7 .16 90 90 95.769 .. . o. .0. u
”6'” #:JWflN. wharf-...! f9“... .9M59699.79 . 9. . 90 a 6. ”9‘...” 0i...- . ..vaL1... ...Ounnm. ..P... .- 61. 6 LNF... 99... .. .0.>. .5.. .9. ... . .. ...
4!...“ 1.7.25... . .- .-. 60... . .3975! ...L. ... 3!... 7:7 21¢...- ..5. ...5. L.. . .. ....L, .. “$2.." .. ..LL 1...... :02... 5.1. 5 .
.,..... ,..... -. Run-...7..- .,... .,..... ......fi... 3.... .... . ...-..r... .. .. ... ...... . . ....m... .. . ......va . ...-...... .. ...... .
.. 90. 00. 9. .0: 9 . I !. .1.. . .6 v -. . .I L . ’70. ...... ....1 9.. .. (66\.9. .... , ...lb.00.. >1.- gt"
”9 9..9..!9. ..6. . '6 .0.. . . . . . , L .
””369 H 9 L 9. ...0..m..5. 9. . 5.5.“."0uuw. ”52.1.5.0... L... 7...9.6...0.9....... . . . . . . . . ......r‘ou“...,... 58w.96..W.0.6n..J..%.5-:.flu9.10669‘. 5605“}: .wN-hWJLflSMNLAMmfiMW
. ... u . . 9 I 9 ‘ o 5 c.- . . _
c a... ..5-.,. .L.. . . ...-.L..» . .L.-“..5... .. . ...-.... ... .. . . . _ . _ _ . . , .,.....a... ...... .... ...-n... . ...... mm.”- .,.w
n... . .... . .L. ... t..- . -.. 2.....-... . - .,... _ . . 2...... ......n, ...- .. a. .
, L 9.3“» 0.0.29.0...07 019 .....I ”3...... 90. ...0. L... . It... . .. . 1:... .. .75.. _. . .. , .. . .1 9...... - 7&6 (.970 L.
50.39.“... t . .567... .66.. . . .6-. 6.. 7.... 7 .1.. .1.... . .31.. .. . : :57: _ ......2f . .. ..wl - L 1.. I. .
.965 09......5 5 507. ‘9. 99.9.9. - .L snlL‘.5195fiL0“0..19 99.9....” 9675 56“.”... . .. .71... ...)“.u» ..9QWHWM5 ..‘59’ .
.. o . .. 9 . .... . .. . . , 5309.... 9 . . . 9..

’ 6
.39“... 909»: ..5. . .1 u. 99 .30...) (-

 

  

 

   

   

   

       
       

 

2.3"»... .33....” ...-2...... ......_.........5.... 2......
. . ..- .
o. 0927 .1 0W. {I65-..0.6Q.‘ J. ...9‘90: . us..\ ‘66-... ‘36... .6... ‘9 L .9... .9:
u P 5.9.59.0?! . 57595.7 ...-.2 009. . a .22.. 1....5 0... ... . ...1.» .90 3.1.9 70.. .....0
.0. .. ......057... .96. 9.5957 .- 5 ..5. -95 ...7: ....... .9 00M... . .5.. L .... .9. 5.00. -.0.... ......r...’ . 9.19 - .. . .. ......6...‘
«09.7.. 0.. f 9"- 6‘95. :29”.- !5.. 5.79. “9:1“.- .9:C. xp.7.9.«..0.!5.. h.- ..r.... ....w ......c- .. ..6... .6 69.. .U.. . .9510. .
3 1999.... . .6 .. 9‘ ..7’.« v} .. .. L. 99650.9. . .93.... 9 900 09.971. d”.%.. ..9. . ...-.1 .. 4. r .3 .9 1 .0.:‘76 6 . 5.. :7. .69. . .. ... 06. 9. ....
501199.76: I5. ... .. .BZv... 99.2.2.0 u -. .fi’: 0 ...0.5.. ..7-I. ...-09. .7: 5... I...5u..l9,.,,..s .. 55.7
9 90.9.. .9. _-.9. 79.1 .. ... 0.1.9. 0. 005.... 55L00 “.5.. 260:... :35 05 . .65... . “La! . L. .. . 9.0 .1099. - v.65 . ... ...I 9...; ...5.
5' . 099.... ’3... .. ’00 .5‘9 ..0019‘.9. L. .70.? . .919... 01,].09 r. 59 77,9....05. 0 0.9 “.09.. 0.6... ..9, 7.9”59': . . . 5.011....7'9. .5.. 39. .L.... .0 0...! 1“...” .... .99.... 6"Y‘.- ..7 .
01.0.9843 0. ,0...“ . 5 ....9..9_.73-1'.5! 509.9... 960...... . . ...7-5 3.659.78 a. .lo . . . .L... ...63 .. 99 6-,;
. «:55. .16 ....0 1-75. .. 5 - 9.591.276!!! , . . 6.61.9175 15LWJWJGM$

      

   

       

   

"9‘“: . 9. .9 6 09 0 0.
.L....Laé ”gum-.... ”yaw... .... .-............ is... ...-.L.“...

.05‘n ..v. 1655.96. 9.96 6.6 59... .....0 . , . . . ..
.9 4909.900! .. o. 5. . .LU69Q9 :. w‘...- 90.. 9 l..\.59\"0.".9§500!97059..

       

..."9. 5 9.“ . .
7 . . 5 .53 0.9 9.. 6. L. 3.5 ‘0. 70
.L :6 .. H Ina-C.- (”0 :56 L ...7 ‘0 09(52»...‘...5.05..u 3.»! ‘19 0
. . . 9...” u;- ‘I . 92.9.3.9... 00 -. -_ .9... 9.0 . .6..5..9. ...0 9 1.79... ..-
0 . , . . .

.. 1.. - 0 ..9 ‘6... O .- .090 ...9.’ . ..59. .....I 956 .
#0....» 27...... . .5.-“5... . 9:... .6 50:065.") ...Ufizdlty... ......

 

   

     

   

  
        

45.59157: .,
Era-”9w“ “.9365 96. .... 1 a .99.. ..0-5 . .. 0L. 9... ...-1.9.9? ..5... .. 0.. 50...: 79.65 . . o . . 5.63.5.5}. . .
“M? .... 9.70:.“ Juvugg'. ch . ‘. .J6 EH04... .0. .0. .0590- .. .6! . 9.... L! .9 . .000 ..50 .. 0 C.- .0-0. 09$.v
6:99.326. . ..F% E. .,‘ ‘7” ”4.39.4. 9.0.9.0611 ..9-5. . 4L ... ...-9. .1301- .. .9 0. .L.... ......0 .37 5 .0. ,. .61 .76... .. A.“ .L‘P .0736 ...... . ’6
‘7. 65' T9... 9 7 ..‘5...0.99.9,O.. . 9....95090.0r.0.9. 900‘5-9 ‘ .09 .9. . . .-. ......v’. ...-9 . . . . ...97.9v~00.5 .. 0.0.21.5...0... .- 69 9 .... ‘9... 99.9.. .3 'MI0A‘5W.’
“6. 57.7 9 9. 5. u .9 . 90990 ... ...va9nu5. "w“WNWUNL. 6 . . . .69.:- I 599.? ,r 99.. . 07!90.’.v!5..l..... L... I o‘ . 9.05. 90199.0!- 57 ,9.) .9 ..9‘9
9 I . 6 6 I L 6
...v...’ ...:516 .r. . ..5... .. 10.7... . 1...: .6... 59.5.07..- ...
509... .0. 1,.

        

 
           

96 .
. “9.99.9.0. 39.3”». .3379qu .
..§EmliL-JL.9..959n.M7 ’90..0t 0h!- ....-6 .. . . . . . . .
w ...7.
9.9%“ 3-:§ 6&9. 6. 0.37.. .. . . . ’90, x69 ... . .. ,. . . ... . .. .
. .‘ mun-Wu?» -77 .(..9\ . . . . . . .. . 7 . . . . . . . . . ....ro. 68.9.27. .Lr 5..

 

      

   
  

7.0.99... 000...!09 ...
(J99. vouuéo . ”.7059“ +00 9
. . 3 .~ 06 .6715 9....0 0. L 57
- d."1fi!§.’W9.-.7006~ I. .‘7969 "Murry-5a .9 .06 . ..5. ... .. .. .0 ...5’ .51.. . “19-..H15Lhwr6.lm‘2tfl.lu\“lfi~ 9......
{fit-.... .7. o .50. 3.- 5)... ....90: 5 . .- z . o. ....0 film... . .... x56: .1.. .. ...-.79.! 1... o .-
._ 7.0.0.- .:5’.9.J1‘..P‘, ....r5..9!.!.7-.19..9.90 95.‘ .0.-90.0
. .....5.... .29. ......”EIJ 0.119....79n5. .

  

Lfmr . L .
.7- 0?: .2?)!-..~!g~;..:u9 ”36.55-50.71? .. .5 .... ..

...... 9.2....

L ”#6; 9.... ..5-99.0 Ilwunhvlmd ”..nmkxqfluuudi . .69)66...9 9.05. .

  

... 709.5...) "0609"? W
. . a 1 L6. 90" .h .9. 099.96 97. .fluw' L. 9. L 7 0”.4 hnr’tn! ..,Ilwfidfluo..0n.597 56
. . 9 a . . 9 .
. Woe-... .... .... LW............. . a... ...-.,..“...m: . 3 .99...- an... 2......- ..
. . .6900009r9u. ., . . . . .
.. ... ...... 7 9. 6.5... . .- . 05. o ......0

   

- '- 7 9 0.6. 6.“ 9.996.609 71.9.1 -.6656.
0“”.9} 9 ,9‘.L09.9.06 l....05.’0.6HW«1-.«9L. .. i6. ...-.-
1 69. ....995..-.56..- .. 10‘ .70799-5.0 .9 ... . ...0 0. ...

.5.“.
1 . Lanna... .LJA...3....-... ......vg-m. haw-m... «ham-......u...
.6... ... - “1h...“ ...7-.25“. 60.6.r6 ...-...... :1 ...u.

 

.. .7. .L. 9%.

 

 

 

                

 

 

        

                                
                

   
 
  

     

 

                          
    
    

 
  
 
 

                                
       

 
   

 

   

  
 

 

                     

                

 

              
 

  

   

     

 

   

                 
   

            
      

 

 

        

               

 

 

    

 

              

                      
                                        

 

 

 

 

   

        

  
 

 

 

           
    

     

 

               

      

I
..5, ...“.an .9. 5 01566066. ..0 .5.. J .0.. 39.6%.. u. ..v. 6 .0
016 .96.. 070:5..“yLl0-L752nfil‘5-R ......r 0.. - 09909.. .. , 3.9.9.3660?! .- .!0
.f (7.119 7.6 ,. .56? 03.09 .99 .... .r 37’... .....0‘. L 7......591... 7L3. 271951799205 .f.
.. 9.- .6! .. 005.077 “h. .u...- «.9000 .5..8.5.. ..0. 0 9.055....V999..c6:!.1 I. ... .- . 9697.04.29.00
.05.", ...-.06 5. . ‘0.5.0 .. . . 6.9. 6.... .1.-$9 0. 0757"! 9.7.. .O .. . .9. .0919.- . .0.... 69.....‘70. - .... . 970 L. ‘0 . 2Y5...
5J1... .0.-9.90 . 0 “A 0&5, L 5J.r\... .. 9919.00. «...-9.. 5‘. j”... .9. 11.4. .59..“ .6J7.....3 .. . ... . . .0 .0.. 0 -. . .5 {fir .05 . 5. 727.. 5.5. .L.}...5..5 .9-0. .32372613656 6.619 0. -75
..7... .. ..05... 1 . 175-. .LM... ..u. 1 5: . .26.“. .26 ....96...5. 9.0 .170 . 67 . -7 .5. 7V0. . . .
.. 3.1-.- 0.. L9 956:». ..X a . 9... ‘27. 0...» in .wL. .. 0, ....9 1.396.216.0f57... fl . - . ..,
nor-10.9309055315u 916 9.199911... L ..9 .,.99 0.59. “Mung.- 5.377.”; ‘ML 0.... ... #:6775931. I..7.. ‘HamWHHJc m9.- 7. 6s“, .. ... .,‘097. ..
.. -‘579..l 0.6 :91“. .576... 516 09 ....5.5L... 1 L . 30-5.. ...“.9 .9".- .5.. 5. 5.9.15.6 5.9.0... .5.. .9. ..69 .669.- ..9.789 7....(9 L. . .0
L. :06. ...”... L- .n.-.. ...-608.76 ....9 .60.!”- 30-0 .....ntnfll 77.34.50”... . ...
_. 0..) :.L_.005lo.. .6“. .... ”..,-0.0.6 9.9.9.45... 96,»; ...9...9.L.1...$5. 51.6...003. .0.! . 5e
,. 5'. ..6. 60 43.371.057. ..9. L 0.... . 00: . 0.. 0.136979... .69? .6 . -.....9..0l. 0 0. 09 .3156)... ..9.99!
~.0....6 .7567? ou 9 .6 ... .. P32129059." 9 o. (-0.55. fih?414”0.7.. . .- 1!... .. . 7.
.. v . 5.6 1ch 1 .8.0..50. u £96.. ....‘fi..nf ... ‘4... 75!! I 9.. . . , . . . .
f . {...-.1. . .5... 5.0-. . .90. 2...: ..7-0...... , ...: ..5. .L.. ..7 u... 0 . 5..:. no: .... . .9.- . ......m .037. ... 5...... 10.11:: -..... . . ..0 ...0... . _ , ,
.\. .75... 9.07.5.n.,.6....§1P05 .. TO 5...“...J77r: 0.95... .. ... 0...... (“.0.-3.51.». L. 9.. 009 . 1!... - . . «5.06 5,. 7-, ... .. ...- .LO... . . .... 1- ....9. . . 5.7.5 0 z .....1. . . .. .... .. .. .. . 5. .0... .. _ 75.0 .0.-...... 7.... I 65965....0?‘
”16906.6 ..7-7.09.50 ..9 ...-9. .0". of: ... 193.759. “...-I . U..- .. $71.99.! 59. .0.. ... ’3‘... .‘55 5“ .00... 9.99! 6.6 09.70.. .39 .00... 79.9 . 10¢ . Lgt'y .. 5‘7 .6 9. :91990. 20.99 2.9.716. 6.0.. 9. 6.9197 1.21996655673 117.15
.5.-... ... 5... 9. ..510 ... ..9... . .3. in». . ..5“. ...7. 3.3!». .nfiO. 6. 6.55... .736?!.r. 6... .., .... .. -... . 0.76.00 .67 . .. .. . ... . .. ... ... . .... . .. r0 .....9 .29.. .1.... ... 9.. .. .. . ....l ...!t. uh: .- 1.50.16.36.77! 659.
i. ...-090 554......- . .5. . 9.1 13-5... .... .667 .79....0555 .69. 99. ....L...o.. 967$ .08. ...-:3 ...58! 5.2.00 :01 -6..5090. .. ..un. (If! t 1... 9 I. 5.0.7-L . . .. . . . .l. 6.3:. 7691.22.97.31, . .... Cr .75 .. v. 0 2700.0...550..6.. .0....196..09 ..5 03,0. 31.9.1 .. ..5-17...... ...-3677$..! 5...... 3.5.9.5967...
.....‘2. . . .6..0.lwf.17- .6. L1.!.9..5. ...-7.. 5.41%.. h.- .. L 6. ton-.0. ...-1.. 7.... - 6.0..“ . . .. . .6125 0.9.1.6.... .7. .... .. .. . .. . .... . 9.19. .... ..0. .. 0.1.0.... .0 .. .. . ..... . ... .... .. . 5.. (...-1.)... 2 . ...... 139.01!.b..9. ..5-......- .0
r7 ..éuuqfi. .36.. .10.... ”...-...... 11.0... 8.“. ...... .. a 5.5.5.... ... 5:52.970. 10...... ..5 50'. 9‘ ....7- . . ...-.0.. ...07 ..9m0 19... ... .1....0 . . 9.. $.36. 0. ........ 3H... .10. .. .. .. 0.. ... ......9... 2.... H. --.5.55.5 ..7 0n. .. .L.... ..7. .5... ...-1.0.75.5? 7 .. 73.969.569.99...
- . 0...: . ...... .5 )..Jm-u0\..P—0 ..99, .....1 I... L0 50 .. L 0 9.9 .....0 ..7... .7 165.62.061- .03 .5 I“... . .. . . ,. , . . . . .5.... . 51:78:73.». . .69.. . 9...... ...... ...... . ...-1...... ... ...! 22.0.. 7.11.5665...
.9105'76.‘ ..‘6 {w .p . .. ..017’9-0...... . 906 .L.. -.. ‘. 90.....6. 57.5 197.79 .06r.l ...- . . . . 0 2. 300-759... 0.9.0.. . . 9...... r95. 65... ..l). 9.... .. 9..9|.0L.. .1.-.... .... 9 5 .910.0~H9.J0. ..9: . -...005....'...t....fln 5.69.6V60 .
0L 7359.90.07; .dV-1 ‘Lv-I‘.\W7 rm L . ”17.09.39. ...J 10640599.... .,. A ..0 9 '69. ”3.9.7., . ‘1 n .I .5 . .,.-9. 9‘2 r: 1.39 L 6.5.. 99. 06.. ....- 90...? . . . 9. 60.7.9... (.05. . 10.. 16.5. . ..6’. 957.69.50n99 ... 6- .....956 . 7.0.5019...5.7....1,.9.).5i0‘9.9 - 05.1.9. . ... $59.6 .¢.. .09. .60‘:
.v5L.u.....u .0.-..071138 6... .... 22.5.9717...»- L h...- V..0 .1.... ...-.1. . 2.9.0.7976. -..U... ~51}...:...... ...5 077 . . ..x......0.-!.1.0‘. ..0...I.... .5.... 5.99.2...055... _. _. 9.6 _ 7...... 2-»... 1-..........-...5 -..9...0-.!._ 2.“ £10.
1 . 596 .5.“. 2.5.2921 ’- ...7 6. ...9‘9 0.. .LA... 9636...“...901... J6 9:55... 0 . 7477-.- ..s 29.. .5. 0...- ... 7. e. .. .... . 99.....69: . . L. .. ... 0.. . 9.70.0: .1.? .0209. . . . .. .012... . .6. ... 209.213.90.595}? 6-. ...-{.515 9.39.70...-
5. 9.. Q9. 96.0 0... “(1 .0 96! 51.04. .95 61.99.. 099 9K. .309 55.....3665.‘ .5.. . 57.. oat-4.09771 59 O9- ...-0.29.7.590L0555 79.0. I. 40:- . . 0.9.59.0 6-‘609..5 . .0.. 5.. ..9: . -. 9. p 70 .. 5...-3.9.6.9 . 9. )0. . .7. 6).... 9.0.5 09": 00. 9. vii). 5|
600.16.}0 ‘7 0069. .. 9.. .00. 3&6 0.. .gvb: L0. .9 L 95. .0. . :60 L .\9. 5.. 99.76. . 6.939 '9 d ..7. .7. .00.. . . ..7 00 . 00. . . .9365 ..9 .9 0 6-9.. .V 0 L 19.65. .....- .... 7-...9 ... _ .. . 0 u _.0.9 9. .6... 7. .09 ...I O. 6.. 73.9.1060. 9.1.9. 9 “.3.
.. ..l . ... .L.,L..9u..h. .. ...7 .. 5.71.6.5 33699: .6”. ...... . 5..:...679. ..6... 0.5.... .9. 33:770.: ... vs. .....- .. X. inn?» v5.7.0... .- .. 909.. ...... -. 9.. ...7-0.5... .. . .. .. ..5- 9a.. .69... .. .05.0 7.... .033. . .. ..7. _ 93‘ ...-:20 .. - “5...-521796.... w \.-.7...0. .... . L 6...... 5
! .u... H...5 55 0.. ... . .. 5062.36.79. .. .. .5.... 5.. ....‘r .1 ... 3940...... 04.161.56.151 . .... ...-.... 0... . ..- 6.35.! I . :5 R. ......51.!. .. 7.69.2..- . 0:6 0.. ..59 .. . .. 0.... .. . .. 7... 15...... . 0... ..5! .07.. t .. ... ....59. .0....91-2 ...-6.. -. . ..1. 6,... !7..9. 900...5.. 50.9.7716
2... . ..97, 9.. . .... ...-.....05 .L. .... ”0.5.0.156 .181....1.,5V..LH.9....96.}.. . .r. . ., .nv . ...“..59635 79.5. ...0p-If5 ......7: ....5 3...... ..7 9990.9 9......5. . ...: L9..167 .61... . ... .. .56.... 6. .0...9.7!- M0330... . 9- .0.9 7-. .L. . ...5 . 7. .9 ... .7... ..7... l ...-£09733 6.... 6...... .Jg!6.!07.9!..x . 9.59.35.07.75
5. ...9179‘... ....9 5.0L. p.55... . .5.. . .. .. .... ...-6:6. 9! ..7 In. 011. 9. .90 .5 5. .,.....9...95. ..5 59.399.55- .01 1.1.... ... .0 1 x 090. ..9 .0595. .. J. :3. 65:0- 5...: 0 5. ..- . 0... 5.0.0 ..7. 9 9. .0..» .5 . .70 . x. .. .797... 9. .550 I . 2.0.1.993: .5- 51-6 51.51.626.669... 656.0
6.07.;- 9.9... r560 5...-9...: ‘ h. ..5? ,9.... ”Raf-.2660” ,5‘1909 0 . L00“ 161%.”. 0.9..” L. .75 ..7-1.1.9.. .0.,- .’ .5939. 99- 9... d... #399. 15.99. .159 900.97 5.. ... 996.5 ,- ..707... s '- ... ..050 .., 726.139 .. all. ...-1... ”5%.... ..6. L 99.9 v6.6 ..07 00.. 0. ...9 49‘. .9 ..r ...7'- .5. 0..- 706819.39. . - 795727595 . 9. ..0. 6r)... 75.5. 9.65. 5.790. 9‘66 00:70.66)
.0... .. . .0 .. .-.0- ..1... .L.....95.. . 6 -... . .5. 5 o 5.... . .6 5.6.7 7. 7.9. 0 .709 . ... .. ... ......160...‘ 5... .55.“ 0 . ... - 9 9. 77.01... . . 27 59...! b .117... 0!. ... . .... 50‘ ...7. .... N1! 735...... 09.6.7763350“. 5.... 6666 15.699.56.53 $87.31*“
... ...). 900Lu-6......)m...5 ..0. IL”. Wu.1'..u..... ...L...»W_.‘5Ll..9.9... 0.6.51.3..2 I .5.! .016... ...... a... #:5. .L.. ...}.0 ...: nu . - .. .6. . 6....6 9...”! . . o. .65.. . . . ...-5 .... ...-0.3.5.5.- . .5. L... .79 .. ... ..,: . .0... - - . 57.9.... . . . . .... .....5 .-5 n0. 95. -5.5. ...-19.50.253.075 6-.4‘5516’7.‘1..£6.95 535.56%
. .... . .. . L... .. I . .... 30!, .11. .9- ... W-.. . ..u ...“?! 69... . .... 5.5” ..e. 6.. .. .L. I .. ....\ . .o 77.0.5. 0 ....5 . . . .. 79.6- ..7..5... .9... 0 .... . .......lv5.. .. 2.7.1.70 . : . .L. .330...- .0::.. ...0. 2.2.0... 1695.5“: .0”! ...-0 5:576:70. 7?...
..5». .J9 on?! .-1.6.0._.0”77.L9116!.. .9 I. .0. 99. to". 65.9 .0. 5a.. .. ..V‘uiqlslc 30150990.... 5 93.5.1905 ..9‘ .. 05 995. 0 5 7...: ML. 509. .5. $999.65 . I7 00.05.19.351... . . 11-. .I. 5 . -917! ......9. ... .0. 0.“. ... 7. 0 .9 ... .. .9. 6000.59 0.0.99.6 ‘9." 5.01.55 6 ....0. 569...? .9070. ...-6.0.9.9‘3 .009
.7 9.!. .600 59.... 16. .0 .. .0. - .‘9. .0“! . a ....9 06"? 0 .9765”. ..‘50 90....999..0.L-1.0. ..- . .5 065 . .. 9.5.06.9:02 09..- .01. 9.9.0.7 .. .5... .. ... . . . . .... 9. 20.3.6.6 _ . 5on7“. . .....7. ..7 . ...-0.139.... . v . ...7-10 9 .5. .5... 3.30.. 6,599.01 99.0.96. 0 169. 5995.9 9.656
5 6.37560. :9 . 9 .0 .I235 .059... . . .66: 1.0.5.0... (Elk....61.09v...n9 593.5 .9. 3006909. 90 .17 99.....IF57619...‘ 5.9... .0.. ... .0.....0...0-. 0.; I:(...96 , , . . . . .775.- .. ......9? ..7 .. . . 6.10.! . . ...6. ... .. .6... 7.9. ... ...-.95... 099. 56,59. . .. .5.-619.. .56.!l.-95I!.a5.95, .11..)5 ..7 6.006..
. .. .00 ...-.6 u.. L ... 5 ...9 .91... .I :71. . ... ... 9 ,..0 ...-Wk. .767... 2.5090669. . 0 5.. .9 1.55.30.12.77 .0. .211... 0. . . .... .. . . . . .9..-0.5 ....- .l: .. ..9... . . ..9. ...I... . ..- . ..‘9lw...-57890.-.,5: .5 .50.. 6.6.6.0.. 6909.0. 299.657.166.560
90.6,. ..V! .0 . ..5.- .. ..7 ...... .5. .1. ..5 .... . ..r.-07. .9...606 5,5172 :0. . ..7I7. . 1.... ...7. 2-776 ...0' Lo... .. 2.1.5.5177. ......2. . . ....- ..L..... .... ..5-7. .- ....- .5 . .5 . 91:95:03.; .. 9. .96n779 .. 7.. .6555.- 51....
.,. 57. ...... .19” 09.... U“ L.» ...... ... 0... 9.9.. 01... .1.-051...... -.7. 5.7. ...7 39.”... .5. ..5-.799 0 .0 7- 5.. 5096-7. .9! . ... .. .60. .167... .. .. 0.. 0 0.- ...7 ., . . . 87. o. .070! .I.J0.5...! 9. 0 1.- .- . 1.70.7055... 796.60..- ...-95
3,6056. 7‘. r96... .90 . 0.0 6.9. .6 69.5.0. 3r|.77...\0519..9.969r...’9 9.9.. 1.6.6759 99.... .. 07. ...0650.u.600.;6.. .5 9.697 5999.79 5.9.5 .. q .96. 050“... ..5- . 00.6. ...9 . . 5 92710 97750 .. :11? - L5. .65 .. .' - .
6-5.2..3. . 0. .0?! _ .1! .v .10.-. ..9... 9 ...-..7! 56“». ”no” .- 9... 5. 9.. u ..9 V6.9 3-3369 3 760 ..5507 .- ...: .1. -. . .. ... (’75 .o . .... .5 0.9. ,2 . o .0.. . . . ,.. . . .. .0! .,..... . .99. .....5 0.0.1.29. - 1.... 0:7: {...-...
..-.9 f . ... .L.“ L. L. C . 1 025 L 915 ..5 29.6. L $.59 .4. . 9.95.“.01164 35.02.... 66.35- 7.. ..0 ..r.5.n71. 6.. 6 0.. .. 6.59.. ....0.» 3.3.29.- ! . . . . .9..1¢9..0...95..... 5.... .... . , . 9. 7 0 . .... .
... . . ...-.2 1.6-. .495 . ...-5.0.. ~— 7.6.5.51... .5. 6.52.... ....- .....0...7.-. .....9.1930.9.9 72.1-00.7 ., . .1- -..P ”duet. .5.. \ -. l. .. . .
Zth-. 7059-. ....7. .4th91}. 0(05W5J .6’. 6.1.00.0... . 19.5.... 73.3.1“? ... 6 . 5.. .7 .6666 ..9 P03. .9. ..7. 3’0. . 76:6...5 ..0 ...-......L. 2-7....- ..... ,6 979.7...9. .....r. .. . 9.. .16 L319... ........-.. ... ......1... ..
. 9. .9. 7 ..5-9.. .9. ,..!v..l I" ...: 5... ._ .9160: 0.05.0.1 . . ..k .905 ..995 .0 .0 96.. a. .99 5055-05.... .,....-.5 .9 6.69.5. .9. . «.0.-9‘.
. . 0306.A..9b1.u.... ...-H17 .1.-9nd. 1570 - 7..9..0...0‘,35.‘. ... it“... .... . ..50..-.5. .1 .22.... 0.5.3.7.. ...-0.6.5.. .5.. .0 ...... .L... h. ...-..m..69...0-. ...9 L ......5. ..... 5.54.6.7.“ .5150. .. . .... 6.199 50. 1 .v...V7.9..5..959... .r.... .619. .
_ 5. .7 9 0 . ......- . o. 60- 715971....39? ”71.6. .. ._ ..u‘ .. 5.01660.- 9...50.-. o . -09 .. 9.6.09. o . L ...0. . .. 0.. . 0 .
... 0‘9.‘_|..6 ... L6 0 .. .. 77.6. .52.... 5.09.. - ...... 9 0.592. 54.01.70-196 . . 1 L. 9.- .. . .,..!0...‘ .763... .0. 100‘ .1. 159...; 9. . 5.7.9.5.! .. 0.....60. ..I..I5.!09,.!l.... .. (7.2.6,.- ..L .P k .. .5.
0. .75. ”.6 6n. ...: . .,-98.-0. a... .9745. .... ...... 09:9 !..... . . .. . ..5-s ....7...v.. .76. . .7. .0.. ...5... ...\... . . ...-......S. ..5
. ....L 1-9.. .5 ... .h.l . 05... 591.1 . 05.66 ......0 ...0. . ... .. ... .6. 59: . ...7-5.61:5. .6 .,9. arr: 5 : ......K... 9.. ... ... . . . .. (.L.-....
..0. 50“. .6 L... .306. ..9 . _9. o ....0 9 0 3096 5....1 L. 1 90 .6.” . . ... ...: .6055..- . Far} ... .. .
... 9.... 0.5 .06 . L... ..- . 0.97.5!11Sf0... 6. 6.0. -. 109.9 2&6». J5 r. 9.. ..01 .5.! 19.9.. 0- . 9. 9. nun-.0. 9. 1 .. . ...7“
.56...(6 .3.!.... ..9 .1fl910”....0.¢.09 .0 .9 . 5. .--(.I 11.0.. 04 1.\0.. ....000 609...... 1.5.2....5 .. .. .
H 6..., 09. .. . . ... . ‘ 5 .‘060941- 0.. «99660... . ...0'...‘ 7 9.1.5.9}. , .. L .L. . .90. , 1..
racor 0 .- kl...” 5H6“... 6.0 5. .099 00! .9 ..5.. .. 9 7. .5 7...... . .97.. L 6900666} .9. 6.7.9099. 99 . . 9.2.09 . .0 72.9.9. .5. In. .0 .
\ 1 9 0.5! L. . 7.0.. 1...... ...7 7.9.4 . ... . 7... .l..565-u.6.... 70:531.... ... . . . . . .. 00.66. ... ...- ..,... ..,... ..7-0 ... . . ... . . .. . . L L .
L -. .9 . 9.2.0.6 . VI. ..9 5 ., . 6956.6 . 4.1.6.... ...00 I Uri...- .0_.’., 0069 . :9” .9. 9.“.5 .. ..7. .....950. ..6 5...-7 ... 09 5.0196 . L.. ...I .50.5.\... .. ! -. 9.. . 60.... 519.5. .7: .. . .. ..9..-7.9.7 .. ..9 0! 92‘ . .95 97.
. 6.551.! 9 0 ....0 .99.,15 I... 10719-001. ... L5. . 069 5. ...-0.. .LQKQVULPS! .25.. ....70 0 . .. 7.09939..- ... . .Llrpv. .“5... s. ... 0.. ... .. 50. .55..-..05 - 6.1.0... 0.. . . .7. -9.7,.... . .... 5!... . :1. 0.1.. ...0 0.5 2.91 .59....5. ..059.
. . 605.. .9 .9 .9 6:, 9.1.9.90. ! 9.95. L .05 0959. 2.1.09.5..0 -!0. .. 1.6...- .. L .0.. 95.3.1090! . . ...... W. .... 5 .5. . .‘7 95 . .563... ’6 .- . 0.10. . . . ... .n .... ...9.09 .?.9.5. 79499... 5.9““...- L 2.3.915...-
...5_ ... ....5. 56:! 5’5“...9..4..05.4. 6 ...-.9. - via?! ... :10... o 5 ..7-0... 4...... . ...-50.. ..- 1.39591. ...u. .9 {.5.-...... 6:1. .. 0.....0 . .. .... . 6...... ..., .5... . 9L. .0. ......5 ..5.9l5-..L5
.00.... 50 51 2.7.. 5.9.90hn.. 7- f... 69.1.36 9....0 0... ....» .....n 29.. . .0 9...... 6.67. ... .0. .. ... 7...... 9.-. r .. 2. .9: . 6.10.0.9 .. 0 . . 0..- » .0. .5. ..5-06 . . . ...... . . 9.1955 .9 ... 8-5.... .629. ...v. .. ...-.... . ..
.0 0......51 .. ...... 6 ...v .54.). . .c. ....0‘ ...-5.7.17. 5391.5 .Mrno... ...7: . .5. ..o. . . . 1.6.2.3.... 600. .. ......1: . L .,..-0.5 ... ...9 .1 ...0. . .. . .. ....6. ..0. .... ... 5. .. 7y 0%....57. r6679!!9.....5. ..-..0 .L6....... .L .
.. u c. 575»: “.5 7.6 906 ...... .5....1 . .L .. . .90 \. ... 9 ..0. ..5 0. . ,0. 0. 67!...050L0f . . . 45 - -! .0. - 7 a 0 7. {...-5 0.0 .70 .. 5.07 5 .. 390.959... 5.9.. ....0... . .... >0. .0 . 0 .03.}... .. ..5-0- 0.6.. ...9 . o ...5 600., .9. .-..
..5-L. o. 51.9. ...-.. 5 .2355 ‘69..07..6...0.9..05.....77.656..0.9.51 04:6. .9; . 20..) 169.15.... . .570 ... ..J. ....t...... 0... ..5...t..!9n7.9 .0 ...I...... 9... . . ‘36..
.9 5 . 7.0.0. 90059 . .9. 0..0.! 6.9 .. .7.!. 9 .59... P ”.0 .1. 50. . 5-’. .65 . . . . . 5 0.99.6. .96.. 9.. .09 .65.. 9 ... I 99.- . .6... ’0. 9 0"...
. . . . 6.5.07 ....» .6. . 5 . . . . ..A 7 7. ...-6M... 5 1509/6 79695.5 3,92! . .6....5V0.5. ... . . . . ..7 .- ..5.)R..0-.5... 097. ... 6 . 200.7 7... . 5 I . .9 . 9 .0 . 0. ...-..w. . 9.. . . 7 15-. L 50.. .
.1 .. L 9. 7 I. 90 5 5 9.0 .6 a . L9,- 19.9. .... . .97 ..! .000 .. . . . 6 ......006 6. L 6.. 6.95. .69. .5.-0.9.} ...... . .9010 .00. .- . .7: .79. 769......9ux- ... .. .L. .L. ..0. 5.9.1. . .
. 6 5.0 5.\ . 5.9.9- ”: 5 -..-.5». .....LLI 21%.. ...... .9r.9 .. .0..)n... Mn.- 9. 9. ...-99 6.“. 59.1211. . _ . .... 05.0. . v- -0....9 335.5. ...-0.7. .. .7..09... 0. .1909 - .. . ... . 9! ... J 0. ... . .0... . 6. 0 . 7. , . .. 6 . .
... .5. .. l.- I. 0 . .0.L-..5 .00-0 .- . . -... b.5539. .. .5.. ... 9“! .f.9.\.... . , . . . .0....0..6. 90.1. 9.17:5 - - ...: . - .. .51 .. .. ...0-.. 9. . . L 9....Ns. ...... ‘9...:.-...!. 1.0... . . . _ . .. .
... L L1 .606 9.0. 0 .v. 3.. ‘74....) ...... 316.. 6715'. .66-- 6 0097.! ...-.90. 625.6600. .... - ... «15.! .... ..7 ...570 u - 9.5 ..n5-. 666. . .9. ... o9“. .0...9-..:... .66 ...... ....5. .. ....5-5. 0.. 5 ......0 -. 9.9... .-.6..30!. .9‘ 6. ., .. ....... .50. C0 .... .. ..900.05.7_.0.9,9 709.75... .. 9.5.5.956166. .769 9...! ... . 600.95.166.69 0. t . ... 5.
...... «59.9...L .- .. 0! 5 . ...- .6. . . «apt... . o. .. . .. ...-..5!9. . 55.. 09.65. 5.7.7.... 156.170.2119.}?! .....0... . ....... ...9 . .. 6.61... .. .20. .0... .. .. . ...-7. .. {...-9.0! .. . .. . . I. ..056-.... .. ,.-...9 9.. 0. 5.9.1.... .. I 20590.5!0-139- .1 0!. 0.16.5.6.
.5..5.70 . _ 0 . ..,. «.L.-.0 -6 .1....06 . -... 9.. ...-...... 5n... .1., .05 ... . .. ......o...... ...-71.4225. .. 5-E .33 . . , . 0. . .. 4.0.. .. .1.-5).... .02.... 7000:! .3551??? 9......-
h09. .- ..- .. ...r J. .9 7.1“. 00-..L0 -. .! .29 7.....10 0G. 0 L. 7.5.6.. .. .9. .967 -. 50.....9 3.2.. . c . . ...7. 1-. 9.... .. 5. .. . . . . . 5. 1:5. 7 5099. 11.... 6.. 9.9 .. 2‘9: 1577651.:
. . .096700! 7 19 .\ .014..- .... 9 .1--9...... . .0. 01.2.5” .15 ..\ 91.5.2069 "9.0. 6.. 7.5-6- ...K..6. 0.5.0 ..76... ......- ...... .... k 0? .0 . ..
. . . 9. ..5 ...7-IO 1.. ... ..J 6 .L ..- .ILYVJV -. 7.1.00.7 .63 .5 ...9! 0... . 19 9.6. . ,7 55...... .5.-9.1709300.)
. . PL: .5 ... ... .... ...... . .5....5....... 2......51 .... ..7-..7...- 320.... . -. .. - . . . ...»..3 21...... 665.77.! .. 72.0.... ... .0. 5. .. ..5.
. 06 ...!.07 55109 ..D 0. .0 .. 54 v. .65 9-...- 007 I’...~ .9 2' . 65.9. .0 r6. 09.9.0‘. .. .. 095.7796.
9.5 ..5. 5.9.9 .6...5 Jofl-v (... .V.,.d.‘. . . o 9.. ...4 9. .. 6. L .5 ... . L
. . . . . 1750....96 .477. .563,... .05- ....0. .9. .... 9065.0 94. 0 L9 .... .L..
5516-45.. 7.9. .0 ‘04 v t. 7 .0.!7 . ... 9., . 9. 690.5 9‘ 9. .. 99 99-9.0121 .
...9. 9 99.. 1 ..5-... .. 97097.61; 1‘ L 19...... 0‘. ! .L. ...09 ... 9.. I ..
$65.19.; L 9.3....- .. .75 .0 . .. .... 0.6996. ! ... 0.. . 6‘. . 6. :59.- . .. 0. ..7.0 . ... .-.. .. .,. ... r
. 90-510.. .5 ”.95 610.0 I. . . ..70 69:76-56-5é .9.“. .05... . . . ...... .. ....Qur._0. .99.
\r. L. 60.0.. 6.6.0. In”? !.9.0..0l.9 95L .9. .25... 0 1.. .5.!90; 9...R.-9 .9. .
”..5“... ”0.0.5.2572. 51. .63.. .09... ...7: ... ..,5.!.!6.70 .. .
. .0_.L99l.- 09.9.7L 6 . )90..F, O... 90. LL90 09 c.0067 - .! . L 007.. ....9. 9. .. .0.. 7 9H.
- 55:70-53” - 6 .6 ! .7 9. .6 .656". . . 15.6.1.0...h... . . 98.160.105.67...» 2 79.1. . 0‘ 71.. .0. .5. .L.. .7 5;.
. ..0. .09. 5...-1....6-25 ... . . ,. . , . .. . ...... 09.9. 1:599... ...IO. 05.. 0....
p‘. n 7.. 6 5 . . 9 9 5... v- 5 65.9. 9 .5666. 9‘9 ..V' . . . . . . .905. 5.6909 . L0. 99 9 ... 5.. 095.9 90 7.0... 9569,. .‘09 all I.
- .. . ... 0.. 6-0. . 9 756:6.‘9-71 5.!!- 3 .. 56 .!9l 5 . , . . -5......?.69.9.. 0 5. .L. . U .0 .5.. 6... .741.6‘9.L.66 5. 1.60. ... 75 ..0 66.695 A9-L690. 99
a . 5709.. 0 - 097 9.9 0 5- .a .L .... .L\ 9007.L ... ..0 .. . ..‘.0.0-..9 .90.. 9 .0. .. . ... . . . 1.. 0... 6.. ..7/.00367 .6.....50..691097|09 6.609;; 795...
.- 7. . .4 ..r -!. s ......0: .0 .. .L 7.7.9.003. 1.9.. . I. 95...! .. .r...17... 1'50! 0... 5. ..9. . .. 9 ...... 39.3.. 5.1.5.... 0.... a . . . .. ,. .. . . . . . . 9 . 6. 60.. ...: ...9 6L. ..-!9 7%. 15L...¥.L7 .06.. .I,|7.96‘5...1.0055l..7.6.0..!20569.6.6.6o 5
9.07... 00.0.6.7. 7.9. . !.. ..7 -.9 5609- .77577 - ..0....- 5.9.0.. . ..0 0:965 ... . .5...- 1. 05.)..8..00..0. .. . .9. ...... ... .,.” . ._ . ... . . . .. 7.9.1. .L..\.9.9 .7... ... “.0... 95- .....5- :.6.99...9.097!055.795.’!6695.975950..9
.t‘. 0.7 9. .9 0 . . 5 0.. .-.. .70 .9 ... 7.1.0. .. ... I!- ..5~959.5 65.919 .. .. .... 5....(u.., .....7... . . .... - 6.05. ..54. .99: .3! . . .... 99.9.... ....2 .75... .... ; 510.696.03.1651. U.....50165909.'..0 10995..
P. : ..9 ... ...»9935 9.5. - ..90 ...... 3.3.2.3713 LIL?! 0!. .0... . 3. .l..... .1170 1.0-. .706 . . . . 55\ I 0. -. .0 561.... ... .. ., L. {...-..5}. .. 0...
. ..9. .7... 5.6..x....:. .0... ... 9 ..l‘ -.. ‘0 .. 7.9 ...L. ...u05. 0.1 .0 9.! 00!. . . I. ... 00419605....76. 7.... 960. .-......0...... . , .
I 5 ..-.5 05:90.6 I. .- .9..09.597 .....10099 ..0.. 9.590. .37 . .. 1»..9. 9.50. 0.... .. . .737- ..0 .'- .\ .. . . .... ..6 5.9.2.. 0206 .5291? ‘6‘..70.09-.5.!0579.97.16...60664.
7--- . . . r L .. ‘—4.0 . a 1:537. . J. 9!. !9 ...- _ . 0. 06.11.. H a. . .. O5 5.0.1.50. . 9.6. . . ..5 ...9-55. .77... ..5508 .96...L.5I.50.9 6.5909917262969060.
.9 L _ 9 .Lo'L-éc .L. .....9.7.10).7W0.Ll.05..5 $.96“. 9....0.”.. . ..5. 0 5 ...1.9-'.96 9. 5 095... 0... ....Q. 02.6..0....9...0§O..5.5.L9.-97..5..9.10.9.6...6.09.99‘J..
761 0’ ....09 065 v 9 6. 69. ,u9‘\. 7...!9. . - 659 0.. 9r. .6. .9 W69}. . 9 .50.. - 9.2.1.... I ..99. .646... '9 IL. .6 .9 7!...- 6. .50. . 5. .. I :9 99- 69550 0... 15.7 .. . 5 ...0 £59609. 9 ..6’.95965-..‘I99
. . 9 . 00 .LL .!. .0 -- ..0 . .9977..5 -09!. . .,. . 61.. 9 6.9 .75 r. ... .. 7 n 5. L .65. . 0.1.9.9.... . ... 67 . 10.950..- ....9...090. 00 5. .050.
. . . .6199: . .6959... .9 . ...9.1..5..0_.99M!. . 0. ..9 555. . I... ..7 . . 9......9 19......7. . 79.1.. . ..5-L: . .. .97! 0 9 .9. 1 .79 9.. .,. 5L.00...'0I... 0! .. .7 . L 0 ..7. .0. 9!...7101 . . . -..6...5..5. ....5.....7..909 ._. 76.22319
.....1. . - !..6!. ... . .....H-I...0...r-0..s 5... 6... ...... ....- «1”.- . .. . .05... . .. . ............ ...... ...: ..5 .... ! . .. . .. . .. . .7...5.0.. 5.. 0-0. .. ....612..9...- -! 9.9.0....
. .. 5‘57. 6. .4 _ fi. 70 . 61.996 - . .. ’...I45.6~. .....0 .. ...5.6067. 9.7. . .v‘ . .0.. . . 715.91.91.50; .7. 90.9 .05 6. Lv... 50. .v' . . . . 9N3-.. .65..
0. !. . ..9 3.5. .9. 5. . .55... 5 . ... r -7. 5.0! .55 7556.7. 9.4. 5. . ..65 . ... .9 ..99 . 0 . . .. .5-...o. .... 969-. 2.00.0. 7. .. 0.. .,. . 0. .0. . 2 .. .
0. 0 74.66. .5. . .. ... 9.5.270 ...I- ..J.!. 0.. .. l9..06..0.......09.5.. . v5.50 0. .... . . ... ...r.. .35.. ... 9 ..., , .5.-0.2.5.2....“0 W920i... . . . ...
. 9 6...!70.‘ f... 6 .....7. ...-.9. . ...-.69 ....-.965.. ..05065....0......7.: .19......-..-9..\.... ... 0,...6. .0. 0 ... 10090.1(}. 7. ...6 .... . .-.... ......5,5 I. .. .
. . . .5. ..1 - .... 5.10.79 .‘ 7-.9, 1.9.56.” ! L95 5.. .7. .5.. . . . . .. .....I“.9..... 79 .. .! .... . .. . . .. .6. ... .....- 95.......,\\. L . . o 0.... 9.5
. . .. 0 L09. .. 5.. ..L 6 . 9 . 999-. . 0 6.05.. I... . .- . .. . . . . 99.....9 .. 599. 999 0|. ...-9 . .. . 6. 5 . ..0 0. ..... .. 9.9, 9. ....
. “-9. . .....55..L.r.0. ... .. . . L1. .. . ..I .. ..- .11.... - . . .. . . .
51-06-99; 19. .. .L.5 . . ... ... . . .-
- . L 7.. 066 .9 ..v. .,9 .f.0l9..9069..1 5997,6396 9 9.99]. 96.7 .
.9. 3-9.... .79.“, 0.9.. O 505 6f. 75. ....r...’ o 19., ..

    

    

 

          
           

    

   

                

! .L.. 7 . . . .
. 501-5 5 !.7. . u‘u.a .. I .65 ....57 1.9.6.. 0.0 . ...-1.9.960...-t01. .0.) 0.9 9.- . 60.59 .59 0. .L. . .- .
, . 9... 5396;... L5! .. .. 0. 7.6. 65....- 90!..¢ L5!.\ ...... . .07.... . . .
.0....5-h: !. ..65 . . .9- .!9 0 .05.. .0.. .... ......0. .05.... .o 5.- ... 0. L .... 7!... ... .. . 99116091.: 50. ...
. 0 ... ... L..001.10‘ -.. 05 7...... .... .. ...-.... .9-.. .5.}. 0. ‘. . .. .0 .5.... ..r ..7, . . . 6, .9. - I. .
.. . 6. J... ......I... 9.4.6. 9.0.7 5' - I?! 09. .600...- -I- . 0r5050 .9...7.0p7. 6!". 7...... ...0. .0... 1L7.L.....-T..5- ... ... . .... . . .. ... 6.. .
a. ., 71-90: \0 «7 7.6V .0 -. 9.9- 5).. 5.. 0 . 7 -\\..f \9_ - .95... 0 ... 2.595. 59 7 21099.. L. L r. . .L .. 7 9L 9 9.. 59 ... 0. .9 .L 50‘. .. . . .190 . h. .6995. 5 0’0... 9 .. . .
.6. 90...-) .L. . .69.! . 0 ...09 L... ... . ..5 .97-1‘. 0 ....0. 59 29.995... I. 600.... ...19. . ...-39060.0 ..5 ..5. ..0. . .1.. . . .. 5 ...-.. .- .0.. . . .L. i 9.20.. L... 0.. 7.. IP‘.. 9 . 0.93.5003... 15 39.3695.
. .-. - . 0. I. . 0. ..4. - .0. . . 60 ...... ... 7.. 5H.) 10" 9.075.. .. . . . .. . f ...-5. ... .9... . .... .50. . 0.... 1- \.... ... 5. 7.1.9.0.. 7.61.:(15-1I..6.... \9L0.7!05.. .
5. 5:70-90 .. c.... ..w... 6.5.. .7 70.0 2.93,, ..5 .. P0 L... .1 5V. . . ... ,. . . 5 . . .- .9 . .1 - 717977.. 6.6.0.2517. 5860.121...- . 1.151.760.0786.
. . v .93 9 .497 0.0 L . .... 9 5.0.. 99.6.. .6: ! ..0. .. 9959.. 7 ...0... .5.. L 5. . .. .. ..0 95.. 0.0 0 56.10.6676,}. .5‘205.
. . . 5. 916.09 9. ... ...5. a. . 0.9 . ..5 0 5-0 45555
.05an5.9. 6-7....»‘009. \. 96. 0.6.! ..9
0. 0. .... .. 0.0 - L . 9 0 . .099 . . . . . . .
...0 .... ..0.....00-9.6 ..... .. 5....9...... .. : . . .. 0.50.69.05.23? .0... . 15‘”! .....759.‘ .009‘606916015
.. .71... .. ..0 . .0. . ..9- .. . . .. . . . .0.. 6.5.9....r7. 9.65:9 062.65- .046.50 L.. 4 n .v. .26. 91.0..0’l0zlt0‘66gl
t...- . .. . .. I . . . ..,-1...... 6.57-7.79 . 6‘. 7.7. 5.560.799.5360 550.666.06.751. .55.!
0s v ..5. .L 9 55.10-05.50. .2. 0 0.0.6.55r1501.1‘..1.lu- ‘69. 7650076765 5
4.1.0.0 5.096. 5.7.0.. 6655...“. 610156.95 656.6667.
0566.609. 95 29.6.65 69.95.667.955

..... ..9,

 
             

   

        

  

           

 

 

   

  

  

0 057 00.9.9. .50.! 06..
.9 .00 . ..975. .‘9
.. .‘.9.. 5!.- 6‘..9.-'5I ..0 . . . ... 8:... .. . ..0 .9 9. . ..
909 n .0 . ....0. . Il-a... . 09. ‘9 9.. - .. . . -0 7. 5.0.0.6.. .9656... 56...!- 0690... £666.65. . 5.... .0'0 ’iz’hd
.. .55... J . .597....._. .L. .0.5 0....... . .
, .20... . : . . .. ..... 9 . . .. 5.- ...5. ...-1.0.5083}: 09 .. 0.171..)965I-s66‘07.
.. . . . . .. . . 6. . 1.1... L .....62... . L - .6 .. .. .. .0... .60 . ..7)6.99005.0.5.9 79.5.75 \5..90\‘50‘r0605i5. 56.7,.k'6vl
. .57.! 5 0.. ... .. -.! ... ... .LI65. .05 .. . n0 , . o. 1. . ..-... .. - L . .... ... .. ...-559...... . 11.7.60: 6.00 0’11..!.£.I’97.05’50.-.0559.‘..‘70559!7
09 6 .v. 5 ‘5 . . r .7. . . 4! 5 . 9 5... :- ... - - . .9. 5.. c. 0060 0 7.9 6-... -. L06. .0“. 9.05... .5 1 .L. ... . L... n . . 5. 9.0.. . 6...! r. . . 967.055 7.0.9 90 069 -.6 .977! 06005..‘ 7 75.9 707...! 0509057,- ...7 A'
I . ... . ... .9, .0 6. .! 09.99.. .6. - 00. 9 9 ' 0 9. .L . V L. 0)”, 56.. .7 99-9... .5 . .... \. .. .. .77 .. . 1.6.. . 9 .o . . L c ..90 5 5 0 0.2.. ...“... . I 5.76.7... 579.2395 76.5... 0.69.3169. 009. .y'..599. ‘II’0'965
.. In» ... .... v . .0 . ...: .. . 6.0.. - . ..! ... .v . ..5500...~u..x .- .L . o ! . . ..9 ..5. .- . ... .... .. . . .. .. . 1-. . .. .-l-.Il!.7.0 kip-... 56.555.50615 g. .
..,-.5 .0 .0. L ..- .- 5 . ..5 .... 5. I . ..7. 9. . .. ..70. . I. ...I 7.050.! 5.5. .0.... 7 I. 9 ...... .9. . ...: C. .. - :.9 .7 59 . . . 177.766.67.611-5‘750056165.‘ \-
r ... I .0757.- \. .. .7. - ... 0.51.... ..r. . . .. 7 9 ..9. ... . ... . . .... .079 1.00.3.3 5...? ...-0 .L. . 0 . 5.. 5.. -. ... . .L . . ...... 770.65.91.07 69.100065755757756..."
9.7.9 .l‘t... V . I . ! .I C ... .9 0L. 9. .....0L.15. 9 . 56“ 50. 990. 7 _ .6. 6 ..9.9L .605 . . 90L . -. . 5.. 0...!0 . .Jo ' 6. ..9. 0s 9' L . . L . .....P. .5.. . .
. L .L \or 5. . 7 $0 9|}... ..9 09.. ...! - ... .,.-5-” 2.05.56. , . . . .. . L09.r.9.. .. ... .L. 00 . 9. . .1.. _. 0 . 09 ..0... . .
0 75.6.6. ...-1 . .Lr. .. .99.}!!! v07... . 9 ....9505...5.. 0.5-7... ..1....9.-. .L ... . 0...... . ..00
. ... 1.0!. 09- 7 ... . . . .69 9.5 9 . .0- 6.. 9. 91...!9 5 . 9100. ....L 1.0.97.6). . .. .95. o. . ...C 0 369,5 9: 0. ..5.
009. 706. 0 ... 79. .6 ..0.-. .., 9 .9 h . . 0 I .. 0 ‘5 1.6.09 ....,. . . .. 90.... .9 . 0.. .. .9L.0 .696 9. . 1 . .07... 5.! . .... .
. .L!!. ).....7 ..vw -. .9 '..5.”3<r. - .599. 37,9 . 9 .0 ....1... .. .,.. . 5 5.... .. 0.0. = - .
059 I! . .l0‘...6 LL. ..599.!0 .7..- 17' .,.9. . .9... ! .. ... I !.9 . ... I... 90. .9 .5 .5 L. 21.5.3... 0. .6799. .0.... 66| 05L ..5 ..165. 7 . .9 . ... 0:7 .07. [7... . 5 ..51..9.I’.0.797 .
6. .9 . O 3 . .‘99, .0 .95 .6»! . ...90 V 7 4. . .5....95509....65 or...7 .... 05 . I l. 0,....5.09.L9-.9.. .. .
7. 6.. 11.5 5. ! l5 . .06 5 .L. .0.._\ . u - LLJ ... 0- . 1.56... 0... L.!.. . . . . .. . . .. . .. 71,- ... 5 - o -. 0.. .
.. ! 7 o _ . .0 .. 6|... L 0 - .0.... .0..- - .9. .o!.5 . 7..0 . . . .. . . L .6!- . ... . . . 1.... 0. u. .. 5 .0 ...0-0
.. .95...I‘995. I [H7 7. ’0 '5 .,.5 !.!... E6... .50 7 ..999 6.0. .61... .7 1909......0 .0‘ I19... ..9. 0 ..‘r‘ 79.99.9009. 1......9 9 . . . .. . . . . ... 99 04. . V .. . . 1 0 - 0 .. ... 5.- 9. I...
. .... .1. s. . 6755.5o-r«~ \ . .. 2 . .9633: .7. .-.». . L ... . 66.511599 . 0. . . . .. . . . . .... .5 ..-.. . ...-. o -00.. 0... .e d. ...:
1.3.9. 0 ...-50 . l... ..9061! - 69.53.. ..0 ..! ... 09 :6... 0L 6.0. .. .7 .1... 00.93.... _ . . .. .0.-L . .. o 5. . .9 .1 0“...
05:55- » . L. . . 1730.0.- 5. ..7.‘ 7. 5.9 ‘ 1.0.755.....( ..6. .. - 9 0795.3. . .19.-.. 90 0. . .69... 79.. . ..'.!-.‘
.Id...!. ‘59.. 5 61!. 7 o . . - .5 ..-7 .....l .5. ..r0 7.0.9 7 -. . .. ...kL . .. '00 1......l5_._. .. .5 . . .. . l 9. - .9. . . 00. . v.
. .9..9 .00 5 k, . 72.... 107 7. .6 . 7-0- 71‘ .91 ... 5... 9 . ... 0.....9. ... ..,9‘ .07 0... .9 . . 0.. ..9 9 .. . 5. 7 .55 .0 I .. 16. 0 a .L0 9.00.5...
0w .... 1070.5. .. . .... .75 6.0 .. .... .0.-7 .... .. 0 Y 0.... . ..g .9. .3-6 . 51.6.? 9. .. L15 . 0. I... .... ....n ...... 5 . 1 ... ! . . . . ... . 1. ... 7-55...- . .,.-1.77.3. .037-‘7930.
. . ! L 65’ ! 57! . . 9.9 ...-...!5 .4 . . .. o .9! . . -.0 9. 5- .5.... . . . ... I . .5 0 . . . .. . 9. . .. .0 ,.. ... ! u . . -..: 0.705.. . 0.1.9. - -0. 90 £36 I.- . .6: 07900955 76.047760 675.5765
QI6F- -‘ .6. -I L. ......V-9 5 .1........- I! .v 095 -. 0. .- “.---14.0.7.6 - .9377 ; (..,. . . . _. .. .. o L. . .. . ... .... .. 9 ...-......6...5.v..7.5 $1956....55LI 5.596....55rn..5 .5.?510600-4L'9-5655759 569.60.550.16
. 5! . x .9. .0 . . 9.0 . . ...! ..0 . 95.6! 5 .0.... L.- .0. ... . - , 7 ! 0. L 30-009. 73: J99 . . I ....961 9. . ..5‘ .v . . 5. 1. . - 0 . ! 79 6- , . .9 . . .. . I 7.056. 0 60.9. I.0550|7.0661...l.‘66i99!.95f.'-90.7’:0r 6395905!
-...6H-6009 9 . 7’.- . .9- ... L. ! . v0 ..5 . 0. I ‘ .0 9.. 00. 0|. .-5.. L. 956 99“.. .050. .. . ....- . 6 .099 ..., . ..5 . .0 . 5 . 5 . 9 ... . .! .. 0 . OH'. .!L .5.-.....57. ...6-.6..! 7 .0... ..5 .9 .. 1764.6 . .30 .67.!53: 5076....76579‘ 97550713701373} ‘59..»‘9‘6.0.I6.
! .05- 5 !0.96.5l.9, . .L . 090-0 .09..~ . . 99 #, 0 ..1. .0 .L. . .. .. .,. 0 .. . 0 . .659 .. . . . . 90 1-... . 7! .... L. .5.. 999...}... . . -..7-0599 .Ll’.7!"55 6.5.. 6.5690‘r6..lvs75007.9767fl035% 6’57‘.‘
0 94... .. 70‘ 6 ..99 6 300 .0 - 5.»!..- .0 .. -...... 5.. 0.59.5... ...... .. .99... ......L .9 5 9. .... .0. 5. 5.770... 5,57... 19 . . . . . . . . . .6. .. o. .,.. . . . . . . ... . ... I ‘- .. I5.0.59.7 .... u 7- 0.. ! .. 9...:50 0 . 0 9.0.9 095 ..Q 50.1.79 006. ‘.’59...659.95 ”a... 5573,5665; 0.5
. . 0‘, «I. . 5 .. ....0 5 5 .0.. .. 5... . -L.... . 59 , . . . _ . . .6. .. _ . .. ...1 .- ... -. . . .0 : . 0 L . ... ..5 . . . . . . ...- 7- . . 9. 1 .9... 7.0.6....- . 3.1.6.3797. -3677. 007.75.19.63 0.... 0.75.19 {60.0.5 57
.,.. 5.07.9 .L. ..5.9 .L.! .. l. .6 .05 ..9 .6. . .. . 00 . . 6 .r 3-. . . 0 .I . 9 5 ... 9 L6 - I If... ..5 .... . ...u‘o.‘ 55.0 - 3.9.. 15.7 195‘55..v...v.-.. 9.6679977 9.55‘7.1.’6P‘f5005.0|
.... .05.. .0911. . . 597.. .... -.. .. .... .5...- .....1. ! ....5.........!..... . - .... .. 5 .. - . ..5 9. . .7 .... ...0... .5- -0....-..6.-.59 .!.7.0...r0o.o50605!7.51570-765 i..1¢060‘605.l.75660-55.f7-
. .5..0..0.. . 9 .09 . . . .. . . .. .9. 99.. 5.3. ....9 .. -. ,. 5 v. 015. .. . .. .. _ ..5.l . . ... 0. 7 -L5 ..7-... 0 L. . 7. .. .5 .. S05 ‘0. n5. 0 . 0 . .0 |.... ..05.60‘.. 9.. 0536.95 7 ..566677..r50--.6575.r.9007‘05-6
\-. ..!.0- .«.0. ..5. . .. _ ....-. . . .! . - . - .0.-2...: .....L. .... .!-... .. . , .0.. ... ...-...... ...! ..7 .L.. .... _- . . . . . I .0 .... .5.-.20 .0.... 0.5.75. ....00...7669055?7006.595\l6707-L606§UI
.96 1.699.“ . . 6.9.- .9 569 ... 5 1!. .5 ... 7 .5 -7!0!--. .5 0 . . ...-.5....5 .L. . . 0. 9 .. 9 .5 . . 5 L 0 -. .. .5 5. 9.9 06090.5 . 55.56765..5975-‘.91006 7.569700 .5 om’7‘60506.6-65706.‘.II..
-6 '75.. 7.....1. ...V . . I9 .. . .. . . 9.... .60. r c. . ...!0-0....- .... .- .. 6... ... . .V-v .! . .-56.l .9. . 5.0 ..5 I9 .00 51.37.3599 .666L0‘gig7'iyi7067t
. . 61. . .l.. r...- . .. L11. .. . l 1966- ..u.. 3.! .. . A . r)!!! . 6 v ..0. . 0U... .5. 0 “I!!! . .. .. ..- 6 .... .-.-. 9 . . . . 9. 5 5. u 0 . \o 1 9 .9 . - [Qt-.....LI. - ....C.5.l.56 9V....9..7.707..06.7v.905’665.9(1.7..9.I7|
90 .. 5... I. - 9 9.... .5 596 ...-......5. . ....5 I. !5 . 0507 60. 5'. 05 -. 6. .....99 .L r .- . 0 5 9 7 .... 99 - .. 0.6. -075! .506 .-77-7.05f‘ 7.7 .50? 6596.3:‘L‘6‘6 601777,.1
. . - 77.5 L. 7 7 -. . .... 5 .. . 750' - -_ . . . - ..7 .. . .. I .. ! . i . 0. .. - L. .- ...09 -. . . .. 9 . - 0.... t 0. ...-0.9. 0!. . 05.6!- 6..(0I-.09- .7.:9.6-496|.07L 656.65.190‘6755
.. . . 5 . 1. .05 ..5. .1 5. . 0.9.00. . - 0 I.. ! ) 5 - -1 u . 7 5 5.70 7 . 595 . '0 .0670 7!! ..5005 fi‘0l‘756'55-5.’ ..0 .6‘5756. 7.0.7.5. 566
I .9 - ... r 9 9 .9.9 6!! 0‘. N. - 06.0-0: . -5 .6 6r .‘0607I9 99593-975576. 7.55.7.5063
- 5 .. ., - - -. ...-56. -910- -.-.0.0-5|.!7!-0-.9!15..69!! 7500-.1‘5
!0...0 . 0 ..0 1 .7 .I.I. 7. -0900 709..5I. :6; .!7
7 . . . 5 0 0 . . I
....
_ . 7
. . - 0 . I -l
.1. .53. ., -..!«!..<.,..\ V . 1.. (...-5.,7
... ... . 4 .. ... x 66 . 5..- 93....
. ,. , ...U 9wL.-(m....o.\r

  

--.mn-mi.- .- .--- .
.1..=.wn.-e....§.0.¢é.-1 ....zc..fi....v..m...w...wsfifm.-3 f... ...-mm. ..5... .... ...---....» .
. .5.. 0. g. . 1.6. .! -!-5..V - «99.05 -5-|l!!7.i
. .I; WWW... .... ......- vim-.7. «...-... -..»...chfie -.........5......1.. hwwwwwm ahmmw- ...... 4L. . Tylflrb. ......uJ. . ...: ......L. FE»... .
9,... 9 -

 

 

 

 

 

 

...-.L. T. . 539 . 1- L.

7.- "046$.671fi6..5.L!53 .51-6."..‘7.0 2.5.7.0. 59.5769 .9 . mm.”

.iuu . . ..7 6W.I(0.PF 670.04.051.53. ...-.7? J72 ..‘h .
. 0! .7-9 “.9 I. . 7.. .v9.7 0. 9.709~..9.99.76§ ! . L .60. 0 ...7-9‘ .0 0.5 I 5' a. 9. 9 .‘9 9.6.999 .9 ?‘ Jph990’ 9.960 r L . .L .L. .L.
.. - ...I\ .65: 6.2.3:. ...7-.9. ..7‘ . r. (7790’. ..L.*Jv ..,.vLL L «uréwfi..—....L . u. ..........L ..L.-.... .... 3...L » ..
- . L ..!- . . I. .769...5 .9.. . VI .9. L . . m. ...~._...,..L.. .7; {.1.-LL... L‘s. 0L......,.L v. .6,f._v.!-..
ll" . v5 .05.- ., L‘ ‘6 . . 6 . 0550.69. ...5. .790.50.06-.
ll 1 7 I
_ I '5'" l7
6 I l! III-r

 

 

LIBRARY
Michigan State
University

 

 

 

This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF TEAM COOPERATION:

DISENTANGLING THE DISCONTINUITY EFFECT

presented by

GUIHYUN PARK

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Ph. D. degree in Psychology

 

/Z///C 002——

 

fil’ Major Professor’s Signature

6/8l?—°\O

 

Date

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer

-._.- -'-'-‘-'-'-4‘-O—Ai . - ..-—.Hr<

 

 

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
To AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SIOB K:IProj/Aoc&Pres/CIRCIDateDue.indd

 

A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF TEAM COOPERATION: DISENTANGLING THE
DISCONTINUITY EFFECT
By

Guihyun Park

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILSOPHY

Psychology

2010

ABSTRACT

A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF TEAM COOPERATION: DISENTANGLING THE
DISCONTINUITY EFFECT
By

Guihyun Park

There are robust findings in the interteam literature that suggest interteam
relationships are more competitive than interpersonal relationships (i.e., group
discontinuity effect). Previous studies suggest that allowing intra-team communication
increases the team discontinuity effect because having communication among team
members strengthens in-group favoritism norms. Drawing on the Information Sampling
Theory (Stasser, 1989) and Social Decision Making Theory (Kerr, 2001), I argue that
communication among team members sways groups to compete more because members
are more likely to focus on sharing more popular opinions to compete than opinions to
cooperate. Accordingly, I propose that having team discussion interventions that
facilitates a discussion of cooperative opinions will increase team decisions to cooperate.
Specifically, I hypothesized that making teams discuss pros and cons of both
cooperative and competitive decisions will make teams become more cooperative. In
addition, I proposed that having cooperative individuals to speak first during team
discussion will increase team decisions to cooperate. Participants played a Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game for six trials as an individual or a three-person team. In individual
conditions, individuals played PDGs individually. In the control team condition, teams

played the PDGs and each trial allowed for two minutes of team discussion. In the

balanced team condition, teams played PDGs and team members discussed using a
decision guideline. In the cooperative primacy condition, the most cooperative team
members were given opportunity to speak first during team discussion for two minutes
for each trial. Teams competed more than individuals thereby replicating the group
discontinuity effect. Consistent with our prediction, teams with balanced team
discussion made more cooperative choices than teams in the control condition. Teams
with cooperative primacy made the most cooperative choices in the first two trials but
their cooperation rates decreased over time. These results suggest that having team
discussion interventions can potentially allow teams to make more cooperative choices

and decrease the discontinuity effect. Implications and limitations are discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Rick DeShon. He was a constant source of
guidance for this project. I am grateful for his confidence in my abilities, his
willingness to allow me the freedom and time to explore and develop my ideas. I would
also like to thank my committee members, Dan Ilgen, Linn VanDyne and Norb Kerr for
their helpfiJl feedback and continuous support.

I would like to thank you to my family. My parents helped me while I was
running experiments. My husband supported me throughout my graduate school. My
baby motivated me to get a job. They are excellent source of support and love.

Thank you for funny jokes, Gordon. Thank you for being so crazy, Goran.
Thank you for being so cool, James. Thank you for taking my cats, Tamara. Thank you

for the great baby shower, Jen. Thank you for great chats, Kim. Thank you all.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... x
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
REVIEW OF LITERATURE .......................................................................................... 4
The Discontinuity Effect ..................................................................................... 4
Increased Greed in Teams ................................................................................... 6
Decreased identifiability ............................................................................. 6

In-group favoritism norm ............................................................................ 7

Social influence .......................................................................................... 8

Increased Fear in Teams ...................................................................................... 9
Inter-group framing .................................................................................... 9

Expanding Understanding of the Discontinuity Effect ......................................... 9
Finding a solution ....................................................................................... 9

Team decision-making framework ............................................................. 10

Multilevel framework ................................................................................ l 1

Multilevel Dynamics of the Discontinuity Effect ................................................ 12
Top-down process ..................................................................................... 13

Bottom-up process ..................................................................................... 15

Current focus: Bottom-up process of the discontinuity effect ..................... 18

What information is shared? ...................................................................... 19

Shared vs. non-shared information .............................................. 19

Negative information bias ........................................................... 20

How is the information shared? ................................................................ .21

Presenter confidence ................................................................... 2]

Polling order ............................................................................... 22

With whom is the information shared? ....................................................... 23
HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................................. 26
Top-down process ..................................................................................... 26
Identifiability (Hypothesis 1) ....................................................... 26

Social support (Hypothesis 2) ...................................................... 27

In-group norm (Hypothesis 3) ..................................................... 28

Inter-group schemas (Hypothesis 4) ............................................ 29

Bottom-up Process ..................................................................................... 3O

Balanced team discussion (Hypothesis 5) .................................... 30

Negative bias and cooperation (Hypothesis 6) ............................. 32

Expressing cooperative opinions first (Hypothesis 7 & 8) ............ 33

Characteristics of interacting parties (Hypothesis 9) .................... 34

Sequence of Trials (Hypothesis 10) ............................................. 35

METHOD ...................................................................................................................... 36

Task Overview ................................................................................................... 36

Design Overview ................................................................................................ 37
Participants ................................................................................................ 38
Task: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game ............................................................... 38

Procedure ........................................................................................................... 39

Measure (Individual-level) ................................................................................. 45
Demographics .......................................................................................... .45
Social value orientation ............................................................................. 45
Inter-group competition schema ................................................................ .46
Favoritism bias .......................................................................................... 46
Individual greed and fear ........................................................................... 47
Individual preference for each alternative .................................................. 47
Individual decision ............................. ' ....................................................... 47
Confidence ................................................................................................ 47
Perceived identifiability ............................................................................ .47
Social support for the opinion to compete ................................................. .48
Perceived confidence ................................................................................ .48

Measure (Team-level) ........................................................................................ 49
Team-level greed and fear ......................................................................... 49
Team decision .......................................................................................... .50
Team preference for each alternative ........................................................ .50
Perceived negative information .................................................................. 50

Manipulation Checks ......................................................................................... 50
Balanced team discussion intervention ...................................................... 50
Cooperation primacy intervention ............................................................. .51

RESULTS ..................................................................................................................... 52

Between-individual Correlation Patterns ............................................................ 52
Condition, .................................................................................................. 52
Demographics ........................................................................................... 52
Social value orientation ............................................................................. 53
Greed, fear, and decision ........................................................................... 53
Confidence ................................................................................................ 54
Social support for decisions ....................................................................... 54

Within-individual Correlation Patterns ....... ........................................................ 54

Between-team Correlation Patterns ..................................................................... 55

Within-team Correlation Patterns ....................................................................... 55

Preliminary Examination of Competition Rates .................................................. 56

Analysis Overview ............................................................................................. 57
Hypothesis 1 .............................................................................................. 58
Hypothesis 2 .............................................................................................. 6O
Hypothesis 3 .............................................................................................. 61
Hypothesis 4 .............................................................................................. 62
Hypothesis 5 .............................................................................................. 62
Hypothesis 6 .............................................................................................. 63
Hypothesis 7 .............................................................................................. 64

vi

Hypothesis 8 .............................................................................................. 65

Hypothesis 9 .............................................................................................. 65

Hypothesis 10 ............................................................................................ 67
Supplemental Analyses .............................................................................. 67
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................ 69
Top-down Effect ................................................................................................ 70
Bottom-up Effect ................................................................................................ 72
Balanced team discussion ......................................................................... .73
Cooperation primacy ................................................................................. 74

Individual cooperativeness ......................................................................... 75

Unexpected Results ............................................................................................ 76
Competition rates in majority-rule teams ................................................... 76

Confidence of competitive individual ........................................................ 78
Non-convergence of greed and fear over time ............................................ 80
Implications and Future Directions ..................................................................... 82
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 112
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 102
Appendix A — Summary of Experimental Design ............................................. 102
Appendix B] — Individual Decision Making Sheet 1 ........................................ 103
Appendix B2 — Individual Decision Making Sheet 2 ........................................ 104
Appendix B3 - Team Decision Making Sheet .................................................. 105
Appendix C — Process Measure 1 ..................................................................... 106
Appendix D — Process Measure 2 ..................................................................... 107
Appendix E — Group Discussion Guideline ....................................................... 108
Appendix F —- Inter-group Schema .................................................................... 109
Appendix G — In-group Favoritism Bias ........................................................... 1 10
Appendix H — Exit Survey ................................................................................ 1 1 1

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Between-and Within-individual Correlations Among Study Variables .............. 89
Table 2. Between- and Within-team Correlations Among Study Variables ..................... 90
Table 3. Effects of Perceived Identifiability on Individual-level Greed and Fear ............ 91

Table 4. Effects of Individual-level Greed and Fear on Preference Ratings for Each
Decisions and Actual Decision ....................................................................................... 91

Table 5. Effects of Social Support for Competitive Decision on Individual-level Greed

and Fear ......................................................................................................................... 92
Table 6. Effects of Social Support for Each Decisions on Individual-level Greed and

Fear. .............................................................................................................................. 92
Table 7. Effects of In-group Favoritism on Individual-level Greed and Fear .................. 93
Table 8. Effects of inter-team Scheme on Individual-level Greed and Fear ..................... 93

Table 9. Effects of Balanced Discussion on Team Decision and Preference Ratings for

Each Decision ................................................................................................................ 94
Table 10. Effect of Balanced Discussion on Team Fear and Greed ................................ .94
Table 11. Effect of Team Greed and Fear on Team Decision ........................................... 94
Table 12. Effect of Sharing Negative Information on Team Fear and Greed ................... 95
Table 13. Effects of Team Greed and Fear on Team Decisions and Preference

Ratings. . . . ..................................................................................................................... 95
Table 14. Effects of Perceived Confidence on Team Fear and Greed ........................... 96
Table 15. Effects of Perceived Confidence on Team Decision ..................................... 96
Table 16. Effect of Cooperation Primacy on Team Fear and Greed ............................. 97
Table 17. Effect of Cooperation Primacy on Team Decision and Preference Ratings for
Each Decision .......................................................................................................... 97
Table 18. Effect of Team Greed and Fear on Team Decision ...................................... .97
Table 19. Effect of Each Member’s Preference Ratings on Team Fear and Greed . .. ..98

viii

Table 20. Effect of Each Member Decision on Team P ear and Greed .......................... 98

Table 21. Effect of Average Prosocial and Competitive Disposition on Team Member
Greed and Fear . ........................................................................................................... 98

Table 22. Effect of Team Greed and Fear on Team Decisions and Preference Ratings
. ................................................................................................................................... 99

Table 23. Effect of Team Interaction on Team Greed, Fear and Team Decisions .100

Table 24. Within-team Standard Deviations Over Time ............................................. 102

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. The Multilevel Model of Team Discontinuity Effect ....................................... 87

Figure 2. Competition Rates Over Time Per Condition .................................................. 88

INTRODUCTION

Technological and economic trends are rapidly changing the structure of work in
modern organizations (Risher, & Fay, 1995). To adapt to the ever-changing business
environment, organizations need to find ways to effectively coordinate their human
resources. Accordingly, the traditional way of running organizations through
segmenting labor into several specialized tasks to attain efficiency is becoming
obsolete. Instead, team-based work systems are becoming the most popular solution for
today’s organizations to manage employees effectively (West, 2003). Compared to the
traditional hierarchical business structure, team-based work systems enable
organizations to work faster and more effectively, allowing them to respond more
quickly to fast-changing environments (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Using team-based
system, employees can easily learn from each other as they are working together, which
helps organizations to increase productivity.

As team-based work is becoming a norm for many organizations, cooperation
among teams is critical to organizational success. When teams cooperate within an
organization, the organization is more likely to achieve its objectives, and the teams are
more likely to improve their performance. In contrast, when teams compete within an
organization, the organization is less likely to attain optimal performance that leverages
available resources, and teams limit their own performance level (West, 2003).

Many scholars have sought to find ways to effectively coordinate multiple teams in
organizations. For example, Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, and Alonso (2005)

suggest a conceptual framework for multi-team systems that emphasizes the goal

interdependency between teams so as to aid in the establishment of effective inter-team
coordination. In a similar vein, DeChurch and Marks (2006) argue that strategic
coordination activities between teams play an important role in the success of inter-team
coordination in organizations.

Notwithstanding the significance of team cooperation for the success of
organizations, teams often find themselves in the position of competing for resources
within an organization (e. g., Rutte, 1990; Mannix, 1991). For example, teams may
compete with each other over budgeting. Because an organization has a fixed amount of
monetary resources to distribute, winning a higher budget may increase the team’s
capacity to perform and give them relative advantages over other teams. In a similar
vein, while organizations often encourage the sharing of information among teams to
maximize organizational learning, teams may be reluctant to do to so if they perceive
that sharing information could undermine their status in the organization (Brewer &
Schneider, 1990).

To make matters worse, inter-team interactions are generally more competitive
and less cooperative than interpersonal interactions. Groups are less trusting and less
trustworthy in their interactions with other groups than individuals (Insko et a1, 2001).
Furthermore, a group is more likely to choose to compete and take advantage of trustful
opponents (W ildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Even in the case of an oral agreement
between two parties to cooperate, groups have been found to be more likely to break
such agreements and betray the opponent by choosing competition options (Insko et a1,
1993). This surge of competitiveness in inter-group relationships is called the group

discontinuity effect (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). Researchers

have suggested that between-group relationships involve at least two additional factors
that cause the discontinuity effect. Specifically, there is a greed factor, which appears to
manifest itself when people believe they have a shield of anonymity, and a fear factor,
which states that a team is more aggressive than any one individual within it (W ildschut
et al, 2003). Both these factors cause groups to act far more competitively and
aggressively toward other groups than an individual would be expected to behave
towards another individual.

The existence of the discontinuity effect in inter-group interactions implies
increased difficulty in promoting cooperative relationships among teams in
organizations. For example, work teams may overuse resources—a strategy that
benefits them, but hurts other teams and the company as a whole. Rutte (1990) reports
inter-team conflicts in a multinational company where teams of researchers abuse the
priority system and compete for laboratory facilities. Mannix (1991) observed that
groups in organizations are often in competition for resources, which, in turn, leads to
inefficient use of resources and suboptimal collective outcomes for the organization.

While it has been widely argued that building trust is the most promising way to
increase cooperation in organizations (e.g., McAllister, 1995; Robinson, 1996), the
discontinuity effect suggests that groups have a tendency to compete more when they
have a high level of trust in the opponent’s goodwill, which facilitates greed-driven
mechanisms (e.g., Insko, Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005; Insko et al, 2001 ).
Insko et a1 (2001) suggested that since teams are more likely to become disloyal to
trustful opponents, trust among teams does not necessarily lead to cooperative

relationships. In a series of experiments involving 181 participants, Insko (2005)

supported this hypothesis by demonstrating that increased trust in an opponent also
increased a group’s tendency to compete against that trusting opponent. Ironically then,
the discontinuity effect appears to negate inter-team trust-building as a mechanism for
improving cooperation among teams, as the process actually fuels the flames of
competition rather than dousing them.

The purpose of the current paper is to develop a theoretical model of the
discontinuity effect in order to attain a better understanding of why teams are more
competitive than individuals. Before attempting this theoretical development, I will
address the limitations of the approaches adopted by current researchers studying the
discontinuity effect, including previously suggested causes of the effect and findings
from a meta-analysis conducted by Widschut et al (2003). I then present and outline two
major frameworks for better understanding the discontinuity effect. Following these
descriptions, I develop a multilevel model of the discontinuity effect in which I
delineate the dynamic emergence of team-level competitiveness and discuss the relevant
hypotheses. Applying the approach taken by Ilgen (1999), the current paper treats small
groups and teams as interchangeable and defines them as collectively composed of two
or more individuals who (a) interact, (b) are interdependent, and (0) share some

common objectives (Ilgen, 1999; pp. 129).

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The Discontinuity Effect
Wildschut et a1. (2003) demonstrated that the team discontinuity effect is a

robust phenomenon. They meta-analyzed 130 studies comparing individuals and teams

making cooperative and competitive decisions toward other individuals or teams. They
found significant increases in competitiveness among inter-team interactions. While
communication among individuals significantly increased cooperation, communication
among teams did not improve cooperation in inter-team relationships (Wildschut et al .,
2003), suggesting that individuals in teams are less trustful of opponent teams. The
meta-analysis also found that the discontinuity effect was greater when group members
were instructed to interact and reach a consensus than when they are not allowed to
interact as a group, suggesting that social interaction facilitates an individual’s
willingness to compete.

Applying social dilemma concepts (e.g., Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977; Dawes,
1980), scholars who study the discontinuity effect suggest that individual greed and fear
are key determinants of cooperative or competitive behaviors. Greed indicates one’s
willingness to take advantage of an opponent’s goodwill, while fear indicates one’s
desire to avoid being taken advantage of by the opponent. In relation to the
discontinuity effect, then, individuals in a team perceive greater fear and greed relative
to individuals who are not in a team, thus leading the team to act more competitively
than they would act as individuals. The increased greed indicates that individuals in a
team are more likely to take advantage of the opponent’s goodwill and choose to
compete with other teams in order to maximize their status. An increase in fear suggests
that inter-group situations prime individuals to be more apprehensive about an
opponent’s ruthless behaviors (i.e., competitive choice), thereby encouraging
competition as a defense mechanism. Building on the greed-fear approach, scholars

further delineate four team-specific factors that contribute to the increased greed and

fear of individuals in a team (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). In the following section, the

specific factors contributing to increased fear and greed approach are discussed.

Increased Greed in Teams

Decreased identifiability. A group context provides a shield of anonymity,
which induces individuals to act based on their own self-interests. Thus, when
individuals become a member of a group, the added anonymity provides a layer of
protection that makes his/her actions less identifiable to those outside of the group.
Accordingly, because individuals are not easily identifiable, they feel less accountable
and less responsible for their behaviors and are freer to compete with an opponent rather
than cooperate. In a similar vein, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) argue that the
reason why individuals in groups become more aggressive and display uninhibited
behaviors is that the decreased identifiability provided by the group decreases concerns
for any ethical evaluations of the actions of group members, thereby freeing them to
behave as competitively as they would like.

Due to the shield of anonymity in a group, individuals are less influenced by
social norms of fairness and reciprocity, which increases their intent to compete with
opponents instead of cooperate (Schopler, Insko, Drigotas, Wisequist, Pemberton, &
Cox, 1995). Schopler et a1. (1995) suggest that the extent to which members’ names are
identifiable affect a group’s decision to cooperate with other groups. In their
experiment, group members were told that they were playing a social dilemma game
against another group. Each member of the three-person group was separately seated in

a cubicle to prevent social interaction and told that their individual vote (compete vs.

cooperate) would be aggregated by majority rule in order to make the final team
decision. In the non-identifiable condition (in which individuals’ identities were not
available to the out-group), group members were more likely to vote for competition
and less likely to vote for cooperation compared to the identifiable condition.

lkgroup favoritism norm. Another line of research suggests that the
discontinuity effect is also caused by a general norm of in—group favoritism that dictates
inter-group competition (Brewer & Brown, 1998). That is, individuals show a reliable
tendency to favor in-groups versus out-groups. Thus, even in a situation where
individuals can choose to maximize outcomes for both in-group and out-group
members, they often choose to maximize between-group differences in outcomes
(Tajfel, 1982). Even in a situation in which individuals have to choose between
maximizing group differences and favoring both groups in the absolute sense,
individuals choose to maximize the between-group differences (Taj fel, 1982).

Being a group member decreases individual sensitivity toward the fairness norm
and increases individual sensitivity toward the in-group favoritism norm, which causes
individuals to become competitive toward the opponent. The in-group favoritism norm
dictates that one should take into account the interest of one’s own group before the
interests of other groups (Horwitz, & Rabbie, 1982). In—group-favoring contrasts with
the norms of fairness and reciprocity that play an important role in inter-individual
relations (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Therefore, moral codes for group
members do not demand benevolent behaviors toward the opponent. Instead,

individuals are governed by the code of in-group favoritism, which encourages them to

do what is best for their in-group regardless of how much the opponent may suffer as a
consequence (Ridley, 1996).

Social influence. Teams can also become more competitive through social
influence processes. Unlike an individual who does not have social support for his/her
decision, group members who collectively make decisions are subject to social
influence during group discussion. Accordingly, things that happen during group
discussion can sway groups to prefer one decision over the other. The social support
that group members can offer for self-interested pursuit thus provides an important
source of reinforcement for competitive behaviors that would otherwise not be present
during interpersonal interactions (Wildschut, Insko, Gaertner, 2002).

In their study, Morgan and Tindale (2002) found that the option to compete is
more influential than the decision to cooperate during group discussion. In the
experiment, group members were asked to make an initial individual decision on
whether or not to cooperate with an opponent group, after which they engaged in
discussion with their other group members to reach a final team decision. The
researchers found that although the majority of individually-reached decisions preferred
cooperation prior to group discussion, the discussion process revealed that competition
was an easier position to defend than was cooperation. Thus, not only were majorities
that favored defection (competition) rarely overridden, but minorities favoring defection
were successful more often than not. The line of evidence discussed above suggests that
the social influence process favoring the option to compete creates greater

competitiveness in teams than in individuals.

Increased Fear in Teams;

Inter-group framing. Some scholars suggest that context-specific factors make
inter-group relationships become more competitive. For example, Insko, Schopler,
Hoyle, Dardis, and Graetz (1990) suggest that group context activates individual fear-
related group schema, which generates competitiveness toward groups. That is,
individuals have a learned belief or expectation that inter-group relations are
competitive and that the out-group is not to be trusted. Consequently, individuals’
anticipation of inter-group competition beget a self-fulfilling prophecy, such that one
believes that the other party intends to choose competition in order to avoid potential
loss (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).

Similarly, Campbell (1967) suggests that individuals possess negative
stereotypes towards out-groups. People expect inter-group interaction to be more
competitive, boastful, and non-trustworthy than inter-individual interactions (Holyle,
Pinkley, & Insko, 1989). The attributed distrust against the out-group makes people
perceive less control over the behaviors of the out-group, thereby increasing their
tendency to defend themselves against being taken advantage of. Therefore, individuals’
anticipation of inter-group competition creates a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby
competition is preferred simply because it is believed that other party will act
competitively as well (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).

E_xp_anding Understanding of the Discontinuity Effect

Findiw solution. Although studies discussing the discontinuity effect provide

explanations for the increased competition between groups, they do not specify a

solution for the problem. While their meta-analysis reveals general evidence of

increased competitiveness at the group-level, Wildschut et a1 (2003) do not provide
information on the specific mechanism that is responsible for the discontinuity effect.
Therefore, there is still a lack of understanding regarding how to adequately resolve the
problem of managing inter-group cooperation. In a similar vein, Wildschut and Insko
(2007) reviewed the different factors contributing to the discontinuity effect (e. g, in-
group favoritism, identifiability) are suggested, little is known about how those factors
are related to each other and how they influence inter-team discontinuity.

In his review of the social dilemma literature, Kollock (1998) warned against the
danger of having too many factors explaining cooperation without building a systematic
framework to understand the mechanism. He argued that “there is nothing to keep a
researcher from examining the effect of eye color or pounds of meat consumed on
cooperation rate, and some studies have come close to such esoterica” (pp. 207). To
better understand the discontinuity effect, it would be best to think systematically about
which situations and variables are most important in producing the effect rather. than
building a list of variables that are related to the effect. Therefore, the different factors
that explain the discontinuity effect need to be disentangled in order to find ways to
increase cooperation among teams. To help organizations promote cooperation among
teams, more concrete and step-by-step conceptualizations of the discontinuity effect are
needed.

Team decision-mam framework. This paper argues that the complex
phenomenon related to the discontinuity effect can be understood as an accumulation of
different team decision-making processes. Kerr (2000) argues that differences between

individual and group outcomes can be analyzed by distinguishing what individual group

10

members bring to the group and what takes place during group interactions. Unlike the
cooperation decision in an interpersonal context, where individuals make their own
decisions, inter—team cooperation involves moving towards a sufficient level of
agreement. In other words, each individual has their own preference for cooperation or
competition that could lead to their final decision in an interpersonal context. In a team
context, however, individuals are expected to discuss their preferences with other
members in order to yield a consensus. Therefore, the discontinuity effect can be
understood as a team decision-making process that moves team consensus toward
competition or cooperation.

In support of this notion, there is some evidence suggesting that the
discontinuity effect can be understood as an accumulation of team decision-making
steps. Wildschut, Insko, and Pinter (2007) demonstrate that the discontinuity effect can
be driven by the anticipation of inter-group and in-group interactions. In their research,
participants made individual decisions to cooperate with the opposing team. When
participants did not expect to interact with other group members, their decision was
more cooperative. In a similar experiment by Morgan and Tindale (2003), participants
made individual cooperation decisions before engaging in group discussion. They found
that the team discussion led to more competitive decisions. Although the majority of
individuals preferred cooperation prior to group discussion, most members chose
competition after discussion. Thus, the discontinuity effect can be better understood
from a team decision-making perspective.

Multilevel framework. While the current approach to the discontinuity effect

successfully identifies contributing factors, no attempt has been made to understand

11

multilevel implications. However, it is important to recognize that the process by which
a team makes cooperative decisions involves a set of multilevel mechanisms. That is,
team—level decisions to cooperate are integrated through multilevel processes involving
top-down contextual effect processes and bottom-up emergent processes related to
distinct cognitive, social, and motivational factors. Unlike individuals who make
decisions on their own, team members are subject to the context that is set by the team,
which includes a new set of norms and expectations (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick,
2004). As a team member, an individual is subject to the effect of team-level cues that
influence their decision to cooperate (i.e., a top down process). Through the process of
social interaction, team members share their individual opinions and perceptions, which
emerge as a team-level decision to cooperate (i.e., a bottom up process). While it is
quite possible that such mechanisms interact to create the discontinuity effect, we
cannot firlly understand or predict inter-team cooperative versus competitive decisions
without specifying the multilevel processes involved when an individual becomes a
team member. Consequently, building a multilevel dynamic model delineating each
process will reveal under what conditions teams decide to cOOperate. Accordingly, to
find ways to increase cooperation among teams, this paper proposes a multilevel
dynamic model of the discontinuity effect that can be tested and falsified.
Multilevel Dynamics of the Discontinuity Effect

In order to better understand the team discontinuity effect, the current focus
must extend beyond the contextual effects of groups on individual-level greed and fear.
The model of the discontinuity effect must explicitly address how individuals acting as

a team can dynamically affect greed and fear at the team-level as well as the team’s

12

decision to cooperate. The core constructs in the model are greed and fear at both the
individual and team levels of analysis. Individual-level greed represents the extent to
which an individual wants to take advantage of the opponent’s good will, while
individual-level fear represents the extent to which an individual wants to avoid being
taken advantage of by the opponent. Team-level greed represents a shared perception of
team members concerning the team’s willingness to take advantage of the opponent’s
good will, while team-level fear represents a shared perception of team members desire
to avoiding being taken advantage of by the opponent.

Top down process. Figure 1 illustrates the multilevel model of the team
discontinuity effect. Each circle in the model represents an individual-level process.
Each team member has individual levels of greed and fear, which determine an
individual’s preference for cooperation. For instance, an individual with a high level of
greed or fear is more likely to choose to compete than to cooperate (Pruitt & Kimmel,
197 7). In the model, the circles representing individual-level processes are placed
within a larger circle representing team context, which indicates the effect of team
contextual cues on individual-level phenomena. Once an individual is placed in a team,
individual greed and fear are subject to contextual cues, which influence preferences for
cooperation. For instance when perceiving a shield of anonymity, an individual is more
likely to be greedy and thus he/she is more likely to compete (Schopler & Insko, 1995).
This phenomenon is a top-down process that focuses on the effect of hi gher-level cues,
such as team contexts or team-level norms, on individual-level processes.

Organizational scholars have long acknowledged the key role of higher-level

variables in establishing individual-level phenomenon. For instance, Ostroff and

13

Kozlowski (1992) found that newcomers in organizations adjusted their behaviors to
match their new organizational settings, which increased satisfaction and decreased
stress. Similarly, Denison (1996) argues that organizational culture determines accepted
patterns of employee interaction and behavior. Kozlowski and Klein (2000) define a
top-down process as a phenomenon in which higher-level features determine individual
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors

Similarly, a team member’s decision to cooperate also depends on team-level
contextual cues. Weber, Kopelman, and Messick (2004) argue that one’s decision to
cooperate heavily depends on contextual cues; that is, an individual considers
situational features when determining the appropriateness of making a decision to
cooperate. Individuals must recognize and classify the type of situation that they are
encountering and then apply appropriate rules to guide their choices. For instance, team-
level features, such as reward structure, decision rules, salient norms, and group sizes,
may influence the appropriate rules for decision-making, which in turn influences one's
willingness to choose competition versus cooperation (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick,
2004)

Team-level characteristics influence individual-level processes through
conscious sense-making, as team members try to meet the expectations of being a group
member. People in organizations encounter numerous events and must perceive these
events in coherent sets in order to react properly (Louis, 1980; Morrison, 1993). Thus,
individuals need an appropriate frame of reference to interpret their environmental cues
and direct their behavior in order to successfully adapt to their environment (Berger &

Luckmann, 1967). Individual adaptation to the team environment is the process by

14

which members establish roles and guidelines that are consistent with team expectations
and values (Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 2000).

Conforming to group expectations satisfies individuals’ need for social approval
(Merton & Kitt, 1950). Individuals are motivated to affiliate with their groups; as a
result, they strive for other group members’ approval of their behaviors (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). In addition, individuals adjust their psychological and behavioral
responses in order to be recognized as valid group members (Schneider, 1975). Through
this process, individual-level phenomena are affected by group-level characteristics. For
example, individuals who perceive differences between their values and goals and those
of the team will often adjust their behaviors to better match the values and goals of the
team (Dragoni, 2005).

Based on the evidence above, a top-down explanation for the discontinuity
effect can be constructed. Because being in a team imposes a new set of norms,
individuals who become team members adjust their behavioral responses to the
situational context in order to satisfy affiliation motives. For example, the in-group
favoritism norm dictates that individuals behave in ways that benefit the team. Group
members should thus be sensitive to this new norm and will be motivated to gain social
approval from other members by behaving competitively toward opposing teams. In this
sense, individuals adjust their individual-level of greed to align with new norms
imposed by the team context, which ultimately affects their individual decision to
cooperate.

Bottom-up process. The emergent team-level phenomenon of greed and fear is a

result of dynamic processes among individuals and is represented in the model by the

15

action arrows. As individuals in a team interact with one another, they share their
attitudes and Opinions, which may converge over time as consensual views of the team
(Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992). Through interaction, team members influence each
other’s perceptions and preferences for cooperation, which, in turn, lead to consensus
for team-level greed and fear as well as the team decision to cooperate. This process is a
bottom-up phenomenon that focuses on how individuals interact to yield team-level
greed and fear, which leads to the team decision to cooperate.

Although team-level factors can be the antecedents of individual-level
perceptions and behaviors, individuals in teams do not exist in a vacuum. They interact,
sharing attitudes and opinions that may converge over time (James, 1982; Kozlowski, &
Hattrup, 1992). The bottom-up process represents the emergence of a higher-level
collective phenomenon that results from dynamic interactions among individuals
(Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Through social interactions, individuals influence one
another, and individual-level perceptions are shared among members; these shared
perceptions represent emergent characteristics of the group (Jones & James, 1979;
Chan, 1998). Kozlowski and Klein (2000) argued that higher-level phenomena in
organizations have their origins in cognition, affect, and behavior at the individual level,
which become amplified at higher level through social interaction.

This process of emergence has been applied to explain a wide variety of social
phenomena including organizational climate, team learning, and social influence (e. g,
Schneider and Reichers, 1983; Kozlowski et al., 2000; Vallacher, Read, & Nowak,
2002). For instance, Schneider and Reichers (1983) describe work group climate as an

emergent phenomenon created by social interactions that allow group members to

16

produce a shared interpretation of the group environment. Interactions among group
members thus provide opportunities to discuss individual interpretations of group-level
characteristics. As a result of social interaction, a negotiated understanding of work
group characteristics emerges that often does not reflect any one group member’s exact
personal perceptions (see also, Rentch, 1990). In their theory of the team learning
process, Kozlowski et a1. (2000) argued that individual-level learning emerges as team-
level learning through interactions among individuals and the integration of their unique
skills and knowledge. Team-level learning represents more than the sum of individual-
level learning; it is a combination of individual-level learning and coordination
processes among individual members.

In the beginning of their team tenure, individuals may view their teams as
having a high or low level of greed. Through the process of social interaction, team
members share their individual perceptions and opinions. Over time, individuals begin
to reach a consensus about the perceptions of greed or fear within a team, which, in
turn, influence the team-level decision to cooperate. Therefore, even if the members
initially disagree with one another, there remains a tendency for uniform team-level
perceptions to emerge over time (V allacher, Nowak, & Miller, 2003). Such emergent
views of team-level greed and fear are the results of the facilitate team decision-making
processes and help the team reach a consensus on their decision to cooperate.

Social interaction processes facilitate development of distinct team levels of
greed, fear and decision preferences. Emergent team-level attitudes can be more
extreme than individual-level attitudes, reflecting polarization, or they can be totally

different, reflecting a non-linear emergence process (V allacher & Nowak, 2007; Macy,

17

Kitts, Flache, Benard, 2003). As already discussed, researchers have found that social
interactions often result in asymmetric emergent processes that can sway teams to prefer
competition over cooperation, yielding the team discontinuity effect. Given the
evidence that the competitive decision is more influential than the cooperative decision
during social interaction in an intergroup context, understanding how such a social
interaction process unfolds is critical for finding ways to decrease the team
discontinuity effect (W ildshut et a1, 2003).

In sum, the complex phenomenon of the discontinuity effect can be understood
as an accumulation of different processes that all simultaneously push teams to become
more competitive. As a team member, an individual is subject to the effect of team-level
cues on individual-level processes. At the same time, through interactions among team
members, individuals impact team-level phenomena such as team-level greed and fear
as well as the subsequent team decisions to compete or to cooperate. Because emergent
team phenomena (i.e., team-level greed, fear, and decisions) play a role in team
contextual cues, they also, in turn, influence individual-level processes. Thus, the team
discontinuity effect dynamically evolves over time as individuals in teams are
continuously influenced by the team context and team member interactions influence
team-level phenomena.

Current focus: the bottom-up process of the discontinuity effect. While studies
of the discontinuity effect have suggested that social interaction facilitates team
members to prefer competition over cooperation, therefore yielding team-level
competitiveness, systematic investigation of the bottom-up process is limited. This

constitutes a void in our scientific knowledge on the team discontinuity effect, which

18

makes it difficult to understand how and why social interaction results in team
competitiveness. This paper is the first attempt to examine the bottom-up processes of
the discontinuity effect by specifying ways in which interactions among team members
contributes to the emergence of greater competitiveness at the team-level.

Applying the concepts of group communication processes (W ittenbaum et al;
2004), the current paper specifies social interaction in terms of three components, each
of which contributes to the emergence of greater competitiveness at the team-level.
Specifically, social interaction processes can be classified by 1) what information is
shared during the interaction (i.e., the content of social interactions), 2) how the
information is shared during the interaction (i.e., the style of social interactions), and 3)
to whom the information is shared during the interaction (i.e., the players of social
interactions). The pattern that is formed through interactions among members
influences the emergence of team-level cooperation and competition. In the next
section, I will explain how each component of these interaction processes can contribute
to the team discontinuity effect.

What Information is Shared?

 

Shared vs. non-shared information. Individuals in teams are more likely to share
opinions and attitudes favoring competition, which, in turn, lead teams to discuss
information favoring competition and ultimately make the decision to compete. In
general, groups demonstrate a bias toward discussing more shared information versus
non-shared information, yielding group—level decisions that favor shared information.
Using the information sampling model, Stasser and Titus (1985) argued that shared

information has a sampling advantage over unshared information and a greater chance

19

of being mentioned during discussion. Information that is not widely shared by
members (e.g., minority opinions) is often treated as invalid and fails to receive
attention from group members (Stasser et al., 1999). The shared information bias thus
influences groups to make decisions that are weigh shared information heavily.

If people believe that opinions favoring competition are widely shared in a team
context, the likelihood that that team members will choose and speak up to compete is
increased. The empirical evidence suggests that because team members tend to favor
the in-group, they will be more likely to encourage other members to compete
(W ildshut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). By sharing opinions that fit with in-group norms,
individuals are more likely to be accepted by their team members, which in turn,
satisfies their need for belongness and protect their self-esteem (Wittenbaum, Hubbell,
& Zuckerman, 1999). Since opinions to compete are considered a better fit with the in-
group favoritism norm, the team’s tendency to focus on discussing competitive opinions
would push team-level decisions toward competitiveness and away from cooperation.

majve information bias. When arguments to cOOperate or to compete are
presented during group discussion, competitive arguments tend to ne more influential,
as they utilize fear against possible negative outcomes. Cacioppo and Bemston (1994)
suggest that people have a negativity bias, meaning that they show greater sensitivity to
negative information. Studies suggest that negative information is weighted more
heavily in the brain compared to positive information. Individuals pay more attention to,
retain more information from, and are influenced to a greater degree by negative
information (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Peeters, & Czapinski, 1990).

Similarly, Prospect Theory argues that individuals weigh possible loss more heavily

20

than possible gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Das, De Wit, and Strobe (2003) find
that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by the fear of losing than by the hope of
gaining, due to the cognitive bias favoring fear.

The negativity bias works in favor of the competition argument. Wildshut et al.
(2003) argued that there is an increased fear that the opponent will not reciprocate
cooperative behaviors in inter-team relations. Therefore, teams prefer to compete due to
the fear of their goodwill being taken advantage of by the opponent (Insko et a1, 1990).
Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, and Graetz (1990) found that groups who discuss their
distrust of the opponent are less likely to cooperate, which contributes to the group
discontinuity effect. Interactions among members allow the negativity bias to be a
factor in the team-level decision process. If one individual chooses to compete while the
two other group members choose to cooperate, the competing individual has the
opportunity to take advantage of the negativity bias; cooperative individuals do not have
such a chance, leading competing individuals to become more influential during social
interaction.

How is the Informagon Shared?

Presenter confidence. Individuals who discuss their desire to compete in a group
often also receive more positive responses from other members as a result of the in-
group favoritism norm. This positive reinforcement, in tum, solidifies their position to
compete and engenders a greater sense of confidence in that opinion. When an
individual speaks his/her opinion in a confident manner, that individual then becomes
more likely to influence others. Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) demonstrate that

individuals are more willing to listen to opinions that are presented in a confident

21

manner. Similarly, Kerr (2001) emphasizes the importance of a confident behavioral
style for a minority faction in order to overcome their lack of popularity (See also
Johnson, Torcivia, & Poprick, 1968).

Because people often assess the accuracy and appropriateness of their thoughts
through comparison with others (F estinger, 1954), an individual’s confidence in their
opinion often depends on responses from others. A study by Julian, Regula, and
Hollander (1968) manipulated the extent to which teammates agreed on participants’
opinions. They found that the agreement positively influenced individual confidence in
the task, suggesting that confidence is a function of agreement made by normative
standards. Individuals in a team may perceive opinions to compete as well accepted by
other team members, because these opinions are consistent with the in-group favoritism
norm. Therefore, the competitive argument become more persuasive in a team context,
because those who are arguing for the compete decision can confidently present their
ideas.

Pollig order. In a similar manner, it could also be the case that the high
confidence of competitive individuals leads them to speak first, yielding greater
influence on others. Previous studies suggest that the individual who speaks first during
a group discussion is also more likely to influence others. French (1956) suggests that
the individual who speaks first in an interaction sequence will have more influence than
those who speak later. In their information sharing theory, Stasser and Titus (1985)
argue that the information mentioned in the initial stages of team discussion is more
likely to influence the team’s decision. Carslon (1977) also observed that during team

discussion, people who speak first generally retain their initial opinion whereas

22

subsequent speakers were more likely to modify their opinions toward the opinions of
earlier speakers. Thus the opinion spoken first appears to establish a preliminary norm,
to which subsequent speakers then conform.

Competitive individuals are more likely to speak first, because they are more
confident than cooperative individuals. According to Van Knippenberg, van
Knippenberg, and van Dijk (2000), when an individual believes that there is a high
likelihood of his/her opinion being perceived favorably by others, they are more likely
to speak first during discussion. In contrast, individuals who are unsure about how their
opinions will be perceived are more likely to wait for others to speak first (Gurnee,

193 7). As previously discussed, the opinion to compete is expected to be well accepted
by other members in teams, because it is more likely to be shared by other members, fits
with the in—group favoritism norm, and utilizes the negativity bias. Consequently,
individuals with competition decisions are more likely to have confidence in their
opinion and to speak first during discussion, which, in turn, may affect teams’ decision
to compete rather than cooperate.

With Whom is the Information Shared?

Teams are more likely to choose to compete because individuals with
cooperative opinions are more likely to be influenced by others. Social interaction is a
bidirectional process—everyone involved in a social interaction is an actor who exerts
influence on others. Vallacher, Nowak, Miller (2003) suggested that the characteristics
of an individual play important roles in the social interaction process. One of the most
relevant individual difference characteristics in social interaction is flexibility and Open-

mindedness. In their simulation study of social interaction, Macy, Kitts, Flache, and

23

Benard (2003) found that individual open-mindedness affected the extent to which a
person was influenced by others’ opinions during social interaction, which ultimately
influenced the emergence of a group norm.

Van Lange and Messick (1996) suggested that individuals who tend to choose
cooperative decisions value other’s outcomes as well as their own; that is, they show
accommodating behaviors toward others. Troetschel, Simon, Gollwitzer and Huffeier
(2005) suggested that cooperative individuals are better at perspective-taking in a
negotiation situation and showed frequent concession with their partners, yielding
higher integrative solutions relative to competitive individuals. By nature, cooperative
individuals are more considerate of other people’s perspectives and more likely to be
influenced by others’ opinions than competitive individuals. Therefore, during social
interaction, individuals with cooperative opinions are more likely to concede to
individuals with competitive opinions thereby allowing the team to choose to compete.

The previous section specified the bottom—up process of the discontinuity effect.
In the bottom-up process, individuals play active roles in influencing the team-level
decision to cooperate through their interactions with other members. As team members
interact to reach a consensus on their team decision, they share individual opinions and
perspectives and express individual levels of greed and fear. Interactions among
individuals provide an opportunity to negotiate a shared view of teams and to reach a
consensus on team decisions to cooperate or compete. In addition, the current paper
suggests different ways that the bottom-up processes of the discontinuity effect unfolds,
such as social interaction among team members (which involves the content of

information), behavioral styles, and through the characteristics of actors. Depending on

24

each component, the interactions form different patterns that influence the emergence of
team-level cooperative decisions. By no means does the current paper suggest that these
three features are an exhaustive representation of the bottom-up processes of the team
discontinuity effect, but they should increase our understanding of the emergent
processes of team-level competitiveness and ultimately uncover ways to decrease the

team discontinuity effect.

25

HYPOTI-[ESES

Top-down Process

Drawing on the top-down process of the multilevel model of the team
discontinuity effect, the current section presents hypotheses related to team-specific
factors that affect individual-level greed, fear, and preference for cooperative decisions.
Unlike the bottom-up processes, which require interaction among individual members,
the top-down process is triggered simply when an individual becomes a member of a
group. Based on previous literature findings, the current study examines four team-
specific factors that influence individual greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate:
identifiability, the in-group norm, perceived support, and the inter-group scheme.

Identifiabilty. The team context provides a shield of anonymity for members,
making their actions less identifiable. Accordingly, individuals feel less responsible for
their behaviors and increase their competitive intentions. Unlike interpersonal situations
in which an individual is solely responsible for causing harm to the other person,
responsibility in team situations is diffused among members, making it difficult to hold
individuals accountable for their actions (Dawes, 1980).

Evidence suggests that decreased identifiability in a group setting increases
individual greed, facilitating competition. Schopler et a1. (1995) manipulated the
identifiability of individual actions against an opposing team and measured participants’
level of greed and decisions to cooperate. 1n the identified condition, participants were
told that their names and decisions would be available to the opponent; in the non-

identified condition, participants remained anonymous. Individuals in the identified

26

condition reported lower levels of greed and were more likely to choose to cooperate.
Therefore, it is predicted that:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who perceive higher identifiability are more likely to have
lower levels of greed and fear; which in turn, lead to decisions that promote

cooperation.

Social support for competition. Team members can have support for maximizing
shared self-interest from their teammates, which increases greed and competition
(Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). Unlike the in-group favoritism norm hypothesis,
which is based on the belief that most team members prefer competition, the social
support explanation for the discontinuity effect argues that support from a single member
can increase one’s greed and the decision to compete.

Evidence suggests a link between perceived social support for self-interest and
increased competition in team situations. After manipulating perceived social support,
Wildschut, Insko, and Gaertner (2002) measured participant levels of greed and frequency
of cooperation. Individuals were separated and told that they were a member of a five-
person team; then they were asked to make decisions regarding the opposing team. In the
social support condition, individuals were informed of the choices made by two other
individuals on the team: one to compete and one to cooperate. In the no social support
condition, individuals were not informed of the choices made by other team members. As
expected, individuals in the social support condition reported higher levels of greed and

were more likely to choose to compete. Therefore, I predict that:

27

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who have less social support for self—interest behaviors
are more likely to have lower levels of greed and make decisions that promote

cooperation.

In-group norm. Unlike inter-individual relations that are governed in part by the
norms of fairness and reciprocity, inter-team relations are also governed by the norm of
in-group favoritism, which implies increased normative pressure toward behaviors that
benefit the in-group and increased competitive behaviors against the out-group
(W ildschut & Insko, 2007). Being a group member also makes individuals more
sensitive to the in-group favoritism norm, and thereby further encourages pro-group
behaviors while simultaneously stimulating competitive out-group behaviors (Kollock,
1998). In an experiment by Taj fel (1982), participants were divided into two groups on
the basis of a trivial categorization and then asked to allocate monetary rewards to in-
group and out-group members. The results showed that group categorization biased
favoritism toward the in-group.

Insko et al. (2005) also provided evidence that team competition is influenced by in-
group favoritism. In their study, individuals were assigned to a three-person group and
told that they were going to interact with another group. The authors manipulated the
perceived categorization of groups and measured individual greed and decisions to
cooperate. Individuals who believed that they were interacting with an opponent
belonging to a different category reported more greed and were more likely to compete
than individuals who believed they were interacting with an opponent belonging to the

same category. Based on this evidence, it is predicted that:

28

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who perceive a weaker in-group favoritism norm are
more likely to have lower levels of greed and make decisions that promote

cooperation.

Inter-group schemas. Individuals in teams have greater fear and are more likely to
compete because of their generalized beliefs that out-groups are competitive, deceitful, and
aggressive (Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990). Hoyle, Pinkley, and Insko
(1989) suggest that inter-group relationships activate schema—based distrust against the
opponent, leading to increased fear and preference for competition. In their study,
participants were asked to describe the personality traits of two interacting individuals and
two interacting groups. The results revealed that inter-group relations were rated more
negatively than inter—individual relations. In a related study, the authors found increased
perception of competition in group interactions compared to individual interactions.
Specifically, they found that individuals who were told to interact with a group expected
greater competition in the interactions than individuals who were told to interact with
another individual. In addition, Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis, and Graetz (1990) found
that discussions of distrust were negatively correlated with the number of cooperative
choices, suggesting that increased fear against the out-group leads to increased competition.
This leads to another prediction:

Hypothesis 4: Individuals who have weaker inter-group schemas are more likely

to have lower fear and make decisions that promote cooperation.

29

 

Bottom-m) Process

In the top-down process, when an individual becomes a member of a team,
his/her personal greed, fear, and preference for cooperation are subject to the influence
of team-level cues. In the current section, hypotheses related to bottom-up processes are
discussed in which social interaction among team members contributes to the
emergence of team-level greed, fear, and preference for cooperation. Based on the
multilevel model of the team discontinuity effect, I focus on three main components of
social interactions that influence team discussion and the emergence of team-level

processes: content, style, and players.

 

__B_alanced team discussion. Evidence shows that allowing social interaction
among team members increases team competition (e. g., Wildschut, Lodewikx, & Insko,
2001; Morgan & Tindale, 2002). Wildschut, Lodewikx, and Insko (2001) found that
intragroup interaction makes teams compete more. In their experiment, they
manipulated the degree to which team members interacted with each other before they
make their team decisions. In the least interactive team condition, individuals were not
allowed to interact with each other and they made their decisions individually. In the
most interactive team condition, individuals were allowed to engage in team discuss and
team decisions were made based on team member consensus. They found that as greater
interaction was allowed among team members, it was more likely that the teams decide
to compete.

In a similar vein, Morgan and Tindale (2002) showed that compared to
individuals with cooperative opinions, individuals with competitive opinions exert a

greater influence during team discussion, and team decisions are biased toward

30

competition. Morgan and Tindale (2002) examined how cooperative and competitive
minority individuals influenced team decisions. Using thee-person-teams who were
collectively making decisions to compete or to cooperate, they found that when
cooperative individuals were a minority within a team, the team had a 9% chance to
cooperate; while competitive individuals were a minority within a team, the team had a
52% chance to compete. Therefore, the above evidence suggests that teams focus on
opinions that favor competition during discussion, neglecting opinions that favor
cooperation, pushing team decisions to be biased toward competition.

Such a phenomenon can be explained using information sampling theory.
Information sampling theory suggests that teams tend to make decisions that favor what
is regarded as popular opinions (Stasser, 1999). That is, individuals are more likely to
speak opinions that they believe fit with immediate social norms (W ittenbaum, Hubbell,
& Zuckerman, 1999). By sharing opinions that fit with social norms, individuals are
more likely to be accepted by their team members, which in turn, satisfies their need for
belongness and protect their self-esteem (W ittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999).
Since opinions to compete are considered a better fit with the in-group favoritism norm,
the team’s tendency to focus on discussing competitive opinions would push team-level
decisions toward competitiveness and away from cooperation. Accordingly, if we find
ways to decrease such biased team discussion processes, it wuld be possible to make
team decisions less competitive.

Following the information sampling approach, the current manipulation aims to
promote discussion of cooperation decisions by directing teams to have a balanced

discussion and fully evaluate each alternative before they make their final decisions.

31

 

Several studies have suggested that encouraging teams to consider each alternative
during team discussion increases discussion of less popular information and decrease
bias in final decision. For example, Greitermeyer, Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, and Frey
(2006) told participants to take turns advocating for each alternative for three minutes
before they made their final decisions; they found an increased balanced discussion of
information with such an experimental manipulation. Similarly, Stewart and Stasser
(1995) reported increased balanced discussion of information when they asked
participants to discuss each alternative at length before making team decisions. Larsen
et a1. (1994) trained groups of participants to fully discuss each alternative and to clear
up any doubts about each option before making team decisions; compared to the control
group, the trained group who had a balanced discussion of different opinions showed
less bias toward shared information and enhanced team decision quality. Based on this
evidence, the following hypothesis can be made:

Hypothesis 5: Discussing each alternative during team discussion will increase

the likelihood that teams make a cooperative decision.

Nggative bias and cOOperation. As previously discussed, individuals show
greater sensitivity to negative information; therefore, the argument for competition is
more persuasive during team discussion than the argument for cooperation (e. g.,
Cacioppo & Bemston, 1994; Das, De Wit, & Strobe, 2003). The negative bias works in
favor of competition, because individuals who argue for competition can take advantage
of other individuals’ fear and distrust against the opposing team. Insko et a1. (1990)

found that groups which discussed their distrust of opponents were more likely to fear

32

 

being taken advantage of by the opponent. Consequently, the groups were more likely
to choose to compete.

Because the negative bias favors competition, one way to decrease team competition
is by suppressing discussion of negative information. When team members are asked
not to discuss the opposing team in a negative light, competition opinion holders will
find it more difficult to persuade teams to compete. Given this information, the
following hypothesis can be made:

Hypothesis 6: Decreased negative information during discussion will decrease

team-level fear and facilitate the decision to cooperate.

Expressing cooperative opinions first. By presenting opinions confidently, an
individual is more likely to succeed at persuading the target (Kerr, 2001). Therefore,
behavioral styles that portray confidence strengthen one’s persuasive power. For
example, in an experiment by Nemeth and Wachtler (1974), an individual’s opinion
exerted greater influence on others when he/ she sat at the head of the table rather than
on the side. The authors suggest that sitting at the head of the table projects confidence,
so others are more likely to favor that individual’s argument. Similarly, Kerr (2001)
emphasizes the importance of behavioral style for a minority faction to overcome their
lack of popularity—stating opinions firmly and consistently projects confidence,
thereby increasing persuasive power. As persuasive power increases, an individual
becomes more influential to the group and has a greater effect on the emergence of

team-level greed, fear, and preference for cooperation.

33

 

One way to increase the influence of an individual’s opinion during team
discussion is to allow that person to speak first. In his theory of social power, French
(1951) suggests that the individual who speaks first in an interaction will have more
influence than those who speak later. Carlston (1977) demonstrates the effects of
polling order on social influence in decision-making groups. In his experiment,
participants were assigned to a four-person group and then discussed political issues in
different polling order conditions. The results show that a team’s opinion tends to
polarize toward the opinion that was spoken first. Carlston also observed that during
team discussion, those who spoke first retained their initial opinions while subsequent
speakers were more likely to move toward the opinions of earlier speakers. The opinion
spoken first establishes a preliminary norm, to which subsequent speakers then
conform. Asch (1955) also notes that people readily alter their stated judgment in order
to accommodate to the responses of those who precede them. Therefore, the following
hypotheses are made:

Hypothesis 7: Individuals who are perceived as confident are more likely to

 

influence team-level greed, fear, and the decision to cooperate.

Hypothesis 8: During team discussion, expressing the preference to cooperate

 

before expressing the preference to compete will decrease team-level greed and fear
and will increase the decision to cooperate.

Characteristics of interacting parties. The team decision often results from
whether cooperative or competitive individuals are more influential within the team; as
such, the extent to which an individual can influence others depends on the

characteristics of his/her targets. When a target is stubborn and inflexible, it is more

34

 

difficult to influence him or her; when the target is agreeable and flexible, it is less
difficult. Because competitive individuals are less likely to be agreeable to cooperative
people’s opinions (Troetschel, Simon, Gollwitzer, & Huffeier, 2005), they are less
likely to concede to cooperative individuals. As a result, team discussion and team-level
processes will focus on the opinions of competitive individuals. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is made:
Hypothesis 9: Competitive individuals are more influential during team
discussion, facilitating team-level greed and fear and decreasing the fiequency of

decisions to cooperate.

Sgopence of Trials. There is no clear evidence that the sequence of trials has an
effect on teams' competitive decisions. This is partly because previous studies mainly
focused on manipulating and identifying factors that are related to the team
discontinuity effect and often longitudinal study were not deemed necessary.
Moreover, amongst the existing longitudinal discontinuity effect studies, there is no
clear sequence effect found. For example, Insko et al. (1990) conducted a study where
individuals or groups played 10 consecutive trials of PDG. They found no clear increase
in groups' competitive choices over time compared to individuals. Insko et al (1995)
conducted an experiment where they compared 15 iterative PDG that was played
between individuals and groups. They found no significant time effect for individual or
groups. They reported, however, a slight increase in cooperation decisions overtime for
those groups who played with opponents who used a tit-and-tat strategy. In a similar
vein, Schopler et al (1993) compared individuals and groups who played 3 consecutive

trials of PDG. While they did not find a trend in team's competitive decisions over time,

35

 

groups were more likely to reciprocate the opponent's choice in later trials. They
suggested that during the initial trials, groups do not have a clear idea of how to interact
with their opponents. Over time, however, groups form a mental schema about the
opposing group and they are more likely to be locked in a cooperative or competitive

reciprocal relationship.

Accordingly, I argue that the two interaction interventions that are suggested in
the current study will help reduce the likelihood of teams becoming locked into a
competitive relationship. Specifically, when teams are encouraged to firlly consider
each alternative before making their final decisions (i.e., balanced team condition) or
when individuals with a cooperative opinion are made to speak first during discussion
(i.e., cooperation primacy condition), teams are more likely to maintain cooperative
relationships over time. Teams without those interventions, however, are more likely to

develop a competitive reciprocal cycle over time. Therefore,

Hypothesis 10: Compared to the balanced discussion and the cooperation
primacy teams, the control teams are more likely to develop a competitive relationship

over time.

METHOD

Task Overview

 

In order to address the proposed hypotheses, a prisoner’s dilemma task (PDG)
was used that called upon individuals and teams to make decisions to cooperate or

compete with an opponent. There are two reasons for using a prisoner’s dilemma task in

36

the current study. First, in order to move beyond previous studies of the team
discontinuity effect, I need to replicate the team discontinuity effect. As the vast
majority of research on the team discontinuity effect and inter-team conflict has been
studied using PDG (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2003), this seems like a justifiable decision.
Second, because it is easy to specify outcome interdependence and measure behavioral
manifestations of cooperation between parties, PDG provides an adequate framework to
study cooperation and competition dilemmas between two parties (Pruitt & Kimmel,
1977)

Design Overview

The experimental design included two independent variables: team versus
individuals and interaction style among team members. The variable of teams versus
individuals was manipulated by allowing one team of three participants to interact with
another team of three participants or having one individual interact with another
individual. The interaction was manipulated by varying the degree of team member
interactions and types of intervention for the team interaction (See Appendix A).

Each condition was designed to examine the multilevel hypotheses of the team
discontinuity effects. First of all, to examine if the current study successfully replicated
the team discontinuity effect, the competition rates between the individual condition and
the team conditions were compared. Second, to examine the impact of the team
contextual effect on individual greed, fear, and preference to cooperate, I compared the
individual condition with the team control condition, where an individual assumed a
role of team member and interacts with another team. Finally, in order to examine the

impact of team discussion interventions on team decision to cooperate, I compared

37

 

control teams, where interaction among team members was allowed without
intervention and intervention teams, where interaction among team members followed
intervention instructions. Therefore, each condition was designed to study the top-
down, team contextual effects on individual-level processes and the bottom-up, social
interaction effects on team-level processes.
Participants

A total of 390 undergraduate college students from a large Midwestern
university participated in the present study. A total of 8 participants were dropped from
the sample for various reasons. Specifically, two participants in an individual condition
were friends outside of the study, a situation that probably influenced their PDG
behaviors. One participant participated in the experiment in team conditions twice, and
thus his second participation instance was dropped from analysis, as it might have been
influenced by his previous task experiences. Therefore, the final sample used for
analysis consisted of 382 participants. All participants were volunteers who received
course credit for their participation in the two hour experiment. Fifty-eight percent of
the participants were female, and most (89 percent) of the participants were between 18
and 22 years old. The experimental sessions were conducted with groups consisting of
two (the individual condition) to 6 participants (team conditions). For team conditions,
teams were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions, resulting in a
relatively even distribution of participants across the four experimental conditions.
Task: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

The prisoner’s dilemma game is one of the many mixed-motive games that exist

in the research literature. There are many ways of designing a prisoner’s dilemma game.

38

 

In the context of the present study the participants played 6 rounds of the prisoner’s
dilemma game; for each round, individuals or teams made a decision to cooperate or a
decision to compete with the opposing individual or team. In order to minimize
confounding effects related to strategic moves, the participants were not informed of the
exact number of rounds they were playing.

For each round, the subjects were asked to choose between “X” (Cooperation
decision) and "‘Y” (Competition decision). The decisions were made simultaneously -
when the subject made his/her choice, they did not know what the opponent’s decision
was. The PDG matrix that was used in the study is presented in Appendix B1-B3. After
each round, participants were given a coupon indicating the amount of money that they
earned for that round. Participants were also told that the coupons would be exchanged
for real money at the end of experiment.

Procedure.

The initial online survey session occurred approximately 1 week before the main
experimental session. During the online session, the participants filled out a number of
instruments including demographic information, Social Value Orientation (V anLange,
1999), and inter-group competition schema (Hoyle, Pinkley, & Insko, 1989). Upon
completion of the survey, participants scheduled themselves for one of the subsequent
experimental sessions.

Either two (Individual condition) or six (team conditions) individuals arrived for
an experimental session. In cases where more than 2 or 6 participants showed up, extra
participants were asked to work on individual survey. On their arrival to the session,

participants read and signed the consent form and drew index cards to randomly

39

determine their room assignments and with whom they would interact. Three rooms
were used: one center room, and two home rooms - one labeled “A” and the other
labeled “B.” Each home room had one squared table. For the individual condition, each
individual was assigned to either room A or room B. For team conditions, three
participants were assigned to room A, and three participants were assigned to room B.
Participants were then informed that they would be interacting with the person (or
group of individuals) in the other room.

Participants then received explicit instruction regarding the choice combination
in the PDG matrix and they were tested concerning their understanding of the matrix.
Their tests were scored individually by the experimenter. Following this testing of
participant understanding, participants were told that they would complete multiple
rounds of PDG and then each group or individual would be dismissed separately.
Participants were not informed of the exact number of rounds that they were going to
play. All participants played 6 rounds of PDG.

Next, the experimenter described the trial sequence. In the individual condition,
each participant sat in a separate home room with the instruction that s/he was working
individually. They were then both given the individual decision-making sheet
(Appendix B1) and asked to think about their decisions that they were going to make
for one minute.

After being allowed one minute thinking about the individual decision, they
were asked to come out of their home room to meet the opponent in the center room for
one minute. During that minute, the two individuals were allowed to talk about anything

that they wanted to, including the matrix. They were reminded, however, that their

40

 

verbal commitment was not binding. After the one minute of meeting with the
opponent, each individual was escorted to his/her homeroom where they were given one
minute to make the final decision and complete process items related to individual
greed, fear and perceived identifiability (See Appendix C). After participants completed
the measures, the experimenter let each person know about the decision made by the
opposing individual. The experimenter distributed cash coupons based on the amount of
money that they earned for the round and resumed the next round.

In the majority rule team condition, three participants sat around a table in a
home room with the instruction that they were going to work as a team. Participants
were told that majority rule would be followed in determining the team’s decision to
cooperate or compete. No team discussion among team members was allowed in this
condition. Each round started with one minute of an individual decision session where
participants made their individual decisions regarding the opposing group privately
(Appendix BZ). After being allowed one minute to make the individual decision,
participants privately completed the first set of process measures - individual greed,
fear, and perceived identifiability (Appendix C). Participants, then, were given an index
card with the decision X (cooperation) on one side and the decision Y (competition) on
the other side. Participants were asked to cast their vote by putting the index card on
their respective side of the table. Based on the vote, the team decision was made by
majority rules. Right after the team decision was made; participants completed the
second set of process measures — team greed, fear, and perceived confidence (Appendix
D). After participants completed the second measure, the experimenter let each group

know about the decision made by the opposing group. The experimenter distributed

41

 

cash coupons based on the amount of money that they earned for the round and resumed
the next round.

In the control team condition, three participants sat around a table in a
homeroom with the instruction that they were given was to work as a team. First, they
were asked to make their individual decisions regarding competing or cooperating with
the opposing team (Appendix B2). After being allowed one minute to make the
individual decision, participants completed the first process measures - individual greed,
fear and perceived identifiability (Appendix C). Participants were then given two
minutes to discuss their team decision. Participants were also given the discussion
worksheet (Appendix E) to guide their discussion. However, they were told that using
the worksheet was optional and not required in this condition. After the two minutes of
team discussion, each group selected their group representative and the representative
came out of their home room to meet the representative of the opponent group in the
center room for one minute. For the one minute, the two representatives were allowed to
talk about anything that they wanted to, including the matrix. They were reminded,
however, that their verbal commitment was not binding. After the one minute of
meeting with the opponent representative, each representative was escorted to his/her
homeroom where they were given one minute as a group to make the final team
decision (Appendix B3) and complete the second set of process measures including
team greed, team fear, and perceived confidence (Appendix D). After participants
completed the measures, the experimenter let each group know about the decision made
by the opposing group. The experimenter distributed cash coupons based on the amount

of money that they earned for the round and resumed the next round.

42

In the balanced team discussion condition, the procedures were exactly the same
as the control team condition except for the fact that teams were required to use the
team discussion worksheet during team discussion. First, three participants sat around a
table in a homeroom with the instructions that they were going to work as a team. Then,
they were asked to make their individual decisions regarding competing or cooperating
with the opposing team (Appendix B2). After being allowed one minute to make the
individual decision, participants completed the first process measures - individual greed,
fear and perceived identifiability (Appendix C). Participants were then given two
minutes to discuss their team decisions. Participants were also given the discussion
worksheet (Appendix E) to guide their discussion. They were told that using the
worksheet was required in this condition. After the two minutes of team discussion,
each group selected their group representative and the representative came out of their
home room to meet the representative of the opponent group in the center room for one
minute. For the one minute, the two representatives were allowed to talk about anything
that they wanted to, including the matrix. They were reminded, however, that their
verbal commitment was not binding. After the one minute of meeting with the opponent
representative, each representative was escorted to his/her home room where they were
given one minute as a group to make the final team decision and complete the second
set of process measures (Appendix D). After participants completed the measures, the
experimenter let each group know about the decision made by the opposing group. The
experimenter distributed cash coupons based on the amount of money that they earned

for the round and then resumed the next round.

43

 

In the cooperation primacy condition, the procedures were exactly the same as
the team control condition except the fact that the most cooperative individual in each
group was asked to speak first during team discussion. First, three participants sat
around a table in a home room with the instruction that they were going to work as a
team. Then, they were asked to make their individual decisions regarding competing or
cooperating with the opposing team (Appendix B2). After being allowed one minute to
make the individual decision, participants completed the first process measures -
individual greed, fear, and perceived identifiability (Appendix C). While they were
completing this measure, the experimenter secretly determined the individual’s
preference ratings for cooperation and competition. Next, a random team member was
asked to draw one stick out of the cup that supposedly contained each member’s name;
however, all the sticks contained the name of the most cooperative individual. The
person who was selected was then called upon to discuss his/her opinion first and begin
the team discussion. After two minutes of team discussion, each group selected their
group representative and the representative came out of their home room to meet the
representative of the opponent group in the center room for one minute. For the one
minute, the two representatives were allowed to talk about anything that they wanted to,
including the matrix. They were reminded, however, that their verbal commitment was
not binding. After the one minute of meeting with the opponent representative, each
representative was escorted back to his/her homeroom where the group was then given
one minute to make the final team decision and complete the second set of process
measures (Appendix D). After participants completed the measure, the experimenter let

each group know about the decision made by the opposing group. The experimenter

44

 

distributed cash coupons based on the amount of money that they earned for the round

and then resumed the next round.

MEASURES
Individual-level variables
Demographics. Participants answered questions regarding their age, gender, and
GPA during the online survey.
Social Value Orientation. Social value orientation was assessed using the 9-item

Triple- Dominance Measure of Social Values developed by Van Lange et a1 (1997) as

 

part of the online survey. For each item, participants were asked to choose one out of
three reward distributions between self and others, where each option represented
prosocial, individualistic, and competitive choice.

An example item is the choice among three options—Option A: 480 points for
one’s self and 80 points for others, Option B: 540 points for one’s self and 280 points
for others, and Option C: 480 points for one’s self and 480 points for others. In this
example, Option A represents the competitive choice because it provides a larger
difference between one's own and others' outcomes than either Option B or Option C.
Option B represents the individualistic choice because one’s own outcomes are larger
than those in Option A or Option C. Finally, Option C represents the prosocial choice
because it provides a larger joint outcome than does either Option A or Option B and a
smaller discrepancy between one's own and others' outcomes than does either Option A

or Option B.

45

In prior research (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997), participants were classified as
having one of the three social value orientations categories if they made at least six
choices that were consistent with that orientation. This method, however, often yields a
high level of missing data because there are some people (IO-30%) who endorsed less
than six for one dimension. This missing data problem is troublesome for the current
study, because if one out of three team members is missing an SVO classification, the
entire team becomes missing data. As a way to avoid such problem, instead of using
that classification method, the current study counted each dimension the participants
endorsed; such that each individual had three scores; representing the prosocial,
individualistic, and competitive dimensions.

Inter-group competition schema Inter-group competition schema, individuals’
preconceptions about interpersonal and intergroup relationships, were assessed during
the online survey using a scale developed by Hoyle, Pinkely, and Insko (1989). See
Appendix F for scale items. Hoyle, Pinkely, and Insko (1989) suggested there are two
dimensions of the scales — friendliness and hostility. The results of factor analyses
supported the two distinct dimensions, as each item loaded onto the appropriate factor.
Reliabilities for each scale were .84 and .80 for the individual level friendliness and
hostility scales and .89 and .87 for the team level friendliness and hostility scales,
respectively.

Favoritism bias. Favoritism bias was assessed at the end of the experiment using
items developed by Kahn and Ryen (1972). The measure consisted of 11 semantic-
difference-type adjective pairs which yield a composite evaluation of own team

(oneself) and the opponent team (the opponent individual). In determining favoritism

46

 

bias, the opponent team (or individual) ratings were subtracted from own team (one
self) ratings, and then added up. See Appendix G for items.

Individual greed and fear. Individual-level greed and fear scales were
administered immediately following the individual decision session using the scale
developed by Insko et a1 (1990). The greed scale consisted of two items. An example of
an individual level greed item is, “I want to earn as much as possible,” and “I want to
earn more than the opponent.” The fear scale consisted of two items. An example of an
individual level fear items is, “I do not trust the opponent.” The response options for the
scale range from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Coefficient alpha for
the greed items were .48, .54, .53, .55, .52, .51 at Time 1 to Time 6, respectively.
Coefficient alpha for the fear items were .70, .69, .73, .73, .77, .73 at Time I to Time 6,
respectively.

Individual preference for each alternative. During the individual decision
session, participants rated their preferences for cooperation and competition on a scale
that ranged from “not at all” (I) to “extremely” (5) (Appendix B1 and B2)

Individual decision. During the individual decision session, participants chose
their decision between two alternatives —cooperation and competition (Appendix B]
and B2).

Confidence. An individual’s confidence in his/her choice was measured after
each individual decision session. The confidence scale ranged from “not confident at
all” (1) to “extremely confident” (5). See Appendix BI and B2 for the items.

Perceived identifiably. Perceived identifability was measured after the

individual decision had been made each round using the two item scale of Wildschut,

47

Insko, & Gaertner (2002). The items were, “I think my decision will be known by the
opponent,” and, “I think my decision will remain anonymous (Reverse).” The response
options for the scale ranged from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7).
Coefficient alpha for the fear items were .60, .60, .67, 64, .68, .64 at Time 1 to Time 6,
respectively (Appendix C)

Social srmport for the opinion to compete. The social support for the opinion to
compete for each round was assessed by counting the number of team members who
preferred competition (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner; 2002). For example when Person
I chose cooperation and Person 2 chose competition for their individual decisions, then
the social support for the opinion to compete is l for Person 3.

A supplementary index for social support for the opinion to compete was
developed using individual preference ratings for competition. For example, when the
individual preference ratings for competition was 5 for Person 1 and 3 for Person 2,
then the social support for the opinion to compete is 4 (the average of Person 1 and

Person 2’s ratings) for Person 3.

 

Perceived confidence. After each team discussion, participants rated the
perceived confidence of each of their other teammates. The confidence scale ranged
from “not confident at all” (1) to “extremely confident” (5). For instance, Person 1 rated
the perceived confidence of Person 2 and Person 3. Person 2 rated the perceived
confidence of Person] and Person 3. Person 3 rated the perceived confidence of Person
2 and Personl. Each member, therefore, had two perceived confidence ratings. The
overall perceived confidence rating for each individual was determined by averaging

the perceived confidence ratings provided by each teammate (Appendix D).

48

Team-level variables.

 

Team-level greed and fear. A shorter version of the team-level greed and fear
scale was administered immediately following the team decision session using the scale
developed by Insko et a1 (1990). Team level greed items were “My team wants to earn
as much as possible,” and “My group wants to earn more than the other group” Team
level fear items were “My team does not trust the opponent,” and “My team wants to
defend ourselves against the actions of the opponent.” The response options for the
scale ranged from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Coefficient alpha for

the greed items were .57, .52, .52, .52, .53, .88 at Time I to Time 6, respectively.

 

Coefficient alpha for the fear items were .70, .73, .76, .75, .74, .68 at Time 1 to Time 6,
respectively.

To examine the appropriateness of representing the measures at the team-level,
ICC (l) was calculated. ICC (1) compares the within-team variance of measures to the
between-team variance of measures to indicate how much of the total variance is due to
team membership. James (1982) reported a median ICC (1) of .12 in the context of
climate perceptions. For team greed, the ICC (1) obtained at time 1 (.21, n2 =.52), time
2 (.29, n2 = .58), time 3 (.33, n2 = .52), time 4 (37,112 = .63), time 5 (37,112 = .64), and
block 6 (.31, n2 = .59) provided justification for aggregating this measure to the team
level of analysis by calculating the average value within teams to represent the team
level of greed. Similarly, for team fear, the ICC (I) obtained at time 1 (.25, n2 =55),
time 2 (.37, n2 = .64), time 3 (.43, n2 = .68), time 4 (48,112 = .70), time 5 (50,112 = .73),

and block 6 (.48, n2 = .71) provided justification for aggregating this measure to the

49

team level of analysis by calculating the average value within teams to represent the
team level of fear.

Team decision. For each team decision session, the team chose for their decision
one of two alternatives —cooperation or competition (Appendix B3).

Team preference for each flmative. For each team decision session, teams
rated their preference for cooperation and competition on a scale that ranged from “not
at all” (1) to “extremely” (5) (Appendix B3).

Perceived negative information Perceived negative information during team
discussion was measured using two items administered at the end of experiment. See
Appendix H for the items. The reliability for the scale was .91.

Manhgmtion Check;

mpced team discussion intervention. For the balanced team discussion
condition, teams were required to fill out a team discussion worksheet to increase the
balance between the discussion of cooperation and competition decisions. A
Manipulation check was conducted two ways. First, we counted the occasions where the
team discussion worksheet was filled out in other conditions compared to the balanced
team condition. Compared to other conditions (4% in team control condition and 7% in
the cooperation primacy condition), groups were more likely to complete the worksheet
in the balanced team condition (97%). Second, at the end of the experiment, we
measured participants’ perceptions of the extent to which their team discussed each
alternative using a two item scale (Appendix H). Compared to team control condition
(M = 4.90) and the cooperation primacy condition (M = 4.74), teams in the balanced

team condition (M = 5.34) reported that they were more likely to have a balanced

50

discussion ofthe two choices, X and Y (t34 = 1.95,p<.05; t54 = 3.01,,p<.01).

Cooperation primacy intervention. For the cooperation primacy condition, the
member who prefers the decision to cooperate the most was asked to speak first during
the team discussion. Because the experimenter chose the one with the most cooperative
preference to speak first unbeknownst to the participants, the success of this
manipulation depends on the transparency of the manipulation and the actual order of
speech during team discussion.

First, participants were checked as to whether they had any suspicion about the
experimental procedure. Some participants said they initially wondering about the
number of rounds that they were going to play. Others said that they were initially
suspicious of whether or not the opponent’s strategy was being manipulated. None of
the participants, however, suspected the fact that we asked the most cooperative
individuals to speak first. I believe that part of reason was that the experimenter
explained such a procedure as being done to give all individuals an equal Opportunity to
speak first through doing the random drawing and it appears participants believed that
argument. In addition, at the end of experiment, I measured participants’ perceptions on
the extent to which the most cooperative individuals spoke first during team discussion
using two items (Appendix H). There is no significant difference in the manipulation
check item. Compared to condition 3 (M = 4.65) and condition 4 (M = 5.06), teams in
condition 5 (M = 4.79) did not have a higher score (F0, 260) = 2.18, p=.11). This
indicates that participants did not notice cooperative individuals were favored during
team discussion.

Second, video footage of actual team discussion was examined to see if the

51

 

person who was asked to speak first actually spoke first. 96% of the time, the person
who was asked to speak first followed the instructions and spoke first during the team
discussion. While the compliance for speaking order was high, it should be kept in mind
that in the most of the rounds (63%), there was a tie in the highest preference ratings for
cooperation. That is, in such cases there was more than one individual whose preference
ratings for cooperation were the same, in which case the first person to speak was
randomly chosen among the tied individuals.

RESULTS

 

The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for all individual-level
variables are provided in Table 1. The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations
for all team-level variables are provided in Table 2. In the next paragraphs, the general
patterns of correlations are described.

Between-Individual Correlation Patterns.

Condition. Compared to team conditions, individuals in the individual condition
had lower individual greed and fear. Also, individuals in the individual condition were
more likely to prefer cooperation, less likely to prefer competition, and they were more
likely to decide to cooperate. In addition, individuals in the individual condition had
higher identifiability perceptions such that they felt their decisions were more likely to
be identifiable by the opponent.

Demographics. While there was no noticeable gender or age effects across all
variables, two interesting relationships were found - females were less likely to perceive
the interpersonal relationship as abrasive and older people tended to have greater in-

group favoritism.

52

Social Value Orientation (SVQ). Individual’s SVO was related to their greed,
fear and actual compete-cooperate decisions. Specifically, individuals with a high
prosocial disposition had lower greed and fear. They were also more likely to cooperate
and less likely to compete with the opponent. Individuals with a high individualistic
disposition had higher greed and fear. They were also more likely to compete and less
likely to cooperate with the opponent.

Interestingly, an individual’s SVO was also related to his/her team members’
decisions and preference ratings. Particularly, prosocial disposition was positively
related to support for cooperation and negatively related to support for competition.
Having an individualistic disposition was negatively related to support for cooperation
and positively related to support for competition. This suggests that when an individual
had a prosocial disposition, his/her teammates were more likely to cooperate and less
likely to compete, whereas, when an individual had an individualistic disposition,
his/her teammates were less likely to cooperate and more likely to compete. This
indicates a social influence process, where an individual’s dispositions interact with
his/her team members’ preferences and decisions.

Greed fear, and decisions. As expected, individuals’ greed and fear were related
to participant preference ratings and decisions. Specifically, when individuals had a
high level of greed, they were more likely to prefer competition and less likely to prefer
cooperation. When individuals had a high level of fear, they were more likely to prefer
competition and less likely to prefer cooperation. The preference ratings for cooperation
and competition were also related to actual individual decisions to cooperate or

compete.

53

 

Confidence. An interesting pattern was found regarding individual’s decisions
and teammate’s ratings of those individuals confidence (perceived confidence). When
individuals wanted to compete, they were less likely to be confident about their
decisions and they were less likely to be perceived as confident by their teammates.
When individuals wanted to cooperate, they were more likely to be confident about
their decisions and they were more likely to be perceived as confident by their
teammates. Also, one’s confidence was related to greed and fear - individuals with a

high level of greed and fear were less likely to be confident about their decisions.

 

Social support for decisions. Social support was related to individuals’ greed and
fear. When there was high social support for cooperation, such that teammates wanted
to cooperate, individuals had lower greed and fear. When there was high social support
for competition, such that teammates wanted to compete, individuals had higher greed
and fear. Also, social support for the cooperation decision was positively related to
individuals’ preference for the cooperation decision and negatively related to
individuals’ preference for the competition decision. Social support for a cooperation
decision was negatively related to individuals’ preference for the cooperation decision
and positively related to individuals’ preference for competition decision. These
patterns suggest that one’s greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate are influenced by
their teammates’ preferences and decisions.

Within-Individual Correlation Patterns.

The patterns of within-individual correlations were similar to the between-

individual correlations. There was a positive relationship between greed and fear,

indicating when an individual has a higher level of greed for a round, the person is more

54

likely to have a higher level of fear for that round as well. Also, individual greed and
fear had a negative relationship with preference ratings for cooperation and a positive
relationship with preference ratings for competition and decisions to compete. This
indicates that as individuals became more greedy and fearful of the opponent for a
round, the person is more likely to prefer competition and decide to compete. In
addition, an individual was more likely to be confident in his/her decision when the
person preferred cooperation and decided to cooperate. Finally, as there was greater
social support for a competitive decision, an individual was more likely to have higher

greed and fear and decide to compete.

 

Between-Team Correlation Patterns.

The patterns of correlations for team-level variables were consistent with the
general hypotheses. Team greed and fear were positively related to team’s preference
ratings for competition and were negatively related to team’s preference ratings for
cooperation. Team greed and fear were also positively related to a team’s decision to
compete. In addition, team members’ SVO were related to team greed and fear and
team decisions. For example, teams with members who had a high prosocial disposition
had lower team greed and fear. Also, team members’ prosocial disposition were
positively related to their preference ratings for cooperation and negatively related to
their preference ratings for competition. Team members’ individualistic disposition was
also related to team greed and fear and decisions in the expected pattern.

Within-Team Correlagon Patterns.

The patterns of within-team correlations were similar to the between-team

correlations. There was a positive relationship between team greed and team fear, which

55

indicates that when a team had a higher level of greed for a round, the team was more
likely to have a higher level of fear as well. Team greed and team fear were also related
to preference ratings for cooperation, preference ratings for competition, and team
decisions in expected direction. The higher the team greed and fear, the more likely the
team was to compete.

Preliminagy examination of competition rates.

Competitive choices over time for each condition are presented in Figure 2. The
individual condition showed the lowest competition rates across rounds (M=6.27%).
The teams whose decisions were determined based on the majority rule with no
discussion showed the highest competition rates over time (M=60.50%). Teams in the
control condition showed a competition rate that is lower than majority rule teams and
higher than the balanced discussion teams and the cooperation primacy teams
(M=40.50%). The balanced discussion teams showed the lowest competition rates
amongst the team conditions overall (M=16.65%). The teams with the cooperation
primacy showed low competition rates for the first three rounds and the rates went up
over time (M=27.95%).

The mean number of competitive choices across six rounds was compared
between the individual condition and the team control condition using ANOVA. There
were significant main effects for groups versus individuals (F(1,53) = 46.51, p < .01).
This indicates that groups were more competitive than individuals, replicating the
discontinuity effect. Also, there were significant main effects for the control team
condition, the balanced team discussion condition and the cooperation primacy

condition (Fagin = 5.41, p <.01). This indicates that the experimental manipulations

56

 

induced greater cooperation between teams.
Analgysis Overview.

All of the hypotheses in this study were tested with Hierarchical Linear
Modeling (HLM: Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) using HLM 6 program. HLM allows for
the examination of predictors at team-, individual-, and rounds-levels of analysis. In this
study, each individual was nested within a team. In addition, both team- and individual-
level variables were assessed for multiple rounds and the variables could vary over the
course of the study. To accommodate the multilevel structure of the data, the time-level
was the level 1 variable (e.g., multiple assessment of individual greed and fear),
individual-level was the level-2 variable (e. g., social value orientation), and team-level
variables was the level-3 variable (e. g., team conditions). To help increase
understanding of the HLM methods used, I now show how I tested the relationship
between individual greed and fear and individual decision in the formula found below.

Level 1 Model
Prob(IND_D = 1 it) = (p
Log [cp/(l- 0)] = n
n = no + 1:1(GREED) + 1:2(FEAR) + 1:3(TIME)

Level 2 Model
7to = [300 + f0
751 = [310
7E2 = 020
7E3 = B30
Level 3 Model
[300 = 7000 + 7001(D1) +7002(D2) + 7003(D3) + 7004(D4) + U00
510 = 7100

[320 = 7200

57

 

1330 = 7300

In the formula above, IND_D represents individual decision to compete or to
cooperation. The individual decisions are the dependent variable and they are a
dichotomous variable. A logistic regression model was used to covert a non-normal
distribution of a dichotomous variable to a normal distribution. In the model, Level-1
represents the time-level. Because individual greed and fear were measured for each
round, they are level-1 predictors. Level-2 represents the individual-level such as
individual disposition or gender. Level-3 represents the team-level such as team
condition. In the above formula, each team condition was dummy-coded and the default
used was the individual condition. Accordingly, D1 represents the difference between
the individual condition and the majority-rule teams. D2 represents the comparison
between the individual condition and the team control condition. D3 represents the
comparison between the individual condition and the balanced team discussion
condition. D4 represents the comparison between the individual condition and the
cooperation primacy condition.

Hypothesis 1. In hypothesis 1, I proposed that individuals who perceive higher
identifiability are more likely to have lower levels of greed and fear; which in turn, lead
to decisions that promote cooperation. In order to test the hypothesis, the individual’s
perceived identifiability that was measured each round was regressed onto individual
greed and fear. In addition, each dummy coded team condition variable was entered as a
control variable. Because the individual condition was coded as default, each condition
coefficient (i.e., D001, D002, D003, D004) represents the comparison between the

individual condition and the respective team condition (See Table 3).

58

 

Consistent with the hypothesis, the HLM analyses revealed that individuals’ perceived
identifiability had a significant relationship with their greed (y =-.08, p <01) and fear (7
=-.11, p <.01). This suggest that individuals who perceived their decisions weere more
likely to be personally identified with by the opponent had lower greed and fear. Also,
all of the team condition effects were significant. This indicates that compared to
individuals in the individual condition, individuals in the team conditions had
significantly higher levels of greed and fear.

The relationships between individual greed and fear and individual decisions
were also examined (See Table 4). There were positive relationships between
individuals’ greed and fear and their decision to compete. When individuals had a
higher level of greed (y =.44, p <.01) or fear (7 =46, p <. 01), they were more likely to
decide to compete with the opponent. Also, there were significant negative relationships
between individuals’ greed (y =-.21, p <. 01) and fear and their preference for
cooperation (y =-.27, p <.01). Finally, there were significant positive relationships
between individuals’ greed (7 =26, p <.01) and fear (7 =26, p < .01) and their
preferences for competition. The above patterns of relationships are consistent with
expectations, such that individuals’ greed and fear were the major determinants of their
decision to compete or to cooperate.

To test the proposed mediated relationships, I examined the significance of each
hypothesized indirect relationships with the 2’ method, as recommended by MacKinnon,
Lockwood, Hoffman, West and Sheets (2002). Like the Sobel test, the z' approach
evaluates the mediation effect using the significance of the product of the direct effect

coefficients. However, it is known that the product of coefficients is not normally

59

distributed and, unlike the Sobel test, the z' approach utilizes critical values that account
for the asymmetric distribution of the products of coefficient (MacKinnon, Lockwood,
& Hoffman, 1998). In addition, because the decision variables are dichotomous, the
coefficient between identifiability and fear/greed and the coefficient between fear/ greed
and decision are on different scales and, thus, they are not comparable to each other.

MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) suggested a formula that modifies the mediation
coefficients involving dichotomous variables. Following their recommendation, the
coefficients in the mediation testing were modified. The results of the 2’ test showed
that the proposed mediated effects of greed and fear were significant. The relationship
between individual’s perceived identifiability and an individual’s decision to compete
was mediated by individual fear (2' = 5.62, p < .01) and greed (z' = 5.62, p <‘f .01).
Overall, hypothesis 1 was supported. Individuals’ who believed they were less
identifiable by the opponent were more likely to have higher greed and fear, which in
turn, related to their decision to compete.

Hypothesis 2. In hypothesis 2, I proposed that individuals with greater social
support for competition are more likely to have higher levels of greed and fear, leading
to decisions that promote competition. In order to test the hypothesis, the social support
variables were entered to predict individual greed and fear along with condition
variables (See Table 5 and 6).

Consistent with the hypothesis, there were significant positive relationships between
social support and individual greed (7 =42, p <01) and fear (7 =21, p <.01). As the
number of competitive teammates increased, individuals were more likely to have

higher greed and fear (Table 5). In addition, there were significant positive relationships

60

between teammates’ preference ratings for cooperation (y =-.23, p <. 01) and
competition (7 =.16, p <.01) with individual fear (Table 6). This means that when one
was surrounded by team members who had a high preference for cooperation or a low
preference for competition, the person had lower fear. In addition, there was a
significant positive relationship between teammates preference for competition and
individual greed (7 =14, p <.01) (Table 6). This indicates that individuals’ greed and
fears were influenced by teammates’ preferences for cooperation and competition.
Finally, the results of the 2’ test showed that the link between social support and
individual decision is mediated by individual greed (7 =52], p <. 01) and fear (y =6.68,
p <.01). Overall, hypothesis 2 was supported. Individuals who had greater social
support for competition had higher greed and fear. Individual greed and fear were in
turn related to individual decisions.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 proposed that individuals with a stronger in-group
favoritism bias are more likely to have higher greed and fear and make decisions that
promote competition. The results of the HLM analysis are presented in Table 7.
Consistent with the hypothesis, in-group favoritism bias was positively related to greed
(y =.01, p <.01) and fear (7 =02, p <.01). This indicates that as individuals had a
greater in-group favoritism bias, they were more likely to have higher greed and fear.
The relationships of greed and fear with preference ratings and decisions were
significant (Table 4).

A mediation test was conducted to examine if the relationship between
favoritism bias and the individual decision was mediated by individual greed and fear.

The mediation test results indicated that individual greed (z' = 2.70, p <3 .01) and fear (2'

61

= 2.22, p < .01) mediated the link between favoritism bias and the individual decision.
Overall, hypothesis 3 was supported. When individuals had a stronger in-group
favoritism bias, they were more likely to have higher greed and fear. Individuals’ greed
and fear, in turn, promoted their decisions to compete.

Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 proposed that individuals who have weaker inter-
group schemas are more likely to have lower fear and make decisions that promote
cooperation. Two dimensions of inter-group schemas — inter-group agreeableness and
inter-group abrasiveness - were entered to predict individual greed and fear (See Table
8). The dummy coded condition variables were entered as a covariate.

As opposed to the expectation, individuals’ inter-group schemas and their levels of
greed (y =.02,p=n.s.; y =-.12, p=n.s.) and fear (7 =-.01,p = n.s.; y =-.01, p =n.s.) were
not related. Therefore, hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 proposed that discussing each alternative during
team discussion will increase the likelihood that teams make a cooperative decision. In
order to test the hypothesis, I compared the control team condition, where team
discussion was allowed without any intervention, and the balanced team discussion
condition, where teams were encouraged to have a balanced discussion of two
alternatives.

First, I examined if balanced discussion teams were more likely to make decisions to
cooperate compared to control teams (See Table 9). Consistent with the hypothesis,
intervention teams were more likely to decide to cooperate (y =-2.95, p <.01). Also,
intervention teams were more likely to prefer to cooperate (7 =2.74, p <. 01) and less

likely to prefer to compete (y =-.96, p <. 01).

62

Second, I examined if there was a difference in team greed and fear between
balanced discussion teams and control teams. Compared to control teams, balanced
discussion teams had significantly lower fear (7 =-.68, p <. 05). Compared to control
teams, balanced discussion teams had nominally lower greed, but the difference was not
statistically significant (7 =-.46, p=.08). I also examined if team greed and fear were
related to team preference ratings and actual team decisions. As expected, team greed
and fear were significantly related to team preference ratings and the actual team
decision (See Table 1 1).

Finally, I examined if the team greed and fear mediated the relationship between
balanced discussion teams and team decisions. The results of the 2’ test suggested that
team greed (z' = 1.70, p < .05) and fear (2' = 2.70, p < .01) significantly mediated the
relationship between balanced discussion teams and team decisions. Overall, hypothesis
5 was supported. Balanced discussion teams were more likely to cooperate than control
teams. Also, balanced discussion teams had lower team fear and team greed, which
promoted team decision to cooperate.

Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 proposed that decreased negative information during
team discussion will decrease team—level fear and facilitate the decision to cooperate. In
order to test the hypothesis, negative information was regressed onto team greed and
fear (Table 12). Team greed and fear then were regressed onto team preference ratings
and team decisions (Table 13).

Negative information was positively related to team fear (y =9.45, p <. 01) and
greed (7 =4.99, p <. 01). This means that as team members shared negative information

about the opponent teams in team discussion, teams were more likely to have higher

63

greed and fear. Also, team greed (7 =3 2, p <01) and team fear (7 =40, p <.01) were
positively related to team preference for competition. Team greed (y =-4.32, p 01)
and team fear (7 =-6.23, p <.01) were negatively related to team preference for
cooperation. Team greed (y =3.85,p <.01) and team fear (y =4.28, p <.01) were
positively related to team decisions to compete.

Mediation tests were conducted to examine the linkage between negative
information, team greed and fear, and the team decision. As predicted, team greed (z' =
3.57, p < .01) and fear (2' = 4.19, p < .01) mediated the relationship between negative
information and the team decision. Therefore, hypothesis 6 was supported.

Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7 proposed that individuals who are perceived as
confident are more likely to influence team-level greed, fear, and the decision to
cooperate. To test the hypothesis, the average perceived confidence ratings for each
team member was entered to predict team greed and fear, as shown in Table 14. I
expected a positive relationship between each member’s perceived confidence and team
greed and fear. The results were not supportive of the hypothesized relationship. There
was no significant relationship between perceived confidence ratings and team greed.
Also, in contrast to expectations, perceived confidence for Person 3 was negatively
related to team fear (7 =-3.23,p <.01).

To further examine the hypothesis, each member’s perceived confidence rating
was entered to predict team preference ratings and team decision, as shown in Table 15.
1 expected a positive relationship between team competition and perceived confidence
ratings. The results were not supportive of the hypothesis. Perceived confidence ratings

were not related to team decisions or team preference ratings. Overall, there was no

64

significant relationship found between perceived confidence ratings and team greed,
fear and the team decision. Therefore, hypothesis 7 was not supported.

Hypothesis 8. Hypothesis 8 proposed that expressing the preference to
cooperate first will increase the likelihood of a decision to cooperate. In order to test the
hypothesis, I compared the control team condition, where team discussion was allowed
without any intervention, and the cooperation primacy condition 2, where the most
cooperative team member was asked to speak first during team discussion.

First, I examined if intervention teams were more likely to make decisions to
cooperate compared to control teams (See Table 17). Even though the effect was in the
right direction and it was not trivial, it failed to reach statistical significance (7 =84,
p=.10). In terms of preference ratings for cooperation, the intervention teams were not
found to be more likely to prefer cooperation. (7 =39, p =.15). The intervention teams
were, however, less likely to prefer competition. (7 =-.54, p <. 01).

Second, I examined if there were differences in team greed and fear between
intervention teams and control teams (See Table 16). Compared to control teams,
intervention teams did not have significantly lower levels of greed (y =-.24 p =.27) or
fear (7 =-.40, p=.17). Overall, hypothesis 8 was partially supported. The intervention
teams were less likely to prefer competition than control teams. However, the
intervention teams did not have lower greed or fear than control teams.

Hypothesis 9. In hypothesis 9, I proposed that competitive individuals are more
influential during team discussion, facilitating team-level greed and fear, and decreasing
the decision to cooperate. In order to test the hypothesis, 1) trait competitiveness that

was measured using the Social Value Orientation scale and 2) the state competitiveness

65

scale that was measured each round using individual decision and preference ratings
were entered to predict team greed and fear. Based on the hypothesis, I expected that
when team members’ were more competitive, the team would have higher team greed
and fear.

When each member’s preference ratings for cooperation and competition were
entered to predict team greed and fear, only team fear was significantly related to team
members’ preference ratings (Table 19). Specifically, Person 1’s preference ratings for
cooperation (y =-2.23, p <.01), Person 3’s preference rating for cooperation (y =-3.21, p
<.01), and Person 2’s preference rating for competition (y =2.95, p <.01) influenced
team fear in the expected directions. In contrast, when each members’ preference
ratings were entered to predict team greed, only Person 3’s preference rating for
cooperation was significant (7 =-1.99, p <. 01).

When each member’s decision to compete was entered to predict team greed and
fear, only team fear was significantly related to team members’ decision to compete
(Table 20). Specifically, each member’s decision significantly predicted team fear (y
=.47, p <.01; 7 =25, p <01; 7 =37, p <.01); whereas, only Person 3’s decision was
significantly related to team greed (7 =3.74, p <.01). In sum, the team members’
competitiveness for each round significantly influenced the team level of fear, but not
team level of greed.

Next, I tested if team member’s dispositions were related to team greed and fear.
Team members’ disposition was represented by averaging team members’ prosocial and
competitiveness dimensions of Social Value Orientation (Table 21). Consistent with

expectations, team members’ average prosocial disposition was negatively related to

66

team greed (y =-5.48, p <.01) and fear (7 =-2.44, p <. 01). Counter to expectations, team
members’ average competitive disposition was not related to team greed and fear.

Overall, the results showed partial support for the hypothesis. When team
members chose to compete, their decisions significantly influenced team fear; whereas,
team members’ preference and decision were not related to team greed. When team
members had a prosocial disposition, the team was more likely to have lower team
greed and fear.

Hypothesis 10. In hypothesis 10, I proposed that compared to teams in the
intervention conditions, teams in the control condition were more likely to develop a
competitive relationship over time. To test this hypothesis, the competition rates over
time were regressed onto three team conditions — Control, balanced discussion, and
cooperation primacy. As you can see in Table 22, compared to control teams, balanced
discussion teams’ preference for cooperation increased over time (7 =-2.62, p -<"i.01).
Compared to control teams, cooperation primacy teams did not show a significant
trajectory in terms of preferences and decisions. Therefore, the hypothesis was partially
supported.

Supplemental analyses. Although the majority rule condition was one of four
main experimental conditions in the current study, none of the hypothesis testing was
specifically focused on examining the condition. In this supplemental analysis, I
examine the majority rule team condition and see if the results are consistent with the
study’s theoretical understandings of the team discontinuity effect.

Unlike the rest of thr team conditions, in the majority rule teams, there was no team

discussion allowed and the team decisions were made using majority rule based on

67

individual decisions. Accordingly, the comparison between the majority rule and other
team conditions should give us some ideas about how team discussion impacts team
greed, fear, and decisions. Based on the multilevel model of the team discontinuity
effect, I proposed team competition is a result of a top-down team contextual effect and
a bottom-up team interaction effect. Accordingly, I expected that majority rule teams
would have lower competition rates compared to the control team conditions. I also
expected the majority rule teams would have more or less similar levels of competition
decisions compared to the balanced discussion teams and the cooperation primacy
teams.

However, in the preliminary results (See Figure 2), we found that such
expectation was not met. The majority rule teams had higher competition rates across
time compared to the control teams. In fact, it had the highest competition rates at all
measurement points. To follow-up such an unexpected finding, I further tested the
majority rule teams’ competition rates, team greed and team fear in supplemental
analyses. Table 23 presents the results of HLM analyses, where majority rule teams
were entered as the default condition along with the rest of team conditions to predict
team greed, fear, and decisions to compete. Majority teams did not have significantly
lower greed (y =-.41, p =.09) or fear (7 =-. 12, p =n.s.) compared to the control team
conditions. In fact, the majority rule teams had slightly higher, but not statistically
significant, team greed (y =-.41, p =. 09) and team decisions to compete (y =-.78, p
=10) compared to control condition teams. In addition, although I expected majority
conditions to have a similar level of team greed, fear and competition rates compared to

the balanced team condition and the cooperation primacy condition, the majority rule

68

teams had significantly higher team greed (y =-3.71, p <.01), fear (7 =-.81, p<1.01), and
competition decisions (7 =-2. 14, p <.01) compared to the balanced discussion condition
teams. In a similar vein, the majority rule teams had significantly higher team greed (y
=-.65, p <.01) and competition decisions (7 =-l .39, p <.01) compared to the
cooperation primacy condition teams.

Overall, my expectation about the majority rule condition was not met. Not
allowing interaction among team members did not necessarily led to higher cooperation
among teams. It is interesting to find out, however, that the top-down, team contextual
effect could be powerful enough to make people to compete at the same level as the top-
down and bottom-up effect combined, as one would assume only top down processes
happened in the majority rule condition. Further explanations of unexpected findings

are discussed in the discussion section.

DISCUSSION

As the team-based management system is becoming popular, cooperative
relationships between teams are becoming critical for the success of today’s
organizations. Previous literature on team relationships, however, has found inter-team
relationships are much more competitive and less cooperative than interpersonal
relationships (i.e., team discontinuity effect) (Wildschut et al, 2003). With that in mind,
this study develops a multilevel model of the team discontinuity effect in an attempt to
discover methods for increasing cooperation between teams. The multilevel model

conceptualizes a team’s decision to cooperate with other teams as a dynamic process of

69

team contextual cues (i.e., top-down processes) and team social interaction (i.e.,
bottom-up process). Empirical work and theory suggests competitive individuals tend
to be more influential during team discussion in comparison to cooperative individuals
(W ildschut et al, 2003; Morgan & Tindale, 2002; Steinel et a1, 2009). Therefore,
cooperative opinions are often ignored during team discussion. On the other hand,
greater cooperation between teams could result from giving cooperative opinions a
chance to be discussed. Based on such an idea, two manipulations were developed for
this research. In the first manipulation, a balanced discussion of each opinion is
encouraged by having a discussion guideline. In the second manipulation, cooperative
opinions possess a primacy advantage by having the cooperative opinion holder speak
first during team discussion. Results are supportive of the first manipulation. Teams
with a balanced discussion show significantly lower competition rates over time.
Support for the second manipulation is mixed. Teams manipulated to have cooperation
primacy start off with the lowest competition rates and then increase over time, thus,

yielding a less than significant overall effect.

Top-down effects

Consistent with previous studies on the team discontinuity effect, the current
study suggests top-down processes relate to the team discontinuity effect. Evidence
suggests team—level of cues influence an individual’s greed, fear and decision whether
to cooperate or compete with opponents. First, as an individual becomes a team
member their actions are less identifiable, in particular, an individual’s greed, fear and

decision whether to compete. Consistent with the expectation, individuals in the team

70

condition have significantly lower perceived identifiability than individuals in the
individual condition. Also, individuals who perceive less identifiability are more likely
to have higher individual greed and fear, which in turn, resulted in decisions to
compete. Second, when individuals are in a team context, social support for a
competitive decision influences an individual’s greed, fear and decision to compete.
Consistently, the number of competitive teammates is related to an individual’s greed
and fear, which in turn, leads to a decision to compete. Third, it was expected that the
in-group favoritism norm would facilitate individual greed and fear. Consistently, in-
group favoritism bias is much stronger in team contexts. Also, the in-group favoritism
norm is positively related to individual greed, fear and decisions to compete. Therefore,
the current study illustrates general support for the top-down processes by which team-
level cues trigger higher greed, fear of individuals, and decisions to compete.

In the current study, I had the majority rule team condition where team members
were not allowed to discuss their opinions. Following individual decisions, team
decisions were made based on majority rule. Therefore, in the majority rule condition,
an individual was a member of team and team decision was collectively made; yet, they
were not engaged in team discussion. This condition is unique because it showed the
effect of a top-down, contextual effect compared to the individual condition. The results
show that there is a strong top-down effect such that individuals in majority rule teams
had significantly higher individual greed and fear compared to individuals in the
individual condition. Furthermore, these individuals in the majority rule teams were

more likely to decide to compete. Therefore, the current study demonstrates support for

71

the top-down process where individuals were immediately influenced by team
contextual cues and have a higher individual greed, fear and desire to compete.
Bottom-up effects

This research is the first to approach the issue of the team discontinuity effect
from a bottom-up perspective, by examining how the team discussion process
influences the emergence of team decisions to cooperate. Based on the social influence
literature, two manipulations of team discussion were designed in order to increase the
influence of cooperative opinions during team member interaction. The results suggest
that team discussion manipulations had a direct impact on the team-level of greed, fear,
and decisions to cooperate. Specifically, when a balanced discussion was encouraged
during social interactions, teams were more likely have lower greed and fear, which in
turn, led to decisions to cooperate. Also, when cooperative individuals were given an
opportunity to speak first during social interaction, teams were more likely to cooperate
for the first few rounds. These findings suggest that by intervening in the social
interaction process, we can influence the emergence of team level greed, fear and
decisions to cooperate.

Additionally, I designed the majority rule condition based on the multilevel
model of the team discontinuity effect. In the majority rule condition, team discussion
was not allowed and bottom-up, social interaction effect was controlled. Accordingly,
the majority rule condition should have lower competition rates compared to the control
team condition. This is because top-down process and bottom-up process was thought
to have an accumulation effect on team competition and having only top-down process

in majority rule condition should make the less competitive teams. However, the

72

comparison between the majority rule teams and the control teams in this study suggests
a different story. The majority rule teams did not have lower team greed, fear, nor
competition rates. In fact, the majority rule teams have slightly higher team greed, fear
and competition rates than the control teams. This finding suggests that the top-down
team contextual effect itself can be powerful enough to make teams become as
competitive as teams with both top-down contextual effect and bottom-up social
interaction effect. Details on why the majority rule teams had such a strong situation
effect are discussed in the unexpected finding section.

Also, it was found that an individual’s level of cooperativeness influenced
his/her team’s level of greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate. This is another indicator
of a bottom-up effect where individuals’ opinions and characteristics influence the
emergence of team-level phenomenon. Specifically, an individual’s decisions to
cooperate influenced team greed and fear, which in turn, influenced team decisions to
cooperate. Also, it was found that team members’ prosocial dispositions were related to
team greed, fear, and decisions to cooperate. In the following section, I will describe the
main findings related to the bottom-up process in more detail.

Balanced team discussion The current study is the first study that examines
whether having balanced team discussion can facilitate cooperative team decisions.
While previous studies on the team discontinuity effect show that discussion among
team members often push teams to make more competitive decisions, there is a lack of
understanding on how team discussion processes impact team decisions to cooperate.
Incorporating information sampling theory and minority influence theory (Stasser &

Titus, I985; Steinel et a1, 2009), I argue that competitive opinions are more popular

73

during team discussion than cooperative opinions because people generally believe
competition fits with the in-group favoritism norm. Therefore, teammates are more
likely to spend time discussing competitive opinions rather than cooperative opiniOns.
This guides team decisions to be more competitive. Thus, for teams with a balanced
team discussion of cooperative and competitive opinions, it is predicted that teams will
make more cooperation decisions. Indeed, the results supported this contention.
Compared to teams in the control condition, teams in the balanced discussion condition
make significantly more cooperative decisions across time. In addition, the balanced
discussion teams display lower team greed and team fear in comparison to control
teams, which mediate the team decision. Therefore, balanced discussion helps teams
build goodwill and trust with one another, thereby increasing cooperation between
teams.

Cooperative Primacy Based on group polarization theory, the current study also
argues that manipulating discussion so that those with cooperative opinions speak first
will influence teams to cooperate. Such a hypothesis is based on group polarization
theory, where opinions spoken first during discussion tend to have a stronger influence
on team decisions (Carlston, 1977). This occurs because people have a tendency to
accommodate previous opinions when speaking their own opinion. Accordingly, I
anticipated the cooperative primacy manipulation would give the cooperation opinion
an edge and thus become more influential. Consistent with expectations, cooperation
primacy does have a significant impact on team decisions in the beginning rounds.
Compared to control teams, cooperation primacy manipulation teams show significantly

higher cooperation rates in rounds I and 2.

74

The high cooperation rates, however, do not last over time. In the later rounds,
we observe significant decreases in cooperation rates in teams with the cooperation
primacy manipulation. This indicates that the push toward competition becomes too
strong to be managed by the cooperation primacy manipulation. One explanation for
such push toward competition decision in the later round can be revenge. Once a team
is deceived, even with a cooperation primacy manipulation, team members are not
likely to be influenced by cooperative opinions because they are more focused on the
idea of revenge. Particularly, the cooperation primacy manipulation assumes that
decision alternatives have more or less equal attractiveness to the team members. This
assumption cannot be found in teams in later rounds. Teams in later rounds form a
certain impression about the opponent teams and already have experienced the
opponent’s behaviors. Therefore, despite the primacy manipulation, once teams get an
indication of competition, it is less likely for the cooperative opinions to win over the
competitive decisions.

Individual COOperativeness. The current study showed that an individual’s
cooperativeness influenced his/her team’s greed, fear and decisions to cooperate.
Specifically, as a greater number of team members decided to cooperate for their
individual decisions, the team had lower fear and was more likely to decide to
cooperate. Also, an individual’s prosocial disposition influenced his/her team’s
decisions to cooperate. That is, as there are a greater number of prosocial individuals
within a team, the team was more likely to have lower greed and fear and more likely to
decide to cooperate. Such finding suggests a bottom-up dynamics where an individual’s

cooperativeness influences shared perceptions about team greed, fear and decisions to

75

cooperate.

It was also interesting to find that an individual’s prosocial disposition
influenced his/her teammates’ preference ratings for cooperation and competition.
Specifically, there were positive relationships between one’s prosocial disposition and
his/her teammates’ preference ratings for cooperation and competition. Taken together,
these findings suggest the bottom—up process of the team discontinuity effect, where an
individual interacts with his/her teammates and influences team’s opinions and
decisions to cooperate.

Unexpected Results.

While many of the relationships among the key study variables were expected,
several unexpected results emerged as well. Given the lack of theoretical and empirical
work based on a multilevel framework of team discontinuity effect, careful examination
of these unexpected results may yield important insight that can inform future work in
this area, perhaps ultimately leading to advances in our understandings of the team
discontinuity effect.

Competition rates in majority-rule teams. It was expected that majority rule
teams would have the lowest competition rate among team conditions. Such expectation
is based on previous findings that allowing teams to interact led to greater team
competition. When team members were not allowed to discuss, it is assumed that they
have no opportunity to polarize their opinions toward competition during team
discussion. Consequently, team should have greater cooperation. It was found,
however, that teams with no interaction, where their team decisions were made based

on the majority rules, showed the highest competition rates overall.

76

 

One possible explanation for the conflicting result concerns the setting in
majority rule teams related to anonymity. While there was no discussion occurred
during the experiment and the team decision was made based on majority rules
following the individual votes, each team member’s decision could be well identified
within a team. That is, team member sat around a table and they were asked to turn their
individual decision onto the table after they made their individual decision. Through
this process, they were able to see who made what decision. Whereas, in the typical
setting of team discontinuity study, for no team discussion conditions, each individual
was seated in a private cubicle, where they were only informed the team decision that
was made without the knowledge of specific decisions made by team members. In
addition, previous studies suggested that group polarization can occur without
interaction (Asch, 1951). Specifically, researchers have argued that when there is access
to salient group norm, group members’ opinion polarizes toward the extreme point
regardless of the presence of group discussion (Asch, 1951). Therefore, the lack of
anonymity and communication within a team made competitive individual decision a
means by which to show loyalty to their team. That is, when people were able to see
each other’s decisions, individuals could have chosen competitive decision in order to
show that they are a part of group. People generally assume competitive decisions show
greater in-group favoritism and thus can be seen as more “safe” decisions.

Additionally, unlike the rest of the team conditions, the majority team condition
did not have a representative meeting between the two teams. This was because the
team decision was automatically made by majority rules following the individual

decision and it made little sense for the team representative to talk about a decision

77

already made by the team. However, having a team representative could have affected
maintenance of a cooperative relationship. That is, for the rest of the team conditions
(i.e., team control condition, balanced discussion condition, and cooperative team
condition), team representative met for each round, which gave them an opportunity to
explain their behavior and apologize for their competitive behaviors. In the majority
rule condition, however, without representative discussion, there is no room to hear the
explanation of the opponent team. Therefore, forgiving opponent’s decisions to compete
is not likely to happen, which could have pushed team decisions toward being
competitive.

Confidence of competitive individual. In hypothesis 7, I proposed that confident
individuals were more likely to influence team greed, fear and decisions to COOperate.
This hypothesis was based on the idea that confident individuals exert a greater
influence on social interaction dynamics and the emergence of team greed, fear and
decisions. To test the hypothesis, I regressed team greed, fear, and decisions onto each
team members’ level of confidence. The results were not significant and thus hypothesis
7 was not supported.

One needs to keep in mind, however, that just because this one analysis turned
out not significant, it does not mean individual confidence does not influence the
emergence of team greed, fear, and decisions. That is, the current test of hypothesis 7
only examined the relationships between individual confidence and the mean level of
team greed, fear, and decisions. There are many different ways of testing the
relationship between individual confidence and the emergence of team level

characteristics.

78

For instance, a composition model of multilevel processes suggests that the
emergence of team characteristics can be viewed as convergence of individual members
and team’s characteristics over time. Accordingly, an alternative way of testing the idea
can be relating confidence with the difference scores (i.e., variance) between individual
and team preference ratings for each decision. In fact, the correlation between those
difference scores and individual confidence across rounds were all negative yet not
significant. This shows some tentative evidence that individual confidence perhaps
plays a role in the convergence of team greed, fear and decisions.

Perhaps, the main shortcoming of the current test of hypothesis 7 is the fact that
we cannot see how confident COOperative versus confident competitive individuals
cause different dynamics in the social influence process. While it was not specifically
hypothesized, the current study assumed that individuals with competitive opinions
would have a higher confidence in their opinions and would appear more confident to
their teammates because a) a competitive opinion can take advantage of the negative
information bias and in-group favoritism norms (Steinel et al, 2009) and b) competitive
individuals are usually not agreeable and do not easily give in on their opinions
(Troetschel et al, 2005).

Interestingly, additional data analyses comparing the relationship between
confidence and cooperative and competitive preference ratings showed interactions with
conditions. Specifically, there were significant positive relationships between
confidence and cooperative preference ratings for the balanced team conditions and the
cooperation primacy condition across all rounds. In contrast, there was no relationship

between confidence and cooperative preference ratings for the majority team decision

79

condition and the team control condition. This means that for the balanced discussion
teams and cooperation primacy teams, individuals with cooperative opinions were more
confident and they were perceived as more confident — an expectation that fits with the
current hypotheses. For balanced discussion teams and cooperation primacy teams,
individuals with cooperative opinions were more confident and they were perceived as
more confident. These findings suggest that the discussion intervention successfully
managed dynamics between cooperative and competitive opinions and increased the
confidence of cooperative opinion holders, which led teams to make cooperative

decisions.

Future research should further investigate how individual confidence influences social
interaction dynamics. For example, one could run a follow up experiment where there is
a confederate who shows highly confident cooperative or competitive opinions and
examine if the team members were more influenced by the cooperative or competitive
confident individuals.

Non-convergpnce ofpreedand fear over time. The design for the experimental
manipulations was based on the anticipated mechanism of the bottom-up processes of
the team discontinuity effect. Specifically, I proposed that individuals would eventually
converge on their perceptions of team greed and fear, which in turn, would influence
team decisions to cooperate. Accordingly, I expected that the manipulations would
make individuals’ perceptions about team greed and fear converge to a lower level of

both due to team interactions.

80

While I found that individuals had lower greed and fear in the manipulation
conditions in general, I did not find convergence of greed and fear over time (See Table
24). In Table 24, within-team standard deviations on individual and team greed and fear
are presented across all time points. As we can see, there is no clear pattern of increase
or decrease in deviation scores over time. This suggests that individuals remained as
diverse in their perceptions of team and individual level greed and fear throughout the
experiment. Two possible explanations for such findings are presented below.

First, it is important to keep in mind that my anticipation of greed and fear
convergence was based on a composition model of the multilevel process. Composition
models are a form of emergence that is based on the notion of isomorphism (Kozlowski
& Klein, 2000). In a composition model, the social interaction process facilitates
sharing and convergence of lower-level phenomenon, yielding a team-level
phenomenon (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Because the data does not support such
convergence of individuals’ perceptions about team greed and fear, this may indicate
that the multilevel process of the team discontinuity effect cannot be adequately
explained using the composition model. Perhaps, the team discontinuity effect may
follow a compilation model of a multilevel process. Compilation models argue
interaction among lower-level entities does not necessarily lead to shared perceptions or
uniform upper level phenomenon. Instead, the variability of lower-level entities and the
mosaic of such variability are the main points of interest for a compilation model.
Accordingly, the convergence of individuals’ cognitions is not assumed in a

compilation model, nor should social interaction necessarily make such cognitions

81

similar to each other. Future studies should carefully examine such different theoretical
positions so as to better understand the team discontinuity effect.

Second, while individual did not converged on their ratings of greed and fear,
there is some evidence that individuals converged on their preference ratings for
cooperation over time. As we can see from Table 24, within-team standard deviations of
individual preference ratings for cooperation decreased from 1.01 to .51 for the control
teams and from 1.11 to .49 for the balanced condition teams over the course of the
experiment. Also, consistent with the idea that social interaction facilitates convergence
of individual opinions, teams with no interaction (majority rule teams) did not
converged on their preference ratings for cooperation. This finding suggests that
individual preferences for cooperation were more susceptible to converge than greed
and fear. One main difference between cooperation preferences and greed and fear
perceptions is the fact that cooperation preferences are things that individuals directly
discuss during the team discussion; while greed and fear are of a more private nature
and not directly discussed. Therefore, it could be the case that a preference for
cooperation was the more commonly talked about topic and thus it is easier to detect
differences among team members during team discussion. Team greed is not a
commonly talked about topic and, thus it is difficult to detect differences among team
members. Accordingly, greed and fear are less influenced by social interaction.
Implications and Future Directions

The present study addresses some of the implications and limitations of the team
discontinuity effect research. The previous research on the team discontinuity effect has

tended to be descriptive, not prescriptive, maintaining a limited view of the team

82

decision-making process, and has not addressed how team discussion interventions
influence team decisions to cooperate.

One of the main contributions of the current study is the development of a
multilevel model of the team discontinuity effect. Previous studies often entangled the
individual level of greed and fear and the team level of greed and fear, such that they
only measured individual greed and fear and ignored the fact that individuals can have
perceptions about the team’s level of greed and fear (team-level greed and fear) that are
different from their greed and fear. Such misspecification of levels can slow the
appropriate development of theory and solutions for the team discontinuity effect. The
current study distinguished individual greed and fear from team greed and fear. By
specifying different levels, the current study was able to test how the different levels are
related through top down and bottom-up processes.

In this study, team discussion was identified as an important factor that
influences the team decision to cooperate. Based on the findings, organizations can use
team discussion intervention techniques to improve cooperation between teams. For
example, the current research suggests that teams given the discussion guidelines are
less likely to have greed and fear, leading to greater cooperation between teams.
Accordingly, organizations can give teams a decision guideline sheet and ask teams to
complete the sheet during team discussion. In addition, organizations can ask individual
opinions prior to team discussion and make individuals with the cooperative opinions
speak first. The current finding suggests that such cooperation primacy techniques
would work well for short—term team interactions. Therefore, this technique can be

implemented for one time interactions involving groups such as organization mergers or

83

acquisitions.

Despite the aforementioned contributions, the present study has a number of
limitations that should be kept in mind. One major limitation of the current study is a
lack of understanding of the team discussion dynamics for each condition. That is,
while the current research suggests that balanced discussion and cooperation primacy
led team discussions in a way that facilitates cooperation, there is still a lack of
understanding of the nature of the discussion dynamics in those conditions. For
example, did the cooperative opinion holder speak more than the competitive opinion
holder? Did the cooperative opinion holder effectively counter the arguments of the
competitive opinion holder? It is still not clear how the specific nature of interaction for
those conditions compared to the control condition. The next step in the current research
area, therefore, should focus on qualitative data where we can observe and compare
dynamic team discussion processes per each condition.

Another limitation stems from the experimental setting and the task involved in
the current study. While many organizational scientists view the prisoner’s dilemma
game as concise and an effective representation of real world dilemmas involving
cooperation, the extent to which the current findings generalize to more natural
situations is unclear at this point. For example, many organizations have more than two
teams to manage and it is unclear if balanced discussion and the cooperation primacy
technique would be effective for facilitating cooperation involving more than two
teams. Also, the current study assumed that team members have more or less equal
status within the team. Many teams in organizations, however, consist of members with

different status levels. Opinions of team leaders would probably be weighted more

84

heavily than opinions of subordinates during team discussion (Wood, 1973). Future
studies should examine discussion dynamics of teams with leaders.

Future studies should further examine the emergence process of team greed and
fear. Originally, based on the composition model of the multilevel process, I argued that
individual greed, fear, and decisions would eventually converge as team members
interact with one another. Mixed supports were found from the current study, and the
specific mechanism of multilevel process is not clear from the results. Specifically,
individuals did not converged on their level of greed or fear; but they converged on
individual preference ratings for cooperation. One explanation for such findings was
that individuals could have mainly talked about their decisions during team discussion
and their greed and fear were hidden as more private matters and did not get enough
attention during team discussion. To test such explanation, the future study should
examine if having team members discuss their levels of greed and fear during team
discussion makes them converge on their levels of greed and fear.

Finally, the future study should also examine the dynamics between top-down
and bottom-up effects of the team discontinuity effect. My initial understanding of such
dynamics was an accumulation process. That is, if one team has only top-down effect,
then it should have lower competition rates compared to teams who have both top-down
and bottom-up effects. The results suggest, however, it is not the case. Teams who were
assumed to have only top-down effect (i.e., majority rule teams) showed the highest
competition rates compared to the rest of teams who supposedly have both effects.
Now, it should be kept in mind that majority rule teams in the current study were not an

exact replication of the control team condition minus team discussion. That is, as I

85

already discussed, majority rule teams could not have representative meetings which
may have contributed why they ended up having the highest competition rates.
Therefore, it is important to run a future study where we can more directly compare the
top—down effect with the bottom-up effect. Having just one round with no representative
meetings for both majority 11.116 team and control teams would give us a better idea

about the nature of the bottom-up effect and the top-down effect.

86

F_igure I. The Multilevel Model of the Team Discontinuity Effect

.IIIIIIII...III-II........Il-IIIOIUII'.

.IIIIIIIIIII'll-OIIIIDIIIIIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIOIIO.
O

 

.° Team decision
to cooperate

I\ I I
\
J \ 1— I |\

 

 

 

 

  
  
   
 

  
   
 

  
  
    
 
    

  
   
   
 

I l \ I x
I
I ,’ Team-level ‘ ‘\
,’ I Greed & Fear \ \
I z T I I, \ f x \
I I I / \l \ I
’ \
' ’ mm Individual-level \ l
I I Greed & Fear 9 Greed & Fear \.
"\ Decision -)Decision 1'
I
l \ I I
I \ \ l l
\ \ / I
X ‘ ~ - _ Individual-level __ ,. ’ ’
Greed & Fear -) I

1

\ : Decision
I
I

O
O
O. \ I .0.
9. \ | I .0
0. ~ .
0 ~ ’ 0
Q ~ - ’ O
. - o.
O. .9
0. Q
0. °
C IIIII III.IIIIII-II...CHIC-......IIIIIIIIIIIII-IIIIII-I.

Team Context

87

 

mucaom

 

 

Eco... 3955 9288000 I
Each :o_ww:om_0 neocfimm I
Seek 65.80 B

Emoh coin—.3562 D
5:650 33229.. I

 

 

 

05.... co>O moonw— co_u_uonEoo

 

m "09m

 

 

 

HSEESO 3m 08F B>O m3 netwomfi. 00. .N 8:. MIE

88

080:582 3 8:558 0020800» 2828088 80 00.58 802820 .8855 00 000331 Houfiomooo 80 00508 853.020 .8555»:

.«o owfio><0 $890808 3 22080 528088 me 808:: 25% 5509-552 0038806 255600 :0 850980: ”72358 8 .8380 40886008
8 5389: USERS—8 80 mmaafl 8:05.083 dofioqooo com 0968 8:86-02ch ”03530800 I 2:208 Sow-“8:1 amuse—page I 2028 :88¢8:=
68530050 1 0838 352205-085: 635532? i 0828 fiaEéLBSM MON/m 00 028250 mmo=o>uuomfié MO>m 00 0:205:50 egg—0550
..O>m mo 029586 368800 ”To—0E8 002026 8.88 0 355 5.280 0:500 Jumaoficeoo E08 6052980 533056 .00. u 2&0 :0 «a 0:02.:qu
20 AE:0_>EE-:§EV 5. 0:0 $5365-08an Z. :05 $0020 830.» 2:- 25 55 22032.8 ESE-egg 00.296 2: 28802 E5006

2: gone 50:50:00 05. .888 02008000 2050365 050: 085.088 80 35 520258 52305-5033 33898 50006 2: 3200. 95:59:00
05. douse-6 03056 “03255-5505 u 3.90 ”500060 90053 5036558303 n 0.0% 50002030 0000 000380 0:3 85360.80 00 0.1-2 .882

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9.0 No.0 5.0 00.0- 00.0 5.0 00.0- 5.0 5.0- 000 00.0 - 0v. 00. 5.... 0.0000 con. .0N
0N0 5.0 5.0 00.0 5.0 5.0 3.0 0E0- 5.0 No.0 00.0 - E. 5. 5d 50:50 .095 .NN
0N0- N00- 00.0- 00.0 5.0- 5.0- 9.0- 3.0 5.0- 00.0- No.0 - E. 00. 00.0 0.0000 4sz ...N
0N0 00.0 No.0- 00.0 5.0 5.0- 9.0 3.0- 00.0 5.0- 5.0 - 00. 5. R. 30.5 .oom .0N
00.0- 5.0 5.0- 00.0- 5.0- 00.0 5.0 00.0 00.0- No.0 Ned mm: 00. 0: 00.... $5505.52 .0?
00.0- 00.0 00.0 5.0 00.0 5.0 00.0- 5.0 00.0- 5.0- 5.0 00.- 00. 5. 006 280000000 .3
0N0 00.0 5.0 00.0 No.0 5.0 00.0 0.0- 3.0 N00- 5.0 0N. 0m. 00. 00.? 5020800 .5
5.0 00.0 00.0 3.0 00.0 00.0 NWO 510- 5.0 5.0- 000 0?. 5. 004 00.N 0.0800 .tn. .0..
5.0- 00.0 00.0 5.0- 00.0- 5.0- NN.0- 5.0 3.0- 00.0 00.0- mm; mm. 5.? 00.0 «.0000 .tn. .00
V0.0 00.0 00.0 0rd 00.0- 00.0 5.0 _.N.0- 5.0 00.0- 5.0 V0. 0». 5.? 004. .00“. .3
00.0 00.0 3.0 0N0 5.0 5.0 0N0 0N0- 5.0 00.0- 5.0- mm. 00. 5.9 006 0020 .0..
00.0- 3.0 00.0 00.0 5.0- 00.0 5.0- 9.0 5.0 00.0- cm. - NY: 00.0 Ew_Eo>mn_ .NP
3.0- 0.010 00.0 00.0 «0.0 5.0- 00.0 5.0- No.0- N0: - 5. 00.... Ezmlfiinai EF. 3.
3.0 5.0 No.0 00.0- 5.0 5.0- N00- 5.0- 00. - N0... 006 389‘ E... .0..
2.0- 3.0 3.0 0N0- No.0 0N0- 00.0 5.- - 00. 05.0 cmzmfimx‘ .00. .0
5.0 00.0- 5.0 00.0- 00.0 .000 3. - 5. 00+ 0090< .05 .0
0 P0- 010- 00.0- 00.0- 5.0 5.- - mud 00. k .058 I O>m N
5.0- 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.- - 0Y0 00.0 005 I O>m .0
5.0 00.0 5.0- 00. - 00.0 m 0.3000 - O>w .0
00.0- 00.0 NF. - 000 50.0w 0% .v
00.0- 5.- - 0v. 5.? 6.50000 .0
- - 5. 00.9 002000.”. .N
- - RN. 5. 5200000 .F

S : S e w e e ell a m N _ 3-0 pm 2
4.55m see 282285003033

 

89

.00. n 0020 :0 00 802-00000 08 9800-00005 5. 0:0 Age-000508 2. :05 0000000 0020> 05. .080 008 0800—0000 5000-0303 00030 05 80000000
008008 05 0800 0800—0080 05. 00800 0000000000 .0508 050: 00009000 08 005 08008080 8000-0003000 80000000 008008 05 3200 08930980
0.:- 0000060 0000000 0000-00003 u 3.3 8000300 00000000 8000-0003000 u 0.90 £808,000 00 000 000308 003 08000 5T Z .008 Z

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

- :2. :00.- ..E. :00. :00. 03. .03. .00.- :00.- 00. 00. 00. 020600 E00... .03
3. - :00.- :00. :00. :8. 00. :00. :00.- ..00- 00. 00. 00.0 .0800 .005 E00... .0
av; 00.- - ...-00.- :8.- 100- 8.- :3- :00. :00. 00. 00. 00.0 .0000 .0000 E000. .0
0v. 00. 00.- - :00. :00. 03. .00. ...-00.- .qu 00. n 3 03V .00“. E00... N
00. 00. 8.- E. - :00. .00. LN. r00.- :00.. mm. 00. 00.0 000.0 EmE. .0

- B. :00. :00.- 07 03 00.0 .85 0200002 .0
- 8.- 1.0»..- E.- 00.3 5. 02500580 0005. .v
- 1.00.- 5.- 03.0 5.0 80920:. 0005. .0
- 8. 00.0 03.0 _0_0ow€n_ 000.2 .N
- N: 00.0 0200000 .3
E 0 0 0 0 m 0 0 N 0 3.90 0.05 2

30:05 030 880 2800.880 8000-02005 000 -000300m .N 030.0

 

9O

 

mo. $86. 5. 50.. oo. “Inca 5. mo. oo. 3... mo. Nor Smdafi-

 

 
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  

 

 

8. :32 8. 8. 8. 3.2.2- 8. R.- No. :03 S. 3. 2m can 3:223
8. ...-m: 8. 8.. No. ...-o3- 8. .m- S. ...-Ea mo. 3. 2m .305 3:232:
8. 23 «m. E. 3. 13¢ mm. 8.- 2. .,.-woe om. 8a 35 53¢ 52:5 .88
8. K. 3“. t. S. «2- mm. on- 8. 12a ow. 52 35 ..5”; 82.23
mo. :93 mm. a. 2. ...-8a. m. 3.- 2. ...-Now E. W? N3Q .88-.- 6:80
8. Iowa 8. co. 2. ...-8.? «N. w:- 2. ...-3a 3. SM 33 55¢ 2am €0.32
-- ...-8.2 2. SN -- ...-9.8 M:. o? - ...-m3- NV. m2- sm fine-35
mm Stu-A am a. x NM mfiUA-K 2.. k «K 333.5 a. a Eco-mm 3me
5338.800 8m 8:80-35 :ouwhomooo 5m 3:80-35 gun 0353800
a>2®=2>€£ _o>2-_w=2>€£ , 35.33223 8:85
.91 momofioga :omfloon— an< 28 gov-moon comm 8m "awed-mm vocab-«8m no Sam was @080 ~0>£4m32>€5 mo “out-m .v 2an
8. ...-SN- 5. 8.- 8. OS 8. S. 2m .08;
8. ...-8+- 8. M5.- 8. 5m:- 8. :.- 2m é=3逧
2. 3.8+ R. we; 2. 1.: on 62 33 dam:- §EE .88
S. ...-Nam S. S. o a ...-M? on w: 35 .e8-_- 8053
2. ...-wow mm. m: w _. ...-o; 2. v: 35 .ase .888
2. 25% mm. c3 w _. ...-3m :- m: :5 .58..- 2E ..32
-- 35.2 S. a: -- ...-8.2 E. 03 em .38th
38mm 85m
mm 23S K mm x mm Sec: 9 mm a
seawaésaé 820 egafiéseaifl 8:25

 

:maoaonHEV sum as 880 35-36365 8 SEES-us 8285 .6 80mm .m 03¢

91

 

 

 

8. 3.. _- 8. 8.- 8. EN 8. 8. am .25
8. ...-88 8. 3. 8. ...-$8. 8. 2. 2m .> E 5&8 38m
8. N2- 8. 8.- 8. ...-.88- mo. 8.. 2m .x .é 5&8 Eoom
8. .83- 8. mm- 8. S. _- 3. $.- §Q .638 32:5 .88
8. :2 .m- vm. fi- 8. ...-:8- om. $- §Q ..5“; 885.3
8. 8m. _- mm. mm- 8. 8.- 8.. 8.- 33 .885 6:80
-- ...-8.8 2. 9% -- 8.8 2. :8 am 80885
mm 2S»: K mm a «K Sac; K mm A {/1 flow-mm taxi

 

moi-.3222: 885
Am mmmofiomNI-v Son 98 805 fi>24~=2>6£ no 288809 comm 8m mtommzm 860m .«o Bow-«m .0 033-

 

 

?Efiéseé sum

:otoEU

 

 

 

8. ...-8...- 8. 8.- 8. 8. 8. 8. 2m as:
8. ...-8.5 8. 8. 8. $8.: 8. S. 2m £258 .528
8. ... _ mm- mm. 8.. 8. N3- 2... 2.- 35 .888- .AoaeE .88
8. ...-mum- mm. 8.. 8. *2 .m- cm. on- N8Q .8on 8853
8. 82- a. No- 8. 8.- 8.. 8.- 33 .ESH 65:8
-- ...-2.8 2. 8mm -- ...-8.8 2. E. 5.8858
mm 33; K 3- .“ mm Sac-A .& mm a ,,-../...//--f flue-mm 3x5

 

moi-3:222: 885
Am Emofiomma 80m can 820 8538:2265 :0 58809 9:509:00 5m tommsm 880m mo poo-Em .m 2an

 

8518222: :88

8:85 //

92

 

a. fame- S. vor 00. m5- 5. co... 3% JEF

8. $- 5. 5.- 8. Mg. _- 8. 2.. gm 62%.? I 255m 889
8. S- S. 5.. 8. mo. 8. 8. am £85382? I 255m awa-
2. ...... .3 R. we; 2. ...-3. on N2 :3 .pafi 52.5 .38
B. imam R. 3. 2. 1.3m on w: 33 as“; Begum
2. 2.8... mu. m? w _. ...-own 8. v: 33 .Esh 6280

o _. 3&3 R. $._ w _. zoom 3. m: 33 asap 03 3.8.32

-- :52 mm. a? -- ......mNS 3. 8a em £0835

 

  
   

 

 

 

 

 

mm was: K a. A at 33: .K a. x flue-mm— @0me
ooswflésfié 806 $573363 8:35
on macs-8&5 30m was 320 35733365 no 083% Snow-5:: mo woo-mm .w 2an
S. to?- S. 8.- 8. S... S. 8.- 2m .08:
8. ...-Rm 8. No. S. LVN 8. 5. am .8853;
2. :8... 8. we; 2. :3 on S: ..sq .889 558.5 .88
8. ...-Ea R. a. 2. :85 on m: 33 .88-F 8233
2. *1: 8.. mi w _. :03 R. v: 33 .ESH :5qu
2. ...-3m 2... 6.. w _. 1.86 3.. m: 3.6 each 23¢ 3.8.32
-- :3: mm. a; -- ......mmd E. 92 gm €8.85
mm mam»; K mm a mm ~33: nu 8- N Soc-mm tux?—

   
  

 

 

232492225 805 932-3:232a alum 8:35
Am £850be 30m can 880 35226385 :0 Sit-55m anew-E mo woo-cm N 2an

93

 

5. ...—Nd- mo. 80.- v0. mm; mo. V0. 00. vmg- mo. o0. 3% GEE.

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

8. iv? 8. 9.. oo. :03- mo. 2... 3. .533 8. 8. ...-m .889 538
mo. :88 8. 8. mo. ...: +- wo. 8..- mo. ......Nv.m 8. a. 29:3 888
2. :88- 8.. 8.- :. $8.8 on. 8. 2. :38.- 3. w... T 3Q .888 BOSE
-- :82 2. E .m -- :3: 2. 9% - 91- 8. :1 3m €08.35
8% 2:6; .8 8.. 8 mt MENU; .8 mm- 8 8% main; .8 3 8 flow-mm v82”—
:Emfioa o>EBanU season 39.23000
58 8:808on 888 58 8:80.55 EwelH Boa-Eco 9 5389 EaloH :otoEU //

 

Am mmmofiomma 866% :58 no :38 28 3on :88 mo woo-mm ._ _ 2%....-

 

 

  

oo. .83 S. :. 8. 3.8.8. mo. 8.- 2m .25..- M
mo. 08. T 8. $.- 8. .2 .8- 8. me. 3Q .88..- 8053

-- :88. 2. 2 .m -- .....2 .8 8. o: 8m €8.85

8% ma}; .8 mm 8 8% 33; .8 my. 8 flow-am taxi

  

 

380 838 Slum.- anh .8585
Am £35333 8on was 308 83.. :0 03388? :08 $238 mason. wary“: mo woo-am A: 032-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

oo. Om. 7 «.0. we. 00. Vm. mo. mo. 00. v0. 80. co. 3% JEE-
2. .1086- mm. 00.- Z. ..sLRN 0N. N8. 2. ......moN- 0v. 9.2—- SQ .838. 82.2mm
-- **Nw.o_ 2. S .m -- 100.: 3. mfm -- S. T Nm. Nm.- 8% #3885
8% SSS .8 3.. 8 mm 2&6: .8 8- - 8 8% 2S»; .8 mm 8 // flootm woxE
:EEQQQ 03:89:00 season 2688000 /-
58 8:20-35 Emu-- 88 855805 Emu-H 83800 8 c0389 Eco-w count-G ///

 

Am ammo—toga 566% some 88 mmctfi 8:808on was 836% :88 no 03388? :08 8288 2:58 war/w: mo goo-mm— .o 2an

 

oo. 5.. mo. No. 00. No. No. oo.. oo. 3. 8b. 5. chm-0:28-

 

   

 

 

mo. .5.-08.8. mo. mm. mo. 18.8%- mo. 3w- mo. imwd ..N. 5. 0mm .0005 800,—-

mo. :36 8o. ow. 80. :30- 80. NV. mo. iwmfi 08. mm. 2m .808 800,—.

mo. vog- wm. ww- mo. mo; 8N. 9.. S. :4- 8m. me. 8Q €008- 8008t& .8000

:. Immam- mm. var mo. **©w.m 8N. 08. co. *Om.N- mm. 2:. SQ .0808- wound—mm

-- .,..-No.2 8.0.. :.m -- 1.2.5 08. om.m -- mm... NV. mm. 8% £00885
flow-am 0308

mm 033; .8 mm. 8 mm 0:38 .8 mm. 8 mm 0368 .8 00 8

mason 03500800 003009 030%

 

 

 

00.8 00080-805 80.08- 008 00080-805 Emu-H 80 800 00 022003 Emu-w 00 08:0

 

G $850985 mwaufi 000000805 000 806600 808 :0 So.“ 0:0 000% :88 80 3008-5 .2 030,—-

 

3. ...-med 5. E. S. v:- 8. 8.- am as:
S. 3.. s. w _ .- 8. 8.- S. 8.- 30 .830. 8885 .88
5. mo. 7 a. N8..- 8. mm. mm. 8. 3Q .888 88an
mm. 5&3 8. on. S. ...-#8 8. 8. am £23853 03332
-- ...-2.8 m _. wow -- ...-00.8 t. m? 8m €8.35

 

/ ago-mm BE

   

8% 0038 .8 ma- 8 mm 0338 .8 mm 8
000.5 Eco-w Sum 8008- 00 EEO
.G $850935 30% 0:0 308 :88 00 nosmauomfi 020030 mafia 80 woo-mm .N_ 0308-

 

95

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8. a. 8. 8. 8. 8.- 8. 8.- 8. .88 8. 2. am .258

8. 8. m _. 8. 8. 8. 2. 8. 8. 8. 8. 8. 8m .8 88880 8288

8. m: m _. t. 8. S. 7 E. 8.- 8. m: 8. 3.. am .8 88880 82888

8. 8.- E. 8.- 8. 8.- 2. 8.- 8. 8. 8. 8. am .5 88380 82888

8. .88 88. 85 8. 8.7 8. 3.7 2. :88. 8. a. 7 8Q .888 8885 .800

8. 85 E. 85 8. 8.7 8. 8.- :. $8.7 8. 8.8- 3Q .588 88880

8. 3.8.8 88. 2.8 8. .88- 8. 8.7 8. 8. 7 8. 8.7 3Q .888 6:80

-- v2 8. 85 -- :88 8. 88 -- v2 8. 8. 8m .8885

8% 0368 .8 0m? 8 mm 0838. 8 0m - 8 8% 0568- 8 0.8. 8 .I/ 30088”.— Bin

:0EO0Q 038600800 00662. 0308800000
~08 005-50805 8008- .08 00580805 8% 3% 20:87..
88 2.850885 8.088000 :88 :0 8:028:00 0030808 80 30088.8 .3 0308/
:_ :88 8. S. 8. 8. 8. 8. 2.0 .85:
8. 8. 8. 8. 8. 18.7 8. 8.- 2m .8 88880 828.8
8. 8.- 8. 8.- 8. 8. 8. 8. 20 .8 88880 82888
8. .8.- 8. 8.- 8. 8. 8. 8. 2m .E 88880 8288
8. :88- 8. 8.- 8. 8.7 8. 8.- 8m .588 8855 .800
8. 1.8.7 8. 8.- 8. 8. 7 8. 8.- 30 .588 88880
8. 8. 7 8. .m- 8. M:- S. 8.- 3Q .588 8:80
- :88 2. mom -- ......8. a 8. m: 3m .8885
mm 0338 .8 0w 8 8% 0:38 .8 0m 8 / 80085 005.8
80005 8808- ? 858:0

 

 

 

   

 

A8 885%.85 80008N 05 80-8 808 :0 00:02.38 800308030 3008.5 .3 03¢..-

6
9

 

oo. co. 8. oo. 00. we. 8- mo. 8.. 00. am. no. No. 08% .08:-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
  

 

 

 

 

8. .88 :. 8. 8. Iowa- 2. 8.- 8. 38.8 8. 8. am .0 880 588
00. 188.0 00. 3. 8o. 0.30m- mo. 3.. mo. 3.3.0 8... m0. 2% .0008 00008.
00. ...moN- 8N. 00- mo. 8.0.8 88. am. No. 0:- 8m. 80. - 8Q .0808- 8080008 .0000
-- ......wwf 08. N_.m -- 1.3.: 07 Sam -- 80.- N0. 00. - 8% 000000808
8% 08808 .8 00.. 8 8% 0308 .8 08.. 8 8% 000808 .8 00- 8 / 300mm 00x8"—
0000000Q 0300000000 008609 0200000000
.008 0000008008 00.0.0IH 008 0000008008 00008. 00000000 00 0000000D 000ll08- 0057/
3 000050885 0002000 80000 00 0008 000 0000w 00000 80 00088-8 .2 0308-
8. 8.0 8. 8. 8. ...... 08.8- 8. 8.- 8. :88 8. 8. am .0508 ..w
8. .88- 8. 8.- 8. 8.0 8. 8. 8. 8. 7 0m. 8. - 3Q .580- 88500 .080
-- 3.08.2 08. N7m -- 3.028 08. 8.0.8“ -- wmg- mm. 0v. - 8% 400000008
«~08 0:38 .8 00.. 8 8% 0308 .8 00. - N 8% 000808 .8 00. 8 30088m 00x88
0|0|0w000a 0200000000 00000003 0050000000
008 0000008008 80'08- 008 0000008008 00-0l0l8- 000000000

 

 

3 08050085 008.500 0000 008 80000 0000008000 000 005800 000.00 00 0.0008 0.80000 00.0000 0200000000 mag: 80 80088m .: 0308.

 

 

  

2. ......88 8. 3. 8. N0. 8. 8. 50 .0508
8. S .7 8. 8.- 8. 8. 7 8. 8.- sQ .588 8858 .080

- ......88 0 0. m 0 .m - ...-.88 8. 8.0. am .8888
mm 0808 .8 0m 8 8% 03808 .8 08- 8 ///. 000088m 00x08

  

 

00080 00008- 0008 000.08- 00.008800
3 m8005008mv 0000w 000 0008 080000 00 00008 080% 000008 0300008000 w00>0n 80 00088m .08 0308-

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

E. :88 8. 8. 8. we. _- 8. 8.- am as:
8. ......Ea 8. 3. 8. it... 8. 8. am .2 sew-En 3.6365
8. SJ 8. 8. 8. :0: 8. mm. ...-m .8 8.225 3.6365
8. o: 8. S. 8. ......88 8. S. 2m .E 8289 .8222:
8. ......8.~- E. $- 8. 8. _- em. 8.. 3Q .58“. SEE .88
8. ...-28- 3... mu- 8. 8. T on on- 3Q ..5“; Begum
8. E. T E. 8.- 8. 8. z. 8. 3Q .89; .825
- ...-8.8 :. mom - ...... E: 8. m: gm €8.85
MK 2am: ..m 8- x mm 8%»; K 8- a flue-cm taxi
U080 Ewe-H 50m Emu-H Haw—3CD
.Ao Emofiomzmv 3on was 88 :88 so 586% 5958 some mo woo-mm .om 2an
:. ...... 8.8 8. 2. 8. E .- S. 8.. § ...-.8:
oo. 8. 3. oo. 8. oo- 3. 8.- ....m .2 .980 E 85585
8. m3 8. 8. 8. :88. 8. S. 2m .8 .888 .8 855-35
8. 02 8. 8. 8. 8. mo. 3. an .E 8:50 .é 85305
8. 18.7 8. 8.- 8. :58- 8. E .- am .2 .88 .8 8552a
8. 2V. 3. 8. 8. 8.- 8. 8.- 2m .8 .88 5.. 8:285
8. E. 8. 8. 8. .88. mo. 8 .- 2m .E .88 .8 8558;
mo. :3- VN. 8.- 8. 8. _- on 2... 3Q .68-H 58:5 .88
8. :88- E. 8.- oo. 8. _- am. 8..- sq .889 805.8
8. E. _- E. $.- 8. 3. on 8. 5Q 53 6580
-- zoo. _ m 2. m3 - :3. a 8.. m: em 88.25
mm 33: K 8- A ~% 2S»: 9 ma x flue-cm coin
mug-Q3 g 8:85

  

 

.8 $350885 39% was 38 Emma co mwcufi 8:80on @3958 :08 mo “oatm— .2 2an

98

 

8. 8. 8. 8. 8. 8.- 8. 8.- 8. 8._ t. 8. 2888288588

8. 8. 7 . 8. 2 .- 8. :8.~ 8. 2. 8. 8.7 t. 8.- :Q 8:3 888m
8. 8. 8. 8. 8. R. 7 8. 8.- 8. of :. w _. 2m .08:
8. 8.7 8. 8.- 8. 8.8 8. 8. 8. 8.7 8. 8.- 3Q 88,—. .6885 .88
:. :87 8. 8.- 8. :88 R. 8. 8. :87 8. 8. 7 3Q .889 Boa-mam
- :8: 8. 28 -- :28 2. 8mm -- 8. 7 8. 2... sm .8228

 

E was; K 8. .8 NM 8838 ..5 mm a «K 8868 K 8. 5
gov-Eon 03:8 800 noumoon 9680 000
8m 8:80-85 8g.- .Bm 3:80.85 8%.. Boa-Sou 3 88.889 Efl :23“th

88m 88

 
  

 

 

 

 

 

9: £838th mwcufi oofibmfiqug 88863 :88 so 80m 28 3on 883 no flue-mm .mm 033.

 

 

   

8. :88 8. S. 8. 8.- 8. 8.- 2m .088
8. :88- 8. 8.- 2. :8: 2. 8.- 3Q .835 EB .88
8. :87 8. 8.- 8. :37 E. E.- aQ .888. .5. 88m
8. 8. 7 8. 8.- 8. 8. 7 E. 2.- 3Q .88-H 888
8. 8. 8. 8. 8. 3.. 7 8. 8.- am .802 38888
8. ...va- 8. 2 .- 8. :88- 8. S .- am .582 3885
- :88 :. mom - :88 t. 88 am 88.85
mm 8838 .8 8. a «N 33: am 8. a flue-mm— 8me

  

@080 :83- 8mm Emu-- :otoEU
.8 Emofiomb-mv 88va 80» :88 no 588286 328350 was 8688808826 «0 Hoot-m AN @33-

 

99

 

8. ...-$8 8. S. 8. 8.- 8. 8.- :. :38 8. S. 2m .058

8. :88- 8. 8. 7 8. 8. 7 8. 8.- 8. ...-8.8- 8. 8.- aQ .88-.- 8885 .88

2. 18.7 8. 2.8- 8. :88.- 8. 8.- 2. 1.8.7 8. 8.- 3Q .888- Begum

8. 8.7 8. 8.- 8. 8.- 8. 2.- 8. 8. 7 8. s... an .688 .2250

- 82 8. 8. -- ...-8.8 8. 3:. - ...-8.8 t. 8.8 am 80835
388m 85

 

 
  

 

8% - 88$ .8 8. A 8% 8838.8 8. A E 88888 8- A
88800 3 aoEFmooQ 83H 80m Emu-w c080 Emu-H :otBtU

 

Roma—88 anfioammmv 2838c :88 98 53m 63% :88 no cone-885 :88 mo flue-um— .mm 2an-

100

Table 24. Within-team Standard Deviations Over Time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Individual Greed
Timel Time2 Time3 Time4 Time5 Timeo
Majority rule teams 1.11 0.98 1 1.04 1.01 1
Control teams 1.05 0.97 0.87 0.91 0.89 0.97
Balanced teams 1.04 0.9 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.88
COOperation primacy teams 1.01 0.99 1.05 0.92 0.97 1.01
Team Greed
Timel Time2 Time3 Time4 Time5 Timeo
Majority rule teams 1.11 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.98 0.72
Control teams 0.95 0.76 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.76
Balanced teams 0.79 0.99 0.93 0.83 0.86 1.03
Cooperation primacy teams 0.87 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.99 0.96
Individual Fear
Timel Time2 Time3 Time4 Time5 Time6
Majority rule teams 1.04 0.9 1.03 0.96 0.92 1.03
Control teams 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.67 0.63 0.75
Balanced teams 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.75 0.89 0.93
Cooperation primacy teams 0.85 0.97 0.96 0.85 0.91 0.99
Team Fear
Timel Time2 Time3 Time4 Time5 Time6
Majority rule teams 0.98 0.87 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.94
Control teams 0.92 0.85 0.71 0.74 0.67 0.84
Balanced teams 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.95
Cooperation primacy teams 0.99 0.92 0.81 0.95 0.97 0.83
Individual Preference for Cooperation
Timel Time2 Time3 Time4 Time5 Time6
Majority rule teams 0.97 0.92 0.64 0.95 0.9 0.87
Control teams 1.01 0.72 0.7 0.57 0.51 0.51
Balanced teams 1.11 0.71 0.57 0.55 0.6 0.49
Cooperation primacy teams 0.78 0.65 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.57

 

101

Appendix A

Summary of Experimental Design

 

Team vs. Team Individual vs. Individual

 

Majority Rule Team - no team discussion Individual Condition
(Minimum social interaction).

Control Team — two minutes of team
discussion.

Balanced Discussion Team - two minustes of
team discussion with considering each
alternative.

Cooperation Primacy Team — two minutes of

team discussion with cooperative member
speak first.

102

Appendix B1.
Individual Decision Making Sheet (For Individual Condition — Condition 1)

Individual A

Y
50 60
50 330

W 30 40
00

 

ll

Individual B

 

 

 

 

 

How much do you prefer to choose X?

L
V

1=N0t At All 2=N0t Very 3=Somewhat 4=Very 5=Extremely
Much Much

How much do you prefer to choose Y?

A
‘

1=N0t At All 2=N0t Very 3=Somewhat 4=Very =Extremely
Much Much

Please circle your decision

XorY

Please rate your confidence in your individual decision above

V

1=N0t Confident 2=N0t Very 3=M0derately 4=Very 5=Extremely
At All Confident Confident Confident Confident

103

V

V

V

Appendix B2.
Individual Decision Making Sheet (For Team Conditions)

Group A

 

Grou B 5GB 3@
p X 3

6‘30) @101

 

 

 

 

 

How much do you prefer to choose X?

A
V

V

1=Not At All 2=N0t Very 3=Somewhat 4=Very 5=Extremely
Much Much

How much do you prefer to choose Y?

A
V

V

1=N0t At All 2=N0t Very =Somewhat 4=Very 5=Extremely
Much Much

Please circle your individual decision

XorY

Please rate your confidence in your individual decision above

V

V

1=N0t Confident 2=Not Very 3=M0derately 4=Very 5=Extremely
At All Confident Confident Confident Confident

104

Appendix B3.
Team Decision Making Sheet (For all team condition).

Group A

 

50 60
Group B 56D 3@

it 30 40
90 e0

 

X3

 

 

 

 

Once your group representative come back, please complete the following questions
together as a group.

 

 

A How much do your group prefer to choose X? _
1=N0t At All 2=N0t Very =Somewhat 4=Very =Extremely
Much Much
L How much do your group prefer to choose Y? g
1=Not At All 2=N0t Very 3=Somewhat 4=Very 5=Extremely
Much Much

Please circle your group decision

XorY

105

Appendix C
Process Measure 1

Use the following scale as you answer the survey questions

l=Strongly 2= Disagree 3= Slightly 4= Neutral 5=Slightly 6=Agree 7=Str0ngly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

Individual greed (Insko et al, 1990)
1. I want to earn as much as possible.
2. I want to earn more than the opponent.

Individual Fear (Insko et al, 1990)
1. I want to defend myself against the actions of the opponent.
2. I do not trust the opponent.

Perceived Identfiability(1nsko et al, 1990)
l. I think my decision will be known by the opponent.
2. I think my decision will remain anonymous (Reverse).

106

Appendix D
Process Measure 2

Perceived Confidence

Use the following scale as you answer the survey questions

A A
‘ 7

l=Not Confident 2=Not Very 3=Moderately 4=Very 5=Extremely
At All Confident Confident Confident Confident

 

The following question is in regards to your confidence about each of your
__gr0up members durinwoup discussion.
Rate your perceived confidence of Person 1 in
his/her opinion
Rate your perceived confidence of Person 3 in
his/her opinion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Team Greed and Fear

Use the following scale as you answer the survey questions

A A
‘ '

1=Strongly 2= Disagree 3: Slightly 4: Neutral 5 =Slightly 6=Agree 7=Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

 

l 2 3 4 5 6 7

 

My group wants to earn as much as possible.

 

My group wants to earn more than the other
group.

My group wants to defend ourselves against the
action of the other group.

My group does not trust the other group.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

107

Appendix B
Group Discussion Guideline

Discussion Guideline (Round 1)

This worksheet is designed to help ensure that you are fully considering each alternative
before making decision.

Please list the pros and cons associated with each alternative in the spaces provided
below.

 

 

Option: X Option: Y
Pros: Pros:
Cons: Cons:

 

108

Appendix F

Inter-group schema (Hoyle, Pinkley, & Insko, 1989)
Instruction: Please take a few moments and imagine an interaction between two
individuals such as two roommates, two students in a particular class, a student and a
professor, or even two foreign exchange students. Think specifically about how the two
individuals tend to interact and respond to each other. Then, using the following items,
please rate how each adjectives describe the interaction between individuals.
1 (Never applies) to 5 (always applied)

Helpful
Loyal
Forgiving
Unselfish
Patient
Trustworthy
Cooperative
Proud
Competitive
Overconfident
Aggressive
Demanding
Boastful
Domineering

Instruction: Please take a few moments and imagine an interaction between two groups
such as the members of two dorms, two fraternity groups, a student organization and the
school administrations, or even two countries. Think specifically about how the two
groups tend to interact and respond to each other. Then, using the following items,
please rate how each adjectives describe the interaction between groups.

1 (Never applies) to 5 (always applied)

Helpful
Loyal
Forgiving
Unselfish
Patient
Trustworthy
Cooperative
Proud
Competitive
Overconfident
Aggressive
Demanding
Boastful
Domineering

109

Appendix G — In-group Favoritism Bias

Please rate your group on the following scale by putting X on the appropriate
space.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Good : : : : ' : : Bad

Altruistic : : : : : : Egotistic

Kind : : : : : : Cruel

Grateful : : : : : : Ungrateful
Harmonious : : : : : : Dissonant
Graceful : : : : : : Awkward
Successful : : : : : : Unsuccessful
Important : : : : : : Unimfortant
Wise : : : : : : Foolish
Meaningful : : : : : : Meaningless
High : : : : : : Low

 

Please rate your opponent group on the following scale by putting X on the
appropriate space.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Good : : : : : : Bad

Altruistic : : : : : : Egotistic

Kind : : : : : : Cruel

Grateful : : : : : : Ungrateful
Harmonious : : : : : : Dissonant
Graceful : : : : : : Awkward
Successfiil : : : : : : Unsuccessful
Important : : : : : : Unimfortant
Wise : : : : t : Foolish
Meaningful : : : : : : Meaningless
High : : : : : : Low

 

110

Appendix H
Exit Survey

Use the following scale as you answer the survey questions

A

 

l=Strongly 2= Disagree 3= Slightly 4= Neutral 5 = Slightly 6=Agree 7=Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
Negative information sharing
1 2 4 5 6

 

During group discussion, we talked about the
opposing group in a negative light.

 

During group discussion, we spoke ill of the
opposing group.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Manipulation Check for Intervention l.

 

During our group discussion, we fully
evaluated each alternative

 

We focused on talked about each and every
pros and cons for each alternative.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Manipulation Check for Intervention 2.

 

In our group discussion, those with
cooperative opinions spoke first.

 

Group members with cooperative opinions
had the opportunity to speak first during our
group discussion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

111

V

REFERENCE
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193, 31-35.

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 11 7,
497-529.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City,
NY: Anchor.

Brewer, M. B., & Brown, R. J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T.
Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds), The handbook of social psychology, New York,
McGraw Hill, pages 554-594.

Cacioppo, J. T., & Bemtson, G. G. ( 1994). Relationship between attitudes and
evaluative space: A critical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive
and negative substrates. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 401-423.

Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotype and the perception of group differences. American
Psychologist, 22, 817-829.

Carlston, D. E. (1977). Effects of polling order on social influence in decision-making
groups. Sociometry, 50, 115-123.

Chan, D. (1998). Functional relations among constructs in the same content domain at
different levels of analysis: A typology of composition models. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 83, 234-246.

Cohen, S. G., & Bailey, D. E. (1997). What makes teams work: Group effectiveness
research from the shop floor to the executive suite. Journal of Management, 23,
239-291.

Das, E. H. H. J., DeWit, J. B. F., & Strobe, W. (2003). Fear appeals motivate
acceptance of action recommendations: Evidence for a positive bias in the
processing of pursuasive messages. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
29, 650-664.

DeChurch, L. A., & Marks, M. A. (2006). Leadership in multiteam systems. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 91, 311-329.

Denison, D. R. (1996). What is the difference between organizational culture and
organizational climate? A natives point of view on a decade of paradigm wars.

Academy of Management Review, 31, 619-649.

Dawes, R. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169-193.

112

Dragoni, L. (2005). Understanding the emergence of state goal orientation in
organizational work groups: The role of leadership and multilevel climate
perceptions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 1084-1095.

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7,
117-140.

French, J. R. (1956). A formal theory of social power. Psychological Review, 63, 181-
194. Greitermeyer, Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, and Frey (2006)

Gumee, H. (1937). A comparison of collective and individual judgments of fact.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 21, 106-112.

Hoyle, R. H., Pinkley, R. L., & Insko, C. A. (1989). Perceptions of behavior: Evidence
of differing expectations for interpersonal and intergroup interaction.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 365-3 76.

Horwitz, M., & Rabbie, J. M. (1982). Individuality and membership in the intergroup
system. In H. Tajifel (Ed), Social identity and intergroup relations (pp. 241 -
274). Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press.

Hosmer, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. (2000). Applied Logistic Regression. Wiley, New
York.

Ilgen, D. R. (1999). Teams embedded in organizations. American Psychologist, 34, 129-
139.

Ito, T. A., Larsen, J. T., Smith, N. K., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1998). Negative information
weight more heavily on the brain: The negativity bias in evaluative
categorizations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 887-900.

Insko, C. A., Kirchner, J. L., Pinter, B., Efaw, J ., & Wildschut, T. (2005).
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and categorization:
The paradox of expected cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 88, 365-385.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Drigotas, S. M., Graetz, K. A., Kennedy, J ., Cox, 0, &
Bomstein, G. (1993). The role of communication in interindividual-intergroup
discontinuity. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 108-138.

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Hoyle, R. H., Dardis, G. J ., & Graetz, K. A. (1990).

Individual-group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 68-7 9.

113

Insko, C. A., Schopler, J ., Gaertner, L., Wildschut, T., Kozar, R., Pinter, B., Finkel, E.
J ., Brazil, D. M., Cecil, C. L., & Montoya, M. R. (2001). Interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity reduction through the acticipation of future interaction.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 95-1 1 1.

James, L. R. (1982). Aggregation bias in estimates of perceptual agreement. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 67, 219-229.

Jones, A. P., & James, L. R. (1979). Psychological climate: Dimensions and
relationships of individual and aggregated work environment perceptions.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 23, 201-250.

Julian, J. W., Regula, C. R., & Hollander, E. P. (1968). Effects of prior agreement by
others on task confidence and conformity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 9, 171-178.

Kahn, A., & Ryen, A. H. (1972). Factors influencing the bias toward one's own group.
International Journal of Group Tensions, 2, 33-50.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.

Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of cooperators and
competitors' beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
16, 66-91.

Kerr, N. L. (2000). On the virtues of assuming minimal differences in information
processing between individuals and groups. Group Processes and Intergroup
Relations, 3, 203-217.

Kerr, N. L. (2001). Is it what one says or how one says it?: Style vs substance from an
SDS Perspective. In C. D. D. N. D. Vries (Ed), Group consensus and minority
influence: Implications for innovation (pp. 201-228). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of
Psychology, 24, 183-214.

Kozlowski, S., & Hattrup, K. (1992). A disagreement about within-group agreement:
Disentangling issues of consistency versus consensus. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 77, 161-167.

Kozlowski, S., & Klein, K. J. (2000). A multilevel approach to theory and research in
organizations: Contextual, temporal and emergent processes. In S. K. K. J. Klein
(Ed), Multilevel theory, research, and methods in organizations: Foundations,
extensions and new directions (pp. 3-90). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

114

Koslowski, S. W., J., Gully, S. M., Nason, E. R., & Smith, E. M. (2000). Developing
adaptive teams: A theory of compilation and performance across levels and time.
In D. R. I. E. D. Pulakos (Ed), The Changing Nature of Work Performance:
Implications for Stafling, Personnel Actions, and Development (pp. 240-292).
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Larsen, J. R., F oster-Fishman, P. G., & Keys, C. B. (1994). Discussion of shared and
unshared information in decision-making groups. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 6 7, 446-461.

Louis, M. R. (1980). Surprise and sense-making. Administrative Science Quaterly, 25,
226-251.

MacKinnon, D.P. & Dwyer, J .H. (1993). Estimating mediated effects in prevention
studies. Evaluation Review, 17, 144-158.

MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., & Sheets, V. (2002).
A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening variable
effects. Psychological Methods, 7, 83-104.

Mannix, E. A. (1991). Resource dilemmas and discount rates in organizational decision
making groups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27, 379-391.

Macy, M. W., Kitts, J ., Flache, A., & Benard, S. (2003). Polarization in dynamic
networks: A hopfield model of emergent structure. In R. Breiger, K. Carley, &
Patti son, P. Dynamic social network modeling and analysis: Workshop summary
and papers. Washington: The National Academics Press.

Merton, R. K., & Kitt, A. S. (1950). Contributions to the theory of reference group
behavior. In R. K. M. P. F. Lazarsfeld (Ed), Continuities in socialresearch:
Studies in the scope and method of the American soldier (pp. 40- 1 05). Glencoe,
IL: Free Press.

Marks, M. A., DeChurch, L. A., Mathieu, J. E., Panzer, F. J., & Alonso, A. (2005).
Teamwork in multiteam systems. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 964-971.

McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect and Cognition-Based Trust As Foundations for '
Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. Academy of Management Journal,
38, 24-3 9.

Morgan, P. M., & Tindale, R. S. (2002). Group vs. individual performance in mixed
motive situations: Exploring an inconsistency. Organizational Behavior and

Human Decision Processes, 87, 44-65.

Morrison, E. W. (1993). Newcomer information seeking: exploring types, modes,
sources and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 557-589.

115

Nemeth, C., & Wachtler, J. (1974). Creating the perceptions of consistency and

confidence: A necessary condition for minority influence. Sociometry, 37, 529-
540.

Ostroff, C. K., Kozlowski, S.W.J. (1992). Organizational socialization as a learning

process: The role of information acquisition. Personnel Psychology, 45, 849-
874.

Peeters, G. C., J. (1990). Positive-negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction
between affective and informational negativity effects. In W. S. M. Hewstone
(Ed), European Review of Social Psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 33-60). Chichester:
Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Prentice-Dunn, S., & Rogers, R. W. (1982). Effects of public and private self-awareness
on deindividuation and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 43, 503-513.

Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique,
synthesis and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363-
392.

Rentch, J. R. (1990). Climate and culture: interaction and qualitative differences in
organizational meanings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 668-681.

Ridley, M. (1996). The origins of virtue. New York, NY: Penguin.

Risher, H., & Fay, C. H. (1995). The Performance Imperative. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, Inc.

Robinson. (1996). Trust and breach of the psychological contract. Administrative
Science Quaterly, 41, 574-599.

Schopler, J ., Insko, C. A., Graetz, K. A., Drigotas, S. M., Smith, V. A., & Dahl, K.
(1993). Individual-group discontinuity: Further evidence for mediation by fear
and greed. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 419-43 1.

Schopler, J., Insko, C. A., Drigotas, S. M., Wieselquist, J ., Pemberton, M. B., & Cox, C.
(1995). The role of identifiability in the reduction of interindividual-intergroup
discontinuity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 553-574.

Schneider, B. (1975). Organizational climates; an essay. Personnel Psychology, 28,
447-479.

Schneider, B., & Reichers, A. E. (1983). On the etiology of climates. Personnel
Psychology, 36, 19-39.

116

 

Stasser, G. (1999). The uncertain role of unshared information in collective choice. In J.
L. L. Thompson, & D. Messick (Ed), Shared Knowledge in Organizations.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. ‘

Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group decision
making: Biased information sampling during discussion. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 48, 1467-1478.

Steinel, W., De Dreu, C. K. W., Ouwehand, E., & Ramirez-Marin, J. Y. (2009). When
constituencies speak in multiple tongues: The relative presuasiveness of hawkish
minorities in representative negotiation Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Process, 109, 67-78.

Stewart, D. D., & Stasser, G. (1995). Expert role assignment and information sampling
during collective recall and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Vol. 69 pp.619 - 628.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of
Psychology, 33, 1-39.

Troetschel, R., Simon, B., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Huffmeier, J. (June, 2005). Social Value
Orientation and Perspective Taking in Integrative and Distributive Negotiations.
Paper presented at the IA CM 18th Annual Conference.

Vallacher, R. R., Read, S. J ., & Nowak, A. (2002). The Dynamical Perspective in
Personality and Social Psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
4, 264-273.

Vallacher, R. R. & Nowak, A. (2007). Dynamical social psychology: Finding order in
the flow of human experience. In A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds),
Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed, pp. 73 4-75 8). New
York: Guilford Publications.

Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A., & Miller, M. E. (2003). Social Influence and group
dynamics. In I. Weiner (Ed), Handbook of psychology (V 01. 5, pp. 383-417).
New York: Wiley.

van Knippenberg, D., van Knippenberg, B., & van Dijk, E. (2000). Who takes the lead
in risky decision making? Effects of group members' individual riskiness and
prototypicality. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83,
213-234.

Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes:

An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 7 7, 337-349.

117

 

Van Lange, P. A. M., Otten, W., De Bruin, E. M. N., & Joireman, J. A. (1997).
Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: Theory
and prelimanry evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73,
733-746.

Van Lange, P. A. M., & Messick, D. M. (1996). Psychological processes
underlyingcooperation in social dilemmas. In M. M. W. Gasparski, B. Banathy
(Ed), Social Agency: Dilemmas and Educational Praxiology. New Brunskwick:
Transaction.

Weber, M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. (2004). A conceptual review of decision
making in social dilemmas: Applying the logic of appropriateness. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 8, 281-307.

West, M. A. (2003). Eflective Teamwork: Practical Lessons fiom Organizational
Research: Blackwell Publishing.

Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2007). Explanations of interindividual-intergroup
discontinuity: A review of the evidence. European Review of Social Psychology,
18, 175-211.

Wildschut, T., Insko, C. A., & Gaertner, L. (2002). Intragroup social influence and
intergroup competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82 (6),
975-992.

Wildschut, T., Insko, C. A., & Pinter, B. (2007). Interindividual-intergroup
discontinuity as a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a
group. European Journal of Social Psychology, 3 7, 390-3 99.

Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the
group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup
discontinuity effect. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 698-722.

Wittenbaum, G. M., Hollingshead, A. B., & Botero, I. C. (2004). From cooperative to
motivated information sharing in groups: Moving beyond the hidden profile
paradigm. Communication Monographs, 71, 286-310.

Wood, M. T. (1973). Power relationships and group decision making in organizations.
Psychological Bulletin, 79, 280-293.

118

 

 

"111111, 121! 1111111111111111111111”