CHILE AND THE UNITED STATES (1800-1830)

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

Josephine M. Spaniola

1954

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By

Josephine M. Spaniola

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

History Department

1954

Approved Harrle B. Files

## Acknowledgments

The author wishes to express her sincere thanks to Dr. Harold Bond Fields, under whose inspiration, supervision, and unfailing interest this investigation was undertaken and to whom the results are herewith dedicated.

She is also greatly indebted to the Michigan State College Library staff who so willingly located and obtained books from libraries throughout the country.



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### Chapter I

#### Introduction

The conquest and settlement of Chile as a Smaish colony was begun in 1540 under the leadership of Pedro de Valdivia. The colony was placed, from the very first years of its existence, in a state of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world. The Spanish kings adopted this policy of isolation because they considered the colony as their own personal property and were unwilling to allow fereigners to establish themselves in the colony or to reap any economic benefit from it. Realising that contact with strangers and fereigners would probably arouse discontent and restlessness among the colonists, the Spanish kings decided to guard against this danger by doing everything in their power to keep foreigners from coming into contact with the colonists.

They even went so far as to place limitations on Spaniards who wished to enrich themselves by explaiting the colony. These Spaniards were allowed passage to Chile if they could "give sufficient proof of their status, religion, honesty, and industry." After this proof was accepted by the king, the applicants were granted a royal license which entitled them to a legal residence in the colony.

The Smaish government maintained complete jurisdiction over its

Luis Galdames (Translated by Isaze Joslin Cox), A History of Chile (North Carolina, 1941), p. 62.

colony by setting up a political system which enabled the king to remain in absolute control of the colony. Chile was placed within the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Peru. The Viceroy was directly responsible to the king and the Council of the Indies. All other colonial efficers such as the members of the audiencias, the governors, energideres, alcaldis, etc. were subordinate to the Vicercy. With this political establishment in existence, the Spanish government endeavered to keep all foreigners from entering the colony and attempted to prevent the people from receiving liberal ideas which might have led to a revelt against Spain. In order to accomplish this, the Vicercy was supplied with exceedingly detailed instructions. Many laws and restrictions were drawn up by the kings of Spain.

The Spaniards, who had received the reyal license from the king, were not able to escape the watchful eye of the Spanish government ence they had arrived in the colony. The local officials were given strict orders to watch their every move. These Spaniards were not permitted "to reside in any port or in any place near the sea." They were obliged to "live apart in the interior under the surveillance of the civil magistrates" who were required to "keep them under strict and constant watch even to the examination of their correspondence." If any stranger was found in the colony without the royal license, he was sent back to Spain by the first returning vessel under guard.

<sup>2</sup> A. Stuart M. Chishelm, The Independence of Chile (Boston, 1911), p. 11.

The Spanish commercial policy also provided for the establishment of Chilean isolation. The Spanish government organised an elaborate economic administration which, similar to the political erganization, previded that the final authority would rest with the king. A House of Trade (the Casa de Contratación) was placed in complete charge of all commerce and navigation between the mother country and the Indies. The Casa de Centratación had the right to confer directly with the Crown, though it was under the general jurisdiction of the Council of the Indies during most of its existence. Similar to the political administration, the economic supplied its officials with detailed instructions and laws. One of the laws stated that any person who did not have a special license from the king was not to be allowed to trade in the colony. In another, the colonial authorities were specifically ordered to punish any person in the colonies who carried em any trade whatseever with foreigners. This law premulgated by King Philip II on December 15, 1558, was frequently repeated by his successors and clearly demonstrates the attitude of the Spanish government which endured for approximately two and a half conturies. It stated:

We order and command that all persons who shall trade and traffic in the Indies, its provinces and harbors, with foreigners, of whatseever nation, who shall buy or barter gold, silver, pearls, precious stenes, fruit or any other kind of merchandise; or shall buy or barter the spoils of battle or shall sell supplies, ammunition, arms or warlike stores and shall be found guilty of such sale, trade, barter or purchase, shall be punished with death and the confiscation of their property; and we command the governors and captains general of our provinces, islands, and harbors to proceed against such persons with all the rigor of the law and to punish them without fail and without remission. And we withhold from our Royal Audiences all power of dispensation or remission in the execution of the aferesaid penalties, since our royal will is that the provisions of this act be enforced and fulfilled without change or favor.

Thus the officials in the colonies had to maintain a strict vigilance over all trading transactions. For approximately two conturies, trade was restricted to the three ports of Veraerus in Mexice, Cartagena in Colombia, and Puerto Belle on the Isthmus of Panama. Of all the Spanish colonies, Chile suffered the most because of this restriction. The mearest port of trade open to Chile was that of Puerto Belle on the Isthmus of Panama and the difficulty of making this trip greatly influenced the majority of the Chileans to remain at home, free from any contact with the outside world.

Although the Spanish colonial system enforced its isolationist policy in all its colonies of South America, Chile was the colony in which the policy of isolation met with the most success. It was not because the Spanish efficials were more scalous than those in the ether colonies, it was because Chile was geographically suited to isolation. The Atacama Desert in the north, one of the driest deserts in the world, hindered the majority of people from making any journey through it. The Andes on the eastern boundary effectively separated Chile from the Provinces of La Plata and to the west, the Pacific

<sup>5</sup> Requeted from Chishelm, Independence of Chile, pp. 11-12.

Coast offered little contact with outsiders. Very few ships ventured through the Straits of Magellan and few people realised the economic possibilities which existed on the Pacific Coast. Most sailors preferred to exploit the waters of the Atlantic rather than risk a hazardous jearney to the Pacific. Consequently Chile remained aloof having only eccasional contacts with Puerte Belle and the previnces of La Plata.

Although Chile had been kept in almost complete isolation for two and a half centuries, she was not destined to remain so forever. Her economic petentiality was seen to be discovered by the Europeans and North Americans. The trip which was to awaken interecurse with the Chilean Coast was that performed by the famous Captain Cook. In 1776, the British government sent Captain Cook on an expedition primarily for the purpose of settling the question of the northwest passage to Europe. He had been instructed to sail into the Pacific, go through the chain of newly discovered islands and after reaching as far morth as the sixty fifth degree of latitude to endeavor to find a passage to the Atlantic. While making this voyage, many new facts were discovered about the Chilean Coast. News of his voyage spread throughout Europe and Morth America. His two volume book published in 1784, which was entitled A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean in 1776, was widely read with increasing interest by many people. John Ledyard, & North American adventurer, who had accompanied Captain Cook on his voyage, returned to Baltimore after deserting the English mavy and dedicated all his efforts to awakening

enthusiasm in his compatricts for far away and bold enterprises.

The man whom he influenced the most was Joseph Barrel an expert

financier from Baltimore. Barrel believed that in the Pacific

there existed a "splendid harvest for the first one who would risk

it."4

In 1787 Barrel's dream of a profitable enterprise in the Pacific materialized and he formed a company with a capital of fifty thousand dellars. His company equipped the frigate "Columbia" and the sloop "Lady Washington" which set sail for the Pacific Ocean with the expressed purpose of going to the north west coast in order to investigate the possibilities of the fur trade. Shortly after the two ships had passed through the Straits of Magellan and entered into the Pacific Ocean, a storm arose which separated them. The "Columbia" was badly damaged and was in need of fresh water and fire wood.

Therefore, in May 1788 because of the damage wrought to it by the storm, the "Columbia" anchored off the island of Juan Fernandez and became the first North American ship ever to visit the coast of Chile. It was the first contact which the North Americans had had with the Chileans and was to be the beginning of an increasing number of American ships and sailers on the coasts of Chile.

Bugenie Pereira Salas, Buques norteamericanes en Chile a fines de la era colonial (1788-1810) (Santiage de Chile, 1936), p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

The governor of the island received the Americans hospitably and permitted the distressed crew to repair damages, take in wood and water, and sail away. Then the Vicercy of Peru heard that the governor of Juan Fernandes had acted so hespitably to the North Americans, he became very indignant. This was a serious effense on the part of the governor because the Spanish policy of seclusion of the colonies was not to be treated as a matter of little importance. The Vicercy immediately thundered a message upon the erring governor in which he critically reprimanded him. He reported in the state paper his handling of the matter as fellows:

In my answer to the governor, I expressed my displeasure for the bad service which he had rendered to the King, in allowing the strange ship to leave the pert instead of taking possession of both her and the erew . . . I expressed my surprise, that the governor of an island should not know that every strange vessel which anchors in these seas, without a license from eur court, ought to be treated as an enemy, even though the nation to which she belonged should be an ally of Spain . . . and I gave orders, that if the ship should appear again, she should immediately be seized and the erew imprisoned . . . .

The Vicercy transmitted a complete account of the whole affair to the King. After reading this account, the King decided that the laws regarding foreign ships and traders should be re-emphasized. In order to strengthen the colonial officials vigilance in regard to this matter, two codules were passed, one on December 29, 1788

America; a History of British Activities in Exploration, Military Adventure, Diplomacy, Science and Trade in Latin America (New York, 1917), pp. 135-136.

and another on July 13, 1789. Both of these specifically ordered the colonial officials to exert every means possible to stop the influx of foreign ships. 7

Previous to the coming of the "Columbia", the Chilean efficials had had little actual need of enfercing the laws against foreign intrusion. Few ships had ever come to Chile except during the Elisabethan period of England when pirates such as Sir Thomas Cavendish and Sir Francis Drake had frequented the coast and landed in Valparaise. But they had given no alarm to the Spanish government. How, however, the situation had changed. The Spanish efficials were greatly concerned ever the possibility of the future influx of North American and fereign ships. This concern was to be justified because Chile was soon to encounter the coming of more ships which were to threaten and finally destroy the existence of the isolationist policy which Spain had adopted.

The discovery of seals and sea lions gave the first actual impetus which brought North American sailers to the Chilean coast. They were first discovered by the erew of the "Lady Washington", the ship which had been separated from the "Columbia" during the storm of 1788. While the sailers of the "Columbia" had been recuperating on the island of Juan Fernandes, Captain Grey and the erew of the "Lady Washington" had

<sup>7</sup> John J. Johnson, "Early Relations of the United States With Chile," Pacific Historical Review, XIII: (1944); pc 262.

Galdames, Hist. of Chile, p. 62.

gene ashere on the island of San Ambrosic. During their stay on shere, the beat's crew saw numerous seals and sea lions, a wast number of which they killed. When the "Lady Washington" returned to Beston with her supply of seal oil and skins, the news spread rapidly and many business men began to realise that the hunting of seals in the Pacific would be an advantageous enterprise. Therefore, in 1792 and 1793 the sealing industry on the west seast of South America began.9

In the years that fellowed, an increasing number of North American ships frequented the waters around the islands of San Ambrosie, San Felis, Más a Fuera, Chilee, La Mocha, Santa Maria, and the Archipielage de les Chomes. 10 Thus the first influx of Worth Americans on a large scale came about because of the scaling industry.

The establishment of the whaling industry was the second insentive which enseuraged North Americans to come to the coast of Chile. The whales had been hunted so methodically in the Atlantic that the supply was becoming depleted and new fields of exploitation had to be found. Only the Pacific had not been exploited and the abundance of whales in the Pacific had been verified by the scientific expedition of Cook in 1776. A

<sup>9</sup> Johnson, "Barly Relations", PHR, XIII, 260.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

further enticement was brought about by a London merchant who adventured in the Pacific in 1789. When he returned to London approximately one year and seven menths later, he brought with him one hundred and thirty nine tons of sporm oil. 11 After the news of this reached the New Englanders in 1791, six ships from Mantucket and one from New Bedford sailed for the Pacific. 12 The "Beaver" of Mantucket was the first ship of North America to pursue whales in the Pacific. 18 Before returning to New England, the "Beaver" put into Callae for provisions. The Spanish officials were at that time adhering strictly to the laws against foreign intrusion and therefore did not greet it in a cerdial manner. Consequently, the "Beaver" helds what J. J. Jehnson calls the "dubious honer of being the first American vessel to be ordered out of a Spanish Pacific coastal port. "14

Mhaling in the Pacific proved to be a very profitable enterprise and as the years passed, the number of North Americans engaged in this enterprise increased. Between 1791 and 1809, one hundred and thirty three North American ships were engaged in whale fishing. The tetal number of North American ships on the

<sup>11</sup> Pereira Salas, Buques norteamericanes, p. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Johnson, "Early Relations", PHR, XIII, 262.

<sup>18</sup> Pereira Salas, Buques nerteemericanes, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Johnson, "Early Relations", PHR, XIII, 262.

Chilean coast engaged in either seal or whale fishing between 1788 and 1890 amounted to two hundred and fifty two. 15

Thus in a period of twenty one years, the influx of North Americans grew to an alarmingly large number as far as the Spanish were concerned. They became greatly agitated over this influx and resented the infiltration of the North Americans, but were unable to put a stop to it. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars had resulted in the blockade of the Spanish ports and consequently Spain was unable to send any aid to the Pacific coast. The Viceroy of Peru didn't have enough ships or sailors available to put forth any substantial epposition that was strong enough to drive the Americans from the coast. He was in such an atterly desperate pecition that on one eccasion he was forced to rely on one of the local businessmen to supply him with a ship in order to pursue the American trespassers. Without a sufficient supply of ships or men, all such efforts to stop foreign intrusion were fruitless as neither the ships nor the sailors which the Vicercy did have under his command were a match for the Americans. 16

Therefore, the Americans were able to continue their seal and whale fishing without any real trouble from the Spanish efficials.

Wany of these ships had occasion to land in the Chilean ports, thus

<sup>15</sup> Pereira Salas, Buques norteamericanos, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> Diego Barros Arana, Historia Joneral de Chile (Santiago, 1890), VII, 485.

ecming in direct contact with the Chilean people. Some ships were driven to the perts by storms, some came because of the need for repairs on their vessels, and still others came in search of fresh water, fire wood, and other provisions.

While in the perts, the sailers noticed that the Spanish celemists were in need of supplies, foodstuffs and other necessities. Because of the strife in Europe, Spain was unable to get even the bare necessities to Chile. For a period of four years (1796 to 1800), net one ship from Spain had entered the port of Valparaise. 17 Therefore, seeing Chile in such a state of need, these North American sailers began to engage in contraband trade. Since the Chileans were in need of supplies, the goods smuggled ashore from the American ships were very much welcomed by the Chileans who were glad to trade with the Americans. The enforcement of the laws against foreign intrusion was laxly executed.

However, in the years 1799 to 1802, there existed a serious attempt on the part of the Spanish authorities to eurb these "contrabandistas". This proposed return to enforcement did not meet with success. Only twenty two ships were presecuted for illicit trade and twelve condemned. In spite of the action taken by the Spanish authorities, the Americans had begun a large scale centraband trade with the Chileans. 18

<sup>17</sup> Johnson, "Early Relations", PHR, XIII, 264.

<sup>18</sup> Pereira Salas, Buques nerteamericanos, p. 25.

Once contraband trade proved profitable, the more enterprising of the American sailors made their homes in Chile and obtained their living by acting as intermediaries for smugglers. The number of sailors who actually settled in Chile was small, however. In a census taken in 1808, out of a population of four hundred thousand, only seventy nine were foreigners, nine or ten of whom were American eitigens. 19

The United States citizens, who came to the Chilean coast, were not only concerned with scaling, whaling, and trading, but also were imbued with the idea of spreading revolutionary doctrines. Since the North Americans had won their independence only a few years previously, they felt that the Chileans should also be free and independent. The United States citizens were proud of their new form of government and extolled its merits to the highest. They made comparisons between the United States government and the Chilean, always pointing out that in the United States, the people had control of their own government. They referred to Spain as a tyrannous nation and proclaimed that the Chileans were living under the terrible yoke of Spanish despotism.

The United States citizens living in Chile, although relatively few in number, were responsible for a large amount of this propaganda.

<sup>19</sup> William Miller Collier and Guillermo Feliu Crus, La Primera Mision de Los Estados Unidos de America en Chile (Santiago de Chile, 1926), p. 4.

Melehier Martines, a loyalist ecclesiastic of Chile, became alarmed over their attack on Spain and their steady growth of influence upon certain portions of the Chilean population. He accused the "Bestonese" (the Chileans referred to all United States citizens as "Bestonese") of coming into Chile as spies, seeking influence in the government in order to spread their revolutionary ideas. He claimed that they were so determined to seduce the inhabitants from their attachment to Spain that they were not even "embarrassed by the differences of religion" but even became "nominally Catholics as a means of acquiring freedom and security" in order to take an active part in separating the colony from the mother country.<sup>20</sup> Although his view was exaggerated to a certain extent, he did show that the North Americans were prompting the colonists to revelt.

Not only did these few North Americans who had settled in Chile advance the sentiment for revelt, but these engaged in sealing, whaling, and contraband trade also introduced revolutionary doctrines and ideas. Melchior Martines recognised what the North Americans were doing and he wrote a letter of warning to the Spanish court in which he summarised the situation as follows:

The clandestine trade and the permission to fish for whales introduce traders and adventurers

<sup>20</sup> Bernard Meses, The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in South America 1810-1824 (New York, 1926), p. 41.

from the United States into all the coasts, perts, islands, and other Spanish possessions, giving them apportunity to persuade the Spanish colonists of the flourishing state and advantageous situation of their country, decrying the Spanish colonial government and subjection to the mother country in Europe as ignominious slavery. They magnify the riches and extent of the provinces; proclaim the injustice and tyranny with which the wealth is carried off to enrich Europe; describe the state of obscurity, abandomment, and civil mullity in which the colonists live, and offer with impudence all the aid of their great power to the people who may wish to shake off the yoke of legitimate and just government.<sup>21</sup>

The situation as seen by Martines was far from being wrong. These men engaged in contraband trade brought into Shile copies of the Declaration of Independence, newspapers which carried descriptions of the principles preclaimed in the Convention of Philadelphia and English verses which referred to the intellerable evils of despotism. They spoke to the creeles telling them how wonderful it was to be living in a state of freedem without any foreign eppressor hevering over them.

In 1802 Captain William Shaler, a contrabandish who had gone to Valparaiso in search of fure and had been prevented by the local authorities from engaging in trade, spent two months in Valparaise. During this time, he talked with many discontented creeles and fanned their discontent by pointing out the relation between independence and prosperity, using the United States as

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-41.

a specific example. He gave them a copy of the United States Constitution and also a Spanish translation of the Declaration of Independence.<sup>22</sup>

In 1808 Procopie Pelloe (Pelloek), another contrabandist, arrived from Baltimere and also caused much discontent among the colonists. He became so influential that he was forced to leave Chile because of his revolutionary teachings. Although he did leave Chile, his influence was still strongly felt because his propaganda for freedom centimed. After he left Chile, he went to Buenos Aires and proceeded to send pamphlets regularly to his friends in Chile. His articles were taken largely from American and English periodicals and were so popular and so widely read that they were known as the "Gaceta de Procepie". 25

The Americans continually urged the Chileans to breek with the mother country and implied that they would be around to help if and when the Chileans should decide to fight against Spain.

To a certain extent, the spreading of pamphlets, of eepies of the Declaration of Independence, of newspaper articles, and verses dealing with liberty was of little value. Many of the people couldn't read. Only a very few of the colonists could speak English. Realising this situation, the North Americans changed the ferm of propaganda. Since many people couldn't read

<sup>22</sup> Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (Baltimore, 1941), pp. 13-14.

<sup>25</sup> Barres Arana, Historia Jeneral, VIII, 115-116.

either in English or Spanish, the universally understood medium of imagery was put to use.

Trade was utilized to play hand in hand with this new mode of democratic propaganda. Many purchaseable items carried images which symbolically stood for freedom. Pocket watches, snuff boxes, jewelry, and other objects of frequent use bore symbols of liberty and independence, "ordinarily of a woman dressed in white with a flag in her hand" upon which the inscription "Libertad Americana" appeared.<sup>24</sup>

Another means of spreading propaganda was by distributing picture eards referring to liberty and tyranny. These eards, which were similar to our modern day posteards, were manufactured in the United States and dramatically pertrayed the desirability of liberty and the ugliness of tyranny. William Collier, one of the United States Ambassadors to Chile and Guillerme Crus, a member of the National Historical Museum at Santiago have both seen two of these cards. Upon one, there is the figure of liberty breaking the chains which oppress a degraded man who symbolises the populace. The degraded man delivers the balance of justice to liberty. The second eard depicts a king wearing a bloody crown which is about ready to fall. His hands equally gush forth blood and he is

<sup>24</sup> Jehnson, "Early Relations", PHR, XIII, 265.

favorite of the sourt is receiving a book from the king in which appears a list of the produce and property of the villagers which the king has confiscated.<sup>25</sup>

This propaganda reached its greatest intensity during the years 1808, 1809, and 1810. More people were influenced by this type of propaganda than by the written and spoken propaganda. The language of pictures and images was understood by all, even the most backward of peoples. 26

The French and English propaganda which similar to that of the United States also spread revolutionary ideas, the examples given to Chile by the setting up of Juntas in Argentina and Venezuela and the appearance of a Frenchman, Joseph Bonaparte, on the throne of Spain plus the influence of the United States citizens led the Chileans to call an open cabildo, on September 18, 1810. At the meeting of the open cabildo, the resignation of the governor was accepted and a Junta composed of seven members was established as the governing body. Thus the Chileans began their members to break away from Spanish domination and receive the privilege of governing themselves.

Although the Spanish were not to lose permanent control of Chile for another eight years, Chile was to begin to act as a

<sup>25</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Told.

and other foreign countries as a nation which would soon be free from the shackles of Spain. The glimmerings of an independent nation began to appear and the Chileans attempted to open commercial and diplomatic relations with the United States.

## Chapter II

## Poinsett's Mission

After the Junta was established in 1810 and the struggle for independence began, the Chileans attempted for the first time to open negotiations with the United States. On March 22nd of 1811, the members of the Junta, finding themselves faced with the problem of equipping the Chilean troops, addressed a letter to President Madison and Congress in which a plea for rifles, pistols, other war an terials and for workmen who knew how to make implements of war appeared. The letter also expressed the desire of the Chileans to establish commercial relations with the United States, and pointed out the advantages which both countries would enjoy if such a step were taken. In order to emphasise this desire for trade, the members of the Junta enclosed a decree in the official letter, which announced the opening of the ports of Valdivia,

Both the decree and the official letter reached the United States emclosed in a letter from Matthew Arnold Hoevel (Havel),

William R. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations (New York, 1945), II, 895-896.

Prancisco José Urrutia, Paginas de Historia Diplomatica, los Estados Unidos de America y las Repúblicas Hispanoamericanas de 1810 a 1830 (Bogota, 1917), p. 45.

North Americans who had some to the Pacific coast during Chile's colonial period in order to engage in whale fishing and commerce. In 1810, he established himself in Chile as a United States citizen and proceeded to become so influential in Santiage society, that when the members of the Junta decided to send the official letter to the United States, they commissioned him with the task of transmitting it.4

In the letter which Hoevel wrote to President Madison, he avowed that the sentiments expressed in the official letter truly represented the attitude of the governing board and of the Chilean people. He further suggested that it would be worthwhile to "meet the wish of the board by seen appointing an agent" in Chile "with whom they might treat on subjects highly interesting and advantageous to both nations." Thus the first attempt of the Chileans to open negetiations with the United States began.

When the Junta's letter arrived in Washington D. C., the United States government, because of its uncertainty as to the successfulness of the revolt, was maintaining a policy of neutrality

Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 895.

Henry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations With the United States (North Carelina, 1947), p. 18; Collier y Crus, La Primera Mission, pp. 32-34.

<sup>5</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 895.

and therefore was unwilling to send any supplies or workmen to Chile. However, the portion of the letter which expressed a desire to establish commercial relations and the decree which announced the epening of Chilean ports to free trade aroused great interest in the government authorities. They began to realize that the Chileans might be able to separate themselves permanently from Spanish control and in the event that this eccurred, they wanted to share in the economic advantages which would be derived from establishing diplomatic relations with Chile.

It also seemed possible that the other provisional governments of South America would win their independence and as they also were opening their ports to free commerce, some of the government officials in Washington began to think that the time had come when the revolted colonies should be recognised as severeign nations. President Madison also was one of these men who deemed it advisable for Congress to deliberate on the question of recognition and in his third annual message to Congress on November 5th, 1811, expressed himself as follows:

In contemplating the scenes which distinguish this mementous epoch, and estimating their claims to our attention, it is impossible to overlook those developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our ewn hemisphere and extend into our neighborhood. An enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their

destinies, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will, to regard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established.

Congress responded to Madison's address by appointing a semmittee of the House of Representatives to consider the subject of recognition. On December 19, 1811, the committee presented a resolution in the House of Representatives to recognise the revolted colonies "as severeign and independent states" and to establish "amicable relations and commercial intercourse", but no action was taken. Congress preferred not to recognise the revolted countries as severeign nations until their revolts proved successful.

However, the United States was very interested in negotiating emmercial treaties with these countries and did not intend to less its chance to establish commercial relations with them.

Therefore, regardless of the fact that the colonies had not as yet wen their independence from Spain, commercial agents were appointed and sent to South America.

The first attempt of the United States to negetiate a commercial treaty with Chile had occurred in 1798 with the appointment of Josiah Blakely of New York as consul to Santiage. Truje, the Spanish minister to the United States, had protested that "Spain recognised no consuls

of the Presidents 1789-1897 (Washington, 1901), I, 494.

<sup>7</sup> Urrutia, Paginas, p. 226.

and he had preceded to warn the Spanish government that the "United States was attempting to worm its way into the celony." The Spanish efficials had succeeded in getting rid of Blakely by imprisoning him on a charge of smuggling and although a man by the name of Andrew Hadfeg had acted in his place from October 15, 1805 to September 6, 1806, all attempts to establish commercial relations had failed. Therefore, no further consular appointments to Chile were made until the United States government decided in 1810 to send commercial agents to South America.

The man selected in 1810 to act as commercial agent in Buenos Aires and Chile was Joel Reberts Poinsett of South Carelina. In 1806 he had returned from a diplomatic mission in Europe and found the government at Nashington as much concerned with Spanish America as with the European war. He seen became familiar with the general situation in respect to Spanish America and sympathized with the revolutionary movements against memarchy. His knowledge of South American conditions, his diplomatic experience in Europe, his ability

<sup>8</sup> Rey F. Nichols, "Trade Relations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America," <u>Hispanic American</u> <u>Historical Review</u>, XIII (1953), 299.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 304.

to speak Spanish fluently and to make friends easily were factors which prompted his appointment.10

On August 27, 1810 he received his first instructions which placed special emphasis on the commercial aspect of his mission.

Robert Smith, the secretary of state, wrote to him as follows:

. . . the real as well as the estensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantage of commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject. 11

Peinsett also was instructed to diffuse the impression that the United States cherished "the sincerest good will towards the people of Spanish America" and that "in the event of a political separation from the parent country, and of the establishment of an independent system of national government," the United States would "premote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal intercourse." 12

On October 15, 1810, Poinsett left the United States and before going to Chile, spent several weeks in Brazil and approximately nine menths in Buenos Aires. During his stay in Buenos Aires, he was premoted to the position of consul general for Buenos Aires.

<sup>10</sup> James Fred Rippy, Joel Roberts Poinsett, Versatile American (North Carelina, 1935), pp. 35-36.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 36, 58; Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 6-7, dates this as June 28, 1810 but Rippy, who has seen the original, states that this must be an error.

<sup>12</sup> Maning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 6-7.

Chile, and Peru. 13 He also received a letter on April 30, 1811 from James Monroe, the new secretary of state. Monroe emphasized the interest which the United States was taking in the South American revolts but gave no decisive set of instructions for Poinsett to follow. He wrote:

The disposition shown by most of the Spanish provinces to separate from Europe and to erect themselves into independent States excites great interest here. As inhabitants of the same hemisphere, as neighbors, the United States cannot be unfeeling spectators of se important a movement. The destiny of those previnces must depend on themselves. Should such a revolution however take place, it cannot be doubted that our relation with them will be more intimate and our friendship stronger than it can be while they are colonies of any European power. 14

Poinsett left for Chile on November 11 of 1811 and four days after his departure, Antonio Pinto, an agent of the Chilean Junta in Buenos Aires, communicated to the governing board of Chile the message that Poinsett was on his way. Fe described him as "a man of fine character" who was very much in sympathy with their cause and informed them that through his mediation, they could secure whatever was needed. 15

<sup>18</sup> Rippy, Jael Poinsett, pp. 37-39.

<sup>14</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 11.

<sup>16</sup> Collier y Cruz, La Primera Mision, p. 23.

Once the news of Peinsett's coming reached Santiage, numerous discussions arose among the Chileans concerning his mission. The "tribunal del censulado", an erganisation with jurisdiction over commercial matters, was definitely opposed to his reception, and when Poinsett arrived in Santiago, he found this erganisation unwilling to accept his credentials. The tribunal, in which a revalist majority predominated, was not entirely pleased with the length to which the new Chilean government had gone in making Chile virtually independent of Spain and did not care to have a United States consul officially received by the Junta.

The members of the tribunal attempted to prehibit his reception by arguing that his appointment had never been confirmed by the United States Senate. 16 They also declared that since Spain had never allowed a consul to enter a colonial port, Chile had no right to receive a censul from the United States. 17 However, these arguments were ably refuted by Don Agustin Vial Santelices, the secretary of the Junta, who pointed out to the members of the tribunal that in 1795, Spain had passed an act which allowed consuls to enter the South American ports. He also enumerated the advantages which Chile would acquire from establishing free trade with the United States and stressed

<sup>16</sup> Evans, Chile and the U.S., p. 16; Rippy, Joel Poinsett, p. 42.

<sup>17</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 24.

the necessity of having a commercial agent in the country. 18

Because the members of the tribunal desired to profit from the trade and commerce which would be epened to them, they decided to accept his credentials.

On February 24, 1812, Poinsett was efficially received in the presence of the Junta, the town council, and a large number of citizens and soldiers. Since he was the first accredited agent of a fereign country to be efficially received in Chile, Den José Miguel Carrera, the President of the Junta, had endeavored to make the occasion as imposing as possible. An address of welcome was delivered by Carrera who emphasised the sincere friendship of the Chilean people and their desire to establish commercial relations with the United States. In reply to Carrera's welcome, Poinsett assured the Chileans of the North American interest in the South American revelts and acknowledged his happiness of "having been the first person" who had the "homorous duty of establishing relations between the two countries."

La Aurora de Chile (the first Chilean revelutionary newspaper) earried an account of Poinsett's reception and commented

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 25-28.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel B. Johnston, Diarie de un tipografe yanqui en Chile y Peru durante la guerra de la independencia (Madrid, 1919), pp. 61-62.

that "it was a day of great gratification for the true lovers of the country." 20

During the period of La Aurora's existence (February 13, 1812 to April 1, 1813), it consistently supported Poinsett and attempted to further the influence of the United States. News from the Boston newspapers appeared in every issue and excerpts from the Declaration of Independence, from a fourth of July speech delivered in Nashington, from Jefferson's inaugural and from Washington's farewell address were often quoted. 21

La Aurera was printed on a printing press brought from New Yerk city by Matthew Hoevel, the United States citisen who had transmitted the Junta's letter to President Madison. The printers of the newspaper were Guillerme Burbidge, Samuel B. Johnston, and Simon Garrison, three United States citizens who had come to Chile in 1811 on board the frigate "Galloway", the same ship which had brought the printing press.<sup>22</sup>

Camile Henriques, the editor of La Aurora, was an ardent admirer of the United States and consequently wrete many editorials in praise of the North American Republic which he described as the "sum of America" and the "beacon" which the Chileans should follow. 23

<sup>20</sup> Requeted from Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 30.

<sup>21</sup> Meses, Intellectual Background, p. 101.

<sup>22</sup> Johnston, Diario, p. 35.

<sup>25</sup> Miguel Luis Amunategui, Camile Henriques (Santiago, 1911), p. 26.

On April 30, 1812, the following article appeared in La Aurora which was characteristic of the manner in which he extolled the merits of the United States:

The United States possesses a great people who have been freed from tyranny and are now offering refuge to many of our peninsular brothers who flee from French vandalism. They lag behind in painting and sculpture but have abounded in material welfare, in farming and manufacturing. Their greatest achievement is their marvelous advancement in schools. Their constitution has made their land an asylum for the oppressed. 24

By writing other articles similar to this, Henriques attempted to persuade the Chilean people that the United States was a sountry to admire and respect.

While Camilo Henriquez was promoting friendship between the United States and Chile, Poinsett was successfully beginning to raise the prestige and influence of the United States. He not only won the support of the Junta but received the warm friendship of its president, Don José Miguel Carrera.

Poinsett and Carrera had much in common. They were of Latin lineage, were deeply interested in military affairs, had a certain passionate intensity, and each accepted the principles of the Prench Revolution with enthusiasm. Consequently a mutual friendship developed almost at first sight, and Carrera admired Poinsett so much that the latter began to acquire a powerful influence in

<sup>24</sup> Requoted from Evans, Chile and the U.S., p. 17.

the affairs of the country.25

When Peinsett first arrived in Chile, he had discovered that many North American ships had been seized and their cargoes confiscated by the Peruvian privateers. The privateers had been sent by the Vicercy of Peru, who resented the action of the Chileans in ridding themselves of the Spanish officials. The Vicercy had declared the Chilean laws regarding free commerce null and void and had attempted to enforce the colonial laws against foreign intrusion. The Junta had done little more than protest and Peinsett, seen after his reception, boldly urged the authorities at Santiage to protect the commerce of the United States by closing the perts of Chile to Peru. But the Chileans were not strong enough to enforce such a policy and therefore Peinsett's suggestion was not followed.<sup>26</sup>

Seen after this eccurrence, the members of the Junta, who were aware of Poinsett's enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause, asked him to aid them in obtaining military supplies. He consented and not only did he furnish them with the names and addresses of certain dealers in the United States but also sent for supplies himself. On February 26, 1812, La Aurora announced that "Mr. Poinsett had sent to the United States for six thousand muskets,

Rippy, Joel Poinsett, p. 42; Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, pp. 33-34.

<sup>26</sup> Collier y Cras, La Primera Mision, pp. 39-48.

ene thousand pistols and some light field pieces, besides uniforms, saddles and trumpets."27 Although he made this effort to obtain these supplies, he was unable to get them because the United States was engaged in the War of 1812 and needed all available supplies at home.

On July 4th, 1812, an elaborate celebration took place in Santiago which advanced the cause of independence and furthered the favorable attitude of the Chileans towards the United States. The United States eitisens living in Santiago had planned the occasion in order to celebrate the fourth of July and the Chilean patriots employed the same day to adopt officially a national flag of blue, white, and yellow and a cockade of the same color. Carrera, because of the persistent encouragement of Peinsett, had entertained the idea of selemnly making a declaration of independence, but abandoned the plan at the last minute.<sup>28</sup>

The celebration strengthened the ties of friendship between the United States and Chile and placed an emphasis on the mutual leve of these two countries for freedom and independence. Samuel B. Johnston (one of the North American printers of La Aurora) described the festivities as follows:

At sunrise, the stars and stripes of our nation were hoisted in many public places(a thing which was done for the first time in this city) entwined with the tri-colored banner of Chile. In the

<sup>27</sup> Chishelm, Independence of Chile, p. 211.

<sup>28</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 60.

afternoon our compatriots, in company with some Chilean gentlemen of distinction, celebrated a banquet at which the liberty and independence of both mations were mutually commemorated in happy toasts. At night a magnificent ball was given by our consul-general at which were present the Junta and nearly three hundred persons of both sexes of the best society.

Camile Henriques, the editor of <u>La Aurora</u>, took advantage of this eccasion to read the patriotic hymn he had composed which sang of the "illustrious country of Washington extending her arms to the vigorous south." After reading this, he demanded that the Chileans declare their independence and draw up a constitution. Sl

Amidst these festivities an unfortunate incident occurred.

Matthew Hoevel (whom Poinsett had appointed as vice consul) and
the North American printers came to the palace where the banquet
was being held. They drank toe freely of liquor and became guilty
of valgarity and disorder which finally led them to attack some
Chilean seldiers. A few casulties resulted, and consequently
the printers were imprisoned. Hoevel was deprived of his position
of vice consul and Poinsett notified the authorities in Washington
that his former assistant had been working secretly against the
United States. However, the incident did not cause the Chilean
people to harbor any bad feelings towards the United States

<sup>29</sup> Johnston, Diarie, pp. 95-96.

<sup>50</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 62.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., pp. 66-69.

because Poinsett tactfully handled the situation and it was soon forgotten. 32

Once the settling of this incident was achieved, Poinsett busied himself with another matter. The Chilean government had become precocupied with Henriques's suggestion of drafting a new constitution and a commission consisting of Henriques and six ethers had been appointed to perform this task. Carrera notified Poinsett of the government's intentions and asked him to help in this project. Poinsett gladly acquiesed and the commission met regularly in Poinsett's home in order to form the fundamental ideas which would be included in the new constitution. 35

On July 11, 1812, Poinsett presented a constitution to the commission which he had drawn up himself. His draft was very similar to the United States constitution except for certain features which were designed especially for the particular conditions that existed in Chile. It stressed the importance of the legislative body, of the desirability of division of powers, asserted Chile's claim to ecclesiastical patronage and contained a bill of rights. But the commission did not adopt it because they believed it to be too bold; it had failed to mention Ferdinand VII and had taken too advanced a position with regard to the question of patronage. Although Poinsett's constitution

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp. 63-65.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 70-71.

was rejected, many of its basic principles were incorporated into the Chilean constitution which was completed on the 22nd of October. 34

During the first year of Poinsett's mission, the United States reached an unparalleled height of prestige and influence in Chile. Captain Porter of the United States Navy, who had been sent to the Pacific to protect American shipping, arrived in Valparaise on March 15, 1813 and attested that he and his crew were offered "every civility, assistance and accomodation that Valparaise could afford." He further acknowledged that the Chileans "looked up to the United States of America for example and protection."

The prestige of the United States was strengthened by Captain Porter's arrival. The Chilean people had assumed from Poinsett's actions and sentiments that the United States would soon make an effort to participate in the revolt, and when the news of Porter's arrival became known the Chileans became overwhelmingly happy. They believed that the United States had decided to negotiate for a cerdial alliance and was ready to support the Chilean cause by force of arms. Porter made me effort to inform the Chileans of their error and noted the situation in his diary as follows:

. . . as I had not, since my arrival, given any hints of my object in this sea, I found it not too late to encourage a belief that suited my

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 70-110.

Captain David Porter, Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ceean in the United States Frigate Essex in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814 (New York, 1822), I, 94.

views and accorded with their wishes. I had prepared my efficers and crew to secrecy before my arrival and had now no objection that the good people of this place should put the most favorable construction on our arrival among them. 36

Consequently when Porter left Valparaise, the Chilean people still mistakenly believed that he had been sent by the United States government to negotiate a cordial alliance and to assist the patriots in their fight for freedom.

In the months which followed, Poinsett, disregarding the neutrality policy of the United States, participated in the military campaigns against the royalist forces. He became Carrera's chief military advisor, organised and disciplined the army which was being formed in Concepcion, and accepted a position as commander of a division in the Chilean army.

Taleshuane that eleven American whalers had been captured by the Peruvian privateers and that the Spanish commander was threatening to send the American sailors to Lima in chains. Poinsett immediately set out for Taleshuane, led an attack against the revalist treeps and succeeded in freeing the sailors. After this attack was ever, he seturned to Concepcion and participated in the Battle of Chillan in which the patriots failed to drive out the revalists.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

<sup>87</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, pp. 145-151; Rippy, Joel Peinsett, p. 50.

Poinsett was not the only United States citizen who participated in the Chilean war of independence. Many of the North Americans living in Chile and those engaged as sailors aboard the North American merchant ships also took an active part in the military and naval campaigns.

The Chilean navy was first established in April of 1815 and was composed of the "Perla" and the "Potrillo", two North American merchant ships. Carrera had purchased these ships from American merchants after the members of the Junta had expressed their desire to establish a navy which would protect Chilean commerce from the Peruvian privateers and aid the military operations of the patriots. 58

Many of the former sailors of the "Perla" and the "Potrille" (all United States citizens) were incorporated into the Chilean navy. One of these Americans, a Mr. Edward Barnewall, was placed in command of the "Potrillo" and Samuel B. Johnston, the former printer of La Aurora, served as his lieutenant. 59

The navy was in existence for only two weeks. The patriots, underestimating the naval power of the Peruvian forces, attempted on May the 3rd to destroy the Spanish frigate "Warren". Because of a traitor on board the "Perla" and because the Chilean navy was very weak, the entire crows of both the "Perla" and the "Potrillo"

<sup>38</sup> José Niguel Carrera to Bernardo O'Higgins, April 13, 1813 and April 15, 1813, Archivo de Don Bernardo O'Higgins (Santiago de Chile, 1947), I, 230, 233.

<sup>39</sup> Johnston, Diario, p. 124.

were captured and imprisoned in Casas Matas, a jail located in Callack

The United States citizens solicited help from Poinsett and the Chilesn Junta, but received no aid. Finally after these United States citizens had been imprisoned for a period of six months, a Mr. Curson (a North American residing in Peru) succeeded in persuading the Vicercy of Peru to release them on the condition that they promise to go directly to the United States and never return to Chile. However, once they had embarked on the frigate "Hope", the captain of the ship pretended that it needed repairs and went to Valparaise where he left the American citizens. 41

Despite the fact that Poinsett and the United States citizens were fighting for Chilean independence, the prestige and influence of the United States began to decrease towards the end of 1813.

Two factors were instrumental in this decline. First of all, the Chilean people were beginning to lose faith in the United States.

Nearly a year had passed since Porter had raised their hopes that a cordial alliance would be formed and still no effort had been made by the United States government to negotiate one. Secondly, the people were becoming dis-satisfied with Carrera's rule and because Poinsett was such a close friend of Carrera and had been

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 125-129.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 162-166.

so active in government affairs, the Chilean people blamed him as well as Carrera for the unfavorable conditions that existed in the country. All patriot losses were said to be due to his influence.

During the last months of 1813, Poinsett began to feel that all his efforts to help the Chileans win their independence were unappreciated and he became completely discouraged. On September 2, 1813 he wrote Joseph Johnson (a friend who lived in Charleston, South Carolina) that he found himself "shut out from the world and all intercourse" with his friends. He became so despondent that he left the battle field and retired to Carrera's country estate in order to recover his health.

On November 27, 1813, Don José Miguel Carrera lest his position as leader of the revolutionary forces and Don Bernardo O'Higgins, a creole of Irish-Spanish blood who was later to become Chile's first executive, was appointed general in chief of the army. This change of leadership hastened the decline of North American influence in Chile. There had always existed much antagonism and resentment between O'Higgins and Carrera and because Poinsett was Carrera's very close friend, O'Higgins continually suspected him of scheming to place Carrera back in

<sup>42</sup> Requoted from Rippy, Joel Poinsett, p. 52.

power. Therefore, Poinsett was unable to revive the prestige of the United States.

The British took advantage of this situation. They had frequented the coast of Chile ever since Cook's expedition in 1776, but had been unable to exert any influence on the Chilean revolutionary government. The reason for this was that after the Frenchman, Joseph Bonaparte, had ascended the Spanish throne in 1808, the British fermed an alliance with the Spanish insurgent government and aided the royalists in attempting to step all revolutionary movements against Spain. Consequently the United States had secured a strong foothold in Chile and British commerce had suffered. But now the British realized that they had a chance to strengthen their prestige and they energetically made an effort to accomplish this.

Two frigates, the "Phoebe" and the "Cherub", under command of Captain Hillyar of the British Havy, were despatched to the Pacific to encourage British commerce, counteract the influence of Poinsett, and to endeavor to destroy the frigate "Essex" which had worked considerable damage to the British whale fishery in the southern seas. Hillyar first proceeded to Callao where he was authorised by the Vicercy of Peru to effer the Chileans certain peace proposals. 45

<sup>43</sup> Archive O'Higgins, II, 62, 139.

When he arrived in Valparaiso February 8, 1814, he found the "Essex" and the "Essex Junior" (a ship which had been taken from the British) safely anchored in the harbor. Although he had orders to destroy the "Essex", he did not wish to violate Chile's neutrality and therefore decided to wait until the ship sailed out of Chilean waters before attacking it.

Porter, realising that his gun power was very inferior to that of Hillyar, waited for a feverable time to clude the enemy and set out to sea. In the meantime the crews of the English and American ships amused the Chilean people by their antics towards one another. The American sailors sang "Yankee Deedle" while the English responded by singing "God Save The King". Perter raised a flag which read, "Free trade and sailors' rights", and Hillyar in turn displayed a flag on which the words "God and country, British sailors' rights; traitors offend both" appeared. 44

On March 28, 1814, Porter tried to escape. The English had withdrawn to the other side of the bay and a favorable wind had arisen. Therefore, taking advantage of the situation, he headed west but just before he reached the open Pacific, a heavy squall struck his frigate and severely injured the rigging. He attempted to get back to shere but was unable to because the

<sup>44</sup> Perter, <u>Journal</u>, II, 147-148.

"Phoebe", "Cherub", and an armed British transport of war began firing on him. Porter resisted the attack for nearly three hours but was compelled to surrender after heavy losses.45

While this combat was in progress, Poinsett, who had come to Valparaiso on the 20th of March, called the governor and asked him to turn the guns of the port on the British, but the governor refused. Poinsett later wrote secretary of state

Monroe that the "Essex" was only "within a cable length of the shere" when the British made this attack.46

With this victory over the "Essex", British influence increased. Captain Poster noted this increase and stated that Chilean friendship was not worth having because the Chilean people gave their support to the country that possessed a superior naval force. He was quite indignant ever the whole affair and remarked:

When I commanded the most powerful force in the Pacific, all were willing to serve me, but when Captain Hillyar appeared with one still stronger, it became the great object to conciliate his friendship by evincing hostility to me. 47

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 168-173.

<sup>46</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 336.

<sup>47</sup> Perter, Journal, II, 173.

Perter, because of his bias, failed to recognize that American prestige had already been on the decline before this incident occurred.

Poinsett, however, had witnessed the increasing hostility of the Chileans towards the United States and had decided to leave Chile, but before departing he attempted to secure the release of Don Jose Miguel Carrera and his brother who had been imprisoned shortly after O'Higgins took charge of the government. On April 11, 1814, Poinsett wrote O'Higgins asking that the Carreras be released and stated:

This is the only thing that detains me here; the hostility which has been manifested against my person has extended to my nation and it esuld produce the most fatal results. The honor of my representation obliges me to leave and I already have my passports but I wait with the desire of contributing to the liberation of my friends.

O'Higgins, however, refused to grant his supplication.

A few days later Poinsett received notice from the government that he should immediately make use of his passperts and leave the country. He had been aggravating the British by trying to persuade the Chileans not to sign the peace treaty which Hillyar had brought from the Viceroy of Pera. Consequently Hillyar and a Lord Strangford had

<sup>48</sup> Archive O'Higgins, I, 223.

written a letter to the Chilean government which insisted that Poinsett be made to leave, 49 Therefore, Poinsett departed for Euenos Aires on April 28, 1814.

The prestige of the United States had completely collapsed and all the efforts of Poinsett to prevent Hillyar from mediating a true between the royalists and the patriots failed. The peace treaty (the Treaty of Lircay) was signed, May 5th, 1814. It provided that Chile should recognize the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII, dissolve the Junta, and re-establish the form of government which it had before the revolt. It also stressed that the troops of Lima would evacuate the territory of Chile and authorised Chile to open her ports to English commerce. 50

Before Poinsett left for the United States, the Carreras escaped from prison and Don José Niguel once more took control of the Chilean government. The Tweaty of Lirouy was repudiated and Carrera sent Poinsett a letter of appreciation for his services to Chile. He wrote that it would be a "happy day" when Poinsett would decide to return but Poinsett had no intention of returning to Chile. He left Buenos Aires for the United States on September 28, 1814.51

<sup>49</sup> Joel Poinsett to James Monroe, secretary of state, June 14, 1814, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 335.

<sup>50</sup> Archive O'Higgins, II, 139.

Collier y Crus, La Primera Mision, p. 184.

## Chapter III

## Missions to Chile and the United States

Once Don José Miguel Carrer reassumed the presidency of the Junta and the command of the patriot forces, the fight for freedom centimed. Bernardo O'Higgins refused to recognize Carrera as Chile's military leader and consequently the country was faced not only with the problem of fighting against Spain but also that of a civil war. However, when O'Higgins learned that the Viceroy of Peru was preparing to send a new contingent of troops to Chile, he decided to change his policy and wrote Carrera proposing that they forget all that had passed and unite their two armies in order to repel the new invasion. Carrera accepted.

In October 1814, the revolutionary forces under the command of O'Higgins met the royalists at Rancagua. The troops were badly in meed of supplies and O'Higgins sent a message to Carrera asking that munitions be sent. Carrera did not send the munitions and consequently O'Higgins' forces were defeated. This defeat spelled the doom of the attempt to drive out the royalists and the patriots were obliged to flee the country.

They erossed the Andes and proceeded to Mendoza where San Martin, who had recently been appointed governor of Cuyo, was erganizing an army and designing a campaign against the royalists in Chile and Peru. When the patriots arrived in Mendoza, they

began quarreling as to who was to blame for the defeat at Fancagua. The old animosity which existed between Carrera and O'Higgins once again arose. The patriots divided into two groups, the Carreristas and the O'Higginistas.

Trouble and dis-satisfaction were caused by Carrera who attempted to maintain the same rank and pre-sainence in Mendosa that he had enjoyed in Chile. Fe treated San Martin arrogantly and haughtily tried to take control of the organization of the army. San Martin did not tolerate this impudent attitude and sent Carrera and his more influential partisans to Buenos Aires.

Thile Carrera was in Buenos Aires, he realized that he had many enemies who were trying to keep him from gaining any influence in a future attack against the Spanish in Chile.

Therefore he decided to go to the United States in order to obtain men and equipment with which he could defeat the Spanish and become once again the leader of Chile. This was not the first time that he had considered going to the United States for help.

On more than one occasion during the period when Poinsett was in Chile, this idea had crossed his mind and now he believed that the time had come when he should take it upon himself to obtain aid from the United States. He, therefore, boarded the frigate "Expedition" and set out for the United States on a self appointed mission to obtain supplies and men.

January 17th, 1816, Carrera arrived in Annapolis, the capital of Maryland, and immediately wrote Foinsett giving him an account of his arrival, of his future plans, and asking Poinsett's aid in order that his project might be fulfilled. Poinsett replied three days later. He encouraged Carrera to continue in his plan but warned him to use the greatest discretion. He enclosed a letter of introduction to be sent to Commodore Forter, the former commander of the frigate "Essex" which had been attacked by the British in the tay of Valparaiso in March of 1814. The letter expressed the desirability of aiding Carrera and read as follows:

## Dear Porter:

I have received a letter from José Miguel Carrera who was president of Chile when you first arrived in Valparaise. You may recollect that he was our warmest and most steady friend. He is on his way to Washington and you will oblige me by showing him some attention. It must occur to you that this gentleman from his extensive influence and connections in Chile may be of influential use in the colonisation of the Islands. When you are at leisure, I should be glad to know if the expedition goes well.

On the same day that Carrera had written Poinsett, he had also addressed a letter to Porter informing him of his arrival and the object that he pursued for Chile. Therefore when Poinsett's letter of introduction remoked Porter, he was already

<sup>1</sup> Collier y Crus, La Primera Misicn, pp. 188-191.

<sup>2</sup> Thid., p. 192, where a photostatic copy appears.

informed of Carrera's arrival and purpose for coming to the United States. Porter needed no urging from Poinsett to aid Carrera because he was completely sympathetic to Carrera's cause. He still remembered the unwillingness of the O'Higginista government to pretect the "Essex" in the bay of Valparaiso in 1814 and resenting these authorities as he did, was thoroughly in favor of helping Carrera who had shown him so much respect and hospitality when he first arrived in Chile in 1818. Even before receiving Poinsett's letter, he wrote Carrera that he was happy to hear of his arrival and would aid him any way that he could.

Once Carrera was assured of the support of Poinsett and Porter, he left Annapolis and traveled to Washington D. C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York where he began making contacts with ship builders and manufacturers of gun powder and war ammunition. With the help of Poinsett, Porter, and John Randall Shaw, a man who had served under Porter on the frigate "Essex", Carrera succeeded in negotiating with E. I. Dupont for gun powder, the Baltimore firm of Darcy and Didier for ships and John Jacob Aster for wer arms.

Although Carrers was successful in making contracts for the necessary implements of war, his problem of obtaining these

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 193-194.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 197-200; Rippy, Joel Poinsett, p. 62.

goods did not end with these negotiations. He had only seventy
five dollars which was not enough to cover sufficiently the expense
of paying for the ships and amountaion for which he had negotiated.
Therefore, it was necessary for him to obtain more money. Because
the government of Euenos Aires and the Chilean revolutionary leaders
(O'Eiggins and San Martín) were not favorably disposed towards him,
he was unable to obtain money from his countrymen and consequently
he turned to his friend Poinsett for help. However, Poinsett gave
no money to him and for a time, Carrera was depressed by his failure
to obtain financial aid.

Finally he succeeded in obtaining a loan of four thousand dollars from John S. Skinner, a Baltimore newspaperman who professed an ardent admiration for Chile. With this money, he purchased four ships from the Darcy and Didier firm. By loans from several other American citizens who had become very friendly tweards him, he was able to purchase gum powder, rifles, pistols, and other war ammunition. He managed to get himself so far in debt over these transactions that he never did recay the loans which he had received. Later on these debts became the cause of much dissension between the United States citizens (whom he owed) and the government of Chile.

Bartolome Mitre, Historia de San Martín y de la Emancipacion Sudamericana (Buenos Aires, 1937), II, 251.

Although he encountered much trouble in raising money to purchase war equipment, the problem of recruiting men for his expedition was very easily solved. Volunteers were to be had for the asking and some United States citizens even wrote him inquiring if they could be permitted to join his expedition.

Among these citizens were Thurlow Feed (later the owner and director of the Albany Evening Journal and one of the most esiment politicens of the Republican party), seven students of the United States Military Academy at West Point, and some United States naval officers.

Carrera's negotiations and transactions were kept a secret from the United States government. Although Commodore Porter brought Carrera to Washington and introduced him to President Madison who displayed a sympathetic attitude towards the Chilean cause, Porter did not inform Wadison of the reason for Carrera's visit to the United States. The United States government was still maintaining its policy of neutrality in regard to the fight between Spain and its South American colonies and as the Spanish minister to the United States (Don Luis Onis) had been complaining that United States citizens were aiding the South

Thurlow Weed to Carrera, September 18, 1816; Thomas Fagland, John D. Orr, John Harleston, James F. Newton, A. Walker, George W. Cerfinew, and Horace Webster to Carrera, September 22, 1816; Cemmodere Porter to Carrera, March 12, 1816, Collier y Cruz, La Primera Mision, pp. 228-229, 230-231, 214.

American revolutionaries, it was not advisable that the government know of Carrera's transactions with the United States firms.

In December 1816, Carrera completed his negotiations and set sail from Ealtimore with four ships, some munitions and armaments, and a small band of North American volunteers. There also were some Prenchmen who had joined the expedition in New York. When he arrived in Buenos Aires, his plans met with an abrupt shock. Pueyrredon (the Supreme Director of Buenos Aires) detained Carrera's ships and took over the supplies for his own use. A few days later Carrera was imprisoned. The Buenos Aires government favored the O'Higginista party and believed that if Carrera were allowed to return to Chile, he would only cause dis-satisfaction and civil strife which would be detrimental to the patriot fight for freedom.

Thus Carrera's plan to secure the leadership of Chile failed, but his stay in the United States was important because of its effect on public opinion. He persistently apread atories that he and his brothers were the true leaders of Chilean independence and that San Martin and O'Higgins were nothing but a "pack of accoundrels" who were going to place Chile under the subjection of Buenos Aires. Frequently, he implied to the

<sup>7</sup> Thomas LLoyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, secretary of state, March 3, 1817, Manning, Dip. Cerr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 350.

United States citizens with whom he came in contact that his party was friendly to the United States while that of O'Higgins was inclined towards the British. He even wrote an article which appeared February let, 1816, in the National Intelligencer of Washington D. C. that placed an exaggerated emphasis on the part he (Carrera) had played in the fight against Spain. No mention of O'Hirgins' activities in the campaigns appeared.

Carrera also made use of this article to stress the fact that he (Carrera) was an ardent admirer of the United States.

Carrera succeeded in making many friends and infused the thought in their minds that O'Higgins was hostile to the United States. These people, whom he influenced, spread their sentiments to others and Carrera's newspaper friends, in particular, were very instrumental in disseminating propaganda favorable to Carrera. The two who exerted the most effort on Carrera's behalf were John S. Skinner, a Baltimore newspaperman, and Baptis Irvine, editor of the New York Columbian.

Because of the verbal and written propaganda spread by

By Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress (London, 1820), I, 205.

Collier y Crus, La Frimera Mision, pp. 235-244; Charles Carroll Griffin, The United States and the Disruttion of the Spanish Empire 1810-1822. A Study of the Felations of the United States with Spain and With the Rebel Spanish Colonies (New York, 1937), p. 460.

Carrera and his friends, many United States citizens, unaware of O'Higgins' side of the story, tended to favor the party of Carrera. Hotable among these people were Theodorick Bland and William G. D. Worthin-ton who later were to become United States agents to Chile.

While Carrers had been busy soliciting help and spreading propagands in the United States, the organisation and training of the Army of the Andes under the direction of San Martin and O'Riggins had been completed. In January, 1817, the Army cressed the Andes by separating into five divisions in order to confuse the royalist army. The plan worked and when O'Riggins met the royalists in Chacabuco, the royalist army had been scattered so far along the Andes that only a fragment of the army was left to fight against the patriots. On February 12, 1817, the patriots defeated the royalists and two days later entered Santiage where they were joyously received by the Chilean people. O'Riggins was elected Supreme Director of Chile.

Once the erganisation of a Chilean mational army was begun, San Martín traveled to Buenos Aires to plan with Director Fueyrredon the best method to begin the campaigns which were to follow. While he was there, he learned that Pueyrredon was going to send an agent (Don Manuel de Aguirre)

to the United States to negotiate for the recognition of Buenos Aires as a sovereign state and to attempt to acquire war materials.

Because the Chilean national army (which was being erganised in Santiago) was badly in need of war supplies and equipment, San Martin decided to take advantage of Aguirre's mission in order to attempt to elicit aid from the United States. After receiving permission from Pueyrredon, he commissioned Aguirre to act as a private Chilean agent to the United States. Aguirre was instructed to enter into all such negotiations as were "relative to the purchase of vessels of war, including a frigate, completely armed and equipped; also, for the purphase of all descriptions of arms, warlike stores, and supplies useful to the army." 10

San Martin wrote President Monroe April 1, 1817 informing him of Aguirre's mission and of the restoration of the patriot rule in Chile under the leadership of O'Higgins. He expressed the hope that Monroe would extend to Aguirre such protection as was compatible with the actual relations of the United States government towards Chile.

<sup>10</sup> Commission of Dom Vanuel de Aguirre from Bernardo O'Higgins, Supreme Director of Chile, Warch 8, 1817, Manning, Dip. Corr. Commercian Latin American Independence, II, 898.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., I, 352-353; Urrutia, Paginas, p. 48.

On the same day, O'Higgins also wrote President Monroe concerning the re-establishment of the patriot rule in Chile and emphasized that because the patriot government was stable and durable, it would remain free from Spanish control. He stressed that he was very "desirous of promoting the commercial and friendly relations of the two countries, and of removing every electable to the establishment of the most perfect harmony and good understanding." 12

Don Manuel de Aguirre arrived in the United States in July, 1817, accompanied by his assistant, José Gregorio Gomes. Since President Monroe was absent from Washington and John Q. Adams had not yet arrived to take his position in the State Department, Aguirre had to content himself with an interview with the acting secretary of state, Richard Rush. Aguirre informed Rush of his reasons for coming to the United States and stated that he believed the "President had a discretionary power to suspend the laws against the fitting out, equipping and arming" of war vessels in United States ports for the belligerent purposes of other powers. Bush explained to him that the policy of neutrality obliged the United States to take no such action which would promote hostilities against the nations that were

<sup>18</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 899; Archivo O'Higgins, VII, 174-175.

at peace with the United States. 13

However, Aguirre disregarded Rush's statement and began negotiating for ships and war supplies. His first attempts to produce these provisions were begun under unfavorable conditions. The United States government refused to sell him any of these goods because of its neutrality policy and private individuals under the new neutrality act of March 3, 1817 were forbiddent to supply the revolted colonists with war ships and supplies.

But Aguirre found a loop hole in the law by which he planned to circumvent the restriction placed on private individuals. There was nothing in the neutrality act which prohibited private individuals from selling ships not armed for war. Aguirre had heard of the success of the "Araucano" (a warship which was destined for the Chilean navy). This ship had cleared the American ports, unarmed, for Gibraltar and after reaching the three mile limit, had been supplied with guns by a small boat. Since it had succeeded in proceeding to Chile fully armed, he decided that he also would make use of this ruse to purchase ships.

At first he encountered some difficulty in obtaining

<sup>15</sup> John Q. Adams, secretary of state, to Hanuel de Aguirre, Argentine agent at Washington, August 27, 1818, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 76-78.

momey with which to purchase these ships. The administration at Washington had disavowed an agreement concluded with the government of Eucnos Aires by two United States agents, Colonel John Devereux, and Consul T. L. Halsey, whereby the United States government was obligated to guarantee a loan to be used by Aguirre in his purchase of ships and arms. Also funds promised him by the Chilean government failed to arrive.

However, he finally was able to obtain the needed funds from the government of Eucnos Aires, a Joseph Skinner of Baltimore and Matthew L. Davis, a New York merchant. 14

Once he had obtained this money, Aguirre signed a contract with a New York firm for three ships at a cost of \$80,000 each. 15 Two ships were built, but at this point the Spanish consul suspecting Aguirre of purchasing these ships for use against 5pain, procured the seisure of the ships and the arrest and imprisonment of Aguirre. It was not surprising that the 5panish consul had detected this for the Spanish minister and his consuls, who were in every port of the United States, were extremely vigilant in preventing any infraction of the

<sup>14</sup> Miguel Zanartu to Nathaniel Strong and Joseph Skinner, March 14, 1819, Archive O'Higgins, V, 66-67; Whitaker, U.S. and Independence, pp. 232-235.

<sup>15</sup> Emelosure of Document 1085, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, III, 1976-1977.

law in favor of the Spanish Americans. If they found any ship that was armed or even appeared to be susceptibile of arming, they insisted upon being told of its destination. 16

When Aguirre was arrested, he appealed to Washington for diplomatic protection, but because he was only a private agent and had no diplomatic character, his appeal was refused. However, he was acquitted, because no proof was presented to show that his ships had been armed. 17

The delay caused by the trial so strained Aguirre's finances that he despaired of being able to clear the vessels. He wrote Adams complaining of the unfairness of the neutrality act and proposed to sell the vessels for which he had contract to the United States. Adams refused the offer. Aguirre was finally able to leave with his two ships but only one of these ships reached Buenes Aires. The other ship was converted into a privateer by its captain while on route to South America. 18

Manuel de Aguirre reached Buenos Aires feeling very hostile towards the United States and expressed his opinion of United States eitisens by stating, "I believe that if they

<sup>16</sup> Gregorie Gomes to Director Pusyrredon, November 13, 1817, Ibid., pp. 1971-1977.

<sup>17</sup> Griffin, U. S. and Disruption of the Spanish Empire, p. 147.

<sup>18</sup> Whitaker, U. S. and Independence, p. 235.

In the United States, the visits of both Carrers and Aguirre produced an increasing interest in the South American situation. Numerous pamphlets, books, and newspaper erticles appeared which dealt with Spanish American affairs. The most popular of these were a book published anonymously by Manuel Palacie Fajarde called An Outline of the Revolution in Stanish America and a pamphlet by Henry Marie Brackenridge entitled A Letter to James Monroe Upon the Present State of South America. Both of these received widespread circulation.

The newspapers which were especially active in expounding the South American cause were the Miles Weekly Register, the Washington Maticual Intelligencer, the Washington City Gasette, and the New York Columbian.

The reawakening of interest in the South American situation was also detected in Congress. During 1816 and 1817 numerous discussions arose concerning the desirability of recognizing the revelted countries as sovereign nations. Such questions as the following were discussed and debated: Should the United States be the first to recognize these countries as

<sup>19</sup> Aguirre to Pueyrredon, August 17, 1817, requoted from Ibid., p. 236.

independent? Should the United States receive a diplomat from these revolted Scuth American maticus? Would the recognition of these countries cause the United States to less the friendship of Spain? Would such a step increase the commercial profits of the United States?

Many congressmen preferred to continue the policy of "watchful waiting" before coming to any decision on the matter. Benry Clay, the famous congressmen and erater, was one of the few who ardently advocated the recognition of the revolted Spanish American countries. He believed that the United States was being unfair to the South American countries because the United States government received diplomats from Spain but not from South America. In December, 1817, he made a very elequent plea on behalf of South American recognition. He stated:

No; their unfortunate case was what curs had been in the years 1778 and 1779, their ministers, like our Franklins and Jays at that day, were skulking about Europe, imploring inexemble legitimacy for one kind look--some aid to terminate a war afflicting to humanity. Nay, their situation was worse than curs; for we had one great and magnanimous ally to recognize us, but no nation had stepped forward to acknowledge any of these provinces. 20

<sup>20</sup> Calvin Colton, The Life and Times of Henry Clay (New York, 1846), I, 216.

Other similar pleas were made by Clay, but most of the congressmen objected to recognising the South American countries until all further possibility of Spain's re-establishing control ever them was gone.

Phile Congress was discussing and debating the advisability of recognising the revolted South American countries, President Monree, who was sympathetic to the South American cause, decided to obtain some substantial information concerning the actual state of affairs in South America. He wrote Joel Poinsett, telling him of his objectives and saying that since no one had better qualifications than Poinsett for performing this task, he would appreciate it if Poinsett would consider making a journey to South America in order to obtain the desired information. 21

Because Poinsett declined the offer, President Monroe selected a semmission of three men (Caesar A. Redney, John Graham, and Theodorick Bland) which was instructed to remain in South America for a period of seven or eight months. The commissioners held no diplomatic rank but were to serve merely as special agents of the United States. Henry Marie Brackenridge was selected secretary of the commission.

<sup>21</sup> James Monroe, President of the United States, to Joel R. Poinsett of Charleston, South Carolina, April 25, 1817, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, 1, 39-40.

The members of the commission were instructed to insure the governments of South America of the friendly disposition that the United States held towards them, to secure proper respect for United States commerce in every port, and ot obtain the best and most complete information of the character and resources of the South American governments. Such things as the form of government, amount of population and pecuniary resources, extent and erganisation of the military forces on each side, mames and characters of the leading sivil and military men, attitudes toward the United States and great nations of Europe, the commercial possibilities and the probable durability of the established governments were to be carefully observed and noted.<sup>22</sup>

The commission was to go to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in order to obtain this information. However, they were told that if they "should find it expedient, or useful with reference to the public service that one or more" of them "should proceed over land to Chile," they were authorised to act accordingly and would be expected to co-operate jointly with Mr. John B. Prevost

Rodney and John Graham, Special Commissioners of the United States to South America, July 18, 1817, Ibid.; I, 40-45; Henry Marie Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Performed by Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress (London, 1820), I, 77-78.

who was already in Chile.23

John B. Prevost, the man with whom these commissioners were to co-operate, had been appointed private agent to Chile on July 7, 1817 by President Monroe for the purpose of observing the political and military state of affairs in Chile, the extent of the plans formed there, the means of their execution and force and power opposed to them. After the commission of Graham, Rodney and Bland was appointed, Prevost was instructed to investigate the commission's proceedings in relation to Chile. He also had the added responsibility of sailing to the Morth west coast of North America in order to take control of Astoria, the English settlement situated on the Columbia river, which the United States had acquired by the Trenty of Ghent. 24

Prevost had left the United States early in September, 1817, on board the "Ontario", an American sloop of war commanded by Captain Biddle of the United States Navy. Elen the "Ontario" reached the coast of Valparaiso, January 24, 1818, it encountered a Spanish squadron which was trying to maintain a blockade of the Chilean ports. The "Ontario" was stopped by

<sup>23</sup> Richard Rush, secretary of state ad interim, to Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham, Special Commissioners of the United States to South America, July 18, 1817, Nanning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 40-48.

<sup>24</sup> Don Thomas Guido to the government of Buenos Aires, September 25, 1819, Ibid., II, 553.

one of the Spanish ships and Captain Biddle was informed by the Spanish captain of the Vicercy's decree which had closed the ports of Chile to international someores. Biddle answered the Spanish captain arrogantly by stating that he did not recognize a blockade which was not in force and that he would continue his route even at the cost of a battle.

When Captain Biddle arrived in Valparaiso on the following day, the people, having heard of his arrogant reprisal to the Spanish captain, mistakenly believed that he had come to aid them in their fight against Spain. Because of this belief, Captain Biddle and Prevost were joyously received by the Chilean patriots. 25 Once again, similar to the time when Porter arrived in Valparaise in 1813, the Chilean hope for American aid arose.

Prevost furthered this hope by openly displaying his ardor for the revolutionary movement and by showing the Chileans that he was "well disposed to prepare the American government to adopt a course favorable to the happy conclusion" of the revolution. He furnished war supplies and also rendered personal aid to the Chilean patriots. When the independence of Chile was declared on February 12, 1818, he jubilantly joined in the celebration, acting as if he himself were a Chilean patriot. Because Prevost

Es Eugenie Pereira Salas, La actuacion de los oficiales mavales nerte-americanos en muestras costas (1813-1840) (Santiago, 1935), p. 24.

displayed such great enthusiasm towards the patriot cause, he won the warm friendship and respect of the Chilean people.26

Not only did he make friends with the Chilean people but he also won the warm friendship of O'Higgins, the Supreme Director. Frevost became so friendly with him that when O'Higgins decided to make a proposal to the Vicercy of Peru concerning the exchange of war prisoners, O'Higgins asked Provost to deliver this proposal. Prevost, always eager to aid the patriots in any way that he could, agreed to contact the Vicercy of Peru. He left Valparaiso in March, 1818.27

During Prevost's absence from Valparaise, Milliam G. D. Worthington, a United States agent who had come to Chile for commercial motives, remained in Valparaise and gathered information concerning the Chilean situation. When he first arrived in Chile, he had been treated very kindly because of the prestige which Captain Biddle and Prevost had gained. But Worthington, instead of merely trying to use this prestige in order to obtain commercial advantages, insisted upon interfering in the affairs of the Chilean government, thus causing friction between him and the Chilean officials.

<sup>26</sup> Don Thomas Guido to the government of Buenos Aires, September 25, 1819, Yamning, Pip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 40-45.

<sup>27</sup> Pereira Salas, Actuacion de eficiales navales, p. 26.

After the decisive battle of Maiju (April 5, 1818), the cabildo abierto in Santiago decided to draw up a new constitution. Northington, inspired by the knowledge that Poinsett had written a constitution for Chile in 1815; also wanted to compose one and devoted himself to this task. He drew up a constitution which, except for a few variations, was a mere adaptation of the United States Constitution.<sup>28</sup>

On May 5, 1818, he sent a letter to O'Higgins informing him that he had finished writing a constitution for Chile. He urged O'Higgins to adopt it, explaining that it provided for a well organised republican form of government which would insure peace and security to Chile both at home and abroad. He also made a draft of a Manifesto for O'Higgins to sign. This Manifesto urged the Chileans to adopt Worthington's constitution. 50

O'Higgins very diplomatically declined Worthington's constitution and manifesto. He explained to Worthington that a republican form of government would not work in Chile at that particular time because the Chilean people were not as yet prepared for a republican form of government. Worthington,

<sup>28</sup> Eugenio Pereira Salas, La Mision Worthington en Chile (1818-1819) (Santiago, 1936), p. 11.

<sup>29</sup> William G. D. Forthington to Bernardo O'Higgins, May 5, 1818, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, 11,824.

<sup>30</sup> Manifesto of his Excellency Don Bernardo O'Higgins, Supreme Director of the State of Chile, Ibid., p. 925.

however, continued trying to convince O'Higgins of the necessity of adopting his constitution.

Not only did he make a nuisance of himself by continually arguing that O'Higgins should adopt a republican form of government but he also aroused the suspicions of O'Hig ins by identifying himself with José Miguel Carrera. In April 1818, the Carrera brothers had formed an army in Mendoza for the purpose of over-throwing O'Higgin's government. Their purpose was not realized because the people in Mendoza who supported O'Higgins captured José's two brothers and imprisoned them. José Miguel Carrera, relying on the prestige that he had gained while in the United States, wrete Worthington and asked that he use his influence to obtain the liberation of his two brothers.

Because Worthington had been one of the men who had sympathized with Carrera during his visit to the United States, he obtained an interview with O'Higgins and stressed that the Carrera "brothers were much esteemed in the United States, and not only would any favor shown them be appreciated generally where they were known in the United States" but "would be particularly pleasing to Colonel Poinsett and Commodore Porter." He further added that the United States esteemed the Carrera brothers

José Miguel Carrera to W. G. D. Northington, September 12, 1818, Ibid., p. 940.

because they looked upon them as patriots.32

O'Higgins enswered Worthington's plee by stating, "that the Carreras might be patriots for ought he knew but that they seemed to consider Chile as their patrimony, and rather than see her liberated by any other persons than themselves would prefer to ruin her." Worthington, in this interview, made a blunder diplomatically because if there was any person whom O'Higgins hated worse than any one else, it was Jose Miguel Carrera.

Another United States agent who made a similar mistake was Theodorick Bland, one of the members of the commission that had been sent to Rio de Janefie and Buenos Aires, December 4, 1818. The commission's instructions had stated that if they found "it expedient or useful with reference to the public service that one or more" of them "should proceed over land to Chile," they were authorised to act accordingly. Bland believed that the fate of Chile was very important in determing whether or not the South American countries would remain free from Spain and insisted upon going to Chile. Therefore, he left Buenos

<sup>52</sup> Worthington's note on General Carrera's letter (undated), Ibid., pp. 940-941.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 941.

<sup>54</sup> Eugenie Pereira Salas, La Mision Bland en Chile (Santiago, 1936), p. 13.

Aires, April 15, 1818, and arrived in Santiago on May 5th. Three days later he obtained an interview with O'Higgins. He congratulated him on the victory of Maipu and told O'Higgins that the United States did not expect a commercial treaty, but wanted to be friendly and be the first to recognize Chile as a sovereign mation. He stressed that the United States hoped that Chile would establish a constitutional government. \$55

During the next two months, Bland had many interviews with O'Higgins. He asked him for information on the Chilean situation which would include the political, economic, and social conditions of the country. Similar to Worthington, Bland continually stressed that a republican form of government should be established. However, O'Higgins did not believe that this form was the best for his country. During one of his interviews with Bland, he stated:

We have seen that our people are not like yours; they are not used to congresses; and, therefore, congresses have often lost the country. The Mexican Congress lost that country; the Congress of Venesuela had once lost that country; and the Congress of Buenos Aires had endangered that country, until now of late it had learned to act more in concert and with greater propriety. 36

<sup>35</sup> Report of Theodorick Bland to John Q. Adams, secretary of state of the United States, on the conditions of South America, November 2, 1818, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 947.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 952.

Besides trying to encourage O'Riggins to adopt a republican government, Bland also tried to promote bad feelings towards Great Britain.

When John B. Prevost returned from Peru where he had been negotiating for an exchange of war prisoners, he and Bland became involved in a dispute. Prevost agreed with O'Siggins that a republican government would not be suitable for Chile at that time. He also thought that Bland was wrong in attempting to bring about a decline in British prestige. He believed that the best way to settle the rivalry with Great Britain was to get Great Britain and the United States to co-operate with one another. Prevost and Bland aggued continually over these points. 37

As a result of these arguments, Prevost strengthened his friendship with O'Figgins, while Bland came to be looked upon by the Chilean people as a trouble maker. He also succeeded in arousing the animosity of O'Higgins by attempting to obtain money from the Chilean government in order to repay the debt which José Miguel Carrers awed to John Skinner, a United States citizen. 88

<sup>87</sup> Pereira Salas, La Mision Bland, pp. 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

Bland left Chile, July 15, 1818. He had obtained the desired information on the state of affairs in Chile and had written up his report which President Monroe and Congress were patiently waiting for back in the United States.

Graham, Rodney, Prevost, and Worthington also were preparing their reports. The United States government officials realised that the fate of the revolted South American countries depended upon the contents of these reports. If they were favorable, the South American countries would be recognised as severeign nations by the United States.

#### Chapter IV

## Recognition of Chilean Independence

While Congress was awaiting the arrival of the commissioner's reports, Madison wrote President Monroe as follows:

Perhaps the most delicate point to be decided awaits the return of your commissioners. Their reports may call for a formal and full acknowledgment of the independence of Buenos Aires, and the step be threatened with the active resentment of all Europe.

Madison in writing the preceding statement expressed the sentiment which many Congressmen held during this period of American History.

However, the "active resentment of all Europe" was not to be easy countered at this time because the newly born South American countries were not destined to be recognised as sovereign nations for another five years.

The reports concerning the state of South American affairs proved to be extremely unsatisfactory. Although the primary purpose of the United States government inssending the commission to South America was to obtain first hand info@mation based upon a completely objective search for the TROTH, the three commissioners failed to perform this task. Instead of carefully observing the actual conditions that existed during their residence in South

<sup>1</sup> James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867), III, 97.

America, they obtained most of their information from books available in Buenes Aires which enumerated historical, geographical, and statistical material dealing primarily with past events. The meager first hand information relating to contemperary occurrences in South America which they included in their reports was very partial and unsatisfactory.

Graham and Rodney, who had been sympathetic to the revolutionary movement before arriving in South America, displayed a tone of disillusionment. They gave no decisive information concerning the advisability of recognising the newly established nations but did stress the fact that the patriot governments faced many difficulties.

Bland, the only commissioner to cross the Andes, pointedly asserted that recognition of Buenos Aires was inadvisable. Although in regard to the recognition of Chile, he commented that it would be presumptuous for him "to point to the measures which the government ought to pursue", his report displayed very clearly that he epposed recognition. His report similar to those of Rodney and Graham, contained fundamentally historical and statistical information. He recognised the commercial advantages which Chile had to effer but showed little enthusiasm for the need of encouraging

Reports of Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham to John Q. Adams, secretary of state of the United States, on the conditions of South America, November 5, 1818, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 486-509.

trade. He commented on the instability of the Chilean government which he attributed to the trouble that existed between the O'Higginistas (the government in power) and the Carreristas (the followers of José Miguel Carrera). The fact that Bland sympathised with the second group partly because of his admiration for Carrera which he acquired during the latter's visit to the United States and partly because O'Higgins refused to establish a republican form of government, was very instrumental in influencing Bland to acquire a negative position as far as Chilean recognision was songerned.

The only person connected with the commission who urged recognition was its secretary, Henry Marie Brackenridge. He had been sympathetic to the revolutionary cause before leaving the United States and unlike Rodney, Graham, and Bland, continued to believe that the South American countries should be recognized as severeign nations. He published a two volume book in 1820 entitled a Yoyage to South America Performed By Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818. In this book, he pointed out the purpose of the mission and also gave a detailed account of his stay in South America. In the appendix of this book on page 274, he wrete the following words which emphasized

Report of Theodorick Bland to J. Q. Adams, secretary of state, on the conditions of South America, November 2, 1818, Ibid., II, 947-1005.

his opinion in regard to recognition.

What would be the advantages to the United States from the independence of the Spanish colonies? I defy any one to point out a disadvantage. Have we not already found much benefit since the commencement of our revolution, from the vicinity of the Spanish previnces, nothwithstanding the narrow, jealous, and restricted intercourse with them? And whence has this proceeded? From our commerce with them; from the market we found there for much of our surplus agricultural produce.

Thus he voiced his sincere opinion.

Another person who was asked to indicate what type of conditions existed in South America was Joel Roberts Poinsett. Because he (Poinsett) had remained in South America for approximately three and one half years, John Quincy Adams had been instructed by President Monroe to write Poinsett and request such information as Poinsett's residence in that country had enabled him to acquire.

When Poinsett wrote his account of South American affairs, he was even more forceful than Bland in his advice against recognition. His resentment towards O'Higgins and his close friendship with Carrera influenced his reply. He wrote Adams that since the people had no part in their government, recognition would only strengthen the faction momentarily in power, which he elaimed was exercising mothing but low cunning tricks and artifices.4

At the time that the reports of Poinsett and the three commissioners arrived in Washington D. C., the reports of special

<sup>4</sup> Toid., I, 80.

agents Prevost and Worthington also were received by secretary of state, John Q. Adams. Prevost and Worthington were very much in favor of recognizing Chile as an independent nation. They both agreed that the people of Chile appeared to have a natural and instinctive partiality for citizens of the United States and that even the most uninformed were gratefully aware of the aid and arms which they had acquired from the North Americans.

Worthington also observed that the Chilean government viewed almost every citizen of the United States with peculiar jealousy because it supposed that the North Americans were more or less attached to the party of the Carreras. He noted further that because of this personal ill will towards certain United States citizens, the Chilean government began to view the United States government in an odious light. It was his contention that if the United States government would acknowledge Chile's independence, the Chilean government would develop a more friendly attitude towards us and that eventually Chile would adopt a government similar to the United States. He made the following plea for recognition:

I hope, however, the United States will have sufficient information before them to adept some positive course of conduct towards these countries. My own opinion is, what sort of government they have now or who may be at the head of affairs, is not of much consequence because things are very unsettled and very frequently changing. They will necessarily become more permanent and decided in their government and rules. . . . I think the

United States for their own interest both commercially and politically ought to acknowledge their independence.

John B. Prevost, the only United States agent who had not aroused the ire of O'Higgins by sympathizing with Carrera, fully encouraged the recognition of Chile and called attention to the "incalculable sourses of wealth which an ascendancy in the commerce of" Chile would offer to the United States.

The reports of Worthington and Prevost were not presented in Congress. Only those of Poinsett and the three commissioners were introduced and discussed. The presentation of these reports greatly discouraged the enthusiasm for recognition which had arisen among some of the Congressmen. Even Henry Clay, the most ardent advecate of recognition, noticed the disillusioning effect of the reports.

Clay attributed the failure of the mission to the announcement in the newspapers of the appointment and the intentions of the sommissioners months before their departure. He surmised that since the South Americans had learned about the mission prior to its arrival, both the revalists and the republicans had prepared to sway the judgments of the three commissioners. He proclaimed that the President should have sent "an individual unknown to all parties;

<sup>5</sup> Worthington to John Q. Adams, July 4, 1818, Ibid., II, 939.

<sup>6</sup> John Prevost to John Q. Adams, April 9, 1818, Ibid., p. 920.

an intelligent, keen, silent, and observing man of pleasing address and insinuating manners, who, concealing the object of his visit, would see and hear everything and report if faithfully. His suggestion was a very valid one and if the President would have handled the situation in this manner, perhaps much more accurate information regarding contemporary affairs would have been obtained.

Beginning in January 1319 and continuing on through April, the newspapers of the United States published serially the reports of Graham, Rodney and Bland together with Joel R. Poinsett's report to Adams. The effect of these diverse but generally unfavorable reports was to dampen public enthusiasm for the Spanish American cause and to create the widespread conviction that none of the new governments was yet entitled to recognition.

In Chile, the prestige and influence of the United States declined. The Chilean government harbored a feeling of distrust towards North Americans primarily because the special agents of the United States had exhibited an admiration for José Miguel Carrera and had tried to obtain payment of Carrera's debts from the Chilean government.

About the time that this feeling of distrust towards North

<sup>7</sup> Thomas Hart Benton (ed.), Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (New York, 1857), VI, 134.

Americans was reaching its intensity, Lord Cochrane, a British naval officer, came to Chile in order to take charge of the Chilean Navy which was being organized for the purpose of defeating the royalists in Peru. The employment of Lord Cochrane served as a further blow to American prestige. W. G. D. Worthington voiced his opinion of the effect Cochrane would have upon Chile as follows:

I doubt if Lord Cochrane's coming to Chile will be of benefit to the United States. He seems to have taken up the idea, that our government views the advancement of the prosperity of South America as detrimental to the growth and aggrandisement of the United States, therefore he will infuse a spirit of jealousy into the cabinet of Chile which will make them act cautiously and jealously towards us.

Morthington's analysis of Lord Cochrane was correct. Shortly after Cochrane took command of the Chilean Navy, a quarrel occurred between Cochrane and Captain Biddle of the United States "Ontario" over questions of precedence and etiquette. Cochrane demanded that Biddle salute the Chilean flag. Biddle refused to do this not because he didn't want to salute the Chilean flag but because he didn't want to pay respect to Lord Cochrane which he felt he would be doing by firing a salute. Cochrane used this situation to his advantage, making it appear as American disrespect for the Chilean

<sup>8</sup>Worthington to John Q. Adams, January 26, 1819, Manning, Dip. Cerr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 1028.

flag. Besides accusing Biddle of displaying arrogance tesards the Chilean flag, he also accused him of smuggling royalists and Spanish property from Lima to Rio de Janeiro.

The circumstances that directly followed Cochrane's accusation are somewhat obscure but shortly afterwards, the United States "Ontario" abruptly left the port of Valparaise without making any explanation to anyone. Cochrane made a big joke of the situation and told Worthington that the wind seemed to blow pretty strongly off the land against United States ships of war in the port of Valparaise. Worthington replied sareastically that he did not "recollect whether it was a land or sea breeze which had disabled the "Essex" (in the year 1813) in her attempt to leave this port, but (he) understood that Captain Biddle had put to sea in a very superior style."

Because of the shroud of mystery surrounding Captain Biddle's hasty departure, Worthington tried to find out exactly what happened. When he questioned Lord Cochrene, the latter replied that only Captain Biddle could tell him what he wanted to know. Worthington also wrote the Chilean officials asking that they explain the whole situation to him. Joaquin de Echeverría, the minister plenipotentiary of Chile, replied that the government did not know the motive of the hasty departure of the United States corbett "Ontario". He explained

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

that there were certain disagreements between Biddle and Cochrane but that these ought not to have caused diffidence on the part of Captain Biddle. He went on to state that the government knew very well that there were European passengers and enemy properties on board the "Chtario", but the Chilean government never intended to force the "Chtario" or any other neutral boat to register. He further remarked that if that apprehension influenced Biddle to sail so hastily from Valparaiso, Biddle certainly formed a very mistaken idea of the natural justice which the Chilean government had proposed to adopt. 10

This was the first of a series of unpleasant controversies growing out of the activities of Coohrane's fleet. During 1819, Chile had declared a blookade of the Peruvian coast and proceeded to seize a number of American ships for infraction of it. The United States government protested against this action as it had done previously to Spain. Although the Chilean government did not persist in upholding the legality of the blockade, Cochrane did very much as he pleased, and incidents continued to occur.

One of the incidents that happened in 1819 was the "Macedonian Affair." The American brig "Macedonia", owned by John S. Ellery and commanded by Captain Bliphalet Smith, had sailed from Boston

<sup>10</sup> Joaquin de Echeverría, Chilean plenipotentiary, to Worthington, January 9, 1819, Archivo O'Higgins, V, 68.

with a valuable cargo, the property of Ellery, Perkins, and other citizens of the United States. It visited various places on the ceast of Chile, Peru, and Callao where the last of the cargo was sold for \$145,000. Captain Smith sent \$60,000 of this in specie by an agent of his to Guamey where the "Macedonia" had proceeded. Later Smith left for Suamey with \$60,000 in specie but was seized by a party of Chilean sailors and taken on board the Chilean warship "O'Higgins" under the command of Lord Cochrane. He was held there for several days and was forced to sign a paper giving up all rights to the money.

In the meantime, his agent, hearing of his capture, took refuge on the French brig "gasell". He feared that if he returned to the "Macedonian", Cochrane would seize the momey which he had in his possession. Cochrane, hearing about this, seized the "Jazell" and compelled the captain to sign a paper giving up the money as a condition of his release. The owners took the matter up with the state department in 1820 and from that time on pursued efforts to obtain redress. 11

Cochrane justified his actions to the Chilean government by stating that Smith's cargo belonged to a Spanish mercantile house

<sup>11</sup> William Roderick Sherman, The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the United States and Chile, 1820 to 1914 (Boston, 1923), p. 64.

(the partnership of Abadia and Arismendi) and that the agent of this house (Irelau) had been on board the "Macedonia" in order to sell the cargo. Since enemy goeds eculd not be protected by a neutral flag, he concluded that it was his duty to seize the cargo. In this manner, he succeeded in discrediting American merchant ships in the Pacific and caused resentment towards North Americans.

Animosity between the Chilean naval forces and the United States warships became so serious that the United States Navy Department sent instructions to its commanders in the Pacific stating that although a paper blockade could not be recognised as legal, the greatest care should be used to avoid antagonizing the Chilean authorities. Despite the fact that this precaution was taken, these incidents continued to occur and accounted for the increasing coelness between the United States and Chile.

Although the Chilean government officials suspected the United States of being sympathetic towards Jose Eiguel Carrera and of aiding the Spanish by transporting revalists and enemy supplies, they displayed no hostility towards North Americans. As a matter of fact, the special agents of the United States were treated very cordially. O'Higgins may have resented North

<sup>12</sup> Manuel Carvallo, Chilean minister, to William L. Marcy, secretary of state, November 12, 1853, William R. Manning, Diplomatic Gerrespondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 18316
1860 (Washington, 1935), V, 199-200.

American admiration for Carrera but he realized that if the United States did recognize Chile as an independent nation, soon the European countries would also recognize Chile and consequently Chile would officially take her place as one of the nations of the world.

During the latter part of 1818 and the beginning of 1819,
O'Higgins continually urged Prevost and Worthington to convince
President Monroe of the necessity of recognizing Chilean
independence. This they proceeded to do but encountered little
success. The reports of Graham, Rodney, Bland, and Poinsett
had dampened all enthusiasm for recognition.

Therefore, O'Higgins decided to send an envoy to the United States for the purpose of soliciting the acknowledgment of the independence of Chile. Antonio José de Yrisarri was the man chosen to perform this task. He was told to go first to London, England where he should attempt to obtain British recognition and then proceed to the United States. 13 Once in London, however, he lacked the money to pay his passage to America and because he couldn't possibly reach the United States before Congress convened, he asked Richard Rush, the United States

<sup>18</sup> Commission of Antonio José de Trisarri as minister envoy of Chile to the United States, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 1042-1043.

minisher to Great Britain, to manage the situation for him. 14

Rush consented and Antonio José de Yrisarri presented him with an efficial document signed by O'Higgins and also a letter to the secretary of state. In this letter, Yrisarri told of his authorization to solicit the acknowledgment of Chile's independence which he stressed was being well secured by the decisive Chilean victories. He wrete that his government had "always flattered itself with the hope that the United States would be the first to recognise Chile" because the interests of the new world seemed to require it from the similarity of the Chilean and American Revolutions. He also explained that he was authorised to make any treaties that Washington believed to be necessary and convenient. Rush sent this letter and a copy of Trisarri's credentials to secretary of state, John Q. Adams.

When this letter arrived in Washington D. C., public sentiment towards South American recognition had once more arisen. The newly born South American Republics appeared to be permanently separated from Spain. They had fought against Spain for approximately ten years and throughout

<sup>14</sup> Archivo O'Higgins, III, 87, 101.

<sup>15</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 1041-1042.

that period, Spain had not been able to reconquer its revolted territories. Also the planned drive against the royalists in Peru aroused much interest. The officials in Washington were quite certain that the fall of Lima would be the consumation of South American independence which would definitely assure the liberty of Buenos Aires and Chile. Worthington recognised this and declared that the right of recognition could not with justice be long denied. 16

Other factors played an important part in the revival of interest in South American recognition. The United States efficials knew that once Lima, Peru was captured, European countries, England in particular, would realize that the South American countries were permanently free of Spanish control and would proceed to recognize them. If this occurred, the European countries would possibly obtain a most favored mation clause and also might influence the form of government that these nations would decide to establish. Consequently the South American agents declared that an early recognition on the part of the United States would produce very important results. First of all, English influence would decrease because the United States would be the first to place Chile among the

<sup>16</sup> Worthington to John Q. Adams, secretary of state, January 26, 1819, Ibid., 1050.

nations of the world. They reasoned that out of sheer gratefulness the Chilean people would favor the United States. Because of this favorable attitude which would develop towards the United States, the North American government would be looked upon as a good example of republicanism and the South American countries would naturally develop a system of government similar to ours. Another attitude held by these South American agents was that once these countries were recognised, they could not continue to disregard the ordinary rules of international law.

Spurred on by these opinions, the United States government began to take a keem interest in South American affairs and once Lima was captured, a discussion of recognition occurred in Congress. The House of Representatives were very much in favor of supporting the revelted countries and appointed a committee to present a resolution to President Monroe which asked for further information concerning South American affairs. This resolution expressed the feeling of deep interest held for the success of the South American provinces and stated that Congress would give its constitutional support to the President of the United States whenever he deemed it expedient to recognize the sovereignty and independence of any of these provinces. 17

<sup>17</sup> Benton, Debates of Congress, VII, 124, 290-291.

On March 8, 1822, Congress received a message from President Monroe which recommended recognition of the new states in the following language:

When we regard, then, the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the provinces, the recent condition of the parties and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled and that the provinces which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognised. 18

President Monroe's message was referred to the committee on foreign relations. It reported in favor of the proposition and the report was affirmed in the House of Representatives, with only one dissenting vote. The measure was finally ratified, nothwithstanding the vain remonstrances and protests of the Spanish ambassador. The sum of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated to meet the charges of diplomatic intercourse with the new governments.

January 27, 1825, Heman Allen of Vermont was commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Chile. He was instructed to maintain the claims of reparation and indemnity which United States eitisens held against the civil and military officers of Chile, pressing such claims whenever the revolutionary political conditions should warrant it, especially the "Macedonian Case" as most important.

<sup>18</sup> Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, I, 147-148.

He was also given the power to conclude a commercial treaty if the occasion arose and was directed to keep the State Department advised of political events, policies, and general internal conditions within Chile. 19

When Allen arrived in Chile on April 27, 1824, he was meet cordially received. The Chilean people were very happy to see him come because it showed the rest of the world that the United States had recognized Chile as an independent nation. When he embarked from the frigate "United States" at Valparaiso, a parade and a military salute greeted him. The highest dignitaries of the state were present and offered him a house at public expense plus a grant of honor which he declined. Allen addressed the Chileans graciously, telling them that the United States was impressed with the events in Chile and believed that Chile was "destined to enjoy, not only happiness at home, but also was to eccupy a distinguished rank, amongst the nations of the world. He pointed out that a new era of Chilean history had arrived, that tyranny, ignorance and superstition were giving way to virtue, intelligence, and the progress of the human mind. He warned them to guard their newly found liberty and ended his speech on a high tone of emetion by stating, "never,

<sup>19</sup> John Q. Adams to Heman Allen, November 30, 1823, Ibid., p. 213.

oh never may it be said, of this rising Republic, she once was free, she once was happy, she once was independent."20

This speech was so well received that Errasuris, the acting supreme director, requested a copy for the press, commenting that it would be highly beneficial to his country. Allen complied and submitted a copy of his speech to Errasuris, who gave it to the newspaper of Valparaise the El Avisador Chileno. Besides printing Allen's speech, this newspaper also commented that "every patriot contemplated Allen's mission as the link that would strengthen relations between the United States and Chile. "22

When Brrasuris first received Heman Allen, he expressed the Chilean government's gratitude for the recognition of Chilean independence and for the recent declaration of President Monroe. The declaration which he referred to was the famous Monroe Doctrine. The papers of Santiago had carried a report of Monroe's historic message a few days prior to Heman Allen's arrival. They seemed to discover in this doctrine a frank and explicit promise of effective protection for the Spanish

<sup>20</sup> Address of Heman Allen found in Enclosure of Document 514, April 29, 1824, Ibid., II, 1094-1095.

<sup>21</sup> Allen to Adams, April 29, 1824, Ibid., p. 1091.

<sup>22</sup> Requoted from William S. Robertson, Hispanic American Relations With the United States (New York, 1923), p. 57.

American Republics against the political combinations and military projects of European monarchs.<sup>25</sup> Consequently the Chilean people were extremely grateful to the United States for two reasons; for recognising Chilean independence and for the Monroe Doctrine.

Although the Chilean people appreciated the efforts of the United States, Heman Allen did not experience an easy task in his position as United States minister to Chile. The predominant obstacle which he faced was the unstableness of the Chilean government.

General Freyre had taken over O'Higgin's place as leader of the country and throughout the first months of Allen's residence in Chile, Freyre was absent from Santiago, commanding the Chilean army forces against the Spanish in Chilee. Consequently, there was little that Allen could do in the way of diplomatic negotiations. When Freyre finally did return to Santiago, a ray of hope arose in the mind of Heman Allen. All the general disorder in government, which had been apparent, seemed to disappear and the prestige and influence of the United States increased because Freyre held the highest regard for the United States. He began to discuss some of the claims and reparations demanded by United States citizens and also promised that he would send

<sup>25</sup> Samuel Guy Inman, "The Monroe Doctrine and Hispanic America," Hispanic American Historical Review, IV (1921), p. 921.

Joaquin Campino to the United States as foreign minister from Chile.

Amidst this encouragement, the instability of the newly born nation once sgain appeared. Freyre lest the Supreme Directorship and in the three years that followed, the leadership in government continually changed hands. Needless to say, Meman Allen found it very difficult to pursue the aims and objectives which he had been instructed to obtain.

He tried to convince the various leaders of Chile that a republican form of government should be adopted. Most of the leaders disregarded this advice, partly because of ambitious desires and partly because some of them realised that Chile was in no position to adopt this form of government. They believed that Chile needed more experience in government before adopting something which was completely foreign to them.

Allen, himself, blamed the Clergy for this reaction to Republicanism. He attacked the feature of their constitution which provided for an established religion and endeavoured to draw the attention of the Chilean officials "to the utter impossibility of ever establishing a Republican government with so edious a feature attached to it." He antagonised many of the Chileans by referring to the Church as an "internal enemy" and an "incubus" which stifled Chile's growth.26

<sup>24</sup> Allen to John Q. Adams, May 26, 1824, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 1096-1097.

Allen encountered many other problems during his residence in Chile. In 1824 a dispute arose over the question of the United States naval supplies. These supplies were customarilly landed at Valparaise and then re-shipped to various vessels in the Pacific Squadron. Hogan (a United States consul at Valparaise) protested to Allen that these goods were being treated in the same manner as private merchandise. He stated that these goods were charged an import and export duty besides being subjected to vexatious delays in handling because of custom house red tape. Formerly stores for naval vessels of friendly powers had been exempt by special law, but the Chilean Congress had repealed this exemption and had raised the rate of duties from three percent to twenty seven percent. Allen protested vigorously against this discrimination and after an exchange of several notes on the subject, the law was repealed.<sup>25</sup>

Heman Allen was less successful in his attempts to arrange the United States commercial relations on a permanent and advantageous footing of reciprocity and to obtain from the Chilean government the liquidation of several important claims of American merchants for the capture and detention of their vessels. His inability to acquire these objectives was primarily due to the inexperience and instability of the Chilean government.

<sup>25</sup> Sherman, Dip. and Commercial Relations, pp. 30-31.

Furthermore, the country was in such a bad condition financially that even if it would have had experience in making claim adjustments, it would have been unable to meet the payments of reparation.

The thing that distressed Heman Allen the most was the growing influence of the English. Immediately after the recognition of Chile and the declaration of the Monroe Loctrine, the Chileans expressed their friendliness towards the United States. But as the months passed, they began making overtures to the French and especially to the British in hopes of being recognized by these nations. Allem tried to decrease British influence by telling Egana (the Chilean minister) that Canning, an English diplomat, had proposed to the United States that the two governments publish a joint and simultaneous acknowledgment to the world which would oppose the interference of any foreign power in respect to the independence of these countries. Although Mr. Rush had not been instructed by his government on that point, he had replied that if the Fritish government would make an unconditional recognition of their independence, he would then assume the same responsibility and immediately comply with Mr. Canning's proposal. Allen explained that when Canning was told this, he grew indifferent to the subject and the correspondence stopped. 26 Despite Allen's

<sup>26</sup> Allen to Adams, April 24, 1824, Manning, Dip. Corr. Concerning Latin American Independence, 11, 1092.

efforts to discr dit the English, the Chileans continued to make overtures to the British in the hopes that England would soon recognise their independence.

Allen's mission lasted until August 1827 when at his own request the State Department granted him his recall. Although he had been unable to settle any of the claims against Chile and had not concluded a commercial treaty, he had epened diplomatic relations, enforced the rights due American citizens in commerce on several occasions, and had submitted to the government of Chile a number of claims which were to be adjusted years later.

Heman Allen left all of his books, records, files, and papers to Samuel Larned, the secretary of the American Legation, who was subsequently appointed United States Charge d Affaires in Chile. Larned tried to obtain reparations from the Chilean government but encountered little success. The Chileans had adopted a policy of sparring for time. Additional information was requested, hack of jurisdiction pleaded and points of international law debated at length. The foreign effice referred these claims to the Chilean Supreme Court which decided that they belonged to the jurisdiction of a lower court. Larned denied this contention on the ground that some of these had already been rendered. He pointed out further that it was contrary to legal precedure for a supreme sourt to refer a case to a lower court.

Such claims rested upon points of international law in which lower tribunals had no jurisdiction and in accordance with established usage, the Chilean government, representing a severeign state, was fully empowered to negotiate directly for a settlement with the accredited representative of a foreign country. Although Larned presented these arguments, he was unable to accomplish any settlement in regard to United States claims.27

In April 1828, Larned received an invitation to commence negotiations for a treaty of commerce. He became very enthusiastic over this proposal and tried to persuade the United States government of the necessity of forming a commercial treaty at this time. He said that despite the unstableness of the government, a treaty could be drawn up which would be valid for the treaty would be made with the nation not with the individuals. He also explained that if the United States did make a commercial treaty, the English would become jealous and decide to recognise Chile as a sovereign nation. The United States could point this cut to the Chileans, thereby obtaining a very favorable commercial treaty because the

<sup>27</sup> Sherman, Dip. and Commercial Relations, p. 34.

Chileans would be so eager to be recognized by Great Britain that the United States could acquire very favorable terms. 28

However, the Chilean government did nothingu until December 1828 when the minister of foreign affairs informed Mr. Larned that his government had decided to transfer the negotiations to Washington and that Mr. Campino had been authorized and instructed to perform this task.

Don Jeaquin Campine had been appointed envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-potentiary of the United States by President Pinto in 1827. Outside of expressing the prefound gratitude of the Chilean people to the United States for acknowledging its independence and for the honor conferred upon it by the United States government in sending a minister to Chile, he did very little as far as diplomatic negotiations were concerned. The principle duty assigned to him of negotiating a commercial treaty was not carried out because he believed that the proposed arrangements were far more favorable to the United States then to Chile. He resided in the United States until May 1829 when he took leave of the United States government.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Samuel Larned to Henry Clay, secretary of state, May 10, 1828, Manning, Dip. Cerr. Concerning Latin American Independence, II, 1128-1150.

<sup>29</sup> Joaquin Campine to Martin Van Busen, secretary of state, May 29, 1829 and Martin Van Buren to Joaquin Campine, May 26, 1829, Ibid., pp. 1135-1136; I, 505.

When Samuel Larned left Chile for Peru, he was succeeded by John Hamm, who was commissioned Charge d Affaires May 26, 1820. Hamm was informed of the accomplishments and duties performed by Allen and Larned. He was specifically instructed to try to obtain a commercial treaty and to obtain reparations for damages done to United States vessels. Wohn Hamm was successful in negotiating a treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Kavigation. This treaty was signed in Santiago May 16, 1832 and in Washington September 1, 1833. This treaty was favorable as far as commerce was concerned but would have been more satisfactory to the United States government if it would have provided for indemnities to United States citizens in consequence of the seizure and detention of their property and effects by efficers of the government in the ports of Chile. Hamm notified Andres Bello, plenpotentiary of Chile. of this attitude and explained that the omission of reparations and claims was not to be interpreted as being waved and abandoned by the government of the United States which was firmly resolved to persevere in the prosecution of them. 50

With the signing of this Treaty, the accumulative efforts of approximately thirty years were accomplished. Ever since 2798

<sup>50</sup> John Hamm to Andres Bello, May 16, 1832, Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Washington, 1942), III, 200.

when Josiah Blakely of New York had been sent to Santiago to negotiate a commercial treaty, the United States had continually striven to obtain such a treaty and to open diplomatic relations with Chile.

Throughout this period, American agents had found it very difficult to pursue their aims and objectives because of the continual struggle and strife that existed within the country. The uncertainty of Chile's permanent separation from Spain, the ever present bickering among the leaders of the nation, the unstableness of the Chilean government, and the competition for influence and prestige that existed between United States citizens and Englishmen all play a very important part in supplying the problems that faced the United States agents in their attempt to establish diplomatic relations.

Although American historians have seemingly neglected this phase of American intercourse with Chile and have concentrated on the period after the recognition of Chilean independence, the early beginnings of American relations with Chile are just as important as those which followed the appointment of Heman Allen.

International relations did not commence with the official appointment of a United States minister. They began when North American citizens first became interested in the economic potentiality of Chile. Once this interest had arisen, the Chileans and North Americans came into contact with one another more frequently and feelings of hatred and friendliness arose. Beginning with O'Eiggin's distrust of Poinsett, the seed of suspicion towards United States citizens was planted

which continued to grow throughout the years that followed. Nonlike Bland and Worthington strengthened this suspicion. A knowledge of the events that occurred between United States citizens and Chileans during this thirty year period prevides a better understanding of the diplomatic relations that arose after this era.

The purpose of the author in writing this Thesis was to discover why the United States government first established intercourse with Chile and finally decided to recognize Chilean independence. The conclusion derived from the facts presented is that the United States established relations with Chile primarily for the purpose of obtaining an advantageous position commercially. From the very first moment when United States citizens reached the Chilean coast and discovered seals and whales, Chile's economic potentiality was recognised. The influx of United States merchant ships, the aid given Chile to fight against Spain by these merchants, the supplies and volunteers received by Carrera from United States citizens who were eager to trade with Chilek the encouragement of recognition because of commercial motives by Brackenridge, Worthington, and Prevost, the sending of commercial agents to Chile to negotiate for a commercial treaty which began in 1798 and lasted until 1824, and the continuous effort on the part of United States ministers Heman Allen, Samuel Larmed, and John Hamm to acquire a commercial treaty all support this supposition.

In a search for bibliographies that dealt with the diplomatic relations of the United States, the most valuable bibliography of bibliographies was Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States 1775-1921 (Washington, 1935). This book lists bibliographies which cover the diplomatic history of the United States from the beginning of the American Revolution until 1921. It then is divided according to the countries with which the United States has negotiated and gives a general list of bibliographies covering the history of each country plus bibliographies dealing specifically with relations between these countries and the United States. Other useful bibliographies of bibliographies were:

- Beers, Henry Futney. Bibliographies In American History. Guide to Materials for Reaearch (New York, 1938).
- Besterman, Theodore. A World Bibliography of Bibliographies and of Bibliographic Catalogues, Calendars, Abstracts, Digests, Indexes, and the Like (London, 1947).
- Coulter, Edith M. Guide to Historical Bibliography (California, 1929).
- Jones, Cecil Enight. Hispanic American Bibliographies Including Collective Biographies, Histories of Literature and Selected General Works (Baltimore, 1922).
- Mudge, I. G. New Guide to Reference Books (Chicago, 1923).

Association (23 vols. Washington, 1905-1945) was the most valuable bibliography because it lists all of the books and magazine articles that have been published concerning the diplomatic, economic, and social history of the United States. Other helpful bibliographies were:

- Channing, Edward; Hart, A. B. and Turner, F. J. Guide to the Study and Reading of American History (Boston, 1912).
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- Richardson, E. C. and Morse, A. E. <u>Fritings on American Bistory</u> (Princeton, 1904).
- Sabin, Joseph. A Dictionary of Books Relating to America, From

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Further bibliographical sources were found in the secondary works which are listed in a separate section.

### Documen to

A very excellent source of material which contains the correspondence between Poinsett and O'Higgins, the ideas that O'Higgins held towards the United States, his correspondence with the United States, and the letters of Chile's foreign ministers concerning foreign relations and special agents of the United States is the Archivo de Bon Bernardo O'Higgins (livels., Santago, 1946-1952). Each volume is organized under certain topies. For example, some of the volumes deal with O'Higgin's family background, the preparation and organization of the Army of the Andes, the expedition to Chile, the diplomatic mission of Don Antonio José de Yrisarri, the diplomatic mission of Miguel Zanarty, the letters of Zanartu to O'Higgins and the correspondence between O'Higgins, San Martín, and other men connected with the governments of Chile, Buenos Aires, United States, Peru, and Columbia. Each topic is arranged chronologically within each volume.

Thomas Eart Benton (ed.), Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (15 vols. New York, 1857) was useful not only for the actual debates that occurred in Congress over South American recognition but also for the lack of mention of South American affairs for many years. This showed the lack of interest found in Congress except during the years 1817, 1818, 1822, and 1823.

William R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin American Nations (3 vols., New York, 1925) provides many of the letters, reports, enclosures of documented materials from Latin American countries, England, France, Spain and the United States and instructions which passed between the diplomatic agents of the United States and the secretaries of state. This was of particular value to the author because of the extensive material dealing with Chilean affairs.

Another book edited by William R. Manning entitled Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Inter American Affairs 1831-1860, Volume V. Chile and Colombia (Washington, 1935) was valuable because of the correspondence concerning claims and reparations, particularly the letters dealing with the "Macedonian Case".

Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (7 vols., Washington, 1942). Volume three was the most useful of these volumes. It contains the peace treaty which was negotiated between Andres Bello and John Hamm. It also prints certain letters between Bello and Hamm and discusses briefly the appointments of Heman Allen and Samuel Larned.

James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents

OF A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 17891897 (12 vols., Washington, 1933) was very valuable because it
supplied information concerning the ideas and attitudes taken by
the Presidents in regard to South American affairs. It was also
important because it displayed the Presidents' lack of concern
for South American affairs during certain specific years.

Francisco José Urrutia, Paginas de historia diplomatica,
Los Estados Unidos de America y Las Repúblicas Hispanoamericanas
de 1810 a 1830 (Bogota, 1917) contains many of the documents to
be found in Manning, Diplomatic History Concerning Latin American
Independence, but was important because it included certain Chilean
documents which Manning did not have access to such as the Chilean
decree which opened Chilean ports to free trade.

### Primary Sources

A two volume book which gave a good account of the aims and objectives of the commission sent to South America in 1818 was Henry Marie Brackenridge, Voyage to South America Performed by Order of the American Government in the Years 1817 and 1818, has the Frigate Congress (2 vols., London, 1820). The author was secretary of the commission. He gives an accurate pisture of the aims and objectives of the mission but it should be noted that upon arriving in South America, he had already decided that the South American countries should be recognized and did not attempt

to view the situation objectively. In the appendix of this book, there appears a copy of a letter to President Monroe written by Brackenridge which urges recognition. This letter is also published in pamphlet form under the title of South America, A Letter to James Monroe, President of the United States of America, on the Present State of that Country (Mashington, 1817).

A book which gives a first hand account of the rivalry between the British and Americans is Isaac Foster Coffin's Journal of a Residence in Chili, by a Young American, Detained in That Country During the Revolutionary Scenes of 1817, 1818, and 1819 (Boston, 1823). Coffin's description of Chilean government officials is very biased.

Thomas Earl of Dundonald Cochrane, Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chili, Feru, and Brazil from Spanish and Portuguese Domination (2vols., London, 1859) was helpful because it described the naval forces of Chile and gave an incite to the character of Cochrane who irritated many North Americans.

Maria Graham, A Journal of a Residence in Chile, During the Year 1825 and a Voyage from Chile to Brazil in 1823 (London, 1824). Waria Graham met special agent Prevost and United States Consul Hogan during her trip. She describes Prevost's interest in the fate of Chile and some of the things he did while in Chile.

Captain Basil Hall's Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico in the Years 1820, 1821, and 1822 (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1825) gives a description of the country of Chile during the years 1820-1822 and mentions some of the American citizens who were in Chile et that time.

Samuel B. Johnston, Cartas escritas durante una Residencia de tres anos en Chile (Madrid, 1917) also published under the title Diario de un tipografo yanqui en Chili y Feru Durante la Guerra de la Independencia (Madrid, 1919) was a most val able book.

Samuel Johnston was the printer of the first Chilean newspaper La Aurora. He describes the bringing in of the printing press, the revolutionary propaganda, and the conditions that existed during Foinsett's mission.

Captain David Forter's Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ocean in the Years 1812, 1813, and 1814 (2 vols., New York, 1822) was an excellent source of information in regard to the manner in which the Chileens received North American citizens and the influence of the British which began to increase towards the end of 1813.

Other useful sources were:

- Medison, James, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1867).
- Mathison, Gilbert F. Narrative of a Visit to Brazil, Chile, Fern, and the Sandwich Islands Luring the Years 1821 and 1822 (London, 1825).

- Miers, John. Travels in Chile and La Plata Including Accounts
  Respecting the Geography, Geology, Statistics, Government,
  Finances, Agriculture, Fanners and Customs, and the Mining
  Operations in Chili Collected During a Residence of Several
  Years In These Countries (London, 1826).
- Sutcliffe, Thomas. Sixteen Years in Chile and Peru From 1822 to 1839 (London, 1841).

Tagart, Edward. A Memoir of Peter Heywood (London, 1832).

# Secondary Forks

One of the best histories of Chilean independence is Diego Barros Arano's Historia jeneral de Chile (16 vols., Santiago, 1887-1898).

William Willer Collier and Guillerme Feliu Crus, La Primera Fision de Los Estados Unidos de America en Chile (Santiago, 1926) was very valuable. Collier and Crus had access to many letters written by Poinsett, Jose Miguel Carrera, and certain American Sitisens who were interested in Chile's fight for independence. Some of these letters were reproduced in this book.

Henry Clay Evans, Chile and Its Relations With the United States (North Carolina, 1927) gave a brief account of the early relations with Chile.

Pegahie Pareira Salas, Euques norteamericanes en Chile a fines to la era colonial (1788-1810) (Santiago, 1936) was very valuable. Pereira Salas, a native of Chile, studied in the National Archives at Washington and also had access to naval papers. He gives a complete list of United States boats on the coast of Chile from 1788 to 1809. He tells the names of the boats, the reason for their voyage, the captain of each ship, and their destination.

Fereira Salas also used the National Archives in writing a detailed account of Bland's mission to Chile. This book is entitled La Mision Bland on Chile (Santiago, 1936).

Another book that Pereira Salas wrote which was very useful was La Mision Northington on Chile (1818-1819) (Santiago, 1936).

A Thesis written for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Sharkam Roderick Sherman entitled The Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the United States and Chile, 1820-1914 (Beston, 1923) was very helpful particularly in regard to the claims and reparations demanded by the United States over the seisure of American ships and goods.

- Other secondary works which were helpful were:
- Adams, Randolph Greenfield. A History of the Poreign Policy of the United States (New York, 1925).
- Alvares, Alejandro. The Fonroe Dootrine, its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New Forld (New York, 1986).
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg (ed.). The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (4 vols., New York, 1927).
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- Chisholm, A. Stuart H. The Independence of Chile (Boston, 1911).
- Colton, Calvin. The Life and Times of Henry Clay (New York, 1846).
- Frost, John. Lives of Distinguished Commanders of the United States Navy (New York, 1845).
- Galdames, Luis (Isaac Joslin Cox, translater). A Ristory of Chile (North Carolina, 1941).
- Garcia Mercu, Martin. <u>Historia de la diplomabia Americana</u> (Buenos Aires, 1964).
- Garcia Samudio, Bicolas. La Independence de Hispanoamerica (Mexico, 1945).
- Goebel, J. The Recognition Pelicy of the United States (New York, 1915).
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- Koebel, William Henry. British Exploits in South America: A History of British Activities in Exploration, Filitary Adventure, Diplomacy, Science and Trade in Latin America (New York, 1917).
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- Mitre, Bartolome. Historia de San Martin y de la Emancipacion Sudamericana (4 vols., Buenos Aires, 1:37).

- Moreno, C. Galvan. El Libertador de Chile, O'Higgins El Gran Amige de San Martin (Buenos Aires, 1942).
- Moses, Bernard. The Intellectual Background of the Revolution in Eouth America 1810-1824 (New York, 1928).
- Rippy, James Fred. Joel Roberts Poinsett, Versatile American (North Carolina, 1988).
- . Rivelry of the United States and Great Britain
  Over Latin America (1808-1850) (London, 1939).
- Rebertson, William Spence. <u>Hispanie American Relations With the United States</u> (New York, 1928).
- Rejas, Ricardo (Herschel Brickell and Carlos Videla, translators).

  San Martin Knight of the Andes (New York, 1945).
- Schoollkopp, Ama. Don Jose de San Martin 1778-1885% Study of Ris Career (New York, 1924).
- Stuart, Graham E. Latin America and the United States (New York, 1922).
- Whitaker, Arthur Preston. The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1850 (Baltimore, 1941).

### Periodicals

An article which discussed the effect that American citizens had upon the Chilean people during the fight for independence was Amen., "The Centenary of the Battle of Maips", Pan American Union Bulletin, XV (1818), pp. 561-569.

Sharlessign Chandler's "Admiral Charles Whiting Wooster in Chile," American Historical Association Report I (1916), pp. 445-456. was valuable because it described United States citizens' participation in the Fight for Chilean independence. Chandler took his information from a pamphlet in the National Library at Santiage de Chile which contains letters to Weester quoted from Freyre, Pinte, and Francisco Vieuna.

A discussion of the effect that the Monroe Destrine had upon the Scuth American countries was found in Samuel Guy Inman's article "The Monroe Dostrine and Hispanic American," <u>Hispanic American</u> <u>Historical Review</u>, IV (1921), pp. 635-676.

John J. Johnson's "Early Relations of the United States With Chile," Pacific Historical Review, XII (1944), pp. 260-270 was most valuable because it is one of the very few sources of information written in English that deals with American relations previous to 1800.

John Hollada Latane's "The United States and Latin America,"
American Historical Review, XXVI (1921), pp. 351-352 offered a
discussion of American relations with the South American countries
but was of little value to the author because it only mentioned
Chile briefly.

An article which provided a good discussion of the very first consuls to visit South America was Roy F. Richols' "Trade kelations and the Establishment of the United States Consulates in Spanish America, 1779-1809," <u>Hispanic American Historical Review</u>, XIII (1953), pp. 289-315.

A brief account of Poinsett, Heman Allen and the recognition of Chile is given in William Spence Robertson's "The First Legation of the United States in Latin America," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, II (1915), pp. 183-212.

Another article by Robertson "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations by the United States," Hispanic American Historical Review I (1918), pp. 239-269 was valuable because it discussed Aguirre's mission to the United States and the fimal recognition of the South American nations. Robertson based his article on information taken from the Annals of Congress, Adam's Memoirs and Documents of Foreign Affairs.

William Spence Robertson also wrote and article which explains how the South American countries received the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. This account is based on newspaper articles and the Matienal Archives in Washington. It is entitled "South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824-1828," Political Science Quarterly, XXX (1915), pp. 82-105.

Watt Stewart's "The South American Commission 1817-1818," Hispanic American Historical Review, IX (1929), pp. 31-59 was useful in obtaining an account of the mission in 1817 and 1818.

THS Abstract

