. . ..r -

 

. N.

A STUDY OF SOME PROBLEMS
IN THE FORMATION OF THE
PROPOSED FEDERATION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS

Thais I‘m tho Doom af M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE
Wayne Dani-OI Baffin

I949

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A STUDY OF SOXE PROBLEAS IN THE FORJATION
OF THE PROPOSED FEDERATION OF WESTERN

EUROPEAN NATIONS

By
Wayne Daniel Bottje

A THESIS
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and Aoplied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History and Political Science

1949

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The writer wishes to

sincere aOQIEClatiOH

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[1 4.111

given

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. 5
3331 tence

S

of this study by Dr.

of the Devartment of
Science. The writer'
also extendej to his

in +

Reihoehl,for his cons

r
d1".

1 criticisms.

the history cecartnent,

acknowieiwe with

the thaughtful
in the Dreoaretian
Hans L. Leonhardt

History and Politicai

s as:reCiation is
friend end coiiearue

tructive camients

he reserves for himself,

the sale resnohsibiiity for

any ani all errars in cantent and

construction.

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A. Recent oronouncements relative to European unity

l. flinston Churchill

[U

'dotlsrd Dalaoier
3. Clecent Attlee
B. History of the unification idea
1. Julius Caesar
2. Charlene :ne
3. Roman Catholic Church
4. Pierre Dotois
5. Duke of Sally
6. Concert of Eurooe
7. Liberalisn vs. reacti.n3ryisn
E. The Locarno Tact
. Eriwnd's Euroiesn Union

oevelonnent of the study

Q:

C. Purpose an

ECCJIIO.-IC 1)}; fl: “OEALIIT

A. Econo 1i develoolcn cofioared with noliticui and
militsry_deV€ oiment
E. Initiation of economic olanning

U1
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(D
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\I)
L‘-
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m g -_ u t .. ‘ ~~ _. n A, .
l. oecretsry herSnall s Hirvgra adoress of

c. Establishment of the Committee of Euronean
ECOHOTiiC Coooerution

, - . ‘ .t , - - ‘= .
:e :Dfelpn ASSLStdIC act of lg4o

4. Creuti or of the Convention for Eurowecn Lconomic
Coooerwtion

5. Develovnent of tre OPPJFizatan for euro: en
Ecorn33ic Coormnfixtion kOUEC)

C. Pro‘cletrs fecizg the 053C

1. Fluidity of the world's economy

w

0

Ho

2. The economic in t8 DI

,_)

L1

L0

Euroce by l952

a. Prozlem of the dollar shortage

b. Alternr.1tives to non-eco‘. iolnic integration
by 1952

D. Benelux as a natte: m for fiestern Euronecn econouic
inteiretion

l. Developnent of the Benelux clan

2. Cono3r able oroclcis with Hestern Eurooegn
uni fic i tio
a. Different stofes of industrialization

‘v

b. Agricultural 3roduction and tariff
egulation

(l) Unbolence of agriculture and
industrial interests

(2) Autsrchic state vs. free economy

I'" +
t LA L) e S

(_+
(I
U)

3. Different 80013 ic ooLicies of senera
3. Differences within the Benelux Union

b. Britisn economic nationalism

O .
(2) Coiilict Vito 'free economy [icions
(3 Oniss ion of Western European econonic
intec Tation

(a) Bone criticism of lack of British
initiative

(3) some reasons for lac“ oi Britisi
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c. French econogic cooperation
(l) Reasons for French oosition

(2) Difficulties of French econonic
in egretion

(J) Tossicl e French eco1 ionic ties I th
Benelux and Its ly

E. Esteblishnent of a common Eestern Eurooecn currency

1. Consequences of the establisnment of a common
currency

2. British rule in a common Currency protram
F. Disoosition of the colonial empires
u. ConCLusion to econonic develoonent

III. EOIJI Ionl.leJoLOi-nlvf

A. Definition of political relations

1:)
(1‘

3. Problems of coliticel intr ration to be ucoonol s

l. Nationalism and state sovereignty

a. Position of France
b. Position of Britain

2. Political stability of France
a. Favorable factors for integration
b. Unfavorable fectors for integration
(l) Lultiolicity of political osrties
(2) sch of a strong executive
(3) Tendency toward extremisn in colitis

.2 “‘n I" II?" 3“ I~I~ M ~. «3‘ ' 3’f- .
3. Eels tWvanio oi nestern euro een CJJHEIICS to

}h

tish relotionshio to derwnny

3-:
1.

hi

8...

(l) Conmerc iel interests

A. Definition of basic military irotlen
B. J=ei for Jcstern Euro3ean milito rv  orcs:isatioL

C. Source of military aid

D. lro‘cle:ns in the deriv: tion of the Li'o rt‘n Atlantic
Denense Treaty from the Erosseis isct

l. Prot_ons of reconcilinr :rnssels an o Norti
Atls nti c Tr3ot

e. Automatic military action
b. Definition of areas
0. Intervention in internal disturbances

llited nls;nin3 unit with the larger
forth Atlantic area

a

O

H
-Jo

2. Association of the United States and Canada
with Jesternn oro3esn defense pi

a. Division of world into two military spheres

a :. n "r,. +A . H .0-‘ .. 3-0,..-
b. Cooid oi nation oi western Eorooeon oeionse
. v 4.2 |,.,u
with toe Je'te:

(1) Location of the oefensive frontier
(2) Political innLicQtions of non—3.3. alo

(K) v.5. attitude towlrd arming Feetern
Eurofie

r- 4;

3. Long runrc Ceveloowent of Forth Atlsntic relations

q
N

is

P).
(\

F. Problem of distribut-on of connsn
G. Conclusion to military develoonent
V. COICLUSION

VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. INTRODUCTION

Out of the chaos and destruction of two world wars
exhaustingly fought over the length and breadth of its
terrain emerged in 1945 a Europe vexed by its own inability
to establish order and tranquillity among nations and
peace, security, and higher living standards for its
people. Since the turn of the century Europe had become
a bubbling caldron of national animosities, lurking
suspicions, narrow prejudices -- nations as bereft of
morals of of the ideas that motivate them. Culminating in
the frenzied orgy of sadism that was Nazism, a bewildered
and beaten postwar Europe crawled from its battered remains
only to rediscover that power had succeeded power in the
councils of nations and that reason and harmony was still

far from shaping the destinies of mankind.

The discovery was not one that especially surprised
the cynics since they had always accepted the "war-is-
forever—inevitable" thesis with equanimity. But the
cynics do not normally govern, elsewise the perpetual
struggle for national security against recurring wars
would not necessarily continue. Thus, Winston Churchill
had the courage to say to the world in the depths of
World War II,

... it would be our hope that the United Nations, headed
by the three great victorious powers, the British Commonwealth

of Nations, the United States and Soviet Russia, should
immediately begin to confer upon the future world organiza-
tion which is to be our safeguard against further wars ...

We must hope and pray that the unity of the three leading
victorious powers will be worthy of their supreme responsibil-
ity and that they will think not only of their own welfare

but of the welfare and future of all. One can imagine that
under a world institution embodying or representing the
United Nations, and some day all nations, there shopld 1
come into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia.

And French Premier Daladier, in the earliest days of the
war, declared that
... the new Europe should have a wider or anization than
that which has existed until now ... (and perhaps
federative bonds (must be) envisaged between the various
European states ...
Clement Attlee, leader of the minority Labour Party in
England during the war, stated
... there must be acceptance of the principle that inter-
national anarchy is incompatible with peace, and that
in the common interest there must be recognition of an
international authority superior to the individual states
and endowed not only with rights over them, but with
power to make them effective, operating not only in the
political, but in the economic sphere. Europe must
federate or perish.3

The ideas expressed by these leaders were not, of
course, anything new. Movements for the unification of
Europe may be said to extend as far back as the Roman
Empire when Julius Caesar established Roman hegemony by

the sword over what is now France, England, the Lowlands,

Spain, Italy, and the Balkans, a unity that secured many

 

l. N.Y. Times, 22 Mar. 1943

20 1\IOYO Tinles, 30 Dec. 1939

3. Cited from William P. Maddox, European Plans For World
Order, (Philadelphia, 1940), pg. 17

of the ends now so ardently sought. After the decline
of the Empire succeeding attempts at unification were
made or planned by Charlemagne and the Roman Catholic
Church but the former's attempt was short-lived and the
Church's hegemony was more in thought than in actual
fact -- a unity which crumbled under the impact of the

Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation.

The idea has nevertheless persisted in the minds
of political thinkers throughout the course of history.
The first plan of federation was cogently outlined in
1306 by a crown jurist of King Philip the Fair of France,

named Pierre Dubois, and entitled On the Reconouest g: the

 

Holy Land wherein it was argued that the Crusades against

 

the Infidels could best be accomplished by securing
unity among the European kings, princes, and cities.
The proposed leadership of a permanent council of princes
by the King of France came to naught, however, when
England broke the French supremacy in a succeeding series

of wars.

Three hundred years later the Duke of Sully, attributing

the origin of his Grand Design to King Henry IV of France,

 

proposed a federated Christian Republic of Europe, composed
of fifteen states, for the purpose of promoting permanent
peace, free trade, and religious tolerance. A council of

forty delegates was to direct the Republic and one of its

direct aims was to be the reconquest of North Africa.

The Grand Design was the forerunner of numerous other

 

federation plans that have since been proposed for Europe.

The nearest approach to a European federation emerged
from the Congress of Vienna in the form of the Concert
of Europe which, reminding one of the present situation,
was motivated more by fear than by the positive forces
of reason and mutual interests. The fears of the Congress
Powers were aroused by the strains of liberalism emanating
from the French Revolution and were temporarily allayed
by a vow to maintain the status quo. But, like so many
alliances based upon the Quicksands of negation rather
than upon the solid foundations of forward-looking
internationalism, the pseudo-unanimity of the Concert
or Europe collapsed under the pressure of national self-
interest and unity once again became a faint flickering

dream.

There followed a Europe rent by liberalism in the
West and reactionaryism in the East. The most outstanding
figure of this epoch was Prince Otto von Bismarck, an
outstanding opponent of reactionary provincialism.
Liberalism became compounded of a confusion of nationalism
and imperialism and the strongest force for international
unity emerged from the socialist doctrine of Karl Marx.

But socialism was weak and it LOOK a catastrophic conflict

to revitalize the ideas of unity. Even then the "feel"
of national power had grown too strong to make anything

but the national self-interest the criterion of action.

A gesture toward European unity was made in the
Locarno Pact of 1925 but its demise illustrated the
inadequacy of purely political instruments. The primary
exclusion of economic considerations would also have
negated the effectiveness of Briand's proposal for
European Union which expressly stated that "All possibility
of progress toward economic union being strictly determined
by the question of security, itself closely bound up
with the question of possible progress in the realm of
political union, it is therefore in the political field
that the best efforts of organizers to create for Europe
an organic structure must be concentrated."4 The plan
failed of acceptance largely because of the rising tide

of nationalism brought on in Europe by the chaos of

economic autarchy following the crash of 1929.

Thus European unity, as it is being considered today,
is neither a new project nor are the conditions which
have caused such discussions without precedent. There
are, however, factors in the existing situation which are
especially adapted to further study and analysis at this

40 :NOYO flmes, 1.8 hiay 19:50

lfl'lul

time. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire into a
few of the infinite number of problems to be overcome
before the idea of a European (or, in this instance,
Western European) federation of nations can become a
reality. This inquiry will be concerned with the economic,
political, and military aspects of federation since it

is in this order that the preliminary groundwork toward
unity has already been accomplished and which later

developments must perforce be built upon.

In the development of this study it should not be
assumed that the European Recovery Program, the Brussels
Pact, and the North Atlantic Defense Treaty are necessarily
considered as the economic, political, and military
elements respectively of an ultimate European federation
plan. They are used in the following discussion primarily
as concrete examples contributing to the establishment
of such a federation rather than integral parts of the
plan, which itself presently remains mostly theoretical.
The Brussels Pact, to be sure, is the political nucleus
of a future federation, although it is not intended to
be regarded as a political constitution. The Pact,
however, should be viewed as political only in the sense
that it is a written document tending toward unification,
since it also significantly provides for close cooperation
among the Benelux nations and England and France on matters

Of armaments and economic affairs. Basically, the Brussels

Pact is the starting point for a future unity of Europe.
II . ECONOMIC DEVELOP E T

The idea of the integration of the fiestern European
economy, insofar as it relates to the post World Var II
period, precedes the development of political and military
ties, although it will very likely be the most difficult
to achieve in the long run. Nearly complete military
cooperation has been attained by most of the Western
European nations in the last two conflicts, at least
to the extent that the concept of Joint military action
is not completely foreign to the nations concerned.
Political coordination, while less complete in scope than
that of the military, has nonetheless been tried -- and,
incidentally, found lacking —- in the great alliances
of European Powers and the League of Nations which,
while not confined entirely to Western European Powers,
has been a fertile practice ground for future plans of
cooperation. But econonic integration, to the degree
necessary to be effective insofar as it touches upon
national economies, is almost entirely a phenomenon
of the present post-war period and a direct reflection of
the relative economic weakness of the Western European
area at the present tim . The view of Briand in his
k..._-._,_,_/ ””””””” ‘
proposal prooosal for a European Union is wholly illustrative

of the attitude of the European nations toward economic

cooperation prior to the cataclysm of the second world

W a I" 0

Far from suggesting that political and security considera-
tions should take precedence over economic matters, the
present approach has been clearly cognizant of the important
role that economic cooperation and integration may play in
the establishment of the security and well being of the
Western European people. After more than two years of
piece-meal assistance, which could only provide a hand-to-
mouth existence for the disrupted and discouraged people

hall, in his Harvard address

‘

of Europe, Secretary of State Mars
of 5 June 1947, threw down the gauntlet to the European
nations by declaring

... before the United States Government can proceed much
further in its effort to alleviate the situation and help
start the European world on its way to recovery, there

must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as

to the requirements of the situation and the part those
countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect
to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government.5

This address resulted in the establishment of a Committee
of European Economic Cooperation which assembled

... a general statement of the problems of European economic
recovery, the plans of the European countries concerned

to meet these problems and the assistance which these countries
believe to be necessary from the United States and other
non-European countries and agencies to restore their economic
position ... (and) also summary statements of the position

and prospects of the participating countries and Western
Germany in food and agriculture, energy sources, iron and
steel, transport, timber, and manpower as well as in their

 

50 NOYO Ting, 6 June 1947

balances of internat onal payments and their internal
financial situation.

This statement, a two-volume report, served as the foundation
for the establishment of the European Recovery Program,
the act which was finally approved by Congress on 3 April

1948.

Almost immediately upon the aoproval of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948 the sixteen Western European nations
who were to be the beneficiaries of the Act, plus the
Commanders in Chief of the French, United Kingdom, and the
United States Zones of Occupation in Germany, created a
Convention for European Economic Cooperation which "... laid
down the principles and the machinery which were to guide
the European nations in developing their cooperative
recovery program."8 The executive organ of this Convention,
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC),
has become a continuing group for Western Eurooean recovery
plans and is now intended to continue with plans for Western
European economic integration after the scheduled discontin-

uance of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1952.

The problems presently facing the OEEC in the realization

of the economic integration of fiesterm EurOpe are infinite

 

6. Cited from the letter of transnittal of the Sec. of State
to the President, "Committee of European Economic
Cooperation, General Report, Paris, 21 Sep. 1947,"
International Conciliation, 447 (Jan. 1949), pg. 6

7. Ibid., pg. 6

8. Ibid., pg. 19

 

and complex. One of the major difficulties that confront
economic planners is the fluidity of the world's economy.
Prices of commodities change from day to day and from

region to region, production is constantly at variance

with demand, the cause of which is often beyond the

capacity of man to control (e.g. the weather with respect

to agriculture), national currencies are disrupted because
of internal difficulties which may in turn affect internation-
al stability -- these, and many more, factors make any
attempts by planners (short of a world state with a single
central authority) to integrate separate national economies
into a workable union an almost insurmountable task. The
most pressing problem facing the OEEC today is the necessity
for having the Western European economies sufficiently
integrated by 1952 so that United States foreign assistance,
scheduled for completion in that year, will relieve nations
of the chronic dollar shortage which has been their lot
individually since the end of the war. Given a completely
balanced world economy (a theoretical situation which has
not prevailed since the beginning of the national state)

the term "dollar shortage" would not exist, since it implies
a material shortage of either raw or manufactured goods or
of productive fac1lities balanced in the proper proportion
to the population. This condition does not only not inhere
in our world economy but, rather, the overwhelming predominance

of productive resources are concentrated in what is now

ll.

known as the "dollar area". These resources may be procured
only in excnange for dollars, or their equivalent, and the
nations of Western Europe, outside of the dollar area,

have little means for securing those dollars beCause of
their own rather limited sources of raw materials and war-
destroyed productive facilities. Therefore, the dollar --
or material -- shortage becomes a continuing problem.
Although the European Recovery Program was designed to
reatore the industrial, agricultural, and mineral resources
of the Western European nations to the point Where they
could once again get into the world marxet, it is becoming
increasingly clear that 1952 will see the Marshall Plan
nations still considerably snort of complete dependence
from dollar credits. Various estimates have been made but
the latest ones seem to place the 1952 dollar deficit of

Earshall Plan nations at nearly $2.5 billion.9

Assuming this fact to be correct, there would be
several possible alternatives in the event the United States
did not decide to continue aid on a limited scale. These
could include a reduction in the general standard of
living or an abandonment to Communist hegemony and all that
it entails. But the most likely result, in the event that

an adequate degree of economic integration is not secured

 

. n . . ., . ' n
9. Sir. ATthUP palter, "European Recovery. a Loom ahead,

Foreign Affairs, 27:2 (Jan. 1949), pg. 290

(and with it an alleviation of the dollar shortage), is
that there will be a resort to national efforts of self-
protection in order to protect the national populations

of the Western European states which will, in turn, bring
about a recurrence of the costly trade wars of the 1930's
era. Conflict among these nations is further likely
because most of them are industrial nations producing
competing products. Protective policies, export and
import controls, and currency manipulations may easily be
used to protect national economies at the expense of other
national economies which will affect the economic stability
of the whole non-Russian world. The case for Western
European integration, therefore, becomes a matter of

paramount importance.

A nucleus for economic integration and a pattern for
future plans may be found in the Benelux customs union
where tariff dealings are intended to apply equally to
all three nations.10 This plan originated out of a long
series of attempts since 1630 to establish better economic
relations among the three nations and the present union
took shape while the Belgian and Netherlands Governments
were in exile in London during the recent war. Luxemburg

became a part of the union as a result of a previous tariff

 

10. "Steps Towards A United Europe," U.S. Hews—World Report,
(13 Feb. 1945), pg. 20

. a ll .
and monetary union agreement with Belgium in l9a2. The

program was begun in 1944 by the establishment of three
Councils to work out a common tariff against other
countries, to negotiate foreign trade agreements on the
basis of these tariffs, and to consider cololete economic
union which was to_be accomplished by stages without inter-
fering with the political sovereignty of the three nations.l
A common customs policy was agreed upon in London on 5
September 1944, but the long period of occupation of The
Netherlands after Belgium was liberated necessitated a
postponement of the tariff agreement. A second sa°ies

of three Councils was set up in a meeting at The Hague

in April, 1946, to determine customs regulations (including
a tariff schedule) and to prepare foreign trade regulations

and commercial treaties.13

The council on tariff regulations prepared a schedule
by considering each comnodity item by item and arriving at
a tariff which was a reasonable compromise between the
relatively high Belgian—Luxemburg tariffs and the generally
l4 ' ‘ 1 1 ‘ .
low Dutch tariffs. This scnedule, whicn went into effect

on 1 January l948, does not affect the existence of excise

 

 

 

 

ll. David T. Roberts, " he Dutch-Belgian ECOHOTlC Union,’
Foreign Affairs, 25:4 (July, l947), pg. 692

l2. Ibid., pg. 691

13. Harold H. Hutcheson, "Benelux: Unity In A Divided Horld,”
Foreign Policy Report, XXIV:4 (l day l94h), pg. 46

14. David T. Roberts,_"The Dutch-Belgian Economic Union,"
Foreign Affair , 25:4 (July, 1247), pg. 692

 

14.

f

and other transaction taxes, inoort quotas, and exchange
controls wnich continue to exist on a national scale,
although ultimately a free trade area is envisioned among

7'

. , . l~
the three count.ies. ’

mi-fl

inis complete economic union is
expected to be achieved by 1 July lQEO, according to
present plans, assuming that the three countries continue
to receive harshall Ilan aid in the exoected quantities

and if "... an overall balance is achieved in international
payments of their econor ies."16 On that date it is further
intended that the currencies of the three countries will

be mutually convertible, ”... machir ery will be designed
to trace fundamental differences in payments o=o sition,
(and) measures will be talien to check disequilibrium,

n17

mainly in the field of commerce.

1
H
O
U

The Benelux economic program poses many problems wh
will be of a comparable nature in a larger Jestern Euro ean
union. On problem arises out of the fact that Belgium
is now a highly industrialized country while The Letzterlands
is consideraply less so, since the latter has been able
heretofore to rely more uoon the returns from a highly
profitable overseas empire. Faced now with the virtual
loss of this colonial investment, The Nethe rlawi s is

endeavoring to establish new industries in the mother country,

15. Harold H. Hutcheson, "Benelux: Unity In A Divided florid,"

Foreiv nlolicy Re33rt, XXIVz4 (1 Lay 1943), pg. 45
16. LICK. T21 leg, 13 lustre L949
17. Ibid.

 

 

H
\)1

both for the purpose (1) of developing an exportable surplus
of manufactured pr'ducts to offset the decline in overseas
investments and (2) of emoloyin3 a raoidly increasing
population.15 This problem may be relatively easy within
the Benelux union since new industries may be develooed
with an eye to the economic benefit of the union as a whole
and not in competition with presently established Belgian
industries, although both nations have some highly comoetitive
industries in their oresent sta3e of development.19 But

the problem is one of major proportions when the economic
integration of countries possessing long-established
competing industries is attempted. Serious dislocations

of manoower and financial investments may occur if radical
steps toward community specialization are taken by a
federated government. Concentrations of complete industries’
in separate localities may also be disadvantageous from a
stra e3ic standpoint. On the other hand, continuation of
existin3 industries in their present locations mi3ht well
prove uneconomic to a federal unit with a single central
government because of transportation costs, availability

of labor, conditions of the industrial plants, and proximity
to consumer units. The integration of the industrial

machinery of a Jestern European Federation is an infinitely

 

 

18. Harold H. Hutcheso on, "Eenelux: Unity In A Divided World,"
Foreicrn Policy Be or rt, xx Iv: 4P (1 194s ), jog-g. 4s
19. David T. Roberts, TrThe Dutch- ~ 1 qian Econo ic Union,"

Foreign Affairs, 25:4 (July, 1,47), pg. o9l

 

complex task wnich will require a high degree of planning
and a lon3 period of slow transition to develop the
present nationally-oriented industrial plants into a

single economic federated unit.

Agricultural production is another problem requirin3
the attention of the Benelux planners. Althou3h both
nations are food importers, The Netherlands produces an
exportable surplus of such things as dairy products and
vegetables.20 The economic union could mean a financial
loss for Dutch food exporters, either through requiring
them to sell the exportable surplus on the new domestic
market (viz. Benelux) at a smaller margin of profit or
through the readjustment of tariff rates because of the
differences of the agricultural-industrial markets of the
two countries. The latter could mean revision of agricultural
tariffs upward to the detriment of Dutch food exporters
through retaliatory measures by other nations. The first
problem may adjust itself if the Benelux market becomes a
complete free trade area to the extent that all domestic
prices will adjust themselves automatically to export prices
or if the entire union should adopt export subsidies to
meet competitive forei3n markets. The second problem has
evidently already been met through the establishment of a

new tariff schedule for the union (as has been previously

 

20. Ibid., p3. e91

17.

indicated), but its effectiveness is yet to be proven.

A larger European union, particularly one embracing
the Scandinavian agricultural areas, would face a similar
unbalance of agricultural and industrial interests. In
many ways this is not unlike the problem that has faced
United States legislators in the course of almost its
entire history. .Agricultural interests generally tend to
favor low tariff policies in order to secure manufactured
products at lower prices, as well as to avoid reciprocal
discrimination against their exmortable surplus. Industrial
interests, on the other hand, tend to favor higher tariffs
in order to exclude foreign competing manufactures who may
be able to preduce more cheaply because of a number of
variable factors (e.g. cheaper labor, better access to raw
materials, technological superiority, etc.) and thereby put
them out of business, or because a high tariff may pernit
them to increase their profit margin on the domestic market.
These conflicting points of View will inevitably pose serious
problems for Western Union economic specialists. Aside
from the necessity for reconciling agricultural and industrial
interests on the tariff issue, union economists will have
to decide whether it is in the best interest of the union
to establish an autarchic state. The latter development
would mean the encouragement of uneconomic industries by
the use of tariffs to insure greater military security and

economic stability through independence from other national

economies. As an illustration, a Western European Union
might become dependent upon the United States for certain
vital defense requirements because the latter could produce
them more economically than a European Union. Such a

union would not only be necessarily bound to the United
States for its military security but the conditions 01
commerce Whicn sucn dependence would entail (and which

might well extend into other than armament industries if
economic superiority is the sole JuSLification for existence)
would make the stability of the Union's economic structure
strongly dependent upon the United States overwhelming
productive superiority. On the other hand, the Unlon

might decide to become as completely autarchic as possible
in order to avoid dependence upon an outside power. Such
action might not only help to stifle world commerce and
assist the present Russian-led attempt to compartmentalize
national economies (which ultimately leads to mounting
international antagonisms and generally reduced living
standards within the separate national groupings) but also
to defeat one of the very purposes for wnich a Western Union

is formed, viz. the establishment of larger free trade areas.

Obviously, the problem of compromiSlng these two
extremes is one of major proportions for the planners of a
Western European Union. It may be considered quite possible

that, unless Russia relaxes to a considerable extent the

semi-autarchic exclusivity of her commercial Eastern bloc
(which appears rather unlikely because of Russian fears of
a Western free economy depression), the proposed Western
European Union will out of necessity become somewhat
dependent upon the United States. This is true in the
short run since the Western European nations are almost
completely dependent upon Marshall Plan assistance to restore
their capital equipment to a point where they can theoretically
become self-sufficient. Their dependency is nearly as
great in the longer run, however, since the Western nations
of Europe do not have enoug. raw materials to make them
completely independent of the remainder of the world.

Still further, unless they are able to gear their technolo-
gical facilities to greater productive units per man it is
possible that they may become dependent upon the United
States' greater technological production to satisfy even
their minimum demands. Finally, outside the realm of
economics but within that of dependency, the history of
long-established commercial relations among the Western
European nations and the United States, plus a common
cultural background and a further common sympathy towards
free commercial intercourse among nations, makes the idea
of close relations between the Western European Union and

the United States a logical condition of fact.

A third problem confronting the Benelux planners is

the marked difference between the economic policies of

The Netherlands and of Belgium-Luxemburg. Since the

latter states were liberated seven months b fore the former
and Belgium became an Allied military base while its currency
was simultaneously being fed by British and American troops,
the postwar fiscal policies of the two national groups
tended in different directions.21 In Belgium sharp measures
were taken to stimulate industrial production to meet
foreign competition, even at the expense of an increasing
gap between prices and wages,22 but that policy is now
paying off by a dropping off in prices of consumer goods

and an increasingly profitable export market.23 Today the
Belgian franc is one of the strongest currencies in Western
Europe.24 Essentially, Belgium has been pursuing a "free
economy" program while most of her neighbors follow a
controlled economy plan which means that little Belgium,
heavily dependent upon foreign trade for her national income,
is compelled to compete with state controlled and sometimes
subsidized economies which are pressing for expanding export
markets.25 It further means that unless Belgium can continue
to meet this competition -- and it is becoming increasingly

difficult as production in the "controlled" countries increase

 

21. Ibid., pg. 69l
22. Ibid., pg. 692
23. N.Y. Times, 20 Mar. l949
24. K.Y. Times, 25 Mar. 1949
25. H.Y. Times, 20 Mar. 1949

21.

and Belgium's valued "hard currency" is hoarded and used

for only necessary purposes -- her gallant exoeriment in

a free economy, much admired by her Marshall Plan benefactors,
may be doomed to failure.26 It is for this reason that
Western European economic union, even more than Benelux

union, is particularly a matter of extreme significance

to the Belgians. Benelux may possibly make the Belgians

less dependent upon foreign trade for their existence

through the absorption of the agricultural surplus of

The Netherlands and a possibly better balanced industrial
structure. But if the free economy policy is pursued by
Benelux it would only result in a Sllfhtly larger island

of free economy, still deoendent uoon a considerable
proportion of foreign trade for its existence and still

faced with the increasing pressure of competition of state
controlled and subsidized industries. It is for this reason
that Belgium is taking the lead in pointing out to ER?
administrators that the economic integration of all of
Western Europe is more important in relieving European
dependence upon American dollars than are the increasing
production and export figures of the individual nations,
which only indicate sharper competition among separate

27

national economies.

 

f‘ l
{U

The post— —wa r financial policy of The Netherlands
followed a mar; :edly diff er nt course. The existing

industries had been virtually destroy d and the valuable

(D

overseas possessions cut off, leaving the Dutch no alternative
but to strictly regulate their import market for need of
adequate ex0hange and closely ration and control food and
; . , - - 2b fl .

raw materials in order to hold orices down. continued
disruptions in the Dutch East Indies plus the breakdown of
h 1 h‘ , - 4. 1 (‘1. —. 29
the highly inportant pre—war Dutcn~aerman trade has not
only reduced the Standard of living of th Hetherlanders'
but their inability to get on their "economic feet" by an
expansion of their export trade has materially weaxened the
Dutch guiider.5O A sharp appreciation f the value of the

I 1 51‘ ‘ ' ' 1
guilder has recently been reported, however, whicn is
probably attributable both to generous Belgian credits,
extended with an eye to alleviating some difficulties

l 32 . . .
of Benelux unity, and the assistance and encouragenent

of ER? funds.33

 

2c. David T. Roberts, "The Dutch-Belgian Econonic Union,"
Foreign Affairs, 25:4 (July, l947),p pg. 692

29. Harold H. Hutcheson, ”Benelux: Unity In A Divid d World,"
Forean rolicy Reoort, xxiv: 4 (1 may 1943), pg. 48

30. Eric C. Bellquist, Mlolitic and Econo ic Conditions
In The Low Countries,' Foreign Policy Reoort, XXIV34
(l May l94b), pg. 44

31. N.Z. Times, 4 Apr. 1949

32. Of. Harold H. Hutcheson, ”Benelux: ni In A Divided
World," Foreign Policy RLpgrt, MXIV 4 (l May 1g4c), pg. 4B;
N.Y. Times, 14 Jar. 15949; and N.i. Tires, 4 Apr. 1949

33. Cf. N.x. Tine , l3 lar. 1949; r.:. Tides, 14 mar. w49; and
Harold H.—Eutcheson, "Benelux: Unity In A Divided florid,"
Foreign Policy Reoort, XXIV:4 (l hay 194C), pg. 4c

 

 

 

C‘"
‘<

 

R)
\x’

The application of the problems of the Benelux fiscal
gap to the multitude of policies that presently exist in
the numerous countries that compose flestern Europe presents
a problem of considerable magnitude. It appears obvious
that, although feeble efforts are being made to conclude
economic agreements between some of the Western European
nations, few, if any, of these nations are psychologically
attuned to the necessity of pursuing the idea of economic
integration to its ultimate ideal. The bonds of economic
nationalism still manifest themselves in such goals as was
reported by Clifton Daniel recently in the New York liflggfi
Raising the proportion of British exports to the United
States and Canada in an effort to remedy the 'crucial problem"
of the country's dollar deficit will be the most important
single aim of British economic policy this year, the
Treasury stated today in its Economic Survey for 1949. The
objective this year will be to increase exports to the
United States and Canada 50 per cent above the 1938 figure}!1L
This trumpeting, by one of the most nationalistic minded
of the Western European economies, reveals a number of very
significant factors. In the first instance, it indicates
that Britain's state—oriented economy is planning an all-out
competition in the American market with all the other Western
European countries who are also eager to increase their
dollar supplies. The American market, on the other hand,
will continue, as it has in the past, to be extremely limited

to foreign exports since the war has greatly expanded

American production facilities to the extent where, once

 

34. N.Y. Times, 16 Mar. 1949

24.

supply has caught up with demand (as it appears to be doing
now), domestic production is liable to saturate the market.
Further, American technological superiority and closer
proximity to raw materials often puts foreign producers

at a marked disadvantage, not only on U.S. domestic markets
but also on foreign competitive markets. Another factor
that must be considered is the return of the buyer's market
in the United States which will mean that domestic producers
who are at a competitive price disadvantage with foreign
producers will apply pressure for higher protective tariffs.
Although such a policy may be somewhat unjustified from an
international viewpoint, it is a logical outgrowth of the
epidemic disease of economic nationalism. In its essence,
the present British program is simoly a reconstitution of
the disastrous pre—war economic policies of all nations,

but it suffers from the additional evil of being assisted

by the United States through ERP aid.

Britain's proposed economic program for 1949 reveals,
in the second instance, that such nations as Belgium and
Luxemburg, who are conscientiously endeavoring to follow
a free economy program leading to ultimate Western European
economic integration in compliance with the ideas of the
framers of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, may be
completely squeezed out of the export market in which their
production and Britain's production compete and upon which

they depend for their existence. The small, free economy

nations would appear to have only two alternatives: (1) they
could establish a state controlled economy themselves,

which would not only be distasteful to their ERP benefactors
but would not be as effective as it might be since Benelux
would be a Johnny-come-lately on an export market already
tied up by a series of bilateral trade agreements from the
present state-control countries, or (2) they could continue
to get economic assistance from the United States in order

to bolster their program of free enterprise, an alternative
not likely to be looked upon too favorably by the United
states Government. A third alternative presents itself,

of course, in the complete integration of the western
European economy and, as things are presently developing,

it would apwear that it is incumbent upon the United States,
as suppliers of recovery aid, to insist upon this program

of economic integration. Such a program, while not necessar-
ily implying a free economy for all of Western Europe,

would assist the tendency in that direction by eliminating

a large series of competing economies and the concomitant
feeling for the necessity for state control in order to

meet that competition.

Another significant item in Britain's proposed 1949
economic program is the complete omission of any thought
of ultimate Western European economic integration. Its
paramount objectives are indicated to be: (1) Increasing

sales to the United States and Canada; (2) expanding production;

26.

(5) bringing down costs and improving quality and productiv—
ity; and (4) battling inflation "with all the weapons used
successfully in 1947 and 1945" (viz. continuance of the

' 35
high disinflationary rate of taxation). The only official
gesture made by Britain towards cooperation in the economic
sphere is found in the Brussels Pact of l7 march 1948
Which reads:
Convinced of the close community of their interests and of
the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic
recovery of Europe, the high contracting parties will so
organize and coordinate their economic activities as to
produce the best possible results, by the elinination of
conflict in their economic policies, coordination of
production and development of commercial exchanges.
As a statement of cooperative policy it appears to be
somewhat belied by the aims of the 1949 Economic Survey,

although it may well remain a goal to be achieved in the

long run.

It is held by one writer that two things have militated
against Britain taking the lead for a new policy of economic

57 He maintains first that the United States

integration.
exerted considerable pressure on Britain during the war
years to return to an economic policy of the Manchester

school of liberalism which is still in high favor with

U.S. laissez-faire advocates today, although the present

 

35. Ibid.

36. Text of Brussels Pact, U.S. Hews-Jorld Report, (26 Mar.

37. 'Thomas Balogh, "The Outlook For Britain,’
Affairs, 26:4 (July, 1948), pg. 677

 

 

' Foreign

official policy of the United States Government, as expressed
in the European Recovery Program, tends toward a collectivist
concept. A second deterrent to British leadership alleged

by this writer was "

... the inability and unwillingness

of Mr. Churchill to face the consequences of the war on

the economic side and thus to face an analysis of the
military strength of the country ...(necessary conditions
to realize a program which) presuoposed meticulous prepara—
tion and intimate political relations between Britain and

Q
Western Europe."3U

\

Despite this measured criticism of Conservative
economics and the evidence of continued economic nationalism
by the Labour Party a few other factors need cons1deration
before heaping all the blame upon Britain for sabotaging
the development of the New Program for Western Europe.

It should be noted that the initiative for the development
of Western European unity, which stands today as the first
concrete move in the direction of that unity (viz. the
Brussels Pact), was a direct outgrowth of Foreign Minister
Ernest Bevin's speech of 22 January 1946 that the "... time
, "39
was ripe for the consolidation of Europe although, to be
sure, this vague allusion did not appear to indicate an

overwhelming enthusiasm for the new project. As early as

 

BU. Ibido, ‘03. 677
39. N.Y. lines, 23 Jan. 1948

1927, however, Bevin went on record as an advocate of
.P l 40 ,_

unilied economic services in Europe. It Should also be

observed that Britain is playirr: a big role in the OEEC

which is studying the ideas of customs unio l 3, payments

agreements, free manpower movement, and the development

, 41
of the Contine nt' shy‘roelectric potential.

A further deterr nt to English initiative in the
economic field lies in Britain's relationships with the
Commonwealth, now slightly strained by political problems
(wnich will be discussed later in this paper). Economically,
the British see a greater de gree of coni tibility between
themselves and the Commonwealth, because of the establish-
ment of the sterling trade area and already well developed
channels of trade, than among themselves and the divergent
and ofttimes less stable economies of Western European

2
nations. On the other hand, many Commonwealth statesmen
see a distinct advantage in the Commonwealth having economic
ties with Western Europe which will not only increase their
own trade outlets but will perhaps provide greater security
for Britain for whose defense most of the Commonwealth nations

feel somewhat resvonsiole.43 At the same tine, Australia

 

40. Grant S. McClellan, "Britain and Western European Union,"

Foreign Policy Reoort, ”VIV: ll (15 Oct. l94o), pg. 124, n. ll
41. Ibid., p:. 129
42. N.Y. Times, 19 Dec. 1948
43. Grant S. McClellan, I'Britain and Western Euros an Union,
Foreign Policy Resort, xxiv:il (15 Oct. 194a), pg. 130

 

and New Zeeland are particularly concerned how such a union
will affect their own market in Britain, which is their

main export outlet todayfl4

Unquestionably, the tremendous size of the British
Empire and the importance of Britain's position as the
center of the sterling area will create major problems for
Western European economists. Britain obviously has consider-
able justification for wishing to preserve her own economic
stability by a concentrated production and exoort program
since her own stability or instability will certainly affect
major portions of the world. But it is also because of
the importance of the British Commonwealth and Empire in
the world's commercial market that her assistance to Western
European economic integration is most needed. The Commonwealth
and Empire will not only furnish excellent markets for
Western European production and furnish sources for raw
materials (as well as certain necessary finished goods)
but will also provide the union with a stable currency
system which will help free all of them to some eXtent from

dependence upon the dollar.

The French, as compared with Britain, are pursuing a
somewhat more direct cooperative line. France's continental

position and the fact that her territory was invaded thrice

 

44. Ibid., pg. 130

by Germans in seventy years has made security the dominant
factor in her foreign policy. Security means not alone
military protection but is reflected in political and
economic aSpects as well. There are indications that the
Fourth Republic is eschewing the post-World War I idea of

45

the complete economic subordination of Germany. However,
France continues to be apprehensive about Gernany's potential
industrial superiority, both from the standpoint of military

strength and in terms of her own recovery. As an example

of the latter it may be observed that the Ruhr coal keeps

‘\

France's basic industries in operation. If this coal is\

used in major part to keep the Ruhr industries Operating it
not only strengthens Germany militarily but also closes
French industries, causes unemployment, weakens France's
competitive position, and creates domestic political problems.
It is thus that France becomes one of the principal advocates

not only of internationalization of the German Ruhr but of

all of Western Europe.

Internal financial instability, caused largely by
disruptive strikes (partly Communist inspired) and a multi-
party political system that cannot deal adequately with
financial problems, combined with an inflation resulting

from four years of German occupation and a real postwar

 

45. Andre Philip, "France and the Econonic Recovery of
Europe,‘ Foreign Affairs, 26:2 (Jan., 1948), pg. 331

 

shortage of consumer and producer goods, would have at any
rate made it difficult to integrate France's economy into
that of Western Europe. Just as Belgium is finding it
necessary to prop up the economy of The Netherlands46

in order to secure greater effectiveness withhthe Benelux
Union so, too, would it be necessary to bring France's
economy more in line before Western European economic
integration could be properly acnieved. There is increasing
evidence, however, that France's monetary position is

47

becoming more stabilized, due in a large measure to ER?
assistance in increasing production and bold deflationary
measures by the Queuille Government. The latter scheme

was accomplished largely by a successful five percent
Reconstruction Loan which revived confidence in French
currency and caused a slump in the price of gold and of the
dollar on the free market in Paris.48 This deflation has

had a complementary effect of reducing food prices, eliminat-
ing the need of much food rationing, and thus getting rid

40
of much black market speculation. ’

It has been reported that the Benelux Economic Union

is considering plans to extend its union to France and

C0
Western Germany. This would represent a big step toward

 

46. See note 32

47. E.Y. Times, 3 Apr. l949
4b. N.Y. Times, 2b Mar. l949
49. Ibid.

50. N.Y. giggg, 24 mar. 194

\O

\,, )4
R)
o

the economic unification of Eastern Europe since France
already has a customs agreement with Italy, the making of
which is ultimately intended to bring a freer flow of trade
E<1
between the latter two countries.“ Some problems under
consideration in the French-Italian accord include: (1) an
adjustment in currency parity to wipe out France's export
deficit; (2) an adjustment of the competitive economies of
the two countries to make them more complementary; (3) a
discussion of the wages of Italian workers in France; (4) an
agreement for the de—blocking of liquid assets; and (5) an
increase in the ceiling limit on the payments agreement
between the two countries so as to ease the situation for

52

France. These discussions are being undertaken in order
to stimulate trade between the two countries which has
lagged because of France's inability to make payments for
Italian goods. It is significant to note that the measures
being considered by these two Latin nations are consciously
designed to be something more than merely temporary in

nature and represents something more lasting than the

extension of a loan for purchases of Italian products.

Complete unification of the two economies, or of all
Western European economies, will not be realized until a

common currency is established for the whole area. The

 

51. N.Y. Times, 25 Mar. 1949
52. Ibid.

\N
\N

chances for this appear to be rather remote at the present
time. One school of thought argues in favor of this plan
while United States aid is still available to cushion the
shock of industrial dislocations and consequent economic
maladjustments.that would certainly follow in some of the

53 .i. . .n _
presently defined national areas. Hails the establisnuent
of a common currency probably would do more than anything
else to integrate the economies of Western Europe into a
single system, it would temporarily create unemployment in
industries now protected by exchange control regulations;
‘modify state taxing systems, and affect social experimentation.
On the other hand, it would reduce the number of competitive
units, use ERP aid for industrial readjustments and unemploy-
ment cushion, equalize the living standards of peoples of
different states, an probably improve Western European
productivity to an extent where it would be not nearly so
dependent upon U.S. aid as at the present time. Finally,

WV?

western Europe might be in a better position to wit

‘

nstand

outside idealogical and commercial pressures.

There are many economists who feel that it would be
better to leave Britain out of any such fiestern economic
union that envisages a common currency for Continental

Western European states since the geographic limits of the

 

53. N.Y. Timeg, 7 Apr. 1949
54. Ibid.

British sterling bloc is so great as to cause world-wide
E

U1

repercussions if tampered with in any way. Other

economists fear, however, that Britain may try to hamstring
continental attempts towards economic unity because it
might affect the stability of her own currency. In the

event that such continental economic unity is accomplished,

the Western world would be reduced to three major currency

.‘

blocs, the dollar, the sterling, and the continental currency.
If this condition Should be realized the negotiation of

trade treaties will become easier and channels of trade

will be freer. 'he temporary dislocations, created by the
establishment of a common currency, may well be more than
.offset by the advantafes of a larger trading area and a

better integrated and n:n-competing economy.

A further problem of major importance in the considera-
tion of Western European economic integration is the
disoosition of the colonial empires of the nations concerned.
Generally speaking, colonial empires have oroved to be
costly enterprises, excepting for the strategic advantages
derived from them in time of war. at the rationilistic
pride of empire may well make nations reluctant to part
with their long established, if economically unsound, bits
of empire. If western European unity reaches the stage of

development conceived by those who dream of such unity the

 

U7
U]

l. Ibid.

v:
\N
O

\

continuation of nation empires will reoresont a mire

anachronisn. The ideal settlement of the colonial problem

..k

\

-— assuming.that colonialism is a continuing problem —— i‘
to make such colonies the common orcoerty of the entire

Western Eurooean Federation. In such an event, the colonial
empire, with a common currency base, would stand in relation

to the Federation much as the sterlin° bloc nations Stand

to Britain today, at lea

U)

t insofar as economic nolicy is
concerned. A common aonroach to the political and econonic
backwardness of colonial areas would also tend to develop
greater productivity through the establishment of integrated
enterprises in the manner of the mother country, the develon—
ment of common production facilities for adjoining areas
(e.g. electricity and irrigation production), and a higher
standard of living through increased trade outlets,wnich

in turn increase productivity.

Although a colonial settlenent of this type is essentially
a oolitical settlement insofar as the disoosition of the
individual colonies is concerned, its consideration is both
a prerequisite to any clan of conoletc economic integration
and a necessary result of the consummation of such a plan

1‘

cl unity. The former is true since anv plan which envisages

a single currency for a whole federation would find it
economically imoossible to maintain separate national

currencies for individual colonial possessions. It is at

the same time a result of the idea of Jestern Eurooean unity

since such a plan of colonial unification would necessarily
presuopose a common understanding among the colonial powers
of Western Europe. From an economic standpoint it is
essential that colonial unity, as well as Jestern Eurooean
unity, be achieved. This is true because such areas can
not only produce agricultural foodstuff and raw materials
which will greatly assist Western Eurooe in becoming more
indeoendent of the dollar area but it may also decrease
unrest in these downtrodden areas by raising the living
standards of the population and make them less of a target

for Communist infiltration and agitation.

This study cannot pretend to consider all the multitude
of problems that do now confront and will confront the
Western Eurooean nations in their attemots to bring about
a comolete integration of their various national economies
into a single, unified, non-competing system. It is sufficient
to point out some of the major difficulties faciny these
nations in order to indicate that the problem is extrenely
complex and involves many material sacrifices by the nations
concerned. Yet necessity should make for many a new invention.
The necessity of continued existence as self-sufficient and
Self-respecting individuals makes the develoonent of Western
European economic unity imperative. Most Students of world
affairs will agree with a distinguished British economist

wno concludes that "the creating by conscious and coordinated

planning of a huge common area comprising Western Eurooe

and its related overseas territories, based on much the
same social goals and faced with much the same problems,
must be attempted if the world political and economic

. "’5
equilibrium is to be restored. D

5-.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOFQiNT

To try to develop the political problems relative to
Jestern European federation as something separate from the
military and economic sohere is as artificial as are the
boundaries that divid Western Eurooe into sixteen separate
national states. But since this paper is intended as a
study of problems rather than of solutions it may be
possible to suggest'some problems which lie either wholly
or largely in the political sphere or which would have to

supplement economic or military agreements.

Political development of a unity program necessarily
suggests understandings among nations. These understandings
may be regarded as political relations expressed in the form
of treaties. To speak of purely political relations relative
to unification we mean such treaties as those which establish
a governing institution, legal but non-economic regulations
among the peoples, and machinery for the continued operation
of the government. Since such relations necessarily begin

with the existence of sixteen separate national states the

 

56. Thomas Balogh, "The Outlook for Britain," Egreirn
Affairs, 26:4 (July, 1948), og. 677

C1
J’ko o

‘.

first problem to be posed is tne de ree of political

integration which may be conceded by the separate states.

The initial problem is complicated by a variety of
circumstances, some tangible and others intangible. The
most persistent of the latter type is the proclem of national-
ism as embodied in the idea of state sovereignty. A general,
though not invariable, rule most applicable to modern nations
is that the idea of state sovereignty varies directly with
the power and influence of the nation in international
relations, i.e. the more powerful and self—sufficient a
nation is the more liable it is to defend the idea of state
sovereignty. Thus it is that the United States and Russia
are the two nations today which are most unwilling to modify
the United Nations Charter in the direction of elimination
of the veto power. Thus it is also that the nations which
have been in the weakest position are the first to consider
the efficacy of unity. France, with an exposed continental
position, has always been in the forefront of unity programs.
When strongly aggressive she has protected herself by an
alliance system and when militarily and economically
weakened (as at the present time) sne turns to a uniiication
idea favoiing‘surrender of state sovereignty. It is
interesting to note that throughout modern history, from

be Grand Dessein of Sully in the seventeenth century through

 

‘ I '1 i ‘- ' '1
the ideas of Abbe de St. Pierre, napoleon, Proudhon, Paul

’ 1 5 1
Valery, and Briand, Frencnmen have pushed tne plan for a

\r'
KL)
0

:7
continental union in some form or another."
The British, on the other hand, heretofore extremely

powerful and relatively isolated, have, prior to the
twentieth century, stayed aloof from alliances and have,

in general, been officially cool to programs of unification.
Lord Acton was one of the Britishers during the glorious
days of the Empire who observed:

The combination of different nations in one state is as
necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination
of men in society ... Where political and national boundaries
coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse
into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce
intercourse with their fellow—men. The difference between
the two unites mankind not only by the benefits it confers
on those who live together, but because it connects society
either by a political or a national bond, gives to every
people an interest in its neighbors, either because they

are under the same government or because they are of the
same race, and thus promotes the interests of humanity, of
civilization, and of religion.3

With the decline of both British power and isolation through
the devastations and technological developments of two

world wars it is not surprising to find statesmen of a
nation long accustomed to playing a leading role in world
affairs taking the lead in forging a union for Western
Europe. Winston Churchill, normally regarded as the
personification of British imperial conservativism but who

cannot be sold short as a statesman of keen foresight, has

taken the lead in the movement toward Western European

 

57. Cf. Rene Courtin, "French Views On European Union,"

V International Affairs, (Jan., l9 9), 0g. 8
55. John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Action (Lord Acton), Essays
gn Freedom and Tower, (Boston, 1948), pg. 186

 

4Q.

unification. In 1946 at Zurich this dougbty Bri ish wartime
leader declared: "We must build a kind of United States

of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of
toilers be able to regain the simole joys and hopes which

"59

make life worth living.

Although Mr. Churchill heads the United Europe movement,

wnich is a powerful unofficial force for European unity,

the first official impetus for unification came from the
British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, in an address to

the British House of Commons on 22 January 1948. On this
occasion, after surveying fully the Russian policy of
obstructionism since the conclusion of the war, hr. Bevin
made the declaration "I believe the time is ripe for a

"60

consolidation of Western Europe. This address was the

motivation for the Brussels Pact of 17 March 1948.

It is most significant that the plan for Western European
unity is being promoted by leaders of both major political
parties in Great Britain, similar to the so-called bipartisan
foreign policy in the United States. However, also as in
the United States, it is most probablg that such copperation
is prompted more by mutual fear of Soviet Russia than by

positive, constructive plans. This idea is reflected in

 

 

 

 

59. Text of Kr. Churchill's Zurich address, Andrew and
Frances Boyd, Jestern Union: A Study of the '::3d Toward
a . . so .- —,77r“ “7 ‘—
European bnlty, (wasnington, l;4a;, pg. llo

 

O‘\
C )

See note 39

1 7‘1, ,fi ' A ,_ 1“? ' a t. p ' 1—. 1 r3 ' Y‘ A
hr. sevin s remarl that ... all these develooments (of

Soviet encroachie nts) whico I have be n describing ooint
to the conclusions that the free nations of Jestern Eurooe
must now dra. closely tDCBtCGP."51 In this condition of
fear lies one of tne areatest deterrents to Jestern
Eurooean unity, assuming that such fear is universally
felt, since it leaves the initiative to SOViet Rossia. If,
for tactical reasons, Russia should chose to be one more
conciliatory towards the Western nations the old ante onisns
that have historically blirthted the relations between England
and France, France and Geroany, and England and Italy may
osily sorin; uo agair and redound to the benefit of “oviet
Russia. If, howcvor, t: e union is concei ved as a noeltive
force to reestablish the standard of living of the oooulation
and create for the peoole, as hr. Churchill ays, a condition
in Which "... honored: of nillions of toilers (will) be
able to regain

k, ti;-
"62

worth living, the cLances for the ultimate success of

the union are considerably increased.

The number one oroblen of political unity, therefore,
resolves its elf into a problem of the will and good faith
of the nations concerned. If British connercial hegemony,

.‘1

or prench security interests against Gennany, or Italian

 

61. Ibid.
62. See note 59

4i.

45’
(U

prestige become considerations of greater importance to

the nations concerned than the welfare of the oeoples of

the various nations as a whole, the unification movement
will only wax and wane as the Soviet Union may consider

it to be in her own best int-rest. Only in the military
sense should unification have a negative connotation, since
otherwise military unification would suggest an aggressive,
warlike oolicy. Positively conceived and created, fiestern
Eurooe, together with the colonial emoires and the Commonwealth
of Nations, could become a tremendous force for the develop—
ment of a worldwide imnrovenent in the standard of living

of all peoples in the manner envisaged in the controversial
Point Four of President Truman's inaugural address of 20
January 1949. Negatively conceived, a Western European
Union would be little more than a process of slugging the
dam until eventually the dam breaks down —- assuming that

the holding process could hang together that long.

Aside from the osychological comolications of a
unification program a large number of practical political
obstacles must be overcome before unity can become an actuality.
One of these problems is the present political stability
of the national States concerned in the unification movement.
Inasmuch as unification demands orogressive coooeration of
the oarticioating nations over a considerable period of
time it would not be difficult for a nation with an unstable

political structure to fruSLrate the accomolishments of the

planners. In this sense the European Recovery Fragram is
making a real contribution to Hestern European unity by
helping to bring oroduction in line with demand. The result
is a stabilizing of the financial structures of the govern-
ments and, thereby, increasing the satisfaction of the
population. This observation would logically lead to the
conclusion that economic stability is a prerequisite for
unification. This is not to infer that economic stability

is the sole factor making for unity, however, since considera—
tion must be given to such factors as the need for security,

cultural affinity, and numerous other factors.

In the realm of political instability France is probably
the most uncertain factor, although the past nine months
have seen a greater degree of political accord in France
than for many years passed. Part of this may be credited
to the leavening effects of the Eurooean Recovery'Program,

part to the bold measures taken by the present Queuille

3

Government to narrow the inflation gap, and part to the
extravagances of the Communists wnich have weakened the
pressure on the Center coalition by the parties of the
extreme Left and Right. The latter group has maintained
its strength prinarily as a last-ditch alternative to
increasing successes by the Communists. Consequently, a
weaaenlng of Communist strength may mean a decrease in the

strength of the RlEflt wing DeGaullist forces, although it

is a little early to test the actual validity of that observation.

44.

There are, nevertheless, continuing factors in France's
political structure wnich maKe for greater instability
than elsewnere in Western Europe. The multiplicity ox
political parties exists in France to a greater extent than
elsewnere in Hestern Eurone which makes the estaolishnent
of stable coalition governments difficult, since disagreement
on even minor issues by one of the coalition narties often
breaks up the government. Italy also has a large number
of parties in its ooliticaL system but the danger of
failure is not as great as in France since three or four
parties dominate the voting and a nredominant majority of
the oarties are as one on most of tne major issues. A
further weakness of France's political structure is the
lack of a strong executive to give firm direction to French
policy. This, of course, may be considered both as a
weakness and a strength since the multioarty governnent,
without a strong leader, has a tendency to be more directly
responsive to the will of the oeoole. But a policy of
unification with other nations demands a unity of nuroose
within a nation itself which can best be gained through the
strong leadershio of a single person. Otherwise the relations
of the nation would be more subject to the cross of ideas

of the various narties.

Another factor in France's political instability is
the tendency towards greater extremism in politics han

elsewhere in Western Eurone. The nresent situation of a

4,:-
\N

Center coalition holding the nrecarious balance between
the dictatorial orooensities of two extreme parties is
rather common to French oolitics and is a natural, though
not necessari, outgrowth of the multioarty system.
prrties of tne present Right and Left wing variety make

the continued existence of the Center coalition in some
measure dependent uoon the actions of the extremist groups.
This danger may be heightened when the extremist groups
coonerate to upset the Center balance and leave the field
open for themselves to fight for the sooils of governing.
If the Center coalition does not have a clear majority

over the two extremist groups combined, the demands upon
the coalition are twofold: (l) to develop measures which
will assure the support of the people and retain the

coalition's parliamentary majoritr; and (2) to keen the

U

coalition from breaking down through minor disputes over

policy measures.

There would be little question regarding he fate of
a Western Eurooean Union should the Left Wing gain control
of the Government in France since the French Communist

Party leaders have made known their allegiance to hoscow

and the Soviet Union clearly regards the Jestern unity
6}
movement as directed against them. It is a little more

 

53. Cf. "Steps Towards A United Europe," U.3. News-florid
ReUOPt, (13 Feb. 1945 , pg. 20, and.Alexander Galln,
“surges: Split Or United?" Foreign Affairs, 25:3 (April,
1947), pp. 408-20

 

 

 

4m
\J.

difficult to ascertain General De Gaulle's oositio; if he

were to gala control of the French Govern ent. A De Gaullist
spokesman quotes the General as sayiig ”Let us assume tne
leadersllo of those who wish to rec nstruct a free and

balanced Eur pe, utilizinr, under conditions that resoect

our inueieoleloc, any assistance that outside Towers, esoecially

r‘
l J
C

the United States, may be able to give us. On the s~*

W
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occasion the soohesnan otserves that

He conceive of a Euroiean federation as a regional organiza—

tlDIl within tne wo; ld-wiie Uni ed Eations fra;ework.
Obviously, a oart of the federal soV‘rei'nty of each
o

reiional gr u> SiOULd be given uo to trle world alt nority,
ctly as a oart of the national sovereignty of each
ind ivid al stat ou h' to be given no to the regional

federation ...
t3 attain a fer
close coooerat
Dta 1.49300" \

'1 . ' c . l ,

France s duty, as we Unde rstclnd it

3d Eurone and secondl*, to pro Mo e
U _

9 u
z..-... -.. 4L2. ‘ F a,‘ . 1 4.
lair/:11 one i. el‘.’ Eur.-. ‘ ...-c 8.1 l’u. p.16 Ul’ll Ct. - LC}.

4
One wno would accept these representations in goor faith
should at least attempt to sonare then with other extremely
nationalistic utterances of the leader of the RlF before

concluding that De Gaullis a would mean a continuance of

the «este rn Eurooean unification program.

A political oroblem clos 31 v allied to French novern—

.LJ \4

mental ins taeility is that of the relationshio of Neatern

Euroiean countries, esoecially 3r itain a d France, to JermanV.

This oroblem ori inated in the Industrial Revolution which

 

ll-q

o4. Jacques Soustelle, rrance Eur) e and Peace, Foreisn
Affairs, 26:3 (Aoril, 194a5, pg. 493

0\
U1

4?.

saw England get a head start over continental nations in
industrial production and commerce. It was accentuated

after 1870 by the unification of Germany and the establishment
of a single large market for British industrial oroducts.

Thus the value of Germany for Britain lies in its usefulness
as a customer of major cronortions. To France, however,

lying adjacent to an increasingly powerful and aggressive
German nation and not as deoendent unon industrial exoorts

to Germany as is Britain, the item of concern is that she

has been the victim of three aggressions by her near—neighbor

in the past seventy years. For France the crimary considera—

tion is therefore security rather than commercial interests.

The conflict of oolicy entailed by these’different
interests is obvious. After each war the British desire
to reestablish German industry in order to increase the
purchasing power of the Gernan oeoole that they may be able
to buy more from British manufacturers. After each war the
French desire to see German heavy industry sunnressed in
order that she can not rearm for another conflict of which

France would again be the first victim.

A further conflict is discernable, however. In bygone
days, when Great Britain held the balance of power, it was
her invariable rule that no single nation on the Continent
should become so powerful as to be able to dominate the

Continent. After the Nanoleonic conquests Britain showed

"51.
L).

a tendency to favor Prussia and German unification as a
counterbalance to a renascent French anbition. Following
the Franco-Prussian Var and the rise of a new continental
power, Britain slowly turned to the sunoort of France,

but the crushing of Ge many in the first Horld War again
made France dominant and Britain once again turned toward
Central Eurooe, creating an additional point of antagonism

between the two major Atlantic Powers.

The present decline in Britain's balance of power
position, added to her war—created economic isnotency,
has made the prosnects for an understanding between France
and Britain somewhat brifihter and is orobably manifested
in the lead being taken by British statesnen towards Jestern
Eurooean unity. The two nations have recently signed a
series of agreements, together with the United States,
concerned with the develonnent of the Ruhr. Furthermore,
the new occupation statute for Western Germany is not only
a recognition of a newly found community of interests
towards Germany but is also a substantial step toward the
unity of all of fiestern Eurone, since it removes obstacles
the nations.

in the way of better understandin among

x.)

(IQ

Although Gernany will most likely continue to be a bone
of contention anong the Western Powers for some time to
come, the agreements already reached transcend the differences

that existed in the entire period between the two wars.

The ultimate solution should be the integration of
Western Germany's economic and oolitical machinerv into
that of the Western Eurooean Union to the extent that it
loses its identity as a sovereign national entity. If this
can be accomolished British commercial interests and French
security concerns could no longer remain a factor and the
welfare of Nestern Germany would become a community concern

of the Jestern European Union. The oroblem of oolitical

integration w ll pernaos be more difficult to ach'eve than

t.)

that of economic integration in Western Gerwany's case
because the latter means prinarily the develooment of
mechanisms of trade which can be inoosed by the occupying
Powers, if they chose to do so. Political integration,

on the other hand, requires acceotance more in the way of
thought than of mere mechanisms and is generally more
difficult to innose uoon peoole from above. The acceotance
of oolitical unification will reouire the breaking down of
the extreme nationalistic mentality which is so cnaracter-
istic of Germany and most of Euro e. The role of Jestern
Germany in any Western Eurooean Union as well be determined
by the policies implemented by the occuoying lowers, and
especially by tne measure of understanding among tnem with

respect to the reestablishnent of the governnent. There

H
[0

F".
(D
:3
(D
"5
L3
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greement, however, that a western Eurooean Union
will not function effectively without Western Germany and

the Ruhr playing a role in it.

U1
(3

One of the major problems of Hestern European unity
is the degree of support given the program by Great Britain.
Although, as has already been pointed out, British Statesmen
are taking the lead in getting the unity program under way,
tnere are other factors which would indicate British
reluctance to follow their own lead. Mr. Bevin's soeech of

, 6o , _ - .l
22 January 194b, wnile reluctantly conceding the necessity
for Western European unity, gave the aooearance of not
expressing too much enthusiasm for it. On this occasion
he remarked:
It is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for a united
Western Europe and to construct neat looking plans on oaper.
While I do not wish to discoura:e the work done by voluntary
peliticaL o ganizations in advocating ambitious schemes
of Eurooean unity, I must say that it is a much Slower
and harder job to carry out a practical program which t”

aK
into account the realities which face us, and am afraid
that it will have to be done a steo at a time.'

A policy of slow deliberation surely has much for which to
commend itself but there are also dangers inherent in that
tyoe of policy. It lends itself more to Russian initiative
in pressure moves to affect the desires of Festern European
nations toward unification. It permits Western nations a
time interval sufficiently large enough to get back on their
"economic feet" and to lose their enthusiasm for the benefits

of economic integration. It permits a greater interval of

time in which changes in governients mi ht develoo which

 

. Times, 23 Jan. 1948

\ )1
i“:

could become hostile to the idea of cooperation. It might
engender a feeling of hostility towards the idea of
unification among people who feel impatience over its

tardy realization. Finally, the impetus for unification,
and facilities for so doing, are largely conti gent uoon
warshall flan funds which are scheduled to be r‘iscontinued
in 1952. By that time economic integration, at least,
Should be so developed as to considerably alleviate Western
European dependence upon.dollar sources. Moreover, continued
anorooriations of ER? funds are being authorized by the
United State's Congress with the understanding that the
Western European nations take steps towards unification.
Lack of enthusiasm for unification on the part of Western
European nations might seriously affect Congressional

disposition towards the aopropriation of further funds.

It is nevertheless true that unity cannot best be
achieved by unconsidered haste. The problems involved
are tremendous and poorly conceived solutions may do the
cause of union more harm than good. A consideration of the
foregoing factors, among others, should be mar
continuing develooment of unification plans in order that
the whole program does not end in conolete frustration. If
1r. Bevin's aooarent reluctance is grounded in skepticism
over the efficacy of the whole unification plan the damage

to the plan may be just as great as if too much haste were

applied.

Another

in Jestern Eurooea n unity clans is the

nations.

Commonwealth of

common council with pov ers sufficient to oro

political oroblem

Unique among all the

relative to Britain's cart

role of the Commonwealth

world' s nation- systCTs s, the
. H .
Nations has ... no constitution and no

duce a concerted,
"he
still less a connon foreign, economic, or defense policy ...
The actual strength and effectiveness of the Commonwealth
grouo lies in the sharinfi of common ideas and ide:ls such

as political fre
extension of the
different
and conflictin

rr

,_.‘
"J

*o‘

Y"
LL

edom d certain commercial interests. The

51

se connon interests to a Eurooean grouo of

ical bac k"rounds, individual tenoeraoents,

interests may well tax the loya ty and

mutual und erst aniin s wit‘in this grouo of nations. If

the Commonvealth nations should give evidence of oooosing
British oarticioation i fiestern Eurowe an unification it
may b assuned that iritish leaders will think tn_ce before
consenting to the disintegration of the Comnonwealth. It

would be relativ

J-

noti

ely sinole for the British to coordinate

 

a col tutionel structure with a Jestern Euroiean program

ut a u itv of ideas and ideals will have a more permanent

significance if it can be ach“eved, since the Willingness

to abide by political agree nts is every hit as si nif‘i cant

as the agree ler ts themselves. duo h a nity might also have

the oossible advantage of noiifyin; internal Commonwealth

cc. Nicholas marsar h, ”Postwar Strains On the British
Comnonme; tn,‘ Fore 31 A L'aiyzi, 27:l (Oct., 1946), ng. l20

 

difficulties of the nature of the Frencn- eihadli s 1:

3'1.” ,fl.' '1.“ “ I" _) “ 7‘ 3 ." "1 Y“ ' '1 - 1‘,“. ‘- 1/“ .Co a. 1“
vii laud uz’ll tLIC ..JuuCu ill tile union of Dodo“ nil’lCa.

Fortunately for federation plans there are indications
t? at t e Con on.e 'th nations look with favor uoon tne

‘ N r, :I ‘0 EV . (— ' f‘ I" 1“ I ‘v -‘ Y '1' "4 (‘ .4“ "‘ t“ H.” -" -'
intctratlon Ol JPltaln and the CDJTDAJcaLth into a western

J
-, z :- F , £ - 1,, a r, , < C ,
dif:CClfiWlCh.<31031P uni1¢r1vi n tle .w.socl1 LJI:>thliiatlons
1. (a I“ ~ \ y '3 '4- T J- 4- r + f ’- n A
by afii.in er oi nature to toe -orth atlantlc ot-o oe

to the orooosed federati n oIo ovi ded that it does not too severelv
affect their major exoort market in Eritain. lhe recent
installation of an extremely nationalistic governnent in

South Af°ica h

‘1

a sale the oosition of tn] t Godwin.ol.t1
nation uncertain at the ore Séllt ti:ne. However, the most
significant manifeotaoion of the attitude of Co1n2 on. ealth

nations to? lard Jestern Luro wean unity can1e out of the recent

meeting of Commonwealth Erite A nisters in Lond.on in October,
194h. In a stateielit of the conference, issued on 22 October

1948, the lrioe Hinisters said:
The Udi d hi do.n Governnc nt outlined the nature of its

r
n with othe Jeote rn Eurooean nations under the
t

.; 3
Brussel Trea y, as a regions l association within the terms
of the United lat ions Charter. There was gene oral a: tflree1ent
that this association of the United Ki ngdon with her European
defense neigfibors was in accorClance with the interests of

the United Nations

the other members of the Com ocwcsgth
and the orouotion of world peace.7

 

‘ .- n.-. . . _
69. Grant 3. “cClella n, critain a

Foreign Policy neoor , XXIV:ll
7Q. N.Y. T11es, 3 Out. 194h

. *qu»e n Uh ion,

 

It must be kept in mind, however, that Cosoonwealtn
unity of understa nlin.g han s only on the tenuous threads
of common interests whi1oh, in turn, are onl

y as tron” as

U)

the ability of the statesmen to reconcile the differences
of ooinion that may come up. Although the ties of such

el—

(1)

dist 1nt nations as Australia and Yew Z nd with Britain

£0

have always remained strong the complications wrought by
the econonic, cultural, and historical differences in the
Eurooean unification program may out consideralle strain

on the statesoen in the settl‘ment of differences. If

(F

majord ii iffe ere noes should arise which may not erove reconcilahle
it could res ilt eit1er in th e breaziown of the Commonwealth
system or a frustration of the Jest rn Euro1et n unity program.
The Commonwealth oroblem is not the least of the many

‘1 O

Holitical problems facing federation olanners today.

A third problem of British norticioation, largely
psycholoEical and not capable of ready diagnosis, is the
one of Britain's historic isolation from continental affairs.
This is largely a oroduct of Britain's geographic seoaration
from the Continent of Eurooe and her long heldo osi tion of
the balance of Dower, which meant intervention in continental
affairs only at certain oooortune hon.‘e nts in his ory. Both

of these positions were severely strained after th first

(I)

World War when the advent of air Dower began to break down
her geogranhic isolation and the balance of power began to

swing towards the United States. The inability of British

U1
U1

power to win a final victory over Nazi Germany in the
second World War without considerable assistance from
the United States was clear cut evidence that Great Britain

no longer held the balance of power role in Eurooean conflicts.

Nevertheless, the illusion still nersists that isolation—
ism, as a historic policy, is still valid in British
political relations and a diehard Conservative groun, with
the Beaverbrook press as its mouthoiece, is strongly onoosed
to British oarticioation in destern Pur-onean Union "clans.71
This position suggests that the readjustment to new ways
of thinking about the radical changes of power as a result
of the two Norld Wars has not been made in certain areas
of British thought any more than in some American isolation—
ist centers. Such isolationisn in Britain may further be
nourished.by the precarious nature of the Commonwealth
relations and the relative stability of British oolitical
institutions. It can be claimed, in the former instance, that
not only is Britain risking the continued stability of the
Commonwealth relations by association with a fiestern European
Union but is likewise subordinating a relatively stable
and self-sufficient Commonwealth bloc to doubtful exoeriments
in Eurone. There is no doubt that this argument has some

degree of validity but, like so many arguments of the non-

 

.w- I w . . ‘ . .
71. Barbara ward, 'Decice or Drift," The Atlantic, 11

(Feb., 1949), pg. 20

p-
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R)

 

U‘I
LJ\

realist school, also tends to overlook certain funda7ent al
facts. Security is the primary consideration in the modern
world where technological warfare has outrun man's social
incenuity. While 3ood relations with distant Commonwealth
countries can make a corsioeluble contribut on to Britain's
security requirements, her actual existence is ihmediately
and directly deoendent uoon co onolete unity bein3 established
anon; the Wastern Eurooean nations. Obviously, such a fact
need not necessarily exclude good Commonwealth relations
but, insofar as security may be considered as of orimary

importance, should orecede such relations.

Tl as British isolationists further maintain that unity
exoerinenters are sacrificing a stable and well—balanced
oolitical system wnich has had a long oeriod of historical
development for an uncertain and new oolltlcal uevelonment.
The ar3ument a3ain is valid to a de3ree but a3ain overlooks
British needs for security, continued economic stability,
and indeoendence from the dollar. In reality, any historical
ar3ument has validity only so lon3 as it can safely be

reconCiled to ever-chan3in3 conditions.

It snould be Observed, however, that While the validity
of the isolationists' arguments may be challenged, considera-
tion snould be 3iven to the world—wide effect of the inte3ra-
tion of Britain with continental countries. It is by no

means certain that world economy and political stability will

benefit by a hasty attempt to join Britain and the Common—
wealth nations with nests rn Eurooe. On the other hand,

the benefits of a strong currency syStem, widesoread natural
resources, and tr a5 tionally stable politic.a l- or3aniza tion 3
may be of inestinable benefit to the security and permanence
of the proposed union. It is not the intent of this study,
however, to prove the case either for or against inte3ration
but It;t ezr to indicate tins fact hat tingxnoblems‘do exist.
The politiCal implications of the present problem involve
orincipally the factor of continued Comfionw alth stabiLity
and the efficacy of inte3r atin3 totally unlike oolitical

systems into a sin3le unit.

One other major oolitical problem still confronts the
planners of an {estern Eurooea n Union. This is the problem

of a3reement on the form the central 3overnnent should take.

It may be noted that the terms "union" and "federation"
have been used interc hangoucly throu: 3hout this study. A
third term -- confederat on -- ni3ht also have bee: used.
This was not intended to comoound confusion but rather to
indicate that insofar as political olans are ctnc rned the
ideas are so nebulous at the present tine as to not envision
any one particular form of 3overnnent. Nevertheless, for
clarity's sake, these three possible forms of 3overnnental

structures should be defined.

f".
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A confederation is ' an association of Governlents, or
a lea us of soverei3" n state who, under the terms of its
constitution, are prepared to collaborate and act to3ether
_ , n72 . a 3
for certain ournoses. A fe uer ation is ... an interstate
parliamentary cov Whient, derivin3 its authority directly
from the votes of the federal electors, and safeguarding,
in the federal constitution, the oowers retained by the

"73 A

state members. union, differin3 from a nation, does

not require continuity of territory or unity of race, faith,
II

or i an3ua3e, but does demand ... first of all, confion

defense, iot merely an eneraeiicr alliance; then a common

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C.

law, not merely diolomatic arr enents; finally, in the

-,. i . 1174
present age, a common economy, within connon cus one lines.
It will be seen that the nited hations is an examole of
the confede tion idea, the United States is a tyoical
example of the Me eration, and the Commonwealth of Nations

probably best tyiifies the union idea, although certainly

not cotoletely so in the latter instance.

There are obvious strengths and weaknesses inherent
in each of these or3a nizational ideas insofar as Western

Eurooean unification is concerned. A confe oe ation would

no doubt be the easiest to formulate because the member

 

72. Lord Davies, A Federa t33 Eurooe, (London, 1940), 33. 15
3. Ibid., n3. lio—
74. Albert Guerard, Eurooe, Fr;
Calif., l945), n3. 44

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nations national sove'eignty could retain intact -- Q3”Mlnv,
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the nrobleu of n1tional sovereignty, and neti n1 sovereignty

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is a 1owerful tool in the nsnds of the economic natianalists
and the dieters historical iscl:1 ti. nists. ConfeieratiDn is

today essentially a doctrine of conserv: ivis SH, Wflich is not

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soc111 11” iieoiogich conflicts. Ddt Vien tnut un1nliltv

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tege” by tne retifition of cololete lfilelQual
eighty if the Russian oressure were elininxte
nts, c1nfeder1tlon is not 1 seritqs c1;.i;er1
13s concenned. The “resent 31;:estions revue
the ide; of uni;n or federation, with 1
nut in tne direct ion of a feder1tion. The
is : Tenl~41t“7 11‘1.tefi out.'ds ex "IjJHS etqznwle
ederation tut, li-e so wuny e‘ologies, it is
ly valid one. Feder1lisn in the U1“.Mt d otgtes
l develooi”nt, in “oaern Jiltern Tuicoe it
indesed. Federalisn in toe Up itea stetes
tiilly & Sifl;1€ ISHLUd e dnj CHItufe, in
21u111e it nnxst eiinéice “VJ; Leiqgn1¢es cur?
relisn in the United btstos "rem uo under a

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federalism hes alreaxv surcesteg

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cuttinj across the lines

'51:.)

of national sovereignty. If the foregoing orotlems of a

historical, sociological, oolitical, econonic, and psycholo-

/ 1- . -.‘u l" . ..., ..r a: r“ (”1 _ 5 _' '1‘“ ' A.
federalism nay oe acceotaole as an ansMci to western surofiean
1

unity. But what way es the oojections to that form of

unitv as orooosed?

In the first instance, federslism oresunes the necessity
of maintaining a deliC1te balance between the powers of
states and of the federal governsent.

It is in this sense that the historical deVeloonent of the
United States has oreserved federalism as a continuing
factor in our national enistonce, since this division of
power has long since been acceoted through customs and
usage to the extent that the threat of secession is not a

matter of concern in the United States today, excepting only

H.

n its political imolications (e.g. third oarty state's
rights revolts). The tenuousness of a Hestern European

federation, based

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s it may be largely uoon d fense against
Russian designs, and the dissimilarity of cultural and
econonic traits,makes the threat of secession a constant
possibility in federation plans. A union plan, on the other
hand, would so comoletely eliginate sovereign st1tus as to

make individual autonomous revolts the sole thrcu

cf

of

disruption. A federation olan could legally circusvent

the threat of secession by making soecific orovisions against
secession in its constitution, but in the final analysis
the only real guarantee of this nature is directly dependent

upon the soirit and good will of the particiiating states.

A primary manifestation of this soirit ant good will

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must be the delegation of suff enforceaent oower to

the federal governoent that it may be able, by military

force if necessary, to maintain its unity. Such an action
obviously inolies a considerable sacrifice of national
sovereignty on the part of the particioating nations but

the only alternative is to risk ultimate disunity. Federalism
in the United States means the military supremacy of the

nation over the state. Elsewise, the history of the United
States indicates that the continent would now be a congerie

of little, conoeting national states. Although it has been
preViously indicated that the larallels between United States
and western Eurooean federations may in some instances be
invalid, the validity of the lesson indicated here is fairly
obvious. Federalism must very necessarily inoly a considerable
military lioltation on state sovereignty. The problem the
arises is in the degree of willingness to limit this sovereignty

by the various oarticioating states.

An equally significant manifestation of good will by
particioating states towards a federal olan lies in their

willingness to make economic grants of power to the federal

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government. If, for exanole, the federal government does
not receive a sufficient oower of taxation any concession
of suoerior military power by the states would have no

significance since the federal government could not sunoort

.5

f the federal government does

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H.

the defense force. Furt.er,
not receive the authority to establish custons duties and
tariffs in trade with foreign nations the oarticiostin:
states may become simoly an uncoordinated grouo of conotting
units. The genesis of federalism must recognize that the
term iholies a cooperative as well as a cotoetitive effort ~—
coonerative with resoect to external relations of the
federation, essentially conoetitive insofar as internal

relations may be concerned (unless, of course, the federal

state is established uoon a completely socialized basis).

Nhile substantial concessions must of necessity be
made by the oarticinating states to the authority of the

‘ Q

federal government it may be seen, by again using the
United States as an exanole, that considerable authority
may also be reserved to the oarticioating states. In its
Western Eurooean aonlication it is esoecially inoortant
that cultural autonomy be oreserved without detracting
from the necessary authority of the federal government.
50, too, the states might be oarticularly concerned with
he develoohent of industries and agriculture (necessarily

coordinated with federal nlahs so as to insure naxiwum

productivity and dollar indeoendence), suoervision of

communications (also coordinated with federal olans for

maximum efficiency in transoortation), suoervision of education

1

and such other ent rises as do not directly manner the

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functions of the IeL ral state in its conduct of foreign

affairs and its own continued security.

The oroblem that arises in this connection, if federalism
is to be the answer, is th problem of delegating sLJfficient
authority to the federal governnent to assure its own
security and continued existence and, at the same time,
leaving sufficient :~thority with the narticioating states
in order that their continuing resoect an” “oodwill toward
a federal system may be maintained. This is undoubtedly
a tremendous nroblem in Statecraft and it must be multiolied
many tines over When consideration is give n to the iar: :e
grouo of conflicting interests nresently enjoyed by the
potential oarticipating nations. In this sense federation
is an infinitely more complex problem than either confederation
or union. Yet it enjoys the advantafie of being nore effective

and per. gnent than confederation, less utooian than union.

A second objection to the use of federalism as a nro"r'
is the difficulty in establishing a niax of electoral
renrese ntation. Much as the United States, in its early
days, struggled with the problem of reconciling the views

of conflicting interests in Congress so, too, must the Jestern

Ll)

European nations now meet the oroblem head-on. A olan base

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entirely uoon reores mt tion acc ording to ooioulation runs
the obvious risk of a federation dominated by Ei

‘

blocs and could hardly orove initially acceotable to the
smaller, less nooulated states. It is possible that.over
a period of time, when a feelinfl of "federationisn” rather
than state nationalisn becomes oredoninant, the oroblem
of representation will becohe less significant (as it is

‘I 1

n the United States today). Nevertheless, the oroblen

kJ.

remains a real one in Jestern Euro2e at the present time.
Bicaneralisn in the United 8L tes style is the obvious
alternative, but it would still allow of doninatinn by the
Bis Powers in a joint session of both houses of th legisla-
ture. However, this latter assumes a Big Power unaniiity
(which would be difficult to envision between France and
Jestern aeroanr) and further assumes tr at le will
largely be accomolished in joint sessions, which is not

necessarily true.

f straig ght bicanera 1 re: resentation nevertheless oroves

p.

unsatisfactory to the smaller states it has been suzge ste

that a systen of weighted voting, 5ivin5 nreference to the

‘

smaller states, be arranged for tne house Choc en accordin5

.‘

to copulation and that wider powers be given to the house

with straight state reoresentation to balance the influence

of the two rrouo interests. However this oroblem may be

u;

 

‘

75. Ricr Hard K. Coud enh ove—Kaler5i, Europe becks Unity,
(New ork, L 4b), p3. 32-33

 

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solved, if iiideed it is to be solved, it is obvious that

there must be some measure of concession on all sid s to the
unity of the whole. This will mean surnounti n{; the zealously-
orotected barriers of the idea of state soverei5nty, the
anachronisn of historic isolationist, and the willinflness

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to sacrifice a measure of political st-

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of greater unity. In order to be an effective organization

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the oarticioating states will h ve to abandon the "315 Power"
concept of nineteenth and twentieth century state relations.
The fact of the existence of this oroblem is in itself a

nod to

(I)
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suorene test of the abilities of the nations conc

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5et alOut with each other.

Subsidiary to the nroblen of reoresentation is that
of how such reoresentatives ray e cho st n. The choices

may include the direct election system to both houses (or

a single house, however the case may be decided) or, as

- - i ~~ -' .. m ~ - u ' . an ' . i, x a
some suggest, C" aooolntuent by the state 3 executive tidy
to the uoiei house and direct elections to the lows house.

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h r alternatives mi5ht include nomination by the state

legislative bodies or direct aooointtzeit to to th houses.

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This orobleu is not insi5nific nt because uoon it rests the

s, ° , .. . . .‘ a 4 4.. ro‘ ,. 4. ' 7.
lw state and little state relations

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delicate balance between

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within the feleral unit. A plan of an woint elmt would mite
a delegation of federal legislators directly resoonsitle

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total effectiveness of the organisation but it need not
neceszsaiily be fatal. In a coho Lets union plan the moasures
toward intSCTdUiOH orobably would be so corolete he the
psychological mood would be tenoere? by the urgency of the
situation, in which event cooocration would not aonear as

a fundamental problem.

‘

A couplete Jestern Eurooean Union does, in fact,

smack soiewhat of utooianish, albeit its total effecti veress

}_.10

would nrooably be sorenhat greater than federat on or
confederation because its degree of integra- tion would oe
considerably more complete. ,Since genuine union deans the
comolete knocMz n; down of barriers anon: the nations, the
demands of union uoon the nations as they exist today do
not anoear to correspond to the urgency of the situation.
Politically, union would not inoly renresentation by states
but representatives selected on a union-wide basis; not a
reservation of ooxer by state units but a sinrle autnorito- tive
government which could delegate authority to smaller units;

nd not conouuo+ interests a inst the interests of the
whole but in conformity with the whole state's interests.
Economically, it wouldm mean first of all a comm.)n currency
(not common convertability, which would he an ordinary
d ma.d for a fe deration-ty oe gove rn:nent) for the whole
union area. It would further require a conolete elinination

of tariff, customs, and exchansje re Wul tions within t e area,

a readjustment of industrial d evelootent to fit the cn-n.ed

( A A“

pattern of economic relatiorships, and a single fixed econonic

0)

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program wits tne remainder of the world s tradln; area

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union-tyoe government would be
the least sianificant. The aloption of a common law and
the free noveients of people throughout the union would
perhaps be the wost significant contributing factors to

cultural change. While a common language would contribute

l

0’

to unity it would not e an essential factor and would be
developed over a lone period of tine by increased inter-
mingling of the peooles. The problem of race would fall
into a similar category. Religion could be a factor for
disunity although not necessarily so since most of the

Western Eurooean nations today have conflicting religious

groups which do not affect their individual unity.

Union is essentially an emergency program in the sense
that, while utopian in conception, it is a necessity of
immediate defense because an innediate danger cannot countenance
a concept of separatism inherent in a federation plan. Yet
union remains practically an unrealizeable reality because
conditions which create an ewergency seldom also permit an
opportunity for long range planning necessarw to make a
genuine union possible. Conversely, a long range program
for complete union stubs its toe uoon a conflict with more
pressing immediate individial concerns and interests. Thus,

it will be seen that the obstacles in the way of a

union are essentially practical, those of a federation

are essentially political, wnile those confronting a con—

federation are nrinarily USyChological.

A final minor political problem is posed by a nroposed
federation of Western Eurooean nations in the relationship
of this government with the United Nations. If such
an organization does develop a central governing body
would the Federation as a whole receive a single vote in
the United Nations (as does the United States federation)
or a vote for each of its member states (as does the
Commonwealth of rations)? If the former alternative nrevailed
the voting balance between East and Rest would be tremendously
altered and a oossible third bloc (e.g. Latin America)
might well become the balance of newer in the United
Nations. If the latter alternative prevailed the present
situation would essent’ally continue in existence, but it
would point up the inconsistency in the United State's
position of holding a single vote in the United fictions at

the present time.

This is considered a minor problem, however, since
the final decision will orobatly not rest with the Western
Euronean olanners but rather with United Hations personnel.
filth the fiestern nations having the oreoonderant majority
of votes in the United Hations it would avoear that the

decision in the United Nations would favor a system of one

vote for each state in a orooosed federation, unless the

71.

\
Latin American grouo, in an effort to improve its own

nosition, would vote against a nrooosal of that nature.

The oolitica’ oroblems, like the economic oroblens,
are far too numerous and too changing to be fully treated
within this Study. Enough has been said to suggest that
all obstacles will not have been overcome with the settling
of the econonic problems and to indicate that, in many
instances, political and economic oroblems may be intertwined.
There remains to be studied a third set of nroblems upon
which the successful development of the first two indubitably
deoends. For, without the security of military defense,
the oolitical and economic plans would dissolve into
notningness, in consideration of conditions as they presently

exist.
IV. LILITARX DEVELOTLENT

Basically, the military oroblems of Nestern Eurooean
unity are the same as the economic and oolitical oroblems,
viz. cooperation among the nations concerned. But, whereas
the latter oroblems must be oositively conceived and
executed, tne military problem is a negative, defensive
prooosition which deoends largely upon the actions of a
potential enemy for its conceotion and execution. This

assumes, of course, that Western Eurooean Federation is

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not to be ‘ 1 iv id aggressive coalition -- which is a

fairly safe assumotion, at least in its nresent state of

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physical exhaustion.

The need for a military establishment of this tyoe
is predicated upon two assumptions. ‘he first assumotion
is that a Hestern Eurooean Federation or Union, for which
unified defense measures will be feasible, will come into
actual existence in the foreseeable future and, secondly,
that sufficient opposition will exist to warrant the
establishment of such an erranization. The first aesumption
obviously cannot be demonstrated at this time. To many
minds the second assumotion aooears to be quite self-evident
in the immediate oresent. If we accept the second assumption
it will be noted that the first is necessarily comolenentary
to it, viz. that unity cannot exist without defense nor can
defense exist without unity. The second assumption is
valid, however, only insofar as we individually presently
consider the Soviet Union a menace to Jestern peace and
security. The evidence since the war seems to indicate
that the Soviet Union, while not actually militarily
aggressive, has always been more than agreeably willing
to establish its suoremacy wherever a vacuun has existed.
It has further been fairly well established that Soviet
pressure diuinisnes whenever strong cpoosition is encountered.
If these facts from recent history be taken note of, the

need for a strong Jestern Eurooean defense becomes clearer.

It may be initially established, therefore, that if a

fies tern Euro3e an Federation is to exist there must also be

4
J

a fies tern ”rooean defense unit. The oroblen that iomediate-

[I
i

ly arises is in What manner and by wh:3n is suooort to be
given to such a unit? There is strong evidence to indicate
that the nations of Jes ern Eurone are not in an economic
position today, even collectively soeakinw to give .adeq uate
technological force to a modern mile”l defense organization.
The five Brussels Tact signers have ma de a neasure of
organizational orogress towards the formation of a defense
union but the arrangeoent suffers from the fm: that none

A‘s. AA.

of them have sufficient resources to give it military

strength. Furthermore, -t is a regional arranxenent,

limited in scone to the extent that it would be fairly easy
for a ootential enemy to outflank the unit, and it conflicts

1

on with the Iorth Atlantic Defense Treaty

f-»

in juris ict
recently sinned by the United States and Canada and ten
estern Euronean states. The first arrang e22ent is essentially
a defense of soecific treaty obligations (viz. the Brussels

Tact) whereas the second is more s3ecifically ao3licable to

Q;

a defense of the unity idea, wr ich erives originally from

to

...

h Pu‘oo a, “e er “rod an. n i o n 7 ’tou Ste e ,
the L 1 e r h cove y I wr 1 I ef ect, t‘e LnL*e” tot s
by initiating and encouraging the develoonent of the

broa oer Iorth Atlantic Alliance, is taking out insurance

on its money investment in Jestern Eurooean economic staoilitv.

The division between the two alliance systeus is obviously

not as clear-cut as that. In realitv the North Atlantic

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l" o run

 

tody cohoosej of the arty, naVQl 4&1 sir staffs of the five
ancrs ind i concerhefi Lith tce ”L e of C€f€d3€ of the
continental territories of the cartinioatihg ”overs. It
would not be too difficult to ezteii cois ‘iiflnlfig function
+- o+—-— .i... i,77 --
to all at ufiN3.n:rth Atthith stotes. Io co so, uz‘v:Ver,
would require some c"::e.r17_jee in the Brussels Tro "y. In the
irst olsce, article 4 of the Brussels Treaty coils for
JUUQJJtiC militviv action by ell Lf the trett'r ueabers
in case soy of the Tr osty oower are ettec:ed.“ The
controversial Article 5 of the Zfort h Atlantic Treaty, 01
the other hand, does not automatically oblijote the sigma—

tories tD'tlke military action 513 ... (each nation) will

assist the warty or oerties so attacked by tokihg fOPtlei
indiviiueLLy and in concert with tlte other parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of arsed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North

‘ fl
N7:

Atlantic area. T‘ne incohsi terxcy here is not too

formidable. Ih the eve nt of a conflict the Eruesels lowers

may automatically obligate themselves without affectinr

in any way th obl_<atiohs of the HQL‘BPUSFSlS Powers.

U44

It might oos.3 ibly effect the attituie of the hon-Erussels
rowers if five of the Eorth Atlantic Powers should become

simultaneously involved in a conflict. The iicoxsi ste oncy

 

77. 3.3. Tines, 24 Ker. 1949
7b. drew and Frances Boyd, Nostern Union, (Ja“hin
2
. -/7
('x

,. Kt of A lantic Defen;: Treat! K.I. Times, 19 her.

 

r—3’O :1» ‘
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could, in effect, increase the danger of entanglement of
the non-Brussels lowers to an extent where they mi;ht find
the dual ohlimj tion unloslre t1e. It is generally felt,
however, that an attack on any of the Iorth Atlantir;

.1 . ‘. L . ~ ‘ -‘ -» T? ‘-. r-q ’ -/“— h . . -\ 1 -.‘| .
toners, Whether :russels Ifilt mdnpcrs or not, would mean

general military nsrticiostion by all of the members in

(.0

site of the conditional nature of Article 5 of the TreatV.
J

A second intonslstonny between the Brussels and fiorth
Atlantic Treaties is the inclusion in the former of orotect ion
only against attacks on continental territo‘ies or the
United Kingdom, whereas the latter also includes attacks
against French Alge z'ia, the occuostion forces in Eurooe,

isls nd oossessions in a defined North Atlantic area, and

vessels or sir ft of the signatory powers Within the
t: I O
Korth Atlantic area. This is not an esoecislly serious

discreosncy, either, since one tlesty siaoly covole1e nts
the other and the more inclusive treaty is onerstive in

W

all instances covered by the previous trea M; The major
difficulty in this case is in an attack on a non—continental
territory. fiilitary assistance is not guaranteed in such

an instance, a condition which would make French Alreria

esoecially vulnerable to attacx -- assuming thct the North

Atlantic rowers interpret their obligs ions broadly.

 

so. Ibid., Art. 6

A third inconsistency gives the North Atlontic Power

sone consultative an , oossiblr, military latitude in the

1
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intervention in the affairs of other “1 story nations
if, "... in the ooinion of any of th em, the territorial

integrity, oolitical indeoend

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parties is threatened. The Brussels Treaty, however,

is not concerned with the ooliticll independence" of the
associated members. Thus, anv of th Brussels lowers
would find themselves in a dual uosition with resoect to
other Erussels Toners. A theoretical condition might be
conceived wherein a Brussels Tower, acting under Article 4

of the Lorth Atla Mi Treaty, intervenes in an inte nal

affair of anotier Forth Atlantic for»

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Recovery frogrsn sre snonli ”133 become a member tf the
Alliance, not only “eceuse the two nrojrans conoleient earn
other but also because the defense of or: no is vlt.l to
tne cef<?.nse of other Jestern 1ro wean nszions (notably
orwsy and sonne~“), all of Wnon reoresent a secori ty

investfient by the Uni :i JtJtes. In snort, Jestern Eurooeen
unity must in 373 cox Lete unity, els "ise oefsnee OT3JKiZatiDAo
defend only flisunit", economic nrogrens promote economic
nationalism and ooliticel planning provides only progressive
international anercny. The unity of all is fond sue nts l to
future Euroveen se nrity.

The seconJ oroole 1 which the Hortn Atlantic Defense
Alliance derives from association H:it1 tne irrssels Trclty
is the eroviL" of the United 8 ates Ani Canada into Jeltern
Euronesn defense olens. Both stra teswic 113 and oolitiC-lLJ
the implications of this development are tremendous.
liactically, of course, the a'es ern Eurooeen states have

almost n

conditi)
defe nse

States)

be bed i

differen

A
n

o alternative, since their straitened fi

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n ms”e

Dancial

s it virtually inoossitle e1 tner to oJrcb se
sunolies wliere to y are evsilable (viz. the Unitei

or to ioroduc e their own sunolies.

t must necessarily be done in league with
in consideration of the Jestern netions'
ces w tn the Soviet Union.

necessity becomes the mother of in eztion,

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eologicsl

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necessary hove hJs invented several strategic problems.
A basic coifld- tion arising out of this develm:'uent is the
very Mef nite crest ion of two onoosing military soheres in

the world, the Soviet Russian sshere and the United states

urooe's military future

[I1

sohere. The tying of Western
with Western fienisohere nations rules out the oossibility

of a "third force"

in tne foreseeable future and, if military
integration be corpse connlete even, nerhaos, in the unfore—

seeable future. Article 3 of the Lorth atlantic Defense

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objectives of this treat“, the oarties, seoa rately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self—helo
and mutual aid, will maintain and develoo their ili ividual

I 0 1 "82
and collective caoecity to reSist armed attsc&.

4.
UBS

L0

The absorption of Jestern Eurooe into the United St—
military sehere does not necessarily suggest that Jestern
Eurooean unity is innossible or impracticable. Rather,
it inplies a oroolem of coordinating tne Western Eurooean
defense with not only the defense establishment of the
United States but with tne whole of the Western He1isohere,
with which the United States is associated through the
TreJt ty of Rio de Janeiro. Obviously, it would be ext reziely

difficult to coordinate fiestern neuisiiere defer ise arrangements

 

es. Ibid., Art. 2

.1

with each individual ”estern Euroian nation. The ourcose
of Jestern Eurooean :nilitJr v unity thus becones doubly

U

significant from the standooint of total Jestern security.

This problem of general overall coordination noses
more nroblems than this study could oretend to suggest.
A major point of contention will arise over where defensive
operations, in the event of a war, will begin. The Jestern
Euronean nations, for quite sound reasons, are not enthusiastic
about undergoinfi another military occusation and would
therefore like the major defensive frontier on the Rhine
Elbe Rivers. The-United_5tates Cong‘ess, on the other
hand, is not mirticularly enthusiastic about reinforcing
the North Atlantic Treaty with an arms shionent program
because of the heavy exoense involved and the fear of
especially antagonizing Russia. This attitude, in turn,
gives oolitical ammunition to R' ghtist leJclers lL Le Genera 1
De Gaulle who decry an antagonistic oact w thout teeth in

1

SD
H'
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it and who us e it as on osi tion inateri

m

the present
French coalition Government. If defensive onerations under
the conditions of the Treaty mean, as some United States
military exoerts content, the initial withdrawal of Western
Eurooean defense forces from forward oositions to behind

the lyrenees, the Treaty is not only a shallow do cumen

for the Western European nations but it also fails in its
incentive to unification initiative, since nlanned military

unity has little significance to Jes ern Eurooean n:1tions

B3
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if the certain result is to be a .n occupation.

Tne United States, inevitaely a Dart of Western
Eurone (at least insofar as the military situation is
concerned), is further hesitant about oouring valuable
arms into a Western Eurooe which at nresent may easily be
taken over ty Russia. Plainly, the considerations in this
problem are sychological and political as well as military.
The problem, baSically one of United States active
participation or non-participation in Nestern European
defense, is one that can only be selved througn considered
understanding between the United btates and western European
military planners. The military men (notoriously indifferent
to considerations other than military) will have to consider
other factors in tnis instance since the entire unification

program of Western Eurooe hinces uoon their decisions.

KJ

These olans, once again, are rather directly deoendent
uoon tne degree of recalcitrance manifested by the Soviet
Union and its satellite nations. If any orogram of defense
is to be directly predicated only uoon defense a sinst
Russia its effectiveness will likely vary in direct orooortion

to Russia's considered choice as a denocratic menace.
O

Russia's military ooiicy, like its oolitical ooLicy, is
extremely flexible. It can easily be one taing one day

1

and somethin? coinleteli different the next day. Tle nolic
_, J

of the senarats lemocratic nations of the Jest, h WCVQP,

does not onerat e in quite the same manner. It d-e manis

consultation, discussion, and agree zent before its oolic ies

can be out into action. Thus, the o nal initiative

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in the hands of the “ISSidnS would only confuse uncoordinated
western olanners. Unity of command, with authority to make
tus of all of the

decisions affecting the milit ry st

ii"

:I')

Western states without ha vin to Wait uoon their anoroval,

is therefore of essence. Planting of this tyne must be

care fully sii‘e duV”€l to insure that it does not become an
ofiens ive organization and does not give the ooCaialce of

being an offensive grouo. The necessity of unity arises
only in the event of an initial enemy thrust Which demands
a strong counter-thrust by the whole attacked organization
in order to nrevent its being tlrown into confusion and
disorder. Only a coon’*n't:d, unified, central sovereign
military command could be deoended uion to meet a sarorise

nation of success.

Fl.

blow with at is as some antic

a purely military oroblem of coordination arises in
the allocation of tyoes of defensive forces. This pattern
is fairly well set at the oresent tiie. Obviously France,
of the major Powers, is in the best oosition to supply the
nucleus of the ground forces, with considerable Lelo from
Ite ly a1 id Benelux. ritain is certainly best able to
orovide naval forces and also possesses a powerful and

well-develooed air force. Coibined with the mighty United

St tes Iavy and Air Force the Jestern Alliance could present

a formidable non-gro ‘”

dition to the

problem of the allocation of suo

of the oresent ec onoznic

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H.)

must initially,

81’}

both advantages

advantageous in th e serlse that a

Lilia de: (Ta-rlblve

TC) "[1

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organization.

forces is the

oil .

of Jestern Eurooe sunnlies

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will tend to Standardize aroanents and thus make for greater
oroduct ive ei ficiency. The administration of the nrogran

by the United 3

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(just as the Hi

because of the soecial interest

grea ter incentive for un

ity

1c es the economic program)
of the United dtates in

Hes orn Eiro,eir Uriifiin ion. .Any Standardiaat ion.of eras
would of itself mane for a natural tendency toward 'nity.
But th= olin also has its cisadvantaies. It could create
the wode~rance of a fact tho the Ulited States was
deliberately arming fieste rn Lurooe in oreoaration for
offensive ooerations a“ainst Russia. ‘t Could stir anong
the more susoicious of Jestern burooean wixds the ilea tha
the United state" was arzinfi JSSLETH Earooeans as Can on
fo7der in.tfim3'hievitable conflict "difilitr*sis. It could
detract from the oroiuctive fforts of like iro“an Recovery
irogrzn slid slow down the orocess of hurooe ettin; beck

on its iloduct u feet. Finally, it could create continuin;
snortJjE" oi certain or 'uoer and cor"“.er go 18 in ils counti
and further deolete our own d.irlll"‘ 31o»lies if basic ran

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II’Mits, or” \') ce sdl;
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Virtddllj uc1cnu tne

larger than that entr
not cnly beclusa of n
the ooocsir; force bu
the United States cod
and lediterraneun are

efore neginr such an atteuot, (2) uedker
pulled to seredd his fozces over many
ject to a counter- J.tt:ck in a vulnerable
y the Jestern nrroir ederaticn
assurance of sich sunoort would, hvwevcr,
exnsnsiod of Unifarce tc an urea much
seed 3y the Seuss’ls Treatv Towers,
ecessity for inoreese; strenjth of
t also for the st: tegic necessity to
C‘ffi.i"z3.d.9 Of l‘I‘Qt“ it 1.11-8 nululltic
as.

The Brussels Treaty sliuld ce reco:nized for wont it
is -— a nucleus of GCOHOTiC, colitical, and defensive
OTlL‘H for an ultiiste conolete Jeste n nuiooeoi Fe ieration.
If it is 1-10W3Q to solidify into a lixi ed regions
arrangeient of sovur*i:n or s ui-sov~r~“;n states its total
defeosive effecti*ene ss would be ittle g eat e- this es five
Separate states. It is only when “t exnsnds into a major,
conoletcly unified ertity of the sixteen Jestcrn Euroceen
nations the it heco es a stnategically significant orr‘n
of military value. The nrotlen, then, insofar vs the three
foregoi: crenise s r wlitive to fefensive creqdizdtloic of
Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties e,e concerned, is
31,113 the develoo ent of a five-mower reelooel orgsnizstion
into d ixteen—Jo er, COO‘BTatlve lerger regional unit.

osvchologicsl orotlen of resrostent. The oresent nrohlen
nt witl in a s inrle state is.mrect: a feo=ration

!

Of Stgbcg souls nultiolv buqt Droolen. Fro ce 1D couog

U

Gernsn resurmence :nd the oossihle th eat of a Russian
advance. This sttitufle would he noticeetlv different if
France were cane L‘e of outting uo 1"n effect've nilitsrv
defense herself. By th sate token, if the United States
were to leave a {totvln Eurooesn Federation, nursed bv J.o.

economic aid, bereft of nilitsry aid with which to defend

cf

hersuelf, it is qui e libel

De co;isiie retle modification of thwught on the osrt of

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federation planners v, resoect to its relations with

other Eurojesn nations. The orool n that arises in «SS: ern

(D

Euronesn olsnniny, then, is the ty=e s1 degree of defense
that can be established in consideration of the defensive
materials available. If, for exsnole, the Jestern states
had no measure of defense whatsoever their GGTPBG of
accoioistion to whatever Communist menace that existed

might be so comolete as to pave tile way for their conokete

subordination to the Communist ideology. Or, on the other

DJ
m
w
( D

hand, their nsive measures might be so extensive as to

to the Soviet Union that the

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latter would feel connelled to reoly with war.

Tie osychological nroblen of the planners, which should
incLude tne United States and Canadian as well as Jestern
Eurooean olanners, is thus to create a defensive program

which is nrecisely toat. A piling uo of arms will possibly

defeat its own ouroose in a nsychological sense by unduly
alarming Russia, in an economic sense by oherburdening

the industrial facilities of the nations concerned with
non—productive manufactures, and in a oolitical sense by
creating disconten anon: the oeoole over lower living
standards through the oroduction of less consuoer goods.

On the other hand, conolete abstention from military
rearmanent would osychologically tenet Russia to aggression,
the Western nation's economically exoanoed consumer goods
industries would even more tetot Russia's croduction-starved
governnent, and political conditions would be created by
which rabble—rousing denagogues, decrying military un—

oreoaredness, could easily profit.

1

There Can be no certainty, to be sure, that tne planner

U;

“‘| "w

of a Western Euroeean Federation can ever reach the naooy
medium" between Fussian intransiseance and necessary Western
military defense requirements. In consideration of the
historical perspective the chances for success in this
endeavor are not too encouraging, since attewots at the

balaice of power have usually led to arnaoent‘ruces.

Lany cases in history mav also to cite; to prove that veak,

' D A “4 — 1- " . — 1“ I" A ‘ . . . ».. r‘ 'w-v'“ a ‘ .
unprotected nations have also been the VlCtllS of awchSSlono
W "1 Y ‘ ‘A "q H . ' “ ' -' - “n 1" ) . ' . . "y"\ '. ’7‘ . ‘ .‘ 7 t ‘x. r) V! "‘ 1"
basic ally, the .eteYWinin; lattor is continuing peace butheu

the East and West.lies orlmarily in their own attitudes
toward oeac , but military unorenaredn less or over‘c reoaredness
could easily be a contributing factor to the oresent unstable

{783.08 0

Another factor, not directly related to strategic
military considerations, is the oroblen of tne distritution
of connands. Practically, this is a minor conSideration

since the recent war has indicated a considerable measure

of comnetency on all sides. Organizational coxnand is

93

the biggest demand t the oreser t tine. Psychologically,
the oroblen is one of major proportions. The major lowers,
esoecially England and France, vie for the too position

as essential to their noise as major Powers. France, as
the principal source of ground forces, covets the ground
force co2 and While Britain, with the better opportunity

in the rece t cast to oroduce ground 1orce co~nanuers, also
eyes the poo ition. Uniforce is ore sently itltei cy :ritish
Field Larshal hontgonery, who is reoutedly a notorioiwsly

A

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difficult oerson to get along with. Alreaj

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indications of differences a one the Uniforce commanders

;n tencenc

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at ontainetl eau . The French fear a

2sithdrow fl”)NlC1 forreg frrwo the Contixwint and CClU”I;Dfl any

. A 2 n "‘ ‘3 l‘. 2 "‘ ' ‘h I; ‘ a ' '. 1“ r
fiht from ofi-snore LaStl’JLISo The ...rltlsh, in turn, are

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wary of the French haginot Line couolex, their blind
mistrust of Germany, and their oolit cal (and, consequently,

military) instabilitv

The fundamental nroblem here is obviously the old

recurring on of tiOUqllSWo It is to be feared that as

1

long as authority is in tne hand of a British or a Frencn

U)

or an Italian con1a nde r these differences are inevitable.
Just as oresent day military thinking is so often

1

by outnod d strategic conceots of east wars so, too, may

the idea of military contend be outmoded by necessarily new
conceotions of unity. The ooint is clearly another argument
favoring the absolute necessity for complete western Eurooean
unity in all fields of endeavor. Until the c mmander

becomes the leader of the trooto os of the Eastern Eurooean

Federation and the direct reoresentative of that Federation

Pi)

the idea 0 unity is basically only an idea. The task of
breaking down the barriers of nationalism has already been
discussed. The primary co; W816 rations in the whole defense
question are, first, wsetner econonic and political unitv
can exist without a fully unified command and, second,

whether a fully unified military co.71nand can exist without

comolete economic and oolitical unitv.

From a military st andooint hese, above all other
problems, must be considered before steos are taken to
:Lnolenent an371orogrsm111f fiesterllborooearl1r1ity. If

oolitical and econonic unity proceeds aoace without Military

Ml
J, O

unity to cosoleuent it the Soviet Union may assume the

re3\onsih l ty for all of their efforts.

1

unity is ore suneo to have

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corresoonding oolitical and econonic unity

‘3 1', V "
“.39 "l ”“733“ LiSLlE‘

01", if military

.1

well flour rider on the rocks of overnourished nationalism.

And again, thev ma? not. The rrotlen is 0

concern for Western Eurooean slanners.

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organizational, os"coological, and oolitical -- are not

only of such ma"nitude as to tax the inge
nost COlflg tent nlanrers but are also, more
elas, the orinary factor feternininv whetn

will eventually result. Since th broades

uity of the

‘ .~,- ,. «V+u+mr
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t goal of ant

Jestern Eurone ean Federision is the esteclishment of a stab e

coimunity in a neaceful world the “illt'rv

arauount inoortance. It is unnecessary t
terms of the other two major orotlems that
cons lcration since it is felt tnat it has
east :lishsd_tflnst tne taree f;xfiuxrs are int

‘7 J" ‘ ~. "~ '1 '1' ‘ "IJ' “ '1 . ‘ . ' ‘.“ . W -'
com; ece unity «use he nositec Ol the coao

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factor is on of
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onsultation and CQHOflDTiSB i
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f 52neral §gPLiCiflatlon in t
all the nations conc *r‘d se
sec thi llfli'ty' 11:o 1?a 1. Tlxs ,2

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the nlanni:

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icance.

Iu‘:1ort

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need to restore the oiosuctlve ecooouy

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an — . .' .-‘ -.Q 4- :A I .‘ ; ‘-‘, ,4 _ . 'fl .
T€;-;,fill’lllig_'; but} .11.).’. 31 cull

neoole wrest. But the

This is the oroblem of

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VE’ TS 7.18

The suurete test which must be met by

maizers is the proof, by
oolitical institutions,

to the continuing needs

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in eVery none, as n; JU be conCelvel Ly many AfloriCau

i

C):

ealists. Neither is it solely a religious rebirth,

the solution which is conceived by many heologians. It
may be that all of these are necessary but when the nfjor

protlen is discernei as the survival of freedom in the
modern world they become not ends, as originally conceives,

but simoly means to the ultimate end.

The oroblems of Western Eurooean unifiCation, as we

1

nave discovered, are many and diverse and comolex. Only

the ignorant would have the temer ty to oredict its success,

y—w

only *he faithless to foresoe its failure. Th final
consideration might well be one of cause and effect. If

free 1L titutions can prove the worth of their existence

U)

by oroducing statesmen of sufficient acumen to solve the

problems confrontin: manzind, they will in themselves have
justified their own existence. If, however, they fail in
his endeavor, the evidence will be sufficiently clear that

events have outlived the efficacy of freeiom.

v:
o:
P_
#2.

R.
G.
O.
I.
L.
B.
I.
3.

KIT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

 

BBC Soeech by Winston Churchill on 21 March 1943, New
York Times, 22 March 1943

Briand's_P1an for Union of European Nations, Jew York
Times, 15 May 1930

Secretary of State Marshall's Soeech at Harvard University
on 5 June 1947, Jew York Times, 6 June 1947

Text of the Brussels Pact of 17 March 1948, U.S. Kews-
World Reoort, 26 March 1948

 

Address by Foreign.hinister Ernest Bevin to the British
House of Commons on 22 January 1946, New York Tiges, 23
January 194d

Text of Empire Statement of 22 October 1946, New York
Times, 23 October 1948 ,

Text of the North Atlantic Defense Treaty, New York Times,
19 March 1949

Mr. Churchill's Zurich Soeech On A United States of
Eurooe, Andrew and Frances Boyd, Western Union:.§ Stud
of the Trend Toward Eurooean Unity (flashington, 1943),

pp. 109-112

 

Convention for European Economic Co-ooeration of 16 April
1948, Andrew and Frances Boyd, Western Union:.§ Stud

of the Trend Toward European Unity (Washington, 1949;,
no. i49-l53

 

W'f
9o.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary, Sources

 

The following references were especially valuable
in the development of the economic section of this study:

 

Thomas Balogh, "The Outlook for Britain," Foreign Affairs,
(April, 1948) .

Percy W. Bidwell and William Diebold, Jr., "New Aid for
Europe," Foreign Affairs, (October, 1947)

 

Eric C. Bellquist, "Political and Economic Conditions in
the Low Countries," Foreign Policy Resorts, (1 May 1945)

 

Thomas K. Finletter, "The European Recovery Programme In
Action," International Affairs, (January, 1949)

 

J. K. Galbraith, "Europe's Great Last Chance," Haroers,
(January, 1949) . .

Seymour Harris, The European Recovery Program, (Cambridge,
Mass., 1948)

 

Edouard Herriot, "France Looks Ahead, Foreign Affairs,

(April, 1948)

 

Harold H. Hutcheson, "Benelux: Unit In A Divided World,"
Foreign Policy Reports, (1 May 1948)

Helen Hill Miller, "Congress and European Reconstruction,"
Virginia Quarterly Review, (Winter, l949)

 

Andre Philip, "France and the Economic Recovery of Europe,"
Foreign Affairs, (January, 1948)

 

Fred W. Riggs, "France: The Fourth Republic On Trial,"
.Foreisn Policy Reports, (15 January 1949) -

 

David T. Roberts, "The Dutch-Belgian Economic Union,"
Foreign Affairs, (July, 1947)

Mario Rossi, "Italy Between Blocs," Nation, (12 March 1949)

Sir. Arthur Salter, "European Recovery: A Look Ahead,"
Foreign Affairs, (January, 1949) -

 

Carlo Sforza, "Italy, the Marshall Plan and the 'Third
Force'," Foreign Affairs, (April, 1948)

 

Fritz Sternberg, "Prophecy For Europe," Nation, (12 March
1949) ~ -

John H. Williams, "Europe After 1952," Foreign Affairs,
(April. 1949) -

John H. Williams, "The Task of Economic Recovery," Foreign
Affairs, (July, 1948) .

"Britain's Four Year Plan," U.S. News-World Report, (24
December 1948), pp. 24-26

"British Back On Their Feet?" U.s. News—World Report,
(11 March 1949), so. 20-21

"Pacts, Federations, Unions," Fortune, (May, 1948), pg. 3
"Plan For the Ruhr," Nation, (8 January 1949)

"Ruhr Control Draft Agreement," Current History, (February,
1949), pp. 103-109 .

"The Ruhr Reborn," (editorial from the London Tribune),

reprinted in Nation, (1 January 1949)

The following references were especially valuable
in the development of the political section of this study:

John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Action (Lord Acton), Essays
9n Freedom and Power, (Boston, 1948)

Oswaldo Aranha, "Regional System and the Future of the
U.N.," Foreign Affairs, (April, 1948)

 

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Coalition for Peace, Foreign

Affairs, (October, 1948)

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Regional Pacts: Strong Points
Or Storm Cellars?" Foreign Affairs, (April, 1949)

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, The Calculated Risk, (New York, 1947)

Eric C. Bellquist, "Political and Economic Conditions in
the Low Countries," Foreign Policy Reports, (1 May 1948)

Alfred M. Bingham, The United States of Europe, (New York,
1940

 

Sir. Harold Butler, "A New World Takes Shape," Foreign
Affairs, (July, 1948)

 

 

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In adflition t) the above indicated refer: n

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invaluable info: ma ian for the orenaration of this study
was gained fram t3e daily and Sunday wages of the flew
York Times and tn. wee: :13 editions of the Fareign Ealic;

 

 

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