

THE QUESTION OF THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII
DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF HARRISON AND CLEVELAND,
1889-1897

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I

It is probable that the islands in the North Pacific were the last habitable parts of the world to be occupied by the human race.¹ In view of the extreme distance from other islands as well as the mainlands it is remarkable that the Hawaiian Islands were found at all by the aborigines with their open canoes.

It was not until the middle of January of 1778 that they were accidentally discovered by Captain James Cook sailing in the service of the King of England.² In 1768, fifteen years after he had entered the British navy as a common sailor, he was assigned the command of an astronomical expedition to the South Pacific which caused him to spend the following ten years exploring the Pacific Ocean and adding to his reputation as a navigator.³

Cook's instructions for his third voyage directed him to sail from the Society Islands to the coast of North America at approximately the forty-fifth degree north latitude from which point he was to skirt the coast northward in search of the elusive Straits of Anian.⁴ Early in December of 1777, Captain Cook sailed northward in his ships, the "Discovery" and the "Resolution". At daybreak on January 18, 1778 the Island of Oahu was sighted and on the next day as the ships approached

1. R. S. Kuykendall, "History of Hawaii", p. 17.

2. Ibid., p. 54.

3. Ibid., p. 53.

4. Ibid., p. 54.

the Island of Kauai, a number of natives in canoes came out to meet them.

The natives were particularly interested in Captain Cook and his ships because of an old tradition which foretold the coming of a strange phenomenon.⁵ The tall masts of Captain Cook's vessels suggested the appearance of trees on a floating island. The sailors also drew their full share of attention inasmuch as they were regarded as being the divine attendants of the great Lono.⁶

After a hasty inspection, Captain Cook located the islands on his chart and continued the journey northward. On his return in November of 1778 Cook discovered the three larger islands to the south where the news of his approach had preceded his vessels and where he was accorded a royal welcome.⁷

Nearly two months were spent by Cook and his men in exploration during which time the high esteem in which the foreigners had first been held lessened considerably. There were several reasons for this change in attitude, namely: first, there was a growing feeling of doubt concerning Cook's godlike character which came as a result of the depredations committed by his men and his inability to restrain them and secondly the grasping demands of the crew for provisions were a serious drain upon

5. B. M. Brain, "Transformation of Hawaii", p. 28.

The tradition related that the great God, Lono, having killed his wife in a sudden fit of anger, grieved for her so intensely that he lost his reason and wandered about from island to island, finally sailed away in a curious triangular canoe promising to return at some future time on "a island bearing cocoanut trees, swine and dogs." Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 30.

the scanty resources of the Islanders and as a result there were fears of a famine.

Serious friction was avoided through the diplomacy of Captain Cook and King Kalaniopuu until the departure of the English on February 4, 1779. When the ships returned a week later for repairs, relations became very strained when the natives stole and dismantled a small boat for the nails and metals it contained. In the ensuing melee Captain Cook was killed before a reconciliation could be effected.⁸

Thus the first contact of the Hawaiians with the outside world, though accompanied with considerable unpleasantness, did establish the fact that each country had something of interest for the other. In Captain Cook's log-book under the date of February 1778 is a notation concerning the excellent quality and quantity of the native products.⁹ Very early the natives evinced a strong desire for English products, chiefly metal.

The Hawaiian Islands soon became an important intermediate point in the lucrative fur trade developed by Cook between China and the western coast of America. An Englishman who visited the Islands in 1792, wrote as follows: "What a happy discovery these Islands were! What would the American fur trade be without these to winter at and get every refreshment? A vessel going on that trade will need only sufficient provisions to carry him to these Islands, where there is plenty of pork and salt to cure it and yams as a substitute for bread."¹⁰

8. Ibid., p. 32.

9. Jean Hobbs, "Hawaii--A Pageant of the Soil", p. 2.

10. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 70-71.

Captain George Vancouver came to dominate the English activities on the Hawaiian Islands during the last decade of the eighteenth century. His judicious, far-sighted administration did much to retain England's preëminence in the Far East, and the treatment he accorded the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands was particularly acceptable. Vancouver had three objectives, namely: (1) the introduction of cattle which he had brought from California; (2) the establishment of permanent peace between the peoples of different islands of the group; (3) the punishment of those who had mistreated English citizens who had come to the Island to trade.¹¹

Not all of the British officials showed as much wisdom as Vancouver had in dealing with the Hawaiian Islands. The Islanders fared rather badly as a result of the aggressive type of diplomacy practiced in the second quarter of the nineteenth century by English officials. The British demands became so insistent and their attitude so peremptory, as exemplified by English consular and naval authorities stationed in the Hawaiian Islands, that King Kamehameha III to avoid further harassment temporarily ceded the Islands to Captain Lord George Paulet, a representative of the British crown, on February 17, 1843.¹²

The vindication of Hawaii's position and the admission that England had been in the wrong was established with the restoration of the Kingdom on July 31, and the statement of

11. Ibid., p. 78.

12. Ibid., p. 158.

Lord Aberdeen on April 1, 1843 that the British government was willing to recognize the independence of the Hawaiian Islands.¹³

England was not the only European country which had designs on the Hawaiian Islands. France, too, had become interested in the Islands but not so much from an economic viewpoint as from a religious one.¹⁴ England by her priority and the United States through her economic and missionary aggressiveness had carved spheres of influence for themselves which tended to exclude other nations. France's remedy for this situation was the introduction of a rival religion into the Islands.¹⁵

The struggle of the French to plant Roman Catholicism in the Islands was marked by a chain of serious obstacles. Two priests and four laymen laden with a shipload of images, crucifixes and other necessary ornament for church services, arrived at Honolulu July 7, 1827.¹⁶ Having landed without obtaining a permit from the Hawaiian government, the missionaries were politely but firmly informed that one religion was sufficient in so small a country.¹⁷ Through the natural curiosity of the natives and the presence of a few Roman Catholic foreigners the Catholic activities increased to such an extent that by the end of 1829 seventy adults and twenty-nine children had been baptized.¹⁸

13. Ibid., p. 160.

14. Ibid., p. 152.

15. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 10.

16. B. M. Brain, "Transformation of Hawaii", p. 105.

17. Ibid.

18. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 145.

These French advances of the Catholic faith were made in the face of Protestant opposition and governmental persecution. The Hawaiian government objected so strenuously to the presence of the Catholics that in December of 1831 all the Catholics with the exception of one lay brother were forcibly deported.¹⁹ In 1835 and again in 1837 the French were unsuccessful in their efforts to inflict an alien faith on an obdurate government even though French warships were present at the time in Honolulu Bay.²⁰

The climax of the French protestation came with the visit in 1839 of the French frigate, "Artemise" under the command of Captain Laplace and the series of extraordinary demands which were incorporated into an unusual treaty, the provisions of which were as follows: (1) that the Catholic worship be declared free in the Hawaiian Islands; (2) that land be given for a Catholic church at Honolulu to be served by French priests; (3) that the persecution of native Catholics cease; (4) that twenty thousand dollars be deposited with Captain Laplace as a guarantee of future good conduct, to be returned when France became satisfied that the Hawaiian government would observe the treaty; (5) that the money and the treaty, signed by the king, should be taken aboard the "Artemise" by a high chief and the French flag saluted with twenty-one guns.²¹ Captain Laplace added that unless these conditions were complied within a period of five days he would bombard the city.²²

19. Ibid., p. 146.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 153.

22. B. M. Brain, op. cit., p. 109.

The distraught king had no alternative but to sign the treaty. However, the intrepid Captain of the "Artemise" extracted two more provisions from the king which were particularly objectionable from the Hawaiian standpoint, namely: extraterritoriality and a more favorable tariff revision.²³

Although a minor skirmish between French naval officers and Hawaiian authorities in 1842 threatened to snap the already strained relations between the two countries, the French recognition of Hawaiian Independence in 1843 and the restitution in 1846, of the unopened packages of twenty thousand dollars, which had been commandeered by Captain Laplace in 1839, combined to prevent further disruption of friendly relationship and to permit the practice of the Catholic faith in the Islands.²⁴

If the English sowed the seeds of barter in the Hawaiian Islands then certainly the United States reaped the benefits of the trade. Eleven years after Cook's momentous discovery four American ships visited the Islands thereby beginning an American trading era in the Orient which has never been relinquished.²⁵

Up to 1800 the trans-oceanic fur trade with Hawaii as a connecting link held the attention of all progressive American seamen.²⁶ After that period the sandalwood commerce plying between Hawaii and the Orient was found to be more profitable. The value of sandalwood, a native Hawaiian tree, was accidentally

23. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II. p. 38.

24. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 163.

25. Ibid., p. 72.

26. Ibid., p. 91.

discovered after it had been taken as firewood and ballast on ships destined for China where the fragrant wood was in great demand as a aid in the manufacture of incense for the temples.²⁷

After the wasteful depletion of the great sandalwood forests, the whaling industry became increasingly important. In the spring of 1826, one hundred and seven whaling ships, the majority of which were American, visited Honolulu harbor.²⁸ The period between 1840 and 1860 marked the height of the whaling activity in the North Pacific Ocean inasmuch as four thousand four hundred and twenty American whalers touched at the various ports of the Islands between 1850-1860.²⁹

Regardless of the presence of large number of Americans in the Islands due to their participation in the sandalwood trade and whaling activities, the relationship between the Americans and the Hawaiians was relatively free from the hostility which so characterized the European contacts with native groups.

The treaties both proposed and ratified reflected the friendly attitude thus engendered between the United States and Hawaii. The first of these treaties negotiated by Hawaii with the United States was the one signed on December 23, 1826 by Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, acting as the representative of the United States, but which the United States Senate failed to ratify. It provided for "perpetual peace and friendship" and for the protection of American commerce in the Islands.³⁰

27. Jean Hobbs, op. cit., p. 23.

28. Ibid., p. 24-25.

29. W. F. Blackman, "Making of Hawaii", p. 188.

30. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 35.

The proposed arrangement continued to be respected by the
Hawaiians for many years.³¹

During the trying period of European intervention in the 'forties, the Hawaiian king invoked the aid and good offices of the United States in his efforts to repel English and French aggrandizement.³² Daniel Webster, American Secretary of State, in his letter of March 15, 1843 to the American consul at Hawaii summarized the attitude of the United States when he stated:

It is obvious from circumstances connected with their (Hawaii's) position that the interest of the United States require that no other power should possess or colonize the Sandwich Islands or exercise over their government an influence which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in matters of navigation or trade.³³

A most significant factor in the development of American influence in Hawaii was the organization of the Sandwich Island³⁴ Mission Board in Boston on October 15, 1819 and the subsequent dispatchment of American missionaries to Hawaii.³⁵ On April 4, 1820 seven American men, accompanied by their wives, set foot on Hawaiian soil for the express purpose of extending Christianity.³⁶ Between 1820 and 1850 eighty-four missionaries arrived in sixteen different ships in Hawaii.³⁷

The scope of their activity was amazing inasmuch as almost immediately on their arrival they established schools.³⁸ In

31. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 126.

32. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 10.

33. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 64.

34. Although Captain Cook named the Islands, "Sandwich Islands" in honor of his patron the Earl of Sandwich, the native term, "Hawaiian Islands" gradually supplanted the English appellation.

35. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 745.

36. Jean Hobbs, "Hawaii--A Pageant of the Soil", pp. 143-144.

37. Ibid., pp. 143-157.

38. Ibid., p. 32.

the year of 1833, 166,040 books and pamphlets for school use came from the simple, ill-equipped mission print shop.³⁹ A special school for young chiefs was established in 1839 in which four boys and one girl who later became ruler of the kingdom were students in these early years.⁴⁰

The missionaries proved helpful in solving difficulties arising from the differences between the traders and the Hawaiians.⁴¹ Because of their superior training they were often chosen as special advisers to the rulers and petty chieftans. In 1838 one of them was officially appointed as a government interpreter and as an instructor in "political science."⁴² As a further evidence of missionary activity, more than four hundred land transactions were entered into by missionaries previous to 1900.⁴³

These early missionaries who came to the Islands prior to 1850 were seemingly actuated by an honest desire to bring a practical Christianity to the natives which stood in marked contrast later to the activities of the sons of these missionaries and those missionaries arriving during the last half of the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ The later group while retaining the title of missionary, conducted themselves in a very unethical manner and far from that befitting the term missionary. For the sake of convenience the term "Later missionary element" will hereinafter be applied to that group whose activities will be considered at some length in the development of this study.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 35.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., App. B, pp. 157-177.

44. American Catholic Quarterly Review, Vol. 19, p. 150.

II

The United States was the first nation to honor Hawaii with a diplomatic representative. The actual value of the first two commissioners (1843-1850) was rather questionable and it was their ineffective and disrespectful conduct which led the Hawaiian King, Kamehameha III, to send James J. Jarves to Washington in 1849 to arrange for a more amicable relationship between the two countries.⁴⁵ The fair and reasonable treaty, consisting of seventeen articles, negotiated by John M. Clayton, American Secretary of State and James J. Jarves went into effect in 1850.⁴⁶

The friendly commercial relations between the United States and Hawaii established by the Treaty of 1850, coupled with a period of internal strife in the latter country, led to some agitation for terms of annexation to the United States.⁴⁷ However, Daniel Webster objected effectively in his letter of July 14, 1851 to Luther Severance, the United States commissioner to Hawaii, in which he stated that "although the United States had been first to recognize Hawaii, we had no designs on them" and specifically warned Severance against entertaining any proposal from any quarter for the annexation of the Islands to the United States.⁴⁸

In sharp contrast to Webster's "hands-off" policy stood

45. R. S. Kuykendall, "A History of Hawaii", p. 177.

46. Malloy, "U. S. Treaties, Conventions, etc.", Vol. p. 908 f.

47. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 186.

48. North American Review, Vol. 157, p. 731.

William S. Seward's frank espousal of territorial expansion. As early as 1846 Seward had declared in a letter that "our population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the north and to encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific."⁴⁹ On July 13, 1867 when he was Secretary of State Seward wrote to the United States Minister McCook, at Hawaii as follows: "You are at liberty to sound the proper authority on the large subject mentioned in your note (annexation) and ascertain probable conditions. You may confidentially receive overtures and communicate the same to me."⁵⁰ In the same year when the proposed reciprocity treaty with Hawaii was under consideration, Seward wrote McCook that if reciprocity and annexation should come into conflict with each other then "annexation is in every case to be preferred."⁵¹

With annexation failing miserably, the Hawaiian planters looked to what seemed to them a more desirable alternative, namely reciprocity. As early as 1855 and again in 1868 proposed reciprocity treaties with Hawaii were voted down in the United States Senate.⁵² These proposals were actively opposed by the Louisiana Senators because of the conflicting sugar interests between the United States and Hawaii. The small vote of twenty ayes and nineteen nays in the Senate was indicative of the slight interest evinced in the question of a more favorable trade situation with Hawaii.⁵³

49. Frederic Bancroft, "Life of Seward", Vol. 2, p. 470.

50. Lorrin A. Thurston, "A Handbook on the Annexation of Hawaii", p. 56.

51. Frederic Bancroft, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 489.

52. W. S. Holt, "Treaties Defeated in the U. S. Senate", p. 104.

53. Ibid., p. 104.

Two factors explain the passage of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, namely: first, the increased commercial activity on the Pacific coast of the United States with Hawaii, and second, the influence of King Kalakaua's presence in the United States which contributed greatly to the drafting of the treaty.⁵⁴

The most significant article of the treaty was article IV which prohibited the Hawaiian King from disposing of any part of his dominions without the consent of the United States.⁵⁵ Other provisions of the treaty included a comprehensive schedule of duty free products from each country and provisions for the approval and ratification of the Treaty.⁵⁶

The effects of the Treaty on economic conditions in the Hawaiian Islands corroborated the wisdom of the Hawaiian ministry in acceding to the apparently unreasonable demands of the United States which seemed to impinge on its sovereignty. The increased economic activity was most noticeable in respect to the sugar industry which was the most important export from the Islands.⁵⁷ Sugar exportation had increased tenfold from 1875 to 1890, the amount exported in the latter year being 130,000 tons.⁵⁸ Most of the irrigation ditches as well as the development of large sugar plantations came after the planters had been assured of reciprocity advantages.⁵⁹ Illustrative of the huge sums of money spent in improving plantations, Claus Spreckels, a pioneer sugar planter, invested a million dollars

54. J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, p. 485.

55. Appendix A.

56. Full provisions may be found in Appendix A.

57. Appendix D.

58. Review of Reviews, Vol. 7, p. 182.

59. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 975.

in developing forty miles of irrigation ditches,⁶⁰ while other American and native planters followed his example to such an extent that Sereno Bishop of Honolulu summed up the situation very well when he stated: "Hawaii has simply become an outlying sugar farm of the United States, very properly enjoying like protection with the Louisiana sugar planters."⁶¹

A supplementary protocol of 1876 limited the Treaty of 1875 to a duration of seven years after which time the Treaty could be terminated by twelve months notice given by either of the contract parties.⁶² Apprehensive lest the Treaty be prematurely terminated thereby losing the economic advantages gained, the Hawaiian planters were anxious to obtain an extension of the agreement.⁶³ As a result of the urgent pleas of the representatives of the Hawaiian planters appearing before the United States Senate committee on Foreign Affairs for the extension of the treaty, ratifications for the Reciprocity Convention, consisting of two articles were exchanged on November 9, 1887.⁶⁴ Article I provided for an extension of time on the Treaty of 1875 for seven years beyond ratification and twelve months notice after that for termination.⁶⁵ Article II was particularly interesting and significant as it was a Senate amendment which was accepted by the Hawaiian government. It read as follows:

His Majesty the king of the Hawaiian Islands grants to the government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the Harbor of Pearl River in the Island of Oahu and

60. Ibid.

61. Review of Reviews, Vol. 7, p. 182.

62. W. M. Malloy, "U. S. Treaties, Conventions, etc.", Vol. 1, p. 918.

63. G. S. Boutwell, "Hawaiian Annexation," p. 10.

64. W. M. Malloy, "U. S. Treaties, Conventions, etc.", Vol. 1, p. 919

65. Ibid.

to establish and maintain there a coaling and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States and to that end the United States may improve the entrance to said harbor and do all other things needful to the purpose aforesaid.⁶⁶

The Hawaiians were so anxious to retain economic concessions from the United States that they were willing to grant the extraordinary amendment of the United States Senate.

Upon publication of the terms of the convention, increased economic activity became apparent in the Islands.⁶⁷ The larger interests felt that now huge sums of money could be safely invested with a reasonable expectation of profitable return. Although the United States was given exclusive rights to Pearl River harbor the naval sanctuary was not developed under the agreement of 1887.⁶⁸

During the period of the reciprocity agreements with the United States there was an increased sentiment toward annexation to the United States. This attitude was largely confined to the business men who were not of native origin and many of whom were the so-called "later missionaries" from the United States.⁶⁹ These early annexationists, indeed, were often actuated by selfish motives. Property surrounding Pearl River was at a premium because it was expected that when the Islands became a possession of the United States, then their property

66. Ibid., pp. 919-920.

67. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 974.

68. R. S. Kuykendall, "A History of Hawaii", p. 259.

69. It should be noted that the dominating position of "Outlanders" was greatly facilitated and perhaps caused by the gradual extinction of the native Hawaiian race. During the first century of contact with the whites, the native population decreased from an 300,000 to a mere 40,000. W. A. Du Puy, "Hawaii and Its Race Problem", p. 11.

within the confines of the harbor, could be disposed of at a fabulous price.⁷⁰ It was generally expected that if annexation were consummated a cable would be laid from the United States to Hawaii, which tangible connection with the United States would, it was hoped, treble the property values in Honolulu.⁷¹

Politically conditions were, moreover, of such a character that the "later missionary" element found themselves contributing to the group which opposed the Hawaiian sovereigns. As early as 1864 King Kamehameha V promulgated a constitution which permitted practical dictatorial powers of which the most notorious was the appointment and dismissal of cabinet members at his pleasure.⁷² King Kalakaua, who was selected as king in 1874, continued this use of the royal prerogative much to the displeasure of the "later missionaries" who believed in a constitutional monarchy similar to that of England.⁷³ Kalakaua was well liked personally and no less a person than Robert Louis Stevenson found his companionship most agreeable.⁷⁴ King Kalakaua resented the missionary influence and broke with it entirely by appointing as head of his cabinet, Mr. Walter M. Gibson, an outcast Mormon who was not above using unscrupulous methods to further his political aspirations.⁷⁵ Although an alien to Hawaii, he carried the favor of the gullible natives by coining the phrase "Hawaii for Hawaiians." Furthermore, "He pandered to every whim of the king, encouraged him to extravagant and useless schemes; hence his power in retaining office."⁷⁶ In 1880 the

70. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 978.

71. Ibid.

72. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 267.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 988.

76. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 983.

king further aggravated the impending rupture by his appointment as Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs an Italian soldier of fortune, Mr. C. C. Moreno, who was particularly obnoxious to the landholders because of his constant participation in open graft and corrupt politics.⁷⁷

The opposition to the king centered in the formation of a secret political organization called the Hawaiian League. The purpose of the association was to bring about a reform in the government by securing a new and more liberal constitution.⁷⁸ Two factions developed within the league: first, a radical group which favored the overthrow of the monarchy, the setting up of a republic and annexation to the United States; second, a conservative group which desired that Hawaii maintain its independence and which favored a continuance of the monarchy under a new constitution with large restrictions on the royal authority.⁷⁹

Affairs were brought to a crisis in June of 1887 through the published reports of scandals in connection with Gibson's granting of opium licenses. Public opinion was greatly wrought up by these reports which led the leaders of the Hawaiian League to conclude that the time for action had arrived.⁸⁰ The resulting bloodless revolution was nothing more than a large mass meeting held on the thirtieth of June which requested the king to dismiss the distasteful officials and to appoint a new cabinet "which shall be committed to the policy of securing a new

77. R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., pp. 268-269.

78. Ibid., p. 270.

79. Ibid., p. 270.

80. Ibid.

constitution" and to promise that in the future he would not interfere in the work of the legislature and the cabinet or in elections.⁸¹

As the king acceded to the demands, the conservative element of the victorious Hawaiian League retained its control and as a consequence there was little agitation for annexation to the United States. In accordance with the King's promise the constitution of 1864 was revised in five important respects, namely: (1) the cabinet ministers could not be dismissed by the king except in compliance with a vote of the legislature; (2) that no official act of the king should be valid unless approved by the cabinet; (3) that the nobles should be elected by voters who had a fairly large amount of property or income; (4) no member of the legislature could be appointed to any other public office; (5) the privilege of voting was extended to resident foreigners of American or European birth or descent if they took an oath to support the constitution.⁸²

In summary between the years 1850-1887 great strides had been taken, first, in bringing about the domination of Hawaiian affairs by a small group of vested property owners and, secondly, in thwarting the prerogatives and powers of the Hawaiian king by the erection of a constitutional monarchy.

81. Ibid., p. 271.

82. Ibid.

III

Encouraged by their success in 1887, the advocates of governmental reform, among whom the "later missionaries" were conspicuous, strove to maintain their superiority over the Hawaiian monarchy. Their political ascendancy was marred chiefly by an abortive, reactionary insurrection on July 30 of 1889 led by R. W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd who were probably secretly supported by Kalakaua.⁸³ Nevertheless, the revolt was easily suppressed on the same day. In the light of future events, a significant feature of the insurrection was that seventy United States sailors were landed with Hawaiian permission to protect life and property at the American legation and in the city.⁸⁴ The military expedition after being favorably received by the Hawaiians, returned on board the U. S. S. "Adams" the following morning.

If Kalakaua was disliked because of his reactionary tendencies, then certainly the "Reformers" found little consolation in his sister Liliuokalani, the heir-apparent, in as much as she was avowedly desirous of restoring the royal prerogatives.⁸⁵ Liliuokalani, like her brother, had many pleasing personal characteristics among which was a decided love and talent for music and

83. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 24. The Reformers also were partially deprived of their powers in 1890 by a union of the native party with the white laborers who were opposed to the coolie labor policy of the planters. L. M. Hacker and B. B. Kendrick, "United States Since 1865," p. 121.

84. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 24.

85. Cosmopolitan, Vol. 15, p. 171.

poetry.⁸⁶ She commanded the respect and admiration of her people to such an extent that many of her high-handed actions were accepted without question. This trait was well illustrated in 1881 when Kalakaua decided to go on a world tour at which time the missionary element desired a council of regency which Liliuokalani was to direct. However, Liliuokalani objected so strenuously to that arrangement that King Kalakaua concurred in her view with the result that she was appointed the sole regent.⁸⁷ While there was no outward conflict between the cabinet and Liliuokalani, nevertheless, the royal officials were quite willing to welcome the king back.⁸⁸ Liliuokalani became regent again during the latter part of 1890 when Kalakaua, in poor health, hastened to the United States to secure redress for the disastrous economic effects of the McKinley Tariff Act which had just been passed.⁸⁹ Liliuokalani became ruler in her own right upon the death of Kalakaua on January 20, 1891. A letter of February 5, 1891, from John L. Stevens, American Minister to Hawaii, to Secretary of State, James G. Blaine revealed that "the sudden and unexpected change of sovereigns has been made without commotion and with no extraordinary excitement."⁹⁰ Fifteen days later, Stevens in another letter to Blaine placed Liliuokalani in an unfavorable light when he stated that she was surrounded by bad advisers

86. R. Liliuokalani, "Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen", pp. 52-53. In later life Liliuokalani composed the music and the words for the widely known "Aloha Oe". R. S. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 275.

87. R. Liliuokalani, op. cit., p. 54. Cf. Caspar Whitney, "Hawaiian America", p. 303.

88. Overland, Vol. 25, p. 651.

89. R. Liliuokalani, op. cit., p. 206.

90. U. S. For. Rel. 1894, App. II, p. 341.

and that the best people on the Island opposed her, and he commented prophetically that if "she should still persist and attempt to form a ministry of her own without the consent of the legislature she would surely imperil her throne."⁹¹

What were the factors which contributed to the pending revolution so accurately prophesied by the United States Minister? Of primary importance were the economic disturbances brought about the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890 by the United States Congress. Previous to the enactment of that measure the Hawaiian sugar planters had enjoyed the same rights as the Louisiana producers in being free from the tariff restrictions of two cents per pound imposed on sugar importers from other foreign countries.⁹² With the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act the reciprocity arrangements of 1887 in regard to sugar were no longer of value to the Hawaiians, in as much as all imported sugar was duty free and the Hawaiians did not enjoy the bounty extended to American growers.⁹³ As Hawaiian economic stability depended on this basic one crop commodity⁹⁴ the resultant economic distress was so noticeably felt that John L. Stevens in a letter of November 20, 1892 to Secretary of State, John W. Foster, estimated that the Hawaiians had lost \$12,000,000 since the passage of the bill.⁹⁵ Although the McKinley Act inflicted hardships on the Hawaiian planters yet it was not ruinous according to Dr. F. W. Taussig who has stated

91. Ibid., pp. 343-344.

92. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 101, p. 335.

93. N. P. Mead, "United States Since 1865", p. 160.

94. Appendix D.

95. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 382.

that "the hard times that ensued meant, to be sure, not that profits had disappeared but that the extravagances of the past were gone. Sugar growing simply got down to hard pan."⁹⁶ Faced with the knowledge that the Queen objected to American economic domination,⁹⁷ the Hawaiian industrialists realized that if Hawaii were to enter into a more intimate economic relationship with the United States then it would have to come through their volition. They were likewise aware of their strength because the great planters had succeeded the missionaries as the real power behind the fragile Hawaiian throne and had made the economic interests the dominant factor back of the Hawaiian government.⁹⁸ Although there were other causes for the Revolution of 1893, yet Dr. Taussig has contended that "none the less it is clear that the root of the movement was in the sugar situation in the wish to get back somehow into the golden relation with the United States Market."⁹⁹

Another outstanding cause of the Revolution of 1893 was the inability of the Queen to reconcile her personal convictions with the Constitution of 1867. The Queen was variously characterized as being "bright but too ambitious,"¹⁰⁰ "a woman of shrewdness and education but of dissolute life and under the influence of medicine men,"¹⁰¹ and "more devoted than her brother to the restoration of monarchy."¹⁰² The Queen had long been urged by the Royalist party, which was composed chiefly of

96. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 101, p. 337.

97. R. S. Kuykendall, "History of Hawaii", p. 259. Note photograph of the two pages of Liliuokalani's diary.

98. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 101, p. 337.

99. Ibid., p. 338. Cf. Nation, Vol. 56, p. 206.

100. Rebellion of 1895, preface.

101. Appletons Cyclopedia, p. 375.

102. Ibid.

natives, to rid the government of the dominant "later missionary" element which had been firmly entrenched by the Constitution of 1887, even though it would be a flagrant violation of that Constitution.¹⁰³ The missionary party was strong enough to overturn in succession various cabinets appointed by the Queen.¹⁰⁴ In spite of the fact that the natives formed a strong majority of the population.¹⁰⁵ In the latter part of 1892 her cabinet, which she supposed was subservient to her wishes, consisted of the following members: Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Samuel Parker; Minister of the Interior, John F. Colburn; Attorney-General, A. P. Peterson; Minister of Finance, W. F. Cornwell.¹⁰⁶

Early in 1893 the Queen decided to put her political theories into practice by proroguing the legislature on Saturday, January 14 and by signing, on the same day, the lottery bill to which the missionaries had objected so bitterly.¹⁰⁷ But these activities marked only the beginning of her program for she had also placed the draft of a reactionary Constitution, which she expected to promulgate by royal edict, in the hands of the cabinet members.¹⁰⁸ On that same day, a great crowd of natives had assembled after the dismissal of the legislature, anticipating the restoration. However, the Reform party had subjected the cabinet members to such pressure that they refused to countersign the new Constitution and the chagrined

103. Ibid., p. 376.

104. Ibid. During the last twenty weeks of Liliuokalani's reign, no less than five cabinets were in office. Cosmopolitan, Vol. 15, p. 171.

105. Nineteenth Century, Vol. 33, p. 833.

106. Appleton's Cyclopedia, p. 376.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

Queen was forced to admit to her constituents that they new constitution would have to be postponed for a time.¹⁰⁹

The Revolution itself was an effort to forestall the continuation of the grandiose though unconstitutional scheme of the Queen. On January 14th, before Liliuokalani had announced her decision to defer the promulgation of the new constitution between fifty and one hundred "prominent" citizens met at the instigation of Lorrin A. Thurston, a "later missionary" lawyer, to consider the situation and devise ways and means to thwart the Queen's ambition.¹¹⁰ Colburn and Peterson, the two disaffected members of the royal cabinet, were present and counseled armed resistance.¹¹¹ A committee of thirteen members was appointed which decided to depose the Queen and to establish a Provisional Government.¹¹² The following morning members of the committee invited Colburn and Peterson to take charge in order that the Revolution might have a legitimate tinge by giving it a foothold in the existing government but the cabinet members refused.¹¹³

The next step of the Committee was to send a petition for protection to the United States Minister.¹¹⁴ Then a chain of events, climaxed by recognition of the Provisional Government and culminated by the Queen's surrender, occurred with

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid. Cf A. Johnson and D. Malone, "Dictionary of Am. Biog.", Vol. 18, p. 576.

111. Appleton's Cyclopedia, p. 376.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

remarkable celerity.¹¹⁵ These events in chronological order were: (1) a mass meeting on the afternoon of the 16th endorsing the action taken by the Committee of Safety; (2) the landing of 160 American troops in answer to the request of the Committee of Safety; (3) reading of a proclamation announcing the abrogation of the Hawaiian monarchy and the establishment of Provisional Government on the afternoon of the 17th; (4) the recognition of the Provisional Government by John L. Stevens between four and five o'clock the same afternoon; (5) the surrender of the Queen.¹¹⁶ It is significant to note that Stevens recognized the Provisional Government before the Queen surrendered.

The results of the bloodless Revolution, which reaffirmed the position of the "later missionaries," were seconded on the following day, January 18th, when the representatives of twelve foreign nations recognized the Provisional Government.¹¹⁷

The Revolution of 1893 might well have been called an "American Revolution" because of the prominence of American citizens and persons of American descent who either fomented or participated in the revolt. Foremost among these was John L. Stevens, who because of his high position and intimate

115. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 221. The report of Wiltse to Secretary of Navy Tracy. Honolulu, January 18, 1893 ...on January 14...the Queen prorogued the legislature and attempted to proclaim a new Constitution. At 2 P. M. on January 16, the citizens met and organized a Committee of Safety. At 4:30 P. M. landed forces in accordance with request of the U. S. Minister Plenipotentiary.

Tuesday (17th) afternoon the Provisional Government was established; the Queen dethroned. The Revolution was accomplished without loss of life. Everything is quiet--Wiltse

116. Appleton's Cyclopedia, pp. 376-380.

117. Senate Executive Documents, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 8, pp. 33-36.

connection with the American State Department¹¹⁸ was in a position not only to encourage the revolt in the Islands but also to prepare America for the consequences. Stevens' numerous dispatches to the State Department of the United States were permeated with the arguments of the advantages of annexation and with warnings of the possible interference of another foreign power which would result in the loss of American control.¹¹⁹ As early as March 20, 1890 he began urging upon Blaine the need for closer relations between the United States and Hawaii and also stated that the United States must soon settle the question: "will the Hawaiian Islands be American or Asiatic?"¹²⁰ On March 8, 1892 Stevens interrogated Blaine for instructions in case "the government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement largely of native Hawaiians and a provisional or republican government organized..."¹²¹ He desired to know to what extent it would be justifiable to use the United States forces in case of a revolution. He intimated that in as much as the relations of the United States and Hawaii were "exceptional" and since United States officials had taken unusual action in the past in circumstances of disorder, then he might be justified in deviating "from established international rules and precedents" in the event of a political uprising.¹²² In the light of following

118. A. Johnson & D. Malone, "Dictionary of Am. Biog.", Vol. 17, p. 618. Blaine and Stevens as partners owned and edited the Kennebec Journal from 1855-1893.

119. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, innumerable selections, "Stevens to Blaine."

120. Ibid., p. 343.

121. Ibid., p. 182.

122. Ibid.

events, this letter, written almost a year before the Revolution indicated first hand information concerning the brewing insurrection as well as an intent to steer its course as he saw fit. Again on November 20, 1892 Stevens' attempts to guide the political destiny of the Hawaiian Islands were portrayed in his letter to John W. Foster, Blaine's successor in the State Department, when he stated that one of two courses should necessarily be followed, namely: first, vigorous measures for annexation or secondly, the formation of an American protectorate over the Islands with the suggestion that the former was preferred.¹²³ He climaxed his argument with the naive expression, "I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand" and added an extended account of the economic advantages that would accrue to the United States by virtue of annexation.¹²⁴

Mr. Stevens had been reporting such a wealth of intrigue and thinly veiled innuendoes to the State Department that Mr. Foster tactfully suggested that the Minister to Hawaii separate his reports into two classes, namely, one for the "open historical aspect" and the other "personal" because of the possibility of a call from Congress for their publication.¹²⁵

Although Mr. Stevens may not have been guilty of a breach of international etiquette, certainly he was unusually receptive to the cause of insurrection and singularly disrespectful

123. Ibid., p. 194.

124. Ibid., p. 195.

125. Ibid., p. 376.

to the de jure government to which he was accredited. Unquestionably the prominence of American citizens and persons of American descent in Hawaiian politics was a contributing factor to Stevens' staunch American imperialistic views. This "Americanized" influence was well illustrated in the composition of the potent "Committee of Thirteen" selected to supervise the revolt, namely:¹²⁶

Henry E. Cooper----American citizen

W. C. Wilder-----American parents; naturalized citizen
of Hawaii: owner of Hawaiian Steamship Co.

F. W. McChesney----American citizen

C. Bolte-----German origin; naturalized citizen of
Hawaii

H. Brown-----Scotchman who had not been naturalized

W. O. Smith-----Native of foreign origin

Henry Waterhouse---Originally from Tasmania; a naturalized
citizen

Ed Suhr-----German subject

Theo. F. Lansing---American citizen

John Emmelmuth----American citizen

L. A. Thurston----American (Connecticut) origin; subject
of Hawaii

W. R. Castle-----Hawaiian of American (New York) parentage

J. A. McCandless---American citizen

Six Hawaiian subjects, five American citizens, one Scotchman and one German, none of whom possessed native Hawaiian names, yet these same individuals termed themselves "Citizens" Committee of Safety!

126. Ibid., p. 587.

What part then did the natives play in this history-making episode? The relative absence of concrete evidence, either of opposition to the new industrial regime or of agitation for the rehabilitation of the monarchy, indicated an apathetic acquiescence to the Revolution. Mr. W. Porter Boyd, the American vice-consul at Honolulu, testified that there was no uneasiness in the neighborhood of the consulate and that the landing of the troops came as a complete surprise.¹²⁷ The population was so unconcerned with the military aspect of the revolt that after the bluejackets had trailed their artillery through the streets, the regular Monday evening out-of-door band concert was well patronized and no overt act of animosity apparent.¹²⁸

Though the natives stoically accepted the new order the Queen, however, was conscious of her precarious position and her anger knew no bounds, but her rational self and her cabinet members counseled passive resistance.¹²⁹ In accordance with the precedent established by Kamehameha III in 1843 and on the advice of her most trusted intimates, Queen Liliuokalani temporarily surrendered her sovereignty to the United States Government for judgment and vindication in the following proclamation:

I hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America, whose Minister Plenipotentiary, his

127. North American Review, Vol. 157, p. 732.

128. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 738-739.

129. Appleton's Cyclopaedia, p. 380.

excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I do under this protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representative and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the Constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.¹³⁰

Liliuokalani followed up her voluntary transfer of authority by a letter to President Harrison containing the salutation "Great and Good Friend" and then continued with the hope that the President would see the Hawaiian situation from her standpoint.¹³¹

Liliuokalani's action, laudable from the standpoint of both expediency and morality, came at a time when the cards were stacked against her. In as much as John L. Stevens had done his work well, no evidence has been uncovered to the effect that Harrison considered the Queen's letter seriously.

Two outstanding personalities heralded the formation and the perpetuity of the Provisional Government, namely, John L. Stevens and Sanford B. Dole. Mr. Stevens, through his intimate personal relations with the conspirators¹³² and by his prompt recognition of the de facto government had revived flagged spirits and had encouraged speedy political transformation. Mr. Dole, a "later missionary," was a member of one of the leading Hawaiian families and had been selected

130. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 232-233.

131. Ibid., p. 1278.

132. Ibid., p. 962, 963, 521.

as a Supreme Court Justice in 1887.¹³³ He had participated actively in the Revolution of 1887, but had consented to join the movement in 1893 only after he became satisfied that further continuance of the monarchy was out of the question and that the best interests of all, including the native Hawaiians demanded its overthrow.¹³⁴ The Judge's influence to the cause of insurrection was inestimable. This was indicated by the fact that J. H. Soper, a naturalized Hawaiian citizen of American birth, was willing to accept the important command of the military forces only after he was assured that Judge Dole was to head the Government.¹³⁵

As the avowed purpose of the revolutionary leaders was the Annexation of Hawaii to the United States, the Committee of Five was promptly chosen to visit Washington. On January 18th, the Executive council¹³⁶ completed and signed instructions empowering the Five Commissioners to negotiate a treaty of Union (annexation) with the United States.¹³⁷

The Queen also was anxious to have her case reviewed by the Washington officials for vindication. In the ensuing race between the annexationists and the royalists to secure American support for their respective positions, Liliuokalani was handicapped by the fact that there was only one available boat for the trip to the United States which was owned by W. C. Wilder,

133. A. Johnson & D. Malone, "Dict. of Am. Biog." Vol. 5, pp. 358-359.

134. Ibid.

135. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 972.

136. Ibid. The members of the Executive Council were as follows: Sanford B. Dole, J. A. King, P. C. Jones, W. O. Smith. p. 212.

137. Ibid., p. 967.

one of the Five Commissioners proposing annexation and naturally he refused accommodations for the Queen's representative.¹³⁸

The scene next shifted from Honolulu to Washington, where in the twilight hours of Republican rule from February 3 to March 4, the ear of President Harrison was sought by the two rival groups from Hawaii in a contest for the adjustment of the issue which the royalists failed to realize had been predetermined unfavorably to them before they left the Islands.

138. Ibid., p. 397.

IV

Benjamin Harrison, the twenty-third President of the United States was a political recluse whose true contributions are still a matter of conjecture. Then too, Harrison was so unfortunate as to be overshadowed by a subordinate.¹³⁹ The impelling force behind the Republican administration was found in the person of James G. Blaine. As Blaine had practically dictated the selection of Harrison in the Republican National Convention of 1888, the latter, when elected, reciprocated by offering Blaine the highest appointive office, namely, Secretary of State.¹⁴⁰ As Blaine had dominated the Convention of 1888, so in the course of time he formulated the foreign policy of the administration.¹⁴¹ Blaine's foreign policy was centered about Henry Clay's earlier principles known as the "American System" which contemplated the eventual domination of the Caribbean area by the United States. He believed it essential to the future welfare of his country that there should be an Isthmian canal under American Control and to that end he labored conscientiously, if not logically, in his diplomatic relations with England.¹⁴² Blaine's comprehending mind, antic-

139. A. Johnson and D. Malone, "Dict. of Am. Biog.", Vol. 8, pp. 332-333.

140. J. F. Rhodes, "History of U. S. From Hayes to McKinley", Vol. 8, p. 316.

141. D. S. Muzzey, "James G. Blaine", p. 383.

142. J. H. Latane, "American Foreign Policy", pp. 519-523. By the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, the canal when constructed would be supervised jointly by Great Britain and the United States or by international control. Blaine persistently attempted to alter the Treaty so that the United States might have exclusive control. Ibid., pp. 306-307.

ipating the construction of the Isthmian canal, included the the Hawaiian Islands in his "American System." Because of the existence of international rivalries in Hawaii and its intimate cultural and commercial ties with the United States, he regarded the annexation of Hawaii as more natural and imperative than the acquisition of the nearby Cuba.¹⁴³ Blaine's imperialistic designs were further shown on August 10, 1891 when he wrote to President Harrison:

I think there are only three places that are of enough value to be taken; one is Hawaii and the others are Cuba and Porto Rico. Cuba and Porto Rico are not imminent and will not be for a generation. Hawaii may come up for a decision at any unexpected hour, and I hope we shall be prepared to decide in the affirmative.¹⁴⁴

There is no evidence that President Harrison's views on foreign policy were not in agreement with those of his aggressive Secretary of State. Harrison in his fourth annual message of December 6, 1892 declared: "Our relations with Hawaii have been such as to attract an increased interest and must continue to do so."¹⁴⁵

A preview of the paternalistic attitude of the Republican administration toward Hawaii was illustrated in the attempts of Blaine to put the "Manifest Destiny" doctrine into practice. Early in 1889 the United States departed from its traditional policy of shunning "entangling alliances" and entered into the Tripartite Condominium affecting the sovereignty of the Samoan Islands.¹⁴⁶ Blaine's persistent attempt to alter the Clayton-

143. S. F. Bemis, "American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, pp. 120-121.

144. D. S. Muzzey, "James G. Blaine", p. 394.

145. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 316.

146. D. S. Muzzey, op. cit., p. 400.

Bulwer Treaty of 1850 so as to permit the construction of an Isthmian canal under the sole auspices of the United States has been previously noted.

Another potent factor affecting Elaine's imperialistic designs were the essays of A. T. Mahan and other "jingoistic" writers. Mahan, a captain in the United States navy, had long been advocating an expansive naval program with emphasis on outlying naval stations as a means of preserving international prestige.¹⁴⁷ Soon after Captain Mahan had published his naval admonitions, Elaine began searching for a suitable Caribbean port as a naval base. Unsuccessful in both Haiti and Santo Domingo in obtaining port privileges, he was unwilling to follow Seward's course of 1867 by attempting to purchase the Danish West Indies until he had secured access to one of the larger Islands.¹⁴⁸ While Elaine failed to realize his objectives yet the trend of his diplomacy was obvious. Furthermore, Hawaii fitted perfectly into the expansionist schemes of both Mahan and Elaine and its acquisition was specifically designated by each.¹⁴⁹

A more direct evidence of increased interest in the annexation question was revealed through the propaganda included in John L. Steven's voluminous dispatches from Honolulu. His continuous references to the "later missionaries" as being the "best people on the Islands" and his expressions of hope for a

147. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 66, p. 822. Cf. Forum, Vol. 15, p. 6.

148. J. W. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898", pp. 29-32.

149. Forum, Vol. 15, p. 6; D. S. Muzzey, "James G. Elaine", p. 394.

closer relationship between the United States and Hawaii left the definite impression that there was considerable agitation for annexation.¹⁵⁰ Stevens also attempted to shake off American lethargy by repeated warnings of possible European or Asiatic intervention.¹⁵¹

A significant move of the annexationists in Hawaii toward realizing their objective came in May of 1892, with the visit of Lorrin A. Thurston to the United States. While the journey was ostensibly in connection with the Hawaiian exhibit at the Chicago World's Fair, yet much of Thurston's activities were centered in Washington where he contacted leading political figures of both parties in an effort to facilitate annexation.¹⁵² Mr. Thurston, another "later missionary," had been proclaimed by Stevens as one of the "most influential members of the Reform party" and, moreover, as the visitor had recently been elected to the Hawaiian legislature, his assertions carried considerable weight.¹⁵³

Armed with all these tidings, it would have been a most inanimate person, indeed, who would have failed to have detected the brewing insurrection in Hawaii and the promise of an impending political adhesion. Secretary Blaine and his successor in the State Department, John W. Foster, were not lacking in diplomatic training as both had a full knowledge of international law and diplomatic practice.¹⁵⁴ The Americans proceeded into the

150. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 338.

151. Ibid., p. 321.

152. Nation, Vol. 56, p. 146.

153. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 303.

154. S. F. Bemis, "American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, p. 187; D. S. Muzzey, op. cit., p. 490.

Hawaiian imbroglio with open eyes--fully alive to the consequences.

Aside from the aforementioned intimate personal relationship with Stevens, the absence of opposition from the administration indicated a tacit acquiescence to his Hawaiian policies. In only one instance, which occurred after the Revolution, was there any semblance of the mildest rebuke.¹⁵⁵

Into such a harmonious group of Republican expansionists came the Five Hawaiian Commissioners seeking annexation. The Commission was composed of L. A. Thurston, Wm. R. Castle, W. C. Wilder, J. Marsden and C. L. Carter.¹⁵⁶ Stevens again endeavored to prepare the way for them to Foster by terming them representatives of the best element in the Islands and by reiterating the need for immediate action.¹⁵⁷ The Commission sailed from Honolulu on January 19, arrived at San Francisco on January 28 and presented their credentials to the American Secretary of State on February 3, 1893.¹⁵⁸ Although the American Department of State and the Hawaiian Commissioners both desired speedy

155. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 406-407. On February 1, Stevens caused the United States flag to be raised over the Government Building and proclaimed a protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. Ibid., p. 405. Foster questioned the rectitude of this action. Ibid., p. 406-7.

156. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 234.

157. Ibid., pp. 397-401. Stevens concluded his suggestions to Foster with the following paragraph: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it. If annexation does not take place promptly, all is held in doubt and suspense for six or ten months, they certainly will be a revulsion to despair, and these people, by their necessities might be forced toward becoming a British colony, for the English here of the monarchical type would then avail themselves of this opportunity and stir up all possible opposition to annexation..."

158. Ibid., p. 234.

annexation, there were several obstacles to the drafting of the treaty. The Hawaiians were most anxious to secure certain provisions which had to be reconciled with the United States Constitution and American Public Law as well as to the interests of competing American industries. In the first place the Hawaiians insisted that the American bounty be paid on sugar.¹⁵⁹ Foster, however, proposed a much smaller bounty of one-half cent per pound. The Hawaiians also wanted the promise of a cable to the Islands. A third and a most aggravating problem that arose was the question of imported labor so necessary for the Hawaiian sugar plantations. The Commissioners were anxious to secure the entrance of Chinese laborers under the existing prohibiting immigration laws.¹⁶⁰ Foster refused this last request flatly.

Foster persuaded the Commissioners to forego their demands for the economic welfare of the Islands in favor of speedier action on the Treaty. On February 14th the Treaty of Annexation containing the following provisions was signed by Foster and the Five Hawaiian Commissioners:¹⁶¹ (1) the cession by the Hawaiian Government of all sovereignty, public land and revenue to the United States; (2) the continuance of the present Hawaiian laws until Congress should provide otherwise; (3) the assumption by the United States of the Hawaiian debt not to exceed \$3,250,000; (4) the prohibition of further immigration of Chinese labor; (5) the payment of an annual sum of \$20,000 to Liliuokalani for

159. S. F. Bemis, "American Secretaries of State", Vol. 8, pp. 213-215.

160. Ibid.

161. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 202-205.

life and of a lump sum of \$150,000 to Princess Kaiulani, the ex-heir presumptive.

On the following day, February 15, President Harrison sent the Treaty to the Senate with a message urging prompt and favorable action.¹⁶² In his message Harrison blamed the Queen, personally, for the fall of the monarchy and disclaimed all responsibility for the Revolution on the part of the United States.¹⁶³ Moreover, he declared that the "restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to her throne is undesirable if not impossible and unless actively supported by the United States would be accompanied by serious disaster and the disorganization of all business interests. The influence and interests of the United States must be increased and not diminished."¹⁶⁴ Two days later the Treaty was promptly approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and reported favorably to the Senate where it was received with mixed emotions.¹⁶⁵ There were various forces at work to prevent ratification. Mr. J. Marsden, one of the Hawaiian Commissioners, probably hurt his own cause when he deprecated the influence of the natives in the following statement to a Washington reporter: "We don't want to be governed by the native vote; we prefer no suffrage at all rather than universal suffrage."¹⁶⁶ The Treaty was actually blocked by Democratic senators at the behest of Mr. John C. Carlisle, a former member of the Senate and the prospective Secretary

162. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

163. Senate Ex. Doc., 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 8, No. 227, pp. 1-2.

164. J. D. Richardson, "Messages & Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 348.

165. Senate Journal, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 1, p. 398.

166. American Journal of Politics, Vol. 4, p. 164.

of the Treasury, who communicated with his erstwhile party associates and the supposition is that he brought a message from the President-elect to the effect that Cleveland desired to have it postponed.¹⁶⁷ Then too, there was so little time left that it could not be spared from last minute necessary party legislation and appointments.¹⁶⁸

The following comprehensive summary has been offered by a present-day historian, W. S. Holt, who has made an intensive study of the defeated Treaty:

"Thus either because of the desire to rob the Harrison administration as the Tribune said or because of Gresham's personal animosity to Harrison as Foster said or because of the desire to protect the honor of the United States from a violation of international morality as Cleveland said or because of the natural feeling that all discussions on pending problems should be left for the incoming administration, another important treaty was defeated in the Senate by partisan action."¹⁶⁹

The second session of the fifty-second Congress ended March 4, 1893 with the Hawaiian Treaty still awaiting action in the Senate.

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167. W. S. Holt, "Treaties Defeated in the U. S. Senate", p. 153.
 168. Ibid. Cf. Ibid., p. 152. Holt offers two reasons for the unusual demonstration of speed in the committee, namely, first because a Republican majority controlled the committee and secondly there was need for haste if the Republican administration was to secure credit for accomplishing the annexation.
 169. Ibid., pp. 153-154.

V

The man who entered the White House on March 4, 1893 as the chief executive, was a forceful determined personality who placed rectitude above everything else; he was singularly unwilling to surrender an iota of principle to expediency. After determining upon a course of action by laborious reasoning, he adhered unswervingly to that course.¹⁷⁰

A guiding factor in the formulation of President Cleveland's foreign policy was his opposition to imperialism in any form.¹⁷¹ His withdrawal of the expansionist Frelinghausen-Zavala Treaty in 1885, his refusal to encourage foreign investments, and his stern tendency to view foreign questions in a moral light, corroborated his anti-expansionist policy.¹⁷² However, this did not mean that he was opposed to all American activity in Hawaii for in his second annual message of December 6, 1886, he stated:

I express my unhesitating conviction that the intimacy of our relations with Hawaii should be emphasized. As a result of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875, those Islands, on the highway of Oriental and Australian traffic are virtually an outpost of American commerce and a stepping stone to the growing trade of the Pacific.¹⁷³

The question then was one of degree and in no wise did Cleveland's message contemplate the subversion of Hawaiian sovereignty to attain Hawaiian "intimacy."

170. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 765.

171. S. F. Bemis, "Diplomatic History of the U. S.", p. 459.

172. Allan Nevins, op. cit., p. 404.

173. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 8, pp. 500-501.

Cleveland's treatment of the vexing Hawaiian problem was consistent with his previous foreign policy. He may have been instrumental in preventing the Annexation Treaty from being "railroaded" through the Senate in the waning hours of the Republican administration. It is likely that he considered the question at some length with members of his cabinet before he assumed the Presidency.¹⁷⁴ Certainly his intensive study of the Hawaiian situation conformed to good international diplomacy.

Apparently his early study of the Annexation Treaty convinced him that it should not be immediately ratified because five days after he became President, he sent the following message to the Senate:

For the purpose of reexamination, I withdraw the Treaty of Annexation between the United States and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands, now pending in the Senate, which was signed February 14, 1893 and transmitted to the Senate on the 15th of the same month, and I therefore request that said Treaty be returned to me.¹⁷⁵

Possibly President Cleveland's legalistic turn of mind revolted at the prospect of judging the issue between the Royalists and the Representatives of the Provisional Government before both sides of the question had been heard. Possibly Cleveland's letter from Queen Liliuokalani, which was similar to that sent to Harrison, caused him to investigate further.¹⁷⁶ Possibly the untoward haste of the annexation proceedings as a whole, urged him to slow down administrative action. At any rate the President decided to send a trusted

174. Allan Nevins, op. cit., p. 556.

175. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, p. 393.

176. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 867-868.

representative to the Hawaiian Islands to determine the true facts of the case. Just two days after he had withdrawn the treaty, he appointed James H. Blount, until March 4 Congressman from Georgia and chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as special Commissioner for the difficult mission. ¹⁷⁷

Although Blount did not relish the commission, ¹⁷⁸ his extensive experience in foreign affairs, publicly lauded even by his political opponents, ¹⁷⁹ and his unswerving integrity and devotion to duty, warranted approbation of his selection by such an ardent annexationist as Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews. ¹⁸⁰ Before leaving for Hawaii, Blount conferred with both Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Gresham, learning that neither had a definite program in mind and inferring that action would hinge upon his findings. ¹⁸¹ His instructions also specified that he was to possess "paramount" authority on all matters touching the protection of American citizens and that the object of his mission was to answer in particular these two questions, namely; first, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's government was overthrown and secondly, the sentiment of the people toward the existing authority. ¹⁸²

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177. A. Johnson and D. Malone, "Dict. of American Biography", Vol. 2, pp. 388-389.
 178. Senate Reports, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 2, No. 227, p. 385. Blount accepted only after his son had referred to his mother's poor health and had insisted that the trip to Hawaii "would add five years to her life." Cf. Overland Monthly, Vol. 25, p. 558.
 179. Cong. Record, 52nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 24, pp. 1207-1208.
 180. Review of Reviews, Vol. 7, pp. 262-263.
 181. Senate Reports, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 2, No. 227, p. 387.
 182. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, pp. 1185-1187. Text of instructions will be found in Appendix H.

As soon as Blount entered Honolulu on March 29, he was subjected to overtures from both the Annexationists and the Royalists which he respectfully declined.¹⁸³ The Annexationists offered him an elaborate house with all the furnishings for which he could pay a nominal rental and a representative of the Queen offered the use of her carriage.¹⁸⁴

During the stay of four months at Honolulu, Mr. Blount interviewed representatives of both groups, and with diligence and good faith he attempted to realize the object of his mission by sending to Secretary Gresham from time to time reports of his activities and deductions from his investigations.¹⁸⁵ While in Honolulu, Blount conducted himself with such exemplary discretion that when he left not only was there a general feeling of indecision about his report but many surmised that he favored annexation.¹⁸⁶

One of Blount's first official acts, which should have been an index to the Hawaiians of the reversal of policy, was the termination of the protectorate instituted by Stevens on February 1.¹⁸⁷ Although Stevens had tendered his resignation on March 7, he was still Minister at the time of the lowering of the American flag and had to yield to Blount's "paramount" authority until May 9 when Blount succeeded him.¹⁸⁸

While Blount outwardly conducted his investigation with utmost decorum yet there was, underlying the maze of collected testimony and related information, a note of hostility toward

183. Ibid., p. 568.

184. Ibid.

185. J. A. Gillis, "The Hawaiian Incident", p. 85.

186. Independent, Vol. 45, p. 666.

187. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 1060.

188. Ibid., p. 413, 421.

Stevens and his propertied white friends who later constituted the Provisional Government. Blount produced circumstantial evidence to show that Stevens had agreed to support the revolution before it was begun. For this Stevens' actions rather than written documents were submitted as proof. Blount contended that no one could have acted so promptly and efficiently in support of the insurgents cause without a previous understanding with its leaders. He arranged the evidence, particularly that of Mr. Wundenburg, to prove that in the minds of some of the revolutionists Stevens had given the impression that he would recognize the Provisional Government as soon as it had occupied any of the Government Buildings in Honolulu.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore Blount was able to extract from Admiral Skerrett, who had succeeded Captain Wiltse, the damaging admission that the troops landed from the "Boston" were very poorly stationed in so far as the protection of American interests were concerned but very well located if their objective was the support of the Provisional Government.¹⁹⁰ Blount criticised the willingness of Stevens to recognize the Provisional Government in the light of its expressed inability to maintain law and order, particularly since Judge Dole had even asked Captain Wiltse to take command of the forces of the Provisional Government.¹⁹¹ Blount summarized his indiotment of Stevens as follows:

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens promise to protect them against any danger from the (Royalist) Government. But for this their mass meeting would not have been held.

189. Ibid., p. 594.

190. Ibid., p. 538.

191. J. A. Gillis, "The Hawaiian Incident", p. 70.

But for this no request to land troops would have been made. Had the troops not been landed no measures for the organization of a new Government would have been taken.

The American Minister and the revolutionary leaders had determined on Annexation to the United States, and had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.¹⁹²

In regard to the second point in his instructions, namely, that of determining the sentiment of the people toward the Provisional Government, Blount reported that native sympathy was entirely with the Queen. This opinion was shared by the Annexationists themselves.¹⁹³ "From a careful inquiry," Blount wrote President, "I am satisfied that it (annexation) would be defeated by a vote of at least two to one. If votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded,¹⁹⁴ it would be defeated more than five to one."

It is not difficult to imagine what an effect this report had on the President and his official advisers. It confirmed their gravest suspicions that the Republican party had been co-partners in an immoral conspiracy to deprive a feeble monarchy of its sovereignty. Soon after Blount's report had been received, Gresham, who was especially active in the Queen's behalf, began to work on the problem of the future relations with Hawaii.¹⁹⁵ In a report to the President, dated October 18, 1893, Gresham summarized Blount's findings and endorsed his view of the reprehensible part played by Minis-

192. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 594.

193. F. R. Dulles, "America in the Pacific," p. 180.

194. Ibid.

195. Ibid., p. 181. His wife explained Gresham's zeal in the Queen's cause on the grounds that "a woman in trouble, my husband would certainly side with her against the power, greed and lust of man."

ter Stevens in the revolution. The climax to his report occurred in the following interrogation:

Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent state by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.¹⁹⁶

The plan to rectify the mistake of their Republican predecessors, apparently formulated by the combined efforts of Cleveland, Gresham, and the Attorney-General, Olney, was to restore the Queen to her former position.¹⁹⁷ In September Albert S. Willis of Kentucky had been named to succeed Blount¹⁹⁸ whose special mission was now completed. Willis, who was accredited to the Provisional Government, carried secret instructions which intended to overthrow that Government and restore the previous one!

In accordance with his instructions, Willis sought an interview with Liliuokalani soon after he had landed at Honolulu and had presented his credentials to the Provisional Government. After he had told her of President Cleveland's decision, he officially asked if she would grant a complete amnesty to the leaders of the January revolt as well as to the members of the Provisional Government. To his consternation the Queen replied: "My decision would be, as the law directs, that such persons should be beheaded and their property confiscated to the Government."¹⁹⁹ Further questioning

196. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 463.

197. F. R. Dulles, op. cit., p. 181.

198. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 464.

199. F. R. Dulles, op. cit., p. 182.

by the American Minister only revealed the dogmatic refusal of Liliuokalani to recede from her position. In answer to Willis' telegram for instructions, Grasham replied that amnesty was essential for the restoration.²⁰⁰ The second meeting found the Queen more amenable to the demands of the American envoy. She first proposed property confiscation and perpetual banishment for the revolutionists but upon Willis' insistence she acquiesced her full acceptance of the President's stipulations.²⁰¹

Upon receipt of this royal concession, Willis turned to what he believed was the least difficult part of his mission, namely, that of informing the Provisional Government of President Cleveland's decision and the receiving of that Government's submission. Willis called at the Government Building on December the 20th and presented to the Executive Council a memorandum summarizing his instructions and divulging that since the Queen had agreed to grant complete amnesty, the President expected the Provisional Government "to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority." He closed by submitting, in the name and by the authority of the United States, this question: "Are you willing to abide by the decision of the President?"²⁰²

However, rumor containing the general tenor of Cleveland's plan had leaked out and Dole was at least partially prepared for the revelation. Three days later he ably

200. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 464.

201. Ibid., pp. 445-448.

202. Ibid., pp. 1272-1275.

answered the proposal to reinstate Liliuokalani by declaring that the independence and sovereignty of his country could not be called into question and finally requested Willis to inform President Cleveland that the Hawaiian Government "respectfully and unhesitatingly declines to entertain the proposition of the President of the United States that it should surrender its authority to the ex-Queen."²⁰³ The Dole Government supported the daring stand of its leader by preparing defenses against possible American aggression.²⁰⁴

This latter move was unnecessary because Cleveland had relinquished his cherished hope of settling the Hawaiian situation by executive agreement five days before Dole had answered the query of Willis. In a special message of December, the 18th, 1893, he reviewed the Hawaiian Revolution with a scathing denunciation of Stevens and his Republican cohorts; he intimated that the United States was guilty of "an act of war" at the time the troops were landed, and he concluded that the Provisional Government owed its existence "to an armed invasion of the United States."²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, he admitted the failure of his own policy owing to the unwillingness of the Queen to refrain from bloodthirsty reprisals (he did not yet know the stand taken by the Provisional Government.)²⁰⁶ Since executive mediation had been stalemated, Cleveland commended the subject "to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress" but hastened to add that he was

203. Ibid., p. 1282.

204. R. S. Kuykendall, "History of Hawaii", p. 281.

205. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. 9, pp. 460-472.

206. Ibid., p. 472.

willing to cooperate "in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity and morality."²⁰⁷

So ended Cleveland's well intentioned but poorly thought out attempt to right a probable wrong in the field of international diplomacy.

The Congress, into whose lap Cleveland dropped the vexing Hawaiian complication, readily assumed the task. Even before Cleveland had surrendered control, Senator Hoar of Massachusetts questioned both the legality of Blount's appointment and his conduct while in Hawaii.²⁰⁸ Soon after the President had delivered his special message on Hawaii, Senator Morgan of Alabama, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, proposed that the message be referred to his committee for consideration as to whether or not there had been any irregularities between the United States and Hawaii in relation to the recent political revolution in Hawaii.²⁰⁹ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in making its report in February of 1894 illustrated the prevailing difference of opinion as to the wisdom of the course pursued by President Cleveland. The four Republican members decried the action of Cleveland and Blount while four of the Democratic members denounced Stevens for his interference as well as the deliberate attempt at Annexation. The fifth Democratic member of the Committee, the expansionist Senator

207. Ibid.

208. Cong. Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 1, Vol. 26, p. 19.

209. Ibid.

from Alabama, Chairman Morgan held the balance of power as well as the ultimate decision which paradoxically sanctioned the actions of all Americans participating in the Hawaiian affair and left the Queen alone at fault--a most unique view in that it was able to reconcile such widely divergent opinions.
210

Outside of the Foreign Relations Committee there were Senators who were unwilling to be eliminated from the Hawaiian fracas and who, both before and after the report of the Foreign Relations Committee, vented their wrath against Blount or Stevens as the case might be.
211 In short, Republicans denounced Blount while the Democrats heaped coals upon the head of Stevens. Both parties offered destructive criticism only and in no way contributed to an amicable, immediate settlement.

No definite course of action was adopted by the Senate until May 31 when Senator Turpie, a Democrat from Indiana, introduced the following resolution which was so skilfully worded that each party could derive consolation from it while at the same time the nation's historic policy toward foreign interference was reaffirmed:

Resolved, That of right it belongs wholly to the people of the Hawaiian Islands to establish and maintain their own form of government and domestic polity; that the United States ought in no wise to interfere therewith, and that any intervention in the political affairs of these Islands by any other government will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States.
212

210. Senate Reports, 53rd Con., 2nd Sess., Vol. 2, pp. 15-36.

211. Cong. Record, 53rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 1, Vol. 26, pp. 61-199.

212. Ibid., pp. 5499-5500.

Inasmuch as the Senate decided neither to restore the Queen nor to interfere with the Provisional Government, it scrupulously avoided the question of Annexation and thereby left it to the tender mercies of the dim future.

In the meantime the House of Representatives had adopted the McCreary Resolutions which were likewise double-barrelled in that they condemned the action of Stevens and repudiated Cleveland's attempt to restore the monarchy though the latter was more implied than apparent.²¹³ In general the House supported the President better than did the Senate.

Naturally, the press of the nation did not treat the matter so delicately as did Congress. Cleveland's message of December 18th, 1893, was the subject of many pithy editorials. Blunt criticism was expressed by the Washington Post (Ind.), St. Louis Globe-Democrat (Rep.), Philadelphia Telegraph (Rep.), and the Chicago Journal (Rep.), New York World (Dem.) in the words of the Baltimore American (Rep.): "President Cleveland's Hawaiian Message will disappoint even the few friends who have endeavored to apologize for his extraordinary course in the matter."²¹⁴ While on the other hand the New York Voice (Pro.), Omaha Bee (Rep.), New Orleans States (Dem.), Denver News (Pro.), Springfield Republican (Ind.), Dallas-Galveston News (Dem.) and the Baltimore Sun (Dem.) commented favorably on the message as expressed by the latter: "President Cleveland's message is a careful, exhaustive and closely reasoned statement of the

213. Ibid., pp. 2001-2008.

214. Public Opinion, Vol. 16, pp. 306-307.

facts and of the moral obligation resting upon the United States."²¹⁵ The Philadelphia Record (Dem.) took this most expressive and moderate view: "The President stands on high moral ground that has been pulled from under him by the course of events."²¹⁶

The general question of annexation again found a divided but vociferous press. The Chicago Journal (Rep.), Washington News (Ind.), and the New York Sun (Dem.), favored annexation and ridiculed Cleveland's policy in a manner similar to the words of the New York Tribune (Rep.) which stated that, "every budget of news as it comes from Hawaii proves that Mr. Blount's mission was a mistake."²¹⁷ At the same time the St. Louis Republic (Dem.), Philadelphia Record (Dem.), and the New York Herald (Dem.) praised Cleveland's anti-annexation policy in the words of the Herald that "even if this whole annexation business did not savor of an unparalleled conspiracy, it would still be a gigantic humbug. We trust the administration at Washington now sees the matter in this light and that its verdict will be 'No Hawaiian Annexation'."²¹⁸

Most of the editors of the contemporary periodicals, with the exception of the Nation and the Independent, took a passive editorial view and left the formation of public opinion to the writers of the individual articles and sometimes going so far as to publish the conflicting opinions of three factional

215. Ibid.

216. Ibid., p. 307.

217. Ibid., Vol. 15, pp. 145-146.

218. Ibid.

219
 authors in the same issue. The Nation consistently opposed
 220 annexation while the Independent was just as anxious to
 221 facilitate the same measure.

Cleveland's policy received the approbation of many
 educators and highly trained intellectuals. Theodore S.
 Woolsey of the Yale Law School advised that "both law and
 222 policy demand that we keep our hands off Hawaii." The
 eminent Michigan jurist, Thomas M. Cooley, upheld Cleveland's
 223 position as did the self-made statesman from Massachusetts,
 224 George S. Boutwell. The legality of Hawaiian annexation was
 questioned by the preeminent authority on American Constitu-
 225 tional law, George T. Curtis while Carl Schurz, the reformer,
 226 opposed the admission of the Hawaiians solely on moral grounds.
 Cleveland must have derived much satisfaction in the receipt of
 a letter from that astute diplomat, Charles Francis Adams Jr.,
 who, though a political opponent of President Cleveland, wrote
 "to express the deep sense of respect, not to use a stronger
 term, I feel for the position the administration has taken on
 227 the Hawaiian question."

It was to be expected that Foster and Harrison would up-

219. North American Review, Vol. 157, pp. 731-752.
 220. Nation, Vol. 56, p. 93, 151; Vol. 57, pp. 38, 359; Vol. 58,
 pp. 58, 130.
 221. Independent, Vol. 45, pp. 149, 288; Vol. 46, p. 5.
 222. Yale Review, Vol. 2 (Old Series), p. 35.
 223. Forum, Vol. 15, pp. 389-406.
 224. G. S. Boutwell, "Hawaiian Annexation", pp. 11-12.
 225. North American Review, Vol. 156, pp. 282-286.
 226. Harpers Monthly, Vol. 87, p. 737.
 227. Allan Nevins, "Letters of Grover Cleveland", p. 339.

228

braid Cleveland for his "hands-off" policy. Harrison in particular decried the lack of continuity in our foreign policy.²²⁹ In spite of the Harrison criticism most writers seemed to realize that it would be impossible to secure any extension of American influence beyond present national borders during the Democratic administration. However, with the likelihood of a return of a Republican administration annexation might be consummated.

The expected English opposition to the "Americanization" of the Islands did not materialize. In fact England appeared to welcome America's initiation of an imperialistic program. As early as 1850 Lord Palmerston had suggested to a group of visiting Hawaiian Commissioners that they had better look forward to becoming an integral part of the United States for "such was the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands, arising from their proximity to the States of California and Oregon and natural dependence on these markets for exports and imports together with the probable extinction of the Hawaiian aboriginal population and its substitution by immigration from the United States."²³⁰ Lord Bryce prophesied annexation in these caustic words: "I shall be sorry to see the Hawaiian Government brought down to the level of San Francisco political methods."²³¹ Two weeks after the outbreak of the Hawaiian Revolution the London News casually informed its reading public

228. J. W. Foster, "Annexation of Hawaii", pp. 1-16.

229. Nation, Vol. 57, p. 384.

230. J. W. Foster, "American Diplomacy in the Orient", p. 368.

231. Nation, Vol. 56, p. 362.

that the Queen and her Ministers had been deposed and that the United States could annex the Islands if they wished to entertain the proposal.²³² England's "provoking indifference" and "calm unconcern" had, as the Nation put it, "robbed the enterprise of all its glamor."²³³

The Provisional Government of Hawaii finally conceded that there was no hope for annexation to the United States during Cleveland's regime and on March 15, 1894²³⁴ passed an act "to provide for a Constitutional Convention."²³⁴ This Convention was so arranged that the ruling oligarchy constituted a majority. Naturally the provisions of the Constitution contained rigid and educational and income qualifications both for suffrage and officeholding.²³⁵ To a greater degree than the Constitution of 1887, the new regulations placed political power in the hands of the white propertied classes. The Nation commented that the new arrangement consisted of "an uncommonly strong central government with very large powers in the hands of a few."²³⁶ The new Constitution with a clause empowering the President to make a treaty of political and commercial union to the United States, was promulgated by a proclamation of President Dole on July 4, 1894.²³⁷

Early in January, 1895 the Republic had occasion to demonstrate the stability of its organization in the face of a royalist attempt to restore the old order.²³⁸ On the night

232. London News, February 4, 1893, p. 139.

233. Nation, Vol. 56, p. 154.

234. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 1311.

235. Ibid., pp. 1360-1371.

236. Nation, Vol. 59, p. 57.

237. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 1371.

238. Rebellion of 1895, p. 1.

of January 6, a party of policemen met and dispersed a small group of rebels and the next day the whole structure of the revolt collapsed and the Hawaiian jail was filled with persons suspected of complicity in the uprising.²³⁹ A military court was created by President Dole to try the conspirators, the most important of whom was Liliuokalani. The ex-Queen was forced to sign a formal abdication, was fined five thousand dollars²⁴⁰ and was sentenced to five years imprisonment. However, in September of 1895 she was released on parole and in October of 1896 she was given a full pardon.²⁴¹ This act of magnanimity by Dole and his associates was conclusive evidence of extreme faith in their Hawaiian Republic. As a matter of fact the Republic did experience a period of prosperity and domestic tranquillity, which as Professor Pratt points out, was due as much to legislation in United States as to the existence of a strong government in Hawaii.²⁴² The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of the United States Congress abolished the sugar bounty and restored the duty on foreign sugar, which situation was much desired by Hawaiian sugar planters as the Reciprocity Treaty of 1887 exempted them from the duty.

Thus, the Cleveland administration drew slowly to a close, still holding Hawaii at arms lengths, while two thousand miles out in the Pacific Ocean that small country, with a discretionary clause for annexation in its centralistic Constitution, waited patiently for the United States to change her mind.

239. U. S. For. Rel., 1895, pp. 818-820.

240. Ibid., p. 835.

241. R. Liliuokalani, "Hawaii's Story By Hawaii's Queen", p. 303.

242. J. W. Pratt, "Expansionists of 1898", p. 193.

VI

As a question of foreign policy the proposed annexation of Hawaii in 1893 was of far greater importance to American interests than the much discussed Venezuelan episode of the Cleveland period. A contemporary historian has summed it up in the following sentences:

It brought out in sharp relief the conflict between Cleveland's foreign outlook and the expansionist tendencies fostered by Blaine. It furnished the first great debate in American history over the merits of imperialism. It illustrated the growing identity of interests between the United States and Great Britain, and in it can be detected the first token of Anglo-American understanding that was to become so important after 1898. Finally, it revealed the force of economic and nationalist impulses that were pressing for expansion overseas. 243

An appreciation of the Hawaiian annexation problem during the Harrison and Cleveland administrations requires an understanding of American foreign policy of those years. Cleveland had a consistent foreign policy from 1835 to 1895 which was at all times different from the Republican imperialistic policy as developed by such Secretaries of State as William Seward and James G. Blaine. It must be kept in mind that throughout the two Cleveland administrations American foreign policy was essentially anti-imperialistic. While certain groups, as early as the Arthur administration, began to realize the importance of Hawaii as a naval base for protecting the Pacific coast and a somewhat distant Isthmian canal, yet it is significant to note that when Cleveland came into

243. Allan Nevins, "Grover Cleveland", p. 549.

the Presidency all such proposals quickly ended.

The later overtures for the annexation of Hawaii came as a result of economic affiliations between the United States and the Hawaiian Islands. It has been previously noted that since 1820 the Americans had dominated both the commercial and economic activities of the Islands. Just as the Jesuits in North America blazed the trails for the French fur traders so the American missionaries to Hawaii had a large share in laying the foundations for American agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises. As early as 1820 the missionaries started to inculcate the American ideals and social customs among the Hawaiians. The so-called group of "later missionaries" were far more interested in the material gains the Islands afforded them than they were in the opportunities for spreading the Christian faith. The geographical proximity of the Islands to the Pacific coast of the United States facilitated a population movement to Hawaii as soon as American interests realized the economic possibilities of the archipelago.

Having secured an economic foothold in Hawaii, the Americans were anxious to reinforce their position by obtaining political control. Hawaiian political history after 1870 is largely the portrayal of the "outlander" industrialists' efforts to obtain a greater degree of political authority from the native population. The Reciprocity Agreement of 1875 between the United States and Hawaii provided commercial advantages for a limited time, and in the meantime American interests had come

to regard the Reciprocity Agreement with Hawaii as setting up a virtual protectorate. In 1884 the advantages derived from reciprocity were renewed for another seven year period. The "later missionaries" at that time joined the reform element in opposing the corrupt practices of Kalakaua's administration and in 1887 took an active part in the Revolution which resulted in a Constitution depriving the monarch of many of the royal prerogatives and in guaranteeing the domination of Hawaiian politics by the propertied whites.

The Americans likewise controlled the Revolution of 1893 which completely overturned Queen Liliuokalani's government and brought about a sentiment favorable to annexation to the United States. It was the American Minister, John L. Stevens, who had helped to direct the course of the revolt, and who had prematurely prepared the American State Department for the probable consequences. Americans were very prominent both in the composition of the potent "Committee of Thirteen," which acted as a board of strategy during the revolt, and in the composition of the Provisional Government which took charge of governmental activities after the conflict. Again, the "Committee of Five," which was sent to the United States to arrange the details of annexation, was also definitely American.

The Republican foreign policy of the Harrison administration pointed toward annexation and was therefore willing to take advantage of any change effected by the Revolution

of 1893 which might lead to the incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands as territory of the United States. The acquisition of Hawaii fitted perfectly into the expansionist plans formulated by Blaine. Although Foster was hostile to several of the provisions advocated by the Hawaiian Commissioners, yet in general they found him willing to cooperate in hurrying through the Treaty of Annexation. Haste was necessary if the Republicans were to receive credit for the achievement, as the second term of Cleveland's administration was to begin on March 4, 1893, only thirty-one days after the arrival of the Hawaiian Commissioners in Washington. Foster, who had drafted the Treaty, and Harrison both urged immediate and favorable action by the Senate. The Senators who opposed annexation declared that Stevens had participated too actively in working for the overthrow of the Queen, and in addition asserted that the Provisional Government represented the foreign rather than the native group.

The Cleveland government was quick in reversing the Hawaiian policy of the Republicans. The celerity with which President Cleveland acted was indicated by the withdrawal of the Annexation Treaty from the Senate within five days after his inauguration and by the dispatching, two days later, of the Blount Commission to determine the facts of the case. The new Hawaiian policy as developed by Cleveland and Gresham was good theoretically but from the standpoint of practicality it was vulnerable. The policy was not well conceived beyond

the point that amends should be made to the Queen who had been a victim of American duplicity. The Democrats failed to realize that only by resorting to drastic changes could their reactionary program be achieved. The Democratic program unfortunately eliminated the Hawaiians from a voice in the proceedings and while the Cleveland administration was motivated by the highest of ideals yet it was near-sighted in the application of its principles.

The Provisional Government of Hawaii, nevertheless, should be given credit for having been able to control the situation during the critical period when the Democratic plan for restitution of Royal Government was being contemplated. President Dole acted with firmness and dispatch in opposing Cleveland's plan. The real test of the Provisional Government, however, came during and after the Rebellion of 1895 at which time the Royal conspiracy was easily suppressed and the prisoners treated with magnanimity. This was particularly true in the case of Liliuokalani who was given partial freedom less than a year after the Rebellion and complete personal freedom less than two years after the insurrection.

In this instance as on other historical occasions the influence of dominant personalities played a large part in determining the course of events relative to their success or failure. The question of Hawaiian annexation during Harrison's and Cleveland's administrations is replete with striking personalities. James G. Elaine commanded attention with his

"American Plan" which demanded expansion beyond the confines of the borders of the United States. Blaine's enthusiasm and principles were avidly accepted by his business partner, John L. Stevens, who engineered the annexation proceedings from Honolulu by keeping the State Department of the United States informed of the developments and by planting seeds of annexation among the "economic barons" in the Hawaiian Islands as well as taking an active part in directing the course of the Revolution of 1893. The most colorful figure of all, however, was not an American but the much maligned Queen of the Hawaiians, Liliuokalani. Her principles were even more reactionary than those of her predecessor, Kalakaua, and her policies received far more criticism. Liliuokalani was a veritable storm center during the latter part of her brief reign. The Revolution of 1893 was a direct outgrowth of the Queen's political inefficiency. Her attempts to rehabilitate the Constitution of 1864 was a serious affront to the "later missionaries" and, if overlooked, would virtually have constituted an admission of defeat for the latter. While the Queen was personally at fault up to the time of her attempted promulgation of the new Constitution, yet after that incident she became the victim of circumstances which were beyond her control. There was no question about the bloodthirsty nature of the Queen and even when Cleveland offered to restore the throne to her, she demanded that her enemies be beheaded and their property confiscated. The outstanding personalities in the Democratic administration, in

so far as the Hawaiian question was concerned, were Cleveland and Gresham. Cleveland's moral rectitude and Gresham's chivalry were the impelling forces which motivated the unwise and eventually stalemated the Democratic policy. Blount might be compared to Stevens in that he was the agent of Cleveland while Stevens was the tool of Blaine. Here the analogy ends for Blount conducted himself remarkably well while Stevens' conduct was definitely not above reproach.

Public opinion played an important part in the annexation question. In Hawaii it was generally recognized that the economic interests of the United States and Hawaii were so intimately associated that annexation was the desired end although some demurred because of the problem of labor importation which would come into conflict with the immigration laws of the United States. In the United States the question was generally accorded a partisan reception until Cleveland made known his plan to eject the Dole Government and restore Liliuokalani to her throne. Immediately a storm of opposition, unrestrained by party alignments broke over Cleveland's head. This vociferous disapproval both from the press and political leaders continued up to the time that the Hawaiian conditions necessitated the abolition of the policy of restitution.

In the final analysis, the outstanding feature of Cleveland's Hawaiian policy was his ability to maintain high ethical standards of conducting foreign relations in the face of admittedly strong opposition. He raised the level of American

foreign policy to a high moral place by insisting that the smaller nations which were being universally trampled upon be accorded an opportunity to decide for themselves on the basis of self-determinism the continuance of their national well-being, and thereby avert the intrigues of designing politicians as well as the selfishly imposed programs of alien groups.

If the Spanish-American crisis had not arisen in 1897, it is likely that Cleveland's Hawaiian policy would have been accepted as the continuous policy of the American State Department for some years to come and the possibility of Hawaiian annexation at least dismissed as a matter of small importance.

APPENDIX A
Treaty of Reciprocity, 1875¹

The United States of America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, equally animated by the desire to strengthen and perpetuate the friendly relations which have heretofore uniformly existed between them, and to consolidate their commercial intercourse, have resolved to enter into a Convention for Commercial Reciprocity. For this purpose, the President of the United States has conferred full powers on Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands has conferred like powers on Honorable Elisha H. Allen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Chancellor of the Kingdom, Member of the Privy Council of State, His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, and Honorable Henry A. P. Carter, Member of the Privy Council of State, His Majesty's Special Commissioner to the United States of America.

And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due form, have agreed to the following articles.

Article I.

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands in the next succeeding article of this convention and as an equivalent therefor, the United States hereby agree to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth and manufacture or produce of the Hawaiian Islands, into all the ports of the United States free of duty.

Schedule.

Arrow-root; castor oil; bananas, nuts, vegetables, dried, and undried, preserved and unpreserved; hides and skins undressed; rice; pulu; seeds, plants, shrubs or trees; muscovado, brown, and all other unrefined sugar, meaning hereby the grades of sugar heretofore commonly imported from the Hawaiian Islands and now known in the markets of San Francisco and Portland as "Sandwich Island sugar;" syrups of sugar-cane, melado, and molasses; tallow.

Article II.

For and in consideration of the rights and privileges granted by the United States of America in the preceding article of this convention, and as an equivalent therefor,

1. Malloy, "Treaties, Conventions, etc., Vol. I, p. 915-17.

His Majesty, the King of the Hawaiian Islands hereby agrees to admit all the articles named in the following schedule, the same being the growth, manufacture or produce of the United States of America, into all the ports of the Hawaiian Islands, free of duty.

Schedule.

Agricultural implements; animals; beef, bacon, pork, ham and all fresh, smoked or preserved meats; boots and shoes; grain, flour, meal, and bran, bread and breadstuffs, of all kinds; bricks, lime and cement; butter, cheese, lard, tallow, bullion; coal, cordage, naval stores including tar, pitch, resin, turpentine raw and rectified; copper and composition sheathing; nails and bolts; cotton and manufactures of cotton bleached, and unbleached, and whether or not colored, stained, painted or printed; eggs; fish and oysters, and all other creatures living in the water, and the products thereof; fruits, nuts, and vegetables, green, dried, or undried, preserved or unpreserved; hardware; hides, furs, skins and pelts, dressed or undressed; hoop iron, and rivets, nails, spikes and bolts, tacks, brads or sorigs; ice; iron and steel and manufactures thereof; leather; lumber and timber of all kinds, round, hewed, sawed, and unmanufactured in whole or in part; doors, sashes and blinds; machinery of all kinds, engines and parts thereof; oats and hay; paper, stationery and books, and all manufactures of paper or of paper and wood; petroleum and all oils for lubricating or illuminating purposes; plants, shrubs, trees and seeds; rice; sugar, refined or unrefined; salt; soap; shooks, staves and headings; wool and manufactures of wool, other than ready-made clothing; wagons and carts for the purposes of agriculture or of drayage; wood and manufactures of wood, or of wood and metal except furniture either upholstered or carved and carriages; textile manufactures, made of a combination of wool, cotton, silk or linen, or of any two or more of them other than when ready-made clothing; harness and all manufactures of leather; starch; and tobacco, whether in leaf or manufactured.

Article III.

The evidence that articles proposed to be admitted into the ports of the United States of America, or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands, free of duty, under the first and second articles of this convention, are the growth, manufacture or produce of the United States of America or of the Hawaiian Islands respectively, shall be established under such rules and regulations and conditions for the protection of the revenue as the two Governments may from time to time respectively prescribe.

Article IV.

No export duty or charges shall be imposed in the Hawaiian Islands or in the United States, upon any of the articles pro-

posed to be admitted into the ports of the United States or the ports of the Hawaiian Islands free of duty, under the first and second articles of this convention. It is agreed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty, that, so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant any special privilege or rights of use therein, to any other power, state or government, nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States.

Article V.

The present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by his Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the Government of the United States, but not until a law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America. Such assent having been given and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in article VI, the convention shall remain in force for seven years, from the date at which it may come into operation; and further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same; each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years, or at any time thereafter.

Article VI.

The present convention shall be duly ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Washington city, within eighteen months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the high contracting parties have signed this present convention, and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

Done in duplicate, at Washington, the thirtieth day of January, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five.

Hamilton Fish.
Elisha H. Allen.
Henry A. P. Carter.

APPENDIX B

Nationality and Value of Sugar Plantations in Hawaii in 1890¹

Nationality	Valuation	Percentage
Americans	\$ 24,735,610	74.17
British	6,038,130	18.11
Germans	2,008,600	6.02
Hawaiians	266,250	.80
Other National- alities	299,100	.90
Totals	\$ 33,347,690	100.

1. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 259.

APPENDIX C

Imports and Exports By Countries¹

Imports into Hawaii	1884	1886	1888	1890
United States	\$2,835,127	\$3,724,006	\$3,444,661	\$5,264,692
Great Britain	715,532	55,711	652,171	1,204,022
Germany	197,531	144,207	189,929	147,288
Australasia	29,375	29,352	110,924	142,494
China & Japan	178,162	257,913	119,616	313,607
France	21,121	11,495	10,292	7,803
All other Countries	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	<u>\$4,637,514</u>	<u>\$4,877,738</u>	<u>\$4,540,857</u>	<u>\$6,962,901</u>
Exports from Hawaii				
United States	-----	10,412,827	-----	13,073,477
Great Britain	-----	-----	-----	-----
Germany	-----	12,209	-----	-----
Australasia	-----	3,322	-----	18,110
China & Japan	-----	3,198	-----	12,536
Islands in Pacific	-----	-----	-----	30,769
All other Places	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	<u>\$8,184,923</u>	<u>\$10,565,886</u>	<u>\$11,707,599</u>	<u>\$13,242,829</u>

1. Revised from U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 264.

APPENDIX D

Value of Exported Articles¹

Articles:	1882	1884	1886	1888	1890
Sugar	-----	-----	\$ 9,775,132	\$10,818,883	\$12,159,285
Molasses	-----	-----	14,502	5,900	7,603
Rice	-----	-----	326,629	577,583	545,240
Coffee	-----	-----	1,067	1,698	14,737
Hides	-----	-----	111,911	85,853	70,949
Tallow	-----	-----	1,011	7,507	1,140
Goatskins	-----	-----	12,644	8,887	3,182
Wool	-----	-----	37,700	41,084	35,396
Fungus	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Bananas	-----	-----	43,824	69,249	176,351
All Others	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	\$6,385,437	\$7,977,909	\$10,565,886	\$11,639,465	\$13,623,304

1. Sen. Ex. Doc., 2nd Sess., 52nd Cong., Vol. 8, p. 67.

APPENDIX E

Nationality of Vessels Engaged in the Foreign Carrying

Trade of Hawaii¹

Nationality	1882	1884	1886	1888	1890					
No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons					
American	179	103,591	191	135,618	220	128,224	164	113,069	224	153,098
Hawaiian	19	5,613	29	41,398	29	40,242	43	65,115	35	43,461
British	44	56,025	11	3,672	38	30,435	24	28,715	16	22,912
German	11	5,716	4	2,959	8	5,581	8	6,385	9	7,070
French	1	244	4	3,225	---	---	---	---	---	---
All other	4	1,430	2	954	7	6,206	8	6,892	9	9,980
Total	258	172,619	241	187,826	302	219,688	247	222,216	293	236,701

1. Revised from U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 265.

APPENDIX F
Dole to Stevens¹

Government Building
Honolulu, January 17, 1893

His Excellency John L. Stevens

United States Minister Resident:

Sir: I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of this day, recognizing the Hawaiian provisional government, and express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late government and have made demand upon the Marshall to surrender the station house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station house, but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United States forces, and would request that the commander of the United States forces take command of our military forces so that they may act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, etc.,

Sanford B. Dole
Chairman executive Council

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication: "The above request not complied with"--Stevens.)

1. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 592.

APPENDIX G¹

We the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliuokalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution, and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action were upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces.

1. Appletons' Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1893, New Series, Vol. XVIII, p. 377.

APPENDIX H
Blount's Instructions¹

Department of State

Washington, March 11, 1893

Hon. James H. Blount, etc:

Sir: The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional Government demands the fullest consideration of the president, and in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to despatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a letter, whereby the president accredits you to the president of the Executive and Advisory Councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution being necessarily left, in a great measure, to your good judgment and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the president all the facts you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Government was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing authority, and, in general, all that

1. U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. II, p. 567.

can fully enlighten the President touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfil this charge, your authority in all matters touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other Government of the Islands, and the protection of our citizens therein, is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the commander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

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
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