'W'ou. 3‘3”}- “"

THE QUESTION OF THE

f; ANNEXATION OF HAWAII DURING

THE ADWNlS FRATJONS OF

.- HARRISON AND CLEVELAND 18891897

Thesls fD‘r the Degree of M A
Wayne D Woodby
1937

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THE QUESTION OF THE ANNEXATION OF NANAII
DURING THE AJMINISTHATIOES 0F HARRISON AND CLEVELAND,
1889.1897

Wayne D. woodby

~19}?-

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate School of
Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science.

Approved for the Department of

Kistory and Political Science

55,35, I

791a»? 2 7, Ma]

Acknowledgment

The writer of this essay wishes to express
his appreciation for the helpful guidance and
many constructive criticisms given during the

writing of this essay by Professor E. B. Lyon.

OUTLINE

I. Introduction
A. Late discovery of the Hawaiian Islands by Captain
Cook in 1778
B. Early Eur0pean relations with Hawaii
1. English interest in Hawaii
a. Prominence of England in the Pacific area
L. Cession of the Islands to George Paulet,
a Eritish naval officer, February 25, 18%}
2. French interest in Hawaii
a. Contact through Catholicism
b. Treaty of 1839 forced on the Islanders
0; Development of American influence in Hawaii
1. American economic contacts witthawaii
2. Missionary activities and their consequences
a. ”Early Missionaries"

b. "Later Missionaries"

II. American economic trends in Hawaii and their political
manifestations, 1850-1887
A. Desire for reciprocity with the United States
by the Hawaiians, 1850-1D83

1. Treaty ralations, 1850-1875
a. Treaty of 1850
b. Attempted treaties

2. Reciprocity Treaty of 1875
a. Provisions

b. Effects

B. Extension of reciprocity, 1883-1887
1. Efforts to renew the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875
2. Desire of the United States to establish
a naval base at Pearl River
3. Reciprocity Treaty of 1887
a. Provisions
b. Effects
C. Growth of a favorable attitude toward annexation
to the United States
D. Political unrest, 1864-1887
1. Conflicting theories of government
a. The divine right theory of kingship
as practiced by the sovereigns
b. Popular conception favoring a
constitutional monarchy
2. Character of the administration under the ‘
ministry of Kalakaua
a. Regime of W. M. Gibson, 1573-1b87
b. Influence of C. C. Moreno, 1880-1887
3. Revolution of 1887 as a climax to the
political strife
a. Immediate cause
b. Nature of the revolution
0. Constitutional changes effected by
'the Revolution of 1887

III. Revolution of 1893
A. Political develcpments, 1887-1893

1. Ascendancy of the Reform party

2. Accession of Queen Liliuokalani
a. Personal qualifications
b. Her personal theories and practices
B. The Revolution of 1893
1. Causes
a. Economic
b. Political and constitutional
2. Nature of the Revolution
3. Activities of United States citizens in the
revolt
-a. The part played by John L. Stevens,
American minister, in directing the
course of the revolt
(1) His imperialistic views
(2) His conduct as American minister
to Hawaii
b. Influence of American planters and
industrialists on the Islands as
.indicated by the "Committee of Thirteen”
4. Reaction of the Hawaiians to the Revolution
a. Immediate reaction in Honolulu
b. Attitude_of main body of natives
c. Attitude of Liliuokalani
5. Results of the Revolution
a. Establishment of the Provisional
Government, January 17, 1893
(1) Recognition by J. L. Stevens
(2) Influence of S. B. Dole

b. Race to secure support in the United States
(1) Annexationists

(2) Supporters of Liliuokalani

IV. President Harrison and annexation
A. President Harrison's foreign policy: domination
by Secretary of State J. G. Blaine
B. Evidences of increased interest in the annexation
question during Harrison's administration
1. Attempts to put ”kanifest Destiny“ doctrine
into practice
2. PrOpaganda included in J. L. Steven‘s dispatches
3. L. A. Thurston's visit to the United States
C. Reaction of the Republican administration to the
Hawaiian Revolution
1. Outbreak of the Revolution not a surprise
2. The administration in accord with Steven's
policies if not his practices
D. Desire for an annexation treaty before a change to
the Democratic administration, March h, 1893
1. Annexation commission of the Provisional Government
2. The prOposed Treaty of February 1“, 1893
3. Action of the United States Senate on the Treaty

V. President Cleveland and annexation
A. The Hawaiian Annexation in the light of President
Cleveland's foreign policy
B. President Cleveland's procedure relative to the

annexation question in 1893

1.
2.

3.

His pre-administration investigation
Withdrawal of the prOposed treaty of the
previous administration
Mission of James H. Blount, March 11, 1893
a. Purpose
b. Appointment of Blount; qualifications
0. Blount's procedure
d. Blount's report
Attempt to reinstate Queen Liliuokalani
a. Refusal of Liliuokalani to c00perate
b. Reaction of the Provisional Government

c. Cleveland turns problem over to Congress

0. Public Opinion toward annexation, 1893-189M

1. Official expressions in Congress

2.
3.

The press

English Opinion

D. Status of annexation, 1898-1897

1.
2.

VI. Conclusion

Situation in the United States
Situation in Hawaii

It is probable that the islands in the North Pacific
were the last habitable parts of the world to be occupied by
the human race.1 In view of the extreme distance from other
islands as well as the mainlands it is remarkable thatthe
Hawaiian Islands were found at all by the aborigines with
their cpen canoes.

It was not until the middle of January of 1778 that they
were accidentally discovered by Captain James Cook sailing in
the service of the King of England.2 In 1768, fifteen years
after he had entered the British navy as a common sailor, he
was assigned the command of an astronomical orpedition to the
South Pacific which caused him to spend the following ten
years emploring the Pacific Ocean and adding to his reputation
as a navigator.3

Cookie instructions for his third voyage directed him to
sail from the Society Islands to the coast of North America at
approximately the forty-fifth degree north latitude from which
point he was to skirt the coast northward in search of the

a

elusive Straits of Anian. Early in December of 1777, Captain
Cook sailed northward in his ships, the "Discovery“ and the
“Resolution”. At daybreak on January 18, 1778 the Island of

Oahu was sighted and on the next day as the ships approached

 

1. R. S. Kuykendall, "History of Hawaii", p. 17.
2. mid-o. p. 51".
3. Ibid.. p. 53.
4. Ibid., p. 58.

the Island of Kauai, a number of natives in canoes came out
to meet them.

The natives were particularly interested in Captain Cook
and his ships because of an old tradition which foretold the
coming of a strange phenomenon.5 The tall masts of Captain
Cook's vessels suggested the appearance of trees on a floating
island. The sailors also drew their full share of attention
inasmuch as they were regarded as being the divine attendants
of the great Lono.6

After a hasty inspectian, Captain Cook located the islands
on his chart and continued the journey northward. On his re-
turn in November of 1778 Cook discovered the three larger is-
lands to the south where the news of his approach had preceded
his vessels and where he was accorded a royal welcome.7

Nearly two months were spent by Cook and his men in orplo-
ration during which time the high esteem in which the foreigners
had first been held lessened considerably. There were several
reasons for this change in attitude, namely: first, there was
a growing feeling of doubt concerning Cook's godlike character
which came as a result of the depredations committed by his men
and his inability to restrain them and secondly the grasping

demands of the crew for provisions were a serious drain upon

 

5. B. U. Brain, I"Transformation of Hawaii", p. 28.

The tradition related that the great God, Lono, having
killed his wife in a sudden fit of anger, grieved for her
so intensely that he lost his reason and wandered about
from island to island, finally sailed away in a curious
triangular canoe promising to return at some future time
on “a island bearing cocoanut trees, swine and dogs.“ Ibid.

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 30.

the scanty resources of the Islanders and as a result there
were fears of a famine.

Serious friction was avoided through the diplomacy of
Captain Cook and King Kalaniopuu until the departure of the
English on February h, 1779. When the ships returned a week
later for repairs, relations became very strained when the
natives stole and dismantled a small boat for the nails and
metals it contained. In the ensu ing melee Captain Cook was
killed before a reconciliation could be effected.8

Thus the first contact of the Hawaiians with the outside
world, though accompanied with considerable unpleasantness,

did establish the fact that each country had something of
interest for the other. In Captain Cook’s log-book under the
date of February 1778 is a nOtation concerning the excellent
quality and quantity of the native products.9 Very early the
natives evinced a strong desire for English products, chiefly
metal.

The Hawaiian Islands soon became an important intermediate
point in the lucrative fur trade deveIOped by Cook between
China and the western coast of America. An Englishman who
visited the Islands in 1792, wrote as follows: 'What a happy
discovery these Islands were! What would the American fur
trade be without these to winter at and get every refreshment?
A vessel going on that trade will need only sufficient provi- '

sions to carry him to these Islands, where there is plenty of
-‘ 1

pork and salt to cure it and yams as a substitute for bread.

 

8. Ibid., p. 32. w I
9. Jean Hobbs, 'Hawaii--A Pageant of the boil , p. 2.

10. Re 8. Kuykendall' Ops Cite. pe 70-71e

Captain George Vancouver came to dominate the English
activities on the Hawaiian Islands during the last decade of
the eighteenth century. His judicious, far-sighted administra—
ticn did much to retain England's preeminence in the Far East,
and the treatment he accorded the inhabitants of the Hawaiian
Islands was particularly acceptable. Vancouver had three ob-
.Jectives, namely: (1) the introduction of cattle which he had
brought from California; (2) the establishment of permanent
peace between the peOples of different islands of the group;
(3) the punishment of those who had mistreated English citizens
who had come to the Island to trade.11

Not all of the British officials showed as much wisdom as
Vancouver had in dealing with the Hawaiian Islands. The Is-
landers fared rather badly as a result of the aggressive type
of diplomacy practiced in the second quarter of the nineteenth
century by English officials. The British demands became so
insistent and their attitude so peremptory, as exemplified by
English consular and naval authorities stationed in the Hawai-
ian Islands, that King Kamehameha III to avoid further harass-
ment temporarily ceded the Islands to Captain Lord George
Paulet, a representative of the British crown, on February 17,
1843.12

The vindication of Hawaii's position and the admission
that England had been in the wrong was established with the
restoration of the Kingdom on July 31, and the statement of

 

11. Ibid., p. 78.
12. Ibid., p. 158.

Lord Aberdeen on April 1, 18“} that the British government
was willing to recognize the independence of the Hawaiian
Islands.13

England was not the only EurOpean country which had
designs on the Hawaiian Islands. France, too, had become
interested in the Islands but not so much from an economic

1n

viewpoint as from a religious one. England by her priority
and the United States through her economic and missionary
aggressiveness had carved spheres of influence for themselves
which tended to exclude other nations. France's remedy for
this situation was the introduction of a rival religion into
the Islands.15

The struggle of the French to plant Roman Catholicism
in the Islands was marked by a chain of serious obstacles.
Two priests and four laymen laden with a shipload of images,
crucifixes and other necessary ornament for church services,
arrived at Honolulu July 7, 1827.16Having landed without
obtaining a permit from the Hawaiian government, the mission-
aries were politely but firmly informed that one religion was
sufficient in so small a country.17 Through the natural curi-
osity of the natives and the presence of a few Roman Catholic
foreigners the Catholic activities increased to such an extent

that by the end of 1829 seventy adults and twenty-nine children
had been baptized.18

 

1%. Ibid., p. 160.

l , Ibid., p. 152.

12. 9, §, E23, He1., 18 4, App. II, p. 10.

l . B. M. Brain, 'Trans ormation of Hawaii", p. 105.
17. Ibid.‘ '

is. a. s. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 1&5.

These French advances of the Catholic faith were made in
the face of Protestant Opposition and governmental persecution.
The Hawaiian government objected so strenuously to the presence
of the Catholics that in December of 1831 all the Catholics
with the exception of one lay brother were forcibly deported.19
In 1835 and again in 1837 the French were unsuccessful in their
efforts to inflict an alien faith on an obdurate government
even though French warships were present at the time in Hono-
lulu Bay.20

The climax of the French protestaticn came with the visit
in 1839 of the French frigate, 'Artemise' under the command of
Captain Laplace and the series of extraordinary demands which
were incorporated into an unusual treaty, the provisions of
which were as follows: (1) that the' Catholic worship be
declared free in the Hawaiian Islands; (2) that land be given
for a Catholic church at Honolulu to be served by French priests;
(3) that the persecution of nfitive Catholics cease; (M) that
twenty thousand dollars be deposited with Captain Laplace as a
guarantee of future good conduct, to be returned when France
became satisfied that the Hawaiian government would observe the
treaty; (5) that the meney and the treaty, signed by the king,
should be taken aboard the 'Artemise' by a high chief and the

French flag saluted with twenty-one guns.21 Captain Laplace

added that unless those conditions were complied within a period

of five days he would bombard the city.22

 

19. Ibid., p.146.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 153.

22. B. H. Brain, 0p. cit., p. 109.

The distraught king had no alternative but to sign the
treaty. However, the intrepid Captain of the 'Artemise'
extracted two more provisions from the king which were partic—
ularly objectionable from the Hawaiian standpoint, namely:
extraterritoriality and a more favorable tariff revision.23

Although a minor skirmish between French naval officers
and Hawaiian authorities in 18h2 threatened to snap the I
already strained relations between the two countries, the
French recognition of Hawaiian Independence in 15a} and the
restitution in 1846, of the unOpened packages of twenty
thousand dollars, which had been commandeered by Captain Laplace
in 1839, combined to prevent further disruption of friendly
relationship and to permit the practice of the Catholic faith
in the Islands.24

If the English sowed the seeds of barter in the Hawaiian
Islands then certainly the United States reaped the benefits
of the trade. Eleven years after Cook's momentous discovery
four American ships visited the Islands thereby beginning an
American trading era in the Orient which has never been relin-
quished.25

Up to 1800 the trans-oceanic fur trade with Hawaii as a
connecting link held the attention of all progressive American
seamen.26 After that period the sandalwood commerce plying
between Hawaii and the Orient was found to be more profitable.

The value of sandalwood, a native Hawaiian tree, was accidentally

 

 

23. p_. g. _F_‘_o_1_-_. 3331,, 1891+, App. II. E. 38.
24. H. S. Kuykendall, Op. Cit., p. 1 3.
22. Ibid., p. 72.

2 . Ibid., p. 91.

S
discovered after it had been taken as firewood and ballast on
ships destined for China where the fragrant wood was in great
demand as a aid in the manufacture of incense for the temples.27

After the wasteful depletion of the great sandalwood .
forests, the whaling industry became increasingly important.
In the spring of 1826, one hundred and seven whaling ships, the
majority of which were American, visited Honolulu harbor.28
The period between 1800 and 1860 marked the height of the
whaling activity in the North Pacific Ocean inasmuch as four
thousand four hundred and twenty American Whalers touched at
the various ports of the Islands between 1850-1860.29

Regardless of the presence of large number of Americans
in the Islands due to their participation in the sandalwood
trade and whaling activities, the relationship between the
Americans and the Hawaiians was relatively free from the I
hostility which so characterized the European contacts with
native groups.

The treaties both prcposed and ratified reflected the
friendly attitude thus engendered between the United States
and Hawaii. The first of these treaties negotiated by Hawaii
with the United States was the one signed on December 23, 1826
by Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, acting as the representative
of the United States, but which the United States Senate failed
to ratify. It provided for "perpetual peace and friendship"

and for the protection of American commerce in the Islands.30

 

27. Jean Hobbs, Op. cit., p. 23.

28. Ibid., p. ZM-ZS.

29. W. F. Blackman, “Making of Hawaii“, 9. 183.
30' 11° g: £93.. 33.91:." 1.2—8 14-, App. II: P0 35-

The prcposed arrangement cpntinued to be respected by the
Hawaiians for many years.3~

During the trying period of Eurcpean intervention in the
'forties, the Hawaiian king invoked the aid and good offices
of the United States in his efforts to repel English and French
aggrandizement.3“Daniel Webster, American Secretary of State,
in his letter of march 15, let} to the American consul at
Hawaii summarized the attitude of the United States when he
stated!

It is obvious from circunstances connected with their
(Hawaii's) position that the interest of the United States
require that no other power should possess or colonize the
Sandwich Islands or exercise over their government an influr
once which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in
matters of navigation or trade.33

A most significant factor in the develcpment of American
influence in Hawaii was the organization of the Sandwich IslandBu
mission Board in Boston on October 15, 1819 and the subsequent~
dispatchment of American missionaries to Hawaii.350n April 4,
1820 seven American men, accompanied by their wives, set foot
on Hawaiian soil for the eXpress purpose of extending Christi-
anity.36 Between 1820 and 1850 eighty~fcur missionaries arrived
in sixteen different ships in Hawaii.)7

The scepe of their activity was amazing inasmuch as almost

immediately.cn their arrival they established schools.33 In

 

31. H. S. Kuykendall, cp. cit., p. 126.

32- 51.. .52. 22.9.2. am... Lass *5 App. II. p. 10.

33. H.- a. £52.:- $2.1... 1e 4. App- 11. p- 64-

3 . Although Captain Cook named the Islands, ”Sandwich Islands' in
honor of his patron the Earl of Sandwich, the native term,
“Hawaiian Islands” gradually supplanted the English appellation.

350 He 3.5-. For. R91. lb‘afi' App. II, p. 7A5.

36. Jean Hobbs, "Hawaii--A Pageant of the 8011", pp. 1M3-1h4.
37. Ibid.! PP- 143-157-

38. Ibid., p. 32.

10

the year of 1833, 166,040 books and pamphlets for school use
came from the simple, ill-equipped mission print shop. A
special school for young chiefs was established in 1339 in
which four boys and one girl who later became ruler of the
kingdom were students in these early years.uo

The missionaries proved helpful in solving difficulties
arising from the differences between the traders and the
Hawaiians.ulhecause of their superior training they were often
chosen as special advisers to the rulers and petty chieftans.
In 1838 one of them was officially appointed as a goverflment
interpreter and as an instructor in "political science.'2As a
further evidence of missionary activity, more than four hundred
land transactions were entered into by missionaries previous to
1900.

These early missionaries who came to the Islands prior to
1850 were seemingly actuated by an-honest desire to bring a
practical Christianity to the natives which stood in marked
contrast later to the activities of the sons of these mission-
aries and those missionaiies arriving during the lee half of
the nineteenth century. The later group while retaining the
title of missionary, conducted themselves in a very unethical
manner and far from that befitting the term missionary. For the
sake of convenience the term ”Later missionary element“ will

hereinafter be applied to that group whose activities will be
considered at some length in the development of this study.

 

9. Ibid.
0

A1. Ibid., p. 35.

ua. Ibid. .

’43. Ibid.. App. B, pp. 157.1770

nu. American Catholic Quarterly Review, Vol. 19, p. 150.

11

II

The United States was the first nation to honor Hawaii
with a diplomatic representative. The actual value of the
first two commissioners (1843-1850) was rather questionable
and it was their ineffective and disrespectful conduct which
led the Hawaiian King, Kamehameha III, to send James J. Jarves to
Washington in 18M9 to arrange for a more amicable relationship
between the two countries.“5 The fair and reasonable treaty,
consisting of seventeen articles, negotiated by John M. Clayton,
American Secretary of State and James J. Jarves went into effect
in 1850.”6

The friendly commercial relations between the United States
and Hawaii established by the Treaty of 1850, coupled with a
period of internal strife in the latter country, led to some
agitation for terms of annexation to the United States.“7 Howb
ever, Daniel Webster objected effectively in his letter of
July In, 1851 to Luther Severance, the United States commis-
sioner to Hawaii, in which he stated that “although the United
States had been first to recognize Hawaii, we had no designs
on them” and specifically warned Severance against entertaining
any prcposal from any quarter for the annexation of the Islands
to the United States.”8

In sharp contrast to Webster's “hands-off" policy stood

#5. R. S. Kuykendall, "A History of Hawaii", p. 177.

M6. Malloy, 'U. 8. Treaties, Conventions, etc.', Vol. p. 908 f.
n7. 3. s. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 186.

#8. North American Review, Vol. 157, p. 731.

12

William S. Seward's frank espousal of territorial expansion.
is early as 18h6 Seward had declared in a letter that “our
papulation is-destined to roll its resistless waves to the
icy barriers of the north and to encounter oriental civiliza-
tion on the shores of the Pacific.“9 On July 13, 1867 when he
was Secretary of State Seward wrote to the United States Mini-
ster McOook, at Hasaii as follows: ”You are at liberty to
sound the proper authority on the large subject mentioned in
your note (annexation) and ascertain probable conditions. You
may confidentially receive overtures and cOmmunicate the same
to me.'50 In the same year when the proposed reciprocity
treaty with Hawaii was under consideration, Seward wrote
MoCook that if reciprocity and annexation should come into
conflict with each other then ”annexation is in every case to
be preferred.'5l

With annexation failing miserably, the Hawaiian planters
looked to what seemed to them a more desirable alternative,
namely reciprocity. As early as 1855 and again in 1668 pro-
posed reciprocity treaties with Hawaii were voted down in the
.United States Senate.52 These prcposals were actively Opposed
by the Louisiana Senators because of the conflicting sugar
interests between the United States and Hasaii. The small
vote of twenty ayes and nineteen nays in the Senate was indic-
ative of the slight interest evinced in the question of a
53

more favorable trade situation with Hawaii.

 

#9. Frederic Bancroft, "Life of Seward“, Vol. 2, p. “70. u

50. Lorrin A Thurston, "A Handbook on the Annexation of Hawaii ,
p. 56- I

51. Frederic Bancroft, on. cit. Vol. 2, p. hgg

52. W. S. Holt, ”Treaties Defeated in the u. S.'Senate', p. 10%

53. Ibid., p. 104.

13

Two factors orplain the passage of the Reciprocity Treaty
of 1875, namely: first, the increased commercial activity on
the Pacific coast of the United States with Hawaii, and second,
the influence of King Kalakaua's presence in the United States
which contributed greatly to the drafting of the treaty.51L

The most significant article of the treaty was article Iv
which prohibited the Hawaiian King from disposing of any part
of his dominicns without the consent of the United States.55
Other provisions of the treaty included a comprehensive sched-
ule of duty free products from each country and provisions for
the approval and ratification of the Treaty.56

The effects of the Treaty on economic conditions in the
Hawaiian Islands corroborated the wisdom of the Hawaiian
ministry in acceding to the apparently unreasonable demands
of the United States which seemed to impinge on its sovereignty.
The increased economic activity was most noticeable in respect
to the sugar industry which was the most important export from
the Islands.57Sugar exportation had increased tenfold from 1675
to 1890, the amount exported in the latter year being 130,000
tons.58 Most of the irrigation ditches as well as the deve10p-
ment of large sugar plantations came after the planters had
been assured of reciprocity advantages.Sglllustrative of the
huge sums of money spent in improving plantations, Claus

Spreokels, a pioneer sugar planter, invested a million dollars

 

5n. J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, p. 485.
5 . Appendix A. ‘

5 0 Full provisions may be found in Appendix A.

57. Appendix D.

56. Review 9;.Reviews, Vol. 7, p. 162.

59. g. g. 321;. 333;,” 1824, App. II. p. 975.

1k

in develOping forty miles of irrigation ditches,60 while other
American and native planters followed his example to such an
extent that Sereno BishOp of Honolulu summed up the situation
very well when he stated: IHawaii has simply become an outlying
sugar farm of the United States, very properly enjoying like
protection with the Louisiana sugar planters.'61‘
A supplementary protocol of 1S76 limited the Treaty of
1875 to a duration of seven years after which time the Treaty
could be terminated by twelve months notice given by either of
the contract parties.62Apprehensive lest the Treaty be prema-
turely terminated thereby losing the economic advantages gained,
the Hawaiian planters were anxious to obtain an extension of
the agreement.63 As a result of the urgent pleas of the repre-
sentatives of the Hawaiian planters appearing before the United
States Senate committee on Foreign Affairs for the extension of
the treaty, ratifications for the Reciprocity Convention, con-
sisting of two articles were exchanged on November 9, 1887.6“
Article I provided for an extension of time on the Treaty cf
1875 for seven years beyond ratification and twelve months
notice after that for termination.65 Article II was particularly
interesting and significant as it was a Senate amendment which
was accepted by the Hawaiian government. It read as follows:

His.MaJesty the king of the Hawaiian Islands grants to
the government of the United States the exclusive right to
enter the Harbor of Pearl River in the Island of Oahu and

 

20' Ibid. 1 v 1 7 182

1. Review g__Reviews, o ._ , p. .

62. W. M. Malloy, U. S. Treaties, Conventions, etc.', Vol. 1,
p. 918. . ,

6 . G. S. Boutwell "Hawaiian Annexation, p. 10. n

63. W. M. Malloy, U. S. Treaties, Conventions, eto. , Vol. 1,

P- 919
65. Ibid.

15

to establish and maintain there a scaling and repair
station for the use of vessels of the United States
and to that end the United States may improve the

entrance to said harbor and.Q%6gllugthgz things need-
121 n the purposg aforesaig.

The Hawaiians.were so anxious to retain economic concessions
from the United States that they were willing to grant the
extraordinary amendment of the United States Senate.

Upon publication of the terms of the convention, in-
creased economic activity became apparent in the Islands.67
The larger interests felt that now huge sums of money could.
be safely invested with a reasonable expectation of profitable
return. Although the United States was given exclusive rights
to Pearl River harbor the naval sanctuary was not deve10ped
under the agreement of 1887.68

During the period of the reciprocity agreements with
the United States there was an increased sentiment toward
annexation to the United States. This attitude was largely
confined to the business men who were not of native origin 'nd
many of whom were the so-called ”later missionaries“ from the
United States.6 These early annexationists, indeed, were
often actuated by selfish motives. Preperty surrounding Pearl River
was at a premium because it was expected that when the Islands

became a possession of the United States, than their prcperty

66. Ibid., pp. 919—920. .

67' ya §J £2.2- BQLO: 1.ng ’4' App. II: PC 97""-

66. R. S. {uykendall, A History of Hawaii", p. 259.

69. It should be noted that the dominating position of 'Out-
landers” was greatly facilitated and perhaps caused by
the gradual extinction of the native Hawaiian race. Dur-
ing the first century of contact with the whites, the
native papulation decreased from an 300,000 to a.mere
”0,000. W. A. Du Puy, "Hawaii and Its Race Problem",

p. ll.

16

within the confines of the harbor, could be diapcsed of at a
fabulous price.70 It was generally expected that if annexation
were consummated a cable would be laid from the United States
to Hawaii, which tangible connection with the United States
would, it was hoped, treble the property values in Honolulu.71
Politically ccnditicnsiwere, moreover, of such a character
that the I'later missionary" element found themselves contributing
to the group which Opposed the Hawaiian sovereigns. As early as
186h King Kamehameha V promulgated a constitution which permitted
practical dictatorial powers of which the most notorious was the
appointment and dismissal of cabinet members at his pleasure.72
King Kalakaua, who was selected as king in 181%, continued this
use of the royal prerogative much to the displeasure cf the
I'later missionaries” who believed in a constitutional monarchy
similar to that of England.73 Kalakaua was well liked personally
and no less a person than Robert Louis Stevenson found his
companionship most agreeable.74 King Kalakaua resented the
missionary influence and broke with it entirely by appointing
as head of his cabinet, Mr. Walter M. Gibson, an outcast
Mormon who was not above using unscrupulous methods to further
his political aspirations.75 Although an alien to Hawaii, he
curried the favor of the gullible natives by coining the phrase
"Hawaii for Hawaiians.“ Furthermore, “He pandered to every
whim of the king, encouraged him to extravagant and useless

6
schemes; hence his power in retaining office."7 In 1880 the

 

70. Ue S. For. Re]... 1891;. App. II. p. 978.
71. Ibid.
72. R. S. KUYkendall. Ops Gite. P. 267s
73. Ibid. '
7 . Ibid.
75. u, S, For. Egl,, 18 4 App. II, p. 988.

76. He is Ee fig}... 182 ’ App. II, p. 983.

17

king further aggravated the impending rupture by his appoint-
ment as Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs an Italian soldier
of fortune, Mr. C. C. moreno, who was particularly obnoxious to
the landholders because of his constant participation in open
graft and corrupt politics.77
The opposition to the king centered in the formation of
a secret political organization called the Hawaiian League.
The purpose of the association was to bring about a reform
in the government by securing a new and more liberal consti-
tution.78 Two factions developed within the league: first,
a radical group which favored the overthrow of the monarchy,
the setting up of a republic and annexation to the United
States; second, a conservative group which desired that
Hawaii maintain its independence and which favored a continu- '
ance of the monarchy under a new constitution with large
restrictions on the royal authority.79
Affairs were brought to a crisis in June of 1887 throug
the published reports of scandals in connection with Gibson's
granting of Opium licenses. Public cpinion was greatly wrought
up by these reports which led the leaders of the Hawaiian League
to conclude that the time for action had arrived.80 The result-
ing bloodless revolution was nothing more than a large mass
meeting held on the thirtieth of June which requested the king
to dismiss the distasteful officials and to appoint a new cabi-

net I'which shall be committed to the policy of securing a new

 

 

77. R. s. Kuykendall, op. cit., pp. 268—269.
78. Ibid., p. 270.

79. Ibid., p. 270.

80. Ibid.

18

constitution" and to promise that in the future he would not
interfere in the work of the legislature and the cabinet or
in elections.81

As the king acceded to the demands, the conservative ele-
ment of the victorious Hawaiian League retained its control
and as a consequence there was little agitation for annexation
to the United States. In accordance with the Klngb promise
the constitution of 1864 was revised in five important respects,
namely: (1) the cabinet ministers could not be dismissed by
the king except in compliance with a vote of the legislature;
(2) that no official act of the king should be valid unless
approved by the cabinet; (3) that the nobles should be elected
by voters who had a fairly large amount of prcperty or income;
(a) no member of the legislature could be appointed to any
other public office; (5) the privilege of voting was extended
to resident foreigners of American or Eur0pean birth or descent
if they took an oath to support the constitution.82

In summary between the years 1850-1887 great strides had
been taken, first, in bringing about the domination of Hawaiian
affairs by a small group of vested prcperty owners and, secondly,
in thwarting the prerogatives and powers of the Hawaiian king

by the erection of a constitutional monarchy.

 

81. Ibid., p. 271.
82. Ibid.

19

III

Encouraged by their success in 1887, the advocates of
governmental reform, among whom the ”later missionaries” were
conspicious, strove to maintain their superiority over the
Hawaiian monarchy. Their political ascendancy was marred
chiefly by an abortive, reactionary insurrection on July 30
of 1889 led by R. W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd who were probably
secretly supported by Kalakaua.83 Nevertheless, the revolt was
easily suppressed on the same day. In the light of future
events, a significant feature of the insurrection wasthat
seventy United States sailors were landed with Hawaiian per-
mission to protect life and prcperty at the American legation
and in the city.gn The military eXpedition after being favorably
received by the Hawaiians, returned on board the U. S. S. "Adams"
the following morning.

If Kalakaua was disliked because of his reactionary tendencies,
then certainly the "Reformers' found little consolation in his
sister Liliuokalani, the heir-apparent, in as much as she was
avowedly desirous of restoring the royal prerogative8.85 Liliu-

okalani, like her brother, had many pleasing personal character-

istics among which was a decided love and talent for music and

 

83. U. S. For. Re1., 1894, App. II, p. 2h. The Reformers also
was: partially deprived of their powers in 1890 by a union
of the native party with the white laborers who were opposed
to the coolis labor policy of the planters. L. a. Hacker
and B. B. Kendrick,"United States Since 1865,"p. 121.

5”"- E. $22. For. Rel... _2_.18 1* App- II. ”P- 24-
835. Cosmogolitan, Vol. 15, p. 171.

 

20

86 She commanded the respect and admiration of her

poetry.
people to such an extent that many of her highwhanded actions
were accepted without question. This trait was well illustrated
in 1881 when Kalakaua decided to go on a world tour at which
time the missionary element desired a council of regency which
Liliuokalani was to direct. However, Liliuokalani objected so
strenuously to that arrangement that King Kalakaua concurred

in her view with the result that she was appointed the sole
regent.S7 While there was no outward conflict between the
cabinet and Liliuokalani, nevertheless, the royal officials

were quite willing to welcome the king back.88 Liliuokalani
became regent again.during the latter part of 1890 when Ka-
lakaua, in poor health, hastened to the United States to

secure redress for the disastrous economic effects of the

8
9 Liliuokalani

McKinley Tariff Act which had Just been passed.
became ruler in her own right upon the death of Kalakaua on
January 20, 1891. A letter of February 5, 1891, from John L.
Stevens, American minister to Hawaii, to Secretary of State,
James G. Blaine revealed that 'the sudden and unexpected
change of sovereigns has been made without commotion and with
no extraordinary excitement."9O Fifteen days later, Stevens

in another letter to Blaine placed Liliuokalani in an unfavor-
able light when he stated that she was surrounded by bad advisers

 

85. R. Liliuokalani, "Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen", pp. 52-
53. In later life Liliuokalani composed the music and the
words for the widely known "Aloha 0e”. R. S. Kuykendall, cp.
cit., p. 275. H

87. R. Liliuokalani, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. Caspar fihitney, ":awai—
ian America", p. 303.

88. Overland, Vol. 25, p. 651.

89. R. Liliuokalani, cp. cit., p. 206.

90. g, §, £93, 53;, 189%, App. II, p. 341.

21

and that the best people on the Island opposed her, and he
commented prophetically that if ”she should still persist
and attempt to form a ministry of her own without the consent
of the legislature she would surely imperil her throne."91

What were the factors which contributed to the pending
revolution so accurately prcphesied by the United States hin-
ister? Of primary importance were the economic disturbances
brought about the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890
by the United States Congress. Previous to the enactment of
that measure the Hawaiian sugar planters had enjoyed the same
rights as the Louisiana producers in being free from the tariff
restrictions of two cents per pound imposed on sugar importers
from other foreign countries.92 With the passage of the McKinley
Tariff Act the reciprocity arrangementsof 1887 in regard to
sugar were no longer of value to the Hawaiians, in as much as
all imported sugar was duty free and the Hawaiians did not

93

enjoy the bounty extended to American growers. As Hawaiian

economic stability depended on_this basic one crOp commodity9u
the resultant economic distress was so noticeably felt that
John L. Stevens in a letter of November 20, 1892 to Secretary
of State, John W. Foster, estimated that the Hawaiians had lost
$12,000,000 since the passage of the bill.95 Although the
McKinley Act inflicted hardships on the Hawaiian planters yet

it was not ruinous according to Dr. F. W. Taussig who has stated

 

91- Ibid.. pp. 343-3uu. 3

92. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 101 p. 3 5.

93. N. P. mead, United States'Since 1865', p. 160.
9 .

Appendix D.
95. U. s. For. Rel., 189A, App. 11, p. 382.

22

that “the hard times that ensued meant, to be sure, not that
profits had disappeared but that the extrava ances of the
past were gone. Sugar growing simply got down to hard pan."96
Faced with the knowledge that the Queen objected to American
economic domination,97the Hawaiian industrialists realized that
if Hawaii were to enter into a more intimate econOmic relation-
ship with the United States then it would have have to come
through their volition. They were likewise aware of their
strength because the great planters had succeeded the mission—
aries as the real power behind the fragile Hawaiian throne
and had made the economic interests the dominant factor back
of the Hawaiian government.9S Although there were other causes
for the Revolution of 1893, yet Dr. Taussig has contended that
"none the less it is clear that the root of the movement was
in the sugar situation in the wish to get back somehow into
the golden relation with the United States Market.99

Another outstanding cause of the Revolution of 1893 was
the inability of the Queen to reconcile her personal convictions
with the Constitution of 1887. The Queen was variously charac-
terized as being ”bright but too ambitious,'100"a woman of
shrewdness and education but of dissolute life and under the
influence of medicine men,'101and ‘more devoted than her brother

to the restoration of monarchy.'103The Queen had long been

urged by the Royalist party,which was composed chiefly of

 

96. Atlantic Monthl , Vol. 101, p. 337.

97. R. S. Kuydendall, "History of Hawaii", p. 259. Note photo-
graph of the two pages of Liliuokalani's diary.

98. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 101, p. 337.

99. Ibid., p. 338. or. figtigg, Vol. 56. p. 206.

100. Rebellion.g£_1895, preface.

101. Appletong C clonedia, p. 375.

102. Ibid.

23

natives, to rid the government of the dominant "later missionp
ary” element which had been firmly entrenched by the Constitu-
tion of 1887, even though it would be a flagrant violation of
that Constitution.103 The missionary party was strong enough
[to overturn in succession various cabinets appointed by the
Queen.10:in spite of the fact that the natives formed a strong
majority of the pepulation.105 In the latter part of 1892 her
cabinet, which she supposed was subservient to her wishes,
consisted of the following members: Premier and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Samuel Parker; Minister of the Interior,
John F. Colburn; attorney-General, A. P. Peterson; minister
of Finance, W. F. Cornwell.106
Early in 1893 the Queen decided to put her political
theories into practice by proroguing the legislature on Satur-
day, January 14 and by signing, on the same day, the lottery
bill to which the missionaries had objected so bitterly.107
But these activities marked only the beginning of her program
for she had also placed the draft of a reactionary Constitution,
which she expected to promulgate by royal edibt, in the hands

103 On that same day, a great crowd of

of the cabinet members.
natives had assembled after the dismissal of the legislature,
anticipating the restoration. However, the Reform party had
subjected the cabinet members to such pressure that they re-

fused to countersign the new Costitution and the chagrined

 

10 . Ibid., p. 376.
10 . Ibid. During the last twenty weeks of Liliuokalani's

reign, no less than five cabinets were in office. Cgsmo-
politan, Vol. 15, p. 171.

105. fiineteenth Centugy, Vol. 33, p. 833.

106. Appleton's Cyclopedia, p. 376.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

24

Queen was forced to admit to her constituents that they new
constitution would have to be postponed for a time.109 ,

The Revolution itself was an effort to forestall the
continuation of the grandiose though unconstitutional scheme
of the Queen. On January luth, before Liliuokalani had
announced her decision to defer the promulgation of the new
constitution between fifty and one hundred "prominent“ citizens
met at the instigation of Lorrin A. Thurston, a ”later mission-
ary'I lawyer, to consider the situation and devise ways and means
to thwart the Queen‘s ambition.llOColburn and Peterson, the two
disaffected members of the royal cabinet, were present and ooun»
seled armed resistance.111A committee of thirteen members was
appointed which decided to depose the Queen and to establish a

112The following morning members of the

Provisional Government.
committee invited Colburn and Peterson to take charge in order
that the Revolution might have a legitimate tinge by giving it
a foothold in the existing government but the cabinet members
refused.113, I
The next step of the Committee was to send a petition
for protection to the United States Minister.llnThen a chain
of events, climaxed by recognition of the Provisional Govern-

ment and culminated by the Queen's surrender, occurred with

 

109. Ibid. , ‘

110. Ibid. Cf A. Johnson and D. Malone, ”Dictionary of Am.
Biog.', Vol. 18, p. 576. ‘

111. Appleton's Cyclopedia, p. 376.

112. Ibid. '

ll . Ibid.

11 . Ibid.

25
remarkable celerity.115These events in chronological order
were: (1) a mass meeting on the afternoon of the 16th endorsing
the action taken by the Committee of Safety; (2) the landing of
160 American troops in answer to the request of the Committee of
Safety; (3) reading of a proclamation announcing the abrogation
of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of Provisional
Government on the afternoon of the 17th; (4) the recognition of
the Provisional Government by John L. Stevens between four and
five o'clock the same afternoon; (5) the surrender of the Queen.115
It is significant to note that Stevens recognized the Provisional
Government before the Queen surrendered.

The results of the bloodless Revolution, which reaffirmed
the position of the "later missionaries," were seconded on the
following day, January 18th, when the representatives of twelve
foreign nations rec0gnized the Provisional Government.117

The Revolution of 1893 might well have been called an
I'American Revolution“ because of the prominence of American
citizens and persons of American descent who either fomented
- or participated in the revolt. Foremost among these was John

L. Stevens, who because of his high position and intimate

 

1150 y...‘_s,o we we. L51”; App. II. p. 221. The IB‘QOIt Of
Wiltse to Secretary of Navy Tracy. Honolulu, January 18,
1893 ...on January 1h...the Queen prorogued the le islature
and attempted to proclaim a new Constitution. At P. u.
on January 16, the citizens met and organized a Committee
of Safety. At #:30 P. M. ianied forces in accordance with
request of the U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary.

Tuesday (17th) afternoon the Provisional Government was
established; the Queen dethroned. The Revolution was accom-
plished without loss of life. Everything is quiet--Wiltse

116. Appleton's CyclOpedia, pp. 376-380.
117. Senate Executive Documents, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 8,

333—33336.

26

connection with the American State Department118 was in a
position not only to encourage the revolt in the Islands but
also to prepare America for the consequences. Stevens' numer-
ous dispatches to the State Department of the United States
were permeated with the arguments of the advantages of annex-
ation and with warnings of the possible interference of another
foreign power which would result in the loss of American con-
trol.119As early as March 20, 1890 he began urging upon Blaine
the need for closer relations between the United States and
Hawaii and also stated that the United States must soon settle
the question: “will the Hawaiian Islands be American or Asiatic?"12
On Earch 8, 1892 Stevens interrOgated Blaine for instructions
in case "the government here should be surprised and overturned
by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement largely of
native Hawaiians and a provisional or republican government
organized...“121He desired to know to what extent it would be
Justifiable to use the United States forces in case of a rev-
olution. He intimated that in as much as the relations of the
United States and Hawaii were "exceptional” and since United
'States officials had taken unusual action in the past in cir-
cumstances of disorder, then he might be Justified in deviating
”from established international rules and precedents" in the

122
event of a political uprising. In the light of following

v ‘—

118. A. Johnson & D. Malone, “Dictionary of Am. Biog.', V01. 17,
p..618. Elaine and Stevens as partners owned and edited
the Kennebec Journal from 1855-1893.

119. U. S. For. Rel., 189#, App. 11, innumerable selections,

1" t'fivens to 'BTainr”.

120. Ibid., p. 3%}. -
12].. Ibid.. p. 152.

122. Ibid.

27
events, this letter, written almost a year before the Revo-
lution indicated first hand information concerning the brew-
ing insurrection as well as an intent to steer its course as
he saw fit. Again on November 20, 1892 Stevens' attempts to
guide the political destiny of the Hawaiian Islands were
portrayed in his letter to John W. Foster, Elaine's successor
in the State Department, when he stated that one of two courses
should necessarily be followed, namely: first, vigorous meas-
ures for annexation or secondly, the formation of an American
protectorate over the Islands with the suggestion that the
former was preferred.123He climaxed his argument with the naive
expression, “I cannot refrain from expressing the cpinion with
emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand" and added an
extended account of the economic advantages that would accrue
to the United States by virtue of annexation.lau

mr. Stevens had been reporting such a wealth of intrigue
and thinly veiled innuendoes to the State Department that Mr."
Foster tactfully suggested that the Minister to Hawaii sepa-
rate his reports into two classes, namely, one for the “Open
historical aspect” and the other "personal” because of the
possibility of a call from Congress for their publication.135

Although Mr. Stevens may not have been guilty of a breach
of international etiquette, certainly he was unusually recep-

tive to the cause of insurrection and singularly disrespectful

 

12 . Ibid., p. 194.
12 . Ibid., p. 195-
125. Ibid., p. 376.

28

to the gg,12;g,government to which he was accredited. Un-
questionably'the prominence of American citizens and persons
of American descent in Hawaiian politics was a contributing
factor to Stevens' staunch American imperialistic views. This
"Americanized" influence was well illustrated in the composition
of the potent ”Committee of Thirteen” selected to supervise the
revolt, namely:

Henry E. COOper-—--American citizen

w. G. Wilder ------ American parents; naturalized citizen
of Hawaii: owner of Hawaiian Steamship Co.

F. W. acChesney----American citizen

C. Bolte ----------- German origin; naturalized citizen of
Hawaii

H. Brown----—-----Scotchman who had not been naturalized

w. 0. Smith, ~~~Hative of foreign origin

 

Henry Haterhouse-o-Originally from Tasmania; a naturalized
citizen

Ed Suhr--------German subject
Theo. F. Lansing--American citizen
John Emmelmuth-~—-American citizen

L. A. Thurstonp--9American (Connecticut) origin; subject
of Hawaii

H. R. Castle-----Hawaiian of American (New York) parentage
J. A. McCandless--American citizen
Six Hawaiian subjects, five American citizens, one Scotchman and
one German, none of whom possessed native Hawaiian names, yet

these same individuals termed themselves ”Citizens“ Committee

of Safety:

 

126. Ibid., p. 587.

29

What part then did the natives play in this history-
making episode? The relative absence of concrete evidence,
either of Opposition to the new industrial regime or of agi-
tation for the rehabilitation of the monarchy, indicated an
apathetic acquiescence to the Revolution. hr. w. Porter Boyd,
the American vice-consul at Honolulu, testified that there was
no uneasiness in the neighborhood of the consulate and that
the landing of the tr00ps came as a complete surprise.127The
pepulation was so unconcerned with the military aspect of the
revolt that after the bluejackets had trailed their artillery
through theamreets, the regular nonday evening out-of-door
band concert was well patronized and no overt act of animosity
apparent.128

Though the natives stoically accepted the new order the
Queen, however, was conscious of her precarious position and
her anger knew no bounds, but her rational self and her cabinet
members counseled passive resistance.129ln accordance with the
precedent established by Kamehameha III in 1843 and on the
advice of her most trusted intimates, Queen Liliuokalani tempo-
rarily surrendered her sovereignty to the United States Governp
ment for judgment and vindication in the following proclamation:

I hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts
done against myself’and the Constitutional Government of
the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have
gggablished a Provisional Government of and for this Kin;-

That I yield to the superior force of the United
States of America, whose Minister Plenipotentiary, his

 

127. North American Review, Vol. 157, p. 732.
128. y, E, For. He;., ISQQ, App. II, pp. 738-739.
129. Appletonig Cyclogedia, p. 380.

30

excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States
trOOps to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he
would support the said Provisional Government.

Now to avoid any collision of armed forces and
perhaps the loss of life, I do under thigprotest and
impelled by said force yield my authority until such
time as the Government of the United States shall,
upon the facts being-presented to it, undo the action
of its representative and reinstate me in the authority
which I claim as the Constitutional sovereign of the
Hawaiian Islands. 130

Liliuokalani followed up her voluntary transfer of authority
by a letter to President Harrison containing the salutation
“Great and Good Friend" and then continued with the hope that
the President would see the Hawaiian situation from her stand-
point.131

Liliuokalani's action, laudable from the standpoint of
both expediency and morality, came at a time when the cards
were stacked against her. In as much as John L. Stevens had
done his work well, no evidence has been uncovered to the
effect that Harrison considered the Queen's letter seriously.

Two outstanding personalities heralded the formation '
and the perpetuity of the Provisional Government, namely,
John L. Stevens and Sanford B. Dole. Hr. Stevens, through

132

his intimate personal relations with the conspirators and

by his prompt recognition of the n§,1§§tg,government had
revived flagged spirits and had encouraged speedy political
transformation. Hr. Dole, a "later missionary: was a member

of one of the leading Hawaiian families and had been selected

.
_—__.. —

130. U. s. For. Lel., 159&, App. II, pp. 232s233.
131. Ibid., p. 1273.
132.1oid., p. 962 963, 521.

31

as a Supreme Court Justice in iee7.133ne had participated active-
ly in the Revolution of 1387, but had consented to Join the move-
ment in 1893 only after he became satisfied that further contin-
uance of the monarchy was out of the question and that the best
interests of all, including the native Hawaiians demanded its
overthrow.13nThe Judge's influence to the cause of insurrection
was inestimable. This was indicated by the fact that J. H.
Soper, a naturalized Hawaiian citizen of American birth, was
willing to accept the important command of the military forces
only after he was assured that Judge Dole was to head the Govern-
ment.135

As the avowed purpose of the revolutionary leaders was the
Annexation of Hawaii to the United States, the Committee of Five
was promptly chosen to visit Washington. On January 18th, the

136

Executive council completed and signed instructions empowering

the Five Commissioners to negotiate a treaty of Union (annexation)
with the United States.137

The Queen also was anxious to have her case reviewed by
the Washington officials for vindication. In the ensueing race
between the annexationists and the royalists to secure American
support for their respective positions, Liliuokalani was handi-
capped by the fact that there was only one available boat for
the trip to the United States which was owned by W. C. Wilder,

L.

133. A. Johnson & D. Malone, 'Dict. of-Am. Biog.‘ Vol. 5, pp. 358-
359.
13%. Ibid.
1350 .Q- .8..- £9.11.- B§l°o Lia 1": App. II: p- 9720
136. Ibid. The members of the Executive Council were as follows:h
' Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith. p. 21:.

137. Ibid., p. 967.

33.

one of the Five Commissioners prcposing annexation and naturally
he refused accomodations for the Queen's representative.138
The scene next shifted from Honolulu to fiashington, where
in the twilight hours of Republican rule from February 3 to
March H, the ear of President Harrison was sought by the two
rival groups from Hawaii in a contest for the adjustment of

the issue which the royalists failed to realize had been pre—
determined unfavorably to them before they left the Islands.

 

138. Ibid., p. 397.

33

IV

Benjamin Harrison, the twenty-third President of the
United States was a political recluse whose true contributions
are still a matter of conjecture. Teen too, Harrison was so

139The im-

unfortunatc as to be overshadowed by a subordinate.
polling force behind the Republican administration was found
in the person of James G. Blaine. As Blaine had practically
dictated the selection of Harrison in the Republican National
Convention of 1888, the letter, when elected, reciprocated by
offering Blaine the highest appointive office, namely, Secre-

luOAs Blaine had dominated the Convention of

tary of State.
1888, so in the course of time he formulated the foreign policy
of the administration.1n1Blaine's foreign policy was centered
about Henry Clay's earlier principles known as the “American
System” which contemplated the eventual dOmination of the
Caribbean area by the United States. He believed it essential
to the future welfare of his country that there should be an
Isthmian canal under American Control and to that end he
labored conscientiously, if not logically, in his diplomatic

relations with England.1u2

_~.

Elaine's comprehending mind, antic-

139. A. Johnson and D. Malone, "Diet. of Am. BiOg.', Vol. 8,
pp. 332-333. ~

140. J. F. Rhodes, ”History of U. S. From Hayes to McKinley",
Vol. 8, p. 316.

1H1. n. s. Muzzey, "James 6. Elaine", p. 383.

1&2. J. H. Latans, "American Foreign Policy”, pp. 519-523.
By the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, the
canal when constructed would be supervised taintly by
Great Britain and the United States or by . ternationel
control. Blaine persistently attempted to alter the

Treaty so that the United States might have exclusive
control. Ibid., pp. 306-307.

34

ipating the construction of the Isthmian canal, included the
the Hawaiian Islands in his “American System." Because of the
existence of international rivalries in Hawaii and its intimate
cultural and commercial ties with the United States, he regarded
the annexation of Hawaii as more natural and imperative than the
acquisition of the nearby Cuba.143Blaine's imperialistic designs
were further shown on August 10, 1891 when he wrote to President
Harrison:
I think there are only three places that are of enough
value to be taken; one is Hawaii and the others are Cuba
and Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not imminent and
will not be for a generation. Hawaii may come.up for a
decision at any unexpected hour, and I hope we shall be
prepared to decide in the affirmative.lh4
There is no evidence that President Harrison's views on
foreign policy were not in agreement with those of his aggres-
sive Secretary of State. Harrison in his fourth annual mes age
of December 6, 1892 declared: "Our relations with Hawaii have
been such as to attract an increased interest and must continue
to do so 1335
A preview of the paternalistic attitude of the Republican
administration toward Hawaii was illustrated in the attempts
of Blaine to put the "manifest Destiny“ doctrine into practice.
Early in 1889 the United States departed from its traditional
policy of shunning 'entangling alliances“ and entered into the
Tripartite Condimonium affecting the sovereignty of the Samoan

Islands.1M6B1aine's persistent attempt to alter the Clayton-

lh3. S. F. Bemis, "American Secretaries of State“, Vol. 8, pp.
120—121.

luh. D. S. Muzzey, “James G. Blaine", p. 394.

1&5. J. D. Richardson, "messages and Papers of the Presidents“,
Vol. 9, p. 316.

1&6. D. s. Huzzey, op. cit., p. too.

35

Bulwer Treaty of 1850 so as to permit the construction of an
Isthmian canal under the sole auspices of the United States
has been previously noted.

Another potent factor affecting Elaine's imperialistic
designs were the essays of A. T. nahan and other I’;‘ingoistic"
writers. sahan, a captain in the United States navy, had
long been advocating an expansive naval program with emphasis
on outlying naval stations as a means of preserving inter-
national prestige.1uTSoon after Captain dahan had published
his naval admonitions, Blaine began searching for a suitable
Caribbean port as a naval base. Unsuccessful in both Haiti
and Santo Domingo in obtaining port privileges, he was unwill-
ing to follow Seward's course of 1567 by attempting to purchase
the Danish West Indies until he had secured access to one of
the larger Islands.1n8While Blaine failed to realize his objec-
tives yet the trend of his diplomacy was obvious. Furthermore,
Hawaii fitted perfectly into the expansionist schemes of both
Mahan and Blaine and its acquisition was specifically designated
by each.m9

A more direct evidence of increased interest in the annex-
ation question was revealed through the propaganda included in
John L. Steven's voluminous dispatches from Honolulu. His
continuous references to the I'1ater missionaries” as being the

"best people on the Islands" and his expressions of hope for a

1&7. Atlantic tonthly, Vol. 66, p. 822. Cf. Forum, Vol. 15, p. 6.
ins. J. w. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898', pp. 29-32.
1&9. Forum, Vol. 15, p. 6; D. S. Muzzey, “James G. Elaine“, p. 39M“

36

closer relationship between the United States and Hawaii left
the definite impression that there was considerable agitation
for annexation.15°Stevens also attempted to shake off American
lethargy by repeated warnings of possible European or Asiatic
intervention.151

A significant move of the annexationists in Hawaii toward
realizing their objective came in May of 1892, with the visit
of Lorrin A. Thurston to the United States. While the Journey
was ostensibly in connection with the Hawaiian exhibit at the
Chicago World's Fair, yet much of Thurston's activities were
centered in Washington where he contacted leading political
figures of both parties in an effort to facilitate annex~
ation.152mr. Thurston, another ”later missionary,“ had been
proclaimed by Stevens as one of the ”most influential members
of the Reform party" and, moreover, as the visitor had recently
been elected to the Hawaiian legislature, his assertions carried
considerable weight.153

Armed with all these tidings, it would have been a most
inanimate person, indeed, who would have failed to have detected
the brewing insurrection in Hawaii and the promise of an impend-
ing political adhesion. Secretary Elaine and his successor in
the State Department, John W. Foster, were not lacking in diplo-
matic training as both had a full knowledge of international
151A

law and diplomatic practice. The Americans preceded into the

A—_‘

150. Q. 51. For. 531,,l893, App. II, p. 338.

151. Ibid., p. 321.

152. Nation, vol. 56, pg 1A6A II 303

1 . U. g. Fog. Rel. l 95, pp. p. .

12 . S. F. Bemis, ”American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, p. 187;

D. S. Muzzey, op. cit., p. ”90-

37

Hawaiian imbroglio with cpen eyes--fu11y alive to the conse-
quenoes.

Aside from the aforementioned intimate personal relation-
ship with Stevens, the absence of Opposition from the adminis-
tration indicated a tacit acquiescence to his Hawaiian policies.
In only one instance, which occurred after the Revolution, "as
there any semblance of the wildest rebzke.155

Into such a harmonious group of Republican expansionists
came the Five Hawaiian Commissioners seeking annexation. The
Commission was composed of L. A. Thurston, Wm. H. Castle, W. C.
Wilder, J. Marsden and C. L. Carter.156Stevens again endeavored
to prepare the way for them to Foster by terming them represenp
tatives of the best element in the Islands and by reiterating
the need for immediate action.157The Commission sailed from
Honolulu on January 19, arrived at San Francisco on January 28
and presented their credentials to the American Secretary of
State on February 3, 1893.158A1though the American Department
of State and the Hawaiian Commissioners both desired speedy

155. U. S. For. Re1., 189”, App. II pp. 906-407. On February
'1‘, Stems 6333mm United States flag to be raised over
the Government Building and proclaimed a protectorate over
the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. Ibid., p. #05.
Eggt;r questioned the rectitude of this action. Ibid., p.

156. U. _8_. Egg. 34,. 182&, App. II, p. 23%.

157. Ibid., pp. 397-A01. Stevens concluded his suggestions to
Foster with the following paragraph: ”The Hawaiian peer
is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the
United States to pluck it. If annexation does not take
place promptly, all is held in doubt and suspense for
six or ten months, they certainly will be a revulsion to
despair, and these people, by their necessities might be
forced toward becoming a British colony, for the English
here of the monarchial type would then avail themselves
of this Opportunfity and stir up all possible Opposition

to annexation. e e
155. Ibid., p. 23%.

 

38

annexation, there were several obstacles to the drafting of

the treaty. The Hawaiians were most anxious to secure certain
provisions which had to be reconciled with the United States
Constitution and American Public Law as well as to the interests
of competing American industries. In the first place the Hawai—
iansinsisted that the American bounty be paid on sugar.159
Foster, however, proposed a much smaller bounty of one-half

cent per pound. The Hawaiians also wanted the promise of a
cable to the Islands. A third and a most aggravating problem
that arose was the question of imported labor so necessary for
the Hawaiian sugar plantations. The Commissioners were anxious
to secure the entrance of Chinese laborers under the existing
prohibiting immigration laws.16OFoster refused this last reiuest
flatly.

Foster persuaded the Commissioners to forego their demands
for the economic welfare of the Islands in favor of speedier
action on the Treaty. On February lhth the Treaty of Annexation
containing the following provisiogs was signed by Foster and
the Five Hawaiian Commissioners: 1(l) the cession by the Hawai-
ian Government of all sovereignty, public land and revenue to
the United States; (2) the continuance of the present Hawaiian
laws until Congress should provide otherwise; (3) the assumption
by the United States of the Hawaiian debt not to exceed 53,250,000°
(U) the prohibition of further immigration of Chinese labor; (5)

the payment of an annual sum of €20,000 to Liliuokalani for

 

159. S. F. Bemis, "American Secretaries of State”, Vol. 8, pp. 213-
215.

160. Ibid.

161. E. E. filo—£0 E0, LES—$5., App. II, pp. 202-205.

39

life and of a lump sum of fil50,oCO to Princess Kaiulani, the
expheir presumptive.

0n the following day, February 15, President Harrison
sent the Treaty to theegenate with a message urging prompt
and favorable action.1 Lin his message Harrison blamed the
Queen, personally, for the fall of the monarchy and disclaimed
all respgnsibility for the Revolution on the part of the United
States.1 3Moreover, he declared that the “restoration of Queen
Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable if not impossible and
unless actively supported by the United States would be accomp
panied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all busi-
ness interests. The influence and interests 2f the United
States must be increased and not diminished.1 gTwo days later
the Treaty was promptly approved by the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and reported favoragly to the Senate where
it was received with mixed emotions.1 5There were various forces
at work to prevent ratification. Mr. J. Marsden, one of the
Hawaiian Commissioners, probably hurt his own cause when he
deprecated the influence of the natives in the following state-
ment to a Washington reporter: "We don't want to be governed
by the native vote; wg6prefer no suffrage at all rather than
universal suffrage."1 The Treaty was actually blocked by
Democratic senators at the behest of hr. John C. Carlisle,

a former member of the Senate and the prospective Secretary

 

162. Ibid., p. 198.
163. Senate.§§. 000., 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 8, H0. 227,

pp. 1-2-
16”. J. D. Richardson,"ieesages & Papers of the Presidents",

V01. 9' D. 3,413.
165, Senate Journal, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 1, p. 395.
166. American Journal 9£_Politics, Vol. M, p. 164.

no

of the Treasury, who communicated with his erstwhile party
associates and the supposition is that he brought a message

from the President-elegt to the effect that Cleveland desired
1 7
to have it postponed. Then too, there was so little time

left that it could not be spared frog last minute necessary
. l 8
party legislation and appointments.

The following comprehensive suanery has been offered by
a present-day historian, W. 8. Bolt, who has made an intensive
study of the defeated Treaty:

"Thus either because of the desire to rob the Harrison
administration as the Tribune said or because of Gresham's
personal animosity to Harrison as Foster said or because
of the desire to protect the honor of the United States
from a violation of international morality msCleveland said
or because of the natural feeling that all discussions on
pending probleas should be left for the incoming adminis~
tration, another important greaty was defeated in the
Senate by partisan action.1 9

The second session of the fiftyosecond Congress ended March

I

e, 1393 with the Hawaiian Treaty still awaiting action in

the Senate.

h.—

167. W. 8. Holt, ITreaties Defeated in the U. 8. Senate”, p. 153.
168. Ibid. Cf. Ibid., p. 152. Holt offers tso reasons for the
unusual demonstration of speed in the committee, namely,
first because a Republican majority controlled the committee
and secondly there was need for haste if the Republican
administration was to secure credit for accomplishing the
the annexation. " '
169. Ibid., pp. 153-154.

M

V

The man who entered the White House on March 4, 1893 as
the chief executive, was a forceful determined personality
who placed rectitude above everything else; he was singularly
unwilling to surrender an iota of principle to expediency.
After determining upon a course of action by laborious reason-
ing, he adhered unswerwmgly to that course.170
A guiding factor in the formulation of President Cleve—
land's foreign policy was his Opposition to imperialism in
any form.1 1His withdrawal of the expansionist Frelinghausen~
Zavala Treaty in 1885, his refusal to encourage foreign invest-
ments, and his stern tendency to view foreign questions in a
moral light, corroborated his anti-eXpansionist policy.172How-
ever, this did not mean that he was opposed to all American
activity in Hawaii for in his second annual message of December
6, 1886, he stated:
I express my unhesitating conviction that the inti-
macy of our relations with Hawaii should be emphasized.
As a result of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, those
Islands, on the highway of Oriental and Australian traf-

fic are virtually an outpost of American commerce and
a stepping stone to the growing trade of the Pacific.l73

The question then was one of degree and in no wise did Cleve-
land's message contemplate the subversion of Hawaiian sovereignty

to attain Hawaiian I'intimacy.“

 

170. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland“, p. 765.
171. S. F. Bemis, "Diplomatic History of the U. 8.", p. #59.

1 2. Allan Nevins o . cit. p. non.-
1;3. J. D. Richardsog, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents",

Vol. 8, pp. 500-501.

M2

Cleveland's treatment of the vexing Hawaiian problem
was consistent with his previous foreign policy. He may have
been instrumental in preventing the Annexation Treaty from
being 'railroaded' through the Senate in the waning hours of
the Republican administration. It is likely that he considered
the question at some length with members of his cabinet before
he assumed the Presidency.17ncertainly his intensive study of
the Hawaiian situation conformed to good international diplo-
macy.

Apparently his early study of the Annexation Treaty
convinced him that it should not be immediately ratified be-
cause five days after he became President, he sent the followb
ing message to the Senate:

_ For the purpose of reexamination, I withdraw the
Treaty of Annexation between the United States and the
Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, now
pending in the Senate, which was signed February lu,

1893 and transmitted to the Senate on the 15th of the
same month, and I therefore request that said Treaty
be returned to me.175

Possibly President Cleveland's legalistic turn of mind
revolted at the prospect of judging the issue between the
Royalists and the Representatives of the Provisional Govern-
ment before both sides of the question had been heard. Pos-
sibly Cleveland's letter from Queen Liliuokalani, which was
similar to that sent to Harrison, caused him to investigate
further.176Possibly the untoward haste of the annexation
proceedings as a whole, urged him to slow down administrative

action. At any rate the President decided to send a trusted

174. Allan Nevins, 0p. cit., p. 556.
175. J. D. Richardson, I'm‘essages and Papers of the Presidents“,

Vol. 9 p. 393. . fi ,4
176. .11- 31. £92.. 3.6.2.1... __2_.13 ’4. App. II. pp. 257-862».

”3

representative to the Hawaiian Islands to determine the true
facts of the case. Just two days after he had withdrawn the
treaty, he appointed James H. Blount, until march M Congress-
man from Georgia and chairman of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, as special Commissioner for the difficult mission.177
Although Blount did not relish the commission,175his
extensive experience in foreign affairs, publicly lauded even
by his political Opponents,179and his unswerving integrity
and devotion to duty, warranted approbation of his selectiOn
by such an ardent annexationist as Albert Shaw, editor of the
fievigw‘gg,Reyiews.180Before leaving for‘Hawaii, Blount con-
‘ferred with both Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Gresham,
learning that neither had a definite program in mind and in-
ferring that action would hinge upon his findings.181His instruc-
tions also specified that he was to possess ”paramount“ author-
ity on all matters touching the protection of American citizens
and that the object of his mission was to answer in particular
these two questions, namely; first, the causes of the revolution
by which the Queen's government was overthrown and secondly, the
sentiment of the people toward the existing authority.182

 

 

177. A. Johnson and D. Malone, “Diet. of American Biograth'.
Vol. 2, pp. 383-389.

1 8. Senat Reports rd Cons. 2nd Seas. V01 2 No. 2 .
7 65. Blount accegzed only after his sdn had réferreg t6 p

his mother‘s poor health and had insisted that the trip to
Hawaii “would add five years to her life.“ Cf. Overland
MOUthl V01. 2 o F 80
179. Cong, Record, 52ndeonZ., 2nd Sess., Vol. at, pp. 1207-1208.
180. Review of Reviews, Vol. 7, pp. 262-263. 8
181. Senate RE orts, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 2, No. 227, p. 3 7.
132. FTsTFor. 53;” 13‘2”. App. II, pp. 1185-1187. Text of in-
Etrfiot'i'éh's will be found in Appendix H.

at

As soon as Blount entered Honolulu on March 29, he was
subjected to overtures from both the Annexationists and the
Royalists which he reapectfully declined. 183The Annexationists
offered him an elaborate house with all the furnishings for
which he could pay a nominal rental and a re=resentative of
the Queen offered the use of her carriage.1b

During the st ay of four nonths at Honolulu, 2r. Blount
interviewed representatives of both groups, and with diligence
and good faith he attempted to realize the object of his mission
by sending to Secretary Gresham from time to time reports of
his activities and deductions from his investigations.185while
in Honolulu, Blount conducted himself with such exemplary
discretion that when he left not only was there a general
feeling of indecision abgut his report but many surmised that
he favored annexationff>

One of Blount's first official acts, which should have
been an index to the Hawaiians of the reversal of policy, was
the termination of the protectorate instituted by Stevens on
February 1.1811though Stevens had tendered.his resignation on
March 7, he was still Minister at the time of the lowering of the
American flag and had to yield to Blount's “paramount" authority
until May 9 when Elount succeeded him.”85

While Blount outwardly conducted his investigation with
utmost decorum yet there was, underlying the maze of collected

testimony and related information, a note of hostility toward

 

18.1bid., p. 568.

18. Ibid.
18. J. A. Gillie, "The “Havaiian Incident" , p. 85.

18. Independent, Vol.4 .
157. u. s. For. Rel., 153i,p App. II, p. 1060.
188.1b1do' p. LL13. “’21.

’45

Stevens and his prcpertied white friends who later constituted
the Provisional Government. Elount produced circumstantial
evidence to show that Stevens had agreed to support the revolup
tion before it was begun. for this Stevens' actions rather
than written documents were submitted as proof, Blount con-
tended that no one could have acted so promptly and efficiently
in support of the insurgents cause without a previous under-
standing with its leaders. He arranged the evidence, partic-
ularly that of Mr. Wundenburg, to prove that in the minds of
some of the revolutionists Stevens had given the impression
that he would recognize the Provisional Government as soon as
it had occupied gny_of the Government Buildings in Honolulu.189
Furthermore Blount was able to extract from Admiral Skerrett,
who had succeeded Captain Wiltse, the damaging admission that
the troOps landed from the "Boston“ were very poorly stationed
in so far as the protection of American interests were concerned
but very well located if their objective was the support of the
Provisional Govern ent.lgoBlount criticised the willingness of
Stevens to recognize the Provisional Government in the light

of its expressed inability to maintain law and order, partic-

ularly since Judge Dole had even asked Captain Wiltse to take
191
command of the forces of the Provisional Government. Blount

summarized his indictment of Stevens as follows!

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not
have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens promise to protect
them against any danger from the (Royalist) Government.
But for this their mass meeting would not have been held.

 

189. Ibid.. p0 5914'.

190. Ibid. p. 538.
191. J. A.'Gillis, "The Hawaiian Incident", p. 70.

#6

But for this no request to land troops would have been

made. Had the trocps not been landed no measures for

the organization of a new Government would have been

taken‘i‘he American Minister and the revolutionary leaders

had determined on Annexation to the United States, and

had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.l92

In regard to the second point in his instructions, namely,
that of determining the sentiment of the peOple toward the
Provisional Government, Blount reported that native sympathy
was entirely with the Queen. This cpinion was shared by the
Annexationists themselves.193'From a careful inquiry,” Blount
wrote President, 'I am satisfied that it (annexation) would
be defeated by a vote of at least two to one. If votes of
persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded,
it would be defeated more than five to one.%9n
It is not difficult to imagine what an effect this report

had on the President and his official advisers. It confirmed
'their gravest suspicions that the Republican party had been
oo-partners in an immoral conspiracy to deprive a feeble
monarchy of its sovereignty. Soon after Blount's report had
been received, Gresham, who was especially active in the
Queen’s behalf, began to work on the problem of the future
relations with Hawaii.195ln a report to the President, dated
October 18, 1893, Gresham summarized Blount'e findings and

endorsed his view of the reprehensible part played by Minis-

 

193- 11- .S.- 193.- leo. .L15 2+ App. II. p. 594.

19 . F. R. Dulles, “America in the Pacific,I p. 180.

19 . Ibid.

195. Ibid., p. 181. His wife orplained Gresham's zeal in the
Queen's cause on the grounds that "a woman in trouble,
my hueband.would certainly side with her against the
power, greed and lust of man.”

47

ter Stevens in the revolution. The climax to his report
occurred in the following interrogation:

Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but
independent state by an abuse of the authority of the
United States be undone by restoring the legitimate
government? Anything short of that will not, I
respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of Justice.196

The plan to rectify the mistake of their Republican pred-
ecessors, apparently formulated by the combined efforts of
Cleveland, Gresham, and the Attorney-Generali Olney, was

to restore the Queen to her former position. In September
Albert 8. Willie of Kentucky had been named to succeed Blount
whose special mission was now completed.198Willis, who was
.accredited to the Provisional Government, carried secret
instructions which intended to overthrow that Government and
restore the previous one:

In accordance with his instructions, Willis sought an
interview with Liliuokaleni soon after he had landed at
Honolulu and had presented his credentials to the Provisional
Government. After he had told her of President Cleveland's
decision, he officially asked if she would grant a complete
amnesty to the leaders of the January revolt as well as to
the members of the Provisional Government. To his consterna-
tion the Queen replied: 'ty decision would be, as the law
directs, that such persons should be beheaded and their

199
property confiscated to the Government.“ Further questioning

For. as]... 189“. App. II, p. 1+6}.

196. g. .21.

197. F. a. fifties, 0p. cit., p. 151.

198. 11.. g. .1325. £21., 1894, App. II, p. 1L6’+.
199. F. H. Dulles, op. cit., p. 182.

#8

by the American minister only revealed the dogmatic refusal
of Liliuokalani to recede from her position. In answer to
Willis' telegram for instructions, Gresham replied that
amnesty was essential for the restoration.2 0The second
meeting found the Queen more amenable to the demands of the
American envoy. She first prcposed prcperty confiscation
and perpetual banishment for the revolutionists but upon
willis' insistence she acquiesced her full acceptance of
the President‘s stipulations.201

Upon receipt of this royal concession, Willis turned
to what he believed was the least difficult part of his
mission, namely, that of informing the Provisional Govern-
ment of President Cleveland's decision and the receiving of ,
that Government's submission. Willis called at the Govern-
ment Building on December the 20th and presented to the
Executive Council a memorandum summarizing his instructions
and divulging that since the Queen had agreed to grant
complete amnesty, the President expected the Provisional
Government “to promptly relinguish to her her constitutional
authority." He closed by submitting, in the name and by the
authority of the United States, this question: 'Are you
willing to abide by the decision of the President?'202

waever, rumor containing the general tenor of Cleve-
land's plan had leaked out and Dole was at least partially

prepared for the revelation. Three days later he ably

 

200. U. s. For. e App. II. p. 46h.'
201. 313...??Eé—wfinss
202. Ibid., pp. 1272-1275.

”9

answered the prcpcsal to reinstate Liliuokalani by declaring
that the independence and sovereignty of his country could '
not be called into question and finally requested Willis to
inform President Cleveland that the Hawaiian Government
“respectfully and unhesitatingly declines to entertain the
proposition of the President of the United States that it
should surrender its authority to the eprueen.”20¥he Dole
Government supported the daring stand of its leader bgofire-
paring defenses against possible American aggression.

This latter move was unnecessary because Cleveland had
relinguished his cherished hepe of settling the Hawaiian
situation by executive agreement five days before Dole had
answered the query of Willie. In a special message of Decen-
ber, the 18th, 1893, be reviewed the Hawaiian Revolution with
a scathing denunciation of Stevens and his Republican cohorts;
he intimated that the United States was guilty of I'an act of
war“ at the time the trocps were landed, and he concluded that
the Provisional Government owed its existence “to an armed
invasion of the United States.'209Nevertheless, he admitted
the failure of his own policy owing to the unwillingness of
the Queen to refrain from bloodthirsty reprisals (he didaggt
yet know the stand taken by the Provisional Government.)
Since executive mediation had been stalemated, Cleveland
commended the subject “to the extended powers and wide dis-

cretion of the Congress“ but hastened to add that he was

20 . Ibid., p. 1282. g

20 . R. S. Kuykendall, “History of Hawaii", p. 281.

205. J. D. Richardson "Messages and Papers of the Presidents"
Vol. 9, pp. Moo-£72.

206. Ibid., p. #72.

‘1} I |.II..\!II ...

 

 

willing to OOOperate “in any legislative plan which may be
devised for the solution of the problem before us which is
consistent with American honor, integrity and morality.'207

Sc ended Cleveland's well intentioned but poorly thought out
attempt to right a probable wrong in the field of international
diplomacy.

The Congress, into whose lap Cleveland drOpped the vexing
Hawaiian complication, readily assumed the task. Even before .
Cleveland had surrendered control, Senator Hoar of Massachusetts
questioned both the legality of Blount's appointment and his
conduct while in Hawaii.EOSScon after the President had delivered
his special message on Hawaii, Senator horgan of Alabama, Chair-
man cf the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, prcposed that
the message be referred to his committee for consideration as
to whether or not there had been any irregularities between
the United States and Hawaii in relation to the recent political
revolution in Hawaii.209The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in making its report in February of 1894 illustrated the pre—
vailing difference of cpinion as to the wisdom of the course
pursued by President Cleveland. The four Republican members
decried the action of Cleveland and Blount while four of the

Democratic members denounced Stevens for his interference as

well as the deliberate attempt at Annexation. The fifth Dem-

ocratic member of the Committee, the expansionist Senator

 

207. Ibid.
208. Cong. Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 1, Vbl. 26, p. 19.

209. Ibid.

51

from Alabama, Chairman Morgan held the balance of power as
well as the ultimate decision which paradoxically sanctioned
the actions of all Americans participating in the Hawaiian
affair and left the Queen alone at fault-«a most unique view
inéthat it was able to reconcile such widely divergent cpin-
ions?10

Outside of the Foreign Relations Committee there were
Senators who were unwilling to be eliminated from the Hawai-
ian fracas and who, both before and after the report of the
Foreign Relations Committee, vented their wrath against Blount
or Stevens as the case might be.2111n short, Republicans de-
nounced Blount while the Democrats heaped coals upon the head
of Stevens. Both parties offered destructive criticism only
and in no way contributed to an amicable, immediate settlement.

No definite course of action was adapted by the Senate
until May 31 when Senator Turpie, a Democrat from Indiana,
introduced the following resolution which was so skilfully
worded that each party could derive consolation from it while
at the same time the nation's historic policy toward foreign
interference was reaffirmed:

Resolved, That of right it belongs wholly to the
peOple of the Hawaiian Islands to establish and main-

tain their own form of government and domestic polity;
that the United States ought in no wise to interfere
therewith, and that any intervention in the political
affairs of these Islands by anyother government will

be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United Statee.212

 

210. Senate Reports. 53rd Con., 2nd Sese., Vol. 2, pp. 15-36.

211. Cong. Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd 8933., Part 1, Vol. 26,

pp. 61-1990
212. Ibid.. pp. 5&99—5500.

52

Inasmuch as the Senate decided neither to restore the Queen
nor to interfere with the Provisional Government, it scrupup
lously avoided the question of Annexation and thereby left
it to the tender mercies of the dim future.

In the meantime the House of Representatives had adOpted
the HcCreary Resolutions which were likewise double-barrelled
in that they condemned the action of Stevens and repudiated
Cleveland's attempt to restore the monarchy though the latter
was more implied than apparent.2131n general the House sup-
ported the President better than did the Senate.

Naturally, the press of the nation did not treat the
matter so delicately as did Congress. Cleveland's message of
December 15th, 1893, was the subject of many pithy editorials.
Blunt criticism was empressed by the Washinatog £Q§1,(Ind.),
(Rein). W 2313232211 (Reno).
and 'the mm (nep.), m mm (Dean) in the
words of the Ealtiggre Agg;iggg,(fiep.): “President Cleveland's

Hawaiian message will disappoint even the few friends who have

 

endeavored to apologize for his extraordinary course in the
21+
matter." While on the other hand the Egg Zgrg Eglgg_(Pro.),

are-1.1mm (Hem). Emmanueiaaes (Dem). magma (Pun).
Springgigld Repuhlicgg (Indd)p.R213?S-Tfi vee on ygwg (Dem.)
and the gaggimgge Sag (Dem.) commented favorably on the message

 

as expressed by the latter: ”President Cleveland's message is

a careful, exhaustive and closely reasoned statement of the

 

21.1b1d.. pp. 2001-2008.
Muili Opinion, Vol.16, 2p. 306-307.

53

facts and of the moral obligation resting upon the United
215
States.” The Ehiladglghia Regard (Dem.) took this most

expressive and moderate view: “The President stands on

high moral ground that hzs been pulled from under him by
21

the course of events."

The general question of annexation again found a divided

gourgal (389.), Washington
Em (Ind.), and the m 22115. .323 (Dem.), favored annexation
and ridiculed Cleveland's policy in a manner similar to the
words of the,fig1,rz§5 Iribung (Rep.) which stated that, “every
budget of news.as it comes from Hawaii proves that Mr. Blount's

217
mission was a mistake." it the seas time the £1. 1,931.1 532212:-

11.9. (Dem-)1 W BEE—JO: (98:11.), and the £31193 £21311

(Dem.) praised Cleveland's anti-annexation policy in the words

aicas

 

but vociferous press. The

 

of the Eeralg that "even if this whole annexation business did
not savor of an unparalled conspiracy, it would still be a
gigantic humbug. We trust the administration at Washington
now sees the matter in this light and that its verdict will be
'30 Hawaiian Annexation'.'213

Most of the editors of the contemporary periodicals, with
the exception of the,£a1ign_and the Endgpendent, took a passive
editorial view and left the formation of public cpinion to the
writers of the individual articles and sometimes going so far

as to publish the conflicting opinions of three factional

 

21 . Ibid.
. 21 0 Ibid.’ p. 307.

217. Ibid., Vol. 15, pp. ins-146.
21%. Ibid. '

5M

219
authors in the same issue. The,§a§ign,consistently opposed
220 - -
annexation while the d = g was Just as anxious to
1 .

facilitate the same measure.

Cleveland's policy received the approbation of many
educators and highly trained intellectuals. Theodore S.
woolsey of the Yale Law School advised that 'bothzégw and
policy demand that we keep our hands off Hawaii.“ The
eminent hgggigan Jurist, Thomas M. Cooley, upheld Cleveland's
position as did the self-made statesman from hassschusetts,
George S. Boutwell.224The legality of Hawaiian annexation was
questioned by the preeminentaggthority on American Constitu-
tional law, George T. Curtis while Carl Schurz, the reformer,226
cppoeed the admission of the Hawaiians solely on moral grounds.
Cleveland must have derived much satisfaction in the receipt of
a letter from that astute diplomat, Charles Francis Adams Jr.,
who, though a political opponent of President Cleveland, wrote
“to express the deep sense of respect, not to use a stronger
term, I feel for the pogétion the administration has taken on.
the Hawaiian question.“

It was to be expected that Foster and Harrison would up-

 

219. Ngrth American vei. 157 pp. 731-752.
220- Naming. V01. 5 . p. 9 . 151: Voi- 57. pp. 38. 359: Vol. 58.
pp- 5 s 1 00

3
221. gppepeggeny, Vol. #5 pp. 1A9, ass; v01. #6, p. 5.
222. Yale Review, Vol. 2 {01d Series), p. 35.
22 . Forum, Vol. 15, pp. 389-#06.
22 . G. S. Boutwell, "Hawaiian Annexation” pp. 11-12.
225. North American Review, Vol. 156, pp. 282-286.

226. Egrpere Monthly, Vol. 67 p. 737.
227. Allan Nevins, Letters of Grover Cleveland”, p. 339.

55
228
braid Cleveland for his "hands~off' policy.' Harrison in

particular decried the lack of continuity in our foreign
policy.2291n spite of the Harrison criticism most writers

seemed to realize that it would be impossible to secure any
extension of American influence beyond present national borders
during the Democratic administration. However, with the likeli-
hood of a return of a Republican administration annexation might
be consummated.

The expected English Opposition to the 'Americanization'
of the Islands did not materialize. In fact England appeared
to welcome America's initiation of an imperialistio program.

As early as ISSO'Lord Palmerston had suggested to a group of
visiting Hawaiian Commissioners that they had better look'
forward to becoming an integral part of the United States for
“such was the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands, arising from
their proximity to the States of California and Oregon and
natural dependence on these markets for exports and imports
together with the probable extinction of the Hawaiian aborig—
inal population and its substitution by imnigration from the
United States.230Lord Bryce prephesied annexation in these
caustic words: "I shall be sorry to see the Hawaiian Govern—
ment'brougg; down to the level of San Francisco political

methods.” Two weeks after the outbreak of the fiawaiian Revo-

lution the London News casually informed its reading public

 

228. J. W. Foster, l'Annexation of Hawaii“, pp. 1-16.

229. Ngsiszn VO1e57 p0 381‘s -
230. J. N. Ecster, 'inerican Diplomacy in the Orient", p. 368.

231. Natl , Vol. 56, p. 362.

‘,
5v

that the Queen and her ministershad been deposed and that the
United States could annex the Islands if they wished to enter-
tain the prcposal.232England's "provoking indifference” and
“calm unconcern' had, as the fiatign put it, “robbed the enter-
prise of all its g1amor.'233.

The Provisional Government of Hawaii finally conceded
that there was no hope for annexation to the United States
during Cleveland's regime and on March 15, 1894 passed an act
"to provide for a Constitutional Convention.'2 uThisConvention
was so arranged that the ruling oligarchy constituted a major-
ity. Naturally the provisions of the Constitution contained
rigid and educational and income qualifications both for sut-
frage and officeholding.2 To a greater degree than the Consti-
tution of 1887, the new regulations placed political power in
the hands of the white prcpertied classes. The fiatign commented
that the new arrangement consisted of “an uncommonly strong
centraé government with very large powers in the hands of a
few.E3 The new Constitution with a clause empowering the Pres-
ident to make a treaty of political and commercial union to
the United States, was promgégated by a proclamation of Pree-
ident Dole on July h, 189fl.

Early in January, 1895 the Republic had occasion to
demonstrate the stability of its organizatiog én the face of

a royalist attempt to restore the old order. On the night

 

232. London News, February 4, 1893, p. 139.
23 . Nation, Vol. 56, p. 154.

23 .. 1.1.. a 319.2. .1391” 1.9% App. 11: P- 1311-
235. Ibid., pp. 1360-1371.

236. Nation, Vol. 59, p. 7.

237. 1;. 9;. £23.. £91., 182 , App. II, p. 1371.
238. Rebellion of 1825, p. 1.

57

of January 6, a party of policemen met and dispersed a small
group of rebels and the next day the whole structure of the
revolt collapsed and the Hawaiian Jail was filled with persons
suspected of complicity in the uprising.239a military court
was created by President Dole to try the conspirators, the
most important of whom was Liliuokalani. The ex—Queen was

forced to sign a formal abdication, was fined five thousand

C.

dollars and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Howb
ever, in September of 1895 she was released on parole and in
October of 1896 she was given a full pardon.2ulThil act of
magnanimity by Dole and his associates was conclusive evidence
of extreme faith in their Hawaiian Republic.' As a matter of
fact the Republic did experience a period of prosperity and
domestic tranquillity, which as Professor Pratt points out,
was due as much to legislation in United States as to the
existence of a strong government in Hawaii.2u2The Wilson-
Gorman Tariff Act of the United States Congress abolished
the sugar bounty and restored the duty on foreign sugar, which
situation was much desired by Hawaiian sugar planters as the
Reciprocity Treaty of 1837 exempted them from the duty.

Thus, the Cleveland administration drew slowly to a close,
still holding Hawaii at arms lengths, while two thousand miles
out in the Pacific Ocean that small country, with a discretion—

ary clause for annexation in its centralistic Constitution,

waited patiently for the United States to change her mind.

 

239. §,1§. For. Rel., l895, pp. 818-820.
2H0. Ibid., p. S35. "
241. R. Liliuokalani, “Hawaii‘s Story By Hawaii's Queen , p. 303.

242. J. W. Pratt, 'Expansionists of 1898", p. 193.

VI

As a question of foreign policy the prcposed annexation
of Hawaii in 1693 was of far greater importance to American
interests than the much discussed Venezvelen episode of the
Cleveland period. A contemporary historian has summed it up
in the following sentences:

It brought out in sharp relief the conflict between
Cleveland's foreign outlook and the orpansionist tendencies
fostered by Elaine. It furnished the first great debate
in American history over the merits of imperialism. It
illustrated the grosing identity of interests betveen the
United States and Great Britain, and in it can be detected

_ the first token of Anglo-American understanding that was
to become so important after 1893. Finally, it revealed
the force of economic and nationalist impulses that sere
pressing for expansion overseas. :43

An appreciation of the Hawaiian annexation problem during
the Harrison and Cleveland administrations requires an under-
standing of American foreign policy of those years. Cleveland
had a consistent foreign policy from 1885 to 1895 which was
at all times different from the Republican imperialistic
policy as develOped by such Secretaries of State as William
Seward and James G. Blaine. It must be kept in mind that
throughout the two Cleveland administrations American foreign
policy was essentially anti~imperialistic. While certain
groups, as early as the Arthur administration, began to
realize the importance of Hawaii as a naval base for protect-
_ing the Pacific coast and a somewhat distant Isthmian canal,

yet it is significant to note that when Cleveland came into

 

2%}. Allan Nevins, “Grover Cleveland", p. 549.

the Presidency all such proposals quickly ended.

The later overtures for the asfléXitlon of nanaii came "s
a result of economic affiliations between the United States
and the Hawaiian Islands. It has been previously noted that
since 1820 the Americans had dominated both the commercial
and economic activities of the Islands.' Just as the Jesuits
in North America blazed the trails for the French fur traders
so the American missionaries to Hawaii had a large share in
laying the foundations for American agricultural, industrial,
and commercial enterprises. As early as 1820 the missionaries
started to inculcate the American ideals and social customs
among the Hawaiians. The so—called group of “later missionaries"
were far more interested in the material gains-the Islands af-
forded them than they were in the Opportunities for spreading
the Christian faith. The geographical proximity of the Islands
to the Paoific coast of the United States facilitated a pOpU~
lation movement to Hawaii as soon as American interests realized
the economic possibilities of the archipelago.

Having scoured an economic foothold in Hawaii, the Americans
were anxious to reinforce their position by obtaining polit-
ical control. Hawaiian political history after 1670 is large-
ly the portrayal of the 'cutlander' industrialists efforts to
obtain a greater degree of political authority from the native
papulation. The Reciprocity Agreement of 1375 between the

United States and Hawaii provided commercial advantages for a

limited time, and in the meantime American interests had coho

60

to regard the Reciprocity Agreement with Hawaii as setting
up a virtual protectorate. In lean the advantages derived
from reciprocity were renewed for another seven year period.
The ”later missionaries" at that time joined the reform
element in Opposing the corrupt practices of Kalakaua's
administration and in 1837 took an active_part in the Revo-
lution.which resulted in'a Constitution depriving the men—
arch of many of the royal prerogatives and in guaranteeing
the domination of Hawaiian politics by the propertied whites.

The Americans likewise controlled the Revolution of
1893 which completely overturned Queen Liliuokalani's govern-
ment and broughtabout a sentiment favorable to annexation to
the United States. It was the American sinister, John L.
Stevens, who had helped to direct the course of the revolt,
and who had prematurely prepared the American State Depart-
ment for the probable consequences. Americans were very
prominent both in the composition of the potent "Committee
of Thirteen," which acted as a board of strategy during
the revolt, and in the composition of the Provisional Govern-
ment which took charge of governmental activities after the
conflict. Again, the'Committee of Five,” which was sent to
the United States to arrange the details of annexation, was
also definitely Aeerican.

The Republican foreign policy of the Harrison adminis-
tration pointed toward annexation and was therefore willing

to take advantage of any change effected by the Revolution

61

of 1893 which might lead to the incorporation of the Hawaiian
Islands as territory of the United States. The acquisition of
Hawaii fitted perfectly into the eXpansionist plans formulated
by Elaine. Although Foster was hostile to several of the pro-
visions advocated by the Hawaiian Commissioners, yet in general
they found him willing to oOOperate in hurrying through the
Treaty of Annexation. Haste was necessary if the Republicans
were to receive credit for the achievement, as the second term
of Cleveland's administration was to begin on March H, 1893,
only thirty-one days after the arrival of the Hawaiian Commis-
sioners in Washington. Foster, who had drafted the Treaty,

and Harrison both urged immediate and favorable action by the
Senate. The Senators who Opposed annexation declared that
Stevens had participated too actively in working for the over-
throw of the Queen, and in addition asserted that the Provision-
al Government represented the foreign rather than the native
group.

The Cleveland government was quick in reversing the Hawai-
ian policy of the Republicans. The celerity with which Presi-
dent Cleveland acted was indicated by the withdrawal of the
Annexation Treaty from the Senate within five days after his
inauguration and by the dispatching, two days later, of the
Blount Commission to determine the facts of the case. The
new Hawaiian policy as develOped by Cleveland and Gresham was
good theoretically but from the standpoint of practicality

it was vulnerable. The policy was not well conceived beyond

62

the point that amends should be made to the Queen who had
been a victim of American duplicity. The Democrats failed
to realize that only by resorting to drastic changes could
their reactionary program be achieved. The Democratic pro-
gram unforunately eliminated the Hawaiians from a voice in
the proceedings and while the Cleveland administration was
motivated by the highest of ideals yet it was near—sighted
in the application of its principles.

The Provisional Government of Hawaii, nevertheless,
should be given credit for having been able to control the
'situation during the critical period when the Democratic
plan for restitution of Royal Government was being contem-
plated. President Dole acted with firmness and dispatch
in Opposing Cleveland's plan. The real test of the Provi-
sional Government, however, came during and after the Rebel-
lion of 1895 at which time the Royal conspiracy was easily
suppressed and the prisoners treated with magnanimity. This
was particularly true in the case of Liliuokalani who was
given partial freedom less than a year after the Rebellion
and complete personal freedom less than two years after the
insurrection.

In this instance as on other historical occasions
the influence of dominant personalities played a large part
in determining the course of events-relative to their success
or failure. The question of Hawaiian annexation during Harri-
son's and Cleveland's administrations is replete with striking

personalities. James G. Elaine commanded attention with his

53

'American Plan” which demanded expansion beyond the confines

of the borders of the United States. Elaine's enthusiasm and
principles were avidly accepted by his business partner, John L.
Stevens, who engineered the annexation proceedings from Honolulu
by keeping the State Department of the United States informed of
the develOpments and by planting seeds of annexation among the
"economic barons“ in the Hawaiian Islands as well as taking an
active part in directing the course of the Revolution of 1893.
The most colorful figure of all, however, was not an American
but the much maligned Queen of the Hawaiians, Liliuokalani.

Her principles were even more reactionary than those of her
predecessor, Kalakaua, and her policies received far more
criticism. Liliuokalani was a veritable storm center during
the latter part of her brief reign. The Revolution of 1893

was a direct outgrowth of the Queen's political inefficiency.
Her attempts to rehabilitate the Constitution of 1864 was a
serious affront to the “later missionaries” and, if overlooked,
would virtually have constituted an admission of defeat for

the latter. While the Queen was personally at fault up to

the time of her attempted promulgation of the new Constitution,
yet after that incident she became the victim of circumstances
which were beyond her control. There was no question about

the bloodthirsty nature of the Queen and even when Cleveland
offered to restore the throne to her, she demanded that her
enemies be beheaded and their property confiscated. The out-

standing personalities in the Democratic administration, in

64

so far as the Hawaiian question was concerned, were Cleveland
and Gresham. Cleveland's moral rectitude and Gresham's chivalry
were the impelling forces which motivated the unwise and even- .
tually stalemated the Democratic policy. Blount might be com-
pared to Stevens in that he was the agent of Cleveland while
Stevens was the tool of Blaine. Here the analogy ends for
Blount cOnducted himself remarkably well while Stevens' conduct
was definitely not above reproach. '

Public Opinion played an important part in the annexation
question. In Hawaii it was generally recognized that the eco-
nomic interests of the United States and Hawaii were so inti-
mately associated that annexation was the desired end although
some demurred because of the problem of labor importation
which would come into conflict with the immigration laws of
the United States. In the United States the question was
generally accorded a partisan reception until Cleveland made
known his plan to eject the Dole Government and restore Liliu—
okalani to her throne. Immediately a storm of Opposition, un-
restrained by party alignments broke over Cleveland's head.
This vociferous disapproval both from the press and political
leaders continued up to the time that the Hawaiian conditions
necessitated the abolition of the policy Of restitution.

In the final analysis, the outstanding feature Of Cleve-
land‘s Hawaiian policy was his ability to maintain high ethical
standards of conducting foreign relations in the face of

admittedly strong Opposition. He raised the level of American

foreign policy to a high moral place by insisting that the
smaller nations which were being universally trampled upon
be accorded an Opportunity to decide for themselves on the
basis of self-determinism the continuance of their national
well-being, and thereby avert the intrigues of designing
politicians as well as the selfishly imposed programs of
alien groups.

If the Spanish-American crisis had not arisen in 1897,
it is likely that Cleveland's Hawaiian policy would have
been accepted as the continuous policy of the American State
Department for some years to come and the possibility of
Hawaiian annexation at least dismissed as a matter of small

importance.

APPfiaDIX A
Treaty of Reciprocity, 15751

The United States of America and His hajesty the King
of the Hawaiian Islands, equally animated by the desire to
strengthen and perpetuate the friendly relations which have
heretofore uniformly existed between them, and to consolidate
their commercial intercourse, have resolved to enter into a
Convention for Commercial Reciprocity. For this purpose, the
President of the United States has conferred full powers on
Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, and His iajesty the King
of the Hawaiian Islands has conferred like powers on Honor-
able Elisha H. Allen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
Chancellor of the Kingdom, Eemher of the Privy Council of
State, His majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and minister Plenips-
tentiary to the United States of America, and Honorable Henry
A. P. Carter, member of the Privy Council of State, His haj-
esty's Special Commissioner to the United States of America.

And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged
their full powers, which were found to be in due form,.have
agreed to the following articles.

Article I.

For and in consideration of the rights and privile es
granted by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands in
the next succeeding article of this convention and as an
equivalent therefor, the United States hereby agree to admit
all the articles named in the following schedule, the same
being the growth and manufacture or produce of the Hawaiian
Islands, into all the ports of the United States free of
duty.

Schedule.

Arrow-root; castor oil; bananas, nuts, vegetables,
dried, and undried, preserved and unpreserved; hides and
skins undressed; rice; pulu; seeds, plants, shrubs or
trees; muscovado, brown, and all other-unrefined sugar,
meaning hereby the grades of sugar heretofore commonly
imported fron the Hawaiian Islands and now known in the
markets of San Francisco and Portland as “Sandeich Island
sugarg” syrups cf sugarécane, meledc, and molasses; taller.

Article II.

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America in the preceding
article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor,

 

l. Halloy, “Treaties, Conventions, etc., Vol. I, p. 915—17.

His Maiesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands hereby agrees

to adm t all the articles named in the following schedule the
the same being the growth, manufacture or produce of the United
States of America, into all the ports of the Hawaiian Islands,
free of duty.

Schedule.

Agricultural implements; animals; beef, bacon, pork, ham
and all fresh, smoked or preserved meats; boots and shoes;
grain, flour, meal, and bran, bread and breadstuffs, of all
kinds; bricks, lime and cement; butter, cheese, lard, taller,
bullion; coal, cordage, naval stores including tar, pitch,
resin, turpentine raw and rectified; cepper and composition
sheathing; nails and bolts; cotton and manufactures of cotton
bleached, and unbleached, and whether or not colored, stained,
painted or printed; eggs; fish and oysters, and all other
creatures living in the water, and the products thereof; fruits,
nuts, and vegetables, green, dried, or undried, preserved or
unpreserved; hardware; hides, furs, skins and pelts, dressed or
undressed; hoop iron, and rivets, nails, epikes and bolts, tacks,
brads or sprigs; ice; iron and steel and manufactures thereof;,
leather; lumber and imber of all kinds, round, hewed, saved,
and unmanufactured in whole or in part; doors, sashes and blinds;
machinery of all kinds, engines and parts thereof; oats and hay
paper, stationery and hooks, and all manufactures of paper or 0
paper and wood; petroleum and all oils for lubricating or illumi-
nating purposes; plants, shrubs, trees and seeds; rice; sugar,
refined or unrefined; salt; soap; shocks, staves and headings;
wool and manufactures of wool, other than ready-made clothing;
wagons and carts for the purposes of agriculture or of drayage;
wood and manufactures of wood, or of wood and metal except furni-
ture either upholstered or carved and carriages; textile manna
factures, made of a combination'of wool; cotton, silk or linen,
or of any two or more of them other than when ready-made clothing;
harness and all manufactures of leather; starch; and tobacco,
whether in leaf or manufactured.

Article III.

The evidence that articles proposed to be admitted into the
ports of the United States of America or the ports of the Hawai-
ian Islands, free of duty, under the first and second articles of
this convention are the growth manufacture or produce of the
United States 0 America or of he Hawaiian Islands respectively,
shall be established under such rules and regulations and condi-
tions for the protection of the revenue as the two Governments
may from time to time respectively prescribe. -

Article IV.

No eXport duty or charges shall be imposed in the Hawaiian
Islands or in the United States, upon any of the articles pro—

posed to be admitted into the ports of the United States or
the ports of the iawaiian Islands free of duty, under the
first and second articles of this convention. It is agreed,
on the part of His Hawaiian majesty, the , so long as this
treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or otherwise
dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor, or other
territory in his dominions, or grant any Special privilege or
rights of use therein, to any other power state or government,
nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the
same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free
of duty, hereby secured to the United States.

Article V.

The present convention shall take effect as soon as it
shall have been approved and proclaimed by his Majesty the
King of the Hawaiian Islands, and shall have been ratified
and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United
States, but not until a law to carry it into Operation shall
have been passed by the Congress of the United States of Amer-
ica. Such assent having been given and the ratifications of
the convention having been exchanged as provided in article
VI, the convention shall remain in force for seven years,
from the date at which it may come into Operation; and further,
until the eXpiration of twelve months after either of the high
contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish
to terminate the same; each of the high contracting parties
being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end
of the said term of seven years, or at any time thereafter.

Article VI.

The present convention shall be duly ratified, and the
ratifications exchanged at Washington city, within eighteen
months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the
high contracting parties have signed this present convention,
an have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done in duplicate at Washington, the thirtieth day of
January, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred
and seventycfive.

Hamilton Fish.
Elisha H. Allen.
Henry A. P. Carter.

APPEIEDIX B

Rationality and Value of Sugar Plantations
in Hawaii in 18901

 

 

 

Nationality : Ealuation ; Percentane
Americans 3 24,735,610 74.17
British 6,038,130 18.11
Germans 2,008,600 6.02
Hawaiians 266,250 .80
Other Nation-

alities _______§99,100 .90
Totals 3 33.3u7,690 100.

 

1. U. S. For. Eel., 189%, App. II, p. 259.

APPEEDIX 0

Imports and Exports By Countries1

“ z ' x

I
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Imports into ; _leeu : .1536 as 1§99

Hawaii . _
United States $2,835,127 . $3,724,006 e3,e4h,661 $5,264,692
Great Britain 715,532 55,711 652,171 1,20%,022
Germany 197,531 1u4,207 189,929 147, as
Australasia 29,375 29,352 110,92u 1h2,49¢
China a Japan 178,162 257,913 119,616 ' 313,607
France 21,121 11.n95 10,292 7,803
All other '

Countries ..-.- ...--- ..--.. ..----
Exports from . .

Hawaii
United States ---.- 10,412,827 --—--.. 13,073,h77
Great Britain W I """' ”...-"I- W
Australasia ...-..- 3,322 ...-... 13,110
China & Japan ---~- 3,195 ~---- 12,536
Islands in

Pacific -a-.- ~-----— ---- 30,769
All other -

Placea ”anoint-D. m... ...}.M ' -—-.a..—d.——L-

Total £6,18h,921 ?;Q.5651836 2311.702.599 .1213.:t§ta29_

 

.

 

1. Revised from U. S. For. Hel., 189%, App. II, p. 264.

186g. 536 11533. __
Sugar ------ --~#é- 8 9,775,132 $10,816,333 112,159,255
Molasses ~~--~ ~ ~--- 16,502 5,900 7,603
Rico ........ -_---- 386.629 577.583 5?+5.2-’='ro
Coffee ---~- -—-- 1,067 1,696 14,737
Hides --..-.~ g---- 111,911 85,853 70,949
Tallow ---~ ---« 1,011 7,507 1,1t0
Goatekine ---~- ---- 12,64fl 8,587 3,182
Wool --.-~ .--- 37,700 41,054 33,393
FunguS‘ --—-~ --é- --—-~-~ ----- --—-—-
Bananas ...Q... .1...;. #3,824 69,249 176,351
All I
Others ---- ---- _1?f'*9" ...... ......
Total '06,135,437 97,927,90901ogs6etse6 911,639,n65 313,623,3eu

Value of Exported Articles1

APPEKDIX D

O
O .

 

 

 

 

 

1. Son. Ex. Doo., 2nd Seae., 52nd Cong., V01. 8, p. 67.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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APPERDIK F

Dole to Stevens1

Government Building

Honolulu, January 17, 1393

His Excellency John L. Stevens
United States minister Resident:

Sir: I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communi-
cation of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian provisional
governhent, and eXpreee deep appreciation of the same.

fie have conferred with the ministers of the late govern-
ment and.have made demand upon the Harshall to surrender the
station house. We are not actually‘yet71n possession of the
station house, but as night is aeproaohing and our forces may
be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate
support of the United States forces, and would request that
the commander of the United States forces take command of our
military forces so that they may act together for the protec.
tion of the city.

Respectfully, etc..
Sanford B. Dole

Chairman executive Council

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication: “The

above request not complied with"-—Stevene.)

——

1. 11. s, For. Rel., 1894, App. 11, p. 592.

Aesegoxx cl

We the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu,
respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events
in this kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of
Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is
menaced, and lives and property are in peril and we appeal to
you and the United States forces at your command for assis-
tance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied
by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom
she was acting, attenpted to proclain a new constitution, and,
while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object,
declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action were upon an occasion and Lnder
circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and
therefore pray for the protection of the United States

forces.

 

l. Appletons' Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important
Events of the Year 1893, New Series, Vol. XVIII, p. 377.

APPENDIX H

Blount‘e Instructions1

Department of State

flashington, harsh 11, 1593

Hon. James H. Blount, etc:

Sir: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by
the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection
of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration
of the president, and in order to obtain trustworthy informa—
tion on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other
duties herein specified, he has decided to despatch you to the
Ha aiinn Islands as his special coamissioner, in which capac-
ity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter,
whereby the president accredits you to the president of the
Executive and Advisory Councils of the hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character -
of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details
of its execution being necessarily left, in a great measure,
to your good Judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the president
all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs
in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which
the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the

peeple toward.existing authority, and, in general, all that

v.._.

1. U. S. For. Eel., 1894, App. II, p. 567.

can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of
your mission.

To enable you to fulfil this charge, your authority in
all matters touching the relations of this Government to the
existing or other Covernment of the Islands, and the protection
of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting
in cOOperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested
full discretion and power to determine when such forces should

he landed or withdrawn.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIEARY SOURCES

Official
Congressional,fiegorg

 

52nd. Cong., 2nd. Sess., Part 2, Vol. 24.

53rd. Cong., 2nd. 8e86,, Part 1, Vol. 26.
House Executiyg Documents

53rd. Cong., 2nd. Sess., Vol. 27, No. 47,

Malloy, W. M., (Comp.),
"United States Treaties, Conventions inter—
national Acts, Protocols and Agreements
Between the United States of America and
Other Powers,” Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1910.

Richardson, J. D., (Ed.),
”A Compilation of the Hoseages and Papers of the
Presidents,” 10 Vols., Nashington, Government

Printing Office, 1899.

Senate Executive Docusent ,

52nd. Cong., 2nd. Sess., Vol. 8, No. 76.
Senate igurrgil

52nd. Cong., 2nd. Sess., Vol. 1.
Senate Reports

53rd. Cong., 2nd. 8688., V01. 2, No. 227.
United_§tates Foreign Relations. l§flfl, £22,.Ll.

United States Forei;n Relations, 1895. Vol. 2, Part 2.

 

 

 

Unoifioiai

Applgtcn's Annual_Cyciopedia and Register 9; imperiani
Men 211.311 21111.3“ 1
New Series, Vol. 18. New York, Appleton and 00.,
189M.

 

 

Foster, J. W.,

“Hawaiian Annexation, An Address Delivered before
the National GeOgraphic Society at flashington."
Washington, Gibson Bros., 1897. ‘ I

Liliuokalani, R., \

IHawaii's Story By Hawaii's Queen.” Boston, Lee

and Shepard, 1899.
Nevins, Allen,
”Letters of Grover Cleveland." New York, Houghton,
Mifflin 00., 1933.
Rebgiiiog 91, 1835,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Star, 1895.
Thurston, Lorrin A..

"Handbook on Annexation of Hawaii.“ St. Joseph,

hich., A. B. Morse 00., 1897.

sscosnsa SOURCES

M

Bancroft, Frederic, ‘, FLife of William H. Seward", 2 Vols.,
New York, Harper & Brothers, 1900.

Bemis, S. F., (8d,), "American Secretaries of State and
Their Diplomacy“, 10 Vols., New York,

Bemis, S. F., "Diplomatic History of the United
States.” New York, H. Holt & 00.,
1936.

Blackman, W. F., "Making of Hawaii”, New York, Macmillan,
1899.

Boutsell, G. 8., 'Fasaiian Annexation.“ Boston, Farrell,

- 1898. ‘
Brain, Belle M., a “The Transformation of Hawaii: How

American Missionaries Gave a Christian
Ration to the World.” New York, F. H.
Revell 00., 1898.

Dulles, Foster Rhea, ’ "America in the Pacific: A Century of
Expansion.“ Boston, Houghtou, hifflin
00., 1932.

Du Puy, w. A., ” "Hawaii and Its Race Problem.I Wash—
ington, Government Printing Office,

1932.

Foster, J. s., ”American Diplomacy in the Orient ' New
York, Houghton, Miffltn 00., 1926,

011113, J. A., “The Hawaiian Incident: An Examination
of Mr. Cleveland's Attitude Toward the
Revolution." Boston, Lee a Shepard,

. 1897- _
Hacker, L, M., and Kendrick6 B; B., “The United States Since
L 5.

18 New York, F. S. Crofts & 00.,
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Holt, f. S., ‘ "Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A

Study of the Struggle Between the
President and Senate over the Conduct
of Foreign Relations.” Baltimore, John
Hepkins Press, 1933.

Hobbs, Jean, 'Hawaii-A Pageant of the 8011.“ Stanford
1 University Press, Stanford University,

1935.

Johnson A., and Malone, 0., (Ed.), ”Dictionary of American
Biography,I Vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
Vol. 5. pp. 353-359.
Vol. 8 pp. 331—335.
Vol. 1 , pp. 618-619.
NegeYork, Charles Scribner's Sons,
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Kuykendall, H. 3., "A History of Hawaii.“ New York,
Macmillan 00., 1926.

Latane, J. H., "A History of American Foreign
Policy." New York, Doubleday, Doran
& 00., 1927.

Mead, N. P., “The Deve10pment of the United States
Since 1865.” New York, Harcourt,
Brace & 00., 1930.

kocre, J. B., (Ed.), “A Digest of International Law,"
.8 Vols. Washington, Government
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uuzzey, D. 8., ”James 0. Elaine: A Political Idol
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Nevins, Allan, "Grover Cleveland: A Study in
Courage.‘ New York, Dodd, head a
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Pratt, Julius s., 'Expansionists of 1898: The Acqui-

sition of Hawaii and the Spanish
Islands." Baltimore, John Hapkins

Rhodes, James F., “History of the United States From
Hayes to lickinley.‘l New York, Mac-
m1llan 000. 1910.

Whitney, Caspar, “Hawaiian America: Something of Its
History Resources and Prospects."
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PERIODICALS

American Catholic Quarterly Review Vol. 19 p. 150,
Hawaii and Its Missionaries,'
Bryan J. Clinche.

American igurna; g§_£olitics, V01. N, pp. N77~h89, “The
Hawaiian Controversy in the Light

of History,” Charles Robinson.
V01. N, pp. 161-166, I"I'he United
States and Hawaii, ”J. A. Donaldson.

Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 66, pp. el6-82u, ”The United
States Looking Outward, ' A. T. Hahan.
Vol 101, pp. 334-344, “Sugar: A
Lesson on Receprocity and the Tariff, "
F. N. Taussig.

Cosmogolitan, Vol. 15, pp. 159-172, "Rise and
Decline of the Hawaiian Monarchy,"
H. H. Gowen.

orum V01. 15, pp. 1-14 ”Hawaii and Our

Future Sea Power, A. T. Hahan.
V01. 15, pp. 389-406, "Grave
Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation,”
T. M. Cooley.

V01. 29, pp. 555-565, ”Hawaii's
Real Story,“ F. L. Clark.

Harperé H'. 2 me V01. 87, pp. 37-746, “Manifest
Destiny," 0m Sohurz.
zngqpegdggj, V01. 42, {Editorial
Vol. 0 , Editorial
N o , Vol. 56, Editorials
, . V01. 57’ Editorials
Vol. 58, Editorials

V01. 59, Editorials)
Nineteenth Century, V01. 33in pp. 830-835, “The Hawaiian
. . on

Revolut ,' Theo H. Davies.

North American Review, Vol. 156, pp. 26Fp281, "The Advan-
tage of Annexation" . A. Thurston.
Vol. 156, pp. 9586, 'Is It
Constitutional, 2" G. T. Curtis. .
Vol. 157, pp. 731-735, “The Invasion
of Hawaii, ‘ E. T. Chamberlain.
V01. 157,p pp. 736-745, "A Plea For
Annexation, John L. Stevens.
V01. 157, pp. 745-752, "Our Present
Duty,“ w. M. Springer.

Overland Monthly. Vol 25 p. 651,'Ka1akaua's Trip
' Around the Horld,‘ N. N. Armstrong.

Public Opinign,

3911213va W o.

m JILL—R 9‘70

1'377133‘ AP 319.33

 

Londgnlflggg,

V01. 15, pp. 145-lfl6, "United States
and Hawaii."

V01 lb, pp. 284, 306-307, “Cleveland's
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and Policy For Hawaii, T. S. Wooleey.

V01. 7, pp. 262-263, (Editorial).

February 4, 1893, p. 139.

 

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIB

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