POLITICAL TRANSITION IN RURAL SIERRA LEONE. 1951-1961 Thesis for {In Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Kenneth C. Wylie 1964 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY MlCHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING. MICHIGAN POLIIICAL TRAHSITION IN RURAL SIERRA LEONE, 1951-1961 A Thesis for partial fulfillment of the requirments for a Master of Arts Degree in African History, in the Department of History, Michigan State University. by Kenneth C. Wylie ,q" ”.7. _' “—3 4-1:..I Try!- -’7I1““ Jule--4 L-‘ J- .‘J. .11) x 3. . .z. aq‘/SU:\".IC U q- , ," ‘- - .Llltf'c 4113:1110-) f‘f‘l _ L . ..--,~ nu, . ‘ ‘ :1 J. '. o L '1 V '_ J vilu‘.) bel‘ .I. a $113 A: 2C '.\_ .‘UITLI J. 00 .I. 011 sic-3]. «1 1}}: C" o o o ‘1 --. . - wildybtl‘ 2.4..- L‘OLII‘ ulLtC‘S oooooooooooooooooooooooo 3“ ~.—\- - 7' 'o m. ,, .-.!" .. .rn . , ,1 .~ s“. "‘79:. unatter Ii .. irene_o:nselcn gne 3e eeloniIl elite -,, ,1» ' ~. " .-:I 1.1-: q I ~ r” ‘ 'H+ \LlEILJU'Jr 190 -1"?}J-’3-‘4?u;511 17.1 t..LC untfile .Jllueoo 4 1 on r’?‘. , I , I". , ., ,_, ....~ ., o. .- .a. ._ ;1€ acct Itnuml to .zflpteiLIOA lJI L;a 5 I ‘T: . .. .” q - ‘t 1. f\- rs n at..- Lelu..tl.4I-l.lql 4J0‘u“- I ................. '~ ~~r ~— a - 1 V r" l . I, .-.~ A .‘ I 0 v‘ .‘-'_.. f ' - . . .,. . .I_ ‘ ... . . . 1 :1 4.» .4.L*b‘; 000000000000000.00.0000... {‘1 ' ‘ ' - 7hr. . 'Ti 9 I' ~ :‘r' ‘. .“ J' . ‘ I ‘ j ‘1’ 1"; .. r.|' ’ 4 uIlGl “LIGL' ‘J .3“: o ll‘JIJ.Lg...Q-..‘I..3 L103. (113' u 10 “Cd 1.41.1. uC o o o o a * .-~«- _- 1-“..7 i , .,. fly UngliJUCJ. untang: «(LICIJHLCII 000000000000000000.0000... .‘ 1'1: 1.! 1 . “LOULLOILJguj 0.0.0.0.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.000 _t h) H U1 0 “3 LJ ) U1 \ I" V) Abstract It is the purpose of this study to investigate the process of political transition in rural Sierra Leone between 1951 and 1961. This shall be done by a systematic analysis of the strae tegies used by members of four key elite groups, by an examination of the process of political transformation sithin these groups, and by an analysis of the ways in which political power was used by each of these groups at any given time. The study is based upon selective study of existing govern- ment documents, field reports, periodicals, scholarly Journals, relevant books and personal eXperience in the field. All this has been done with a view towards demonstrating how a traditional African and a Europeanized political system have interpenetrated with the result that a new elite, combining diverse elements, has come into power, and that its power is the result of a compromise with powerful traditional elements who control local politics. 11 INTRODUCTION This study is the result of an idea first conceived during Peace Corps duty in Sierra Leone, West Africa. While working as a teacher in a secondary school in the Herthern Province of Sierra Leone, this writer became acutely aware of the importance of local government in the process of political change which is transforming most of Africa. During work as a Census Field Officer between February and May of 1963, the tenacious hold of traditional forms of government in the rural areas became most obvious to this writer, and several of the problems outlined in this paper became a frustrating part of a daily routine. To any careful observer the compromises and empedients which characterize so much of local politics, cepecially in relation to the ties between the chiefs and the central government, appear to be inadequate and dangerous. So little is known of the details of political develop- ment in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, that any research into the workings of local politics seems more than Justified. It is hoped that this paper will provide a valid interpretation of some of the events which shaped political transition in rural Sierra Leone, and perhaps answer a few important questions. I would like to eXpress deep appreciation to Dr. James B. Hooker of the History Department at Michigan State University for the many hours he has Spent in reading over this paper, and for his constant encouragement and constructive criticism. I would also like to thank Dr. Martin Kilson of the Center for International Studies at Harvard University for his courtesy and aid during a 111 fascinating week's work in his office, and for his permission to use his personal files, and to consult his unpublished manu- script on Sierra Leone politics. CHAPTER I Background to Political Change Sierra Leone is typical of many new nations in Africa, eSpecially in West Africa. The little country is situated flush on the Atlantic coast, and it was one of the first areas "discovered“ by the Portugese in the 15th century. The magnifi- cent harbor at Freetown has long been a place for shelter, fresh water and food for generations of sailors. Sierra Leone has been right in the path of the migrations and shifting tides of slavery, rebellion, war, plague, colonialism and lately national- ism which have shaped West Africa. Her tribes are in no way unique and they have inspired several good anthrOpological studies. Her political problems are typical of other former British colonies and her present development as a modern state is hindered by illiteracy, poverty and cultural resistance to change. Sierra Leone is a product of that peculiar mixture of altruistic humanism and hard-headed imperialism which so often characterized British colonialism in Africa. Her capital city was originally settled by former slaves from Britain in 1787, 'and the new settlement was appropriately called Freetown. It was in Freetown and the surrounding “colony” located on a mountainous peninsula about twenty miles in length, that the repatriated slaves absorbed new arrivals from along the coast and deveIOped l a new Westernized African society known as Creoledom. Until 1 A.T. Porter, Creoledom, (London, 1963), pg. 10. the 1890's the British government had no Jurisdiction or ambi- tions in regard to the hinterland :hich 5 read hundreds of miles inland from the colony. Then in response to rapid French ex; mision in nearby Quin-ea, the British signed an agreement with the French in 1895 which fir ed the boundarie most as they C! m a P4 exist today. A Protectorate was decl red over :0 hinterland and administers: through five districts by the system knonn as Indirect Rule. One famous sine Ch icf, b3 the rrze of Eai Burch Kasseh, resisted a hut-tax placed on his people, and in 1898 led his people in rebellion against the new colonial rulers. British troops successfully defeated the Teams in this HuteTax War, but not without a fierce and protracted str"itle, WllCh earned the respect of the British and created a legend around Bai Euroh's hate which he s lasted to this day. The history of Sisr.t a Leone fro:n l”93 to world tar II is hardly unique. Ar w constitution was int duo ed in 19l4 w th an enlarged Legislative Council, and education began to agreed into the Protectorate largely as a result of mis;ionary effo.t. From 1937, ’ative administrations modelled after those in hes tern Nigeria, were introduced ordinally into the ch cfd :;s and the people's share in power was theoretically broadened. After the second world War, as ver :1 c: eHng-s were introched. In 19u6 District Councils, made up of representatives from each chiefdom, were set up, supposedly to re; Ml te local tarps more efficiently. Each Corncil was empowered to send representatives to a Protectorate Asse .le which not in Do, thus instituting a 2 Christowher Fyfe, A’Shor c Mi tory of Sierra Leone, (London, 1962)9 P8. 13“. a separate branch of government for the Protectorate itself. A new Constitution was drawn up in 1997, allowing fourteen members from the Protectorate to sit in the Legislative Council. This frightened the Creoles in the colony who saw power and influence slipping finally into the hands of the Protectorate. They vio- lently Opposed the new Constituion, arguing that about 90% of the Protectorate people were illiterate and technically not even British subjects. Under the leadership of Dr. Bankole-Bright and I.T.A. wellace-Johnson (founder of the West African Youth League) the Creoles forced the government to delay until 1950, when the Protectorate people acted. In the same year, Dr. Kilton Margai, the first doctor from the provinces, founded the Sierra Leone People's Party (henceforth cited as the SLPP). This party preached unity and adeption of the new Constitution. In 1951 the Constitution was introduced, an election was held and the SLPP gained an overwhelming majority over the other parties in Sierra Leone. 5 This is a very brief historical background to the eventful decade which led to Independence in April of 1961, .and with which this study is concerned. Any understanding of the events which characterized political develOpment in Sierra Leone between 1951 and 1961 requires some knowledge of the traditional structure of the societies or ”tribes“ which played such important roles in the process. In fact, any study of political change in the rural areas of Sierra Leone necessarily means that a great deal of emphasis must be placed U I Ibido 9 PS. 1730 Ibldo’ p30 175. upon the traditional political system and how it works. Sierra Leone is dominated by two large tribes, the hands and the Temne. The hands occupy a large.part of the Southern and Southwestern area of the country, and the Temne occupy most of the Nerth and West. Several other tribes fill out the remain- der, but they have little political influence (with the exception of the Keno, in the diamond rich areas). Many of these tribes are dominated by one or the other of the larger tribes. For example, the Lokko liVe among the Temne and share political institutions with them; the Sherbmo have close connections with the hands, and the Limbs with both the Temne and the fiends. The hands are a Patrilineally organized people, who by the mid-19th century had established themselves in large towns, '... each formed of a cluster of small towns, strongly stockaded with high fences." Each of these towns had its own ruler, ususally a man who had gained his reputation in war. Often these "chiefs” owned large numbers of slaves captured in war, and plunder from battle was a main source of wealth.‘ It was, therefore, in the interest of these warlike leaders to see that there were plenty of small wars, and trade and commerce sufiered accordingly. The great majority of fiends were peaceful farmers however, who lived in relatively self-sufficient small villages. It was over this structure, loosly organized as it was, that the British imposed their hegemony, with consequences which shall be discussed later in this study. 6 Ibido’ P8. 950 The Temne are also an agricultural people, who invaded northern Sierra Leone from the Futa Jallon plateau late in the 18th century. Unlike the hende, the Temne had a highly organized political structure, with powerful chiefs who possessed certain mystic qualities. Descent was claimed through patrilineal clans, superimposed over kin-groups. These possessed great potential for political organization; During the nineteenth century there was a tendency for Temne chiefdoms to increase in size under the leadership of powerful kin-groups. In 1822...Tenne country was divided into four districts, each having a separate chief. The British conquest of Temne country was not an easy one, as has already been shown, and in more recent times the most serious disturbances have been centered in Temneland. Political changes and adaptations have been more drastic there, and the consequences far-reaching. In fact, any careful analysis of political development in Sierra Leone, must concentrate largely on events in Temne country, especially in the post-war era. A good part of this study is therefore devoted to the process of political transition in the Temne political structure, and the fiends are discussed only in comparison and where “modernization” has created situations of conflict and tension. Economic develOpment in the Protectorate has been largely neglected and in comparison with several other emerging African nations, it is still largely unexploited. Education has only recently Spread widely throughout the districts, in 1950 only two secondary schools existed in the entire Protectorate, and M M. McCullock, The geoples‘gf the Sierra Leone Protectorate, (London, 1950). pg. 510 these were primarily established for the sons of chiefs. Cash crops, such as cocoa, palm-nuts, and ground-nuts are rarely produced by farmers in any but the most haphazard way, trade is still largely internal and the mineral wealth, diamonds and iron- ore for the most part, is mined and sold by British companies with rather outdated concessions. The result is that the rural reas of Sierra Leone have had less prolonged contact with the outside world, and traditional ways still have a powerful hold. Chiefs' powers are largely undininished, and even nationalism in Sierra Leone originated as an alliance between the chiefs and the new political elite from the provinces. hany of the elements which have created contemporary African Nationalism have only Just emerged in the Protectorate, and few of Hodgkin's well-known conditions exist even today. Hodgkin's list is as follows: The demand for constitutional reform; the transfer of political power; opposition to the economic power of the extra-territorial firrs; opposition to the spiritual power of the missions; the movements to strengthen the position of the peasants against that of the chief; the reawakening of interest in national history and culture; the protest against poverty and demands for improvement in the standard of life. 8 Certainly many of these do not apply to the Sierra Leone Protect- orate (now known as the Provinces) even now. This is of great importance, and as we shall see, it has largely determined the course of political transition. But, the emergence of subterri- torial group sentiment, often called tribalism, has been a prime factor in the political alignment and even in party allegiances since 1950. In the case of the SLPP: 8 Thomas Hodgkin, "Towards Self Government in British west Africa,” The e West Africa, (ed) B. Davidson and A. Adenola, (London, T536 . pp. 35-35. 7 The bond of unity has bee n a mixture of apprehension shared by leaders in the Zrotectorate, re3ardin3 the historically dominant po osition of the Creoles in Freetown, a common awareness of be ing far more under- develOped, and therefore wealrer tlan the colony, and a tacit a3reenent to use t eir unity plus tieir n.mc*i icel sup;:rio ity to achieve endghold power in the emergent state of Sierra Leone. This deve looment is of utmost importance and it shall be investi3ated in detail f rther on. The division of Sierra Leone into two areas, the Colony and the Protectorate, with two diff- erent peoples in each, created a political situation that had little in common with that of neighboring countries. The entry of the provincial peoples into politics (throu53h the SLIP) does not fit Hodgkin' s cla ification of the origins of African partim , as extra ~parlim ' ntsry bodies. Rather it rose in the backaround of a pa rlie.: entary situation, we do up of several semi-politic el bodi e sorganized-to'neet the needs of an unofficial African majority in the Legislative and Executive Councils, as ' . 10 designated under the 1951 Orier in Council These are some of the fa ctors which fo r to -e boo: :3round to political chan3e in the Sierra Leone Protectorate. Apart from Liberia, the Protectorate is unique in some ways, in others quite typical in its politics. hany scholars have felt that the strongest counter forces to the tendency towards unity and centralize tion are tribal and traditional forces. Certainly Sierra Leone is an excellent example of these forces in Operation, 9 James S. Mole :an, The Caer3ence of African Political Parties,” in Africa Today, (ed) Groves Ha.ines, (Baltimore, 1955), pg. 239. 10 "artin Kilson ”Sierra Leone Politics and the Approach to IndeWpendence, West Africa, June 18, July 9 1960, pg. 668. (Henceforth cited as "Sierra Leone Politics ”5 and whether the political consciousness and enlightenment of the traditional authorities is enough to make a necessary and inevitable transition to modern centralized government in local affairs, is a question of utmost importance. It is heped that this study will illustrate some of the political conditions in the rural areas of Sierra Leone, as well as explain the process of transition itself. Equally important, an attempt has been made to use certain new methods in the theoretical framework of the study. Many old analytical methods have been cast aside, particularly in Chapter fiend Chapter fl, though most of the documentation is according to established historical method. Certain sections are highly theoretical, and in these instances an attempt has been made to apply some of the tools of the behavioral scientist to rather commonplace historical events. Perhaps a greater understanding of the sign-' ificance of these events will result, providing that the techniques are consistent and the conclusions valid. A good deal of this study is based upon an experience of eighteen months in the Nbrthern Province of Sierra Leone. Personal observations, especially if not carefully annotated and documented, are always dangerous. But a good deal of chiefdom politics, particularly in the strong chiefdoms in the North, is not amenable to factual analysis. Much of the knowledge in this area comes only through conjecture, hearsay and the most subjective personal analysis of others' opinions.~ This is unavoidable. Wherever Opinion which is not documentable enters this study, it shall be designated as such, and there shall be no attempt to project personal feelings in the form of prophesy or prediction. Needless to say a great part of the theoretical framework of this study is the direct result of this writer's personal observation of how politics works in rural Sierra Leone. Now we shall proceed to the task of investigating and examining the four elite groups which acted in the drama of political transition in the Sierra Leone Protectorate in the decade prior to Independence. The various groups which inter- acted in the drama of transtion have been arbitrarily classified into four ”elite” groups, which have broad enough definitions that all the important elements can be included, and analysis is much simpler. One hopes that these classifications do not Vcloud the events studied here, but rather that they clarify and bring into light the conflicts which determined so many of those events. 10 CHAPTER II Four Elites At this point a more extensive investigation of the four elites already mentioned would be in order. The diviSion of the power structure in Sierra Leone into four groups might seem artificial, even arbitrary. In a sense it is, but there is no doubt that for purposes of definition and comparison, this division is helpful. Also, at any point in the postmwar history of Sierra Leone, these four distinct groups could easily be recognized and it is the interaction between them which makes the political history of the Protectorate. In analysing the criterion of political power, it is important to define these elements who make the decisions. Professor A.T. Porter mentions three such groups in his book Creoledomx In colonial areas, one can distinquish three classes which fit these conditions. These are the leaders in traditional societies, the EurOpean or alien rulers and the western educated Africans whose status is rooted in the coastal towns. All three groups have suppliedlthose who have wielded or still wield political power. To the three groups listed here, I have added a forth; the ”new elite", which has been recruited from educated Protectorate Africans who Opposed the urbanized Creole influence, and constituted another force for change in local politics. The first and initially the most important of these groups is the “colonial elite". This group, composed exclusively of the British colonial officials sent out by the colonial office, 11 Porter, Creoledom, pg. 121. 11 held ultimate power in local affairs riglt up to independence, and to a certain extent after. For our purposes, the most import- ant men in these groups, were the District Commissioner (henceforth D.C.) one for each of the twelve-districts, the Provincial Commissioner, one for each Province and the Chief Commissioner, responsible for the whole Protectorate. These men literally ruled the Protectorate until selfugovernment came in 1961. They always had the ultimate sanction of the British government behind them, and they are extremely important to any study of political transi- tion in the Protectorate. In his district, the D.C. had power of life or death over anyone under his Jurisdiction. To be sure he rarely intruded into the affairs of the Paramount Chiefs and their councils, except when corruption or criminal acts were obvious. But every Para- mount Chief (P.C.) and every Tribal Authority (T.A.) knew he had the power to negate their acts and if necessary, to enforce his decisions with force of arms. He was the last local legal resort beyond the chiefdom courts, and usually directed the economic and eductional deve10pment of his district personally. The lesser colonial officials, such as the agricultural officers, district engineers) medical officers and foresters, were reaponsible to him as well as to their superiors in the Secretariat in Freetown: ...the District Officer (or Commissioner) was often more important than his colleagues in the Secretariat ...because of the degree of discretion permitted him. Upon him depended the maintenance of an orderly legal framework of political life, improvement of health and sanitation, collection of taxes, enforcement of financial regulations under his Jurisdiction. His scope also widened 12 as the colonial administration widened its interest to include education, agriiglture, forestry, mining, commerce, husbandry, etc. Even after self-government, the D.C. (the title was changed to District Officer in 1963) held basically the same powers, and often he was British. TJIS man was the link between the colonial government in Freetown and the traditional authorities and through more than six decades of colonial rule he kept the peace and solely represented the British government to tens of thousands of Africans. With the possible exception of the period between November 1955 and April 1956, when the tax riots occurred, the D.C.‘s prestige was always great. Nearly everyone, no matter what his status, felt that his grievances would be heard by the D.C., and the greater authority of the central government invoked if necessary. This writer often witnessed examples of the District Commissioners' authority and prestige as farmers, traders, sub- chiefs, and even Paramount Chiefs would come to the District Office to seek the D.C.‘s aid in problems which were beyond their control. Often the most humble of rural peasants would appeal to him for aid in legal problems involving their own chiefs and usually they were fairly certain of success. As long as the British ruled Sierra Leone, the D.C. was the most powerful decis- ion-maker on the local level and in his person he represented the entire strength and resources of the colonial government, as well as the British government itself. 12 D.Apter and E. Lystad, “Bureaucracy, Party and Constitutional Democracy,” in Transition i3 Africa, (ed) G. Carter and W.O. Brown, (Boston, 19005, pg. 21. 13 The Provincial Commissioner was the next step up the chain of command, and he represented the link between the D.C. and the Chief Commissioner, who was the man responsible for the govern- ment of the entire Protectorate. The Provincial Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner possessed great power, but they had little to do with local politics, and they usually presided over the administration of the provinces through their D.C.‘s and passed orders down to the local level whenever necessary. They concern us here only when they report to the governor himself. Often the reports they drafted determined decisions made in the Secretariat which had profound effects on local affairs. The second group in our discussion is the Creole elite. Members of this group usually occupied important secondary posts in the provincial administration, the District Offices, the governmental departments and the Tribal Authorities themselves. It should be made clear that this elite group does not by any means include all Creoles. We are concerned only with those Creoles who lived in the Protectorate and who exercised important decision-making positions. Often their positions were nominally unimportant, but by virtue of their superior education and skills they played a vital role in the political transition in the Pro- tectorate. They were also an elite because they had a “superiority” of a general kind, and were imitated by the Protectorate Africans in the sense that their manner of acting and living set standards for others. They were acutely conscious of their role and as Professor Porter writes: ...they expected in due course to fall heir to the political structure of which they were a part on tPe eventual with- drawal of the British government. Their built-in conservatism, 14 however, militated against any pressure for radical changed or for a hurried acceleration of political development. 13 This conservatism and this desire to dominate the Protect- orate peoples by virtue of an alleged superiority and SOphistication, led the Creole elite into direct conflict with the traditional elite, the colonial elite anr the rising new elite from the provinces. In some ways this conflict was a result of the cul- tural dualism natural to an emerging nation, but it was a unique situation in that the Creoles had identified with he British colonial elite and considered themselves British citizens first. As events will prove, this led to tremendously important develop- ments which largely determined a good deal of the political development, especially as regards the parties, in the Sierra Leone Protectorate. Today, many Creoles still hold important positions in local government (in District Offices especially). They still dominate clerical posts in the offices of the various branches of the government. Many are Native Administration clerks, and many even have positions in the senior service. But today they have ident- ified with modern African Nationalism, and they have learned to work wirh their fellow Sierra Leoneans from the Protectorate. Perhaps here an eXplanation of the terms ”Protectorate” and “Colony“ would be helpful. The tern "colony” refers to an area directly governed by the British, where British law and Justice 13 A.T. Porter, “The Social Background of Political Decision- Makers in Sierra Leone,” §ierra Leone Studies, June, 1960. pg. 9. .’ prevail. In general the term came to mean any area in the British Empire which was under the direct authority of the colonial office and in which no traditional government functioned. The Colony of Sierra Leone refers to the mountainous peninsula immediately around Freetown, in which most of the Creole population live, and which was settled by them in the eighteenth and nineteenth cent- uries. Today it is called the Western Province. The work “protectorate” refers to an area indirectly governed by the British colonial office, usually through local chiefs. In a protectorate, local laws still have force, and British law is used only on a appeal. In Sierra Leone the term Protectorate refers to the remainder of the hinterland outside the Freetown peninsula. Today it is called the "Provinces”. Early in the century it was often Creoles who first spread the ideas of African nationalism down the West African coast. They were usually the first doctors, lawyers, missionaries and teachers to penetrate beyond the coastal cities. They spread western life- styles into the hinterland of SierraLeone, as well as parts of the Gold Coast, the Gambia and Nigeria, and they were generally thought of as progressive and enlightened arbiters of change. Their alienation from the British in the last two decades of - colonial rule and their opposition to Protectorate political power was a natural result of their own shock at the loss of their once dominant position in commerce, culture, the professions and lb politics. Not until they realized that they were a minority AL 1h . Kilson, "Sierra Leone Politics”, West Africa, pg. 688. l6 and that they must take their place as part of a new nation ruled by Protectorate Peoples, did they adjust to reality and cease their active opposition to the other groups which clamored for power. The presence of the Creoles as an element in the struggle for power in Sierra Leone created a rather uncommon situation in con- trast to that of Ghana or Nigeria, where the educated Africans were original members of the indigenous society. The Creole presence complicated political development in the Protectorate, and as we shall see, precipitated collaboration between the traditional elite and the new African elite. he third group in our discussion, is the traditional elite. This powerful group, composed of Paramount Chiefs, sub-chiefs, and the Tribal Authorities (formerly the chiefdom council), is basically the same group which ruled prior to British rule, and they have retained moSt of their political power on the local level in all the years since. When the British came in the last decade of the 19th century, they instituted a system known as Indirect Rule. This allowed Paramount Chiefs and their councils to govern largely unhindered in their chiefdoms, with the D.C. only overseeing the administration to assure fairness and legality, and to represent the colonial government. Indirect Rule was considered desirable largely because it broke the shock of Western annexation, it kept the peace, and it, '...induced a sympathetic inquiring attitude in colonial 15 officials towards African society.“ 15 M. Perham, the Colonial Bechoning, (London, 1961), pg. 33 l? The system of Indirect Rule was designed so that the real responsibility for decent local control would rest in the D.C.‘s hands, originally because there were so few qualified and able men available to administer vast regions of colonial Africa. In certain ares, such as Northern Nigeria and the Sierra Leone Protectorate this was the most effective system which would least disturb the indigenous structure. Behind this ingenious system was the implicity theory that eventually the native institutions, properly gmided by the British administration, would evolve in a more democratic structure, and local government would become the mainstay of independent national states. Of course, no one predicted that anything less than a ceniury of such "evolution” in local government could possibly result in self-rule. It was the most effective system which the British could introduce and still not upset the traditional political and social structure, and it required only a handful of officials, as Lord Lugard, its orginator in Nigeria, discovered. In theory, it was believed by the colonial elite that over a long period of time the traditional institutions would slowly evolve in a more democratic structure, and certain measures were introduced to, help this ”evolution” along, most of which proved failures. 10 The traditional elite was, and still is, authoritarian in 16 Gray Cowan, "Local Politics and Democracy in Nigeria,” Transition igfléggiga, (ed) Carter, and Brown, (Boston, 1900), pg. 5. 18 its local form, particularly in Teens country. Chiefs, especially Temne Chiefs, often had a mystic quality to their power, and with the support of various secret societies and ancient tribal customs, they ruled nearly as autocrats. Of course, they were always subject to the advice of their councils, but the members of these bodies reflected the traditional awe of the indigenous peoples towards the ancient structure of law and government. Wherever the basic pattern of life has remained unchanged, the political power of the traditional elite has continued largely undiminished. In fact, this group remains the strongest force counter to the tendency towards centralization and unitary govern- ment in Sierra Leone, though at present they share power with the new elite, who govern from the capital. Some think this is a good thing, since too much power in the hands of the national government on the local level can mean: tyranny. But, as this study will make clear, too little control over the traditional elite can produce local tyranny Just as easily. The Sierra Leone Protectorate is one of‘those places where “modernization“ in political forms has been late in coming and traditional ways still exercise great force. The com.on people have not been politicized to the modern techniques of local government by legal representation. Those who have been pre- pared in this way to accept Western ideas, or adaptations of Western ideas, have not tried to break tribal ties, but, '... rather both to use them and to transcent them; to strengthen 19 their own movements by securing tribal support and yet to develOp trans-tribal links.” 17 The situation in the rural areas has always been quite diff- erent from that in the cities. Even among the educated Africans, tribal loyalties are strong, and contacts with members of the extended family are extensive and intimate. As Professor Gluckman says: o..1n the rural areas membership of a tribe involves participation in a working political system, and sharing domestic life with kinfolk; and ...this continued part- icipation is based on present ecigomic and social needs, and not merely on conservatism. Much of the economic structure of the rural areas still revolves around the traditional elite. Paramount Chiefs and sub-chiefs control large tracts of land, and as we shall see, Chiefs often abused their political power for economic gains. Since the poli- tical power of the traditional elite has actually increased in some instances, it appearsgthat the colonial elite were quite wrong in their assumption that the traditional political structure would evolve in the general direction of a broader and more deomocratic base. The political skills and strategic position of the Chiefs in the Protectorate were held essential to the original consoli- dation and maintenance of colonial rule, and the traditional elite were therefore able to bargain for a continuation of their preferred . 19 position, and found their niche in the new system of power. Many L 4g 1" Ibidu pg. 13. 13 max Gluckmann, 'Tribalism in Modern British Africa," Cahiers d' Etudes gfricaniges, vol. 1, 1960, pg. 55. 19“ Mhrtin Kilson, Political Chan e in A West African Statel‘é Study *1 golitical Modernization, iUnpublished hanuscript pg. 0. he nceforth cited as Political Change! 20 of the politicians in the central government realized this and they rarely directly opposed the Chief's entrenched position. Unlike other parts of West Africa, where the educated (new) elite have directly opcoced the traditional authorities in the struggle for local power, the channeling of legitimate political activity through the trcditional structure has had several important and interesting results for the Sierra Leone Protectou rate: In the first plcce it forced the modernist-atho party politiciene of the urbcn centers-~to carry their appeal to the native authority councils of the most remote bush villecee. Elections were not the esoteric pastime of the barristers, clerks and morketmen or the main centers-oe rally of the faithful. as nationalist leaders desiring direct elections would have preferred-- rather they involved cannaignlng throughout the countryside, with Bhe courting or intimidation of the traditionaliets. 2 This leads us directly to the last of the elite groups which interacted with the other three to form a pattern of political deveIOpment in the Protectorate since the war. This group is perhaps the most important, since it now holds power in the central government. runs the political parties, and is evaru increasing in size and influence. Eventually, it seems that this "new elite“ will dominate all phases of government as it now does in Ghana and the southern regions of Rigeria. But as has been indicated above. the new elite in the Sierra Leone Protecto- rate has compromised with the traditional elite in local politics and an uneasy partnership prchils throughout most of the provinces. 20 Callahan, op. cit.. pg. 214.0. 21 Often members of the traditional elite (members by birth and allegiance) are also members of this new elite and they have a vested interest in maintaining the situation as it develOped prior to Independence and as it has largely remained to this day. This new elite rose gradually as a result of the spread of education and western culture into the hinterland of Sierra Leone. Prior to World War II this group numbered only a hand- ful in the Protectorate. The Creole ascendancy in the urban areas also made it extremely difficult for the few educated men from the rural areas to exercise any influence in the same way they did in rural Ghana or Nigeria. The only way they could enter the power structure was through the traditional political system, thus aligning themselves with the Chiefs. The alter~ native, Open and active opposition to the existing structure, was hardly conceivable before the war, since this rising new intellectual elite numbered so few. Furthermore, the Creoles dominated the lesser positions in which an educated African could work. The war changed all this, but not as drastically as might be eXpected. The return of soldiers who had served in the army, primarily in Burma, provided an impetus to the growth of the new elite, but many of these soldiers had little education and were not really eager to enter political activities. The political division of Sierra Leone into Colony and Protectorate further complicated the situation, since many soldiers found employment in Freetown where traditional values had long under- gone considerable transformation. The economic and educational backwardness of the Protectorate was not substantially altered 22 until well after the war, and besides, the system of local government supported by the colonial rulers did not promote political and social change on the local level. The absence of large scale development and social revolution Spared the traditional elite the shock effect which broke Indirect Rule and Chiefly authority in Ghana. The fact that in 1950 only two secondary schools existed in the entire Protectorate is glaring evidence of the state of the Protectorate in terms of modern development. There were simply few places for the educated African from the provinces to go, and tiis remained so until the 50's. As Dennis Austin wrote: so: until the formation of District Councils in 1946, and the 1950 provision for increased non-chief member- ship of the Counsils, was there any official outlet for non-traditional educated opinion. 4 Of course there were the ”as ociations” which often provided a limited outlet for educating Protectorate Africans. Some of these were actually tribal associations which played an active part in the education of the new elite, “...not only through providing scholarships for the children of tribesmen, but also through founding and managing their own independent schools. 22 As early as the mid 30's, Youth Congresses, such as I.T.A. wallace-Johnson‘s West African Youth League, provided another means of political expression. But such organizations could do 21 Dennis Austin, ”The People and Constitution of Sierra Leone,” West Africa, Sept.- Oct. 1952, pg. 893. 22 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, (New York, 1957): pg. 87. 23 little to provide avenues of direct action outside of the cities. Perhaps the first really politically oriented Protectorate organization was the Sierra Leone Organization Society, (808) founded in l9h6 by Dr. John Karefa-Smart, the first Temne doctor, and soon Joined by Dr. Milton hargai, the first doctor from the entire Protectorate, and a Mende. It first had as its organiza- tional program the promotion of co-Operative agriculture in the Protectorate, but it became a political organization during the 1947-51 crises over the new Constitution. 23 The SLPP, which became the first political party in 1951, still depended heavily on the Paramount Chiefs for support, though led by the new elite, and it was not a mass party as was the Convention People's Party in Ghana or the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. in Nigeria. The long period of conflict between the Creoles and the Protectorate Africans, '...had made the latter fully pre- disposed to any political organization which might emerge among themselves against the former,” 24 and because of this split it was not essential to create a body of political beliefs or even a nationalistic attitude to get the support of the masses. The issue of Creole supremacy, not colonial rule, was the main rallying cry in the SLPP's struggle for power and it was therefore essent- ial to work with the powerful traditional elite, rather than against them. 23 Austin, op. cit.. pg. 893. 24 Kilson, I'S‘ierra Leone Politics", West Africa, pg. 688. 2% Therefore, the educated Protectorate Africans, led by a few professional men, but largely clerks in government offices, or in branches of merchantile firms, teachers and technicians, only recently began to take an active part in national politics, and to exercise their potential as an elite. At present they still govern in partnership with the traditional elite, and will probably continue to do so for some tine. With this background in mind, we shall investigate some aspects of political transition (or transformation) as they relate to the colonial elite. 25 CHAPTER III Transformation and the Colonial Elite The process of transformation within the political elite in rural Sierra Leone has its roots, as we have seen, in the inter- action between four groups; the colonial elite, the Creole elite, the traditional elite, and a rising new African elite. We have already discussed the nature of these groups in some detail, but here some more precise Working definitions might be in order. The term ”elite” is defined as any small but powerful group who exercise decisive power in decision—making on the local level of government. The membership of any elite group mentioned has been determined primarily by their position in the social structure, for influence generally goes with position in traditional societies. Transformation is defined here as change in the form and structure of the local political system in Sierra Leone, especially the methods of governing. The following chapters are concerned with which group or groups make the political decisions on the local level and how they make them at any given time. They shall also investigate the process of interaction between the elite groups and how this process influenced the process of transforma- tion within the elite groups. One scholar has explained this all- important process of change as follows: ...A fundamental transformation in a political system when support has shifted from one set of authorities to a different set, in which the organization, solidary symbols (that is, symbols validating and defining limits of power) and central characteristics with regard to 26 the way £3 which power is used have all undergone change. Power is not so easily defined. But Professor A.T. Porter has cleverly applied a classical definition to the African situation: Power, according to max Weber, consists in the probabli- lity that one of the parties in a social relationship will be able to carry out his will despite the opposing will of the other authority. To say for example, that a person has political authority is to say that a political formula assigns him power and that those who adhere to that formula eXpect him to have powegéand regard his exercise of it as Just and proper. Often in these chapters, the men who hold power also have authority, but this is primarily because in the traditional society there have never been many avenues to power. In most cases Paramount Chiefs have both authority and power and the people regard their exercise of it as natural and prOper and never challenge the authority which many in fact serve as a basis for that power. In other instances, as with certain Creole administrative clerks, power has nothing to do with authority, and great difficulty in defining the extent of that power and how it is used naturally results. In any case, transformation, as defined above, shall be examined by means of analysis of certain strategies used by members of the elite groups, and by an analysis of colonial policy, chiefdom politics, and nationalist party politics. 25 Martin Kilson, “African Political Change and the Modernization Process,” 1;. git-10d. A2. Studies, Vol. 1 1963, pg. 425. (Henceforth cited as JAfrican Pol. Change“.s Some theoretical guidelines have been provided by Professor Sidney Verbs. He writes: ...that the processes studied W‘thlh the small $.0up are of social and political importance, and that knowledge of them should Operate to improve our understanding of political processes. ‘ And to further extend the framework to fit the peculiar circum~ stances of rural Sierra Leone, Professor Verbs also provides some ideas: The pattern of decision-making is most evident in those cases in which group membership is highly important to the individualonin traditional groups for instance, where relations among mesbers are diffuse, deeply as effective and have existed for an extended period. Such ideas help provide part of the conceptual framework for these chapters, and they serve to clarify the detailed examina- tion which follows. The Sierra Leone Protectorate between 1951 and 1961 was a society in rapid change, as it still is, and conflict between the elite groups is natural to such an order. The late 3.F. Eadel wrote in respect to such societies in transition: ...the conflict between rural elites is most acute in societies undergoing change, when traditional and anti. traditional conceptions come into conflict. In this sense, an “old elite", perhaps based on aristocratic descent, may be opposed by a "new elite" deriving its claims to age- eminence from technical skills or economic import:nce. 2? Sidney Verbs, 1961). yge 50 23 r01dgg pg. 2-7. (Princeton, Grourg and folitica; 29 S.F. Nadel ”The Concept of Social Elites,” international gggial Science ourna , vol, 8, 1956, PE. #20. In Sierra Leone Protectorate the new elite did not directly Oppose the traditional elite for reasons which will become clear later, but there did occur a conflict situation, natural to the cultural dualism of any transitional society, The nature of this conflict, which we have already discusccd in terms or the treditonel politicsl structure, determined the majority of the events studied in these chapters. The Euronesn colonial elite who ruled in to- Sierra Leone Protectorate were typical of tEst peculiar breed of able, dedicated civil-seernts who ran the British Empire from Bethurst to Hong Kong. host of these men, such as the District Commissioners, who as we have seen were perhaps the most important, were primarily concerned with maintaining fiance and orderly development in their areas. In fact, the entire frenesork of local political life depended upon the District Commissioner (D.C.), end he was the one can from the cgloniel government who watched over the 30 legal framework of toe tredltlon; society, 1 This colonial elite held sctuel power griLerily by means In. the locol D.C. could usuolly only 0 {D of prestige. for armed for depend upon a telegram to the on: tel asking for a contingent of police who might arrive e day later. Authority was delegated directly from the control sovernnent and the colonial office, but rarely did any local officer have physical force at his dispossl. Power for the D.C. rested upon the one and respect 30 a Apter, and LyStad. 0p. Cite, P80 41. 29 in which he was held by the local people, and the remarkable thing is that his power was rarely if ever tested by the great mass of Africans in any given local area. This writer can testify to the enormous status held by more than one British D.C. (now called District Officers), even after independence. Generally everyone, from the Paramount Chief down to the peasant farmer showed constant respect and deference for the D.C.‘s person, and the office itself seemed to lend a kind of dignity to the man, however petty he might be in private life. host of these officers, however conservative, had long been aware that their day was passing, and for the most part they did a good Job in making the process of transformation as smooth as possible. The process of transfornation as regards the colonial elite, always represented on the local level by the D.C. and his subordinate officials, was largely willing and self-directed. As the pressures for self-government mounted, and as the nations alism of the post-war are spread even to the remotest regions of the Protectorate, the colonial elite tried their best to 3 adapt and adjust rather than to oppose the inevitable change. After all, it had always been maintained by the colonialist that, '...the cernerstone of Indirect Rule was the progressive adaptation of indigenous political institutions to meet the needs of modern government... within the framework of traditional 31 authority.“ 31 Cowan, Op. Cite. 1380 .59 30 As early as the thirties the colonial elite had made conces ions to change in the structure of traditional societies. Some of these we have discussed. But, we are primarily concerned with the decade prior to independence, and it is in these ten years that the great changes took place and that tie colonial elite cleared the way for 'afrioahization' cf the entire civil service, , a process not yet complete. Atten ts to democratize the Native sdsinstretion, are typical of the strategy of peecful evolution, directed from.above, which characterized so such of the colonial elite's actions. They did not always work, but the intentions of -he officials who instituted some of hese changes, were basically good. They wan ed to ease the process of transition and render it more viable.. It may appear naive to attribute such foresight and even altruism to the colonial elite.’ But it seems indisnutehle that the colonial rulers in Sierra Leone did recognize the necessit for change in local governm ‘4 ment, and by the aid 53's they were consciously aware of the fact that they could not remain much longer in power. Accordingly, they willinfily egalised the process of transformation whenever and wherever pos ibis, by attempting to prepsre the local political system for independert and reopensihle action. This was a primary but unspoken policy of the British government from 1945 on. A good eranple of colonial policy which.worked towards an orderly and lasting transformation of poser' would be the executive order of the Ministry of Local Government, sent out six-months after the tax riots of 1955~56. This order gr atly expanded the representative principle in the composition of the Tribal Authorities, 31 32 by expanding the nchor5 in. This supposeily meant more éezo. craoy in loc5l govern;cnt . but it is interesting to tote that the are ord.cr gore he D.C. a greater role in the oootr l 5c5ern.ont'e scrutiny of the native to charity system: ...Thie Ion no.tor’l for they (the 3.0.5) re5reeented the unit of contr5.1 5ovorr: ent tth was inc daily contact with the fi.A. It roe fauna particulcrly ir ort Jt that the D.C.‘o powers of intervention in any 5cncot of motive Adminic tr5tion t“ror5h in5uiry, be e rencthenco in the poetror period. 3 , Thus, While the colonial govern5ent extended more leg? representation to the reople on the T. A.e on tao one'hond. it grve the all-import5nt D.C. more direct power over the TJA. on the other hand. It seems that the etrrtosy in this coco was one or strong tJen- ing the hand of the control covcrnzont for any future oontir 5enci at the ammo time tact it Eloceted poyuler opinion on too locol level. to we hove clrc outsiders lost their lives. Ironically, centralized power in the hands of he Temne chief caused more difficulty for the Teens people in the 1950's than did the relative weakness of the fiends chief. The Iemne Paramount C"nief is st ill chosen from e.nozm : ...the oldest suitable male menher of the ruling house of houses, 1.6., the kin-group which traces descent from the firs st settlers of th is chie “501, or more 0 ften from men who gained power through conquest or wealth. Usually there are only two or mere abuqa or patriclans which are most strongly represented in the chiefdom and whose leading lineages share the succession to the chieftsinship and provide a chief in turn, the principal adv sor being chosen from the other hoes The Paramount Chief (P.C.) had nearly aosolute power over his sub-chiefs and could decide legal css es as he wished, though there was roo mfor ap cal to a chief of another chiefdom if his decision was opposed to recognized pattern. He could not, unlike the hende chief, be deposed, and this remains ture today, to the extent that a Paramount Chief retains the title althourh removed from office 71 Ibid., pg. 61. 58 72 by the government. The connection between the P.C. and the Poro (as well as the Bagbenle society and others) society is strong, as it always has been. The Chief is installed by one or the other depending on the chiefdom, and he is in fact, a semi. religious figure, unlike the hende chief. He is considered as a priest, and officiates at the important rites of the secret society which holds away in his chiefdom, and is conSidered as immortal as the tribe itself. 73 The Chiefdom Council, now known as the Tribal Authority, is made up of the K mrabai, a man who acts as the Chief's principal advisor and a member of the alternative ruling house; the sub: chiefs (or section-chiefs, ghose role is similar to that-of the Honda section-chief) called glimami. the gapgs (only where Pore is predominant) who correspond roughly to magistrates_and who lose office at the Chief's death; and the Santiqis who are elected from anong the principal men of the chiefdom section by the section- chiefs. 4 When the British changed the name of the Chicfdom Council and attempted to invest it with more power and use it as a check on the chief's power. they upset a delicately balanced system. It only caused friction between the chief and his people and in almost every case the P.C. was able to quickly dominate the Tribal Authorities in much the same way he had dominated the _‘.._ 72 Vernon J. Dorjahn, “The Changing Political System of the Temne,“ Africa, Vbl 30. 1960. P8. 120 73 thullock, cp.cit., pg. 62 74' Ibid., pg. 64 59 Cnicrdom Councils; It provided a 'deomocretic” facade under which the P.C. could more easily pursue hie own ends, and convinced the mass of peOple that the colonial government was only further bolstering up the P.C.'e already euthoritien rule.‘ It was against this background that the first really significant political upheaval since 1898 took place in Temne country in late 1955. These so called "disturbances in the provinces” are an excellent example of how certain British innovations in the politice structure of the Temne failed, and how a few succeeded. They also indicate once again the connection between events which seem outwardly to promote discord but which actually play an important part in the evolution of what some have called "modern tribeliem'. These disturbances were triggered late in 1955 by objections to the payment of local taxes instituted under the Local Tax Ordinance or 195“, which went into effect in 1955. However, the root of the troubles went deeper. The Commission set up to investigate the cause of the riote wrote in its subsequent report: he have found and therefore described, a degree of demoral- izetion among the people in the customary institutions and in their up roach to the stetutory cuties nigh which they have been entrusted, which nee uhOCnEd us. It would seem tnet they had no cause to be shocked. for the stage had been set well in edVence. Chiefs generally venerated 75 ' G. Carter, end v.0. Brown, Tregegtion lg gggice, (Boston. 1960). P30 130 76 “Report of the Comniesion of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the frovinces hovember l955-herch 1956," Crown Agents on behalf of the Government of Sierra Leone, Journal Qfi Agricen 5de13;- ggxggigg, Vblo 9. 1957. pg. 49. (henceforth cited Gov. Comiesior} 60 by the people had been undermined and their legal prerogatives largely taken over by a formerly subservient council (now called the Tribal Authority) which caused the chiefs to act in extra- legal ways, and to resort to uncustomary methods to maintain power in their chiefdoms. This reaction by the chiefs caused a deep distrust in turn by the people and authority was undermined. As a result the Commission felt that many “customary” practices had to be changed, (though the abuses were often extraolegal by custom— ary standard§.‘ They recommended that the chiefs become less dominant in local life and the the elected District Council play a more important role. (Resin the Commission failed to notice .that the "dominance' of the chiefs was largely a result of their reaction to the changes in the traditional structure of government forced upon them by the government).\ Several malpractices had grown up, such as multiplication of licences, chiefs holding “courts“ outside the framework of the native court system and exaction of fines by illegal means. The Commission also reco mended that collection of fees by chiefs be abolished and that a simpler tax system be established. But, as many observers later pointed out, this was only treating the symptoms and not the cause. The Commission concluded by stating, I'....that chiefs should not be associated with any political party and that party officials should not enter local politics." 78 This will be examined in detail further on, but it seems a rather naive view, for if this 77 District Councils were formed by the Government in 1950. Their membership included the Paramount Chief, and members elected by the Tribal Authority and co-Operative members. 78 Cox Commission Report, op.cit., pg. 51 61 were the case, the chiefs would surely have lost all their power and prestige with independence. If they wished to main»- tain it they had little choice but to Join a party and work for its success (as they subsequently did). The Sierra Leone Government, in a statement released after the Cox Commission reported its findings, denied that the “disturbances“ were a surprise, but were rather the, ”...cu1mina- tion of a long train of events starting in the years after the war for which it would be quite unreasonable to hold the present government responsible”. 79 1 Perhaps the best appraisal of the situation is an article by a member of the Cox Commission Mr. A.J. Loveridge, who says that the chiefs are generally venerated by the peeple, that a certain mysticism surrounds them, and that it is significant that the Cox Report made: ...no suggestion that chiefs are outmoded or that the chiefdom is not an area with an intense feeling of cohesion. ...It is perhaps strange that there should be no real evidence of an attack upon the chieftaincy as an institut- 33.323222332830318 “£11331“?“Edimwws as g po ca neop y es... Certainly the effect of many soldiers returning from the war, the undermining of law and order in areas where the chief's preStige was reduced, and the general impact of western culture, all had 79 - ”Statement of the Sierra Leone Government on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Provinces,” Jgurnal of African Administratign, vol. 9, 1957, pg. :55. 80 A.J. Loveridge, “The Present Postion of Temne Chiefs in Sierra Leone,” Journal 9; £3. Adm. V01. 9, 1957, pg. 115 their effect. But in Temne country the extra-legal practices had continued until, '...increasing contact with other tribes- men changed an attitude of tolerance into one of bitter resent- 81 ment." Such resentment of the Chief by a people who hold the Chief in awe is a revolutionary thing and it could hardly remain long confined to the Chief's person. Loveridge still saw an opportunity to-smooth the transtion from old to new if the chiefdom authorities were modified quickly without depriva- tion of the Chief's traditional powers. The Tribal Authority, as set up by the British, had magnified rather than limited the Chief's position, for he dominated the discussions and ”cloaked 82 his edicts with the reapectablity of law.” Tie Tribal Authority had also been enasculated in 1955 when many services were transferred to elected District Councils and the chiefs were blamed for unjustifiable taxation because one third had gone to the District Councils, which the people did not comprehend, and less than one third was spent by the chiefs on visible benefits to the taXpayers. As long as the chiefs exercised their traditional prerogatives all went well, but: When the time came to broaden the political base upon which they worked they neatly sidestepped the tribal authorities; when the time came for the tribal authorities to perform a few simple functions of local government, they feltered. Ultimately, when they were empected to do what was unknown to custom... they showed signs of acute distemper; their methods of levying taxation have resulted in their being given purgatives by thgfir own people and sophorics (sic) by the Government. Thus the sanction of Government behind the chief greatly 81 Ibid., 5. 116 82 Ibid., pg. 118 83‘ 63 altered the power structure and the traditional checks and balances in the Temne political system were largely eliminated with nothing appearing in their place. Still supported by Temne religious beliefs and with the Government behind them, the Chiefs, '...used their position for personal economic gain, pursuing too well perhaps, the changing values of the times.”8u Since the 1955 riots, several Temne Paramount Chiefs have -been reinstated, and at least one is a member of the House of Representatives and an active member in the SLPP. It would seem that the ultimate effect of the “disturbances” was rather more good than harm, for adjustments have been made, the transition to self-government has been peaceful and present changes are going on quietly withing the structure. However, the implications of still powerful chiefs working with the SLPP are difficult to forces, and we shall look at this in more detail below. At least some of the disharmonious aspects within the traditional political structure have become forces for peaceful change, and the inherent strength of the Temne political system remains intact. For a final-example of the impact of the West, let us look briefly at a modern industrial town in Temne country. Lunsar is a mining town which has grown up since 1930 around an open-cast iron mine in harampa chiefdom in the Northern Province. Better than half of the Company's local employees live in Lunsar and nearly 70% of the population there is Temne. The town has become the commerical and administrative center for the chiefdom, and it 84 Dorjahn. Op.01to’ pg. 136 6b is an ideal place to study the impact of new ideas and institu- tions. 85 his writer Spent several months in Lunsar in 1963 directing Census Operations for the chiefdoms in the immediate area. The striking thing about the political structure of the area is that political power has remained almost exclusively in the hands of the tradtional elite. The young people from the families of skilled workers are mainly interested in getting on in life by "virtue of their individual skills, education, training and opportunities for advancement, and have little interest in politics. The unskilled workers are primarily interested in day to day existence (like the traditional farmers). They do carry over into the urban situation many traditional institutions and attitudes, since contact with the rural villages remains close. 86 : Only two groups, the chiefly families and the families of clerical workers, civil servants and teachers, show any deep interest in political matters. The latter are active in “improvement societies” and political parties but they achieve little, for their influence among the people is almost nil. They usually support the opposition parties. It is the chiefly clans which provide the present leadership, as they have always done. here traditional culture plays a vital role in the upbring- ing of children and even though they are sent to school, they retain much of their notions of superiority and they mix little 85 David P. Gamble, ”The Temne Family in a hodern Town (Lunsar) in Sierra Leone”, Africa, vol. 33. 1963, 5. 209. 86 Ibid., pg. 225. 65 . 87 with outsiders. The result is that the transition in political* power has taken place within the system, with educated sons of chiefly families maintaining political authority by means of their still valid position in the society. The chief and the local authorities have certainly had difficulties, and they have had to adapt to new contingencies: ...though a chief is less able to eXpliot a heterogenous urban population (Lunsar), control over the rural areas has changed little. In recent years a system of political parties has evolved, but at the local level rivalries are still fought out on tradtional lines. Chiefs support the political party in power {the SLPP) and those who oppose the chief and his supporters therefore take the labels of the opposition parties. 88 In summary, the general effect of Creole influence has been to change social patterns, to create new political situations and ultimately to unite Hands and Temne in a common pursuit of dignity and autonomy. The general effect of British innovations in the political structure of both hands and Teams institutions has been to creat minor crises between chiefs, tribal authorities and the people, which were only partially resolved in the struggle for independence. hany faults in both systems were brought to light, many strengths were clarified and in the end the transition has been marked by compromise and concession rather than violent upheaval and discord. There are still many problems to be faced and as the process of modernization continues, new problems will arise. Perhaps the very structure of traditional hands and Temne society will be changed in the end, with revolutionary consequences as regards the 87' Ibid., pg. 212. 88 Ibid., pg. 213. 66 political structure. However, if the change is gradual and peaceful within the society, and.as long as the traditional elite themselves recognize the necessity for change, it is likely that future political tr nsition in both areas will follow a pattern similar to that in_the past. tow we must turn an investigation of the process of trans- formation within the traditional elite as it took place in the context of rural politics. 67 CHAPTER VI Transformation within the Traditional Elite The arbitrary arrangement which the British used in setting up a Protectorate over the Sierra Leone hinterland has already been discussed. As we have seen, this created several problems. Inihende country, where the chief had depended upon war tribute and services owed him by members of the sections under his military rule, the traditional structure was weakened by the intervention of British administrators. But, since the Hende Paramount Chief was largely restricted by his chiefdom council, which comprised all the title holders in the chiefdom, the restrictions on his sources of wealth did not prove disastrous, because he could now depend upon the colonial government to back him up, and he had less fear of being deposed. 90 hands P.C.s did not, as we have mentioned, possess any mystic powers. They were patrons of the powerful secret societies and were eXpected to perform certain ceremonial functions inreturn for their direct support. In times of peace the hands chiefs most probably relied on the support of the Poro Society for their political power. 'In hendeland therefore, the colonial rulers found a relatively “democratic“ system, in that the chiefs mixed freely with their people and even depended upon the secret societies for any reli- gious sanctions which they could not command themselves. In some instances women even held great power, and a few were chiefs (and still are). In Temneland the British found quite a different situation. 90 m 68 Temne Paramount Chiefs were most powerful, having almost absolute authority over their sub-chiefs and near autonomy in deciding legal cases. The Temne P.C. was at the head of a complex political system which had managed a remarkable degree of political unifi- cation, as we explained previously. Power was largely derived from the chief's mystical role and he could never be deprived of his title, if in fact he were reomved from ofiice. 91 The anthrOpologist KcCulloch says; “Unlike the hands Chiefs, he is a semi-religious figure...“ He was considered a priest as well as a king by his people and as one Temneman Said, '... he and our country are one, he is as immortal as our race." 92 he traditional powers and prerogatives of the Temne Para- mount Chief were such that the British immediately recognized in him a means to stable government. on the model created by Lugard in Nigeria. hey system worked in Temne country as long as the society rema ned somewhat isolated from the dynamism and change of the Western world, but it broke down quickly after World War II. 05 the contrary, in Nende country the chiefs were largely deprived of their old power sanctions. Since the British chose to administer the Protectorate through the chiefs, they gave no official recognition to the secret societies and, '... to a large extent therefore, changes brought about administratively to Mende political institutions are reflected in the altered status, signi- 93 ficance and implications of the chief's office." Thus the hands 91 McCulloch, op.cit.. PE. 62. 92 Ibid., pg. 60. 93 Little, The hende, pg. 202. V7 chiefs lost some power through loss of the overt support of the Poro and other societies, as well as through loss of their old means of getting wealth (which in a traditional society as well as a modern economy, means power). One result was the gradual conversion of chiefly power into chiefdom power which eventually culminated in the Native Authority system of government, a system with which we are directly concerned in the period between 1951- 1961. In Temne country a similar system was arbitrarily intro. duced over a structure of traditionally powerful chiefs with mystic sanctions, and the result was that these chiefs turned to extra-legal means to maintain their local autocracy. Thus by 1951, when the SLPP had won a majority in the Legis- lative Council and party government was on its way, the traditional elite were still tremendously powerful in local government. Even the most conscienctious D.C. rarely intervened in the everyday governuent of the chiefdoms in his district. In Temne country chiefs still had the ultimate decision-making power, though the , Tribal Authority supposedly shared power with them. In hende country the chiefs remained figureheads under which the councils (now in the form of the T.A.) still governed by traditions means. '. Ofcourse, the influence of western culture was not lost on the traditional elite. By the 50’s many P.C.s had a compound both in their chiefdom and in Freetown. Their children would be educated in the infant years in the traditional faShion, usually under the guidance of an elderly woman, then they would be sent to school “for a modern education. These children were however, carefully instilled with notions of their inherint superiority to others and 7O 94 mixed little with other children. Several chiefs were themselves educated to a greater or lesser degree, but education had little moderating influence on the exercise of political power in their chiefdoms. In the same way it can be said for other members of the Tribal Authority, and as we shall see, education tended to worsen the traditional elit's abuse of power in local government. In many cases the traditional elite especially in Temneland, were only too willing to comply with a limited degree of British control through the D.C., since they had repeatedly gained from their association with the colonial elite. Since their ruling skills and strategic position in African society were held essential to the consolidation and maintenance of colonial rule (especially in British Africa and somewhat less in French Africa), the traditional rulers were capable of bargaining for a pre9§rred role in the new system wealth, authority and power. Transformation within this elite has been gradual and in- complete. In fact, there has been little chanre in the basic structure of local government, though there has been some change in form and method, or at Professor Kilson put it, “... certain characteristics with regard to the way in which power is used have all undergone change.”96 This process, as far as it has gone, is most important to our study and a great deal of space has been. devoted to an investigation of the techniques, strategies an powers of the traditional elite during the decade prior to independence. 94 Gamble, op. cit., pg. 212. 6 Kilson, Political Chanee, pg. 80. 9 Kilson, "Political Change and the Modernization Process," pg. #25. 71 Political transformation, however incor plet among the traditional elite, is closely rele ted to similar change among the ”mas sea": This is revealed in the ambivalent a t-tude of the ra sses towards indirenous institutions; tradt ions.l rulers repre- sent tr e authoritative unit of colonial politi al change nEarest to the masses, who attack them as a cause of the complex political change they experience, and yet still depend upon them as the only known sources of values capable of providing the stability necessary to any people undergoing relatively rapid socio-political change. 97 The nature of this ”elite-mass nexus" as Kilson calls it, has become, ”...the £0 cal point of political elm as as the si uation shifts from conflict bewtween tile colonial and African modernizers 93 to competition with the African community.” It is this ambivalence on the part of the rural peoples which has played so well into the hands of tnc tra.aitional elite. They can pose as moderaizers and yet rule as tyrants in their own chiefdoms.~ Since our concern is prinarily with $18 tre ditiona l elite and its actions, the following analysis of some abuses com mon to chiefdom politics is centered on the chiefs and the tribal authorities. But the transformation which has occured did not take place within a vacuum, and this discussion necessarily (refers) to the conflict between the masses and.the traditional elite, as well. No otxer single aSpect of traditional authority has been ‘so thoroughly documented as the way in which cniefs use their tax powers and otl 'er means to wealth, nor has any other raised 97 Ibid., pg. 425. 98 Ibid. pg. #36. so many problems. Furthermore,.no other facet of traditional power so clearly illustrates the whole range of ways in which the traditional elite Operates. It had been obvious to the colonial elite for a long time that the workability of the indirect rule system rested upon the Just and effective role of tie chiefs and their councils. In his annual report on the Protectorate for 1951, Chief Commiss- ioner H. Childs wrote: One District Commissioner reporting on his district for the year 1951.goes so far as to express the opinion that the success or failure of a chiefdom administration as an instrument of local government is entirely dependent, upon the character and caliber of the Paramount Chief. When there is a good chief all may be well, but Where there is a weak, corrupt, lethargic, or unpopular chief, a Chiefdom administration can hardly be eXpected to function successfully. His conclusion is that the system of native administration as applied to chiefdoms in Sierra Leone is merely a method by which a chief rules or misrules, ggd that it primarily reflects his own personality. As later events were to prove, this D.C. was largely correct in his appraisal, and by 1956 the basic weakness of the system of local administration had caused severe shock to the entire system indirect rule as applied to the Sierra Leone Protectorate. The basic failrre of the British to devise a satisfactory means for the discharge of day to day chiefdom business proved to be a flaw which shock the whole structure and caused many to doubt that the traditional elite ought.to be allowed any power at all. Let us look in detail at some of the financial muddle which led to direct changes in the form of chiefdom politics. On tne 99 ‘ Childs, Report for 1251, pg. 11. 73 17th of November, 1955, a crowd of some two hundred farmers from Hofenka in maforki Chiefdom in Port Loko District went to see the D. . at Fort Lo kc to trotest against tax assessment and alleged abuses by the raraaount Chief. (The tax in question was a five shillin: surtex on all ta Xpa.yers in h-for i Cnic‘ fdon to pay for P.C. Alike li Hodu III's new house). Since the D.C. was away the delegation was dispersed by its leader, a Peter Kamara. On the morning of Hoverber 21, the D.C. at sort Loko, hr. D.C. Dixie, met a-cr ad of some one thousand five hundred, some with Weapons, near Port Loko, and luv-1.531;."r arrangements were made to hold a meeting outside the town. Kesnwh e the crowd bro" to star three thousand and entered the town, going to the District headquarters where its leaders, inc udine Peter flamers and another poPular man, Abu Sankoh, repeated their protests about the assess- ment for the Chief's house. In answer, Er. Dixie stated hat the tax rates were the business of the T.A. and that he was not authorized to discuss them. This led to a large meeting on the 25th of November, which was dissersed after a promise to secure Minister to see and hear the crowd on December 2. Soon after riots began which resulted in violence to people and rope rty, 100 the use of slings, stones and steers and arson. Tr ne mood of rebellion which started in Port Loko Spread rapidly to nearly every chiefdom in the Horthern Prov‘nce and to several in other Provinces. As the Cox Commission stated in its report on th 18 riots: 100‘ §ierra eone Pepe rt of Conaission of Inguirz into Disturbances in the Provinc.s , i‘Eovember l955-narch 1956, (Crown Agents for Overseas Governments on beheld of the Government of Sierra Leone, 1956) pg. 19-21. (Henceforth cited as COX Report) 74 Out of twelve district: five, Port Loko, Kambia, Bombali and Tonkilili in the Northern Province and Moyamba in the Southern-western frovince were seriously affected by the disturbances. These disturbances relected an alarring degree of loss of confidence by the local people in the governnent by the tr dtional elite, es pecially the chiefs. host of the animosity extressed during the riots, es,“ eciall y in Kambia District and iort Loko District, was against the chiefs, hough sometimes it was aimed at the T.A.s and sub—chiefs, as well. Usually, as the Commission of Inquiry discovered, the ihmediate c use was the abuse of tax powers by the P.C. or the chiefdom authorities, and this led to the expression of maiy other grievances wh .ich had long been_ building up over the years. In reference to the riots, Dr. Kilson writes: In the report of inquiry into the tax riots in 1955-56 it was revealed that the Cl iefs generally provided themp selves with modern concrete houses, motor cars, and sundry other modern conviehces through the abuse of their tax powers and functions. In one instshce a Chief-i3aramount Chief 331 She roro litkella II--e rdeavored to have his Chiefdom fuzd tv:o-thirds cost of a 5000 modern house for his private use, vhile he e.lreody owned severel modern houses and in the report's 3w rds, we 3 living in a "modern three-story concrete house. " 102 This would indiC' hat chiefs, in Terms country as ecially, as the holders of traditional Power, used their revered positions for personal gain and took only residusl interest in the welfare of their people. As long as they could get away with this abuse of power they took no steps tOLOderanG the system of local govern~ ment an~, intract, warpei the few chsh;es made ty the colonial 101 Ibid., pg. 80. 102 Kilson, iolitica; Chan 8, pg. 82. elite to their own ends. Another example of this would be the commercialization of tr'ditional economic relations. Such itional ins :itutions as the chic f's cu to,"rv ri 'ts to (.1; tre tribute and looor, were imjortont sort of the mechanics of social ind economic tr.hs ition. many of these rights were left undis- rbed by the colonial sovernnent during the early years of rule, and some were included in colonial law. kith the rise of a money economy, the chief's custorery ri htt— to tribute or labor were easily or 'gei fro: a type of woclth in kind to actual wealth in cash. Ir liti”"nl Tillers had beer arorq the first to enter the mh-1et econ y throu-h tie yroduction and sale of cash crops. As early as 1937 when the hative lininistretiOhs were set up, ChiEfs surrerdered reny customerv rithts in turn for regular sale rise (a relic cy u:sed throughout British Africa when establishing local government throurh indirect rule). Actually these tributes were allov.'ed to co :ti'uc by tts colonial eltte, except in those cases .uhere rebellion resulted. It was not until 1956 after the shock effect of the tax riots, that the SOVSTflflCHt put a step to 103 the erection of customary tributes and forced labor by Chiefs. As long as these mesrs of wealth were 9 oil'hlw to some Chiefs, the y we e e.iale to equal or even exceed the affluence of more modernized AfriCans such as businessmen, doctors, traders and lawyers, a growls: group in the Protectorate after 1945. lhis meant that the at} 1e of life of some chiefs wee quite like that of urbanized modern groups, though they funcioned in a traditional setting, cont Luing to preside over the ceremonial asyects of tribal life. TEAS bros me a sirn.ificant re ctor in the political v w w 103 Ibid., pg. 85—86 [V relationship which develnpnd between tho cci2f3- 1:1 tho modernized “now elite". It accourto for the foot that 33:? chitfc are actually members of “oth the new elite cod the trs1itioral elite. It is worth noting that the riotcro ncvcr dr11”-ed the 1 destruction of the existinfi crates of trcditio cl cuthority (thus .‘ s Q. (til .4; u . 54- nevor meeting the tioi of revolutionaries). u3,ct-. they 9' only documented a demand for 0h? “:03 1? t1m use of power by the traditional elite, especioiig in ficcar 0151 matters. 213 fact that such violent urrisircs ncvor dcvcicrcd into cctval revolution against the rcthrr antiquated cyrtéx, ill‘ttr tic the ambivalent attitude of Itony £.ficcrs tors rds tho tr ditiorcl elite, as wcll . their awareness of thc_ovcrwhclminq British power. A more dctoilcd crowinrtion of tro 1rwc ior of on e chi ~ night '- help to clarify the problem. 'cctwaen Cctobcr 3rd Fovcmbcr of 1956 a soccial ioouiry, f311ori’~ tfc fiancrcl inquiry held by the Cox Comrmissioa, has ncli at iort Loko to invaoti'otc corwloiot against the Paramount Chief Alikali Voiu III. Etc co: .lsizts were as follows: 1) Forced 11% hour on .his for 1.3 ; 2) Inf liction of hoavy fincto 0.11 v: r on“ villa no in co"cs whero vill.n crs had died t iougtx tcir; bitter by an ckcs, 133130-1118, om ol‘i’rm‘crs and. no rt-‘coi'o to ion-49' for such f’ines, axd also inflictirfl of a collective fine 01oa village for non-dis cloanre of the identity of the porson who killc. d a m. are teloooic~ to the P.C.; 3) P'orcing tax-payers to pay a {tax in rice in 1950, and selling ouch rice a few montho later at a considerable r‘rOthz a) Levy of a five shillinxs uitox on all tor- o:"crs in 1953 to provide for the hou.c for the 1.0. and an attempt in 1955 to impose an identical levy for the core purpose; 5) Ind: ml? lag in trcde 3nd croctinu for himself moflopolies in variou. commoditicc to the detriment of ordinary traders; 6) Izn.position of an illcrcl levy 1y Tax A33c33cent Committee: on each village to too extent of two shillings and six- penco for the P.C.; 7? 7) Taxing on non-existent persans, 0. persons egemvted for payinm tax, whereby villa as had to pay ex illegal talat on;r 8) Cruelty to individuals who did not pay their tax or Who were lgte in doing so; 9) Ereventinm persons from trififilhf chglfllfit D.C. and disgaraging the post of the Q.L : 10b 10) Confiscation of hauses and land kithout ompetmation; This list of abuses would do Juarice to any petty tyrant, and yet it typified the normal behavior of many Tempe Earamount Chiefs prior to 1955, and even after, 38 subsequent reports yroved. This writer knows Paramount Chief Alikali nodu III personally, and can testify to his general enlightenment and geniality, as well a4 his relatively BiVEUCfifi educatian. A3 a private pnrnon he seems the perfect gentleman. fie npyarwntl? deceivad th government equally successfully. Even though four changes were dropvcd, thia was still a daxning iniictwent of tha uwe cf powsr by a rfilatively progresaive chief. Kr. Willan , who presided over the inquiry, wrote in refgrencs to complain: nusbsr one. “I held thfit the ?.C., who is a very ifitelliaent psr57n, has used fcrccfl lafiour'on his farms when he knew full we 1 he should as have dame so, and thereby caused consifierable resentment amongst th? poor 105 Chiefdom.” a Re arrivefl at similar caqclusinns on the other five ckerjes, and ended by saying,”I Dun find n3 extenuating circumstances in 106 favour of the P.C., his conduct is unworthy of a P.C.“ 10h . :— 3H: governi'fi'k’ét pt’atijvt wages], Cfifi21¢flfin'gi ingfiizx,;gto the V Ibid., pg. 60. Am interes n3 controst to the r933rt 3.1 Lafsrki Chiefdom was the renort on macro? Rare: mafiasifiera Calof,ol a, two same oommiafiionfir. Th3 P.C. there, fifi hoolo hrti--il, was exonerated of the char3os againpt him, thjugh “is ”first speaer” ( a leader I» of the Tribal Authority or former Chicfdom co“’cil) was found 10? guilty of conuuct, ”subsorzivo of the interest of good government.” Ever turlly "li 72ml}. IOLu III reg-2 1:521?" as ELC. in Karorkl under pressure from the S'E? whiz}: oouli total; Jiford to continue to support him nnflfir the oircu:sts.:ces), a pattern which was rereated all ovor the Korthern Mr rinco after the resorts on the dis Lrb LCQo wora all corplote. At thio time the SLFP had won toe Temne chiafs to its annor. If the party was aware of corrupa tion are $3 the chiefs it did lit: a to srow it a; ii only e.cted after the facts were obvious. Some P.C.s and f.A. Lombars were extolled outxiaht , 'hvughz1ono were prosecuted under the law It is worth mentioning that Chief Alikali fiodu III was soon ro- called as P.C. of Jaforki Chiefdom, and in 1952 he ran for a seat in the House of Jen: aseLta‘ivos and won. 30 oypr.r:ntly convinced the S “P leads: mlip that he would not continue abusi r,his power, and would loyelly work for the forty in the thure. It seems he has care 50, W 06 he was awovdcd rec :tly an M.3.E. by the Crown for his services to his country. Eh point of all tris is trat oolitical tr m:foi:ation within t.1e trnfiitional elite did mo t take plFCS snoothly, no“ will it likely continue in so orflorly fashion. Chiofs like filikall fiodu III are quite typical of those who rule by riditional 10? Ibid.. P3. 2. 79 authoritarian methods long after all Justification for such methods were gone. He also abused many ancient customary pract- ices, at the same tire that he worked Openly for increased educa- tional facilities, and backed the government "reforms" in the Native Administration. Another point is that many chiefs could no longer simply be catagorized as members of a "traditional elite", though we have continued to use the term. Their authority and political power had already been affected by their participation in the colonial economic process. In reality men like Alikali hodu III combine characteristics of both the traditional and new elite,a situation which has had great consequences for the political power of the chiefs. They can call upon both traditional and modern sources of power, but they no longer rule in a static situation. The riots of 1955-56 made it abundantly clear that the processes which transformed certain chiefs into a traditic--nodern elite have equally shaken the masses of the rural people from their ancient allegiances. As a result: ...the traditional rulers may be expected to support that political arrangement which will enable them to 1) maximize modern sources of their power, and 2) simultaneously main. 108 tain as much as possible of traditional sources of authority. 80, in the period between 1951 and 1961 the traditional elite shifted slowly but decisively away from accommodation to colonial rule towards an alliance with tuc most powerful nationalist groups, capacially the SLPP. This was part of their strategy during the years Just before self-government, and it largely deter- mined the elite transformation. 108 Kilson, Political harps, pa. \1 i \J‘ O 80 After the riots the exercise of power by the traditional elite was modified by governnent action, and an uneaSy alliance between the chiefs and the SL9? government was patched up for a time. Now, we shall see how the methods of governing, and some of the outward force of local government, were changed. In. 1950 new local bodies called District Councils (already referred to in sons detail previously). were set up by the colonial government,"...so as to maximize the validity and usefulness of whatever African advice it might need on postwar development and local governaent.‘ 109 The act recognized that the tradi- tional elite were the main authoritative force on the local level (as indeed they were) and the P.C. in each chiefdos was allowed to sit as an ex-officio member of the new council. At first direct elections were not introduced, and the members of the District Councils were apnointed by the old Tribal Authority (which in Tennelend at least, remained firmly under the hand of the raranount Cdlfif). Thus the chiefs were able to determine the membership of the councils and limit the influence of any elements within the new elite. The District Councils were given executive functions at the start, but the District Commissioner could still supervise action and thus negate any decisions if he wished.~ In addition they were financed after 195& by the native AdsiniStrations, which assessed taxes, as we have seen, by traditional techniques. This meant that the-Tribal Authority and the chiefs, who controlled 109 _ 81 revenue, could easily determine the rate of local finance granted to the District Council, and then literally dictate policy. After the 1955-56 riots, the colonial government imposed a standard precept in all districts, independent of the Hative Administrations, and this helped stablize the revenue and gave the District Councils more independentr. But, in the meantime, an ordinance passed in 1954 had made provision for the District Council to govern the membership of the D.C., who could not be a member of the Council if another presiding officer was elected by that body. (An unsuccessful attempt to make the District Council even more autonomous). As Dr. Kison observed, this reflected: ...the not inconsiderable differences that prevailed in local government between chiefs (as well as their SLPP allies at the national level) on the one hand, and the colonial officials on the other. As such, the provision denying membership to District Commissioners except when they presided, represents the first occasion when chiefs freed themselves of direct colonial government supervision in the performance of local government functions. Thus for a while the chiefs actually gained power relative to the shift in the structure of local government. They could control thin_s even more thoroughly, eSpecially monetary matters, through the very council originally created to check their power and broaden the base of local government. Another source of traditional elite influence upon the Council was through kinship ties, for a large percentave of members were closely related to the chiefly families. The chiefly clans con- tinued to manipulate the polities of the District Councils by means of indirect control over their memcership. 110 Thifll_. 'na- 1:1 82 Finally in 1956 a local frenchiSe for direct election to the District Councils was established, though the chief remained as an ex~officio member and dominated the presidency of many councils. (In 1960 half of the twelve Councils had P.C.s as presidents.) 111 The chiefs also utilized the financial opportunities repre- sented by a new scheme for building materials introduced by the SLPP governnent. This scheme was financed by the government and $300,000 were alloted to it in 1961. Actually it seems that this scheme was simply a way of rewarding the traditional elite for their support. As might be predicted from previous events, the chiefs' influence was largely irreSponsible, and tens of thousands of pounds were 5r-nted from the schemes funds as loans to chiefs. The abuse of funds allocated for local building materials by th chiefs would seem to, '...reflect the considerable dependence of the SLPP upon the chiefly class in local society.” 112 In addi- tion, it indicated that the government's apcrocch to local deveIOpment in recent years has been both unrealistic and short- sighted. The traditional elite-;although it has merged to some extent with the new elite-- still holds almost supreme power in local affairs and only the methods have changed. Chiefs now make their decisions through the District Councils rather than the T.A. which they so long dominated, and they do this by exercising a large measure of control over the membership of the Councils themselves. 111 Ibid., 98. 356 112 Ibid. , pg. 360 83 meet peeple in the rural areas still vote as the chiefs direct them. Judging from the results of the election in 1957 and in 1962, the chiefs are still able to influence a great majority of their people to vote for the party in power. 113 In effect, therefore, the chiefs continue as the simple legitimate possessors of traditional authority in the eyes of most of their subjects. Even the disturbances of 1955-56 did not substantially shake personal and group loyalty to the chiefs, and in the context of the transformation of power within this elite, this is very important. What it means is that the nationalistic new elite in local government. This is a good example of a group who possessed authority (as defined previously), patronizing a group who still possessed EQEEE on the local level. The distinction between the two is clear in this instance. It is to the "new elite" that we must now turn for a conclusion of this investigation of transformation in the rural areas of Sierra Leone. 113 SCOtt. Op. Cit.. {‘5- 1J6. 84 CiArTEfi VII Transformation and the New Elite Sierra Leone, 1.1ke Liberia was L its in "rocucin.~ a nationalistic indigenous elite, especially in comparison with nations such as Ghana or Fineria. The prs~es inence of th Creole elite in Freetown, as well as in the Protectorate tended to discourses the s;: read of education and chants in the hinter- land. Ihoush Sierra Leone wrs looked upon as a center for the Epremfi of ratio**li t iciees and orgvnizatione down the coast, this was the result of the activities of Creoles such as Ca.ely- Hayford, herbert hacauley, and I.T.A. Kallace-Johnson who did mos t of tr eir agitation in the urb n areas of other colonies, and seldom took an interest in the neglected hinterland of Sierra Leone. After the war this small nationalistic Creole grriup lost its lead an.. -. H. 4 th— HOPLLUQS 0* Lu: 301.3131 Lind a3 it Jcmls- Sulth rouole ’ . A “'-‘ c s T 5“. 1‘ 1 - mhlch :33 langclJ un.;reneen. “D co: r21.1; to 13¢ earlier V N ., J. 1.3-- .n ".4 -. ,- . 4. 1| . 5%,. . r. r. .. ' . + * P1 ~< n . '| -\ A gives SOTe imporu Eu hi7.lto 31 to 1crtoh33ir’ volicJ 0} ages, and th roby explams their 0:21. 308. erg; Leone R- 3ort of the Somwission of In :uirx_into Listurosnces ‘ . 'rs '1 7. ':"fi {'2‘ 0’]; 12:36. 4.2.1.4. .m__,C1..tIS flyioistrstic2s on behalf of the 0 3(2-0 :3 0 '3 ml U C l. l 5.) (L f" I»: r ”*9 1“ J (A. (I F q "q - -_ \ , .LOJ.“ 2462.213 ( O.:1’UT..C-1L;} . J. a I: Covernftnc oi Sierra Locn~ u :5 Lu L I I112 is perhaps tlzc most M gvorta“t sir rle flocamont used in this stuly. It is a voluminous r rt of nea“l‘ ivory anycct of tLe tax rfi_ots mLio 1 513 urL :1‘ le Lort.1crn Province of Sierra Leone in l,»)- 3, 2nd w;ic}1 Caused a coosiécpxtle 2h2cc —up 12 bot11 t1e contr.2l ”overnment and the local adminis- trations. is 2 source :tor infor :nation a on" the began“ or of chiefs, as well as their anvisors and iribal .Kutnorities, it is invaluaslc. It runs to scum Pal h aired 3.2 23 uld covers such a 22120 rants of matters relqting to K2tive ilninistpwtion on local Fovernmont, that a very selective use 01 relevant parts is necessary. ‘2‘ n ‘1 :1 fi,,_.l -‘~ -9 ..° I.-. 1,. 4.: illan, H2rold. "cr.o ;; Lac 2. fission:.s o.~ Indtzrw loco use 2 a n 1-‘ 4* ~ L . . r712. , 4.2 gozjic 01 Jort2in 11123; 212 L16 kOV‘P s _ 2gigent 11crc0-. o" y -. "'3: J- - ' 9- '- 1H, I-u ‘ 1:: V” overs“ 1t -Pl“cln§ liiicc, :rcctowz, 13:1. 'fnis flocufiont i a lore det2ilod i.nquiry into tie matters brCUfht into the oven by W e 3 "212sion 0. Inquiry cited above (known as the Cox Cc**i""io2), :25 it investijatcs tac most minute inciflcnts whidh relate to the use of power by certain Isrszu mt Chiefs. For t2 J1 rescar01 it fl‘OV‘E d most V2 luacle. .“ fi ‘, o -. ;22112923 22013 Davidson, 32511, and Adcmols, Adenekan (63.). the How Host gfric§- Lonoon, 1956. This collection of essays by seven2 21 well two. n 3f2102nists, is USCIUI 10? a mnthetic View of n2ti onnlizs, how it do veloped 223 the ch2h§es it rrovoked. T”G 6222" by} o?"‘i t1o steps towards srlf-rovorni fit is 623:01211r “oot5201t. Carter, C""oTol"n, 2o} Brown, U. C. (od.). Trn“~ition‘ig ifric :tgiies in Ioliticol .32: toi:ic'n. Vol. 1. Loston, l9o3. An.2nt2010"5 of es says rcleoscd by the :f1icnn- cs earoh 211.-’3 Studies 1*::.‘o..rw:r1 at Iior atom hniveroitv, t :15: book is use- ful in nu J the same we" as is the aioxe collection. The sec 10:13 1.3r 32vid 3. Apter, and Rob ert L;rst.d, and the essay on local lclifl cs 1; L. ”ray Cc~2n, are :o d loo a ccnoral View of forty politics and locwl 5cmoor2tic processes. 99 Fyfe, Christopher. A :31ortE story:r f 3 e-ra Lcong. Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd. London, 1962. Fyfe's brief survey is little more than a 500d reference He intended it to be no more then that. For those who want a more comprehensive history there is none better than his voluminous History g; Sierra Leone, published by Oxford University Prose in 1952. The lar5er volume does not cover the period considered in this study, so it is not needed here. Holmes, Groves. (ed.) Africa Zodgx. Johns Hopkins Prose, baltimoro, 1935. Another collection of essays useful for general reference. The contributMXIOf James 3. Coleman on the elnerccncc of political parties 13 an excellent one. Hodgkin, Tgome 3. African Politgcol Parties. Pen5uin Books Ltd. Cne of the most valuable short guides to the origins, aims and netlr ode 01 tLe various African oertice. It is of great practical value, but it is also fill of astute obeervationc and inei5hte. For back5round ifiiorrocion it in one of the few boolze which was elwn35 within easy reach. Hodgkin, Thomas. W t .ne . i5 Colonial Agricg. New York University Frees, Ker York, 1957. This is one of the best studies of African Eationaliem available. Hod5hin brings e.wealth of knowledge and a lucid style to a very complicated subject. The chapters dealin5 with change in local government and the references tc1:3ierra Leone politics or e co: ecially pertinent. Like -Hod5l:in' a ct or book, it was rleieatedly referred to. Little, Kbnneth,L. Efig_filn§g,g§,§ierra Leone: A Vest Afrigyg Ieoole‘;g Trgngition. Routled5e and Logan. Eaul Ltl., L033 {31031 g 1951 o This fine monogflra;h provides the clearest picture avail- able to date on the ct octure of Kende Society. It is in~ diepeneacla as an anthropological source as well as useful as a guide to Kende political behavior. In ado ition, the book is his 21y readable. .LUU Hacken zie, w.SJn., at. d hobinson, Ibnneth. (ed.) give Election 131 Iifric cg. ozlord at the Clerend n Tress, lSoO. me only pert of this "cool: useful for the purposes of this study was cgenter J, w 1021 deals witl1tne elections in Sierra Leone in 19 The author of t1is czepter, D.J.I. Scott, discusses the events leading Up to the election Izith great skill and provioes some excellent data about the election itself. KcCullock, K. Tfie Peonles g: the Sierrg_Leore Protectorate. 3.3.A. International African Institute, London, 950. This ent‘rorolo"icol survey provides 3 no of the important f9 cts scout Temne tribal life and political organization. It also deals with the other tribes in a brief manner. is an ethnograghic survey it is excellent. but it has little value in regard to political change. Pe1hem, Karger‘. The Colonio grcjnning. Collins, Lone on, 1961. A brief but highly literate study of colonial policy and its imrlicoticno, t‘is book is snot“er fine reference. ihe out10r deals 1.1th Ineirect 1“ule in a mop t comprehensive manner and thorOU5hly exaiines its conzseguences. Verbs, Sidney. mc- Grouns end Foliticel Fehovior. Princeton University lrcss, lel. "no theorec.icnl f one .'o11; of the stuéy is largely based Upon IZr. Jerbo' s boolu T10 5fl1 it 97ys notr.in5 at all about sierra Leone or Afr-co, it 1133 5‘reut vs] in e"nl7 nin5 the significance of c.3all crougns in the rrocess of political change. Unnukli 7*01 Source; Kilson, Loztin. IclitiC7l Jr71 e 113 est ‘fricen tote: g 311”" of Felitic l L23e".ric1 ion 1,;25TT3 Leone. Lrnunlisacj Lsnuscript. . Edison {racio usly offeleo L16 use of this m2nus cript for my re 50 1rch during a tri‘t2 to Geno1‘lwc. It is perh7 ps the most valuecle secondary so1rce cit ed 1ere. Irofessor I lson has done extensive work in ;ierra Leone politics, and :7cb2rly no one else knows as much about it. ihe manuscript is full of doc cive data and very revealing i1si' to. A {cc number of the ideas which provioed the basis for whole charters of -his stud 3r cone orifinslly from this scholarly m~norroj h, which will be The iohed.this fell. It will surely be the definitive “ork on Sierra Leone politics for a long ime to come. vi? 101 Periodic.l Articles :3 Austin, Ibnnis. “The reople and.Constitution of Sierra Leone," West Africa,-(September 13. 1952), pp. 846-942. - A Journalist's account of some or the more dbvious facts about the government of Sierra Leone and.hou it was changing. DorJahn, vernon, R. "The Changing Political System of the inane," m3, V010 3O'~(195O). pp. 110.1390 . 'This covers some or the important changes in the structure of Temne society between.1880 and.l956. Very useful for an understanding of the administrative heirarchy of Temne chiefdoms. Fallers. Lloyd. ”The Predicament of the ficdern African Chief," Asgricga Anthmpolorist, Vol. 57. (1955). pp. 290-305. - Fallers provides some interesting new theories as to methods for social anthropological analysis. Some of the ideas apply very well to a study of this sort. Gamble, David, P. "The Temne Family in a.Hodern.wan (Lunsar) in Sierra Leone," Airicg, vol. 33. (July 1963). pp. 209-225. One of the most useful articles cited. Ehe information about the activities of families divided into several social classes. is very rewarding. The references to chiefdom politics and how the chiefly families retain control are also good. C—luckman. Max. "Tribalism in Modern British Africa," (taggers distaste meatless. Vol- 1. (1960). pp- 55-70.. Provides some insights into tribalism in urban areas as contrasted to rural areas, and destroys some of the myths about the tenacity of traditional values. Kilson, Martin. "African Lolltical dhange and the Modernization Process," J rn g§,Modc African Studies, Vol. 1. (December 19 3 , pp. 25- 0. Kilson discusses modernisation as an analytical concept. The article applies to Sierra Leone directly, since Dr. Ifileon has done most of his work there, and it provides some excellent ideas about chance. v" 1 — '.'-‘\ ‘- v. 4-: . ‘3 '.~ «my. 1* an»... "qt/«'3 1... an " .. __.~ ~+ ”-._... p... ("Ff-w: . b.1J. {3(JQ.‘ ’ a - '1;6 ”non . ~l. 1 .. a. 2 H}. '.,'s.~.‘.., 4 \JJ. ‘\ 3.. L.- .J ’ W“ Wot-w \.- (#3., .4...” Q ‘N -- . N . .I' o ' H "y a p chrw"! '.. . . 1 a f“ 1r, ,3 ~---- C - L \ .._ a . 4). . on . " , -" . . . .. .. | w y. . an. _ or ._ 1..-! 1.. had... j. darn. , 4; as”. -.J.) J L. f [i ‘x 0 m .. “t' e . -- n. .. . ~. 4 ,4.,.. “a 1 ,..I ...,.,.. - - ,.. .n .. ..‘ d 0 -C \36 3A .0- C~E 3 {'1- v n. . ( C 1 .‘v-o—{J “.594 ‘c .c ~|\a" v- ~ C‘; V‘- “I-“ . .‘ ‘- .-'1 9." ‘ -~n - ‘ w . - - ' . r ‘t"-n-. 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I :’~~I social Lolefics Bulletin, J01. 8, (1936), Up. 4L0-4d3, J- Eafiel's article provides a 037 :31 0 definition and explm n7 Lion 01‘ elites. It 93011383 part of the CO7cc3tual n V _- -- LPQ'J‘ s‘IC-‘lsi for 11418 StUdJ Iorter, 3.2? "Time ' 70171 )d3“*TM7a_ol I ”one“ in Sis P? a Leone,”1err7 I;COI‘L (JuLG, 1960) pp. ”-1 {:‘DO litioal Decision- ' n A most V'fl U73].e study of tne :clcs 713 p it injiv1i3 713, their V7lues 771 t-u ee;rc of -a?ticlyqlion in polii ic l activi ties. Jhich a Chanje int eese may pgovoiro Irofessor Porter also GGIIHEB the types of elite {roup uric operate in Sierra Leone, and r7Lses 3C7 Le in3rort17t cluest ions about the proper- met‘hods of analysing then. run, - 7n H ":4, v - _ . ‘ ‘ f. . , " —,- I! glimmer, Elliott, 1 aer77§eps in Jest AffiCJn uOLthiGB, 711°“1 " 7 0 ......~. wt... V01. )3, (COIL-0130}? 19:3), 111‘). 337’3200 Elia artiCle is cs:c -cislly use ful in understa73ing the mlafliot between th.e Creoles {Eid t'1e froteotorate Africans wxiclx sm oed so mu on of the 701111‘3 in Sierra Leone in the years p17ior to i77c7cnéc709. It 37ovifles an excellent exp177a1ation of some of tLe causes I P tensions of this sort, anJ puts tge problem in the Context of soci7l trafm it.i (D. 34. "otatem‘7t of the Sierra Is one OLOPJI at on tee Hepo7t of t LC Comriission of In‘uiry into SistWJr 77063 in t ‘.e Isotocterae D, Eovcmoer 19 5573 -37031 1916. " 3ro:7 gents o7 beaslf of tie Governmett of Sierra Leone, 5:7- :71 of African Ai:ini:treti77, Vol. 9, (19 57). pp. 54-5: 1710 su.3:tary of the rovernment statement in answer to the Comzi7sion Seport, is valuable since it provifles a contrast to the rezort itself n73 exp37i_ns the ovc77wcnt's stand on the issue of 177'7Ztit7 in local goveeh :c7t. ..q ‘ - I . . “-1 _ ,.1‘ v’ ‘ . i ‘ ~ , fl 1 . 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