign that he was disturbed by Hadrian's effort to capital- ize upon Desiderius's weakness. If Charles had planned by that early time to take Lombardy he did not seem prepared to rule all that Desiderius had claimed to govern. On this matter, Charles reflected his father's lack of concern for any area of Italy not immediately related to the Lombard threat. 24 From yet another point Of view, however, Charles seemed interested in Lombardy, beyond restraining the menace to Rome, only insofar as Lombardy harbored potential rivals to his ZlAbei, Jahrbficher, p. 144. 22Ibid. , p. 150. Abel regards the period of the siege of Pavia before Easter 774 as the time when Charles decided to depose Desiderius. We are tempted to agree although the position is conjectural. See Duchesne, Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty of the POpeS, p. 103 for the view—th—at the decision to deposeDes—idefius followed Easter 774 and was Charles's independent decision which invalidated the SO-called Donation of Charles that had intended the suppression of the Lombard Kingdom. 23Vita Hadrianus, pp. 495: "Nam Spolitini et Reatini, abquanti eorum utiIES personae, antequam Desiderius seu Langobardorum eius exercitus ad clusas pergerent, illi ad beatum Petrum confugium facientes praedicto sanctissimo Adriano papae se tradiderunt et in fide ipsius principis apostolorum atque praedicti . . . pontificis iurantes, more Romanorum tonsorati sunt. ” 24See above, Ch. II. 121 position in Francia. Observers of Charles 's actions, governed by experi- ence with the Franks in the past and by assumptions about the role of the papacy in Italy, were able to draw their own conclusions. Unfortunately, the biographer of Pope Hadrian is the only writer to leave a record of his impressions of Charles's role in Italy down to June, 774. 25 As was suggested above, the biographer couched his account of events from 772 until August, 773, in terms Of the general theme of Hadrian's singlehanded struggle for papal independence. Although the central issue in that period was the Lombard threat, the bio- grapher also attempted to indicate his idea Of the limited role which he expected the Franks to play in Roman affairs. Frankish interests were protected, as the biographer carefully recorded, in the discussion of Desiderius's attempts to force Hadrian to anoint the sons Of Carloman. 26 However, though the Franks had an interest in seeing to it that the murderers of their allies, Christopher and Sergius, received punishment, Hadrian carefully avoided any moves that would have eXpanded Frankish influence over these proceedings. Hadrian appealed not to Charles but to the Eastern Emperor for a place of exile for the murderers even though the pope perhaps risked renewed imperial attempts to assert greater authority over Rome. 27 25Abe1, Jahrbflcher, pp. 161-162 and Duchesne, L. P., p. ccxxxiv. 26See above, fn. 5. 27Vita Hadriani, p. 490: ". . . atque deprecans eorum imperi- alem clementiam ut pro emendatione tanti reatus ips um Paulum suscipi et in ipsis Graciae partibus in exilio mancipatum retineri praecepissent. " 122 In the biographer '3 record we find none of the profound ideologi- cal themes exalting the Franks that had eSpecially characterized some of POpe Paul's letters to Pepin. 28 The Papal-Frankish alliance was pre- served, but apparently only on a strictly military basis. The papacy was left free to carry {out Roman political objectives in central Italy, or so the biographer apparently assumed. This assumption appears to have been conditioned by the idea that Charles had no greater role to play than that of military defender of the Romans. 29 Thus, we find in the full account of the submission of Spoleto and other areas to Rome not the slightest Sign that Charles had protested vigorously enough to dampen the biographer's enthusiasm. 30 Charles 'S inaction gave license to the biographer to incorporate into his account of events the impression that Charles endorsed papal independence in Italy. Charles's greatest interest, in the biographer's estimation, was to eliminate the rivals which Desiderius had tried to create. Thus, we read that Charles detached a portion of his army to attack Verona where Gerberga and her sons had sought refuge. 31 Their capture was speedily ZBSee Miller, pp. 125-128. 29Vita Hadriani, p. 493: ". . . direxit suos missos marino itinere cum apostolicas litteras ad excellentissimum Carolum, a Deo pro- tectum regem Francorum et patricium Romanorum, deprecans . . . ut Sicut suus pater . . . Pippinus, et ipse succerreret atque subveniret sanctae Dei Ecclesiae ad adflicte Romanorum seu exarchatus Ravennan- tium provinciae atque plenarias beati Petri iustitias et abstullas civitates ab eodem Desiderio rege exigeret. " 3OIbido 9 pp. 495-4960 311bid. , p. 496: "Et dum agnovisset fugam arripuisse in Veronam praenominatum Adelgis, relinquens plurimam partem ex suis exercitibus Papiam, ipse quoque cum abquantis fortissimis Francis in eadem Veronam properavit civitatem. Et dum illuc coniunxisset, protinus Autcarius et uxor adque filii saepius nominate Carolmanni propria voluntate eidem benignissimo Carulo regi se tradiderunt. " 123 accomplished. Nothing further of the Frankish king's activities is report- ed until we hear that he undertook an unannounced visit to Rome. 32 It is only logical that the biographer chose to avoid language that exalted the role of Charles. The biographer apparently was trying to convince his audience that Hadrian's change of policy was necessary. Aside, Of course, from the pro-Lombards, the one group probably least anxious to call upon the Franks for aid was the lay aristocracy who had provided Hadrian with an important source Of strength to resist Paulus Afiarta. Hadrian had been "compelled by necessity" to call upon Charles, and once committed the pope did not try to retreat because he knew that Rome could not resist the full weight Of Lombard arms. The Frankish intervention, from the biographer's point of view, did not mean the end of the Roman nobility's aspirations in Italy, contrary perhaps to the idea of those among the nobility who had watched their desire for a role in papal affairs thwarted by Pepin in 757 and again by Charles and Carloman in 769. 33 As if to demonstrate that the Romans need not fear the Franks, the biographer lingered over the papal acquisi- tion of Spoleto. Charles perhaps appeared too absorbed with his own concerns about potential rivals, in the estimation of the biographer, to give much attention to papal activities in an area outside the traditional 32Ibid. , "Et dum per sex mensum Spatium ipse Francorum rex Papiam demoraretur in Obsessione ipsius civitatis magnum desiderium habens ad limina apostolorum pr0perandum, considerans quod et sacratissima paschalis festinitas adpropinquasset . . . hic Roman per Tusciae partes pr0peravit . . . Cuius adventum audiens antedictus beatissimus Adrianus papa quod Sic repente ipsi Francorum advenisset rex, in magno stupore et extasi deductus . . . . ” 33see above, pp. 79-80, 86-87. 124 range of Frankish interests in Italy. The biographer's purpose, if he wrote for a special audience, or only as a member of the group con- cerned with the future of the Roman nobility, was to convince others, or possibly only himself, that Hadrian's change of policy in 773 was neces- sary and full of promise for the future of Rome in Italy. Although he emphasized the point that Charles came to Rome in 774 as a pilgrim for the occasion Of Easter, 34 the biographer continued to stress the theme of papal independence, a view most likely to appeal to a Roman audience. Hadrian was portrayed on two occasions as the temporal ruler Of Rome, a position that Charles seemed to accept willing- ly enough since the pOpe's power over Rome was closely associated with his Spiritual position. As if to underline Hadrian's Official capacity at this time, the biographer chose to compare Charles's reception to that given the Exarch of Ravenna. 35 This was done not so much to identify Charles's role but to establish Hadrian's position with respect to the Frankish king. At least, it seems logical to assume this to be the case since the biographer, as a Roman, would naturally be more concerned to establish the point of Hadrian's temporal position. 3‘ISee above, fn. 32. 35Vita Hadriani, p. 497: "Et dum adpropinquasset fere unius miliario a Romana u_rbe, direxit universas scholas militiae una cum patronis simulque et pueris qui ad didicendas litteras pergebant, deport- antes omnes ramos palmarum adque Olivarum, laudesque illa omnes canentes, cum adclamationum earundem laudium vocibus ipsum Francorum susceperunt regem; Obviam illi eius sanctitas dirigens venerandas cruces, id est Signa, sicut mos est exarchum aut patricium suscipiendum, eum cum ingenti honore suscipi fecit. 125 The scene depicting Charles's approach to the Church of St. Peter where Hadrian waited on the porch to greet him also illustrates the biographer's tendency to focus upon Hadrian's temporal power. Hav- ing made his way on foot through the assembled ranks of Romans, Charles ascended the steps of St. Peter on his knees in the manner of a pilgrim, and at the top, Charles rose and clasped Hadrian's hand. 36 One recent historian has suggested that this incident reflected Charles's determina- tion to Show obeisance only to St. Peter and not to his Vicar. 37 While that seems a reasonable interpretation of Charles's behavior, it is possible that, from the biographer's point Of'view, Charles recognized Hadrian as a temporal equal. Again, the biographer, as a Roman, could logically be eXpected to be more concerned about the significance of Charles's acts from the Roman, not the Frankish, point of view. His support of the drive for papal independence probably led him to interpret Charles's behavior in a light favorable to his central theme. Thus, the point was not that Charles made a distinction between the roles of St. Peter and Hadrian, but that he treated Hadrian as a temporal ruler on a 36Ibid.: "Ipse . . . carolus magnus Francorum rex et patricius Romanorum . . . descendens de eO quo sedebat equo, ita cum sius indicibus ad beatum Petrum sedestris pr0perare studuit. Quod quidem antedectus almificus pontifex diluculo surgens in eodem sabbato sancto cum iniverso clero et populom Romano ad beatum Petrum pr0peravit ad suscipiendum eundem Francorum regem, et in gradibus ipsius aposto- licae aula eum suo clero prestolavit. Coniungente vero eodem . . . Carulo rege, omnes gradOS Singillatim euisdem . . . Petri ecclesiae deosculatus est . . . quue suscepto, mutuo se amplectantes, tenuit isdem . . . Carolus rex dextram manum antedicti pontificis et ita in eandem venerandam aulam Petri principis apostolorum ingressi sunt. " 37A. Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1934), p. 119. 126 par sufficiently equal to Charles for the neutral greeting of a handshake. Once inside the Church, after an impressive greeting by the assembled clergy, Hadrian and Charles moved to the confession Of St. Peter where both knelt and prayed for a Frankish victory over Desiderius. 38 Then the biographer added that Charles humbly request- ed permission to enter Rome. 39 Having satisfied himself that Charles willingly acknowledged Hadrian's temporal power in Rome, the biographer passed briefly over Charles's participation in Easter Observances, and related the account of the historic meeting of 6 April 774 before the tomb Of St. Peter. According to his version of the meeting, possibly acquired from one of the milites in Hadrian's entourage, 40 Charles, in the presence of his advisors, reSponded to Hadrian's entreaties by reviewing the so-called Donation of Pepin and agreeing "of his own free will" to renew 38Vita Hadriani, p. 497: ". . . laudem Deo et eius excel- lentiae decantantes universus clerus et cuncti religiosi Dei famuli, extensa voca adclamantes: 'Benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini' et cetera. Sicque cum eodem pontifici ipse Francorum rex simulque et omnes episc0pi, abbates et vidicis et universi Franci qui cum eo advenerant, ad confessionem beati Petri adprOpinquanteS seseque provi ibidem prosternentes, Deo nostro omnipotenti interventionum suffragia eiusdem principis apostolorum concedere iussit victoriam. " 39Ibid.: "EXpletz vero eadem oratione, obnixe deprecatus est isdem Francorum rex antedictum almificum pontificem illi licentiam tribui Romam ingrediendi sua orationem vota per deversas Dei ecclesias persolvenda. 40Ibid. p. 498: "agressus praenominatus pontifex cum suis iudicibus tam cleri quamque militiae . . . . " 127 it. 41 The extent of that grant was then set forth by describing a line across northern Italy that signified the transfer of almost three-fourths of Italy to Rome. 42 Charles swore a mighty oath to fulfill his promise and copies of the agreement were drawn up and distributed. 43 Needless to say, the accuracy of the biographer's account of the meeting has been debated by many historians. Interpretations have ranged from those who accept the account as an accurate, contemporary record to those who charge the biographer with an outright forgery. 41Ibid.: " . . . pariterque cum eodem rege se loquendum coniungens, constantes eum deprecatus est atque ammonuit et paterno affectu adhortare studuit ut promissionem illam, quam eius . . . genitor Pippinus quondam rex et ipse . . . Carolus cum suo germano Carlomanno atque omnibus iudicibus Francorum fecerant beato Petri et eius vicario . . . dommo Stephano iuniori papae, quando Franciam perrexit, pro concedendis diuersis civitatibus ad territoriis istius Italiae provinciae et contradendis beato Petro euisque omnibus vica- riis in perpetuum possidendis, adimpleret in omnibus . . . Et prOpria voluntate bonO ac libenti animo, aliam donationis promissionem ad instar anterioris ipse . . . Carolus Francorum rex adscribi iussit H . 42Ibid.: " . . . a Lunis cum insula Corsica, deinde in Suriano, deinde in monte Bardone, id est in Verceto, deinde in Parma, deinde in Regio; et exinde in Mantua atque Monte Silicis, simulque et universum exarchatum Ravennantium, Sicut antiquitus erat, atque provincias Venetiarum et Istria; neconon et cunctum ducatum Spolitinum seu Beneventanum. " 43Ibid.: "Factaque eadem donatione et prOpria sua manu earn ipse . . . Francorum rex eam conroborans, universas epiSCOpOS, abbates, duces, etiam et grafiones in ea adscribi fecit; quam prives super altare beati Petri et postmodum intus in sancta eius confessione poventes, tam ipse Francorum rex quamque eius indices, beato Petro et eius vicario . . . Adriano . . . sub terribile sacramento sese omnia conservaturos qui in eadem donatione continentus promittentes tradi- derunt. " Ibid.: "Apparem vero ipsius donationis eundem Etherium adscribi faC1ens ipse . . . Francorum rex intus super corpus beati Petri, subtus evangelia quae ibidem osculantur pro firmissima cautela et aeterna nominis sui ac regni Francorum memoria prOpriis suis manibus posuit. " 128 \ Duchesne, for example, accepted the whole record and tried to eXplain Charles's later change of heart upon the basis Of changed political real- ities which Hadrian eventually accepted. 44 The fall of the Lombard Kingdom and the assumption of the Lombard crown by Charles negated the papal concern for its security upon which it had advanced its claim to SO vast an area, according to Duchesne. 45 Hadrian's trouble later with Ravenna convinced him of the need to moderate papal aSpirations to rule in Italy. 46 By 781, he had abandoned his claims and had released Charles from his promise of 774.47 Another eXplanation advances the thesis that what Charles really promised was to return papal patrimonial lands within the areas cited by the biographer. Among the adherents to this View of the promise of 6 April one finds Abel and Lindner. 48 But, as Hodgkin has noted, although this is a convincing exPlanation of Charles's intensions, there is Simply nothing in the biographer's account to suggest that this was Charles 's aim. 49 Other historians, unable to accept the idea that Charles willingly gave away most of Italy to Rome, have built interpretations of this docu- ment on the argument that references to territories were interpolations inserted in the text to clarify a much vaguer statement actually made in 44Be . . f . ginnings o the Temporal Sovereignty of the POpeS, pp. 104-106 and II. P., p. cccxxxvi. 45L. P., p. cccxxxvi. 461bid. 47Ibid. 48Abel, FDG, 1(1860), 459, 471-472. Theodor Lindner, Die sogennanten Schenkungen Pippins, Karls deS Grossen und Ottos I an die Papste (STuttgart,1896Y, as summarized in Hodgkin, VII, 39—0-3917 49Hodgkin, VII, 391, 392. 129 774 regarding Charles's Obligations to Rome. In developing his thesis that Papal-Frankish alliance had never been a clearly defined legal arrangement, Wilhelm Martens asserted that a disgruntled cleric in 781 took the opportunity to register his dismay at the meagre territorial gains which had followed the defeat Of the Lombards. 50 TO keep alive hope that some future Frankish king would be more generous, in order to remove from Charles the stigma of being an oathbreaker, the additional territories were tacked on to the Sketchy account of the 774 meeting then at hand. In this way, according to Martens, an ill-defined oral agree- ment became a written document of a formal agreement. More recently, a French historian, E. Griffé, following a course marked out by Soltet, adapted the interpolation thesis to his own idea Of the events of 6 April 774. 51 Unlike Duchesne, Griffé insisted that papal claims to lands in Italy between 774 and 781 were very moderate. 52 Hadrian stubbornly persevered in good relations with Charles, even though the pope did not like it when Spoleto slipped from Roman control. 53 Charles's "deception" in the matter Of Spoleto prompted the Frankish king to make other Offerings to Rome in 781. 54 The effeCt, according to O I I I I I I Griffe, was to raise Roman aspirations to recover territories long ago 50Martens, Die rdmische Frage, pp. 159-161. Hodgkin, VII, 393-3940 51E. Griffe, "Aux origines de l'Etat pontifical: Charlemagne et Hadrian Ier (772-795)" BLE, (1954), 65-89. 521bid., p. 70. 53Ibid., p. 80. 54Ibid. 130 lost to the Lombards. 55 It was in 781 that the interpolations were added to the biographer's account which had until then only recorded Charles's renewal Of his father's promise concerning Ravenna. 56 Undoubtedly the issue can never be resolved in favor of any argu- ment unless new evidence can be found to corroborate or deny the biographer's account. About all that historians can agree upon in this debate is that Charles did make some promise to Hadrian on 6 April 774. The king probably confirmed in some general way Hadrian's claim to the Exarchate of Ravenna and the Pentapolis based upon Pepin's promise regarding these areas. But even this assumption can be challenged. 57 In addition, Charles probably restored the cities taken during the recent crisis by Desiderius. 58 And, if we can trust Hadrian's claim in a later letter to Charles, the king also recognized the papal fait accompli of rule over Spoleto, by Offering it as a religious gift. 59 551bid., p. 82. 561bid., p. 82. 57Hodgkin, VII, 391. Griffe’, BLE, (1954), 74. Abel, FDG, I, (1860), 461. See below, Chap. VI. 58Vita Karoli M., c. 6, p. 446: "Karolus post inchoatum a se bellum non prius destitit quam . . . omnes Romanis erepta restitueret et res a Longobardorum regibus ereptae Adriano Romanae ecclesiae rectori restitutae." Annales Petaviani, a. 774 MGH, Scriptores, I, p. 16: "Et domnus rex KarOlus, rfiissis comitibus per omnem Italiam laetus sancto Petro reddidit civitates quas debuit. " 59Codex Carolinus, ep. #56, p. 581: " . . . quia et ipsum Spoletinum dEcatum vos praesentiliter Offeruistis protectori vestro beato Petro principi apostolorum per nostram mediocritatem pro animae vestrae mercaede. " See below, Chap. VI. 131 The Size of Charles's donation to Rome is not the only factor that casts doubt upon the truth of the biographer's report, if he intended it to be an accurate record of Charles 's promise and not, as we think, simply a statement of Roman hopes for the future. The method of (making the donation was clearly a radical departure from practices established since 756. The whole thrust of Frankish involvement in the territorial ques- tion in Italy had been toward cautious investigation of conflicting claims, not Spontaneous acquiescence in papal demands. 60 Pepin perhaps had made that mistake before his anointment in 754, but subsequent land diSputes had seen Frankish m diSpatched to inquire into the merits of the various claims. After Pepin's death the Franks continued to exercise a caution that reflected their due regard for the complexity Of the land question in Italy where, for centuries, possession of some areas Of central Italy had shifted back and forth many times. Although Charles intervened vigor- ously in Ravenna in 770, as we have seen, 61 he imitated Pepin and sent mis Si to investigate POpe Stephen III'S claims in Spoleto. 62 Though the issue was decided in the pOpe's favor, the point remains that Charles, like his father, understood the need for careful investigation before attempting to settle territorial disputes. In addition, it should be noted that Charles '5 action in Ravenna in 770 suggests that there was no doubt in Frankish circles regarding papal jurisdiction in the area. Spoleto and Benevento, however, were areas with which the Franks had had little 60M111er, pp. 97, 99-100. '615ee above, Chap. IV, p. 98. 62COdex Carolinus, ep. #47, p. 565. 132 significant contact before 770 Since Pepin had deliberately chosen to exclude them from his narrow range of interests in Italy. If Charles had not carefully investigated territorial disputes in Italy the result no doubt would have been that his court would have been clogged with plaintifs from the lands in question, bearing evidence of their claims. This perhaps had happened to Pepin in 755, 63 and Frankish policy Since then had in part been directed toward avoiding a recurrence Of this situation. There is little to support the thesis that Charles was "dazzled" by his visit to Rome into departing from this cautious procedure and giving up so much of Italy. 64 The one thing most likely to have turned Charles's head was his reception upon arriving at Rome, and yet here Charles managed to preserve a sense of dignity and proportion that allowed him to perform his pilgrim's duties and still retain a sensible attitude toward Hadrian. With several days to reflect upon his surround- ings, it seems more likely that, whatever the initial emotional reSponse Charles might have had, in the presence of hard-headed advisers like Itherius, 65 the king probably approached his meeting on 6 April with a clear head. If so, he knew the problems of settling land claims that would come if he arbitrarily conceded the area in question to Rome. But those territorial limits, being either the biographer's idea of the meaning 93See above, Chap. III , p. 60. 64Kleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 119. 65Hodgkin, VII, 392-393, notes that efforts to blame Itherius somehow for deceiving Charles "are mere baseless conjecture. " 133 of Charles's promise or the work of an interpolator, probably never entered the discussion in such specific terms. 66 The clearest evidence of the biographer's distortion of the events of 6 April lies in the fact that nowhere in his account did he trouble to mention that Hadrian made a very important promise to Charles. That promise, very clearly repeated in Hadrian's letters to the king, to be examined below in Chapter VI, required the pope to give to Charles the full Spiritual resources of the papacy. NO others were to receive the same kind of aid because no one else would ever be able to Share with Charles his role as protector of the Church, 67 After God only Charles defended Rome, as Hadrian took care to stress perhaps at a time when the Romans were most anxious for him to retreat from his agreement with the king. 68 In order to gain a clearer picture of the nature Of the alliance of 774, from the Frankish point of view, we must turn to the letters Of Hadrian to Charles and to Charles '3 letter to Hadrian's successor, 66Griffé, BLE, (1954), 74, stresses how little prepared Charles was to undertake detailed negotiations at Easter, 774. See below, Chap. VI. 67Codex Carolinus, ep. #54, p. 577: "NOS quidem, veritate testante, coram DeoiiEimus puriter et fideliter in vestro permenantes amore, iuxta quod inter nos praesentaliter in aulo apostolica confirmatum est, ea, quae ad nos perveniunt, de presenti cum magna cautela vobis stedemus denuntianda, quia post Deum et beatum Petrum alihi nostra spes et fiducia non est nisi in vestra a DeO protecta excellentia. " 68Ibid.: "Etenim innotescimus . . . christianitati vestrae, eo quod, quando a vestra regalia vestiga reversus est Leo antefatus archiepiocopus, in magnam superbiam ac tyrannicam elationem pervenit . . . . " We can assume that Leo's behavior raised criticism about the alliance with Charles which Hadrian (above fn. 67) continued to cling to. 134 Pope Leo III. 69 AS was noted above, it was a mutual agreement between Hadrian and Charles, not merely one in which Charles responded of his own free will to Hadrian's plea for the renewal of Pepin's promise. 70 In failing to emphasize, or even to mention, the pOpe'S promise to Charles, the papal biographer indicated his central concern, and that of the lay aristocracy, without attempting to reflect Charles 's attitude toward the alliance. In 795 Charles made his feelings on the subject clear to Hadrian's successor. In that Often-quoted letter, Charles pointed out that it was the pope's duty to pray for the success of Frankish arms against the enemies of the Church while Charles himself fought the Church's battles. 71 69Especially, Codex Carolinus, ep. #62, pp. 589-590. 70Codex Carolinus, ep. #51, p. 571: "Alisit namque a nobis, carissime et €1st nobis dulcissimi fili, ut ea, quae inter nos mutuo coram sacratissimi corpus fautoris tui, beati apostolorum principis Petri, confirmavimus atque stabilivimus, per quovis modum iritum facere adtemptemus, quoniam et nos satisfacti sumus, qui et vos in nostra caritate firmiter esse permansuros. " Ibid. , ep. #52, p. 574: " . . . eo quOd nimis desiderabiles sumus . . . vestrum conSpicere vultum; quoniam- satisfaciat te veritas . . . - in eadem Sponsione, quam invicem ante sacram evisdem Dei apostoli confessionem adnexi sumus, firmi atque incommutabiles diebus vitae nostre cum universo nostro populo permanere satagimus. . . ."; Ibid. ep. #56, p. 581: " . . . quia - DeO teste dicimus - visi vestram cupimus exultationem et laetitiam, dum annuente DeO magna inter nos atque insolubilis caritatis concordia corroborata est, permanentis in his, quae mutuo inter nos asserentes confirmavimus. " 71Epistolae Carolinae, ep #10, Monumenta Carolina, IV, ed. Philippus Jane, Bibliotheca rerum Germamfarum (BeroIini, 1867), pp. 354-357: ”Vestrum est, sanctiss—fme pater: elevatis ad Deum cum Moyse manibus nostram adiuvare militiam; quatenus, vobis inter- cedentibus, Deo ductore et datore pOpulus christianus super inimicos sui sancti nominis ubique semper habeat victoriam . . . . " 135 From Charles's point of view the alliance Of 774 was neither a legal contract nor a political settlement. It was above all a Spiritual alli- ance formed in order to establish a formal religious ceremony in which the pope called down upon Charles the grace Of God so that the king would be "everywhere followed by the apostolic benediction. "72 This desire was the fundamental source of the differences between Charles's Italian policy and that of Pepin. The danger was that Charles's concep- tion of Papal-Frankish relations would smother the feeble Roman Republic, as we Shall see below in Chapter VI. It is not entirely clear from this letter that Charles implied a necessarily subordinate role for the pope in the West. 73 If the pope took a back seat in determining the direction of Frankish policy, he nevertheless held a crucial Spiritual position, for upon his attention to the duty of calling upon St. Peter depended the success Of Charles's efforts. 74 In this sensethey were serving as equals, though in different functions, in order to advance the cause of St. Peter and the Church. Beginning immediately after Charles left Rome in 774, Hadrian initiated the practice Of marshalling the Spiritual power Of St. Peter, by 72Ibid., p. 355: ”Sed magnum divina nobis praevidebat gratis solatium, dum vos, vir venerande, in Locum illius subrogavit; ut esset, qui cotidie apud beatum Petrum . . . pro totius ecclesiae stabilitate atqui pro salute nea neorumque fidelium immo et prototius prOSperitate regni nobis a Deo intercederet et paterna pietate nos in filium Sibi adoptaret dilectionis. " 73Winston, Charlemagne: from the Hammer to the Cross (New York, 1954), pp. 8F85, implies such a position iTihiS view that Charles "was beginning En 774) to see the papacy as the Spiritual arm of the Frankish state. " 74Heinrich Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire: The A e of E Row Charlema ne, trans. Peter Munz (Harper Torchbooks, Harper New York, 1964), p. 61. 136 daily assembling the Roman clergy and the Roman peOple, to participate in Special services either to call upon St. Peter for aid or to return thanks to him for his assistance. 75 At first these services were held to reinforce Charles in his struggle with Desiderius, but they were soon directed toward aiding the king in his war of conquest and conversion in Saxony.76 This support was not merely a formality that Charles chose to Observe. He was constantly concerned to know that Hadrian was faithful in the performance of his Spiritual duties, as an undated letter written probably sometime in the period from 774 to 781 by Hadrian indicates. 77 Hadrian's response it should be stressed, was a reply to a letter from Charles;78 it was not Simply a piece of papal rhetoric unsolicited by the king. 75Codex Carolinus, ep. #50, p. 570: " . . . ab illO die, quO ab hac Romana urbedn illis partibus profecti estis, cotidiae momentaneis etiam atque sedulis horis omnes nostri sacerdotes seu etiam religiosi Dei Famuli, monachi, per universa nostra monasteria simulque et reliquus populus tam per titulos quam per diaconos trecentos 'krieleyson' extensis vocibus pro vobis Deo nostro adclamandum non cessant flexisque genibus eundem . . . dominum Deum nostrum exorantes, ut et veniam dilectorem vobis et maximam prosperitatis laetitiam etiam et copiosas victorias vobis multipliciter e caelo concedat. " 76Ibid., ep. #53, p. 575: "Plenissimae enim satisfactus est . . . regum, qualis fortissimus ac validus ipse ianitor regni caelorum beatus Petri tuae extitit excellentiae adiutor, et quomodo eius sacris interventionibus omnipotens dominus Deus noster victoriam tibi tribuit regnumque Langobardorum tuae tradere vissit potestatis dicioni; et in antea magnum halicto fiduciam, quia, eius suffragis circumvallatus, tuis regalibus vestigiis caeteras barbaras nationes omnipotens Dominus substernet. " 77Ibid., ep. #62, pp. 589-590. 78Ibid., p. 589: " . . . benignissimae fili, honorabiles suscepi- mus syllaEas . . . ." 137 Very possibly Charles had written to inform Hadrian of an im- pending campaign and sought assurances that St. Peter would be with the Franks. In reply, Hadrian said that Charles could certainly count on St. Peter's support. "Day and night without ceasing, " according to the pOpe, he and his clergy and all Christians prayed humbly in the Confession of St. Peter for a Frankish victory, Since a victory would bring the barbarous nations under Charles's rule, thereby exalting him and the Church as well. 79 Apparently Hadrian expected Saxon resist- ance to crumble before Charles, just as the Lombards had done. When that was accomplished, the pope then seemed to imply that Charles could be trusted to keep his promise to St. Peter, whom he had loved Since his earliest childhood. 80 In closing, the pope expressed confi- dence that no evil men, meaning perhaps Archbishop Leo of Ravenna, would be able to separate Charles from the love he bore for St. Peter. 81 Meanwhile, the pOpe assured Charles that everything was being done on his behalf in Rome to insure success. From this letter, and from others to be examined in another place, 79Ibid.: "Nos quidem die noctuque numquam desistimus, cum sacerdoteS—cfi-nctoque Christiano pOpulo in confessione beati Petri . . . subpliciter exorare . . . victorem te super omnes barbaras nationes faciat, quatenus omnes sub tuo brachio umiliati vestigia pedum tuorum prorsus osculentur et ecclesia Dei (tua) a DeO instituta regali potentia nimirum exaltetur. " ' 80M. , p. 590: "Numquam enim credimus, quod semel pollicitus es super venerabile corpus beati Petri . . . quaelibet falsa potestas seu principatus poterit tuam firmissimam excellentiam segregare a caritate et amore, quam a cunabulis tuis beato Petro . . . habuisti . . . . " 81See above, fn. 79-80. 138 one can detect the essentially Spiritual quality of the alliance between Charles and Hadrian. We may presume that in the above letter Hadrian was repeating the terms of the alliance as Charles wanted to hear them, thus stressing the Spiritual side of their agreement, just as Charles stressed this aSpect of the agreement in his letter to Pope Leo. 82 The pope did not fail to mention Charles's promise to Rome. However, we note the lack of an appeal for immediate action which suggests that Hadrian linked the exaltation of the Church to Charles's final victory over the "barbarians". The timetable probably changed as pressures on Hadrian in Rome increased or decreased. 83 To those historians determined to analyze Papal-Frankish rela- tions within a strictly political or legal framework the significance of Hadrian's promise to Charles at this meeting has seemed slight. CaSpar, for example, in his analysis Of the role played by Rome in Frankish policy, asserted that Hadrian played only a peripheral part in the problems of Saxony and Bavaria. 84 TO Support this contention Caspar ignored the Spiritual significance of the agreement of 774 and its 821hid. 83Codex Carolinus, ep. #50, p. 570: "Et certe crede nobis, magne . . . rex . . . et maximam habeto fiduciam, quia, dum tu fideli studio in amore ipsius principis apostolorum secundam tuam promission- em permanseris et cuncta eidem Dei apostolo adimplere studueris, et salus tibi et immensa Victoria ab omnipotenti DeO tribuetur indesinenter. " Here victories apparently will follow from Charles's efforts to complete his promise rather than the other way around. Ibid. , ep. #53, p. 575: "Sed . . . deprecor et obnixae peto . . . ut veloCiter ea, quae beato Petro pro magna animae tuae mercede . . . per tuam donationem offerenda Spopondisti, adimplere iubeas . . . ." 84Das Papsttum unter fra'nkischer Herrschaft, pp. 72-74. 139 implications to concentrate upon the point that Hadrian's letters revealed only a few instances in which the Pope concerned himself directly with Charles's difficulties in those areas. 85 In his analysis CaSpar made reference only to a few, isolated Signs of direct papal involvement in Frankish political concerns. A letter of 785, reflecting Charles's belief that the Saxon war at last had ended, indicated that the pOpe honored Charles's request for a period of special thanksgiving throughout his lands. 86 On another occasion, Hadrian replied to Charles's request for advice concerning measures to take against Saxons who lapsed into their old pagan ways. 87 AS we shall see, CaSpar's legalistic interpretation does not take into account the possi- bility that the mainSpring Of Charles's Italian policy after 774 had been to create a Situation in which the Spiritual alliance could function un- hindered. In the case of Bavaria, CaSpar argues again that Hadrian played only a minor role as an "aide" to Charles in the realization Of his desire to unseat Tassilo. 88 Caspar cites the warning delivered to Tassilo in 781 by papal envoys that he should recall his oath of loyalty to Charles. In 787, the POpe again played the part of "aide" by warning Tassilo that Charles would be held blameless if war should occur between them. 89 85Ibid. 86Ibid.; Codex Carolinus, ep. #76, pp. 607-608. 87Caspar, DaS Papsttum unter fra'nkischer Herrschaft, p. 72. 88Ibid., p. 74. 891bid. 140 Beyond these manifestations of papal participation in Frankish affairs, Caspar found no significant instances of papal involvement. Caspar, like Hadrian's biographer, attempt ed to confine papal-Frankish rela- t ions within a structure far too narrow to reveal the far-reaching impli- c: ations of the basically Spiritual alliance which Charles and the pope attempted to establish in 774. One possible explanation for the biographer's failure to mention Hadrian's promise to Charles at the meeting is that he wrote as a member of an audience hostile to or at least suSpiciouS of the Franks. For the ti :rme being the biographer had persuaded himself that Charles had come to Italy to remove the Lombard threat and to guarantee without any 8 1: rings attached that Rome would direct her own destiny. Bitter experi- en ces later, perhaps by as early as the end of 774, would challenge this oPtimistic view Of the future. His evaluation of the alliance, unlike the on «3 later expressed by Hadrian's critics, 90 was unduly Optimistic pe rhaps because he had chosen to read Charles's actions in Italy and in R0 line as indications of the king's acceptance of an independent role for Ha—d rian in Italy. 91 When it became clear after the middle of 774 that Ch 2.. rles would not rush to support the territorial aspirations of the Roman nob ility, the biographer ceased his record of Hadrian's political activi- tie S and began a dull catalog of church restorations. It is quite possible M 90Codex Carolinus, ep. #49, p. 568: "Et ecce inproperatur nobis a. plurimus nostris Tnir—nicis, ex probrantes nos et dicentes: 'Quid vobis p"r-‘Ofuit, quod Langobardorum gens est abolita et regno Francorum Buliugata? Et ecce iam nihil de his, quae promissa sunt, adinpletum est; rmSuper et ea, quae antea beato Petro concessa sunt a sanctae recorda- ti()I'iis domno Pippino rege, nunc ablata esse noscuntur'. " 915ee above, pp. 122-126. 141 that the biographer's task was taken over by another author at this point and that the original writer joined the ranks of Hadrian's critics who 5 ought to turn the pope away from his agreement with Charles. Pope Hadrian's own attitude toward the territorial expansion of the. papacy is difficult to establish precisely. He, along with his critics, a. ppeared to think, first, that Charles had guaranteed the lands originally p romised by Pepin. 92 In addition, Hadrian later argued, in response to C: harles's efforts to avoid trouble with Spoleto, that the king had given up t his territory to Rome as a religious offering, "for the good Of his 8 oul". 93 Finally, the POpe also seemed to expect still greater "fruits" t o accrue to Rome as a result Of the arrangement made in 774, but he (:1 id not press Specific claims to an area representing three fourths of Italy. 94 Hadrian later seemed far more concerned to hang on to the areas Rome had already acquired with the addition perhaps Of territories long 9Z-Codex Carolinus, ep. #49, p. 568: "Sed magis peto te coram De 0 omnipotente, ut ita diSponere iubeas eundemque archiepiscopum S '31— b nostra potestate contradere digneris, ut a nobis cunctam exarchatum d1 8 ponatur, Sicut saepe fatus domnus Stephanus, . . . temporibus . . . ge hitoris vestri, domini Pippini, disponere visus est . . . . " The need f0 1‘ clarification at this time (late 774) suggests that the details of papal 11°:l—Iz'lings in the Exarchate had not been discussed fully in April. 93See above, p. 130, fn. 59. 94Codex Carolinus, ep. #53, p. 575: " . . . immensas referuimus g1;- ates, impensfus pro vestra prOSperitate eius divinam clementiam exorantes, ut confirmet isdem dominus Deus noster hoc ipsud in vestro £10:Irigero pectore, quatenus velociorem atque copiosum fructum sancta Spi ritalis mater vestra, Romana ecclesia, capud omnium ecclesiarum Hei, de vestra consequatur promissione." Ibid. ep. #55, p. 579: Unde et copiosam a vobis suscipi prestolamus fructum, ut, Sicut caepisti, Onum apus perficias tuisque temporibus sancta Dei ecclesia multo a-l'7riplius exaltata permaneat quatenus omnipotens Dominus, intercedente beato Petro . . . dignam vobis remunerationem tribuat . . . . " 142 in diSpute with Desiderius rather than to press unrealistic claims upon Charles. But the pope had to respond to those, perhaps like the biogra- phe r, who expected much in return for the Spiritual support Of Rome. Hadrian's pr es sure upon Charles was thus the product in part of the pope's own possibly more modest ambitions for papal expansion and in part of his reflection of the demands of one of his major sources of S upport, the Roman nobility. 95 Periodically, from 774 until 778 Hadrian was under great pressure from this quarter to end the alliance W ith Charles and to seek Roman fortunes elsewhere, possibly in closer ti es with Tassilo of Bavaria. 96 While the biographer's record is an interesting reflector of the R<2>Inan nobility's hopes for the future, it tells us little about the I’fil‘amkish attitude toward Rome or toward Italy in general. 97 Absorbed by his task Of describing the papal struggle for an independent role in Italy and of enlisting Charles's support for that policy on paper, the bi Q grapher did not inquire very deeply into Charles's motives either for inv ading Italy or for visiting Rome. \— t 95Hallenbeck, Church History, XXXVII (1968), 264-265 denies hat Hadrian was the leader ofan aristocratic faction because his long larch career had detached him from this background. However, the “Q bility possibly saw Hadrian as their natural Spokesman and put pres- sure on him as one who at least understood their interests. Necessity akes strange bedfellows, and Hadrian ami the Roman party might have s Ought support from the lay nobles in 772 against the Lombard party. See Ibid. p. 269 when the author accepts the above view. 96Codex Carolinus, ep. #51, p. 571: " . . . neque nulla nos posse huius mundi transitorfi ac labentibus opibus vel humani suasioni blandi- l’nentis ab amore et dilectione vestrae inclytae sublimitatis vel ab ea, Quae vobis polliciti sumus . . . . " 97See above, pp. 118-119. 143 Charles came to Italy, as was said, in his role of Patricius Romanorum, that is, as the military defender of the Romans, from the biographer's point of view. A further motive implied in the biograph- er's account, was supplied by Hadrian's defense of Charles's interests, an act that by implication provided for Charles's intervention as a reasonable flflfl for papal support. 98 While these factors were probably important to Charles's decision to go to war in Italy, they do not necessarily represent the only reasons for his intervention. As was suggested above (p. 86), Charles's desire to end the Lombard menace might also have been reinforced by a need to consider the potential danger of Tassilo's efforts to strengthen his ties with Rome. If the biographer knew Of these efforts, he did not trouble to mention them. Finally, and most importantly, Charles grasped more fully than had Pepin, how important the papacy was as a Source of spiritual justifica- tion for his expansionist aims, which themselves were mixed with religious motives. The visit to Rome was not inSpired by papal acquisition of Spoleto, as was indicated above (p. 91). Charles's near indifference to this action was in keeping with past Frankish policy Of Pepin who deliber- ately ignored efforts by Paul I to entangle the Franks in a wider question than the Lombard threat to Rome. Those who have argued to the con- trary have been hard pressed to provide evidence for their position in view of Hadrian's blunt assertion that Charles had promised Spoleto to Rome in 774. 988ee above, pp. 120-121. 144 Thus, it was not questions of territory that drew Charles to Rome in 774. In part he came as a pilgrim as some have argued. In addition, and more important, he probably came seeking the Spiritual support of the papacy in the war against Desiderius and also against the Saxons which was reopened in 774 by a Saxon retaliatory raid on Frankish terri- tory. By securing Lombardy and by receiving Hadrian's support, Charles could turn his attention back to the conquest and conversion of Saxony. Charles '3 religious zeal drove him not Simply to serve St. Peter in the narrow role of defender of Rome but also to serve him by expanding the scope of Christianity in the West. Ultimately, as Hadrian frequently expressed it, Charles looked forward to the day when, with the aid Of St. Peter, all the "barbarous nations" were brought under Frankish rule. Perhaps Charles implied during his discussions with Hadrian that the Church would prosper in the process by reaping a harvest of new Christians, although we cannot tell this from the biographer's account. and Hadrian appeared to relate the prOSperity of the Church to the return of unspecified lands in Italy belong- ing to St. Peter. However, even as he expressed his hopes for the Church in Italy, Hadrian made clear in his cor reSpondence that he and his clergy were faithfully putting into effect the Spiritual sanctions which had been promised to Charles in 774. From 774 until 781, and beyond, Charles focused his attention, as we Shall see below, upon removing potential or real Obstacles to the smooth functioning of the Spiritual alliance which he had formed with the pOpe. CHAPTER VI THE EXPANSION OF THE FRANKISH POLITICAL HORIZON IN ITALY 774-780 The expansion of the spiritual role of the papacy in Frankish mili- tary affairs, marked by the new alliance of 774, was a fundamental step in broadening the Frankish political horizon to include all Italy. The motive of Charles's policy, as this discussion will try to Show, was not power for its own sake in Italy as some historians have assumed. 1 The goal of Frankish Italian policy, though never fully achieved between 774 and 780, was to remove or reduce the political burdens Of Hadrian so that the full Spiritual resources of Rome could be joined to the Frankish missiOnary - military program in Germany. The gulf between Frankish theory and the actual status of Papal- Frankish relations in Italy was wide and deep. Instead of creating the clear separation of political and religious functions in Papal-Frankish 1The impetus to political action, in the Realpolitik analysis Of Frankish policy, was Charles's decision to becomeKing of the Lombards which, it iS assumed, naturally led him to adOpt the aims Of his prede- cessors on the Lombard throne. Abel, Jahrbficher, pp. 189-190. Caspar, DaS Papsttum unter frtinkischer Herrschflt, p. 39. Duchesne, Beginnings Of_the TemporaTSoverei nty of the Po es, p. 103. Abel, FDC 1(1850) 476 477 HodgEm, 9H1, 23-24. hleinclausz, Charlemagne, p. 26. Martens, Die rdmische Frage, pp. 142-145. Cregorovius, Rome in the Middle Ages, II, 366. Mohr, Die Karolingische Refchsidee, p. 37, is more cautious; he ir—id'i'hates that the conquest Of Lomhardy and the "renewal of friendship" with Rome are in some uncertain way interwoven. 145 146 relations, Charles's Italian policy left a broad grey area in which Hadrian managed to preserve Roman claims for a political role in Italy. 2 In practice, the situation in Italy was far too complex to permit a Simple solution like the one prOposed by Charles to POpe Leo III. 3 Nevertheless, as we Shall see below, Charles tried to find ways to reconcile his view of the Spiritual role of Rome with the reality of Roman political interests in Italy. Charles's efforts to create a stable political order in Italy gener- ated new problems in the process of solving Old ones. The dispute over Ravenna, to be examined below, is only one case in point. Another example is that of Spoleto. In the course of resolving the conflict be- tween Hadrian and Duke Hildebrand, Charles's Ln_i_s_s_i_ perhaps hit upon a political compromise that in effect laid the foundation for a new poli- tical problem later on. 4 Although Charles probably attempted to set limits upon the extent of Frankish involvement in Italy, he found himself finally committed by 781 to an Open-ended policy that led him eventually into contact not only with all Italy but with the Eastern Empire as well. Charles's behavior immediately following the meeting with Hadrian on 6 April 774 is a puzzle that the available sources cannot 2See below, pp. 165-170. 3See above, Chap. V, p. 134, fn. 71. 4see below, pp. 165-170. 147 solve. 5 The negotiations with Archbishop Leo of Ravenna and the subse- quent deposition of Desiderius in June are two acts which contrast Sharply with the events of 6 April. But, as we have argued above (Chap. V, p. 133 ) the biographer's account of the meeting between Charles and Hadrian was a gross distortion of that encounter. The author's motives, it was indicated, were not SO much those Of a deliber- ate forger as those of one who, perhaps on the basis of information acquired from one of the milites present at the meeting, pieced together an account that reflected the hOpeS for the future Of the Roman nobility. Guided by the assumption that Charles favored Roman independence in Italy, the biographer projected an optimistic view Of the future which he expected the alliance to create. Perhaps it was only to win support for the alliance that the biographer apparently was willing to lie shamelessly about the extent Of the lands conveyed by what probably was a vaguely defined territorial agreement. 6 From Charles's point of view, however, the promise made by Hadrian to support the Franks in papal prayers in a formal ceremony was probably uppermost in his mind. The major political obstacle to 5Vita Hadrianus, p. 499 makes no mention of a meeting with Leo. It must be irfihrredlrom Hadrian's report in Codex Carolinus, ep. #49, p. 568: "Et in sua (Leo) potestate diversas civifiites Emiliae detinere videtur . . . asserens, quOd a vestri excellentia ipse civitates una cum universo Pentapoli illi fuissent concessae . . . . " Agnelli qui et Andreas Liber Pontificalis Ecclesiae Ravennatis ed. 0. Hold-eat - Egger, MGI-T, Scriptores rerum Langobardorum et Italicarum saeculi VI - IX (Hanover, 1878? p. 381 gives no clue. 6We cannot rule out the argument that the precise list of lands was added later on, but that does not change our view of the biographer as one who was preparing a blueprint for Roman action rather than faithfully recording the terms of a legal agreement. 148 the implementation of the expanded Spiritual alliance, as it appeared in the late spring of 774, was still Desiderius. AS for ArchbishOp Leo we can only guess that Charles was asked to confirm possessions which the archbishop had held before, 7 not knowing that Leo would attempt to parley Charles '8 support into an attempt to drive Hadrian out of the whole Exarchate of Ravenna. When Pavia fell in June, 774, Charles at last had to face the question of how to avoid future trouble with the Lombards. Many factors probably contributed to his decision to claim Desiderius's title. Appar- ently there was some support for such a drastic step among the Lombards themselves. 8 Perhaps Charles's Own advisers favored this step as well, although we are unable to determine their role. Finally, with his per- spective on Italy still limited to the Papal-Lombard dispute, judging by his willingness to acquiesce in the papal takeover in Spoleto, 9 Charles probably saw the deposition of Desiderius as the surest way to pr event further distracting political quarrels from diverting the papacy from its Spiritual duties. But the smooth functioning of the Papal-Frankish Spiritual alli- ance, according to Charles's idea of its purpose, was not assured by the deposition of Desiderius. On the contrary, the termination of the tradi- tional Lombard pressure upon southern Italy prepared the way for the development of a far more complex political Situation the re. Freed from the fear of Lombard domination, the leaders of Ravenna and Spoleto 7See Martens, pp. 174-175. 8Abel, Jahrbficher, pp. 185-187. 9See above, Chap. V, pp. 123, 143. 149 imitated Rome in the attempt to carve independent positions for them- selves. In the background, the aspirations Of the Duke Of Beneventum, the Eastern Emperor, and Desiderius's heir, as well as a number of lesser freebooters, all combined to increase pressure upon Rome's precarious political power. Rather than providing order and stability, the overthrow Of Desiderius brought Italy to the brink of political chaos. Soon after Charles returned to Francia to deal with the Saxons, who had made a retaliatory raid probably in the late Spring or early summer Of 774, Rome's fragile political position began to crumble. 10 Archbishop Leo Of Ravenna began a new drive for independence from papal authority. Leo successfully detached eight cities in the Exarchate from papal jurisdiction. 11 At the same time he boldly sent a missus into the Pentapolis to challenge papal authority there but, according to Hadrian, met with no success. 12 Hadrian was disturbed by Leo's claim that Charles had conceded the territories in question to the archbishop. 13 The pope sent Bishop Anastasius to remind Charles that papal claims to govern the whole 10Codex Carolinus, ep. #49, p. 568: "Etenim . . . magne rex, postquam vestra excellentia a civitate Papia in partes Franciae remeavit, ex tunc tyrannico atque procacissimo intuitu rebellis beato Petro et nobis extitit. " The letter probably reached Charles late in 774. 11Ibid. Faventias, Forumpopuli, Farolini, Cesinas, Bobio, Comiaclum, Imulas and Bononias were detached from the districts Of Emiliae and Ferraria. 12Ibid. " . . . et continue direxit Theophylactum missum suum per universam Pentapolim, hoc ipsud denuntians, cupiens easdum Pentapolenses a nostro servito separare. Sed ipsi nullo modo sese illi humiliare inclinati sunt nec a servitio beati Petri et nostro recedere malverunt . . . ." 13See above, fn. 5. 150 Exarchate had been assured by Pepin and to order Leo to submit to papal authority. 14 From this account we must conclude, with Martens, that the disposition of the "whole Exarchate" had not been decided either in 774 or in 756.15 Whatever the nature of the document presented to Charles for his examination in April, it had not been precise enough regarding the territorial limits of papal authority in the Exarchate, nor had the territorial promise which Charles made in 774. 16 With nothing Sharply defined regarding the entire Exarchate, perhaps Charles felt free to confirm the claims advanced by Leo soon after April 774. It is not necessary, however, to assume that Charles endorsed all of Leo's later claims as reported by Hadrian. Leo's loyalty was a valuable asset for which Charles apparently was willing to concede a measure Of recognition to the archbishop's claims. Perhaps this came in an attempt to insure Leo's acquiescence in the new arrange- ment which Charles planned for the Kingdom of the Lombards. While we cannot be sure Of this, it is possible that Charles wanted Leo's support in the event Of a challenge to the Frankish hold on the Lombard throne. Furthermore, it is also possible that Charles attempted to form a vague personal bond with Leo in order to restrain him from acting too 1‘J‘Codex Carolinus, ep. #49, p. 569: "Sed magis peto te . . . ut ita deSponere iubeas eundemque archiepiSCOpum sub nostra potestate contradere digneris, ut a nobis cuncta exarchatum diSponatur, Sicut saepe fatus domnus Stephanus . . . temporibus . . . genitoris vestri, domini Pippini, deSponere visus est . . . . " 15Martens, pp. 174-175. 161bid., p. 175 151 vigorously against Hadrian. Perhaps the pOpe related his difficulties with Leo to Charles during their Easter meeting. 17 It cannot be said with certainty that Cha rleS'S negotiations with Leo in 774 were neces- sarily inimical to Hadrian's interests. In any case, it seems that Charles himself prepared the foundation for a new problem that would be far more perplexing than that posed by Desiderius. From Leo's point of view, Charles had provided the wedge by which to force Ravenna and Rome apart, and the archbishop energetically eXploited his advantage until his death in 777. Although Hadrian thought the diSpute with Leo could be settled by Bishop Anastasius's explanation of the details of the donation Of Pepin, the POpe also noted that his "enemies" among the Romans had taken a much dimmer view of events. 18 Hadrian's critics had concluded the Papal-Frankish alliance had been nothing less than a disaster. Not only had Rome failed to profit by the Frankish victory over the Lombards, but now it appeared that they were going to lose lands long in their 17Signs that Leo acted independently appear in the account of the death of Paulus Afiarta, Vita Hadriani, pp. 490-491: "Ecce qualem occasionem ipse archiepiSCOpus eccTésiae Ravennantium callide adhibuit ut ipsum Paulum extinguere valeret . . . Et continuo . . . archiepisco- pus, acceristo consulare Ravennantium civitatis, praecepit ei ipsum interficiendum Paulum. Et dum reversus fuisset saepefatus sacellarius a Ticino, Ravennamque coniungeret, invenit praenominatum Paulum iam interfectum. Pro quo nimis increpavit eidem archiepiSCOpO cur praesumpsisset contra apostolicum praeceptum taliter de eodem Paulo agere.” 18Codex Carolinus, ep. #49:! p. 568: "Et ecce inproperatur nobis a plurimus nostris inimicis . . . . 152 possession.19 The pressure to end the alliance had begun and would remain a major problem for Hadrian to contend with. The pOpe'S troubles with critics of the alliance, presumably among the Roman nobility, was a problem to which Charles remained peculiarly indifferent. It is a tribute to Hadrian's political skill that he eventually managed to divert the attention of the nobility away from central Italy toward objectives in the south that were less likely to bring Rome into Open conflict with allies or subjects Of Charles. Thus, by 779 the future direction of Roman expansion had been established as Hadrian turned the nobility toward lands lying within the Sphere of Beneventan influence or Greek control. 20 Before any response was received to the pOpe'S first letter re- garding the problem in Ravenna, Hadrian received news from Charles that the Franks had defeated the Saxons in the campaign Of 774. 21 Unlike his first letter, Hadrian's second letter was not strictly confined to papal problems. Before he could return to these affairs, Hadrian had to devote half of this communication to a discussion Of matters pre- sumably raised by the king. Charles '3 questions did not stray from his 19Ibid.: "Quid vobis profuit, quod Langobardorum gens est abolita et regno Francorum subiugata? Et ecce iam nihil de his, quae promissa sunt, adinpletum est; insuper et ea, quae antea beato Petro concessa sunt a . . . domno Pippino rege, nunc ablata esse noscuntur. " 20See below, pp. 165-170. 21Codex Carolinus, ep. #50, p. 569: "Reversus avestriS . . . regalibus vestigiis praescns Gausfridus . . . nostrisque praesentatus Optutibus retulit nobis de inmensis victoriis, quas vobis . . . noster dominus Deus . . . concedere dignatus est . . . . " 153 central concern that the Spiritual duties which Hadrian had agreed to perform were actually being fulfilled. Hadrian first recorded his joy at the good news of Charles's victory. Immediately, Hadrian said, he "raiS ed his hands to heaven" and praised God for aiding Charles. 22 At the same time the pope prayed that God in his divine mercy would continue to protect Charles and multiply his victories until "all the barbarous nations were brought under his foot. "23 The pope expressed his belief that "while Charles will remain steadfast in love of St. Peter and will strive to complete that which he promised, God will provide both safety for the king and immense victories as well.‘24 Departing from the topic of Charles's victory, Hadrian attempt- ed to emphasize that the Romans had been dutifully looking after Frankish spiritual interests ever Since Charles had left Rome in 22Ibid., p. 570: "Quo audito, vehementi exultationis laetitia noster in ITO—rhino ovans relenatus est animus, et protinis, extensis palmis ad aethera, regi regum et domino dominantium Opimas laudes retulimus . . . ." 23Ibid.: " . . . enixiuS deprecantes ineffabilem eius divinam clementiam, ut et corporis sospitatem et anime salutem vobis tribuat et multipliciter de hostibus victorias tribuat omnesque barbaras nationes vestris substernat vestigiis. " 24Ibid.: "Et certe crede nobis magne . . . rex . . . et maximam habeto fiduCiam, quia, dum tu fideli studio in amore ipsius principis apostolorum secundum tuam promissionem permanseris et cuncta eidem Dei apostolo adimplere studveris, et salus tibi et inmensa Victoria ab omnipotenti Deo tribuetur indesinenter. " 154 April 774. 25 The pOpe took pains to describe the ceremony that had become part of the daily ritual in Rome Since April. 26 That these were not casual or formulary remarks can be seen by the Opening clause in which Hadrian appeals to "God as our witness". 27 Was Hadrian's good faith already being challenged at Charles's court by critics as yet not directly acknowledged in this letter? The prefatory clause in which Hadrian appears to be taking a vow, rather than Simply conveying infor- mation, suggests that this was the case. Thus, the description of the ceremony invoking St. Peter's intercession was described not merely to convey impressive information but to dispel doubts reflected by Charles regarding papal performance of an essential function. To allay these fears Hadrian asserted that since the day Charles had left Rome, "every day all priests and monks plus three hundred deacons and nobles raised their voices in the m eleison. And, bowing without ceasing before God, they implored most merciful God to concede to Charles the greatest prOSperity and joy and to multiply his victories. "28 25Ibid.: "Et quidem nos Deum proferimus testem, cui omnium cordium occulta reserata existunt: ab illo die, quo ab hac Romana urbe in illis partibus profecti estis, cotidiae momentaneis etiam atque sedulis horis omnes nostri sacerdotes seu etiam religiosi Dei famuli, monachi, per universa nostra monasteria simulque et reliquus populus tam per titulos quam per diaconos trecentos 'krieleyson' extensis vocibus pro vobis Deo nostro adclamandum non cessant flexisque genibus eundem . . . dominum Deum nostram exorantes, ut et veniam dilictoram vobis et maximam prOSperitatis etiam laetitiam et copio- sas victorias vobis multipliciter e caelo concedat. " 261bid. 271bid. 281bid. 155 Hadrian's attempt to raise his Spiritual prestige among the Franks was accompanied by a request for Charles to support the papal envoy, Gausfrid, by turning over to him certain farms. Gausfrid later was exposed as a fraud much to Hadrian's embarrassment. Coming at a time when the Spiritual performance of the Romans was being chal- lenged, this episode must have further undermined confidence that the pOpe could be relied upon. 29 It was not until 775, perhaps in the Spring or early summer, that Hadrian again addressed a letter to Charles. Two Frankish m, Archbishop Wilcharius and Abbot Dodo had brought news Of Charles's "great prOSperity" to Rome. 30 Apparently they also brought Charles's reaction to Hadrian's initial letter informing the king that some Of the Romans had begun to question the value of the alliance. What had been Hadrian's response to his enemies ? Did he remain firmly committed to the alliance? Perhaps these were questions raised by Charles which the pOpe attempted to answer first, even though, from Hadrian's point of view, the detention of his missus Anastasius, was perhaps a more S erious concern. 29Ibid.: "Quem, petimus, ut pro amore beati Petri et nostra postulatione Benigne suscipere et protectionis atque favoris vestri Opem illi inpertire dignemini, deprecantes et hoc: ut masas illas quas ei concessistis, per vestram auctoritatis largitatem possideat. " Ibid., ep. #51, p. 572: "Nam de Langobardo illo, qui cum eodem Anastasio misso nostro apud vos properavit nomine Gaidifridus, unde nobis Significastis, ut dum vestro fuisset palatio, fraudem agebat adversus vestram regalitatem . . . sed testis nobis est Deus . . . per nullum argumentum eum infidelem vestrum cognovimus. " 30Codex Carolinus, ep. #51, p. 571: "Quas relegentes et de vestra immensa prOSperitate agnoscentes, nimis sumus gratulati, quoniam vestra prOSperitatis nostra esse comprobatur letitia . . . . 156 Once again calling upon God as his witness, Hadrian asserted that he strove always to receive Charles's _rr_1_is_s_i_ with decent honor (in contrast, no doubt, to the treatment accorded Anastasius), and to carry out the king's wishes with sincere efforts. 31 Nothing, neither the temptations of this world nor human persuasion, could turn the pope from the promise he had made to Charles. 32 The agreement they had mutually made before the tomb of St. Peter remained in effect, and Hadrian intended to resist all efforts to make it void. 33 He was satis- fied to remain firmly and permanently in Charles '8 love. Concerning those people who spread false stories about the pOpe in order to ingratiate themselves with Charles, Hadrian asked that the king ignore them. 34 Charles seemed unusually sensitive to charges originating at his court that somehow the pOpe was inadequate to the great and crucial 31Ibid.: "Sed cognoscit omnipotens Deus noster, cui archana cordiS reserata assistunt, quia omnium missum a vestris regales obtutibus directum cum nimio amore et decenti honore suscipere studemus et omnem vestram voluntatem Sincera mentis integritate inplere satagimus atque cum properitate ad vos repedandum absolvere festinamus . . . ." 32Ibid.: " . . . neque nulla nOS posse huius mundi transitori ac labentiBuS Opibus vel humani suasioni blandimentis ab amore et dilectione vestrae inclytae sublimitatis vel ab ea, quae vobis polliciti sumus, declinari, dum hic advixerimus sed firmi et stabiles in vestra permanemus caritate. " 33’Ibid.: "Absit namque a nobis, . . . fili, ut ea, quae inter nos mutuo coram sacratissimi corpus fautoris tui, . . . Petri, confirm- avimus atque stabilivimus, per quovis modum irritum facere adtemp- temus, quoniam et nos satisfacti sumus, qui et vos in nostra caritate firmiter esse permansuros. " 3("Ibid.t " . . . Si quis de nobis nequissimas dictas vestris auribus proferre malverint, cupiens per fallatiam se vobis commendare, nullam credulitatis illi admittatis copiam . . . . " 157 task of calling upon St. Peter to defend the Franks. Leo of Ravenna probably contributed his share Of stories to undermine Hadrian, but perhaps they found a receptive audience among some Of the Frankish bishops who preferred to see the Frankish clergy reSponSible for prayers for the king's safety and success. 35 Anti-Roman sentiment, which we have encountered in the past, apparently died hard among the Franks. 36 The persistence of Anastasius in pressing papal claims, 37 which perhaps caused Charles to detain him, and the corruption of Gausfrid did little to enhance the Spiritual prestige of Pope Hadrian. Although smarting under the stings (of Anastasius's detention, Hadrian was cheered to learn that Charles planned to visit Rome in October, 775. 38 The purpose Of the visit, as Hadrian saw it, was to complete all that had been promised to St. Peter. 39 Whether in fact this was what Charles had in mind it is not possible to say. Perhaps 3E‘Kantorowicz, Laudes Regiae, pp. 53-54, traces the origin of the Singing of laudes for thelcing toTrancia between 751 and 774, probably closer to 751. It is, therefore, possible that a minority Of Frankish bishops disapproved of the transfer, or at least the sharing, of this vital function to Rome in 774. 361bid,, p. 58, and above, pp. 154. 156. 37Codex Carolinus, ep. #51, p. 572: "Illud vero quod de Anastasiam missum nostrum indicastis, quod aliqua inportabilia verba, que non expediaebat, vobis locutus fuisset . . . . " 381bid.: ". . . et pro hoc adhuc vos eum (Anastasius) detenetis, nimis nosfmraglat animus: dum Langobardi et Raviniani fatentur inquientes, quia nullo modo rex in apostolico permanet caritate, dum eius miss um apud se detinet. " Ibid.: "Interea continebatur series vestrae excellentiae, quod, accedente proximo mense Octobrio dum Deo favente in partibus Italiae advenerilis. " 39Ibid.: ". . . omnia, quae beato Petro . . . et nobis polliciti estis, ad effectum perducere maturatae . . . . " 158 Charles intended to find some kind of workable compromise between ArchbiShOp Leo and POpe Hadrian. The king's presence in Rome was perhaps seen as necessary to prevent any attempt by the lay nobility to depose Hadrian and set in his place someone who would seek Roman fortunes elsewhere. Hadrian's remarks in the first letter of 774 had probably sufficiently alarmed Charles to make this course of action necessary. Another letter from Charles came during 775, this time brought by Possessor and Rabigaudus. 40 Charles's letter made reference again to his planned visit to Rome following the end of the campaign against the Saxons.41 His visit was to be, in part, a pilgrimage to holy places in Rome and in part a political visit. 42 Hadrian was overjoyed to learn Of the visit as he had been before. He was very eager that Charles should see with his own eyes how firmly Hadrian had adhered to his promise. Charles would be "satisfied of the truth" of papal claims to this effect when he arrived in Rome. 43 SO anxious was he to see the king that he was prepared to meet with Charles at any place convenient 4OIhid., ep. #52, pp. 573-574. 41Ibid., p. 573: "Itaque . . . fili, coniungentes ad nos fidelis- Simi vestri missi, scilicet Possessorem . . . seu Rabigaudum . . . detulerunt nobis . . . vestre sublimitatis syllabas. " 42Ibid.: " . . . ad limina protectoris vestri . . . Petri, ad implendis, quae ei polliciti estis prOperare desideraretis. " 43Ibid., p. 574: " . . . eo quod nimis desiderabiles sumus . . . vestrum (Where vultum; quoniam - satisfaciat te veritas . . . magne rex - in eadem Sponsione . . . firmi atque incommutabiles diebus vitae nostre cum universo nostro populo permanere satagimus . . . . " 159 Should that be necessary. 44 Hadrian probably was under great pressure to produce results from his policy of cooperation with the Franks. This last remark suggests the urgency which he had begun to feel in this re- Spect. A visit to Rome would not only diSpel any doubts Charles might have had about the firmness of the papal commitment but it would, hope- fully, lead to the desired territorial settlement which Hadrian's critics in particular expected. Although it iS possible that Charles's promised visit to Rome was a calculated effort to placate Hadrian which the king did not intend to carry out, it is also possible, and more likely, that Charles was disturbed by developments in Italy. The question of Ravenna was by now too difficult to settle through r3322: Furthermore, Hadrian's remarks about enemies were possibly unsettling enough to cause Charles to investigate the Situ- ation for himself. In addition, the king seemed dissatisfied with Hadrian's assurances that all was being done to secure St. Peter's support, and perhaps wanted to see for himself that the Romans were meeting their Obligations satisfactorily. Finally, perhaps Charles confidently expected a decisive victory over the Saxons to emerge in 775 that, in turn, would enable him to meet his Obligation to St. Peter. It was at about this time that Charles had vowed either to convert or to exterminate the Saxons. 45 44Ibid.: " . . . quia, Si mora de vestro adventu provenerit, magna nobis inminet voluntas, ibidem in vestri Obuiam, coniungere, gradiendum proficiscere. " 45Annales Einhardi a. 775, p. 41: "Cum rex in villa Carisiaco hiemaret, consilium irTiit, ut pe rfidam ac foedifragam Saxonum gentem bello adgrederetur et eO usque perseveraret, dum aut victi christianae religioni subicerentur aut omnino tollerentur. " 160 The Ln_i_s_s_i whom Hadrian had sent to deliver this letter returned bearing another message from Charles. They brought reassurances of the "constancy Of Charles's heart" regarding his commitment to St. Peter for which Hadrian returned thanks to God. 46 Hadrian included in his prayer for Charles's prosperity the hope that Charles would Speed- ily bring forth the "many fruits" to the Roman Church that should follow from his promise. 47 Again, the pOpe registered the need for Speed in fulfilling the king's promise since Peter would be an even greater protect- or before the power Of Divine Majesty.48 The note Of impatience reflected in these remarks probably indicates once again the grOwing pressure upon Hadrian to Show the results of his policy. Without abandoning the idea that Speed was essential in fulfilling Charles's promise to St. Peter, Hadrian took up another tOpic that probably was raised by Charles's letter. The king apparently sought assurances from the Pope that St. Peter still supported the Frankish 46Codex Carolinus, ep. #53, p. 575: "Revertentes ad nos missi nostri . . . detulerunt nObiS . . . vestrae apices; quorum series dum nostris recitaretur auribus, liguido cuncta in eis adnixa didicimus. Sed et ipsi . . . missi indeminutae nobis, quae illis a vobis iniuncta sunt, retulerunt plenissime, ads erentes de vestra benivola puritate et magna cordis constantia, quam erga . . . Petrum . . . secundum vestram pro- missionem habere videmini. Pro quo nimio repleti gaudio . . . inmensas referuimus grates . . . ." 47Ibid.: " . . . inpensius pro vestra prOSperitate eius divinam exorantes clementiam, ut confirmet isdem dominus Deus noster hoc ipsud in vestro florigero pectore, quatenus velociorem atque copiosum fructum sancta Spiritalis mater vestra, Romana nostra ecclaesia , . , de vestra consequatur promissione. " 481bid.: " . . . velociter ea quae beato Petro . . . per tuam donationem offerenda Spopondisti, adimplere iubeas, quatenus isdem princeps apostolorum multo ampliuS tibi protector et auxiliator apud divinae maiestatis potentiam existat. " 161 cause. 49 Evidently, as he prepared for the Saxon campaign of 775, Charles felt the need for Spiritual support. For a brief moment Charles must have hesitated to implement his program of conversion or extermin- ation pronounced at a synod in this year. Unlike Pepin, whose military campaigns were undertaken without reference to the papacy, Charles ap- peared reluctant to proceed without St. Peter's approval as conveyed by Pope Hadrian. Hadrian's support was firm and direct. He assured Charles that St. Peter's defense of the Franks had been clearly demonstrated in the defeat of the Lombards, and Hadrian remained confident that God would continue to aid the king in bringing all the barbarous peoples under his authority. 50 At the same time, the pOpe expressed his satisfaction with the alliance and his confidence that Charles would Speedily complete his promise to St. Peter. 51 Perhaps to separate himself from critics of the alliance, Hadrian asserted that "we know best what was firmly agreed upon by us in the confession of St. Peter, and 'we know whom we trust and 491bid.: "Plenissimae enim satisfactus es, . . . regum, qualis fortissirhfi'S-ac validus ipse ianitor regi callorum beatus Petrus tuae extitit excellentiae adiutor, et quomodo eius sacris interventionibus omnipotens dominus Deus noster victoriam tibi tribuit regnumque Langobardorum tuae tradere iussit potestatis dicioni; et in antea magnam habeto fiduciam, quia, eius suffragiis circumvallatus, tuis regalibus vestigiis caeteros barbaras nationes omnipotens Dominus substernet. " 5OIbid. 51Ibid.: "Quia nos omnino satisfacti sumus et magnam habemus fiuciam in vestri cordis constancia, celeriter vos omnia perfici, quae eidem apostolo apostolorumque principi SpOpondistis . . . . " 162 we are confident. "'52 Meanwhile, even as Charles turned to Hadrian for spiritual support, the king was meeting with Archbishop Leo who had come to Francia unbeknown to Hadrian until Charles told him. 53 The results of this meeting were felt in Rome soon after Leo's return to Ravenna, as a letter written by Hadrian in late October, 775, testifies. Leo intensified his efforts to dislodge the papacy from the disputed areas Of the Exarchate of Ravenna. 54 In addition, according to Hadrian, Leo interfered with a papal attempt to convey important news, proba- bly of the impending revolt in Italy, and informed the Duke of Beneventum of the letter's contents. 55 This was probably a deSparate effort to 52Ibid.: " . . . Optime enim cognoscimus, qualis firmitas et . _ O O I O C O entegritatis stabilitas inter nos Deo auspice in apostolica aula corro- borata est, et 'Scimus, cui credidimus, et certi sumus'. " 531bid.: "De vero eO, quod innotuists; ad vos properasse Leonem . . . nos quippe, testatur veritas, libentissimae acceptamus eos, qui ad vestra regalia accelerant vestigia, quoniam una delectio, una caritas eademque puritatis affectio inter nos consistit. " 54Ibid., ep. #54, p. 577: "De reliquis vero civitatibus Emiliae simulque et Gabello hi, qui a nobis ibidem ordinati sunt, ab eo exinde rpoiecti sunt, et alios ex eis uniculis detinet; at vero de civitatibus Imulense seu Bononiense ita profanizat dicens, quod vestra excellentia ipsas civitates minime beato Petro et nobis concessit, sed ipse Sibi archiepiSCOpus a vobis fuisse concessas ac traditas asserit sub sua potestate permanendas. " 55Ibid., p. 576: "Itaque innotescimus excellentiae vestrae, sus- cepisse dis—"epistolam directam nobis a Iohanne patriarcha Gradens e, Vicesima septima enim die Octobrii mensis ipsa ad nos pervenit epistola, et protinus . . . ipsam antefati epistolam cum his nostris apostolicis syllabis vobis transmisimum . . . Itaque valde tristest effecti sumus, quoniam sifoniatas bullas euisdem epistolae repperimus: a Leone arch- iepiscopo primitus relecta nobis directa est. Etin hoc conprobare potest excellentissima christianitas vestra qualis est fraudulenta fides ipsius Leonis . . . . quia non pro alio praesumserit eandem epistolam primitus reserare ac relegere, nisi ut omnia, quae ibi oscripta sunt, ut certe omnibus manifestum est, adnuntiaret tam Argliis duci Beneventano. . . ." Ibid., ep. #57, p. 582. 163 discredit Leo on Hadrian's part, as most historians have assumed. 56 When no action to rectify the situation came from Charles in September or October of 775, Hadrian dispatched£n_i_s_§_i_ to Francia in November. 57 They were sent to plead the papal cause regarding Ravenna and to urge Charles, once more, to fulfill his promise. The pope made clear that he did not doubt the "constancy of Charles's heart" and that he waited to receive from Charles the "many fruits" which Should come as a result of God's aid to Charles through the intercession of St. Peter. 58 But Leo, meanwhile, continued to deny papal authority in the Exarchate of Ravenna. Leo had even gone SO far as to deny Count Dominic Of Gebellum the power to rule that city. 59 Dominic, according to Hadrian, had been commended to the pOpe by Charles, probably in in 774, and the pope had given his permission for him to rule 56E. CaSpar, Das Papittum unter Frankischer Herrschaft, pp. 40-44. Martens, pp. T7CITS. Ibel, Iahrhflcher, p. 239, Th. T. 57Codex Carolinus, ep. #55, pp. 578-580. 58 Ibid. , p. 579: "NOS enim magnam fiduciam habemus in vestri cordis firma constantia, et certi sumus omnino de benigno mentis vestre proposito. Unde et COpiosam a vobis suscipi prestolamus fructum, ut, Sicut caepisti, bonum Opus perficias tuisque temporibus sancta Dei ecclesia multo amplius exaltata permaneat, quatenus omnipotens Dominus, intercedente beato Petro principe apostolorum, dignam vobis remuner- ationem tribuat . . . . " 591bid.: "Nam et Dominicum, quem nobis in ecclesia beati Petri tradidistis atque commendastis, comitem constituimus in quandam brevissimam civitatem Bagellensem, praeceptum euisdem civitatis illi tribuentes: minime illum permisit ipsum actum agere, sed, dirigens exercitum vinctum eum Ravennam deduxit et sub custodia habuit. " 164 Gabellum. 90 Perhaps Hadrian hOped that this insult to a Frankish Official, if he was in fact a Frank, would prompt Charles to intervene. 61 If SO, the pOpe was disappointed. SO far, Charles's efforts to deal effectively with Leo and Hadrian at the same time had failed to produce harmony and peace between the two. If, as is assumed here, Charles had attemptedto form some sort of personal bond with Leo in 774, then Leo had interpreted this move as license to work his will upon Ravenna. While Charles probably did not endorse Leo's behavior, there was little, short of the use Of force, that the Frankish king could do to restrain the archbishop. But force was not the answer since Charles needed Leo's loyalty in the event that the enemies of the king tried to move against him in the Lombard Kingdom. Ravenna was strategically Situated to hinder the advance of the Duke of Beneventum, for example, from the South. The news that external enemies were preparing an attack upon Italy perhaps served to reinforce Charles's toleration of Leo. Perhaps the king was leSS concerned about his position in the Lombard Kingdom in 775 than he was about the success of the Saxon campaign. His Italian policy, though not to Rome's liking, had so far preserved the alliance with Hadrian. The pOpe, by supplying assurance of St. Peter's support, had played the part envisioned for him by Charles. In this sense, Leo was no threat to Rome, thereby allowing Charles to devote his full resources to what perhaps was seen as a last major effort to subdue the Saxons. 601bid. 61 Hodgkin, VIII, 27. 165 With the matter of Leo's intransigence still unsettled, POpe Hadrian found himself confronted with another crisis, this time in Spoleto. Toward the end of 775 Hadrian communicated his dismay at the independ- ent action of Charles's _r_rl_i_s_s_i_, Possessor and Rabigaudus, who had gone directly to Spoleto to negotiate with Duke Hildebrand. 62 Dis regarding the papal injunction that they should come to Rome to prepare a common course of action toward Benevento, Charles 'S m left Spoleto to visit the Duke of Beneventum, Arichis. 63 The result, as Hadrian said, was that the Spoletans increased their impudence toward Rome. 64 The details that would explain why Charles abruptly became inter- ested in the Duchy of Spoleto and moved so quickly to establish ties with Duke are missing. We may only guess that his action was related to the growing threat posed by Desiderius's heir and his allies, particularly the Duke of Beneventum. 65 Spoleto, like Ravenna, was strategically located in central Italy to protect the southern boundary of the Kingdom of the Lombards. However, Spoleto could also have been seen as a threat to the szodex Carolinus, ep. #56, p. 581: "Ille nempe, dum Perusiam coniunxissent, relaxsantes recto itinere ad nos coniugendum - secundum qualiter a vestro a Deo protecto culmine directi fuerunt et ut vestros honorandos apiceS relegentes invenimus -, nos deSpicientes apud Hildibrandum in Spoletium perrexerunt, dirigentes nobis per nostros missos: 'eo quod tantummodo cum Hildibrandum loquimur; et diende, ut directi sumus, una vobiscum apud domnum apostolicum coniungemus. " . 63Ibid.: "Postmodum enim, dum cum praedictum Hildebrandum locuti fuissent et apud eum diucius morarentur, nostris apostolicis eis adiurantes direximus syllabas . . . Sed illi, nescimus quid pertractantes statim a Spoleto in Beneventum perrexerunt, nos in magnum derelinquen- tes ignominium. . . ." 64Ibid.: " . . . et Spoletinos ampliaverunt in protervia. " 65Hodgkin, VIII, 36, 41. 166 Papal-Frankish alliance because the Spoletans represented another dis- traction for Hadrian in the performance of his Spiritual role in Frankish policy. It Should be noted that Hadrian had avoided any reference to difficulties with Duke Hildebrand in his previous letters to Charles. Yet, from the remark that the Spoletans had "increased" their hostility to Rome following the visit of Possessor and Rabigaudus we must assume that relations with Rome had been strained at least during 77 5. 66 Perhaps Charles had learned of these difficulties from Leo or from the Franks at Pavia and moved to prevent Duke Hildebrand from allying with Arichis of Beneventum as a means of shaking off papal control. The terms governing the new political relationship between Hadrian and Hildebrand have not been preserved. It is possible that Hildebrand entered indirectly into a personal tie with Charles in 775 that only remotely resembled vassalage, as Hodgkin noted, thereby removing papal authority over Spoleto. 67 Charles 's policy has appeared high handed, tactless, and crude and motivated by the desire to recover an area rightfully his as a result Of his possession of the Lombard crown. 68 This evaluation ignores important scraps of evidence which suggest that the Frankish EELS-Si, Possessor and Rabigaudus, managed to find an acceptable compromise in 77 5. 69 A compromise was necessary to 665ee above, fn. 64. 67VIII, p. 50-51. 68 Martens, p. 154. 69codex Carolinus, ep. #61, 64, 65, pp. 588-589, 591-593. 167 extricate Charles from an extremely delicate Situation. Since the king had confirmed papal authority in Spoleto in 774, according to Hadrian, by Offering the duchy as a religious gift, an abrupt reversal Of this policy in 775 would have been an insult to his patron, St. Peter. Furthe r- more, the Romans, already chafing over Charles's stand on Ravenna, could not be eXpected to tolerate this humiliating turn of events. It was necessary perhaps to soften the blow to Roman pride and to preserve the idea that Spoleto was part of St. Peter's dominion. Thus, we must argue that Roman interests were not wholly ignored in the creation Of the bond between Hildebrand and Charles. Some papal rights were probably preserved in the economic Sphere, particularly the right of Rome to secure wood from the Spoletans. 70 However, here, as in the political realm, the Spoletans chose to ignore Hadrian's attempt to exercise that right. 71 While Duke Hildebrand acted upon the assumption that the negoti- ations of 775 had freed Spoleto from papal control, 72 Hadrian took a different view of the political relationship between himself and Spoleto. The pOpe had, under protest, agreed to share power with Charles in the duchy. This idea is reflected dimly in the papal correspondence of 779 or 780.73 70Ibid., ep. #65, p. 593: "Et tunc per vestram regalem praecel- lentiam iussionem dirigatur ipse magister in partibus Spoletii, et demand- ationem ibidem de ipSO faciat lignamen, quOd in predicto ypochartosin, hoc est camarado necesse fuerit, quia in nostris finibus tale lignamen minime reperiter. " 711bid. 72Hodgkin, VIII, 30-31. 73Codex Carolinus,vep. #61, 64, pp. 588-589, 591-592. 168 In reSponse to an attempt by Duke Arichis of Beneventum to detach the city of Terracina from papal control, Hadrian tried to nego- tiate a settlement. 7‘4 When that failed to produce results, the pOpe, aided by trOOpS from Charles's "general power", sent an army to recover the city. 75 Although Hadrian does not so Specify, it is possible that Spoletans were included among the auxiliary trOOps. If this encounter occurred early in 779 instead of 780, then possibly we have a motive for the visit of Duke Hildebrand to Charles, recorded in the annals as having taken place sometime in the Spring of 779. 76 Hildebrand's visit to Charles could have been prompted by Hadrian's effort to enlist Spoletan troops into the service of Rome. Charles probably supported Hildebrand's claim that Spoleto served the Franks and only served Rome if the Frankish king ordered it. That some such clarification of Hildebrand's obligation to Hadrian was made can be inferred from a second letter dealing with the pOpe'S military ventures against Arichis. 77 Hadrian complained that the city 7‘lthidn ep. #61, pp. 588-589: "Et hoc agnoscat a Deo protecta precellentia vestra: quia, aliquantos civitates nostras Campanie Oper- antes, emuli vestri atque nostri, nefandissimi Beneventani, ipsum nostrum pOpulum suadent atque subtrahere a nostra dicione decertant una cum habitores castri Caietani seu Terracinensium . . . . Nec tunc ammonitionibus se accommodere voluerunt. " 75Ibid. , p. 589: "Dum vero eorum nequitiae praevalere minime potuimus, diSposuimus cum Dei virtute atque auxilio una cum vestra potentia generalem nostrum exercitum illuc dirigere, qui eos constrin- gere debeant et inimici beati Petri atque nostri seu vestri emendare. " 76Annales Einhardi, a. 779, p. 53: "At rex de Heristallio, ubi hiemaverat et ubi natalem Domini ac sanctum pascha celebraverit, prima veris temperie movens Compendium venit. Et cum inde peracto, prOpter quod venerat, negotio revertisset, occurrit ei Hildebrandus dux Spolitinus cum magnis muneribus in villa Virciniaco. " 77Codex Carolinus, ep. #64, 591-592. 169 of Terracina, "which we had subjected before to your, our and St. Peter's service", had been invaded by the Greeks Of Naples. 78 Instead of combin- ing forces as before, Hadrian now asked Charles to send a Frank, Vulfiunus, to Rome before August to order all Tuscans and Spoletans who were "equally" in the service of Charles and Hadrian to join in the recovery of Terracina. 79 This sudden Shift to reliance on Frankish authority to do what Hadrian himself had done before suggests that Charles had asserted the right to decide when troops from outside Rome would be mustered into papal service. However, Hadrian's pointed reference to the dual service of the Spoletans indicates that the pOpe still had in mind the settlement of 775. Charles, SO far as we know, did not support Hadrian's request for him to marshall trOOpS in his service in Spoleto to aid Rome later in 779. However, this does not mean that Charles rejected the idea of Shared power over Spoleto so much as it suggests that the king Opposed Hadrian's adventurous policy in southern Italy. 80 78Ibid., p. 591: "Quatenus salutantes triumphatorissime erga vos benivolentiae vestra, per hos nostros affatus enucleatius vobis de parti- bus istis insinuamus, qualiter . . . Neopolitani una cum deo Odilibus Grecos . . . subito venientes Terricinensum civitatem, quam in servitio beati Petri . . . et vestro atque nostro antea subiugavimus, nunc autem in valido consilio iterum ipsi iam fati . . . NeOpOlitani cum . . . Grecis invasi sunt. " 791bid.; "Nos quidem sine vestro consilio nullatenus ibidem dirigere voluimus, sed poscimus vestram a Deo promotam regalem excel- lentiam, ut Sicut solita est, . . . disponere debeat et celeriter nobis Vulfuinum dirigere, ut hic apud nos Kalendas Augustas paratus esse festinet; atque talem eidem mandationem facere iubeatis, ut cum omnes Tuscanos sue Spoletinos . . . in servitio vestro pariterque nostro ad recol- ligendum ipsam civitatem Terracinensem eveniant, simulque Domino annuente ad expugnandum Caietam seu Neopolini, nostrum recolligentes patrimonium, quod ibidem in territorio Neopolitano ponitur, occurrant ut eos in omnbiussubiugantes, sub vestra atque nostra sint dicione. " 80See below, p. 183. 170 In any case, it is difficult to see the effort made in 775 to resolve the Papal-Spoletan clash ard to retain Hildebrand's loyalty without losing St. Peter's support either as the result of deliberate "deception" wrought by Charles upon Rome or the total disregard for Roman interests in Spoleto. Given the mounting threat to his Lombard crown, Charles was forced to alter the unsatisfactory arrangement between Rome and Spoleto which had emerged since the meeting of 774 with Hadrian. Until the actual crisis develOped it appears that Charles had continued to follow his father's policy regarding Spoleto by considering it outside his Sphere of interests in Italy. If we assume that Charles had been aware Of papal troubles with Hildebrand before the negotiations of 775, then it is possi- ble that he could have moved at any time to recover his rights in Spoleto, if his rights had been his chief concern. But when he did act, Charles left the issue of rights unsettled, for Hadrian assumed that the Spoletans remained at least partially under Roman authority. Hildebrand, on the other hand, read the results of the negotiations as a declaration Of inde- pendence from Rome. Not until 779 did the compromise of 775 return to cloud the political situation in Italy. AS in the case of Ravenna, in 775 Charles 's missi had planted the seeds of further trouble, by giving Hadrian the impression that the Spoletans still remained in Roman service as well as in Charles's. Not all the Romans could be persuaded to accept the results Of the settlement of 775 with Spoleto. Though Hadrian hastened to assure Charles of continued papal Spiritual support, the pope made it clear that enemies of the Papal-Frankish alliance had raised protests once again. 81 81Codex Carolinus, ep. #57, p. 582: "Ne nos derelinquas aut differas solatiandum, ut dicant gentes, quae in cuncto orbe terrarum sunt: "Ubi est fiducia Romanorum qua m post Deum in regem et regnum Francorum habebant? '" 171 Perhaps it was with the vain hope of winning Charles's help in subduing Hildebrand that Hadrian now denounced him as conspiring with the Duke of Beneventum in a plot to restore Desiderius '5 son to the Lombard throne and to depose Hadrian as well. 82 AS it turned out, Charles had only the Duke of Friuli to deal with. A swift winter march with a small army brought this rebellion to an end early in 776. 83 Hildebrand and Leo of Ravenna had clearly cast their lots with the Franks. The death Of the Eastern Emperor, Constantine V, in September of 775 had removed a key source Of support from the con- spirators. Desiderius's heir had no resources of his own to pursue his claims, and Eastern interests in Italy rapidly faded as the new Empress Irene tried to strengthen her position in Byzantium. The Duke of Friuli thus stood, and fell, alone. By Easter of 776 the Italian Situation appeared to be under control. 84 The Lombard rebels had been defeated in Friuli and Frankish counts were installed there. Charles did not go to Rome, probably because he had no 82Ibid.: "Ipse nempe noster missus cum eum apud coniunxisset, in magna eum invenit protervia, eo quod missi Arigisi Benevantani ducis seu Rodcasi Foroiulani nec non et Regengaldi Clusinae civitatis ducum in Spoletio cum praefatum reperit Hildebrandum, adibentes adversus nos pernicios um consilium: qualiter . . . proximo Martio mensae adveniente . . . cupientes hanc nostram Romanam invadere civitatis . . . . " 83Annales Regni Francorum a. 776, pp. 42, 44: "Tune domnus Carolus rex Italfam fngressus est partibus Foriulensium pergens. Hrodgaudus occisus est, et . . . domnus Carolus rex ad Tarvisium civi- tatem pascha celebravit, et captas civitatis Foroiulem, Tarvisium cum reliquis civitatibus quae rebellatae fuerant, et disposuit omnes per Francos et iterum cum prOSperitate et Victoria reversus est in Franciam. " 84ibid. 172 desire to face Hadrian's reproaches. In addition, Charles probably did not look seriously upon the papacy as a political entity. Not only did Charles prefer to see a primarily Spiritual role for Rome, but also Hadrian had demonstrated Roman incapacity to provide firm political leadership in Italy. Perhaps this view Of the political weakness of Rome was further underscored by the report, early in 776, Of Hadrian's troubles with Duke Reginaldus Of Clusia, who had detached from Rome an area, the Castello Felicitatis, that had come under Roman control at the same time Spoleto had been acquired. 35 Here was another area formerly under Desiderius's authority, indicating that Charles Should have been equally concerned to protect his rights as Lombard King in this region as he was in Spoleto, according to the Realpolitik view. However, we have no indication that Charles reacted by seeking to tie Reginaldus to the Franks. The reason for Charles's apparent lack of interest in this problem is uncertain. It is important to note that Charles did not, so far as we can determine, relentlessly pursue his rights in Italy based upon his Lombard title. Since the crisis created by the conspirators against him had passed, Charles had little reason to concern himself with Duke Raginaldus. The king was thus content to leave the Situation alone. 85Vita Hadriani, p. 496: "Sed et omnes habitores tam ducatus Firmani, Auximani, et Anconitani simulque et de castello Felicitatis, et ipsi dum clusis Langobardorum fugientes reversi sunt, ad praefatum . . . pontificem concurrentes, eius se tei beatitudini tradiderunt praesti- toque sacramenti in fide et servitio beati Petri . . . more Romanorum tonsorati sunt. " Codex Carolinus ep. #58, p. 583: ". . . omulum Raginaldum dudum in castello Felicitatis castaldum, qui nunc Clusinae civitate dux esse indetur . . . et per semet ipsum cum exercitu in eandem civitatem nostram, castello Felicitatis, properans eosdem castellanos abstulit. " 173 Hadrian had lost control Of the territory, and we may assume that Charles was under no Obligation to maintain the area as a possession of St. Peter. Hadrian implied that Charles had also given this territory as a religious gift, but, unlike Spoleto, the pope avoided a direct state- ment to this effect. 86 If Charles had acknowledged papal control of Castello Felicitatis in 774, as he had done with Spoleto, we must assume that Frankish missi would have appeared to negotiate another face-saving compromise that would have preserved St. Peter's dominion while allow- ing effective political power to pass from Hadrian. For papal territorial aspirations, the period from mid 774 until February, 776, had been one Of a series of disasters. Ravenna remained an Open wound. Leo had gained ground in 775 by his visit to Charles's court since, from the Roman point Of view, Charles appeared to have ignored the papal claim that Pepin had donated the "whole Exarchate". Hadrian clung tenaciously to Roman claims upon Ravenna, making a final political settlement impossible, from Charles's point of view. As for Spoleto, Hadrian had apparently not yet seen any way to turn his greatly weakened political hold there to his advantage. The idea of Shared power had probably been established at the 775 negotiations with Hildebrand, however. By 779 or 780 Hadrian was prepared to turn this idea to advantage by extending the principle to the lands of southern Italy, as we have seen. 86Codex Carolinus, ep. #58, p. 583: " . . . eO (Raginaldus) quod plurima mala per suas iniquas summissiones Spiritalis matris vestrae, sanctae Dei ecclesiae, et nobis ingerendum non desinit, dum omnino ea, quae beato Petro . . . a vestra excellentia pro animae vestri mercede offertae sunt, per suum iniquum argumentum abstollere anhelat et in suO prOprio servitio eos habere desiderat . . . . " 174 Charles 'S attitude toward these developments in the Italian poli- tical situation is less easily established. His chief concern had been to know that the papacy was faithfully devoting its Spiritual resources in support of the Saxon war, as we have seen above. However, a deepened political awareness Of the complexity of Rome's role in Italy had led him to compromise his ideal of the papal role. Thus, the king, we think, acknowledged albeit vaguely, Hadrian's political claims in Spoleto. Mean- while the status Of Ravenna, far from being determined by the simple expedient of forming a vague personal bond with Leo, remained an all but unsolvable problem as long as Leo requed to restrain his ambitions and Hadrian refused to give up papal claims. The more or less constant political turmoil in Italy Since 774 had grim social consequences for which Hadrian's enemies at Charles's court tried to hold the pope responsible. In 776 Hadrian found himself under attack for allowing Romans to engage in the Slave trade with the Saracens. 87 Patiently, Hadrian explained that the Lombards, not the Romans were reSponSible and that the Greeks, not the Saracens, were buying Slaves along the Italian coast. Hadrian insisted that he had tried to st0p them but lacked the necessary ships. The Slaves were Lombards driven by famine to desperate measures. They had lost hope and saw Slavery as the only means of survival. With these charges came a more familiar claim that the Roman clergy were corrupt. 88 All along we have noted an undercurrent Of 87ibid., ep. #59. pp. 584-585. 88Ibid. , p. 58 5: "De autem sacerdotibus nostris quod vobis false et contra Deum et animae eorum suggere ausi sunt, 'mentita est iniquitas Sibi, ' et nulla est Domino annuente, in nostris sacerdotibus pollutio 175 concern among the Franks that the pOpe and the Romans in general were inadequate to their great task. Charles's worries about St. Peter's support were perhaps connected with this vein of criticism which, in part at least, is perhaps traceable to those disaffected by Charles's decision to transfer the Spiritual function of calling upon St. Peter for aid from the Frankish Church to Rome. 89 Even though answering serious, and insulting charges, Hadrian made it clear that he continued to carry out his promise. 90 He and his clergy returned thanks for the safety Of Charles and all the Franks and prayed that God would bring victories, expand the Frankish kingdom, and exalt the Roman Church. 91 "Your exaltation is our joy. "92 Furthermore, the Romans desired the Franks to prOSper "because after God we have faith in none but your strong arm. "93 If, as was suggested above, a faction among the Romans tried to coax Hadrian to abandon the alliance, then it may be that this group had an alternative ally in mind, possibly Tassilo. The duke had aSpirationS to be a king and 89See above, p. 154. 90Codex Carolinus, ep. #59, pp. 584-585: "Et deprecamus Dei omnipotentis Elémentfam cum nostris episc0pis, sacerdotibus, clerum atque servatum et universum nostrum pOpulum, ut vobis indesinenter victorias tribuat et vestrum dilatet regnum ad exaltationem Spiritalis matris vestrae, sanctae Dei Romane ecclaesiae . . . . " 911bid. 92Ibid., p. 585: " . . . et salutem pOpuli nobis a Deo commissi, quia vestra exaltatio nostra est letitia. " 93Ibid.: "Et semper desideramus et cupimus, quae bona sunt atque prOSpera, de vestro a Deo protecto regno et omnium Francorum salutaria addiscere, quia nos post Deum alii fiduciam non habemus visi in vestro fortissimo brachio. " 176 might prove a useful ally. Furthermore, the Lombards might be tempted to oppose Charles in favor of Tassilo, considering his Lombard bride. Such Speculation cannot be supported, however. All that appears likely from Hadrian's stout affirmation that Charles was his SOle defender is that papal critics had Siggested alternatives to the Franks. The relationship that had existed between Stephen and Pepin was what Hadrian sought to establish, on a much greater scale, with Charles. 94 AS he indicated, Hadrian, as much as Charles, was eager to expand the points of mutual interest between the papacy and the Frankish kingdom. SO far Charles had taken much and had given little in return although Hadrian was too tactful a diplomat to suggest this point. Perhaps the pope recognized that his hold upon the papal throne depended upon Charles's continuing support. To have abandoned the alliance would have probably invited an attempt by his critics to depose him. The political tensions which had marked 775 fell Off sharply during the latter half Of 776. We hear no more of Hadrian's troubles with Leo, nor did the pOpe comment further on relations with Spoleto. Hildebrand, meanwhile, appeared content to maintain his agreement with the Franks. It is possible that a letter urging Charles to order the Duke of Friuli to intervene on Rome's behalf in Istria was written during this year, or perhaps in 777. 95 This prevents us from adOpting Wilhelm Marten's view that the letter defending the moral fiber of the Roman clergy marked <”Ibid.: "Et Sicut predecessor noster, domnus Stephanus papa, bonam havuit fiduciam genitori vestro . . . domno Pippino regis, ita et nos multo amplius in vestro fortissimo regno confidimus et certi permanemus. 951bi ., ep. #63, p. 590. fi 177 a break in Papal-Frankish relations that lasted until May, 778. 99 The real reason for the supposed break, as Martens argued, was the loss of Spoleto."7 But, as we have indicated, Charles's missi took steps to prevent such an event by preserving the fiction Of papal political authority in the dual service concept. Marten's argument, therefore, must be rejected. Furthermore, had Hadrian withdrawn from the alliance, as Martens assumed, Charles would have been forced to take action to restore it because the intercession of St. Peter secured by the pOpe was an essen- tial element in Charles's military policy. We must take very seriously Charles's concern for the performance of the religious services which the pope had agreed to institute. The spiritual welfare Of the kingdom, from Charles's point of view, was closely tied to Hadrian's fulfillment Of his promise. Thus, Hadrian, had he abandoned the alliance in 776, would have done more than withdraw friendship, he would have threatened the safety Of Charles's kingdom. 98 Martens's assumption that Charles and Hadrian finally worked out their differences during this long Silent period cannot be supported. 99 It seems likely that Frankish sources would bear at least a trace of such an important achievement. At the same time it 96Martens, p. 159. 971bid. 98We agree with Martens, p. 197, in his view that Papal-Frankish relations were defined aS Special Situations arose and not from long term, clearly defined, legal positions. However, the basis of the alliance was more than mere "Liebesbund" as Martens contends (p. 26); it was a Spiritual alliance in which St. Peter, working through Hadrian, commun- icated his support to Charles. 99Ibid., pp. 159-160. 178 seems very unlikely that Hadrian would have continued to press Old claims while asking for the return of patrimonial lands when corres- pondence resumed in May, 778, if a new agreement had been negotiated. 100 In addition, as was indicated above, it would have been danger- ous for Hadrian to have severed his tie with Charles not only because Charles himself might have taken steps to restore the alliance but also because Hadrian would have lost his one sure defense against his critics. At worst an attempt to depose him could have followed from his failure to achieve the territorial goals which we have attributed to the lay nobility among his supporters. Thus, rather than a precipitate break in Papal-Frankish relations, the period from mid 776 to May, 778, was one in which papal corres- pondence with Charles decreased because the political tensions in Italy that prompted such correspondence decreased. The death Of Archbishop Leo in 777 was the most important change in this direction. His successor, John VII, apparently did not share Leo's consuming ambi- tion to rule Ravenna in his own right. The election of John brought no response from Charles so far as we can tell from the available sources. 101 Hadrian's re'assertion of 100Codex Carolinus, ep. #60, p. 587: "Et hos deprecamur vestram excellentiam, . . . pro amore Dei et ipsius clavigeri regni caelorum, qui solium regni patris vestri vobis largiri dignatus est: et secundum promis- sionem, quam polliciti estis eidem Dei apostolo pro animae vestrae mercaede et stabilitate regni vestri, omnia nostris temporibus adimplere inbeatis, ut ecclesia Dei omnipotentis . . . in omnibus amplius quam amplius sancta Dei ecclesia exaltata permaneat et omnia secundum vestram pollicitationem adinpleantur. " 101Ibid. , ep. #8 5, p. 621: "Nam nos nullo modo memininus: . . . neque a vestra in triumpliis regali Victoria missum ad electionem Ravenne directum esse tam in electione Iohannis archiepiscopi quam in electione Gratiosi archiepiscopi eiusdem. " 179 papal claims did not lead Charles to challenge papal temporal power. Though the king looked upon the pOpe'S role as a Spiritual one, Charles did not insist on the denial of papal authority in Ravenna. The impres- sion left by the episode of Leo, therefor e, is that Charles Simply reacted to a Situation over which the pOpe appeared to have little control in an effort to protect Frankish and Roman interests. Charles's policy of binding the leading political figures Of Italy to himself as a means of stabilizing the political situation had failed to achieve that objective with reSpect to Leo. Thus, in 777 Hadrian proposed to try once more to rule Ravenna through a more tractable representative, John VII. As luck would have it, Hadrian was successful, but by the time Of John's death in 788, Charles was ready to experiment with his Old policy once again. 102 The need for a Frankish role in Ravenna was dramatized earlier, in 783, when Hadrian ran afoul of two corrupt officials who refused to accept papal authority. 103 Like Leo, these men went straight to Charles for support. 104 Charles's response to their appeal is not known although we may guess that the king supported Hadrian. In 788 the personal bond 102Ibid.: "Directus a vestra insigne regale precellentia, videl- icet ErmenhEr—tus religiosus presbiter, inter responsionis suae verba Obtulit nobis commemoratorium, ut asserebat vestre excellentiae exaratum, scilicet de electione episcoporum Ravennatis ecclesiae: quia, quando Sergius . . . Obuit, in electione Leonis archiepiscopis fuerunt missi vestri, Huchaldus vel pares sui. " 1031bid., ep. #75, pp. 505-507. 104'Ibid., p. 506: " . . . neque recipere ipsos nefandos vultu dignissimo dignemini sed . . . ad nos dehonestatos per fidelissimos missos vestros humiles veniant . . . . " 180 between the king and the new archbishop was to be launched on the firmer footing of legality. But Hadrian rejected the Frankish attempt to assert a right to a voice in the election of the archbiShOp and apparently Charles retreated from the effort to insure a greater measure of stability in the Exarchate. 105 Perhaps to avoid further situations in which his court was clogged with appellants from Italy, Charles hoped to invest the Archbishop of Ravenna with the prestige associated with the king's name. Indirectly, assuming Hadrian's firm control over the archbiShOp, perhaps Charles sought to reinforce rather than weaken Hadrian's position in the Exarchate. The Frankish king was not engaged in a power struggle with Rome over Ravenna. Instead, he seemed to be searching for a way to blend Frankish and papal power in order to insure the political stability of the area. This compromise was forced on him by Hadrian's spirited defense of claims which the Franks themselves had helped create. As Charles had learned Since 774, political stability was not easily secured in Italy but it remained essential if the energies Of the papacy were to be fully directed toward the essential task Of providing Spiritual support for Frankish undertakings which were directed not only toward extending the Frankish kingdom but exalting the Roman Church as well, to borrow Hadrian's phrase. We have digressed briefly to indicate the extent to which the problem 105Ibid. ep. #85, p. 621: " . . . quatenus, una concordia, una eademque voluntas unoque consilio conglobati, apostolicam suscipientes admonitionem, talem Sibi eligerent pastorem, qui nec a sacris canonibus respueretur nec ullo extra capitulo possit obsistere . . . Sicut et nunc canonicae factum est. " 181 of Ravenna provided incentives for continued political experimentation in Italy on Charles '3 part. Now we must return to the period from 778 to 780 to examine additional facets of Charles's Italian policy. Most historians have assigned great significance to a letter of May 778 in which Hadrian not only addresses Charles as potentially a "new Constantine" but also in which the pope adOpted a new approach to the territorial problem in Italy by requesting the return of patrimonial lands in Tuscany, Spoleto, Beneventum, Corsica and Sabina. 106 Opinions have varied regarding the reference to Charles as a "new Constantine". By some it is taken as a Sign of the existence of the Donation of Constantine. 107 But this argument is not convincing. AS Schnflrer has observed, "It is possible to perceive in the pope's letter no more than the legendary background against which a later unscrupu- lous but very learned forger was able to elaborate his fabrication. "108 The author suggests that the reference represents instead the beginning of a plan to elevate Charles as Constantine's successor and emperor of the West, but this view is conjectural.109 In somewhat the same vein, Walter Mohr found the importance of this passage to lie in the fact that it provided a new foundation for the 106Ibid., ep. #60, p. 587: " . . . ut omnes gentes, quae hec audierint, edicere valeant: 'Domino salvum fac regem . . . quia ecce novus christianissimus Dei Constantius imperator his temporibus surrexit . . . . " Ibid.: "Sed et cuncta alia, quae diverSOS imperatores, patricios . . . in partibus Tusciae, Spoletio seu Benevento atque Corsica simul et Savinensae patrimonio beato Petro . . . concessa sunt . . . ." 107Caspar, Papsttum unter frankischer Herrschaft, pp. 60-62. 108Church and Culture in the Middle Ages, I, 454. 109Ibid. 182 government of the "Church-State" that had naturally evolved during the eighth century. 110 Since the death of Pepin, according to Mohr, the idea of the Church-State had lost clear definition. Charles's policy had revealed no clear Sign Of his sympathy for this view of government. 111 However, Mohr's interpretation places too little emphasis upon the Spiritual Significance of the alliance of 774. As we have attempted to point out, Charles request for Spiritual support represented a tremendous expansion of the role Of the papacy in Frankish affairs. The institution of formal, daily Observances on behalf of the Frankish army was a Sign that Charles had committed the welfare Of his military ventures into papal hands insofar as Hadrian prayed for the intercession Of St. Peter on Charles 's behalf. Church and State had never been more completely intertwined. Where Pepin had seen Rome as a prop to his family's claim to rule, Charles involved the papacy in the most essential affairs of his government. The difficulty lay in implementing this idea of Papal-Frankish relations. The political problems of Italy stood in the way, and Charles sought the most efficient way to remove these obstacles to the far broader role which he had assigned the papacy. Unlike Pepin, Charles could not successfully draw arbitrary lines beyond which he refused to take an interest in Italy. Hadrian could not totally abandon a temporal role in Italy for the Spiritual duties that Charles expected him to perform. Practical needs, such as revenues to finance church repairs, forced Hadrian to seek larger territorial possessions. The thought that political control Should 110Die karoliigische Reichsidee, pp. 37. 41. lllibid., p. 35 183 accompany these possessions is not surprising. In addition, Hadrian had to deal with the Roman nobility who aspired, perhaps unrealistical- ly, to restore Roman prestige and power in Italy. That they saw the Church as an instrument to achieve political goals seems evident both from the papal biographer of Hadrian and from Hadrian's letters to Charles. Mixed with the notion that the Romans eXpected "many fruits" to accrue to Rome from the alliance was Hadrian's understanding that the expansion of Charles's kingdom in the northeast would exalt the Church as well. These contradictory positions reflect Hadrian's dilemma - on the one hand, he had, in 774, agreed to accept a primarily Spiritual role perhaps defined by Charles, on the other hand, the Romans expected the alliance to raise the prestige and power Of Rome in Italy. Fortunately for Hadrian, Charles had not totally denied the papacy a temporal role. The settlement of the problem of Ravenna in 777 is a case in point, as is that of Spoleto. However, no further expansion of papal jurisdiction in central Italy was considered by Charles as the case of Spoleto also seems to indicate. By 778 Hadrian had apparently accept- ed this decision. But, Since he was still confronted by the demands of an agressive aristocracy, Hadrian had to find a new outlet for their energies. By interpreting the settlement of 775 regarding Spoleto to mean that Hadrian and Charles Shared power there, Hadrian was able to seize the political initiative in southern Italy, only to be frustrated by Charles '3 lack of support. If the king had been forced to compromise in 775 by encouraging Hadrian to think that the papacy could play a political role in Spoleto, Charles had apparently no desire to see this principle extended to cover lands now in diSpute with Beneventum and Naples. That Hadrian had this goal in mind can be seen in his negotiations with the NeOpOlitanS 184 for the recovery of patrimonial lands in Naples in exchange for Terracina. 112 Although Charles might have advised Hadrian to seek Frankish counsel before making war in southern Italy a second time, the king did not apparently Speak out strongly against the idea, held by Hadrian, that he and Charles Shared political power in Italy. 113 Thus, although Hadrian's complex negotiations with Naples fell through, his intention was to bring Naples, and Beneventum as well, under both papal and Frankish authority. 114 As far as we know, Charles failed to support Hadrian's scheme to expand the range of Frankish political interests to include Beneventum in 779, and by 781 papal interest in the area had diminished under the influence perhaps of the effort to restore good relations with the Eastern Empire through a marriage alliance with the son of the Empress Irene and one Of Charles's daughters. 115 The thrust of Charles '3 Italian policy during the period from mid 774 until 780 aimed primarily toward removing the papacy from the political role it had attempted to carve for itself Since the days of 112See above, p. 169. fn- 78. 79- 113Charles's admonition in this respect is possibly reflected in Codex Carolinus, ep. #64, p. 591: "Nos quidem sine vestro consilio nullatenus ibidem dirigere vobimus . . . . " and Ibid. , "Sed nos Sine vestro consilio neque obsides neque ipsam civitatem reddere habuimus ll 11""‘See above, fn. 78, 79. 115See Mohr, Die karolingische Reichsidee, p. 40. 185 Gregory II. 116 Each time the Romans demonstrated their incapacity to control areas they claimed to govern, Charles was forced to intervene. His method, insofar as it can be discovered, was to tie the leaders of the various foci of power to himself, but this technique was inadequate to stabilize relations between Rome and Ravenna. It worked with more success in Spoleto, but here Charles had to compromise, thereby Open- ing the door to a new problem as Hadrian sought to apply the dual power concept to lands in Beneventum. Thus by 780 the pattern of Charles's Italian policy had been set. Though imperfectly realized, Charles's ideal Of the role Of the papacy as the spiritual foundation of the expansion of Frankish power north of the Alps had led to the narrowing Of independent papal political activity in Italy. With the ultimate failure of Hadrian's attempt to share in the direction of the political future of Beneventum, the pOpe fell back upon his claim to govern Ravenna. Meanwhile, by reducing the political role Of Rome in Italy, the Frankish political horizon below the Alps gradual- ly came to encompass the entire penninsula. Open-ended and Often vaguely defined, Charles 's policy for Italy grew out of his greater reli- ance upon the papacy to support Frankish military goals. Thus, the motive of Charles's Italian policy was religious. If Charles sought power in Italy, he did so not for its own sake but to impose his vision of the proper role of the papacy in the West on a situation that threatened to deny that vision. 116Both Duchesne, Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes, p. 105 and Abel, JahrbHcher, p. 2H acknOle-dge Charles's concern for Rome's Spiritual support, but they do not, as is done here, connect that concern with the direction of Charles's Italian policy. CONCLUSION The expansion of the Frankish political horizon in Italy between 739 and 781 was thus the product of a complex of political and religious changes during these years. From 739 until 781 the Frankish attitude toward their role in Italy was conditioned primarily by their View of the papacy. AS that view changed, in company with changes in the Frankish attitude toward the Lombards, the Obstacles to Frankish poli- tical activity beyond the Alps were diminished or removed. The reigns of Charles Martel, Pepin the Short, and Charlemagne revealed three distinct attitudes toward Frankish involvement in Italy. The Spiritual authority of Pope Gregory III was too weak and Frankish friendship with Liutprand too strong to draw the Franks into the papacy's political troubles with the Lombards in Charles Martel's era. In addi- tion to more clearly political issues, a religious problem also entered into the political arena. Rival claims to be St. Peter's chosen people emerged to insure that the Franks and the Romans would have little common ground upon which to stand to confront the Lombards. The reform of the Frankish Church by Boniface strengthened the Spiritual authority Of the papacy in Francia. Still, in 753, Pepin moved against the Opinion of the Frankish nobility in seeking closer ties with Pope Stephen 11. Stephen, however, appeared to possess a clearer under- standing Of Frankish religious psychology. Supported by the solid achievements of Boniface's reform efforts, Stephen found a satisfactory solution to the lingering dispute over Frankish claims to be St. Peter's 186 187 chosen people. At the placitum of 754, the anointment of Pepin and his family was interpreted to mean that St. Peter, acting through his vicar, had adopted the whole Frankish peOple and thus acknowledged them as superior to all other nations of the West. Without this fundamental con- cession the Franks might have rejected Pepin's alliance as politically unwise Since a war with the Lombards was the high price Pepin paid to secure the Frankish crown for his heirs. Papal acknowledgment of Frankish equality with the Romans combined with the possible reaction to Carloman's appearance at the placitum as a Sign Of Lombard meddling in Frankish affairs to carry the day for Pepin's decision to support the papacy. The spiritual and political ties that bound Stephen and Pepin apparently were stronger than those which bound the Frankish nobility to Pepin's alliance. In the critical months between the first and second war with Aistulf, Stephen learned how narrowly the Franks defined their role in Italy. The renewed territorial diSpute that grew out Of the peace terms established between Pepin and Aistulf in 755 ended up in Pepin's court where Aistulf perhaps made a good case against Stephen's claims. Pepin was reluctant to serve as a referee in Italy, and he urged Stephen to find a settlement with Aistulf. Aistulf broke the impasse by attacking Rome in January, 756. Stephen now called upon the Franks to remember that St. Peter had adopted them, had made them the brothers of the Romans, in return for their promise to defend Rome, the source of their Spiritual support. With the situation made Simpler by Aistulf's rash act, the Franks could not ignore the papal appeal. The result of the second campaign indicated that the Frankish attitude toward their role in Italy had advanced far 188 enough to allow Pepin a role as referee in the Papal-Lombard dispute. For the remainder of his reign Pepin played this role, employing diplo- macy to forestall clashes between Rome and Pavia that would make further Frankish military campaigns in Italy necessary. From the papal point of view perhaps Pepin appeared to have accepted an Office in the res flblicae Romanorum indicated by his title, patricius Romanorum. Unfortunately, we have no way to discover Pepin's assessment of his constitutional position. Perhaps he did not think in such terms. In any case, he did not challenge the idea of Rome as an independent temporal power, although he set limits to the extent to which he would support papal territorial claims. He narrowly defined the Frankish role in Italy to the Papal-Lombard dispute. If he had will- ingly accepted a vaguely defined Office in the Roman "state", he did not take into his purview all that fell logically within the range of duties of that office. POpe Stephen's high hOpes in this respect were quickly dis- appointed as Pepin made no move to interest himself in Papal troubles with Spoleto or Beneventum. Italy thus drew only the most limited attention from the Franks during the reign of Pepin. The king's whole policy seemed calculated on the assumption that the Franks were reluctant to fight again in Italy. To avoid war in Italy became Pepin's personal problem rather than the problem of the Frankish peOple. Their interests were concentrated on lands closer to home. The pursuit of Frankish military interests along the borders of the kingdom was carried out without regard to the papacy. This fact is Significant insofar as it indicates the narrow role which the papacy played in the daily life of the Franks. Pepin and his followers probably continued 189 to assume that St. Peter himself supported their particular causes either in Saxony or Aquitaine. POpes Stephen and Paul I had assured the Franks that they would be victorious because they had helped St. Peter in Rome. However, no attempt by either Side was made to fuse the Spiritual resources of the papacy in any formal way with the military resources of the Franks. When that fusion occurred in the reign of Charlemagne, one of its principal byproducts was that the door was abruptly thrust Open on a far wider role for the Franks in Italy. Charles's political focus in Italy in June of 774 had not veered far, if at all, from that of Pepin. The Papal-Lombard dispute was the center of his concern. By elimin- ating decisively the Lombard threat to ROme, Charles probably hoped to divert the energies of the papacy toward Charles 's own goal of the conquest and Christianization of Saxony. From 774 on the papacy played as essential a role in this process as Frankish military might. Peace in Italy acquired a new priority, at a time when peace in Italy became far more difficult to secure. The removal Of the Lombard threat also removed the incentive of various foci of power in Italy to seek close ties with Rome. Charles's decision to take up the Lombard crown, but not its policy of southward expansion, created a political vacuum which Rome could not fill without Frankish support. As the realization grew among the Franks that papal problems in Italy went far beyond the diSpute with Desiderius, Charles attempted to secure peace in Italy by the personal bond. The use Of this instrument was bound to create conflict with the papacy Since Hadrian was committed to protecting the territorial interests of the Roman nobility, largely as a matter of self-defens e. 190 Because the pOpe stoutly defended Roman claims in central Italy, especially over the Exarchate of Ravenna and Spoleto, Charles could not ignore the papacy's temporal claims in the attempt to provide a stable political foundation for the Spiritual alliance of 774. Ravenna could not be stabilized because of the ambitions of Archbishop Leo who might have read Charles's attempts to establish a personal bond as license for the archbishop to move against Hadrian's power in the Exarchate. This problem was pushed into the background by Leo's death rather than by the successful assertion Of Frankish authority over Ravenna. The settlement in Spoleto, reached in the face of a threat to Charles's hold on Lombardy, preserved, in theory, a measure Of papal political authority over the Spoletans. At least, Hadrian later chose to interpret the compromise in that way. Duke Hildebrand, however, cast his lot entirely with Charles. It is interesting to note that Hildebrand's visit to Charles in 778 came only a Short time before Hadrian attempted to test his view of the political tie that bound Hildebrand equally to Charles and to the pope. Although the pope's attempt failed to establish in practice in 779 what had perhaps been arranged in 775 to placate Roman sentiment, the theory of Shared authority remained alive after 781. While Charles clearly preferred to have the pope play a strictly spiritual role, as the letter to Pope Leo III in 795 attests, Hadrian had kept alive a claim to temporal power in Italy. AS long as the papacy could take the initiative, Charles was committed to an essentially Open- ended policy. Thus, by 781, as the king moved to stabilize relations with Hadrian, the pope had begun to negotiate with the Eastern Empress Irene. The expansion of the political horizon of the Franks beyond Italy was thus as sured. 191 Although the last Chapter of this study has made a strong case for the connection between Charles's military policy in Saxony and his desire to maintain a spiritual alliance with the papacy, it would be rash to conclude that this was Charles '3 concern with regard to the papacy. Walter Ullmann, in The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship, has provided ample evidence that the leadership among the Franks looked to Rome for far more than Spiritual support, for a strictly military policy. In 774 we know that Charles received a collection of canons compiled by Dionysius Exiguus in the sixth century from POpe Hadrian, and that the Frankish King gave Special attention to them in 802 (Ullmann, p. 11). Rome supplied the tools by which Charles intended to effect a "rebirth" of EurOpean society. In this early period of his relations with Hadrian, perhaps Charles had not yet made it clear to the pOpe how very much the Franks would rely upon Rome for spiritual guidance in this task. From the point of view expressed by the pope in the Codex Carolinus it seems that, at this early stage, Hadrian had not fully grasped the range of Charles 's vision for the Spiritual future of the West. However, this is a matter that will require much further investigation, as will the problem of the "idea of EurOpe" and its possible conflict with the Roman conception of the right order of the world. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY AS practically every page Of this study will testify, the most valuable work consulted was the Codex Carolinus. The best edition of that work is by Wilhelm Gundlach in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae III (Berlin, 1892). To extract from the papal letters contained in this source a Frankish "point Of view" has been the most difficult task presented by this study. At every point along the way one had to decide whether or not the particular passage in question was an adequate reflection by a pope of Frankish concerns, or perhaps only a formula included for purposes of style. AS an example, one should question the frequent references to the Frankish hopes to conquer the "barbarous nations" and to extend Christianity to new areas as a result. Walter Ullmann's study, The Carolingian Renaissance and the Idea of Kingship (London, 1969) has made it clear that the Franks, especially Charlemagne, looked to Rome for far more than the endorsement of a military policy. While we agree with his position, we must then ask to what extent POpe Hadrian in particular graSped the Significance of the role that Charles was asking the papacy to play in reforming EurOpe. This is a question that surely deserves further study. Louis Duchesne's edition of the Liber Pontificalis (Paris, 1886) is another source that was frequently consulted. Here one finds less of the Frankish viewPoint and a more clearly defined expression of Roman hOpeS and concerns. We have discussed the papal biographer's treatment of the meeting between Pope Hadrian and Charles in 774 in 192 193 this context. The biographer seemed to lack what Charles most desired: that the papacy acquire a much larger view of its role in the West. While POpe Hadrian perhaps understood that Charles intended to "exalt the Church" by his programs, the pOpe'S followers within the curia cannot be said to have uniformly understood this point of view. This we suspect was a particular problem of the lay nobility for whom Hadrian seems to have found a greater role in papal affairs. Thus, the Liber Pontificalis Offers a valuable contrast to the Frankish point of view that we have attempted to uncover in the papal letters. In searching for other expressions of Frankish attitudes toward Italy we consulted a number Of Specifically Frankish sources. Among these were the Annales Regni Francorum, the Annales Einhardi, the Einhardi Vita Karoli Impe ratoris, and the Codicis Carolini Epistolae. Useful secondary works that have attempted to convey a clear picture of the Frankish image of themselves were perhaps more valuable for the purposes of this study. Among the most valuable we Should note, Ernst Kantorowicz, Laudes Reiia: A Study in Liturgical AcclamationS and Medieval Ruler Worshm (Berkeley, 1958). The author's investigations indicate convincingly that the Franks were not simply passive recipients of the Roman tradition. Ullmann's contention in the above-mentioned work that Francia was, intellectually and educationally, fallow ground (p. 2) is probably true enough, but we cannot ignore the set Of ideas and assumptions which the Franks applied in adopting and adapting the Latin- Roman-Christian cosmology that Ullmann identifies. Again, this is an area that requires much further investigation. Unfortunately, neither Ullmann nor Kantorowicz has made any concerted effort to relate their particular line of investigation to the problems posed by Italy for the Franks. 194 Still the best study of Italy, though out Of date in some reSpectS is Thomas Hodgkin's Italy and her Invaders (Oxford, 1892-1899). Not only do es Hodgkin provide valuable commentaries on the sources for a study of Italian history, but also he supplies a scholar's balanced view of the motives of Roman and Frankish policies. Rather than fit the historical process into a rigidly defined mold, Hodgkin prefers to acknowledge the complexity of the personalities and events that influ- ence historical developments. He is still refreshing reading. Another study of Italian history Of value for the present investigation was Ludo Moritz Hartmann's Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter (Gotha, 1900). Other works of interest, but of less value, were Gabriel Pepe's Le mOLen age barbare en Italie (Paris, 1956), Leon Homo's Rome medievale (Paris, 1956), and Pasquale Villari's The Barbarian Invasions of Italy (London, 1902). Ferdinand Gregorovius 'S Historxof the City of Rome in the Middle Ages (London, 1894) is in some respects still useful. The flood of journals and articles dealing with Carolingian history is enormous, as iS well known. One useful bibliographical tool that helped the writer select secondary materials was the Internationale Bibliogr_aphie der Zeitschriftenliteratur issued annually from Leipzig and Osnabruck in two parts, one listing German the other non-German writings. A close eye was cast upon the lists of Significant articles contained in various numbers Of the American Historical Review and Historische Zeitschrift. These proved to be the most useful among the publications that attempt to keep scholars informed of recent literature. BIBLIOGRAPHY Abel, Sigurd. "Papst Hadrian I und die weltliche Herrschaft des Romischen Stuhls, " Forschurggn zur Deutschen Geschichte, I, (1860), 427-495. Abel, Sigurd and Bernhard Simson Jahrbiicher der Deutschen Geschichte, Leipzig, 1888. Amann, Emile. L'epoque carolingienne, Vol. VI, Histoire de l'eglise, ed. By K. Fliche aha V. Martin. Paris,j947. Bayet, C. "Les elections pontificales sous les carolingiens au VIII et au IX Siecle, " Revue Historique, XXIV, (1884). 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Carlyle. A History of Medieval Political Thought in the West, 6 Vols. New YorkT W62. Cartelliere, Alexander. Weltgeschichte als Machtgeschichte 382- 911: Die Zeit der Reichsgrund’ngen, Manhen and Berlin, 1926. Caspar, Erich. Geschichte des Papsttums von den anfangen bis zur mihe Weltherrshhaft, 2 Vols. THbihgen, I933.— "Papst Gregor II und der Bilderstreit, " Zeitschrift fiir Kirchengeschichte, L11 (1933), 29-89. "Das Papsttum unter frankischer Herrschaft, " Zeihschrift ftir Kirchengeschichte, LIV (1935), 132-164. . Pippin und die rdmische Kirche. Berlin, 1914. Coleman, C. B. Constantine the Great and Christiang in Columbia University Studies inmistory, Economics, and Public raw CXEVI. New York, 1914? Dannenbauer, H. DaS rdmische Reich und der Westen vom Tode Justinians bis zum Todh ICarls ties—Grossen in Grundlagen der mittefilterlichenWelt. Stuttgart, I958. Deer, Josef. "Die vorrechte des Kaisers in Rom 772-800, " Schweizer Beitrage zur allgemeinen Geschichte, XV, 5-63. 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